Complete Works 0872203492

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PLATO COM PLETE WORKS

Digitized by the Internet Archive in

2017 with funding from

Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/completeworksOOplat

PLATO COMPLETE WORKS

Edited, with

Introduction and Notes, by

John M. Cooper Associate Editor D.

S.

Hutchinson

Hackett Publishing Company Indianapolis/ Cambridge

Copyright

©

1997 by Hackett Publishing Company,

Inc.

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99

For further information, please address

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. P. O. Box 44937 Indianapolis, Indiana 46244-0937

by Chris Hammill Paul Text design by Dan Kirklin

Jacket design

1.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Plato.

English.

[Works.

1997]

Complete works /Plato; edited, with introduction and notes, by John M. Cooper; associate editor, D. S. Hutchinson,

cm.

p.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-87220-349-2 (cloth: alk. paper)

Philosophy, Ancient. 2. I.

Socrates.

Cooper, John M. (John Madison). II. Hutchinson, D. S. III.

Title.

B358.C3

1997

184— dc21 96-53280

CIP

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,

ANSI

Z39.48-1984.

CONTENTS Introduction Editorial

vii

Notes

xxvii

Acknowledgments

xxix

Euthyphro

G.M.A. Grube

1

Apology

G.M.A. Grube

17

Crito

G.M.A. Grube

37

Phaedo

G.M.A. Grube

49

Cratylus

C.D.C. Reeve

Theaetetus

M.

Sophist

Nicholas P. White

Statesman

C.

Parmenides

Mary

Philebus

Dorothea Frede

398

Symposium

Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff

457

Phaedrus

Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff

506

Alcibiadest

D.

557

Second Alcibiades*

Anthony Kenny

596

Hipparchus*

Nicholas D. Smith

609

Rival Lovers*

Jeffrey Mitscherling

618

Theages*

Nicholas D. Smith

627

Charmides

Rosamond Kent Sprague

639

Laches

Rosamond Kent Sprague

664

Lysis

Stanley Lombardo

687

Euthydemus

Rosamond Kent Sprague

708

Protagoras

Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell

746

levett, rev.

].

].

S.

101

Myles Burnyeat

157

235

Rowe

294

Louise Gill and Paul

Ryan

Hutchinson

v

359

Contents

Gorgias

Donald

Zeyl

791

Meno

G.M.A. Grube

870

Greater Hippiast

Paul Woodruff

898

Lesser Hippias

Nicholas D. Smith

922

Ion

Paul Woodruff

937

Menexenus

Paul Ryan

950

Clitophont

Francisco

Republic

G.M.A. Grube

Timaeus

Donald

Critias

Diskin Clay

1292

Minos*

Malcolm

Schofield

1307

Laws

Trevor

Saunders

1318

Epinomis*

Richard D. McKirahan,

Letters}:

Glenn R. Morrow

1634

Definitions*

D.

Hutchinson

1677

On Justice* On Virtue*

Andrew

Mark Reuter

1694

Demodocus*

Jonathan Barnes

1699

Sisyphus*

David Gallop

1707

Halcyon*

Brad Inwood

1714

Eryxias*

Mark

1718

Axiochus*

Jackson P. Hershbell

Epigrams}:

J.

S.

J.

J.

J.

965

Gonzalez

J.

,

rev.

C.D.C. Reeve

1224

Zeyl

S.

Jr.

Joyal

,

rev.

1734 John

M. Cooper

listed are those of the translators.

not the author of this work,

*It is

generally agreed by scholars that Plato

tit is

not generally agreed by scholars whether Plato

{As

1742

1747

Index

Names

1617

1687

Becker

M. Edmonds

971

is

to Plato's authorship of the individual Letters

introductory notes.

is

the author of this work.

and Epigrams, consult the respective

INTRODUCTION Since they were written nearly twenty-four hundred years ago, Plato's dialogues have found readers in every generation. Indeed, in the major centers of

Greek

beginning in the first and second centuries of our era, Plato's works gradually became the central texts for the study and practice of philosophy altogether: in later antiquity, a time when Greek philosophy was struggling to maintain itself against Christianity and other eastern 'wisdoms', Platonist philosophy was philosophy itself. Even after Christianity triumphed in the Roman Empire, Platonism continued as the dominant philosophy in the Greek-speaking eastern Mediterranean. As late as the fifteenth century, in the last years of the Byzantine empire, the example of George Gemistos Plethon shows how strong this traditional concentration on Plato could be among philosophically educated Greeks. When Plethon, the leading Byzantine scholar and philosopher of the time, accompanied the Byzantine Emperor to Ferrara and Florence in 1438-39 for the unsuccessful Council of Union between the Catholic and Orthodox churches, he created a sensation among Italian humanists with his elevation of Plato as the first of philosophers above the Latin scholastics' hero, Aristotle. Plato's works had been unavailable for study in the Latin west for close to a millennium, except for an incomplete Latin translation of Timaeus, 2 but from the fifteenth century onwards, through the revived knowledge of Greek and from translations into Latin and then into the major modern European languages, Plato's dialogues intellectual culture,

1

—

resumed held

it

their central place in

European culture as

without interruption ever

In presenting this

we hope

a whole.

They have

since.

new edition of Plato's dialogues in English translation,

to help readers of the twenty-first century carry this tradition

forward. In this introduction I explain our presentation of these works (Section I), discuss questions concerning the chronology of their composition (II), comment on the dialogue form in which Plato wrote (III), offer some advice on how to approach the reading and study of his works (IV),

1.

Greek

it

mark, by

is

a

—

its

resemblance

to Plato's

own name,

Translations of Phaedo and Meno,

made

in Sicily,

vii

to

his authoritative sponsorship of Platonist

doctrines. See George Gemistos Plethon: The Last of the Hellenes, by C. M. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); for the change of name, see pp. 186-88. 2.

—in

pseudonym George Gemistos adopted toward the end of his life has essentially the same meaning as 'Gemistos' itself does apparently

'Plethon'

were

also available

Woodhouse

from about 1160.

Introduction

Vlll

and describe the principles on which the translations in the volume have been prepared (V). But first, a few basic facts about Plato’s life and career. Plato, a native Athenian, was born in 427 b.c. and died at the age of eighty-one in 347. 3 He belonged, on both his mother s and father s side, to old and distinguished aristocratic families. At some point in his late teens or early twenties (we do not know when or under what circumstances), he began to frequent the circle around Socrates, the Athenian philosopher who appears as the central character in so many of his dialogues and whose trial and death he was to present so eloquently in his Apology and dozen years or so following Socrates’ death in 399, Plato, then nearly thirty years old, may have spent considerable time away from Athens, for example, in Greek-inhabited southern Italy, where he seems to have met philosophers and scientists belonging to the indigenous ’’Pythagorean" philosophical school, some of whose ideas were taken up in several of his own dialogues, most notably, perhaps, in the Phaedo. In about 388 he visited Syracuse, in Sicily— the first of three visits to the court of the "tyrants" Dionysius I and II during his thirty-odd-year-long engagement in Syracusan politics. This involvement is reported on at length in the Platonic Letters included in this edition. At some point, presumably in the 'eighties, Plato opened a school of higher education in the sacred grove of Academus, in the Attic countryside near Athens, apparently offering formal instruction in mathematical, philosophical, and political studies. He seems to have spent the rest of his life (except for the visits to Syracuse) teaching, researching, and writing there. Under his leadership, the Academy became a major center of research and intellectual exchange, gathering to itself philosophers and mathematicians from all over the Greek world.

his Phaedo. In the

,

Among

its

members was

Aristotle,

who came

as a student in about 367

age of eighteen and remained there as teacher, researcher, and writer himself, right up to the time of Plato's death twenty years later.

at the

I.

The 'Canon'

of Thrasyllus

These Complete Works make available a single collection of all the works that have come down to us from antiquity under Plato’s name. We include all the texts published in the early first century a.d. in what became the definitive edition of Plato's works, that by Thrasyllus, an astrologer and 4 Platonist philosopher from the Greek city of Alexandria, in Egypt. From and so Thrasyllus' edition derive all our medieval manuscripts of Plato almost all our own knowledge of his texts. Apparently following earlier

—

have survived from antiquity, of which the earliest, that by Diogenes Laertius (translated by R. D. Hicks, Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 1925), dates perhaps from the third century a.d. 3.

Several

'lives'

of Plato

For the sake of completeness, we also print translations of the short poems ('Epigrams') that have come down to us from antiquity with Plato's name attached. 4.

— Introduction

IX

precedent, Thrasyllus arranged the works of Plato (thirty-five dialogues, plus a set of thirteen 'Letters' as a thirty-sixth entry) in nine 'tetralogies' groups of four works each reminiscent of the ancient tragedies, which were presented in trilogies (such as the well-known Oresteia of Aeschylus)6

—

followed by a fourth, so-called satyr play, preserving a link to the origins of tragedy in rituals honoring the god Dionysus. In addition to these, he included in an appendix a group of 'spurious' works, presumably ones that

had been circulating under

later accretions.

We

Plato's

name, but that he judged were

own

follow Thrasyllus in our

presentation:

first

the

nine tetralogies, then the remaining works that he designated as spurious 5 With one exception, earlier translations into English of Plato's collected .

works have actually been only selections from this traditional material usually they have omitted all the Thrasyllan 'spurious' works, plus a certain number of others that were included in his tetralogies, since the editors of the collections judged them not in fact Plato's work. In their widely used collection/ Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns include none of the 'spuria' and only twenty-nine of the thirty-six other works 8 From :

.

Thrasyllus' tetralogies they omit Alcibiades, Second Alcibiades , Hipparchus , Rival Lovers Theages, Clitophon, and Minos. Even if these dialogues are not ,

by Plato himself (and they are

at least Clitophon

and

Alcibiades could very well be),

valuable works, casting interesting light on Socrates and the Socratic legacy. They also deserve attention as important documents in the history of Platonism: it is worthy of note that teachers of Platonist all

philosophy in later antiquity standardly organized their instruction through lectures on ten 'major' dialogues, beginning with Alcibiades omitted by Hamilton and Cairns, presumably as not by Plato. The dialogues classified by Thrasyllus as spurious also deserve attention, even though in their case there are strong reasons for denying Plato's authorship; and the Definitions are a valuable record of work being done in Plato's Academy

—

Since our manuscripts standardly present the thirty-six 'tetralogical' works in the order that ancient evidence indicates was Thrasyllus', it is reasonable to think that their 5.

order for the spuria goes back to Thrasyllus' edition too. We present these in the order of our oldest manuscript that contains them, the famous ninth- or tenth-century Paris

manuscript of the complete works. front of the

list,

(In

some

other manuscripts Axiochus

is

placed at the

instead of the back.)

The only previous comparably complete

does however omit one small work of disputed authorship, the Halcyon, included here, and the Epigrams as well) is The Works of Plato, edited by George Burges, in six volumes, for the Bohn Classical Library, London: G. Bell and Sons, 1861-70. This is a 'literal' translation, not easy to 6.

translation

(it

read or otherwise use.

The Collected Dialogues of Plato including the University Press, 1961). 7.

8.

In

its

Letters,

Bollingen Foundation (Princeton

ten Plato volumes, the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, various dates) does include translations (with facing

works

in Thrasyllus' tetralogies,

but none of the 'spuria'.

Greek

text) of all thirty-six

)

Introduction

X in his lifetime

9 and the immediately following decades (For further .

details

see the respective introductory notes to each of the translations.) Especially given the often inevitably subjective character of judgments

about authenticity, it is inappropriate to allow a modern editor's judgment to determine what is included in a comprehensive collection of Plato's work. The only viable policy is the one followed here, to include the whole corpus of materials handed down from antiquity. At the same time, it should be frankly emphasized that this corpus both the works it includes as genuine and the text itself of the works— derives from the judgment of one ancient scholar, Thrasyllus. His edition of Plato's work, prepared nearly four hundred years after Plato's death, was derived from no doubt differing texts of the dialogues (and Letters ) in libraries and perhaps in

—

from anything like a modern author's 'autograph'. No doubt also, both in its arrangement and in decisions taken as to the genuineness of items and the text to be inscribed, it may have reflected the editor's own understanding of Plato's philosophy (perhaps a tendentious one) and his views on how it ought to be organized for teaching purposes 10 So, since the present editor has exercised his own judgment private hands, not at

all

.

only to the extent of deciding to follow the edition of Thrasyllus, we are thrown back on Thrasyllus' judgment in the works included and in their order and arrangement. Since Thrasyllus included all the genuine works of Plato that any surviving ancient author refers to, plus some disputed

we

apparently have the good fortune to possess intact all of Plato's published writings. Thrasyllus' order appears to be determined by no single criterion but by several sometimes conflicting ones, though his arrangement may represent some more or less unified idea about the order in which the dialogues should be read and taught. For example, the first four works ( Euthyphro Apology Crito Phaedo manifestly follow internal evidence establishing a ones,

,

,

,

—

chronological order for the events related in them the 'Last Days of Socrates'. The conversation in Euthyphro is marked as taking place shortly before Socrates' trial; his speech at his trial is then given in the Apology while Crito presents a visit to Socrates in prison, three days before his ,

the culminating event of the Phaedo. Somewhat similar internal linkages explain the groups Republic-Timaeus-Critias and Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman (although the conversation in Theaetetus seems to

execution,

present

key

a

itself

to

is

as taking place earlier

on the same day as

that of Euthyphro

grouping that Thrasyllus quite reasonably opted

to ignore).

—

But

more superficial connections play a role as well. Clitophon placed before Republic and Minos before Laws to serve as brief introduc-

topical is

which

and

other,

,

works whose Platonic authorship has plausibly been questioned in antiquity or modern times are marked, either as ones which no one reasonably thinks are by Plato or as ones as to which there is no consensus that they are by him. 9.

In the table of contents

For a somewhat speculative, rather alarmist, view of the extent of Thrasyllus' editorial work, see H. Tarrant, Thrasyllan Platonism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). 10.

Introduction

xi

themes of these two major works, justice and legislation respectively, and the two Alcibiades dialogues are grouped together, as are the Greater and Lesser Hippias. Even the presumed order of composition seems responsible for the last tetralogy's bringing the series to a conclusion with Laws and its appendix Epinomis (followed by Letters ): we have evidence that Lazos was left unpublished at Plato's death, presumably because he had not finished working on it. Most readers will have little need to attend to such details of Thrasyllus' arrangement, but one point is important. Except for Laws as just noted, Thrasyllus' tetralogies do not claim to present the dialogues in any supposed order of their composition by Plato. Indeed, given the enormous bulk of Lazos, different parts of it could well have been written before or contemporaneously with other dialogues so Thrasyllus' order need not indicate even there that Laws was the last work Plato composed. Thrasyllus' lack of bias as regards the order of composition is one great advantage tions to the central

,

—

that accrues to us in following his presentation of the dialogues. Previous

editors (for example, both

Hamilton and Cairns and Benjamin Jowett 11 )

imposed their own view of the likely order of composition upon their arrangement of the dialogues. But judgments about the order of composition are often as subjective as judgments about Platonic authorship itself. In modern times, moreover, the chronology of composition has been a perennial subject of scholarly debate, and sometimes violent disagreement, in connection

with

efforts to establish the outline of Plato's philosophical

'development', or the lack of any.

some

a consensus about

scholarly arguments

and

aspects of the chronology of Plato's writings

(I

much

too slight a basis on which conscieneven an approximate ordering of all the dialogues. Speaking

return to this below), but this tiously to fix

We have solid

is

The Dialogues of Plato (London: Macmillan, 1st ed. 1871, 3rd 1892; 4th ed., revised, by D. J. Allan and H. E. Dale, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, four vols.). Allan and Dale claim explicitly that theirs is the approximate order of composition; Jowett left his own 11.

order unexplained, but thirty-six 'genuine'

adds

it

is

not very different from Allan and Dale's. Of Thrasyllus'

works Jowett

a twenty-eighth

(

1

prints twenty-seven dialogues (no Letters ); Jowett3

Second Alcibiades), plus one of Thrasyllus' eight 'spurious' works

by his secretary Matthew Knight; Jowett 4 shrinks back to twentyeight (adding Greater Hippias, translated by Allan and Dale themselves, but omitting Second Alcibiades as nongenuine). The earliest comprehensive English translation, that (

Eryxias ), both translated

of

Thomas Taylor

(except that

F.

Sydenham

dialogues) (London, 1804, five vols.)

is

is

credited with the translation of nine

organized on a fanciful 'systematic' basis, in

which the dialogues judged by him to establish the 'comprehensive' Platonic views respectively in ethics and politics and in natural philosophy and metaphysics come first, followed by the various more 'partial' treatments of specific questions. The title page to each of Taylor's five volumes claims to present '[Plato's! Fifty-five Dialogues and Twelve Epistles', a surprising way of referring to the thirty-five Thrasyllan 'genuine' dialogues that the collection actually contains (he omits the thirteenth Letter as obviously spurious): presumably he counts each book of Republic and Laws as a separate 'dialogue', in

which case the

total is

indeed

fifty-five.

Introduction

Xll

readers to pursue or not, as they see fit, and it would be wrong to bias the presentation of Plato's works in a translation intended for general use by imposing on it one's

generally, issues of chronology should be

own favorite chronological hypotheses. and

left to

Thrasyllus' order does not

do

that,

has the additional advantage of being for us the traditional one,

it

12

common ground for all contemporary interpreters. Such interpretative biases as it may contain do not concern any writer nowadays, so it can reasonably be considered a neutral basis on which to present these works to

contemporary readers.

II.

Thematic Groupings of the Platonic Dialogues

Chronological

vs.

almost customary nowadays (in my view unfortunately so: see below) to divide the dialogues into groups on the basis of a presumed rough order of their composition: People constantly speak of Plato's 'early', 'middle' (or 'middle-period'), and 'late' dialogues though there is no perfect unanimity as to the membership of the three groups, and finer distinctions are sometimes marked, of 'earlymiddle' dialogues or 'transitional' ones at either end of the intermediate group. 13 Although this terminology announces itself as marking chronologically distinct groups, it is in reality based only in small part on anything

In teaching

and writing about

Plato,

it is

—

about when Plato composed given dialogues. (For these facts, see the next paragraph.) For the most part, the terminology encapsulates a certain interpretative thesis about the evolving character of Plato's authorlike

hard

facts

development of his philosophical thought. This authorship began, it is assumed, sometime after 399 b.c., the year of Socrates' death, and continued until his own death some fifty years later. According to this thesis, Plato began as the author of dialogues setting forth his 'teacher' conversing much as we presume he typically actually did when

ship, linked to the

—

discussing his favorite philosophical topics morality, virtue, the best human life with the young men who congregated round him and other intellectuals in Athens, where he spent his entire life. These, then, would constitute the 'early' dialogues, sometimes also thematically described as the 'Socratic' dialogues; they are all relatively short works. Only gradually,

—

on

this

view, did Plato grow into a fully independent philosopher, with

ideas and interests of his own, as outgrowths from and supplements to his 'Socratic heritage'. In his writings presumed to postdate the founding of the Academy, we see new ideas and interests first and primarily in the

new

12.

Modern

editions of Plato in Greek (for example, that of

Classical Texts series of

edition

is

Clarendon

J.

Burnet in the Oxford

Press, Oxford, 1900-1907, in five

underway) regularly present the Thrasyllan corpus

volumes: a revised

in Thrasyllus' order.

For one influential version of this division, see G. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 46-47. 13.

xm

Introduction

—

introduction of his celebrated theory of 'Forms' eternal, nonphysical, quintessential^ unitary entities, knowledge of which is attainable by ab-

and

immutably in the nature of things as standards on which the physical world and the world of moral relationships among human beings are themselves grounded. This happens in the 'middle' dialogues: Symposium Phaedo and Republic most notably much longer and philosophically more challenging works. The 'middle' diastract

theoretical thought, standing

,

,

—

,

logues are usually construed to include also Parmenides with its critical reflections on the theory of Forms, and Theaetetus. Finally still according to this interpretative thesis the 'late' period comprises a new series of investigations into logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of physics, and ethics and political theory, from which these 'Forms' either are absent altogether ,

—

—

work

accomplished without direct and simple appeal to their authoritative status. These include 77maeus, Sophist Statesman Philebus, and Laws. Along with these philosophical developments, Plato's manner of writing dialogues was evolving, too. In the 'middle' dialogues, where Socrates continues to be the principal speaker, he is no longer limited to questioning and commenting upon the views of his fellow discussants, as in the 'early' dialogues, but branches out into the development of elaborate, positive philosophical theses of his own. In the 'late' dialogues, however (with the understandable exception or else at least the principal theoretical

,

of Philebus

is

,

— see the introductory note

to that work), Socrates ceases alto-

gether to be an active participant in the discussion. Moreover, the conversation takes on the character of a dogmatic exposition of doctrine by the

main speaker to an audience. One of these may play virtually the sole role of nodding assent from time to time or requesting further explanations, so as to register acceptance and provide an easy means of noting and dividing and highlighting the importance of the principal topics as they

—

—

successively arise.

Now,

broad outlines, such a division of Plato's works into three chronological periods could be correct the interpretative thesis, or rather theses, on which it rests do have some plausibility, though they are obviously not compelling. But in fact we have really only two bits of reliable, hard information about the chronology of Plato's writings. One of these I have already mentioned: Laws was left unpublished at Plato's death. The other derives from the fact that Theaetetus seems to present itself as a memorial honoring its namesake, a famous mathematician and longtime associate of Plato's in his Academy, who died an untimely death in 369 b.c.: that seems to date the dialogue to about 369-365 or so. Since internal evidence links Theaetetus to Sophist and Statesman as its two successors, that would suggest (though of course it does not prove) that those three dialogues were written in that order, after about 367 therefore in the last two decades of Plato's life, his sixties and seventies. Useful as that information may be, it is obviously not sufficient basis for fixing any complete chronological guide to the reading and teaching of the dialogues. As for Laws however, it began to be noticed already in the nineteenth in

its

—

—

,

—

— Introduction

XIV

sentences are characterized by the frequency and constancy of a number of stylistic features that it shares with only a few other Timaeus, Sophist, Statesman, dialogues: the four that I listed above as late' Philebus plus Critias. On the obviously not perfectly secure assumption

century that

its

—

that, at least

cumulatively, such

stylistic affiliation, setting

these

works

off

strongly from all the others, must fix a chronological grouping, exhaustive 'stylometric' investigations have led to a consensus in favor of adding

— independently known to be a

composition Thus one might claim substantial hard as constituting Plato's last period evidence in favor at least of recognizing these six works (plus Epinomis, if it is by Plato) as constituting a separate, late group. But stylometry does not strongly support any particular order among the six, nor can it establish any particular ordering of the remaining dialogues among themselves though some do claim that it establishes a second group of four dialogues

these five

works

to

Laws

late

14

.

as the latest of the nonlate group: Republic, Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Phaedrus in some undetermined order. So, even if we accept the somewhat

insecure assumption noted just above, no hard data support the customary division of the dialogues into chronological groups, except with respect to the 'late' dialogues Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Statesman, the last of the three Philebus, and Laws. The classifications of 'early' and 'middle-period' dia-

—

logues rest squarely on the interpretative theses concerning the progress of Plato's work, philosophically and literarily, outlined above. As such, they are an unsuitable basis for bringing anyone to the reading of these

way

announce in advance the results of a certain interpretation of the dialogues and to canonize that interpretation under the guise of a presumably objective order of composition when in fact no such order is objectively known. And it thereby risks prejudicing an unwary reader against the fresh, individual reading that these works demand. works. To use them in that

is

to

—

For these reasons, I urge readers not to undertake the study of Plato's works holding in mind the customary chronological groupings of 'early', 'middle', and 'late' dialogues. It is safe to recognize only the group of six late dialogues. Even for these, it is better to relegate thoughts about chronology to the secondary position they deserve and to concentrate on the literary and philosophical content of the works, taken on their own and in relation to the others. In some cases it may indeed seem desirable to begin with a preliminary idea about the place of a given dialogue in the series ( Gorgias and Protagoras earlier than Republic, say, or Theaetetus before Sophist, or Symposium before Phaedo ). Certainly, a study of such sets of dialogues might lead one to argue that the philosophical ideas they contain show an evolution in some particular direction. But chronological hypotheses must not preclude the independent interpretation and evalua-

14.

For a survey of these investigations and references to recent and older stylometric

studies of Plato, see Charles in

Ancient Philosophy XII, ed. ,

M. Young, Tlato and Computer Dating' in Oxford Studies C. C. W. Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 227-50.

xv

Introduction

arguments the dialogues contain; so far as possible, the individual texts must be allowed to speak for themselves. However, in reading the dialogues, it may help to be aware from the outset of certain thematic groupings among them. In our introductory notes to the individual works, we inform readers about such links from the work in question to others and provide other information that may help in placing the work in the proper context within Plato's writings and in the Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries b.c. One very large group of dialogues can usefully be identified here. These are what we may call the Socratic dialogues provided that the term is understood to make no chronological claims, but rather simply to indicate certain broad thematic affinities. In tion of the philosophical

—

these works, not only

Socrates the principal speaker, but also the topics

is

and manner of the conversation conform to what we have reason to think, both from Plato's own representations in the Apology and from other contemporary literary evidence, principally that of the writer Xenophon 15 was ,

characteristic of the historical Socrates'

own

philosophical conversations.

Included here are fully twenty of the thirty-six works in Thrasyllus' tetralogies and (allowance made for their post-Platonic authorship) all seven of the dialogues that he classified as spurious: from the tetralogies, Euthyphro Apology Crito, Alcibiades Second Alcibiades, Hipparchus Rival Lovers Theages, Charmides Laches Lysis Luthydemus Protagoras Gorgias, Greater and Lesser Hippias, Ion Menexenus Clitophon, and Minos. One can think of these works, in part, as presenting a portrait of Socrates Socrates teaching young men by challenging them to examine criti,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

—

cally their

own ideas, Socrates as moral exemplar and supreme philosophi-

seeking after moral knowledge, while always disclaiming the final possession of any, through subjecting his own and others' ideas to searching rational scrutiny. But just as there is no reason to think that these dialogues are or derive in any way from records of actual conversations of the historical Socrates, so there is also no reason 16 to suppose that in writing them Plato intended simply to reconstruct from memory actual arguments, philosophical distinctions, etc., that Socrates had used, or views that he had become persuaded of through his lifelong practice of philosophical dialectic. To be sure, one evident feature of these dialogues is that in them Socrates does philosophize in the way the historical Socrates, according to the rest of our evidence, did. He seeks the opinions of his interlocutors on moral, political, and social questions cal dialectician, Socrates

Xenophon's Socratic writings include his own Apology a Symposium, and four books of Memoirs of Socrates (often referred to by its Latin title, Memorabilia ); these are translated by H. Tredennick and R. Waterfield (Penguin Books, 1990), and are available in Greek and English in the Loeb Classical Library series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 15.

,

Press, various dates). 16.

That

is,

the ones he did write: there are reasonable doubts as to the Platonic origins

of several of the dialogues included in the tetralogies, to

be his work.

and

a

few are generally held not

— Introduction

XVI

and

subjects

them

to searching critical examination.

It is

true that, in

some

comes forward with distinctive moral and political ideas of his own, to which he attempts to show his interlocutors, despite their overt denials, are logically committed since these ideas follow from propositions that the other speakers have themselves granted. But, by contrast with dialogues such as Phaedo and Republic he does not engage here in elaborate positive philosophical construction, putting forward ambitious philosophical theses of his own and offering independent philosophical argument and other considerations in their favor. In particuof them, such as Gorgias, he also

,

Socrates says nothing about the theory of Forms. That is a sign that in these dialogues Plato intends not to depart, as he does elsewhere, from Socratic methods of reasoning or from the topics to which Socrates devoted lar,

his attention,

and no doubt he

carries over into these portraits

much

of the

substance of Socrates' own philosophizing, as Plato himself understood it. But Plato was not the only or even the first of Socrates' companions to write Socratic dialogues. Though, with the exception of Xenophon's, no other such dialogues have survived complete, we know enough about the contents of some of them to be sure that no convention of the genre forbade the author to write freely and from his own head about philosophical and other matters that interested him. Indeed, quite to the contrary, as we can see from Xenophon's dialogue Oeconomicus in which Socrates discourses ,

knowledgeably and at great length about estate management, a subject we have good reason to think he never knew or cared anything about though Xenophon himself certainly did. So we have good reason to expect that at least some of what Plato makes Socrates say in his Socratic dialogues expresses new ideas developed in his own philosophical reflections, not mere elaborations of historically Socratic thoughts. This is perhaps particularly clearly the case, though in different ways, in Charmides Lysis Euthydemus, and Gorgias but it is an open possibility in them all, to be decided ,

,

,

in the light of a full interpretation of their contents, in relation to that of

worth saying again that classifying these along with the rest as Socratic dialogues carries no implication whatsoever of an early date of composition or an early stage of the author's philosophical development. As I am using the term, it is a thematic classification only. We know no reason to conclude that Plato wrote dialogues of this genre during only one phase of his career as an author, whether early or late. Though it is reasonable to suppose that Plato's earliest writings were in fact Socratic dialogues, there is no reason to suppose that, just because a dialogue is a Socratic one, it must have been written before all the dialogues except, of course, that if we were right to accept a special of other types group of late dialogues, the Socratic dialogues must predate all of these. The decision about the relative chronology of any of these dialogues, if one wishes to reach a decision on that secondary question at all, must be reached only after a careful and complete study of their philosophical content, in comparison with the contents of Plato's other works. other dialogues.

—

It is

,

Introduction

XVII

There are eight dialogues other than the Socratic and the late dialogues: Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Parmenides Symposium Phaedrus, Meno and Republic. It is not easy to identify a common theme unifying this whole group. As it happens, however, they correspond closely to the putative classification of 'middle-period' dialogues. In these Socrates remains a principal speaker, although in Parmenides not Socrates but Parmenides sets and directs the philosophical agenda. As noted above, these stand apart from the Socratic dialogues in that here Socrates takes and argues directly ,

,

for ambitious, positive philosophical positions of his

own. However, those

them cleanly apart from the late dialogues as a whole, since Socrates is the main speaker again in Philebus, and he appears in the introductory conversations of Timaeus and Critias, more briefly in those of Sophist and Statesman and those dialogues are just as philosophically ambitious, even if in somewhat different ways. In all but two of the dialogues of this group Theaetetus and Meno), the Platonic theory of Forms plays a prominent and crucial role: Indeed, it is these dialogues that establish and define the 'classical' theory of Forms, as that has been understood by later generations of philosophers. Were it not for Theaetetus and Meno, one might be tempted to classify this group simply as the 'Classical Theory considerations do not set

,

(

of Forms' dialogues.

On

the other hand, Phaedrus, despite Socrates' use of

the classical theory in his second speech

on

foreshadows the revised conception of a Form as some sort of divided whole no longer a simple unity known about by the method of 'collection and division' that the late dialogues Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus set out and employ at length. And it seems that one important lesson Parmenides wishes to teach Socrates in the Parmenides also goes in the same direction. Moreover, Theaetetus is marked by Plato as some sort of successor to Parmenides and predecessor of Sophist and Statesman. (See the introductory notes to these dialogues.) Thus Phaedrus, Parmenides, and Theaetetus all have clear forward conneceros,

—

—

tions to the late dialogues.

would be

any unifying single common theme for this group. At the most, one could say that this group develops the positive philosophical theories in ethics and politics and in metaphysics and theory of knowledge that we normally associate with Plato, centering on the classical theory of Forms, while including several dialogues which point forward to the innovations worked out in the late group. Accordingly, no thematic name for the group seems available, and we must make do simply by referring to a 'second' group of Plato's dialogues, alongside the Socratic works, both groups to be placed chronologically before the late dialogues. As before, this classification must be understood as having no chronological implications whatsoever of its own, For

all

these reasons,

it

a mistake to claim

as regards their relationship to the Socratic dialogues.

Any

decision as to

second group itself or with respect to the various members of the Socratic group, must be reached only after comparative study of the philosophical contents of the individual relative dates of composition, either within the

— Introduction

XV111

dialogues themselves. While one might reasonably suppose that, in general, the dialogues of the second group were written later than the Socratic group, it is not safe to rule out some chronological overlapping in composition.

III.

Plato

and the Dialogue Form

Why

did Plato write dialogues? What does it mean for the reader of his works that they take this form? Philosophers of earlier generations expounded their views and developed their arguments either in the meters of epic poetry (Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, for example), or in short prose writings or collections of remarks (Anaximander, Heraclitus,

Anaxagoras, Philolaus, Democritus), or in rhetorical display pieces (the Sophists Gorgias, Protagoras, and Prodicus). Socrates himself, of course, was not a writer at all but engaged in philosophy only orally, in face-toface question-and-answer discussions. It is clear that the dialogue form for philosophical writing began within the circle of those for whom philosophy meant in the first instance the sort of inquiry Socrates was engaged in. I mentioned above that Plato was not the first or only Socratic to write

philosophical dialogues, but he certainly elaborated and expanded the genre far beyond what anyone else ever attempted. He not only wrote Socratic dialogues, as we have seen, but he developed the genre also to the point where, eventually, Socrates altogether

dropped out

of the cast of characters

— in the magnum opus of his old age, the Laws. Plato's younger

which have perished), as well as the lectures and treatises that we know him for, but, significantly, 17 they seem not to have had Socrates among their characters Socrates had been dead for fifteen years at Aristotle's birth, and he could not have had the personal attachment to him as a philosophical model that Plato and associate Aristotle also wrote dialogues

(all

of

:

18 But, generation of dialogue writers obviously did as already with Aristotle, the medium of choice for later philosophers Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, Epicurus and his followers, the Stoic philosophers, Sextus Empiricus, late Platonists was the prose discourse or treatise (sometimes a commentary on a work of Plato's or Aristotle's

the others in the

first

.

—

philosopher ). 19 There, the author spoke directly to his readers in his own voice. The close association of the dialogue form with the Socratic conception of philosophy as face-to-face discussion is or

17.

some other

According

speaker in his

'ancient'

to Cicero

own

(

Letters to Atticus XIII xix 4), Aristotle

appeared as the main

dialogues.

At least one other Academic of Aristotle's generation, Plato's nephew and successor as head of the school, Speusippus, also wrote dialogues, along with philosophical works 18.

of other genres. 19.

We know

nothing substantial about them.

Epicurus also seems to have written

dialogues written by

some

Peripatetics.

at least

one dialogue, and there

is

evidence of

— Introduction

borne out

xix

in the principal exception to this rule, the Latin philosophical

works of Cicero

(first

century

b.c.):

the plurality of voices

and the author's

what these voices say made the nondogmatic or 'skeptical' Platonist like

capacity to stand back from and question

dialogue format suit perfectly a Cicero. (On 'skeptical' Platonism, see further below.) It was characteristic of philosophy before Socrates and Plato that philosophers usually put themselves forward as possessors of special insight and wisdom: they had the truth, and everyone else should just listen to them and learn. Thus Parmenides' poem tells how he was brought in a chariot to a goddess at the borders of night and day the very center of the truth and then sets out that truth and the arguments on which it rests, while also revealing the errors of everyone else's ways. Similarly Heraclitus, in his prose book, claims to have discovered in one big thought essentially, the unity of opposites the key to all reality, and he excoriates other thinkers several by name as having missed it by wasting their time learning up all sorts of arcane details. These philosophers hoped and expected to win fame for themselves personally, as the authors (among humans) of their own 'truth'. The genres in which they wrote suited this intellectual stance and these authorial ambitions perfectly: they could speak directly to their readers, as the authors of the poetry or prose in which they were handing down the truth. Socrates was a totally new kind of Greek philosopher. He denied that he had discovered some new wisdom, indeed that he possessed any wisdom at all, and he refused to hand anything down to anyone as his personal 'truth', his claim to fame. All that he knew, humbly, was how to reason and reflect, how to improve himself and (if they would follow him in behaving the same way) help others to improve themselves, by doing his best to make his own moral, practical opinions, and his life itself, rest on appropriately tested and examined reasons not on social authority or the say-so of esteemed poets (or philosophers) or custom or any other kind of intellectual laziness. At the same time, he made this self-improvement and the search for truth in which it consisted a common, joint effort, undertaken in discussion together with similarly committed other persons even if it sometimes took on a rather combative aspect. The truth, if achieved, would be a truth attained by and for all who would take the trouble to think through on their own the steps leading to it: it could never be a personal 'revelation' for which any individual could claim

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

special credit. In writing Socratic dialogues and, eventually, dialogues of other types,

Plato

was following Socrates

as wise

in rejecting the earlier idea of the philosopher

man who hands down

the truth to other mortals for their grateful

acceptance and resulting fame for himself.

important to realize that whatever is stated in his works is stated by one or another of his characters, not directly by Plato the author; in his writings he is not presenting his 'truth' and himself as its possessor, and he is not seeking glory for having it. If there is new wisdom and ultimate truth in his works, this is not It is

— Introduction

XX

served up on a plate. Plato does not formulate his his readers, for

them

to learn

and

accept.

own

special 'truth' for

You must work hard even

to

what the author of a Platonic dialogue is saying to the reader it is in the writing as a whole that the author speaks, not in the words of any single speaker and the dialogue form demands that you think for yourself in deciding what, if anything, in it or suggested by it is really the truth. So you have to read and think about what each speaker says to the others (and also, sometimes, what he does not say), notice what may need further defense than is actually given it, and attend to the author's manner in presenting each character, and the separate speeches, for indications of points on which the author thinks some further thought is required. And, beyond that, you must think for yourself, reasoning on the basis of the

find out

—

whether or not there really are adequate grounds in support of what it may appear to you the text as a whole is saying. In all this, Plato is being faithful to Socrates' example: the truth must be arrived at

text, to see

and Plato

only inviting others to do their own intellectual work, in cooperation with him, in thinking through the issues that he is addressing. One might attend here to what Plato has Socrates say at the end of Phaedrus about written discourses. Socrates is speaking in the first instance of speeches written for oral delivery, but he applies his remarks to all writing on political or other serious philosophical subjects. Actual knowledge of the truth on any of these matters requires a constant capacity to express and re-express it in relation to varying circumstances and needs

by each of us

and is

in

for ourselves, in a cooperative search,

response to

new

may arise. Knowledge

questions or challenges that

a limitless ability to interpret

and

is

reinterpret itself

—

it

cannot be set

down

exhaustively in any single set of formulas, for universal, once-forall use. Accordingly, no book can actually embody the knowledge of anything of philosophical importance; only a mind can do that, since only a

mind can have this capacity to interpret and reinterpret its own understandings. A book must keep on saying the same words to whoever picks perhaps those of Parmenides and some other early it up. Most books philosophers among them attempt the impossible task of telling the reader the truth, with the vain idea that, through putting their words into 20 Plato's dialogues their heads, they will come to possess knowledge of it too; like all books, once written, their words are are writings books

—

—

.

—

—

20. Letter VII (341c-d,

344c-e) speaks rather similarly about philosophical writings,

emphasizing the impossibility of writing down the content of any constitute true

very different,

knowledge

much

of philosophical truth. Letter

less interesting,

II

remedy that actually contradicts the main idea here: it wrong hands, so that any sensible philosopher will have

memory

instead of writing

down on paper

In both Letters the author (whether Plato or

mind

(314b— c) limits

complaint about such writing

a

teaching to

state of

that

might

itself to

a

—and recommends

will inevitably fall into the his pupils

the

words

to

commit

his oral

be memorized!

someone impersonating him) gives these

considerations as Plato's reasons for never having written a philosophical treatise.

Introduction

fixed for

all

xxi

time and

and

all

readers. But because they

meaning

what

demand

that the reader

going ever deeper in their own questioning and their own understanding both of the writings themselves and of the truth about the subjects addressed in them, these writings speak in a unique new way to the reader. It may remain true that only a mind, and no book, can contain the knowledge of anything important. But a Platonic dialogue makes a unique claim to do what a book can do to engage a person effectively in the right sort of search for truth. interpret

reinterpret the

IV.

of

is

said,

Reading Plato

Despite this inherent open-endedness and the fact that Plato speaks only through the writing as a whole, all Plato's dialogues do have a principal speaker, one who establishes the topic of discussion and presides over it. In the Socratic works and the second group of dialogues, with the exception of Parmenides this is Socrates. In the late dialogues, except Philebus, where Socrates reappears to discuss the nature of the human good, it is the anonymous visitor from Elea, in Sophist and Statesman, or the equally anonymous Athenian of Laws and Epinomis or else Timaeus or Critias, in the dialogues named after them. In each dialogue Plato focuses the reader's attention on what the principal speaker says. Indeed, in the late dialogues, though again Philebus is something of an exception, the other speakers put up so little opposition and their comments introduce into the proceedings so little of the sort of fertile nuance that one finds in the other dialogues, that for long stretches there is little else that could claim the reader's attention at all. In fact, the substance of Timaeus and Critias is contained in uninterrupted discourses that the main speaker delivers to the others present, with no indication even at the end of how they received it: there is no return to the conversational context in which it was originally introduced. Can one not take these principal speakers as Plato's mouthpieces, handing straight out as their own opinions what Plato himself believed at the time he wrote and what he wished his readers to understand as such both as the truth and as what Plato thought was the truth? If what I have said about the dialogue form and Plato's commitment to ,

,

—

it

— right to the end of his writer's career—

is

correct, the strict

answer

to

question must be in the negative, in all cases. However much his principal speakers really do, in some way, speak on his behalf, he must also, in some way, be holding back from arguing and asserting personally the things that he has any of them say. What, then, are we to make of Plato's relation to what they do say? Each dialogue has to be read individually, but the three different groups the Socratic dialogues, the second group, and plainly do place the author in different sorts of relationthe late dialogues ship to his main speaker. Without going into the individual differences, here is some general orientation on the author's relationships to the leading speakers in each of the three groups. this

—

—

— Introduction

XXII First,

As

I

there

is

a matter of literary

form that applies

have emphasized, Plato never speaks

in his

to all the dialogues.

own

author's voice but

puts all his words into a particular speaker's mouth. This means that, although everything any speaker says is Plato's creation, he also stands before it all as the reader does: he puts before us, the readers, and before himself as well, ideas, arguments, theories, claims, etc. for all of us to

—

sum, to use as a springboard for our own further philosophical thought. Authors writing in their own voices can, of course, do the same: they do not always have to be straightforwardly advocating the positions they develop and argue for, though that is what Greek authors usually did, and with passionate self-promotion. But they must take special steps to make the reader aware that that is what they are doing, for example by saying it in so

examine

carefully, reflect on, follow out the implications of

in

21

many words. In his dialogues, Plato adopts that stance automatically However much he may himself believe everything that, say, the Athenian visitor puts forward in Laws X about the existence of the gods and the importance for human life of accepting their providential relationship to .

us and the physical world, he stands to it, even though he is its author, as his readers also stand. To finally understand all this as the truth requires further work one must sift and develop and elevate the thoughts expressed there into the kind of self-sufficient, self-interpreting total grasp that I referred to above in drawing on what Phaedrus says about writing. Certainly, we should not think that Plato had already attained that Elysian condition and was writing from its perspective through the Athenian's mouth. Much less should we think that he was pretending to himself or to his readers that he had attained it. That would be a malicious and unprincipled abuse of the very dialogue form that Plato was so obviously determined to uphold. So even in the late dialogues, where, as noted, there is often little else before us but the arguments of the principal speaker, everything needs further thought; what we have before Plato stands back us is partial and provisional at best, however decisive it might be about

—

—

under discussion. In the dialogues of the second group, the role of the interlocutors is much more substantial, and the main speaker himself, usually Socrates, expresses more reservations, more caution and tentativeness, about what he is putting forward. Accordingly, even though readers always and understandably speak of the theories adumbrated by Socrates here as 'Plato's theories', one ought not to speak of them so without some compunction the writing itself, and also Plato the author, present these always in a spirit of open-ended exploration, and sometimes there are contextual clues

particular points

21.

I

should emphasize that

I

am speaking here simply of Plato's handling of the dialogue

form. Another author (perhaps Berkeley in his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

one of these) might use the form simply for expository convenience, making it clear that he is using one of the speakers to present his own ideas and arguments and using

is

the others as a

means

of countering certain sorts of resistance to them.

xxm

Introduction

indicating that Socrates exaggerates or goes truly justifies,

and so

beyond what the argument

on. Finally, in the Socratic dialogues,

all

these caution-

ary points hold good, and others too. To the extent that Plato is providing a portrait of his friend Socrates, it is only common sense not to assume that Plato accepts as valid everything philosophical that he makes Socrates

and however much one knows Plato admired Socrates and, indeed, regarded him as the very model of how a philosopher should live, one should remain open to the possibility that a Socratic dialogue, when read fully and properly, may actually indicate some criticisms and point to some shortcomings of positions or methods of argument that it attributes to Socrates. Here one might especially mention Gorgias and Protagoras as dialogues that may demand interpretation along those lines, but the same applies in principle to all the Socratic dialogues. Reading a Platonic dialogue in the spirit in which it was written is therefore a dauntingly complex task. It is in the entire writing that the author speaks to us, not in the remarks made by the individual speakers. To find out what the writing itself is saying equivalently, what Plato is saying as its author one must work constantly to question everything that any speaker says, to ask what reasons he may have or what reasons might be provided to support it and what might tend to speak against it; one must never simply take, as if on Plato's authority, a claim made by any speaker as one that, from the perspective of the dialogue as a whole, certainly not in the form constitutes an established philosophical truth in which it is stated and not without qualification, expansion, taking into account wider perspectives, and so on. Especially in the Socratic dialogues and those of the second group, one must be alert to contextual indicators the particular way in which an interlocutor agrees to or of all sorts dissents from something, the more or less explicit characterization provided and other indicators about the personal qualities and commitments of the speakers, as well as hesitations and reservations and qualifications expressed by one or another of them. say.

Even beyond

that,

—

—

—

—

Those, then, are my own suggestions about the significance of the dialogue form in Plato's writings. The dialogues have not always been read in the way I have suggested, and not all scholars today share this approach to them: many would not hesitate simply to identify the positions and arguments stated or suggested by Socrates, or whoever the principal speaker is in any given dialogue, as those of the author at the time of composition. Already in antiquity Aristotle usually treats them in that 'dogmatic' way, except for the Socratic dialogues, which he seems to have

taken as depicting (equally 'dogmatically') the historical Socrates' philosophy. However, in Plato's own Academy, beginning only a couple of generations after Aristotle's death, the dialogues were read differently. They were taken to express a skeptical philosophy, one that raises questions about everything, examining the reasons pro and con on each issue, but always holds back from asserting anything as definitely established, as known to be the case. This reading works best, of course, for the Socratic dialogues,

— Introduction

XXIV

which Socrates makes much of the fact that he does not actually know anything himself and can only examine and criticize the well-groundedness in

of other people's opinions

who

think that they do. But Arcesilaus (third

head of the Academy, who first adopted such a skeptical mode of philosophizing and defended it as genuinely Platonic, is reported to have owned a complete set of Plato's writso apparently ings apparently that was an unusual thing in those days he studied them all. And indeed, even the last of Plato's works can sustain the skeptical reading if one takes account of the fact that, formally at least, as I have emphasized myself, Plato never speaks in his own person when any of his characters does: even a main character like the Athenian in Laws or the visitor from Elea, who does not hesitate to speak dogmatically himself, as if he had full possession of the truth on the matters he discourses upon, can still be read as putting something forward that Plato the author is presenting merely for examination and criticism. This 'skeptical' Platonism held the field in the Academy for the best part of two centuries, until Antiochus of Ascalon early in the first century b.c. refused any longer to century

b.c.),

one of

Plato's successors as

—

—

accept the skeptical interpretation of Plato's own dialogues. After Antiochus, Plato was interpreted again, in the way Aristotle and his contemporaries had understood him, as a systematic philosopher with

whole system of doctrine, both about human life and about metaphysical and scientific principles for interpreting and relating to one another all the facts of experience. This system could be found expounded and argued one just for especially in the dialogues of the second and the late groups had to take each dialogue's main character as Plato's mouthpiece. In Roman imperial times, this dogmatic interpretation was expanded and consolidated, as Platonist philosophers came to regard Plato's writings as the repository of the ultimate and permanent highest truths about the universe the equivalent for rationalist pagans of the Jews' Books of Moses or the Christians' Gospels. For them, Plato himself had gained a complete and totally adequate insight into the nature and structure of the world and of the divine principles upon which it is organized. All that anyone need do is to read the dialogues correctly in order to discover the truth a

—

—

about every important question of philosophy. It is as if, for Plotinus and the other Platonists of late antiquity (the ones we usually refer to as 'Neoplatonists'), Plato was speaking to us in his writings in the same way that Parmenides or Heraclitus had done, as possessor of his own 'truth' the real truth handing that down to other mortals in his own somewhat cryptic way, in dialogues. It is quite an irony that, in treating Plato thus as a superwise authority on all philosophical subjects, himself in direct intellectual touch with the highest and most divine principles on which the universe depends, these late Platonists set Plato upon the pedestal of wisdom, traditional among earlier philosophers, the very pedestal that, if I am right, his own commitment to the dialogue form for his writings was intended to renounce.

—

xxv

Introduction

My

suggested approach to the reading of Plato pays full respect to this renunciation. But with the reservations already noted about Plato's openness and experimental spirit it also accepts the overwhelming impression, not just of Antiochus, but of every modern reader of at least many of his dialogues, that Platonism nonetheless constitutes a systematic body of 'philosophical doctrine' about the soul and its immortality; the nature of human happiness and its dependence on the perfection of mind and character that comes through the virtues of wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage; the eternal and unaltering Forms whose natures structure our physical world and the world of decent human relations within it; the nature of love and the subservience of love in its genuine form to a vision of that eternal realm. These and many other substantive philosophical ideas to be explored in Plato's dialogues are his permanent contribution to our Western philosophical culture. But we would fail to heed his own warnings if we did not explore these in a spirit of open-ended inquiry, seeking to expand and deepen our own understandings as we interrogate his texts, and ourselves through them.

—

—

—

V.

The Translations

Hackett Publishing Company began bringing out the works of Plato in modern, readable English translations in 1974, with G.M.A. Grube's Republic. By 1980 I was advising first William Hackett and then James Hullett, his successor, in the commissioning of, and providing editorial oversight over, the new translations that the company published during the next decade and a half, looking toward an eventual Complete Works. In 1991 D. S. Hutchinson joined the project. In completing the process we now add to the twenty dialogues already published twenty new works commissioned specially for this volume, taking over five additional translations from other sources (two of them extensively revised by the translators for publication here).

have had constantly in mind two principal objectives, not often combined, that I was convinced could be achieved simultaneously. First, I wanted them to be as correct as was humanly possible. Taking Plato's to be first and foremost works of philosophy, for me that meant not just that the meaning of the Greek sentences should be correctly grasped and rendered, with any significant, genuine alternative renderings indicated, but, equally important, that everything establishing the flow and connection of philosophical ideas in the Greek be somehow preserved in the English. Variances and continuities in philosophically significant terminology within a single work should so far as possible be preserved or otherwise indicated in the translation. Where logical relationships are precisely defined in the Greek, they have to be rendered equally precisely in the English. And so on. Many older In overseeing the preparation of the translations,

I

XXVI

Introduction

smooth-reading though they sometimes are, fail signally in these crucial respects. On the other hand, I saw no need, in the name of 'philosophical accuracy', to introduce indiscriminately neologisms and technical language and to resort to other odd and unnatural terminology or turns of phrase or to torture normal English syntax and patterns of prose composition. Plato's Greek is straightforward and elegant, most of the time, though in order to express novel and complex theoretical ideas, it must sometimes strain the powers of ordinary language. The aim should be to find a way, while adhering to normal English translations,

word order and sentence

—

construction, to say as precisely as possible, in

—

ordinary English where necessary, ordinary philosophical English just what an educated contemporary of Plato's would have taken the Greek being translated to be saying. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to produce 'English' encrusted with esoteric code-formations that no one could make good use of except by consulting the Greek text. Hence, we have to reject the ideal some recent translators of Greek philosophy into English have held aloft, to produce a version as 'close' to the Greek text in syntax, word order, and terminology as were the medieval Latin Aristotle translations of William of Moerbeke. For one thing, Latin grammar and normal sentence construction are vastly closer to the Greek than our contemporary English has any chance of being. And, in any case, the scholastic study of Aristotle that Moerbeke's translations were intended to facilitate is nothing we should wish ourselves or our students to emulate in reading Plato (or, for that matter, Aristotle, either). When we English-speaking readers turn to Plato's texts, we want to find a Plato who speaks in English our English and communicates to us as accurately as possible all the details of his thought and artistry. I know that these translations achieve this aim in varying degrees and no doubt none of them as fully as one might realistically wish. But I hope they will be found a durable basis on which both general readers and students can rely in carrying forward into the new millennium the twenty-four-hundred-year tradition of reading and studying these classics of Western philosophy.

—

—

John M. Cooper July 1996

EDITORIAL NOTES Marginal references In order to facilitate comparison between this edition and others, in Greek or in translation, we print in the margins of the translations the 'Stephanus numbers' that are commonly used in scholarly references to the works of Plato. These numbers and letters indicate the corresponding page and section on that page of the relevant volume of the Greek text of Plato as edited (Paris, 1578) by the French scholar Henri Estienne (in Latin, Stephanus). (These are omitted in the case of Halcyon and Epigrams because Stephanus did not include those works in his edition.)

Footnotes It has been our intention to provide in footnotes all the basic information the general reader might need in order to follow the discussion in the texts. This includes the identification of persons, places, events, etc.,

Greek history and culture, insofar as these are not explained sufficiently in the context where the references to them occur. We have also identified the sources of all Plato's quotations from other authors, so far as those are known; any that are not identified should be presumed to be from now unidentifiable authors or works. In general, we have not attempted to provide any guidance or commentary as regards issues of philosophical interpretation, apart from that contained in the introductory notes to the individual works. But we have sometimes given alternative translations, where some point of philosophical significance may be at issue and the Greek is ambiguous or otherwise subject to differing construals. In all cases in

the editor bears ultimate responsibility for the footnotes to the translations:

was in the footnotes in the original was provided by those responsible for translations

usually these incorporate material that place of publication or

here published for the first time, but the editor has decided when a footnote is needed, and when not, and he has borne the responsibility of editing and otherwise preparing the footnotes as they appear here, including providing most of the alternative translations himself. Responsibility for any errors or omissions in the footnotes rests with the editor.

Greek

Greek

John Burnet, in Platonis Opera Oxford Classical Texts, five volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1907). Where the translation of a given work is based on a different text from Burnet's, this is recorded in a note at the beginning of the work in question. For each work, every effort has been made to register text

In general the

text translated

,

xxvii

is

that of

,

Editorial Notes

xxviii

in footnotes all variances in the translation

from the basic Greek

text,

Burnet's or another. Such departures, as indicated in the notes, often select alternative readings contained in the manuscripts, or else follow emendations proposed by other editors or in scholarly articles: we do not record

"some manuscripts," or else that a given emendation "is accepted," or the like. Those who wish to know the details may usually find them in the apparatus criticus of a critical edition of the dialogue in question. In a few places the the details,

beyond saying

translator has opted for a

there

that a given reading

new

is

found

in

conjectural treatment in the text translated;

we simply record the conjectured reading without further elaboration.

Many

book have been published before, either by Hackett Publishing Company or by another publisher (details are given in the Acknowledgments). In all cases the version appearing here reflects revisions, of varying quantity and significance, made by the translators on the advice of the editor. While no general effort has been made to ensure consistency in the translation of recurrent words or phrases across the vast extent of Plato's works (that would intrude too greatly on the prerogatives and the individual judgment of the translators to whose Translations

scholarly expertise

of the translations in this

we

are indebted for these Complete Works),

adopted a policy of keeping to nouns and adjectives that occur

As

Editorial responsibilities

we have

a single spelling for each of the

proper

in the book.

editor John

M. Cooper has had

editorial

oversight over the preparation for publication of all the translations in this volume, as well as for the introductions and notes. He is the author of all the introductory notes except those noted just below, signing

them J.M.C.

In addition to advising the editor generally, D. S. Hutchinson's special responsibilities as associate editor

concerned a

set of fifteen

works

— the

ones marked as spurious by the first-century-A.D. editor Thrasyllus, plus eight further dialogues whose Platonic authorship has been at least doubted in modern times: Definitions On Justice On Virtue Demodocus, Sisyphus Eryxias Axiochus , Halcyon Alcibiades Second Alcibiades Hipparchus Rival ,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

and Minos. He recruited the translators (translating two of them. Definitions and Alcibiades, himself) and worked closely with them in the preparation and revision of their versions. He wrote the introductory notes to these fifteen works, signing them D.S.H. Eovers, Theages, Clitophon,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS acknowledge the assistance of Sean Kelsey, who as research assistant read through all the translations at the penultimate stage, offering many excellent suggestions for improvement, identifying the sources of Plato's quotations, and indicating where footnotes were

The editor would

like to

needed, as well as preparing the texts for submission to the publisher. For advice and help on the introduction and introductory notes he would like to thank Rachel Barney, Christopher Bobonich, Panos Dimas, D. S. Hutchinson, George Kateb, Alexander Nehamas, C.D.C. Reeve, J. B. Schneewind, and David Sedley. Discussion with 0yvind Rabbas was helpful in preparing the introductory notes for the Socratic dialogues, especially Laches. Paul Woodruff gave good advice on the revision of the Epigrams translation. For Hackett Publishing Company Deborah Wilkes and Dan Kirklin gave steady, reliable, and invariably intelligent advice and assistance on all aspects of the production of the book. The associate editor would like to thank Nicholas Denyer, Rudolf Kassel, and Carl Werner Muller (whose book Die Kurzdialoge der Appendix Platonica sheds invaluable light on the spurious works in the Platonic corpus), as well as John Cooper, whose critical eye improved every introductory note.

The index was prepared by Paul Coppock. The editors would also like to thank him for his work at earlier stages of the project in overseeing the preparation of the translations on behalf of the publisher. Thanks also go to Jonathan Beere for verifying typographical errors and other corrections for the second printing, and to Adam Kissel for invaluable help in bringing

some

of these to the editors' attention.

Many

book have previously been published separately by Hackett Publishing Company: of the translations appearing (in revised form) in this

Euthyphro Apology Crito Phaedo, Theaetetus, Sophist Parmenides Philebus, Symposium Phaedrus Charmides, Eaches, Lysis Euthydemus, Protagoras Gor,

,

,

gias,

,

,

,

,

,

,

Meno, Greater Hippias Ion and Republic. ,

,

Published here for the first time are the translations of Cratylus, Alcibiades Second Alcibiades Hipparchus Rival Lovers Theages Lesser Hippias Menexe,

,

,

,

,

,

Minos Epinomis, Definitions On Virtue Demodocus, Sisyphus Halcyon and Eryxias.

nus, Glitophon, Timaeus, Critias ,

,

,

,

,

XXIX

,

Justice ,

On

,

Acknoivledgmen ts

XXX Translations previously published

Rowe, Warminster: Phillips Ltd., UK.

Statesman translated by C.

permission of Aris

&

by other publishers

J.

are

1995, reprinted here

by

Saunders, reprinted here by permission of Penguin Books Ltd. First published in Great Britain by Penguin Books Ltd., 1970. Reprinted with minor revisions, 1975. Laws, translated by Trevor

Letters , translated

J.

by Glenn R. Morrow, from Plato,

Epistles, 1962,

Library

of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.

by Jackson P. Hershbell, 1981, The Society of Biblical Literature. Reprinted here by permission of Jackson P. Hershbell. Epigrams, reprinted as revised by John M. Cooper by permission of the publishers of the Loeb Classical Library from Elegy and Iambus with the Anacreontea, Vol. II, edited by J. M. Edmonds, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Axiochus, translated

University Press, 1931.

Over the twenty years and more that Hackett Publishing Company has been bringing out new translations of Plato, including the work done on the translations appearing here for the first time, many scholars have generously offered their advice as line-by-line readers and consultants on the translations-in-progress of individual works in some cases, a single reader has worked on more than one such project. The publisher gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of:

—

William Arrowsmith

J.M.E. Moravcsik

Malcolm Brown Eve Browning Cole John M. Cooper Daniel Devereux

Alexander Nehamas Martha Nussbaum C.D.C. Reeve Jean Roberts

Cynthia Freeland

T.

Marjorie Grene Richard Hogan D. S. Hutchinson

Allan Silverman

Mark

Joyal

Richard Kraut

M. M. McCabe

M. Robinson

Simon

Slings

Nicholas P. White Paul Woodruff Donald J. Zeyl

EUTHYPHKO agora or central marketplace of Athens before the offices of the magistrate who registers and makes preliminary inquiries into charges brought under the laws protecting the city from the gods' displeasure. There Socrates meets Euthyphro Socrates is on his way in to answer the charges of 'impiety' brought against him by three younger fellow citizens on which he is going to be condemned to death, as we learn in the Apology. Euthyphro has just deposed murder charges against his own father for the death of a servant. Murder was a religious offense, since it entailed 'pollution' which if not ritually purified was displeasing to the gods; but equally, a son's taking such action against his father might well itself be regarded as 'impious'. Euthyphro professes to be acting on esoteric knowledge about the gods and their wishes, and so about the general topic of 'piety'. Socrates seizes the opportunity to acquire from Euthyphro this knowledge of piety so that he can rebut the accusations against himself. However, like all his other interlocutors in Plato's 'Socratic' dialogues, Euthyphro cannot answer Socrates' questions to Socrates' satisfaction, or ultimately to his own. So he cannot make it clear what piety The scene

is

the

,

—

,

is

— though he continues

tes'

to

think that he does

hopes are disappointed; just when he

thyphro express his knowledge,

if

is

know

ready

it.

Thus, predictably, Socra-

to press

indeed he does possess

further to help Eu-

it,

Euthyphro begs

off

on the excuse of business elsewhere.

Though Socrates does not succeed about the sort of thing Socrates

in his quest,

we

readers learn a good deal

looking for in asking his question 'What

is

is

?' questions he pursues in other dialogues. and the other 'What is He wants a single 'model' or 'standard' he can look to in order to determine which acts and persons are pious, one that gives clear, unconflicting, and unambiguous answers. He wants something that can provide such a standard all

piety?'

on

own

.

.

.

—

as one of Euthyphro' s proposals, that being pious is simply being loved by the gods, cannot do, since one needs to know first what the gods do its

love.

Pious acts and people

ondary quality, not the

may

indeed be loved by the gods, but that

'essence' of piety

—

it

is

is

a sec-

not that which serves as the

standard being sought.

There seems no reason

to

doubt the character Socrates' sincerity in probing

—

work out an adequate answer he has in advance no answer of his own to test out or to advocate. But does the dialogue itself suggest to the attentive reader an answer of its own ? Euthyphro frustrates Euthyphro' s statements so as

to

Socrates by his inability to develop adequately his final suggestion, that piety justice in relation to the gods, in serving 1

and

assisting them in

some purpose

is

Euthyphro

2

or enterprise of their own. Socrates seems to find that an enticing idea. Does Plato mean to suggest that piety may be shown simply in doing one's best to

—

become as morally good as possible something Socrates claims in the Apology the gods want more than anything else? If so, can piety remain an independent virtue at all, with its own separate standard for action? These are

among

the questions this dialogue leaves us to ponder.

J.M.C.

2

b

Euthyphro: What's new, Socrates, to make you leave your usual haunts in the Lyceum and spend your time here by the king-archon's court? Surely you are not prosecuting anyone before the king-archon as I am? Socrates: The Athenians do not call this a prosecution but an indictment, Euthyphro. Euthyphro: What is this you say? Someone must have indicted you, for you are not going to tell me that you have indicted someone else. Socrates:

No

indeed.

Euthyphro: But someone Socrates: Quite so. Euthyphro: Who is he?

else has indicted

you?

do not really know him myself, Euthyphro. He is apparently young and unknown. They call him Meletus, I believe. He belongs to the Pitthean deme, if you know anyone from that deme called Meletus, with long hair, not much of a beard, and a rather aquiline nose. Socrates:

I

Euthyphro: against you? c

Socrates:

I

don't

know

What charge?

A

him, Socrates.

What charge does he

not ignoble one

I

think, for

it

is

bring

no small

young man to have knowledge of such an important subject. He says he knows how our young men are corrupted and who corrupts them. He is likely to be wise, and when he sees my ignorance corrupting thing for a

d

3

he proceeds to accuse me to the city as to their mother. I think he is the only one of our public men to start out the right way, for it is right to care first that the young should be as good as possible, just as a good farmer is likely to take care of the young plants first, and of the others later. So, too, Meletus first gets rid of us who corrupt the young shoots, as he says, and then afterwards he will obviously take care of the older ones and become a source of great blessings for the city, as seems likely to happen to one who started out this way. Euthyphro: I could wish this were true, Socrates, but I fear the opposite may happen. He seems to me to start out by harming the very heart of his contemporaries,

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

Euthyphro

3

by attempting corrupt the young?

the city to

to

wrong you.

me, what does he say you do

Tell

he says that I am a maker of gods, and on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the old gods, he has indicted me for their sake, as he puts it. Euthyphro: I understand, Socrates. This is because you say that the divine sign keeps coming to you So he has written this indictment against you as one who makes innovations in religious matters, and he comes to court to slander you, knowing that such things are easily misrepresented to the crowd. The same is true in my case. Whenever I speak of divine matters in the assembly and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy; and yet I have foretold nothing that did not happen. Nevertheless, they envy all of us who do this. One need not worry about them, but meet them head-on. Socrates: My dear Euthyphro, to be laughed at does not matter perhaps, for the Athenians do not mind anyone they think clever, as long as he does not teach his own wisdom, but if they think that he makes others to be like himself they get angry, whether through envy, as you say, or for Socrates: Strange things, to hear him

tell

it,

for

1

.

some

other reason.

Euthyphro:

I

have certainly no desire

to test their feelings

towards

me

in this matter.

Socrates: Perhaps you seem to make yourself but rarely available, and not be willing to teach your own wisdom, but I'm afraid that my liking

makes them think

anybody anything I have to say, not only without charging a fee but even glad to reward anyone who is willing to listen. If then they were intending to laugh at me, as you say they laugh at you, there would be nothing unpleasant in their spending their time in court laughing and jesting, but if they are going to be serious, the outcome is not clear except to you prophets. Euthyphro: Perhaps it will come to nothing, Socrates, and you will fight your case as you think best, as I think I will mine. Socrates: What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you the defendant or for people

that

I

pour out

to

the prosecutor?

Euthyphro: The prosecutor. Socrates:

Whom

Euthyphro: One

do you prosecute?

whom am

thought crazy to prosecute. Socrates: Are you pursuing someone who will easily escape you? Euthyphro: Far from it, for he is quite old. Socrates:

Who

I

is it?

My father. My dear sir!

Euthyphro: Socrates:

Euthyphro: Certainly.

1.

See Apology 31 d.

Your own

father?

Euthyphro

4

Socrates:

What

is

the charge?

What

is

the case about?

Euthyphro: Murder, Socrates. b

Socrates: Good heavens! Certainly, Euthyphro, most men would not know how they could do this and be right. It is not the part of anyone to

do

is

this,

but of one

who

is

far

advanced

in

wisdom.

Euthyphro: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is so. Socrates: Is then the man your father killed one of your relatives? Or that obvious, for you would not prosecute your father for the murder

of a stranger.

c

d

e

5

b

Euthyphro: It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think that it makes any difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go, but if not, one should prosecute, if, that is to say, the killer shares your hearth and table. The pollution is the same if you knowingly keep company with such a man and do not cleanse yourself and him by bringing him to justice. The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he was a servant of ours. He killed one of our household slaves in drunken anger, so my father bound him hand and foot and threw him in a ditch, then sent a man here to inquire from the priest what should be done. During that time he gave no thought or care to the bound man, as being a killer, and it was no matter if he died, which he did. Hunger and cold and his bonds caused his death before the messenger came back from the seer. Both my father and my other relatives are angry that I am prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of a murderer when he hadn't even killed him, they say, and even if he had, the dead man does not deserve a thought, since he was a killer. For, they say, it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder. But their ideas of the divine attitude to piety and impiety are wrong, Socrates. Socrates: Whereas, by Zeus, Euthyphro, you think that your knowledge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate that, when those things happened as you say, you have no fear of having acted impiously in bringing your father to trial? Euthyphro: I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would not be superior to the majority of men, if I did not have accurate knowledge of all such things. Socrates: It is indeed most important, my admirable Euthyphro, that I should become your pupil, and as regards this indictment challenge Meletus about these very things and say to him: that in the past too I considered knowledge about the divine to be most important, and that now that he says that I am guilty of improvising and innovating about the gods I have become your pupil. I would say to him: "If, Meletus, you agree that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, consider me, too, to have the right beliefs

and do not bring

me

father,

trial. If

you do not think

so,

then prosecute

me, for corrupting the older men, me and his by teaching me and by exhorting and punishing him." If he

that teacher of mine, not

own

to

Euthyphro is I

5

not convinced, and does not discharge me or indict you instead of me, shall repeat the same challenge in court. Euthyphro: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and, if he should try to indict me, I

think

him

I

would

find his

weak

spots and the talk in court

would be about

rather than about me.

Socrates: It is because I realize this that I am eager to become your pupil, my dear friend. I know that other people as well as this Meletus do not even seem to notice you, whereas he sees me so sharply and clearly that he indicts me for ungodliness. So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards murder and other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance in so far as it is

impious? Euthyphro: Most certainly, Socrates. Socrates: Tell

me

then,

what

is

the pious,

and what the impious, do

you say? Euthyphro: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious. And observe, Socrates, that I can cite powerful evidence that the law is so. I have already said to others that such actions are right, not to favor the ungodly, whoever they are. These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father for similar reasons. But they are angry with me because I am prosecuting my father for his wrongdoing. They contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me. Socrates: Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defendant in the case, because I find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely to be the reason why I shall be told I do wrong. Now, however, if you, who have full knowledge of such things, share their opinions, then we must agree with them, too, it would seem. For what are we to say, we who agree that we ourselves have no knowledge of them? Tell me, by the god of friendship, do you really believe these things are true?

Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates, and so are even more surprising things, of which the majority has no knowledge. Socrates:

And do you

believe that there really

is

war among

the gods,

and other such things as are told by the poets, and other sacred stories such as are embroidered by good writers and by representations of which the robe of the goddess is adorned when it is carried up to the Acropolis? Are we to say these things are true, Euand

terrible enmities

thyphro?

and

battles,

Euthyphro

6

Euthyphro: Not only these, Socrates, but, as I was saying just now, I will, if you wish, relate many other things about the gods which I know will

amaze you.

Socrates: I should not be surprised, but you will tell me these at leisure some other time. For now, try to tell me more clearly what I was asking just now, for, my friend, you did not teach me adequately when I asked you what the pious was, but you told me that what you are doing now, in prosecuting

Euthyphro:

your father

And

I

for

murder,

is

pious.

told the truth, Socrates.

Socrates: Perhaps.

You

agree, however, that there are

many

other pi-

ous actions. Euthyphro: There are. Socrates: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don't you remember? Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another's that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not. Euthyphro: If that is how you want it, Socrates, that is how I will tell you. Socrates: That is what I want. Euthyphro: Well then, what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is

impious. Socrates: Splendid, Euthyphro!

You have now answered in the way I true I do not know yet, but you will

wanted. Whether your answer is obviously show me that what you say is true. Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: Come then, let us examine what we mean. An action or a man dear to the gods is pious, but an action or a man hated by the gods is impious. They are not the same, but quite opposite, the pious and the impious.

Is

that not so?

Euthyphro: Socrates:

It is

And

Euthyphro:

I

We

indeed.

that

seems

to

be a good statement?

think so, Socrates.

have also stated that the gods are in a state of discord, that they are at odds with each other, Euthyphro, and that they are at enmity with each other. Has that, too, been said? Euthyphro: It has. Socrates: What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other, or would we proceed to count and soon resolve our difference about this? Euthyphro: We would certainly do so. Socrates:

7

Euthyphro

Socrates: Again,, if we differed about the larger and the smaller, would turn to measurement and soon cease to differ.

Euthyphro: That is so. Socrates: And about the heavier and the weighing and be reconciled. Euthyphro: Of course.

lighter,

we would

we

resort to

would make us angry and hostile to each other if we were unable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but examine as I tell you whether these subjects are the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the Socrates:

What

subject of difference

bad. Are these not the subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and other men become hostile to each other

whenever we do?

Euthyphro: That is the difference, Socrates, about those subjects. Socrates: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If indeed they have differences, will it not be about these same subjects? Euthyphro: It certainly must be so. Socrates: Then according to your argument, my good Euthyphro, different gods consider different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad, for they would not be at odds with one another unless they differed about these subjects, would they? Euthyphro: You are right. Socrates: And they like what each of them considers beautiful, good,

and

just,

and hate the opposites

of these?

Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: But you say that the same things are considered just by some gods and unjust by others, and as they dispute about these things they are at odds and at war with each other. Is that not so? Euthyphro: It is. Socrates: The same things then are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and would be both god-loved and god-hated. Euthyphro: It seems likely. Socrates: And the same things would be both pious and impious, according to this argument? Euthyphro: I'm afraid so. Socrates: So you did not answer my question, you surprising man. I did not ask you what same thing is both pious and impious, and it appears that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. So it is in no way surprising if your present action, namely punishing your father, may be pleasing to Zeus but displeasing to Cronus and Uranus, pleasing to Hephaestus but displeasing to Hera, and so with any other gods who differ from each other on this subject. Euthyphro: I think, Socrates, that on this subject no gods would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty.

Euthyphro

8 c

Socrates: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man maintaining that one who has killed or done anything else unjustly should not pay the penalty?

on this subject, both elsewhere when they have committed many wrongs they do

Euthyphro: They never cease

d

to dispute

and in the courts, for and say anything to avoid the penalty. Socrates: Do they agree they have done wrong, Euthyphro, and in spite of so agreeing do they nevertheless say they should not be punished? Euthyphro: No, they do not agree on that point. Socrates: So they do not say or do just anything. For they do not venture to say this, or dispute that they must not pay the penalty if they have done wrong, but I think they deny doing wrong. Is that not so? Euthyphro: That

is

true.

Socrates: Then they do not dispute that the wrongdoer must be punished, but they may disagree as to who the wrongdoer is, what he did

and when. Euthyphro: You are

Do

not the gods have the same experience, if indeed they are at odds with each other about the just and the unjust, as your argument maintains? Some assert that they wrong one another, while others deny it, but no one among gods or men ventures to say that the wrongdoer Socrates:

e

right.

must not be punished. Euthyphro: Yes, that Socrates:

is

true, Socrates, as to the

main

point.

those who disagree, whether men or gods, dispute about indeed the gods disagree. Some say it is done justly, others

And

each action,

if

unjustly. Is that not so?

Euthyphro: Yes, indeed. 9

Come now, my dear Euthyphro, tell me, too, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods consider that man to have been killed unjustly who became a murderer while in your service, was Socrates:

bound by the master of his victim, and died in his bonds before the one who bound him found out from the seers what was to be done with him, and b

that

it is

right for a son to

denounce and

on the gods

to prosecute his father

behalf of such a man. Come, try to show me a clear sign that all definitely believe this action to be right. If you can give me adequate proof

never cease to extol your wisdom. Euthyphro: This is perhaps no light task, Socrates, though I could show you very clearly. Socrates: I understand that you think me more dull-witted than the jury, as you will obviously show them that these actions were unjust and that all the gods hate such actions. Euthyphro: I will show it to them clearly, Socrates, if only they will of this,

I

listen to c

shall

me.

they think you show them well. But this thought came to me as you were speaking, and I am examining it, saying to myself: "If Euthyphro shows me conclusively that all the gods consider Socrates: They will listen

if

— 9

Euthyphro

such a death unjust,

to

what

greater extent have

I

learned from

him

the

nature of piety and impiety? This action would then, it seems, be hated by the gods, but the pious and the impious were not thereby now defined, for what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them/' So I will not insist on this point; let us assume, if you wish, that all the gods consider this unjust and that they all hate it. However, is this the correction we are making in our discussion, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they all love is pious, and that what some gods love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you now wish us to define piety

and impiety?

Euthyphro: What prevents us from doing so, Socrates? Socrates: For my part nothing, Euthyphro, but you look whether on your part this proposal will enable you to teach me most easily what you promised. Euthyphro: I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious. Socrates: Then let us again examine whether that is a sound statement, or do we let it pass, and if one of us, or someone else, merely says that something is so, do we accept that it is so? Or should we examine what the speaker means? Euthyphro: We must examine it, but I certainly think that this is now a fine statement.

We

soon know better whether it is. Consider this: Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods? Euthyphro: I don't know what you mean, Socrates. Socrates: I shall try to explain more clearly: we speak of something carried and something carrying, of something led and something leading, of something seen and something seeing, and you understand that these things are all different from one another and how they differ? Euthyphro: I think I do. Socrates: So there is also something loved and a different thing something loving. Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: Tell me then whether the thing carried is a carried thing because it is being carried, or for some other reason? Euthyphro: No, that is the reason. Socrates: And the thing led is so because it is being led, and the thing seen because it is being seen? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: It is not being seen because it is a thing seen but on the contrary it is a thing seen because it is being seen; nor is it because it is something led that it is being led but because it is being led that it is something led; nor is something being carried because it is something carried, but it is something carried because it is being carried. Is what I want to say clear, Euthyphro? I want to say this, namely, that if anything is being changed Socrates:

shall

—

Euthyphro

10

being affected in any way, it is not being changed because it is something changed, but rather it is something changed because it is being changed; nor is it being affected because it is something affected, but it is something affected because it is being affected. 2 Or do you not agree? or

is

Euthyphro:

e

11

do.

something loved either something changed or something affected by something? Euthyphro: Certainly. Socrates: So it is in the same case as the things just mentioned; it is not being loved by those who love it because it is something loved, but it is something loved because it is being loved by them? Euthyphro: Necessarily. Socrates: What then do we say about the pious, Euthyphro? Surely that it is being loved by all the gods, according to what you say? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Is it being loved because it is pious, or for some other reason? Euthyphro: For no other reason. Socrates: It is being loved then because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved? Euthyphro: Apparently. Socrates: And yet it is something loved and god-loved because it is being loved by the gods? Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: Then the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor the pious the same as the god-loved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other. Euthyphro: How so, Socrates? Socrates: Because we agree that the pious is being loved for this reason, that it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved. Is that not so? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: And that the god-loved, on the other hand, is so because it is being loved by the gods, by the very fact of being loved, but it is not being loved because it is god-loved. Euthyphro: True. Socrates: But if the god-loved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then if the pious was being loved because it was pious, the god-loved would also be being loved because it was god-loved; and if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the gods, then Socrates:

d

I

Is

Here Socrates gives the general principle under which, he says, the specific cases already examined those of leading, carrying, and seeing all fall. It is by being changed by something that changes it (e.g. by carrying it somewhere) that anything is a changed thing not vice versa: it is not by something's being a changed thing that something else then changes it so that it comes to be being changed (e.g. by carrying it somewhere). Likewise for "affections" such as being seen by someone: it is by being "affected" by something that "affects" it that anything is an "affected" thing, not vice versa. It is not by being an "affected" thing (e.g., a thing seen) that something else then "affects" it. 2.

—

—

—

11

Euthyphro

would also be pious because it was being loved by the gods. But now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different the pious

such as to be loved because it is being loved, the other is being loved because it is such as to be loved. I'm afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is, you did not wish to make its nature clear to me, but you told me an affect or quality of it, that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is. Now, if you will, do not hide things from me but tell me again from the beginning what piety is, whether being loved by the gods or having some other quality we shall not quarrel about that but be keen to tell me what the pious and the impious are. Euthyphro: But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we establish it. Socrates: Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to belong to my ancestor, Daedalus. If I were stating them and putting them forward, you would perhaps be making fun of me and say that because of my kinship with him my conclusions in discussion run away and will not stay where one puts them. As these propositions are yours, however, we need some other jest, for they will not stay put for you, as you say yourself. Euthyphro: I think the same jest will do for our discussion, Socrates, for I am not the one who makes them go round and not remain in the same place; it is you who are the Daedalus; for as far as I am concerned they would remain as they were. Socrates: It looks as if I was cleverer than Daedalus in using my skill, my friend, in so far as he could only cause to move the things he made himself, but I can make other people's move as well as my own. And the smartest part of my skill is that I am clever without wanting to be, for I would rather have your statements to me remain unmoved than possess the wealth of Tantalus as well as the cleverness of Daedalus. But enough of this. Since I think you are making unnecessary difficulties, I am as eager as you are to find a way to teach me about piety, and do not give up before you do. See whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just. Euthyphro: I think so. Socrates: And is then all that is just pious? Or is all that is pious just, but not all that is just pious, but some of it is and some is not? Euthyphro: I do not follow what you are saying, Socrates. Socrates: Yet you are younger than I by as much as you are wiser. As I say, you are making difficulties because of your wealth of wisdom. Pull yourself together, my dear sir, what I am saying is not difficult to grasp. I am saying the opposite of what the poet said who wrote:

from each

other: the

one

is

—

—

You do not wish all

3.

to

name Zeus, who had done

things grow, for inhere there

Author unknown.

is

fear there

is

it,

and who made

also shame.

3

Euthyphro

12

disagree with the poet. Shall

I

tell

I

you why?

Euthyphro: Please do. Socrates: for

I

do not think

I

think that

such things

that

"where there

many people who

fear disease

but are not ashamed of

feel fear,

is

fear there

also shame,"

is

and poverty and many other the things they fear. Do you

not think so?

Euthyphro: I do indeed. Socrates: But where there c

shame

there

anyone

who, in feeling shame and embarrassment at anything, does not the same time fear and dread a reputation for wickedness?

also at

Euthyphro:

He

is

there

is

also fear. For

is

certainly afraid.

is

Socrates: It is then not right to say "where there is fear there is also shame," but that where there is shame there is also fear, for fear covers a larger area than shame. Shame is a part of fear just as odd is a part of

number, with the is

result that

also oddness, but that

it is

not true that where there

where there

is

oddness there

is

is

number

also

there

number.

Do

you follow me now? Euthyphro: Surely.

was asking before, whether where there is piety there is also justice, but where there is justice there is not always piety, for the pious is a part of justice. Shall we say that, or do you Socrates: This

d

is

the kind of thing

I

think otherwise?

Euthyphro: No, but

like that, for

what you say appears

Socrates: See what comes next: if the pious must, it seems, find out what part of the just it

is

to

be

right.

a part of the just,

Now

we me

you asked something of what we mentioned just now, such as what part of number is the even, and what number that is, I would say it is the number that is divisible into two equal, not unequal, parts. Or do you not think so? e

is.

if

Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: Try in this way to tell me what part of the just the pious is, in order to tell Meletus not to wrong us any more and not to indict me for ungodliness, since I have learned from you sufficiently what is godly

and pious and what

is

not.

Euthyphro: I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice. Socrates: You seem to me to put that very well, but I still need a bit of 13

do not know yet what you mean by care, for you do not mean the care of the gods in the same sense as the care of other things, information.

I

example, we say, don't we, that not everyone knows how to care for horses, but the horse breeder does. Euthyphro: Yes, I do mean it that way. Socrates: So horse breeding is the care of horses. Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Nor does everyone know how to care for dogs, but the hunter does. as, for

13

Euthyphro

Euthyphro: That is so. Socrates: So hunting is the care of dogs. Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates:

And

cattle raising is the care of cattle.

Euthyphro: Quite so. Socrates: While piety and godliness Is

that

is

the care of the gods, Euthyphro.

what you mean?

Euthyphro: Socrates:

It is.

Now care in each case

has the same

effect;

it

aims

at the

good

and the benefit of the object cared for, as you can see that horses cared for by horse breeders are benefited and become better. Or do you not think so?

Euthyphro: I do. Socrates: So dogs are benefited by dog breeding, cattle by cattle raising, and so with all the others. Or do you think that care aims to harm the object of

its

care?

Euthyphro: By Zeus, no. Socrates: It aims to benefit the object of Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates:

Is

piety then,

which

is

its

care?

the care of the gods, also to benefit the

gods and make them better? Would you agree that when you do something pious you make some one of the gods better? Euthyphro: By Zeus, no. Socrates: Nor do I think that this is what you mean far from it but that is why I asked you what you meant by the care of gods, because I did not believe you meant this kind of care. Euthyphro: Quite right, Socrates, that is not the kind of care I mean. Socrates: Very well, but what kind of care of the gods would piety be? Euthyphro: The kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.

—

—

understand. It is likely to be a kind of service of the gods. Euthyphro: Quite so. Socrates: Could you tell me to the achievement of what goal service to doctors tends? Is it not, do you think, to achieving health? Euthyphro: I think so. Socrates: What about service to shipbuilders? To what achievement is Socrates:

it

I

directed?

Euthyphro: Clearly, Socrates, Socrates:

And

to the building of a ship.

service to housebuilders to the building of a house?

Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Tell

me

then,

my

good

sir,

to the

achievement of what aim

does service to the gods tend? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the best knowledge of the divine. Euthyphro: And I am telling the truth, Socrates. Socrates: Tell me then, by Zeus, what is that excellent aim that the gods achieve, using us as their servants? Euthyphro: Many fine things, Socrates.

Euthyphro

14 14

Socrates: So do generals, my friend. Nevertheless you could easily me their main concern, which is to achieve victory in war, is it not?

tell

Euthyphro: Of course. Socrates: The farmers too,

main point

b

c

of their efforts

is

I

to

think, achieve

many

fine things,

produce food from the

earth.

Euthyphro: Quite so. Socrates: Well then, how would you sum up the many fine things that the gods achieve? Euthyphro: I told you a short while ago, Socrates, that it is a considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things, but, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve both private houses and public affairs of state. The opposite of these pleasing actions are impious and overturn and destroy everything. Socrates: You could tell me in far fewer words, if you were willing, the sum of what I asked, Euthyphro, but you are not keen to teach me, that is clear. You were on the point of doing so, but you turned away. If you had given that answer, I should now have acquired from you sufficient

knowledge

of the nature of piety.

As

it is,

must follow what do you say

the lover of inquiry

beloved wherever it may lead him. Once more then, that piety and the pious are? Are they a knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray? Euthyphro: They are. Socrates: To sacrifice is to make a gift to the gods, whereas to pray is to beg from the gods? Euthyphro: Definitely, Socrates. Socrates: It would follow from this statement that piety would be a knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods. Euthyphro: You understood what I said very well, Socrates. Socrates: That is because I am so desirous of your wisdom, and I concentrate my mind on it, so that no word of yours may fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it is to beg from his

d

but the

them and

to give to

Euthyphro: Socrates:

I

them?

do.

And

to

beg correctly would be

to ask

from them things that

we

need? Euthyphro: What else?

e

And

Socrates: us, for

way

it

to give correctly

would not be

them what they need from bring gifts to anyone that are in no

is

skillful to

to give

needed.

Euthyphro: True, Socrates. Socrates: Piety

would then be

a sort of trading skill

between gods

and men? Euthyphro: Trading yes, Socrates:

I

if

you

prefer to call

prefer nothing, unless

it is

true.

it

But

that. tell

the gods derive from the gifts they receive from us?

me, what benefit do

What they

give us

is

15

Euthyphro

obvious to all. There is for us no good that we do not receive from them, but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Or do we have such an advantage over them in the trade that we receive all our blessings from them and they receive nothing from us? Euthyphro: Do you suppose, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us? Socrates: What could those gifts from us to the gods be, Euthyphro? Euthyphro: What else, do you think, than honor, reverence, and what

mentioned

I

just

now, gratitude?

Socrates: The pious is then, Euthyphro, pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them? Euthyphro: I think it is of all things most dear to them. Socrates: So the pious is once again what is dear to the gods.

Euthyphro: Most Socrates:

certainly.

When you

say

this, will

you be surprised

if

your arguments

move about instead of staying put? And will you accuse me of being Daedalus who makes them move, though you are yourself much more skillful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not realize that our argument has moved around and come again to the same place? You surely remember that earlier the pious and the godloved were shown not to be the same but different from each other. Or seem

to

do you not remember? Euthyphro:

is

do.

then not realize now that you are saying that what dear to the gods is the pious? Is this not the same as the god-loved? Or it not?

Socrates: is

I

Do you

Euthyphro:

It

certainly

Socrates: Either right then,

we

are

is.

we were wrong when we

agreed before,

or, if

we were

wrong now.

Euthyphro: That seems to be so. Socrates: So we must investigate again from the beginning what piety is,

as

I

shall not willingly give

up

before

I

learn this.

Do

me For you know not think

unworthy, but concentrate your attention and tell the truth. 4 before you it, if any man does, and I must not let you go, like Proteus tell me. If you had no clear knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on behalf of a servant. For fear of the gods you would have been afraid to take the risk lest you should not be acting rightly, and would have been ashamed before men, but now I know well that you believe you have clear knowledge of piety and impiety. So tell me, my good Euthyphro, and do not hide ,

what you think

it is.

Euthyphro: Some other time, Socrates, is

4.

time for

me

to go.

See Odyssey iv.382

ff.

for

I

am

in a

hurry now, and

it

Euthyphro

16

16

my

By going you have cast me down from a great hope I had, that I would learn from you the nature of the pious and the impious and so escape Meletus' indictment by showing him that I had acquired wisdom in divine matters from Euthyphro, and my ignorance would no longer cause me to be careless and inventive about such things, and that I would be better for the rest of my life. Socrates:

What

a thing to do,

friend!

APOLOGY known

'Apology' of Socrates in deference to the word apologia that stands in its Greek title. Actually the word means not an apology but .a defense speech in a legal proceeding and that is what we certainly Socrates does not apologize for anything! This is not really a get This work

universally

is

as Plato's

,

,

,

—

,

dialogue. Except for an interlude

when he engages one

of his accusers in the

sort of question-and-answer discussion characteristic of Plato's 'Socratic' dialogues, we see Socrates delivering a speech before his jury of 501 fellow male

Athenians. At the age of seventy he had been indicted for breaking the law for offending the Olympian gods (Zeus, Apollo, and the against 'impiety'

—

rest)

recognized

in the city's festivals

the charge, such as

it

was, lay in the

and other

way

official activities.

that, for

been carrying on his philosophical work in Athens. that the real basis for

associates had been

it

many It

The

basis of

years, Socrates

has often been thought

known

lay in 'guilt by association': several of Socrates'

prominent malfeasants

in

had

Athens' defeat

in the

Peloponne-

War

only a few years earlier and the oligarchic reign of terror that followed; but an amnesty had forbidden suits based on political offenses during that time. However much those associations may have been in the minds of his

sian

accusers

—and

his jurors, too

charges as lodged. After

all,

—Plato makes him respond

these

would be

sincerely to the

the ultimate basis on

which he

should or shoidd not be found guilty of anything. So he takes the occasion to explain and defend his devotion to philosophy, and the particular ways he has

pursued that in the city

in discussions with select

—discussions

like those

we

young men and with people prominent

see in Plato's other 'Socratic' works.

He

argues that, so far from offending the gods through his philosophizing, or showing disbelief in them, he has piously followed their lead (particularly that of Apollo, through his oracle at Delphi) in making himself as good a person as he can and encouraging (even goading) others

do the same. The gods want,

to

more than anything else, that we shall be good, and goodness depends principally upon the quality of our understanding of what to care about and how to behave in our

lives:

philosophy, through Socratic discussion

is

,

the pursuit of

that understanding.

This trial in

ing

is,

of course, no record of the actual defense Socrates

399

how

b.c.,

but a composition of Plato's

closely, if at all,

it

conforms

own

mounted

—we have no way

to Socrates' real speech.

us the best, most serious, response to the charges that, on his of Socrates, Socrates

charged? In deciding

was

entitled to give.

this,

Was

In

it

at his

of

know-

Plato gives

own knowledge

Socrates nonetheless guilty as

readers should notice that, however sincere Plato's

17

,

Apology

18 Socrates

does set

may be in up human

claiming a pious motivation for his philosophical work he reason in his own person as the final arbiter of what is ,

want us to do: he interprets Apollo through his oracle at Delphi to have told him to do that! As we see also from Euthyphro, he has no truck with the authority of myths or ancient poets or religious tradition and 'divination' to tell us what to think about the gods and right

and wrong and ,

so of

what

the gods

,

their

commands

or wishes as regards ourselves.

In democratic Athens , juries were randomly selected subsets

—

—

representa-

Hence as Socrates makes clear, he is addressing the democratic people of Athens, and when the jury find him guilty and condemn him to death, they act as and for the Athenian people. Did Socrates bring on tives

his

of the whole people.

own condemnation, whether

,

wittingly or not, by refusing to say the sorts

comport himself in the sort of way that would have won his acquittal? Perhaps. True to his philosophical calling, he requires that the Athenians think, honestly and dispassionately, and decide the truth of the charges by of things

and

to

reasoning from the facts as they actually were. This was his final challenge to them to care more for their souls their minds, their power of reason than for

—

—

and comfort undisturbed by Plato wants us to see it, the failure was their peace

17

b

,

the likes of him. Seen in that light, as theirs.

do not know, men of Athens, how my accusers affected you; as for me, I was almost carried away in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak. And yet, hardly anything of what they said is true. Of the many lies they told, one in particular surprised me, namely that you should be careful not to be deceived by an accomplished speaker like me. That they were not ashamed to be immediately proved wrong by the facts, when I show myself not to be an accomplished speaker at all, that I thought was most shameless on their part unless indeed they call an accomplished speaker the man who speaks the truth. If they mean that, I would agree I

—

that c

d

I

am

an orator, but not

after their

was

manner,

for indeed, as

From me you

I

say,

whole truth, though not, by Zeus, gentlemen, expressed in embroidered and stylized phrases like theirs, but things spoken at random and expressed in the first words that come to mind, for I put my trust in the justice of what I say, and let none of you expect anything else. It would not be fitting at my age, as it might be for a young man, to toy with words when I appear before you. One thing I do ask and beg of you, gentlemen: if you hear me making my defense in the same kind of language as I am accustomed to use in the marketplace by the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do not be surprised or create a disturbance on that practically nothing they said

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

true.

will hear the

Apology

19

account.

The position

the age of seventy;

is this:

am

this is

my

first

appearance in a lawcourt,

at

therefore simply a stranger to the

manner of speaking here. Just as if I were really a stranger, you would certainly excuse me if I spoke in that dialect and manner in which I had been brought up, so too my present request seems a just one, for you to pay no attention to my manner of speech be it better or worse but to concentrate your attention on whether what I say is just or not, for the excellence of a judg e lies i n this, as th at of a speaker hesurutellmg-Th I

—

/Tt

is

right for haeTgerfETemen, to

/accusations

made

against

—

defend myself

me and my

first

accusers,

first

against the

first

lying

and then against the

and the later accusers. There have been many who have accused me to you for many years now, and none of their accusations are true. These I fear much more than I fear Anytus and his friends, though they too are formidable. These earlier ones, however, are more so, gentlemen; they got hold of most of you from childhood, persuaded you and later accusations

me

quite falsely, saying that there is a man called Socrates, a wise man, a student of all things in the sky and below the earth, who makes the worse argument the stronger. Those who spread that rumor, gentlemen, are my dangerous accusers, for their hearers believe that those who study

accused

do not even believe in the gods. Moreover, these accusers are numerous, and have been at it a long time; also, they spoke to you at an age when you would most readily believe them, some of you being children and adolescents, and they won their case by default, as there was no dethese things

fense.

^

_

___

Wtetls rmaSTabsurcf in all tKlslsTHafone cannot even know or mention their names unless one of them is a writer of comedies Those who maliciously and slanderously persuaded you who also, when persuaded 1

.

—

—

themselves then persuaded others all those are most difficult to deal with: one cannot bring one of them into court or refute him; one must simply fight with shadows, as it were, in making one's defense, and crossexamine when no one answers. I want you to realize too that my accusers are of two kinds: those who have accused me recently, and the old ones I mention; and to think that I must first defend myself against the latter, for you have also heard their accusations first, and to a much greater extent than the more recent.

Very well then. I must surely defend myself and attempt to uproot from your minds in so short a time the slander that has resided there so long. I wish this may happen, if it is in any way better for you and me, and

my

may be successful, but think this is very difficult and I am fully aware of how difficult it is. Even so, let the matter proceed as the god may wish, but I must obey the law and make my defense. that

defense

Let us then take

I

up

from its beginning. What is the accusation from which arose the slander in which Meletus trusted when he wrote This

the case

Aristophanes. Socrates refers below (19c) to the character Socrates in his Clouds (225 ff.), first produced in 423 b.c. 1.

is

Apology

20

out the charge against me? What did they say when they slandered me? read the affidavit they would I must, as if they were my actual prosecutors, have sworn. It goes something like this: Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing earth; in that he busies himself studying things in the sky and below the he makes the worse into the stronger argument, and he teaches these same things to others. You have seen this yourself in the comedy of Aristophanes,

swinging about there, saying he was walking on air and talking I do a lot of other nonsense about things of which Lknow nothing at all. not speak in contempt of such knowledge, if someone is wise in these but, gentlemen, I have lest Meletus bring more cases against me things no part in it, and on this point I call upon the majority of you as witnesses. heard me conversing, and I think it right that all those of you who have many of you have, should tell each other if anyone of you has ever heard

a Socrates

—

—

discussing such subjects to any extent at all. From this you will learn that the other things said about me by the majority are of the same kind.

me

Not one

of

them

is

And

true.

if

you have heard from anyone

that

I

undertake to teach people and charge a fee for it, that is not true either. Yet I think it a fine thing to be able to teach people as Gorgias of Leontini 2 does, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Flippias of Elis. Each of these men can go to any city and persuade the young, who can keep company with anyone of their own fellow citizens they want without paying, to leave the company of these, to join with themselves, pay them a fee, and be grateful to them besides. Indeed, I learned that there is another wise man from Paros who is visiting us, for I met a man who has spent more money on Sophists than everybody else put together, Callias, the son of Callias, I said, if your Hipponicus. So I asked him he has two sons

—

—

could find and engage a supervisor for them who would make them excel in their proper qualities, some horse breeder or farmer. Now since they are men, whom do you have in mind to supervise them? Who is an expert in this kind of excellence, the human and social kind? I think you must have given thought to this since you have sons. there is," he Is there such a person," I asked, "or is there not?" "Certainly sons were colts or calves,

we

he?" 1 asked, "What is his name, where is he from? and what is his fee?" "His name, Socrates, is Evenus, he comes from Paros, and his fee is five minas." I thought Evenus a happy man, if he really possesses this art, and teaches for so moderate a fee. Certainly I would pride and preen myself if I had this knowledge, but I do not have it, gentlemen. One of you might perhaps interrupt me and say: "But Socrates, what is your occupation? From where have these slanders come? For surely if you said.

"Who

is

did not busy yourself with something out of the common, all these rumors and talk would not have arisen unless you did something other than most people. Tell us what it is, that we may not speak inadvisedly about you. Anyone who says that seems to be right, and I will try to show you what These were all well-known Sophists. For Gorgias and Hippias see Plato's dialogues named after them; both Hippias and Prodicus appear in Protagoras. 2.

— Apology

21

has caused this reputation and slander. Listen then. Perhaps some of you will think I am jesting, but be sure that all that I shall say is true. What has caused my reputation is none other than a certain kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom, perhaps. It may be that I really possess this, while those whom I mentioned just now are wise with a wisdom more than human; else I cannot explain it, for I certainly do not possess it, and whoever says I do is lying and speaks to slander me. Do not create a disturbance, gentlemen, even if you think I am boasting, for the story I shall tell does not originate with me, but I will refer you to a trustworthy source. I shall call upon the god at Qelphi as witness to the_ ^-existence and nature of J3iyjwis4pm, if it be such.JYou Lno w CTi a e r eph o nTA He was my friend from youth, and the friend of most of you, as he shared your exile and your return. You surely know the kind of man he was, how impulsive in any course of action. He went to Delphi at one time and ventured to ask the oracle as I say, gentlemen, do not create a / disturbance he asked if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythian replied

no one was wiser. ChaerephonJs^^a^rbuLdu^djrother

^ou-abcaiDthis. Consider that

21

—

—

that

e

will testify to/

~

^

tHTycnxtms because I would inform you about the origin of the slander. When I heard of this reply I asked myself: "Whatever does the god mean? What is his riddle? I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For surely he does not lie; it is not legitimate for him to do so." For a long time I was at a loss as to his meaning; then I very reluctantly turned to some such investigation as this; I went to one of those reputed wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle and say to it: "This man is wiser than I, but you said I was." Then, when I examined this man there is no need for me to tell you his name, he was one of our public men my experience was something like this: I thought that he appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought himself wise, but that he was not. As a result he came to dislike me, and so did many of the bystanders. So I withdrew and thought to myself: "I am w iser t han this man; it is likely that neithe r o f us knows an ything worthwhile, but Tie thinks he knows something wKefTKe^oesTiot, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so 1 am likely to be wiser than he~fo this smalT extent” tlrat l do IrTyTthilik Ik no w w ha i..L dn.no t jcnjojv " Alter this I approached another man, one of those thought to be wiser than he, and I thought the same thing, and so I came to be disliked both by him and by many others. After that I proceeded systematically. I realized, to my sorrow and alarm, that I was getting unpopular, but I thought that I must attach the greatest importance to the god's oracle, so I must go to all those who had any reputation for knowledge to examine its meaning. And by the dog, gentlemen of the jury for I must tell you the truth I experienced something like this: in my invest igation in th e service of the god I found that tho se w,ho had the highest reputation were nearly the most deficient, while those I

b

c

—

d

v

.

—

—

e

22

J

Apology

knowledgeable.

I

must give

Had undertaken poets, to prove the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the the writers of tragedies and dithyrambs and the other s, intending q n t heir case to catch myself being more ignorant- than they^So I took up those poems with which they seemed to have taken most trouble and asked them what they meant, in order that I might at the same time learn something from them. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen, but I must. Almost all the bystanders might have explained the poems better than their authors could. I soon realized that poets do not compose their poems with knowledge, but by some inborn talent and by inspiration, like seers and prophets who also say many fine things without any understanding of what they say. The poets seemed to me to have had a simila experience. At the same time I saw that, because of their poetry, the" thought themselves very wise men in other respects, which they were not So there again I withdrew, thinking that I had the same advantage over

you an account

them

as

held

I

of

my journeyings as if they were labors"

I

over the politicians

went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically nothing, and I knew that I would find that they had knowledge of many fine things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, Finally

I

,

and to that extent they were wiser than I. Bu^ gentlemen of the .jury, the the sameTau it as thej? e>ets ;-£aeh of good craitsmeii-s^^ them, because ofj^uccess ^-Fhis^afL thoughthi mself very wise in othp r most important pursuits, and this error of theirs oversh ado wed the wisdom fjipy hark so that I asked myself;imi7eh^tf^rthe oracle, whetKer I should prefer to be as I am, with neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to have both. The answer I gave myself and the oracle was that it was to my advantage

be as

I

am.

gentlemen of the jury, I acquired much unpopularity, of a kind that is hard to deal with and is a heavy burden, many slanders came from these people and a reputation for wisdom, for in each case the bystanders thought that I myself possessed the wisdom that probable, gentlemen, is I proved that my interlocutor did not have. What is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing, and that when he says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example, as if he said: "This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his

As

23

to

a result of this investigation,

now

continue this investigation as the god bade me and I go around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise. Because of this occupation, to any extent, nor I do not have the leisure to engage in public affairs

wisdom

is

worthless." So even

I

—

look after my own, but I live in great poverty because of my service to the god. Furthermore, the young men who follow me around of their own free will, those who have most leisure, the sons of the very rich, take pleasure

indeed

to

-

Apology

23

people questioned; they themselves often imitate me and try to question others. I think they find an abundance of men who believe they have some knowledge but know little or nothing. The result is that those whom they question are angry, not with themselves but with me. They say: "That man Socrates is a pestilential fellow who corrupts the young." If one asks them what he does and what he teaches to corrupt them, they are silent, as they do not know, but, so as not to appear at a loss, they mention those accusations that are available against all philosophers, about "things in the sky and things below the earth," about "not believing in the gods" and "making the worse the stronger argument"; they would not want to tell the truth. I'm sure, that they have been proved to lay claim to knowledge when they know nothing. These people are ambitious, violent and numerous; they are continually and convincingly talking about me; they have been filling your ears for a long time with vehement slanders against me. From them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus being vexed on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the craftsmen and the politicians, Lycon on behalf of the orators, so that, as I started out by saying, I should be surprised if I could rid you of so much slander in so short a time. That, gentlemen of the jury, is the truth for you. I have hidden or disguised nothing. I know well enough that this very conduct makes me unpopular, and this is proof that what I say is true, that such is the slander against me, and that such are its causes. If you look into this either now or later, this is what you will find. Let this suffice as a defense against the charges of my earlier accusers. After this I shall try to defend myself against Meletus, that good and patriotic man, as he says he is, and my later accusers. As these are a different lot of accusers, let us again take up their sworn deposition. It goes something like this: Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young and of not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other new spiritual things? Such is their charge. Let us examine it point by point. He says that I am guilty of corrupting the young, but I say that Meletus is guilty of dealing frivolously with serious matters, of irresponsibly bringing people into court, and of professing to be seriously concerned with things about none of which he has ever cared, and I shall try to prove that this is so. Come here and tell me, Meletus. Surely you consider it of the greatest tanceAha^t-ou^ycmiagThAh^b^ns^oodas-possible.?,—Indeed-I-d Come then, tell the jury who improves them. You obviously know, i view of your concern. You say you have discovered the one who corrupts them, namely me, and you bring me here and accuse me to the jury. Come, inform the jury and tell them who it is. You see, Meletus, that you are silent and know not what to say. Does this not seem shameful to you and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have not been concerned with any of this? Tell me, my good sir, who improves our young men? VCThe laws TKaFnf not what I am asking, but what person who has knowledge of the laws to begin with? These jurymen, Socrates. in hearing

—

—

24

Apology

24

do you mean, Meletus? Are these able to educate the young and improve them? Certainly. All of them. All of them, or some but not others? Very good, by Hera. You mention a great abundance of benefactors. But what about the audience? Do they improve the young or not? They do, too. What about the members of Council? The Councillors, also. But, Meletus, what about the assembly? Do members of the assembly corrupt the young, or do they all improve them? They improve them. All the Athenians, it seems, make the young into fine good men, except me, and I alone corrupt them. Is that what you mean? That is most definitely what I mean.

How

—

—

—

—

—

—

You condemn me

b

to a great misfortune. Tell

me: does

this also

apply

do you think? That all men improve them and one individual Corrupts them? Or is quite the contrary true, one individual is able to improve them, or very few, namely, the horse breeders, whereas the majorIs that not the case, ity, if they have horses and use them, corrupt them? Meletus, both with horses and all other animals? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus say so or not. It would be a very happy state of affairs others improved them. if only one person corrupted our youth, while the You have made it sufficiently obvious, Meletus, that you have never had any concern for our youth; you show your indifference clearly; that you have given no thought to the subjects about which you bring me to trialj And by Zeus, Meletus, tell us also whether it is better for a man to live among good or wicked fellow citizens. Answer, my good man, for I am not asking a difficult question. Do not the wicked do some harm to those who are ever closest to them, whereas good people benefit them?

to horses i \j

a

Ai 4

—Certainly.

harmed than benefited by his associates? Answer, my good sir, for the law orders you to answer. Of course not. Is there any man who wants to be harmed? Come now, do you accuse me here of corrupting the young and making

And

does the

man

exist

who would

rather be

—

them worse

26

— Deliberately.

Are you so much wiser at your age than I am harm to at mine that you understand that wicked people always do some their closest neighbors while good people do them good, but I have reached such a pitch of ignorance that I do not realize this, namely that if I make one of my associates wicked I run the risk of being harmed by him so that I do not believe you, Meletus, I do such a great evil deliberately, as you say? and I do not think anyone else will. Either I do not corrupt the young or, case. Now if I corrupt if I do, it is unwillingly, and you are lying in either them unwillingly, the law does not require you to bring people to court to for such unwilling wrongdoings, but to get hold of them privately, instruct them and exhort them; for clearly, if I learn better, I shall cease my to do what I am doing unwillingly. You, however, have avoided company and were unwilling to instruct me, but you bring me here, where

What

e

deliberately or unwillingly?

fellows, Meletus?

Apology

25

the law requires one to bring those

who

are in need of punishment, not

of instruction.

And

gentlemen of the jury, what I said is clearly true: Meletus has never been at all concerned with these matters. Nonetheless tell us, Meletus, how you say that I corrupt the young; or is it obvious from your deposition that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city so,

believes but in other

new

—

what you say what I do say.

spiritual things? Is this not

I

teach

and so corrupt them? That is most certainly Then by those very gods about whom we are talking, Meletus, make this clearer to me and to the jury: I cannot be sure whether you mean that I teach the belief that there are some gods and therefore I myself believe that there are gods and am not altogether an atheist, nor am I guilty of that not, however, the gods in whom the city believes, but others, and that this is the charge against me, that they are others. Or whether you mean that I do not believe in gods at all, and that this is what I teach to others. This is what I mean, that you do not believe in gods at all. You are a strange fellow, Meletus. Why do you say this? Do I not believe, as other men do, that the sun and the moon are gods? No, by Zeus, jurymen, for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth. My dear Meletus, do you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras? Are you so contemptuous of the jury and think them so ignorant of letters as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of those theories, and further, that the young men learn from me what they can buy from time to time for a drachma, at most, in the bookshops, and ridicule Socrates if he pretends that these theories are his own, especially as they are so absurd? Is that, by Zeus, what you think of me, Meletus, that I do not believe that there are any gods? That is what I say, that you do not believe in the gods at all. You cannot be believed, Meletus, even, I think, by yourself. The man appears to me, gentlemen of the jury, highly insolent and uncontrolled. He seems to have made this deposition out of insolence, violence and youthful zeal. He is like one who composed a riddle and is trying it out: "Will the wise Socrates realize that I am jesting and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and others?" I think he contradicts himself in the affidavit, as if he said: "Socrates is guilty of not believing in gods but believing in gods," and surely that is the part of a jester! Examine with me, gentlemen, how he appears to contradict himself, and you, Meletus, answer us. Remember, gentlemen, what I asked you when

—

—

—

—

—

began, not to create a disturbance if I proceed in my usual manner. Does any man, Meletus, believe in human activities who does not believe in humans? Make him answer, and not again and again create a disturbance. Does any man who does not believe in horses believe in horsemen's activities? Or in flute-playing activities but not in flute-players? No, my good sir, no man could. If you are not willing to answer, I will tell you and the jury. Answer the next question, however. Does any man believe in spiritual activities who does not believe in spirits? No one. I

—

Apology

26

d

Thank you for answering, if reluctantly, when the jury made you. Now you say that I believe in spiritual things and teach about them, whether new or old, but at any rate spiritual things according to what you say, and to this you have sworn in your deposition. But if I believe in spiritual things I must quite inevitably believe in spirits. Is that not so? It is indeed, answer. Do we not believe I shall assume that you agree, as you do not Of course. spirits to be either gods or the children of gods? Yes or no? Then since I do believe in spirits, as you admit, if spirits are gods, this you state is what I mean when I say you speak in riddles and in jest, as that I do not believe in gods and then again that I do, since I do believe in spirits. If on the other hand the spirits are children of the gods, bastard children of the gods by nymphs or some other mothers, as they are said to be, what man would believe children of the gods to exist, but not gods? That would be just as absurd as to believe the young of horses and asses, namely mules, to exist, but not to believe in the existence of horses and asses. You must have made this deposition, Meletus, either to test us or because you were at a loss to find any true wrongdoing of which to accuse me. There is no way in which you could persuade anyone of even small intelligence that it is possible for one and the same man to believe in spiritual but not also in divine things, and then again for that same man

—

e

28

to believe neither in spirits

nor in gods nor in heroes.

requires a prolonged defense to prove that I am not guilty of the charges in Meletus' deposition, but this is sufficient. On the other hand, you know that what I said earlier is true, that I am very unpopular with many people. This will be my undoing, I

c

think,

gentlemen of the

am

.

d

jury, that

it

undone, not Meletus or Anytus but the slanders and envy of many people. This has destroyed many other good men and will, I think, continue to do so. There is no danger that it will stop at me. Someone might say: "Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have followed the kind of occupation that has led to your being now in danger of death? However, I should be right to reply to him: "You are wrong, sir, if you think that a man who is any good at all should take into account the risk of life or death; he should look to this only in his actions, whether what he does is right or wrong, whether he is acting like a good or a bad man. According to your view, all the heroes who died at Troy were inferior people, especially the son of Thetis who was so contemptuous of danger compared with disgrace 3 When he was eager to kill Hector, his goddess mother warned him, as I believe, in some such words as these: "My child, you if you avenge the death of your comrade, Patroclus, and you kill Hector, will die yourself, for your death is to follow immediately after Hector's." Hearing this, he despised death and danger and was much more afraid to live a coward who did not avenge his friends. "Let me die at once," he said, "when once I have given the wrongdoer his deserts, rather than

if I

b

do not

3.

See

Iliad xviii.94

ff.

Apology

27

remain here, earth."

This

a laughingstock

Do you is

by the curved

ships, a

burden upon the

think he gave thought to death and danger?

the truth of the matter, gentlemen of the jury: wherever a

man

has taken a position that he believes to be best, or has been placed by his commander, there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for death or anything else, rather than disgrace. It would have been a dreadful way to behave, gentlemen of the jury, if, at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium, I had, at the risk of death, like anyone else, remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered me, and then, when the god ordered me, as I thought and believed, to live the life of a philosopher, to examine myself and others, I had abandoned my post for fear of death or anything else. That would have been a dreadful thing, and then I might truly have justly been brought here for not believing that there are gods, disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking I was wise when I was not. To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know. No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have. I do know, however, that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one's superior, be he god or man. I shall never fear or avoid things of which I do not know, whether they may not be good rather than things that I know to be bad. Even if you acquitted me now and did not believe Anytus, who said to you that either I should not have been brought here in the first place, or that now I am here, you cannot avoid executing me, for if I should be acquitted, your sons would practice the teachings of Socrates and all be thoroughly corrupted; if you said to me in this regard: "Socrates, we do not believe Anytus now; we acquit you, but only on condition that you spend no more time on this investigation and do not practice philosophy, and if you are caught doing so you will die;" if, as I say, you were to acquit me on those terms, I would say to you: "Gentlemen of the jury, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet: Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?" Then, if one of you disputes this and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him and test him, and if I do not think he has attained the

Apology

28

goodness that he says he has, I shall reproach him because he attaches to little importance to the most important things and greater importance inferior things. I shall treat in this way anyone I happen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger, and more so the citizens because you are

more kindred to me. Be sure that this and I think there is no greater blessing

is

what the god orders me

to do,

than my service to the god. For I go around doing nothing but persuading both young and old among you not to care for your body or your wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as I say to you: "Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and for the city

4

." everything else good for men, both individually and collectively Now if by saying this I corrupt the young, this advice must be harmful, but if anyone says that I give different advice, he is talking nonsense. On this point I would say to you, gentlemen of the jury: "Whether you believe

whether you acquit me or not, do so on the understanding that this is my course of action, even if I am to face death many times." Do not create a disturbance, gentlemen, but abide by my request not to cry out at what I say but to listen, for I think it will be to your advantage to listen, and I am about to say other things at which you will perhaps cry out. By no means do this. Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say Neither Meletus nor I am, you will not harm me more than yourselves. Anytus can harm me in any way; he could not harm me, for I do not think certainly he might it is permitted that a better man be harmed by a worse; others kill me, or perhaps banish or disfranchise me, which he and maybe think to be great harm, but I do not think so. I think he is doing himself much greater harm doing what he is doing now, attempting to have a man executed unjustly. Indeed, gentlemen of the jury, I am far from making a defense now on my own behalf, as might be thought, but on yours, to prevent you from wrongdoing by mistreating the god's gift to you by condemning me; for if you kill me you will not easily find another like me. I was attached to this city by the god— though it seems a ridiculous thing to say as upon a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to be stirred up by a kind of gadfly. me in It is to fulfilll some such function that I believe the god has placed the city. I never cease to rouse each and every one of you, to persuade and reproach you all day long and everywhere I find myself in your company. Another such man will not easily come to be among you, gentlemen, and if you believe me you will spare me. You might easily be annoyed with me as people are when they are aroused from a doze, and strike out at me; if convinced by Anytus you could easily kill me, and then you could sleep on for the rest of your days, unless the god, in his care for you, sent you someone else. That I am the kind of person to be a gift of the god to the city you might realize from the fact that it does not seem

Anytus or

not,

—

Alternatively, this sentence could be translated: "Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence brings about wealth and all other public and private blessings 4.

for

men."

Apology like

29

human

nature for

me

to

have neglected

all

my own

affairs

and

to

have tolerated this neglect now for so many years while I was always concerned with you, approaching each one of you like a father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue. Now if I profited from this by charging a fee for my advice, there would be some sense to it, but you can see for yourselves that, for all their shameless accusations, my accusers have not been able in their impudence to bring forward a witness to say that I have ever received a fee or ever asked for one. I, on the other hand, have a convincing witness that I speak the truth, my poverty. It may seem strange that while I go around and give this advice privately and interfere in private affairs, I do not venture to go to the assembly and there advise the city. You have heard me give the reason for this in many places. I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything. This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right to prevent me. Be sure, gentlemen of the jury, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago, and benefited neither you nor myself. Do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; no man will survive who genuinely opposes you or any other crowd and prevents the occurrence

many unjust and

of

for justice

illegal

must lead

happenings

in the city.

a private, not a public, life

if

A man who really fights he

is

to survive for

even

a short time.

you great proofs of this, not words but what you esteem, deeds. Listen to what happened to me, that you may know that I will not yield to any man contrary to what is right, for fear of death, even if I should die at once for not yielding. The things I shall tell you are commonplace and smack of the lawcourts, but they are true. I have never held any other office in the city, but I served as a member of the Council, and our tribe Antiochis was presiding at the time when you wanted to try as a body the ten generals who had failed to pick up the survivors of the naval battle This was illegal, as you all recognized later. I was the only member I

shall give

3

.

committee to oppose your doing something contrary to the laws, and I voted against it. The orators were ready to prosecute me and take me away, and your shouts were egging them on, but I thought I should run any risk on the side of law and justice rather than join you, for fear of prison or death, when you were engaged in an unjust course. This happened when the city was still a democracy. When the oligarchy was established, the Thirty 6 summoned me to the Hall, along with four others, and ordered us to bring Leon from Salamis, that he might be of the presiding

5.

This

was

the battle of Arginusae (south of Lesbos) in 406

victory of the Peloponnesian war.

b.c.,

the last Athenian

A violent storm prevented the Athenian generals from

rescuing their survivors. 6. b.c.

This

was

was set up after the final defeat of Athens in 404 some nine months in 404-3 before the democracy was restored.

the harsh oligarchy that

and ruled Athens

for

Apology

30

They gave many such orders to many people, in order to implicate as many as possible in their guilt. Then I showed again, not in words but in action, that, if it were not rather vulgar to say so, death is something anything I couldn't care less about, but that my whole concern is not to do executed.

d

unjust or impious. That government, powerful as it was, did not frighten me into any wrongdoing. When we left the Hall, the other four went to e

33

b

Salamis and brought in Leon, but I went home. I might have been put to death for this, had not the government fallen shortly afterwards. There are many who will witness to these events. Do you think I would have survived all these years if I were engaged in public affairs and, acting as a good man must, came to the help of justice and considered this the most important thing? Far from it, gentlemen of

would any other man. Throughout my life, in any public activity I may have engaged in, I am the same man as I am in private life. neither I have never come to an agreement with anyone to act unjustly,

the jury, nor

with anyone else nor with any one of those who they slanderously say are my pupils. I have never been anyone's teacher. If anyone, young or old, desires to listen to me when I am talking and dealing with my own concerns, I have never begrudged this to anyone, but I do not converse when I receive a fee and not when I do not. I am equally ready to question

and the poor if anyone is willing to answer my questions and listen to what I say. And I cannot justly be held responsible for the good or bad conduct of these people, as I never promised to teach them anything and have not done so. If anyone says that he has learned anything from

the rich

c

d

me, or that he heard anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the truth, Why then do some people enjoy spending considerable time in my company? You have heard why, gentlemen of the jury, I have told you the whole truth. They enjoy hearing those being questioned who think they are wise, but are not. And this is not unpleasant. To do this has, as I say, been enjoined upon me by the god, by means of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever ordered a man to do anything. This is true, gentlemen, and can easily be established, If I corrupt some young men and have corrupted others, then surely some of them who have grown older and realized that I gave them bad advice when they were young should now themselves come up here to accuse me and avenge themselves. If they were unwilling to do so them-

some of their kindred, their fathers or brothers or other relations should recall it now if their family had been harmed by me. I see many of these present here, first Crito, my contemporary and fellow demesman,

selves, then

e

the father of Critobulus here; next Lysanias of Sphettus, the father of Aeschines here; also Antiphon the Cephisian, the father of Epigenes; and others whose brothers spent their time in this way; Nicostratus, the son

and Theodotus has died so he could son of Demodocus, whose brother was

of Theozotides, brother of Theodotus, 34

not influence him; Paralius here, Theages; there is Adeimantus, son of Ariston, brother of Plato here; Acantidorus, brother of Apollodorus here.

Apology

31

could mention many others, some one of whom surely Meletus should have brought in as witness in his own speech. If he forgot to do so, then let him do it now; I will yield time if he has anything of the kind to say. You will find quite the contrary, gentlemen. These men are all ready to come to the help of the corruptor, the man who has harmed their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those who were corrupted might well have reason to help me, but the uncorrupted, their kindred who are older men, have no reason to help me except the right and proper one, that they know that Meletus is lying and that I am telling the truth. I

Very well, gentlemen of the jury. This, and maybe other similar things, is what I have to say in my defense. Perhaps one of you might be angry as he recalls that when he himself stood trial on a less dangerous charge, he begged and implored the jury with many tears, that he brought his children and many of his friends and family into court to arouse as much pity as he could, but that I do none of these things, even though I may seem to be running the ultimate risk. Thinking of this, he might feel resentful toward me and, angry about this, cast his vote in anger. If there is such a one among you I do not deem there is, but if there is I think it would be right to say in reply: My good sir, I too have a household and, in Homer's phrase, I am not born "from oak or rock" but from men, so that I have a family, indeed three sons, gentlemen of the jury, of whom one is an adolescent while two are children. Nevertheless, I will not beg you to acquit me by bringing them here. Why do I do none of these things? Not through arrogance, gentlemen, nor through lack of respect for you. Whether I am brave in the face of death is another matter, but with regard to my reputation and yours and that of the whole city, it does not seem right to me to do these things, especially at my age and with my reputation. For it is generally believed, whether it be true or false, that in certain respects Socrates is superior to the majority of men. Now if those of you who are considered superior, be it in wisdom or courage or whatever other virtue makes them so, are seen behaving like that, it would be a disgrace. Yet I have often seen them do this sort of thing when standing trial, men who are thought to be somebody, doing amazing things as if they thought it a terrible thing to die, and as if they were to be immortal if you did not

—

execute them. stranger, too,

among

I

think these

would assume

whom

—

men

bring

that those

shame upon

who

the city so that a

are outstanding in virtue

they themselves select from themselves to fill offices of state and receive other honors, are in no way better than women. You should not act like that, gentlemen of the jury, those of you who have any reputation at all, and if we do, you should not allow it. You should make it very clear that you will more readily convict a man who performs these pitiful dramatics in court and so makes the city a laughingstock, than a man who keeps quiet. Quite apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, I do not think it right to supplicate the jury and to be acquitted because of this, but to teach and persuade them. It is not the purpose of a juryman's office to give justice as a favor to whoever seems good to him, but to judge according the Athenians,

Apology

32

he has sworn to do. We should not accustom you to perjure yourselves, nor should you make a habit of it. This is irreverent conduct for either of us. Do not deem it right for me, gentlemen of the jury, that I should act towards you in a way that I do not consider to be good or just or pious, especially, by Zeus, as I am being prosecuted by Meletus here for impiety; clearly, if I convinced you by my supplication to do violence to your oath of office, I would be teaching you not to believe that there are gods, and my defense would convict me of not believing in them. This is far from being the case, gentlemen, for I do believe in them as none of my accusers do. I leave it to you and the god to judge me in the way that will be best to law,

d

for

and

me and

this

for you.

[The jury

now

gives

its

verdict of guilty,

and Meletus asks

for the

penalty of death.] e

36

b

There are many other reasons for my not being angry with you for convicting me, gentlemen of the jury, and what happened was not unexpected. I am much more surprised at the number of votes cast on each side for I did not think the decision would be by so few votes but by a great many. As it is, a switch of only thirty votes would have acquitted me. I think myself that I have been cleared on Meletus' charges, and not only this, but it is clear to all that, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him in accusing me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a

He

fifth

of the votes.

assesses the penalty at death. So be

it.

What counter-assessment

should be a penalty I deserve, and what do I deserve to suffer or to pay because I have deliberately not led a quiet life but have neglected what occupies most people: wealth, household affairs, the position of general or public should

I

propose

to you,

gentlemen of the jury? Clearly

orator or the other offices, the political clubs c

d

and

it

factions that exist in the

thought myself too honest to survive if I occupied myself with those things. I did not follow that path that would have made me of no use either to you or to myself, but I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and as wise as possible, not to care for the city's possessions more than for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way. What do I deserve for being such a man? Some good, gentlemen of the jury, if I must truly make an assessment according to my deserts, and something suitable. What is suitable for a poor benefactor who needs leisure to exhort you? Nothing is more suitable, gentlemen, than for such a man to be fed 7 in the Prytaneum much more suitable for him than for any one of you who has won a victory at Olympia with a pair or a team of horses. The city?

I

The Prytaneum was the magistrates' hall or town hall of Athens in which public entertainments were given, particularly to Olympian victors on their return home. 7.

Apology

33

makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy. he does not need food, but I do. So if I must make a just assessment

Olympian Besides,

what

of

I

When

victor

deserve,

I

assess

it

may

as this: free meals in the Prytaneum.

when

spoke of appeals to pity and entreaties, that I speak arrogantly, but that is not the case, gentlemen of the jury; rather it is like this: I am convinced that I never willingly wrong anyone, but I am not convincing you of this, for we have talked together but a short time. If it were the law with us, as it is elsewhere, that a trial for life should not last one but many days, you would be convinced, but I

say this you

think, as

I

not easy to dispel great slanders in a short time. Since I am convinced that I wrong no one, I am not likely to wrong myself, to say that I deserve some evil and to make some such assessment against myself.

now

it

is

What should

should suffer the penalty Meletus has assessed against me, of which I say I do not know whether it is good or bad? I then to choose in preference to this something that I know very well to be an evil and assess the penalty at that? Imprisonment? Why should I live in prison, always subjected to the ruling magistrates, the Eleven? A fine, and imprisonment until I pay it? That would be the same thing for me, as I have no money. Exile? for perhaps you might accept that assessment. I should have to be inordinately fond of life, gentlemen of the jury, to be so unreasonable as to suppose that other men will easily tolerate my company and conversation when you, my fellow citizens, have been unable to endure them, but found them a burden and resented them so that you are now seeking to get rid of them. Far from it, gentlemen. It would be a fine life at my age to be driven out of one city after another, for I know very well that wherever I go the young men will listen to my talk as they do here. If I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out; if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relations I

fear? That

I

Am

will drive

me

out on their behalf.

Perhaps someone might say: But Socrates, if you leave us will you not be able to live quietly, without talking? Now this is the most difficult point on which to convince some of you. If I say that it is impossible for me to keep quiet because that means disobeying the god, you will not believe me and will think I am being ironical. On the other hand, if I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for men, you will believe me even less. What I say is true, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. At the same time, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve any penalty. If I had money, I would assess the penalty at the amount I could pay, for that would not hurt me, but I have none, unless you are willing to set the penalty at the amount I can pay, and perhaps I could pay you one mina of silver. 8 So that is my assessment. 8.

was

One mina was

the equivalent of 100 drachmas. In the late

the standard daily

wage

of a laborer.

A

fifth

century one drachma

mina, then, was a considerable sum.

Apology

34

and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus bid me put the penalty at thirty minae, and they will stand surety for the money. Well then, that is my assessment, and they will be sufficient guarantee of payment. Plato here, gentlemen of the jury,

[The jury

e

39

b

c

votes again

and sentences Socrates

to death.]

you will acquire the reputation and the guilt, in the eyes of those who want to denigrate the city, of having killed Socrates, a wise man, for they who want to revile you will say that I am wise even if I am not. If you had waited but a little while, this would have happened of its own accord, You see my age, that I am already advanced in years and close to death. I am saying this not to all of you but to those who condemned me to death, and to these same jurors I say: Perhaps you think that I was convicted for lack of such words as might have convinced you, if I thought I should say or do all I could to avoid my sentence. Far from it. I was convicted because I lacked not words but boldness and shamelessness and the willingness to say to you what you would most gladly have heard from me, lamentations and tears and my saying and doing many things that I say are unworthy of me but that you are accustomed to hear from others. I did not think then that the danger I ran should make me do anything mean, nor do I now regret the nature of my defense. I would much rather die after this kind of defense than live after making the other kind. Neither I nor any other man should, on trial or in war, contrive to avoid death at any cost. Indeed it is often obvious in battle that one could escape death by throwing away one's weapons and by turning to supplicate one's pursuers, and there are many ways to avoid death in every kind of danger if one will venture to do or say anything to avoid it. It is not difficult to avoid death, gentlemen of the jury, it is much more difficult to avoid wickedness, for it runs faster than death. Slow and elderly as I am, I have been caught by the slower pursuer, whereas my accusers, being clever and sharp, have been caught by the quicker, wickedness. I leave you now, condemned to death by you, but they are condemned by truth to wickedness and injustice. So I maintain my assessment, and they maintain theirs. This perhaps had to happen, and I think it is as it should be. Now I want to prophesy to those who convicted me, for I am at the point It is

d

now

for the sake of a short time,

gentlemen of the

jury, that

when men prophesy most, when they are about to die. I say gentlemen, to those who voted to kill me, that vengeance will come upon you immediately after my death, a vengeance much harder to bear than that which you took in killing me. You did this in the belief that you would avoid d

giving an account of your life, but I maintain that quite the opposite will happen to you. There will be more people to test you, whom I now held back, but you did not notice it. They will be more difficult to deal with

younger and you will resent them more. You are wrong if you believe that by killing people you will prevent anyone from reproachas they will be

Apology

ing

you

35

way. To escape such

for not living in the right

possible nor good, but

it is

best

and

tests is neither

easiest not to discredit others but to

prepare oneself to be as good as possible. With this prophecy to you who convicted me, I part from you. I should be glad to discuss what has happened with those who voted for my acquittal during the time that the officers of the court are busy and I do not yet have to depart to my death. So, gentlemen, stay with me awhile, for nothing prevents us from talking to each other while it is allowed. To you, as being my friends, I want to show the meaning of what has occurred. A surprising thing has happened to me, judges you I would rightly call judges. At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual manifestation, frequently opposed me, even in small matters, when I was about to do something wrong, but now that, as you can see

—

for yourselves,

I

was faced with what one might think, and what is generally

my

divine sign has not opposed me, either when I left home at dawn, or when I came into court, or at any time that I was about to say something during my speech. Yet in other talks it often held me back in the middle of my speaking, but now it has opposed

thought to be, the worst of

evils,

no word or deed of mine. What do I think is the reason for this? I will tell you. What has happened to me may well be a good thing, and those of us who believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of this, for it is impossible that my familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was right. Let us reflect in this way, too, that there is good hope that death is a blessing, for it is one of two things: either the dead are nothing and have no perception of anything, or it is, as we are told, a change and a relocating for the soul from here to another place. If it is complete lack of perception, dreamless sleep, then death would be a great advantage. For I think that if one had to pick out that night during which a man slept soundly and did not dream, put beside it the other nights and days of his life, and then see how many days and nights had been better and more pleasant than that night, not only a private person but the great king would find them easy to count compared with the other days and nights. If death is like this I say it is an advantage, for all eternity would then seem to be no more than a single night. If, on the other hand, death is a change from here to another place, and what we are told is true and all who have died are there, what greater blessing could there be, gentlemen of the jury? If anyone arriving in Hades will have escaped from those who call themselves judges here, and will find those true judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and the other demi-gods who have been upright in their own life, would that be a poor kind of change? Again, what would one of you give to keep company like a

with Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times if that is true. It would be a wonderful way for me to spend my time whenever I met Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, and any other of the men of old who died through an unjust conviction, to compare

Apology

36

my

c

experience with theirs. I think it would be pleasant. Most important, I could spend my time testing and examining people there, as I do here, as to who among them is wise, and who thinks he is, but is not. What would one not give, gentlemen of the jury, for the opportunity to examine the man who led the great expedition against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, and innumerable other men and women one could mention.

would be an extraordinary happiness to talk with them, to keep company with them and examine them. In any case, they would certainly not put one to death for doing so. They are happier there than we are here in other respects, and for the rest of time they are deathless, if indeed what It

we

are told

You d

true.

must be

too

and keep

is

good hope

gentlemen of the jury, cannot be harmed either

as regards death,

one truth in mind, that a good man death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods. What

this

in life or in

of

me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for me to die now and to escape from trouble. That is why my divine sign did not oppose me at any point. So am certainly not angry with those who convicted me, or with my accusers. Of course has happened to

I

purpose when they accused and convicted me, but they thought they were hurting me, and for this they deserve blame. This much I ask from them: when my sons grow up, avenge yourselves by causing them the same kind of grief that I caused you, if you think they care for money or anything else more than they care for virtue, or if they think they are somebody when they are nobody. Reproach them as I reproach you, that they do not care for the right things and think they are worthy when they are not worthy of anything. If you do this, I shall have been justly treated by you, and my sons also. Now the hour to part has come. I go to die, you go to live. Which of us goes to the better lot is known to no one, except the god. that

e

42

was not

their

CRITO As

the beginning of the

Phaedo

relates , Socrates did not die until a

month

which followed by a day the sailing of the Athenian state galley on an annual religious mission to the island of Delos; no executions were permitted during its absence. Crito comes to tell Socrates of its anticipated arrival later that day and to make one last effort to persuade him to allow his friends to save him by bribing his jailers and bundling him off somewhere beyond the reach of Athenian law. Crito indicates that most people expect his friends to do

after his trial ,

this

— unless (dishonorably) they value

rates,

however, refuses. Even

if

their

money more than

people do expect

it,

to

their friend. Soc-

do that would be grossly

unjust.

Both Crito' s arguments in favor of his plan and Socrates' in rejecting it are rather jumbled as perhaps befits the pressure and excitement of the moment.

—

damage to his and Socrates' other friends' reputations and delicately minimizes any financial loss he might suffer, in case Socrates might be unwilling to accept any great sacrifice from a friend. Socrates witheringly dismisses the first consideration and ignores the second. But Crito also claims that it would actually be unjust of Socrates to stay. That would allow his enemies to triumph over him and his friends, including his young sons, whom he Crito cites the

abandon by going docilely to his death: a person ought not to take lying down an attack on the things he holds most dear, including philosophy itself and the philosophical life to which he and (presumably) his friends are devoted. Here we hear strains of the time-honored Greek idea that justice is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies, cited by Polemarchus in Republic I. only preventing them (But Crito does not propose harming their enemies will

—

from having

their

way.) As

to his children, Socrates

as well or better cared for after his death than ile.

But

ironically, considering his

if

responds that they will be

he resisted

it

own subsequent arguments

and went

into ex-

for accepting his

death, he seems not to hear the larger claim of injustice that Crito lodges.

jumbled presentation of his case facilitates this. Unmoved by the claims of justice grounded in his private relationships to friends and family, Socrates appeals to the standards of civic justice imbedded in his relations as a citizen to the Athenian people and to the Athenian system Crito' s

of law.

He

claims that a citizen

is

necessarily, given the benefits he has enjoyed

under the laws of the city, their slave, justly required to do whatever they ask, and more forbidden to attack them than to violate his own parents. That would rendering a wrong for the wrong received in his unjust condembe retaliation nation

—and

—

retaliation

is

never just. But what

37

if

he chose to depart not in an

a

Crito

38

unjust spirit of retaliation but only in order to evade the ill consequences of the unjust condemnation for himself and his friends and family? As if recogniz,

ing that loophole Socrates also develops a celebrated early version of the social contract between the laws or the city and each citizen, not among contract ,

—

'

'

the citizens themselves

—with

the

argument

that

now,

after he

is

condemned by

an Athenian court and has exhausted all legal appeals, he must in justice to his implicit promise, abide by the laws' final judgment and accept his death sen,

tence.

where Socrates stands; he is committed, as a public figure known for pleading the preeminent value of the civic virtues, to honoring them in his and death. But the dialogue itself, through Crito's ignored appersonal life peal to justice in the private sphere invites the reader to reflect on a wider It is

clear

—

,

range of issues about justice than Socrates himself addresses. Did justice really , require that Socrates stay to accept his death? , ,

Socrates: Why have you Crito: It certainly is.

come

so early, Crito?

Socrates: How early? Crito: Early dawn. Socrates: I am surprised that the warder Crito:

He

is

quite friendly to

was

me by now,

Or

is it

and

Crito:

still

early?

willing to listen to you.

Socrates.

I

have given him something. Socrates: Have you just come, or have you been here

often

not

r

have been here

I

A

for

some time?

fair time.

Socrates: Then

why

did you not

wake me

right

away but

sit

there

in silence?

By Zeus no, Socrates. I would not myself want to be in distress and awake so long. I have been surprised to see you so peacefully asleep. It was on purpose that I did not wake you, so that you should spend your time most agreeably. Often in the past throughout my life, I have considered the way you live happy, and especially so now that you bear your present misfortune so easily and lightly. Socrates: It would not be fitting at my age to resent the fact that I must die now. Crito:

Crito: Other

men

of

your age are caught

in

such misfortunes, but their

age does not prevent them resenting their fate. Socrates: That is so. Why have you come so early? Crito: I bring bad news, Socrates, not for you, apparently, but for me and all your friends the news is bad and hard to bear. Indeed, I would

count

it

among

the hardest.

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

39

Crito

Socrates:

which

of

Crito:

I

It

What

must

is it?

Or has

the ship arrived from Delos, at the arrival

d

die?

has not arrived

yet,

but

it

will,

I

believe, arrive today, according

message some men brought from Sunium, where they left it. This makes it obvious that it will come today, and that your life must end tomorrow. Socrates: May it be for the best. If it so please the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will arrive today. Crito: What indication have you of this? Socrates: I will tell you. I must die the day after the ship arrives. Crito: That is what those in authority say. Socrates: Then I do not think it will arrive on this coming day, but on the next. I take to witness of this a dream I had a little earlier during this night. It looks as if it was the right time for you not to wake me. Crito: What was your dream? Socrates: I thought that a beautiful and comely woman dressed in white approached me. She called me and said: "Socrates, may you arrive at fertile Phthia on the third day." Crito: A strange dream, Socrates. Socrates: But it seems clear enough to me, Crito. Crito: Too clear it seems, my dear Socrates, but listen to me even now and be saved. If you die, it will not be a single misfortune for me. Not to a

44

b

1

only will I be deprived of a friend, the like of whom I shall never find again, but many people who do not know you or me very well will think that I could have saved you if I were willing to spend money, but that I did not care to do so. Surely there can be no worse reputation than to be thought to value money more highly than one's friends, for the majority will not believe that you yourself were not willing to leave prison while we were eager for you to do so. Socrates: My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the majority think? The most reasonable people, to whom one should pay more attention, will believe that things were done as they were done. Crito: You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to the opinion of the majority. Your present situation makes clear that the majority can inflict not the least but pretty well the greatest evils if one is slandered

among them. Socrates: Would

that the majority could inflict the greatest evils, for

they would then be capable of the greatest good, and that would be fine, but now they cannot do either. They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, but they inflict things haphazardly.

1.

A

quotation from

Iliad ix.363.

Achilles has rejected

all

Agamemnon home. He says his

the presents

and threatens to go ships will sail in the morning, and with good weather he might arrive on the third day "in fertile Phthia" (which is his home). The dream means that Socrates' soul, after death, will find its home on the third day (counting, as usual among the Greeks, both the first and the last member of the series). offered

him

to get

him

to return to the battle,

c

d

Crito

40 e

Crito: That

b

c

d

46

so.

But

tell

me

this, Socrates,

are

you anticipating

I

throughout one's e

be

and your other friends would have trouble with the informers if you escape from here, as having stolen you away, and that we should be compelled to lose all our property or pay heavy fines and suffer other punishment besides? If you have any such fear, forget it. We would be justified in running this risk to save you, and worse, if necessary. Do follow my advice, and do not act differently. Socrates: I do have these things in mind, Crito, and also many others. Crito: Have no such fear. It is not much money that some people require to save you and get you out of here. Further, do you not see that those informers are cheap, and that not much money would be needed to deal with them? My money is available and is, I think, sufficient. If, because of your affection for me, you feel you should not spend any of mine, there are those strangers here ready to spend money. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought enough for this very purpose. Cebes, too, and a good many others. So, as I say, do not let this fear make you hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in court trouble you, that you would not know what to do with yourself if you left Athens, for you would be welcomed in many places to which you might go. If you want to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will greatly appreciate you and keep you safe, so that no one in Thessaly will harm you. Besides, Socrates, I do not think that what you are doing is just, to give up your life when you can save it, and to hasten your fate as your enemies would hasten it, and indeed have hastened it in their wish to destroy you. Moreover, I think you are betraying your sons by going away and leaving them, when you could bring them up and educate them. You thus show no concern for what their fate may be. They will probably have the usual fate of orphans. Either one should not have children, or one should share with them to the end the toil of upbringing and education. You seem to me to choose the easiest path, whereas one should choose the path a good and courageous man would choose, particularly when one claims that

45

may

life

to care for virtue,

ashamed on your behalf and on behalf of us, your friends, lest all that has happened to you be thought due to cowardice on our part: the fact that your trial came to court when it need not have done so, the handling of the trial itself, and now this absurd ending which will be thought to have got beyond our control through some cowardice and unmanliness on our part, since we did not save you, or you save yourself, when it was possible and could be done if we had been of the slightest I

feel

whether this is not only evil, but shameful, both for you and for us. Take counsel with yourself, or rather the time for counsel is past and the decision should have been taken, and there is no further opportunity, for this whole business must be ended tonight. If we delay now, then it will no longer be possible, it will be too late. Let me persuade you on every count, Socrates, and do not act otherwise.

use. Consider, Socrates,

41

Crito

Socrates:

My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth much if

it

should have

your keenness the more difficult it is to deal with. We must therefore examine whether we should act in this way or not, as not only now but at all times I am the kind of man who listens only to the argument that on reflection seems best to me. I cannot, now that this fate has come upon me, discard the arguments I used; they seem to me much the same. I value and respect the same principles as before, and if we have no better arguments to bring up at this moment, be sure that I shall not agree with you, not even if the power of the majority were to frighten us with more bogeys, as if we were children, with threats of incarcerations and executions and confiscation of property. How should we examine this matter most reasonably? Would it be by taking up first your argument about the opinions of men, whether it is sound in every case that one should pay attention to some opinions, but not to others? Or was that well-spoken before the necessity to die came upon me, but now it is clear that this was said in vain for the sake of argument, that it was in truth play and nonsense? I am eager to examine together with you, Crito, whether this argument will appear in any way different to me in my present circumstances, or whether it remains the same, whether we are to abandon it or believe it. It was said on every occasion by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, as I have just now been speaking, that one should greatly value some people's opinions, but not others. Does that seem to you a sound statement? You, as far as a human being can tell, are exempt from the likelihood of dying tomorrow, so the present misfortune is not likely to lead you astray. Consider then, do you not think it a sound statement that one must not value all the opinions of men, but some and not others, nor the opinions of all men, but those of some and not of others? What do you say? Is this

some

right aim;

if

not, then the greater

not well said? Crito:

It is.

Socrates:

One should value

the

good opinions, and not the bad ones?

Crito: Yes.

Socrates: The good opinions are those of wise men, the bad ones those

men? Of course.

of foolish

Crito:

Socrates:

Come

then,

what

of statements such as this: Should a

man

professionally engaged in physical training pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of any man, or to those of one man only, namely a

doctor or trainer? Crito: To those of one only. Socrates: He should therefore fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man, and not those of the many? Crito: Obviously.

then act and exercise, eat and drink in the way the one, the trainer and the one who knows, thinks right, not all the others? Socrates:

He must

42

Crito

Crito: That c

is so.

Socrates: Very well. And if he disobeys the one, disregards his opinion and his praises while valuing those of the many who have no knowledge,

harm?

will he not suffer

Crito:

Of

Socrates:

man who

course.

What

is

harm, where does

that

disobeys does

it

tend,

and what part

of the

affect?

harm

Crito: Obviously the

it

to his

is

body, which

it

ruins.

Socrates: Well said. So with other matters, not to enumerate them d

and certainly with actions just and unjust, shameful and beautiful, good and bad, about which we are now deliberating, should we follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is one who has knowledge of these things and before whom we feel fear and shame more than before all the others. If we do not follow his directions, we shall harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions. Or is there nothing in this? Crito:

e

all,

I

think there certainly

is,

Socrates.

Socrates: Come now, if we ruin that which is improved by health and corrupted by disease by not following the opinions of those who know, is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not? Crito: Yes.

Socrates:

And

is life

worth

living with a

body

that

is

corrupted and in

bad condition? Crito: In no way.

48

Crito:

Not

Socrates:

is life

at all.

It is

more valuable?

Much

more. Socrates: We should not then think so much of what the majority will say about us, but what he will say who understands justice and injustice, the one, that is, and the truth itself. So that, in the first place, you were wrong to believe that we should care for the opinion of the many about what is just, beautiful, good, and their opposites. “But," someone might say "the many are able to put us to death." Crito: That too is obvious, Socrates, and someone might well say so. Socrates: And, my admirable friend, that argument that we have gone through remains, I think, as before. Examine the following statement in turn as to whether it stays the same or not, that the most important thing is not life, but the good life. Crito: It stays the same. Crito:

b

And

worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and injustice, is inferior to the body? Socrates:

Socrates:

And

that the

the same; does that

Crito:

It

still

does hold.

good

life,

the beautiful

hold, or not?

life,

and the

just life are

43

Crito

we must examine next whether it is just for me to try to get out of here when the Athenians have not acquitted me. If it is seen to be just, we will try to do so; if it is not, we will abandon Socrates:

As we have agreed

As

so

far,

about money, reputation, the upbringing of children, Crito, those considerations in truth belong to those people who easily put men to death and would bring them to life again if they could, without thinking; I mean the majority of men. For us, however, since our argument leads to this, the only valid consideration, as we were saying just now, is whether we should be acting rightly in giving money and gratitude to those who will lead me out of here, and ourselves helping with the escape, or whether in truth we shall do wrong in doing all this. If it appears that we shall be acting unjustly, then we have no need at all to take into account whether we shall have to die if we stay here and keep quiet, or suffer in another way, rather than do wrong. Crito: I think you put that beautifully, Socrates, but see what we should do. Socrates: Let us examine the question together, my dear friend, and if you can make any objection while I am speaking, make it and I will listen to you, but if you have no objection to make, my dear Crito, then stop now from saying the same thing so often, that I must leave here against the will of the Athenians. I think it important to persuade you before I act, and not to act against your wishes. See whether the start of our inquiry is adequately stated, and try to answer what I ask you in the way you the idea.

for those questions

you

raise

think best. Crito:

I

shall try.

Do we say that one must never in any way do wrong willingly, or must one do wrong in one way and not in another? Is to do wrong never good or admirable, as we have agreed in the past, or have all these former agreements been washed out during the last few days? Have we Socrates:

our age failed to notice for some time that in our serious discussions we were no different from children? Above all, is the truth such as we used to say it was, whether the majority agree or not, and whether we must still suffer worse things than we do now, or will be treated more gently, that nonetheless, wrongdoing or injustice is in every way harmful and shameful to the wrongdoer? Do we say so or not? at

Crito:

We

do.

Socrates: So one must never do wrong. Crito: Certainly not. Socrates: Nor must one, when wronged, inflict wrong in return, as the majority believe, since one must never do wrong. Crito: That seems to be the case. Socrates: Come now, should one mistreat anyone or not, Crito? Crito: One must never do so. Socrates: Well then, if one is oneself mistreated, is it right, as the majority say, to mistreat in return, or is it not? Crito:

It is

never

right.

Crito

44

d

Socrates: Mistreating people is no different from wrongdoing. Crito: That is true. Socrates: One should never do wrong in return, nor mistreat any man, no matter how one has been mistreated by him. And Crito, see that you do not agree to this, contrary to your belief. For I know that only a few people hold this view or will hold it, and there is no common ground between those who hold this view and those who do not, but they inevitably despise each

whether we have this view in common, and whether you agree, and let this be the basis of our deliberation, that neither to do wrong nor to return a wrong is ever right, nor is bad treatment in return for bad treatment. Or do you disagree and do not share this view as a basis for discussion? I have held it for a long time and still hold it now, but if you think otherwise, tell me now. If, however, you stick to our former opinion, then listen to the next point. Crito: I stick to it and agree with you. So say on. Socrates: Then I state the next point, or rather I ask you: when one has come to an agreement that is just with someone, should one fulfill it or cheat on it? Crito: One should fulfill it. Socrates: See what follows from this: if we leave here without the city's other's views. So then consider very carefully

e

50

permission, are

And

are

c

d

mistreating people

whom we

should

least mistreat?

sticking to a just agreement, or not?

cannot answer your question, Socrates. I do not know. Socrates: Look at it this way. If, as we were planning to run away from here, or whatever one should call it, the laws and the state came and confronted us and asked: "Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you not by this action you are attempting intend to destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you are concerned? Or do you think it possible for a city not to be destroyed if the verdicts of its courts have no force but are nullified and set at naught by private individuals?" What shall we answer to this and other such arguments? For many things could be said, especially by an orator on behalf of this Crito:

b

we

we

I

law we are destroying, which orders that the judgments of the courts shall be carried out. Shall we say in answer, "The city wronged me, and its decision was not right." Shall we say that, or what? Crito: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is our answer. Socrates: Then what if the laws said: "Was that the agreement between us, Socrates, or was it to respect the judgments that the city came to?" And if we wondered at their words, they would perhaps add: "Socrates, do not wonder at what we say but answer, since you are accustomed to proceed by question and answer. Come now, what accusation do you bring against us and the city, that you should try to destroy us? Did we not, first, bring you to birth, and was it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Tell you, do you find anything to criticize in those of us who are concerned with marriage?" And I would say that I do not criticize them. "Or in those of us concerned with the

Crito

45

nurture of babies and the education that you too received? Were those assigned to that subject not right to instruct your father to educate you in the arts and in physical culture?" And I would say that they were right. "Very well," they would continue, "and after you were born and nurtured and educated, could you, in the first place, deny that you are our offspring and servant, both you and your forefathers? If that is so, do you think that we are on an equal footing as regards the right, and that whatever we do to you it is right for you to do to us? You were not on an equal footing with your father as regards the right, nor with your master if you had one, so as to retaliate for anything they did to you, to revile them if they reviled you, to beat them if they beat you, and so with many other things. Do you think you have this right to retaliation against your country and its laws? That if we undertake to destroy you and think it right to do

you can undertake to destroy us, as far as you can, in return? And will you say that you are right to do so, you who truly care for virtue? Is your wisdom such as not to realize that your country is to be honored more than your mother, your father and all your ancestors, that it is more to be revered and more sacred, and that it counts for more among the gods and sensible men, that you must worship it, yield to it and placate its anger more than your father's? You must either persuade it or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it instructs you to endure, whether blows or bonds, and if it leads you into war to be wounded or killed, you must obey. To do so is right, and one must not give way or retreat or leave one's post, but both in war and in courts and everywhere else, one must obey the commands of one's city and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice. It is impious to bring violence to bear against your mother or father, it is much more so to use it against your country." What shall

e

51

so,

b

c

we

say in reply, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not? Crito: I think they do. Socrates: "Reflect now, Socrates," the laws might say "that if what we say is true, you are not treating us rightly by planning to do what you are planning. We have given you birth, nurtured you, educated you, we have given you and all other citizens a share of all the good things we could. Even so, by giving every Athenian the opportunity, once arrived at voting age and having observed the affairs of the city and us the laws, we proclaim that if we do not please him, he can take his possessions and go wherever he pleases. Not one of our laws raises any obstacle or forbids him, if he is not satisfied with us or the city, if one of you wants to go and live in a colony or wants to go anywhere else, and keep his property. We say, however, that whoever of you remains, when he sees how we conduct our trials and manage the city in other ways, has in fact come to an agreement with us to obey our instructions. We say that the one who disobeys does wrong in three ways, first because in us he disobeys his parents, also those who brought him up, and because, in spite of his agreement, he neither obeys us nor, if we do something wrong, does he try to persuade us to do better. Yet we only propose things, we do not

d

e

52

— Crito

46

commands to do whatever we order; we give two alternatives, persuade us or to do what we say. He does neither. We do say

issue savage either to

open to those charges if you do what you have in mind; you would be among, not the least, but the most guilty of the Athenians." And if I should say "Why so?" they might well be right to upbraid me and say that I am among the Athenians who most definitely came to that agreement with them. They might well say: "Socrates, we have convincing proofs that we and the city were congenial to you. You would not have dwelt here most consistently of all the Athenians if the city had not been exceedingly pleasing to you. You have never left the city, even to see a festival, nor for any other reason except military service; you have never gone to stay in any other city, as people do; you have had no desire to know another city or other laws; we and our city satisfied you. "So decisively did you choose us and agree to be a citizen under us. Also, you have had children in this city, thus showing that it was congenial to you. Then at your trial you could have assessed your penalty at exile if you wished, and you are now attempting to do against the city's wishes what you could then have done with her consent. Then you prided yourself that you did not resent death, but you chose, as you said, death in preference to exile. Now, however, those words do not make you ashamed, and you pay no heed to us, the laws, as you plan to destroy us, and you act like the meanest type of slave by trying to run away, contrary to your commitments and your agreement to live as a citizen under us. First then, answer us on this very point, whether we speak the truth when we say that you agreed, not only in words but by your deeds, to live in accordance with us." What are we to say to that, Crito? Must we not agree? that

b

c

d

you

53

We

must, Socrates. Socrates: "Surely," they might say, "you are breaking the commitments and agreements that you made with us without compulsion or deceit, and under no pressure of time for deliberation. You have had seventy years during which you could have gone away if you did not like us, and if you thought our agreements unjust. You did not choose to go to Sparta or to Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor to any other city, Greek or foreign. You have been away from Athens less than Crito:

e

too, Socrates, are

the lame or the blind or other handicapped people.

b

It is

clear that the city

has been outstandingly more congenial to you than to other Athenians, and so have we, the laws, for what city can please without laws? Will you then not now stick to our agreements? You will, Socrates, if we can persuade you, and not make yourself a laughingstock by leaving the city. "For consider what good you will do yourself or your friends by breaking our agreements and committing such a wrong? It is pretty obvious that your friends will themselves be in danger of exile, disfranchisement and loss of property. As for yourself, if you go to one of the nearby cities Thebes or Megara, both are well governed you will arrive as an enemy to their government; all who care for their city will look on you with suspicion, as a destroyer of the laws. You will also strengthen the conviction

—

47

Crito

anyone who destroys the laws could easily be thought to corrupt the young and the ignorant. Or will you avoid cities that are well governed and men who are civilized? If you do this, will your life be worth living? Will you have social intercourse with them and not be ashamed to talk to them? And what will you say? The same as you did here, that virtue and justice are man's most precious possession, along with lawful behavior and the laws? Do you not think that Socrates would appear to be an unseemly kind of person? One must think so. Or will you leave those places and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly? There you will find the greatest license and disorder, and they may enjoy hearing from you how absurdly you escaped from prison in some disguise, in a leather jerkin or some other things in which escapees wrap themselves, thus altering your appearance. Will there be no one to say that you, likely to live but a short time more, were so greedy for life that you transgressed the most important laws? Possibly, Socrates, if you do not annoy anyone, but if you do, many disgraceful things will of the jury that they passed the right sentence

on you,

for

c

d

e

be said about you.

spend your time ingratiating yourself with all men, and be at their beck and call. What will you do in Thessaly but feast, as if you had gone to a banquet in Thessaly? As for those conversations of yours about justice and the rest of virtue, where will they be? You say you want to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them. How so? Will you bring them up and educate them by taking them to Thessaly and making strangers of them, that they may enjoy that too? Or not so, but they will be better brought up and educated here, while you are alive, though absent? Yes, your friends will look after them. Will they look after them if you go and live in Thessaly, but not if you go away to the underworld? If those who profess themselves your friends are any good at all, one must assume that they will. "Be persuaded by us who have brought you up, Socrates. Do not value either your children or your life or anything else more than goodness, in order that when you arrive in Hades you may have all this as your defense before the rulers there. If you do this deed, you will not think it better or more just or more pious here, nor will any one of your friends, nor will

"You

will

be better for you when you arrive yonder. As it is, you depart, if you depart, after being wronged not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you depart after shamefully returning wrong for wrong and mistreatment for mistreatment, after breaking your agreements and commitments with us, yourself, your friends, after mistreating those you should mistreat least your country and us we shall be angry with you while you are still alive, and our brothers, the laws of the underworld, will not receive you kindly, knowing that you tried to destroy us as far as you could. Do not let Crito persuade you, rather than us, to do what he says." Crito, my dear friend, be assured that these are the words I seem to hear, as the Corybants seem to hear the music of their flutes, and the echo of these words resounds in me, and makes it impossible for me to hear

54

b

it

—

c

—

d

Crito

48

anything else. As far as my present beliefs go, if you speak in opposition to them, you will speak in vain. However, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

have nothing to say, Socrates. Socrates: Let it be then, Crito, and let us

Crito: 54e

the

way

I

the

god

is

leading us.

act in this

way, since

this is

,

PHAEDO Phaedo, known to the ancients also by the descriptive title On the Soul, is a drama about Socrates' last hours and his death in the jail at Athens. On the way back home to Elis one of his intimates Phaedo, who was with him then stops off at Phlius, in the Peloponnese. There he reports it all to a group of Py,

,

thagoreans settled there since their expulsion from Southern Italy. The Pytha-

gorean connection

is

fellow discussants , pelled

members

carried further in the dialogue itself since Socrates' two ,

Simmias and Cebes

—from Thebes —are

of the brotherhood settled

,

the other city

where ex-

associates of Philolaus

the lead-

,

ing Pythagorean there. Pythagoreans were noted for their belief in the immortality of the soul and its reincarnation in human or animal form and for the

consequent concern

body so as ,

into his It is

win

to

to keep one's soul

pure by avoiding contamination with the

the best possible next

Socrates weaves

life.

all

these themes

own

discussion of the immortality of the soul. noteworthy that these Pythagorean elements are lacking from the

Apol-

ogy, where Socrates expresses himself noncommittally and unconcernedly

—

about the possibility of immortality and from Crito, as well as the varied discussions of the soul's virtues in such dialogues as Euthyphro, Laches, and

Protagoras. Those dialogues are of course not records of discussions the historical Socrates actually held but Plato seems to take particular pains to indicate ,

that

Phaedo

does not give us Socrates' actual last conversation or even one

that fits at all closely his actual views.

He

takes care to

present on the last day: Phaedo says he was

man

intellect's affinity to eternal

Forms

ill.

tell

us that he was not

Socrates makes

much

of the hu-

and other normative such as Oddness and Even-

of Beauty , Justice ,

and of mathematical properties and objects, ness and the integers Two, Three, and the rest, as well as physical forces such as Hot and Cold, all existing in a nonphysical realm accessible only to abstract notions,

thought.

None

of this comports well with Socrates' description of his philosophi-

cal interests in the

Apology

Plato's 'Socratic' dialogues.

motifs of immortality

and

or with the

It is

way

generally agreed that both the Pythagorean

purification

and

the theory of eternal

linked with them in this dialogue are Plato's

Phaedo's

affinities in philosophical

Symposium and

he conducts his inquiries in

own

Forms

that

is

contribution. Indeed, the

theory go not toward the Socratic dia-

an unmistakable reference to Meno's theory of theoretical knowledge (of geometry, and also of the nature of human virtue) as coming by recollection of objects known before birth. But now the claim is made that this recollection is of Forms. logues, but to

Republic. There

49

is

Phaedo

50

Phaedo

concludes with a myth describing the fate of the soul after death. Concluding myths in other dialogues with which this one should be compared ,

,

are those in in Socrates'

Gorgias and Republic. It should second speech in the Phaedrus.

also be

compared with

Despite the Platonic innovations in philosophical theory the ,

ents a famously

and

moving picture

the philosophical

life

of Socrates' deep

commitment

the

Phaedo to

myth

pres-

philosophy

even , or especially in the face of an unjustly imposed ,

death j

.

57

,

^

Echecrates: Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did someone else tell you about it?

was there myself, Echecrates. Echecrates: What are the things he said before he died? And how did Phaedo:

should be glad to hear this. Hardly anyone from Phlius visits Athens nowadays, nor has any stranger come from Athens for some time who could give us a clear account of what happened, except that he drank the poison and died, but nothing more. Phaedo: Did you not even hear how the trial went? Echecrates: Yes, someone did tell us about that, and we wondered that he seems to have died a long time after the trial took place. Why was he die?

b

58

I

I

Phaedo? Phaedo: That was by chance, Echecrates. The day before the trial, as it happened, the prow of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos had been crowned with garlands.

that,

Echecrates:

Phaedo:

What

It is

c

is

that?

the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed

seven victims He saved them and was himself saved. They vowed then to Apollo, so the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission to Delos every year. And from that time to this they send such an annual mission to the god. They have a law to keep the city pure while it lasts, and no execution may take place once the mission has begun until the ship has made its journey to Delos and returned to Athens, and this can sometimes take a long time if the winds delay it. The mission begins when the priest of Apollo crowns the prow of the ship, and this happened, as I say, the day before Socrates' trial. That is why Socrates was in prison a long time between this trial and to Crete, taking

b

ship

with him the two

lots of

1

.

his execution.

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

Legend says that Minos, king of Crete, compelled the Athenians to send seven youths and seven maidens every year to be sacrificed to the Minotaur until Theseus saved them and killed the monster. 1

.

Phaedo

Echecrates: What about his actual death, Phaedo? What did h What did he do? Who of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities not allow them to be present and he died with no friends present? Phaedo: By no means. Some were present, in fact, a good many. Echecrates: Please be good enough to tell us all that occurred as fully as possible, unless you have some pressing business. Phaedo: I have the time and I will try to tell you the whole story, for nothing gives me more pleasure than to call Socrates to mind, whether

him myself, or listening to someone else do so. Echecrates: Your hearers will surely be like you in this, Phaedo. So do try to tell us every detail as exactly as you can. talking about

Phaedo: I certainly found being there an astonishing experience. Although I was witnessing the death of one who was my friend, I had no feeling of pity, for the man appeared happy both in manner and words as he died nobly and without fear, Echecrates, so that it struck me that even in going down to the underworld he was going with the gods' blessing and that he would fare well when he got there, if anyone ever does. That is why I had no feeling of pity, such as would seem natural in my sorrow, nor indeed of pleasure, as we engaged in philosophical discussion as we were accustomed to do for our arguments were of that sort but I had a strange feeling, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and pain at the same time as I reflected that he was just about to die. All of us present were affected in much the same way, sometimes laughing, then weeping; you know the man and his ways. especially one of us, Apollodorus

—

—

—

Echecrates: Of course

I

do.

Phaedo: He was quite overcome; but I was myself disturbed, and so were the others. Echecrates: Who, Phaedo, were those present? Phaedo: Among the local people there was Apollodorus, whom I men2 tioned, Critobulus and his father also Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines and Antisthenes. Ctesippus of Paeania was there, Menexenus and some ,

was ill. Echecrates: Were there some strangers present? Phaedo: Yes, Simmias from Thebes with Cebes and Phaedondes, and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion. Echecrates: What about Aristippus and Cleombrotus? Were they there? Phaedo: No. They were said to be in Aegina.

others. Plato,

2.

The

I

believe,

father of Critobulus

is

Crito, after

whom

the dialogue Crito

is

named. Several

mentioned here also appear in other dialogues. Hermoone of the speakers in the Cratylus. Epigenes is mentioned in Apology 33d, as

of the other friends of Socrates

genes

is

who was

Menexenus has a part in the Lysis and has a dialogue named after him. Euclides and Terpsion are speakers in the introductory conversation of Theaetetus and Euclides too wrote Socratic dialogues. Simmias and Cebes are mentioned in the Crito, 45b, as having come to Athens with enough

is

Aeschines,

money

a writer of Socratic dialogues.

to secure Socrates' escape.

Phaedo

52

d

Echecrates: Was there anyone else? Phaedo: I think these were about all. Echecrates: Well then, what do you say the conversation was about? Phaedo: I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days also both the others and I used to visit Socrates. We foregathered at daybreak at the court where the trial took place, for it was close to the prison, and each day we used to wait around talking until the prison did not open early. When it opened we used to go in to Socrates and spend most of the day with him. On this day we gathered rather early, because when we left the prison on the previous evening we were informed that the ship from Delos had arrived, and so we told each other to come to the usual place as early as possible. When we arrived the gatekeeper who used to answer our knock came out and told us to

should open, for e

it

wait and not go in until he told us

to.

Socrates from his bonds and telling 60

"The Eleven /' 3 he

him how

said, "are freeing

his death will take place

today." After a short time he came and told us to go in. We found Socrates you know her sitting recently released from his chains, and Xanthippe by him, holding their baby. When she saw us, she cried out and said the

—

—

women

usually say: "Socrates, this is the last time your friends will talk to you and you to them." Socrates looked at Crito. "Crito," he said, "let someone take her home." And some of Crito's people led her

sort of thing that

b

away lamenting and beating her breast. Socrates sat up on the bed, bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and as he rubbed he said: "What a strange thing that which men call pleasure seems to be, and how astonishing the relation it has with what is thought to be its opposite, namely pain! A man cannot have both at the same time. Yet if he pursues and catches the one, he is almost always bound to catch the other also, like two creatures with one head. I think

c

d

he would have composed a fable that a god wished to reconcile their opposition but could not do so, so he joined their two heads together, and therefore when a man has the one, the other follows later. This seems to be happening to me. My bonds caused pain in my leg, and now pleasure seems to be following." Cebes intervened and said: "By Zeus, yes, Socrates, you did well to remind me. Evenus 4 asked me the day before yesterday, as others had done before, what induced you to write poetry after you came to prison, you who had never composed any poetry before, putting the fables of Aesop into verse and composing the hymn to Apollo. If it is of any concern to you that I should have an answer to give to Evenus when he repeats his question, as I know he will, tell me what to say to him." Tell him the truth, Cebes, he said, that I did not do this with the idea of rivalling him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but I that

if

Aesop had noted

this

3.

The Eleven were the police commissioners

4.

Socrates refers to Evenus as a Sophist and teacher of the

of Athens.

young

in

Apology 20a,

c.

53

Phaedo

meaning of certain dreams and to satisfy my conscience in case it was this kind of art they were frequently bidding me to practice. The dreams were something like this: the same dream often came to me in the past, now in one shape now in another, but saying the same thing: "Socrates," it said, "practice and cultivate the arts." In the past I imagined that it was instructing and advising me to do what I was doing, such as those who encourage runners in a race, that the dream was thus bidding me do the very thing I was doing, namely, to practice the art of philosophy, this being the highest kind of art, and I was doing that. But now, after my trial took place, and the festival of the god was preventing my execution, I thought that, in case my dream was bidding me to practice this popular art, I should not disobey it but compose poetry. I thought it safer not to leave here until I had satisfied my conscience by writing poems in obedience to the dream. So I first wrote in honor of the god of the present festival. After that I realized that a poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose fables, not arguments. Being no teller of fables myself, I took the stories I knew and had at hand, the fables of Aesop, and I versified the first ones I came across. Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, wish him well and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to follow me tried to find out the

soon as possible. I am leaving today, it seems, as the Athenians so order it. Said Simmias: "What kind of advice is this you are giving to Evenus, Socrates? I have met him many times, and from my observation he is not as

at all likely to

blow I

follow

so, said he, is

it

willingly."

Evenus not

a philosopher?

think so, Simmias said.

be willing, like every man who partakes worthily of philosophy. Yet perhaps he will not take his own life, for that, they say, is not right. As he said this, Socrates put his feet on the ground and remained in this position during the rest of the conversation. Then Cebes asked: "How do you mean Socrates, that it is not right to do oneself violence, and yet that the philosopher will be willing to follow one who is dying?" Come now, Cebes, have you and Simmias, who keep company with Philolaus 5 not heard about such things?

Then Evenus

will

,

Nothing

definite, Socrates.

do not mind telling you what I have heard, for it is perhaps most appropriate for one who is about to depart yonder to tell and examine tales about what we believe that journey to be like. What else could one do in the time we have Indeed,

I

too speak about this from hearsay, but

I

until sunset?

But whatever

the reason, Socrates, for people to say that

not right to kill oneself? As to your question just now, I have heard Philolaus say this when staying in Thebes and I have also heard it from others, but I have never heard anyone give a clear account of the matter. 5.

is

See Introductory Note.

it is

Phaedo

and you may yet hear one. And it may well astonish you if this subject, alone of all things, is simple, and it is never, as with everything else, better at certain times and for certain people to die than to live. And if this is so, you may well find it astonishing that those for whom it is better to die are wrong to help themselves, and that they must wait for someone else to benefit them. And Cebes, lapsing into his own dialect, laughed quietly and said: "Zeus Well, he said,

knows

we must do

our

best,

it is."

Indeed, said Socrates, it does seem unreasonable when put like that, but perhaps there is reason to it. There is the explanation that is put in the language of the mysteries, that we men are in a kind of prison, and that one must not free oneself or run away. That seems to me an impressive doctrine and one not easy to understand fully. However, Cebes, this seems to me well expressed, that the gods are our guardians and that men are

one of their possessions. Or do you not think so? I d o, sa id- Cebes. And would you not be angry if one of your possessions killed itself when you had not given any sign that you wished it to die, and if you had any punishment you could inflict, you would inflict it? Certainly, he said. Perhaps then, put in this way, it is not unreasonable that one should not kill oneself before a god had indicated some necessity to do so, like the necessity now put upon us. That seems likely, said Cebes. As for what you were saying, that philosophers should be willing and ready to die, that seems strange, Socrates, if what we said just now is reasonable, namely, that a god is our protector and that we are his possessions. It is not logical that the wisest of men should not resent leaving this service in which they are governed by the best of masters, the gods, for a wise man cannot believe that he will look after himself better when he is free. A foolish man might easily think so, that he must escape from his master; he would not reflect that one must not escape from a good master but stay with him as long as possible, because it would be foolish to escape. But the sensible man would want always to remain with one better than himself. So, Socrates, the opposite of what was said before is likely to be true; the wise would resent dying, whereas the foolish would rejoice at it. I thought that when Socrates heard this he was pleased by Cebes' argumentation. Glancing at us, he said: "Cebes is always on the track of some arguments; he is certainly not willing to be at once convinced by what one says." Said Simmias: "But actually, Socrates, I think myself that Cebes has a point now. Why should truly wise men want to avoid the service of masters better than themselves, and leave them easily? And I think Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are bearing leaving us so lightly, and leaving those good masters, as you say yourself, the gods."

— 55

Phaedo

You are both justified in what you say, and I think you mean that I must make a defense against this, as if I were in court. You certainly must, said Simmias. Come then, he said, let me try to make my defense to you more convincing than it was to the jury. For, Simmias and Cebes, I should be wrong not to resent dying if I did not believe that I should go first to other wise and good gods, and then to men who have died and are better than men are here. Be assured that, as it is, I expect to join the company of good men. This last I would not altogether insist on, but if I insist on anything at all in these matters, it is that I shall come to gods who are very good

why I am not so resentful, because I have good hope that awaits men after death, as we have been told for years, a

masters. That

some

future

is

good than

wicked. WelkTroWT^bcratesTsald Simmias, do youATffend'TcTkeejTthiF^^ yourself as you leave us, or would you share it with us? I certainly think it would be a blessing for us too, and at the same time it would be your

--myuch better future for the

defense I

if

you convince us

of

for the

what you

will try, he said, but first let us see

been wanting

say.

what

it

is

that Crito here has,

I

say for quite a while. What else, Socrates, said Crito, but what the man who is to give you the poison has been telling me for some time, that I should warn you to talk as little as possible. People get heated when they talk, he says, and one should not be heated when taking the poison, as those who do must think,

sometimes drink

it

Socrates replied:

administer I

ing

it

rather sure

me

for

him

some

be,

why

two or three times. "Take no notice of him; only

twice or,

was

Let

to

he

if

let

him be prepared

to

necessary, three times."

you would say

that, Crito said,

but he has been bother-

time. said.

I

want

to

make my argument before you, my judges,

man who

has truly spent his life in philosophy is probably right to be of good cheer in the face of death and to be very hopeful that after death he will attain the greatest blessings yonder. I will try to tell you, Simmias and Cebes, how this may be so. I am afraid that other people do not realize that the one aim of those who practice philosophy in as to

the proper

I

think that a

manner

is

to practice for

dying and death.

Now

if

this is true,

would be strange indeed if they were eager for this all their lives and then resent it when what they have wanted and practiced for a long time comes upon them. Simmias laughed and said: "By Zeus, Socrates, you made me laugh, though I was in no laughing mood just now. I think that the majority, on if

hearing this, will think that it describes the philosophers very well, and our people in Thebes would thoroughly agree that philosophers are nearly dead and that the majority of men is well aware that they deserve to be. And they would be telling the truth, Simmias, except for their being aware. They are not aware of the way true philosophers are nearly dead,

J

Phaedo

nor of the way they deserve to be, nor of the sort of death they deserve. But never mind them, he said, let us talk among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death? Certainly, said Simmias. Is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? Do we believe that death is this, namely, that the body comes to be separated by itself apart from the soul, and the soul comes to be separated by itself apart from the body? Is death anything else than that?

c

No, that is what it is, he said. Consider then, my good sir, whether you share my opinion, for this will lead us to a better knowledge of what we are investigating. Do you think it is the part of a philosopher to be concerned with such so-called pleasures as those of food and drink? By no means.

d

What about Not

the pleasures of sex?

at all.

of the other pleasures concerned with the service of the body? Do think such a man prizes them greatly, the acquisition of distinguished

What you

and shoes and the other bodily ornaments? Do you think he values these or despises them, except in so far as one cannot do without them?

clothes e

think the true philosopher despises them. Do you not think, he said, that in general such a man's concern is not with the body but that, as far as he can, he turns away from the body I

towards the soul? I

do.

So in the than other

65

first

men

place, such things frees the soul

show

clearly that the philosopher

more

from association with the body as much

as possible?

Apparently.

A man who

such things and has no part in them is thought by the majority not to deserve to live and to be close to death; the man, that is, who does not care for the pleasures of the body. finds

no pleasure

in

Whnt you say is certainly true. TKenwhat about the actual acquiring of knowledge? Is the body an obstacle when one associates with it in the search for knowledge? I mean,

[

for

b

example, do

men

any truth in sight or hearing, or are not even us that we do not see or hear anything accurately,

find

the poets forever telling j

j

I

those two physical senses are not clear or precise, our other senses can hardly be accurate, as they are all inferior to these. Do you not

and surely

Ldhink I

if

so?

certainly do, he said.

When

attempts to examine anything with the body, c

whenever it deceived by it.

then, he asked, does the soul grasp the truth? For it is

clearly

True. Is

it

not in reasoning

the soul?

if

anywhere

that

any

reality

becomes

clear to

57

Phaedo Yes.

indeed the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact

And

or association with

in its search for reality.

it

That

is so.

And

it is

And

the Beautiful,

then that the soul of the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself? It appears so. What about the following, Simmias? Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself, or not? We do say so, by Zeus.

Of

and the Good?

course.

And have you

ever seen any of these things with your eyes?

no way, he said. Or have you ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses? I am speaking of all things such as Size, Health, Strength and, in a word, the reality of all other things, that which each of them essentially is. Is what is most true in them contemplated through the body, or is this the position: whoever of us prepares himself best and most accurately to grasp that thing itself which he is investigating will come closest to the knowledge In

of

it?

Obviously. Then he will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in any sense perception with his reasoning, but who, using pure thought alone, tries to track down each reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible from eyes and ears, and in a word, from the whole body, because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it. Will not that man reach reality,

Simmias,

What you

if

anyone does?

say, said

Simmias,

is

All these things. will necessarily

indeed

make

true.

the true philosophers believe

and

say to each other something like this: 'There is likely to be something such as a path to guide us out of our confusion, because as long as we have a body and our soul is fused with such an evil we shall never adequately attain what we desire, which we affirm to be the truth. The body keeps

us busy in a thousand ways because of its need for nurture. Moreover, if certain diseases befall it, they impede our search for the truth. It fills us with wants, desires, fears, all sorts of illusions and much nonsense, so that, as it is said, in truth and in fact no thought of any kind ever comes to us from the body. Only the body and its desires cause war, civil discord and battles, for all

body and

and it is the to which we are enslaved, which compel us to this makes us too busy to practice philosophy.

wars are due

the care of

acquire wealth, and

it,

all

to the desire to acquire wealth,

Phaedo

e

67

Worst of all, if we do get some respite from it and turn to some investigation, everywhere in our investigations the body is present and makes for confusion and fear, so that it prevents us from seeing the truth. "It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe things in themselves with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live; for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after death. Then and not before, the soul is by itself apart from the body. While 'welrve, we shall be closest to knowledge if we refrain as much as possible from association with the body and do not join with it more than we must, if we are not infected with its nature but purify ourselves from it until the god himself frees us. In this way we shall escape the contamination of the body's folly; we shall be likely to be in the company of people of the same kind, and by our own efforts we shall know all that is pure, which is presumably the truth, for it is not permitted to the impure to attain the pure."

Such are the things, Simmias, that all those who love learning in the proper manner must say to one another and believe. Or do you not think so? I

certainly do, Socrates.

And

if

arriving

this is true,

where

I

am

my

going,

if

anywhere,

chief preoccupation in our past for

me

It

life,

I

shall

is

now ordered man who believes

so that the journey that

is

good hope, as it is also for any other mind has been prepared and, as it were, purified.

is full

of

certainly

is,

that his

good hope that on acquire what has been our

friend, said Socrates, there

said Simmias.

does purification not turn out to be what we mentioned in our argument some time ago, namely, to separate the soul as far as possible from the body and accustom it to gather itself and collect itself out of every part of the body and to dwell by itself as far as it can both now and in thejfuture, fr eed, as it wer e. from the bonds of the body? Certainly, he said. And that freedom and separation of the^sOUTTrom the body is called

And

_

~~

^-death?

That It is

is

altogether so.

only those

who

way, we say, who release and separation of the

practice philosophy in the right

always most want to free the soul; and this soul from the body is the preoccupation of the philosophers? So it appears. Therefore, as I said at the beginning, it would be ridiculous for a man to train himself in life to live in a state as close to death as possible, and then to resent it when it comes? Ridiculous, of course.

59

Phaedo In fact, Simmias, he said, those

who

practice philosophy in the right

men. Consider it from this point of view: if they are altogether estranged from the body and desire to have their soul by itself, would it not be quite absurd for them to be afraid and resentful when this happens? If they did not gladly set out for a place, where, on arrival, they may hope to attain that for which they had yearned during their lifetime, that is, wisdom, and where they would be rid of the presence of that from which they are estranged? Many men, at the death of their lovers, wives or sons, were willing to go to the underworld, driven by the hope of seeing there those for whose company they longed, and being with them. Will then a true lover of wisdom, who has a similar hope and knows that he will never find it to any extent except in Hades, be resentful of dying and not gladly undertake the journey thither? One must surely think so, my friend, if he is a true philosopher, for he is firmly convinced that he will not find pure knowledge anywhere except there. And if this is so, then, as I said just now, would it not be highly unreasonable for such a man to fear death? It certainly would, by Zeus, he said. Then you have sufficient indication, he said, that any man whom you see resenting death was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body, and also a lover of wealth or of honors, either or both.

way are

It is

in training for

certainly as

you

And, Simmias, he to

men

dying and they fear death

least of all

say.

said,

does not what

is

called courage belong especially

of this disposition?

Most

certainly.

And

the quality of moderation

which even the majority call by that one's feet by one's passions, but to treat

name, that is, not to get swept off them with disdain and orderliness, is this not suited only to those most of all despise the body and live the life of philosophy?

who

Necessarily so, he said.

you are willing to reflect on the courage and moderation people, you will find them strange. In what way, Socrates? If

You know

of other

that they all consider death a great evil?

Definitely, he said.

And

the brave

among them

face death,

when

they do, for fear of

greater evils?

That

^

is so.

TsHear and terror that make all men brave, except th philo sophers. Yet it is illogical to be brave through fear and cowardice Therefore,

It

certainly

it

is.

moderate among them? Is their experience not similar? Is it license of a kind that makes them moderate? We say this is impossible, yet their experience of this unsophisticated moderation turns out to be similar: they fear to be deprived of other pleasures which they desire, so

What

of the

Phaedo

60

69

they keep away from some pleasures because they are overcome by others. Now to be mastered by pleasure is what they call license, but what happens to them is that they master certain pleasures because they are mastered

by

c

what we mentioned just now, that has made them moderate.

is like

that in

some way

it

kind of license That seems likely. My good Simmias, I fear this is not the right exchange to attain virtue, to exchange pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains and fears for fears, the greater for the less like coins, but that the only valid currency for which all these things should be exchanged is wisdom. With this we have real courage and moderation and justice and, in a word, true virtue, with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and all such things be present or absent. Exchanged for one another without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth, whereas, in truth, moderation and courage and justice are a purging away of all such things, and wisdom itself is a kind of cleansing or purification. It is likely that those who established the mystic rites for us were not inferior persons but were speaking in riddles long ago when

is

b

others. This a

they said that whoever arrives in the underworld uninitiated and unsanctified will

initiated will

d

e

70

b

whereas he who arrives there purified and dwell with the gods. There are indeed, as those concerned

wallow

in the mire,

with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus but the Bacchants are few. 6 These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way. I have in my life left nothing undone in order to be counted among these as far as possible, as I have been eager to be in every way. Whether my eagerness was right and we accomplished anything we shall, I think, know for certain in a short time, god willing, on arriving yonder. This is my defense, Simmias and Cebes, that I am likely to be right to leave you and my masters here without resentment or complaint, believing that there, as here, I shall find good masters and good friends. If my defense is more convincing to you than to the Athenian jury, it will be well. When Socrates finished, Cebes intervened: Socrates, he said, everything else you said is excellent, I think, but men find it very hard to believe what you said about the soul. They think that after it has left the body it no longer exists anywhere, but that it is destroyed and dissolved on the day the man dies, as soon as it leaves the body; and that, on leaving it, it is dispersed like breath or smoke, has flown away and gone and is no longer anything anywhere. If indeed it gathered itself together and existed by itself and escaped those evils you were recently enumerating, there would then be much good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true; but to believe this requires a good deal of faith and persuasive argument, to

6.

That

is,

the true worshippers of Dionysus, as

external symbols of his worship.

opposed

to those

who

only carry the

61

Phaedo believe that the soul

still

exists after a

man has died and that it still possesses

some capability and intelligence/' What you say is true, Cebes, Socrates said, but what shall we do? Do you want to discuss whether this is likely to be true or not? hear your opinion on the subject. I do not think, said Socrates, that anyone who heard me now, not even a comic poet, could say that I am babbling and discussing things that do not concern me, so we must examine the question thoroughly, if you think we should do so. Let us examine it in some such a manner as this: whether the souls of men who have died exist in the underworld or not. We recall an ancient theory that souls arriving there come from here, and then again Personally, said Cebes,

I

should

like to

and are born here from the dead. If that is true, that the living come back from the dead, then surely our souls must exist there, for they could not come back if they did not exist, and this is a sufficient that they arrive here

proof that these things are so if it truly appears that the living never come from any other source than from the dead. If this is not the case we should need another argument. said Cebi Do not, he saicCconfine yourself to humanity if you want to understand this more readily, but take all animals and all plants into account, and, in short, for all things which come to be, let us see whether they come to be in this way, that is, from their opposites if they have such, as the beautiful is the opposite of the ugly and the just of the unjust, and a thousand other things of the kind. Let us examine whether those that have an opposite must necessarily come to be from their opposite and from nowhere else, as for example when something comes to be larger it must necessari] become larger from having been smaller before.

something smaller comes to be, it will come from something larger before, which became smaller? That is so, he said. And the weaker comes to be from the stronger, and the swifter from

Then

if

the slower? Certainly.

something worse comes to be, does and the juster from the more unjust?

Further, better,

Of

if

it

not

come from

the

course.

So we have sufficiently established that way, opposites from opposites?

all

things

come

to

be in

this

Certainly.

There

is

a further point,

something such as

this,

about these opposites:

between each of those pairs of opposites there are two processes: from the one to the other and then again from the other to the first; between the larger and the smaller there is increase and decrease, and we call the one increasing and the other decreasing? Yes, he said.

Phaedo

62

separation and combination, cooling and heating, and all such things, even if sometimes we do not have a name for the one process, but in fact it must be everywhere that they come to be from other? another, and that there is a process of becoming from each into the

And

so too there

is

Assuredly, he said.

Well then, is there an opposite being awake? Quite so, he said.

c

What

to living, as sleeping

is

the opposite of

is it?

Being dead, he said.

be from one another, and there are two processes of generation between the two? Therefore,

Of

d

come

to

course.

will

I

these are opposites, they

if

you, said Socrates, one of the two pairs

tell

I

was

just talking

other. about, the pair itself and the two processes, and you will tell me the awake comes from sleeping, and I mean, to sleep and to be awake; to be is going to to sleep comes from being awake. Of the two processes one sleep, the other is waking up. Do you.accept that, or not?

Certainly.

You to

tell

be dead

me is

in the

same way about

life

and death. Do you not say

that

the opposite of being alive?

do.

I

And

they

come

to

be from one another?

Yes.

What comes

to

be from being alive?

Being dead.

And what comes to be from being dead? One must agree that it is being alive. Then, Cebes, living creatures and things come to be from the dead? So it appears, he said. Then our souls exist in the underworld. That seems likely. Then in this case one of the two processes of becoming is clear, for dying

e

is

clear It

enough,

certainly

is it

not?

is.

we

not supply the opposite process of becoming? Is nature to be lame in this case? Or must we provide a process of becoming opposite to dying?

What

We

shall

then? Shall

surely must.

And what Coming 72

we do

is

that?

to life again.

such a thing as coming to life again, it would be a process of coming from the dead to the living? Quite so. from the dead in this It is agreed between us then that the living come way no less than the dead from the living and, if that is so, it seems to be Therefore, he said,

if

there

is

63

Phaedo a sufficient proof that the souls of the

they can

come back

dead must be somewhere whence

again.

from what we have agreed on. Consider in this way, Cebes, he said, that, as I think, we were not wrong to agree. If the two processes of becoming did not always balance each other as if they were going round in a circle, but generation proceeded from one point to its opposite in a straight line and it did not turn back again to the other opposite or take any turning, do you realize that all I

think, Socrates, he said, that this follows

would ultimately be in the same state, be affected in the same wa “ and cease to become? How do you mean? he said. It is not hard to understand what I mean. If, for example, there was such a process as going to sleep, but no corresponding process of waking up, you realize that in the end everything would show the story of Endymion to have no meaning. There would be no point to it because everything would have the same experience as he, be asleep. And if everything were combined and nothing separated, the saying of Anaxagoras 8 would soon be true, 'That all things were mixed together." In the same way, my dear Cebes, if everything that partakes of life were to die and remain in that state and not come to life again, would not everything ultimately have to be dead and nothing alive? Even if the living came from some other source, things

c

7

and

all

that lived died,

how could all things avoid being absorbed in death?

could not be, Socrates, said Cebes, and I think what you say is altogether true. I think, Cebes, said he, that this is very definitely the case and that we were not deceived when we agreed on this: coming to life again in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist. Furthermore, Socrates, Cebes rejoined, such is also the case if that theory is true that you are accustomed to mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time have learned what we now recollect. This is possible only if our soul existed somewhere before it took on this human shape. So according to this theory too, the soul is likely to be something immortal. Cebes, Simmias interrupted, what are the proofs of this? Remind me, for I do not quite recall them at the moment. There is one excellent argument, said Cebes, namely that when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give the right answer of their own accord, and they could not do this if they did not possess the knowledge and the right explanation inside them. Then if one shows them It

7.

Endymion was granted

eternal sleep

by Zeus.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was born at the beginning of the fifth century b.c. He came to Athens as a young man and spent most of his life there in the study of natural philosophy. He is quoted later in the dialogue (97c ff.) as claiming that the universe is directed by Mind (Nous). The reference here is to his statement that in the original state of the world all its elements were thoroughly commingled. 8.

Phaedo

64 a

diagram or something

such If

the case

is

this

agree

if

show most

clearly that

.

does not convince you, Simmias, said Socrates, see whether you we examine it in some such way as this, for do you doubt that

what we It is

else of that kind, this will

9

call

learning

not that

I

recollection?

is

want to experience the very and from what Cebes undertook to

doubt, said Simmias, but

we

I

are discussing, recollection, say, I am now remembering and am pretty nearly convinced. Nevertheless, I should like to hear now the way you were intending to explain it. surely agree that if anyone recollects anything, This way, he said.

thing

We

he must have known Quite so, he said.

it

before.

when knowledge comes to mind in this way, it is recollection? What way do I mean? Like this: when a man sees or hears or in some other way perceives one thing and not only knows that

Do we

not also agree that

thing but also thinks of another thing of which the knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the second thing that comes into his

How

mind?

do you mean?

Things such as

this: to

know

a

man is surely a different knowledge from

knowing a lyre. Of course. Well, you know what happens

whenever they see a lyre, a garment or anything else that their beloved is accustomed to use, they know the lyre, and the image of the boy to whom it belongs comes into their mind. This is recollection, just as someone, on seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes, and there are thousands of other such occurrences. Thousands indeed, said Simmias. to lovers:

kind of thing not recollection of a kind? he said, especially so when one experiences it about things that one had forgotten, because one had not seen them for some time? Quite so. Further, he said, can a man seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre recollect Certainly. a man, or seeing a picture of Simmias recollect Cebes? Or seeing a picture of Simmias, recollect Simmias himself? He cerIs this

—

—

—

tainly can.

In all these cases the recollection can be occasioned by things that are It can. similar, but it can also be occasioned by things that are dissimilar?

—

caused by similar things, must one not of necessity also experience this: to consider whether the similarity to that which one recollects is deficient in any respect or complete? One must. Consider, he said, whether this is the case: we say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone,

When

the recollection

is

—

9.

Cf.

Meno

81 e

ff.,

where Socrates does

precisely that.

65

Phaedo or anything of that kind, but something else itself. Shall we say that this exists or not?

beyond

all

these, the

Equal

we shall, by Zeus, said Simmias, most definitely. And do we know what this is? — Certainly. Whence have we acquired the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we mentioned just now, from seeing sticks or stones or some other things that are equal we come to think of that other which is different from them? Indeed

seem to you to be different? Look at it also this way: do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear one to be equal and to another to be unequal? Certainly they do. ” But what of the equals themselves? Have they ever appeared

Or doesn't

it

—

to you, or Equality to

be Inequality?

Never, Socrates. These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore I do not think they are the same at all, Socrates. But it is definitely from the equal things, though th that Equal, that you have derived and grasped the

Very true, Socrates. Whether it be like them or unlike them? Certainly. It

makes no

difference.

think of another, whether

As long it

as the s

be similar or d

* be recollection? « * Quite so. » Well then, he said, do we experier equal sticks and the other equal ob‘ to us to be equal in the same se deficiency in their being such

A

considerable deficiency

Whenever someone, on

now

sees wants to be

like that other since this

must have

prior

deficiently so?

Necessarily.

Well, do

we

als
r

difference.

:h

the

later,

One

knowledge

we

say, are

^collection.

e are f

born with

which we had

Phaedo

have no means of choosing at the moment, Socrates. Well, can you make this choice? What is your opinion about it? A man who has knowledge would be able to give an account of what he knows, or would he not? He must certainly be able to do so, Socrates, he said. And do you think everybody can give an account of the things we were mentioning just now? I wish they could, said Simmias, but I'm afraid it is much more likely that by this time tomorrow the|£ will be no one left who can do so adequately. So you do not think that everybody “has knowledge qf those things? I

No

®

indeed.

So they

recollect

t

*

*

v

'*

what they once learned? 4

They must.

When did our souls acquire we were born as men.

the

knowledge

of

4

them? Certainly not since

Indeed no. 5*

Before that then?

A

Yes.

.

So then, Simmias, our souls also existed apart from the body before they took on human form, and they had intelligence. Unless we acquire the knowledge at the moment of birth, Socrates, for that time

is still left

to us.

Quite so, my friend, but at what otfcer time do we lose it? We just now agreed that we are not born with that knowledge. Do we then lose it at the very time we acquire it, or can you mention any other time? I cannot, Socrates. I did not realize that I was talking nonsense. So this is our position, Simmias? he said. If those realities we are always talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality* discovering that it compare these things with it, then, just existed Derore and is ours, anc

must exist before we are born. If these realities do not exist, then this argument is altogether futile. Is this the position, that there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist, and for our souls to exist before we were born? If the former do not exist, neither do the latter? I do not think, Socrates, said Simmias, that there is any possible doubt that it is equally necessary for both to exist, and it is opportune that our argument comes to the conclusion that our soul exists before we are born, and equally so that reality of which you are now speaking. Nothing is so evident to me personally as that all such things must certainly exist, the Beautiful, the Good, and all those you mentioned just now. I also think that sufficient proof of this has been given. Then what about Cebes? said Socrates, for we must persuade Cebes also. He is sufficiently convinced I think, said Simmias, though he is the most difficult of men to persuade by argument, but I believe him to be fully convinced that our soul existed before we were born. I do not think myself, however, that it has been proved that the soul continues to exist after as they exist, so our soul

Phaedo

68

death; the opinion of the majority which Cebes mentioned still stands, that when a man dies his soul is dispersed and this is the end of its existence. What is to prevent the soul coming to be and being constituted from some

other source, existing before

it

enters a

human body and

then, having

dying and being destroyed? You are right, Simmias, said Cebes. Half of what needed proof has been proved, namely, that our soul existed before we were born, but further proof is needed that it exists no less after we have died, if the proof is to

done so and departed from

it,

itself

be complete. It has been proved even now, Simmias and Cebes, said Socrates, if you are ready to combine this argument with the one we agreed on before, that every living thing must come from the dead. If the soul exists before, it must, as it comes to life and birth, come from nowhere else than death and being dead, so how could it avoid existing after death since it must be born again? What you speak of has then even now been proved. However, I

you and Simmias would like to discuss the argument more fully. You seem to have this childish fear that the wind would really dissolve and scatter the soul, as it leaves the body, especially if one happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather. Cebes laughed and said: "Assuming that we were afraid, Socrates, try to change our minds, or rather do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child in us who has these fears; try to persuade him think

not to fear death like a bogey." You should, said Socrates, sing a charm over

have charmed away

Where

now

that

shall

you

we

him every day

until

you

his fears.

find a

good charmer

for these fears, Socrates,

he said,

are leaving us?

he said, and there are good men in it; the tribes of foreigners are also numerous. You should search for such a charmer among them all, sparing neither trouble nor expense, for there is nothing on which you could spend your money to greater advantage. You must also search among yourselves, for you might not easily find people Greece

is

a large country, Cebes,

who

could do this better than yourselves. That shall be done, said Cebes, but let us,

argument where we left Of course it pleases me.

the

if it

pleases you, go back to

it.

Splendid, he said. We must then ask ourselves something like this: what kind of thing is likely to be scattered? On behalf of what kind of thing should one fear this, and for what kind of thing should one not fear it? We should then

which class the soul belongs, and as a result either fear for the soul or be of good cheer. What you say is true. Is not anything that is composite and a compound by nature liable to be split up into its component parts, and only that which is noncomposite, if anything, is not likely to be split up? examine

to

69

Phaedo I

think that

the case, said Cebes.

is

Are not the things that always remain the same and in the same state most likely not to be composite, whereas those that vary from one time to another and are never the same are composite? I

think that

is so.

same things with which we were dealing

Let us then return to those earlier, to that reality of

whose

existence

we

are giving an account in our

d

questions and answers; are they ever the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform by itself, remain the

same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever? It must remain the same, said Cebes, and in the same state, Socrates. What of the many beautiful particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, or other such things, or the many equal particulars, and all those which bear the same name as those others? Do they remain the same or, in total contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other? The latter is the case, they are never in the same state. These latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but those that always remain the same can only be grasped by the reasoning power of the mind? They are not seen but are invisible? That

e

79

altogether true, he said.

is

Do you

then want us to assume two kinds of existences, the visible and

the invisible?

assume

Let us

And

this.

the invisible always remains the same, whereas the visible never

does?

assume

Let us

Now Quite

that too.

one part of ourselves

is

the body, another part

the soul?

b

so.

To which class of existence do we say To the visible, as anyone can see.

What about It is

is

the soul?

Is it visible

the

body

is

more

alike

and akin?

or invisible?

not visible to men, Socrates, he said.

Well,

we meant

visible

and

invisible to

do you think? To human eyes. Then what do we say about the soul? Not visible.

human

eyes; or to

Is it visible

any

others,

or not visible?

—

So it is invisible? Yes. So the soul is more like the invisible than the body, and the body more Without any doubt, Socrates. like the visible? Haven't we also said some time ago that when the soul makes use of the body to investigate something, be it through hearing or seeing or some other sense for to investigate something through the body is to do it

—

—

c

Phaedo

70

—

through the senses it is dragged by the body to the things that are never the same, and the soul itself strays and is confused and dizzy, as if it were drunk, in so far as it is in contact with that kind of thing? Certainly.

_

by itself it passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to this, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can do so; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with things of the same kind, and its experience then is what is called wisdom? investigates

Ther.well

and what we are saying now, these two kinds do you think that the soul is more alike and

Judging from what

which of more akin? to

we have

said before

argument any man, even the dullest, would agree that the soul is altogether more like that which always exists in the same state rather than like that which does not. What of the body? I

think, Socrates, he said, that

That 80

is

on

this line of

like the other.

way: when the soul and the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Then again, which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine is to rule and to lead, whereas it is that of the mortal to be ruled and be subject?

Look

I

at

it

also this

do.

Which does

the soul resemble?

Obviously, Socrates, the soul resembles the divine, and the body resembles the mortal.

Consider then, Cebes, whether b

it

follows from

all

that has

been said that

most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and never consistently the same. Have we anything else to say to show, my dear Cebes, that this the soul

is

is

not the case?

We

have not. Well then, that being so, is it not natural for the body to dissolve and for the soul to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so? c

Of

course.

You

realize,

he said, that

when

a

man

dies, the visible part, the

body,

and which we call the corpse, whose natural lot it would be to dissolve, fall apart and be blown away, does not immediately suffer any of these things but remains for a fair time, in fact, quite a long time if the man dies with his body in a suitable condition and at a favorable season? If the body is emaciated or embalmed, as in Egypt, it remains almost whole for a remarkable length of time, and even if the body decays, some parts of it, namely bones and sinews and the like, are nevertheless, one might say, deathless. Is which

d

easily,

exists in the visible world,

that not so?

— Yes.

% }LMowledge^l^^^^^^'—

for this is~what

we are a sked tounderstand by the^addit ion of an ac count.'

Theaetetus: Apparently so. trying to Socrates: And it is surely just silly to tell us, when we are accompanied by discover what knowledge is, that it is correct judgment Theaetetus, knowledge whether of differentness or of anything else? And so, knowledge is neither perception nor true judgment, nor an account added ,

judgment. Theaetetus: It seems not. labor with Socrates: Well now, dear lad, are we still pregnant, still in them all? any thoughts about knowledge? Or have we been delivered of far Theaetetus: As far as I'm concerned, Socrates, you've made me say more than ever was in me, Heaven knows. these offSocrates: Well then, our art of midwifery tells us that all of spring are wind-eggs and not worth bringing up?

to true

Theaetetus: Undoubtedly r"attempt Socrates: And so, Theaetetus, if ever in the future you should theories, they will be to conceive or should succeed in conceiving other -

better ones as the result of this inquiry.

48.

Reading

Ei ge de

.

.

.

for Eipe de at 209e5.

And

if

you remain

barren,

you

210

234 Theaetetus

21 Od

companions will find you gentler and less tiresome; you will be modest and not think you know what you don't know. This is all my art can achieve— nothing more. I do not know any of the things that other men know— the great and inspired men of today and yesterday. But this art of midwifery my mother and I had allotted to us by God; she to deliver women, I to deliver men that are young and generous of spirit, all that have any beauty. And now I must go to the King's Porch to meet the indictment that Meletus has brought against me; but let us meet here again in the

morning, Theodorus.

SOPHIST The day following their conversation in Theaetetus, the geometer Theodorus, together with his Athenian pupils Theaetetus and Socrates' young namesake rejoins Socrates for further discussion. They bring with them a philosopher visiting from Elea a Greek town of Southern Italy famous as home to the great phiboth of whom Socrates losopher Parmenides and his pupil the logician Zeno ,

,

—

,

had encountered

in yet

another dialogue closely linked

ides. Socrates asks whether this visitor

and

to this

one Parmen,

the others at Elea treat the philoso-

pher the statesman and the sophist as actually being just one thing ,

,

—

a single

sort of person , though appearing to different people as falling under just one or or rather as having three distinct intellectual capacianother of these headings

—

ties , as their three

names

indicate.

Hearing

that the latter

is

the Eleatics'

view

,

he thus initiates two successive complex discussions. First in Sophist, the visitor opting to use Socrates' favorite procedure of question and answer displays ,

,

*,

,

own conception of the sophist. way with the statesman. There

in full detail his

In

Statesman he then contin-

no third discussion of the philosopher despite occasional suggestions that the initial agenda calls for one. The visitor after all , is a distinguished philosopher. Perhaps Plato's intention is to mark the philosopher off for us from these other two through showing a ues in a similar

is

,

,

supreme philosopher at work defining them and therein demonstrating his own devotion to truth and the correct method of analysis for achieving it: for Plato ,

these together define the philosopher.

In defining the sophist , the visitor employs the 'method of division'

—

—

or,

more accurately of 'collection and division' described in Phaedrus 265d ff. and early on in Philebus; this also underlies the latter's discussion of the varieties of pleasure and knowledge. He first offers six distinct routes for under,

standing the sophist by systematically demarcating specific classes within suc,

cessively smaller , nested

,

more inclusive

classes of practitioners ; these specific

subclasses are then identified as the sophists. Apparently 'sophistry'

—

is

a some-

hunts rich prominent young men so as to receive a wage for speaking persuasively to them about virtue it sells (in several different circumstances ) items of alleged knowledge on

what

loosely associated set of distinct capacities

it

,

,

this

same subject

wrong

,

it

,

it is

expert at winning private debates about right and

cleanses people's souls by refuting their false or poorly supported

—

whose long-delayed completion is reached Yet in a final accounting the sophist is 'penned in' as one who only at the very end of the dialogue ideas.

—

235

,

236

Sophist

though aware that he does not know anything, produces in words totally inadequate 'copies' of the truth on important subjects, ones he makes appear to others to be the truth, even though, being false they are hardly even like it. The ,

relation of this final definition to the six first ones

is

not fully explored. The vis-

may

be intimating the general principle that sometimes a 'nature' or real 'kind' has no single place in a systematic division; it unifies a set of differently

itor

located functions, each with lectual neighbors. In

and

division'

ness of

is

any

own

differences

from

more immediate

its

intel-

case, the essential idea of the

that each thing

and

similarities

its

its

is to

'method of collection be understood through a full, lively aware-

differences in relation to other things

—

the sort of

awareness that the varied divisions encourage us to reach. Much other general instruction on how to make proper use of the 'method' is given in Statesman. The visitor delays completing his final accounting because he sees the need

show how

even possible for anyone to do what he wants to say the sophist does do speak words that appear to be true but in fact are false. The trouble is that he understands speaking falsely as saying 'what is not', while

first to

—

it is

Parmenides famously maintained that that is impossible: so he is reengage in 'parricide' in showing how Parmenides was wrong. There

his teacher

quired to

—

ensues an elaborate discussion of the meaning of 'what is' as well as of 'what is not', in which we can see Plato working out a new theory of the nature of the

Form

of being,

and

Forms: such a theory falsely

—

is

its

relations to other 'greatest' or

needed

intelligible after all.

to

make saying 'what

Much

most comprehensive

—speaking dialogue has always being —and not

not'

is

of the interest of the

been found in this metaphysical excursion into the topic of ing in general.

—

be-

J.M.C.

Theodorus: We've come at the proper time by yesterday's agreement, Socrates. We're also bringing this man who's visiting us. He's from Elea and he's a member of the group who gather around Parmenides and Zeno. And he's very much a philosopher. Socrates: Are you bringing a visitor, Theodorus? Or are you bringing a god without realizing it instead, like the ones Homer mentions? He says gods accompany people who are respectful and just He also says the god of visitors who's at least as much a god as any other is a companion who keeps an eye on people's actions, both the criminal and the lawful ones. So your visitor might be a greater power following along with you. 1

.

—

Translated by Nicholas 1.

—

P.

See Odyssey ix.270-71.

White.

a sort of

god

of refutation to

keep watch on us and show

how bad we

are

—

speaking and to refute us. Theodorus: That's not our visitor's style, Socrates. He's more moderate than the enthusiasts for debating are. And he doesn't seem to me to be a god at all. He is divine but then I call all philosophers that. Socrates: And that's the right thing for you to do, my friend. But probably it's no easier, I imagine, to distinguish that kind of person than it is to distinguish gods. Certainly the genuine philosophers who "haunt our 2 appearcities" by contrast to the fake ones take on all sorts of different ances just because of other people's ignorance. As philosophers look down from above at the lives of those below them, some people think they're worthless and others think they're worth everything in the world. Some-

at

—

—

—

times they take on the appearance of statesmen, and sometimes of sophists. Sometimes, too, they might give the impression that they're completely insane. But if it's all right with our visitor I'd be glad to have him tell us what the people where he comes from used to apply the following names

and what they thought about these things? Theodorus: What things? Socrates: Sophist statesman, and philosopher. Theodorus: What, or what kind of thing, especially makes you consider asking that question? What special problem about them do you have in mind? Socrates: This: did they think that sophists, statesmen, and philosophers make up one kind of thing or two? Or did they divide them up into three kinds corresponding to the three names and attach one name to each of them? Theodorus: I don't think it would offend him to tell us about it. Or

to,

,

would

it,

sir?

No, Theodorus, it wouldn't offend me. I don't have any objection. the answer is easy: they think there are three kinds. Distinguishing

Visitor:

And

though, isn't a small or easy job. Theodorus: Luckily, Socrates, you've gotten hold of words that are very much like the ones we happened to be asking him about. And he made since he's heard a the same excuse to us that he made to you just now

clearly

what each

of

them

is,

—

lot

about the issue, after

all,

and hasn't forgotten

it.

Socrates: In that case, sir, don't refuse our very first request. Tell us this. When you want to explain something to somebody, do you usually prefer to explain it by yourself in a long speech, or to do it with questions? That's the way Parmenides did it one time, when he was very old and I

was young 2.

3 .

He used

questions to generate a very fine discussion. gods go from town to town disguised as visitors of Odysseus on this occasion, to observe the deeds of just and

See Odyssey xvii.483-87.

varied appearance, just like

.

.

.

unjust people. 3.

The reference

is to

the conversation in the Parmenides.

— 238

Sophist

Visitor:

easier to

It's

do

it

the second way, Socrates,

with someone who's easy to handle and it's

easier to

Socrates:

do

it

isn't

you're talking a trouble-maker. Otherwise if

alone.

You can

pick anyone here you want. They'll all answer you take my advice you'll choose one of the young ones

But if you Theaetetus here or for that matter any of the others you prefer. Visitor: As long as I'm here with you for the first time, Socrates, I'd be embarrassed not to make our meeting a conversational give-and-take, but politely.

instead to stretch things out and give a long continuous speech by myself or even to someone else, as if I were delivering an oration. A person wouldn't expect the issue you just mentioned to be as small as your question suggests. In fact it needs a very long discussion. On the other

hand,

it

certainly

seems rude and uncivilized

you and these people have. So

here, especially

for a visitor not to oblige

when you've spoken

the

way you

accept Theaetetus as the person to talk with, on the basis of your urging, and because I've talked with him myself before. Theaetetus: Then please do that, sir, and you'll be doing us all a favor, just as Socrates said. I'll

Visitor:

We probably don't need

anything more about that, then, Theaetetus. From now on you're the one I should have the rest of our talk with. But if you're annoyed at how long the job takes, you should blame your friends here instead of me. Theaetetus: I don't think I'll give out now, but if anything like that does happen we'll have to use this other Socrates over here as a substitute. He's Socrates' namesake, but he's my age and exercises with me and he's used to sharing lots of tasks with me. Visitor: Good. As the talk goes along you'll think about that on your own. But with me I think you need to begin the investigation from the sophist— by searching for him and giving a clear account of what he is. Now in this case you and I only have the name in common, and maybe we've each used it for a different thing. In every case, though, we always need to be in agreement about the thing itself by means of a verbal explanation, rather than doing without any such explanation and merely agreeing about the name. But it isn't the easiest thing in the world to grasp the tribe we're planning to search for I mean, the sophist or say what it is. But if an important issue needs to be worked out well, then as everyone has long thought, you need to practice on unimportant, easier issues first. So that's my advice to us now, Theaetetus: since we think it's hard to hunt down and deal with the kind, sophist we ought to practice our method of hunting on something easier first unless you can tell us about another to say

—

—

way

that's

somehow more

Theaetetus: Visitor:

I

—

,

promising.

can't.

Do you want

us to focus on something as a model for the more important issue?

trivial

and

try to

use

it

239

Sophist

Theaetetus: Yes.

What might we propose

unimportant and easy

understand, but can have an account given of it just as much as more important things can? For example, an angler: isn't that recognizable to everybody, but not worth being too serious about? Visitor:

that's

to

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: That,

I

expect, will provide an appropriate

method

of hunting

what we want. Theaetetus: That would be fine.

and way

of talking for

Well then,

Visitor:

me, shall

we

take

let's

him

to

go after the angler from this starting point. Tell be an expert at something, or a nonexpert with

another sort of capacity? Theaetetus: He's definitely not a nonexpert. Visitor: But expertise as a whole falls pretty much into two types. Theaetetus: How? Visitor: There's farming, or any sort of caring for any mortal body; and there's also caring for things that are put together or fabricated, which we call equipment; and there's imitation. The right thing would be to call all those things by a single name. Theaetetus: How? What name? Visitor: When you bring anything into being that wasn't in being before, we say you're a producer and that the thing you've brought into being is

produced. Theaetetus: That's Visitor:

And

all

right.

the things

we went

through

just

now have

their

own

capacity for that. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Let's put

them under

the heading of production.

Theaetetus: All right. Visitor: Next, consider the whole type that has to do with learning, recognition, commerce, combat, and hunting. None of these creates anything. They take things that are or have come into being, and they take possession of some of them with words and actions, and they keep other things from being taken possession of. For that reason it would be appropriate to call all the parts of this type acquisition.

Theaetetus: Yes, that would be appropriate. Visitor: If every expertise falls under acquisition or production, Theaetetus, which one shall we put angling in? Theaetetus: Acquisition, obviously. Visitor: Aren't there two types of expertise in acquisition? Is one type mutually willing exchange, through gifts and wages and purchase? And would the other type, which brings things into one's possession by actions or words, be expertise in taking possession? Theaetetus: It seems so, anyway, given what we've said.

240

Sophist

Well then, shouldn't

Visitor:

secret

we

The part

that's

done openly we

label

combat, and the part that's

hunting.

call

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: And furthermore in two. Theaetetus: How?

We

Visitor:

cut possession-taking in two?

How?

Theaetetus: Visitor:

we

divide

it

it

would be unreasonable not

into the hunting of living things

to cut

hunting

and the hunting

of lifeless things.

Theaetetus: Yes, if there are both kinds. Visitor: How could there not be? But we should let the part involving lifeless things go. It doesn't have a name, except for some kinds of diving and other trivial things like that. The other part namely the hunting of living animals we should call animal-hunting. Theaetetus: All right.

—

—

Visitor:

And isn't it right to say that animal-hunting has two types? One

land-hunting, the hunting of things with feet, which is divided into many types with many names. The other is aquatic hunting, which hunts animals that swim. is

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

And

things that swim,

we

see, fall into things

with wings and

things living underwater.

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: And all hunting of things that have wings,

I

suppose,

is

called

bird-catching.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

all

hunting of underwater things

is

fishing.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Well then, this kind of hunting might be divided into two

main

parts.

Theaetetus: Visitor:

one does

One it

by

Theaetetus: Visitor:

The

and enclosing it

What of

are they?

them does

its

hunting with stationary nets and the other

striking.

What do you mean? first it

to

one

How

are

you dividing them?

whatever involves surrounding something prevent it from escaping, so it's reasonable to call is

enclosure.

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: Shouldn't baskets, nets, slipknots, creels, and so forth be called enclosures? Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: like that.

So we'll

call this part of

hunting enclosure-hunting or something

— 241

Sophist

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: But the kind that's done by striking with hooks or three-pronged spears is different, and we should call it by one word, strike-hunting. Or

what term would be

better?

Theaetetus: Let's not worry about the name. That one will do. Visitor: Then there's a part of striking that's done at night by firelight, and as it happens is called torch-hunting by the people who

do

it.

Theaetetus: Visitor: But three-pronged Theaetetus:

Of

course.

whole daytime part is called hooking, since even the spears have hooks on their points. Yes, that's what it's called. Visitor: Then one part of the hooking part of striking is done by striking downward from above. And since you usually use a three-pronged spear that way, I think it's called spearing. Theaetetus: Some people do call it that. Visitor: And I suppose there's only one type left. Theaetetus: What? Visitor: It's the type of striking contrary to the previous one. It's done with a hook, not to just any part of the fish's body but always to the prey's head and mouth, and pulls it upward from below with rods or reeds. the

going to say its name should be, Theaetetus? Theaetetus: I think we've now found what we said we aimed to find. Visitor: So now we're in agreement about the angler's expertise, not just as to its name; in addition we've also sufficiently grasped a verbal explanation concerning the thing itself. Within expertise as a whole one

What

half

we

are

was

was taking possession; half of hunting was animal-hunting; half

acquisitive; half of the acquisitive

was hunting; half of of animal-hunting was aquatic hunting; all of the lower portion of aquatic hunting was fishing; half of fishing was hunting by striking; and half of striking was hooking. And the part of hooking that involves a blow drawing a thing upward from underneath is called by a name that's derived by its possession-taking

similarity to the action

itself,

that

is, it's

called draw-fishing or angling

what we're searching for. Theaetetus: We've got a completely adequate demonstration of that, anyway. Visitor: Well then, let's use that model to try and find the sophist, and see what he is. which

is

Theaetetus: Fine. Visitor:

angler

is

The

first

question, then,

a nonexpert, or that he's

was whether we should suppose an expert

at

the

something?

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Well, shall

and

truly

an expert?

we suppose

the sophist

is

a

layman, or completely

242

Sophist

Theaetetus: He's not a layman at all. I understand what you're saying: he has to be the kind of person that the name sophist indicates 4 .

seems we need Theaetetus: But what is it? Visitor:

So

it

to take

him

to

have

we recognize

Visitor: For heaven's sake, don't

a kind of expertise.

that the

one

man belongs

same kind as the other? Theaetetus: Which men? Visitor: The angler and the sophist. Theaetetus: In what way? Visitor: To me they both clearly appear to be hunters. Theaetetus: We said which kind of hunting the angler does. What kind

to the

does the sophist do? Visitor: We divided all hunting into two parts, one for land animals and one for swimming animals. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: We went through one part, about the animals that swim underwater. But we left the land part undivided, though we noted that it contains

many

types.

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: Up till that point the sophist and the angler go the same way, beginning from expertise in acquisition. Theaetetus: They seem to, anyway.

from animal hunting, though, they turn away from One goes to ponds, rivers, and the sea, and hunts for the

Visitor: Starting

each other. animals there. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

which are

The other one goes like plentiful

to the land

meadows

and

to different kinds of rivers,

of wealthy youths, to take possession

of the things living there.

Theaetetus:

What do you mean?

There are two main kinds of things to hunt on land. Theaetetus: What are they? Visitor: Tame things and wild ones. Theaetetus: Is there any such thing as hunting tame animals? Visitor: There is if human beings are tame animals, at any rate. Make whichever assumption you like: either there are no tame animals, or there are tame animals but humans are wild, or else, you'll say, humans are tame but aren't hunted. Specify whichever you prefer to say. Theaetetus: I think we're tame animals and I'll say that humans are in fact hunted. Visitor:

4.

The word "sophist"

and so can be taken

to

(sophistes) is

etymologically related to the

connote knowledge and expertise.

word "wise"

{sophos),

243

Sophist

Visitor:

Then

let's

say that the hunting of tame animals

falls into

two

parts.

Theaetetus:

How?

Visitor: Let's take piracy, enslavement, tyranny, along with everything that has to do with war, and let's define them all together as hunting

by

force.

Theaetetus: Fine. Visitor:

And we'll also take legal oratory, political oratory, and conversa-

tion all together in

one whole, and

call

them

all

one single

sort of expertise,

expertise in persuasion.

Theaetetus: Right. Visitor: Let's say that there are two kinds of persuasion. Theaetetus: What are they? Visitor: One is done privately, and the other is done in public. Theaetetus: Yes, each of those is one type. Visitor: And doesn't one part of private hunting earn wages, while the other part gives gifts? Theaetetus: I don't understand.

seems you aren't paying attention to the way lovers hunt. Theaetetus: In what connection? Visitor: The fact that when they hunt people they give presents to

Visitor:

them

It

too.

Theaetetus: Very true. Visitor: Let's call this type expertise in love. Theaetetus: All right. Visitor:

One

by being own room and

part of the wage-earning type approaches people

agreeable, uses only pleasure as

its bait,

and earns only

its

board. I think we'd all call it flattery, or expertise in pleasing people. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: But doesn't the kind of wage-earning that actually earns money, though it claims to deal with people for the sake of virtue, deserve to be called

by

a different

name?

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

What name? Try and

Theaetetus: the

name

that

It's

obvious.

would be

I

me. think we've found the sophist. tell

I

think that's

suitable for him.

So according to our account now, Theaetetus, it seems that this sort of expertise belongs to appropriation, taking possession, hunting, animal-hunting, hunting on land, human hunting, hunting by persuasion, 5 hunting privately, and money-earning It's the hunting of rich, prominent young men. And according to the way our account has turned out, it's Visitor:

.

what should be 5.

called the expertise of the sophist.

In addition to the

words bracketed by Burnet, we bracket

doxopaideutikes also.

244

Sophist

Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: Still, let's look at

this

it

way

what we're looking for diverse one. And even in what

too, since

but quite a we've just said earlier it actually presents the appearance of being not what we're now saying, but a different type. Theaetetus: How? isn't a trivial sort of expertise

Visitor: Expertise in acquisition

had two

parts,

hunting and exchanging.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

let's

say there are two types of exchanging, giving and

selling.

Theaetetus: All right. Visitor: And we're also going to say that selling divides in two. Theaetetus: How? Visitor:

other

is

One

part

the sale of things that the seller himself makes. The purveying, that is, the purveying of things other people make. is

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: city

Then what?

Isn't the part of

— about half of — called retailing?

purveying

done within the

that's

it

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

isn't

Visitor:

And

can't

wholesaling the part that buys and exchange between one city and another? Theaetetus: Of course. the nourishment sells

and

sells

things for

we

see that one part of wholesaling sells things for use of the body in exchange for cash, and the other

things for the soul?

What do you mean by that? Maybe we don't understand the one for the soul

Theaetetus: Visitor:

we understand

— since certainly

the other kind.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Let's consider every kind of music that's carried from one city to another and bought here and sold there, as well as painting and shows and other things for the soul. Some of them are transported and sold for

amusement and others for serious purposes. We can use the word wholesaler for the transporter and seller of these things just as well as for someone who sells food and beverages. Theaetetus: That's absolutely true. Visitor: Wouldn't you use the same and exchanged items of knowledge for Theaetetus: Definitely. Visitor:

Wouldn't the

name for somebody who bought money from city to city?

right thing to say be that the art of display

part of that soul-wholesaling?

And

don't

we have

the part that consists in selling knowledge, also equally ridiculous? it,

Theaetetus: Definitely.

by

a

is

one

to call the other part of

name

that's similar

and

245

Sophist

should be used for the part of this knowledgeselling that deals with knowledge of virtue, and another name for the part that deals with knowledge of other things? Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: "Expertise-selling" would fit the second one. You try and tell Visitor:

me

the

And one name

name

of the

Theaetetus:

What

first

one.

other

name could you mention

which we're looking for right I couldn't mention any other one. Come on now and

for the kind, sophist ,

Visitor:

would now? that

except

fit,

let's collect

it

together. We'll say that the expertise of the part of acquisition, exchange,

all

selling, wholesaling,

that

have

to

and soul-wholesaling, dealing

do with virtue

—

that's sophistry in its

in

words and learning

second appearance.

Theaetetus: Definitely. Visitor: In the third place

I

somebody just the same and undertook to make his living selling

think you'd call

he settled here in the city those same things, both ones that he'd bought and ones that he'd thing

if

made

himself.

Theaetetus: Yes, I would. Visitor: So apparently you'll

still

say that sophistry

falls

under acquisi-

exchange, and selling, either by retailing things that others make or by selling things that he makes himself. It's the retail sale of any learning that has to do with the sorts of things we mentioned. Theaetetus: It has to be, since we need to stay consistent with what we tion,

said before. Visitor:

Now

let's

see whether the type we're chasing

is

something

like

the following.

Theaetetus: What? Visitor:

Combat was one

part of acquisition

6 .

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

it

makes sense

to divide

it

in two.

Theaetetus: How? Visitor: We'll take one part to be competition and the other part to

be fighting. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

would be fitting and proper to give a name like fighting in which one body fights against another.

And

to the part of

it

violence

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

would you

call

as for the part that pits it

words against words, what

else

other than controversy?

Theaetetus: Nothing

else.

sometimes translated (or transliterated) "eristic." It refers to a practice of competitive debating which the sophists made popular in Athens. Plato's use of the term stigmatizes the practice as not directed at truth. 6.

The word here translated by "debating,"

eristikon, is

246

Sophist

Visitor: But

we have

to

have two types of controversy.

Theaetetus: In what way? Visitor: So far as it involves one long public speech directed against another and deals with justice and injustice, it's forensic. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: But if it goes on in private discussions and is chopped up into questions and answers, don't we usually call it disputation? Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

One

part of disputation involves controversy about contracts and isn't carried on in any systematic or expert way. should take that to be a type of disputation, since we can express what makes it different. But it hasn't been given a name before and it doesn't deserve to get one

We

from

us.

Theaetetus: That's true. Its subtypes are too small and varied. Visitor: But what about disputation that's done expertly and involves controversy about general issues, including what's just and what's unjust? Don't we normally call that debating? Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: Part of debating,

it

turns out, wastes

money and

the other part

makes money. Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: Let's try

and say what each have to.

of

them ought

to

be called.

Theaetetus: We Visitor: I think one type of debating is a result of the pleasure a person gets from the activity, and involves neglecting his own livelihood. But its style is unpleasant to most people who hear it, and in my view it's right to call

it

chatter.

Theaetetus: That's pretty much what people do call it. Visitor: You take a turn now. Say what its contrary is, which makes money from debates between individuals. Theaetetus: How could anyone go wrong in saying that the amazing sophist we've been after has turned up once again for the fourth time. Visitor: It seems his type is precisely the money-making branch of experdebating, disputation, controversy, fighting, combat, and acquisition. According to what our account shows us now, that's the sophist. Theaetetus: Absolutely. tise in

So you see how true it is that the beast is complex and can't be caught with one hand, as they say. Theaetetus: It does take both hands. Visitor: Yes, and you need all your capacity to follow his tracks in what's to come. Tell me: don't we call some things by names that houseVisitor:

servants use?

Theaetetus: A lot of things. But what are you asking about? Visitor: For example things like filtering, straining, winnowing.

247

Sophist

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

And

also

about carding, spinning, weaving, and a that which are involved in experts' crafts. Is

we know

million other things like that right?

Theaetetus:

What

general point are you trying to

make with

these ex-

amples? Visitor: All the things I've

mentioned are kinds of dividing.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Since there's a single kind of expertise involved in all of them, then according to what I've said we'll expect it to have a single name. Theaetetus: What shall we call it? Visitor: Discrimination.

Theaetetus: All right. Visitor: Think about whether we can see two types in it. Theaetetus: You're asking me to do some quick thinking. Visitor: In fact in what we've called discriminations one kind separates what's worse from what's better and the other separates like from like. Theaetetus: That's obvious now that you've said it. Visitor: I don't have an ordinary name for one of them, but I do have

—

name for the kind of away what's worse.

a

discrimination that leaves what's better and throws

Theaetetus: What? Tell me. Visitor: I think everyone says that that kind of discrimination

is

cleansing.

Theaetetus: Yes.

Won't everyone see that cleansing has two types? Theaetetus: Yes, maybe, if they had time, but I don't see now. Visitor: Many kinds of cleansing that have to do with the body can appropriately be included under a simple name. Theaetetus: Which ones? What name? Visitor: There's the cleansing of the inside part of living bodies, which Visitor:

done by gymnastics and medicine. And there's the cleansing of the insignificant outside part that's done by bathing. And also there's the cleansing of nonliving bodies, which fulling and all kinds of furbishing take care of and which have lots of specialized and ridiculous-seeming names. Theaetetus: Very ridiculous. Visitor: Of course, Theaetetus. But our method of dealing with words doesn't care one way or the other whether cleansing by sponging or by taking medicine does a lot of good or only a little. The method aims at

is

acquiring intelligence, so it tries to understand how all kinds of expertise belong to the same kind or not. And so for that it values them all equally without thinking that some of them are more ridiculous than others, as more far as their similarity is concerned. And it doesn't consider a person impressive because he exemplifies hunting by military expertise rather

248

Sophist

than by picking lice. Instead it usually considers him more vapid. Moreover you just asked about what name we call all the capacities that are assigned to living or nonliving bodies. As far as that's concerned, it doesn't matter to our method which name would seem to be the most appropriate, just so long as it keeps the cleansing of the soul separate from the cleansing of everything else. For the time being, the method has only tried to distinguish the cleansing that concerns thinking from the other kinds if, that is,

we understand what Theaetetus:

—

its

aim

is.

do understand, and

agree that there are two types of cleansing, one dealing with the soul and a separate one dealing with the body. I

Visitor: Fine.

Theaetetus: Visitor:

Next

and

I

one we've mentioned in two. try to follow your lead and cut it however you say. say that wickedness in the soul is something different

I'll

Do we

listen

try to cut the

from virtue? Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

And

to cleanse

something was

to leave what's

good and throw

out whatever's inferior. Theaetetus: Yes.

So insofar as we can find some way to remove what's bad in the soul, it will be suitable to call it cleansing. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: We have to say that there are two kinds of badness that affect Visitor:

the soul.

Theaetetus: Visitor:

What

One

Theaetetus:

bodily sickness, and the other don't understand.

is I

are they?

like

is like

ugliness.

Presumably you regard sickness and discord as the same thing, don't you? Theaetetus: I don't know what I should say to that. Visitor: Do you think that discord is just dissension among things that are naturally of the same kind, and arises out of some kind of corruption? Visitor:

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

ugliness

is

precisely a consistently unattractive sort of

disproportion? Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Well then, don't

we

see that there's dissension in the souls of

people in poor condition, between beliefs and desires, anger and pleasures, reason and pains, and all of those things with each other? Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: But all of them do have to be akin to each other. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: So we'd be right if we said that wickedness is discord and sickness of the soul.

249

Sophist

Theaetetus: Absolutely right.

Well then, suppose something that's in motion aims at a target and tries to hit it, but on every try passes by it and misses. Are we going because it's to say that it does this because it's properly proportioned or Visitor:

out of proportion? Theaetetus: Out of proportion, obviously. Visitor: But we know that no soul is willingly ignorant of anything.

Theaetetus: Definitely. Visitor: But ignorance occurs precisely when a soul tries for the truth, but swerves aside from understanding and so is beside itself.

Theaetetus: Of course.

So

Visitor:

we have

to take

it

that

an ignorant soul

is

ugly and out

of proportion.

Theaetetus:

Then

Visitor: soul.

It

seems

so.

appears, these two kinds of badness in the one of them wickedness, but it's obviously a disease

there are,

Most people

call

it

of the soul.

Theaetetus: Yes. other one ignorance, but if it occurs only in a person's soul they aren't willing to agree that it s a form of badness. Theaetetus: One thing absolutely must be granted the point I was in doubt about when you made it just now that there are two kinds of

They

Visitor:

call the

—

—

need to say that cowardice, licentiousness, and deficiency in the soul. all sorts injustice are a disease in us, and that to be extremely ignorant of

We

of things

is

a kind of ugliness.

Visitor: In the case of the body, weren't there

two kinds

of expertise

dealing with those two conditions? Theaetetus: What were they? Visitor: Gymnastics for ugliness and medicine for sickness.

Theaetetus: Apparently. Visitor:

And isn't correction the most appropriate of all kinds of expertise and cowardice ? 7 judge by what people

for treating insolence, injustice,

think. seems, to the Visitor: Well then, for all kinds of ignorance wouldn't teaching be right treatment to mention? Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Now should we say that there's only one kind of expertise in teaching or more than one, with two of them being the most important

Theaetetus: So

it

ones? Think about it. Theaetetus: I am. Visitor: I think we'll find Theaetetus: How? 7.

The

text

seems faulty

here.

it

quickest this way.

The general

sense, however,

is clear.

250

Sophist

By seeing whether ignorance has a cut down the middle of it. has two parts, that will force teaching to have two parts too, one for

Visitor: If it

each of the parts of ignorance. Theaetetus: Well, do you see what we're looking for? Visitor: I think I see a large, difficult type of ignorance marked off from the others and overshadowing all of them. Theaetetus: What's it like? Visitor:

causes

all

Not knowing, but thinking the mistakes

that

you know. That's what probably

we make when we

Theaetetus: That's true. Visitor: And furthermore

it's

think.

the only kind of ignorance that's called

lack of learning.

Theaetetus: Certainly. Visitor: Well then, what should

we

call

the part of teaching that gets

rid of it?

Theaetetus: The other part consists in the teaching of here in Athens we call this one education. Visitor:

And

about

crafts,

I

think, but

other Greeks do too, Theaetetus. But we still have to think about whether education is indivisible or has divisions that are worth mentioning.

Theaetetus: Visitor:

I

Visitor:

One

just

We

all

do have

to think

think it can be cut Theaetetus: How?

about

that.

somehow.

part of the kind of teaching that's road, and the other part is smoother.

Theaetetus:

What do you mean by

done

in

words

is

a

rough

two parts? Visitor: One of them is our forefathers' time-honored method of scolding or gently encouraging. They used to employ it especially on their sons, and many still use it on them nowadays when they do something wrong. Admonition would be the right thing to call all of this. these

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

As

for the other part,

some people seem

have an argument to give to themselves that lack of learning is always involuntary, and that if someone thinks he's wise, he'll never be willing to learn anything about what he thinks he's clever at. These people think that though admonition is a lot of work, it doesn't do much good. Theaetetus: They're right about that. Visitor. So they set out to get rid of the belief in one's own wisdom in another way. Theaetetus: Visitor:

to

How?

They cross-examine someone when he thinks

he's saying

some-

thing though he's saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize them. They collect his opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they

251

Sophist

same time on the same subjects in relation being to the same things and in the same respects. The people who are examined see this, get angry at themselves, and become calmer toward others. They lose their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more lasting effect on them. Doctors who work on the body think it can't benefit from any food that's offered to it until what's interfering with it from inside is removed. The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the soul, it until too, won't get any advantage from any learning that's offered to someone shames it by refuting it, removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things that it does know, and nothing more. Theaetetus: That's the best and most healthy-minded way to be.

conflict

is

with each other

at the

Visitor: For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we have to say that refutation the principal and most important kind of cleansing. Conversely we have

he remains unrefuted, is uncleansed the in the most important respect. He's also uneducated and ugly, in just ways that anyone who is going to be really happy has to be completely

to think that

even the king of

Persia,

if

clean and beautiful. Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor:

form

Well then,

who

are

we

going to say the people

of expertise are? I'm afraid to call

them

who

apply

this

sophists.

Why? So we don't pay

Theaetetus:

sophists too high an honor. Theaetetus: But there's a similarity between a sophist

Visitor:

and what we ve

been talking about. Visitor: And between a wolf and a dog, the wildest thing there is and the gentlest. If you're going to be safe, you have to be especially careful about similarities, since the type we're talking about is very slippery.

Anyway,

when

let

that description of

the sophists are

unimportant

them

enough on

their

stand.

I

certainly don't think that

guard the dispute

will

be about an

distinction.

Theaetetus: That seems right. Visitor: So let it be the cleansing part of the expertise of discriminating things; and let it be marked off as the part of that which concerns souls; and within that it's teaching; and within teaching it's education. And let's say that within education, according to the way the discussion has turned now, the refutation of the empty belief in one's own wisdom is nothing other than our noble sophistry. Theaetetus: Let's say that. But the sophist has appeared in lots of different ways. So I'm confused about what expression or assertion could convey the truth about

what he

really

is.

extremely confused, too,

we have

he s about where he can go to escape from our account

Visitor: You're right to be confused. But

to think that

— ZDZ

Sophist

The saying that you can't escape we really have to go after him. of him.

all

your pursuers

is

right.

So

now

Theaetetus: Right. Visitor: But let's stop first and catch our breath, so to speak. And while we re resting let s ask ourselves, "Now, how many different appearances has the sophist presented to us?" I think we first discovered him as a hired hunter of rich young men. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Second, as a wholesaler of learning about the soul. Theaetetus: Right. Visitor: Third, didn't

he appear as a

Theaetetus: Yes, and fourth as a seller of his Visitor:

an athlete

Your memory's in verbal

correct.

I'll

same things?

retailer of the

own

learning?

try to recall the fifth

way: he was

combat, distinguished by his expertise in debating.

Theaetetus: Yes.

The sixth appearance was disputed, but still we made a conceshim and took it that he cleanses the soul of beliefs that interfere

Visitor:

sion to

with learning. Theaetetus: Definitely. Visitor: Well then, suppose people apply the name of a single sort of expertise to someone, but he appears to have expert knowledge of lots of things. In a case like that don't

way

the

he appears?

many

expert at is

wrong with obvious that if somebody takes him to be an then that observer can't be seeing clearly what it

Isn't

things,

you

it

in his expertise that all of those

which

notice that something's

why

many

pieces of learning focus on names instead of one?

he calls him by many Theaetetus: That definitely does seem to be the nature of the case. Visitor: So let's not let laziness make that happen to us. First let's take up one of the things we said about the sophist before, which seemed to

me

is

to exhibit

him

Theaetetus:

especially clearly.

What

Visitor:

We

Visitor:

And

is it?

said that he engages in disputes, didn't Theaetetus: Yes. also that he teaches other people to

we? do

the

same thing

too?

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor.

Then

think:

what

do people

him claim to make others able to engage in disputes about? Let's start with something like this: do sophists make people competent to dispute about issues about the gods, which are opaque to most people? let s

subject

like

Theaetetus: Well, people say they do. Visitor:

sky,

and

And

also things that are related matters?

Theaetetus: Of course.

open

to view,

on the earth and

in the

— 253

Sophist

people make general statements in private discussions about being and coming-to-be, we know that sophists are clever do the at contradicting them and they also make other people able to Visitor:

And when

same thing? Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: And what about laws and all kinds of political issues? Don t sophists promise to make people capable of engaging in controversies

about them? Theaetetus: If they didn't promise that, practically no one would bother to discuss anything with them. Visitor: As a matter of fact you can find anything you need to say to contradict any expert himself, both in general and within each particular wants to field, laid out published and written down for anybody who learn

it.

Theaetetus: Apparently you're talking about Protagoras' writings on wrestling and other fields of expertise. Visitor: And on many other things, too, my friend. In fact, take expertise sufficient in disputation as a whole. Doesn't it seem like a capacity that s for carrying on controversies about absolutely everything? Theaetetus: It doesn't seem to leave much of anything out, anyway. Visitor: But for heaven's sake, my boy, do you think that s possible? Or maybe you young people see into this issue more keenly than we do. Theaetetus: Into what? What are you getting at? I don't fully understand

what you're asking. Visitor: Whether it's possible for any human being to know everything. Theaetetus: If it were, sir, we'd be very well off. Visitor: But how could someone who didn't know about a subject make a sound objection against someone who knew about it? Theaetetus:

He

couldn't.

Then what is it in Theaetetus: About what?

Visitor:

the sophist's capacity that's so amazing?

the sophists can ever make young people believe they're wiser than everyone else about everything. It's obvious that they didn't make correct objections against anyone, or didn't appear so to young Visitor:

How

Or if they did appear to make correct objections, but their controveryou say sies didn't make them look any the wiser for it, then— just as people would hardly be willing to pay them money to become their stupeople.

dents.

Theaetetus: Right. Visitor: But people are willing to? Theaetetus: They certainly are. Visitor: Since sophists do seem, dispute about. Theaetetus: Of course.

I

think, to

know about

the things they

254

Sophist

And

Visitor:

they do

we

it,

say,

about every subject?

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: So to their students they appear wise about everything? Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: But without actually being wise since that appeared impos-

—

sible.

Theaetetus: Of course

it's

impossible.

So the sophist has now appeared as having a kind of beliefknowledge about everything, but not truth. Theaetetus: Absolutely. What you've said about them is probably just Visitor:

right.

Visitor: But let's consider a pattern that will exhibit

Theaetetus:

What

pattern

my

clearly.

that?

Pay attention

Visitor: This one.

answering

is

them more

me, and

to

try to

do

a

good

job of

questions.

Which questions? someone claimed that by

Theaetetus: Visitor:

kind of expertise he could know, not just how to say tnings or to contradict people, but how to make and do everything, then Theaetetus: What do you mean, everything ? If

.

Visitor:

You

a single

.

.

don't understand the

first

thing

I

say!

Seemingly you don't

understand everything Theaetetus: No, I don't. !

Visitor: Well,

I

mean

everything to include you and

me and

also the

other animals and plants Theaetetus: What are you talking about? .

Visitor:

If

.

.

someone claimed

that he'd

make you and me and

all

the

other living things Theaetetus: What kind of making are you talking about? You're not talking about some kind of gardener after all, you did say he made an.

.

.

—

imals. Visitor: Yes,

and

mean

and earth and heaven and gods And furthermore he makes them each quickly and

also

I

the sea

and everything else. sells them at a low price.

Theaetetus: You're talking about some kind of game for schoolchildren. Visitor: Well, if someone says he knows everything and would teach it to someone else cheaply and quickly, shouldn't we think it's a game? Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

Do you know

of

any game

more expertise than and is more engaging? Theaetetus: No, not at all, since you've collected everything together and designated a very broad, extremely diverse type. that involves

imitation does,

So think about the man who promises he can make everything by means of a single kind of expertise. Suppose that by being expert at Visitor:

255

Sophist

drawing he produces things that have the same names as real we know that when he shows his drawings from far away to fool the

more mindless young children

produce anything he wants

things. he'll

Then

be able

into thinking that he can actually

to.

Theaetetus: Of course. experVisitor: Well then, won't we expect that there s another kind of it to this time having to do with words— and that someone can use ti se the truth trick young people when they stand even farther away from about things? Wouldn't he do it by putting words in their ears, and by showing them spoken copies of everything, so as to make them believe them is the that the words are true and that the person who's speaking to

—

wisest person there is? Theaetetus: Yes, why shouldn't there be that kind of expertise too? sophVisitor: So, Theaetetus, suppose enough time has passed and the

hearers have gotten older, and that they approach closer to real things and are forced by their experiences to touch up palpably against them. Won't most of them inevitably change their earlier beliefs, which made t the large things appear small and easy things appear hard? And won overturn facts they've encountered in the course of their actions completely ist's

all

I

the appearances that

had come

—

to

them in the form of words? what someone my age can tell. But

Theaetetus: Yes at least as far as think I'm one of the young people who are

still

standing far

away from

real things.

keep trying to take you as close experiences to force to them as possible, but without your needing those kind you. But tell me about the sophist. Is it obvious by now that he's a doubt about of cheat who imitates real things? Or are we still in any whether he truly knows all the things that he seems to be able to engage Visitor: That's

in controversies

why

all

of us here will

about?

Theaetetus: But, sir, how could we be in any doubt? By this time it s who pretty obvious from what we've said that he's one of those people play games. Visitor: So we have to regard him as a cheat and an imitator. Theaetetus: How could we avoid it? We've Visitor: Well, now it's our job not to let the beast escape. almost hemmed him in with one of those net-like devices that words

provide for things

like this.

So anyway he won't get away from

this

next point. Theaetetus:

What is it? From being taken

be a kind of magician. Theaetetus: That's what he seems to me to be too. quickly Visitor: So it's settled. We'll divide the craft of copy-making as gives up right as we can and we'll go down into it. Then if the sophist away we'll obey the royal command and we'll capture him and hand our Visitor:

to

ADO

Sophist

catch over to the king. But if the sophist slips down somewhere into the parts of the craft of imitation, we'll follow along with him and we'll divide each of the parts that contain him until we catch him. Anyway, neither he nor any other kind will ever be able to boast that he's escaped from the method of people who are able to chase a thing through both the particular and the general.

how we have

Theaetetus: Good. That's Visitor:

d

to

Going by the method of division

we've used so

see

the

One type of imitation I see is the art of one we have whenever someone produces an

far,

I

think

clearly

tell

likeness-making. That's imitation by keeping to

the proportions of length, breadth, and depth of his model, keeping to the appropriate colors of its parts.

Theaetetus: But don't Visitor: Not the ones

236

that

it.

two types of imitation here too. But I don't think I can yet which one the type or form we're looking for is in. Theaetetus: Well, first tell us what distinction you mean. I

Visitor:

e

do

and

also

by

do that? who sculpt or draw very large works. If they reproduced the true proportions of their beautiful subjects, you see, the upper parts would appear smaller than they should, and the lower parts would appear larger, because we see the upper parts from farther away and the lower parts from closer. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: So don't those craftsmen say goodbye to truth, and produce in their images the proportions that seem to be beautiful instead of the all

imitators try to

real ones?

Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: So can't the first sort of image be called a likeness, since

it's

like

the thing?

Theaetetus: Yes. b

Visitor:

And

as

we

said before, the part of imitation that deals with that

should be called likeness-making. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

Now, what

Visitor:

And

are

we

going to call something that appears to be like a beautiful thing, but only because it's seen from a viewpoint that's not beautiful, and would seem unlike the thing it claims to be like if you came to be able to see such large things adequately? If it appears the way the thing does but in fact isn't like it, isn't it an appearance? Theaetetus: Of course. c

this part of imitation

covers a great deal of painting and

of the rest of imitation.

Theaetetus: Of course.

Wouldn't appearance-making be the right thing producing appearances that aren't likenesses?

Visitor: in

Theaetetus: Yes, definitely.

to call expertise

257

Sophist

two types

Visitor: Well, these are the

making and appearance-making. Theaetetus: You were right about

of

copy-making

I

meant, likeness-

that.

see clearly the thing I was in doubt about then, namely, which type we should put the sophist in. He s really an amazing man very hard to make out. He's still escaped neatly into an impossibly Visitor: But

still I

can

t

—

confusing type to search through. Theaetetus: It seems that way. or is the Visitor: Are you agreeing with me because you know that, the current dragging you, so to speak, into agreement so quickly because discussion has given you a habit of agreeing? Theaetetus: What do you mean? Why do you say that? investigation Visitor: Really, my young friend, this is a very difficult we're engaged in. This appearing, and this seeming but not being, and saying things but not true things— all these issues are full of confusion, to say what just as they always have been. It's extremely hard, Theaetetus, form of speech we should use to say that there really is such a thing as without being caught false saying or believing, and moreover to utter this this

in a verbal conflict.

Theaetetus: Why? assumption Visitor: Because this form of speech of ours involves the rash come into being. that that which is not is, since otherwise falsity wouldn't from But when we were boys, my boy, the great Parmenides testified to us that start to finish, speaking in both prose and poetic rhythms, on us that that which is not may be; While you search keep your thought far away from this path*

Never

shall this force itself

,

,

our own way of speaking itself would make the point especially obvious if it we examined it a little. So first. if it's all the same to you, let's look at that Theaetetus: As far as I'm concerned you can do what you want. But as how it will go best, far as our way of speaking is concerned, think about and follow along with it and take me along the road with you. utter the Visitor: That's what we have to do. Tell me: do we dare to

So

we have

sound

that

his testimony to this.

which

in

no way

And

is?

Theaetetus: Of course. playing a Visitor: But suppose one of our listeners weren't debating or game but had to think seriously and answer the following question: What should the name, that which is not be applied to? Why do we think he'd ,

8.

See Parmenides,

ence, at 258d.

frg. 7, 11.1—2.

The same

lines reoccur,

with one slight textual differ

258

use

Sophist

and

what connection, and for what kind of purpose? And what would he indicate by it to someone else who wanted to find out about it? it,

in

Theaetetus: That's a hard question. In fact, it's just about completely, impossibly confusing for someone like me to answer. Visitor: But

anyway

can't be applied to

this

much

obvious to us, that

is

any of those which

which

that

is

not

are.

Theaetetus: Of course not.

So if you can't apply apply it to something.

Visitor:

either to

Theaetetus: Visitor:

since

it

from

all

s

Why

it

which

to that

is, it

wouldn't be right

not?

obvious to us that we always apply this something to a being, impossible to say it by itself, as if it were naked and isolated It s

beings. Isn't that right?

Theaetetus: Yes.

Are you agreeing because you're thinking

Visitor:

says something has to be saying Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Since of things

is

some

who

one thing?

you'd say that something

a sign of two,

that a person

and somethings

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: And it's absolutely necessary, not say something says nothing 9 at all. Theaetetus: Yes.

is is

it

a sign of one ,

and

that a couple

a sign of a plurality ?

seems, that someone

who

does

Visitor: Therefore don't we have to refuse to admit that a person like that speaks but says nothing? Instead, don't we have to deny that anyone who tries to utter that which is not is even speaking?

Theaetetus: Then our

way

of speaking

would have reached

the height

of confusion.

Don

do any boasting yet. There are still more confusions to come, including the primary and most fundamental one, which actually happens to be at the source of the whole problem. Theaetetus: What do you mean? Don't hold back. Tell me. Visitor: To that which is there might belong some other of those which are. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: But shall we say that any of those which are can ever belong to that which is not? Visitor:

t

How could they? Now then, we take all

Theaetetus: Visitor:

Theaetetus: Yes,

if

we

one

to

Note that the Greek word even one" (mede hen). 9.

numbers

to

be beings.

take anything else to be.

Then let s not even that which is not.

Visitor.

the

try to

apply either plurality of number or

for "nothing/' meden, literally

means something

like "not

,

259

Sophist

Theaetetus:

Our way

of speaking itself tells us that

it

would be wrong

to try to.

Visitor:

Then how would anyone

which

that

is

try either to say those which

in thought, apart

even grasp them

not out loud, or

citc

not or

from

number? Theaetetus: Tell me. Visitor:

Whenever we speak

of those which are not

apply numerical plurality to them? Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: And when we speak of that which

is

,

aren't

not aren't

we

we

trying to

applying one

to it?

Theaetetus: Obviously. to attach Visitor: But we say it isn't either right or correct to try which is to that which is not. Theaetetus: That's absolutely true. Visitor: Do you understand, then, that

that

impossible to say, speak, or unsayable, think that which is not itself correctly by itself? It's unthinkable, unutterable, and unformulable in speech. it's

Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor:

So was

I

wrong

the biggest confusion about is

now when said that would formulate when we have this other one to state which

just it,

I

I

even bigger? Theaetetus:

What

is it?

on the basis of the who's refuting things we said that that which is not even confuses the person someone tries to refute it, he's forced to it in just this way, that whenever Visitor:

My

good young

friend,

don

you

t

notice

say mutually contrary things about it? Theaetetus: What do you mean? Say it more clearly. was the one who Visitor: You shouldn't expect more clarity from me. I made the statement that that which is not should not share either in one or that to speak of it as one in plurality. But even so I've continued after all

say that which is not. You understand? Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: And again a little earlier I said that and inexpressible in speech. Do you follow?

since

I

follow, of course. Visitor: So in trying to attach being to the contrary of what I'd said before?

Theaetetus:

it is

unutterable, unsayable,

I

it

wasn't

I

saying things that were

Theaetetus: Apparently. Visitor:

And

in attaching that which,

10

wasn't

I

speaking of

it

as one ?

Theaetetus: Yes. the view that

Accepting the conjecture to "to," translated by "that which" on "that which part of the phrase to me on, which is generally translated by "those which"). the form is singular (in contrast with ta, for example, 10.

is

not." In

it

is

Greek

260 Sophist

And

Visitor:

also in speaking of it as something inexpressible in speech unsayable, and unutterable, I was speaking of it as one thing Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: But we say that if someone speaks correctly he shouldn't definitely fix it as either one or plural. He shouldn't even call it it at all, since even calling it by that label he'd be addressing it by means of the form one

Theaetetus: Absolutely.

b

Then what would somebody say about me? He'd find that the refutation of that which is not has been defeating me for a long time So as I said, let's not use what I say to help us think of how to speak correctly about that which is not. Come on, let's use what you say instead. Theaetetus: What do you mean? Visitor:

Visitor:

Come

on, pull yourself together for us as well as

you can and say something correct about that which is not, without attaching either being, one, or numerical plurality to it. heaetetus: I d have to have a strangely large amount of enthusiasm for the project to try it myself after seeing what you've gone through. Visitor: Well, let's give up on both you and me, if you prefer. But until we meet someone who can do it let's say that the sophist has stopped at nothing. He's escaped down into inaccessible confusion. Theaetetus: He certainly seems to have. try

it

since

you

So

Visitor:

re

young. Try

to

we

say he has some expertise in appearance-making, it wi be easy for him to grab hold of our use of words in return and twist our words the contrary direction. Whenever we call him a copy-maker he 11 ask us what in the world we mean by a "copy." We need to think, Theaetetus, about how to answer the young man's question. Theaetetus: Obviously we'll say we mean copies in water and mirrors, and also copies that are drawn and stamped and everything else like if

m

Visitor: Evidently, Theaetetus,

Theaetetus:

Why

Visitor: He'll

eyes at

you haven't seen

do you say that? seem to you to have his eyes

a sophist.

shut, or else not to

all.

Theaetetus:

have anv 7

How?

Visitor: He'll laugh at what you say with talk about things in mirrors or to

him

when you answer him that way, sculptures, and when you speak pretend he doesn't know about mirrors

he could see. He'll or water or even sight, and he'll put his question of words. Theaetetus: What sort of question? as

Visitor:

if

He'll ask about

to

you only J

in

terms

what runs through all those things which you but which you thought you should call by the one name, copy to cover them all, as if they were all one thing. Say something, then, and defend yourself, and don't give any ground to him. call

many

261

Sophist

What in the world would wo say something that's made similar to a true thing and Theaetetus:

a is

copy

mean by

like

except

it?

Or what do you

it ?

Theaetetus: Not that Visitor:

another true thing like

it's

sir,

another thing that's

like it?

Visitor: You're saying

is,

Meaning by

it's

but that really being?

true at

true,

all,

resembles the true thing.

it

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And meaning by

not true , contrary of true?

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: So you're saying that that which is, if you speak of it as not true.

Theaetetus: But it is, in a way. Visitor: But not truly, you say. Theaetetus: No, except that it really Visitor: So it's not really what is, but

is it

is

like is not really that

which

a likeness. really

is

what we

call a likeness?

Maybe that which is not is woven together with that which in some way like that— it's quite bizarre. see that the manyVisitor: Of course it's strange. Anyway, you can

Theaetetus: is

using this interweaving to force us to agree unwillingly that that which is not in a way is. Theaetetus: I definitely do see it. expertise, so as to Visitor: Well then, how can we define his field of

headed sophist

is still

be consistent? afraid of. Theaetetus: What do you mean? What kind of problem are you appearances and that Visitor: When we say that he deceives us about his expertise makes he's an expert at deception, are we saying so because

our souls believe what is false? Or what shall we say? Theaetetus: Just that. What else would we say? believing things that are Visitor: Again, a false belief will be a matter of contrary to those which are? Or what? Theaetetus: Yes, contrary. Visitor: So you're saying that a false belief

is

believing those whic

i

are not.

Theaetetus: Necessarily. or that those which Visitor: Believing that those which are not are not, in

is

no way are

in a

way

are?

if anyone Theaetetus: That those which are not are in a way, it has to be, ever going to be even a little bit wrong. those which comVisitor: Well, doesn't a false belief also believe that

pletely are in

no way are?

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

this is false too?

Theaetetus: Yes.

262 Sophist

Visitor:

And

Visitor:

I

think we'll also regard false speaking the same way, as saying that those which are are not, and that those which are not are." Theaetetus: How else would it be false? I

don't suppose there's any other way. The sophist, though, is going to deny that this way is possible. And how could any sensible person accept it, now that what we agreed to earlier has been reinforced 11 Do we understand what he's saying, Theaetetus? Theaetetus: How could we not understand that when we dare to say .

that falsity

and words contain falsity, we're saying what is contrary to what we said just before. We're forced to attach that which is to that which is not, even though we agreed just now that that's comis

in beliefs

pletely impossible. Visitor:

Your memory's

correct. But think about what we need to do about the sophist. You see how many and easily available his supply of objections and confusions is if we assume, as we search for him, that he's an expert at cheating and falsehood-making. Theaetetus: Definitely. Visitor: He's got a practically infinite supply of them, and we've gone through only a small fraction. Theaetetus. If so, then it seems it would be impossible to catch him. Visitor: What, then? Are we going to go soft and give up? Theaetetus: I say we shouldn't, if there's even the smallest chance that we can catch him. Visitor: So you'll be forgiving and, as you said, happy if we can somehow extricate ourselves even slightly from such a powerful argument? Theaetetus: Of course.

Then I've got something even more urgent to request. Theaetetus: What? Visitor: Not to think that I'm turning into some kind of patricide Theaetetus: What do you mean? Visitor:

Visitor: In order to defend ourselves we're going to father Parmenides' saying to further examination,

have to subject and insist by brute force

both that

that

somehow

is

which

is

not

somehow

is,

and then again

that that which

is

not.

Theaetetus:

It

does seem that in what we're going to say, we'll

to have through that issue. Visitor: That's obvious even to a blind man, as they say. We'll never be able to avoid having to make ourselves ridiculous by saying conflicting things whenever we talk about false statements and beliefs, either as copies to fight

or likenesses or imitations or appearances, or about whatever sorts of expertise there are concerning those things— unless, that is, we either refute Parmenides claims or else agree to accept them. 11.

I.e.,

237a-238c, reinforced by 238d-239c.

263

Sophist

Theaetetus: That's true. to attack what our Visitor: So that's why we have to be bold enough then we'll have to leave father says. Or, if fear keeps us from doing that, it alone completely. Theaetetus: Fear, anyway, isn't going to stop us. something small. Visitor: Well then, I've got a third thing to ask you, Theaetetus: Just Visitor:

tell

When was I

up whenever

me what

it is.

said that I've always given Parmenides said, just the way I did

talking a minute ago

I've tried to refute

what

I

this time.

Theaetetus: Yes, you did say that. always shifting my Visitor: I'm afraid I'll seem insane to you if I your sake that we'll position back and forth, given what I've said. It's for it. be trying to refute what Parmenides said if we can do think you re Theaetetus: Go ahead, then. Don't worry about that. I won t your inappropriately in any way if you go right ahead with

m

—

behaving

refutation

and demonstration.

The Well then, how shall I begin this dangerous discussion? absolutely have to turn onto, my boy, is this.

Visitor:

path we Theaetetus: Namely, Visitor:

We

have

.

.

.

?

whether seem to be

to reconsider

fused about things that now judgment may make us agree too easily.

we may clear,

not be

somehow

con-

and whether over-hasty

Theaetetus: Say what you mean more clearly. rather easygoing, it Visitor: Parmenides' way of talking to us has been who has ever seems to me. So does the way of talking that everyone uses what they're like. urged us to specify just how many beings there are and Theaetetus: Flow? Visitor: They each appear to

myth, as if we were children. someOne tells us that there are three beings, and that sometimes they're how at war with each other, while at other times they become friendly, one says that there marry, give birth, and bring up their offspring. Another

me to tell us a

off and two beings, wet and dry or hot and cold. He marries them starting from makes them set up house together. And our Eleatic tribe, assumpXenophanes and even people before him, tells us their myth on the Later on, some Ionian tion that what they call "all things" are just one weave the two and Sicilian muses both had the idea that it was safer to and one, and is views together. They say that that which is is both many of these bound by both hatred and friendship. According to 13the terser more relaxed muses, in being taken apart they're brought together The

are

12

.

.

12. 13.

of course, comes from there). This group includes Parmenides of Elea (the Visitor, Plato, Symp. 187a). The reference here is to Heraclitus, who was Ionian. See frg. 51 (cf.

264 Sophist

muses, though, allow things

be free from that condition sometimes. They say that all that there is alternates, and that sometimes it's one and riendly under Aphrodite's influence, but at other times it's many and at war with itself because of some kind of strife 14 It's hard to say whether any one of these thinkers has told us the truth or not, and to

.

it wouldn't be appropriate for us to be critical of such renowned and venerable men. But it wouldn't be offensive to note the following thing, either. Theaetetus: What?

Visitor: That they've

been inconsiderate and contemptuous toward us. They ve simply been talking their way through their explanations, without paying any attention to whether we were following them or were left behind.

Theaetetus:

What do you mean?

Visitor: For heaven's sake, Theaetetus,

do you understand anything of what they mean each time one of them says that many or one or two

things are or have become or are becoming, or when another one speaks of hot mixed with cold and supposes that there are separations and combinations? Earlier in my life I used to think I understood exactly what someone meant when he said just what we're confused about now, namely, not.

this

You do

see

what confusion we're

in

about

is

it?

Theaetetus: Yes, I do. Visitor: But just perhaps the very same thing has happened to us equally about is. We say we re in the clear about it, and that we understand when someone says it, but that we don't understand is not. But maybe we're in the same state about both. Theaetetus: Maybe. Visitor:

And

let's

suppose the same thing

may

be true of the other

expressions we've just used. Theaetetus: All right. Visitor.

We

can look into most of them later, if that seems to be the best thing to do. Now we'll think about the most fundamental and most important expression. Theaetetus: Which one? Oh, obviously you're saying

one it

we have

that being

to explore first— that

think they're indicating by Visitor:

we have

to ask

is

the

what people who sav J

it.

You understand

exactly, Theaetetus. I'm saying we have to follow the track this way. Let's ask as if they were here "Listen, you people who say that all things are just some two things, hot and cold or some such pair. What are you saying about them both when you say that they both are and each one is? What shall we take this being to be? Is it a

—

14.

Here Plato

15.

Accepting the emendation of

refers to

Empedocles,

who

lived in Sicily.

alios eipei for allothi pei in b5.

—

265

Sophist

to you everything third thing alongside those two beings, so that according calling one or the other of the two is no longer two but three? Surely in are, since then in either of them being you aren't saying that they both ,

case they'd be one and not two." Theaetetus: That's true. Visitor: "But

you do want

to call

both of them being?"

Theaetetus: Probably. Visitor: "But," we'll say, "if you did that, friends, very clearly that the two are one."

you'd also be saying

Theaetetus: That's absolutely right.

"Then clarify this for us, since we're confused about it. What known for do you want to signify when you say being? Obviously you've confused about it. So first a long time. We thought we did, but now we're you're saying when teach it to us, so we won't think we understand what Visitor:

just the contrary is the case."

Would

it

be the

least bit inappropriate for

everything is more us to ask them this, and anyone else who says that than one? Theaetetus: Not at all. find out from the Visitor: Well, then, shouldn't we do our best to being? people who say that everything is one what they mean by

Theaetetus: Of course. you say that only Visitor: Then they should answer this question: "Do one thing is?" "We do," they'll say, won't they?

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: "Well then, you

call

something being?"

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: "Is that just

the

what you

one , so that

call

you use two names

for

same thing? Or what?"

Theaetetus: Visitor:

How

will they

answer

that question?

Obviously it's not the easiest thing in the world to answer that for someone who makes the or any other question, either

—

—

question supposition that they do. Theaetetus: Why not? are two names Visitor: Surely it's absurd for someone to agree that there when he maintains that there's only one thing.

Theaetetus: Of course. for someone to Visitor: And it's completely absurd, and unacceptable, say that there's a name if there's no account of it. Theaetetus: What do you mean? Visitor: If he supposes that a thing

is

different

from

its

name, then surely

he's mentioning two things. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And moreover

thing, he'll either

if

he supposes that the name

be forced to say that the name

is

the

is

the

name

same

as the

of nothing.

266

Sophist

or else,

he says that it's the name of something, then it's the name of nothing other than itself and so will turn out to be only the name of a name and nothing else. Theaetetus: Yes. if

And

Visitor:

of the

name

also the one , being the

name

one

.

Theaetetus:

have

will

It

to be.

Well then, will they say that

Visitor:

of the one , will also be the

16

the

whole

is

different

from

the one

same as it? Theaetetus: Of course theyTl say it's the same, and they do. Visitor: But suppose a whole is, as even Parmenides says.

being , or the

All around like the bulk of a well-formed sphere,

Equal-balanced

all

ways from

the middle, since neither anything

more

Must

be, this

way

or that way, nor anything

less.

then that which is will have a middle and extremities. it has those then it absolutely has to have parts, doesn't it? Theaetetus: Yes.

If it s if

it

like that,

Visitor. But

if

a thing has parts then nothing

characteristic of being

and

it's

also

one

in all its parts,

and

keeps in that

it

And

from having the

way

it's all

being

one whole.

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: But something with that characteristic can't be just the one can it? Theaetetus:

Why

itself,

not?

Visitor: Surely a thing that's truly one, properly speaking, has to be completely without parts.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: But a thing like what we've described, which consists of parts,

won't

Theaetetus: Visitor:

way,

will

it

many

that account.

fit I

Now

understand.

which is has the characteristic of the one in this be one and a whole? Or shall we simply deny it's a whole at all? if

that

Theaetetus: That's a hard choice. Visitor: You're right. If it has the characteristic of somehow being one, it won't appear to be the same as the one. Moreover, everything will then be more than one. Theaetetus: Yes. 16

Plato

relying on the thought that if the terms “one" and "name" designate one thing (in the sense that he assumes is relevant), then they are interchangeable, even to the point of generating the strange phrase "the one of the name." .

is

267

Sophist

Visitor: Further

if

that

which

not a whole by possessing that as a the whole itself, that which is will turn out

is

is

but rather just is to be less than itself. Theaetetus: Certainly. Visitor: And because it's deprived of

characteristic,

itself, that

which

will

be not bung,

that

which

is

according to that account. Theaetetus: Yes. since Visitor: And everything will be more than one, nature. the whole will each have its own separate

.

is

anc

Theaetetus: Yes. same things are true Visitor: But if the whole is not at all, then the very it would not even become of that which is, and in addition to not being, a being.

Theaetetus: Why not? point become as a Visitor: Invariably whatever becomes has at some without taking whole. So we can't label either being or becoming as being whole to be

the

among

the beings too.

Theaetetus: That seems entirely right. Visitor:

And moreover something

quantity at

whole

all,

that isn't a

whole

can't be of

any

to be a since something that's of a certain quantity has

whatever

of that quantity,

it

may

be.

Theaetetus: Exactly.

And millions of other issues indefinitely many confusions, if you say Visitor:

will also arise, each generating

that being

is

only two or one.

problem led Theaetetus: The ones that just turned up show that. One more and more difficulty and to another, and at each step there was stage. uncertainty about what we'd just said at the previous accounts that people Visitor: We haven't gone through all the detailed enough. Now we have give of that which is and that which is not but this is issue in another way. Our aim is to to look at the people who discuss the what that which is have them all in view and that way to see that saying ,

not is. a bit easier than saying what that which is Theaetetus: So we need to go on to these people too. battle of gods and giants Visitor: It seems that there's something like a 17 among them, because of their dispute with each other over being

is isn't

.

Theaetetus: Visitor:

How? from the heavenly actually clutching rocks and trees with their hands.

One group drags

everything

down

to earth

region of the invisible, When they take hold of all these things they insist that only what offers same as body. And if tangible contact is, since they define being as the they absolutely any of the others say that something without a body is,

despise 17.

him and won't

listen to

See Theogony, esp. 675-715.

him any more.

268 Sophist

Theaetetus: These are frightening quite a lot of

them

men

you're talking about. I've met

already.

Visitor: Therefore the people on the other side of the debate defend their position very cautiously, from somewhere up out of sight. They insist violently that true being is certain nonbodily forms that can be thought

They take the bodies of the other group, and also what they call truth, and they break them up verbally into little bits and call them

about. the

a

process of coming-to-be instead of being. There's a never-ending battle going on constantly between them about this issue. Theaetetus: That's true. Visitor: Let's talk with each of these posit.

How

Theaetetus: Visitor.

we do

shall

groups about the being that thev J

it?

easier to talk with the ones who put being in the forms They're gentler people. It's harder— and perhaps just It s

with the ones

me

that

who

we have

Theaetetus:

to

about impossible— drag everything down to body by force. It seems to deal with them this way.

Namely

.

.

.

?

Mainly by making them actually better than they are— if we somehow could. But if we can't do that in fact, then let's do it in words, by supposing that they're willing to answer less wildly than they actually do. Something that better people agree to is worth more than what worse ones agree to. Anyway we're not concerned with the people; we're looking Visitor:

&

for what's true.

Theaetetus: That's absolutely right. Visitor: Then tell the better people to answer you and interpret what they say.

Theaetetus: All Visitor.

Then

right.

let

them

tell

us

this:

do they say

animal? Theaetetus: Of course they do. Visitor: And they agree that a mortal animal Theaetetus: Of course.

that anything

is

a

mor-

tal

Visitor:

And

Visitor:

What

so they're placing soul Theaetetus: Yes. unjust,

and

then?

that this

Do

one

among

is

the beings?

they say that this soul

s intelligent

and

that

an ensouled body'?

is just

one

and

that soul

is

isn't?

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: But isn't a soul just by the possession and presence of justice, and isn't another soul contrary to it by the possession and presence of the contrary? Theaetetus: Yes, they agree with that. Visitor: But they'll say further that at

a thing or absent

from

it is

something.

any

rate

what can be present

to

269

Sophist

Theaetetus: Yes.

and intelligence and the rest of virtue, those and also their contraries, and moreover since there is a soul in which are visible or things come to be present, do they say that any of these Visitor:

So since there

touchable, or that they

is

all

justice

are invisible?

Theaetetus: They can hardly say any of them is visible. say that they Visitor: And what about these invisible things? Do they

have bodies?

They Theaetetus: They don't give one single answer to that question. as do say that the soul seems to them to have a kind of body. But as far concerned, they re intelligence and the other things you ve asked about are ashamed and don't dare either to agree that they are not beings or to insist that everything

is

a body.

breed of men has improved, Theaetetus. The hold the line native earthborn giants would never have been ashamed to in their hands is absofor their position, that anything they can't squeeze Visitor:

Obviously

this

lutely nothing.

Theaetetus: That pretty

much

describes their thinking.

enough if they admit body. They need to that even a small part of that which is doesn't have things that do say something about what's common to both it and the Maybe have body, which they focus on when they say that they both are. think about whether that will raise some confusion for them. If it does, then Visitor:

Then

let's

go back

to questioning

them.

It's

is something they'd be willing to accept our suggestion that that which is like the following. Theaetetus: Like what? Tell me and maybe we 11 know. capacity at all, Visitor: I'm saying that a thing really is if it has any or to have even the either by nature to do something to something else even if it only smallest thing done to it by even the most trivial thing, to happens once. I'll take it as a definition that those which ait amount

nothing other than capacity. better to Theaetetus: They accept that, since they don't have anything say right now. Visitor: Fine.

Maybe something

else will occur to

them

later,

and

For now let's agree with them on this much. Theaetetus: All right. the forms. Visitor: Let's turn to the other people, the friends of

to

us

too.

You

serve as their interpreter for us. Theaetetus: All right. being and say that Visitor: You people distinguish coming-to-be and

they are separate? Is that right? Theaetetus: "Yes." perception we Visitor: And you say that by our bodies and through our souls have dealings with coming-to-be, but we deal with real being by

270

Sophist

and through reasoning. You say that being always stays the same and in the same state, but coming-to-be varies from one time to another. Theaetetus: "We do say that." Visitor: And what shall we say this dealing with is that you apply in the two cases? Doesn't it mean what we said just now? Theaetetus: "What?" Visitor: What happens when two things come together, and by some capacity one does something to the other or has something done to it. Or maybe you don't hear their answer clearly, Theaetetus. But I do, probably because I'm used to them. Theaetetus: Then what account do they give? Visitor: They don't agree with what we just said to the earth people about being. Theaetetus: What's that? Visitor: We took it as a sufficient definition of beings that the capacity be present in a thing to do something or have something done to it, to or by even the smallest thing or degree. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: In reply they say that coming-to-be has the capacity to do something or have something done to it, but that this capacity doesn't fit with being. Theaetetus: Is there anything to that? Visitor: We have to reply that we need them to tell us more clearly whether they agree that the soul knows and also that being is known. Theaetetus: "Yes," they say. Visitor: Well then, do you say that knowing and being known are cases of doing, or having something done, or both? Is one of them doing and the other having something done? Or is neither a case of either? Theaetetus: Obviously neither is a case of either, since otherwise they'd be saying something contrary to what they said before. Visitor: Oh, I see. You mean that if knowing is doing something, then necessarily

what

known

has something done to it. WTen being is known by knowledge, according to this account, then insofar as it's known it's is

changed by having something done to something that's at rest.

to

it— which we say wouldn't happen

Theaetetus: That's correct. Visitor. But for heaven s sake, are we going to be convinced that it's true that change, life, soul, and intelligence are not present in that which wholly is and that it neither lives nor thinks, but stays changeless, solemn, and holy, without any understanding? Theaetetus: If we did, sir, we'd be admitting something frightening. ,

Visitor: But are

have

we

going to say that

life?

Theaetetus: Of course not.

it

has understanding but doesn't

271

Sophist

Visitor: But are

we saying that it has both those things in it while denying

has them in its soul? Theaetetus: How else would it have them? life, and soul, but Visitor: And are we saying that it has intelligence, though it's alive? that it's at rest and completely changeless even Theaetetus: All that seems completely unreasonable. have to be admitted Visitor: Then both that which changes and also change

that

it

as being.

Theaetetus: Of course. change then Visitor: And so, Theaetetus, it turns out that if no beings nothing anywhere possesses any intelligence about anything. Theaetetus: Absolutely not. is moving and Visitor: But furthermore if we admit that everything away from changing, then on that account we take the very same thing those which are. Theaetetus: Why? Visitor: Do you think that without rest anything the same state in the same respects?

Theaetetus: Not at

would be

the same, in

all.

Well then, do you see any case to-be anywhere without these things? Visitor:

Theaetetus: Not in the

in

which

intelligence

is

or comes-

least.

And we need to use every argument we can to fight against intelligence anyone who does away with knowledge, understanding, and Visitor:

but at the same time asserts anything at all about anything. Theaetetus: Definitely. the person who values these things the Visitor: The philosopher is at most absolutely has to refuse to accept the claim that everything from friends of the many forms. rest, either from defenders of the one or say that that which is In addition he has to refuse to listen to people who both, and changes in every way. He has to be like a child begging for unchanging and that say that that which is everything is both the

—

—

—

—

which changes. Theaetetus: True. Visitor:

Well now, apparently we've done a

fine job of

making our

account pull together that which is haven't we? Theaetetus: Absolutely. Now I think we'll recognize Visitor: But for heaven's sake, Theaetetus, how confused our investigation about it is. ,

.

.

.

Theaetetus: Why, though? What do you mean? we're now in extreme Visitor: Don't you notice, my young friend, that something. ignorance about it, though it appears to us that we re saying 18.

Accepting the emendation of inserting panton after onton.

272

Sophist

Theaetetus:

does to

me anyway.

But I don't completely understand how we got into this situation without noticing. Visitor: Then think more clearly about it. Given what we've just agreed to, would it be fair for someone to ask us the same question we earlier asked the people who say that everything is just hot and cold ? Theaetetus: What was it? Remind me.

250

It

Visitor. Certainly. just the

same

same way

as

And I

1 11

try, at

any

rate, to

asked them, so that

we

do

can

by asking you

it

move forward

in

at the

pace.

Theaetetus: Good. Visitor:

Now then, wouldn't you say that change and rest are completely

contrary to each other? Theaetetus: Of course.

And

Visitor:

equally b

you'd say they both equally

are,

and

that each of

them

is?

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

When you

admit that they

are, are

you saying

that both

each of them change? Theaetetus: Not at all. Visitor:

And

are

you signifying

both are? Theaetetus: Of course not. Visitor: So do you conceive

that they rest

when you "

that

which

and

say that they J

as a third thing alongside them which encompasses rest and change? And when you say that they both are, are you taking the two of them together and focusing on their associais

tion with being? c

Theaetetus:

does seem probably true that when we say change and rest are, we do have a kind of omen of that which is as a third thing. Visitor: So that which is isn't both change and rest; it's something different It

from them instead. Theaetetus: It seems so. Visitor: Therefore by its

own

nature that which

is

doesn't either rest

or change.

Theaetetus:

d

suppose it doesn't. Visitor: Which way should someone turn his thoughts if he wants to establish for himself something clear about it? Theaetetus: I don't know. Visitor: I don't think any line is easy. If something isn't changing, how can it not be resting? And how can something not change if it doesn't in any way rest? But now that which is appears to fall outside I

both of them.

Is

that possible?

Theaetetus: Absolutely not. Visitor: In this connection we ought to remember the following. Theaetetus: What?

273

Sophist

When we were asked what we should apply the name we became completely confused. Do you remember?

Visitor: not to,

is

that

which

Theaetetus: Of course.

And now

Visitor:

which is ? Theaetetus:

aren't

we

in just as

much

confusion about

that

be in even more confusion, if that's possible. of our confusion. Visitor: Then we've now given a complete statement is and that which But there's now hope, precisely because both that which confusion. That is, in so far as one of them is is not are involved in equal will be too. And if we can t clarified, either brightly or dimly, the other account of both of them see either of them, then anyway we'll push our

We

forward as well as

seem

we

to

can.

Theaetetus: Fine. Visitor: Let's give an account of

how we

call the

very same thing,

by several names. Theaetetus: What, for instance? Give me an example. we name him several Visitor: Surely we're speaking of a man even when and shapes, sizes, defects, things, that is, when we apply colors to him he's not only and virtues. In these cases and a million others we say that different things. And similarly a man but also is good and indefinitely many time we on the same account we take a thing to be one, and at the same speak of it as many by using many names for it.

whatever

it

may

be,

Theaetetus: That's true.

we've prepared a feast for young people and for idea that it's impossible old late-learners. They can grab hold of the handy which is one to be many. for that which is many to be one and for that and only They evidently enjoy forbidding us to say that a man is good, that the man is a man. letting us say that that which is good is good, or things like You've often met people, I suppose, who are carried away by amazed at this kind of thing, that. Sometimes they're elderly people who are discovered because their understanding is so poor and they think they ve Visitor:

Out

of all this

something prodigiously wise. Theaetetus: Of course.

our questions now both to these people and way our account will also to the others we were talking with before. That about being. be addressed to everyone who's ever said anything at all Visitor:

Then

let's direct

questions do you mean? to rest, or anything Visitor: Shall we refuse to apply being to change or be unblended and incapable to anything else? Shall we take these things to say? Or shall we pull of having a share of each other in the things we each them all together and treat them all as capable of associating with some can't? Which of other? Or shall we say that some can associate and these options shall we say they d choose, Theaetetus? Theaetetus: I don't know how to answer for them.

Theaetetus:

What

274

Sophist

Visitor:

Why

don't

you reply

to the options

one by one by thinking

about what results from each of them? Theaetetus: Fine. Visitor: First,

if

you

like, let's

take

them

capacity at all for association with anything. have any share in being. Theaetetus: No, they won't. Visitor:

Well then, will either of them be,

to

say that nothing has any

Then change and

if

rest

won't

they have no association

with being? Theaetetus: No. Visitor:

It

seems

that agreeing to that destroys everything right

away,

both for the people who make everything change, for the ones who make everything an unchanging unit, and for the ones who say that beings are forms that always stay the same and in the same state. All of these people apply being. Some do it when they say that things really are changing, and others do it when they say that things really are at rest. Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: Also there are people who put everything together at one time and divide them at another 19 Some put them together into one and divide them into indefinitely many, and others divide them into a finite number of elements and put them back together out of them. None of these people, regardless of whether they take this to happen in stages or continuously, would be saying anything if there isn't any blending. Theaetetus: Right. Visitor: But furthermore the most ridiculous account is the one that's adopted by the people who won't allow anything to be called by a name .

that

it

gets

by association with something

Theaetetus:

else.

Why?

Visitor: They're forced to use being about everything, from others , of itself, and a million other things. They're

and

also separate ,

powerless to keep from doing it— that is, from linking them together in their speech. So they don't need other people to refute them, but have an enemy within, as

people say, to contradict them, and they go carrying him around talking in an undertone inside them like the strange ventriloquist Eurycles 20 Theaetetus: That's a very accurate comparison. Visitor: Well then, what if we admit that everything has the capacity to associate with everything else? Theaetetus: I can solve that one. .

Visitor:

How?

Theaetetus: Because if change and rest belonged to each other then change would be completely at rest and conversely rest itself would be changing.

19.

These thinkers were introduced

20.

See Aristophanes, Wasps, 1017-20.

at

242c-d, e-243a.

275

Sophist

suppose it's ruled out by very strict necessity that change rest and that rest should change.

Visitor: But

I

should be at Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: So the third option is the only one left. Theaetetus: Yes. to be the case, either Visitor: Certainly one of the following things has things are and some everything is willing to blend, or nothing is, or some are not.

Theaetetus: Of course.

And we found

Visitor:

that the first

two options were impossible.

Theaetetus: Yes.

So everyone

Visitor:

who wants

to give the right

answer

will choose

the third.

Theaetetus: Absolutely. they'll be a good deal Visitor: Since some will blend and some won't, together with each other and like letters of the alphabet. Some of them fit

some

don't.

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: More than the other

vowels run through all of them without a vowel no one of the like a bond, linking them together, so that others can fit with another. letters the

Theaetetus: Definitely. Visitor: So does everyone know which kinds of with which, or does it take an expert?

Theaetetus:

letters

can associate

takes an expert.

It

What kind?

Visitor:

expert in grammar. and low notes? The Visitor: Well then, isn't it the same with high ones mix and musician is the one with the expertise to know which who doesn't which ones don't, and the unmusical person is the one

Theaetetus:

understand

An

that.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

something

And

.

in other cases of expertise

and the lack

of

it

we'll find

similar.

Theaetetus: Of course. in the Well then, we've agreed that kinds mix with each other kinds harmosame way. So if someone's going to show us correctly which other, doesn't he have to nize with which and which kinds exclude each discussion? And have some kind of knowledge as he proceeds through the there are any kinds that run in addition doesn't he have to know whether

Visitor:

through

all

of

them and

link

them together

to

make them capable

of

certain kinds running blending, and also, when there are divisions, whether through wholes are always the cause of the division? just about Theaetetus: Of course that requires knowledge probably

—

the most important kind.

276

Sophist

Visitor: So, Theaetetus,

we label this knowledge? Or for heaven's sake, without noticing have we stumbled on the knowledge that free people have? Maybe we've found the philosopher even though we

were looking

shall

for the sophist?

What do you mean?

Theaetetus: d

what

Visitor: Aren't

we

going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic to divide things by kinds and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a different form is the same? Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: So if a person can do that, he'll be capable of adequately discriminating a single form spread out all through a lot of other things, each of which stands separate from the others. In addition he can discriminate forms that are different from each other but are included within a single form that's outside them, or a single form that's connected as a unit throughout many wholes, or many forms that are completely separate

from othersV That

s

things can associate

what it is to know how and how they can't.

to discriminate

by kinds how

Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor:

254

And

you'll assign this dialectical activity only to just love of wisdom.

someone who

has a pure and Theaetetus: You certainly couldn't assign it to anyone else. Visitor: We 11 find that the philosopher will always be in a location like this if we look for him. He's hard to see clearly too, but not in the same

way

as the sophist.

Theaetetus:

Why

Theaetetus:

It

not? Visitor: The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is riot, which he's had practice dealing with, and he's hard to see because the place is so dark. Isn't that right?

seems

to be.

Visitor: But the philosopher being.

b

of

He

isn

t

at all

easy to

always uses reasoning to stay near the form, see because that area is so bright and the eyes

most people's souls can't bear Theaetetus: That seems just as

to look at

what's divine.

right as what you just said before. Visitor: We'll think about the philosopher more clearly soon if we want to. But as far as the sophist is concerned we obviously

shouldn't give

until

we've gotten a good enough look

at

up

him.

Theaetetus: Fine.

21.

two previous sentences can be translated: "So if a person can do adequately discriminate a single form spread out all through many, each of which stands separate from the others, and many forms that are different from each other but are included within a single form that's outside them; and another single form connected as a unit through many wholes, and many forms that are all marked off Alternatively, the

that, he'll

in separation."

277

Sophist

We've agreed on this: some kinds will associate with each other will associate a and some won't, some will to a small extent and others Visitor:

being all-pervading from great deal, nothing prevents still others from pursue our account being associated with every one of them. So next let's That way we won't be together this way. Let's not talk about every form.

choose some thrown off by dealing with too many of them. Instead let's what they re like, and next of the most important ones. First we'll ask other. Even if our grasp we'll ask about their ability to associate with each our aim will be which is and that which is not isn't completely clear, of that

far as that's allowed avoid being totally without an account of them— so get away with by our present line of inquiry and see whether we can not. saying that that which is not really is that which is Theaetetus: That's what we have to do. discussing are that Visitor: The most important kinds we've just been

to

—

which is rest and change. Theaetetus: Yes, by far. blend with each other. Visitor: And we say that two of them don't ,

,

Theaetetus: Definitely not. them, since presumably Visitor: But that which is blends with both of

both of them are. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: We do have three of them. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: So each of them as

is

different

from two

of them, but

is

the

same

itself.

Theaetetus: Yes. the different that we ve Visitor: But what in the world are the same and but necessarily been speaking of? Are they two kinds other than those three them all as being always blending with them? And do we have to think of been calling the same and the five and not three? Or have what we've three? turned out, without our realizing it, to be among those different

Theaetetus: Maybe. Visitor: But change and rest are certainly not Theaetetus: Why not? Visitor:

Whatever we

call

change and

rest in

different or the same.

common

can

t

be either

one of them. Theaetetus: if

Why

not?

Then change would change or rest comes

Visitor:

rest

either

to

and

would change. In both cases, same or different, then it will

rest

be either

force the other to change to the contrary of share in its contrary.

its

own

nature, since

Theaetetus: Absolutely. different. Visitor: And both do share in the same and in the

Theaetetus: Yes.

it

will

278

Sophist

Visitor:

Then anyway let's not say that change is the same or the different,

nor that rest is. Theaetetus: All right. Visitor: But do we have to think of that which is and the same as one thing? Theaetetus: Maybe. Visitor: But if that which is and the same don't signify distinct things, then when we say that change and rest both are, we'U be labeling both of them as being the same. Theaetetus: But certainly that's impossible. Visitor: So it's impossible for the same and that which is to be one. Theaetetus: I suppose so. Visitor: Shall

we

take the same as a fourth in addition to the other

three forms?

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: Well then, do we have to call the different a fifth? Or should think of it and that which is as two names for one kind?

we

Theaetetus: Maybe. Visitor. But I think you 11 admit that some of those which are are said by themselves, but some are always said in relation to other things. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: But the different

is

always said in relation

to another, isn't it?

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: But it wouldn't be if that which is and the different weren't completely distinct. If the different shared in both kinds the way that which is does, then some of the things that are different would be different without being different in relation to anything different. In fact, though, it turns out that whatever is different definitely has to be what it is from

something

that's different.

Theaetetus: That's exactly the Visitor:

And we do have

way

it is.

to call the nature of the different a fifth

among

the forms we're choosing.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: And we're going to say that it pervades all of them, since each of them is different from the others, not because of its own nature but because of sharing in the type of the different. Theaetetus: Absolutely.

up each Theaetetus: What? Visitor: Let's take

Visitor: First let's say that

change

we

say that? Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: So it is not rest. Theaetetus: Not at all. Visitor: But it is, because

of the five

it

is

one by one and say

this.

completely different from

shares in that which

is.

rest.

Shall

279 Sophist

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Then again change

is

different

from the same.

Theaetetus: Pretty much. Visitor: So it is not the same. Theaetetus: No. Visitor: But still

was

it

we

the same,

said

22 ,

because everything has a

share of that. Theaetetus: Definitely. that change is the same Visitor: We have to agree without any qualms the same, we and not the same. When we say that it's the same and not the same, that s because aren't speaking the same way. When we say it's to itself. But when we say it s not the it shares in the same in relation

Because of its same, that's because of its association with the different. the same, and so association with the different, change is separated from not the same. becomes not it but different. So that it's right to say that it's Theaetetus: Of course.

would So if change itself ever somehow had a share in rest, there be nothing strange about labeling it resting? some kinds Theaetetus: That's absolutely right, as long as we admit that Visitor:

will blend with each other

and some won

t.

before Visitor: That, though, we demonstrated earlier, so. point, and we showed that by nature it has to be

we came

to this

Theaetetus: Of course.

To repeat 24 change than both the same and rest. Visitor:

,

Theaetetus: Visitor:

we've

So

It

is

different

from

different, just as

it

s

ot rer

has to be.

in a

way

it is

different

and not

different, according to

what

said.

Theaetetus: Right.

from So what next? Are we going to say that change is different fact that we've agreed the first three but not from the fourth, in spite of the investigate? that there were five things we were going to there are fewer Theaetetus: How could we do that? We can t admit that of them than there appeared to be just now. that change is different Visitor: So shall we go on fearlessly contending Visitor:

from

that

which

is?

22. Cf. 255a.

23.

At 251a-252c.

24. Alternatively: "Let's continue, then:"

the next step in his plan

announced

(On

at 255e8;

this translation, the Visitor is

he has said

how change

relates to rest

proceeds to say how it relates to the different saying how it relates to being. Thus he ff., he completes the plan by anything already said previously.)

to the

same, and

now

here taking

after is

and

which, ell

not repeating

280

Sophist

Theaetetus: Yes,

So

Visitor:

it's

also a thing that

we

should be absolutely fearless. clear that change really is both something that since

is

not, but

partakes in that which is? Theaetetus: That's absolutely clear. Visitor: So it has to be possible for that which is not to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all the kinds. That's because as applied to all of them the nature of the different makes each of them not be, by making it different from that which is. And we're going to be right if we say that all

them

of

it

are not in this

going to be right

which

is

if

we

call

same way. And on the other hand we're them beings, because they have a share in

also that

is.

Theaetetus:

seems

way. Visitor: So as concerning each of the forms that which is is extensive, and that which is not is indefinite in quantity. Theaetetus: That seems right. Visitor: So we have to say that that which is itself is different from It

that

the others.

Theaetetus: Necessarily. Visitor: So even that which is is not, in as many applications as there are of the others, since, not being them, it is one thing, namely itself, and on the other hand it is not those others, which are an indefinite number. Theaetetus: I suppose so.

So then we shouldn't even be annoyed about this conclusion, precisely because it's the nature of kinds to allow association with each other. And if somebody doesn't admit that, then he needs to win us over from our earlier line of argument for it, in order to win us over from Visitor:

consequences. Theaetetus: That's entirely fair. Visitor: Now let's look at this. Theaetetus: What?

its

Visitor:

It

seems

that

when we

thing contrary to that which

Theaetetus: Visitor:

seem

to

It's

you

is,

say that which is not we don't say somebut only something different from it. ,

Why? like this.

that

we

When we

speak of something as not

large,

does

it

indicate the small rather than the equal?

Theaetetus: Of course not. Visitor: So we won't agree with somebody who says that denial signifies a contrary. We'll only admit this much: when "not" and "non-" are prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the names, or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are applied.

Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: If you don't mind, though, Theaetetus: What?

let's

think about

this.

281 Sophist

Visitor: like

The nature

of the different appears to be

chopped up,

just

knowledge.

Theaetetus:

Why?

ot it Knowledge is a single thing, too, I suppose. But each part has a name peculiar to has to do with something is marked off and

Visitor: that

itself.

of

That's

why

there are said to be

many

expertises

and many kinds

knowledge. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

And

so the

same thing happens

the different, too, even though

it's

Theaetetus: Maybe. But shall

to the parts ot the nature ot

one thing.

we

say

how?

placed over against the beauVisitor: Is there a part of the different that's

tiful?

Theaetetus: Yes.

say that it's nameless, or does it have a name. is the thing that's Theaetetus: It has a name. What we call not beautiful of the beautiful. different from nothing other than the nature Visitor: Shall

Visitor:

Now

we

go ahead and

tell

me

this.

Theaetetus: What? Visitor: Isn't

it

in the following

that the not beautiful turns out to off within one kind of those that are,

way

namely, by being both marked and also set over against one of those Theaetetus: Yes.

be,

Visitor:

Then

it

seems

that are ? .

a that the not beautiful is a sort of setting of

over against a being. Theaetetus: That's absolutely right. account, Visitor: Well then, according to this

is

the beautiful

being

more

a

being than the not beautiful? Theaetetus: Not at all. the not large and the large Visitor: So we have to say that both equally are. Theaetetus: Yes. _

......m

just on a par with the Visitor: So we also have to put the not that neither is any more than the other.

just,

Theaetetus: Of course.

way too, since we'll speak about the others in the same being one of those that are. And the nature of the different appeared as we have to posit its parts as no less beings. Visitor:

And

because it is, Theaetetus: Of course. each other of the nature ot Visitor: So it seems that the setting against that which is is not any less beinga part of the different and the nature of such a thing— than that which is itself. And it does if we're allowed to say but only something different not signify something contrary to that which is

from

it.

282

Sophist

Theaetetus: Clearly.

So what shall we call it? Theaetetus: Obviously that which is not— which we were looking for because of the sophist is just exactly this. Visitor: Then does it have just as much being as any of the others, as you said it did? Should we work up the courage now to say that that which is not definitely is something that has its own nature? Should we say that Visitor:

—

just as the large

large,

and

not also

was

large, the beautiful

the not beautiful

was and

was

was

beautiful, the not large was not not beautiful, in the same way that which

not being, and is one form among the are ? Do we, Theaetetus, still have any doubts about that? Theaetetus: No. is

Visitor:

is

You know, our

disbelief in

many

that

Parmenides has gone even farther

than his prohibition. Theaetetus: How?

We've pushed our investigation ahead and shown him something even beyond what he prohibited us from even thinking about. Theaetetus: In what way? Visitor: Because he says, remember. Visitor:

Never shall it force itself on us, that that which is not may Keep your thought far away from this path of searching.

be;

Theaetetus: That's what he says. Visitor: But we've not only shown that those which are not are. We've also caused what turns out to be the form of that which is not to appear. Since we showed that the nature of the different is, chopped up among all beings in relation to each other, we dared to say that that which is not really is just this, namely, each part of the nature of the different that's set over against that which is. Theaetetus: And what we've said seems to me completely and totally true.

Nobody can say appear and now dare to

Visitor:

that this that which

which we've made say is, is the contrary of that which is. We've said good-bye long ago to any contrary of that which is, and to whether it is or not, and also to whether or not an account can be given of it. With regard to that which is not, which we ve said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that we ve made a mistake or else, so long as he can't do that, he should say just what we say. He has to say that the kinds blend with each other, that that which is and the different pervade all of them and each other, that the different shares in that which is and so, because of that sharing, is. But he won't say that it is that which it shares in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it is different from that which is, it clearly can be what is not. On the other hand that which is has a share to

—

is

not,

283

Sophist

being different from not all of the others except

of the others,

in the different, so,

all

them and

itself.

is

it is

not millions of things, and

all

that

not each of

is

indisputably

and

also each of

which

of the others together,

them, are in many ways and also are not in Theaetetus: True. Visitor:

So

it is

many ways.

And if anyone doesn't believe these contrarieties, he has to think

about them himself and say something better than what we've said. But if he thinks he's recognized a problem in it and enjoys dragging the argument back and forth, then he's been carried away by something that's not worth much of anyone's attention to go by what we've just been saying, anyway. A thing like that isn't clever or hard to discover, but the other thing is both difficult and at the same time beautiful. Theaetetus: What other thing? Visitor: The thing we said earlier. That is, we should leave pointless things like this alone. Instead we should be able to follow what a person says and scrutinize it step by step. When he says that what's different is the same in a certain way or that what's the same is different in a certain way, we should understand just what way he means, and the precise respect in which he's saying that the thing is the same or different. But when someone makes that which is the same appear different in just any old way, or vice versa, or when he makes what's large appear small

—

—

well, if someone enjoys or something that's similar appear dissimilar constantly trotting out contraries like that in discussion, that's not true

only the obvious new-born brain-child of someone who just came into contact with those which are 25 Theaetetus: Definitely. Visitor: In fact, my friend, it's inept to try to separate everything from everything else. It's the sign of a completely unmusical and unphilosophirefutation.

It's

.

cal person.

Theaetetus:

Why?

To dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy totally everything there is to say. The weaving together of forms is what makes Visitor:

speech possible for us. Theaetetus: That's true. Visitor: Think about what a good moment we picked to fight it out against people like that, and to force them further to let one thing blend with another. Theaetetus: Why a good moment? Visitor: For speech's being one kind among those that are. If we were deprived of that, we'd be deprived of philosophy to mention the most important thing. Besides, now we have to agree about what speech is, but we'd be able to say nothing if speech were taken away from us and weren't

—

25.

See 234d-e.

284 b

Sophist

anything at all. And it would be taken away if we admitted that there's no blending of anything with anything else. Theaetetus: This last thing is right, anyway. But I don't understand why we have to agree about speech. Visitor: Well, perhaps you'll understand if you follow me this way. Theaetetus: Where? Visitor: That which is not appeared to us to be one kind among others, but scattered over all those which are. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: So next we have to think about whether it blends with belief

and speech.

Why?

Theaetetus: c

them then everything has to be true. But if it does then there will be false belief and false speech, since falsity in thinking and speaking amount to believing and saying those that are not. Visitor:

doesn't blend with

If it

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

if

there's falsity then there's deception.

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

And

if

there's deception then necessarily the

of copies, likenesses,

world

will be full

and appearances.

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor:

d

We

said that the sophist

had escaped

into this region, but that

he denied that there has come to be or is such a thing as falsity. For he denied that anyone either thinks or says that which is not on the ground that that which is not never in any way has a share in being. Theaetetus: That's what he said. Visitor: But now it apparently does share in that which is so he probably wouldn't still put up a fight about that. Perhaps, though, he might say that some forms share in that which is not and some don't, and that speech and belief are ones that don't. So he might contend again that copy-making and appearance-making in which we said he was contained totally are not. His ground would be that belief and speech don't associate with that which is not and that without this association falsity totally is not. That's why we have to search around for speech, belief, and appearance, and first discover what they are, so that when they appear we see their association with that which is not clearly. Then when we've seen that clearly we can show that falsity is, and when we've shown that we can tie the sophist up in it, if we can keep hold of him or else we'll let him go and look for him in another kind. Theaetetus: What you said at the start seems absolutely true. The sophist is a hard kind to hunt down. He seems to have a whole supply of roadblocks, and whenever he throws one down in our way we have to fight through it before we can get to him. But now when we've barely gotten through the one about how that which is not is not, he's thrown another one down and we have to show that falsity is present in both speech and ,

,

e

—

—

,

261

—

b

285

Sophist

seems, there will be another and another after that. A limit, it seems, never appears. Visitor: Even if you can only make a little progress, Theaetetus, you should cheer up. If you give up in this situation, what will you do some other time when you don't get anywhere or even are pushed back? A person like that would hardly capture a city, as the saying goes. But since we've done what you just said, my friend, the largest wall may already

belief.

And

next,

it

have been captured and the

rest of

them may be lower and

easier.

Theaetetus: Fine. Visitor:

Then

let's

take

up speech and

belief, as

we

said just

now. That

can calculate whether that which is not comes into contact with them, or whether they're both totally true and neither one is ever false. Theaetetus: All right. Visitor: Come on, then. Let's think about names again, the same way as we spoke about forms and letters of the alphabet. What we're looking

way we

for

seems

to lie in that direction.

them do we have to answer? Visitor: Whether they all fit with each other, or none of them do, or some of them will and some of them won't. Theaetetus: Anyway it's clear that some will and some won t. Visitor: Maybe you mean something like this: names that indicate something when you say them one after another fit together, and names that don't signify anything when you put them in a row don t fit. Theaetetus: What do you mean? Visitor: The same thing I thought you were assuming when you agreed with me just now since there are two ways to use your voice to indicate Theaetetus:

What kind

of question about

—

something about being. Theaetetus: Visitor:

What

One kind

are they? is

called names,

and the other them is.

is

called verbs.

Theaetetus: Tell me what each of Visitor: A verb is the sort of indication that's applied to an action. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: that

And

a

name

is

the kind of spoken sign that's applied to things

perform the actions.

Theaetetus: Definitely. Visitor: So no speech is formed just from names spoken in a row, and also not from verbs that are spoken without names. Theaetetus: I didn't understand that. Visitor: Clearly you were focusing on something else when you agreed with me just now. What I meant was simply this: things don't form speech if

they're said in a

row

like this.

Theaetetus: Like what? Visitor: For example, "walks runs sleeps," and other verbs that signify wouldn't actions. Even if somebody said all of them one after another that

be speech.

286

Sophist

Theaetetus: Of course not. Visitor: Again, if somebody said “lion stag horse/' and whatever names c

make up

there are of things that perform actions, the series wouldn't

speech. The sounds he uttered in the

first

or second

way wouldn't

indicate

an action or an inaction or the being of something that is or of something that is not not until he mixed verbs with nouns. But when he did that, they'd fit together and speech the simplest and smallest kind of speech, I suppose would arise from that first weaving of name and either

— —

—

verb together. Theaetetus:

What do you mean? When someone says “man

Visitor:

shortest

d

learns,"

would you say

that's the

and simplest kind of speech?

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: Since he gives an indication about what is, or comes to be, or has come to be, or is going to be. And he doesn't just name, but accomplishes something, by weaving verbs with names. That's why we said he speaks and doesn't just name. In fact this weaving is what we use the word “speech" for. Theaetetus: Right.

So some things fit together and some don't. Likewise some vocal signs don't fit together, but the ones that do produce speech. Visitor:

e

Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: But there's still this small point. Theaetetus: What?

Whenever

there's speech

has to be about something. not to be about something.

Visitor:

it

It's

impossible for it Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: And speech also has to have some particular quality. Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: Now let's turn our attention to ourselves. Theaetetus: All right.

produce some speech by putting action by means of a name and a verb. You have Visitor:

263

I'll

a thing together to tell

me what it's

Theaetetus: I'll do it as well as I can. Visitor: “Theaetetus sits." That's not a long piece of speech, Theaetetus: No, not too long. Visitor:

Your

job

is

Theaetetus: Clearly

to tell

what

it's

about,

what

with an about.

is it?

it's of.

about me, of me. Visitor: Then what about this one? Theaetetus: What one? Visitor: “Theaetetus (to whom I'm now talking) flies." Theaetetus: No one would ever deny that it's of me and about me. Visitor: We also say that each piece of speech has to have some particular quality.

it's

287

Sophist

Theaetetus: Yes.

we

say each one of these has? Theaetetus: The second one is false, I suppose, and the other one is true. 26 Visitor: And the true one says those that are, as they are, about you

What

Visitor:

quality should

.

Theaetetus: Of course.

And

Visitor:

the false one says things different from those that

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: So it says those

that are not ,

but that they

are.

are.

Theaetetus: I suppose so. are Visitor: But they're different things that are from the things that about you since we said that applied to each thing many beings are and

—

many

are not.

2'

Theaetetus: Absolutely.

second piece of speech I said about you must be one of the shortest there is, according to our definition of speech. Theaetetus: We agreed to that just now, anyway. Visitor: And we agreed that it's of something. Visitor: In the first place, the

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And

if it is

not of you,

it

isn't of

anything

else.

Theaetetus: Of course not. Visitor: And if it were not of anything it would not be speech at all, speech since we showed that it was impossible for speech that is, to be that

is

of nothing.

Theaetetus: Absolutely right. Visitor: But if someone says things about you, but says different things false as the same or not beings as beings, then it definitely seems that speech really and truly arises from that kind of putting together of verbs

and names. Theaetetus: Yes, very true.

Well then, isn't it clear by now that both true and and belief and appearance can occur in our souls? Visitor:

Theaetetus:

false

thought

How?

The best way for you to know how is for you first to grasp what they are and how they're different from each other. Theaetetus: Then just tell me. Visitor: Aren't thought and speech the same, except that what we call Visitor:

thought is speech that occurs without the voice, inside the soul in conversation with itself? the Greek here uses an idiom which could mean are" (cf. 263d). either "says those that are, as they are" or "says those that are, that they with "says," Secondly, the additional explanatory phrase, "about you/' could be taken 26.

This sentence

is

ambiguous.

with "are," or with both. 27.

See 256e5-6.

First,

288

Sophist

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: And the stream of sound from the soul that goes through the mouth is called speech? Theaetetus: Right. Visitor: And then again we know that speech contains Theaetetus: What? Visitor: Affirmation and denial. Theaetetus: Yes. .

So when affirmation or denial occurs as the soul, wouldn't you call that belief? Visitor:

silent

.

.

thought inside

Theaetetus: Of course.

And what

Visitor:

if

that doesn't

someone through perception? When call

it

correctly, besides

happen on

own

but arises for that happens, what else could one its

appearance?

Theaetetus: Yes.

So since there is true and false speech, and of the processes just mentioned, thinking appeared to be the soul's conversation with itself, belief the conclusion of thinking, and what we call appearing the blending of perception and belief, it follows that since these are all the same kind of thing as speech, some of them must sometimes be false. Visitor:

Theaetetus: Of course. Visitor: So you realize we've found false belief and speech sooner than we expected to just now. Then we were afraid that to look for it would be to attack a completely hopeless project. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: So let's not be discouraged about what's still left. Since these other things have come to light, let's remember the divisions by types that

we made

earlier.

Theaetetus: Which ones? Visitor: We divided copy-making into two types, likeness-making and appearance-making. Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

sophist

And we

said

we were

confused about which one

to

put the

in.

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor: And in our confusion about that we plunged into even greater bewilderment, when an account emerged that disagreed with everyone,

by denying that there are likenesses or copies or appearances at the ground that there isn't ever any falsity in any way anywhere.

all,

on

Theaetetus: That's right. Visitor: But now since false speech and false belief both appear to be, it's

possible for imitations of those that are to be,

deception to arise from that state of Theaetetus: Yes.

affairs.

and

for expertise in

289

Sophist

And we agreed before two types we just mentioned.

Visitor:

the

that the sophist

does

fall

under one of

Theaetetus: Yes. again to take the kind we've posited and cut it we've in two. Let's go ahead and always follow the righthand part of what until we strip cut, and hold onto things that the sophist is associated with away everything that he has in common with other things. Then when we've left his own peculiar nature, let's display it, especially to ourselves but also to people to whom this sort of procedure is naturally congenial. Visitor:

Then

let's try

e

265

Theaetetus: All right. Visitor: Didn't we begin by dividing expertise into productive and acquisitive?

Theaetetus: Yes. Visitor:

And under

the acquisitive part the sophist appeared in hunting, 28

combat, wholesaling, and types of that sort Theaetetus: Of course. first Visitor: But now, since he's included among experts in imitation, we obviously have to divide productive expertise in two. We say imitation things themselves. Is is a sort of production, but of copies and not of the .

b

that right?

Theaetetus: Absolutely. Visitor: First of all, production has two parts. Theaetetus: What are they? Visitor: Divine

Theaetetus:

I

and human.

don't understand yet.

you remember how we capacity that causes things to come Visitor:

If

started /"

1

to

we

said production

was any

be that previously were not.

remember. Visitor: Take animals and everything mortal, including plants and everything on the earth that grows from seeds and roots, and also all lifeless bodies made up inside the earth, whether fusible or not. Are we going to say that anything besides the craftsmanship of a god makes them come and the to be after previously not being? Or shall we rely on the saying Theaetetus:

widespread

I

belief that

.

.

.




i

u y^ the likeness

d° y° u think

that partake of

that likeness itself

we

have? And one and Zeno read about a while ago?"

many

something, separate from and all the things you heard is

do indeed," Socrates answered. "And what about these?" asked Parmenides. "Is there a form, itself, of just, and beautiful, and good, and everything of that "I

itself

by

sort?"

"Yes," he said.

What about us. Is

form of human being, separate from us and all those there a form itself of human being, or fire, or water?" a

like

Socrates said,

Parmenides, I've often found myself in doubt whether should talk about those in the same way as the others or differently." And what about these, Socrates? Things that might seem absurd,

I

like hair

and mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless? Are you doubtful whether or not you should say that a form is separate for each of these, too, which in turn is other than anything we touch with our hands?" "Not at all," Socrates answered. "On the contrary, these things are in fact just what we see. Surely it's too outlandish to think there is a form or them. Not that the thought that the same thing might hold in all cases hasn t troubled me from time to time. Then, when I get bogged down in

hurry away, afraid that I may fall into some pit of nonsense and come to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of the things we agreed a moment ago have forms, I linger there and occupy myself with them." That s because you are still young, Socrates," said Parmenides, "and philosophy has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to consider none of the cases beneath your notice. Now, though, you still care about what people think, because of your youth "But tell me this: is it your view that, as you say, there are certain forms from which these other things, by getting a share of them, derive their names - as, for instance, they come to be like by getting a share of likeness, that,

I

by getting a share of largeness, and share of justice and beauty?" targe

'It

certainly

is,"

Socrates replied.

just

and beautiful by y getting h 6

a

"

365 Parmenides as its share the form as a whole "So does each thing that gets a share get some other means of getting a share or a part of it? Or could there be apart from these two?" "How could there be?" he said. each - one thing - is that the form as a whole

m

"Do you think, then, of the many? Or what do you think?"

„

7 said Socrates. "What's to prevent its being one Parmenides?" the same time, as a whole, "So being one and the same, it will be at from many and separate; and thus it would be separate

m

,

things that are itself

"No

one and the same day. wouldn't/' Socrates said. "Not if it's like and is none the less not separate in many places at the same time

it

That is might be, at the same time, from itself. If it's like that, each of the forms one and the same in all." one and the same thi g "Socrates " he said, "how neatly you make many people It's as if you were to cover ,

.

in

many

same

time!

and then say that one thing the sort of thing you mean to say?

with a that

places at the

sail,

as a

whole

is

over many. Or isn

"Perhaps," he replied. whole, over each person, or "In that case would the sail be, as a and another part over another? a part of it be over one person

t

would

said, "and things "Soothe forms themselves are divisible, Socrates," he of a part; no longer would awioe that partake of them would partake

be in each thing. "It does appear that way." one form is really divided l "Then are you willing to say, Socrates, that our

form, but only a part of

it,

.

,

be one?" "Not at all," he replied. are going to divide argeness "No," said Parmenides. "For suppose you things is to be large by a part of largeness itself. If each of the many large unreasonable. than largeness itself, won't that appear

Will

it still

smaller "It

certainly will," he replied.

ot the each thing that has received a small part to anything, when its portion equal have something by which to be equal is less than the equal itself?"

"What about

this? Will

"That's impossible."

have

a part of the small.

The sm

"Well, suppose one of us is going to since the part is a part of it: so the sma will be larger than that part of it, part subtracted is added wil will be larger! And that to which the itself

be smaller, not larger, than it was before." "That surely couldn't happen," he said.

7.

Removing

the brackets in alO-11.

,

366 Parmenides

what way, then, will the other things get a share of your can do so neither by getting parts nor by getting wholes?"

"Socrates, in t0

^by 7 S,

th

Zeus!f,y Socrates exclaimed. termine!"

"And what do you

"It strikes

me

that's not at all easv to deJ

think about the following?"

"What's that?" "I suppose you think each form is one on the following ground: whenever some number of things seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some one character, the same as you look at them all, and from that you conclude that the large is one." "That's true," he said.

"What about the large itself and the other large things? If you look at them all in the same way with the mind's eye, again won't some one thing appear large, by which all these appear large?" 8 "It

seems

so."

"So another form of largeness will make its appearance, which has emerged alongside largeness itself and the things that partake of it, and turn another over all these, by which all of them will be large. Each of your forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in multitude." But, Parmenides, maybe each of these forms is a thought," 9 Socrates said, "and properly occurs only in minds. In this way each of them might be one and no longer face the difficulties mentioned just now "

m

"What do you mean?" he asked.

"Is

thought of nothing?" "No, that's impossible," he said. "Of something, rather?"

each of the thoughts one, but a

"Yes."

Of something

that

is,

or of something that

is

not?"

"Of something that is." "Isn't it of some one thing, which that thought thinks instances, being some one character?"

is

over

all

the

"Yes." 10.

Then won

over

all

t

this thing that is

thought

the instances, be a form?"

to

be one, being always the same

"That, too, appears necessary."

And what

about this?" said Parmenides. "Given your claim that other things partake of forms, won't you necessarily think either that each thing is composed of thoughts and all things think, or that, although they are thoughts, they are unthinking?" 10 "That isn't reasonable either, Parmenides," he said. "No, what appears most likely to me is this: these forms are like patterns set in nature, and 8.

Alternatively: "If

some one 9.

large

you look

them all in the same way with the mind's eye won't again appear, by which all these appear large?" at

Alternatively: "But, Parmenides,

maybe each of the forms is a thought of these things."

Alternatively: "or that, although they are thoughts, they are not thought?"

367 Parmenides likenesses; and this partaking of the other things resemble them and are modeled on them." forms is, for the other things, simply being he said, "can that form not be like "If something resembles the form," the thing has been made what has been modeled on it, to the extent that something like to be like what is not like it. like it? Or is there any way for -

T here is not." "And isn't there a compelling necessity ?" it of the same one form as what is like

for that

which

is

partake

like to

11

/f

'There "But if

is

like things are like

by partaking

of something, won't that be the

form itself?" "Undoubtedly."

.

,

can the form be like anything "Therefore nothing can be like the form, nor form another form will always make its else. Otherwise, alongside the yet another; and if the form appearance, and if that form is like anything, fresh form will never cease proves to be like what partakes of it, a emerging." "That's very true." 1M likeness; by forms the of share a get don't "So other things get a share." seek some other means by which they

"So

it

we must .

seems."

great the "Then do you see, Socrates," he said, "how themselves?" marks things off as forms, themselves by

"Quite clearly." you do not yet, "I assure you," he said, "that

if I

difficulty

may

put

it

is if

so,

one

u have

one form if you are going to posit an inkling of how great the difficulty is make a distinction among things. in each case every time you "How so?" he asked. said, "but the mam one is "There are many other reasons," Parmenides we claim to say that if the forms are such as this: suppose someone were known. If anyone should raise that thev must be, they cannot even be show him that he is wrong, unless objection, you wouldn't be able to experienced and not ungifted, and the objector happened to be widely effort to show him you deal consented to pay attention while in your the person who insists tha with many distant considerations. Otherwise, remain unconvinced. are necessarily unknowable would .

they

Parmenides?" Socrates asked. anyone else who posits that "Because I think that you, Socrates, and begin being, itself by itself, would agree, to is for each thing some

"Why

is

that,

there

with, that

none

of those beings

is

in us."

be itself by itself?" replied Socrates. the characters that are what "Very good," said Parmenides. "And so all their being in relation to themselves they are in relation to each other have the to us. And whether one posits but not in relation to things that belong "Yes -

11.

how

Removing

could

it still

the brackets in el.

368

Parmenides

latter as likenesses or in

some

other way, it is by partaking of them that to be called by their various names. These things that belong to us, although they have the same names as the forms, are in their turn what they are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this way are themselves but not of the forms." of What do you mean?" Socrates asked. "Take an example," said Parmenides. "If one of us is somebody's master or somebody s slave, he is surely not a slave

we come

of master itself - of what a master is is the master a master of slave itself - of what a slave is. n the contrary, being a human being, he is a master or slave of a human being. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself; and, the same way, slavery itself is slavery of

- nor

m

mastery itself. Things in us do power in relation to forms, nor do they have theirs in relation to us, but, I repeat, forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what they are in relation to themselves. You do understand what I mean?" not have their

"Certainly," Socrates said, "I understand."

"So too," he said, "knowledge itself, what knowledge

edge of that truth

itself,

which

is

what

is,

would be knowl-

truth is?"

"Certainly."

Furthermore, each particular knowledge, what

edge of some particular thing, of what that thing

it is,

is.

would be knowl-

Isn't that so 7

"

"Yes."

"But wouldn't knowledge that belongs to us be of the truth that belongs to our world? And wouldn't it follow that each particular knowledge that elongs to us is in turn knowledge of some particular thing in our world 7 " "Necessarily." "But, as

belong

you

agree,

we

to us."

neither have the forms themselves nor can thev 7

"Yes, you're quite right." And surely the kinds themselves, the form of knowledge itself 7 "

what each

of

them

is,

are

known bv

"Yes."

"The very thing that we don't have." "No, we don't." So none of the forms is known by

knowledge itself." "It seems not." "Then the beautiful

us,

because

what it is, cannot be good, nor, indeed, can any of the things we take itself,

looks that way." "Here's something even

we

don't partake of

known by

nor can the to be characters themselves " us,

It

more shocking than

that

"

"What's that?" Surely you is

much more

would say that precise than

goes for beauty and

all

is

if

in fact there is

knowledge

the others."

knowledge - a kind

that belongs to us.

And

itself

the

-

it

same

369 Parmenides "Yes."

knowledge itself, wouldn t you say has this most precise knowledge?

"Well, whatever else partakes of

god more than anyone

that

else

"Necessarily."

,

me, will god, having knowledge that belong to our world?" "Tell

"Because

we have agreed,

Socrates,"

itself,

,

Parmenides

said,

'

u things

.

know

,

then be able to

.

.

that those

d

forms

our world, and things m do not have their power in relation to things in forms, but that things m each our world do not have theirs in relation to group have their power in relation to themselves. "Yes, we did agree on that." most precise knowledge "Well then, if this most precise mastery and this .

,

mastery could never master us, nor could that belongs to us. No just as we their knowledge know us or anything know nothing of the divine do not govern them by our governance and

belong

to the divine, the gods'

by our knowledge, so they

in their turn are, for the

same reason,

human affairs. our masters nor, being gods, do they know he said, "our argument "If god is to be stripped of knowing,"

e

neither

may

be

getting too bizarre." inevitably involve "And yet Socrates," said Parmenides, "the forms besides - if there are those characters these objections and a host of others s off each form as 'something itself. for things, and a person is to mark do about them is doubtful and objects that they .

.

.

.

,

.

135

whoever hears must by strict necessity be unknownot exist, and that, even if they do, they this he seems to have a point and, able to human nature; and in saying to win over. Only a very gifted man as we said, he is extraordinarily hard by is some kind, a being itself can come to know that for each thing there remarkable still will discover that and be itself; but only a prodigy more all these difficulties thoroug a y able to teach someone else who has sifted and critically for himself." what

a result

,

agree with you, Parmenides,"

"I

Socrates said.

'

That

s

very

much

,

b

.

think too." ...... if someone, having Parmenides, said Socrates," hand, "Yet on the other brought up and others of the an eye on all the difficulties we have just things and won't mark ott same sort, won't allow that there are forms for his thought, since one, he won't have anywhere to turn

I

,

form for each he doesn't allow

a

same. In

this

a character that is always the - entirely. But will destroy the power of dialectic

that for each thing there

way he

is

you are only too well aware of that. "What you say is true," Socrates said. "What then will you do about philosophy? Where

think

will

you

turn,

whi

e

these difficulties remain unresolved?"

12.

The Greek word

is dialegesthai,

untechnically as "conversation.

which could instead be translated

as "discourse,

or

c

Parmenides

don

}Socrates, that s have think

anything clearly in view, at least not at present." because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, and just, and good, and each one of the forms, too soon," he said, "before you have been properly trained. I noticed that the other day too as I listened to you conversing with Aristotle here. The impulse you bring to argument is noble and divine, make no mistake about it. But while you are still young, put your back into it and get more training through something people think useless - what the crowd call idle talk. Otherwise, the truth will escape you." t

1

"What manner of training is that, Parmenides?" he asked. The manner is just what you heard from Zeno," he said. "Except I was also impressed by something you had to say to him: you didn't allow him to remain among visible things and observe their wandering between opposites. You asked him to observe it instead among those things that one might above all grasp by means of reason and might think to be forms." dld not at

he sald "because I think that here, among visible things, i, all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything ° else you please." 1

.

,

,

And you

are quite right," he said. "But

you must do the following in addition to that: if you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis; you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not." "What do you mean?" he asked. "If you like," said Parmenides, "take as an example this hypothesis that Zeno entertained: if many are 13 what must the consequences be both for the many themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to the one, ,

and

for the

one

in relation to itself

and in relation to the many? And, in on the hypothesis, if many are not, you must again examine what the consequences will be both for the one and for the many in relation to themselves and m relation to each other. And again, in turn, if you hypothesize, if likeness is or if it is not, you must examine what the consequences will be on each hypothesis, both for the things hypothesized themselves and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation turn,

each other. And the same method applies to unlike, to motion, to rest, to generation and destruction, and to being itself and not-being. And, in a word, concerning whatever you might ever hypothesize as being or as not being or as having any other property, you must examine the consequences for the thing you hypothesize in to

relation to itself and in one of the others, whichever you select, and in relation to several of them and to all of them in the same way; and, in turn you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether what you relation to each

hypothesize you hypothesize as being or as not being. All

13.

Alternatively:

"if [things]

are

many," or

"if

there are

many."

this

you must

.

371

Parmenides

do

if,

after

completing your training, you are

view of

to achieve a full

you describe! And besides, ^"Scarcely manageable, Parmenides, this task more fully, understand," he said. "To help me understand I don't quite through the exercise or why don't you hypothesize something and go

me

yourself?"

"For a man my "Well then," said Socrates, "you, Zeno

why

„

jfor

And Antiphon to

do

it

said that

himself, Socrates.

Zeno laughed and

What

said, "Let's

man

his age, to

engage

Ordinary people don't know

,

1

beg Parmenides

he's proposing won't be easy,

it Or don't you recognize what a big assignment more of us here, it wouldn't be right to ask him

for a

.

,

he said. don't you go through

age that's a big assignment, Socrates,

is?

Indeed,

it's

not

if

I

m afraid.

there

fitting,

were

especial y

such a discussion in front ot a crowd. and circuthat without this comprehensive in

And so, cannot hit upon the truth and gam insight. so that I too may become Parmenides, I join with Socrates in begging you, your pupil again after all this time." Pythodorus sai When Zeno had finished speaking. Antiphon said that

itous treatment

we

,

Parmenides not

begged along with Aristotle and the others, n demonstration of what he was recommending, to refuse but to give a 1 obliged to go along with you. And yet the end Parmenides said: "I am 4 Ibycus compares himself to a the horse in the poem of Ibycus.’ that

he

too,

feel like

on the point of drawing a chario horse - a champion but no longer young, experience tells him is about to happen in a race and trembling at what his is being forced against and says that he himself, old man that he is, a good dea Love's game. I too, when I think back, feel will to

compete

in

vast

age I am to make my way across such a do it, since it is right tor me to and formidable sea of words. Even so. I'll Zeno says, by ourselves. oblige you; and besides, we are, as What shall we hypothesize "Well then, at what point shall we start? game/ in fact decided to play this strenuous first 7 I know: since we have and my own hypothesis. if I begin with myself is it’ all right with you what the consequences hypothesize about the one itself and consider

of anxiety as to

Shall

how

at

my

I

must be, if it is one or if it is not one? , "By all means," said Zeno. sure youngest, y "The asked he "Then who will answer my questions?" would be the most likely to say what For he would give the least trouble and would allow me a breathing space. he thinks. At the same time his answer ,

.

Parmenides," Aristotle said. "Because "I'm ready to play this role for you, away - you can count on you mean me when you say the youngest. Ask

me

to answer."

14.

Ibycus

his love

frg.

6 (Page 1962). Ibycus of

poems.

137

Rhegium

(sixth century b.c.)

was

best

known

tor

b

Parmenides

Ver y 8°°d, he said. If it is one, the one would not be many would it?" "No, how could it?"— "Then there cannot be a part of it nor can it 1

—

d

^

—

—

be a whole." "Why?" "A part is surely part of a whole." "Yes "— But what is the whole? Wouldn't that from which no part is missing be a whole?"— "Certainly."— "In both cases, then, the one would be composed of parts, both if it is a whole and if it has parts."— "Necessarily."— "So in both cases the one would thus be many rather than one." "True." "Yet it must be not many but one."— "It must."— "Therefore, if the one is to begone, it will neither be a whole nor have parts." "No, it won't."

—

"Well, then,

doesn't have a part, it could have neither a beginning nor an end nor a middle; for those would in fact be parts of it." "That's right. "Furthermore, end and beginning are limits of each thing." "Doubtless."— "So the one is unlimited if it has neither beginning nor

e

if it

end."— "Unlimited."— "So it is also without shape; for it partakes of neither round nor straight."— "How so?"— "Round is surely that whose extremities are equidistant in every direction from the middle."— "Yes."— "Furthermore, straight is that whose middle stands in the way of the two extremities."— "Just so."— "So the one would have parts and be many if

partook of either a straight or a curved shape." fore it is neither straight nor curved, since in fact it

138

— "Of course." it

"That's right."

b

doesn't have F parts

"—

Furthermore, being like that, it would be nowhere, because it could be neither in another nor in itself."— "How is that?"— "If it were in another, it would surely be contained all around by the thing it was in and would touch it in many places with many parts; but since it is one and without parts and does not partake of circularity, it cannot possibly touch in many places all around."— "It can't."— "Yet, on the other hand, if it were in itself, its container would be none other than itself, if in fact it were in itself; for a thing can't be in something that doesn't contain it."— "No, it can't."— 'So the container itself would be one thing, and the thing contained some-

thing else, since the

same thing

and do both

And

two.

—

if it is

will not, as a

whole at any rate, undergo one would be no longer one but Yes, you're quite right."— "Therefore, the one is not anywhere, at once.

in that case the

neither in itself nor in another."

"Then consider whether, since

—

"It isn't."

as we have said, can be or in motion. Yes, why not?" — "Because moves, would either move spatially or be altered, since these are the only motions." — "Yes." "But the one surely can be altered from — and be one." it is

it

if it

c

"There-

t

itself

at rest

it

still

"It can't."

"Then it doesn't move by alteration at least."— "Apparently not "—"But by moving spatially?"-"Perhaps."-"And if the one moved spatially, it surely would either spin in a circle in the same location or change from one place to another."— "Necessarily."— "Well then, if it spins in a circle, it must be poised on its middle and have other parts of itself that move 15.

The hypothesis could

above

at 137b.

also be rendered "if

one

is."

But

cf.

Parmenides' statement

373 Parmenides

do with middle Not at circle round its middle? or parts manage to be moved in a be here at one hme there "But by changing places does it come to all." asn "If m fact it moves at a at another, and move in this way?"— Then is Yes. be anywhere in anything?

round the middle. But how

will a thing that has nothing to

—

.

— —

—

cannot I don t see w y. be?" not even more impossible for it to come to necessary that it not yet be something comes to be in something, isn't it be to be in it - and that it no longer in that thing - since it is still coming Necessarit? coming to be entirely outside it, if in fact it is already that which has parts could " "So if anything is to undergo this, only ily that thing, while some, at do so because some of it would already be in thing that doesn't have parts will the same time, would be outside. But a time, neither wholly inside nor not by any means be able to be, at the same isn't it much more impossible wholly outside something."-"True."-"But parts and is not a whole to come to be still for a thing that has no by part nor as a whole? something somewhere, if it does so neither part by going somewhere "Apparently "—"Therefore it doesn't change places move by spinning in the same and coming to be in something, nor does it therefore, is being altered."— "It seems not."— "The one,

it

shown

that

it

—

m

m

-

by Unmoved. unmoved by every sort of motion. „ it cannot be in anything. that say also we hand, "Yet, on the other in the same thing."— "Why?"— "Yes, we do."— "Then it is also never - in that same thing it is in. "Because it would then be in that „ another. it to be either in itself or m for impossible was it course."— "But It is never in the same thing."— "Yes, you're quite right."— "So the one thing neither enjoys repose seems not."— "But what is never in the same the one, as it seems, is neither nor is at rest."— "No, it cannot."— "Therefore certainly does appear not." at rest nor in motion."— "It thing or itself; nor, again, "Furthermore, it won't be the same as another thing."— "Why is that?"— "If it could it be different from itself or another different from one, and would were different from itself, it would surely be "On the other hand, if it were the same as another, "True." not be one." be and not itself. So in this way, too, it would not it would be that thing, - but would be different from one."— Yes, you re just what it is - one the same as another or different from quite right."— "Therefore, it won't be

location or

^

—

—

itself."— "No,

it

won't."

. .

.

as it is one; tor it 1 "And it won't be different from another, as long something, but proper to differentnot proper to one to be different from from-another alone, and to nothing else."-"That's No indeed. think it will? won't be different by being one. Or do you and it it it will not be so by itself; "Yet if it isn't different by being one, be so. And if it is itself in no way different, isn't so by itself, it will not itself That s right. nothing. it will be different from not?"— "The nature of the "Nor will it be the same as itself."— "Why

—

not

same."-"Why?"-"Because it is not, of course, also that of the comes to be the same as something, the case that, whenever a thing

one

is

it

374 Parmenides

comes to be one/'— "But why?"-"If it comes to be the same as the many, it must come to be many, not one."— 'True."— "But if the one and the same in no way differ, whenever something came to be the same, it would always come to be one; and whenever it came to be one, it would always

e

come same

be the same."— "Certainly."— "Therefore, if the one is to be the as itself, it won't be one with itself; and thus it will be one and not one. But this surely is impossible. Therefore the one can't be either different from another or the same as itself."— "It can't."— "Thus the one could neither be different from nor the same as itself or another." "Yes you're J to

—

'

quite right."

Furthermore, it will be neither like nor unlike anything, either her h y ? "-' BeCaUSe whatever has a property

;Ty

?r‘ ike. 140

the

Yes.

"But

it

was shown

that the

same

is

same

separate in

itself is

its

or

surely

nature

from the one."— "Yes, it was."— "But if the one has any apart m be 8 ° ne U W ° Uld be m ° re than one; and that is property impossible."— T Yes —"Therefore, the one can in no way have a property the same as Bnother or itself."— "Apparently not."— "So it cannot be like another or itself either." "It seems not." "Nor does the one have the property of being different; for in this way

y

'

,

—

too

it

would be more than one."— "Yes,

would be more."— "Surely that from itself or another would be unlike itself or another, if in fact what has a property the same is like." "That's right. But the one, as it seems, since it in no way has a property different which has

b

is

m no

a property different

way

unlike

it

—

or another thing."— "Yes, you're quite right."— Theretore the one could be neither like nor unlike another or itself "

c

d

itself

"Apparently not." Furthermore, being like that, it will be neither equal nor unequal to itself or another."— "How?"— "If it is equal, it will be of the same measures as that to which it is equal."— "Yes."— "But surely if it is greater or less, it will, in the case of things with which it is commensurate, have more measures than those that are less, and fewer than those that are greater." Y S And in the case of things with which is not commensurate, it n u will be~r of smaller measures in the one case, and of larger measures in the othen -"N° doubt."-"Well, if a thing doesn't partake of the same, it can t be or the same measures or of the same anything else at all, can it?" It can t. So it couldn't be equal to itself or another, if it is not of the same measures."— "It certainly appears not."— "Yet if it is, on the other hand, of more measures or fewer, it would have as many parts as measures; and thus, again, it will be no longer one, but just as many as are its measures. "That's right."— "And if it were of one measure, it would prove to be equal to its measure; but it was shown that it couldn't be equal to anything." "Yes, it was."-"Therefore, since it doesn't partake of one measure or many or few, and since it doesn't partake of the same at all it will, as it seems, never be equal to itself or another; nor again will it be greater or less than itself or another."— "That's absolutely so." "What about this? Do you think that the one can be than, or the

same age

as,

older or younger anything?"— "Yes, why not?"— "Because if it is

3 75

Parmenides

partake of likeness and of as itself or another, it will surely equality - we said the one has equality of time, of which - likeness and also said that it does not no share." "Yes, we did say that." "And we

the

same age

—

—

"Of course."— "Then, being like partake of unlikeness and inequality."— or younger than, or the same age as, that, how will it be able to be older " "Therefore, the one could not be younger or "In no way." anything 7 another /'-''Apparently not." older than, or the same age as, itself or be in time at all, could it. "So if it is like that, the one could not even come to be is in time, that it always

—

—

Or

isn't

it

necessary,

if

something

the older always older than a older than itself?"— "Necessarily."— "Isn't comes to be older than younger?"— "To be sure."— "Therefore, that which

younger than itself, if in fact it is to "What do you mean, have something it comes to be older than."— different from a thing mean this: there is no need for a thing to come to be already be different from what is that is already different; it must, rather, from what has come to be already different, have come to be different from what is going to be different; different, and be going to be different to be, or be different from what but it must not have come to be, be going and nothing else. comes to be different: it must come to be different, is a difference from younger "Yes that's necessary."— "But surely older that which comes to be older and from nothing else "-"Yes, it is."-"So than itself. must also, at the same time, come to be younger itself

comes

to be, at the

same

time,

than itself to be for more or less time "So it seems."— "But it must also not come have come to be and be going than itself; it must come to be and be and "Yes, that too is necessary ."-"Therefore to be for a time equal to itself."— partakes of that each thing that is in time and it is necessary, as it seems, same time, come to be both older time be the same age as itself and, at the way."-"But the one surely had and younger than itself."— "It looks that didn't."-"Therefore, it has no share of share of any of that."— "No, it

no

proves. any time."— "It certainly isn't, as the argument 'was coming "Now don't you think that 'was' and 'has come to be' and past?"— "By all means."— "And again that to be' signify partaking of time 'will be coming to be' signify partaking 'will be' and 'will come to be' and that 'is' and 'comes to be' signify parof time hereafter?"— "Yes."— "And course."-"Therefore, if the one partaktag of time now present?"-"Of that it has at one time come to be, takes of no time at all, it is not the case comes to be, or is; or was coming to be, or was; or has now come to be, to be, or will be."— "Very true. will hereafter come to be, will be coming ft one of those ways. "Could something partake of being except in It seems "Therefore the one in no way partakes of being. couldn't." Therefore "Apparently not." no t " "Therefore the one in no way is." because it would then, by being neither is it in such a way as to be one, one neither is one nor is, and partaking of being, be. But, as it seems, the that way. to trust this argument."— "It looks

time nor

is it in

—

if

—

—

we

are obliged

"If

something

is

— "How

not, could

anything belong

'

to this

thing that

is

not, or

to it, nor could it?"— "Therefore, no name belongs perception or opinion of it.' there an account or any knowledge or

be

of it?"

is

Parmenides

Apparently not."

"Therefore

not

named

or spoken of, nor is it the knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it." seems not."— "Is it possible that these things are so for the one 7 " "I it is

object of opinion or "It

certainly don't think so." b

c

"Do you want to return to the hypothesis from the beginning, in the hope that another kind of result may come to light as we go back over it? I do indeed." "If one is, we are saying, aren't we, that we must agree on the consequences for it, whatever they happen to be?" "Yes." "Consider from the beginning: if one is, can it be, but not partake of being?"— "It cannot."— "So there would also be the being of the one, and that is not the same as the one. For if it were, it couldn't be the being of the one, nor could the one partake of it. On the contrary, saying that one is would be like saying that one is one. But this time that is not the hypothesis, namely, what the consequences must be, if one is one, but if one is. Isn't that so?"— "Of course."— "Is that because 'is' signified somet mg other than one ?" "Necessarily." "So whenever someone, being brief, says 'one is,' would this simply mean that the one r partakes of be-

—

ing?"— "Certainly." Let

again say what the consequences will be, if one is Consider whether this hypothesis must not signify that the one is such as to have s

parts."-"How so?"— "In this way: if we state the 'is' of the one that is and the 'one' of that which is one, and if being and oneness are not the same, but both belong to that same thing that we hypothesized, namely, t e one that is, must it not itself, since it is one being, be a whole, and the parts of this whole be oneness and being?"— "Necessarily."— "Shall we call each of these two parts a part only, or must the part be called part of the whole?" "Of the whole."-"Therefore whatever is one both is a whole and has a part." "Certainly." "Now, what about each of these two parts of the one that is, oneness and being? Is oneness ever absent from the being part or being from the oneness part?"— "That couldn't be."— "So again, each of the two parts possesses oneness and being; and the part, in its turn, is composed of at least two parts; and in this way always, for the same reason, whatever part turns up always possesses these two parts, since oneness always possesses being and being always possesses oneness. So, since it always proves to be two, it must never be one."— "Absolutely."— "So, in this way,

—

—

wouldn't the one that is be unlimited in multitude?" "So it seems." "Come, let's proceed further in the following way."— "How?"— "Do we say that the one partakes of being, and hence is?"— "Yes."— "And for this reason the one that is was shown to be many."— "Just so."— "And what about the one itself, which we say partakes of being? If we grasp it in thought alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, will it appear to be only one, or will this same thing also appear to be many?" ne, I should think."— "Let's see. Must not its being be something and it itself something different, if in fact the one is not being but, as one,

377 Parmenides

and the if being is something partakes of being?"— "Necessarily."— "So being one that the one is different one is something different, it is not by its n being is other than the one. from being, nor by its being being that each other by difference and otherthe contrary, they are different from or is not the same as oneness ness "_"Of course."— "And so difference being/

—

'

Obviously

not.

.

difference, or being and "Now, if we select from them, say, being and we not in each selection choose a oneness, or oneness and difference, do 'both'?"-"How so?"-' As foltowswe certain pair that is correctly called That again, we can say one can say 'being'?"-"We can."-" And, "

— "So

00 about when t

hasn't each of the pair been mentioned.

—

.

Yes.

^

Wh.

been mentioned. say 'being and oneness'? Haven't both difference' or difference and one"Certainly "—"And if I say 'being and "Yes."-"Can things I speak of both?" ness,' andso on - in each case don't It They cannot. both, but not two? that are correctly called 'both' be for each member of the pair not to there are two things, is there any way pair taken together " "Not at all." "Therefore, since in fact each be one 7 be one."-"Apparently."-"And turns out to be two, each member would I

r—

—

added to any couple, doesn each of them is one, when any one is "Yes."— "And isn't three odd, and two the total prove to be three?"—

if

even?"

— "Doubtless.

.

not also be twice, and "What about this? Since there are two, must there three is fact two is two times one and since there are three, thrice, if in "Since there are two and twice, must three times one?"— "Necessarily."— must since there are three and thrice, there not be two times two? And "Doubtless."— "And again: if there are there not be three times three?"— there are two and they are three times, three and they are two times, and if times two?"— "There “rtamly must there not be two times three and three odd times odd, o " "Therefore, there would be even times even, nlll ,t so."-"Then if that is so, do times even, and even times odd."-"That's not be?"— ha no way at a you think there is any number that need Bu Necessarily. number. "Therefore, if one is, there must also be would be many, and an unlimited multitude ot if there is number, there e in multitude, also prove to parta beings Or doesn't number, unlimited "So if all number partakes of being, each of being?"— "It certainly does."— Yes. of it? part of number would also partake things, which are many, and is it "So has being been distributed to all the smallest nor the largest. Or missing from none of the beings, neither being be missing to ask that question? How could is it unreasonable even "So being is chopped up into from any of the beings?"— "In no way."— the largest possible, and is the beings of all kinds, from the smallest to Quite are countless. most divided thing of all; and the parts of being lne most ot things. ."—"Therefore its parts are the most numerous •

—

—

-

so

numerous indeed."

,

7„

not one part. "Now is there any of them that is part of being, yet that if in fact it "How could that happen?"-"! take it, on the contrary,

is.

— Parmenides

must alwa Y as long as lNecessarily."— "So oneness s/

be some one thing; it cannot be nothing." is attached to every part of being and is not

it is,

absent from a smaller or a larger, or any other, part." being one, is it, as a whole, in many places at

d

the

— "Just so."

same time? Look

"So at this

am - and I see that it's impossible."— "Therefore as divided, if fact not as a whole; for surely it will be present to all the parts of being at the same time only as divided."-"Yes."-"Furthermore, a divided thing certainly must be as numerous as its parts." "Necessarily." "So we were not speaking truly just now, when we said that being had been carefully."— "I

m

—

distributed into the most numerous parts. It is not distributed into more parts than oneness, but, as it seems, into parts equal to oneness, since neither is being absent from oneness, nor is oneness absent from being. On the contrary, being two, they are always equal throughout all things." ''It appears absolutely so."— "Therefore, the one itself, chopped up by being, is many and unlimited in multitude."

— "Apparently." "So only the case that the one being many, but also the one completely distributed by being, must be many." — "Absolutely." is

145

it

is

not

itself,

"Furthermore, because the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as the whole, would be limited. Or aren't the parts contained by the whole?"— "Necessarily."— "But surely that which contains would be a limit."— Doubtless."— "So the one that is is surely both one and many, a whole and parts, and limited and unlimited in multitude."— "Apparently." So, since in fact

it

is

limited, does

not also have extremities?" 'And again: if it is a whole, would it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can anything be a whole without those three? And if any one of them is missing from something, will it still consent to be a whole?" "It won't."-"The one, as it seems, would indeed have a beginning, an end, and a middle."— "It would."— "But the middle is equidistant from the extremities - otherwise, it wouldn't be a middle." "No, it wouldn't."— "Since the one is like that, it would it

Necessarily.

b

partake of some seems, either straight or round, or some shape mixed from both. Yes, it would partake of a shape." Since it is so, won't it be both in itself and in another?" "How so?" Each of the parts is surely in the whole, and none outside the whole." Just so. And are all the parts contained by the whole?" "Yes "

shape, as

it

—

—

c

"Furthermore the one is all the parts of itself, and not any more or less than all. No, it isn't." "The one is also the whole, is it not?" "Doubtess. So if all its parts are actually in a whole, and the one is both all the parts and the whole itself, and all the parts are contained by the whole, the one would be contained by the one; and thus the one itself would then, be in itself." "Apparently." Vet on the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, either in

—

—

—

—

d

'

some

all

one. For

“Y it

were not s

all

.

in

em

In

if it

were

some

one,

in all, it

would

also

have

to

certainly could not be in

aU ' but the whol e

no way."— "Nor

it

is it

is

in

or in

be in one, because

And

if

one is it, how will the whole still be in some of the parts: for if the whole were

not in

all.

if

this

379

Parmenides

Yes, impossible. some, the greater would be in the less, which is "But if the whole is not in some or one or all the parts, must impossible." or be nowhere at all?"— "Necessarily."— it not be in something different but since it is a whole, and is "If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; "Certainly."— "So the not in itself, it must be in another. Isn't that so?"— insofar as it is all the parts, one, insofar as it is a whole, is in another; but one must be both in itself and in a different it is in itself. And thus the

—

in

thing."

— "Necessarily."

motion and the one's natural state, must it not be both in if in fact it is in itself. For being at rest?"— "How?"— "It is surely at rest, would be in the same thing, in one thing and not stirring from that, it in the same namely, itself."— "Yes, it is."— "And that which is always "What about "Certainly." thing must, of course, always be at rest." different thing be, on the contrary, this? Must not that which is always in a thing, also not never in the same thing? And since it is never in the same "Just so."— "Therefore the one, at rest? And since not at rest, in motion?"— different thing, must always since it is itself always both in itself and in a "Since that

is

—

be both in motion and at rest."— "Apparently." from "Furthermore, it must be the same as itself and different

and

likewise, the

same

as

and

different

from the others,

if

m

fact

itself,

has

it

"Everything is surely related to the aforesaid properties."— "How so?"— or, if it is not the everything as follows: either it is the same or different; as whole to same or different, it would be related as part to whole or

part."— "Apparently." "Is the one itself part of

— "In no way."

,

.

.

So neither could it be itself?" itself, because then it would be a a whole in relation to itself as part of "But is the one different part in relation to itself."— "No, it could not."— from itself."— from one?"— "No indeed."— "So it couldn't be different "So if it is neither different nor whole nor part in relation "Certainly not."

—

not then be the same as itself?"— "Necessarily." from "What about this? Must not that which is in something different itself - be different from itself, itself - the self that is in the same thing as "It seems so to me. is also to be in something different?"

to itself,

must

it

—

if

in fact

—

it

in one was shown to be so, since it is, at the same time, both one, it was."— "So in this way the itself and in a different thing."— "Yes, "So it seems." as it seems, would be different from itself."— from "Now, if anything is different from something, won't it be different things that something that is different?"— "Necessarily."— "Aren't all the from the things not-one?"— are not-one different from the one, and the one "Therefore the one would be different from the oth"Doubtless."

"In fact the

—

ers."

— "Different."

and the different opposite to each "Then will the same ever consent to be in the "Doubtless." other 7 " won't."— "So if the different different, or the different in the same?"— "It for any is no being that the different is m is never to be in the same, there whatsoever, for that time the time; for if it were in anything for any time "Consider

this: aren't

the

—

same

itself

— 380

Parmenides

would be

different

in the same. Isn't that

so?"— "Just so."— "But

—

since

it

never in the same, the different would never be in any being." "True."— "So the different wouldn't be in the things not-one or in the one." "Yes, you're quite right."— "So not by the different would the one be different from the things not-one or they different from it."— "No, it wouldn't."— 'Nor by themselves would they be different from each other, if they don't partake of the different."— "Obviously not."— "But if they aren't different by themselves or by the different, wouldn't they in fact entirely avoid being different from each other?"— "They would."— "But neither do the things not-one partake of the one; otherwise they would not be not-one, but somehow one." "True." "So the things not-one could not be a number either; for in that case, too, they would not be absolutely not-one, since they would at least have number." "Yes, you're quite right."— "And is

—

—

—

—

again, are the things not-one parts of the one? Or would the things notone in that case, too, partake of the one?"— "They would."— "So if it is in

every

way

and they are

every way not-one, the one would be neither a part of the things not-one nor a whole with them as parts; and, in turn, the things not-one would be neither parts of the one nor wholes in relation to the one as part."— "No, they wouldn't."— "But in fact we said that things that are neither parts nor wholes nor different from each other will be the same as each other."— "Yes, we did."— "So are we to say one,

that the one, since

in

so related to the things not-one, is the same as they are?"— "Let's say so."— "Therefore the one, as it seems, is both different from the others and itself, and the same as the others and itself."— "It it is

certainly looks that

"Would

way from our argument."

the one then also be both like

and unlike itself and the others?" At any rate, since it was shown to be different from the others, the others would surely also be different from it."— "To be sure."— "Wouldn't it be different from the others just as they are different from it, and neither more nor less? "Yes, why not?" "So if neither more nor Perhaps.

less, in like

— — — "Yes." — "Accordingly, insofar as degree."

has the property from the others and they, likewise, have the property of being different from it, in this way the one would have a property the same as the others, and they would have a property the same as it." it

of being different

"What do you mean?" "As follows: don't you apply to something each name you use?" "I do." "Now, could you use the same name either more than once or once?"— "I could."— "So if you use it once, do you call by name that thing whose name it is, but not that thing, if you use it many times? Or whether you utter the same name once or many times, do you quite necessarily always also speak of the same thing?"— "To be sure."— "Now 'different'

—

— "Certainly." — "So when you utter whether once or many times, you don't apply to another — "Necesthing or name something other than that thing whose name in particular

is

a

name

for

something,

isn't it?"

it,

it

it

sarily."— "Whenever 'the

one

is

we

is."

say 'the others are different from the one' and different from the others,' although we use 'different' twice,

381

Parmenides

another nature, but always to that nature whose name the one is different from the others, it i s "_"Of course."— "So insofar as and the others from the one, on the basis of having the property difference but the same as the others. itself, the one would have a property not other,

we

don't apply

And

that

it

to

which has

same

a property the

is

surely

like, isn't it?"

"Yes.

from the "Indeed, insofar as the one has the property of being different like them all, others, owing to that property itself it would be altogether "So it seems." because it is altogether different from them all."

— — "Yes."— opposite to the unlike." "Yet, on the other hand, the — "That too." "But "Isn't the different also opposite to the same?" like is

this

was shown as well: "And being was."

—

that the

the

one

same

is

the

same

as the others.

Yes,

it

the property opposite to Insofar as the one is "Certainly. "So insofar as it is the same, "Yes."

as the others

— —

is

being different from the others." different, it was shown to be like." property opposite to that which makes it it will be unlike, owing to the "So the same will "Yes." like. And surely the different made it like?" So it make it unlike; otherwise it won't be opposite to the different. - insofar "Therefore the one will be like and unlike the others seems." unlike."— "Yes, it admits as it is different, like, and insofar as it is the same, of this

argument

too, as

it

— —

—

seems."

"Insofar as it has also admits of the following."— "What is that?"— not of another kind, and if a property the same, it has a property that is another kind, it is not unlike, and if not it has a property that is not of it has a property unlike, it is like. But insofar as it has a property other, that is of another kind, it that is of another kind; and if it has a property "It

is

unlike."

"That's true."

— "So because the one

same as the others on both grounds and either, it would be both is

the

and because it is different, like and unlike the others."— "Certainly." Since in the same way, it will be like and unlike itself as well. itself and the same as itself, fact it was shown to be both different from unlike on both grounds and either, won't it be shown to be both like and itself?"

— "Necessarily."

Consider the question whether the one touches well."— "Surely the one or does not touch itself and the others."— "Very one was shown to be in itself as a whole."— "That's right."— "Isn't the

"And what about

also in the others?"

this?

— "Yes." — "Then insofar as

it is

in the others,

it

would

from touching touch the others; but insofar as it is in itself, it would be kept Thus Apparently. the others, and being in itself, would touch itself." would." the one would touch itself and the others."— "It "And again, in this way: must not everything that is to touch something occupying the position adjacent to that lie next to that which it is to touch, one, if it is occupied by what it touches?"— "Necessarily."— "So, too, the place next touch itself, must lie directly adjacent to itself, occupying a to

which it itself is."— "Yes, it must."— "Now if the one were two same time; but could do that and turn out to be in two places at the

to that in it

won't

it

refuse as long as

it is

one?"— "Yes,

you're quite right."— "So the

— 382

Parmenides

same

necessity that keeps the one from being

itself."

— "The same."

But

won

two keeps

—

it

from touching

—

touch the others either." "Why?" "Because, we say, that which is to touch must, while being separate, be next to what it is to touch, and there must be no third thing between them."— "True."— "So there must be at least two things if there is to be contact." "There must." But if to the two items a third is added in a row, they themselves will be three, their contacts two."— "Yes."— "And thus whenever one item is added, one contact is also added, and it follows that the contacts are always fewer by one than the multitude of the numbers. For in regard to the number being greater than the contacts, every later number exceeds all the contacts by an amount equal to that by which the first two exceeded it

t

—

b

c

their contacts, since thereafter

one

added

number and, at the same time, one contact to the contacts."— "That's right."— "So however many the things are in number, the contacts are always fewer than they are is

to the

by

one -"— "True."— "But if there is only one, and not two, there could not be contact."— "Obviously not."— "Certainly the things other than the one, we say, are not one and do not partake of it, if in fact they are other." "No, they don't."— "So number is not in the others, if one is not in them."— Obviously not." "So the others are neither one nor two, nor do they have a name of any other number."— "No."— "So the one alone is one, and there could not be two." "Apparently not." "So there is no contact, since there aren't two items."— "There isn't."— "Therefore, the one doesn't touch the others nor do the others touch the one, since in fact there is no

—

d

—

contact."

e

—

"Yes, you're quite right."

— "Thus,

sum

up, the one both touches and does not touch the others and itself."— "So it seems." "Is it then both equal and unequal to itself and the others?"— "How so? " "If the one were greater or less than the others, or they in turn to

—

greater or less than

they wouldn't be in any way greater or less than each other by the one being one and the others being other than one that is, by their own being - would they? But if they each had equality in addition to their own being, they would be equal to each other. And if it,

had largeness and the one had smallness, or vice versa, whichever form had largeness attached would be greater, and whichever had the others

smallness attached would be less?"

"Then

150

— "Necessarily."

two forms, largeness and smallness? For certainly, if there weren't, they couldn't be opposite to each other and couldn't occur in things that are."— "No. How could they?"— "So if smallness occurs in the one, it would be either in the whole of it or in part of it." "Necessarily-"— "What if it were to occur in the whole? Wouldn't it be in the one either by being stretched equally throughout the whole of it, or by containing it?" "Quite clearly." "Wouldn't smallness, then, if it were in the aren't there these

—

—

one equally throughout, be equal to it, but if it contained the one, be larger?" "Doubtless." "So can smallness be equal to or larger than something, and do the jobs of largeness and equality, but not its own?" "It

—

b

—

—

383

Parmenides can't." is

— "So smallness could not be

would be in a Otherwise, it will do exactly

in the one,

part.

one as a whole; but if in fact it part."— "Yes."— "But, again, not in all the

it

in the

the

same thing

as

it

did in relation to

is in."— will be equal to or larger than whatever part it since it "Necessarily."— "Therefore smallness will never be in any being,

the whole:

it

be small except occurs neither in a part nor in a whole. Nor will anything smallness itself."— "It seems not." something else, "So largeness won't be in the one either. For if it were, namely, that apart from largeness itself, would be larger than something, small which the largeness is in - and that too, although there is for it no But this is impossible, thing, which it must exceed, if in fact it is large. "True." since smallness is nowhere in anything." smallness "But largeness itself is not greater than anything other than other than largeness itself."— itself, nor is smallness less than anything "So the others aren t greater than the one, nor are they they aren't. smallness. Nor do these two less, because they have neither largeness nor one, their themselves - largeness and smallness - have, in relation to the relation power of exceeding and being exceeded; they have it, rather, in Nor could the one, in its turn, be greater or less than these two

—

—

to

each other.

It certainly has neither largeness nor smallness. than the others, appears not."— "Slaa^t^ ''sLahcTsT^ver them with his mending tools, asking, "What is it you human beings really want from each other?" And suppose they're perplexed, and he asks them again: "Is this your heart's desire, then for the two of you to become parts of the same whole, as near as can be, and never to separate, day or night? Because if that's your desire, I'd like to weld you together and join you into something that is naturally whole, so that the two of you are made into one. Then the two of you would share one life, as long as you lived, because you would be one being, and by the same token, when you died, you would be one and not two in Hades, having died a single death. Look at your love, and see if this is what you desire: wouldn't this be all good fortune you could want?" Surely you can see that no one who received such an offer would turn it down; no one would find anything else that he wanted. Instead, everyone would think he'd found out at last what he had always wanted: to come together and melt together with the one he loves, so that one person lesbians

come from

this class.

— —

—

i;z

—

17. Cf.

Odyssey viii.266

ff.

^ /D

Symposium

emerged from two.

Why should

be so? It's because, as I said, we used be complete wholes in our original nature, and now "Love is the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire to be complete. this

to

"

Long ago we were united, as I said; but now the god has divided us as punishment for the wrong we did him, just as the Spartans divided the Arcadians. So there s a danger that if we don't keep order before the gods, we 11 be split in two again, and then we'll be walking around in the condition of people carved on gravestones in bas-relief, sawn apart between

We

the nostrils, like half dice. should encourage all men, therefore, to treat the gods with all due reverence, so that we may escape this fate and find wholeness instead. And we will, if Love is our guide and our commander. Let no one work against him. Whoever opposes Love is hateful to the gods, but if we become friends of the god and cease to quarrel with him, then we shall find the young men that are meant for us and win their love, as very few men do nowadays.

Now don't get ideas,

Eryximachus, and turn this speech into a comedy. Don't think I'm pointing this at Pausanias and Agathon. Probably, they both do belong to the group that are entirely masculine in nature. But I am speaking about everyone, men and women alike, and I say there's just one way for the human race to flourish: we must bring love to its perfect

conclusion,

and each

of us

must win the favors

of his very

own young

man, so

that he can recover his original nature. If that is the ideal, then, of course, the nearest approach to it is best in present circumstances,

and win the favor of young men who are naturally sympathetic to us. If we are to give due praise to the god who can give us this blessing, then, we must praise Love. Love does the best that can be done for the time being: he draws us towards what belongs to us. But for the future, Love promises the greatest hope of all: if we treat the godsl with due reverence, he will restore to us our original nature, and by healing us, he will make us blessed and happy. that

is

to

That,

he said,

is

my

speech about Love, Eryximachus.

It is

rather

from yours. As I begged you earlier, don't make a comedy of it. I d prefer to hear what all the others will say or, rather, what each of them will say, since Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left." "I found your speech delightful," said Eryximachus, "so I'll do as you say. Really, we've had such a rich feast of speeches on Love, that if I couldn t vouch for the fact that Socrates and Agathon are masters of the art of love. I'd be afraid that they'd have nothing left to say. But as it is, I have no fears on this score." Then Socrates said. That s because you did beautifully in the contest, Eryximachus. But if you ever get in my position, or rather the position I'll different

—

Arcadia included the city of Mantinea, which opposed Sparta, and was rewarded by having its population divided and dispersed in 385 b.c. Aristophanes seems to be referring anachronistically to those events; such anachronisms are not uncommon in 18

.

Plato.

— Symposium

477

be in after Agathon's spoken so well, then you'll really be afraid. You'll be at your wit's end, as I am now." "You're trying to bewitch me, Socrates," said Agathon, "by making me think the audience expects great things of my speech, so I'll get flustered." "Agathon!" said Socrates, "How forgetful do you think I am? I saw how brave and dignified you were when you walked right up to the theater platform along with the actors and looked straight out at that enormous audience. You were about to put your own writing on display, and you weren't the least bit panicked. After seeing that, how could I expect you to be flustered by us, when we are so few?" "Why, Socrates," said Agathon. "You must think I have nothing buf theater audiences on my mind! So you suppose I don't realize that, if you're intelligent, you find a few sensible men much more frighteni than a senseless crowd?" "No," he said, "It wouldn't be very handsome of me to think you crud in any way, Agathon. I'm sure that if you ever run into people you consider wise, you'll pay more attention to them than to ordinary people. But you can't suppose we're in that class; we were at the theater too, you know, part of the ordinary crowd. Still, if you did run into any wise men, other than yourself, you'd certainly be ashamed at the thought of doing anything ugly in front of them. Is that what you mean?" 'That's true," he said. "On the other hand, you wouldn't be ashamed to do something ugly in front of ordinary people. Is that it?" ....

—— —

At th^poiTrfThn^ my friend, if you answer Socrates, he'll no longer care whether we get anywhere with what we're doing here, sculong as he has a partner for discussion. Especially if he>^ handsome? Now, fi1

,

,

,

.

.

.

Socrates: That's enough. Who would know better. Ion, whether Homer speaks correctly or not in these particular verses— a doctor or a charioteer? Ion:

A

charioteer, of course.

Socrates: Is that because he other reason?

4. Iliad xxiii. 335-40.

is

a

master of that profession, or for some

— 945

Ion

because he's a master of it. Socrates: Then to each profession a god has granted the ability to know we won't a certain function. I mean, the things navigation teaches us learn them from medicine as well, will we? Ion: Of course not. Socrates: And the things medicine teaches us we won't learn from archiIon:

No.

It's

—

tecture.

Ion:

Of course

Socrates:

d

not.

And

so

it

is

mastering one profession first,

that

for every other profession:

we

what we

learn

by

won't learn by mastering another, right? But

answer me this. Do you agree one is different from another?

that there are different professions

Ion: Yes.

how you

determine which ones are different? When I find that the knowledge [involved in one case] deals with different subjects from the knowledge [in another case], then I claim that one is a different profession from the other. Is that what you do? Socrates:

And

is

this

e

Ion: Yes.

some knowledge of the same subjects, then why should we say there are two different professions? Especially when each of them would allow us to know the same subjects! Take these fingers: them I know there are five of them, and you know the same thing about that I do. Now suppose I asked you whether it's the same profession that teaches you and me the same things, or whether it's two arithmetic different ones. Of course you'd say it's the same one. Socrates:

I

mean

if

there

is

—

—

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Then tell me now what I was going to ask you earlier. Do you think it's the same way for every profession the same profession must teach the same subjects, and a different profession, if it is different, must teach not the same subjects, but different ones? Ion: That's how I think it is, Socrates. Socrates: Then a person who has not mastered a given profession will not be able to be a good judge of the things which belong to that profession, whether they are things said or things done.

538

—

b

Ion: That's true.

Socrates: Then who will know better whether or not Homer speaks beautifully and well in the lines you quoted? You, or a charioteer? Ion:

A

charioteer.

Socrates: That's because you're a rhapsode, of course, and not a charioteer.

Ion: Yes.

Socrates:

And

the rhapsode's profession

If it's

different, then its

is

different

from the chario-

teer's.

Ion: Yes.

Socrates:

knowledge

is

of different subjects also.

— 946

Ion

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Then what about the time Homer tells how Hecamede, Nestor's woman, gave barley-medicine to Machaon to drink? He says something like this

Over wine

of

Pramnos she grated

With a brazen grater.

Is

Homer

right or not:

.

.

would

.

And

goat's milk cheese

onion relish for the drink

a fine diagnosis here

5 .

.

.

come from

a doctor's

profession or a rhapsode's?

A

Ion:

doctor's.

Socrates:

And what

about the time

Homer

says:

leaden she plunged to the floor of the sea like a weight That is fixed to a field cow's horn. Given to the hunt It goes among ravenous fish carrying death 6 ,

.

Should we say it's for a fisherman's profession or a rhapsode's whether or not he describes this beautifully and well?

to tell

Ion: That's obvious, Socrates. It's for a fisherman's. Socrates: All right, look. Suppose you were the one asking questions, and you asked me, "Socrates, since you're finding out which passages belong to each of the professions Homer treats— which are the passages that each profession should judge— come tell me this: which are the passages that belong to a diviner and to divination, passages he should be able to judge as to whether they're well or badly composed?"

Look how

can give you a true answer. Often, in the Odyssey he says things what Theoclymenus says— the prophet of the sons of Melampus:

easily

I

,

like

Are you mad? What evil is this that's upon you? Night Has enshrouded your hands, your faces and down to your ,

knees.

Wailing spreads like fire tears wash your cheeks. Ghosts fill the dooryard ghosts fill the hall they rush ,

,

,

To the black gate of hell, they drop below darkness. Sunlight Has died from a sky run over with evil mist 7 .

And

often in the

5. Iliad xi. 639-40 6. Iliad 7.

Iliad,

as in the battle at the wall. There he says:

with 630.

xxiv. 80-82.

Odyssey xx.351-57; line 354

is

omitted by Plato.

,

,

947

Ion

them a bird as they hungered to cross over. An eagle a high-flier circled the army's left With a blood-red serpent carried in its talons a monster There came

to

,

,

c

,

breathing

Alive ,

still

For

struck

it

its

,

it

has not yet forgotten

its

warlust ,

captor on the breast , by the neck;

was writhing back but the eagle shot it groundwards In agony of pain and dropped it in the midst of the throng Then itself with a scream, soared on a breath of the wind? It

,

,

d

,

I

and those examine and judge.

shall say that these passages

They

are for

him

to

like

them belong

to a diviner.

Ion: That's a true answer, Socrates.

—

Socrates: Well, your answers are true, too, Ion. Now you tell me just as I picked out for you, from the Odyssey and the Iliad, passages that belong to a diviner and ones that belong to a doctor and ones that belong to a fisherman in the same way, Ion, since you have more experience with

e

—

Homer's work than I do, you pick out for me the passages that belong to the rhapsode and to his profession, the passages a rhapsode should be able to examine and to judge better than anyone else.

My

answer, Socrates, is "all of them." Socrates: That's not your answer. Ion. Not "all of them." Or are you really so forgetful? But no, it would not befit a rhapsode to be forgetful. Ion: What do you think I'm forgetting? Socrates: Don't you remember you said that a rhapsode's profession is Ion:

different

Ion:

I

from a charioteer's? remember.

Socrates:

know

540

And

didn't

you agree

that because they are different they will

different subjects?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: So a rhapsode's profession, on your view, will not know everything, and neither will a rhapsode. Ion: But things like that are exceptions, Socrates. Socrates: By "things like that" you mean that almost all the subjects of the other professions are exceptions, don't you? But then thing zvill a rhapsode know, if not everything?

what

b

sort of

opinion, anyhow, is that he'll know what it's fitting for a man or a woman to say or for a slave or a freeman, or for a follower or a leader. Socrates: So what should a leader say when he's at sea and his ship is Ion:

hit

My

—

— by a storm — do you mean a rhapsode will know better than a navigator? A

navigator will know that. Socrates: And when he is in charge of a sick man, what should a leader say will a rhapsode know better than a doctor? Ion:

No, no.

—

Ion:

Not

that, either.

8. Iliad xii. 200-207.

c

948

Ion

Socrates: But he

zvill

know what

a slave should say. Is that

what you

mean? Ion: Yes.

Socrates: For example, what should a slave who's a cowherd say to calm down his cattle when they're going wild will a rhapsode know what a cowherd does not? Ion: Certainly not. Socrates: And what a woman who spins yarn should say about working

—

d

with wool? Ion: No.

And what

Socrates.

a

man

should say,

if

he's a general, to

encourage

his troops?

Ion: Yes! That's the sort of thing a

What?

Socrates:

rhapsode

will

know.

rhapsode's profession the same as a general's? Ion: Well, I certainly would know what a general should say. Socrates. Perhaps that s because you're also a general by profession. Ion. I mean, if you were somehow both a horseman and a cithara-player

same

Is a

you would know good riders from bad. But suppose I asked you: Which profession teaches you good horsemanship the one that makes you a horseman, or the one that makes you a cithara-player?" Ion: The horseman. I'd say. Socrates: Then if you also knew good cithara-players from bad, the profession that taught you that would be the one which made you a citharaplayer, not the one that made you a horseman. Wouldn't you agree? at the

time,

—

Ion: Yes.

l

Socrates:

Now,

Ion: One,

I

you know the business of a general, do you know this by being a general or by being a good rhapsode? Ion: I don't think there's any difference, Socrates: What? Are you saying there's no difference? On your view is there one profession for rhapsodes and generals, or two? since

think.

Socrates: So anyone general too.

who

is

a

good rhapsode turns out

to

be a good

Ion: Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates: is

a

It

also follows that

good rhapsode

Socrates: But you a good general too. I

be a good general

don't agree. do agree to this: anyone I

who

is

a

good rhapsode

is

quite agree.

Socrates: Ion:

to

too.

Ion: No. This time

Ion:

anyone who turns out

By

And

far,

aren't

you

the best rhapsode in Greece?

Socrates.

Socrates: Are you also a general. Ion? Are you the best in Greece? Ion: Certainly, Socrates. That, too, I learned from Homer's poetry. Socrates: Then why in heaven's name. Ion, when you're both the best general and the best rhapsode in Greece, do you go around the country

— 949

Ion

giving rhapsodies but not

needs a rhapsode need a general?

who

commanding

is

Do you think Greece really golden crown? And does not

troops?

crowned with

a

c

governed and commanded by you [by Athens]; we don't need a general. Besides, neither your city nor Sparta would choose Ion: Socrates,

me

my

You

good enough for that yourselves. you're superb. Don't you know Apollodorus of Cyzicus?

for a general.

Socrates: Ion, Ion:

city is

What does

he

think you're

do?

who

has often been chosen by Athens to be their general. And Phanosthenes of Andros and Heraclides of Clazomenae they're also foreigners; they've demonstrated that they are worth noticing, and Athens appoints them to be generals or other sorts of officials. And do you think that this city, that makes such appointments, would not select Ion of Ephesus and honor him, if they thought he was worth noticing? Why? Aren't you people from Ephesus Athenians of long standing? And Socrates: He's a foreigner

d

—

e

second to none? But you, Ion, you're doing me wrong, if what you say is true that what enables you to praise Homer is knowledge or mastery of a profession. You assured me that you knew many lovely things about Homer, you promised to give a demonstration; but you're cheating me, you're a long way from giving a demonstration. You aren't even willing to tell me what it is that you're so wonderfully clever about though I've been begging you for ages. isn't

Ephesus

a city that

is

,

Really, you're just like Proteus ,

9

you

twist

up and down and

take

many

you've escaped me altogether by turning yourself into a general, so as to avoid proving how wonderfully wise you are about Homer. If you're really a master of your subject, and if, as I said earlier, you're cheating me of the demonstration you promised about Homer, then you're doing me wrong. But if you're not a master of your subject, if you're possessed by a divine gift from Homer, so that you make many lovely speeches about the poet without knowing anything as I said about you then you're not doing me wrong. So choose, how do you want us to think of you as a man who does wrong, or as someone divine ? Ion: There's a great difference, Socrates. It's much lovelier to be thought divine. Socrates: Then that is how we think of you, Ion, the lovelier way: it's as someone divine, and not as master of a profession, that you are a singer different shapes,

till

finally

542

—

—

of

9.

Homer's

Proteus

wanted

praises.

was

a servant of Posidon.

in order to

He had

the

power

to take

avoid answering questions ( Odyssey iv.385

ff.).

whatever shape he

b

MENEXENUS Menexenus was it

known

also

in antiquity as

once in his Rhetoric under that

oration for the

Funeral Oration; Aristotle

Here Socrates annual ceremony when Athens praised title.

recites to itself

and

cites

Menexenus an its

citizens

fallen in battle for the city. Several such speeches survive , including the celebrated oration of Pericles in Thucydides Book II. Socrates , himself alludes to

this fatuous speech,

Pericles rhetoric

claiming that

its

true author

intellectually accomplished mistress.

teacher— not

that rhetoric ever

author of the speech he

is

about

He

was none other than Aspasia, also claims her as his

was her profession!—and

to recite.

own

in fact as the

Knowing

that the time was at hand for the selection of this year's speaker, Aspasia, in the usual manner of rhetoric teachers in ancient Greece, had her pupil commit to memory her own composition, as a

model of what a funeral orator ought

The rest of the dialogue then occupied with Socrates' recitation. It is usual in Plato for Socrates to disclaim personal responsibility, as here with Aspasia, for his excursions outside philosophy. One could compare espeto say.

is

Cratylus, where he playfully attributes his brilliant etymologizing to instruction and inspiration from Euthyphro (whose expert knowledge about the gods reported in Euthyphro thus included expert knowledge cially

of the

of their names),

and Phaedrus, with

its

meanings

appeal to the magical effects of the

lo-

and to Socrates' retentive recall of others' speeches to explain his unaccustomed oratorical prowess. The reader is plainly to understand that this is being

cale

represented as Socrates' Is

Plato the dialogue

own

speech.

—

author? Aristotle, who cites it twice not indeed naming Plato as author, but in the same way that he often cites Plato's works, as well

known

to the

s

reader—gives powerful testimony

that he

is.

Modern

schol-

doubts have rested in large part on their inability to conceive what purpose Plato could have had in writing it. One purpose could be satirical, to show by exaggeration how trivial an accomplishment these rhetorical tours-dears'

force were; better, since Socrates' speech is in fact a highly skilled oration of the genre intended (with all the overblown praise of Athens and the selective attention to history that that entails), is to think it may shozv (as indeed the Phaedrus claims) how very much better a skilled philosopher is at the composition of speeches than the usual rhetorical 'expert'.

Another ground for doubt

has been found in the fact that Socrates carries his story of the Athenians' prowess down to the so-called Corinthian war of 395-387, whose dead he is

of-

memorializing— long after Socrates' death in 399. But that may only remind us that Plato's, and the ancients', literary conventions are not our own.

ficially

950

951

Menexenus

prominent member of the Socratic circle: he is reported as present for the conversation on Socrates' last day (Phaedo), and he is one of the two young men Socrates questions about friendship in Lysis.

Menexenus was

a

J.M.C.

Menexenus coming from? The market place? Menexenus: Yes, Socrates the Council Chamber, to be exact. Socrates: You at the Council Chamber? Why? I know you fancy that you're finished with your schooling and with philosophy, and intend to turn to higher pursuits. You think you're ready for them now. At your Socrates:

Where

is

—

—

my

prodigy, you're undertaking to govern us older men, so that your family may carry on with its tradition of providing someone to look after us. Menexenus: Socrates, with your permission and approval I'll gladly hold age,

went to the Chamber because I heard that the Council was going to select someone to speak over our war-dead. They are about to see to the public funeral, you know. public office; otherwise

Socrates: Certainly

I

I

won't. Today, however,

do.

Whom

I

did they choose?

Menexenus: Nobody. They put if off until tomorrow. But I think Archinus or Dion will be chosen. Socrates: Indeed, dying in war looks like a splendid fate in many ways, Menexenus. Even if he dies a pauper, a man gets a really magnificent funeral, and even if he was of little account, he gets a eulogy too from the lips of experts, who speak not extempore but in speeches worked up long beforehand. They do their praising so splendidly that they cast a spell over our souls, attributing to each individual man, with the most varied and beautiful verbal embellishments, both praise he merits and praise he does not, extolling the city in every way, and praising the war-dead, all our ancestors before us, and us ourselves, the living. The result is, Menexenus, that I am put into an exalted frame of mind when I am praised by them. Each time, as I listen and fall under their spell, I become a different man I'm convinced that I have become taller and nobler and better looking all of a sudden. It often happens, too, that all of a sudden I inspire greater awe in the friends from other cities who tag along and listen with me every year. For they are affected in their view of me and the rest of the city just as I am: won over by the speaker, they think the city more wonderful than they thought it before. And this high-and-mighty feeling remains with me more than three days. The speaker's words and the sound of his voice sink into my ears with so much resonance that it is only with difficulty that on the third or fourth day I recover myself and realize where I am. Until then I could imagine that I dwell in the Islands of the Blessed. That's how clever our orators are.

—

Translated by Paul Ryan.

952

d

Menexenus

Menexenus: You're forever making fun of the orators, Socrates. This time, though, I don t think that the one who's chosen is going to have an easy time of it; the selection is being made at the last minute, so perhaps the speaker will be forced practically to make his speech up as he goes, Socrates: Nonsense, my good man. Every one of those fellows has speeches ready-made, and, besides, even making up this kind of speech as you go isn't hard. Now if he were obliged to speak well of the Athenians

among

the Peloponnesians or the Peloponnesians among the Athenians, only a good orator could be persuasive and do himself credit; but

when

you're performing before the very people you're praising, being thought to speak well is no great feat. 1

e

Menexenus: You think not, Socrates? Socrates: No, by Zeus, it isn't. Menexenus: Do you think that you could deliver the speech, if that were called for, and the Council were to choose you? Socrates. In fact, Menexenus, there would be nothing surprising in my being able to deliver it. I happen to have no mean teacher of oratory. She is the very woman who has produced— along with a multitude of other good ones— the one outstanding orator among the Greeks, Pericles, son of Xanthippus.

Menexenus: What 36

Socrates: Yes,

I

woman

do— her

is

that? But obviously

you mean Aspasia?

and Connus, son

my

of Metrobius. These are teachers, he of music, she of oratory. Surely it's no surprise if a man with an upbringing like that is skilled in speaking! But even someone less

two

well educated than

I

a

man who learned music from Lamprus and oratory

—

from Antiphon the Rhamnusian even he, despite these disadvantages, could do himself credit praising Athenians among Athenians. Menexenus: And what would you have to say if the speech were to

b

yours

make?

Socrates: On my own, very likely nothing; but just yesterday in my lesson I heard Aspasia declaim a whole funeral oration on these same dead. For she heard that the Athenians, just as you say,

were about to me what the

choose someone to speak. Thereupon she went through for speaker ought to say, in part out of her head, in part by

some

pasting together

and pieces thought up before, at the time when she was composing the funeral oration which Pericles delivered, as, in my opinion, she did. Menexenus: And can you remember what Aspasia said? bits

Socrates:

c

I

think

can. Certainly

was taught

it by the lady herself— and I narrowly escaped a beating every time my memory failed me. Menexenus: So why don't you go ahead and repeat it? I

Socrates: I'm afraid her speech.

1.

Lamprus was

my

I

teacher will be angry with

a respected musician,

me

if I

divulge &

and Thucydides called Antiphon the foremost is that no one could have more accom-

orator in Athens. Socrates' broad ironical point plished teachers than these two.

— 953

Menexenus

Menexenus: Have no fear, Socrates. Speak. I shall be very grateful, whether you're pleased to recite Aspasia's speech or whosever it is. Only speak. Socrates: But perhaps you will laugh at me if I seem to you, old as I am, to go on playing like a child. Menexenus: Not at all, Socrates. In any case, just speak the speech. Socrates: Well, certainly you're a man I'm so bound to gratify that I would even be inclined to do so if you asked me to take off my clothes and dance especially since we are alone. All right, listen. To begin with

—

she spoke,

"As

I

think,

on the dead themselves

for deeds, these

men have

— as follows:

just received at

our hands what they

and with it they are making the inevitable journey, escorted at the outset communally by the city and privately by their families. Now we must render them in words the remaining recognition that the law appoints for them and duty demands. For when deeds have been bravely done, it is through an eloquent speech that remembrance and honor accrue to their doers from the hearers. Clearly, what is required is a speech that will praise the dead as they deserve but also gently admonish the living, urging their sons and brothers to imitate the valor of these men, and consoling their fathers, their mothers and any of their grandparents who deserve

2

,

may remain

alive.

"Well then, what speech on our part would display that effect? Where would it be right for us to begin our praise of brave men, who in their lives gladdened their families and friends through their valor and by their death purchased safety for their survivors? I think it appropriate to present their praises in an order the same as that in which they became brave the order of nature: they became brave by being sons of brave fathers. Let us, therefore, extoll first their noble birth, second their rearing and education. After that, let us put on view the deeds they performed, showing that they were noble and worthy of their birth and upbringing. "The nobility of these men's origin is rooted in that of their ancestors. The latter were not immigrants and did not, by arriving from elsewhere, make these descendants of theirs live as aliens in the land, but made them children of the soil, really dwelling and having their being in their ancestral home, nourished not, as other peoples are, by a stepmother, but by a mother, the land in which they lived. Now they lie in death among the familiar places of her who gave them birth, suckled them, and received

them

as her

way

own. Surely

it is

most

just to celebrate the

men

mother

herself

first;

same time. "Our land is indeed worthy of being praised not merely by us but by all of humanity. There are many reasons for that, but the first and greatest is that she has the good fortune to be dear to the gods. The quarrel of the in this

2.

the noble birth of these

celebrated at the

dead have been exposed to view, mourned, and carried the tomb, where the speech is being delivered.

The remains

procession to

is

of the

in

954

Menexenus

who disputed over her and the verdict that settled it bear witness what we say How could it not be just for all humankind to praise a

gods d

to

3

.

land praised by the gods? The second commendation that is due her is that in the age when the whole earth was causing creatures of all kinds— wild animals and domestic livestock to spring up and thrive, our land showed herself to be barren of savage beasts and pure. Out of all the animals she selected and brought forth the human, the one creature that towers over the others in understanding and alone acknowledges

—

justice

e

and the gods. The fact that everything that gives birth is supplied with the food its offspring needs is weighty testimony for this assertion that the earth hereabouts gave birth to these men's ancestors and ours. For by this sign it can be seen clearly whether or not a woman has really given birth: she is foisting off an infant not her own, if she does not have within her the wellsprings of its nourishment. The earth here, our mother, offers precisely this as sufficient testimony that she has brought forth humans. She first and she alone in that olden time bore food fit for humans, wheat and barley, which are the finest and best nourishment for the human race, because she really was the mother of this creature. And such testimonies are to be taken more seriously on earth's behalf than a woman's, inasmuch as earth does not mimic woman in conceiving and generating, but

woman

b

earth.

She was not miserly with this grain; she dispensed it to others too. Later she brought olive oil to birth for her children, succor against toil. And when she had nourished them and brought them to their youthful prime, she introduced the gods to rule and teach them. They (it is fitting to omit their names on an occasion like this: we know them) equipped us

by instructing us, earlier than other peoples, in arts for meeting our daily needs, and by teaching us how to obtain and use arms for the for living,

defense of the land.

With the birth and education I have described, the ancestors of these men lived under a polity that they had made for themselves, of which it c

is

right to

make

brief mention. For a polity

molds its people; a goodly one molds good men, the opposite bad. Therefore I must show that our ancestors were molded in a goodly polity, thanks to which both they and the present generation— among them these men who have died— are good men. For the polity was the same then and now, an aristocracy; we are now governed by the best men and, in the main, always have been since remote age. One man calls our polity democracy, another some other name that pleases him; in reality, it is government by the best men along with popular consent. We have always had kings; at one time they were that

d

myth Athena and Posidon vied for sovereignty of Athens. On the grounds that Athena's gift of the olive tree was more valuable than the salt-water spring Posidon had 3.

In

made gush

forth

on the Acropolis, the twelve gods appointed by Zeus

dispute awarded the sovereignty to her.

to arbitrate the

Menexenus

955 4

Yet in most respects the people have sovereign power in the city; they grant public offices and power to those who are thought best by them at a given time, and no one is excluded because of weakness or poverty or obscurity of birth, nor is anyone granted honors because of the corresponding advantages, as happens in other cities. There is, rather, one standard: he who is thought wise or good exercises power and holds office. 'The reason we have this polity is our equality in birth. The other hereditary, later elected

.

have been put together from people of diverse origin and unequal condition, so that their polities also are unequal tyrannies and oligarchies. Some of their inhabitants look on the others as slaves, while the latter look on the former as masters. We and our fellows-citizens, all brothers sprung from one mother, do not think it right to be each other's slaves or masters.

e

cities

—

239

Equality of birth in the natural order makes us seek equality of rights in the legal and defer to each other only in the name of reputation for goodness

and wisdom.

—

splendid polity of ours, the fathers of these men our fathers and the men themselves, brought up in complete freedom and well-born as they were, were able to display before all humanity, in both the private and the public spheres, many splendid deeds. They thought that they were obliged to fight on the side of freedom both for Greeks

b

Greece as a whole. My time is too brief to narrate as the matter deserves how they defended their country against Eumolpus and the Amazons and even earlier invaders, or how they defended the Argives against the Cadmeans and the sons of Heracles against the Argives 5 Besides, poets have already hymned the valorous exploits of the ancients in splendid song and made them known to all; so if we should try to elaborate the same subjects in prose, we would perhaps

c

"Because of

this

—

against Greeks

and against barbarians

for

.

finish a clear second.

think

best to pass those deeds

by

for that reason as well as

because they already have a reward worthy of them. But in regard to deeds for which no poet has yet received glory worthy of worthy themes, and which remain in virgin state 6 those I think I ought to mention with praise and "I

it

—

4.

monarchy was abolished at Athens, one of the nine principal administrative called archons, was the "king archon." He was concerned for the most part

After the

officials,

with religious functions.

Eumolpus was defeated at Eleusis by the legendary Athenian king Erechtheus. According to legend, the Amazons, when they invaded Athens, were defeated by Theseus, who also led the Athenians in forcing Thebes, founded by Cadmus, to return the Argive dead after the war of the Seven Against Thebes. The Sons of Heracles were supposed to have been pursued by their father's enemy Eurystheus, who ruled cities in the part of the Peloponnese that is often referred to, somewhat loosely, as Argos. When they took refuge in Athens, he marched against them and was defeated and killed by the Athenians. 5.

6.

Reading en

mnesteia(i) in c4.

956

Menexenus

woo

out of seclusion for others to put into choral odes and poems of other kinds in a manner that befits the men who performed them.

Here are the first among the deeds I mean. When the Persians held dominion over Asia and were trying to enslave Europe, the sons of this land checked them our fathers, whose valor it is both right and necessary to mention first in praise. Clearly one who is to praise it well must contemplate it after he has, in thought, been transported into that time when the whole of Asia was already subject to a third Persian king. Cyrus, the first of them, when by his keen spirit he liberated his fellow citizens, the Persians, enslaved the Medes, their masters, at the same time and became lord over the rest of Asia as far as Egypt; his son over as much of Egypt and Libya

—

as

was

possible to penetrate. Darius, third of the line, with his land forces set the bounds of his sway as far as Scythia, and with his ships gained so much control over the sea and its islands that no one presumed to oppose him. The minds of all humankind were in bondage: so many, such great and warlike, peoples had the realm of Persia enslaved. it

"Now

Darius denounced us and the Eretrians. On the pretext that we had plotted against Sardis he dispatched five hundred thousand men in transport and combat ships, with three hundred ships of war, and ordered Datis, their commander, to come back with the Athenians and Eretrians in tow if he wanted to keep his head on his shoulders. "Datis sailed to Eretria, against men who were the most highly esteemed in warfare of the Greeks of that time and were quite numerous besides. He overpowered them in three days. He also scoured their whole country

keep anyone from escaping. This he accomplished in the following way: his soldiers proceeded to the border of Eretria's territory and posted themselves at intervals from sea to sea; they then joined hands and passed through the entire country, so that they would be able to tell the king that no one had escaped them. "Datis and his force left Eretria and came ashore at Marathon with the to

same

intention, confident that

it

would be easy

for

them

to force the

Athenians under the same yoke as they had the Eretrians and lead them captive too. Even though the first of these operations had been accomplished and the second was underway, none of the Greeks came to aid either the Eretrians or the Athenians except the Lacedaemonians and

—

they arrived on the day after the battle. All the others were panic-stricken and lay low, cherishing their momentary safety. "By being transported into that situation, I say, one might realize just

how

great the valor really

was

of those

men who

withstood the might of the barbarians at Marathon, chastened the arrogance of all Asia, and were first to erect a trophy over the barbarians. They showed the way and 1

7.

I.e.,

as usual in classical Greek, the Persians. Similarly, "king"

below

refers to the

king of Persia. 8.

I.e.,

win

were erected

a battle; trophies, usually consisting of a suit of at battle sites

by the army

still

enemy armor on

a stake,

in possession of the field after the action.

— Menexenus

9 57

taught the rest that Persian power is not invincible and that there is no multitude of men and mass of money that does not give way to valor. I declare that those men were fathers not only of our bodies but of our freedom, ours and that of everyone on this continent. For it was with eyes

on

that

deed

that followed

that the

Greeks dared

e

to risk the battles for their deliverance

— pupils of the men who fought

at

Marathon.

“So the highest rank in honor must be assigned to them by my speech, but the second to the men who fought and won at sea off Salamis and at Artemisium 9 For one could give a lengthy account of those men, too the kind of assaults they withstood on land and sea, and how they fought them off. But I shall mention what I think is their finest achievement: they

241

.

accomplished the successor to the task accomplished at Marathon. The men there showed the Greeks only that a few of them could fight off many barbarians by land; by sea there was still doubt, and the Persians had a reputation for invinciblity because of their numbers, wealth, skill, and strength. This in particular is what merits praise in the men who fought

b

the sea battles of those times: they freed the Greeks from this second terror and made them stop fearing preponderance in ships and men. So it turns

—

out that the other Greeks were educated by both by those who fought at Marathon and those who took part in the naval battle at Salamis: as pupils of the former by land and the latter by sea, they lost their habit of

c

fearing the barbarians.

“And

I

of the exploits for the deliverance of Greece that at Plataea was, maintain, the third, both in number and in valor at last an effort shared

—

by both the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. “So all the men in those battles fought off a very great and formidable danger. They are being eulogized for their valor now by us, and will be eulogized in the future by posterity. Afterwards, though, many Greek

were still subject to the barbarian, and it was reported that the king himself had a new attempt on the Greeks in mind. Therefore, it is right for us to mention those, too, who, by cleansing the sea and driving from it the entire barbarian force, brought to completion what their predecessors had done for our deliverance. These were the men who fought in the naval battle at Eurymedon, those who made the expedition to Cyprus, and those who sailed to Egypt and many other places. They must be mentioned with gratitude, because they instilled fear in the king and forced him to ponder cities

his

own

war

against the barbarians

was endured

to the

end by the

defense of ourselves and our fellow speakers of Greek. But when peace prevailed and the city was held in honor, there came upon her what people generally inflict on the successful: jealousy and through jealousy ill-will. And that involved her, reluctantly, in fighting against Greeks. When war had broken out, the Athenians did battle with the city in

—

9.

e

safety rather than plot the destruction of the Greeks.

“Well, this

whole

d

—

During the second Persian invasion of the Greek mainland, by Darius' son Xerxes

in 480-479.

242

— 958

Menexenns

Lacedaemonians

at

Tanagra for the freedom of the Boeotians, and although

was unclear, the action that followed was decisive. For the Lacedaemonians withdrew and abandoned those whom they had come to aid, but our men were victorious at Oenophyta two days later and justly restored those who were unjustly in exile. They were the first the issue of the battle

after the Persian

War

freedom of Greeks in the new way against Greeks; and since they proved to be brave men and liberated those to whose aid they came, they were the first to be buried in this tomb with to fight for the

civic honors.

when

war 10 had broken out, and all the Greeks attacked our city, ravaged her land, and made sorry recompense for the services she had done them, our countrymen, who had been victorious over them at sea and had captured their Lacedaemonian leaders on Sphacteria, spared the latter, sent them home, and made peace, even though they could have killed them. They thought that against men of their own race it is right to make war as far as victory rather than bring the common interests of Greece “Later,

to ruin

a great

through resentment against one

but against the barbarians it make total war. The men who fought in that war and now lie here deserve praise, because they showed that if anyone maintained that in the former war, the one against the barbarians, any other people were braver than the Athenians, that was not true. By prevailing when Greece was in discord, by getting the better of the foremost among the other Greeks, they showed on this occasion that they could conquer by themselves those with whom they had once conquered the barbarians in a city,

right to

is

common

effort.

“After this peace a third tions

on

and was

terrible.

war broke out— a war

Many

Sicilian shores after they

11

brave

had

men who

set

up

that defied all expecta-

died in

a great

it lie

here.

Many

fell

many

trophies in battles by oaths, they had sailed

freedom of the people of Leontini. Bound to those parts to defend them, but when their city found herself thwarted on account of the length of the voyage and could not reinforce them, they gave out and came to grief. Their enemies, even though they fought on the other side, have more praise for their self-control and valor than have the friends of other men. Many fell, too, in naval battles on the Hellespont, after capturing all the enemy ships in one engagement 12 and coming off for the

,

victorious in

“As

what

for I

many

others.

my saying

mean

is

that the

The reference Archidamian War 11.

is

to the first part (432-421) of the

after a Spartan,

of the Peloponnesian War,

12.

The

and defied

all

expectations,

Greeks arrived at such a pitch of jealous that they brought themselves to send an embassy

i.e.,

Peloponnesian War, called the

Lacedaemonian, king.

This "third war" (counting the Persian

Sicily in

terrible

that the other

rivalry against our city

10.

war was

War as the first) is the second and final part which broke out when the Athenians sent an expedition to

415 and which lasted until 404. battle of Cyzicus, in 410.

Menexenus to their a

959

worst enemy, the king,

common

effort, to

whom

they had as our

him back on

bring

allies

expelled in

own, a barbarian against

their

Greeks, and to muster everyone, Greeks and barbarians, against our city. "And at just that point her strength and valor shone bright. For when her enemies supposed that she was already beaten, and when her ships were blockaded at Mytilene, the citizens themselves embarked and went to the rescue with sixty ships. After they had, as everyone agrees, behaved most heroically in overcoming their enemies and rescuing their friends, they met with undeserved calamity: their dead were not picked up from 13 We ought to remember and praise those men the sea and do not lie here forever, because by their valor we won not only that naval engagement, but also the rest of the war. For it was through them that the opinion gained currency that our city could never be defeated in war, not even by .

was true. We were overcome by our own quarrels, not by other men; by them we remain undefeated to this day, but we conquered ourselves and suffered defeat at our own hands. mankind.

all

And

that belief

"Afterwards, when tranquillity reigned and we were at peace with our neighbors, there was civil war 14 among us, fought in such a way that, if people had to engage in internal strife, no one would pray for his city to be stricken in any other. So readily and naturally so much contrary to the expectations of the other Greeks did the citizens from the Piraeus and those from the city deal with each other! So moderately did they bring

—

—

war "And

the

against the

men

at Eleusis to a conclusion!

was

genuine kinship, which provided them, not in word but in fact, with a firm friendship based on ties of blood. We must also remember those who died at each other's hands in that war and try to reconcile them in ceremonies such as today's by what means we have prayers and sacrifices praying to the gods below who have power over them, since we ourselves are reconciled as well. For they did not lay hands on each other through wickedness or enmity, but through misfortune. And we, the living, are witnesses of this ourselves, since we, who are of the same stock, have forgiven each other for what the sole cause for

all

that

their

—

—

we

did and for what we suffered. "After that we got general peace, and the city enjoyed tranquillity. She forgave the barbarians; she had done them harm, and they gave as good as they got. But the Greeks aroused her indignation, because she recalled the thanks they had returned for the good she had done them by making common cause with the barbarians, stripping her of the ships that had once been their salvation, and dismantling walls once sacrificed by us to

—

13.

Failure to pick

of Arginusae, in 406, 14.

and rescue the wounded from the sea after the battle caused widespread resentment against the generals in charge.

up

This "civil war"

the dead

was fought

in

403 to restore the Athenian democracy by ousting

the oligarchy of the "Thirty Tyrants,"

who had

seized

power with Spartan help

at the

end of the Peloponnesian War. The conclusion of the civil war, referred to just below, came about through the defeat of the Thirty at Eleusis, where they had retreated.

— 960

Menexenus

keep theirs from falling 15 The city formed a policy of no longer protecting Greeks from being enslaved, either by each other or by barbarians, and conducted herself accordingly. So, since this was our policy, the Lacedaemonians, thinking that we, the champions of freedom, had fallen and all they had to do now was enslave the other Greeks, set about that very task. "And why should I prolong the tale? From here on I wouldn't be speaking of things that happened in the past to former generations. We ourselves know how the foremost among the Greeks the Argives and the Boeotians and Corinthians came, in a state of panic, to feel a need for our city, and wonder of wonders! even the king reached such a point of perplexity that his deliverance came full circle to arising from nowhere other than this city, which he had kept zealously trying to destroy. "In fact, if one should wish to lay a just charge against our city, one would rightly blame her only by saying that she is always too compassionate and solicitous of the underdog. And during this time in particular, she was not able to persevere and stick to the policy she had decided on— namely, to aid against enslavement none of the cities that had treated her people unfairly. On the contrary, she relented, came to the rescue, and released the Greeks from slavery by coming to their aid herself, with the result that they remained free until they once more enslaved themselves. On the other hand out of respect for the trophies at Marathon and Salamis and Plataea she could not stomach aiding the king in person; but merely by allowing exiles and mercenaries to assist him, she was, by common consent, his salvation. And after she had rebuilt her walls and fleet, she took the war upon herself, when she was forced to do so, and fought with the Lacedaemonians in the Parians' behalf. The king came to fear our city, when he saw that the Lacedaemonians were giving up the war at sea. Out of a wish to disengage himself, he demanded, as his price for continuing to fight on our side and that of the other allies, the Greeks on the Asian mainland whom the Lacedaemonians had previously made over to him. lh He did so because he believed that we would refuse and give him an excuse for disengaging. He was mistaken about the other allies; the Corinthians, the Argives, the Boeotians, and the rest were willing to hand them over to him and made a sworn treaty on terms that if he would give them money, they would hand over the Greeks on the mainland. We alone could not bring ourselves to betray them or swear the oath. That is how firm and sound the high-mindedness and liberality of our city are, how much we are naturally inclined to hate the barbarians, through being purely Greek with no barbarian taint. For people .

—

—

5.

—

—

—

In response to Xerxes' invasion, the Athenians

abandoned their city walls to destrucof their ships, which were instrumental in defeating the Persians at Salamis. Now Sparta had exacted the destruction of both walls and ships in the peace terms that ended the Peloponnesian War. 1

tion

and took

to the

"wooden walls"

This probably refers to the terms under which the Spartans brought Persia into the Peloponnesian War against Athens in 412. 16.

Menexenus

who

961

—

by birth but Greeks by law offspring of Pelops, Cadmus, Aegyptus, Danaus and many others do not dwell among us 17 We dwell apart Greeks, not semibarbarians. Consequently, our city is imbued are barbarians

—

—

.

with undiluted hatred of foreignness. "For all that, we found ourselves once again isolated, because we refused to commit a shameful and sacrilegious deed by betraying Greeks to barbarians. So we arrived in the same circumstances that had led to our defeat before, but this time, with divine help, we managed the war better: we disengaged ourselves while still in possession of our ships, walls, and colonies. That is how glad the enemy, too, were to make peace! But we lost brave men in this war also, victims of rough terrain at Corinth and treason at Lechaeum. Brave, too, were those who extricated the king from his difficulties and banished the Lacedaemonians from the sea. I remind you of those men, and it is fitting for you to praise them with me and do

them honor. were the deeds of the men who lie here and of others who have died for Athens. Many fine words have been spoken about them, but those that remain unsaid are a great deal more numerous and finer still; many days and nights would not suffice for one who sets out to complete the enumeration. Therefore we must remember the fallen, and every man, just as in war, must encourage their descendants not to desert the ranks of their ancestors and not to yield to cowardice and fall back. So then, I myself both so encourage you today, sons of brave men, and in the future, whenever I meet any of you, I will remind you and exhort you to do your utmost to be as brave as can be. "On this occasion, though, it is my duty to repeat the words that our

"And

these, in truth,

commanded

us to report to those

home

every time they were about to put their lives at risk, in case they lost them. I will tell you what I heard from them and what judging by what they said then they would gladly say to you now, if only they could. Whatever I report you must imagine you are hearing from them in person. And this is what they said: fathers

left at

—

—

"'Sons, the present circumstance itself reveals that

you

are sprung

from

brave fathers. Free to live on ignobly, we prefer to die nobly rather than subject you and your descendants to reproach and bring disgrace on our fathers and all our ancestors. We consider the life of one who has brought disgrace on his own family no life, and we think that no one, human being or god, is his friend, either on the earth or beneath it after his death. "Therefore, you must remember what we say and do whatever you do to the accompaniment of valor, knowing that without it all possessions and all ways of life are shameful and base. For neither does wealth confer

Many Greek

had adventurers from abroad mixed up in their foundation legends, such as Pelops from Asia Minor at Mycenae, Cadmus from Phoenicia at Thebes, and Aegyptus and Danaus from Egypt and Libya at Argos. 17.

cities

962

Menexenus

on one who possesses

with cowardice (the riches of a man like that belong to another, not himself) nor do bodily beauty and strength, when they reside in a worthless and cowardly man, seem to suit him. On the contrary, they seem out of character; they show up the one who has them for what he is and reveal his cowardice. Moreover, all knowledge cut off from rectitude and the rest of virtue has the look of low cunning, distinction

it

not wisdom.

“Tor these reasons, make it your business from beginning to end to do your absolute utmost always in every way to surpass us and our ancestors in glory. If you do not, be sure that if we excel you in valor, our victory, as we see it, brings us shame, but if we are excelled by you, our defeat brings happiness. And the surest way to bring about our defeat and your victory would be if you would prepare yourselves not to abuse and waste the good repute of your ancestors, because you are aware that for a man with self-respect nothing is more disgraceful than to make himself honored not through himself, but through his ancestors' glory. Honors that come from ancestors are a noble and magnificent treasure for their descendants, but it is shameful and unmanly to enjoy the use of a treasure of wealth and honors and fail to hand it on to the following generation because of a lack of acquisitions and public recognition on one's own part. And if you will live as we advise you to live, you will come to us as friends to friends, when your destiny conveys you here; but if you have neglected our advice and behaved as cowards, no one will welcome you. So ends what is to be reported to our sons. '"And as for those of our fathers and mothers who still live, one ought ceaselessly to encourage them to bear the sorrow, should it fall to their lot, as easily as they can, instead of joining them in lamentations. For they will stand in no need of a stimulus for grief; the misfortune that has befallen them will be enough to provide that. A better course is to try to heal and soothe them, by reminding them that the gods have answered their most earnest prayers. For they prayed for their sons to live not forever, but bravely and gloriously. And that the greatest of boons is what they received. It is not easy for a mortal to have everything in his life turn out

—

as he

would have

—

it.

they bear their sorrows courageously, they will seem to be really fathers of courageous sons and just as courageous themselves; but if they succumb to grief, they will provide grounds for suspicion that either they are not our fathers or the people who praise us are mistaken. Neither of '"If

—

must happen. On the contrary, they above all must be our encomiasts in action, by showing themselves to be true men, with the look of truly being the fathers of true men. Nothing too much has long been thought an excellent adage— because it is, in truth, excellent. For that man's life is best arranged for whom all, or nearly all, the things that promote happiness depend on himself. Such a man does not hang from other men and necessarthese

ily rise

he

is

or

fall in

the brave

fortune as they fare well or badly; he

and wise man. He above

all,

is

the temperate,

when wealth and

children

Menexenus

963

come and when they

go, will

pay heed

because he relies on grieve too much.

to the adage:

himself, he will be seen neither to rejoice nor to

"That is the sort of men we expect our fathers to be, the sort we wish them to be, and the sort we say they are. It is, moreover, how we now comport ourselves neither too much vexed nor too fearful if the time of our death is upon us. And we beg our fathers and mothers to pass the rest of their lives with these same sentiments. We want them to know that they will give us no special pleasure by singing dirges and wailing over us. On the contrary, if there is among the dead any perception of the living, that is how they would most displease us by doing themselves injuries and bearing their sorrows heavily. They would please us most by bearing them lightly and with moderation. By that time our lives will have come to the conclusion that is noblest for human beings, so that it is more fitting to celebrate them than to lament them. But by caring for our wives and children and nourishing them, and by turning their minds to the concerns of the living, they would most readily forget their troubles and live more nobly, more uprightly, and more in harmony with our wishes. "That is enough to report from us to our parents. As for the city we would exhort her to care for our parents and children, educating the latter decently and cherishing the former in their old age as they deserve, if we did not, in fact, know that she will care for them well enough with no exhortation from us/

—

—

—

"Children and parents, the dead commanded me to report those words, and I report them with all my heart. And on my own part, in these men's name I beg their sons to imitate them, and I beg their fathers to be confident about themselves, knowing that we will, as individuals and as a community, cherish you in your old age and care for you, anywhere any one of us comes upon any one of you. No doubt you yourselves are aware of the concern shown by the city: she has made laws relating to the families of men who have died in war, and she takes care of their children and parents. More than in the case of other citizens, it is the official duty of the highest magistracy to see to it that their fathers and mothers are protected from injustice. The city herself assists in bringing up their children, eager to keep their orphaned condition as hidden from them as it can be. She assumes the role of father to them while they are still children. When they attain manhood, she decks each of them out in hoplite's armor and sends him out on his life's business, showing him and reminding him of his father's pursuits, by giving him the tools of his father's valor and, at the same time, allowing him, for the sake of the omen, to go for the 18 first time to his ancestral hearth, there to rule in might, arrayed in arms .

During the festival called the Great Dionysia, before the competition in tragedy which formed part of it, grown sons of men who had been killed in war were presented to the people in the theater, dressed in hoplite armor, and put in charge of their household and property. 18.

964

Menexenus

The dead themselves she never celebrates for

and and

all

publicly the rites

honor: every year she herself that are celebrated for each in private, fails to

in addition she holds contests in athletic prowess and horsemanship in music and poetry of every kind. Quite simply, for the dead she

249c

stands as son and heir, for their sons as a father, for their parents as a guardian; she takes complete and perpetual responsibility for all of them. "With this in mind, you ought to bear your sorrow more patiently; in that way you would best please both the dead and the living and would most easily heal and be healed. And now that you and all the others have, according to the custom, publicly lamented the dead, take your departure."

d

There you have it, Menexenus the speech of Aspasia of Miletus. Menexenus: By Zeus, Socrates, your Aspasia is indeed lucky if, woman though she be, she can compose speeches like that one. Socrates: If you doubt it, come to class with me and hear her speak. Menexenus: I have often talked with Aspasia, and I know what she is

—

like, Socrates.

Socrates: Well then, don't you admire her and aren't you grateful to her for her speech now?

Menexenus: Yes, Socrates, I'm very grateful e

whoever

who

it

recited

was who to

recited

it

—

speech to her or to you. Furthermore, I'm grateful to him

me, for that and

many

for that

other favors besides. Socrates: Very well, but make sure you don't give me away, so that I may report to you many fine, statesmanlike speeches from her in the future. Menexenus: Don't worry. I won't. Just be sure to report them. Socrates: Yes, I'll be sure to. it

CLITOPHON Socrates

is

in Clitophon's

bad books because he has been unable

to satisfy Clito-

phon's thirst for virtue. It was Socrates himself with his rousing exhortations to virtue who stimulated this desire in Clitophon and caused him to enter the ,

,

Socratic milieu in search of the knowledge that he needed next: a philosophical

understanding of virtue itself, especially justice. With Socrates and Socrates' friends, his search always ended in dead ends, and he concluded that the Socratic project

had

to be

pursued at a deeper

level, in

open discussions with

Thrasymachus and anybody else who might help. It comes as quite a surprise to see a Platonic dialogue in which Socrates is the target of attack and fails to have the last word, especially considering that the criticisms he leaves unanswered are delivered by an associate of Thrasymachus, the radical thinker whose views are rejected in Plato's Republic. Even considering the rich variety of the Platonic corpus, Clitophon is an oddity, indeed an enigma. One of the most interesting features of the dialogue is the Socratic exhortation to virtue (407b-408c), a version of the speeches with which Socrates repeatedly harangued his fellow Athenians. The ideas in this exhortation have parallels in Plato's Apology and Euthydemus, the Alcibiades, Aeschines' Alcibiades (fragments), Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates (IV.ii), and other works, including no doubt the lost Exhortation dialogues of Aristippus of Cyrene and Antisthenes of Athens. The rhetoric of Socrates' exhortation in Clitophon is paralleled in Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates (I.v). Although his enthusiasm for

this style of exhortation is rather sarcastically expressed, Clito-

on what comes next, or rather, on what

come next: a properly philosophical understanding of the nature of justice and what it accomplishes. The remarkable thing is that Clitophon argues in the same dia-

phon focuses

his criticism

fails to

way that Socrates does in Plato's Socratic dialogues; Socrates is hoist with his own petard, and Clitophon is the Socratic hero of the piece. But why is Socrates the villain? Does the author align himself with the rhetorical tradition in rejecting the entire Socratic legacy as a dead end? Or is he a spokesman for Plato and his dialectical attempt to establish the Socratic way lectical

of thinking on deeper

and

better foundations than those built

upon by compet-

ing followers of Socrates? Might the author even be Plato himself? All these questions remain open.

Xenophon seems to have read Clitophon; (Memoirs of Socrates I.iv.l) would date it

965

if so,

his reply in Socrates' defense

to the

second quarter of the fourth

966

Clitophon

century

during Plato

b.c.

s lifetime.

The dialogue

is

a carefully contrived

pam-

phlet , not a fragment or a draft.

D.S.H.

Socrates:

We

have recently been informed that Clitophon the son of discussion with Lysias, has been criticizing the conversa-

Aristonymos, in tions and speeches of Socrates, while greatly praising the instruction of

Thrasymachus

1 .

Clitophon: Whoever told you that, Socrates, misrepresented what I said to Lysias about you. Though it's true that I didn't praise you for some things, I did praise you for others. Since you're obviously scolding me right now, though you're pretending you don't care, I'd be very glad to tell you myself what I said especially since we happen to find ourselves alone so you won t so readily suppose that I have anything against you. In fact, you probably didn't hear the truth, which is why I think you're being needlessly hard on me. So 2 if you'd let me speak freely. I'd gladly

—

do so

—

want to tell you what I said. Socrates: By all means; it would be shameful for me not to submit to you when your intention is to help me; for clearly, once I know my good and bad points, I will make it my practice to pursue and develop the I

former while ridding myself of the latter to the extent that I am able. Clitophon: Listen, then. Socrates, when I was associating with you I was often struck with amazement by what you said. You appeared to me to rise above all other men with your magnificent speeches when you reproached mankind and, like a god suspended above the tragic stage, chanted 3 the following refrain:

O

you borne? Do you not realize that you are doing none of the things you should ?! 4 You men spare no pains in procuring wealth for yourselves, but you neither see to it5 that your sons, to whom you are leaving this wealth, should know how to use it justly, nor do you find them teachers of justice (if justice can be taught), nor anybody to exercise and train them adequately (if it is acquired by exercise and training) nor indeed have you started by undergoing such treatment yourselves! mortals, whither are

—

Translated by Francisco 1.

Lysias

of rhetoric

was (

a

J.

Gonzalez.

famous orator

in

Athens ( Phaedrus 227a

Phaedrus 266c), appears in Republic (336b

ff.)

ff.);

Thrasymachus,

in a hostile light.

2.

Reading de instead of de

3.

Accepting the conjecture humnois

4.

Placing a question

5.

Accepting the supplement oute phrontizete after paraddsete in b4.

mark

in a 12. in a8.

after prattontes in b2.

a teacher

967

Clitophon

you and your children have had a thorough education in grammar, gymnastics and the arts which you consider to be a complete education in virtue and that you still have turned out to be no good at using wealth, how can you fail to despise our present education, and seek those who will rescue you from this lack of culture?! Yet it is this dissonance, this carelessness, not dancing the wrong measures to the lyre, that makes measure and harmony disappear between brother and brother, city and city, as they oppose each other, clash and fight, inflicting and suffering the utmost horrors of war. You say that men are unjust because they want to be, not because they are ignorant or uneducated. But then you have the effrontery to say, on the other hand, that injustice is shameful and hateful to the gods. Well, then, how could anyone willingly choose such an evil?! "Perhaps he is defeated by pleasure," you But

when you

see that

—

—

But isn't this defeat involuntary if conquering is voluntary? Thus every way you look at it, the argument shows that injustice is involuntary, and that every man privately and every city publicly must devote to this matter greater care than is presently the say.

norm.

When,

Socrates,

I

hear you say such things time and time again, I'm

and also when you go on to the next point, that those who discipline the body while neglecting the soul are doing something else of the same sort, neglecting that which should rule while busying themselves with that which should be ruled; and also when you say that it's better to leave unused what you don't know how to use: if someone doesn't know how to use his eyes or his ears or his whole body, it would be better for him not to use it all, whether for seeing or hearing or anything else, rather than use it in some haphazard way. In fact, the same applies to skills; for someone who doesn't know

very impressed and

I

praise

you

to the skies;

own lyre will hardly be able to use his neighbor's lyre, nor will someone who doesn't know how to use the lyre of others be capable of using his own lyre, nor any other instrument or possession whatsoever. Your speech delivers a wonderful coup de grace when it concludes that someone who doesn't know how to use his soul is better off putting his

how

to

use his

soul to rest and not living at actions are based

must free,

else

live,

it

all

on nothing but personal whim.

would be

better for such a

handing over the rudder of

who knows

rather than leading a

his

man

mind,

that skill of steering

If

for

life in

which

his

some reason he

to live as a slave than to

like that of a ship, to

men which

be

somebody

you, Socrates, often

call

very same skill, you say, as the judicial skill and justice. I dare say I never objected nor, I believe, ever will object to these arguments, nor to many other eloquent ones like them, to the effect that virtue is teachable and that more care should be devoted to one's self than to anything else. I consider them to be extremely beneficial and extremely politics, the

968

Clitophon

effective in turning us in the right direction; they can really rouse us as

we'd been sleeping.

I

was

therefore very interested in

if

what would come

next after such arguments; at first I asked not you, Socrates, but your companions and fellow enthusiasts, or friends, or whatever we should call their relationship to you. And I first questioned those who are thought by

you to be really something; I asked them what argument would come next and put my case to them in a style somewhat like your own:

O

you most distinguished gentlemen, what

are

we

actually 6 to

make

of Socrates' exhorting of us to pursue virtue? Are we to believe that this is all there is, and that it is impossible to pursue the matter 7 further and grasp it fully? Will this be our life-long work,

simply to convert to the pursuit of virtue those who have not yet been converted so that they in turn may convert others? Even if

we

agree that this

what

man

we not also ask Socrates, and each other, what the next step is? How should we begin to learn what justice is? What do we say? It's as if we were children with no awareness of the existence of such things as gymnastics and medicine, and somebody saw this and exhorted us to take care of our bodies and reproached us, saying that it s shameful that we devote such care to cultivating wheat, barley, vines and all the other things which we work hard to acquire for the sake of the body, while we fail to discover any skill or other means of making the body itself as good as possible, even though such skills exist. Now, if we were to ask the man who gave us this exhortation, "Which skills are you talking about?," he would presumably reply, "Gymnastics and medicine." Now what about us? What do we say is the skill which concerns is

a

should do, should

the virtue of the soul? Let's have an answer.

The man who appeared the most formidable among your companions answered these questions by telling me that this skill is "the very skill which you hear Socrates talking about, namely, justice itself." Then I said, "Don't just give me the name; try it this way. Medicine is surely a kind of skill. It has two results: it produces other doctors in addition to those who are already doctors, and it produces health. Of these, the second result not itself a skill, but rather the product of a skill, the product health the skill itself is what teaches and what's taught. Likewise,

is

,

try has as

its

results a

while the second is

also to

house and carpentry

itself;

the

first is

we

carpen-

the product

what s taught. Let s assume that one result of produce just men, just as in the case of each of the skills is

6.

Reading nun

7.

Accepting the emendation

in

d2 as

enclitic.

estin for eni in d4.

call

justice

a goal

969

Clitophon

—

produce men with that skill but what, then, are we to call the other thing, the product which the just man produces for us? Tell me."

is

to

He,

I

priate,"

somebody else said, "the approand someone else, "the advantageous."

think, replied, "the beneficial,"

someone

else, "the

useful"

returned to the point and said, "All those words, such as 'acting correctly', 'advantageously', 'usefully' and the like, are to be found in each of the skills as well. When asked, however, what these all aim at, each skill will mention some product peculiar to itself. So, for example, when carpentry uses the words 'well', 'properly' and 'appropriately', it is speaking of the production of wooden artifacts, which are products distinct from the skill itself. What, then, is the peculiar product of justice? Give me that

But 8

I

sort of answer."

—

one of your friends answered and he really seemed that the product peculiar to justice and not quite clever in saying this shared by any of the other skills is to produce friendship within cities. When questioned, he said that friendship is always good and never bad. When questioned further, he wouldn't allow that what we call the "friendships" of children and animals are really friendships, since he was led to the conclusion that such relationships are more often harmful than good. So in order to avoid saying that this is true of friendship, he claimed that these relationships are not friendships at all and that those who call them that are wrong; instead, real and true friendship is most precisely agreement. When asked whether he considered this agreement to be shared belief or knowledge, he rejected the former suggestion since he was forced to admit that many men's shared beliefs are harmful, whereas he had agreed that friendship is entirely good and is the product of justice; so he said that agreement is the same, being knowledge, not belief. Now by the time we reached this point in the argument, having really made no progress, the bystanders were able to take him to task and say that the argument had gone around in a circle back to where it began. "Medicine too," they said, "is a sort of agreement, as is every skill, and they all can say what they're about. But what you call 'justice' and 'agreement' has no idea what it's aiming at, and so it's not clear what its product could be." So, Socrates, finally I asked you yourself these questions and you told me that the aim of justice is to hurt one's enemies and help one's friends. But later it turned out that the just man never harms anyone, since everything he does is for the benefit of all. When I had endured this disappointment, not once or twice but a long time, I finally got tired of begging for an answer. I came to the conclusion that while you're better than anyone at turning a man towards the pursuit of virtue, one of two things must be the case: either this is all you can do, nothing more as might happen with any other skill, for example, when someone who's not a pilot rehearses a speech in praise of the pilot's skill Finally, Socrates,

—

—

8.

Reading de instead of de

in c3.

970

Clitophon

410d

worth to men; the same could also be done for any other skill. And someone might accuse you of being in the same position with justice, that your ability to praise it so well does not make you any more knowledgeable about it. Now that's not my own view, but there are only two possibilities: either you don't know it, or you don't wish to share it with me. And this is why, I suppose, I go 9 to Thrasymachus and to anyone else

e

you're finally ready to stop exhorting me with speeches I mean, if it had been about gymnastics that you were exhorting me, saying that I must not neglect my body, you would have proceeded to give me what comes next after such an exhortation, namely, an explanation of the nature of my body and of the particular kind of treatment this nature requires that's the kind of thing you should do now.

as being something of great

I

can: I'm at a loss. But

if

—

—

Assume

that Clitophon agrees with

you

that

it's

ridiculous to neglect

the soul itself while concerning ourselves solely with

what we work hard

Suppose now that I have also said all the other things which come next and which I just went through. Then, please, do as I ask and I won't praise you before Lysias and others for some things while criticizing you for others, as I do now. For I will say this, Socrates, that while you're worth the world to someone who hasn't yet been converted to the pursuit of virtue, to someone who's already been converted you rather get in the way of his attaining happiness by reaching the goal of virtue. to acquire for

9.

its

sake.

Reading poreuomai

in c7.

REPUBLIC The Republic's ancient

subtitle

—On Justice — much understates

the scope of

manbegins as a discussion of the nature of justice, much in the Socrates examinner of 'Socratic' dialogues like Laches or Charmides, with subject. But in ing and refuting successive views of his interlocutors on this and refuting book II he renews the inquiry now agreeing to cease examining jusothers and to present his own account. He will say what opinions

the work.

It

,

the

of

tice really is

and show

happier

better,

,

life

and fully just thereby lead than any unjust person could. The horizon lifts to leveal that people

who

are truly

a

the original

ever-expanding vistas of philosophy. Socrates presents his views on were founded, the basic princities purposes for which political communities young peojust social and political organization, and the education of ciples

—

of

ple that those principles

demand

(books

II, III,

—

He decides that a truly men and women living in a and

V).

both just society requires philosophic rulers communistic 'guardhouse' within the larger community.

The need for such variety and nature (and rulers leads him on to wider topics. He discusses the justice and proper regimentation) of human desires, and the precise nature of both in the individual perthe other virtues—and of the corresponding vices— son's psychology

and

in the organization of political society (IV, VIII, IX).

proper objects (V-VII): The world reis, he aigues, cog everyday traditional life

explains the nature of knowledge and vealed by our senses nitively

—

the world of

and metaphysically

He

its

,

deficient. It

depends upon a prior realm of sepa-

Forms, organized beneath the Form of the Good and graspable thought and discussion, not by our senses but only through rigorous dialectical studies. There is even a discussion after preparation in extended mathematical and literary art and art criticism (X). All this of the basic principles of visual about justice necessary Socrates says, finally to answer the basic question rately existing

is

,

not what

and

it

is,

but

why

it

must make

the just person live a

good happy ,

life,

the unjust person a bad, miserable one.

Speaking throughout rea der

— Socrates

to

no identified person

that

is,

relates a conversation he took part in

diiectly to the

one day

in the

Athenian

company, represent port city of Piraeus. All the others present, a considerable and teacher of orahistorical personages: among them were the noted sophist Plato s brothers. Glaucon tory, Thrasymachus, and Glaucon and Adeimantus, is

public af an ambitious, energetic, 'manly young man, much interested in person, and drawn to the life of politics. An intelligent and argumentative

fairs

Always especially he scorns ordinary pleasures and aspires to 'higher' things. had gone down to attracted by such people, it was with him that Socrates 971

Socrates /Cephalus

Piraeus in the

Adeimantus, equally a decent young man, is less driven, less demanding of himself, more easily satisfied and less gifted in philosophical argument. After book I Socrates carries on his discussion first with first place.

one, then with the other of these

answering

two men. The conversation as

to their satisfaction the challenge they jointly raise

conviction that justice

is

a

whole aims at

against Socrates'

a preeminent

good for the just person, but Socrates ada different one of them. (To assist the

dresses different parts of his reply to reader, we have inserted the names of the speakers at the tops of the pages of the translation.)

Though

in books

II-X Socrates no longer searches for

ing his interlocutors

the truth by criticiz-

ideas, he proceeds nonetheless in a spirit of exploration

and discovery, proposing bold hypotheses and seeking their confirmation in the first instance through examining their consequences. He often emphasizes the tentativeness of his residts, and the need for a more extensive treatment. Quite different is the main speaker in the late dialogues Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, and Laws whether Socrates himself, or a visitor from Elea or Athens:

—

we

get confident, reasoned delivery of philosophical results assumed by the speaker to be well established. there,

J.M.C.

Book 327

I

went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, the son of Ariston. I wanted to say a prayer to the goddess and I was also curious to see how they would manage the festival, since they were holding it for the first time. I thought the procession of the local residents was a fine one and that the one conducted by the Thracians was no less outstanding. After we had said our prayer and seen the procession, we started back towards Athens. Polemarchus saw us from a distance as we were setting off for home and told his slave to run and ask us to wait for him. The slave caught hold of my cloak from behind: Polemarchus wants you to wait, he said. I turned around and asked where Polemarchus was. He's coming up behind you, he said, please wait for him. And Glaucon replied: All I

1

,

b

right, c

we

will.

Polemarchus caught up with us. Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, was with him and so were Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and some others, all of whom were apparently on their way from the procession. Polemarchus said: It looks to me, Socrates, as if you two are starting off Just then

for Athens. It

looks the

Do you

see

way it is, then, I said. how many we are? he

said.

Translated by G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve.

he Thracian goddess Bendis, whose cult had recently been introduced in the Piraeus, the harbor town of Athens. 1

.

i

Republic I

973

I

do.

Well,

you must

either prove stronger than

we

are, or

you

will

have

to

stay here.

another alternative, namely, that we persuade you to But could you persuade us, if we won't listen?

Isn't there

let

us go?

Certainly not, Glaucon said.

you'd better make up your mind to that. on Don't you know, Adeimantus said, that there is to be a torch race horseback for the goddess tonight? On horseback? I said. That's something new. Are they going to race on horseback and hand the torches on in relays, or what? festival that In relays, Polemarchus said, and there will be an all-night at it. We 11 be will be well worth seeing. After dinner, we'll go out to look go; stay. joined there by many of the young men, and we'll talk. So don't stay. It seems, Glaucon said, that we'll have to Well,

we won't

listen;

you think so, I said, then we must. and So we went to Polemarchus' house, and there we found Lysias Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Charmantides of Paeania, and Clitophon the son of Aristonymus. Polemarchus' father, Cephalus, was also there, and I thought he looked quite on a sort of old, as I hadn't seen him for some time. He was sitting cushioned chair with a wreath on his head, as he had been offering a we sat down sacrifice in the courtyard. There was a circle of chairs, and If

by him. As soon

saw me, Cephalus welcomed me and said: Socrates, you it were don't come down to the Piraeus to see us as often as you should. If t have to come here, we d still easy for me to walk to town, you wouldn come to you. But, as it is, you ought to come here more often, for you as he

my

desire for that as the physical pleasures wither away, conversation and its pleasures grows. So do as I say: Stay with these young but come regularly to see us, just as you would to friends

should

know

men now,

or relatives.

for we Indeed, Cephalus, I replied, I enjoy talking with the very old, that should ask them, as we might ask those who have travelled a road we too will probably have to follow, what kind of road it is, whether rough and difficult or smooth and easy. And I'd gladly find out from you what you think about this, as you have reached the point in life the poets call 2 threshold of old age." Is it a difficult time? What is your report

"the

about

it?

By god, Socrates, I'll tell you exactly what I think. A number of us, who with the are more or less the same age, often get together in accordance 3 old saying.

When we meet,

the majority complain about the lost pleasures

xxiv.487; Odyssey xv.246, 348, xxiii.212.

2.

Iliad xxii.60,

3.

"God ever draws

together like to like"

(

Odyssey xvii.218).

4

Socrates / Cephalus

they remember from their youth, those of sex, drinking parties, feasts, and the other things that go along with them, and they get angry as if they

had been deprived

and had lived well then but are now hardly living at all. Some others moan about the abuse heaped on old people by their relatives, and because of this they repeat over and over that old age is the cause of many evils. But I don't think they blame the real cause, Socrates, for if old age were really the cause, I should have suffered in the same way and so should everyone else of my age. But as it is, I've met some who don't feel like that in the least. Indeed, I was once present when someone asked the poet Sophocles: "How are you as far as sex goes, Sophocles? Can you still make love with a woman?" "Quiet, man," the poet replied, "I am very glad to have escaped from all that, like a slave who has escaped from a savage and tyrannical master." I thought at the time that he was right, and I still do, for old age brings peace and freedom from all such things. When the appetites relax and cease to importune us, everything Sophocles said comes to pass, and we escape from many mad masters. In these matters and in those concerning relatives, of important things

the real cause isn't old age, Socrates, but the way people live. If they are moderate and contented, old age, too, is only moderately onerous; if they aren't, both old age and youth are hard to bear.

admired him for saying that and urged him on: When you say things

wanted him

me

more, so I like that, Cephalus, I suppose that the majority of people don't agree, they think that you bear old age more easily not because of the way you live but because you're wealthy, for the wealthy, they say, have many consolations. That's true; they don't agree. And there is something in what they say, though not as much as they think. Themistocles' retort is relevant here. When someone from Seriphus insulted him by saying that his high reputation was due to his city and not to himself, he replied that, had he been a Seriphian, he wouldn't be famous, but neither would the other even if he had been an Athenian. The same applies to those who aren't rich and find old age hard to bear: A good person wouldn't easily bear old age if he were poor, but a bad one wouldn't be at peace with himself even if he I

I

were wealthy. Did you inherit most of your wealth, Cephalus,

to tell

I

asked, or did you

make it for yourself? What did I make for myself, Socrates, you ask. As a money-maker I'm in a sort of mean between my grandfather and my father. My grandfather and namesake inherited about the same amount of wealth as I possess but multiplied it many times. My father, Lysanias, however, diminished that amount to even less than I have now. As for me. I'm satisfied to leave my sons here not less but a little more than I inherited. The reason I asked is that you don't seem to love money too much. And those who haven't made their own money are usually like you. But those

who have made

it

for themselves are twice as

haven't. Just as poets love their

poems and

fond of

it

as those

who

fathers love their children, so

Republic

975 I

don't just care about it because it's something they've made it's useful, as other people do, but because word themselves. This makes them poor company, for they haven't a good

those

to

who have made

their

own money

say about anything except money. That's true.

something else. What's the greatest good you've received from being very wealthy? What I have to say probably wouldn't persuade most people. But you know, Socrates, that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes then that frightened and concerned about things he didn t fear before. It s who've been unjust the stories we're told about Hades, about how people twist of here must pay the penalty there stories he used to make fun whether because of his soul this way and that for fear they're true. And what happens in the weakness of old age or because he is now closer to Hades and has a clearer view of it, or whatever it is, he is filled with been foreboding and fear, and he examines himself to see whether he has awakes from unjust to anyone. If he finds many injustices in his life, he of bad things to sleep in terror, as children do, and lives in anticipation good come. But someone who knows that he hasn't been unjust has sweet4 hope as his constant companion a nurse to his old age, as Pindar says, It

certainly

But

is.

tell

me

d

—

e

331

—

he puts

for

a just

it

charmingly, Socrates,

and pious

when he

says that

when someone

lives

life

Sweet hope

is

in his heart ,

Nurse and companion

to his age.

Hope captain of the ever-twisting Minds of mortal men. ,

connection that wealth is orderly most valuable, I'd say, not for every man but for a decent and deceive someone one. Wealth can do a lot to save us from having to cheat or place in fear against our will and from having to depart for that other other because we owe sacrifice to a god or money to a person. It has many most useful to a uses, but, benefit for benefit. I'd say that this is how it is

How

man

wonderfully well he puts

of

that. It's in this

any understanding.

Cephalus, but, speaking of this very thing itself, truth namely, justice, are we to say unconditionally that it is speaking the and paying whatever debts one has incurred? Or is doing these things sometimes just, sometimes unjust? I mean this sort of thing, for example.

A

fine sentiment,

Everyone would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapons to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn't should anyone return them, and wouldn't be acting justly if he did. Nor mind. be willing to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his

4.

Frg. 214 (Snell).

1

—

976

Socrates/Polemarchus/Cephalus

That's true.

Then

the definition of justice isn't speaking the truth

and repaying what

one has borrowed. It

certainly

is,

Socrates, said Polemarchus, interrupting,

Simonides at all 5 Well, then, Cephalus said.

to trust

if

indeed we're

.

I'll

hand over

the

argument

to you, as

I

have

to look after the sacrifice.

Polemarchus

So,

You

am

then to be your heir in everything? certainly are, Cephalus said, laughing, and off he went to the sacsaid,

I

rifice.

Then

tell

us, heir to the

argument,

I

said, just

about justice that you consider correct. He stated that it is just to give to each what

my

fine saying, in

Well, now,

is

what Simonides

owed

to him.

stated

And

it's

a

view.

easy to doubt Simonides, for he's a wise and godlike man. But what exactly does he mean? Perhaps you know, Polemarchus, but I don't understand him. Clearly, he doesn't mean what we said a moment ago, that it is just to give back whatever a person has lent to you, even if he's out of his mind when he asks for it. And yet what he has lent to

you

is

it

isn't

surely something that's

owed

to

him,

isn't it?

Yes.

But

it is

absolutely not to be given to

him when

he's out of his

mind?

That's true.

Then

it

seems

that

Simonides must have meant something different

when he

says that to return what is owed is just. Something different indeed, by god. He means that friends

owe

it

to

do good for them, never harm. I follow you. Someone doesn't give a lender back what he's owed by giving him gold, if doing so would be harmful, and both he and the lender are friends. Isn't that what you think Simonides meant? their friends to

It is.

But what about this? Should one also give one's enemies whatever

owed

is

them? By all means, one should give them what is owed to them. And in my view what enemies owe to each other is appropriately and precisely something bad. It seems then that Simonides was speaking in riddles just like a poet! when he said what justice is, for he thought it just to give to each what is appropriate to him, and this is what he called giving him what is owed to

—

to

him.

What

you think he meant? Then what do you think he'd answer if someone asked him: "Simonides, which of the things that are owed or that are appropriate for someone or 5.

else did

Simonides

of Ceos.

(c.

548-468

b.c.),

a lyric

and

elegiac poet,

was born

in the

Aegean

island

Republic

977 I

something what does It's

have does the give them?"

to it

and

6

we

call

medicine give, and

to

what does

or

it

gives seasonings to food. Good. Now, what does the craft

give them?

It

friends

give

it

we

call justice give,

and

to

whom

or

it?

are to follow the previous answers, Socrates,

we

If

or

it

whom

to

what does

whom

gives medicines, food, and drink to bodies. owed or appropriate things does the craft we call cooking

clear that

And what give,

craft

and does harm

it

gives benefits to

to enemies.

Simonides means, then, that

to treat friends well

and enemies badly

justice?

is

believe so.

I

most capable of treating friends well and enemies badly disease and health?

And who matters of

A

is

doctor.

can do so best in a storm

And who

A

m

at sea?

ship's captain.

What about

what actions and what work and harming enemies?

the just person? In

is

he most

capable of benefiting friends In wars and alliances, I suppose. All right. to

Now, when people aren't sick, Polemarchus,

a doctor

is

useless

them? True.

And

a ship's captain to those

so

is

to

people

who

aren't sailing?

Yes.

And

who

aren't at war, a just

man

is

useless?

don't think that at all. Justice is also useful in peacetime, then?

No,

I

It is.

And

so

is

farming,

isn't it?

Yes.

For getting produce? Yes.

And shoemaking

as well?

Yes.

For getting shoes,

I

think you'd say?

Certainly.

.

Well, then,

what

is

justice useful for getting

Contracts, Socrates. And by contracts do I

mean

and using

you mean partnerships,

in peacetime.

or what?

partnerships.

techne what follows "craft" translates techne. As Socrates conceives it a founded on a grasp of the truth about what is good is a disciplined body of knowledge and bad, right and wrong, in the matters of concern to it. 6.

Here and

in

Socrates / Polemarchus Is

b

someone

good and useful partner

a

in a

game

of checkers because

he's just or because he's a checkers player? Because he's a checkers player.

And

in laying bricks

and

stones,

is

a just

person a better and more useful

partner than a builder?

Not at all. In what kind

of partnership, then,

is

a builder or a lyre-player, in the way just person at hitting the right notes?

In

c

money

matters,

I

a just person a better partner than that a lyre-player is better than a

think.

Except perhaps, Polemarchus, in using money, for whenever one needs to buy a horse jointly, I think a horse breeder is a more useful partner, isn't he? Apparently.

And when one needs to buy a boat, it's

a boatbuilder or a ship's captain?

Probably. In

what

joint

use of silver or gold, then,

is

a just

person a more useful

partner than the others?

When

must be deposited for safekeeping, Socrates. You mean whenever there is no need to use them but only it

to

keep them?

That's right.

Then

it is

I'm afraid

d

when money

isn't

being used that justice

is

useful for

it?

so.

And whenever one

needs to keep a pruning knife safe, but not to use it, justice is useful both in partnerships and for the individual. When you need to use it, however, it is skill at vine pruning that's useful? Apparently. You'll agree, then, that

and not them,

to

it is

when one needs

to

keep

use them, justice is a useful thing, but soldiery or musicianship that's useful?

a shield or a lyre safe

when you need

to

use

Necessarily.

And

so, too,

use but useful It

e

with everything

when

else, justice is useless

when

they are in

they aren't?

looks that way.

In that case, justice isn t worth much, since it is only useful for useless things. But let's look into the following point. Isn't the person most able to land a blow, whether in boxing or any other kind of fight, also most able to guard against it? Certainly.

And

the one

who

is

most able

to

guard against disease

produce it unnoticed? So it seems to me, anyway. And the one who is the best guardian of an army can steal the enemy's plans and dispositions?

is

also

most able

to

334

is

the very one

who

Certainly.

Whenever someone

is

a clever guardian, then,

he

is

also a clever thief.

Republic

979

I

Probably so. If a just person

is

clever at stealing

it.

clever at guarding

money,

therefore, he

must

also be

According to our argument, at any rate. A just person has turned out then, it seems, to be a kind of thief. Maybe you learned this from Homer, for he's fond of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, whom he describes as better than everyone at 7 lying and stealing According to you, Homer, and Simonides, then, justice seems to be some sort of craft of stealing, one that benefits friends and harms enemies. Isn't that what you meant? No, by god, it isn't. I don't know any more what I did mean, but I still believe that to benefit one's friends and harm one's enemies is justice. Speaking of friends, do you mean those a person believes to be good and useful to him or those who actually are good and useful, even if he .

doesn't think they are, and similarly with enemies? Probably, one loves those one considers good and useful and hates those one considers bad and harmful. But surely people often make mistakes about this, believing many people opposite mistake to be good and useful when they aren't, and making the

about enemies?

They do indeed. And then good people

are their enemies

and bad ones

their friends?

That's right.

And

so

it's

just to benefit

bad people and harm good ones?

Apparently. But good people are just and able to do no wrong? True.

Then, according to your account,

do no No,

it's

just to

do bad things

to those

who

injustice.

my

account must be a bad one. benefit just ones? It's just, then, is it, to harm unjust people and That's obviously a more attractive view than the other one, anyway. Then, it follows, Polemarchus, that it is just for the many, who are mistaken in their judgment, to harm their friends, who are bad, and benefit opposite their enemies, who are good. And so we arrive at a conclusion to what we said Simonides meant. That certainly follows. But let's change our definition, for it seems that we didn't define friends and enemies correctly. How did we define them, Polemarchus? We said that a friend is someone who is believed to be useful. that's not just at

all,

Socrates;

we to change that now? Someone who is both believed to be useful and is useful is a friend, someone who is believed to be useful but isn is believed to be a friend but isn't. And the same for the enemy.

And how

are

t,

7.

Odyssey

xix. 392-98.

Socrates/Polemarchus/Thrasymachus

According to this account, then, bad one an enemy.

good person

a

will

be a friend and a

Yes.

So you want us

when we

b

to

said that

add something

it is

to

what we

said before about justice,

and enemies badly. You well a friend who is good and

just to treat friends well

want us to add to this that it is just to harm an enemy who is bad? Right. That seems fine to me.

to treat

man to harm anyone? Certainly, he must harm those who are both bad and enemies. Do horses become better or worse when they are harmed? Is

it,

then, the role of a just

Worse.

With respect to the virtue 8 that makes dogs good or the one that makes horses good? The one that makes horses good. And when dogs are harmed, they become worse in the virtue that makes dogs good, not horses? Necessarily. c

Then won't we say the same about human beings, are harmed they become worse in human virtue?

too, that

when

they

Indeed.

But

isn't justice

human

virtue?

Yes, certainly.

Then people who So

it

Can

seems. musicians

are

harmed must become more

unjust?

make people unmusical through music?

They cannot. Or horsemen make people unhorsemanlike through horsemanship? No.

who are just make people unjust through justice? who are good make people bad through virtue?

Well, then, can those d

In a

word, can those

They cannot. It

isn't the

function of heat to cool things but of

its

opposite?

Yes.

Nor

the function of dryness to

make

things wet but of

its

opposite?

Indeed.

Nor

the function of goodness to

harm but

of

its

opposite?

Apparently.

broader than our notion of virtue, which tends to be applied only to human beings, and restricted to good sexual behavior or helpfulness on their part to others. Arete could equally be translated “excellence" or "goodness." Thus if something 8.

is it

I.e., arete.

Arete

is

a knife (say) its arete or "virtue" as a knife a

good knife

is

that state or property of

it

that

— having a sharp blade, and so on. So with the virtue of a man:

this

makes might

include being intelligent, well-born, or courageous, as well as being just and sexually well-behaved.

Republic

And

981

I

person

a just

is

good?

Indeed.

Then, Polemarchus,

it

function of a just person to harm a friend the function of his opposite, an unjust person?

isn't the

anyone else, rather it is In my view that's completely true, Socrates. he's owed If anyone tells us, then, that it is just to give to each what and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his friends, he isn't wise to say it, since what he says isn t true, for anyone? it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm

or

I

agree.

You and

Simonides, Bias, Pittacus,

men

anyone who tells us that or any of our other wise and blessedly happy

shall fight as partners, then, against

I

said this.

any rate, am willing to be your partner in the battle. Do you know to whom I think the saying belongs that it is just friends and harm enemies? at

I,

to benefit

Who? belongs to Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias of Corinth, or some other wealthy man who believed himself to have think

I

great

it

power

9 .

That's absolutely true.

has become apparent that justice and the just aren't what such people say they are, what else could they be? While we were speaking, Thrasymachus had tried many times to take over the discussion but was restrained by those sitting near him, who wanted to hear our argument to the end. When we paused after what I d just said, however, he couldn't keep quiet any longer. He coiled himself All right, since

up

like a

it

wild beast about to spring, and he hurled himself

at

us as

if

to

tear us to pieces.

Polemarchus and I were frightened and flustered as he roared into our midst: What nonsense have you two been talking, Socrates? Why do you act like idiots by giving way to one another? If you truly want to know what justice is, don't just ask questions and then refute the answers simply to satisfy your competitiveness or love of honor. You know very well that answer yourself, it is easier to ask questions than answer them. Give an

and

tell

us what you say the

just

is.

And

don't

tell

me

that

it's

the right,

the beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and exactly what you mean; for I won't accept such nonsense

from you. His words

me, and, looking at him, I was afraid. And I think that if I hadn't seen him before he stared at me, I'd have been dumbstruck. But as it was, I happened to look at him just as our discussion began to startled

exasperate him, so

9.

The

first

three

I

named

his extraordinary wealth.

was

able to answer, and, trembling a

are notorious tyrants or kings, the fourth a

little, I

said:

man famous

for

982

Socrates /Glaucon/Thrasymachus

Don't be too hard on us, Thrasymachus, for if Polemarchus and I made an error in our investigation, you should know that we did so unwillingly.

we were searching for gold, we'd

never willingly give way to each other, if by doing so we'd destroy our chance of finding it. So don't think that in searching for justice, a thing more valuable than even a large quantity of gold, we d mindlessly give way to one another or be less than completely serious about finding it. You surely mustn't think that, but rather— as I do— that we're incapable of finding it. Hence it's surely far more appropriate for us to be pitied by you clever people than to be given rough treatment. When he heard that, he gave a loud, sarcastic laugh. By Heracles, he said, that s just Socrates' usual irony. I knew, and I said so to these people earlier, that you'd be unwilling to answer and that, if someone questioned you, you d be ironical and do anything rather than give an answer. That's because you're a clever fellow, Thrasymachus. You knew very well that if you ask someone how much twelve is, and, as you ask, you warn him by saying "Don't tell me, man, that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, for I won't accept such nonsense," then you'll see clearly, I think, that no one could answer a question framed like that. And if he said to you: "What are you saying, If

Thrasymachus, am I not to give any of the answers you mention, not even if twelve happens to be one of those things? I'm amazed. Do you want me to say something other than the truth? Or do you mean something else?" What answer would you give him? Well, so you think the two cases are alike? Why shouldn't they be alike? But even if they aren't alike, yet seem so to the person you asked, do you think him any less likely to give the answer that seems right to him, whether we forbid him to or not? Is that what you're going to do, give one of the forbidden answers? I wouldn't be surprised— provided that it's the one that seems right to

me

after I've investigated the matter.

What a better

What namely, I

show you a different answer about one? What would you deserve then?

if I

justice

than

all

these

— and

else than the appropriate penalty for one who doesn't know, to learn from the one who does know? Therefore, that's what

deserve.

You amuse me, but I

will as

He

has

soon as

I

in addition to learning,

you must pay

a fine.

have some money.

some

already, said Glaucon. If it's a matter of money, speak, Thrasymachus, for we'll all contribute for Socrates. I know, he said, so that Socrates can carry on as usual. He gives no

answer himself, and then, when someone else does give one, he takes up the argument and refutes it. How can someone give an answer, I said, when he doesn't know it and doesn't claim to know it, and when an eminent man forbids him to express the opinion he has? It's much more appropriate for you to answer, since

Republic

983

I

you say you know and can tell us. So do it as a favor to me, and don t begrudge your teaching to Glaucon and the others. While I was saying this, Glaucon and the others begged him to speak. fine answer and that It was obvious that Thrasymachus thought he had a he wanted to earn their admiration by giving it, but he pretended that he wanted to indulge his love of victory by forcing me to answer. However, he agreed in the end, and then said: There you have Socrates' wisdom; he himself isn't willing to teach, but he goes around learning from others and isn't

even grateful

them.

to

say that I learn from others you are right, Thrasymachus, but when you say that I'm not grateful, that isn't true. I show what gratitude only praise. But just how I can, but since I have no money, I can give enthusiastically I give it when someone seems to me to speak well, you'll know as soon as you've answered, for I think that you will speak well. Listen, then. I say that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger. Well, why don't you praise me? But then you'd do anything to

When you

avoid having to do that. I must first understand you, for

I

know what you mean. The What do you mean, Thrasyma-

don't yet

advantage of the stronger, you say, is just. chus? Surely you don't mean something like this: Polydamus, the pancra10 to build up is stronger than we are; it is to his advantage to eat beef tist his physical strength; therefore, this food is also advantageous and just ,

who

weaker than he is? You disgust me, Socrates. Your trick is to take hold of the argument at the point where you can do it the most harm. Not at all, but tell us more clearly what you mean. Don't you know that some cities are ruled by a tyranny, some by a democracy, and some by an aristocracy? Of course.

for us

And

in

are

each

city this

element

is

stronger, namely, the ruler?

Certainly.

each makes laws to its own advantage. Democracy makes demoAnd cratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical laws, and so on with the others. they declare what they have made what is to their own advantage to be just for their subjects, and they punish anyone who goes against this all as lawless and unjust. This, then, is what I say justice is, the same in

And

—

the advantage of the established rule. Since the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who reasons correctly will conclude that the just stronger. is the same everywhere, namely, the advantage of the

cities,

what you mean. Whether it's true or not. I'll try to find out. But you yourself have answered that the just is the advantageous, Thrasymachus, whereas you forbade that answer to me. True, you've added "of the stronger" to it.

Now

10.

The

I

see

pancration

was

a

mixture of boxing and wrestling.

^

Socrates/Thrasymachus/Polemarchus/Clitophon

And

suppose you think that's an insignificant addition. It isn t clear yet whether it's significant. But it is clear that we must investigate to see whether or not it's true. I agree that the just is some kind of advantage. But you add that it's of the stronger. I don't know about that. We'll have to look into it. Go ahead and look. We will. Tell me, don't you also say that it is just to obey the rulers? I

I

do.

And are the rulers in all cities infallible, or are they liable to error? No doubt they are liable to error. When they undertake to make laws, therefore, they make some correctly, others incorrectly?

suppose so. And a law is correct if it prescribes what is to the rulers' own advantage and incorrect if it prescribes what is to their disadvantage? Is that what I

you mean? It is.

And whatever

laws they make must be obeyed by their subjects, and

this is justice?

Of

course.

Then, according to your account, it is just to do not only what is to the advantage of the stronger, but also the opposite, what is not to their advantage.

What

you saying?

are

The same that, in

as to to

as you. But let s

giving orders to

what

is

more

Haven't we agreed their subjects, the rulers are sometimes in error

best for themselves,

do whatever I

examine

it

and yet

their rulers order?

Haven't

that

we

fully.

it is

just for their subjects

agreed

to that

much?

think so.

Then you must

you have agreed that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and those who are stronger, whenever they unintentionally order what is bad for themselves. But you also say that

it is

clever,

also think that

just for the others to

obey the orders they

Thrasymachus, but doesn't

the opposite of

what you

give. You're terribly

necessarily follow that it is just to said, since the weaker are then ordered to it

do do

what is disadvantageous to the stronger? By god, Socrates, said Polemarchus, that's quite clear. If you are to be his witness anyway, said Clitophon, interrupting.

Who

needs a witness? Polemarchus replied. Thrasymachus himself agrees that the rulers sometimes order what is bad for themselves and that

it is

just for the others to

That, Polemarchus, to

is

do

it.

because Thrasymachus maintained that

obey the orders of the

it is

just

rulers.

He also maintained, Clitophon, that the advantage of the stronger is just. And having maintained both principles he went on to agree that the

Republic

985

I

—

stronger sometimes gives orders to those who are weaker than he is in other words, to his subjects that are disadvantageous to the stronger himself. From these agreements it follows that what is to the advantage

—

than what is not to his advantage. But, Clitophon responded, he said that the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage. This is what the weaker must do, and this is what he maintained the just to be.

of the stronger

is

no more

just

what he said, Polemarchus replied. It makes no difference, Polemarchus, I said. If Thrasymachus wants to put it that way now, let's accept it. Tell me, Thrasymachus, is this what you wanted to say the just is, namely, what the stronger believes to be to his advantage, whether it is in fact to his advantage or not? Is that what we are to say you mean? Not at all. Do you think I'd call someone who is in error stronger at the That

isn't

very moment he errs? I did think that was what you meant when you agreed that the rulers aren't infallible but are liable to error. That's because you are a false witness in arguments, Socrates. When someone makes an error in the treatment of patients, do you call him a doctor in regard to that very error? Or when someone makes an error in accounting, do you call him an accountant in regard to that very error in calculation? I think that we express ourselves in words that, taken literally, do say that a doctor is in error, or an accountant, or a grammarian. But each of these, insofar as he is what we call him, never errs, so that, according account (and you are a stickler for precise accounts), no craftsman ever errs. It's when his knowledge fails him that he makes an error, and in regard to that error he is no craftsman. No craftsman, expert, or ruler makes an error at the moment when he is ruling, even though everyone will say that a physician or a ruler makes errors. It's in this loose way that you must also take the answer I gave earlier. But the most precise answer is this. A ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and to the precise

unerringly decrees what

Thus, as

I

said from the

is

and this do what is

best for himself,

first, it is

just to

his subject to the

must do.

advantage of

the stronger. All right, Thrasymachus, so

You

a false witness?

certainly are.

And you the

you think I'm

think that

I

asked the questions

I

did in order to

harm you

in

argument?

won't do you any good. You'll never be able to trick me, so you can't harm me that way, and without trickery you'll never be able to overpower me in argument. I wouldn't so much as try, Thrasymachus. But in order to prevent this sort of thing from happening again, define clearly whether it is the ruler and stronger in the ordinary sense or in the precise sense whose advantage you said it is just for the weaker to promote as the advantage of the stronger. I

know

it

very well, but

it

Thrasymachus/ Socrates I

mean

the ruler in the most precise sense.

doing and false witnessing on that if you can you but you certainly won't be able to.

—

c

Now

—

I

your harmask no concessions from practice

Do you

think that I'm crazy enough to try to shave a lion or to bear false witness against Thrasymachus?

You certainly tried just now, though you were a loser at that too. Enough of this. Tell me: Is a doctor in the precise sense, whom you mentioned before, a money-maker or someone who treats the sick? Tell

me

about the one who is really a doctor. He's the one who treats the sick. What about a ship's captain? Is a captain in the precise sense a ruler of

sailors or a sailor?

A ruler of sailors. We shouldn't, think,

take into account the fact that he sails in a ship, and he shouldn't be called a sailor for that reason, for it isn't because of I

d

he

his sailing that

called a ship's captain, but because of his craft

is

and

his rule over sailors?

That's true.

And and

is

there something advantageous to each of these, that

is,

to

bodies

to sailors?

Certainly.

And

aren't the respective crafts

provide what

They

And e

is

to their

by nature

set

over them to seek and

advantage?

are. is

there

any advantage

for

each of the crafts themselves except to

be as complete or perfect as possible? What are you asking? This: If you asked me whether our bodies are sufficient in themselves, or whether they need something else. I'd answer: "They certainly have needs. And because of this, because our bodies are deficient rather than

medicine has now been discovered. The craft of medicine was developed to provide what is advantageous for a body." Do you think that I'm right in saying this or not? self-sufficient, the craft of

\2

b

You are right. Now, is medicine

Does a craft need some further virtue, as the eyes are in need of sight, and the ears of hearing, so that another craft is needed to seek and provide what is advantageous to them? Does a craft itself have some similar deficiency, so that each craft needs another, to seek out what is to its advantage? And does the craft that does the seeking need still another, and so on without end? Or does each seek out what is to its own advantage by itself? Or does it need neither itself nor another craft to seek out what is advantageous to it, because of its own deficiencies? Or is it that there is no deficiency or error in any craft? That it isn't appropriate for any craft to seek what is to the advantage of anything except that of which it is the craft? And that, since it is itself correct, it is without either fault or impurity, as long as it is wholly and precisely the deficient?

Republic

craft that

tioned.

98 7

I

Consider

is?

it

Is it

this

with the preciseness of language you men-

so or not?

appears to be so. Medicine doesn't seek It

its

own

advantage, then, but that of the body?

Yes.

horse-breeding doesn't seek its own advantage, but that of horses? Indeed, no other craft seeks its own advantage for it has no further needs but the advantage of that of which it is the craft?

And

—

—

Apparently

so.

Thrasymachus, the crafts rule over and are stronger than the things of which they are the crafts? Very reluctantly, he conceded this as well. No kind of knowledge seeks or orders what is advantageous to itself, then, but what is advantageous to the weaker, which is subject to it. He tried to fight this conclusion, but he conceded it in the end. And after he had, I said: Surely, then, no doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to

Now,

surely,

We

agreed that a doctor in the precise sense bodies, not a money-maker. Wasn't that agreed? his patient?

is

a ruler of

Yes.

So a ship's captain That's

what we agreed.

follow that a ship's captain or ruler won't seek and order advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to a sailor?

Doesn't

what

He

is

in the precise sense is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?

it

reluctantly agreed.

any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his subjects; the ones of whom he is himself the craftsman. that he It is to his subjects and what is advantageous and proper to them looks, and everything he says and does he says and does for them. When we reached this point in the argument, and it was clear to all that his account of justice had turned into its opposite, instead of answering, Thrasymachus said: Tell me, Socrates, do you still have a wet nurse? What's this? Hadn't you better answer my questions rather than asking me such things? Because she's letting you run around with a snotty nose, and doesn't wipe it when she needs to! Why, for all she cares, you don't even know about sheep and shepherds. Just what is it I don't know? You think that shepherds and cowherds seek the good of their sheep and cattle, and fatten them and take care of them, looking to something other than their master's good and their own. Moreover, you believe that So, then,

Thrasymachus, no one

in

rulers in cities— true rulers, that is— think about their subjects differently than one does about sheep, and that night and day they think of something

besides their own advantage. You are so far from understanding about justice and what's just, about injustice and what's unjust, that you don't

Thrasymachus/ Socrates realize that justice

good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules the truly simple and just, and those it is

really the

do what is to the advantage of the other and stronger, and they make the one they serve happy, but themselves not at all. You must look at it as follows, my most simple Socrates: A just man always gets less than an unjust one. First, in their contracts with one another, you'll never find, when the partnership ends, that a just partner has got more than an unjust rules

one, but

Second, in matters relating to the city, when taxes are to be paid, a just man pays more on the same property, an unjust one less, but when the city is giving out refunds, a just man gets nothing, while an less.

unjust one makes a large profit. Finally, when each of them holds a ruling position in some public office, a just person, even if he isn't penalized in other ways, finds that his private affairs deteriorate because he has to neglect them, that he gains no advantage from the public purse because

and that he's hated by his relatives and acquaintances when he's unwilling to do them an unjust favor. The opposite is true of an unjust man in every respect. Therefore, I repeat what I said before: A person of great power outdoes everyone else. Consider him if you want to figure out how much more advantageous it is for the individual to be just rather than unjust. You'll understand this most easily if you turn your thoughts to the most complete injustice, the one that makes the doer of injustice happiest and the sufferers of it, who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched. This is tyranny, which through stealth or force appropriates the property of others, whether sacred or profane, public or private, not little by little, but all at once. If someone commits only one part of injustice and is caught, he's punished and greatly reproached such partly unjust people of his justice,

—

are

called

11

temple-robbers kidnappers, housebreakers, robbers, and thieves when they commit these crimes. But when someone, in addition to appropriating their possessions, kidnaps and enslaves the citizens as ,

well, instead of these

shameful names he is called happy and blessed, not only by the citizens themselves, but by all who learn that he has done the whole of injustice. Those who reproach injustice do so because they are afraid not of doing it but of suffering it. So, Socrates, injustice, if it is on

enough scale, is stronger, And, as I said from the first, justice a large

and more masterly than justice. is what is advantageous to the stronger, while injustice is to one's own profit and advantage. Having emptied this great flood of words into our ears all at once like a bath attendant, Thrasymachus intended to leave. But those present didn't let him and made him stay to give an account of what he had said. I too begged him to stay, and I said to him: After hurling such a speech at us, Thrasymachus, do you intend to leave before adequately instructing us or finding out whether you are right or not? Or do you think it a small The temples acted day bank robber. 11.

freer,

as public treasuries, so that a temple robber

is

much

like a present-

Republic

989

I

matter to determine which whole worthwhile for each of us?

way

of

would make

life

living

most

you to think? Thrasymachus said. Either that, or else you care nothing for us and aren't worried about whether we'll live better or worse lives because of our ignorance of what you say you know. So show some willingness to teach it to us. It wouldn't be a bad investment for you to be the benefactor of a group as large as ours. For my own part. I'll tell you that I am not persuaded. I don't believe that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if you give it full scope and put no obstacles in its way. Suppose that there is an unjust person, and suppose he does have the power to do injustice, whether by trickery or open warfare; nonetheless, he doesn't persuade me that injustice is more profitable than justice. Perhaps someone here, besides myself, feels the same as I do. So come now, and persuade us that we are wrong to esteem justice more highly than injustice in planning our lives. And how am I to persuade you, if you aren't persuaded by what I said just now? What more can I do? Am I to take my argument and pour it Is that

into

seem

I

to

345

b

your very soul?

God if

what

forbid! Don't

you change your

do

what you've said, and then, openly and don't deceive us. You see,

that! But, first, stick to

position,

do

it

Thrasymachus, that having defined the true doctor the things

you

said before

— to continue examining

to keep necessary — you didn't consider insofar as he's a think it

later

that, guard on the true shepherd. You shepherd, he fattens sheep, not looking to what is best for the sheep but to a banquet, like a guest about to be entertained at a feast, or to a future sale, like a money-maker rather than a shepherd. Shepherding is concerned only to provide what is best for the things it is set over, and it is itself adequately provided with all it needs to be at its best when it doesn't fall short in any way of being the craft of shepherding. That's why I thought

a precise

c

d

12 necessary for us to agree before that every kind of rule, insofar as it rules, doesn't seek anything other than what is best for the things it rules and cares for, and this is true both of public and private kinds of rule. But

it

do you think I

don't think

But,

wants

who rule cities, by god, know it.

that those it,

the true rulers, rule willingly?

I

Thrasymachus, don't you to rule for its

own

realize that in other kinds of rule

no one

sake, but they ask for pay, thinking that their

ruling will benefit not themselves but their subjects? Tell me, doesn't every craft differ from every other in having a different function? Please don't

answer contrary

to

what you

believe, so that

we

can come to some defi-

nite conclusion.

Yes, that's

what

differentiates them.

each craft benefits us in its own peculiar way, different from the others. For example, medicine gives us health, navigation gives us safety while sailing, and so on with the others?

And

12.

See 341e-342e.

e

346

— 990

Thrasymachus/ Socrates /Glaucon

Certainly.

And

b

wage-earning gives us wages, for this is its function? Or would you call medicine the same as navigation? Indeed, if you want to define matters precisely, as you proposed, even if someone who is a ship's captain becomes healthy because sailing is advantageous to his health, you wouldn't for that reason call his craft medicine? Certainly not.

Nor would you

wage-earning medicine, even healthy while earning wages? call

if

someone becomes

Certainly not.

Nor would you c

call

medicine wage-earning, even

if

someone earns pay

while healing? No.

We It

are agreed, then, that each craft brings does.

its

own

peculiar benefit 7

Then whatever benefit all craftsmen receive in common must clearly result from their joint practice of some additional craft that benefits each of them? So

seems. And we say that the additional craft in question, which benefits the craftsmen by earning them wages, is the craft of wage-earning? He reluctantly agreed. it

Then

d

this benefit, receiving

wages, doesn't result from their own craft, but rather, if we're to examine this precisely, medicine provides health, and wage-earning provides wages; house-building provides a house, and wage-earning, which accompanies it, provides a wage; and so on with the other crafts. Each of them does its own work and benefits the things it is set over. So, if wages aren't added, is there any benefit that the craftsman

from his craft? Apparently none. But he still provides a benefit when he works for nothing? Yes, I think he does. Then, it is clear now, Thrasymachus, that no craft or rule provides for its own advantage, but, as we've been saying for some time, it provides and orders for its subject and aims at its advantage, that of the weaker, not of the stronger. That's why I said just now, Thrasymachus, that no one willingly chooses to rule and to take other people's troubles in hand and straighten them out, but each asks for wages; for anyone who intends gets

e

347

to practice his craft well at least

not

never does or orders what

is

—

when he

best for himself

orders as his craft prescribes but what is best for his subject. It is because of this, it seems, that wages must be provided to a person if he s to be willing to rule, whether in the form of money or honor or a penalty if he refuses.

What do you mean, of wages, but call

it

a

wage.

I

Socrates? said Glaucon.

don't understand

what penalty

know the first two kinds you mean or how you can I

Republic

991

I

Then you don't understand the best people's kind of wages, the kind that moves the most decent to rule, when they are willing to rule at all. Don't you know that the love of honor and the love of money are despised, and rightly so? do.

I

Therefore good people won't be willing to rule for the sake of either money or honor. They don't want to be paid wages openly for ruling and get called hired hands, nor to take them in secret from their rule and be called thieves. And they won't rule for the sake of honor, because they aren't ambitious honor-lovers. So, if they're to be willing to rule, some compulsion or punishment must be brought to bear on them perhaps that's why it is thought shameful to seek to rule before one is compelled be ruled to. Now, the greatest punishment, if one isn't willing to rule, is to

—

by someone worse than

oneself.

And

I

think that

it's

fear of this that

makes

they do. They approach ruling not as something good or something to be enjoyed, but as something necessary, since it can t be entrusted to anyone better than or even as good as themselves. In a city of good men, if it came into being, the citizens would fight in order

decent people rule

when

—

—

not

as they

to rule , just

do now

in order to rule.

There

it

would be

quite

anyone who is really a true ruler doesn't by nature seek his own advantage but that of his subjects. And everyone, knowing this, would rather be benefited by others than take the trouble to benefit them. So I can't at all agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the advantage of the stronger but we'll look further into that another time. What Thrasymachus is now saying that the life of an unjust person is better than that seems to be of far greater importance. Which life would of a just one you choose, Glaucon? And which of our views do you consider truer?

clear that

—

—

—

I

more profitable. good things Thrasymachus listed a moment ago

certainly think that the

Did you hear

all

of the

life

of a just person

is

for the unjust life?

wasn't persuaded. Then, do you want us to persuade him, if we're able to find a way, that what he says isn't true? Of course I do. just If we oppose him with a parallel speech about the blessings of the measure life, and then he replies, and then we do, we'd have to count and the good things mentioned on each side, and we'd need a jury to decide the case. But if, on the other hand, we investigate the question, as we've been doing, by seeking agreement with each other, we ourselves can be I

heard, but

I

both jury and advocates

at once.

Certainly.

Which approach do you

prefer?

I

asked.

The second. Come, then, Thrasymachus, I said, answer us from the beginning. You say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice? I certainly do say that, and I've told you why.

Socra tes/Th rasymach us

Well, then, virtue

Of

what do you say about

and the other

this?

Do you

call

one of the two

a

a vice?

course.

That

is

to say,

you

call justice a virtue

and

That's hardly likely, since I say that injustice Then, what exactly do you say?

injustice a vice? is

profitable

and justice

isn't.

The opposite. That justice is a vice? No, just very high-minded simplicity. Then do you call being unjust being low-minded? No, I call it good judgment.

You consider unjust

people, then, Thrasymachus, to be clever and good? Yes, those who are completely unjust, who can bring cities and whole communities under their power. Perhaps, you think I meant pickpockets? Not that such crimes aren t also profitable, if they're not found out, but they aren't worth mentioning by comparison to what I'm talking about. I not unaware of what you want to say. But I wonder about this: Do you really include injustice with virtue and wisdom, and justice

m

with

their opposites? I

certainly do.

That's harder, and it isn't easy now to know what to say. If you had declared that injustice is more profitable, but agreed that it is a vice or shameful, as some others do, we could have discussed the matter on the basis of conventional beliefs. But now, obviously, you'll say that injustice

and strong and apply to it all the attributes we used justice, since you dare to include it with virtue and wisdom. You've divined my views exactly. is

fine

Nonetheless,

to

apply

to

we mustn't shrink from pursuing the argument and looking

into this, just as long as

take

you

be saying what you really think. And I believe that you aren't joking now, Thrasymachus, but are saying what you believe to be the truth. What difference does it make to you, whether I believe it or not? It's my account you're supposed to be refuting. It makes no difference. But try to answer this further question: Do you think that a just person wants to outdo someone else who's just? Not at all, for he wouldn't then be as polite and innocent as he is. Or to outdo someone who does a just action? No, he doesn't even want to do that. And does he claim that he deserves to outdo an unjust person and believe that

it is

He d want

to

I

him

to

do so, or doesn't he believe that? outdo him, and he d claim to deserve to do so, but he

just for

to

wouldn't be able. That s not what I asked, but whether a just person wants to outdo an unjust person but not a just one, thinking that this is what he deserves?

He

does.

Republic

993

I

unjust person? Does he claim that he deserves to outdo a just person or someone who does a just action? Of course he does; he thinks he deserves to outdo everyone.

What about an

an unjust person also outdo an unjust person or someone who does an unjust action, and will he strive to get the most he can for himself from everyone?

Then

He

will

will.

Then, let's put it this way: A just person doesn't outdo someone like himself but someone unlike himself, whereas an unjust person outdoes both like and unlike.

Very well

An

put.

unjust person

clever

is

and good, and

a just

one

is

neither?

That's well put, too. It

follows, then, that an unjust person

is like

clever

and good people,

while the other isn't? Of course that's so. How could he fail to be like them when he has their qualities, while the other isn't like them? Fine. Then each of them has the qualities of the people he's like?

Of

course.

All right, Thrasymachus.

Do you

call

one person musical and another

nonmusical? I

do.

Which

of

them

The musical one

And

is

clever, of

the things he's clever

bad

he's

in,

and which isn't? course, and the other isn't. he's good in, and the things he

clever in music,

is

in,

isn't clever

in?

Yes. Isn't the

same

true of a doctor?

It is.

think that a musician, in tuning his lyre and in tightening and loosening the strings, wants to outdo another musician, claiming that this is what he deserves?

Do you

I

do

not.

But he does want to outdo a nonmusician? Necessarily.

Does he, when prescribing food and drink, want outdo another doctor or someone who does the action that medicine pre-

What about to

a doctor?

scribes?

Certainly not.

But he does want

to

outdo a nondoctor?

Yes.

any branch of knowledge or ignorance, do you think that a knowledgeable person would intentionally try to outdo other knowledgeable people or say something better or different than they do, rather than doing or saying the very same thing as those like him? In

994

Thrasymachus/ Socrates

Well, perhaps

it

must be

as

you

say.

And what

b

about an ignorant person? Doesn't he want to outdo both a knowledgeable person and an ignorant one? Probably.

A

knowledgeable person

is

clever?

agree.

I

And

a clever

one

is

good?

agree.

I

Therefore, a good and clever person doesn't want to outdo those like himself but those who are unlike him and his opposite.

So it seems. But a bad and ignorant person wants to outdo both his

like

and

his op-

posite.

Apparently.

Now, Thrasymachus, we found that an unjust person tries those like him and those unlike him? Didn't you say that?

to

outdo

Then, a just person is like a clever and good one, and an unjust an ignorant and bad one.

is like

I

c

did.

And

that a just person won't

outdo

his like but his unlike?

Yes.

It

looks that way.

Moreover, Yes,

we

we

agreed that each has the qualities of the one he resembles.

did.

Then, a just person has turned out to be good and clever, and an unjust one ignorant and bad.

Thrasymachus agreed

d

to all this, not easily as I'm telling

but relucsince it was summer a quantity of sweat that was a wonder to behold. And then I saw something I'd never seen before Thrasymachus blushing. But, in any case, after we'd agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom and that injustice is vice and ignorance, I said. All right, let s take that as established. But we also said that injustice is powerful, or don't you remember that, Thrasymachus? I remember, but I not satisfied with what you're now saying. I could make a speech about it, but, if I did, I know that you'd accuse me of en 8 a §i n 8 oratory. So either allow me to speak, or, if you want to ask questions, go ahead, and 1 11 say, "All right," and nod yes and no, as one does to old wives' tales. Don't do that, contrary to your own opinion. tantly,

with

toil,

trouble,

and

—

it,

—

m

answer so as to please you, since you won't let me make a speech. What else do you want? Nothing, by god. But if that s what you're going to do, go ahead and do it. I'll ask my questions. 1 11

1

Ask ahead. I'll ask what about justice

asked before, so that we may proceed with our argument and injustice in an orderly fashion, for surely it was claimed I

Republic

995

I

more powerful than justice. But, now, if justice indeed wisdom and virtue, it will easily be shown to be stronger than

that injustice is

is

stronger and

ignorance (no one could now be ignorant of that). However, I don't want to state the matter so unconditionally, Thrasymachus, but to look into it in some such way as this. Would you say that and to hold it is unjust for a city to try to enslave other cities unjustly

injustice, since injustice is

them in subjection when Of course, that's what most completely unjust.

it

many

has enslaved

of

them?

the best city will especially do, the one that

is

your position, but the point I want to examine is this: Will the city that becomes stronger than another achieve this power without justice, or will it need the help of justice? If what you said a moment ago stands, and justice is cleverness or wisdom, it will need the help of justice, but if things are as I stated, it will need the help of injustice. I'm impressed, Thrasymachus, that you don't merely nod yes or no but understand

I

that's

give very fine answers. That's because I'm trying to please you. You're doing well at it, too. So please me

some more by answering this question: Do you think that a city, an army, a band of robbers or thieves, or any other tribe with a common unjust purpose would be able to achieve they were unjust to each other? No, indeed. What if they weren't unjust to one another?

it if

Would

they achieve more?

Certainly.

war, hatred, and fighting among themselves, while justice brings friendship and a sense of common purpose. Injustice,

Thrasymachus, causes

civil

Isn't that so?

be so, in order not to disagree with you. You're still doing well on that front. So tell me this: If the effect of injustice is to produce hatred wherever it occurs, then, whenever it arises, whether among free men or slaves, won't it cause them to hate one another, engage in civil war, and prevent them from achieving any common Let

it

purpose? Certainly.

between two people? Won't they be at odds, hate each other, and be enemies to one another and to just people? They will. Does injustice lose its power to cause dissension when it arises within

What

if it

arises

a single individual, or will

Let

it

preserve

it

it

preserve

it

intact?

intact.

Apparently, then, injustice has the power, first, to make whatever it arises whether it is a city, a family, an army, or anything else incapable of in achieving anything as a unit, because of the civil wars and differences it

—

—

creates, and, second, in

every

way

its

it

makes

that unit

an enemy

to itself

opposite, namely, justice. Isn't that so?

and

to

what

is

996

Thrasymachus/ Socrates

Certainly.

And

even

in a single individual,

has by its nature the very same effect. First, it makes him incapable of achieving anything, because he is in a state of civil war and not of one mind; second, it makes him his own enemy, as well as the enemy of just people. Hasn't it that effect? it

Yes.

And Let b

c

d

the gods too are just?

it

be

so.

So an unjust person is also an enemy of the gods, Thrasymachus, while a just person is their friend? Enjoy your banquet of words! Have no fear, I won't oppose you. That would make these people hate me. Come, then, complete the banquet for me by continuing to answer as you've been doing. We have shown that just people are cleverer and more capable of doing things, while unjust ones aren't even able to act together, for when we speak of a powerful achievement by unjust men acting together, what we say isn t altogether true. They would never have been able to keep their hands off each other if they were completely unjust. But clearly there must have been some sort of justice in them that at least prevented them from doing injustice among themselves at the same time as they were doing it to others. And it was this that enabled them to achieve what they did. When they started doing unjust things, they were only halfway corrupted by their injustice (for those who are all bad and completely unjust are completely incapable of accomplishing anything). These are the things I understand to hold, not the ones you first maintained, We must now examine, as we proposed before 13 whether just people also live better and are happier than unjust ones. I think it's clear already that this is so, but we must look into it further, since the argument concerns no ordinary topic but the way we ought to live. ,

Go ahead and I

e

I

will. Tell

look.

me, do you think there is such a thing as the function of a horse?

do.

And would you

define the function of a horse or of anything else as that which one can do only with it or best with it? I don't understand. Let

me put it this way:

Is

it

possible to see with anything other than eves?

Certainly not.

Or

to

hear with anything other than ears 7

No. Then, we are right eyes and ears?

Of

say that seeing and hearing are the functions of

course.

What about 353

to

this?

Could you use

other things in pruning a vine? 13.

See 347e.

a

dagger or a carving knife or

lots of

Republic

Of

997

I

course.

But wouldn't you do a finer job with a pruning knife designed for the purpose than with anything else? You would. Then shall we take pruning to be its function? Yes.

think you'll understand what I was asking earlier when I asked whether the function of each thing is what it alone can do or what it does

Now,

I

better than anything else.

understand, and I think that this is the function of each. All right. Does each thing to which a particular function is assigned also have a virtue? Let's go over the same ground again. We say that eyes have I

some function? They do. So there There is.

And

is

also a virtue of eyes?

ears have a function?

Yes.

So there There is.

And

all

They

And virtue

is

also a virtue of ears?

other things are the same, aren't they?

are.

could eyes perform their function well

and had the

How

if

they lacked their peculiar

vice instead?

could they, for don't you

mean

if

they had blindness instead

of sight?

Whatever their virtue is, for I'm not now asking about that but about whether anything that has a function performs it well by means of its own peculiar virtue and badly by means of its vice? does.

That's true,

it

So

deprived of their

ears, too,

own virtue, perform

their function

badly?

That's right.

And

the

So

seems.

it

same could be

said about everything else?

Come, then, and let's consider this: Is there some function of a soul that you couldn't perform with anything else, for example, taking care of things, anything other than a soul to which you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar ruling, deliberating,

and the

like? Is there

function?

No, none of them.

What It

of living? Isn't that a function of a soul?

certainly

And

We

don't

is.

we

also say that there

is

a virtue of a soul?

do.

Then, will a soul ever perform its function well, Thrasymachus, deprived of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?

if it is

998

Thrasymachus/ Socrates /Glaucon impossible.

It's

Doesn t badly and

follow, then, that a that a good soul does

it

bad soul all

rules

and takes care

of things

these things well?

does.

It

Now, we agreed

We

that justice

is

a soul's virtue,

and

injustice its vice?

did.

Then,

follows that a just soul and a just unjust one badly. it

Apparently

man

will live well,

and an

according to your argument. surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy, and anyone

354

And who doesn't Of

so,

the opposite.

is

course.

Therefore, a just person

So be It

c

no one

to

be wretched but to be happy.

course.

And

b

happy, and an unjust one wretched.

it.

profits

Of

is

Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice. Let that be your banquet, Socrates, at the feast of Bendis. Given by you, Thrasymachus, after you became gentle and ceased to give me rough treatment. Yet I haven't had a fine banquet. But that's my fault not yours. I seem to have behaved like a glutton, snatching at every dish that passes and tasting it before properly savoring its predecessor. Before finding the answer to our first inquiry about what justice is, I let that go and turned to investigate whether it is a kind of vice and ignorance or a kind of wisdom and virtue. Then an argument came up about injustice being more profitable than justice, and I couldn't refrain from abandoning the previous one and following up on that. Hence the result of the discusso,

sion, as far as

m

concerned, is that I know nothing, for when I don't know what justice is, 1 11 hardly know whether it is a kind of virtue or not, or whether a person who has it is happy or unhappy. I

Book 357

When

thought I had done with the discussion, but it turned out to have been only a prelude. Glaucon showed his characteristic courage

on

b

said this,

II

I

this

I

occasion too and refused to accept Thrasymachus' abandonment

of the argument. Socrates, he said, do you want to seem to have persuaded us that it is better in every way to be just than unjust, or do you want truly to convince us of this?

want

truly to convince you, I said, if I can. Well, then, you certainly aren't doing what you want. Tell me, do you think there is a kind of good we welcome, not because we desire what comes from it, but because we welcome it for its own sake joy, for example, and all the harmless pleasures that have no results beyond the I

—

joy of having

them?

Republic

999

II

Certainly,

I

think there are such things.

good we like for its own sake and also for the sake of what comes from it— knowing, for example, and seeing and being healthy? We welcome such things, I suppose, on both counts.

And

is

there a kind of

Yes. also see a third kind of good, such as physical training, medical treatment when sick, medicine itself, and the other ways of making money? We'd say that these are onerous but beneficial to us, and we

And do you

wouldn't choose them for

and other things There

is

that

their

own

come from them.

also this third kind. But

Where do you put justice? I myself put it among the anyone who and because

is

sakes, but for the sake of the rewards

what

of

it?

goods, as something to be valued by going to be blessed with happiness, both because of itself finest

what comes from it. That isn't most people's opinion. They'd say that justice belongs to the onerous kind, and is to be practiced for the sake of the rewards and popularity that come from a reputation for justice, but is to be avoided because of itself as something burdensome. justice on these I know that's the general opinion. Thrasymachus faulted grounds a moment ago and praised injustice, but it seems that I'm a slow

of

learner.

and see whether you still have that problem, for I think that Thrasymachus gave up before he had to, charmed by you as if he were a snake. But I'm not yet satisfied by the argument on either side. I want to know what justice and injustice are and what power each itself has when it's by itself in the soul. I want to leave out of account their rewards and what comes from each of them. So, if you agree. I'll renew the argument of Thrasymachus. First, I'll state what kind of thing people consider justice to be and what its origins are. Second, necessary, I'll argue that all who practice it do so unwillingly, as something not as something good. Third, I'll argue that they have good reason to act as they do, for the life of an unjust person is, they say, much better than

Come,

then,

and

listen to

me

as well,

that of a just one.

believe any of that myself. I'm perplexed, indeed, and my ears are deafened listening to Thrasymachus and countless others. But I've yet to hear anyone defend justice in the way I want, proving that I think that it is better than injustice. I want to hear it praised by itself and It isn't,

Socrates, that

I

,

I'm most likely to hear this from you. Therefore, I'm going to speak at length in praise of the unjust life, and in doing so I'll show you the way But see I want to hear you praising justice and denouncing injustice.

whether you want me to do that or not. with any I want that most of all. Indeed, what subject could someone understanding enjoy discussing more often? what justice Excellent. Then let's discuss the first subject I mentioned

—

is

and what

its

origins are.

uu

They say

359

b

Glaucon / Socrates that to

do

injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad, but that the badness of suffering it so far exceeds the goodness of doing it that those who have done and suffered injustice and tasted both, but who lack the power to do it and avoid suffering it, decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants, and what the law commands they call lawful and just. This, they say, is the origin and essence of justice. It is intermediate between the best and the worst. The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is a mean between these two extremes. People value it not as a good but because they are too weak to do injustice with impunity. Someone who has the power to

do this, however, and is a true man wouldn't make an agreement with anyone not to do injustice in order not to suffer it. For him that would be

madness. This

is

and these are

its

the nature of justice, according to the argument, Socrates, natural origins.

We can see most clearly that those who practice justice do c

it

unwillingly

and because they lack the power to do injustice, if in our thoughts we grant to a just and an unjust person the freedom to do whatever they like. We can then follow both of them and see where their desires would lead. And we'll catch the just person red-handed travelling the same road as the unjust. The reason for this is the desire to outdo others and get more and more. This is what anyone's nature naturally pursues as good, but nature is forced by law into the perversion of treating fairness with respect.

d

e

The freedom I mentioned would be most easily realized if both people had the power they say the ancestor of Gyges of Lydia possessed. The story goes that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler of Lydia. There was a violent thunderstorm, and an earthquake broke open the ground and created a chasm at the place where he was tending his sheep. Seeing this, he was filled with amazement and went down into it. And there, in addition to many other wonders of which we're told, he saw a hollow bronze horse. There were windowlike openings in it, and, peeping in, he saw a corpse, which seemed to be of more than human size, wearing nothing but a gold ring on its finger. He took the ring and came out of the chasm. He wore the ring at the usual monthly meeting that reported to the king on the state of the flocks. And as he was sitting among the others, he happened to turn the setting of the ring towards himself to the inside of his hand.

360

b

When

he did

he became invisible to those sitting near him, and they went on talking as if he had gone. He wondered at this, and, fingering the ring, he turned the setting outwards again and became visible. So he experimented with the ring to test whether it indeed had this power and it did. If he turned the setting inward, he became invisible; if he turned it outward, he became visible again. When he realized this, he at once arranged to become one of the messengers sent to report to the king. And when he arrived there, he seduced the king's wife, attacked the king with her help, killed him, and took over the kingdom. this,

Republic

1001

II

were two such rings, one worn by a just and the other by an unjust person. Now, no one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice or stay away from other people's property, when he could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace with impunity, go into people's houses and have sex with anyone he wished, kill or release from prison anyone he wished, and do all the other things that would make him like a god among humans. Rather his actions would be in no way different from those of an unjust person, and both would follow the same path. This, some would say, is a great proof that one is never just willingly but only when compelled to be. No one believes justice to be a good when it is kept private, since, wherever either person thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it. Indeed, every man believes that injustice is far more profitable to himself than justice. And any exponent of this argument will say he's right, for someone who didn't want to do injustice, given this sort of opportunity, and who didn't touch other people's property would be thought wretched and stupid by everyone aware of the situation, though, of course, they'd praise Let's suppose, then, that there

him for

in public, deceiving

my

second

each other for fear of suffering

injustice.

So

much

topic.

As for the choice between the lives we're discussing, we'll be able to make a correct judgment about that only if we separate the most just and the most unjust. Otherwise we won't be able to do it. Here's the separation have in mind. We'll subtract nothing from the injustice of an unjust person and nothing from the justice of a just one, but we'll take each to be complete in his own way of life. First, therefore, we must suppose that an unjust person will act as clever craftsmen do: A first-rate captain or doctor, for example, knows the difference between what his craft can and can't do. He attempts the first but lets the second go by, and if he happens to slip, he can put things right. In the same way, an unjust person's successful attempts at injustice must remain undetected, if he is to be fully unjust. Anyone who is caught should be thought inept, for the extreme of injustice is to be believed to be just without being just. And our completely unjust person must be given complete injustice; nothing may be subtracted from it. We must allow that, while doing the greatest injustice, he has nonetheless provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice. If he happens to make a slip, he must be able to put it right. If any of his unjust activities should be discovered, he must be able to speak persuasively or to use force. And if force is needed, he must have the help of courage and strength and of the substantial wealth and friends with which I

he has provided himself. Having hypothesized such a person, let's now in our argument put beside him a just man, who is simple and noble and who, as Aeschylus says, doesn't want to be believed to be good but to be so. We must take 1

1.

In Seven Against Thebes, 592-94,

be believed to be the best but to be quotes below at 362a-b.

wish to The passage continues with the words Glaucon

it is

it."

said of

Amphiaraus

that "he did not

Glaucon/ Socrates/ Adeimantus c

away

his reputation, for a reputation for justice

and rewards, so of justice itself

him

d

would bring him honor

wouldn't be clear whether he is just for the sake or for the sake of those honors and rewards. We must strip that

it

of everything except justice

and make his situation the opposite of an unjust person's. Though he does no injustice, he must have the greatest reputation for it, so that his justice may be tested full-strength and not diluted by wrongdoing and what comes from it. Let him stay like that unchanged until he dies— just, but all his life believed to be unjust. In this way, both will reach the extremes, the one of justice and the other of injustice, and we'll be able to judge which of them is happier.

Whew! Glaucon, for

I

our competition,

said,

how

just as

vigorously you've scoured each of the

you would

a pair of statues for an art

men

compe-

tition. I

do the

best

I

can, he replied. Since the

two are

as I've described, in shouldn't be difficult to complete the account of the kind of life that awaits each of them, but it must be done. And if what I say sounds crude, Socrates, remember that it isn t I who speak but those who

any

case,

it

praise

injustice at the

362

expense of justice. They'll say that a just person in such circumstances will be whipped, stretched on a rack, chained, blinded with fire, and, at the end, when he has suffered every kind of evil, he'll be impaled, and will realize then that one shouldn't want to be just but to be believed to be just. Indeed, Aeschylus' words are far more correctly applied to unjust people than to just ones, for the supporters of injustice will say that a really unjust person, having a way of life based on the truth about things and not living in accordance with opinion, doesn't want simply to be believed to be unjust but actually to be so Harvesting a deep furrow in his mind Where wise counsels propagate.

b

,

He

rules his city because of his reputation for justice; he marries into any family he wishes; he gives his children in marriage to anyone he wishes; he has contracts and partnerships with anyone he wants; and

besides these ways, he profits because he has no scruples about doing injustice. In any contest, public or private, he's the winner benefiting himself in

and outdoes

all

his enemies.

And by

outdoing them, he becomes wealthy, and harming his enemies. He makes adequate sacrito the gods and sets up magnificent offerings to them. He takes better

benefiting his friends c

fices

care of the gods, therefore, (and, indeed, of the human beings he's fond of) than a just person does. Hence it's likely that the gods, in turn, will take better care of him than of a just person. That's what they say, Socrates, that gods and humans provide a better life for unjust

people than for

just ones. I

When Glaucon had said

this,

I

had

it

in

mind

Adeimantus intervened: You surely don't think adequately stated?

respond, but his brother that the position has been

to

Republic

Why

1003

II

not?

said.

I

The most important thing to say hasn't been said yet. Well, then, I replied, a man's brother must stand by him, as the saying goes If Glaucon has omitted something, you must help him. Yet what he has said is enough to throw me to the canvas and make me unable to 2

.

come

to the aid of justice.

Hear what more I have to say, for we should also fully explore the arguments that are opposed to the ones Glaucon gave, the ones that praise justice and find fault with injustice, so that what I Nonsense, he

said.

take to be his intention

When

may

be

clearer.

fathers speak to their sons, they say that

one must be

just, as

do

who have

charge of anyone. But they don't praise justice itself, only the high reputations it leads to and the consequences of being thought to be just, such as the public offices, marriages, and other things Glaucon listed. But they elaborate even further on the consequences of reputation. By bringing in the esteem of the gods, they are able to talk about the abundant good things that they themselves and the noble Hesiod and Homer say that the gods give to the pious, for Hesiod says that the all

the others

gods make the oak

trees

Bear acorns at the top and bees

And make for the just, is

and

fleecy sheep

tells

of

in the

middle

heavy laden with wool

many

other

good things akin

to these.

And Homer

similar:

When

a good king , in his piety ,

Upholds justice the black earth bears ,

Wlwat and barley

for

him and ,

his trees are

heavy with

His sheep bear lambs unfailingly and the sea yields up ,

fruit. its fish

3 .

son make the gods give the just more headstrong goods than these 4 In their stories, they lead the just to Hades, seat them on couches, provide them with a symposium of pious people, crown them with wreaths, and make them spend all their time drinking as if they thought drunkenness was the finest wage of virtue. Others stretch even further the wages that virtue receives from the gods, for they say that someone who is pious and keeps his promises leaves his children's children and a whole race behind him. In these and other similar ways, they praise

Musaeus and

his

.

—

2.

See Odyssey

3.

The two

xvi. 97-98.

last

quotations are from Works and Days 232

ff.

and Odyssey

xix. 109-13,

omitting 110, respectively. 4.

Musaeus was

Orphism.

a legendary poet closely associated with the

mystery religion of

1004

Adeimantus

They bury

and unjust in mud in Hades; force them to carry water in a sieve; bring them into bad repute while they're still alive, and all those penalties that Glaucon gave to the just person they give to the unjust. But they have nothing else to say. This, then, is the way people praise justice and find fault with injustice. Besides this, Socrates, consider another form of argument about justice and injustice employed both by private individuals and by poets. All go on repeating with one voice that justice and moderation are fine things, but hard and onerous, while licentiousness and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire and are shameful only in opinion and law. They add that unjust deeds are for the most part more profitable than just ones, and, whether in public or private, they willingly honor vicious people who have wealth and other types of power and declare them to be happy. But they dishonor and disregard the weak and the poor, even though they justice.

the impious

agree that they are better than the others. But the most wonderful of all these arguments concerns what they have to say about the gods and virtue. They say that the gods, too, assign misfortune and a bad life to many good people, and the opposite fate to

Begging priests and prophets frequent the doors of the rich and persuade them that they possess a god-given power founded on sacrifices and incantations. If the rich person or any of his ancestors has committed an injustice, they can fix it with pleasant rituals. Moreover, if he wishes to injure some enemy, then, at little expense, he'll be able to their opposites.

harm

and unjust alike, for by means of spells and enchantments they can persuade the gods to serve them. And the poets are brought forward as witnesses to all these accounts. Some harp on the ease of vice, as follows: just

Vice in abundance

is

easy to get;

The road is smooth and begins beside you But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue ,

and

,

road that is long, rough, and steep 5 Others quote Homer to bear witness that the gods can be influenced by humans, since he said: a

.

The gods themselves can be swayed by prayer And with sacrifices and soothing promises Incense and libations human beings turn them from When someone has transgressed and sinned 6 ,

,

,

their

purpose

.

And

they present a noisy throng of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring as they say of Selene and the Muses, in accordance with which

5.

Works and Days 287-89, with minor alterations.

6.

Iliad ix. 497-501,

with minor alterations.

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1005

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they perform their rituals 7 And they persuade not only individuals but whole cities that the unjust deeds of the living or the dead can be absolved or purified through ritual sacrifices and pleasant games. These initiations, as they call them, free people from punishment hereafter, while a terrible fate awaits those who have not performed the rituals. When all such sayings about the attitudes of gods and humans to virtue and vice are so often repeated, Socrates, what effect do you suppose they have on the souls of young people? I mean those who are clever and are able to flit from one of these sayings to another, so to speak, and gather from them an impression of what sort of person he should be and of how best to travel the road of life. He would surely ask himself Pindar's question, "Should I by justice or by crooked deceit scale this high wall and live my life guarded and secure?" And he'll answer: "The various sayings suggest that there is no advantage in my being just if I'm not also thought just, while the troubles and penalties of being just are apparent. But they tell me that an unjust person, who has secured for himself a reputation for .

god. Since, then, 'opinion forcibly overcomes truth' and 'controls happiness,' as the wise men say, I must surely turn

365

b

justice, lives the life of a

should create a facade of illusory virtue around me to deceive those who come near, but keep behind it the greedy and crafty fox of the wise Archilochus ." 9 "But surely," someone will object, "it isn't easy for vice to remain always hidden." We'll reply that nothing great is easy. And, in any case, if we're to be happy, we must follow the path indicated in these accounts. To remain undiscovered we'll form secret societies and political clubs. And there are teachers of persuasion to make us clever in dealing with assemblies and law courts. Therefore, using persuasion in one place and force in another, we'll outdo others without paying a penalty. "What about the gods? Surely, we can't hide from them or use violent force against them!" Well, if the gods don't exist or don't concern themselves with human affairs, why should we worry at all about hiding from them? If they do exist and do concern themselves with us, we've learned all we know about them from the laws and the poets who give their genealogies nowhere else. But these are the very people who tell us that the gods can be persuaded and influenced by sacrifices, gentle prayers, and offerings. Hence, we should believe them on both matters or neither. If we believe them, we should be unjust and offer sacrifices from the fruits of our injustice. If we are just, our only gain is not to be punished by the gods, since we lose the profits of injustice. But if we are unjust, we get the entirely to

it

c

8

I

.

d

e

—

7.

It is

not clear whether Orpheus

Greek myth

a

rests

on the poems

8.

The quotation

9.

Archilochus of Paros

famous

is

in

was

a real person or a mythical figure. His

which the doctrines

attributed to Simonides, (c.

756-716

fable about the fox

b.c.)

whom

of the

Polemarchus

was an iambic and

and the hedgehog.

Orphic religion are cites in

elegiac poet

fame

in

set forth.

Book

I.

who composed

366

1UU6

Adeimantus/ Socrates

our crimes and transgressions and afterwards persuade the gods by prayer and escape without punishment. "But in Hades won't we pay the penalty for crimes committed here, either ourselves or our children's children?" "My friend," the young man will say as he does his calculation, "mystery rites have great power and the gods have great power of absolution. The greatest cities tell us this, as do those children of the gods who have become poets and prophets." Why, then, should we still choose justice over the greatest injustice? Many eminent authorities agree that, if we practice such injustice with a false facade, we'll do well at the hands of gods and humans, living and dying as we've a mind to. So, given all that has been said, Socrates, how is it possible for anyone of any power whether of mind, wealth, body, or birth to be willing to honor justice and not laugh aloud when he hears it praised? Indeed, if anyone can show that what we've said is false and has adequate knowledge that justice is best, he'll surely be full not of anger but of forgiveness for the unjust. He knows that, apart from someone of profits of

—

—

godlike character

who

is

disgusted by injustice or one

who

has gained

knowledge and avoids injustice for that reason, no one is just willingly. Through cowardice or old age or some other weakness, people do indeed object to injustice. But it's obvious that they do so only because they lack the power to do injustice, for the first of them to acquire it is the first to do as much injustice as he can. And all of this has no other cause than the one that led Glaucon and me to say to you: "Socrates, of all of you who claim to praise justice, from the original heroes of old whose words survive, to the men of the present day, not one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except by mentioning the reputations, honors, and rewards that are their consequences. No one has ever adequately described what each itself does of its own power by its presence in the soul of the person who possesses it, even if it remains hidden from gods and humans. No one, whether in poetry or in private conversations, has adequately argued that injustice is the worst thing a soul can have in it and that justice is the greatest good. If you had treated the subject in this way and persuaded us from youth, we wouldn't now be guarding against one another's injustices, but each would be his own best guardian, afraid that by doing injustice he'd be living with the worst thing possible."

Thrasymachus or anyone

might say what we've said, Socrates, or maybe even more, in discussing justice and injustice crudely inverting their powers, in my opinion. And, frankly, it's because I want to hear the opposite from you that I speak with all the force I can muster. So don't merely give us a theoretical argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but tell us what each itself does, because of its own powers, to someone who possesses it, that makes injustice bad and justice good. Follow Glaucon's advice, and don't take reputations into account, for if you don't deprive justice and injustice of their true reputations and attach false ones else

—

to

them, we'll say that you are not praising them but their reputations

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that you're encouraging us to be unjust in secret. In that case, we'll

and

say that you agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the good of another, the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is one's own advantage and profit, though not the advantage of the weaker. You agree that justice is one of the greatest goods, the ones that are worth getting for the sake of what comes from them, but much more so for their own sake, such as seeing, hearing, knowing, being healthy, and all other goods that are fruitful by their own nature and not simply because of reputation. Therefore, praise justice as a good of that kind, explaining how because of its very self it benefits its possessors and how injustice harms them. Leave wages and reputations for others to praise. Others would satisfy me if they praised justice and blamed injustice in that way, extolling the wages of one and denigrating those of the other. But you, unless you order me to be satisfied, wouldn't, for you've spent your whole life investigating this and nothing else. Don't, then, give us only a theoretical argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what effect each has because of itself on the person who has it the one whether it remains hidden from gods for good and the other for bad

—

—

—

—

and human beings or not. While I'd always admired the natures of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially pleased on this occasion, and I said: You are the sons of a great man, and Glaucon' s lover began his elegy well when he wrote, celebrating your achievements at the battle of Megara, Sons of Ariston, godlike offspring of a famous man.

my

by the divine if you're not convinced that injustice is better than justice and yet can speak on its behalf as you have done. And I believe that you really are unconvinced by your own words. I infer this from the way you live, for if I had only your words to go on, I wouldn't trust you. The more I trust you, however, the more I'm at a loss as to what to do. I don't see

That's well said in

opinion, for

you must indeed be

affected

can be of help. Indeed, I believe I'm incapable of it. And here's my evidence. I thought what I said to Thrasymachus showed that justice is better than injustice, but you won't accept it from me. On the other hand, I don't see how I can refuse my help, for I fear that it may even be impious to have breath in one's body and the ability to speak and yet to stand idly by and not defend justice when it is being prosecuted. So the best course

how

I

any assistance I can. Glaucon and the others begged me not to abandon the argument but to help in every way to track down what justice and injustice are and what the truth about their benefits is. So I told them what I had in mind: The investigation we're undertaking is not an easy one but requires keen eyesight. Therefore, since we aren't clever people, we should adopt the method of investigation that we'd use if, lacking keen eyesight, we were told to read small letters from a distance and then noticed that the same is

to give justice

1UU °

Socrates/ Adeimantus

letters existed

consider

it

and then

elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface. We'd a godsend, I think, to be allowed to read the larger ones first

to

examine the smaller ones,

whether they

to see

really are

the same.

That s certainly true, said Adeimantus, but our investigation of justice? you. We say, don't we, that there and also the justice of a whole city? I'll tell

is

how

is this

case similar to

the justice of a single

man

Certainly.

And

a city

It is

larger.

is

larger than a single

Perhaps, then, there easier to learn

what

more

is

man?

justice in the larger thing,

and

will be

it

you're willing, let's first find out what sort of thing justice is in a city and afterwards look for it in the individual, observing the ways in which the smaller is similar to the larger. That seems fine to me. If

we

So,

if

could watch a city coming to be in theory, wouldn't

justice

its

it is.

coming

Probably

to be,

and

its

we

also see

injustice as well?

so.

And when

that process

is

completed,

we

can hope to find what

we

are

looking for more easily?

Of

course.

Do you

think

we

should try to carry

my view. So think it We have already, thing else. I think a city

we

all

it

out, then?

It's

no small

task, in

over.

said Adeimantus. Don't even consider doing any-

comes

to

be because none of us

need many things. Do you think that a

is

self-sufficient,

city is

but

founded on any

other principle?

No.

And

because people need many things, and because one person calls on a second out of one need and on a third out of a different need, many people gather in a single place to live together as partners and helpers. And such a settlement is called a city. Isn't that so? It is.

And

they share things with one another, giving and taking, they do so because each believes that this is better for himself? if

That's right.

Come,

then, let's create a city in theory

our needs,

seems, that will create It is, indeed. Surely our first and greatest need it

from

its

beginnings.

it.

is

to

provide food to sustain

Certainly.

Our second That's right.

is

for shelter,

and our

And

third for clothes

and such.

life.

it's

Republic

How, to

1009

II

then, will a city be able to provide

be a farmer, another

we add

a cobbler

a builder,

and someone

and another

else to

Won't one person have weaver? And shouldn't

all this?

a

provide medical care?

All right.

So the essential minimum for a city is four or five men? Apparently. And what about this? Must each of them contribute his own work for the common use of all? For example, will a farmer provide food for everyone, spending quadruple the time and labor to provide food to be shared by them all? Or will he not bother about that, producing one quarter the food in one quarter the time, and spending the other three quarters, one in building a house, one in the production of clothes, and one in making shoes, not troubling to associate with the others, but minding his own business on his own? Perhaps, Socrates, Adeimantus replied, the would be easier than the other.

way you

suggested

first

That certainly wouldn't be surprising, for, even as you were speaking it occurred to me that, in the first place, we aren't all born alike, but each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being suited to one task, another to another. Or don't you think so? I

do.

Second, does one person do a better job if he practices many crafts or if he practices one? since he's one person himself If he practices one. It's clear, at any rate, I think, that if one misses the right moment in

—

anything, the

work

is

spoiled.

It is.

done won't wait on the leisure of the necessity pay close attention to his work rather

That's because the thing to be doer, but the doer

must

of

than treating it as a secondary occupation. Yes, he must.

and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is released from having to do any of The

result, then, is that

more

plentiful

the others.

Absolutely.

Then, Adeimantus, we're going to need more than four citizens to provide the things we've mentioned, for a farmer won't make his own plough, not if it's to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor any of his other farming tools. Neither will a builder and he, too, needs lots of things. And the same is

—

true of a

weaver and

a cobbler, isn't

it?

It is.

Hence, carpenters, metal workers, and many other craftsmen of that sort will share our little city and make it bigger. That's right.

Socrates/ Adeimantus / Glaucon

Yet it won t be a huge settlement even if we add cowherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen in order that the farmers have cows to do their ploughe

have oxen to share with the farmers in hauling their materials, and the weavers and cobblers have hides and fleeces to use. It won't be a small one either, if it has to hold all those. Moreover, it's almost impossible to establish a city in a place where ing, the builders

nothing has to be imported. Indeed it is. So we'll need yet further people to import from other is needed.

cities

whatever

Yes.

And

371

an importer goes empty-handed to another city, without a cargo of the things needed by the city from which he's to bring back what his own city needs, he'll come away empty-handed, won't he? So it seems. Therefore our citizens must not only produce enough for themselves at home but also goods of the right quality and quantity to satisfy the requirements of others. if

They must. So we'll need more farmers and other craftsmen in our

city.

Yes.

And

others to take care of imports and exports. merchants, aren't they? Yes.

So we'll need merchants,

And

they're called

too.

Certainly. b

And if the how to sail.

A

trade

is

by

sea, we'll

need

a

good many others who know

good many, indeed.

And how will It

was

those in the city itself share the things that each produces? for the sake of this that we made their partnership and founded

their city.

must do it by buying and selling. need a marketplace and a currency for such exchange.

Clearly, they

Then

we'll

Certainly. c

d

a farmer or

any other craftsman brings some of his products to market, and he doesn't arrive at the same time as those who want to exchange things with him, is he to sit idly in the marketplace, away from his own work? Not at all. There'll be people who'll notice this and provide the requisite service— in well-organized cities they'll usually be those whose bodies are weakest and who aren't fit to do any other work. They'll stay around the market exchanging money for the goods of those who have something to sell and then exchanging those goods for the money of those who want them. Then, to fill this need there will have to be retailers in our city, for aren't If

those

who

establish themselves in the marketplace to provide this service

Republic

1011

II

buying and selling called are called merchants? of

retailers,

while those

who travel between cities

That's right.

There are other servants, I think, whose minds alone wouldn't qualify them for membership in our society but whose bodies are strong enough for labor. These sell the use of their strength for a price called a wage and hence are themselves called wage-earners. Isn't that so? Certainly.

So wage-earners complete our I

city?

think so.

Well, Adeimantus, has our city

Perhaps

it

grown

to completeness, then?

has.

Then where

are justice

and

injustice to

be found in

it?

With which

of

we examined

did they come in? I've no idea, Socrates, unless it was somewhere in some need that these people have of one another. You may be right, but we must look into it and not grow weary. First, then, let's see what sort of life our citizens will lead when they've been provided for in the way we have been describing. They'll produce bread, wine, clothes, and shoes, won't they? They'll build houses, work naked and barefoot in the summer, and wear adequate clothing and shoes in the winter. For food, they'll knead and cook the flour and meal they've made from wheat and barley. They'll put their honest cakes and loaves on reeds or clean leaves, and, reclining on beds strewn with yew and myrtle, they'll feast with their children, drink their wine, and, crowned with wreaths, hymn the gods. They'll enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war. It seems that you make your people feast without any delicacies, Glauthe things

con interrupted. True enough,

I

said,

I

was

olives, cheese, boiled roots,

forgetting that they'll obviously need

and vegetables

of the sort they

cook

salt,

in the

them desserts, too, of course, consisting of figs, chickpeas, and beans, and they'll roast myrtle and acorns before the fire, drinking moderately. And so they'll live in peace and good health, and when they country. We'll give

die at a ripe old age, they'll bequeath a similar

life to

their children.

you were founding a city for pigs, Socrates, he replied, wouldn't you fatten them on the same diet? Then how should I feed these people, Glaucon? I asked. If

way.

they aren't to suffer hardship, they should recline on proper couches, dine at a table, and have the delicacies and desserts that people have nowadays. All right, I understand. It isn't merely the origin of a city that we're considering, it seems, but the origin of a luxurious city. And that may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well see how justice and injustice grow up in cities. Yet the true city, in my opinion, is the one we've described, the healthy one, as it were. But let's study a city with a In the conventional

If

1UAZ 373

Socrates /Glancon

what you want. There's nothing to stop us. The things I mentioned earlier and the way of life I described won't satisfy some people, it seems, but couches, tables, and other furniture will have to be added, and, of course, all sorts of delicacies, perfumed oils, incense, prostitutes, and pastries. We mustn't provide them only with the necessities we mentioned at first, such as houses, clothes, and shoes, but painting and embroidery must be begun, and gold, ivory, and the like acquired. Isn't fever,

if

that's

that so?

b

c

d

Yes.

Then we must enlarge our city, for the healthy one is no longer adequate. We must increase it in size and fill it with a multitude of things that go beyond what is necessary for a city— hunters, for example, and artists or imitators, many of whom work with shapes and colors, many with music. And there'll be poets and their assistants, actors, choral dancers, contractors, and makers of all kinds of devices, including, among other things, those needed for the adornment of women. And so we'll need more servants, too. Or don t you think that we ll need tutors, wet nurses, nannies, beauticians, barbers, chefs, cooks, and swineherds? We didn't need any of these in our earlier city, but we'll need them in this one. And we'll also need many more cattle, won't we, if the people are going to eat meat? Of course.

And if we live like that, we'll have a far greater need for doctors than we did before? Much greater. And the land, I suppose, that used to be adequate to feed the population we had then, will cease to be adequate and become too small. What do you think? The same. Then we'll have to seize some of our neighbors' land if we're enough pasture and ploughland. And won't our neighbors want part of ours as well, acquisition of

e

if

money

have

to seize

they too have surrendered themselves to the endless and have overstepped the limit of their necessities?

That's completely inevitable, Socrates. Then our next step will be war, Glaucon, won't It

to

it?

will.

We

won't say yet whether the effects of war are good or bad but only that we've now found the origins of war. It comes from those same desires that are

most of

all

and the individuals

responsible for the bad things that happen to

cities

in them.

That's right.

Then the

374

must be further enlarged, and not just by a small number, either, but by a whole army, which will do battle with the invaders in defense of the city's substantial wealth and all the other things we mencity

tioned.

Why

aren

the citizens themselves adequate for that purpose? won't be, if the agreement you and the rest of us made when t

They were founding

the city

was

a

good one,

for surely

we

agreed,

if

we you

Republic

1013

II

remember,

that

impossible for a single person to practice

it's

many

crafts

or professions well. That's true.

Well, then, don't

you think

that warfare

is

a profession?

Of course. Then should we be more concerned about cobbling than about warfare? Not at all. But

we prevented a cobbler from trying to be a farmer, weaver, or builder

must remain a cobbler in order to produce fine work. And each of the others, too, was to work all his life at a single trade for which he had a natural aptitude and keep away from all the others, so as not to miss the right moment to practice his own work well. at the

Now,

And

same time and

isn't is

said that he

of the greatest importance that warfare be practiced well?

it

fighting a

war

so easy that a farmer or a cobbler or any other

craftsman can be a soldier at the same time? Though no one can become so much as a good player of checkers or dice if he considers it only as a sideline and doesn't practice it from childhood. Or can someone pick up a shield or any other weapon or tool of war and immediately perform adequately in an infantry battle or any other kind? No other tool makes anyone who picks it up a craftsman or champion unless he has acquired the requisite knowledge and has had sufficient practice. If tools could make anyone who picked them up an expert, they'd be valuable indeed. Then to the degree that the work of the guardians is most important, it requires most freedom from other things

and the

greatest skill

and de-

votion. I

should think

And

doesn't

so.

also require a person

it

whose nature

is

suited to that

way

of life?

Certainly.

Then our to

job,

guard the

it

seems,

is

to select,

if

we

can, the kind of nature suited

city.

It is.

By god,

it's

no

trivial task that

we've taken on. But insofar as

we mustn't shrink from it. No, we mustn't. Do you think that, when it comes

we

are

able,

to guarding, there

is

any difference

between the nature of a pedigree young dog and that of a well-born youth? What do you mean? Well, each needs keen senses, speed to catch what it sees, and strength in case it has to fight it out with what it captures. They both need all these things. And each must be courageous if indeed he's to fight well. Of course. And will a horse, a dog, or any other animal be courageous, if he isn't spirited? Or haven't you noticed just how invincible and unbeatable spirit is, so that its presence makes the whole soul fearless and unconquerable?

1014

Glaucon / Socrates /Adeimantus

have noticed that. The physical qualities of the guardians are I

clear, then.

Yes.

And

as far as their souls are concerned, they

That too. But if they have natures

like that,

must be

spirited.

Glaucon, won't they be savage to each

other and to the rest of the citizens? By god, it will be hard for them to be anything else. Yet surely they must be gentle to their own people and harsh to the enemy. If they aren't, they won't wait around for others to destroy the city but will do it themselves first. That's true.

What gentle

are

we

Where are we to find a the same time? After all,

to do, then?

and high-spirited

at

character that

is

a gentle nature

both

is

the

opposite of a spirited one. Apparently. If

someone

lacks either gentleness or spirit, he can't be a

good guardian. a good guardian

Yet it seems impossible to combine them. It follows that cannot exist. It looks like it. I couldn't see a way out, but on reexamining what had gone before, I said: We deserve to be stuck, for we've lost sight of the analogy we put forward.

How do you mean? We overlooked the fact

that there are natures of the sort

we

thought impossible, natures in which these opposites are indeed combined.

Where?

You can

them in other animals, too, but especially in the one to which we compared the guardian, for you know, of course, that a pedigree dog naturally has a character of this sort— he is gentle as can be to those he's used to and knows, but the opposite to those he doesn't know. I do know that. So the combination we want is possible after all, and our search for the good guardian is not contrary to nature. see

Apparently

not.

Then do you think that our future guardian, besides being spirited, must also be by nature philosophical? How do you mean? I don't understand. It's something else you see in dogs, and it makes you wonder at the animal.

What?

When a dog sees someone bad happens it

it

doesn't know,

it

gets angry before anything

But when it knows someone, it welcomes him, even if has never received anything good from him. Haven't you ever wondered to

it.

at that?

never paid any attention to dog behaves. I've

it,

but obviously that

is

the

way

a

Republic

1015

II

Surely this

is

a refined quality in

its

nature and one that

is

truly philo-

sophical. In

what way philosophical?

judges anything it sees to be either a friend or an enemy, on no other basis than that it knows the one and doesn't know the other. And how could it be anything besides a lover of learning, if it defines what is ignorance? its own and what is alien to it in terms of knowledge and

Because

It

it

couldn't.

But surely the love of learning love of

is

the

same thing

as philosophy or the

wisdom?

It is.

Then, may we confidently assume in the case of a human being, too, that if he is to be gentle toward his own and those he knows, he must be a lover of learning

We

and wisdom?

may.

Philosophy, spirit, speed, and strength must all, then, be combined in the nature of anyone who is to be a fine and good guardian of our city. Absolutely. Then those are the traits a potential guardian would need at the outset. But how are we to bring him up and educate him? Will inquiry into that topic bring us any closer to the goal of our inquiry, which is to discover the origins of justice and injustice in a city? We want our account to be adequate, but we don't want it to be any longer than necessary. inquiry will further I certainly expect, Glaucon's brother said, that such

our goal. Then, by god, Adeimantus, I said, we mustn't leave turns out to be a somewhat lengthy affair. No, we mustn't.

Come,

then,

and

describe in theory

just as

how

if

we had

to educate

the leisure to

it

out,

make up

even

if it

stories, let's

our men.

All right.

What

will their education be?

Or

is it

hard to find anything better than

which has developed over a long period— physical training for bodies and music and poetry for the soul? Yes, it would be hard. Now, we start education in music and poetry before physical training, don't we? Of course. Do you include stories under music and poetry?

that

I

do.

Aren't there two kinds of story, one true and the other false? Yes.

mustn't our men be educated in both, but first in false ones? I don't understand what you mean. Don't you understand that we first tell stories to children? These are false, on the whole, though they have some truth in them. And we tell them to small children before physical training begins.

And

1016

Adeimantus/ Socrates

That's true.

And

what

that's

meant by saying

I

that

we must

deal with music and

poetry before physical training. All right.

You know,

b

don't you, that the beginning of any process is most important, especially for anything young and tender? It's at that time that it is most malleable and takes on any pattern one wishes to impress on it. Exactly.

Then shall we carelessly allow the children to hear any old stories, told by just anyone, and to take beliefs into their souls that are for the most part opposite to the ones we think they should hold when they are grown up?

We

certainly won't.

Then we must first of all, their stories whenever they

c

seems, supervise the storytellers. We'll select are fine or beautiful and reject them when they aren't. And we'll persuade nurses and mothers to tell their children the ones we have selected, since they will shape their children's souls with stories much more than they shape their bodies by handling them. Many of the stories they tell now, however, must be thrown out. Which ones do you mean? We'll first look at the major stories, and by seeing how to deal with them, we'll see how to deal with the minor ones as well, for they exhibit it

same pattern and have the same effects whether they're famous or not. Don't you think so? I do, but I don t know which ones you're calling major. Those that Homer, Hesiod, and other poets tell us, for surely they composed false stories, told them to people, and are still telling them. Which stories do you mean, and what fault do you find in them? The fault one ought to find first and foremost, especially if the falsehood the

d

well told. For example?

isn't

When e

the

a story gives a

way a

painter does

bad image of what the gods and heroes are

whose

picture

is

not at

all like

to paint.

You

re right to object to that.

you have

in

the things b he's trvine y 6

But what sort of thing in particular do

mind?

First, telling

the greatest falsehood about the

most important things story— I mean Hesiod telling us about how Uranus behaved, how Cronus punished him for it, and how he was in turn punished by his own son 10 But even if it were true, it should be passed over in silence, not told to foolish young people. And if, for some reason, it has to be told, only a very few people— pledged to secrecy and after sacrificing not just a pig but something great and scarce— should hear it, so that their doesn't

378

like,

make

a fine

.

number

kept as small as possible. Yes, such stories are hard to deal with.

10.

is

See Hesiod, Theogony 154-210, 453-506.

Republic

1017

II

they shouldn't be told in our city, Adeimantus. Nor should a young person hear it said that in committing the worst crimes he's doing nothing out of the ordinary, or that if he inflicts every kind of punishment on an unjust father, he's only doing the same as the first and greatest of the gods. No, by god, I don't think myself that these stories are fit to be told. Indeed, if we want the guardians of our city to think that it's shameful to be easily provoked into hating one another, we mustn't allow any stories about gods warring, fighting, or plotting against one another, for they

And

aren't true.

The

battles of

gods and

giants,

and

all

the various stories of

the gods hating their families or friends, should neither be told nor even woven in embroideries. If we're to persuade our people that no citizen

has ever hated another and that it's impious to do so, then that s what should be told to children from the beginning by old men and women; and as these children grow older, poets should be compelled to tell them whether the same sort of thing. We won't admit stories into our city about Hera being chained by her son, nor about Hephallegorical or not aestus being hurled from heaven by his father when he tried to help his

—

—

who was

mother,

being beaten, nor about the battle of the gods in Homer.

from what isn't, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable. For these reasons, then, we should probably take the utmost

The young

can't distinguish

first stories

care to insure that the for

them

is

allegorical

they hear about virtue are the best ones

to hear.

That's reasonable. But

should

what

we

if

someone asked us what

stories these are,

what

say?

founding a city. And must it's appropriate for the founders to know the patterns on which poets base their stories and from which they mustn't deviate. But we aren't actually going to compose their poems for them.

You and

Adeimantus, aren't poets, but

I,

All right. But

what

we

are

precisely are the patterns for theology or stories

about the gods?

Something

be represented as he Indeed, he must.

Now, What

And I

a

Whether in epic,

like this:

god

is

lyric,

or tragedy, a

god must always

is.

really good, isn't he,

and must be described

as such?

else?

surely nothing

suppose

good

is

harmful,

is it?

not.

can what isn't harmful do harm? Never. Or can what does no harm do anything bad? No. And can what does nothing bad be the cause of anything bad? How could it? Moreover, the good is beneficial?

And

Yes.

1018

Socrates/Adeimantus

It is

the cause of doing well?

Yes.

The good

isn

t

the cause of

all

things, then, but only of

good ones;

it

cause of bad ones, agree entirely.

isn't the c

I

—

Therefore, since a god is good, he is not as most people claim cause of everything that happens to human beings but of only

— the

a few things, good things are fewer than bad ones in our lives. He alone is responsible for the good things, but we must find some other cause for the bad ones, for

not a god. That's very true, and

I

believe

it.

Then we won't accept from anyone d

about the gods

when he

says:

There are two urns at the threshold of Zeus , One filled with good fates , the other with bad ones.

and the person

to

whom

who

We

.

.

fate ,

sometimes with good

,

receives his fate entirely from the second urn.

Evil famine drives

e

.

he gives a mixture of these

Sometimes meets with a bad

but the one

Homer makes

the foolish mistake

him over

won't grant either that Zeus

is

the divine earth.

for us

The distributor of both good and bad.

And

as to the breaking of the promised truce by Pandarus, us that it was brought about by Athena and Zeus or that

were responsible 380

praise him.

Nor

anyone tells Themis and Zeus if

and contention among the gods, we will not we allow the young to hear the words of Aeschylus:

for strife

will

A

god makes mortals guilty When he wants utterly to destroy a housed

And

1

anyone composes a poem about the sufferings of Niobe, such as the one in which these lines occur, or about the house of Pelops, or the if

Troy, or anything else of that kind, we must require him to say that these things are not the work of a god. Or, if they are, then poets must look for the kind of account of them that we are now seeking, and tale of

11.

The

first

three quotations are from Iliad xxiv.527-32.

for the quotation to

break the truce

The sources for the fourth and from Aeschylus are unknown. The story of Athena urging Pandarus is

told in Iliad

iv. 73-1 26.

Republic

1019

II

say that the actions of the gods are good and just, and that those they punish are benefited thereby. We won't allow poets to say that the punished are made wretched and that it was a god who made them so. But we will

allow them to say that bad people are wretched because they are in need of punishment and that, in paying the penalty, they are benefited by the gods. And, as for saying that a god, who is himself good, is the cause of bad things, we'll fight that in every way, and we won't allow anyone to say it in his own city, if it's to be well governed, or anyone to hear it

— whether young

or old, whether in verse or prose. These stories are not pious, not advantageous to us, and not consistent with one another.

either

your law, and I'll vote for it. This, then, is one of the laws or patterns concerning the gods to which speakers and poets must conform, namely, that a god isn't the cause of I

like

things but only of

all

And

good ones.

a fully satisfactory law.

it's

second law? Do you think that a god is a sorcerer, able to appear in different forms at different times, sometimes changing himself from his own form into many shapes, sometimes deceiving us by making us think that he has done it? Or do you think he's simple and least of all likely to step out of his own form?

What about

I

this

can't say offhand.

he steps out of his own form, mustn't he either change himself or be changed by something else? He must. But the best things are least liable to alteration or change, aren't they? For example, isn't the healthiest and strongest body least changed by food, drink, and labor, or the healthiest and strongest plant by sun, wind, and

what about

Well,

this?

If

the like?

Of

course.

most courageous and most altered by any outside affection?

And

the

rational soul

is

least

disturbed or

Yes.

same account is true of all artifacts, furniture, houses, and clothes. The ones that are good and well made are least altered by time or anything else that happens to them.

And

the

That's right.

Whatever

is

admits least of So it seems.

Now,

good condition, then, whether by nature or being changed by anything else.

in

surely a

god and what belongs

to

him

are in every

best condition.

How

could they

Then

a

fail to

god would be

be?

least likely to

have many shapes.

Indeed.

Then does he change Clearly he does,

if

or alter himself?

indeed he

is

altered at

all.

craft or both,

way

in the

Socrates /Adeimantus

Would he change

himself into something better and

more

beautiful than

himself or something worse and uglier? It

would have

surely

we won't

Absolutely

to

be into something worse,

say that a god

right.

if

he's

changed

at all, for

deficient in either beauty or virtue. think, Adeimantus, that anyone, whether

is

And do you

god or human, would deliberately make himself worse No, that's impossible.

any way?

in

impossible, then, for gods to want to alter themselves? Since they are the most beautiful and best possible, it seems that each always and unconditionally retains his own shape. Is it

That seems entirely necessary to me. Then let no poet tell us about Proteus or Thetis, or say that The gods

,

in the likeness of strangers

Adopt every

sort of shape

and

visit

from foreign lands our cities

,

Nor must they present Hera, in their tragedies or other poems, as

a priestess

alms for

collecting

the life-giving sons of the Argive river Inachusf 3

or

tell

us other stories of that

sort.

Nor must mothers,

believing bad stories at night in the shapes of strangers from foreign lands, terrify their children with them. Such stories blaspheme the gods and, at the same time, make children more cowardly.

about the gods wandering

They mustn't be told. But though the gods are unable believe that they appear in

Perhaps.

What? Would

a

all

change, do they nonetheless make us sorts of ways, deceiving us through sorcery? J

god be willing

to

to

be

false, either in

presenting an illusion? I don't know. Don't you know that a true falsehood,

by

all

if

one

may

word

call

willing to tell falsehoods to the part of himself about the most important things, but of most afraid to have falsehood there.

12.

that, is

by

hated

gods and humans?

What do you mean? I mean that no one is

I

it

or deed,

still

most important all

places he

is

don't understand.

Odyssey

xvii. 485-86.

Inachus was the father of Io, who was persecuted by Hera because Zeus was in love with her. The source for the part of the story Plato quotes is unknown. 13.

Republic

1021

II

you think I'm saying something deep.

That's because

I

simply mean

that to be false to one's soul about the things that are, to be ignorant and to have and hold falsehood there, is what everyone would least of all

accept, for everyone hates a falsehood in that place

most of

all.

That's right. Surely, as

said just

I

now,

—

would be most correctly called true of someone who has been told a false-

this

falsehood ignorance in the soul hood. Falsehood in words is a kind of imitation of this affection in the soul, an image of it that comes into being after it and is not a pure falsehood. Isn't that so?

Certainly.

And but by It

the thing that

human

seems so

is

really a falsehood

is

hated not only by the gods

beings as well. to

me.

falsehood in words? When and to whom is it useful and so not deserving of hatred? Isn't it useful against one's enemies? And when any of our so-called friends are attempting, through madness or ignorance, to do something bad, isn't it a useful drug for preventing them? It is also useful in the case of those stories we were just talking about, the ones we tell because we don't know the truth about those ancient events

What about

involving the gods. By making a falsehood as can, don't we also make it useful?

We

like the truth as

we

certainly do.

Then

in

which

Would he make of

much

be useful to a god? likenesses of ancient events because of his ignorance

of these

false

ways could

a falsehood

them?

would be ridiculous to think that. Then there is nothing of the false poet Not in my view. It

Would he be Far from

false, then,

in a

god?

through fear of his enemies?

it.

Because of the ignorance or madness of his family or friends, then? No one who is ignorant or mad is a friend of the gods. Then there's no reason for a god to speak falsely? None. Therefore the daemonic and the divine are in every way free from falsehood.

Completely. A god, then, is simple and true in word and deed. Fie doesn't change himself or deceive others by images, words, or signs, whether in visions or in dreams. That's what I thought as soon as I heard you say it. You agree, then, that this is our second pattern for speaking or composing poems about the gods: They are not sorcerers who change themselves, nor

do they mislead us by falsehoods

in

words or deeds.

1022

Adeimantus/ Socrates

agree.

I

even though we praise many things in Homer, we won't approve of the dream Zeus sent to Agamemnon, nor of Aeschylus when he makes Thetis say that Apollo sang in prophecy at her wedding: So,

About

the

my

good fortune

children

would have

,

Free of disease throughout their long lives ,

And

of all the blessings that the friendship of the gods would bring / hoped that Phoebus' divine mouth would be free of falsehood, Endowed as it is with the craft of prophecy.

But the very god who sang the one at the The one who said all this he himself it is Who killed my son. H ,

me

,

feast ,

,

Whenever anyone says such things about a god, we'll be angry with him, refuse him a chorus 15 and not allow his poetry to be used in the education ,

of the young, so that our guardians will be as god-fearing

human I

beings can be. completely endorse these patterns, he said, and

I

and godlike

as

would enact them

as laws.

Book Such, then,

III

said, are the

kinds of stories that I think future guardians should and should not hear about the gods from childhood on, if they are to honor the gods and their parents and not take their friendship with one another lightly. I'm sure we're right about that, at any rate. What if they are to be courageous as well? Shouldn't they be told that will

I

make them

stories

ever becomes courageous

No,

I

death? Or do you think that anyone he's possessed by this fear?

least afraid of if

certainly don't.

And

can someone be unafraid of death, preferring or slavery, if he believes in a Hades full of terrors?

it

to defeat in battle

Not at all. Then we must supervise such stories and those who tell them, and ask them not to disparage the life in Hades in this unconditional way, but rather to praise it, since what they now say is neither true nor beneficial to future warriors.

We

must.

Zeus sends a dream to Agamemnon to promise success if he attacks Troy immediately. The promise is false. The source for the quotation from Aeschylus 7 is unknown. 14.

In Iliad

15. I.e.,

ii.l

34,

deny him the funding necessary

to

produce

his play.

Republic

Then

1023

III

we'll

following

expunge

all

that sort of disparagement, beginning with the

lines:

would rather labor on earth in service To a man who is landless with little to Than be king over all the dead 3

I

,

and

to

another

live

on

also these:

He

feared that his

home should appear

to

gods and men

Dreadful, dank, and hated even by the gods.

2

and Alas, there survives in the Halls of Hades 3 soul, a mere phantasm with its wits completely gone.

A

and

,

this:

And

he alone could think; the others are flitting shadows

and The sold, leaving his limbs, made its way to Hades, 3 Lamenting its fate, leaving manhood and youth behind.

and

these:

His soul went below the earth 6 Screeching as it went .

.

like

smoke,

.

and

1.

Odyssey xi.489-91. Odysseus

2.

Iliad xx. 64-65.

earth will split 3.

for

The speaker open and reveal

Iliad xxiii. 103-4.

is

is

being addressed by the dead Achilles in Hades. the

god

that his

of the

home

is

underworld dreadful,

is

afraid that the

etc.

Achilles speaks these lines as the soul of the

dead Patroclus leaves

Hades.

4.

Odyssey x.495. Circe

5.

Iliad xvi. 856-57.

is

speaking to Odysseus about the prophet Tiresias.

The words

refer to Patroclus,

who

has just been mortally

by Hector. 6.

— who

Iliad xxiii. 100-101.

The soul referred

to is Patroclus'.

wounded

1024

Socrates/Adeimantus

As when

an awful cave Fly around screeching if one of them falls From the cluster on the ceiling all clinging So their souls went screeching 7 bats in

,

.

b

one another

,

.

We'll ask Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we delete these passages and all similar ones. It isn't that they aren't poetic and pleasing to the majority of hearers but that, the more poetic they are, the less they should be heard by children or by men who are supposed to be free and to fear slavery more than death.

Most

And

c

to

certainly.

the frightening

and dreadful names for the underworld must be struck out, for example, "Cocytus" and "Styx," 8 and also the names for the dead, for example, "those below" and "the sapless ones," and all those names of things in the underworld that make everyone who hears them

shudder. They may be all well and good for other purposes, but we are afraid that our guardians will be made softer and more malleable by such shudders. And our fear is justified. Then such passages are to be struck out? Yes.

And

poets must follow the opposite pattern in speaking and writing?

Clearly. d

Must we men?

also delete the lamentations

and

pitiful

speeches of famous

We

must, if indeed what we said before is compelling. Consider though whether we are right to delete them or not. We surely say that a decent man doesn't think that death is a terrible thing for someone decent to suffer— even for someone who happens to be his friend. We do say that. Then he won't mourn for him as for someone who has suffered a terri-

ble fate.

Certainly not.

We

e

also say that a decent person is most self-sufficient in living well and, above all others, has the least need of anyone else.

That's true.

Then

dreadful for him than for anyone else to be deprived of his son, brother, possessions, or any other such things. it

Much

s less

less.

Then he quietly

7.

has

11

when

least give it

way

to lamentations

and bear misfortune most

strikes.

Odyssey xxiv.6-9. The souls are those of the suitors of Penelope,

whom

Odysseus

killed.

"Cocytus" means river of wailing or lamenting; "Styx" means river of hatred or gloom. 8.

Republic

1025

III

Certainly.

We'd be right, then, to delete the lamentations of famous men, leaving them to women (and not even to good women, either) and to cowardly men, so

we

that those

say

we

are training to guard our city will disdain

to act like that.

That's right.

Again, then, we'll ask Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a goddess, as Lying now on

On

his side ,

now on up

his belly; then standing

way and

This

his back , to

now

wander

again

distracted

that on the shore of the unharvested sea.

both hands and pour them over his head, weeping and lamenting in the ways he does in Homer. Nor to represent Priam, a close descendant of the gods, as entreating his men and

Nor

And and

to

make him

pick

up ashes

in

Rolling around in

dung

Calling upon each

man by named

we'll ask

,

them even more earnestly not

make

to

the gods lament

say:

Alas unfortunate that ,

I

am

,

wretched mother of a great sew

10 .

they do make the gods do such things, at least they mustn't dare to represent the greatest of the gods as behaving in so unlikely a fashion

But, 9.

if

as to say:

my own

Alas, with

Chased around the

eyes I see a city ,

and

my

man who

is

most dear

to

me

heart laments

or

Woe

is

Fated

me

,

to be killed

who

most dear to me, should be n by Patroclus , the son of Menoetius

that Sarpedon,

is

.

.

,

our young people, Adeimantus, listen to these stories without ridiculing them as not worth hearing, it's hardly likely that they'll consider the things If

The

last

three references

and quotations are

to Iliad xxiv.3-12, Iliad xviii.23-24,

and

Iliad xxii. 414-15, respectively.

10. Iliad xviii.54. Thetis, the

mother of

11. Iliad xxii. 168-69

is

xvi.433-34.

(Zeus

Achilles,

is

mourning

his fate

among

the Nereids.

watching Hector being pursued by Achilles), and

Iliad

Socrates /Adeimantus

e

described in them to be unworthy of mere human beings like themselves or that they'll rebuke themselves for doing or saying similar things when misfortune strikes. Instead, they'll feel neither shame nor restraint but groan and lament at even insignificant misfortunes, What you say is completely true. Then, as the argument has demonstrated and we

—

suaded by

until

it

someone shows us

a better

must remain perone— they mustn't behave

like that.

No, they mustn't. Moreover, they mustn't be lovers of laughter either, indulges in violent laughter, a violent change of

389

for

mood

whenever anyone

is

likely to follow.

So I believe. Then, if someone represents worthwhile people as overcome by laughter, we won t approve, and we 11 approve even less if they represent gods r 6 that way.

Much less. Then we won't approve of Homer saying things like this

about the gods:

And

unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods As they saw Hephaestus limping through the hall} 2

According b

If

to

your argument, such things must be

you want

we now is

Moreover, said just

to call

mine, but they must be rejected in any case. have to be concerned about truth as well, for if what

it,

it

we

and falsehood, though of no use to the gods, form of drug, clearly we must allow only doctors

correct,

useful to people as a

use

rejected,

is

to

not private citizens.

Clearly.

Then the city,

appropriate for anyone to use falsehoods for the good of because of the actions of either enemies or citizens, it is the

if it is

rulers.

But everyone else must keep

c

away from them, because for a

private citizen person or athlete not to tell the truth to his doctor or trainer about his physical condition or for a sailor not to tell the captain the facts about his own condition or that of the ship and the rest of its crew— indeed it is a worse mistake than either of these. to lie to a ruler

is

just as

bad

That's completely true. And if the ruler catches

d

a mistake as for a sick

someone

else telling falsehoods in the city

Any

one of the craftsmen Whether a prophet, a doctor who heals the

12. Iliad i.599-600. 13.

Odyssey

xvii. 383-84.

sick, or a

maker of spears 13

Republic

—

1027

III

punish him for introducing something as subversive and destructive a city as it would be to a ship.

he'll

to

He

will,

if

practice

is

to follow theory.

What about moderation? Won't our young people Of

also

need that?

course.

And aren't these the most important aspects of moderation for the majority of

sex,

people, namely, to obey the rulers and to rule the pleasures of drink,

and food

for themselves?

my

opinion at any rate. Then we'll say that the words of Homer's Diomedes are well put: That's

Sit

and so

is

down

what

in silence ,

my friend and ,

be persuaded by me.

follows:

The Achaeans breathing eagerness for battle Marched in silence fearing their commanders. ,

,

,

and all other such things. Those are well put. But what about this? u Wine-bibber with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer ,

—

and the rest, is it or any other headstrong words spoken in prose or poetry by private citizens against their rulers well put? No, they aren't. not, in any I don't think they are suitable for young people to hear case, with a view to making them moderate. Though it isn't surprising that they are pleasing enough in other ways. What do you think? The same as you. What about making the cleverest man say that the finest thing of all

—

—

is

when The tables are well laden With bread and meat and the winebearer Draws wine from the mixing bowl and pours ,

it

in the cups.

or

The last three citations are, respectively, Iliad iv.412, where Diomedes rebukes his squire and quiets him; Iliad iii.8 and iv.431, not in fact (in our Homer text) adjacent to one another or the preceding; and Iliad i.225 (Achilles is insulting his commander, Agamemnon). 14.

1028

Socrates /Adeimantus

Death by starvation

Do you

is

the

most

pitiful fated

make

think that such things

5

young people? Or all the other gods are asleep and he alone is awake, easily forget all his plans because of sexual desire and be so overcome by the sight of Hera that he doesn't even want to go inside but wants to possess her there on the ground, saying that his desire for her is even greater than it was when— without their parents' knowledge— they were first lovers? Or what about the chaining together of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus 16 also the result of sexual passion? No, by god, none of that seems suitable to me. But if, on the other hand, there are words or deeds of famous men, who are exhibiting endurance in the face of everything, surely they must be for self-control in

what about having Zeus, when

c

—

d

seen or heard. For example.

He "

struck his chest and spoke to his heart:

Endure

They

,

my

heart , you've suffered

this ."'

7

certainly must.

Now, we mustn't allow our men with

more shameful things than

to

be money-lovers or to be bribable

gifts.

Certainly not. Then the poets mustn't sing to them:

e

Gifts persuade gods ,

and

gifts

persuade revered kings

18 .

Nor must Phoenix, moderation when

the tutor of Achilles, be praised as speaking with he advises him to take the gifts and defend the Achaeans,

but not to give up his anger without gifts. 19 Nor should we think such things to be worthy of Achilles himself. Nor should we agree that he was such a money-lover that he would accept the gifts of Agamemnon or 391

release the corpse of Hector for a ransom but not otherwise. It certainly isn't right to praise such things.

only out of respect for Homer, indeed, that I hesitate to say that it is positively impious to accuse Achilles of such things or to believe others who say them. Or to make him address Apollo in these words: It is

15.

Odysseus

in

Odyssey ix.8-10; Odyssey xii.342 (Eurylochus urges the

cattle of Helios in

7

Odysseus absence).

16.

Odyssey viii.266

17.

Odyssey xx.17-18. The speaker

18.

The source

19.

Iliad ix. 602-5.

ff.

of the passage

is

is

Odysseus.

unknown.

Cf. Euripides,

Medea

964.

men

to slay the

Republic

1029

III

You've injured me, Farshooter, most deadly of the gods; And I'd punish you, if I had the power A

—

—

say that he disobeyed the river a god and was ready to fight it, or that he consecrated hair to the dead Patroclus, which was already consecrated to a different river, Spercheius. It isn't to be believed that he did any of these. Nor is it true that he dragged the dead Hector around 21 So we'll the tomb of Patroclus or massacred the captives on his pyre deny that. Nor will we allow our people to believe that Achilles, who was the son of a goddess and of Peleus (the most moderate of men and the grandson of Zeus) and who was brought up by the most wise Chiron,

Or

to

.

—

two diseases in his soul slavishness accompanied by the love of money, on the one hand, and arrogance towards gods and humans, on the other.

was

so full of inner turmoil as to have

That's right.

We

we

allow it to be said that Theseus, the son of Posidon, and Pirithous, the son of Zeus, engaged 22 or that any other hero and son of a god dared in terrible kidnappings to do any of the terrible and impious deeds that they are now falsely said to have done. We'll compel the poets either to deny that the heroes did certainly won't believe such things, nor will

,

such things or else to deny that they were children of the gods. They mustn't say both or attempt to persuade our young people that the gods bring about evil or that heroes are no better than humans. As we said earlier, these things are both impious and untrue, for we demonstrated 23 that it is impossible for the gods to produce bad things .

Of

course.

Moreover, these stories are harmful to people who hear them, for everyone will be ready to excuse himself when he's bad, if he is persuaded that similar things both are being done now and have been done in the past by Close descendants of the gods, Those near to Zeus, to whom belongs

The ancestral In

whom

the

up on Mount Ida, blood of daemons has not weakened A altar high

For that reason, we must put a stop to such stories, the youth a strong inclination to do bad things.

lest

they produce in

20. Iliad xxii.15, 20. 21.

The

last

four references are to

Iliad

xxi.232

ff.,

Iliad xxiii. 141-52, Iliad xxiv. 14-18,

and

Iliad xxiii. 175, respectively.

According to some legends, Theseus and Pirithous abducted Helen and abduct Persephone from Hades.

22.

23.

See 380d

ff.

24.

Thought

to

be from Aeschylus'

lost

play Niobe.

tried to

1030

Adeimantus/ Socrates

Absolutely.

Now,

kind of story whose content we haven't yet discussed? So far we've said how one should speak about gods, heroes, daemons, and things in Hades.

We

isn't there a

have.

Then what's

b

how to deal with stories about human beings, isn't it?

left is

Obviously. But we can't settle that matter at present. Why not? Because I think we'll say that what poets and prose-writers tell us about the most important matters concerning human beings is bad. They say that many unjust people are happy and many just ones wretched, that injustice is profitable

escapes detection, and that justice is another's good but one's own loss. I think we'll prohibit these stories and order the poets to compose the opposite kind of poetry and tell the opposite kind of tales. Don't you think so? I

c

know

if it

so.

But if you agree that what I said is correct, couldn't I reply that you've agreed to the very point that is in question in our whole discussion? And you'd be right to make that reply. Then we'll agree about what stories should be told about human beings only when we've discovered what sort of thing justice is and how by nature it profits the one who has it, whether he is believed to be just or not. That's very true. This concludes our discussion of the content of stories. should now, think, investigate their style, for we'll then have fully investigated both

We

I

d

what should be said and how it should be said. I don t understand what you mean, Adeimantus responded. But you must, I said. Maybe you'll understand it better if I put it this way. Isn't everything said by poets and storytellers a narrative about past, present, or future events?

What

else could

it

be?

And

aren't these narratives either narrative alone, or narrative imitation, or both? I

393

seem

well.

be a ridiculously unclear teacher. So, like those who are incompetent at speaking, I won't try to deal with the matter as a whole, but I'll take up a part and use it as an example to make plain what I want to say. Tell me, do you know the beginning of the Iliad, where the poet tells us that Chryses begs Agamemnon to release his daughter, that Agamemnon harshly rejects him, and that, having failed, Chryses prays to the god I

e

need a clearer understanding of that as

through

to

against the Achaeans? I do.

You know,

then, that

up

to the lines:

Republic

1031

III

And

he begged

all

the

Achaeans

But especially the two sons of Atreus, the commanders of the army

25 ,

speaking and doesn't attempt to get us to think that the speaker is someone other than himself. After this, however, he speaks as if he were Chryses and tries as far as possible to make us think that the speaker isn't Homer but the priest himself an old man. And he composes pretty well all the rest of his narrative about events in Troy, Ithaca, and the whole Odyssey in this way. the poet himself

is

—

b

That's right.

Now,

the speeches he

makes and

the parts

between them are both nar-

rative?

Of

course.

But when he makes a speech as if he were someone else, won't we say that he makes his own style as much like that of the indicated speaker

c

as possible?

We

certainly will.

Now,

to

make

oneself like

imitate the person one

someone

makes oneself

else in voice or

appearance

is

to

like.

Certainly.

In these passages, then,

it

seems

that

he and the other poets

effect their

narrative through imitation.

That's right.

whole of his poem would be narrative without imitation. In order to prevent you from saying again that you don't understand. I'll show you what this would be like. If Homer said that Chryses came with a ransom for his daughter to supplicate the Achaeans, especially the kings, and after that didn't speak as if he had become Chryses, but still as Homer, there would be no imitation but rather simple I'll speak without meter narrative. It would have gone something like this since I'm no poet: "And the priest came and prayed that the gods would allow them to capture Troy and be safe afterwards, that they'd accept the ransom and free his daughter, and thus show reverence for the god. When he'd said this, the others showed their respect for the priest and consented. But Agamemnon was angry and ordered him to leave and never to return, lest his priestly wand and the wreaths of the god should fail to protect him. He said that, before freeing the daughter, he'd grow old in Argos by her side. He told Chryses to go away and not to make him angry, if he wanted to get home safely. When the old man heard this, he was frightened and went off in silence. But when he'd left the camp he prayed at length to Apollo, calling him by his various titles and reminding him of his own services to him. If any of those services had been found pleasing, whether If

the poet never hid himself, the

d

—

25. Iliad

i.

15-16.

e

394

1Uv

^

Socrates/ Adeimantus

was

the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims, he asked in return that the arrows of the god should make the Achaeans pay for his tears." it

That is the way we get simple narrative without imitation. I understand. Then also understand that the opposite occurs when one omits the words between the speeches and leaves the speeches by themselves. I understand that too. Tragedies are like that. That's absolutely right. And now I think that I can make clear to you what I couldn't before. One kind of poetry and story-telling employs only

tragedy and comedy, as you say. Another kind employs only narration by the poet himself you find this most of all in dithyrambs. A third kind uses both as in epic poetry and many other places, if you follow me. imitation

—

Now

I

—

understand what you were trying

to say.

Remember, too, that before all that we said that we had dealt with what must be said in stories, but that we had yet to investigate how it must be said. Yes,

I

remember.

more

meant: We need to come to an agreement about whether we'll allow poets to narrate through imitation, and, if so, whether they are to imitate some things but not others and what things these are, or whether they are not to imitate at all. I divine that you re looking into the question of whether or not we'll allow tragedy and comedy into our city. Perhaps, and perhaps even more than that, for I myself really don't know yet, but whatever direction the argument blows us, that's where we Well,

this,

precisely,

is

what

I

—

must

go.

Fine.

Then, consider, Adeimantus, whether our guardians should be imitators or not. Or does this also follow from our earlier statement that each individual

would do

one occupation, not of many, and that if he tried the latter and dabbled in many things, he'd surely fail to achieve distinction in any of them?

He would

a fine job of

indeed.

Then, doesn't the same argument also hold for imitation— a single individual can't imitate many things as well as he can imitate one? No, he can't. Then, he'll hardly be able to pursue any worthwhile way of life while at the same time imitating many things and being an imitator. Even in the case of two kinds of imitation that are thought to be closely akin, such as tragedy and comedy, the same people aren't able to do both of them well. Did you not just say that these were both imitations? I did, and you're quite right that the same people can't do both. Nor can they be both rhapsodes and actors. True.

Indeed, not even the same actors are used for tragedy and comedy. Yet all these are imitations, aren't they?

Republic

They

1033

III

are.

And human

nature, Adeimantus, seems to

me

to

be minted in even

smaller coins than these, so that it can neither imitate many things well nor do the actions themselves, of which those imitations are likenesses. That's absolutely true.

Then, if we're to preserve our first argument, that our guardians must be kept away from all other crafts so as to be the craftsmen of the city's freedom, and be exclusively that, and do nothing at all except what contributes to it, they must neither do nor imitate anything else. If they do imitate, they must imitate from childhood what is appropriate for them, namely, people who are courageous, self-controlled, pious, and free, and their actions. They mustn't be clever at doing or imitating slavish or shameful actions, lest from enjoying the imitation, they come to enjoy the reality. Or haven't you noticed that imitations practiced from youth become part of nature and settle into habits of gesture, voice, and thought?

have indeed. Then we won't allow those for whom we profess to care, and who must grow into good men, to imitate either a young woman or an older one, or one abusing her husband, quarreling with the gods, or bragging because she thinks herself happy, or one suffering misfortune and possessed by sorrows and lamentations, and even less one who is ill, in love, or in labor. I

That's absolutely right.

Nor must they

imitate either

No, they mustn't. Nor bad men, it seems,

who

male or female slaves doing slavish

things.

cowards and are doing the opposite of what we described earlier, namely, libelling and ridiculing each other, using shameful language while drunk or sober, or wronging themselves and others, whether in word or deed, in the various other ways that are typical of such people. They mustn't become accustomed to making themselves like madmen in either word or deed, for, though they must know about mad and vicious men and women, they must neither do nor are

imitate anything they do.

That's absolutely true.

Should they imitate metal workers or other craftsmen, or those

who row

anything else connected with ships? How could they, since they aren't to concern themselves with any of those occupations? And what about this? Will they imitate neighing horses, bellowing bulls, roaring rivers, the crashing sea, thunder, or anything of that sort? They are forbidden to be mad or to imitate mad people. If I understand what you mean, there is one kind of style and narrative that someone who is really a gentleman would use whenever he wanted to narrate something, and another kind, unlike this one, which his opposite by nature and education would favor, and in which he would in triremes, or their time-keepers, or

narrate.

Which

styles are those?

Socrates / Adeimantus / Glaucon

Well,

think that

I

good man

of a

were

man

that

when a moderate man comes upon the words or actions

in his narrative, he'll

be willing to report them as if he himself, and he won't be ashamed of that kind of imitation.

good man most when he's acting in a faultless and intelligent manner, but he'll do so less, and with more reluctance, when the good man is upset by disease, sexual passion, drunkenness, or some other misfortune. When he comes upon a character unworthy of himself, He'll imitate this

however,

be unwilling to make himself seriously resemble that inferior character except perhaps for a brief period in which he's doing something good. Rather he'll be ashamed to do something like that, both because he s unpracticed in the imitation of such people and because he can't stand to shape and mold himself according to a worse pattern. He despises this in his mind, unless it's just done in play. That seems likely. he'll

—

He'll therefore use the kind of narrative we described in dealing with the Homeric epics a moment ago. His style will participate both in

imitation

and

in the other

kind of narrative, but there'll be only a in a long story? Or is there nothing in what I say?

little bit

of imitation

how the pattern for such a speaker must be. someone who is not of this sort, the more inferior he is,

That's precisely

As

for

the more willing he'll be to narrate anything and to consider nothing unworthy of himself. As a result, he'll undertake to imitate seriously and before a large audience all the things we just mentioned— thunder, the sounds of wind, hail, axles, pulleys,

trumpets, flutes, pipes, and all the other instruments, even the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds. And this man's style will consist entirely of imitation in voice and gesture, or else include only a small bit of plain narrative.

That too

certain.

is

These, then, are the two kinds of style There are these two.

The

first

of these styles involves

I

little

was

talking about.

variation, so that

if

someone

provides a musical mode and rhythm appropriate to it, won't the one who speaks correctly remain with a few minor changes pretty well within that mode and rhythm throughout?

—

That's precisely

what

—

he'll do.

What about

is

the other kind of style? Doesn't it require the opposite if it to speak appropriately, namely, all kinds of musical modes and all kinds

of rhythms, because

it

contains every type of variation?

That's exactly right.

Do

poets and speakers adopt one or other of these patterns of style or a mixture of both? Necessarily. all

What

are

we

to do, then? Shall

we admit

all

these into our city, only

one of the pure kinds, or the mixed one? If my opinion is to prevail, we'll admit only the pure imitator of decent person.

a

Republic

And

1035

III

Adeimantus, the mixed

yet,

style is pleasant. Indeed,

it

is

by

far

most pleasing to children, their tutors, and the vast majority of people. Yes, it is the most pleasing. But perhaps you don't think that it harmonizes with our constitution, because no one in our city is two or more people simultaneously, since each does only one job. the

Indeed,

And

it

doesn't harmonize.

only in our city that we'll find a cobbler who is a cobbler and not also a captain along with his cobbling, and a farmer who is a farmer and not also a juror along with his farming, and a soldier who is a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his isn't

it

because of

this that it's

and so with them

soldiering,

all?

That's true.

seems, then, that if a man, who through clever training can become anything and imitate anything, should arrive in our city, wanting to give a performance of his poems, we should bow down before him as someone holy, wonderful, and pleasing, but we should tell him that there is no one like him in our city and that it isn't lawful for there to be. We should pour myrrh on his head, crown him with wreaths, and send him away to another city. But, for our own good, we ourselves should employ a more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller, one who would imitate the speech of a decent person and who would tell his stories in accordance with the patterns we laid down when we first undertook the education of our soldiers. It

were up to us. It's likely, then, that we have now completed our discussion of the part of music and poetry that concerns speech and stories, for we've spoken both of what is to be said and of how it is to be said. That

I

is

certainly

what we'd do

if it

agree.

Doesn't

it

remain, then, to discuss lyric odes and songs?

Clearly.

what we would say about them, given that it has to be in tune with what we've already said? Glaucon laughed and said: I'm afraid, Socrates, that I'm not to be included under "anyone," for I don't have a good enough idea at the moment of what we're to say. Of course, I have my suspicions. Nonetheless, I said, you know that, in the first place, a song consists of words, harmonic mode, and rhythm. three elements Yes, I do know that. As far as words are concerned, they are no different in songs than they are when not set to music, so mustn't they conform in the same way to

And

couldn't anyone discover

—

the patterns

we

established just

now?

They must. Further, the

Of

mode and rhythm must

fit

the words.

course.

And we our words.

said that

we no

longer needed dirges and lamentations

among

1036

Glaucon/ Socrates

We

did, indeed.

What

e

are the lamenting modes, then? You tell me, since you're musical. mixo-Lydian, the syntono-Lydian, and some others of that sort.

The

Aren't they to be excluded, then? They're useless even to decent let alone to men.

women,

Certainly.

Drunkenness, softness, and idleness are also most inappropriate for our guardians. How could they not be? What, then, are the soft modes suitable for drinking-parties? 99

The Ionian and those Lydian modes that are said to be relaxed. Could you ever use these to make people warriors? Never. And now all you have left is the Dorian and Phrygian modes. I don't know all the musical modes. Just leave me the mode that would suitably imitate the tone and rhythm of a courageous person

who b

and

active in battle or doing other violent deeds, or who is failing facing wounds, death, or some other misfortune, and who, in is

all

these circumstances,

fighting off his fate steadily

and with self-control. me also another mode, that of someone engaged in a peaceful, unforced, voluntary action, persuading someone or asking a favor of a god in prayer or of a human being through teaching and exhortation, or, on the other hand, of someone submitting to the supplications of another who is teaching him and trying to get him to change his mind, and who, in all these circumstances, is acting with moderation and selfcontrol, not with arrogance but with understanding, and is content with the outcome. Leave me, then, these two modes, which will best imitate the violent or voluntary tones of voice of those who are moderate and courageous, whether in good fortune or in bad. The modes you re asking for are the very ones I mentioned. Well, then, we'll have no need for polyharmonic or multistringed instruments to accompany our odes and songs. It doesn't seem so to me at least. Then we won't need the craftsmen who make triangular lutes, harps, and all other such multistringed and polyharmonic instruments. is

Leave

c

d

Apparently not. What about flute-makers and flute-players? Will you allow them into the city? Or isn't the flute the most "many-stringed" of all? And aren't the panharmonic instruments all imitations of it? 26 Clearly.

The

lyre

and the

country, there'd be

That

some

then, as useful in the city, while in the sort of pipe for the shepherds to play. left,

what our argument shows,

at least.

The instrument here is the aulos, which was not was especially good at conveying emotion.

26. It

is

cithara are

really a flute but a reed instrument.

Republic

1037

III

we

Well,

certainly aren't doing anything

new

Marsyas and his By god, it doesn't seem as though we are. And, by the dog, without being aware of

his instruments to

city

we

recently said

in preferring

Apollo and

27

.

was

it,

we've been purifying the

luxurious.

That's because we're being moderate.

Then

let's

purify the

rest.

The next

topic after musical

modes

is

the

We

shouldn't strive to have either subtlety or great variety in meter. Rather, we should try to discover what are the rhythms of someone who leads an ordered and courageous life and then adapt the regulation of meter.

words, not his words to them. What these rhythms actually are is for you to say, just as in the case of the modes. I really don't know what to say. I can tell you from observation that there are three basic kinds of metrical feet out of which the others are constructed, just as there are four in the case of modes. But I can't tell you

meter and the tune

to his

which sort imitates which sort of life. Then we'll consult with Damon as to which metrical feet are suited to slavishness, insolence, madness, and the other vices and which are suited to their opposites. I think I've heard him talking about an enoplion, which is a composite metrical phrase (although I'm not clear on this), and also about dactylic or heroic meter, which he arranged, I don't know how, to be equal up and down in the interchange of long and short. I think he called one foot an iambus, another a trochee, assigning a long and a short to both of them. In the case of some of these, I think he approved or disapproved of the tempo of the foot as much as of the rhythm itself, or I can't tell you which. But, as I said, of some combination of the two

—

Damon, since to mark off the different kinds long argument. Or do you think we should try it?

we'll leave these things to

would No,

require a I

certainly don't.

But you can discern, can't you, that grace and gracelessness follow good

and bad rhythm respectively? Of course. Further, if, as we said just now, rhythm and mode must conform to the words and not vice versa, then good rhythm follows fine words and is similar to them, while bad rhythm follows the opposite kind of words, and the same for harmony and disharmony. To be sure, these things must conform to the words. What about the style and content of the words themselves? Don't they conform to the character of the speaker's soul? Of course. And the rest conform to the words? Athena had invented the aulos, she discarded it because it distorted her features to play it. It was picked up by the satyr Marsyas, who was foolish enough to challenge Apollo (inventor of the lyre) to a musical contest. He was defeated, and Apollo flayed him especially their sexual desires. alive. Satyrs were bestial in their behavior and desires

27. After

—

1038

Glaucon/Socrates

Yes.

Then fine words, harmony, grace, and rhythm follow simplicity of character and I do not mean this in the sense in which we use "simplicity" as a euphemism for "simple-mindedness" but I mean the sort of fine and good character that has developed in accordance with an intelligent plan.

—

—

That's absolutely certain.

And must not our young to do their own work?

people everywhere aim

at these,

if

they are

They must, indeed.

Now,

surely painting

of these qualities, as are all the crafts similar full of them, and so are embroidery, architecture, and the

weaving is crafts that produce to

it;

is full

the other furnishings. Our bodily nature is full of them, as are the natures of all growing things, for in all of these there is grace and gracelessness. And gracelessness, bad rhythm, and disharmony are akin to bad words and bad character, while their opposites are akin to

all

and are imitations

of the opposite, a

moderate and good character.

Absolutely. Is

it,

then, only poets

we have

an image of a good character

among them

us?

Or

a character that

in their

poems

compelling them to make

or else not to

—

also to give orders to other craftsmen, forbidding whether in pictures, buildings, or any other works

vicious, unrestrained, slavish,

is

compose them

we

are

to represent

to supervise,

and graceless? Are we

to

allow someone who cannot follow these instructions to work among us, so that our guardians will be brought up on images of evil, as if in a meadow of bad grass, where they crop and graze in many different places every day until, little by little, they unwittingly accumulate a large evil in their souls? Or must we rather seek out craftsmen who are by nature able to pursue what is fine and graceful in their work, so that our young people will live in a healthy place and be benefited on all sides, and so that something of those fine works will strike their eyes and ears like a breeze that brings health

childhood on, of reason?

The

latter

to

from

a

good

resemblance, friendship,

would be by

them unwittingly, from and harmony with the beauty

place, leading

far the best

education for them. Aren't these the reasons, Glaucon, that education in music and poetry is most important? First, because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else, affecting it most strongly and bringing it grace, so that if someone is properly educated in music and poetry,

it

makes him graceful, but

if

not, then the opposite. Second,

because

anyone who has been properly educated in music and poetry will sense it acutely when something has been omitted from a thing and when it hasn't been finely crafted or finely made by nature. And since he has the right distastes, he

praise fine things, be pleased

by them, receive them into his soul, and, being nurtured by them, become fine and good. He'll rightly object to what is shameful, hating it while he's still young and unable to grasp the reason, but, having been educated in this way, he will 11

Republic

1039

III

welcome

the reason

when

comes and recognize

it

it

easily because of

its

kinship with himself. Yes, I agree that those are the reasons to provide education in music

and poetry.

way it was with learning how to read. Our ability wasn't adequate until we realized that there are only a few letters that occur in It's

just the

and

sorts of different combinations,

all

small 28

that

— whether

written large or

b

— they were worthy of our attention, so that we picked them out

eagerly wherever they occurred, knowing that readers until we knew our letters.

we wouldn't

be competent

True.

And

isn't

or water,

also true that

it

we

if

there are images of letters reflected in mirrors

know them

won't

abilities are parts of the

both

Absolutely. Then, by the gods,

am

until

same

we know

craft

and

the letters themselves, for

discipline?

not right in saying that neither we, nor the guardians we are raising, will be educated in music and poetry until we know the different forms of moderation, courage, frankness, highmindedness, and all their kindred, and their opposites too, which are moving around everywhere, and see them in the things in which they are, I

c

both themselves and their images, and do not disregard them, whether they are written on small things or large, but accept that the knowledge of both large and small letters is part of the same craft and discipline? That's absolutely essential. Therefore, if someone's soul has a fine

and beautiful character and

his

body matches it in beauty and is thus in harmony with it, so that both share in the same pattern, wouldn't that be the most beautiful sight for anyone who has eyes to see? It

d

certainly would.

And Of

isn't

what

is

most beautiful

also

most loveable?

course.

And

a musical

person would love such people most of

all,

but he

wouldn't love anyone who lacked harmony? No, he wouldn't, at least not if the defect was in the soul, but if it was only in the body, he'd put up with it and be willing to embrace the boy

who had

e

it.

gather that you love or have loved such a boy yourself, and I agree with you. Tell me this, however: Is excessive pleasure compatible with modI

eration?

can it be, since it drives one mad just as much as pain does? What about with the rest of virtue? No. Well, then, is it compatible with violence and licentiousness?

How

Very much 28.

See 368c-d.

so.

403

u

Socrates / Glaucon

Can you can't

I

—

think of a greater or keener pleasure than sexual pleasure? or a madder one either.

But the right kind of love is by nature the love of order and beauty that has been moderated by education in music and poetry? That's right.

Therefore, the right kind of love has nothing

b

mad

or licentious about

it?

No, it hasn't. Then sexual pleasure mustn't come into it, and the lover and the boy he loves must have no share in it, if they are to love and be loved in the right

way?

By god,

no, Socrates,

it

mustn't come into

it.

seems, then, that you 11 lay it down as a law in the city we re establishing that if a lover can persuade a boy to let him, then he may kiss him, be with him, and touch him, as a father would a son, for the sake of what is fine and beautiful, but turning to the other things his association with the one he cares about must never seem to go any further than this, otherwise he will be reproached as untrained in music and poetry and lacking in appreciation for what is fine and beautiful. It

—

c

That's right.

Does it seem to you that we've now completed our account of education in music and poetry? Anyway, it has ended where it ought to end, for it ought to end in the love of the fine and beautiful. I

agree.

After music and poetry, our

young people must be given physical

training.

Of

course.

In this, too, they

d

must have careful education from childhood throughout life. The matter stands, I believe, something like this— but you, too, should look into it. It seems to me that a fit body doesn't by its own virtue make the soul good, but instead that the opposite is true— a good soul by its own virtue makes the body as good as possible. How does it seem to you? Then,

if

we have devoted

sufficient care to the

mind, wouldn't we be order to avoid having to do too much talking, to entrust it with the detailed supervision of the body, while we indicate only the general patterns to be followed? right, in

e

Certainly.

We

said that our prospective guardians

must avoid drunkenness, for it be drunk and not to know where on

appropriate for a guardian to earth he is than it is for anyone else. It would be absurd for a guardian to need a guardian. What about food? Aren't these men athletes in the greatest contest? is less

4

They are. Then would the regimen currently prescribed suitable for them?

for athletes in training

be

Republic

1041

III

Perhaps it would. Yet it seems to result health.

in sluggishness

and

to

be of doubtful value for

noticed that these athletes sleep their lives away they deviate even a little from their orderly regimen, they

Or haven't you

and that, if become seriously and

violently

ill?

have noticed that. Then our warrior athletes need a more sophisticated kind of training. They must be like sleepless hounds, able to see and hear as keenly as possible and to endure frequent changes of water and food, as well as summer and winter weather on their campaigns, without faltering in I

health.

how

That's

Now,

it

seems

isn't the best

we were

to

me,

too.

physical training akin to the simple music and poetry

describing a

moment ago?

How I

do you mean? mean a simple and decent physical

training, particularly the kind

involved in training for war. What would it be like? You might learn about such things from Homer. You know that, when his heroes are campaigning, he doesn't give them fish to banquet on, even though they are by the sea in the Hellespont, nor boiled meat either. Instead, he gives them only roasted meat, which is the kind most easily available to soldiers, for it's easier nearly everywhere to use fire alone than to carry pots

and pans.

That's right.

Nor,

I

believe,

does

Homer mention sweet

desserts anywhere. Indeed,

even the other athletes aware that, if one's body is to be sound, one must keep away from all such things? They're right to be aware of it, at any rate, and to avoid such things. If you think that, then it seems that you don't approve of Syracusan

aren't

cuisine or of Sicilian-style dishes.

do not. Then you also object to Corinthian good physical condition. I

girlfriends for

men who

are to be in

Absolutely.

What about

the reputed delights of Attic pastries?

I

certainly object to them, too.

I

believe that we'd be right to

to the kinds of lyric

and this entire life-style are composed in all sorts of modes

compare

odes and songs that

this diet

and rhythms. Certainly.

embellishment in the one gives rise to licentiousness, doesn't it give rise to illness in the other? But simplicity in music and poetry makes for moderation in the soul, and in physical training it makes for bodily health? Just as

That's absolutely true.

u z

Socrates /Glaucon

And

405

and disease breed in the city, aren't many law courts and hospitals opened? And don't medicine and law give themselves solemn airs when even large numbers of free men take them very seriously? as licentiousness

How

could it be otherwise? Yet could you find a greater sign of bad and shameful education in a city than that the need for skilled doctors and lawyers is felt not only

by

and craftsmen but by those who claim to have been brought the manner of free men? Don't you think it's shameful and a great

inferior people

up b

in

sign of vulgarity to be forced to make use of a justice imposed by others, as masters and judges, because you are unable to deal with the situation yourself?

think that's the most shameful thing of all. Yet isn't it even more shameful when someone not only spends a good part of his life in court defending himself or prosecuting someone else but, through inexperience of what is fine, is persuaded to take pride in being clever at doing injustice and then exploiting every loophole I

c

and

escape conviction and all for the sake of little worthless things and because he's ignorant of how much better and finer it is to arrange trick to

one

s

own life so as to have no need of finding a sleepy or inattentive judge?

This case

d

even more shameful than the other. And doesn t it seem shameful to you to need medical help, not for wounds or because of some seasonal illness, but because, through idleness and the life-style we've described, one is full of gas and phlegm like a is

swamp, so that sophisticated Asclepiad doctors are forced to come up with names like "flatulence" and "catarrh" to describe one's diseases? It does. And those certainly are strange new names for diseases. stagnant

Indeed, himself. e

406

I

don't suppose that they even existed in the time of Asclepius take it as a proof of this that his sons at Troy didn't criticize I

woman who treated Eurypylus when he was wounded, or Patroclus who prescribed the treatment, which consisted of Pramnian wine either the

with barley meal and grated cheese sprinkled on it, though such treatment is now thought to cause inflammation 29 Yet it's a strange drink to give someone in that condition. .

Not

you recall that they say that the kind of modern medicine that plays nursemaid to the disease wasn't used by the Asclepiads before Herodicus. He was a physical trainer who became ill, so he mixed physical training with medicine and wore out first himself and then many others b

if

as well.

How

did he do that?

By making his dying a lengthy process. Always tending his mortal illness, he was nonetheless, it seems, unable to cure it, so he lived out his life under medical treatment, with no leisure for anything else whatever. If he departed even a little from his accustomed regimen, he became

29.

See

Iliad xi.580

ff.,

828-36, and 624-50.

Republic

1043

III

completely worn out, but because his

skill

made dying

difficult,

he lived

into old age.

That's a fine prize for his

One

skill.

that's appropriate for

someone who

didn't

know

that

it

wasn't

because he was ignorant or inexperienced that Asclepius failed to teach this type of medicine to his sons, but because he knew that everyone in a well-regulated city has his own work to do and that no one has the leisure to be ill and under treatment all his life. It's absurd that we recognize this to be true of craftsmen while failing to recognize that it's equally true of those who are wealthy and supposedly happy.

How

is

that?

an emetic or a purge from his doctor or to get rid of his disease through surgery or cautery. If anyone prescribed a lengthy regimen to him, telling him that he should rest with his head bandaged and so on, he'd soon reply that he had no leisure to be ill and that life is no use to him if he has to neglect his work and always be concerned with his illness. After that he'd bid good-bye to his doctor, resume his usual way of life, and either recover his health or, if his body couldn't withstand the illness, he'd die and escape his troubles. It is believed to be appropriate for someone like that to use medicine in this way. Is that because his life is of no profit to him if he doesn't do his work?

When

a carpenter

is ill,

he expects

to receive

Obviously. But the rich person, we say, has no work that would make his life unlivable if he couldn't do it. That's what people say, at least. That's because you haven't heard the saying of Phocylides that, once

you have the means of life, you must practice virtue I think he must also practice virtue before that.

30 .

We

won't quarrel with Phocylides about this. But let's try to find out whether the rich person must indeed practice virtue and whether his life is not worth living if he doesn't or whether tending an illness, while it is an obstacle to applying oneself to carpentry and the other crafts, is no obstacle whatever to taking Phocylides' advice. But excessive care of the body, over and above physical training, is pretty well the biggest obstacle of all. It's troublesome in managing a household, in military service, and even in a sedentary public office. Yet the most important of all, surely, is that it makes any kind of learning, thought, or private meditation difficult, for it's always imagining some headaches or dizziness and accusing philosophy of causing them. Hence, wherever this kind of virtue is practiced and examined, excessive care of the body hinders it, for it makes a person think he's ill and be all the time concerned about his body. 30.

Phocylides of Miletus was a mid-sixth-century elegiac and hexameter poet best

known

for his epigrams.

1044

Glauconj Socrates

probably does. Therefore, won't we say that Asclepius knew this, and that he taught medicine for those whose bodies are healthy in their natures and habits but have some specific disease? His medicine is for these people with these habits. He cured them of their disease with drugs or surgery and then ordered them to live their usual life so as not to harm their city's affairs. But for those whose bodies were riddled with disease, he didn't attempt to prescribe a regimen, drawing off a little here and pouring in a little there, in order to make their life a prolonged misery and enable them to It

d

e

408

b

produce offspring in all probability like themselves. He didn't think that he should treat someone who couldn't live a normal life, since such a person would be of no profit either to himself or to the city. The Asclepius you're talking about was quite a statesman. Clearly. And don't you see that because he was a statesman his sons turned out to be good men at Troy, practicing medicine as I say they did? Don't you remember that they "sucked out the blood and applied gentle potions to the wound Pandarus inflicted on Menelaus, but without prescribing what he should eat or drink after that, any more than they did for Eurypylus ? 31 They considered their drugs to be sufficient to cure men who were healthy and living an orderly life before being wounded, even if they happened to drink wine mixed with barley and cheese right after receiving their wounds. But they didn't consider the lives of those who were by nature sick and licentious to be profitable either to themselves or to anyone else. Medicine isn't intended for such people and they shouldn't be treated, not even if they're richer than Midas. The sons of Asclepius you're talking about were indeed very sophisti-

cated.

Appropriately so. But Pindar and the tragedians don't agree with us 32 They say that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, that he was bribed with gold to heal a rich man, who was already dying, and that he was killed by lightning for doing so. But, in view of what we said before, we won't believe this. We'll say that if Asclepius was the son of a god, he was not a money-grubber, and that if he was a money-grubber, he was not the son of a god. That s right. But what do you say about the following, Socrates? Don't we need to have good doctors in our city? And the best will surely be those who have handled the greatest number of sick and of healthy people, In the same way, the best judges will be those who have associated with people whose natures are of every kind. I agree that the doctors and judges must be good. But do you know the kind I consider to be so? If you'll tell me. .

c

d

31. Hind iv. 218-19. 32. Cf.

Aeschylus Agamemnon 1022

ff.,

Euripides Alcestis

3,

Pindar Pythians 3.55-58.

Republic I'll

1045

III

try.

But you ask about things that aren't alike in the same question.

what way? The cleverest doctors are those who, in addition to learning their craft, have had contact with the greatest number of very sick bodies from childhood on, have themselves experienced every illness, and aren't very healthy by nature, for they don't treat bodies with their bodies, I suppose if they did, we wouldn't allow their bodies to be or become bad. Rather they treat the body with their souls, and it isn't possible for the soul to treat anything well, if it is or has been bad itself. In

—

That's right.

he does rule other souls with his own soul. And it isn't possible for a soul to be nurtured among vicious souls from childhood, to associate with them, to indulge in every kind of injustice, and come through it able to judge other people's injustices from its own case, as it can diseases of the body. Rather, if it's to be fine and good, and a sound judge of just things, it must itself remain pure and have no experience of bad character while it's young. That's the reason, indeed, that decent people appear simple and easily deceived by unjust ones when they are young. It's because they have no models in themselves of the evil experiences of the vicious to guide their judgments.

As

for the judge,

That's certainly so.

good judge must not be a young person but an old one, who has learned late in life what injustice is like and who has become aware of it not as something at home in his own soul, but as something alien and present in others, someone who, after a long time, has recognized that injustice is bad by nature, not from his own experience of it, but Therefore, a

through knowledge. Such a judge would be the most noble one of all. And he'd be good, too, which was what you asked, for someone who has a good soul is good. The clever and suspicious person, on the other hand, who has committed many injustices himself and thinks himself a wise villain, appears clever in the company of those like himself, because he's on his guard and is guided by the models within himself. But when he meets with good older people, he's seen to be stupid, distrustful at the wrong time, and ignorant of what a sound character is, since he has no model of this within himself. But since he meets vicious people more often than good ones, he seems to be clever rather than unlearned, both to himself and to others. That's completely true. Then we mustn't look for the good judge among people like that but among the sort we described earlier. A vicious person would never know either himself or a virtuous one, whereas a naturally virtuous person, when educated, will in time acquire knowledge of both virtue and vice. And it is someone like that who becomes wise, in my view, and not the

bad person. I

agree with you.

1U ^°

410

Socrates/Glaucon

Then won't you legislate in our city for the kind of medicine we mentioned and for this kind of judging, so that together they'll look after those who are naturally well endowed in body and soul? But as for the ones whose bodies are naturally unhealthy or whose souls are incurably evil, won't they let the former die of their own accord and put the latter to death? That seems to be best both for the ones who suffer such treatment and for the city.

However, our young people, since they practice and poetry that we said produces moderation, coming to need a judge.

that simple sort of will plainly be

music

wary

of

That's right.

And won't a person who's educated in music and poetry pursue physical b

training in the

same way, and choose

to

make no use

when unavoidable?

of medicine except

believe so.

I

He'll

work

at physical exercises in

order to arouse the spirited part of his nature, rather than to acquire the physical strength for which other

and

athletes diet

labor.

That's absolutely right.

Then, Glaucon, did those

c

who established education in music and poetry and in physical training do so with the aim that people attribute to them, which is to take care of the body with the latter and the soul with the some other aim? What other aim do you mean?

former, or with

looks as though they established both chiefly for the sake of the soul. How so? It

d

Haven't you noticed the effect that lifelong physical training, unaccompanied by any training in music and poetry, has on the mind, or the effect of the opposite, music and poetry without physical training? What effects are you talking about? Savagery and toughness in the one case and softness and overcultivation in the other. I

get the point.

You mean

that those

who

devote themselves exclusively be more savage than they should, while devote themselves to music and poetry turn out to be softer

to physical training turn out to

those

than

who is

good

for

them?

Moreover, the source of the savageness is the spirited part of one's nature. Rightly nurtured, it becomes courageous, but if it's overstrained, it's likely to become hard and harsh. So it seems.

And isn tion?

If it is

nurtured,

So

the philosophic part of one's nature that provides the cultivarelaxed too far, it becomes softer than it should, but if properly

t it

it is

cultivated

and

orderly.

it is.

Now, we

say that our guardians must have both these natures. They must indeed.

Republic

And Of

1047

III

mustn't the two be harmonized with each other?

course.

And

if

this

harmony

is

achieved, the soul

is

both moderate and coura-

geous? Certainly.

But

if it is

inharmonious,

it is

cowardly and savage?

Yes, indeed.

gives music an opportunity to charm his soul with the flute and to pour those sweet, soft, and plaintive tunes we mentioned through his ear, as through a funnel, when he spends his whole Therefore,

when someone

whatever spirit he has is softened, just as iron is tempered, and from being hard and useless, it is made useful. But if he keeps at it unrelentingly and is beguiled by the music, after a time his spirit is melted and dissolved until it vanishes, and the very sinews of his soul are cut out and he becomes "a feeble life

humming them and

delighting in them, then, at

first,

warrior ." 33 That's right.

he had a spiritless nature from the first, this process is soon completed. But if he had a spirited nature, his spirit becomes weak and unstable, flaring up at trifles and extinguished as easily. The result is that such people become quick-tempered, prone to anger, and filled with discontent, rather than spirited.

And

if

That's certainly true.

What about someone who works hard and

spirit?

and

eats well

good physical condition And doesn't he become more coura-

but never touches music or philosophy? at first, full of resolution

at physical training

Isn't

he

in

geous than he was before? Certainly.

But what happens if he does nothing else and never associates with the Muse? Doesn't whatever love of learning he might have had in his soul soon become enfeebled, deaf, and blind, because he never tastes any learning or investigation or partakes of

any discussion or any of the

poetry, to nurture or arouse It

does seem

to

rest of

music and

it?

be that way.

someone like that becomes a hater of reason and of music. He no longer makes any use of persuasion but bulls his way through every situation by force and savagery like a wild animal, living in ignorance and stupidity without either rhythm or grace. That's most certainly how he'll live. It seems, then, that a god has given music and physical training to human beings not, except incidentally, for the body and the soul but for the spirited and wisdom-loving parts of the soul itself, in order that these might be in harmony with one another, each being stretched and relaxed I

believe that

to the appropriate degree.

33. Iliad xvii.588.

1048

Glaucon/ Socrates

seems so. Then the person who achieves the finest blend of music and physical training and impresses it on his soul in the most measured way is the one we d most correctly call completely harmonious and trained in music, much more so than the one who merely harmonizes the strings of his inIt

strument. That's certainly so, Socrates.

Then, won t we always need this sort of person as an overseer in our city, Glaucon, if indeed its constitution is to be preserved? It

seems that we'll need someone

most of all. education and upbringing. Should we like that

These, then, are the patterns for enumerate the dances of these people, or their hunts, chases with hounds, athletic contests, and horse races? Surely, they're no longer hard to discover, since it's pretty clear that they must follow the patterns we've already estab-

lished.

Perhaps

so.

All right, then what's the next thing we have to determine? Isn't of these same people will rule and which be ruled?

Of

it

which

course.

Now, isn't it obvious that the rulers must be older and the ruled younger? 7

Yes,

it is.

And

mustn't the rulers also be the best of them?

b

That, too.

And

aren't the best farmers the ones

who

Yes.

are best at farming? 6 '

Then, as the rulers must be the best of the guardians, mustn't they be the ones who are best at guarding the city? Yes.

Then, in the first place, mustn t they be knowledgeable and capable, and mustn't they care for the city? That's right.

Now, one

cares

most

for

what one

loves.

Necessarily.

And someone same

loves something most of

things are advantageous to

does well,

he'll

do

well,

and

that

it

all

when he

believes that the

and supposes that if it does badly, then he'll do badly too

as to himself

if it

That's right.

Then we must choose from among our guardians those men who, upon examination, seem most of all to believe throughout their lives that they must eagerly pursue what is advantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the opposite. Such people would be suitable for the job at any rate. I think we must observe them at all ages to see whether they are guardians of this conviction and make sure that neither compulsion nor magic spells will get them to discard or forget their belief that they must do what is

best for the city.

Republic

1049

III

What do you mean by

discarding?

you. I think the discarding of a belief is either voluntary or involuntary voluntary when one learns that the belief is false, involuntary I'll

tell

—

in the case of all true beliefs.

understand voluntary discarding but not involuntary. What's that? Don't you know that people are voluntarily deprived of bad things, but involuntarily deprived of good ones? And isn't being deceived about the truth a bad thing, while possessing the truth is good? I

Or don't you think That's right,

that to believe the things that are

and

I

is

to possess the truth?

that people are involuntarily deprived of

do think

true opinions.

But can't they also be so deprived by theft, magic spells, and compulsion? Now, I don't understand again. I'm afraid I must be talking like a tragic poet! By "the victims of theft" I mean those who are persuaded to change their minds or those who forget, because time, in the latter case, and argument, in the former, takes away their opinions without their realizing it. Do you understand now? Yes.

By "the compelled"

I

mean

those

whom

pain or suffering causes to

change their mind. I understand that, and you're right. The "victims of magic," I think you'd agree, are those who change their mind because they are under the spell of pleasure or fear. It seems to me that everything that deceives does so by casting a spell. Then, as I said just now, we must find out who are the best guardians of their conviction that they must always do what they believe to be best for the city. We must keep them under observation from childhood and set them tasks that are most likely to make them forget such a conviction or be deceived out of it, and we must select whoever keeps on remembering it and isn't easily deceived, and reject the others. Do you agree? Yes.

And we must

subject

can watch for these

them

to labors, pains,

and contests

in

which we

traits.

That's right.

Then we must

also set

up

a competition for the third

way

in

which

people are deprived of their convictions, namely, magic. Like those who lead colts into noise and tumult to see if they're afraid, we must expose our young people to fears and pleasures, testing them more thoroughly than gold is tested by fire. If someone is hard to put under a spell, is apparently gracious in everything, is a good guardian of himself and the music and poetry he has learned, and if he always shows himself to be rhythmical and harmonious, then he is the best person both for himself and for the city. Anyone who is tested in this way as a child, youth, and adult, and always comes out of it untainted, is to be made a ruler as well as a guardian; he is to be honored in life and to receive after his death the most prized tombs and memorials. But anyone who fails to prove himself

1LOU

Socrates/Glaucon

in this

b

way

to

be rejected.

seems

to me, Glaucon, that rulers and guardians must be selected and appointed in some such way as this, though we've provided only a general pattern and not the exact details. It also seems to me that they must be selected in this sort of way. Then, isn t it truly most correct to call these people complete guardians, since they will guard against external enemies and internal friends, so that is

the one will lack the

It

power and

the other the desire to harm the city? The young people we ve hitherto called guardians we'll now call auxiliaries and supporters of the guardians' convictions. I agree.

How,

then, could

we

devise one of those useful falsehoods we were talking about a while ago 34 one noble falsehood that would, in the best case, persuade even the rulers, but if that's not possible, then the others in the city? ,

c

What

sort of falsehood?

Nothing new, but a Phoenician story which describes something that has happened in many places. At least, that's what the poets say, and they've persuaded many people to believe it too. It hasn't happened among us, and I don t even know if it could. It would certainly take a lot of persuasion to get people to believe

You seem

hesitant to

tell

it.

the story.

When you

hear it, you'll realize that Speak, and don't be afraid. d

e

[5

b

then,

I'll tell it,

though

I

don't

I

have every reason

know where

I'll

to hesitate.

get the audacity or even

what words I'll use. I'll first try to persuade the rulers and the soldiers and then the rest of the city that the upbringing and the education we gave them, and the experiences that went with them, were a sort of dream, that in fact they themselves, their weapons, and the other craftsmen's tools were at that time really being fashioned and nurtured inside the earth, and that when the work was completed, the earth, who is their mother, delivered all of them up into the world. Therefore, if anyone attacks the land in which they live, they must plan on its behalf and defend it as their mother and nurse and think of the other citizens as their earthborn brothers. It isn't for nothing that you were so shy about telling your falsehood. Appropriately

Nevertheless, listen to the rest of the story. "All of you in the city are brothers, we'll say to them in telling our story, "but the god who made you mixed some gold into those who are adequately equipped to rule, because they are most valuable. He put silver in those who are auxiliaries and iron and bronze in the farmers and other craftsmen. For the most part you will produce children like yourselves, but, because you are all related, a silver child will occasionally be born from so.

a golden

parent,

and

and all the others from each other. So the first and most important command from the god to the rulers is that there is nothing that they must guard better or watch more carefully than the mixture of 34.

See 382a

vice versa,

ff.

Republic

1051

III

metals in the souls of the next generation. If an offspring of theirs should be found to have a mixture of iron or bronze, they must not pity him in any way, but give him the rank appropriate to his nature and drive him out to join the craftsmen and farmers. But if an offspring of these people is found to have a mixture of gold or silver, they will honor him and take him up to join the guardians or the auxiliaries, for there is an oracle which says that the city will be ruined if it ever has an iron or a bronze guardian." So, do you have any device that will make our citizens believe this story? I can't see any way to make them believe it themselves, but perhaps there is one in the case of their sons and later generations and all the other

people who come after them. I understand pretty much what you mean, but even that would help to make them care more for the city and each other. However, let's leave this matter wherever tradition takes it. And let's now arm our earthborn and lead them forth with their rulers in charge. And as they march, let them look for the best place in the city to have their camp, a site from which they can most easily control those within, if anyone is unwilling to obey the laws, or repel any outside enemy who comes like a wolf upon the flock. And when they have established their camp and made the requisite sacrifices, they must see to their sleeping quarters. What do you say? I

agree.

And

won't these quarters protect them adequately both in winter and

summer? Of course,

for

it

seems

to

me

that

you mean

their housing.

Yes, but housing for soldiers, not for money-makers.

How

do you mean

from one another? I'll try to tell you. The most terrible and most shameful thing of all is for a shepherd to rear dogs as auxiliaries to help him with his flocks in such a way that, through licentiousness, hunger, or some other bad trait of character, they do evil to the sheep and become like wolves instead to distinguish these

of dogs.

That's certainly a terrible thing. Isn't

it

necessary, therefore, to guard in every

way against our auxiliaries

doing anything like that to the citizens because they are stronger, thereby becoming savage masters instead of kindly allies? It is

And

necessary.

wouldn't a really good education endow them with the greatest

caution in this regard? But surely they have had an education like that. Perhaps we shouldn't assert this dogmatically, Glaucon. What we can assert is what we were saying just now, that they must have the right

they are to have what will most gentle to each other and to those they are guarding. education, whatever

it is, if

make them

That's right.

Now, someone with some understanding might say

that,

besides this

education, they must also have the kind of housing and other property

Socrates /Glaucon /Adeimantus

that will neither prevent

them

do

to

them from being

the best guardians nor encourage

evil to the other citizens.

That's true.

Consider, then, whether or not they should live in some such way as this, if they're to be the kind of men we described. First, none of them should possess any private property beyond what is wholly necessary. Second, none of them should have a house or storeroom that isn't open for enter at will. Third, whatever sustenance moderate and courageous warrior-athletes require in order to have neither shortfall nor surplus in all to

a given year they'll receive by taxation on the other citizens as a salary for their guardianship. Fourth, they'll have common messes and live to-

gether like soldiers in a camp. We'll tell them that they always have gold and silver of a divine sort in their souls as a gift from the gods and so have no further need of human gold. Indeed, we'll tell them that it's

impious for them to defile this divine possession by any admixture of such gold, because many impious deeds have been done that involve the currency used by ordinary people, while their own is pure. Hence, for

them alone among the city's population, it is unlawful to touch or handle gold or silver. They mustn't be under the same roof as it, wear it as jewelry, or drink from gold or silver goblets. In this way they'd save both themselves and the city. But if they acquire private land, houses, and currency themselves, they'll be household managers and farmers instead of guardians hostile masters of the other citizens instead of their allies. They'll spend their whole lives hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against,

more

afraid of internal than of external enemies, and they'll hasten both themselves and the whole city to almost immediate ruin. For all these reasons, let's say that the guardians must be provided with housing and the rest in this way, and establish this as a law. Or don't you agree? I

certainly do,

Glaucon

said.

Book IV And Adeimantus he

said,

and

if

that

interrupted:

someone it's

their

told

own

you

How would

you aren't The city really belongs

that

fault?

you defend yourself, Socrates, making these men very happy

them, yet they derive no good from it. Others own land, build fine big houses, acquire furnishings to go along with them, make their own private sacrifices to the gods, entertain guests, and also, of course, possess what you were talking about just

now, gold and

to

and all the things that are thought belong to people who are blessedly happy. But one might well say that your guardians are simply settled in the city like mercenaries and that all they do is watch over it. Yes, I said, and what's more, they work simply for their keep and get no extra wages as the others do. Hence, if they want to take a private trip away from the city, they won't be able to; they'll have nothing to give to to

silver

Republic

1053

IV

nothing to spend in whatever other ways they wish, as are considered happy. You've omitted these and a host of

their mistresses,

people do

who

from your charge. Well, let them be added to the charge as well. Then, are you asking how we should defend ourselves?

other, similar facts

Yes. I

think we'll discover

what

to say

if

we

follow the same path as before. these people were happiest just

We'll say that it wouldn't be surprising if as they are, but that, in establishing our city, we aren't aiming to make any one group outstandingly happy but to make the whole city so, as far

We

thought that we'd find justice most easily in such a city and injustice, by contrast, in the one that is governed worst and that, by observing both cities, we'd be able to judge the question we've been inquiring into for so long. We take ourselves, then, to be fashioning the happy city, not picking out a few happy people and putting them in it, but making the whole city happy. (We'll look at the opposite city soon. ) Suppose, then, that someone came up to us while we were painting a statue and objected that, because we had painted the eyes (which are the most beautiful part) black rather than purple, we had not applied the most as possible.

1

most beautiful parts of the statue. We'd think it reasonable to offer the following defense: "You mustn't expect us to paint the eyes so beautifully that they no longer appear to be eyes at all, and the same with the other parts. Rather you must look to see whether by dealing with each part appropriately, we are making the whole statue beautiful." Similarly, you mustn't force us to give our guardians the kind of happiness that would make them something other than guardians. We know how to clothe the farmers in purple robes, festoon them with gold jewelry, and tell them to work the land whenever they please. We know how to settle our potters on couches by the fire, feasting and passing the wine around, with their wheel beside them for whenever they want to make pots. And we can make all the others happy in the same way, so that the whole city is happy. Don't urge us to do this, however, for if we do, a farmer wouldn't be a farmer, nor a potter a potter, and none of the others would keep to the patterns of work that give rise to a city. Now, if cobblers become inferior and corrupt and claim to be what they are not, that won't do much harm to the city. Hence, as far as they and the others like them are concerned, our argument carries less weight. But if the guardians of our laws and city are merely believed to be guardians but

beautiful colors to the

are not,

you surely

see that they'll destroy the city utterly, just as they

alone have the opportunity to govern it well and make it happy. If we are making true guardians, then, who are least likely to do evil to the city, and if the one who brought the charge is talking about farmers and banqueters who are happy as they would be at a festival rather than in a city, then he isn't talking about a city at all, but about something else. 1.

This discussion

is

announced

at 445c,

but doesn't begin until Book

VIII.

Socrates /Adeimantus

mind, we should consider whether in setting up our guardians we are aiming to give them the greatest happiness, or whether since our aim is to see that the city as a whole has the greatest happiness we must compel and persuade the auxiliaries and guardians to follow our other policy and be the best possible craftsmen at their own work, and the same with all the others. In this way, with the whole city developing and being governed well, we must leave it to nature to provide each group with its

With

this in

— —

share of happiness. I think you put that very well, he said. Will you also think that I'm putting things well point, which is closely akin to this one?

Which one

when

I

make

the next

exactly?

Consider whether or not the following things corrupt the other workers, so that they

What

become bad.

things?

Wealth and poverty.

How

do they corrupt the other workers? Like this. Do you think that a potter who has become wealthy be willing to pay attention to his craft? Not at all. Won't he become more idle and careless than he was?

will

still

Much

more. Then won't he become a worse potter? Far worse.

And

surely

poverty prevents him from having tools or any of the other things he needs for his craft, he'll produce poorer work and will if

teach his sons, or anyone else he teaches, to be worse craftsmen. Of course.

So poverty and wealth make a craftsman and his products worse. Apparently. It seems, then, that we've found other things that our guardians must guard against in every way, to prevent them from slipping into the city unnoticed.

What

are they?

Both wealth and poverty. The former makes for luxury, idleness, and revolution; the latter for slavishness, bad work, and revolution as well. That's certainly true. But consider this, Socrates: If our city hasn't got any money, how will it be able to fight a war, especially if it has to fight against a great and wealthy city? Obviously, it will be harder to fight one such city and easier to fight two.

How

do you mean?

First of all, it

if

our

city

has to fight a city of the sort you mention, won't

be a case of warrior-athletes fighting against rich men?

Yes, as far as that goes. Well, then, Adeimantus, don't you think that one boxer who has had the best possible training could easily fight two rich and fat non-

boxers?

1055

Republic IV

Maybe

not at the same time.

Not even by escaping from them and then turning and hitting the one who caught up with him first, and doing this repeatedly in stifling heat and sun? Wouldn't he, in his condition, be able to handle even more than two such people? That certainly wouldn't be surprising. And don't you think that the rich have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of how to fight a war? I

do.

Then

in all likelihood

three times their I

agree, for

I

our athletes will easily be able to fight twice or

own numbers

think

in a war.

what you say

is right.

they sent envoys to another city and told them the following truth: "We have no use for gold or silver, and it isn't lawful for us to possess them, so join us in this war, and you can take the property of those who oppose us for yourselves." Do you think that anyone hearing this would choose to fight hard, lean dogs, rather than to join them in fighting fat and tender sheep? No, I don't. But if the wealth of all the cities came to be gathered in a

What

if

single one,

watch out

that

it

doesn't endanger your nonwealthy city. you think that anything other than the kind

You're happily innocent if of city we are founding deserves to be called a

city.

What do you mean? because each of them is a great many cities, not a city, as they say in the game. At any rate, each of them consists of two cities at war with one another, that of the poor and that of the rich, and each of these contains a great many. If you approach them as one city, you'll be making a big mistake. But if you approach them as many and offer to give to the one city the money, power, and indeed the very inhabitants of the other, you'll always find many allies and few enemies. And as long as your own city is moderately governed in the way that we've just arranged, it will, even if it has only a thousand men to fight for it, be the greatest. Not in reputation; I don't mean that, but the greatest in fact. Indeed, you won't find a city as great as this one among either Greeks or barbarians, although many that are many times its size may seem to be as great. Do you disagree? We'll have to find a greater

title

for the others

No, I certainly don't. Then this would also be the best limit for our guardians to put on the size of the city. And they should mark off enough land for a city that size and let the rest go.

What

limit

is

that?

suppose the following one. As long as it is willing to remain one city, may continue to grow, but it cannot grow beyond that point. That is a good limit. Then, we'll give our guardians this further order, namely, to guard in I

it

every way against the city's being either small or great in reputation instead of being sufficient in size and one in number.

1UDt)

Adeimantus/ Socrates

At any

And

rate, that

the one

order will be fairly easy for them to follow.

we mentioned

even easier, when we said that, if an offspring of the guardians is inferior, he must be sent off to join the other citizens and that, if the others have an able offspring, he must join d

earlier

is

was meant to make clear that each of the other citizens to what he is naturally suited for, so that, doing the one own, he will become not many but one, and the whole

the guardians. This is

to

be directed

work

that

is

his

be naturally one not many. That is easier than the other. These orders we give them, Adeimantus, are neither as numerous nor as important as one might think. Indeed, they are all insignificant, provided, as the saying goes, that they guard the one great thing, though I'd rather call it sufficient than great. What's that? Their education and upbringing, for if by being well educated they become reasonable men, they will easily see these things for themselves, city will itself

e

as well as

424

all

the other things

we

are omitting, for example, that marriage, the having of wives, and the procreation of children must be governed as far as possible by the old proverb: Friends possess everything in common.

That would be best. And surely, once our city gets a good start, it will go on growing in a cycle. Good education and upbringing, when they are preserved, produce

good natures, and useful natures, who are in turn well educated, grow up even better than their predecessors, both in their offspring and in other b

respects, just like other animals.

That's likely.

To put

briefly, those in

charge must cling to education and see that it isn't corrupted without their noticing it, guarding it against everything. Above all, they must guard as carefully as they can against any innovation music and poetry or in physical training that is counter to the established order. And they should dread to hear anyone say: it

m

People care most for the song That is newest from the singer's

lips

2 .

Someone might

c

praise such a saying, thinking that the poet meant not new songs but new ways of singing. Such a thing shouldn't be praised, and the poet shouldn't be taken to have meant it, for the guardians

beware of changing

As Damon

to a

new form

of music, since

it

threatens the

must whole

and I am convinced, the musical modes are never changed without change in the most important of a city's laws. system.

says,

You can count me among

2.

Odyssey

i.

the convinced as well,

351-52, slightly altered.

Adeimantus

said.

Republic

1057

IV

Then it seems, I said, that it is in music and poetry that our guardians must build their bulwark. At any rate, lawlessness easily creeps in there unnoticed. Yes, as if music and poetry were only play and did no harm at all.

—

harmless except, of course, that when lawlessness has established itself there, it flows over little by little into characters and ways of life. Then, greatly increased, it steps out into private contracts, and from private contracts, Socrates, it makes its insolent way into the laws and government, It is

until in the

Well,

end

it

that the

is

overthrows everything, public and private.

way

goes?

it

think so.

I

Then, as we said at first, our children's games must from the very beginning be more law-abiding, for if their games become lawless, and the children follow suit, isn't it impossible for them to grow up into good and law-abiding men? It

certainly

is.

But when children play the right games from the beginning and absorb lawfulness from music and poetry, it follows them in everything and fosters their growth, correcting anything in the city that may have gone wrong before in other words, the very opposite of what happens where

—

games

the

are lawless.

That's true.

These people will also discover the seemingly insignificant conventions their predecessors have destroyed.

Which ones?

When

proper for the young to be silent in front of their elders, when they should make way for them or stand up in their presence, the care of parents, hair styles, the clothes and shoes to wear, deportment, and everything else of that sort. Don't you agree?

Things

it is

do.

I I

like this:

think

it's

will never

How

foolish to legislate about such things. Verbal or written decrees

make them come about

or

last.

could they?

looks as though the start of someone's education determines what follows. Doesn't like always encourage like?

At any It

rate,

Adeimantus,

it

does.

And

the final

outcome

of education,

I

suppose we'd

say,

is

a single

newly finished person, who is either good or the opposite. Of course. That's why I wouldn't go on to try to legislate about such things. And with good reason. Then, by the gods, what about market business, such as the private contracts people make with one another in the marketplace, for example, or contracts with manual laborers, cases of insult or injury, the bringing of lawsuits, the establishing of juries, the payment and assessment of whatever dues are necessary in markets and harbors, the regulation of

Socrates/ Adeimantus / Glaucon

market, city, harbor, and the rest about any of these?

— should we bring ourselves

to legislate

appropriate to dictate to men who are fine and good. They'll easily find out for themselves whatever needs to be legislated about such things. isn't

It

Yes, provided that a are preserved. not, they'll

If

spend

god grants

aren't willing to

we have already

their lives enacting a lot of other

amending them, believing

You mean they

that the laws

that in this

way

described

laws and then

they'll attain the best.

people who, through licentiousness, abandon their harmful way of life? 11

live like those sick

That's right.

And

such people carry on in an altogether amusing fashion, don't they? Their medical treatment achieves nothing, except that their illness becomes

worse and more complicated, and they're always hoping that someone will recommend some new medicine to cure them. That's exactly what happens to people like that. And isn t it also amusing that they consider their worst enemy to be the person who tells them the truth, namely, that until they give up drunkenness, overeating, lechery, and idleness, no medicine, cautery, or surgery, no charms, amulets, or anything else of that kind will do them any good? It isn't amusing at all, for it isn't amusing to treat someone harshly when he's telling the truth.

You

don't

seem

approve of such men. I certainly don't, by god. Then, you won't approve either if a whole city behaves in that way, as we said. Don't you think that cities that are badly governed behave exactly to

when

they warn their citizens not to disturb the city's whole political establishment on pain of death? The person who is honored and considered clever and wise in important matters by such badly governed cities is the one who serves them most pleasantly, indulges them, flatters them, anticipates their wishes, and is clever at fulfillling them. Cities certainly do seem to behave in that way, and I don't approve of like this

it

at

all.

What about you admire I

those

who

are willing

and eager

to serve

such

cities?

Don't

courage and readiness? do, except for those who are deceived by majority approval into believtheir

ing that they are true statesmen.

What do you mean? Have you no sympathy think

it's

possible for

someone who

when many

believe

it

himself

that he

is

six feet tall?

for

such men? Or do you

ignorant of measurement not to others who are similarly ignorant tell him is

No, I don't think that. Then don t be too hard on them, for such people are surely the most amusing of all. They pass laws on the subjects we've just been enumerating and then amend them, and they always think they'll find a way to put a

Republic

1059

IV

stop to cheating on contracts and the other things I mentioned, not realizing 3 that they're really just cutting off a Hydra's head .

Yet that's all they're doing. I'd have thought, then, that the true lawgiver oughtn't to bother with that form of law or constitution, either in a badly governed city or in a well-governed one in the former, because it's useless and accomplishes nothing; in the latter, because anyone could discover some of these things, while the others follow automatically from the ways of life we established. What is now left for us to deal with under the heading of legislation? For us nothing, but for the Delphic Apollo it remains to enact the greatest,

—

finest,

and

first

What laws

of laws.

are those?

Those having to do with the establishing of temples, sacrifices, and other forms of service to gods, daemons, and heroes, the burial of the dead, and the services that ensure their favor. We have no knowledge of these things, and in establishing our city, if we have any understanding, we won't be persuaded to trust them to anyone other than the ancestral guide. And

upon

god, sitting

this

4 the rock at the center of the earth ,

doubt the ancestral guide on these matters

is

without a

for all people.

Nicely put. And that's what we must do. Well, son of Ariston, your city might now be said to be established. The next step is to get an adequate light somewhere and to call upon your brother as well as Polemarchus and the others, so as to look inside it and

where the justice and the injustice might be in it, what the difference between them is, and which of the two the person who is to be happy should possess, whether its possession is unnoticed by all the gods and see

human

beings or not. You're talking nonsense, Glaucon said. You promised to look for them yourself because you said it was impious for you not to come to the rescue of justice in every way you could. That's true, and I must do what I promised, but you'll have to help.

We I

will.

hope

to find

correctly founded,

way. I think our completely good.

in this

it

is

city, if

indeed

it

has been

Necessarily so. Clearly, then,

it is

wise, courageous, moderate,

and

just.

Clearly.

Then, if we find any of these in haven't found?

Of

what's

left

over will be the ones

we

course.

The Hydra was new heads grew in 3.

4.

it,

I.e.,

on the rock

center of the earth.

a mythical monster. its

place. Heracles

When one

had

to

heads was cut off, two or three slay the Hydra as one of his labors.

in the sanctuary at Delphi,

of

its

which was believed

to be the navel or

1U0U

Socrates / Glaucon

Therefore, as with any other four things,

we were

looking for any one it first, that would be enough for us, but if we recognized the other three first, this itself would be sufficient to enable us to recognize what we are looking for. Clearly it couldn't be anything other than what's left over.

them

of

in

if

something and recognized

That's right.

Therefore, since there are four virtues, mustn't

we

look for them in the

same way? Clearly.

Now,

b

the

thing

think

can see clearly in the city there seems to be something odd about it. What's that? first

think that the city

I

has good judgment,

I

we

I

described

is

really wise.

And

is

wisdom, and

that's

because

it

isn't it?

Yes.

Now, for

it's

very thing, good judgment, is clearly some kind of knowledge, through knowledge, not ignorance, that people judge well. this

Clearly.

But there are

Of

many

kinds of knowledge in the

city.

course.

because of the knowledge possessed by its carpenters, then, that the city is to be called wise and sound in judgment? Is

c

it

Not at all. It's called skilled in carpentry because of that. Then it isn t to be called wise because of the knowledge by which

it

arranges to have the best wooden implements. No, indeed. What about the knowledge of bronze items or the like? It isn't because of any knowledge of that sort. Nor because of the knowledge of how to raise a harvest from the earth, for it's called skilled in farming because of that. I should think so. Then, is there some knowledge possessed by some of the citizens

d

e

we

in the

founded that doesn't judge about any particular matter but about the city as a whole and the maintenance of good relations, both internally and with other cities? There is indeed. What is this knowledge, and who has it? It is guardianship, and it is possessed by those rulers we just now called complete guardians. Then, what does this knowledge entitle you to say about the city? That it has good judgment and is really wise. Who do you think that there will be more of in our city, metal-workers city

just

or these true guardians?

There will be

far

more metal-workers.

Indeed, of all those who are called by a certain name because they have some kind of knowledge, aren't the guardians the least numerous?

Republic

By

1061

IV

far.

according to nature would be wise because of the smallest class and part in it, namely, the governing or ruling one. And to this class, which seems to be by nature the smallest, belongs a share of the knowledge that alone among all the other kinds of knowledge

Then, a whole

is

city established

be called wisdom. That's completely true. Then we've found one of the four virtues, as well as to

though

don't

I

Our way

know how we found

its

place in the

city,

it.

seems good enough to me. And surely courage and the part of the city it's in, the part on account of which the city is called courageous, aren't difficult to see. of finding

it

How

is

Who,

in calling the city

that?

other than to

cowardly or courageous, would look anywhere the part of it that fights and does battle on its behalf?

No

one would look anywhere else. At any rate, I don't think that the courage or cowardice of its other citizens would cause the city itself to be called either courageous or cowardly. No, it wouldn't. The city is courageous, then, because of a part of itself that has the power to preserve through everything its belief about what things are to be feared, namely, that they are the things and kinds of things that the lawgiver declared to be such in the course of educating it. Or don't you call that courage? I don't completely understand what you mean. Please, say it again. I mean that courage is a kind of preservation.

What

sort of preservation?

That preservation of the belief that has been inculcated by the law through education about what things and sorts of things are to be feared. And by preserving this belief "through everything," I mean preserving it and not abandoning it because of pains, pleasures, desires, or fears. If you like, I'll compare it to something I think it resembles. I'd like that.

You know the

that dyers,

many colors

of

who want

wool the one

to

that

dye wool purple,

is

first

pick out from

naturally white, then they carefully

various ways, so that it will absorb the color as well as possible, and only at that point do they apply the purple dye. When

prepare

this in

—

something is dyed in this way, the color is fast no amount of washing, whether with soap or without it, can remove it. But you also know what happens to material if it hasn't been dyed in this way, but instead is dyed purple or some other color without careful preparation. I know that it looks washed out and ridiculous. Then, you should understand that, as far as we could, we were doing something similar when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music and physical training. What we were contriving was nothing other than this: That because they had the proper nature and upbringing, they

1UDZ

Socrates / Glaucon

would absorb

the laws in the finest possible way, just like a dye, so that their belief about what they should fear and all the rest would become so fast that even such extremely effective detergents as pleasure, pain, fear,

—

b

c

d

and desire wouldn't wash it out and pleasure is much more potent than any powder, washing soda, or soap. This power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn't is what I call courage, unless, of course, you say otherwise. I have nothing different to say, for I assume that you don't consider the correct belief about these same things, which you find in animals and slaves, and which is not the result of education, to be inculcated by law, and that you don't call it courage but something else, That's absolutely true. Then I accept your account of courage. Accept it instead as my account of civic courage, and you will be right. We'll discuss courage more fully some other time, if you like. At present,

our inquiry concerns not it but justice. And what we've said is sufficient for that purpose. You're quite right. There are now two things left for us to find in the city, namely, moderation" and the goal of our entire inquiry justice.

—

—

That's right. Is

there a

way we

could find justice so as not to have to bother with

moderation any further? I don't know any, and I wouldn't want justice to appear first if that means that we won't investigate moderation. So if you want to please me, look for the latter e

I

m

first.

certainly willing.

It

Look, then. We will. Seen from here, than the previous ones. In

would be wrong not it is

to be.

more like a kind of consonance and harmony

what way?

Moderation pleasures and

surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of desires. People indicate as much when they use the phrase self-control and other similar phrases. I don't know just what they mean by them, but they are, so to speak, like tracks or clues that moderation

431

is

has left behind in language. Isn't that so? Absolutely. Yet isn't the expression "self-control" ridiculous? The stronger self that does the controlling is the same as the weaker self that gets controlled, so that only one person is referred to in all such expressions.

Of 5.

course.

The Greek term

is

sophrosune.

It

has a very wide meaning: self-control, good sense,

reasonableness, temperance, and (in some contexts) chastity. head under pressure or temptation possesses sophrosune.

Someone who keeps

his

1063

Republic IV

Nonetheless, the expression is apparently trying to indicate that, in the soul of that very person, there is a better part and a worse one and that, whenever the naturally better part is in control of the worse, this is expressed by saying that the person is self-controlled or master of himself.

At any rate, one praises someone by calling him self-controlled. But when, on the other hand, the smaller and better part is overpowered by the larger, because of bad upbringing or bad company, this is called being selfdefeated or licentious and is a reproach. Appropriately so. Take a look at our new city, and you'll find one of these in it. You'll say that it is rightly called self-controlled, if indeed something in which the better rules the worse is properly called moderate and self-controlled. I am looking, and what you say is true. Now, one finds all kinds of diverse desires, pleasures, and pains, mostly in children, women, household slaves, and in those of the inferior majority

who

are called free.

That's right.

But you meet with the desires that are simple, measured, and directed by calculation in accordance with understanding and correct belief only in the few people who are born with the best natures and receive the best education.

That's true.

Then, don't you see that in your

many I

are controlled

the desires of the inferior

by the wisdom and desires

of the superior few?

do.

Therefore,

and

city, too,

desires,

if

any

city is said to

be in control of

itself

and

of

its

pleasures

this one.

it is

Absolutely.

And

isn't

it,

therefore, also

moderate because of

all this?

It is.

And,

further,

indeed the ruler and the ruled in any city share the same should rule, it is in this one. Or don't you agree?

about who agree entirely.

belief I

if

the citizens agree in this way, in which of moderation is located? In the ruler or the ruled?

And when I

suppose

in both.

Then, you see how right a kind of harmony?

How

them do you say

we were

to divine that

moderation resembles

so?

Because, unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in one part, making the city brave and wise respectively, moderation spreads

throughout the whole. It makes the weakest, the strongest, and those in between whether in regard to reason, physical strength, numbers, wealth, all sing the same song together. And this unanimity, or anything else this agreement between the naturally worse and the naturally better as to

—

—

1UCH:

Socrates / Glaucon

which

of the

two

is

to rule

both in the

city

and

in each one,

is

rightly

called moderation.

agree completely. All right. We ve now found, at least from the point of view of our present beliefs, three out of the four virtues in our city. So what kind of virtue is I

left,

then, that

that

it is

makes

the city share even further in virtue? Surely,

it's

clear

justice.

That is clear. Then, Glaucon,

we must

station ourselves like hunters

wood and

surrounding a

focus our understanding, so that justice doesn't escape us and vanish into obscurity, for obviously it's around here somewhere. So look and try eagerly to catch sight of it, and if you happen to see it before I do, you can tell me about it. I

wish

follower

I

make better use of me if you take me things when you point them out to him.

could, but you'll

who

can see

to

be a

Follow, then, and join me in a prayer. I'll do that, just so long as you lead. I

though the place seems to be impenetrable and full of certainly dark and hard to search though. But all the same,

certainly will,

shadows.

It is

we must go on. Indeed we must. And then I caught sight of something. Ah ha! there's a track here, so

it

Glaucon, it looks as though seems that our quarry won't altogether escape us.

good news. Either that, or we've just been stupid. In what way? Because what we are looking for seems to have been rolling around at our feet from the very beginning, and we didn't see it, which was ridiculous of us. Just as people sometimes search for the very thing they are holding That's

in their hands, so

we

didn't look in the right direction but gazed off into that's probably why we didn't notice it.

and What do you mean? I mean that, though we've been talking and hearing about it for a long time, I think we didn t understand what we were saying or that, in a way, we were talking about justice. That's a long prelude for someone who wants to hear the answer. Then listen and see whether there's anything in what I say. Justice, I think, is exactly what we said must be established throughout the city when we were founding it— either that or some form of it. We stated, and often repeated, if you remember, that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is naturally best suited. the distance,

Yes,

we

did keep saying that. Moreover, we've heard many people say and have often said ourselves that justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what isn't one's own. Yes,

we

have.

Then,

comes

1065

IV

Republic

it

own work — provided that it And do you know what take

turns out that this doing one's

be in a certain as evidence of this? No, tell me. to

way

—

is justice.

I

what was left over in the city when moderation, courage, and wisdom have been found. It is the power that makes it possible for them to grow in the city and that preserves them when they've I

think that this

is

remains there itself. And of course we said that justice would be what was left over when we had found the other three. Yes, that must be so. And surely, if we had to decide which of the four will make the city good by its presence, it would be a hard decision. Is it the agreement in

grown

for as long as

it

and the ruled? Or the preservation among the soldiers of the law-inspired belief about what is to be feared and what isn't? Or the wisdom and guardianship of the rulers? Or is it, above all, the fact that every child, woman, slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler, and ruled each does his own work and doesn't meddle with what is other people's?

belief

between the

rulers

How

could this fail to be a hard decision? It seems, then, that the power that consists in everyone's doing his own work rivals wisdom, moderation, and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city. It

certainly does.

And

wouldn't you

call this rival to the

others in

its

contribution to the

city's virtue justice?

Absolutely.

Look

at

it

this

way

if

you want

to

be convinced. Won't you order your

rulers to act as judges in the city's courts?

Of

course.

won't their sole aim in delivering judgments be that no citizen should have what belongs to another or be deprived of what is his own? They'll have no aim but that. Because that is just?

And

Yes.

Therefore, from this point of view also, the having own would be accepted as justice.

and doing

of one's

That's right.

Consider, then, and see whether you agree with me about this. If a carpenter attempts to do the work of a cobbler, or a cobbler that of a carpenter, or they exchange their tools or honors with one another, or if the same person tries to do both jobs, and all other such exchanges are

made, do you think that does any great harm to the city? Not much. But I suppose that when someone, who is by nature a craftsman or some other kind of money-maker, is puffed up by wealth, or by having a majority of votes, or by his own strength, or by some other such thing, and attempts to enter the class of soldiers, or one of the unworthy soldiers tries to enter

UDD

Socrates / Glaucon

and guardians, and these exchange their tools and honors, or when the same person tries to do all these things at once, then I think you 11 agree that these exchanges and this sort of meddling bring the city that of the judges

to ruin.

Absolutely.

c

Meddling and exchange between these three classes, then, is the greatest harm that can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst thing someone could do to it. Exactly.

And wouldn't you his city

Of

say that the worst thing that someone could do to

injustice?

is

course.

Then, that exchange and meddling is injustice. Or to put it the other way around: For the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes each

do its own work in the city, is the opposite. That's makes the city just? I agree. Justice is that and nothing else. to

d

justice, isn't

it,

and

Let's not take that as secure just yet, but if we find that the same form, when it comes to be in each individual person, is accepted as justice there as well, we can assent to it. What else can we say? But if that isn't what we find, we must look for something else to be justice.

For the moment,

however, let's complete the present inquiry. We thought that, if we first tried to observe justice in some larger thing that possessed it, this would

make

it

thing

is

We agreed that this larger

easier to observe in a single individual. 6 a city, and so we established the best city

that justice

would be

in

one

that

was good.

we

So, let's

knowing well apply what has come could,

to light in the city to

435

an individual, and if it is accepted there, all will be well. But if something different is found in the individual, then we must go back and test that on the city. And if we do this, and compare them side by side, we might well make justice light up as if we were rubbing

And, when

fire sticks

together.

grip on

for ourselves.

it

it

has

come

to light,

we

can get a secure

You're following the road

we set, and we must do as you say. Well, then, are things called by the same name, whether they are bigger or smaller than one another, like or unlike with respect to that to which that name applies? Alike. Then b

a just

man won't

differ at all

from

a just city in respect to the

form

of justice; rather he'll be like the city.

He

will.

But a city was thought to be just when each of the three natural classes within it did its own work, and it was thought to be moderate, courageous, and wise because of certain other conditions and states of theirs. 6.

See 368c

ff.

Republic

1067

IV

That's true.

Then, if an individual has these same three parts in his soul, we will expect him to be correctly called by the same names as the city if he has the same conditions in them. Necessarily so. Then once again we've

come upon an easy

question, namely, does the

soul have these three parts in it or not? It doesn't look easy to me. Perhaps, Socrates, there's

old saying that everything fine

some

truth in the

is difficult.

Apparently so. But you should know, Glaucon, that, in my opinion, we will never get a precise answer using our present methods of argument although there is another longer and fuller road that does lead to such an answer. But perhaps we can get an answer that's up to the standard of our previous statements and inquiries. Isn't that satisfactory? It would be enough for me at present. In that case, it will be fully enough for me too. Then don't weary, but go on with the inquiry. Well, then, we are surely compelled to agree that each of us has within himself the same parts and characteristics as the city? Where else would they come from? It would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness didn't come to be in cities from such individuals as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us who are held to possess spirit, or that the same isn't true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated

with our part of the world, or of the love of money, which one might say is conspicuously displayed by the Phoenicians and Egyptians. It would. That's the way it is, anyway, and it isn't hard to understand. Certainly not. But this is hard.

Do we do

these things with the

same

part of ourselves,

do we do them with three different parts? Do we learn with one part, get angry with another, and with some third part desire the pleasures of food, drink, sex, and the others that are closely akin to them? Or, when we set out after something, do we act with the whole of our soul, in each

or

what's hard to determine in a of our argument.

case? This

I

is

that's

up

to the standards

think so too.

Well, then, the

way

same

let's try to

determine in that

way whether

these parts are

or different.

How? It is

obvious that the same thing will not be willing

do or undergo same thing, at the to

opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same time. So, if we ever find this happening in the soul, we'll we aren't dealing with one thing but many. All right.

Then consider what I'm about

to say.

know

that

1068

Glauconj Socrates

Say on. possible for the

Is it

same

in the

Not

to

stand

and move

still

at the

same time

part of itself?

at all.

Let's

make our agreement more

someone hands and head on.

same thing

If

precise in order to avoid disputes later

said that a person

who

standing

but moving his is moving and standing still at the same time, we wouldn't consider, I think, that he ought to put it like that. What he ought to say is that one part of the person is standing still and another part is moving. is

still

Isn't that so? It is.

And

our interlocutor became even more amusing and was sophisticated enough to say that whole spinning tops stand still and move at the same time when the peg is fixed in the same place and they revolve, if

and

same

that the

same

is

true of anything else

we wouldn't

spot,

moving

agree, because

it

in a circular

isn't

motion on the

with respect

parts of themselves that such things both stand still and that they have an axis and a circumference and that

same move. We'd say to the

with respect to the wobble to either side, while with respect to the circumference they move in a circle. But if they do wobble to the left or right, front or back, while they are spinning, we'd say that they aren't standing still in any way. And we'd be right. No such statement will disturb us, then, or make us believe that the same thing can be, do, or undergo opposites, at the same time, in the same axis they stand

respect,

and

still,

since they don't

in relation to the

same

They won't make me believe

it,

thing.

at least.

Nevertheless, in order to avoid going through all these objections one by one and taking a long time to prove them all untrue, let's hypothesize that this

shown be

is

to

corrrect

and carry

be incorrect,

all

on. But

we

agree that

the consequences we've

if it

should ever be

drawn from

it

will also

lost.

We

should agree

Then wouldn

to that.

you consider

the following, whether they are doings or undergoings, as pairs of opposites: Assent and dissent, wanting to have something and rejecting it, taking something and pushing it away? Yes, they are opposites.

What about

t

all

these? Wouldn't

you include thirst, hunger, the appetites as a whole, and wishing and willing somewhere in the class we mentioned? Wouldn t you say that the soul of someone who has an appetite for a thing wants what he has an appetite for and takes to himself what it is his will to have, and that insofar as he wishes something to be given to him, his

soul, since

it

desires this to

to a question? I

would.

come

about, nods assent to

it

as

if

in

answer

1069

Republic IV

What about not willing, not wishing, and not having an appetite? Aren't these among the very opposites cases in which the soul pushes and drives

—

away?

things

Of course. Then won't we say that the clearest

We

that there

is

a class of things called appetites

examples are hunger and

and

thirst?

will.

One

of these

is

for

food and the other for drink?

Yes.

Now,

insofar as

it

is thirst, is it

an appetite

in the soul for

more than

the appetite? For example, is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold, or much drink or little, or, in a word, for drink of a certain sort? Or isn't it rather that, where heat is present as well as thirst,

that for

which we say

that

it is

causes the appetite to be for something cold as well, and where cold for something hot, and where there is much thirst because of the presence of

it

muchness, it will cause the desire to be for much, and where little for in little? But thirst itself will never be for anything other than what it is its nature to be for, namely, drink itself, and hunger for food. That's the way it is, each appetite itself is only for its natural object, while the appetite for something of a certain sort depends on additions. Therefore, let no one catch us unprepared or disturb us by claiming that no one has an appetite for drink but rather good drink, nor food but good food, on the grounds that everyone after all has appetite for good things, so that if thirst is an appetite, it will be an appetite for good drink or whatever, and similarly with the others. All the same, the person who says that has a point. But it seems to me that, in the case of all things that are related to something, those that are of a particular sort are related to a particular sort of thing, while those that are merely themselves are related to a thing that is merely itself. I don't understand. Don't you understand that the greater is such as to be greater than something?

Of course. Than the less? Yes.

And

the

much

greater than the

much

less, isn't that

so?

Yes.

And

the once greater to the once less?

And

the going-to-be greater than

the going-to-be less? Certainly.

same true of the more and the fewer, the double and the heavier and lighter, faster and slower, the hot and the cold, and all

And half,

isn't the

other such things? Of course.

u/u

Socrates IGlaucon

And what

d

about the various kinds of knowledge? Doesn't the same apply? Knowledge itself is knowledge of what can be learned itself (or whatever it is that knowledge is of), while a particular sort of knowledge is of a particular sort of thing. For example, when knowledge of building houses came to be, didn't it differ from the other kinds of knowledge,

and

so

was called knowledge Of course.

And

of building?

wasn't that because

it

was

a different sort of

knowledge from

all

the others? Yes.

And

wasn't

became

it

because

it

a particular sort of

was

of a particular sort of thing that

knowledge? And

itself

it

isn't this true of all crafts

and

kinds of knowledge? It is.

Well, then, this

when

e

is

said that of

what

I

was

say— if you understand

trying to

it

now—

things that are related to something, those that are merely themselves are related to things that are merely themselves, while those that are of a particular sort are related to things of a particular sort, However, I don't mean that the sorts in question have to be the same for them both. For example, knowledge of health or disease isn't healthy or diseased, and knowledge of good and bad doesn't itself become good or bad. I mean that, when knowledge became, not knowledge of the thing itself that knowledge is of, but knowledge of something of a particular sort, the result was that it itself became a particular sort of I

all

knowledge, caused it to be no longer called knowledge without qualification, bul with the addition of the relevant sort medical knowledge or whatever. I understand, and I think that that's the way it is.

and

this

—

Then 439

to

as for thirst, wouldn't

something? Surely I

know

it's

you include

thirst is related to

.

it .

among

things that are related

.

related to drink.

Therefore a particular sort of thirst thirst itself isn

t

for

much

or

little,

is

for a particular sort of drink. But

good or bad,

of a particular sort. Rather, thirst itself

is

or, in a

word, for drink

in its nature only for drink

itself.

Absolutely.

Hence

b

the soul of the thirsty person, insofar as he's thirsty, doesn't wish anything else but to drink, and it wants this and is impelled towards it. Clearly.

Therefore,

something draws it back when it is thirsting, wouldn't that be something different in it from whatever thirsts and drives it like a beast to drink? It can t be, we say, that the same thing, with the same part of itself, in relation to the same, at the same time, does opposite things 6 No, it can't. In the same way, I suppose, it's wrong to say of the archer that his hands at the same time push the bow away and draw it towards him. if

^

'

Republic

1071

IV

We

ought to say that one hand pushes towards him.

it

away and

the other

draws

it

Absolutely.

Now, would we assert that sometimes wish

there are thirsty people

who don't

to drink?

happens often to many different people. What, then, should one say about them? Isn't it that there is something in their soul, bidding them to drink, and something different, forbidding them to do so, that overrules the thing that bids? Certainly,

I

it

think so.

—

Doesn't that which forbids in such cases come into play if it comes as a result of rational calculation, while what drives and into play at all drags them to drink is a result of feelings and diseases? Apparently. Hence it isn't unreasonable for us to claim that they are two, and different from one another. We ll call the part of the soul with which it calculates the rational part and the part with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and

—

by other appetites the irrational appetitive indulgences and pleasures.

gets excited of certain

part,

companion

Yes. Indeed, that's a reasonable thing to think. Then, let these two parts be distinguished in the soul. Now, is the spirited part by which we get angry a third part or is it of the same nature as either of the other

two?

Perhaps it's like the appetitive part. But I've heard something relevant to this, and I believe it. Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner's feet. He had an appetite to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide

open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, "Look evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!"

for yourselves,

you

heard that story myself. the appetites, It certainly proves that anger sometimes makes war against as one thing against another. I've

Besides, don't

we

someone contrary

often notice in other cases that

to rational calculation,

when

appetite forces

he reproaches himself and gets

doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting a civil war, so to speak, spirit allies itself with reason? But I don't think you can say that you've ever seen spirit, either in yourself or anyone else, ally itself with an appetite to do what reason has decided must not be done. No, by god, I haven't. What happens when a person thinks that he has done something unjust? Isn't it true that the nobler he is, the less he resents it if he suffers hunger.

angry with that

in

him

that's

1072

Socrates /Glaucon

hands of someone whom he believes to be inflicting and won t his spirit, as I say, refuse to be aroused?

cold, or the like at the

on him

this

justly,

That's true.

But what happens

d

instead, he believes that

someone has been unjust within him boiling and angry, fighting for what he believes to be just? Won't it endure hunger, cold, and the like and keep on till it is victorious, not ceasing from noble actions until it either wins, dies, or calms down, called to heel by the reason within him, like a dog him?

to

by

a

Isn't the spirit

shepherd?

Spirit

our

if,

is

certainly like that.

city like

dogs obedient

And,

of course,

to the rulers,

we made

the auxiliaries in

who are themselves like shepherds

of a city.

You

well understand what I'm trying to say. But also reflect on this

further point,

What? The position

e

of the spirited part

seems to be the opposite of what we thought before. Then we thought of it as something appetitive, but now we say that it is far from being that, for in the civil war in the soul it aligns itself far more with the rational part. Absolutely.

Then

441

is it

also different

from the rational

part, or is it some form of it, so that there are two parts in the soul— the rational and the appetitive— instead of three? Or rather, just as there were three classes in the city that held it together, the money-making, the auxiliary, and the

deliberative, is the spirited part a third thing in the soul that is by nature the helper of the rational part, provided that it hasn't been corrupted by a bad upbringing? It

must be

a third.

Yes, provided that

we saw It

isn

can

show

it is

different

from the rational

was from the appetitive one. difficult to show that it is different. Even

earlier t

we

part, as

it

in small children,

one

can see that they are full of spirit right from birth, while as far as rational calculation is concerned, some never seem to get a share of it, while the b

majority do so quite late. That's really well put. And in animals too one can see that what you say is true. Besides, our earlier quotation from Homer bears it out, where

he says,

He For here c

struck his chest and spoke to his heart

Homer clearly represents

and worse as

different

That's exactly right.

7.

See 390d, and note.

from

7 .

the part that has calculated about better the part that is angry without calculation.

1073

Republic IV

now made our difficult way through a sea of argument. much agreed that the same number and the same kinds of

Well, then, we've

We

are pretty

classes as are in the city are also in the soul of each individual.

That's true. necessarily follows that the individual in the same part of himself as the city.

Therefore,

way and

is

it

wise in the same

That's right.

individual courageous in the same way and in the same part of himself as the city? And isn't everything else that has to do with virtue the same in both?

And

isn't the

Necessarily.

Moreover, Glaucon,

way

suppose we'll say that

man

a

is just

in the

same

as a city.

That too

And we

is

entirely necessary.

surely haven't forgotten that the city

the three classes in I

I

don't think

we

it

was doing

could forget

its

own

was

just

because each of

work.

that.

Then we must also remember that each one of us in whom each doing its own work will himself be just and do his own. Of course, we must.

part

is

Therefore, isn't it appropriate for the rational part to rule, since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul, and for the spirited part to obey It

certainly

it

and be

its

ally?

is.

and poetry, on the one hand, and physical training, on the other, that makes the two parts harmonious, stretching and nurturing the rational part with fine words and learning, relaxing the other part through soothing stories, and making it gentle by means of harmony and rhythm?

And

isn't

it,

as

we were

That's precisely

saying, a mixture of music

it.

And these two, having been nurtured in this way, and having truly learned their own roles and been educated in them, will govern the appetitive part, which is the largest part in each person's soul and is by nature most insatiable for money. They'll watch over it to see that it isn't filled with the so-called pleasures of the body and that it doesn't become so big and strong that it no longer does its own work but attempts to enslave and rule over the classes it isn't fitted to rule, thereby overturning everyone's whole life. That's right.

Then, wouldn't these two parts also do the finest job of guarding the whole soul and body against external enemies reason by planning, spirit by fighting, following its leader, and carrying out the leader's decisions

—

through

its

courage?

Yes, that's true.

because of the spirited part, I suppose, that we call a single individual courageous, namely, when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn't.

And

it is

1074

Glaucon/ Socrates

That's right.

And

him wise because of that small part of himself that rules in him and makes those declarations and has within it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the community of all three parts. we'll call

Absolutely.

And

he moderate because of the friendly and harmonious relations between these same parts, namely, when the ruler and the ruled believe in common that the rational part should rule and don't engage in civil d

war

isn't

against

it?

Moderation

is

surely nothing other than that, both in the city and in

the individual.

And,

of course, a person will be just because of mentioned, and in that way. Necessarily.

Well, then,

what we've so often

the justice in us at all indistinct? Does it something different from what we found in the city? It doesn't seem so to me. If there are still any doubts in our soul about this, we could e

is

seem

to

dispel

them

be

altogether by appealing to ordinary cases.

Which ones? For example, if we had to come to an agreement about whether someone similar in nature and training to our city had embezzled a deposit of gold or silver that he had accepted, who do you think would consider him to 443

have done

it

rather than

someone who

isn't like

him?

No one. And would he have anything to do with temple robberies, thefts, betrayals of friends in private life or of cities in public life?

No, nothing.

And

he'd be in no agreement.

How And

in

keeping an oath or other

could he be? adultery, disrespect for parents,

and neglect

of the gods would be keeping with every other kind of character than his. With every one. And isn't the cause of all this that every part within him does its own work, whether it's ruling or being ruled? Yes, that and nothing else. Then, are you still looking for justice to be something other than this power, the one that produces men and cities of the sort we've described? No, I certainly am not.

more

b

way untrustworthy

in

Then the dream we had has been completely fulfillled— our suspicion that, with the help of some god, we had hit upon the origin and pattern c

of justice right at the beginning in founding our city 8.

See 432c-433b.

8 .

1075

Republic IV

Absolutely.

Indeed, Glaucon, the principle that it is right for someone who is by nature a cobbler to practice cobblery and nothing else, for the carpenter to practice carpentry, and the same for the others is a sort of image of justice

—

that's

why

it's

beneficial.

Apparently.

And

in truth justice

is, it

seems, something of this

However, it isn't but with what is

sort.

concerned with someone's doing his own externally, inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates well

own and

He

puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale high, low, and middle. He binds together those

what

is

really his

rules himself.

—

and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he act. And when he does anything, whether acquiring wealth, parts

—

taking care of his body, engaging in politics, or in private contracts in all of these, he believes that the action is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that oversees such actions. And he believes that the action that destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees

it

as ignorance.

That's absolutely true, Socrates.

Well, then,

what

if

we

the justice

is

claim to have found the just man, the just city, and that is in them, I don't suppose that we'll seem to be

complete falsehood.

telling a

we certainly won't. Shall we claim it, then? No,

We

shall.

So be

it.

Now,

I

suppose

we must

look for injustice.

Clearly.

war between the three parts, a meddling and doing of another's work, a rebellion by some part against the whole soul in order to rule it inappropriately. The rebellious part is by nature Surely,

it

must be

a kind of civil

not a slave but belongs to the ruling class. We'll say something like that, I suppose, and that the turmoil and straying of these parts are injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, ignorance, and, in a word, the whole of vice. suited to be a slave, while the other part

is

what they are. So, if justice and injustice are really clear enough to acting unjustly, and doing injustice are also clear. That's

How

us, then acting justly,

so?

Because just and unjust actions are no different for the soul than healthy and unhealthy things are for the body. In

what way?

1076

Socrates/Glaucon/Polemarchus/Adeimantus

Healthy things produce health, unhealthy ones disease Yes.

And don

just actions

t

produce

justice in the soul

and unjust ones

in-

justice?

Necessarily.

To produce health is to establish the components of the body in a natural relation of control and being controlled, one by another, while to produce disease is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to nature. That's right.

Then, isn

produce justice to establish the parts of the soul in a natural relation of control, one by another, while to produce injustice is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to nature? t

to

Precisely.

Virtue seems, then, to be a kind of health, fine condition, and well-being of the soul, while vice is disease, shameful condition, and weakness. That's true.

And

don't fine

shameful ones

ways

of living lead one to the possession of virtue,

to vice?

Necessarily.

So

now

remains,

seems, to inquire whether it is more profitable to act justly, live in a fine way, and be just, whether one is known to be so or not, or to act unjustly and be unjust, provided that one doesn't pay the penalty and become better as a result of punishment. it

it

But, Socrates, this inquiry looks ridiculous to

me now

and have been shown to be as we have described. Even if one has every kind of food and drink, lots of money, and every sort of power to rule, life is thought to be not worth living when the body's nature is ruined. So even if someone can do whatever he wishes, except what will free him from vice and injustice and make him acquire justice and virtue, how can it be worth living when his soul— the very thing by which he lives— is ruined and in turmoil? that justice

injustice

Yes,

ridiculous. Nevertheless, now that we've come far be able to see most clearly that this is so, we mustn't give up. it is

enough

to

That's absolutely the last thing we must do. Then come here, so that you can see how many forms of vice there are, anyhow that I consider worthy of examination.

I'm following you, just tell me. Well, from the vantage point we've reached in our argument, it seems to me that there is one form of virtue and an unlimited number of forms of vice, four of which are worth mentioning.

How It

do you mean? seems likely that there are

as

many

types of soul as there are specific

types of political constitution.

How many

is

that?

Five forms of constitution and five of souls. What are they?

1077

Republic IV

the constitution we've been describing. And it has two names. one outstanding man emerges among the rulers, it's called a kingship; more than one, it's called an aristocracy.

One If if

is

That's true.

one form of constitution. Whether one man emerges or many, none of the significant laws of the city would be changed, if they followed the upbringing and education we described. Probably not. Therefore,

I

say that this

is

1

Book This

the kind of city

is

and so too

is this

and

V

constitution, then, that

kind of man.

And

e

if

indeed

I

call

good and

correct,

449

this is the correct kind,

governments or as organizations of the —whether as of four kinds. individual soul — are bad and mistaken. Their badness city

the others

all

is

What

are they? he said.

was going to enumerate them and explain how I thought they developed out of one another but Polemarchus, who was sitting a little further away than Adeimantus, extended his hand and took hold of the latter's cloak by the shoulder from above. He drew Adeimantus towards him, while he himself leaned forward and said something to him. We overheard nothing of what he said except the words "Shall we let it go, or what?" We certainly won't let it go, Adeimantus said, now speaking aloud. And I asked: What is it that you won't let go? I

,

You, he

said.

For what reason in particular? We think that you're slacking off and that you've cheated us out of a whole important section of the discussion in order to avoid having to deal with it. You thought we wouldn't notice when you said as though it were something trivial that, as regards wives and children, anyone could see that the possessions of friends should be held in common: isn't that right,

Adeimantus?

we've discussed, requires an explanation— in this case, an explanation of the manner in which they are to be held in common, for there may be many ways of doing this. So don't omit telling us about the particular one you mean. We've been waiting for some time, indeed, for you to tell us about the production of children how they'll be produced and, once born, how they'll be brought up and about the whole subject of having wives and children in common. We think that this makes a considerable difference indeed all the difference to whether a constitution is correct or not. So now, since you are beginning to describe another constitution before having adequately it is.

— —

But

this "right," like the other things

—

—

taken

1.

This task

2.

See 423e-424a.

is

c

—

—

But Yes

b

up

in

Book

VIII.

d

1078

Adeimantusl Glaucon /Thrasymachus / Socrates

discussed these things, we are resolved, as you overheard, not to off until you explain all this as fully as the rest. Include me, Glaucon said, as a partner in this resolution. In fact, Socrates,

of

all

Thrasymachus added, you can take

you

this as the resolution

of us.

What

a thing you've done, I said, in stopping me! What an ve started up again from the very beginning, as it were,

you

let

constitution!

was delighted

argument about the

had already been described and was content to have these things accepted as they were stated before. You don't realize what a swarm of arguments you've stirred up by calling me to account now. I saw the swarm and passed the topic by in order to save us a

I

to think that

it

lot of trouble.

Well, said Thrasymachus, are

an argument? The latter, I

we

here to search for gold 3 or to listen to

said, but within reason.

within reason, Socrates, Glaucon said, for people with any understanding to listen to an argument of this kind their whole life long. So don't mind about us, and don't get tired yourself. Rather, tell us at length what your thoughts are on the topic we inquired about, namely, what the common possession of wives and children will amount to for the guardians and how the children will be brought up while they're still small, for the time between birth and the beginning of education seems to be the most difficult period of all. So try to tell us what the manner of this upbringing y It s

must

66

be.

an easy subject to explain, for it raises even more incredulity than the topics we've discussed so far. People may not believe that what we say is possible or that, even if it could be brought about, it would be It

isn

t

for the best.

reason that I hesitated to bring it up, namely, that our argument might seem to be no more than wishful thinking. Then don t hesitate, for your audience isn't inconsiderate, incredulous, It

s for this

or hostile.

Are you trying to encourage me by saying that? I am. Well, you're doing the opposite. Your encouragement would be fine, if I could be sure I was speaking with knowledge, for one can feel both secure and confident when one knows the truth about the dearest and most important things and speaks about them among those who are themselves wise and dear friends. But to speak, as I'm doing, at a time when one is unsure of oneself and searching for the truth, is a frightening and insecure thing to do. I'm not afraid of being laughed at that would be childish indeed. But I am afraid that, if I slip from the truth, just where it's most important not to. I'll not only fall myself but drag my friends

—

3.

A

more

proverbial expression applied to those fascinating but less profitable pursuit.

who

neglect the task at

hand

for

some

Republic

1079

1/

So I bow to Adrastea 4 for what I'm going to say, for I suspect that it's a lesser crime to kill someone involuntarily than to mislead people about fine, good, and just institutions. Since it's better to run this risk among enemies than among friends, you've well and truly encouraged me! Glaucon laughed and said: Well, Socrates, if we suffer from any false note you strike in the argument, we'll release you and absolve you of any guilt as in a homicide case: your hands are clean, and you have not deceived

down as well.

So take courage and speak. I will, for the law says that someone who kills involuntarily is free of guilt when he's absolved by the injured party. So it's surely reasonable to

us.

think the

With Then

same

is

true in

my

case as well.

your defense, speak. I'll have to go back to what should perhaps have been said in sequence, although it may be that this way of doing things is in fact right and that after the completion of the male drama, so to speak, we should then go through the female one especially as you insist on it so urgently. For men born and educated as we've described there is, in my opinion, no right way to acquire and use women and children other than by following the road on which we started them. We attempted, in the argument, to set up the men as guardians of the herd. that as

—

Yes.

Then whether

let's it

give

them

a birth

and rearing consistent with

that

and see

suits us or not.

How? As

follows:

Do we

think that the wives of our guardian watchdogs the males guard, hunt with them, and do everything

should guard what else in common with them? Or should we keep the women at home, as incapable of doing this, since they must bear and rear the puppies, while the males work and have the entire care of the flock? Everything should be in common, except that the females are weaker and the males stronger. And is it possible to use any animals for the same things if you don't give them the same upbringing and education? No, it isn't. Therefore, if we use the women for the same things as the men, they must also be taught the same things. Yes.

Now, we gave

the

men music and

poetry and physical training.

Yes.

well as those having to do with also to use in the same way as the men use them.

Then we must give these two warfare, to the

women

crafts, as

That seems to follow from what you say.

Adrastea was a kind of Nemesis, a punisher of pride. The "bow to Adrastea" is a kind of apology for the sort of behavior that might otherwise spur her to take action. 4.

Socrates /Glaucon

much

of

incite ridicule

if

But perhaps

would It

certainly would.

What

most ridiculous thing that you see in it? Isn't it obviously exercising naked in the palestras with the men? And not just

the

is

women

the

what we are saying, since it is contrary to custom, it were carried out in practice as we've described!

—

young women, but the older ones too like old men in gymnasiums who, even though their bodies are wrinkled and not pleasant to look at, still love to do physical training. Yes, that would look really ridiculous as things stand at present. the

b

But surely, now that we've started to speak about this, we mustn't fear the various jokes that wits will make about this kind of change c

and poetry, physical and riding horses. You're

training,

and

—

last

but not least

— in

music bearing arms in

right.

And now

we've begun to speak about this, we must move on to the tougher part of the law, begging these people not to be silly (though that

that

own

work!) but to take the matter seriously. They should remember that it wasn t very long ago that the Greeks themselves thought it shameful and ridiculous (as the majority of the barbarians still do) for even men to be seen naked and that when the Cretans and then the d

Lacedaemonians began the gymnasiums, the wits of those times could also have ridiculed it all. Or don't you think so? I

e

their

is

do.

But I think that, after it was found in practice to be better to strip than to cover up all those parts, then what was ridiculous to the eyes faded away in the face of what argument showed to be the best. This makes it clear that it s foolish to think that anything besides the bad is ridiculous or to try to raise a laugh at the sight of anything besides what's stupid or bad or (putting it the other way around) it's foolish to take seriously any standard of what is fine and beautiful other than the good. That's absolutely certain.

However, mustn

453

t

we

first

agree about whether our proposals are possigive to anyone who wishes the opportunity

ble or not?

And

to question

us— whether in jest or in earnest— about whether female human

mustn't

we

nature can share all the tasks of that of the male, or none of them, or some but not others, and to ask in which class the waging of war belongs? Wouldn't this, as the best beginning, also be likely to result in the best conclusion?

Of

course.

Shall

we

give the argument against ourselves, then, on behalf of those who share these reservations, so that their side of the question doesn't fall by default? b

There's no reason not to. Then let's say this on their behalf: "Socrates and Glaucon, there's no need for others to argue with you, for you yourselves, when

you began

V

Republic

1081 that each

found your city, agreed with his nature." to

And

I

think

we

"Can you deny Of course not.

his

own work

in

accordance

certainly did agree to that. that a

woman

by nature very

is

different

from

a

man?"

appropriate to assign different work to each in accordance nature?"

"And with

must do

isn't

its

it

Certainly.

"How

you aren't mistaken and contradicting yourselves when you say that men and women must do the same things, when their natures are so completely separate and distinct?" Do you have any defense against that attack? It isn't easy to think of one on the spur of the moment, so I'll ask you to explain the argument on our side as well, whatever it is. This and many other such things, Glaucon, which I foresaw earlier, were what I was afraid of, so that I hesitated to tackle the law concerning the possession and upbringing of women and children. By god, it doesn't seem to be an easy topic. It isn't. But the fact is that whether someone falls into a small diving pool or into the middle of the biggest ocean, he must swim all the same.

He

is it,

then, that

certainly must.

Then we must swim

too,

and

try to save ourselves

from the sea of

argument, hoping that a dolphin will pick us up or that we'll be rescued

by some other desperate means It seems so. Come, then. Let's see if we can find a way out. We've agreed that different natures must follow different ways of life and that the natures of men and women are different. But now we say that those different natures must follow the same way of life. Isn't that the accusation brought 5

.

against us? That's

it

exactly.

Ah! Glaucon, great

Why

is

is

power

the

of the craft of disputation.

that?

many

They think they are having not a quarrel but a conversation, because they are unable to examine what has been said by dividing it up according to forms. Hence, they pursue mere verbal contradictions of what has been said and have a quarrel rather Because

fall

into

than a conversation. That does happen to

moment, is it? It most certainly

is,

it

against their wills.

lots of people,

for

it

but

it

isn't

happening

to us at the

looks to me, at any rate, as though

falling into disputation against

our

we

are

will.

How? 5.

See Herodotus, Histories 1.23-24 for the story of Arion's rescue by the dolphin.

°

We

Socrates / Glaucon

re bravely,

but in a quarrelsome and merely verbal fashion, pursuing the principle that natures that aren't the same must follow different ways of life. But when we assigned different ways of life to different natures and the same ones to the same, we didn't at all examine the form of natural difference

c

and sameness we had

in

distinguishing them. No, we didn't look into that. Therefore, we might just as well,

or in

what regard we were

seems, ask ourselves whether the natures of bald and long-haired men are the same or opposite. And, when we agree that they are opposite, then, if the bald ones are cobblers, we ought to forbid the long-haired ones to be cobblers, and if the long-haired it

ones are cobblers, we ought to forbid That would indeed be ridiculous.

And

d

mind

aren't

we

this to the

bald ones.

in this ridiculous position

because at that time we did not introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature, but focused on the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life themselves? We meant, for example, that a male and female doctor have souls of the same nature. Or don't you think so? I

do.

But a doctor and a carpenter have different ones?

Completely Therefore,

different, surely.

the male sex is seen to be different from the female with regard to a particular craft or way of life, we'll say that the relevant one if

must be assigned

e

But if it s apparent that they differ only in this respect, that the females bear children while the males beget them, we ll say that there has been no kind of proof that women are different from men with respect to what we're talking about, and we'll continue to believe that our guardians and their wives must have the same way of life.

And

anyone who holds the opposite view to instruct us in this. With regard to what craft or way of life involved in the constitution of the city are the natures of men and women not the same but different? That's a fair question, at any rate. And perhaps he'd say, just as you did a moment ago, that it isn't easy to give an immediate answer, but with enough consideration it should not be

b

it.

rightly so.

Next, we'll

455

to

tell

difficult.

Yes, he might say that. Shall we ask the one who raises this objection to follow us whether we can show him that no way of life concerned with the ment of the city is peculiar to women?

and see manage-

Of course. Come, now, we'll say to him, "give us an answer: Is this what you meant by one person being naturally well suited for something and

another being naturally unsuited? That the one learned it easily, the other with difficulty; that the one, after only a brief period of instruction, was able

Republic

V

1083

much

to find out things for himself, while the other, after

remember what he'd

couldn't even

instruction,

body of the one other opposed his.

learned; that the

adequately served his thought, while the body of the

Are there any other things besides these by which you distinguished those who are naturally well suited for anything from those who are not?" No one will claim that there are any others. Do you know of anything practiced by human beings in which the male sex isn't superior to the female in all these ways? Or must we make a long story of it by mentioning weaving, baking cakes, and cooking vegetables, in which the female sex is believed to excel and in which it is most ridiculous be inferior? It's true that one sex is much superior to the other in pretty well everything, although many women are better than many men in many things. But on the whole it is as you say. Then there is no way of life concerned with the management of the city that belongs to a woman because she's a woman or to a man because he's a man, but the various natures are distributed in the same way in both creatures. Women share by nature in every way of life just as men do, but

of

all for it to

in all of

women

them

are

weaker than men.

Certainly.

Then

we

shall

assign

all

them

of

to

men and none

to

women?

How

can we? We'll say, I suppose, that one woman one is musical by nature, another not.

is

Of course. And, therefore, won't one be athletic or like and no lover of physical training? I

suppose

a doctor, another not,

warlike, while another

and

is

that

unwar-

so.

Further, isn't one

woman

philosophical or a lover of wisdom, while

another hates wisdom? And isn't one spirited and another spiritless? That too. So one woman may have a guardian nature and another not, for wasn't it qualities of this sort that we looked for in the natures of the men we selected as guardians? Certainly.

Therefore,

guarding the

men and women city,

except to

by nature the same with respect to the extent that one is weaker and the other are

stronger.

Apparently.

Then women sort to live

of this sort

must be chosen along with men

of the

same

with them and share their guardianship, seeing that they are

adequate for the task and akin

to the

men

in nature.

Certainly.

And

We

mustn't must.

we

assign the

same way

of

life

to the

same natures?

Socrates /Glaucon

We've come round, isn

then, to

what we

said before

and have agreed that and physical

against nature to assign an education in music, poetry, training to the wives of the guardians. Absolutely. it

t

Then we're not

legislating impossibilities or indulging in

mere wishful

thinking, since the law we established is in accord with nature. the way things are at present that seems to be against nature.

So

seems. Now, weren't

It's

rather

it

possible Yes,

And

we

trying to determine whether our proposals

were both

and optimal?

we

were. haven't we

now

agreed that they're possible?

Yes.

Then mustn't we next reach agreement about whether or not timal?

thev're opv

Clearly.

Should

we have one

kind of education to produce women guardians, then, and another to produce men, especially as they have the same natures to begin with? No. Then, what do you think about this?

What? About one man being all

alike?

better

and another worse. Or do you think thev're 7

Certainly not. In the city we're establishing, who do you think will prove to be better men, the guardians, who receive the education we've described, or the cobblers, who are educated in cobblery? Your question is ridiculous. I

understand. Indeed, aren't the guardians the best of the citizens?

By

far.

And what women?

about the female guardians? Aren't they the best of the

They're by far the best. Is there anything better for a city than having the best possible

women

There

as

its

men and

citizens?

isn't.

And isn't it music and poetry and physical training, lending their support in the way we described, that bring this about? Of course. Then the law we've

established isn't only possible;

it is

also optimal for

a city?

Yes.

Then the guardian women must strip for physical training, since they'll wear virtue or excellence instead of clothes. They must share in war and the other guardians' duties in the city and do nothing else. But the lighter

Republic

V

1085

them because of the weakness of their sex. And the man who laughs at naked women doing physical training for the sake "6 of laughter and doesn't of what is best is "plucking the unripe fruit know, it seems, what he's laughing at or what he's doing, for it is and parts

must be assigned

always will be the harmful is ugly.

to

finest

saying that the beneficial

is

beautiful, while the

Absolutely.

we've escaped one wave of criticism in our discussion of the law about women, that we haven't been altogether swept away by laying it down that male and female guardians must share their entire way of life, and that our argument is consistent when it states that this is both possible and beneficial? And it's certainly no small wave that you've escaped. You won't think that it's so big when you get a look at the next one. Tell me about it, and I'll decide. I suppose that the following law goes along with the last one and the others that preceded it. Which one? That all these women are to belong in common to all the men, that none are to live privately with any man, and that the children, too, are to be possessed in common, so that no parent will know his own offspring or any child his parent. This wave is far bigger than the other, for there's doubt both about its possibility and about whether or not it's beneficial.

Can we

say, then, that

being beneficial would be disputed or that it would be denied that the common possession of women and children would be the greatest good, if indeed it is possible. But I think that there would be a lot of disagreement about whether or not it is possible. There could very well be dispute about both. You mean that I'll have to face a coalition of arguments. I thought I'd escape one of them, if you believed that the proposal was beneficial, and that I'd have only the one about whether or not it's possible left to deal with. But you didn't escape unobserved, so you have to give an argument I

don't think that

its

for both.

Well, then.

I'll

have

to accept

my punishment.

But do

me

this favor. Let

me, as if on a holiday, do what lazy people do who feast on their own thoughts when out for a solitary walk. Instead of finding out how something they desire might actually come about, these people pass that over, so as to avoid tiring deliberations about what's possible and what isn't. They assume that what they desire is available and proceed to arrange the rest, taking pleasure in thinking through everything they'll do when they have what they want, thereby making their lazy souls even lazier. I'm getting soft myself at the moment, so I want to delay consideration 6.

frg.

Plato

209

is

here adapting a phrase of Pindar, "plucking the unripe fruit of wisdom,"

(Snell).

UOD

Socrates /Glaucon

of the feasibility of our proposal until later. With your permission. I'll assume that it's feasible and examine how the rulers will arrange these matters when they come to pass. And I'll try to show that nothing could be more beneficial to the city and its guardians than those arrangements.

c

These are the things I'll examine with you first, and I'll deal with the other question later, but only if you'll permit me to do it this way. You have my permission, so carry on with your examination. I suppose that our rulers and auxiliaries if indeed they're worthy of the names will be willing to command and to obey respectively. In some cases, the rulers will themselves be obeying our laws, and in others, namely, the ones we leave to their discretion, they'll give directions that are in the spirit of our laws. Probably so.

—

—

Then you,

as their lawgiver, will select women just as you did men, with natures as similar to theirs as possible, and hand them over to the

men.

d

And

since they have common dwellings and meals, rather than private ones, and live together and mix together both in physical training and in the rest of their upbringing, they will, I suppose, be driven by innate necessity to have sex with one another. Or don't

you think we

e

re

talking about necessities here? The necessities aren't geometrical but erotic, and they're probably better than the others at persuading and compelling the majority of people. That s right. But the next point, Glaucon, is that promiscuity is impious in a city of happy people, and the rulers won't allow it.

No, for it isn't right. Then it's clear that our next task must be as possible.

to

make marriage

as sacred

And the sacred marriages will be those that are most beneficial.

Absolutely. 459

How,

then, will they be

In the

first

most beneficial? Tell me this, Glaucon: I see that you have hunting dogs and quite a flock of noble fighting birds at home. Have you noticed anything about their mating and breeding? Like what? the best

There

place, although they're all noble, aren't there

and prove themselves

that are

be so?

are.

Do you breed them much as possible?

all alike,

or

do you

try to

breed from the best as

breed from the best. And do you breed from the youngest or the oldest or from those in their prime? I

b

to

some

try to

From

those in their prime. And do you think that if they weren't bred in this way, your stock of birds and dogs would get much worse? I do.

What about them?

horses and other animals? Are things any different with

Republic

1087

V

would be strange

they were. Dear me! If this also holds true of human beings, our need for excellent rulers is indeed extreme. It does hold of them. But what of it? Because our rulers will then have to use a lot of drugs. And while an inferior doctor is adequate for people who are willing to follow a regimen and don't need drugs, when drugs are needed, we know that a bolder It

doctor

is

if

required.

That's true. But

what

exactly

do you have

in

mind?

looks as though our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit of those they rule. And we said that all such falsehoods are useful as a form of drug/ I

mean

that

it

And we were Well,

it

c

d

right.

seems we were right, especially where marriages and the produc-

ing of children are concerned.

How

so?

follows from our previous agreements, first, that the best men must have sex with the best women as frequently as possible, while the opposite is true of the most inferior men and women, and, second, that if our herd It

be of the highest possible quality, the former's offspring must be reared but not the latter's. And this must all be brought about without being noticed by anyone except the rulers, so that our herd of guardians remains as free from dissension as possible. to

is

e

That's absolutely right.

Therefore certain festivals and sacrifices will be established by law at which we'll bring the brides and grooms together, and we'll direct our poets to compose appropriate hymns for the marriages that take place. We'll leave the number of marriages for the rulers to decide, but their aim will be to keep the number of males as stable as they can, taking into

account war, disease, and similar factors, so that the city possible, become neither too big nor too small.

460

will, as far as

That's right.

be some sophisticated lotteries introduced, so that inferior people we mentioned will blame luck rather at than the rulers when they aren't chosen. There will. And among other prizes and rewards the young men who are good in war or other things must be given permission to have sex with the women more often, since this will also be a good pretext for having them father

Then

have each marriage the

as

there'll

many

to

of the children as possible.

That's right. then, as the children are born, they'll be taken over by the officials appointed for the purpose, who may be either men or women or both,

And

since our offices are

7.

See 382c

ff.

open

and 414b

ff.

to

both sexes.

b

1088

Glaucon/ Socrates

Yes.

think they'll take the children of good parents to the nurses in charge of the rearing pen situated in a separate part of the city, but the children of inferior parents, or any child of the others that is born defective, they'll hide in a secret and unknown place, as is appropriate. I

c

indeed the guardian breed is to remain pure. And won't the nurses also see to it that the mothers are brought to the rearing pen when their breasts have milk, taking every precaution to insure that no mother knows her own child and providing wet nurses if the mother's milk is insufficient? And won't they take care that the mothers suckle the children for only a reasonable amount of time and that the care of sleepless children and all other such troublesome duties are taken over by the wet nurses and other attendants? You re making it very easy for the wives of the guardians to have It is, if

d

children.

And

that s only proper.

So

let s

We

take

up

the next thing

we

proposed.

said that the children's parents should be in their prime. True.

Do you e

and

a

share the view that a

man's about

woman's prime

lasts

about twenty years

thirty?

Which years

are those?

A woman

to

bear children for the city from the age of twenty to the age of forty, a man from the time that he passes his peak as a runner until he reaches fifty-five. 61

At any if

physical and mental prime for both. younger or older than that engages in reproduction

rate, that's the

man who is community, we

Then, for the

is

a

say that his offense is neither pious nor just, for if it remains hidden, will be born in darkness, through a dangerous weakness of will, and without the benefit of the sacrifices and prayers offered at every marriage festival, in which the priests and priestesses, together with the entire city, ask that the children of good and beneficial parents may always prove themselves still better 11

the child he begets for the city,

b

and more

beneficial.

That's right.

The same law

a man still of begetting years has a child with a woman of child-bearing age without the sanction of the rulers. We'll say that he brings to the city an illegitimate, unauthorized, and

unhallowed

will

apply

if

child.

That's absolutely right.

However,

I

when women and men have passed the age of leave them free to have sex with whomever they

think that

having children, we'll wish, with these exceptions: For a man— his daughter, his mother, his daughter s children, and his mother's ancestors; for a woman her son

and

—

his descendants, her father and his ancestors. Having received these instructions, they should be very careful not to let a single fetus see the light of day, but if one is conceived and forces its way to the light, they must deal with it in the knowledge that no nurture is available for it.

1089

V

Republic

That's certainly sensible. But

how

will they recognize their fathers

and

daughters and the others you mentioned? They have no way of knowing. But a man will call all the children born in the tenth or seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, if they're male, and his daughters, if they're female, and they'll call him

group to which he belongs grandfathers and grandmothers. And those who were born at the same time as their mothers and fathers were having children they'll call their brothers and sisters. Thus, as we were saying, the relevant groups will avoid sexual relations with each other. But the law will allow brothers and sisters to have sex with one another if the lottery works out father. He'll call their children his grandchildren,

way and

that

and

they'll call the

the Pythia 8 approves.

That's absolutely right. This, then, Glaucon,

and children

in

is

how

common.

We

the guardians of your city have their wives

must now confirm

that this

arrangement

is

both consistent with the rest of the constitution and by far the best. Or how else are we to proceed? In just that way. Then isn't the first step towards agreement to ask ourselves what we say is the greatest good in designing the city the good at which the and what is the greatest evil? And legislator aims in making the laws isn't the next step to examine whether the system we've just described fits into the tracks of the good and not into those of the bad?

—

—

Absolutely. Is it

we can mention for a city than that which tears many instead of one? Or any greater good than that

there any greater evil

apart and

makes

which binds There

it

it

together and

as far as possible,

same successes and

bind the It

it

one?

isn't.

And when, the

makes all

and are pained by sharing of pleasures and pains

the citizens rejoice

failures, doesn't this

city together?

most certainly does.

But

when some

things happening

suffer greatly, while others rejoice greatly, at the same to the city or its people, doesn't this privatization of

pleasures and pains dissolve the city?

Of course.

And mine"

what happens whenever such words as "mine" and "not used in unison? And similarly with "someone else's"?

isn't that

aren't

Precisely.

the best-governed city the one in which most people say "mine" "not mine" about the same things in the same way?

Then,

and

It is

is

indeed.

person? For example, when one of us hurts his finger, the entire organism that binds body and soul together into a single system under the ruling part within it is aware of

What about

8.

The

the city that

is

most

priestess of Apollo at Delphi.

like a single

1U ^ U this,

d

Socrates /Glaucon

and the whole

pain together with the part that suffers. That's say that the man has a pain in his finger. And the same can be said about any part of a man, with regard either to the pain it suffers or to the pleasure it experiences when it finds relief. feels the

why we

Certainly.

most

And,

as for

your question, the

city

with the best government

such a person. Then, whenever anything good or bad happens to a single one of citizens, such a city above all others will say that the affected part is is

e

like

own and If it

its its

will share in the pleasure or pain as a whole. has good laws, that must be so.

time now to return to our own city, to look there for the features we've agreed on, and to determine whether it or some other city possesses It's

them to the greatest degree. Then that's what we must

do.

What about

463

those other cities? Aren't there rulers and people in them, as well as in ours?

There

are.

Besides fellow citizens, what do the people other cities? In this

many

—

they

call

them despots, but

in

call

the rulers in those

democracies they are called

What about

the people in our city? Besides fellow citizens, call their rulers? b

just

rulers.

what do they

Preservers and auxiliaries. And what do they in turn call the people? Providers of upkeep and wages.

What do

the rulers call the people in other cities?

Slaves.

And what do

the rulers call each other?

Co-rulers.

And

ours? Co-guardians.

Can you of his

Yes,

me

whether a ruler in those other cities could address some co-rulers as his kinsmen and others as outsiders? tell

many

could.

And

c

doesn't he consider his kinsman to be his own, and doesn't he address him as such, while he considers the outsider not to be his own? He does.

What about your guardians? Could any as an outsider or address

There's no

way he

him

could, for

of

them consider

a co-guardian

as such?

when he meets any one

of them, he'll hold meeting a brother or sister, a father or mother, a son or daughter, or some ancestor or descendant of theirs. You put that very well. But tell me this: Will your laws require them simply to use these kinship names or also to do all the things that go along with the names? Must they show to their "fathers" the respect, that he's

d

solicitude.

Republic

V

1091

and obedience we show to our parents by law? Won't they fare worse at the hands of gods and humans, as people whose actions are neither pious nor just, if they do otherwise? Will these be the oracular sayings they hear from all the citizens from their childhood on, or will they hear something and or the ones they're told are their fathers else about their fathers

—

—

other relatives?

they only mouthed kinship names without doing the things that go along with them. Therefore, in our city more than in any other, they'll speak in unison

The former.

the

It

would be absurd

words we mentioned

a

if

moment

ago.

well or badly, they'll say that "mine" doing badly.

e

When any is

one of them is doing doing well or that "mine" is

That's absolutely true.

is

we

say that the having and expressing of this conviction closely followed by the having of pleasures and pains in common?

Now,

didn't

and we were right. Then won't our citizens, more than any others, have the same thing in common, the one they call "mine"? And, having that in common, won't they, more than any others, have common pleasures and pains? Of course. And, in addition to the other institutions, the cause of this is the having of wives and children in common by the guardians? That more than anything else is the cause. But we agreed that the having of pains and pleasures in common is the greatest good for a city, and we characterized a well-governed city in terms of the body's reaction to pain or pleasure in any one of its parts. And we were right to agree. Then, the cause of the greatest good for our city has been shown to be the having of wives and children in common by the auxiliaries.

464

Yes,

It

b

has.

And, of course, this is consistent with what we said before, for we said somewhere that, if they're going to be guardians, they mustn't have private houses, property, or possessions, but must receive their upkeep from the 9 other citizens as a wage for their guardianship and enjoy it in common .

c

That's right.

Then

isn't

it

true, just as

together with what them and prevents

we

I

claimed, that what

said before,

them from

we

makes even

are saying

now, taken

better guardians out of

tearing the city apart

by not

calling the

same thing "mine"? If different people apply the term to different things, one would drag into his own house whatever he could separate from the others, and another would drag things into a different house to a different wife and children, and this would make for private pleasures and pains at private things. But our people, on the other hand, will think of the same

9.

See 41 6d

ff.

d

1U ~ Z

Socrates /Glaucon

things as their own, aim at the pleasure and pain in unison.

same

goal, and, as far as possible, feel

Precisely.

And what

about lawsuits and mutual accusations? Won't they pretty well disappear from among them, because they have everything in common

own

except their

bodies? Hence they'll be spared all the dissension that arises between people because of the possession of money, children, e

and

families.

They'll necessarily be spared

it.

Nor could any

lawsuits for insult or injury justly occur among them, for we 11 declare that it s a fine and just thing for people to defend themselves against others of the same age, since this will compel them to stay in good physical shape. That's right. 165

This law

also correct for another reason: If a spirited person vents his anger in this way, it will be less likely to lead him into more serious disputes. Certainly. is

But an older person will be authorized to rule and punish

the

all

younger ones. Clearly.

And any

surely

it's

also obvious that a

sort of violence to

younger person won't

an older one or

show him

fail to

strike or

do

respect in other

ways, unless the rulers command it, for there are two guardians sufficient to prevent him from doing such things— shame and fear. Shame will prevent him from laying a hand on his parents, and so will the fear that

b

would come brothers, and some

the others

to the aid of the victim,

his

as his fathers.

some

as his sons,

some

as

That's the effect they'll have.

Then, in all cases, won't the laws induce one another?

Very much

And

if

men

to live at

peace with

so.

there's

no discord among the guardians,

there's no danger that the rest of the city will break into civil war, either with them or among themselves.

Certainly not. I

hesitate to mention, since they're so unseemly, the pettiest of the evils

the guardians c

the perplexities

making

d

would

the

therefore escape:

The poor man's

and sufferings involved

in bringing

flattery of the rich,

up

children and in necessary to feed the household, getting into debt, and in some way or other providing enough money to hand

money

paying it off, over to their wives and household slaves to manage. All of the various troubles men endure in these matters are obvious, ignoble, and not worth discussing. They're obvious even to the blind. They 11 be free of all these, and they'll live a life more blessedly happy than that of the victors in the Olympian games.

Republic

1093

V

How? The Olympian victors are considered happy on account of only a small part of what is available to our guardians, for the guardians' victory is even greater, and their upkeep from public funds more complete. The victory they gain is the preservation of the whole city, and the crown of victory that they and their children receive is their upkeep and all the necessities of life. They receive rewards from their own city while they live, and at their death they're given a worthy burial. Those are very good things. Do you remember that, earlier in our discussion, someone I forget who shocked us by saying that we hadn't made our guardians happy, that it was possible for them to have everything that belongs to the citizens, yet they had nothing? We said, I think, that if this happened to come up at some point, we'd look into it then, but that our concern at the time was to make our guardians true guardians and the city the happiest we could, rather than looking to any one group within it and molding it for hap-

—

—

piness

10 .

remember.

I

Well, then,

the

if

better than that of

life

of our auxiliaries

Olympian

apparently

is

victors, is there

any need

much to

finer

compare

and it

to

the lives of cobblers, farmers, or other craftsmen?

Not in my opinion. Then it's surely right

to repeat here

what

I

said then:

If

a guardian seeks

happiness in such a way that he's no longer a guardian and isn't satisfied with a life that's moderate, stable, and as we say best, but a silly, adolescent idea of happiness seizes him and incites him to use his power to take everything in the city for himself, he'll come to know the true wisdom of ." 11 Hesiod's saying that somehow "the half is worth more than the whole If he takes my advice, he'll keep to his own life-style. You agree, then, that the women and men should associate with one another in education, in things having to do with children, and in guarding the other citizens in the way we've described; that both when they remain in the city and when they go to war, they must guard together and hunt

—

—

together like dogs and share in everything as far as possible; and that by doing so they'll be doing what's best and not something contrary either to woman's nature as compared with man's or to the natural association of

men and women I

with one another.

agree.

Then doesn't

it

remain

for

us to determine whether

about this association among human beings, as to say just how it might be done? You took the words right out of my mouth.

10.

See 419a

11.

Works and Days

ff.

40.

it is

it's

possible to bring

among

animals, and

Socrates / Glaucon e

As

war

far as

How

is

concerned,

I

think

it's

clear

how

thev will

waee

it.

so?

Men and women will campaign together. They'll take the sturdy children with them, so

467

that, like the children of

other craftsmen, they can see what they'll have to do when they grow up. But in addition to observing, they can serve and assist in everything to do with the war and help their mothers and fathers. Haven't you noticed in the other crafts how the children of potters, for

example,

assist

and observe

for a long time before actually

making any pots? have indeed. And should these craftsmen take more care in training their children by appropriate experience and observation than the guardians? I

Of course

b

not; that

would be completely

ridiculous, Besides, every animal fights better in the presence of That's so. But, Socrates, there's a considerable danger

and such things are to recover.

provide for

Not

defeat— happen in a war— they'll lose their children's own, making it impossible for the rest of the city y

But do you think that the the avoidance of all danger?

is

is

young.

that in a

likely to

lives as well as their

What you say

its

true.

first

thing

we

should

at all.

Well, then,

people will probably have to face some danger, shouldn't it be the sort that will make them better if they come through it successfully? y Obviously. if

And do you

c

think that whether or not men who are going to be warriors observe warfare when they're still boys makes such a small difference that it isn't worth the danger of having them do it?

No,

does make a difference to what you're talking about. On the assumption, then, that the children are to be observers of war, if we can contrive some way to keep them secure, everything will be fine & won't it? it

Yes.

Well, then, in the

d

place, their fathers won't be ignorant, will they, about which campaigns are dangerous and which are not, but rather as knowledgeable about this as any human beings can be? Probably so. Then they 11 take the children to some campaigns and not first

to others?

Correct.

And

they

put officers in charge of them whose age and experience qualifies them to be leaders and tutors? Appropriately so. But, as

we

11

say, the

unexpected often occurs.

Indeed.

With

this in

mind,

we must

provide the children with wings

they're small, so that they can fly

away and

escape.

when

V

Republic

1095

What do you mean? We must mount them on

— not on spirited and manageable ones — and when

horses as early as possible

on very fast they must be taken

or aggressive horses, but

observe a war. In this way, own work and, if the need arises, make the securest possible escape to safety, following their older guides. I think you're right. What about warfare itself? What attitude should your soldiers have to each other and to the enemy? Are my views about this right or not?

they've learned to ride, they'll get the best look at their

to

me what

they are. If one of them leaves his post or throws away his shield or does anything else of that sort through cowardice, shouldn't he be reduced to being a craftsman or farmer? First, tell

Certainly.

shouldn't anyone who is captured alive be left to his captors as a gift to do with as they wish? Absolutely. But don't you think that anyone who distinguishes himself and earns high esteem should, while still on the campaign, first be crowned with wreaths by each of the adolescents and children who accompany the expe-

And

dition? I

do.

And what

about shaken by the right hand?

That too. But I suppose that you wouldn't go

this far?

Namely? That he should kiss and be kissed by each of them. That most of all. And I'd add this to the law: As long as the campaign lasts, no one he wants to kiss shall be allowed to refuse, for then, if one of them happens to be in love with another, whether male or female, he'll be all the more eager to win the rewards of valor. Excellent. And we've already stated that, since he's a good person, more marriages will be available to him, and he'll be selected for such things more frequently than the others, so that he'll beget as many children as possible.

we

did say that. Indeed, according to Homer too, it is just to honor in such ways those young people who are good, for he says that Ajax, when he distinguished himself in battle, "was rewarded with the long cut off the backbone." And that's an appropriate honor for a courageous young man, since it will both Yes,

honor him and increase

his strength.

That's absolutely right.

Then

we'll follow

Homer

in these matters at least.

And

insofar as

good

people have shown themselves to be good, we'll honor them at sacrifices and all such occasions with hymns, "seats of honor, meats, and well-filled

°

Socrates /Glaucon

cups of wine /' 12 and in all the other ways we mentioned, so that, in addition to honoring good men and women, we'll continue to train them. That's excellent. All right. And as for those who died on the campaign, won't first of all, that, if their deaths were distinguished, they

we

say,

belong to the

golden race? That above all. And won't we believe with Hesiod

that,

whenever any

of that race die,

they become

Sacred daemons living upon the earth,

Noble

spirits ,

13 protectors against evil, guardians of articulate mortals ?

We'll certainly believe that. Then we'll inquire from the god 14 what kind of distinguished funeral we should give to daemonic and godlike people, and we'll follow his in-

structions.

Of

course.

And

remainder of time, we'll care for their graves and worship at them as we would at those of daemons. And we'll follow the same rites for anyone whom we judge to have lived an outstandingly good life, whether he died of old age or in some other way. That is only just. Now, what about enemies? How will our soldiers deal with them? In

for the

what respect?

First,

enslavement.

Do you

think

just for Greeks to enslave Greek as far as they can, should they not even allow other cities to do make a habit of sparing the Greek race, as a precaution it is

cities, or,

and

so,

against

being enslaved by the barbarians? It's altogether and in every way best to spare the Greek race. Then isn't it also best for the guardians not to acquire a Greek slave and to advise the other Greeks not to do so either? Absolutely. In that way they'd be more likely to turn against the barbarians

and keep

their

hands

one another. What about despoiling the dead? Is it a good thing to strip the dead of anything besides their armor after a victory? Or don't cowards make this an excuse for not facing the enemy as if they were doing something of vital importance in bending over a corpse? And haven't many armies been lost because of such plundering? off

—

12.

The

13.

Works and Days 122.

14.

Apollo. See 427b.

last

two quotations are from

Iliad vii.321

and

viii.162, respectively.

Republic

V

1097

Indeed, they have. Don't you think it's slavish and money-loving to strip a corpse? Isn't it small-minded and womanish to regard the body as your enemy, when the enemy himself has flitted away, leaving behind only the instrument with which he fought? Or do you think such behavior any different from that of dogs who get angry with the stone that hits them and leave the

thrower alone?

no different at all. Then may our soldiers strip corpses or refuse the enemy permission to pick up their dead? No, by god, they certainly may not. Moreover, we won't take enemy arms to the temples as offerings, and if we care about the goodwill of other Greeks, we especially won't do this with their arms. Rather we'd be afraid of polluting the temples if we brought them such things from our own people, unless, of course, the god It's

tells

us otherwise.

That's absolutely right.

What about ravaging

the land of the Greeks

and burning

their

houses?

Will your soldiers do things of this sort to their enemies? I'd like to hear your opinion about that. Well, I think they should do neither of these things but destroy the year's harvest only.

Of

Do you want me

to tell

you why?

course.

seems to me that as we have two names, "war" and "civil war," so there are two things and the names apply to two kinds of disagreements arising in them. The two things I'm referring to are what is one's own and akin, on the one hand, and what's foreign and strange, on the other. The name "civil war" applies to hostilities with one's own, while "war" applies It

to hostilities

with strangers.

That's certainly to the point.

Then its

see whether this

own and

akin, but

is

is

also to the point:

I

say that the Greek race

is

strange and foreign to barbarians.

That's right.

Then when Greeks do

with barbarians or barbarians with Greeks, we'll say that they're natural enemies and that such hostilities are to be called war. But when Greeks fight with Greeks, we'll say that they are natural friends and that in such circumstances Greece is sick and divided into factions and that such hostilities are to be called civil war. I, at any rate, agree to think of it that way. Now, notice that, wherever something of the sort that's currently called civil war occurs and a city is divided, if either party ravages the land of the others and burns their houses, it's thought that this is abominable and that neither party loves their city, since otherwise they'd never have ravaged their very nurse and mother. However, it is thought appropriate for the victors to carry off the harvest of the vanquished. Nonetheless, their battle

Socrates /Glaucon

attitude of

mind should be

and who won't always be

that of people who'll

at

one day be reconciled

war.

way of thinking is far more civilized than the other. What about the city you're founding? It is Greek, isn't it? This

has to be. Then, won't your citizens be good and civilized? Indeed they will. Then, won't they love Greece? Won't they consider Greece as their and share the religion of the other Greeks? Yes, indeed. It

Then won't they consider their differences with Greeks are their own not as war but as civil war? Of course.

—

And

won't they quarrel

like

people

who know

that

own

— people who

one day

they'll

be reconciled? Certainly.

Then

moderate their foes with enslavement and destruction, they'll

in a friendly spirit, not

punish them

for they're moderators, not enemies.

That's right.

And

being Greeks, they won't ravage Greece or burn her houses, nor will they agree that in any of her cities all the inhabitants— men, women, and children are their enemies, but that whatever differences arise are caused by the few enemies that any city inevitably contains. Because of this, because the majority are friendly, they won't ravage the country or destroy the houses, and they'll continue their quarrel only to the point at

which those who caused were its innocent victims.

it

are forced to

pay the penalty by those who

agree that this is the way our citizens must treat their enemies, and they must treat barbarians the way Greeks currently treat each other. I

Then

shall

we

also

impose

this

law on the guardians: Neither ravage

the country nor

burn the houses? Consider it imposed. And let's also assume

law and its predecesI think, Socrates, that if we let you go on speaking about this subject, you 11 never remember the one you set aside in order to say all this, namely, whether it's possible for this constitution to come into being and in what way it could be brought about. I agree that, if it existed, all the things we've mentioned would be good for the city in which they occurred. And I'll add some that you've left out. The guardians would be excellent fighters against an enemy because they'd be least likely sors are

all fine.

that this

But

each other, since they know each other as brothers, fathers, and sons, and call each other by those names. Moreover, if their women joined their campaigns, either in the same ranks or positioned in the rear to to desert

enemy and in case their help should ever be needed, I know that this would make them quite unbeatable. And I also see all the good things that they d have at home that you've omitted. Take it that I agree that all these things would happen, as well as innumerable others, if this frighten the

Republic

V

1099

kind of constitution came into being, and say no more on that subject. But rather let's now try to convince ourselves that it is possible and how it is

and let the rest go. This is a sudden attack that you've made on my argument, and you show no sympathy for my delay. Perhaps you don't realize that, just as I've barely escaped from the first two waves of objections, you're bringing down upon me. When you the third the biggest and most difficult one see and hear it, you'll surely be completely sympathetic, and recognize that it was, after all, appropriate for me to hesitate and be afraid to state and look into so paradoxical a view. The more you speak like that, the less we'll let you off from telling us possible,

—

—

how

it's

472

possible for this constitution to

come

into being.

So speak instead

of wasting time.

b

we must first remember that we got to this

Well, then,

what

to discover

justice

and

point while trying

injustice are like.

We

must. But what of it? Nothing. But if we discover what justice that the just

man

like justice in

to

it

is

in

no way different from the

every respect? Or will

as possible

and

is like,

participates in

it

will

we

also maintain

just itself, so that

he

is

we

be satisfied if he comes as close far more than anyone else?

c

We'll be satisfied with that.

Then it was in order to have a model that we were trying to discover what justice itself is like and what the completely just man would be like, if he came into being, and what kind of man he'd be if he did, and likewise with regard to injustice and the most unjust man. We thought that, by looking at how their relationship to happiness and its opposite seemed to us, we'd also be compelled to agree about ourselves as well, that the one who was most like them would have a portion of happiness most like theirs.

that

But

it's

we

weren't trying to discover these things in order to prove

possible for

them

come

to

d

into being.

That's true.

Do you

having painted a model beautiful human being would be like and of what the finest having rendered every detail of his picture adequately, he could not prove that such a man could come into being? No, by god, I don't. Then what about our own case? Didn't we say that we were making a

someone and most

think that

theoretical

model

of a

good

is

a

city?

worse painter

1

if,

"

Certainly.

So do you think that our discussion will be any less reasonable if we can't prove that it's possible to found a city that's the same as the one in our theory?

Not

15.

at all.

See 369a-c.

e

Socrates /Glaucon

Then

that's the truth of the matter.

But

in order to please you,

must also be willing to show how and under what conditions it would most be possible to found such a city, then you should agree to make the same if,

I

concessions to me, in turn, for the purposes of this demonstration. Which ones? Is it possible to do anything in practice the same as in theory? Or is in the nature of practice to grasp truth less well than theory does, even

some people don't I

you

think so? Will

first

it

if

agree to this or not?

agree.

Then don't compel me come into being exactly discover

how

to

show

that

what we've described

as we've described

come

it.

Rather,

in theory

can

we're able to

if

be governed in a way that most closely approximates our description, let's say that we've shown what you ordered us to show, namely, that it's possible for our city to come to be. Or wouldn't you be satisfied with that? I would be satisfied with it. So would I. Then next, it seems, we should try to discover and point out what's now badly done in cities that keeps them from being governed in that a city could

way and what

s

to

the smallest change that

would enable our

city to reach

our sort of constitution— one change, if possible, or if not one, two, and if not two, then the fewest in number and the least extensive. That's absolutely right.

There is one change we could point to that, in my opinion, would accomplish this. It's certainly neither small nor easy, but it is possible.

What

is it?

Well, I've

now come

to

what we likened

wave. But I shall say what I have to say, even if the wave is a wave of laughter that will simply drown me in ridicule and contempt. So listen to what I'm going to the greatest

to say.

Say on. Until philosophers rule as kings or those

who

are now called kings and genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the constitution we've been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest extent possible or see the light of the sun. It's because I saw how very paradoxical this statement would be

leading

that

I

men

hesitated to

that there can be

make

it

for so long, for

no happiness,

it's

hard

to face

up

to the fact

either public or private, in

any other city. at us, you must

Socrates, after hurling a speech and statement like that expect that a great many people (and not undistinguished ones either) will cast off their cloaks and, stripped for action, snatch any available

weapon, and make a determined rush at you, ready to do terrible things. So, unless you can hold them off by argument and escape, you really will pay the penalty of general derision. Well, you are the one that brought this on me.

Republic

V

1101

And I was right to do However, won't betray you, but rather defend you in any way can — by goodwill, by urging you on, and perhaps by it.

I

I

being able to give you more appropriate answers than someone else. So, with the promise of this assistance, try to show the unbelievers that things are as you say they are. I must try it, then, especially since you agree to be so great an ally. If we're to escape from the people you mention, I think we need to define for them who the philosophers are that we dare to say must rule. And once that's clear, we should be able to defend ourselves by showing that the people we mean are fitted by nature both to engage in philosophy and to rule in a city, while the rest are naturally fitted to leave philosophy alone and follow their leader. This would be a good time to give that definition. Come, then, follow me, and we'll see whether or not there's some way to set it out adequately.

Lead on. Do you need

be reminded or do you remember that, if it's rightly said that someone loves something, then he mustn't love one part of it and not another, but he must love all of it? 16 I think you'll have to remind me, for I don't understand it at all. That would be an appropriate response, Glaucon, for somebody else to make. But it isn't appropriate for an erotically inclined man to forget that all boys in the bloom of youth pique the interest of a lover of boys and arouse him and that all seem worthy of his care and pleasure. Or isn't that the way you people behave to fine and beautiful boys? You praise a snub-nosed one as cute, a hook-nosed one you say is regal, one in between is well proportioned, dark ones look manly, and pale ones are children of the gods. And as for a honey-colored boy, do you think that this very term is anything but the euphemistic coinage of a lover who found it easy to tolerate sallowness, provided it was accompanied by the bloom of youth? In a word, you find all kinds of terms and excuses so as not to reject anyone whose flower is in bloom. If you insist on taking me as your example of what erotically inclined men do, then, for the sake of the argument, I agree. Further, don't you see wine-lovers behave in the same way? Don't they love every kind of wine and find any excuse to enjoy it?

b

c

to

d

e

475

Certainly.

And

think you see honor-lovers,

they can't be generals, be captains, and, if they can't be honored by people of importance and dignity, they put up with being honored by insignificant and inferior ones, for they I

desire the

whole

if

of honor.

b

Exactly.

Then do you agree to this or not? When we say that someone something, do we mean that he desires everything of that kind or desires one part of

16.

See 438a-b.

it

but not another?

desires that

he

1102

Glaucon/ Socrates

We mean

he desires everything. Then won't we also say that the philosopher doesn't desire one part of wisdom rather than another, but desires the whole thing? Yes, that's true.

And

c

as for the one

who's choosy about what he learns, especially if he's young and can't yet give an account of what is useful and what isn t, we won t say that he is a lover of learning or a philosopher, for we wouldn't say that someone who's choosy about his food is hungry or has an appetite for food or is a lover of food instead, we'd say that he is a bad eater. And we'd be right to say it. But the one who readily and willingly tries all kinds of learning, who turns gladly to learning and is insatiable for it, is rightly called a philoso-

—

pher, isn't he? d

Then many strange people will be philosophers, for the lovers of sights seem to be included, since they take pleasure in learning things. And the lovers of sounds are very strange people to include as philosophers, for they would never willingly attend a serious discussion or spend their time that way, yet they run around to all the Dionysiac festivals, omitting none, whether in cities or villages, as if their ears were under contract to listen to every chorus. Are we to say that these people and those who learn

e

similar things or petty crafts— are philosophers? No, but they are like philosophers.

—

And who are the true philosophers? Those who love the sight of truth. That's right, but It

what

would not be easy

do you mean by it? explain to someone else, but

exactly to

I

think that

you

will agree to this.

To what? 476

Since the beautiful Of course.

is

the opposite of the ugly, they are two.

And I

since they are two, each grant that also.

And

is

one?

same account is true of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the forms. Each of them is itself one, but because they manifest themselves everywhere in association with actions, bodies, and one another, each of them appears to be many. the

That's right. So,

b

I

draw

this distinction:

On

lovers of sights, lovers of crafts, those we are arguing about and

How

one side are those you just now called and practical people; on the other side are whom one would alone call philosophers.

do you mean?

The lovers of sights and sounds like beautiful sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of them, but their thought is unable to see and embrace the nature of the beautiful itself. That's for sure.

Republic

V

1103

In fact, there are very

beautiful itself

and see

it

few people who would be able by itself. Isn't that so?

to reach the

Certainly.

What about someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn't believe follow anyone who could lead him to the knowledge of it? Don't you think he is living in a dream rather than a wakened state? Isn't this dreaming: whether asleep or awake, to think that a likeness is not a likeness but rather the thing itself that it is like? in the beautiful itself

I

and

certainly think that

isn't able to

someone who does

that

is

dreaming.

But someone who, to take the opposite case, believes in the beautiful itself, can see both it and the things that participate in it and doesn't believe that the participants are it or that it itself is the participants is he living in a dream or is he awake? He's very much awake. So we'd be right to call his thought knowledge, since he knows, but we should call the other person's thought opinion, since he opines?

—

Right.

What

who

has opinion but not knowledge is angry with us and disputes the truth of what we are saying? Is there some way to console him and persuade him gently, while hiding from him that he isn't if

the person

mind? There must be.

in his right

Consider, then, what we'll say to him. Won't

we

question him like this?

nobody begrudges him any knowledge he may have and that we'd be delighted to discover that he knows something. Then we'll say: "Tell us, does the person who knows know something or First, we'll tell

him

that

You answer for him. He knows something.

nothing?"

Something that is or something that is not? Something that is, for how could something that is not be known? Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what is completely is completely knowable and what is in no way is in every way unknowable? A most adequate one. Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be, won't it be intermediate between what purely is and what in no way is? 1

Yes,

it's

intermediate.

Then, as knowledge is set over what is, while ignorance is of necessity set over what is not, mustn't we find an intermediate between knowledge

17.

Because of the ambiguity of the verb

einai (“to be"), Socrates

could be asking any

"Something that exists or something that does not exist?" (existential "is"); (2) "Something that is beautiful (say) or something that is not beautiful?" (predicative "is"); (3) "Something that is true or something that is not true?" or

all

of the following questions: (1)

(veridical "is").

Socrates /Glaucon

b

and ignorance to be set over what is intermediate between what what is not, if there is such a thing?

is

and

Certainly.

Do we Of

A A

say that opinion

is

something?

course. different

power from knowledge

or the same?

different one.

Opinion, then, is set over one thing, and knowledge over another, according to the power of each. Right.

Now, But

first

How

knowledge by its nature set over what maybe we'd better be a bit more explicit.

isn't

a class of the things that are that enable

else for that matter

—

do whatever we

to

example, and hearing are of thing I'm referring to. I

to

know

it

as

it

is?

so?

Powers are

c

is,

among

us— or

anything

are capable of doing. Sight, for

the powers,

if

you understand

the kind

do.

Here's what

A

think about them. power has neither color nor shape nor any feature of the sort that many other things have and that I use to distinguish those things from one another. In the case of a power, I use d

only what it is set over and what it does, and by reference to these I call each the power it is: What is set over the same things and does the same I call the same power; what is set over something different and does something different I call a different one. Do you agree? I

do.

Then it

e

is

let's

back up.

Is

knowledge

a power, or

what

class

would you put

in?

a power, the strongest of

them all. And what about opinion, is it a power or some other kind of thing? It s a power as well, for it is what enables us to opine. A moment ago you agreed that knowledge and opinion aren't the same. How could a person with any understanding think that a fallible power the same as an infallible one? Right. Then we agree that opinion is clearly different from knowledge. It's

8

I

It is

different.

Hence each

of

them

is

by nature

set

over something different and does

something different? Necessarily.

Knowledge

is

set

over what

is,

to

know

it

as

it

is?

Yes.

And

opinion opines?

Yes.

Does it opine the very thing that knowledge knows, so and the opinable are the same, or is this impossible?

that the

knowable

V

Republic

1105

what we agreed, for if a different power is set over something different, and opinion and knowledge are different powers, then the knowable and the opinable cannot be the same. Then, if what is is knowable, the opinable must be something other than what is? impossible, given

It's

must. Do we, then, opine what is not? Or is it impossible to opine what is not? Think about this. Doesn't someone who opines set his opinion over something? Or is it possible to opine, yet to opine nothing? It

impossible.

It's

But someone

who

opines opines some one thing?

Yes.

Surely the most accurate but "nothing"?

word

for that

which

is

not

isn't

"one thing"

Certainly.

But we had to set ignorance over what is not and knowledge over what is? That's right.

So someone opines neither what is nor what is not? How could it be otherwise? Then opinion is neither ignorance nor knowledge? So it seems. Then does it go beyond either of these? Is it clearer than knowledge or darker than ignorance?

No, Is

neither.

opinion, then, darker than

knowledge but

clearer than ignorance?

It is.

Then

it

lies

between them?

Yes.

So opinion

is

intermediate between those two?

Absolutely.

Now, we

something could be shown, as it were, to be and not to be at the same time, it would be intermediate between what purely is and what in every way is not, and that neither knowledge nor ignorance would be set over it, but something intermediate between ignorance and knowledge? said that,

if

the thing

we

Correct.

And now

call

opinion has emerged as being intermediate

between them? It

has.

Apparently, then, it only remains for us to find what participates in both being and not being and cannot correctly be called purely one or the other, in order that, if there is such a thing, we can rightly call it the opinable, thereby setting the extremes over the extremes and the intermediate over the intermediate. Isn't that so? It is.

1106

Socrates /Glaucon

Now that these points have been established, 479

to

our friend

I

want

to

address a question

who

doesn't believe in the beautiful itself or any form of the beautiful itself that remains always the same in all respects but who does believe in the many beautiful things the lover of sights who wouldn't

—

b

allow anyone to say that the beautiful itself is one or that the just is one or any of the rest: "My dear fellow," we'll say, "of all the many beautiful things, is there one that will not also appear ugly? Or is there one of those just things that will not also appear unjust? Or one of those pious things that will not also appear impious?" There isn't one, for it is necessary that they appear to be beautiful in a way and also to be ugly in a way, and the same with the other things you asked about. What about the many doubles? Do they appear any the less halves than doubles?

Not

one.

So, with the

c

many

and smalls and lights and heavies, is any one of them any more the thing someone says it is than its opposite? No, each of them always participates in both opposites. Is any one of the manys what someone says it is, then, any more than it is not what he says it is? No, they are like the ambiguities one is entertained with at dinner parties or like the children's riddle about the eunuch who threw something at a bat the one about what he threw at it and what it was in 18 for they are ambiguous, and one cannot understand them as fixedly being or fixedly bigs

—

,

not being or as both or as neither.

d

Then do you know how to deal with them? Or can you find a more appropriate place to put them than intermediate between being and not being? Surely, they can't be more than what is or not be more than what is not, for apparently nothing is darker than what is not or clearer than what is. Very true. We've now discovered, it seems, that according to the many conventions of the majority of people about beauty and the others, they are rolling around as intermediates between what is not and what purely is.

We

have.

And we agreed earlier that anything of that kind would have to be called the opinable, not the knowable the intermediate power.

We As e

— the wandering intermediate grasped by

did. for those

beautiful itself

who

study the

many

do not see the and are incapable of following another who leads them to beautiful things but

The riddle seems to have been: A man who is not a man saw and did not see a bird that was not a bird in a tree (lit., a piece of wood) that was not a tree; he hit (lit., threw at) and did not hit it with a stone that was not a stone. The answer is that a eunuch with bad eyesight saw a bat on a rafter, threw a pumice stone at it, and missed. 18.

Republic

1107

1/

who see many just things but not the just itself, and so with everything these people, we shall say, opine everything but have no knowledge of

it,

anything they opine. Necessarily.

who

each case study the things themselves that are always the same in every respect? Won't we say that they know and don't opine? That's necessary too. Shall we say, then, that these people love and embrace the things that knowledge is set over, as the others do the things that opinion is set over?

What about

the ones

Remember we colors

We We

in

said that the latter

saw and loved

and the like but wouldn't allow the beautiful remember, all right.

beautiful sounds itself to

480

and

be anything?

won't be in error, then, if we call such people lovers of opinion rather than philosophers or lovers of wisdom and knowledge? Will they be angry with us if we call them that? Not if they take my advice, for it isn't right to be angry with those who

speak the

truth.

As for those who in each case embrace them philosophers, not lovers of opinion? Most definitely.

the thing

itself,

we must

call

Book VI And

Glaucon, I said, after a somewhat lengthy and difficult discussion, both the philosophers and the nonphilosophers have revealed who they so,

484

are. It

probably wouldn't have been easy, he said,

to

have them do

it

in a

shorter one.

Apparently not. But for my part, I think that the matter would have been better illuminated if we had only it to discuss and not all the other things that remain to be treated in order to discover the difference between the just

life

and the unjust one.

What's our next topic? What else but the one that's next in orcier? Since those who are able to grasp what is always the same in all respects are philosophers, while those who are not able to do so and who wander among the many things that vary in every sort of way are not philosophers, which of the two should be the leaders in a city? What would be a sensible answer to that? We should establish as guardians those who are clearly capable of guarding the laws and the ways of life of the city. That's right.

guardian who is to keep watch over everything should be keen-sighted rather than blind?

And

isn't

it

clear that the

b

c

1108

Glaucon/ Socrates

Of course it's clear. Do you think, then,

any difference between the blind and those who are really deprived of the knowledge of each thing that is? The latter have no clear model in their souls, and so they cannot in the manner of painters look to what is most true, make constant reference to it, and study it as exactly as possible. Hence they cannot establish here on earth conventions about what is fine or just or good, when they need to be established, or guard and preserve them, once they have been established. No, by god, there isn't much difference between them. Should we, then, make these blind people our guardians or rather those who know each thing that is and who are not inferior to the others, either in experience or in any other part of virtue? It would be absurd to choose anyone but philosophers, if indeed they're not inferior in these ways, for the respect in which they are superior is pretty well the most important one. Then shouldn't we explain how it is possible for someone to have both that there's

—

—

d

485

these sorts of qualities? Certainly.

Then, as we said at the beginning of this discussion, it is necessary to understand the nature of philosophers first for I think that, if we can reach adequate agreement about that, we'll also agree that the same people can have both qualities and that no one but they should be leaders in cities. 1

,

How

so?

Let's agree that philosophic natures

b

always love the sort of learning that makes clear to them some feature of the being that always is and does not wander around between coming to be and decaying.

And further, let's agree that, like the honor-lovers and erotically inclined men we described before they love all such learning and are not willing 2

,

to give

up any

part of

it,

whether large or small, more valuable or

less so.

That's right.

Consider next whether the people we're describing must also have c

this

in their nature.

What? They must be without falsehood they must false, hate it, and have a love for the truth. That's a reasonable addition, at any rate.

—

It s

not only reasonable,

man who

is

it's

erotically inclined

refuse to accept

entirely necessary, for

what

is

necessary for a by nature to love everything akin to or it's

belonging to the boy he loves. That's right.

And

could you find anything that belongs more to

does?

Of course

not.

1.

See 474b-c.

2.

See 474c-475c.

wisdom than

truth

1109

Republic VI

Then

wisdom

same nature

possible for the

is it

to

be a philosopher

— and a lover of falsehood?

Not at all. Then someone who loves learning must above of truth from childhood on.

— a lover of

all strive for

every kind

Absolutely.

Now, we

surely

know

that,

when someone's

desires incline strongly for

one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, has been partly diverted into another channel.

Of

stream that

just like a

course.

when someone's

Then,

desires flow towards learning

and everything

of

suppose, with the pleasures of the soul itself by itself, and he'd abandon those pleasures that come through the body if indeed he is a true philosopher and not merely a counterfeit one. That's completely necessary. Then surely such a person is moderate and not at all a money-lover. It's appropriate for others to take seriously the things for which money and large expenditures are needed, but not for him. that sort, he'd be concerned,

I

That's right.

And of course there's also this to consider when you are judging whether a nature

is

philosophic or not.

What's that? slavish,

If it is at all

you should not overlook

altogether incompatible with a soul that

everything both divine and That's completely true.

And

will a thinker

human

that fact, for pettiness

always reaching out

is

is

to

grasp

all

being

as a whole.

high-minded enough to study to be something important?

all

time and

consider human life He couldn't possibly.

Then

He

will

he consider death

least of

Then

it

to

be

a terrible thing?

all.

seems

a

cowardly and slavish nature will take no part

in true phi-

losophy.

Not

in

my

opinion.

an orderly person, who isn't money-loving, slavish, a boaster, or a coward, could become unreliable or unjust? There isn't. Moreover, when you are looking to see whether a soul is philosophic or not, you'll look to see whether it is just and gentle, from youth on, or savage and hard to associate with.

And

is

there

any way

that

Certainly.

And

here's

What? Whether to love

something

I

think

you won't leave

he's a slow learner or a fast one.

something when

it

only small return? No, it couldn't happen.

pains him to do

out.

Or do you ever expect anyone

it

and when much

effort brings

1110

Socrates /Glaucon/Adeimantus

And what

he could retain nothing of what he learned, because he was full of forgetfulness? Could he fail to be empty of knowledge? How could he? if

Then don't you think that, if he's laboring in vain, he'd inevitably come to hate both himself and that activity in the end? Of course. Then let's never include a forgetful soul among those who are sufficiently philosophical for our purposes, but look for one with a good Absolutely.

Now, we'd

certainly say that the unmusical

person's nature draws

Of

him

to lack of

memory.

and graceless element

in a

due measure.

course.

And do you

think that truth

is

akin to what lacks due measure or to

what is measured? To what is measured. Then, in addition to those other things, let's look for someone whose thought is by nature measured and graceful and is easily led to the form of each thing that is.

Of

course.

Well, then, don't you think the properties we've enumerated are compatible with one another and that each is necessary to a soul that is to have

an adequate and complete grasp of that which They're

is?

completely necessary. Is there any objection you can find, then, to a way of life that no one can adequately follow unless he's by nature good at remembering, quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage, and moderation? Not even Momus 3 could find one. When such people have reached maturity in age and education, wouldn't you entrust the city to them and to them alone? And Adeimantus replied: No one would be able to contradict the things you've said, Socrates, but on each occasion that you say them, your hearers are affected in some such way as this. They think that, because they're inexperienced in asking and answering questions, they're led astray a little bit by the argument at every question and that, when these little bits are all

added together at the end of the discussion, great is their fall, as the opposite of what they said at the outset comes to light. Just as inexperienced checkers players are trapped by the experts in the end and can't make a move, so they too are trapped in the end and have nothing to say in this different kind of checkers, which is played not with disks but with words. Yet the truth isn't affected by this outcome. I say this with a view to the present case, for someone might well say now that he's unable to oppose you as you ask each of your questions, yet he sees that of all those who take up philosophy not those who merely dabble in it while still young

—

3.

Momus

is

a personification of

blame or censure.

mi

Republic VI

complete their upbringing and then drop it, but those who continue in it for a longer time the greatest number become cranks, not to say completely vicious, while those who seem completely decent are rendered useless to the city because of the studies you recommend. When I'd heard him out, I said: Do you think that what these people say is false? I don't know, but I'd be glad to hear what you think. You'd hear that they seem to me to speak the truth. How, then, can it be true to say that there will be no end to evils in our people we agree to be useless rule in them? cities until philosophers The question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image in order to

—

d

e

—

—

or simile.

And

you, of course, aren't used to speaking in similes! So! Are you making fun of me now that you've landed me with a claim that's so hard to establish? In any case, listen to my simile, and you'll appreciate all the more how greedy for images I am. What the most decent people experience in relation to their city is so hard to bear that there's no other single experience like it. Hence to find an image of it and a defense for them, I must construct it from many sources, just as painters paint goat-stags by combining the features of different things. Imagine, then, that something like the following happens on a ship or on many ships. The shipowner is bigger and stronger than everyone else on board, but he's hard of hearing, a bit short-sighted,

and

his

knowledge

of seafaring

488

b

equally deficient. The sailors are quarreling with one another about steering the ship, each of them thinking that he should be the captain, even though he's never learned the art of navigation, cannot point to anyone who taught it to him, or to a time when he learned it. Indeed, they claim that it isn't teachable and are ready to cut to pieces anyone who is

They're always crowding around the shipowner, begging him and doing everything possible to get him to turn the rudder over to them. And sometimes, if they don't succeed in persuading him, they execute the ones who do succeed or throw them overboard, and then, having stupefied their noble shipowner with drugs, wine, or in some other way, they rule the ship, using up what's in it and sailing in the way that people like that are prone to do. Moreover, they call the person who is clever at

says that

it is.

persuading or forcing the shipowner to let them rule a "navigator," a "captain," and "one who knows ships," and dismiss anyone else as useless. They don't understand that a true captain must pay attention to the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and all that pertains to his craft, if he's really to be the ruler of a ship. And they don't believe there is any craft that would enable him to determine how he should steer the ship, whether the others want him to or not, or any possibility of mastering this alleged craft or of practicing it at the same time as the craft of navigation. Don't you think that the true captain will be called a real stargazer, a babbler, and a good-for-nothing by those who sail in ships governed in that way, in which such things happen?

c

d

e

489

1112 I

Adeimantus/ Socrates

certainly do.

don't think that you need to examine the simile in detail to see that the ships resemble cities and their attitude to the true philosophers, but you already understand what I mean. I

Indeed,

b

do.

I

Then first tell this simile to anyone who wonders why philosophers aren't honored in the cities, and try to persuade him that there would be far more cause for wonder if they were honored. I

will

Next

him.

tell

him

tell

that

what he says

is

true, that the best

among

the philoso-

phers are useless to the majority. Tell him not to blame those decent people for this but the ones who don't make use of them. It isn't natural for the captain to beg the sailors to be ruled by him nor for the wise to knock at the doors of the rich the man who came up with that wisecrack made a c

mistake. The natural thing is for the sick person, rich or poor, to knock at the doctor's door, and for anyone who needs to be ruled to knock at the door of the one who can rule him. It isn't for the ruler, if he's truly any use, to

beg the others

to accept his rule. Tell

mistake in likening those

we mentioned

that he'll

make no

who

now, and

just

him

rule in our cities at present to the sailors those who are called useless stargazers to

the true captains.

That's absolutely right. Therefore, it isn t easy for the best ways of life to be highly esteemed by people who, as in these circumstances, follow the opposite ways. By far the greatest and most serious slander on philosophy, however, results

d

from those

who

profess to follow the philosophic way of life. I mean those of whom the prosecutor of philosophy declared that the greatest number are completely vicious and the most decent useless. And I admitted that what he said was true, didn't I? Yes.

And haven we t

explained

why

the decent ones are useless?

Yes, indeed.

Then, do you next want us to discuss

number e

are vicious

and

to try to

why it's inevitable that the greater show, if we can, that philosophy isn't

responsible for this either? Certainly.

Then,

490

begin our dialogue by reminding ourselves of the point at which we began to discuss the nature that someone must have if he is to become a fine and good person. First of all, if you remember, he had to be guided by the truth and always pursue it in every way, or else he'd really be a boaster, with no share at all in true philosophy. let's

what was said. And isn't this view completely contrary about him? That's

It

certainly

to the opinions currently held

is.

Then, won't it be reasonable for us to plead in his defense that it is the nature of the real lover of learning to struggle toward what is, not to

1113

Republic VI

remain with any of the many things that are believed to be, that, as he moves on, he neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each nature itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because of its kinship with it, and that, once getting near what really is and having intercourse with it and having begotten understanding and at that point, but not truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and before is relieved from the pains of giving birth? That is the most reasonable defense possible. Well, then, will such a person have any part in the love of falsehood, or will he entirely hate it? HeTl hate it. And if truth led the way, we'd never say, I suppose, that a chorus of

—

—

could ever follow in its train. How could it? But rather a healthy and just character, with moderation following

evils

it.

That's right.

What need is there, then, to marshal all over again from the beginning the members of the philosophic nature's chorus in their inevitable array? Remember that courage, high-mindedness, ease in learning, and a good memory all belong to it. Then you objected, saying that anyone would be with what we said, but that, if he abandoned the argument and looked at the very people the argument is about, he'd say that some of them were useless, while the majority had every kind of vice. So we examined the reason for this slander and have now arrived at the

compelled

to agree

point of explaining why the majority of them are bad. And it's for this reason that we've again taken up the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it necessarily has to be. That's true.

We

must now look

at the

many

ways

in

which

this

nature

number

is

corrupted,

how

ones that are called useless rather than bad) escape. After that, we must look in turn at the natures of the souls that imitate the philosophic nature and establish themselves in its way of life, so as to see what the people are like who thereby arrive at a way of life they are unworthy of and that is beyond them and who, because they often strike false notes, bring upon philosophy the reputation that you said it has with everyone everywhere. In what ways are they corrupted? I'll try to enumerate them for you if I can. I suppose that everyone would

it's

destroyed in

people, while a small

agree that only a few natures possess said

were

essential to

occur naturally I

among human

a complete philosopher

beings.

Or

we

the qualities that

don't

and

just

that

now

seldom

you think so?

certainly do.

Consider, then, the rupted. What are they?

What

we

becoming

all

(the

will surprise

many important ways in which

you most, when you hear

it,

is

these few can be cor-

that each of the things

praised in that nature tends to corrupt the soul that has

it

and

to

drag

1114 it

Socrates /Adeimantus

away from philosophy. I mean courage, moderation, and the other things

we

mentioned. That does sound strange. Furthermore, all the things that are said to be good also corrupt it and drag it away beauty, wealth, physical strength, relatives who are powerful in the city, and all that goes with these. You understand what I

—

have

mind? I do, and Td be glad to learn even more about it. If you correctly grasp the general point I'm after, it will be clear to you, and what I've said before won't seem so strange. What do you want me to do? We know that the more vigorous any seed, developing plant, or animal is, the more it is deficient in the things that are appropriate for it to have in

when

deprived of suitable food, season, or location. For the bad more opposed to the good than is the merely not good. it is

Of course. Then it's reasonable

to say that the best nature fares worse,

is

when unsuit-

ably nurtured, than an ordinary one. It is.

Then won't we say

same thing about souls too, Adeimantus, that become outstandingly bad when they receive a bad upbringing? Or do you think that great injustices and pure wickedness the

those with the best natures

originate in an ordinary nature rather than in a vigorous one that has been corrupted by its upbringing? Or that a weak nature is ever the cause of either great good or great evil?

No, you're

Now, grow but

right.

think that the philosophic nature as we defined it will inevitably to possess every virtue if it happens to receive appropriate instruction, I

sown, planted, and grown in an inappropriate environment, it will develop in quite the opposite way, unless some god happens to come to its rescue. Or do you agree with the general opinion that certain young people are actually corrupted by sophists that there are certain sophists with significant influence on the young who corrupt them through private teaching? Isn't it rather the very people who say this who are the greatest sophists of all, since they educate most completely, turning young and old, men and women, into precisely the kind of people they want them if it is

—

to be?

When do they do that? When many of them are army camps,

or in

sitting together in assemblies, courts, theaters,

some

other public gathering of the crowd, they object very loudly and excessively to some of the things that are said or done and approve others in the same way, shouting and clapping, so that the very rocks and surroundings echo the din of their praise or

blame and is the effect, as they say, on a young person's heart? What private training can hold out and not be swept away by that kind of praise or blame and be carried by the flood wherever double

it.

In circumstances like that,

what

1115

Republic VI it

goes, so that he'll say that the

crowd does, follow

the

same things

same way

of

life

are beautiful or ugly as the

as they do,

and be the same

sort

of person as they are?

He will be under great compulsion And yet we haven't mentioned the

to

do

so, Socrates.

greatest

compulsion of

all.

What's that?

what these educators and sophists impose by their actions if their words fail to persuade. Or don't you know that they punish anyone who It's

isn't

persuaded, with disenfranchisement,

They most

fines, or

death?

certainly do.

other sophist, then, or what private conversations do will prevail in opposition to these?

What

you think

don't suppose that any will. No, indeed, it would be very foolish even to try to oppose them, for there isn't now, hasn't been in the past, nor ever will be in the future anyone with a character so unusual that he has been educated to virtue I

—

he received from the mob I mean, a human character; the divine, as the saying goes, is an exception to the rule. You should realize that if anyone is saved and becomes what he ought to be under our present constitutions, he has been saved you might in spite of the contrary education

rightly say I

—

—by a divine dispensation.

agree.

Well, then,

you should

What? Not one of those paid and consider to be their

also agree to this.

whom

the people call sophists rivals in craft, teaches anything other than the convictions that the majority express when they are gathered together. Indeed, these are precisely what the sophists call wisdom. It's as if someone were learning the moods and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he's how to approach and handle it, when it is most difficult to deal rearing

private teachers,

—

with or most gentle and what makes it so, what sounds it utters in either condition, and what sounds soothe or anger it. Having learned all this through tending the beast over a period of time, he calls this knack wisdom, gathers his information together as if it were a craft, and starts to teach is fine or it. In truth, he knows nothing about which of these convictions shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, but he applies all these names in

—

accordance with how the beast reacts calling what it enjoys good and what angers it bad. He has no other account to give of these terms. And he calls what he is compelled to do just and fine, for he hasn't seen and cannot show anyone else how much compulsion and goodness really differ. Don't you think, by god, that someone like that is a strange educator?

do indeed. Then does this person seem any I

from the one who believes that it is wisdom to understand the moods and pleasures of a majority gathered from all quarters, whether they concern painting, music, or, for that matter, politics? If anyone approaches the majority to exhibit his poetry different

1110

Socrates/Adeimantus

some other piece of craftsmanship or his service to the city and gives them mastery over him to any degree beyond what's unavoidable, he'll be under Diomedean compulsion, as it's called, to do the sort of thing of which they approve. But have you ever heard anyone presenting an argument that such things are truly good and beautiful that wasn't absoor

lutely ridiculous? e

No, and I don't expect ever to hear one. Keeping all this in mind, recall the following question: Can the majority in any way tolerate or accept the reality of the beautiful itself, as opposed

many

to the

494

beautiful things, or the reality of each thing

itself,

as

opposed

corresponding many? Not in any way. Then the majority cannot be philosophic.

to the

They cannot. Hence they inevitably disapprove

of those

who

practice philosophy?

Inevitably.

And

so

do

those private individuals and try to please them. all

who

associate with the majority

Clearly.

Then, because of all that, do you see any salvation for someone who is by nature a philosopher, to insure that he'll practice philosophy correctly to the end? Think about what we ve said before. We agreed that ease in b

learning, a

good memory, courage, and high-mindedness belong

to the

philosophic nature. Yes.

And

won't someone with a nature

in everything, especially

if

be first among the children his body has a nature that matches that of like that

his soul?

How

c

could he not be?

Then I suppose that, as he gets older, his family and fellow citizens will want to make use of him in connection with their own affairs. Of course. Therefore they'll pay court to him with their requests and honors, trying by their flattery to secure for themselves ahead of time the power that is going

to

be

his.

what usually happens, at any rate. What do you think someone like that will do in such circumstances, especially if he happens to be from a great city, in which he's rich, well-born' good-looking, and tall? Won't he be filled with impractical expectations and think himself capable of managing the affairs, not only of the Greeks, but That's

of the barbarians as well? d

heights and be

brimming

And

as a result, won't he exalt himself to great with pretension and pride that is empty and

lacks understanding?

He certainly will. And if someone approaches tells

him

a

young man

the truth, namely, that that there's

in that condition

no understanding

and gently in

him, that

Ill 7

Republic VI

he needs attain

it,

and that it can't be acquired unless he works like a slave do you think that it will be easy for him to listen when he's it,

the midst of so

Far from

many

to in

evils?

it.

young man of that sort somehow sees the point and is guided and drawn to philosophy because of his noble nature and his kinship with reason, what do you think those people will do, if they believe that they're losing their use of him and his companionship? Is there anything they won't do or say to him to prevent him from being persuaded? Or anything they won't do or say about his persuader whether plotting against him in private or publicly bringing him into court to prevent him from such persuasion?

And even

if

a

—

There certainly isn't. Then, is there any chance that such a person will practice philosophy?

None at Do you

all.

weren't wrong to say that, when someone with a philosophic nature is badly brought up, the very components of together with the other so-called goods, such as wealth and his nature other similar advantages are themselves in a way the cause of his falling see, then, that

—

away from I

do,

we

—

the philosophic

way

and what we said was

of life?

right.

—

many ways in which the best nature which is already rare enough, as we said is destroyed and corrupted, so that it cannot follow the best way of life. And it is among these men that we find if the ones who do the greatest evils to cities and individuals and also they happen to be swept that way by the current the greatest good, for These, then, are the

—

—

a petty nature will never

do anything

great, either to

an individual or a

city.

That's very true.

these men, for whom philosophy is most appropriate, fall away from her, they leave her desolate and unwed, and they themselves lead lives that are inappropriate and untrue. Then others, who are unworthy

When

of her,

come

to her as to

an orphan deprived of the protection of kinsmen

and disgrace her. These are the ones who are responsible for the reproaches that you say are cast upon philosophy by those who revile her, namely, that

some

who consort with many bad things.

of those

her are useless, while the majority

deserve to suffer Yes, that is indeed what is said. And it's a reasonable thing to say, for other

little

—

men — the

ones

who

most sophisticated at their own little crafts seeing that this position, which is full of fine names and adornments, is vacated, leap gladly from those little crafts to philosophy, like prisoners escaping from jail who take refuge in a temple. Despite her present poor state, philosophy is still more high-minded than these other crafts, so that many people with defective natures desire to possess her, even though their souls are cramped and spoiled by the mechanical nature of their work, in just the way that their bodies are mutilated by their crafts and labors. Isn't that inevitable? are

1118 It

496

Adeimantus/ Socrates certainly

is.

Don't you think that a man of this sort looks exactly like a little baldheaded tinker who has come into some money and, having been just released from jail, has taken a bath, put on a new cloak, got himself up as a bridegroom, and is about to marry the boss's daughter because she is poor and abandoned? They're exactly the same. And what kind of children will that marriage produce? Won't they be

and They have to

illegitimate

inferior? 4

be.

What about when men who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily? What kinds of thoughts and opinions are

we to say they beget? Won't they truly be what are properly called

sophisms, things that have nothing genuine about them or worthy of being

wisdom?

called true

That's absolutely right. Then there remains, Adeimantus, only a very small group who consort with philosophy in a way that's worthy of her: noble and well brought-up character, for example, kept down by exile, who remains with philosophy

A

b

according to his nature because there is no one to corrupt him, or a great soul living in a small city, who disdains the city's affairs and looks beyond them. A very few might be drawn to philosophy from other crafts that they rightly despise because they have good natures. And some might be held back by the bridle that restrains our friend Theages for he's in every

way qualified

c

—

be tempted away from philosophy, but his physical illness restrains him by keeping him out of politics. Finally, my own case is hardly worth mentioning my daemonic sign because it has happened to no one before me, or to only a very few. Now, the members of this small group have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and at the same time they've also seen the madness of the majority and realized, in a word, that hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs and that there is no ally with whom they might go to the aid of justice and survive, that instead they'd perish before they could profit either their city or their friends and be useless both to themselves and to others, just like a man who has fallen among wild animals and is neither willing to join them in doing injustice nor sufficiently strong to oppose the general savagery alone. Taking all this into account, they lead a quiet life and do their own work. Thus, like someone who takes refuge under a little wall from a storm of dust or hail driven by the wind, the philosopher seeing others filled with to

n

d

lawlessness

—

—

—

he can somehow lead his present life free from injustice and impious acts and depart from it with good hope, blameless e

is

satisfied

if

and content. 4.

See the Theages.

5.

See Plato, Apology 31c-32a, where Socrates explains that his daimonion has kept him

out of

politics.

1119

Republic VI

Well, that's no small thing for

him

to

have accomplished before de-

497

parting.

he didn't chance upon a constitution that suits him. Under a suitable one, his own growth will be fuller, and that we've he'll save the community as well as himself. It seems to me now sensibly discussed the reasons why philosophy is slandered and why unless, of course, you have something to add. the slanderer is unjust of our present constituI have nothing to add on that point. But which But

it

isn't the greatest either, since

—

tions

do you think

is

suitable for philosophers?

None of them. That's exactly my complaint: None of our present constituworthy of the philosophic nature, and, as a result, this nature is perverted and altered, for, just as a foreign seed, sown in alien ground, is likely to be overcome by the native species and to fade away among them, so the philosophic nature fails to develop its full power and declines into it is a different character. But if it were to find the best constitution, as other natures itself the best, it would be clear that it is really divine and that and ways of life are merely human. Obviously you're going to ask next tions

b

is

what the

best constitution

c

is.

You're wrong there; I wasn't going to ask that, but whether it was the constitution we described when we were founding our city or some other one. In the other respects,

it is

that one. But

we said even then

6

that there

must

always be some people in the city who have a theory of the constitution, the same one that guided you, the lawgiver, when you made the laws.

d

We

did say that. Yes, but we didn't emphasize it sufficiently, for fear of what your objections have made plain, namely, that its proof would be long and difficult. And indeed what remains is by no means easy to go through.

What's that? How a city can engage in philosophy without being destroyed, for all great things are prone to fall, and, as the saying goes, fine things are really hard to achieve. Nevertheless, to complete our discussion, we'll have to get clear about this. of willingness If anything prevents us from doing it, it won't be lack but lack of ability. At least you'll see how willing I am, for notice again how enthusiastically and recklessly I say that the manner in which a city ought to take up the philosophic way of life is the opposite of what it does

e

at present.

How? At present, those who study philosophy do so as young men who have just left childhood behind and have yet to take up household management and money-making. But just when they reach the hardest part— I mean they abandon it the part that has to do with giving a rational account

—

6.

See 412a-b.

498

11ZU

Socrates IAdeimant us

and are regarded as fully trained in philosophy. In later life, they think they're doing well if they are willing to be in an invited audience when others are doing philosophy, for they think they should do this only as a sideline. And, with a few exceptions, by the time they reach old age, their eagerness for philosophy is quenched more thoroughly than the sun of Heraclitus, which is never rekindled 7 What should they do? Entirely the opposite. As youths and children, they should put their minds to youthful education and philosophy and take care of their bodies at a time when they are growing into manhood, so as to acquire a helper for philosophy. As they grow older and their souls begin to reach maturity, .

they should increase their mental exercises. Then, when their strength begins to fail and they have retired from politics and military service, they should graze freely in the pastures of philosophy and do nothing else mean the ones who are to live happily and, in death, add a fitting destiny in that other place to the life they have lived.

—

You seem

be speaking with true enthusiasm, Socrates. But I'm sure that most of your hearers, beginning with Thrasymachus, will oppose you with even greater enthusiasm and not be at all convinced. to

—

Don t slander Thrasymachus and me just as we've become friends not that we were enemies before. We won't relax our efforts until we either convince him and the others or, at any rate, do something that may benefit them in a later ments again.

incarnation,

when, reborn, they happen upon these argu-

That's a short time you're talking about! It s nothing compared to the whole of time. All the same, it's no wonder that the majority of people aren't convinced by our arguments, for they've never seen a man that fits our plan (and the rhymes of this sort they have heard are usually intended and not, like this one, the product of mere chance). That

is

to say, they

ve never seen a

man

or a

themselves rhymed with virtue, were assimilated to

and ruled

in a city of the

same

type.

Or do you

number it

of

men who

as far as possible,

think they have?

don't think so at all. Nor have they listened sufficiently to fine and free arguments that search out the truth in every way for the sake of knowledge but that I

keep away from the sophistications and eristic quibbles that, both in public trials and in private gatherings, aim at nothing except reputation and disputation. No, they haven't. It

was because

of this, because

we

foresaw these difficulties, that we were afraid. Nonetheless, we were compelled by the truth to say that no city, constitution, or individual man will ever become perfect until either some chance event compels those few philosophers who aren't vicious Aristotle ( Meteorologica 355a 14) reports Heraclitus as believing that “the every day": the sun not only sets at night, it ceases to exist, being 7.

new sun

sun replaced by a

the next morning.

is

new

totally

1121

Republic VI

called useless) to take charge of a city, whether they want to or not, and compels the city to obey them, or until a god inspires the present rulers and kings or their offspring with a true erotic (the ones

who

are

now

love for true philosophy. Now, it cannot be reasonably maintained, in my view, that either of these things is impossible, but if it could, we'd be justly ridiculed for indulging in wishful thinking. Isn't that so? It is.

Then,

if

in the limitless past, those

who were

foremost in philosophy

charge of a city or if this is happening now in some foreign place far beyond our ken or if it will happen in the future, we are prepared to maintain our argument that, at whatever time the muse of philosophy controls a city, the constitution we've described will also exist at that time, whether it is past, present, or future. Since it is not impossible for this to happen, we are not speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult

were forced

for

it

to take

happen, however,

to

That's

my

we

agree ourselves.

opinion, anyway.

But the majority don't share your opinion

—

is

that

what you

are going

to say?

They probably

make such wholesale charges against the majority, for no doubt come to a different opinion, if instead of indulging your

You should they'll

don't.

not

love of victory at their expense, you soothe them and try to remove their slanderous prejudice against the love of learning, by pointing out what you mean by a philosopher and by defining the philosophic nature and way of life, as we did just now, so that they'll realize that you don't mean

they once see it your way, even you will say that they'll have a different opinion from the one you just attributed to them and will answer differently. Or do you think that anyone who is the

same people

as they do.

And

if

harsh with someone who is neither irritable nor malicious? I'll anticipate your answer and say that a few people may have such a harsh character, but not the majority.

gentle

and without malice

is

And, of course, I agree. Then don't you also agree that the harshness the majority exhibit towards philosophy is caused by those outsiders who don't belong and who've burst in like a band of revellers, always abusing one another, indulging their love of quarrels, and arguing about human beings in a way that is wholly inappropriate

to

philosophy?

do indeed. No one whose thoughts are I

towards the things that are, Adeimantus, has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to be filled with envy and hatred by competing with people. Instead, as he looks at and studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates them and tries to become as like them as he can. Or do you think that someone can consort with things he admires without imitating them? I

do

not. It's impossible.

truly directed

11Z/

Socrates/ Adeimantus

-

Then the philosopher, by consorting with what is ordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that say otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human being can. That's absolutely true.

And

he should come

be compelled to put what he sees there into people's characters, whether into a single person or into a populace, instead of shaping only his own, do you think that he will be a poor craftsman of moderation, justice, and the whole of popular virtue? if

to

He least of all. And when the majority realize that what we are saying about the philosopher is true, will they be harsh with him or mistrust us when we say that the city will never find happiness until who use the divine model?

its

outline

is

sketched by painters

They won't be harsh, if indeed they realize this. But what sort of sketch do you mean? They'd take the city and the characters of human beings as their sketching slate, but first they'd wipe it clean which isn't at all an easy thing to do. And you should know that this is the plain difference between them and

—

others, namely, that they refuse to take either an individual or a city in hand or to write laws, unless they receive a clean slate or are allowed to

clean

themselves. And they'd be right to refuse. Then don't you think they'd next sketch the outline of the constitution?

Of

it

course.

And

suppose

they work, they'd look often in each direction, towards the natures of justice, beauty, moderation, and the like, on the one hand, and towards those they're trying to put into human beings, on I

the other.

And

that, as

in this

way

they'd mix and blend the various

ways

of

life

produced a human image based on what Homer too the divine form and image" when it occurred among human

in the city until they

called

beings

8 .

That's right.

They'd erase one thing,

made

characters for

I

human

suppose, and draw in another until they'd beings that the gods would love as much

as possible.

At any rate, that would certainly result in the finest sketch. Then is this at all persuasive to those you said were straining to attack us— that the person we were praising is really a painter of constitutions? They were angry because we entrusted the city to him: Are they any calmer, now that they've heard what we had to say? They'll be much calmer, if they have any moderation. Indeed, how could they possibly dispute it? Will they deny that philosophers are lovers of what is or of the truth? That would be absurd. 8.

See, for example, Iliad

i.

131

1123

Republic VI

Or that their nature as we've described it is close to the best? They can't deny that either. Or that such a nature, if it follows its own way of life, isn't as completely good and philosophic as any other? Or that the people we excluded are more so? Certainly not. Then will they

be angry when we say that, until philosophers take control of a city, there'll be no respite from evil for either city or citizens, and the constitution we've been describing in theory will never be completed in still

practice?

They'll probably be less angry. right with you, let's not say that they'll simply be less but that they'll become altogether gentle and persuaded, so that

Then angry

if it's all

be shamed into agreeing with us, if nothing else. It's all right with me. Let's assume, therefore, that they've been convinced on this point. Will anyone dispute our view that the offspring of kings or rulers could be born with philosophic natures? No one would do that. Could anyone claim that, if such offspring are born, they'll inevitably be corrupted? We agree ourselves that it's hard for them to be saved from corruption, but could anyone claim that in the whole of time not one of they'll

them could be saved?

How

could he? But surely one such individual would be sufficient to bring to completion all the things that now seem so incredible, provided that his city obeys him.

One would be

sufficient.

a ruler established the laws and surely not impossible that the citizens If

Not

at

ways of life we've would be willing to

described, carry

them

it

is

out.

all.

And would it think as we do?

be either astonishing or impossible that others should

don't suppose it would. But I think our earlier discussion was sufficient to arrangements are best, if only they are possible. I

show

that these

was. Then we can now conclude that this legislation is best, if only it is possible, and that, while it is hard for it to come about, it is not impossible.

Indeed

it

We can. Now that

has been disposed of, we must deal with what remains, namely, how the saviors of our constitution will come to be in the city, what subjects and ways of life will cause them to come into being,

and

at

this difficulty

what ages

they'll take

each of them up.

Indeed we must. It wasn't very clever of me to omit from our earlier discussion the troublesome topics of acquiring wives, begetting children, and appointing

Socrates /Adeimantus

because I knew that the whole truth would provoke resentment and would be hard to bring about in practice, for as it turned out, I had to go through these matters anyway. The subject of women and children has been adequately dealt with, but that of the rulers has to be taken up again from the beginning. We said, if you remember, that they must show themselves to be lovers of their city when tested by pleasure and pain and that they must hold on to their resolve through labors, fears, and all other rulers, just

Anyone who was incapable of doing so was to be rejected, while anyone who came through unchanged like gold tested in a fire was to be made ruler and receive prizes both while he lived and after his adversities.

—

death. These

were the

afraid of stirring

up

and slipped

by.

face

That's very true;

I

sort of things

we were

saying while our argument, the very problems that now confront us, veiled its

do remember

it.

We

hesitated to say the things we've now dared to say anyway. So let's now also dare to say that those who are to be made our guardians in the most exact sense of the term must be philosophers.

do it. Then you should understand Let's

that there will probably be only a

them, for they have to have the nature

we

described,

and

its

few of

parts mostly

grow in separation and are rarely found in the same person. What do you mean? You know that ease of learning, good memory, quick wits, smartness, youthful passion, high-mindedness, and all the other things that go along with these are rarely willing to grow together in a mind that will choose an orderly life that is quiet and completely stable, for the people who possess the former traits are carried by their quick wits wherever chance

them and have no

leads

stability at

all.

That's true.

On

the other hand, people with stable characters, who don't change easily, who aren't easily frightened in battle, and whom one would employ because of their greater reliability, exhibit similar traits when it comes to

They are as hard to move and teach as people whose brains have become numb, and they are filled with sleep and yawning whenever they learning.

have

to learn anything.

That's so.

Yet

we

say that someone must have a fine and goodly share of both characters, or he won't receive the truest education, honors, or rule. That's right.

Then, don't you think that such people will be rare?

Of

course.

Therefore they must be tested in the labors, fears, and pleasures we mentioned previously. But they must also be exercised in many other subjects

— which we didn't mention but are adding now — to see whether

they can tolerate the most important subjects or will shrink from them like the cowards who shrink from other tests.

1125

Republic VI

appropriate to examine them like that. But what do you mean by the most important subjects? Do you remember when we distinguished three parts in the soul, in order to help bring out what justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom It's

each

is?

remember that, it wouldn't be What about what preceded it? What was that? If

I

We

didn't

said,

I

just for

to

hear the

rest.

view of these would make them plain

believe, that, in order to get the finest possible

we would need to take a longer road that anyone who took it but that it was possible to

matters, to

me

give demonstrations of

what they are that would be up to the standard of the previous argument." And you said that that would be satisfactory. So it seems to me that our discussion at that time fell short of exactness, but whether or not it satisfied you is for you to say. I thought you gave us good measure and so, apparently, did the others. Any measure of such things that falls short in any way of that which is is not good measure, for nothing incomplete is the measure of anything, although people are sometimes of the opinion that an incomplete treatment is nonetheless adequate and makes further investigation unnecessary. Indeed, laziness causes

many

people to think

that.

thought that a guardian of a city and its laws can well do without. Probably so. Well, then, he must take the longer road and put as much effort into It is

a

learning as into physical training, for otherwise, as we were just saying, he will never reach the goal of the most important subject and the most

appropriate one for him to learn. Aren't these virtues, then, the most important things? he asked. anything even more important than justice and the other virtues

cussed? There

is

something more important. However, even

Is

there

we

dis-

themdid before, while

for the virtues

enough to look at a mere sketch, as we neglecting the most complete account. It's ridiculous, isn't it, to strain every nerve to attain the utmost exactness and clarity about other things of little value and not to consider the most important things worthy of selves,

it

isn't

the greatest exactness?

But do you think that anyone is going to let you off without asking you what this most important subject is and what it concerns? No, indeed, and you can ask me too. You've certainly heard the answer often enough, but now either you aren't thinking or you intend to make trouble for me again by interrupting. And I suspect the latter, for you've often heard it said that the form of the good is the most important thing It

certainly

to learn

others

9.

is.

about and that

it's

become useful and

See 435d.

by

their relation to

beneficial.

it

that just things

You know very

well

now

and the

that

I

am

lzt>

1

Socrates/ Adeimantus / Glaucon

going it.

b

to

say

And you

this,

also

we have no adequate knowledge of we don't know it, even the fullest possible of no benefit to us, any more than if we

and, besides, that

know

that,

if

knowledge of other things is acquire any possession without the good of it. Or do you think that it is any advantage to have every kind of possession without the good of it? Or to know everything except the good, thereby knowing nothing fine or good? No, by god, I don't. Furthermore, you certainly know that the majority believe that pleasure is the good, while the more sophisticated believe that it is knowledge. Indeed

I

do.

And you know knowledge

that those

who

believe this can't tell us what sort of however, but in the end are forced to say that it is knowl-

it is,

edge of the good.

And c

that's ridiculous.

Of course it is. They blame us for not knowing the good and then turn around and talk to us as if we did know it. They say that it is knowledge of the good as if we understood what they're speaking about when they utter the word "good." That's completely true.

What about

those who define the good as pleasure? Are they any less full of confusion than the others? Aren't even they forced to admit that there are bad pleasures?

Most So,

d

I

definitely.

think, they

have

to

agree that the same things are both good and

bad. Isn't that true? Of course. then, isn't

It's clear,

How And

could isn

it

it,

why there are many large controversies about this?

be otherwise?

this also clear? In the case of just

and beautiful things, many people are content with what are believed to be so, even if they aren't really so, and they act, acquire, and form their own beliefs on that basis.

Nobody

is

t

satisfied to acquire things that are

merely believed

however, but everyone wants the things that really

mere

are

to

be good,

good and disdains

belief here.

That's right.

Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake. It divines that the good is something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, and so it misses the benefit, if any, that even those other things may give. Will we allow the best people in the city, to

whom we

506

entrust everything, to be so in the dark about something of this kind of this importance?

and

That's the last thing we'd do. I

don

much

suppose, at least, that just and fine things will have acquired of a guardian in someone who doesn't even know in what way they t

1127

Republic VI

are good.

And

I

divine that no one will have adequate knowledge of them

he knows this. You've divined well. But won't our constitution be perfectly ordered, if a guardian who knows these things is in charge of it? Necessarily. But, Socrates, you must also tell us whether you consider the good to be knowledge or pleasure or something else altogether. What a man! It's been clear for some time that other people's opinions about these matters wouldn't satisfy you. Well, Socrates, it doesn't seem right to me for you to be willing to state other people's convictions but not your own, especially when you've spent

until

so

if

much

time occupied with these matters. What? Do you think it's right to talk about things one doesn't

one does

know them?

Not

one knows them, he

as

if

said,

know

as

but one ought to be willing to state

one's opinions as such. What? Haven't you noticed that opinions without knowledge are shameor do you think that ful and ugly things? The best of them are blind

—

express a true opinion without understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road? They're no different. Do you want to look at shameful, blind, and crooked things, then, when you might hear illuminating and fine ones from other people? By god, Socrates, Glaucon said, don't desert us with the end almost in sight. We'll be satisfied if you discuss the good as you discussed justice, those

who

moderation, and the

my friend,

rest.

me

but I'm afraid that I won't be up to it and that I'll disgrace myself and look ridiculous by trying. So let's abandon the quest for what the good itself is for the time being, for even to arrive at my own view about it is too big a topic for the discussion we are now started on. But I am willing to tell you about what is apparently an offspring of the good and most like it. Is that agreeable to you, or would That,

you

rather

we

let

I

said,

the

would

satisfy

too,

whole matter drop?

The story about the father remains a debt you'll pay another time. of I wish that I could pay the debt in full, and you receive it instead just the interest. So here, then, is this child and offspring of the good. But be careful that I don't somehow deceive you unintentionally by giving " you an illegitimate account of the child. It is.

1

We'll be as careful as possible, so speak on. I

will

when we've come

to

an agreement and recalled some things that

we've already said both here and many other times.

Which ones?

Throughout, Socrates the interest on capital. 10.

is

punning on the word

tokos,

which means

either a child or

°

Socrates /Glaucon

We say that there are many beautiful things and many good so on for each kind, and in this We do.

way we

distinguish

them

in

things,

words.

And beauty itself and good itself and all the things that we down as many, reversing ourselves, we set down according form of each, believing

that there

is

but one, and

call

it

and

thereby set to a single

"the being" of each.

That's true.

And we

say that the many beautiful things and the rest are visible but not intelligible, while the forms are intelligible but not visible. That's completely true.

With what part of ourselves do we see With our sight.

c

visible things?

And so audible things are heard by hearing, and we perceive all the other perceptible things.

with our other senses

That's right.

Have you considered how lavish the power to see and be seen?

maker

of our senses

was

in

making

have. Well, consider it this way. Do hearing and sound need another kind of thing in order for the former to hear and the latter to be heard, a third thing in whose absence the one won't hear or the other be I

d

can't say

the

I

heard?

No, they need nothing else. And if there are any others that need such of them. Can you think of one? I

a thing, there can't be

many

can't.

You

don't realize that sight and the visible have such a need? How so? Sight may be present in the eyes, and the one who has it may

try to use

and colors may be present in things, but unless a third kind of thing is present, which is naturally adapted for this very purpose, you know that sight will see nothing, and the colors will remain unseen. What kind of thing do you mean? I mean what you call light. it,

e

You're 508

right.

Then it isn t an insignificant kind of link that connects the sense of sight and the power to be seen— it is a more valuable link than any other linked things have got,

indeed light is something valuable. And, of course, it's very valuable. Which of the gods in heaven would you name as the cause and controller of this, the one whose light causes our sight to see in the best way and the visible things to be seen? The same one you and others would name. Obviously, the answer to your question is the sun.

And

isn't sight

Which way?

if

by nature

related to that

god

in this

wav?

1129

Republic VI

Sight isn't the sun, neither sight

itself

nor that in which

it

comes

to be,

namely, the eye. No, it certainly isn't. But I think that it is the most sunlike of the senses.

Very much

And

it

so.

power

receives from the sun the

it

has, just like

an influx from

an overflowing treasury. Certainly.

The sun

is

not sight, but

isn't

the cause of sight itself

it

and seen by

it?

That's right. Let's say, then, that this

the

good begot

as

its

what

is

analogue.

I

called the offspring of the good,

What

the

good

itself is in

which

the intelligible

realm, in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the sun the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things.

How? Explain a bit more. You know that, when we

turn our eyes to things

whose

is

colors are

in

no

longer in the light of day but in the gloom of night, the eyes are dimmed and seem nearly blind, as if clear vision were no longer in them.

Of

course.

Yet whenever one turns them on things illuminated by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears in those very same eyes? Indeed. Well, understand the soul in the same way: When it focuses on something illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding, but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity,

on what comes

to

opines and is dimmed, and seems bereft of understanding.

be and passes away,

it

changes its opinions this way and that, It does seem that way. So that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but to think of

of

them

is

it is

wrong

to think that they are the sun, so here

knowledge and truth as goodlike but wrong for the good is yet more prized. the good

it is

right

to think that either

—

This is an inconceivably beautiful thing you're talking about, if it provides both knowledge and truth and is superior to them in beauty. You surely don't think that a thing like that could be pleasure.

Hush!

Let's

examine

its

image

in

more

detail as follows.

How? sun not only provides visible be seen but also with coming to be, growth, and

You'll be willing to say,

things with the

power

to

nourishment, although How could it be?

I

it is

think, that the

not

itself

coming

to be.

11JU

Socrates /Glaucon

Therefore,

you should

also say that not only

do the

knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power. And Glaucon comically said: By Apollo, what a daemonic superiority! It's your own fault; you forced me to tell you my opinion about it. And I don t want you to stop either. So continue to explain its similarity to the sun,

I

if

objects of

you've omitted anything.

I'm certainly omitting a lot. Well, don't, not even the smallest thing. I think I 11 have to omit a fair bit, but, as far as won't omit anything voluntarily.

is

possible at the

moment,

Don't.

Understand, then, that, as we said, there are these two things, one sovereign of the intelligible kind and place, the other of the visible (I don't say "of heaven" so as not to seem to you to be playing the sophist with the name). In any case, you have two kinds of thing, visible and intelligible 1

6

Right. It is

like a line

divided into two unequal sections. 12 Then divide each

section— namely, that of the visible and that of the intelligible— in the same ratio as the line. In terms now of relative clarity and opacity, one subsection of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, first.

11.

The play may be on

sound between ouranou Uof heaven") and More likely, Socrates is referring to the fact that ouranou seems to contain the word non the genitive case of nous ("understanding"), and relative of noetou ("of the intelligible"). If he said that the sun was sovereign of heaven, he might be taken to suggest in sophistical fashion that it was sovereign of the intelligible and that there was no real difference between the good and the sun. 12. The line is illustrated below: the similarity of

horatou ("of the visible").

,

Understanding

Thought

(

(

dianoia

Belief

Imagination

noesis

(

(

pistis )

eikasia )

1131

Republic VI

water and shiny materials, and everything of that

shadows, then reflections I

in

smooth, and you understand.

in all close-packed, sort,

if

e

510

do.

In the other subsection of the visible, put the originals of these images, namely, the animals around us, all the plants, and the whole class of

manufactured things. Consider them put. Would you be willing division

is

likeness

is

say that, as regards truth and untruth, the in this proportion: As the opinable is to the knowable, so the to the thing that it is like? to

b

Certainly.

Consider

now how

the section of the intelligible

is

to

be divided.

How? As

follows: In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that

forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, however, it makes its way to a first principle that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but without the images used in the previous subsection,

were imitated before,

is

using forms themselves and making its investigation through them. I don't yet fully understand what you mean. Let's try again. You'll understand it more easily after the following

c

preamble. I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, as if they knew them. They make these their hypotheses and don't think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone. And going from these first principles through the remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement.

d

know that much. Then you also know that, although I

certainly

they use visible figures and make claims about them, their thought isn't directed to them but to those other things that they are like. They make their claims for the sake of square itself and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the others. These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as images, in

seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought.

e

511

That's true. This, then,

is

the kind of thing that,

and, on the other,

is

on the one hand,

such that the soul

is

I

said

is intelligible,

forced to use hypotheses in the

not travelling up to a first principle, since it cannot reach beyond its hypotheses, but using as images those very things of which images were made in the section below, and which, by comparison to their images, were thought to be clear and to be valued as such.

investigation of

I

it,

understand that you mean what happens

sciences.

in

geometry and related

b

Socrates / Glaucon

Then

also understand that, by the other subsection of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as hypotheses but

—

as stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses

and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, itself

moving on from forms understand, of an enormous I

if

to forms,

and ending

not yet adequately (for in

in forms.

my

opinion you're speaking

you want to distinguish the intelligible part of that which is, the part studied by the science of dialectic, as clearer than the part studied by the so-called sciences, for which their hypotheses are task), that

And

although those who study the objects of these sciences are forced to do so by means of thought rather than sense perception, still, because they do not go back to a genuine first principle, but proceed from hypotheses, you don't think that they understand them, even though, given such a principle, they are intelligible. And you seem to me to call the state of the geometers thought but not understanding, thought being intermediate between opinion and understanding. Your exposition is most adequate. Thus there are four such conditions in the soul, corresponding to the four subsections of our line: Understanding for the highest, thought for the second, belief for the third, and imaging first

principles.

for the last.

Arrange them

in a ratio,

and consider

that each shares in

clarity to the I

degree that the subsection it is set over shares in truth. understand, agree, and arrange them as you say.

Book VII Next,

said,

compare the

education and of the lack of it on our nature to an experience like this: Imagine human beings living in an underground, cavelike dwelling, with an entrance a long way up, which is both open to the light and as wide as the cave itself. They've been there since childhood, fixed in the same place, with their necks and legs fettered, able to see only in front of them, because their bonds prevent them from turning their heads around. Light is provided by a fire burning far above and behind them. Also behind them, but on higher ground, there is a path stretching between them and the fire. Imagine that along this path a low wall has been built, like the screen in front of puppeteers above which they show their puppets. I'm imagining it. I

effect of

Then

also imagine that there are people along the wall, carrying all kinds of artifacts that project above it statues of people and other animals, made out of stone, wood, and every material. And, as you'd expect,

some

of the carriers are talking, It's

a strange

and some are

silent.

image you're describing, and strange prisoners.

1133

Republic VII

They're like us. Do you suppose, first of all, that these prisoners see anything of themselves and one another besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall in front of them? How could they, if they have to keep their heads motionless through1

out

life?

What about

the things being carried along the wall? Isn't the

same

true

them?

of

Of

course.

And if they could talk to one another, don't you think they'd suppose that the

names they used applied

They'd have

to the things

they see passing before them ?

to.

had an echo from the wall facing them? Don't you think they'd believe that the shadows passing in front of them were talking whenever one of the carriers passing along the wall was

And what

if

their prison also

doing so? I

certainly do.

Then

would in every way believe shadows of those artifacts.

the prisoners

that the truth

is

nothing

other than the They must surely believe that. Consider, then, what being released from their bonds and cured of their ignorance would naturally be like, if something like this came to passe

one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light, he'd be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose shadows he'd seen before. What do

When

you think he'd

say,

quential, but that

if

we

told

him

now— because

that

he

what he'd seen before was inconse-

is

a bit closer to the things that are

—

turned towards things that are more he sees more correctly? Or, to put it another way, if we pointed to each of the things passing by, asked him what each of them is, and compelled him to answer, don't you think he'd be at a loss and that he'd believe that the things he saw earlier were truer than the ones he was now being shown?

and

is

Much truer. And if someone compelled him

to look at the light itself,

wouldn't his

eyes hurt, and wouldn't he turn around and flee towards the things he's able to see, believing that they're really clearer than the ones he's being

shown?

He would. And if someone dragged him away from

by force, up the rough, steep path, and didn't let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn't he be pained and irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, with the sun filling his eyes, wouldn't he be unable to see a single one of the things now said to be true?

1.

Reading parionta autous nomizein onomazein

2.

Reading

hoia

tis

an

eie phusei, ei in c5.

there

in b5.

1134

Socrates /Glaucon

He would

b

be unable

them, at least at first. I suppose, then, that he d need time to get adjusted before he could see things in the world above. At first, he'd see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. Of these, he'd be able to study the things in the sky and the sky itself more easily at night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than during the day, looking at the sun and the light of the sun.

Of

to see

course.

suppose, he'd be able to see the sun, not images of it in water or some alien place, but the sun itself, in its own place, and be able to study it. Necessarily so. Finally,

And

c

I

point he would infer and conclude that the sun provides the seasons and the years, governs everything in the visible world, and is in some way the cause of all the things that he used to see. It's

at this

clear that

would be

his next step.

What about when he reminds

himself of his

dwelling place, his there? Don't you think that first

fellow prisoners, and what passed for wisdom he'd count himself happy for the change and pity the others? Certainly.

And

d

had been any honors, praises, or prizes among them for the one who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by and who best remembered which usually came earlier, which later, and which simultaneously, and who could thus best divine the future, do you think that our man would desire these rewards or envy those among the prisoners who were honored and held power? Instead, wouldn't he feel, with Homer, that he'd much prefer to "work the earth as a serf to another, one without possessions," and go through any sufferings, rather than share their opinions and live as they do? I suppose he would rather suffer anything than live like that. Consider this too. If this man went down into the cave again and sat down in his same seat, wouldn't his eyes coming suddenly out of the sun like that be filled with darkness? They certainly would. And before his eyes had recovered and the adjustment would not be quick while his vision was still dim, if he had to compete again with if

there

3

e

—

—

—

517

the perpetual prisoners in recognizing the shadows, wouldn't he invite ridicule? Wouldn't it be said of him that he'd returned from his upward

journey with his eyesight ruined and that to travel

worthwhile even to try as for anyone who tried to free them and lead they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn't

upward? And,

them upward, if they kill him? They certainly would.

3.

Odyssey

xi. 489-90.

it

isn't

1135

Republic VII

This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said before. The visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun. And if you interpret the upward journey and the study of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you'll grasp what I hope to convey, since that is what you wanted to hear about. Whether it's true or not, only

god knows. But this is how I see it: In the knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty. Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it produces both light and its source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it. I have the same thought, at least as far as I'm able. Come, then, share with me this thought also: It isn't surprising that the ones who get to this point are unwilling to occupy themselves with human affairs and that their souls are always pressing upwards, eager to spend their time above, for, after all, this is surely what we'd expect, if indeed things fit the image I described before. the

It is.

What about what happens when someone turns from divine study to the evils of human life? Do you think it's surprising, since his sight is still dim, and he hasn't yet become accustomed to the darkness around him, that he behaves awkwardly and appears completely ridiculous if he's compelled, either in the courts or elsewhere, to contend about the shadows of justice or the statues of which they are the shadows and to dispute about the way these things are understood by people who have never seen justice itself? That's not surprising at all. No, it isn't. But anyone with any understanding would remember that the eyes may be confused in two ways and from two causes, namely, when they've come from the light into the darkness and when they've come from the darkness into the light. Realizing that the same applies to the soul, when someone sees a soul disturbed and unable to see something, he won't laugh mindlessly, but he'll take into consideration whether it has

and is dimmed through not having yet become accustomed to the dark or whether it has come from greater ignorance into greater light and is dazzled by the increased brilliance. Then he'll declare the first soul happy in its experience and life, and he'll pity the

come from

a brighter

—but even

life

he chose to make fun of it, at least he'd be less ridiculous than if he laughed at a soul that has come from the light above. What you say is very reasonable. If that's true, then here's what we must think about these matters: Education isn't what some people declare it to be, namely, putting knowllatter

if

edge into souls that lack They do say that.

it,

like putting sight into blind eyes.

11JO

Socrates /Glaucon

But our present discussion, on the other hand, shows that the power to learn is present in everyone's soul and that the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to

without turning the whole body. This instrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is, namely, the one we call the good. Isn't that right? light

d

Yes.

Then education is the craft concerned with doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how the soul can most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn't the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn't turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately.

So

it

Now,

seems.

looks as though the other so-called virtues of the soul are akin to those of the body, for they really aren't there beforehand but are added e

519

it

by habit and practice. However, the virtue of reason seems to belong above all to something more divine, which never loses its power but is either useful and beneficial or useless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned. Or have you never noticed this about people who are said to be vicious but clever, how keen the vision of their little souls is and how later

sharply its

it

distinguishes the things

sight isn't inferior but rather

sharper

it

sees, the

more

evil

it

it is

turned towards? This shows that

forced to serve evil ends, so that the accomplishes. is

Absolutely.

However, if a nature of this sort had been hammered at from childhood and freed from the bonds of kinship with becoming, which have been fastened to it by feasting, greed, and other such pleasures and which, like b

—

leaden weights, pull its vision downwards if, being rid of these, it turned to look at true things, then I say that the same soul of the same person would see these most sharply, just as it now does the things it is presently turned towards. Probably so.

And what

who have no

experience of truth? Isn't follow necessarily from what was said before that they will never adequately govern a city? But neither would those who've been allowed to spend their whole lives being educated. The former would fail because they don't have a single goal at which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim; the latter would fail because they'd refuse to act, thinking that they had settled while still alive in the faraway it

c

about the uneducated

likely

— indeed, doesn't

it

Isles of the Blessed.

That's true.

our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to reach the study we said before is the most important, namely, to make the ascent and see the good. But when they've made it and looked sufficiently, we mustn't allow them to do what they're allowed to do today. It is

d

1137

Republic VII

What's that?

To stay there and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the cave and share their labors and honors, whether they are of less worth or of greater.

Then

are

we

to

do them an

injustice

when they could live a better one? You are forgetting again that it isn't

by making them

live a

the law's concern to

worse

life

make any one

spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion and by making them share with each

class in the city outstandingly

happy but

to contrive to

4

other the benefits that each class can confer on the community The law produces such people in the city, not in order to allow them to turn in whatever direction they want, but to make use of them to bind the .

city together.

That's true,

I

had

forgotten.

Observe, then, Glaucon, that we won't be doing an injustice to those who've become philosophers in our city and that what we'll say to them, when we compel them to guard and care for the others, will be just. We'll say:

"When people

like

you come

to

be

in other cities, they're justified in

not sharing in their city's labors, for they've grown there spontaneously, against the will of the constitution. And what grows of its own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing has justice on its side when it isn't keen to pay anyone for that upbringing. But we've made you kings in our city and leaders of the swarm, as it were, both for yourselves and for the rest of the city. You're better and more completely educated than the others

and are better able to share in both types of life. Therefore each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. When you are used to it, you'll see vastly better than the people there. And because you've seen the truth about fine, just, and good things, you'll know each image for

what

it is

and

also that of

which

it is

you and for us, cities nowadays, by

the image. Thus, for

the city will be governed, not like the majority of people who fight over shadows and struggle against one another in order but by people who are awake rather as if that were a great good to rule

—

—

than dreaming, for the truth is surely this: A city whose prospective rulers are least eager to rule must of necessity be most free from civil war, whereas a city with the opposite kind of rulers is governed in the opposite way." Absolutely. Then do you think that those we've nurtured will disobey us and refuse to share the labors of the city, each in turn, while living the greater part of their time with one another in the pure realm? It isn't possible, for we'll be giving just orders to just people. Each of them will certainly go to rule as to something compulsory, however, which is exactly the opposite of what's done by those who now rule in each city. 4.

See 420b-421c, 462a-466c.

Socrates / Glaucon

This

how

is

If

it is.

you can

for the prospective rulers, for only in

ity,

but those a

way

of

life that's

your well-governed

will the truly rich rule

city will

better than ruling

become

a possibil-

— not those who are rich in gold

who

good and

public

it

find a

are rich in the wealth that the happy must have, namely, rational life. But if beggars hungry for private goods go into

thinking that the good is there for the seizing, then the wellgoverned city is impossible, for then ruling is something fought over, and life,

this civil

and domestic war destroys these people and the

as well.

rest of the citv 7

That's very true.

Can you name any

life

that despises political rule besides that of the

true philosopher?

No, by god, I can't. But surely it is those they don't, the lovers

who are not lovers of ruling who must of it, who are rivals, will fight over

rule, for

if

it.

Of course. Then who will you compel

become guardians of the city, if not those who have the best understanding of what matters for good government and who have other honors than political ones, and a better life as well?

No

to

one.

Do you want

how—just

our

city

the

gods— we'll

and

Of course This isn

us to consider

I

lead

now how

such people will come to be in as some are said to have gone up from Hades to

them up

to the light?

do.

seems, a matter of tossing a coin, but of turning a soul from a day that is a kind of night to the true day the ascent to what is, which we say is true philosophy. Indeed. t, it

—

Then mustn

t

we

try to discover the subjects that

have the power

to

bring this about?

Of

course.

So what subject is it, Glaucon, that draws the soul from the realm of becoming to the realm of what is? And it occurs to me as I'm speaking that we said, didn t we, that it is necessary for the prospective rulers to be athletes in war when they're young? Yes,

we

did.

Then

the subject we're looking for addition to the former one.

must

also

have

this characteristic in

Which one? It

mustn't be useless to warlike men.

If it's

at all possible,

Now,

prior to this,

it

we

mustn't.

educated them in music and poetry and physi-

cal training.

We

did.

And

physical training is concerned with what comes into being and dies, for it oversees the growth and decay of the body.

1139

Republic VII

Apparently.

So it couldn't be the subject we're looking for. No, it couldn't. Then, could it be the music and poetry we described before? But that, if you remember, is just the counterpart of physical training. certain It educated the guardians through habits. Its harmonies gave them a harmoniousness, not knowledge; its rhythms gave them a certain rhythmical quality; and its stories, whether fictional or nearer the truth, cultivated other habits akin to these. But as for the subject you're looking for now, there's nothing like that in music and poetry. Your reminder is exactly to the point; there's really nothing like that in music and poetry. But, Glaucon, what is there that does have this? The be base or mechanical. could they be otherwise? But apart from music and poetry, physical

crafts all

How

training,

Well,

seem

to

and the if

we

crafts,

what

is left?

can't find anything apart

the subjects that touches

What

subject

all

from

these, let's consider

one of

of them.

sort of thing?

For example, that common thing that every craft, every type of thought, and every science uses and that is among the first compulsory subjects for everyone.

What's that? That inconsequential matter of distinguishing the one, the two, and the three. In short, I mean number and calculation, for isn't it true that every

and science must have They certainly must. Then so must warfare.

craft

a share in that?

Absolutely.

Palamedes is always showing up Agamemnon as a totally ridiculous general. Haven't you noticed? He says that, by inventing numbers, he established how many troops there were in the Trojan army and counted their ships and everything else implying that they were uncounted before and that Agamemnon (if indeed he didn't know how to count) didn't even know how many feet he had? What kind of general do you think that made him? In the tragedies, at

any

rate,

—

A

very strange one, if that's true. Then won't we set down this subject as compulsory for a warrior, so that he is able to count and calculate? More compulsory than anything. If, that is, he's to understand anything about setting his troops in order or if he's even to be properly human. Then do you notice the same thing about this subject that I do?

What's that? That this turns out

be one of the subjects we were looking for that naturally lead to understanding. But no one uses it correctly, namely, as something that is really fitted in every way to draw one towards being. to

What do you mean?

1

14U

Socrates / Glaucon

make my view

try to

I 11

clear as follows:

I'll

distinguish for myself the

do or don't lead in the direction we mentioned, and you must study them along with me and either agree or disagree, and that way we may come to know more clearly whether things are indeed as I divine. Point them out. I'll point out, then, if you can grasp it, that some sense perceptions don't summon the understanding to look into them, because the judgment of things that

b

sense perception

way

adequate, while others encourage it in every to look into them, because sense perception seems to produce no

sound

itself

is

result.

You're obviously referring to things appearing in the distance and to trompe Voeil paintings. You're not quite getting

my

meaning.

Then what do you mean? The ones that don't summon go c

the understanding are

all

those that don't

off into opposite perceptions at the

way

off in that

clare

I

summoners

call

one thing any more than

striking the senses

meaning

is

—

same time. But the ones that do go whenever sense perception doesn't de-

opposite, no matter whether the object near at hand or far away. You'll understand my its

put it this way: These, we say, are three fingers smallest, the second, and the middle finger. better

if I

— the

That's right.

Assume this is

my

that I'm talking about

them

as being seen

from close

by.

Now,

question about them.

What? apparent that each of them is equally a finger, and it makes no difference in this regard whether the finger is seen to be in the middle or at either end, whether it is dark or pale, thick or thin, or anything else of that sort, for in all these cases, an ordinary soul isn't compelled to ask the understanding what a finger is, since sight doesn't suggest to it that a It's

d

finger

No,

is at it

the

awaken No,

it

the opposite of a finger.

doesn't.

Therefore, e

same time

it

isn

t

likely that

anything of that sort would

summon

or

the understanding. isn't.

But what about the bigness and smallness of fingers? Does sight perceive them adequately? Does it make no difference to it whether the finger is in the

524

middle or

at the

end?

And

same with the sense of touch, as regards the thick and the thin, the hard and the soft? And do the other senses reveal such things clearly and adequately? Doesn't each of them rather do the following: The sense set over the hard is, in the first place, of necessity also set over the soft, and it reports to the soul that the same thing is perceived by it to be both hard and soft? is it

the

That's right.

And

necessary that in such cases the soul is puzzled as to what this sense means by the hard, if it indicates that the same thing is also isn't

it

1141

Republic VII soft,

what

or

it

means by

the light

and the heavy,

if it

indicates that the

or the light, heavy? Yes, indeed, these are strange reports for the soul to receive, and they

heavy

is light,

do demand to be looked into. Then it's likely that in such cases the understanding,

first tries

nounced to it Of course.

one or two.

is

to

soul,

summoning

calculation

and

determine whether each of the things an-

evidently two, won't each be evidently distinct and one?

If it's

Yes.

Then,

two

if

each

is

one,

are separate, for

understand that the wouldn't understand the inseparable to be two,

and both two, the soul

it

will

but rather one. That's right. Sight,

however, saw the big and small, not as separate, but as mixed up

together. Isn't that so?

Yes.

understanding was compelled to see the big and the small, not as mixed up together, but as separate the opposite way from sight.

And

in order to get clear

about

all this,

True.

And big

is

from these cases and what the small is? isn't

it

that

it

first

occurs to us to ask what the

Absolutely.

And, because

of this,

we

called the

one the

intelligible

and the other

the visible.

That's right. This, then,

is

what

I

was

trying to express before,

when

I

said that

some

thought, while others don't. Those that strike the relevant sense at the same time as their opposites I call summoners, those that don't do this do not awaken understanding. Now I understand, and I think you're right. Well, then, to which of them do number and the one belong?

things

summon

don't know. Reason it out from what was said before. If the one is adequately seen itself by itself or is so perceived by any of the other senses, then, as we were saying in the case of fingers, it wouldn't draw the soul towards being. But if something opposite to it is always seen at the same time, so that I

apparently any more one than the opposite of one, then something would be needed to judge the matter. The soul would then be puzzled, would look for an answer, would stir up its understanding, and would ask what the one itself is. And so this would be among the subjects that lead the soul and turn it around towards the study of that which is. But surely the sight of the one does possess this characteristic to a remarkable degree, for we see the same thing to be both one and an

nothing

is

unlimited

number

at the

same

time.

U4Z

Socrates / Glaucon

Then,

Of

if

this is true of the one,

won't

also be true of

it

all

numbers?

course.

Now,

calculation

and arithmetic are wholly concerned with numbers.

That's right.

Then evidently they lead us towards Supernaturally so. Then they belong,

truth.

seems, to the subjects we're seeking. They are compulsory for warriors because of their orderly ranks and for philosophers because they have to learn to rise up out of becoming and grasp being, if they are ever to become rational. it

That's right.

And

our guardian must be both a warrior and a philosopher.

Certainly.

Then

it

would be appropriate, Glaucon,

to legislate this subject for those

who

are going to share in the highest offices in the city and to persuade them to turn to calculation and take it up, not as laymen do, but staying

with it until they reach the study of the natures of the numbers by means of understanding itself, nor like tradesmen and retailers, for the sake of

buying and

selling,

soul around,

Well put. Moreover,

away

but for the sake of war and for ease in turning the from becoming and towards truth and being

me,

now

has been mentioned, how sophisticated the subject of calculation is and in how many ways it is useful for our purposes, provided that one practices it for the sake of knowing rather it

strikes

that

it

than trading.

How

is it

useful?

In the very

way we were

talking about.

It

leads the soul forcibly

upward

and compels it to discuss the numbers themselves, never permitting anyone to propose for discussion numbers attached to visible or tangible bodies. You know what those who are clever in these matters are like: If, in the course of the argument, someone tries to divide the one itself, they laugh and won't permit it. If you divide it, they multiply it, taking care that one thing never be found to be many parts rather than one. That's very true.

Then what do you think would happen, Glaucon, if someone were to ask them: "What kind of numbers are you talking about, in which the one is as you assume it to be, each one equal to every other, without the least difference and containing no internal parts?" I think they d answer that they are talking about those numbers that can be grasped only in thought and can't be dealt with in any other way. Then do you see that it's likely that this subject really is compulsory for us, since it apparently compels the soul to use understanding itself on the truth itself?

Indeed,

it

And what ing?

most certainly does do about those

Have you already

who

that.

are naturally

good

at calculation or reason-

noticed that they're naturally sharp, so to speak.

1143

Republic VII

and that those who are slow at it, if they're educated and exercised in it, even if they're benefited in no other way, nonetheless improve and become generally sharper than they were? in all subjects,

That's true.

Moreover,

don't think you'll easily find subjects that are harder to

I

learn or practice than this.

No, indeed. Then, for best natures I

these reasons, this subject isn't to be neglected,

all

must be educated

in

and the

it.

agree.

Let that, then, be one of our subjects. Second, let's consider whether the subject that comes next is also appropriate for our purposes.

What

subject

is

that?

That's the very one

I

Do you mean geometry? had

in

mind.

obviously appropriate, for when it comes to setting up camp, occupying a region, concentrating troops, deploying them, or with regard to any of the other formations an army adopts Insofar as

on the march,

in battle or

a

pertains to war,

it

geometer or

it

it's

makes

all

the difference whether

not.

But, for things like that,

— would

even

a

little

What we need

geometry

someone

is

—or calculation for that

whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to make it easier to see the form of the good. And we say that anything has that tendency if it compels the soul to turn itself around towards the region in which lies the happiest of the things that are, the one the soul must see at any cost.

matter

You're

suffice.

to consider is

right.

geometry compels the soul to study being, it's appropriate, but if it compels it to study becoming, it's inappropriate. So we've said, at any rate. Now, no one with even a little experience of geometry will dispute that Therefore,

if

this science is entirely the

of

its

opposite of what

is

said about

it

in the accounts

practitioners.

How

do you mean?

They give ridiculous accounts of it, though they can't help it, for they speak like practical men, and all their accounts refer to doing things. They talk of "squaring," "applying," "adding," and the like, whereas the entire subject is pursued for the sake of knowledge. Absolutely.

And

mustn't

What

is

we

also agree

on

a further point?

that?

That their accounts are for the sake of knowing what always is, not what comes into being and passes away. That's easy to agree to, for geometry is knowledge of what always is. Then it draws the soul towards truth and produces philosophic thought

by directing upwards what we now wrongly

As

far as

anything possibly can.

direct

downwards.

Socrates I Giaucon

Then

we possibly can, we must require those in your fine neglect geometry in any way, for even its by-products are

as far as

city not to

not insignificant.

What

are they?

The ones concerned with war that you mentioned. But we also surely know that, when it comes to better understanding any subject, there is a world of difference between someone who has grasped geometry and someone who hasn't. Yes, by god, a world of difference. Then shall we set this down as a second subject for the young? Let's do so, he said. And what about astronomy? Shall we make it the third? Or do you disagree? That's fine with me, for a better awareness of the seasons, months, and years is no less appropriate for a general than for a farmer or navigator.

You amuse me: You're

someone who's afraid that the majority will prescribing useless subjects. It's no easy task— indeed it's very like

think he is difficult— to realize that in every soul there is an instrument that is purified and rekindled by such subjects when it has been blinded and destroyed by other ways of life, an instrument that it is more important to preserve

than ten thousand eyes, since only with it can the truth be seen. Those who share your belief that this is so will think you're speaking incredibly well, while those who've never been aware of it will probably think you're talking nonsense, since they see no benefit worth mentioning in these subjects. So decide right now which group you're addressing. Or are your

—

arguments for neither of them but mostly for your own sake though you won't begrudge anyone else whatever benefit he's able to get from them? The latter. I want to speak, question, and answer mostly for my own sake. Then let s fall back to our earlier position, for we were wrong just now about the subject that comes after geometry.

What was our

error?

After plane surfaces,

we went on

to revolving solids before dealing with the right thing to do is to take up the third

by themselves. But dimension right after the second. And and of whatever shares in depth. solids

this,

I

suppose, consists of cubes

You're right, Socrates, but this subject hasn't been developed yet. There are two reasons for that: First, because no city values it, difficult subject is little researched.

this

Second, the researchers need a director, without one, they won't discover anything. To begin with, such a director is hard to find, and, then, even if he could be found, those who currently do research in this field would be too arrogant to follow him. If an entire city helped him to supervise it, however, and took the lead in valuing it, then he would be followed. And, if the subject was consistently and vigorously pursued, it would soon be developed. Even now, when it isn't valued and is held in contempt by the majority and is pursued by for,

1145

Republic VII

who

are unable to give an account of its usefulness, nevertheless, in spite of all these handicaps, the force of its charm has caused it to develop somewhat, so that it wouldn't be surprising if it were further

researchers

developed even as things stand. The subject has outstanding charm. But explain more clearly what you were saying just now. The subject that deals with plane surfaces you took to be geometry. Yes.

but later you went back on that. I've only progressed more slowly. In my The subject dealing with the dimension of depth was next. But because it is in a ridiculous state, I passed it by and spoke of astronomy (which deals

And

you put astronomy after haste to go through them all.

at first

it,

with the motion of things having depth)

after

geometry.

That's right. Let's then put

astronomy as the fourth

subject,

on the assumption

that

geometry will be available if a city takes it up. That seems reasonable. And since you reproached me before for praising astronomy in a vulgar manner, I'll now praise it your way, for I think it's clear to everyone that astronomy compels the soul to look upward and leads it from things here to things there. It may be obvious to everyone except me, but that's not my view about it. Then what is your view? As it's practiced today by those who teach philosophy, it makes the soul

solid

look very

much downward.

How do you mean? In my opinion, your

conception of "higher studies" is a good deal too generous, for if someone were to study something by leaning his head back and studying ornaments on a ceiling, it looks as though you'd say he's studying not with his eyes but with his understanding. Perhaps you're right, and I'm foolish, but I can't conceive of any subject making the soul look upward except one concerned with that which is, and that which is is invisible. If anyone attempts to learn something about sensible things, whether by gaping upward or squinting downward. I'd claim since that he never learns anything and there's no knowledge of such things that, even if he studies lying on his back on the ground or floating on it in the sea, his soul is looking not up but down. You're right to reproach me, and I've been justly punished, but what did you mean when you said that astronomy must be learned in a different way from the way in which it is learned at present if it is to be a useful

—

—

subject for our purposes?

We

be the most beautiful and most exact of visible things, seeing that they're embroidered on a visible surface. But we should consider their motions to fall motions that are really fast or slow as measured far short of the true ones It's like this:

should consider the decorations in the sky

to

—

in true

numbers, that trace out true geometrical

figures, that are all in

1146

Socrates /Glaucon

one another, and that are the true motions of the things carried along in them. And these, of course, must be grasped by reason and thought, not by sight. Or do you think otherwise? relation to

Not

at all.

we

should use the embroidery in the sky as a model in the study of these other things. If someone experienced in geometry were to come upon plans very carefully drawn and worked out by Daedalus or some other craftsman or artist, he'd consider them to be very finely executed, but he'd think it ridiculous to examine them seriously in order to find the truth in them about the equal, the double, or any other ratio. How could it be anything other than ridiculous? Then don't you think that a real astronomer will feel the same when he looks at the motions of the stars? He'll believe that the craftsman of the heavens arranged them and all that's in them in the finest way possible for such things. But as for the ratio of night to day, of days to a month, of a month to a year, or of the motions of the stars to any of them or to each other, don't you think he'll consider it strange to believe that they're always the same and never deviate anywhere at all or to try in any sort of way to grasp the truth about them, since they're connected to body Therefore,

and

visible?

That's

my

now

opinion anyway,

hear it from you. Then if, by really taking part in astronomy, we're to make the naturally intelligent part of the soul useful instead of useless, let's study astronomy by means of problems, as we do geometry, and leave the things in the that

I

sky alone.

The task you're prescribing in

is

a lot harder than anything

now attempted

astronomy.

And

I

suppose

that,

if

we

any benefit as lawgivers, our be of the same kind. But have you

are to be of

prescriptions for the other subjects will any other appropriate subject to suggest?

Not offhand. Well, there isn't just one form of motion but several. Perhaps a wise person could list them all, but there are two that are evident even to us. What are they?

Besides the one we've discussed, there

is

also

its

counterpart.

What's that?

on astronomical motions, so the ears fasten on harmonic ones, and that the sciences of astronomy and harmonics are closely akin. This is what the Pythagoreans say, Glaucon, and we agree, It's

don't

We

likely that, as the eyes fasten

we? do.

Therefore, since the subject

so huge, shouldn't

we

ask them what they have to say about harmonic motions and whether there is anything else besides them, all the while keeping our own goal squarely in view?

What's that?

is

1147

Republic VII

That those whom we are rearing should never try to learn anything incomplete, anything that doesn't reach the end that everything should reach the end we mentioned just now in the case of astronomy. Or don't you know that people do something similar in harmonics? Measuring audible consonances and sounds against one another, they labor in vain, just like present-day astronomers. Yes, by the gods, and pretty ridiculous they are too. They talk about

—

—

"dense interval" or quartertone putting their ears to their instruments like someone trying to overhear what the neighbors are saying. And some say that they hear a tone in between and that it is the shortest interval by which they must measure, while others argue that this tone sounds the same as a quarter tone. Both put ears before

something they

call a

understanding. You mean those excellent fellows who torment their strings, torturing them, and stretching them on pegs. I won't draw out the analogy by speaking of blows with the plectrum or the accusations or denials and boastings on the part of the strings; instead I'll cut it short by saying that these aren't the people I'm talking about. The ones I mean are the ones we just said we were going to question about harmonics, for they do the same as the astronomers. They seek out the numbers that are to be found in these audible consonances, but they do not make the ascent to problems. They don't investigate, for example, which numbers are consonant and

which

what the explanation is of would be a superhuman task.

aren't or

each.

But that Yet it's useful in the search for the beautiful and the good. But pursued for any other purpose, it's useless. Probably so. Moreover, I take it that, if inquiry into all the subjects we've mentioned brings out their association and relationship with one another and draws conclusions about their kinship, it does contribute something to our goal and isn't labor in vain, but that otherwise it is in vain. I, too, divine that this is true. But you're still talking about a very big task, Socrates.

Do you mean

Or don't you know that all these song itself that must also be learned?

the prelude, or what?

subjects are merely preludes to the

Surely you don't think that people

who

are clever in these matters are dia-

lecticians.

Although I have met a few exceptions. But did it ever seem to you that those who can neither give nor follow an account know anything at all of the things we say they must know? My answer to that is also no. Then isn't this at last, Glaucon, the song that dialectic sings? It is intelligible, but it is imitated by the power of sight. We said that sight tries No, by god,

at last to

I

don't.

look at the animals themselves, the stars themselves, and, in the

end, at the sun

itself.

In the

same way, whenever someone

tries

through

1

Socrates/ Glaucon

argument and apart from all sense perceptions to find the being itself of each thing and doesn't give up until he grasps the good itself with understanding itself, he reaches the end of the intelligible, just as the other reached the end of the visible. Absolutely.

And what I

about

this

journey? Don't you

call

it

dialectic 7

do.

Then statues

the release from

and the

bonds and the turning around from shadows

to

way up out of the cave to the sunlight and, there, the continuing inability to look at the animals, the plants, and the light of the sun, but the newly acquired ability to look at divine images in water and shadows of the things that are, rather than, light of the fire and, then, the

as before, merely at shadows of statues thrown by another source of light that is itself a shadow in relation to the sun— all this business of the crafts

we've mentioned has the power to awaken the best part of the soul and lead it upward to the study of the best among the things that are, just as, before, the clearest thing in the

body was

led to the brightest thing in the

bodily and visible realm. I accept that this is so, even though it seems very hard to accept in one way and hard not to accept in another. All the same, since we'll have to return to these things often in the future, rather than having to hear them

once now, let s assume that what you've said is so and turn to the song itself, discussing it in the same way as we did the prelude. So tell us: what is the sort of power dialectic has, what forms is it divided into, and what paths does it follow? For these lead at last, it seems, towards that place which is a rest from the road, so to speak, and an end of journeying for the one who reaches it. You won't be able to follow me any longer, Glaucon, even though there just

no lack of eagerness on my part to lead you, for you would no longer be seeing an image of what we're describing, but the truth itself. At any rate, that's how it seems to me. That it is really so is not worth insisting on any further. But that there is some such thing to be seen, that is something we must insist on. Isn't that so? Of course. And mustn t we aiso insist that the power of dialectic could reveal it is

only to someone experienced in the subjects we've described and that cannot reveal it in any other way? That too is worth insisting on.

At any

no one

it

it when we say that there is no other inquiry that systematically attempts to grasp with respect to each thing itself what the being of it is, for all the other crafts are concerned with human opinions and desires, with growing or construction, or with the care of growing or constructed things. And as for the rest, I mean geometry

rate,

will dispute

and the subjects that follow it, we described them as to some extent grasping what is, for we saw that, while they do dream about what is, they are unable to command a waking view of it as long as they make use of

1149

Republic VII

hypotheses that they leave untouched and that they cannot give any account of. What mechanism could possibly turn any agreement into knowledge when it begins with something unknown and puts together the conclusion and the steps in between from what is unknown? None. Therefore, dialectic is the only inquiry that travels this road, doing away with hypotheses and proceeding to the first principle itself, so as to be secure. And when the eye of the soul is really buried in a sort of barbaric bog, dialectic gently pulls it out and leads it upwards, using the crafts we described to help it and cooperate with it in turning the soul around. From force of habit, we've often called these crafts sciences or kinds of knowledge, but they need another name, clearer than opinion, darker than knowledge. We called them thought somewhere before 5 But I presume that we won't dispute about a name when we have so many more important

c

d

.

matters to investigate. Of course not. It

will therefore

be enough

e

to call the first section

knowledge, the second

thought, the third belief, and the fourth imaging, just as we did before. The last two together we call opinion, the other two, intellect. Opinion is concerned with becoming, intellect with being. And as being is to becoming, so intellect is to opinion, and as intellect is to opinion, so knowledge is to belief and thought to imaging. But as for the ratios between the things

and the division of either the opinable or the intelligible section into two, let's pass them by, Glaucon, lest they involve us in arguments many times longer than the ones we've already gone through. I agree with you about the others in any case, insofar as I'm able to follow. Then, do you call someone who is able to give an account of the being

534

these are set over

b

of each thing dialectical? But insofar as he's unable to give an account of

something, either to himself or to another, do you deny that he has any understanding of it? How could I do anything else? Then the same applies to the good. Unless someone can distinguish in an account the form of the good from everything else, can survive all refutation, as if in a battle, striving to judge things not in accordance with opinion but in accordance with being, and can come through all this with his account still intact, you'll say that he doesn't know the good itself or any other good. And if he gets hold of some image of it, you'll say that it's through opinion, not knowledge, for he is dreaming and asleep throughout his present life, and, before he wakes up here, he will arrive in Hades

c

and go

d

Yes,

to sleep forever.

by god.

I'll

certainly say

all

of that.

Then, as for those children of yours whom you're rearing and educating in theory, if you ever reared them in fact, I don't think that you'd allow

5.

See 511d-e.

1150

Socrates /Glaucon

them

to rule in

your

city or

be responsible for the most important things

while they are as irrational as incommensurable

lines.

Certainly not.

Then

you'll legislate that they are to give most attention to the education that will enable them to ask and answer questions most knowledgeably? e

I'll

legislate

it

along with you.

Then do you think

535

we've placed dialectic at the top of the other subjects like a coping stone and that no other subject can rightly be placed above it, but that our account of the subjects that a future ruler must learn has come to an end? Probably so. Then it remains for you to deal with the distribution of these subjects, with the question of to whom we'll assign them and in what way. that

That's clearly next.

Do you remember what of rulers ?

sort of people

we

chose in our earlier selection

6

Of course

I

do.

same natures have to be chosen: we have to select the most stable, the most courageous, and as far as possible the most graceful. In addition, we must look not only for people who have a noble and tough character but for those who have the natural qualities conducive In the other respects, the

b

education of ours. Which ones exactly? They must be keen on the subjects and learn them easily, for people's souls give up much more easily in hard study than in physical training, since the pain being peculiar to them and not shared with their body to this

—

is

more

own.

their

That's true. c

We must also look for someone who has got a good memory, is persistent, and is in every way a lover of hard work. How else do you think he'd be willing to carry out both the requisite bodily labors much study and practice?

and

also complete so

Nobody would,

unless his nature was in every way a good one. In any case, the present error, which as we said before explains why philosophy isn't valued, is that she's taken up by people who are unworthy of her, for illegitimate students shouldn't be allowed to take her up, but only legitimate ones.

How d

so?

no student should be lame in his love of hard work, really loving one half of it, and hating the other half. This happens when someone is a lover of physical training, hunting, or any kind of bodily labor and isn't a lover of learning, listening, or inquiry, but hates the work In the

first

place,

involved in them. opposite direction 6.

See 412b

ff.

And someone whose is

also lame.

love of hard

work tends

in the

1151

Republic VII

That's very true. Similarly with regard to truth, won't

we

say that a soul

is

maimed

if it

hates a voluntary falsehood, cannot endure to have one in itself, and is greatly angered when it exists in others, but is nonetheless content to accept

angry when it is caught being ignorant, and lack of learning easily, wallowing in it like a pig?

an involuntary falsehood,

isn't

bears its Absolutely. And with regard to moderation, courage, high-mindedness, and all the other parts of virtue, it is also important to distinguish the illegitimate from the legitimate, for when either a city or an individual doesn't know

how

unwittingly employs the lame and illegitimate as friends or rulers for whatever services it wants done. to

do

this,

That's just

it

how

it is.

be careful in all these matters, for if we bring people who are sound of limb and mind to so great a subject and training, and educate them in it, even justice itself won't blame us, and we'll save the city and its constitution. But if we bring people of a different sort, we'll do the opposite, and let loose an even greater flood of ridicule upon philosophy. And it would be shameful to do that. It certainly would. But I seem to have done something a bit ridiculous myself just now. What's that? I forgot that we were only playing, and so I spoke too vehemently. But I looked upon philosophy as I spoke, and seeing her undeservedly besmirched, I seem to have lost my temper and said what I had to say too earnestly, as if I were angry with those responsible for it. That certainly wasn't my impression as I listened to you. But it was mine as I was speaking. In any case, let's not forget that in our earlier selection we chose older people but that that isn't permitted 7 in this one, for we mustn't believe Solon when he says that as someone grows older he's able to learn a lot. He can do that even less well than he can run races, for all great and numerous labors belong to the young.

So

we must

Necessarily.

Therefore, calculation, geometry, and all the preliminary education required for dialectic must be offered to the future rulers in childhood, and

not in the shape of compulsory learning either.

Why's

that?

Because no free person should learn anything like a slave. Forced bodily labor does no harm to the body, but nothing taught by force stays in the soul.

That's true.

Then don't use instead. That

way

force to train the children in these subjects; use play you'll also see better

what each

fitted for.

7.

Athenian statesman, lawgiver, and poet

(c.

640-560).

of

them

is

naturally

1152

Glaucon/ Socrates

That seems reasonable.

Do you remember war on horseback

that

we

stated that the children

as observers

and

that,

wherever

should be brought close and taste blood, I

it is

be led into safe to do so, they to

puppies?

remember.

In all these things

show b

like

were

— in labors, studies, and fears — the ones who always

the greatest aptitude are to be inscribed on a

list,

At what age?

When

from compulsory physical training, for during that period, whether it's two or three years, young people are incapable of doing anything else, since weariness and sleep are enemies of learning. At the same time, how they fare in this physical training is itself an important

they're released

test.

Of course

And

c

from the age of twenty, those who are chosen will also receive more honors than the others. Moreover, the subjects they learned in no particular order as children they must now bring together to form a unified vision of their kinship both with one another and with the nature of that which is. At any rate, only learning of that sort holds firm in those who receive it. It is

for

I

after that, that

is

to say,

also the greatest test of

anyone who

who

d

it is.

who

naturally dialectical and who isn't, can achieve a unified vision is dialectical, and anyone is

can't isn't.

agree.

Well, then, you'll have to look out for the ones who most of all have this ability in them and who also remain steadfast in their studies, in war, and in the other activities laid down by law. And after they have reached their thirtieth year, you'll select

them

from among those chosen earlier and assign them yet greater honors. Then you'll have to test them by means of the power of dialectic, to discover which of them can relinquish his eyes and other senses, going on with the help of truth to that which by itself is. And this is a task that requires great care. What's the main reason for that? Don t you realize what a great evil comes from dialectic as it is cure

in turn

rently practiced?

What

evil is that?

Those

who

practice

it

are filled with lawlessness.

They certainly are. Do you think it's surprising that this happens to them? Aren't you sympathetic?

Why 538

isn't

it

surprising?

And why

should I be sympathetic? the case of a child brought up surrounded by

Because it's like much wealth and many flatterers in a great and numerous family, who finds out, when he has become a man, that he isn't the child of his professed parents and that he can't discover his real ones. Can you divine what the

1153

Republic VII

someone like that would be to the flatterers, on the one hand, and to his supposed parents, on the other, before he knew about his parentage, and what it would be when he found out? Or would you rather hear what I divine about it? attitude of

hear your views. Well, then, I divine that during the time that he didn't know the truth, he'd honor his father, mother, and the rest of his supposed family more than he would the flatterers, that he'd pay greater attention to their needs, be less likely to treat them lawlessly in word or deed, and be more likely to obey them than the flatterers in any matters of importance. I'd rather

Probably so. When he became aware of the truth, however, his honor and enthusiasm would lessen for his family and increase for the flatterers, he'd obey the latter far more than before, begin to live in the way that they did, and keep company with them openly, and, unless he was very decent by nature, he'd eventually care nothing for that father of his or any of the rest of his

supposed family.

would probably happen as you those who take up arguments?

All this

image of

say, but in

what way

is it

an

We

hold from childhood certain convictions about just and fine things; we're brought up with them as with our parents, we obey and honor them. Indeed, we do. There are other ways of living, however, opposite to these and full of pleasures, that flatter the soul and attract it to themselves but which don't persuade sensible people, who continue to honor and obey the convictions

As

follows.

of their fathers.

That's right.

then a questioner comes along and asks someone of this sort, "What is the fine?" And, when he answers what he has heard from the traditional lawgiver, the argument refutes him, and by refuting him often and in

And

many

places shakes

him from

his convictions,

and makes him believe

that

and the same with the just, the good, and the things he honored most. What do you think his attitude will be then to honoring and obeying his earlier convictions? Of necessity he won't honor or obey them in the same way. Then, when he no longer honors and obeys those convictions and can't discover the true ones, will he be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which flatters him? No, he won't. And so, I suppose, from being law-abiding he becomes lawless. the fine

is

no more

fine than shameful,

Inevitably.

Then, as

happens

I

only to be expected that this is what take up arguments in this way, and don't they

asked before,

to those

who

therefore deserve a lot of

isn't

it

sympathy?

1154

Glaucon/ Socrates

and they deserve pity too. Then, if you don't want your thirty-year-olds to be objects of such pity, you'll have to be extremely careful about how you introduce them Yes,

to

arguments. That's right.

And

one lasting precaution not to let them taste arguments while they're young? I don't suppose that it has escaped your notice that, when young people get their first taste of arguments, they misuse it by treating it

isn't

it

as a kind of

game

of contradiction.

They

imitate those

who've refuted

them by refuting others themselves, and, like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments. They're excessively fond of it. Then, when they've refuted many and been refuted by them in turn, they forcefully and quickly fall into disbelieving what they believed before.

And,

as a result, they themselves

and the whole

of philosophy are discred-

ited in the eyes of others.

That's very true.

But an older person won't want to take part in such madness. He'll imitate someone who is willing to engage in discussion in order to look for the truth, rather than someone who plays at contradiction for sport. He'll be more sensible himself and will bring honor rather than discredit to the philosophical

way

of

life.

That's right.

And when we

said before that those allowed to take part in arguments should be orderly and steady by nature, not as nowadays, when even the unfit are allowed to engage in

them

— wasn't

all

that also said as

a precaution?

Of course. Then if someone continuously, strenuously, and exclusively devotes himself to participation in arguments, exercising himself in them just as he did in the bodily physical training, which is their counterpart, would that be enough? Do you mean six years or four? It doesn't matter. Make it five. And after that, you must make them go down into the cave again, and compel them to take command in matters of war and occupy the other offices suitable for young people, so that they won't be inferior to the others in experience. But in these, too, they must be tested to see whether they'll remain steadfast when they're pulled this way and that or shift their ground. How much time do you allow for that? Fifteen years. Then, at the age of fifty, those who've survived the tests and been successful both in practical matters and in the sciences must be led to the goal and compelled to lift up the radiant light of their souls to what itself provides light for everything. And once they've seen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order, using it as their model. Each of them will spend most of his time

1155

Republic VII

comes, he must labor in politics and rule for the city's sake, not as if he were doing something fine, but rather something that has to be done. Then, having educated others like himself to take his place as guardians of the city, he will depart for the Isles of the Blessed and dwell there. And, if the Pythia agrees, the city will publicly establish memorials and sacrifices to him as a daemon, but if not, then as

with philosophy, but,

a

when

happy and divine human

his turn

c

being.

Like a sculptor, Socrates, you've produced ruling

men

that are

com-

pletely fine.

And

women, any more

ruling

said applies

Glaucon, for you mustn't think that what I've to men than it does to women who are born with

too,

the appropriate natures.

That's right, as

we

if

indeed they are

to share

everything equally with the men,

said they should.

Then, do you agree that the things we've said about the city and its constitution aren't altogether wishful thinking, that it's hard for them to come about, but not impossible? And do you also agree that they can come about only in the way we indicated, namely, when one or more true philosophers come to power in a city, who despise present honors, thinking them slavish and worthless, and who prize what is right and the honors that come from it above everything, and regard justice as the most important and most essential thing, serving it and increasing it as they set their

d

e

city in order?

How

will they

do

that?

They'll send everyone in the city

who

is

over ten years old into the

possession of the children, who are now free from the ethos of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws, which are the ones we've described. This is the quickest and easiest way for the city and constitution we've discussed to be established, become happy, and bring most benefit to the people among whom it's escountry.

Then

they'll take

541

tablished.

and easiest way. And in my opinion, Socrates, you've described well how it would come into being, if it ever did. Then, isn't that enough about this city and the man who is like it? Surely it is clear what sort of man we'll say he has to be. It is clear, he said. And as for your question, I think that we have reached the end of this topic. That's

by

far the quickest

Book

VIII

Well, then, Glaucon, we've agreed to the following:

If

a city

is

to achieve

good government, wives must be in common, children and all their education must be in common, their way of life, whether in peace or war, must be in common, and their kings must be those among them who have proved to be best, both in philosophy and in warfare. the height of

b

543

1156

Glaucon/ Socrates

We

have agreed to that, he said. Moreover, we also agreed that, as soon as the rulers are established, they will lead the soldiers and settle them in the kind of dwellings we described, which are in no way private but common to all. And we also agreed, if you remember, what kind of possessions they will have. I remember that we thought that none of them should acquire any of the things that the other rulers now do but that, as athletes of war and guardians, they should receive their yearly upkeep from the other citizens as a wage for their guardianship and look after themselves and the rest of the city

1 .

That's right. But since we have completed this discussion, let's recall the point at which we began the digression that brought us here, so that we can continue on the same path from where we left off.

That

much

same

now, you were talking as if you had completed the description of the city You said that you would class both the city you described and the man who is like it as good, even though, as it seems, you had a still finer city and man to tell us about. But, in any case, you said that, if this city was the right one, the others were faulty. You said, if I remember, that there were four types of constitution remaining that are worth discussing, each with faults that we should observe, and we should do the same for the people who are like them. Our aim was to observe them all, agree which man is best and which worst, and then determine whether the best is happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it's otherwise. I was asking you which four constitutions you had in mind when Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted 3 And that's when you took up the discussion that led here. isn't difficult, for,

the

as

2

.

.

That's absolutely right. Well, then, like a wrestler, give me the same hold again, and when I ask the same question, try to give the answer you were about to give before. If I

d

can.

hear what four constitutions you meant. That won't be difficult since they're the ones for which we have names. First, there's the constitution praised by most people, namely, the Cretan or Laconian 4 The second, which is also second in the praise it receives, is called oligarchy and is filled with a host of evils. The next in order, and I

at least like to

.

democracy. And finally there is genuine tyranny, surpassing all of them, the fourth and last of the diseased cities. Or can you think of another type of constitution— I mean another whose form is distinct from these? Dynasties and purchased kingships and other constituantagonistic to

1.

See 414d-20b.

2.

See 445c-e.

3.

See 449b

4.

I.e.,

it,

is

ff.

the Spartan constitution.

1157

Republic VIII

which one finds no

tions of that sort,

among

the Greeks, are

less

among

the barbarians than

somewhere intermediate between

these four.

At any event, many strange ones are indeed talked about. And do you realize that of necessity there are as many forms of human character as there are of constitutions? Or do you think that constitutions "5 and not from the characters of the people are born "from oak or rock who live in the cities governed by them, which tip the scales, so to speak, and drag the rest along with them? No, I don't believe they come from anywhere else. Then, if there are five forms of city, there must also be five forms of the individual soul.

Of

course.

Now, we've

already described the one that's like aristocracy, which

rightly said to be

We

good and

is

just.

have.

Then mustn't we next go through the inferior ones, namely, the victoryloving and honor-loving (which corresponds to the Laconian form of constitution), followed by the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical, so that, having discovered the most unjust of all, we can oppose him to the most just? In this way, we can complete our investigation into how pure justice and pure injustice stand, with regard to the happiness or wretchedness of those who possess them, and either be persuaded by Thrasymachus to practice injustice or by the argument that is now coming to light to practice justice.

what we have to do. Then, just as we began by looking for the virtues of character in a constitution, before looking for them in the individual, thinking that they'd be clearer in the former, shouldn't we first examine the honor-loving constitution? I don't know what other name there is for it, but it should be called either timocracy or timarchy. Then shouldn't we examine an That's absolutely

individual

who

is

related to that constitution, and, after that, oligarchy

and democracy and a democratic person? And finally, having come to a city under a tyrant and having examined it, shouldn't we look into a tyrannical soul, trying in this way to become adequate judges of the topic we proposed to ourselves? That would be a reasonable way for us to go about observing and judging, at any rate. Well, then, let's try to explain how timocracy emerges from aristocracy. Or is it a simple principle that the cause of change in any constitution is civil war breaking out within the ruling group itself, but that if this group however small it is remains of one mind, the constitution cannot be changed?

and an

oligarchic person,

—

Yes, that's right.

5.

See

e.g.

Odyssey xix.163.

Socrates /Glaucon

How,

then, Glaucon, will our city be

changed?

How will civil war arise,

between the auxiliaries and the rulers or within either group? Or do you want us to be like Homer and pray to the Muses to tell us "how either

civil

war

tones, as

broke out ?" 6 And shall we say that they speak to us in tragic they were in earnest, playing and jesting with us as if we

first if

were children?

What

will they say?

Something

hard for a city composed in this way to change, but everything that comes into being must decay. Not even a constitution such as this will last forever. It, too, must face dissolution. And this is how it will be dissolved. All plants that grow in the earth, and also all animals that grow upon it, have periods of fruitfulness and barrenness of both soul and body as often as the revolutions complete the circumferences of their circles. These circumferences are short for the short-lived, and the like this. "It is

opposite for their opposites

7 .

Now,

the people

you have educated

to

be

leaders in your city, even though they are wise, still won't, through calculation together with sense perception, hit upon the fertility and barrenness of the

human

species, but

time beget children

when

it

will escape them,

they ought not to do

and so they

will at

some

For the birth of a divine creature, there is a cycle comprehended by a perfect number. For a human being, it is the first number in which are found root and square increases, comprehending three lengths and four terms, of elements that make things like and unlike, that cause them to increase and decrease, and that render all things mutually agreeable and rational in their relations to one another. Of these elements, four and three, married with five, give two harmonies

when

thrice increased.

One

of

them

is

so.

many times a hundred. oblong. One of its sides is one

a square, so

The other is of equal length one way but hundred squares of the rational diameter of five diminished by one each or one hundred squares of the irrational diameter diminished by two each. The other side is a hundred cubes of three. This whole geometrical number controls better and worse births 8 And when your rulers, through ignorance of these births, join brides and grooms at the wrong time, the children .

6.

An

adaptation of

Iliad xvi. 112-13.

The reference is to the fertility and gestation periods and animals and their (supposedly related) life spans. 7.

of different species of plants

The human geometrical number is the product of 3, 4, and 5 "thrice increased/ multiplied by itself three times, i.e., (3-4-5) 4 or 12,960,000. This can be represented geometrically as a square whose sides are 3600 or as an oblong or rectangle whose sides are 4800 and 2700. The first is "so many times a hundred," viz. 36 times. The latter is obtained as follows. The "rational diameter" of 5 is the nearest rational number to the real diagonal of a square whose sides are 5, i.e., to V50. This number is 7. Since the square of 7 is 49, 8.

7

we

get the longer side of the rectangle

by by

100. This gives 4800.

is

2,

The

and multiplied by 100

2700.

by diminishing 49 by

"irrational diameter" of 5 this, too, is

4800.

is

The short

V50.

1

and multiplying the

result

When squared, diminished

side, "a

hundred cubes

of three

"

1159

Republic VIII

will be neither

The older generation will these children but they are unworthy nevertheless, and

good natured nor

fortunate.

choose the best of when they acquire their fathers' powers, they will begin, as guardians, to neglect us Muses. First, they will have less consideration for music and poetry than they ought, then they will neglect physical training, so that your young people will become less well educated in music and poetry. Hence, rulers chosen from among them won't be able to guard well the testing of the golden, silver, bronze, and iron races, which are Hesiod's and your own 9 The intermixing of iron with silver and bronze with gold .

engender lack of likeness and unharmonious inequality, and these always breed war and hostility wherever they arise. Civil war, we declare, is always and everywhere 'of this lineage '." 10 that results will

And

we'll declare that

what the Muses say

is

right.

must be, since they're Muses. What do the Muses say after that? Once civil war breaks out, both the iron and bronze types pull the constitution towards money-making and the acquisition of land, houses, not being poor, gold, and silver, while both the gold and silver types but by nature rich or rich in their souls lead the constitution towards virtue and the old order. And thus striving and struggling with one another, they compromise on a middle way: They distribute the land and houses as private property, enslave and hold as serfs and servants those whom they previously guarded as free friends and providers of upkeep, and occupy themselves with war and with guarding against those whom It

—

—

they've enslaved. I think that is the way this transformation begins. Then, isn't this constitution a sort of midpoint between aristocracy

and oligarchy? Absolutely.

Then, if that's its place in the transformation, how will it be managed after the change? Isn't it obvious that it will imitate the aristocratic constitution in some respects and oligarchy in others, since it's between them, and that it

will also

have some features of

its

own?

That's right. rulers will be respected; the fighting class will be prevented from taking part in farming, manual labor, or other ways of making money; it will eat communally and devote itself to physical training and training for

The

war; and in

all

such ways, won't the constitution be

like the aristocratic

one?

Yes.

be afraid to appoint wise people as rulers, on the grounds that they are no longer simple and earnest but mixed, and will incline towards spirited and simpler people, who are more naturally

On

9.

10.

the other hand,

it

will

See Works and Days 109-202. See

e.g. Iliad vi.211.

1

ie,u

Socrates / Glaucon,/ Adeimantus

suited for 548

and spend

war than all its

peace;

it

will value the tricks

and stratagems

of

war

time making war. Aren't most of these qualities peculiar

to it?

Yes.

Such people

will desire

just as those in oligarchies do, passionsilver in secret. They will possess private treasuries

ately adoring gold

b

money

and and storehouses, where they can keep it hidden, and have houses to enclose them, like private nests, where they can spend lavishly either on women or on anyone else they wish. That's absolutely true. They'll be mean with their

own money, since they value it and are not allowed to acquire it openly, but they'll love to spend other people's because of their appetites. They'll enjoy their pleasures in secret, running away from the law like boys from their father, for since they've neglected the true Muse that of discussion and philosophy and have valued physical training more than music and poetry, they haven't been educated by

—

c

persuasion but by force. The constitution you're discussing is certainly a mixture of good and bad. Yes, it is mixed, but because of the predominance of the spirited element, one thing alone is most manifest in it, namely, the love of victory and the love of honor.

Very much

so.

This, then,

is

what

d

—

way

the

would be

this constitution

would come

Then who is the man that corresponds to he come to be, and what sort of man is he? I

think, said

Adeimantus,

the love of victory In that respect,

e

549

into being

and

like, for, after all,

we're only sketching the shape of the constitution in theory, not giving an exact account of it, since even from a sketch we'll be able to discern the most just and the most unjust person. And, besides, it would be an intolerably long task to describe every constitution and every character without omitting any detail. That's right. it

is

this constitution?

that he'd be very like

Glaucon

How

does

here, as far as

concerned.

he might be, but, in the following ones, I don't think his nature would be similar, Which ones? He d be more obstinate and less well trained in music and poetry, though he s a lover of it, and he d love to listen to speeches and arguments, though he s by no means a rhetorician. He'd be harsh to his slaves rather than merely looking down on them as an adequately educated person does. He'd be gentle to free people and very obedient to rulers, being himself a lover of ruling to rule

on

I

and

a lover of honor.

his ability as a speaker or

of physical training in

said,

and

warfare and warlike

However, he doesn't base

anything

a lover of hunting,

his claim

like that, but, as he's a lover

on

his abilities

and exploits

activities.

Yes, that's the character that corresponds to this constitution.

1161

Republic VIII

Wouldn't such a person despise money when he's young but love it more and more as he grows older, because he shares in the money-loving nature and isn't pure in his attitude to virtue? And isn't that because he lacks the best of guardians?

What guardian

Adeimantus said. mixed with music and poetry, is

that?

Reason, I said, the person who possesses Well put. That, then,

is

it

for

it

alone dwells within

as the lifelong preserver of his virtue.

a timocratic youth;

he resembles the corresponding

city.

Absolutely.

And good

he comes into being in some such

way

as this. He's the son of a

who lives in a city that isn't well governed, who avoids honors, lawsuits, and all such meddling in other people's affairs, and who

father

office,

even willing to be put at a disadvantage in order to avoid trouble. Then how does he come to be timocratic? When he listens, first, to his mother complaining that her husband isn't one of the rulers and that she's at a disadvantage among the other women as a result. Then she sees that he's not very concerned about money and that he doesn't fight back when he's insulted, whether in private or in public in the courts, but is indifferent to everything of that sort. She also sees him concentrating his mind on his own thoughts, neither honoring nor dishonoring her overmuch. Angered by all this, she tells her son that his father is unmanly, too easy-going, and all the other things that women repeat over and over again in such cases. Yes, Adeimantus said, it's like them to have many such complaints.

is

You know,

too,

I

said, that the servants of

men

like that

— the ones who

are thought to be well disposed to the family— also say similar things to the son in private. When they see the father failing to prosecute someone who owes him money or has wronged him in some other way, they urge

the son to take revenge on

all

such people

when he grows up and

to

be

man than his father. The boy hears and sees the same kind of things when he goes out: Those in the city who do their own work are called fools and held to be of little account, while those who meddle in other people's affairs are honored and praised. The young man hears and more

of a

but he also listens to what his father says, observes what he does from close at hand, and compares his ways of living with those of the others. So he's pulled by both. His father nourishes the rational part of his soul and makes it grow; the others nourish the spirited and appetitive parts. Because he isn't a bad man by nature but keeps bad company, when he's pulled in these two ways, he settles in the middle and surrenders the sees

all this,

middle part— the victory-loving and spirited part— and becomes a proud and honor-loving man. of man I certainly think that you've given a full account of how this sort comes to be. Then we now have the second constitution and the second man.

rule over himself to the

We

have.

1162

Socrates /Adeimantus

Then like

shall

another

we

city,"

next 11

talk, as

or shall

we

We

Aeschylus says, of "another man ordered follow our plan and talk about the city first?

must follow our plan. And I suppose that the one is

that

comes

after the present constitution

oligarchy.

And what

d

kind of constitution would you call oligarchy? The constitution based on a property assessment, in which the rich and the poor man has no share in ruling. I understand. So mustn t we first explain how timarchy is transformed into

rule,

oligarchy?

Y GS And

surely the

What

is it

manner

of this transformation

is

clear

even

to the blind.

like?

The treasure house

with gold, which each possesses, destroys the constitution. First, they find ways of spending money for themselves, then they stretch the laws relating to this, then they and their wives disobey the laws altogether.

They would do

And e

as

filled

that.

one person sees another doing

this

and emulates him, they make

the majority of the others like themselves. They do.

From

there they proceed further into money-making, and the more they value it, the less they value virtue. Or aren't virtue and wealth so opposed that if they were set on a scales, they'd always incline in opposite directions? That's right. So, 551

when wealth and

the wealthy are valued or

and good people are valued

honored

in a city, virtue

less.

Clearly.

And what

is

valued

is

always practiced, and what

isn't

valued

is

ne-

glected.

That's right.

Then, in the end, victory-loving and honor-loving men become lovers of making money, or money-lovers. And they praise and admire wealthy people and appoint them as rulers, while they dishonor poor ones. Certainly.

Then, don

they pass a law that is characteristic of an oligarchic constitution, one that establishes a wealth qualification— higher where the constitution is more oligarchic, less where it's less so and proclaims that those whose property doesn't reach the stated amount aren't qualified to rule? And they either put this through by force of arms, or else, before it comes to that, they terrorize the people and establish their constitution t

—

b

that

Isn't that so?

Of course 11.

it is.

Perhaps an adaptation of Seven Against Thebes 451.

wav.

1163

Republic VIII

Generally speaking, then, that's the

way this kind of constitution is estab-

lished.

what

Yes, but it

And what

character?

is its

are the faults that

we

said

contained?

very thing that defines it is one, for what would happen refusing if someone were to choose the captains of ships by their wealth, to entrust the ship to a poor person even if he was a better captain? They would make a poor voyage of it. And isn't the same true of the rule of anything else whatsoever? First of all, the

I

suppose

so.

Except a city? Or does

To

most of

it

all,

it

since

also apply to a city?

it's

the

most

difficult

and most important kind

of rule.

That, then,

is

one major

Apparently. And what about

What

second

fault? Is

it

any smaller than the other?

fault?

That of necessity the rich

this

fault in oligarchy.

it

isn't

one

city

but two

— one of the poor and one of

— living in the same place and always plotting against one another.

By god,

that's just as big a fault as the first.

hardly a fine quality either, namely, that oligarchs probably aren't able to fight a war, for they'd be compelled either to arm and use the majority, and so have more to fear from them than the enemy,

And

the following

is

—

—

them and show up as true oligarchs few in number on the battlefield. At the same time, they'd be unwilling to pay mercenaries, because of their love of money. or not to use

That certainly isn't a fine quality either. And what about the meddling in other people's affairs that we condemned before? Under this constitution, won't the same people be farmers, money-makers, and soldiers simultaneously? And do you think it's right for things to

Not

at all.

Now, of

be that way?

let's

see whether this constitution

is

the

first to

admit the greatest

all evils.

Which one is that? Allowing someone to them and then allowing city,

possessions and someone else to buy the one who has sold them to go on living in the sell all his

while belonging to none of

a craftsman, a

member

its

money-maker, but a poor person

parts, for he's neither a

of the cavalry, or a hoplite,

without means. It is

the

allow

that.

not forbidden in oligarchies. If it were, of their citizens wouldn't be excessively rich, while others are totally

At any

some

first to

rate, this sort of

impoverished. That's right.

thing

is

1104

Socrates /Adeimantus

Now,

think about

When

this.

the person

who

possessions was rich and spending his money, was he of any greater use to the city in the ways we've just mentioned than when he'd spent it all? Or did he

merely seem

c

sells all his

be one of the rulers of the city, while in truth he was neither ruler nor subject there, but only a squanderer of his property? That's right. He seemed to be part of the city, but he was nothing but a squanderer. Should we say, then, that, as a drone exists in a cell and is an affliction to

to the hive, so this

person

is

a

drone

in the

house and an

affliction to the city?

That's certainly right, Socrates. Hasn't the god made all the winged drones stingless, Adeimantus, as well as some wingless ones, while other wingless ones have dangerous stings? And don't the stingless ones continue as beggars into old age, while d

those with stings become That's absolutely true. Clearly, then, in

any

what we

call

evildoers?

where you see beggars, there pickpockets, temple-robbers, and all such evildoers hidden. That

are thieves,

is clear.

What about e

city

oligarchic cities? Don't

you see beggars

in

them?

Almost everyone except the rulers is a beggar there, Then mustn t we suppose that they also include many evildoers with stings, whom the rulers carefully keep in check by force?

We

certainly must.

And

shall

we

of education,

We

say that the presence of such people

bad rearing, and

the result of lack

bad constitutional arrangement?

shall.

something like it, is the oligarchic and probably others in addition.

This, then, or evils

a

is

city. It

contains

all

these

That's pretty well

553

what it's like. Then, let's take it that we've disposed of the constitution called oligarchy I mean the one that gets its rulers on the basis of a property assessment and let's examine the man who is like it, both how he comes to be and what sort of man he is.

—

All right.

Doesn

t

the transformation

from the timocrat we described

to

an oligarch

occur mostly in this way?

Which way? The timocrat's son at first emulates his father and follows in his footsteps. Then he suddenly sees him crashing against the city like a ship against

a

b

out all his possessions, even his life. He had held a generalship or some other high office, was brought to court by false witnesses, and was either put to death or exiled or was disenfranchised and had all his property confiscated. reef, spilling

That's quite likely.

The son sees his

life,

from it, loses his property, and, fearing for immediately drives from the throne in his own soul the honorall this,

suffers

1165

Republic VIII

loving and spirited part that ruled there. Humbled by poverty, he turns greedily to making money, and, little by little, saving and working, he amasses property. Don't you think that this person would establish his appetitive

and money-making part on the throne,

king within himself, adorning it with Persian swords? I

it

setting

it

up

as a great

with golden tiaras and collars and girding

do.

He makes

and

the rational

spirited parts

on the ground beneath slaves. He won't allow the

sit

one on either side, reducing them to first to reason about or examine anything except how a little money can be made into great wealth. And he won't allow the second to value or admire anything but wealth and wealthy people or to have any ambition other than the acquisition of wealth or whatever might contribute to getappetite,

ting

it.

There is no other transformation of a young man who is an honor-lover into one who is a money-lover that's as swift and sure as this. Then isn't this an oligarchic man? Surely, he developed out of a man who resembled the constitution from which oligarchy came. Then let's consider whether he resembles the oligarchic constitution? All right.

Doesn't he resemble tance to money?

it,

in the first place,

by attaching the

greatest impor-

Of course. And, further, by being a thrifty worker, who satisfies only his necessary appetites, makes no other expenditures, and enslaves his other desires as vain.

That's right.

A

somewhat squalid

fellow,

who makes

—

hoards it the sort the majority admires. such a constitution?

a profit

from everything and

Isn't this the

man who

resembles

opinion, anyway. At any rate, money is valued above everything by both the city and the man. I don't suppose that such a man pays any attention to education. Not in my view, for, if he did, he wouldn't have chosen a blind leader That's

my

and honored him most 12 Good. But consider this: Won't we say

for his chorus

.

because of his lack of educasome beggarly and others evil exist in him, tion, the dronish appetites but that they're forcibly held in check by his carefulness? that,

—

—

Certainly.

Do you know where you

should look to see the evildoings of such

people?

Where?

12.

Plutus, the

god

of wealth,

is

represented as being blind.

1100

Socrates IAdeimant us

To the guardianship of orphans or something like ample opportunity to do injustice with impunity.

that,

where they have

True.

And doesn't this make it clear that, in those other contractual obligations, where he has

a

good reputation and

is thought to be just, he's forcibly holding his other evil appetites in check by means of some decent part of himself? He holds them in check, not by persuading them that it's better not to act on them or taming them with arguments, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his other possessions.

That's right.

And, by god,

you'll find that

of the drone, once they

You

most of them have appetites akin

have other people's money

to those

to spend.

certainly will.

Then someone like that wouldn't be entirely free from internal civil war and wouldn't be one but in some way two, though generally his better desires are in control of his worse. That's right.

For this reason, he d be more respectable than many, but the true virtue of a single-minded and harmonious soul far escapes him. I

suppose

so.

Further, this thrifty city or for

any other

man

fine

is

a

poor individual contestant

and much-honored

for victory in a

thing, for he's not willing to

spend money

for the sake of a fine reputation or on contests for such things. He's afraid to arouse his appetites for spending or to call on them as allies to obtain victory, so he fights like an oligarch, with only a few of his resources. Hence he's mostly defeated but remains rich.

That's right.

Then have we any further doubt

that a thrifty

money-maker

is

like

an

oligarchic city?

None It

at

all.

seems, then, that

we must

next consider democracy, how it comes into being, and what character it has when it does, so that, knowing in turn the character of a man who resembles it, we can present him

judgment. That would be quite consistent with what we've been doing. Well, isn t the city changed from an oligarchy to a democracy in some such way as this, because of its insatiable desire to attain what it has set before itself as the good, namely, the need to become as rich as possible? for

In

what way?

Since those who rule in the city do so because they own a lot, I suppose they're unwilling to enact laws to prevent young people who've

had no from spending and wasting their wealth, so that by making loans to them, secured by the young people's property, and then calling those loans in, they themselves become even richer and more honored. discipline

That's their favorite thing to do.

1167

Republic VIII

So

and

isn't

it

at the

other

is

clear

by now

same time

impossible for a city to honor wealth citizens to acquire moderation, but one or the

that

for its

it is

inevitably neglected?

That's pretty clear. Because of this neglect chies

and because they encourage bad discipline, oligarnot infrequently reduce people of no common stamp to poverty.

That's right.

suppose, with their stings and weapons some in debt, some disenfranchised, some both hating those who've acquired their property, plotting against them and others, and

And

these people

sit

idle in the city,

I

—

—

longing for a revolution.

They do. The money-makers, on

on the ground, pretend not to see these people, and by lending money they disable any of the remainder who resist, exact as interest many times the principal sum, and so create a considerable number of drones and beggars in the city. the other hand, with their eyes

A

considerable number indeed. In any case, they are unwilling to quench this kind of evil as it flares up in the city, either in the way we mentioned, by preventing people from doing whatever they like with their own property or by another law which also solve the problem.

would

What law? The second-best one, which compels the

citizens to care

about virtue by

prescribing that the majority of voluntary contracts be entered into at the lender's own risk, for lenders would be less shameless then in their pursuit of money in the city and fewer of those evils we were mentioning just

now would

develop.

Far fewer.

But as

for all these reasons, the rulers in the city treat their subjects we described. But as for themselves and their children, don't

it is,

way make

in the

of luxury, incapable of effort either mental or physical, too soft to stand up to pleasures or pains, and idle besides?

they

Of

their

young fond

course.

don't they themselves neglect everything except caring no more for virtue than the poor do?

And

making money,

Yes.

But

when

rulers

and

subjects in this condition

—

meet on

a journey or

undertaking it might be a festival, an embassy, or and see one a campaign, or they might be shipmates or fellow soldiers another in danger, in these circumstances are the poor in any way despised by the rich? Or rather isn't it often the case that a poor man, lean and suntanned, stands in battle next to a rich man, reared in the shade and carrying a lot of excess flesh, and sees him panting and at a loss? And don't you think that he'd consider that it's through the cowardice of the poor that such people are rich and that one poor man would say to another

some

other

common

—

Socrates /Adeimantus

when

they met in private: 'These people are at our mercy; they're good for nothing"?

e

know

very well that's what they would do. Then, as a sick body needs only a slight shock from outside to become ill and is sometimes at civil war with itself even without this, so a city in the same condition needs only a small pretext such as one side bringing in allies from an oligarchy or the other from a democracy to fall ill and to fight with itself and is sometimes in a state of civil war even without I

—

any external 557

—

influence.

Absolutely.

And I suppose that democracy comes about when the poor are victorious, killing

some

of their

opponents and expelling others, and giving the rest an equal share in ruling under the constitution, and for the most part assigning people to positions of rule by lot. Yes, that's how democracy is established, whether by force of arms or because those on the opposing side are frightened into exile. Then how do these people live? What sort of constitution do they have? b

It s

clear that a

That

man who

is like it

will be democratic.

is clear.

First of all, then, aren't

they free? And isn't the city full of freedom and doesn't everyone in it have the license to do what

freedom of speech? And he wants? That's what they say, at any rate. And where people have this license, it's clear that each of them arrange his own life in whatever manner pleases him.

will

It is.

Then c

I

suppose that

people of

it

s

most of all under

this constitution that

Of course. Then it looks tions, for, like a

though this is the finest or most beautiful of the constitucoat embroidered with every kind of ornament, this city,

as

embroidered with every kind of character type, would seem beautiful. And many people would probably judge it to be and children do when they see something multicolored. They certainly would. d

one finds

all varieties.

to

be the most

so, as

women

also a convenient place to look for a constitution. Why's that? It s

Because

contains

kinds of constitutions on account of the license its citizens. So it looks as though anyone who wants to put a city in order, as we were doing, should probably go to a democracy, as to it

it

all

gives

a

supermarket of constitutions, pick out whatever pleases him, and establish that. e

probably wouldn or again to

others are,

be

at a loss for

models,

any rate. no requirement to rule, even if you're capable of it, be ruled if you don't want to be, or to be at war when the or at peace unless you happen to want it. And there is no

In this city, there

is

t

at

1169

Republic VIII least that

requirement in the

you happen

want

to

so. Isn't that a

to serve,

you not serve even

divine and pleasant

if

there

life,

in public office as a juror, is

while

a it

law forbidding you

to

if

do

lasts?

—

probably is while it lasts. And what about the calm of some of their condemned criminals? Isn't that a sign of sophistication? Or have you never seen people who've been condemned to death or exile under such a constitution stay on at the center of things, strolling around like the ghosts of dead heroes, without anyone It

staring at

them

or giving

Yes, I've seen

it

a

them

a thought?

lot.

about the city's tolerance? Isn't it so completely lacking in small-mindedness that it utterly despises the things we took so seriously when we were founding our city, namely, that unless someone had transcendent natural gifts, he'd never become good unless he played the right games and followed a fine way of life from early childhood? Isn't it magnificent the way it tramples all this underfoot, by giving no thought to what someone was doing before he entered public life and by honoring

And what

him

only he

if

Yes,

tells

them

that he wishes the majority well?

altogether splendid!

it's

Then these and others like them are the characteristics of democracy. And it would seem to be a pleasant constitution, which lacks rulers but not variety and which distributes a sort of equality to both equals and unequals

We

alike.

certainly

know what you mean.

Consider, then, what private individual resembles it. Or should we first inquire, as we did with the city, how he comes to be? Yes, we should. Well, doesn't it happen like this? Wouldn't the son of that thrifty oligarch

be brought up in his father's ways?

Of course. Then he too rules his spendthrift pleasures by money-making and are called unnecessary.

force

— the ones that aren't

Clearly. But, so as not to discuss this in the dark, do you which desires are necessary and which aren't? I

want us

first to

define

do.

Aren't those

we

can't desist

us rightly called necessary, for both? Isn't that so?

Of

from and those whose satisfaction benefits we are by nature compelled to satisfy them

course.

So we'd be right to apply the term "necessary” to them? We would. What about those that someone could get rid of if he practiced from youth on, those whose presence leads to no good or even to the opposite? we be right? If we said that all of them were unnecessary, would

We

would.

1170

Socrates /Adeimantus

Let

s

pick an example of each, so that

hibit.

We b

should do

we

can grasp the patterns thev exJ

that.

Aren't the following desires necessary: the desire to eat to the point of health and well-being and the desire for bread and delicacies?

suppose so. The desire for bread I

unless

it's

satisfied,

we

is

necessary on both counts;

it's

beneficial,

and

die.

Yes.

The desire

for delicacies

is

also necessary to the extent that

it's

beneficial

to well-being.

Absolutely.

What about

the desire that goes

beyond these and seeks other sorts of most people can get rid of, if it's restrained and educated while they're young, and that's harmful both to the body and to the reason and moderation of the soul? Would it be rightly called unnecessary? foods, that

:

7

would indeed. Then wouldn t we It

also say that such desires are spendthrift, while the earlier ones are money-making, because they profit our various projects 7 Certainly.

And won't we say

the

same about

the desire for sex

sires?

and about other de-

Yes.

And

didn't

we

say that the person we just now called a drone is full of such pleasures and desires, since he is ruled by the unnecessary ones, while a thrifty oligarch is ruled by his necessary desires?

We

certainly did.

go back, then, and explain how the democratic man develops out of the oligarchic one. It seems to me as though it mostly happens as follows Let

s

When a young man, who is reared in the miserly and uneducated manner we described, tastes the honey of the drones and associates with wild and dangerous creatures who can provide every variety of multicolored

pleasure in every sort of way, this, as you might suppose, is the beginning of his transformation from having an oligarchic constitution within him to having a democratic one. It's

inevitable that this

And

is

how

it

starts.

just as the city

changed when one party received help from iikeminded people outside, doesn't the young man change when one party of his desires receives help from external desires that are akin to them and of the same form? Absolutely.

And

suppose that, if any contrary help comes to the oligarchic party within him, whether from his father or from the rest of his household who exhort and reproach him, then there's civil war and counterrevolution within him, and he battles against himself. I

1171

Republic VIII

That's right.

Sometimes the democratic party yields to the oligarchic, so that some of the young man's appetites are overcome, others are expelled, a kind of shame rises in his soul, and order is restored. That does sometimes happen. But I suppose that, as desires are expelled, others akin to them are being nurtured unawares, and because of his father's ignorance about how to bring him up, they grow numerous and strong. That's what tends to happen. These desires draw him back into the same bad company and in secret intercourse breed a multitude of others. Certainly.

knowledge, fine ways of living, and words of truth (which are the best watchmen and guardians of the thoughts of those men whom the gods love), they finally

And, seeing the

citadel of the

young man's soul empty

of

occupy that citadel themselves. They certainly do. absence of these guardians, false and boastful words and beliefs rush up and occupy this part of him. Indeed, they do. Won't he then return to these lotus-eaters and live with them openly? And if some help comes to the thrifty part of his soul from his household, won't these boastful words close the gates of the royal wall within him to prevent these allies from entering and refuse even to receive the words

And

in the

and controlling things themselves, won't they call reverence foolishness and moderation cowardice, abusing them and casting them out beyond the frontiers like disenfranchised exiles? And won't they persuade the young man that measured and orderly expenditure is boorish and mean, and, joining with

of older private individuals as

many

ambassadors? Doing

useless desires, won't they expel

it

battle

across the border?

They certainly will. Having thus emptied and purged these from the soul of the one they've possessed and initiated in splendid rites, they proceed to return insolence, anarchy, extravagance, and shamelessness from exile in a blaze of torchlight, wreathing them in garlands and accompanying them with a vast chorus of followers. They praise the returning exiles and give them fine names, calling insolence good breeding, anarchy freedom, extravagance magnificence, and shamelessness courage. Isn't it in some such way as this that someone who is young changes, after being brought up with necessary desires, to the liberation and release of useless and unnecessary pleasures?

way

happens. And I suppose that after that he spends as much money, effort, and time on unnecessary pleasures as on necessary ones. If he's lucky, and his frenzy doesn't go too far, when he grows older, and the great tumult within him has spent itself, he welcomes back some of the exiles, ceases Yes, that's clearly the

it

Socrates /Adeimantus

b

to surrender himself

completely to the newcomers, and puts his pleasures on an equal footing. And so he lives, always surrendering rule over himself

whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot. And when that is satisfied, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but to

them

satisfying

all

equally.

That's right.

And

c

d

he doesn't admit any word of truth into the guardhouse, for if someone tells him that some pleasures belong to fine and good desires and others to evil ones and that he must pursue and value the former and restrain and enslave the latter, he denies all this and declares that all pleasures are equal and must be valued equally. That s just what someone in that condition would do. And so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes he drinks heavily while listening to the flute; at other times, he drinks only water and is on a diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other times, he s idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself with what he takes to be philosophy. He often engages in politics, leaping

up from

and saying and doing whatever comes If he happens to admire soldiers, he's carried in that direction, if money-makers, in that one. There's neither order nor necessity in his life, but he calls it pleasant, free, and blessedly happy, and he follows it his seat

into his mind.

for as long as e

he

lives.

You ve perfectly described the life of a man who believes in legal equality. I

also

suppose that he's

a

complex man,

full of all sorts of characters,

and multicolored, just like the democratic city, and that many men and women might envy his life, since it contains the most models of constitutions and ways of living. fine

That's right.

Then 562

we

shall

set this

man

beside democracy as one

who

is

rightly

called democratic? Let's

The

do

so.

finest constitution

and the

finest

man remain

for us to discuss,

namely, tyranny and a tyrannical man.

They certainly do. Come, then, how does tyranny come

into being?

It's fairly

clear that

it

evolves from democracy. It is.

And b

doesn't

it

evolve from democracy in

much

the

same way

that

democracy does from oligarchy?

What way The good established

is

that?

that oligarchy puts before itself is

wealth, isn't

and because

of

which

it

is

it?

Yes.

And

insatiable desire for wealth and its neglect of other things for the sake of money-making is what destroyed it, isn't it? its

That's true.

1173

Republic VIII

And

isn't

democracy's insatiable desire for what

what destroys it? What do you think it defines

it

defines as the

good

also

as the

good?

Freedom: Surely you'd hear a democratic thing

who

it

has, so that as a result

by nature free. Yes, you often hear

it is

say that this

city

is

the only city worth living in for

the finest

someone

is

Then, as

I

that.

was about

of other things

and the neglect

freedom constitution and put it in need

to say, doesn't the insatiable desire for

change

this

of a dictatorship? In

what way?

suppose that, when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens to get bad cupbearers for its leaders, so that it gets drunk by drinking more than it should of the unmixed wine of freedom, then, unless the rulers are very pliable and provide plenty of that freedom, they are punished by the city and accused of being accursed oligarchs. I

Yes, that It

is

what

it

does.

who obey

insults those

the rulers as willing slaves

and good-for-

nothings and praises and honors, both in public and in private, rulers

behave

and subjects who behave freedom should go to all lengths

like subjects

inevitable that

Of course. It makes its way

into private

households and

like rulers.

in

such a

in the

And

who

isn

t

it

city?

end breeds anarchy

even among the animals.

What do you mean? I mean that a father accustoms

himself to behave like a child and fear his sons, while the son behaves like a father, feeling neither shame nor fear in front of his parents, in order to be free. A resident alien or a foreign

equal to a citizen, and he is their equal. Yes, that is what happens. teacher in such It does. And so do other little things of the same sort. A a community is afraid of his students and flatters them, while the students despise their teachers or tutors. And, in general, the young imitate their elders and compete with them in word and deed, while the old stoop to the level of the young and are full of play and pleasantry, imitating the

visitor is

young

made

for fear of

appearing disagreeable and authoritarian.

Absolutely.

The utmost freedom for the majority is reached in such a city when bought slaves, both male and female, are no less free than those who bought them. And I almost forgot to mention the extent of the legal equality of men and women and of the freedom in the relations between them. What about the animals? Are we, with Aeschylus, going to "say whatever it was that came to our lips just now" about them? Certainly. I put it this way: No one who hasn't experienced it would believe

domestic animals are in a democratic city than As the proverb says, dogs become like their mistresses;

how much

anywhere

else.

freer

11/4

Socrates/ Adeimantus

horses and donkeys are accustomed to streets,

d

bumping

into

roam

and proudly along the anyone who doesn't get out of their way; and all freely

the rest are equally full of freedom.

You

me what

re telling

already know. I've often experienced that sort of thing while travelling in the country. To sum up: Do you notice how all these things together make the citizens' souls so sensitive that, if anyone even puts upon himself the least degree

become angry and cannot endure

of slavery, they

you know, they take no e

in order to I

notice of the laws,

avoid having any master

at

it.

And

in the end, as

whether written or unwritten,

all.

certainly do.

This, then, to

I

me It is

the fine to evolve. is

and impetuous origin from which tyranny seems

certainly impetuous. But

The same disease

what comes next?

developed in oligarchy and destroyed it also develops here, but it is more widespread and virulent because of the general permissiveness, and it eventually enslaves democracy. In fact, excessive action in one direction usually sets up a reaction in the opposite direction. This happens in seasons, in plants, in bodies, and, last but not 564

that

least, in constitutions.

That's to be expected.

Extreme freedom can't be expected to lead to Anything but a change to extreme slavery, whether for a private individual or for a city. No, it can't. Then I don't suppose that tyranny evolves from any constitution other than democracy the most severe and cruel slavery from the utmost

—

freedom. Yes, that's reasonable. b

But I don't think that was your question. You asked what was the disease that developed in oligarchy and also in democracy, enslaving it. That's true.

And what I had

mind as an answer was that class of idle and extravagant men, whose bravest members are leaders and the more cowardly ones followers. We compared them to stinged and stingless drones, respectively. in

That's right.

Now,

c

two groups cause problems in any constitution, just as phlegm and bile do in the body. And it's against them that the good doctor and lawgiver of a city must take advance precautions, first, to prevent their presence and, second, to cut them out of the hive as quickly as possible, cells and all, if they should happen to be present. Yes, by god, he must cut them out altogether. Then let's take up the question in the following way, so that we can see what we want more clearly. In what way? these

Let's divide a democratic city into three parts in theory, this being the way that it is in fact divided. One part is this class of idlers, that

grows

d

here no less than in an oligarchy, because of the general permissiveness.

1175

Republic VIII

So it does. But it is far

How

democracy than

fiercer in

in the other.

so?

In an oligarchy

it is

fierce

because

it's

disdained, but since

it is

prevented

doesn't get any exercise and doesn't become vigorous. In a democracy, however, with a few exceptions, this acting, class is the dominant one. Its fiercest members do all the talking and while the rest settle near the speaker's platform and buzz and refuse to

from having

a share in ruling,

it

tolerate the opposition of another speaker, so that, under a democratic constitution, with the few exceptions I referred to before, this class mane

ages everything. That's right.

Then

second class that always distinguishes

there's a

itself

from the

majority of people.

Which

is

that?

When everybody is trying to make money, those who are naturally most organized generally become the wealthiest. Probably so. Then they would provide the most honey for the drones and the honey that is most easily extractable by them. Yes, for how could anyone extract it from those who have very little? Then I suppose that these rich people are called drone-fodder.

Something like that. The people those who work with their own hands are the third but, when class. They take no part in politics and have few possessions, they are assembled, they are the largest and most powerful class in

—

—

565

a democracy.

But they aren't willing to assemble often unless they get a share of the honey. And they always do get a share, though the leaders, in taking the wealth themof the rich and distributing it to the people, keep the greater part for

They

are.

selves.

Yes, that

is

the

way

5

the people get their share.

taken away are compelled to defend themselves by speaking before the people and doing whatever else they can.

And suppose I

that those

whose wealth

is

Of course.

And

by the drones of plotting against the people and even if they have no desire for revolution at all.

they're accused

of being oligarchs,

That's right.

So

in the end,

when

they see the people trying to

harm them, they

truly

do become oligarchs and embrace oligarchy's evils, whether they want to or not. But neither group does these things willingly. Rather the people drones, act as they do because they are ignorant and are deceived by the and the rich act as they do because they are driven to it by the stinging of those same drones. Absolutely.

CRATEs: But that is not yet three hundred years ago, perhaps, or a little more than that. Where do the best of their accepted provisions come

from?

Do you know?

Friend: People say from Crete. Socrates: So among the Greeks

it is

the Cretans

most ancient laws?

who make

use of the

Friend: Yes. Socrates: Then

do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa: these laws were theirs.

2.

Accepting a conjectural deletion of ton somatos

3.

Marsyas was said

in a 1-2.

to have invented a form of music for wind instruments (such as the aulos , here conventionally but misleadingly translated "flute"). Olympus was credited with bringing this music from the Near East to Greece and developing it further

—

:

1315

Minos

Rhadamanthus was a just man, Socrates; but they say Minos was savage and harsh and unjust. Socrates: My good friend, you are telling a theatrical Attic version of Friend: People certainly claim that

the story.

what they say about Minos? Socrates: Not Homer and Hesiod. Yet they are more persuasive than who are the people you are listening to all the tragedians put together are saying. if this is what you 4 Friend: And what is it that Homer and Hesiod say about Minos? Socrates: I will tell you, so that you won't commit impiety along with the mass of people. There cannot be anything more impious than this, nor anything over which one should take more precautions, than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to gods, and in second place, with regard to divine humans. You should always exercise very great forethought, when you are about to criticize or praise a man, to ensure that you don't speak incorrectly. This is why you should learn to distinguish admirable from wicked men. For god vents his anger when anyone criticizes someone similar to himself, or praises someone whose condition is opposite to his own; the former is the good man. For you really mustn't think that there are sacred stones and pieces of wood and birds and snakes, but not humans A good human being is the most sacred of all of these, and one who is wicked the most defiled. So now I will speak about Minos, and how Homer and Hesiod sing his praises, with this purpose in mind: that you, as a human and the son of a human, may not be mistaken in what you say about a hero who is son of Zeus. Homer when telling us about Crete and how there are many men in it and "ninety cities," says: Friend: Well, isn't that

—

.

Among

was King This, then,

but

is

Cnossus a great city where Minos the ninth season having converse with great Zeus

them

is

in

how Homer

makes

and

,

,

Homer composed

a sophist

,

sings the praises of Minos: briefly expressed

nothing

like

that this art of his

clear here as well as in

it

is

any of the heroes. That Zeus is something altogether excellent, he

for

many

other places. For he

means

that

during the ninth year Minos got together with Zeus to discuss things, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. So the fact that Homer assigns this privilege of being educated by Zeus to no one among the heroes but to Minos is extraordinary praise. And in the book of the dead in the Odyssey he represents Minos, not Rhadamanthus, 6 He does not represent as giving judgment with a golden scepter .

4.

Reading

5.

Odyssey

xix. 178-79.

6.

Odyssey

xi. 568-71.

toi

for

ti

in a5.

1316

Minos

Rhadamanthus

e

as giving

judgment

in this passage,

nor as associated with

Zeus in any passage. For this reason I say that Minos beyond all others has had his praises sung by Homer. To be the son of Zeus and then to be the only one educated by Zeus is praise that cannot be exceeded. For this verse, "was king in the ninth season, having converse with great Zeus" indicates that Minos was an associate of Zeus. "Converses" are discussions, and someone who "has converse

an associate in discussions. In other words, every nine years Minos would go into the Cave of Zeus, partly to learn and partly to demonstrate what he had learned from Zeus in the preceding ninth year. There are those who suppose that someone who "has converse" is a drinkis

ing and partying 320

companion

of Zeus, but one

may

use the following as supposition talk nonsense. Of all the

evidence that those who make this many human beings there are, Greeks and foreigners, none abstain from drinking sessions and the sort of partying there is when wine is present except Cretans and in second place Spartans, who have learned it

from

the Cretans. In Crete it is one of the laws Minos laid down that people are not to drink together to the point of drunkenness. And indeed it is clear that

what he accepted

also for his

own

as admirable he laid

down as accepted

practice

b

For Minos would surely not have accepted one thing but done something different from what he accepted, like a dishonest person. His form of association was as I say, through discourses for education into virtue. This is why he laid down for his own citizens those laws which have made Crete happy for all time, and Sparta from when she began to make use of them, because they are divine,

c

Rhadamanthus was a good man: he had been educated by Minos. But he had been educated not in the art of kingship as a whole, but in one subsidiary to it, confined to presiding in law courts; that is why he was said to be a good judge. Minos used him as watcher over the law in the

d

citizens.

town, but Talos in the rest of Crete. Talos used to tour the villages three times a year, preserving a watch over the law in them by having the laws written on bronze tablets: this is why he was called "bronze." Hesiod too has said some things akin to these with regard to Minos. After making mention of his name he says

Who

proved

most kingly of mortal kings and ruled over most of the the countryside holding the scepter with which he exercised of Zeus to be

,

people in

,

kingship also over

cities

—

7 .

He means by

e

"the scepter of Zeus" nothing other than the education he received from Zeus, by means of which he governed Crete, Friend: Why, then, Socrates, has this rumor about Minos as someone

who was uneducated and

harsh ever been spread about? Socrates: Because of something over which you, my good friend, will

take precautions, for a

7.

if

you are

sensible,

good reputation: never

Hesiod

frg.

to fall

144 (Merkelbach-West).

and so

anyone else who cares out with any man who is skilled will

1317

Minos

The poets have great power where reputation

in poetry.

whichever mode

Which was

— eulogy or abuse —

the mistake

Minos made

concerned, they adopt in writing about people.

in

waging war on

is

this city,

where

as

other forms of wisdom there are poets of every kind, who compose tragedy as well as every other kind of poetry. Tragedy is an ancient form here, not beginning with Thespis as some suppose nor with

well as

many

matter you will find

very ancient discovery, made in this very city. Tragedy is that form of poetry which most delights the populace and which most seduces the soul. So it

Phrynichus

8

:

if

you care

to consider the

it

to

be

a

Minos and take vengeance upon him for that 9 tribute he compelled us to pay This, then, was the mistake Minos made, in falling out with us. And that is why, to answer your question, he has come to have a worse and worse reputation. He was good and lawabiding, as we said at the outset, a good apportioner. And the greatest indication of this is that his laws are unaltered: that shows how well he did at in tragedy that

is

we

torture

.

discovering reality as regards habitation of a city. Friend: In my view, Socrates, the account you have given is a likely one. Socrates: Now if what I say is true, is it your view that the Cretans, who are citizens of Minos and Rhadamanthus, make use of the most ancient laws?

They seem to. Socrates: Then these two have proved to be the best lawgivers among the ancients, apportioners and shepherds of men, just as Homer said that ." the good general was "shepherd of the people Friend:

10

Friend: Certainly.

Socrates: Please, now, by Zeus god of friendship: if someone were to ask us what are these things that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to the body to make it better, we would say if we were to reply well and briefly: food and hard work, building it up with the one,

and exercising and constituting the body

itself

with the other.

Friend: Quite correct.

then after this he were to ask us: "Whatever then are those things that the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to it better?," what reply would we make if we are not to be ashamed make 10. both of ourselves and of our mature years? Socrates:

Friend:

I

If

don't any

more know what

to say.

each of us that it plainly doesn't know what in it constitutes goodness and badness for it, whereas what constitutes goodness and badness for the body, and for other things, Socrates: Yet

is

8.

something

it

it

has already considered.

playwright to win a prize at the Athenian festival of Dionysus, Phrynichus was a tragic playwright active in the early fifth century.

Thespis was the

about 535

b.c.

really is a disgrace to the soul in

first

According to legend, after Minos defeated the Athenians, he exacted a tribute every nine years of seven maidens and seven young men, whom he imprisoned in the Labyrinth, eventually to be devoured by the Minotaur, the 'bull of Minos'. 9.

Iliad i.263,

Odyssey iv.532, and elsewhere.

LAWS This work Plato's longest and a product of his last years was left unpublished at his death perhaps because he felt it still needed revision. Plato's associate Philip of Opus is said to have transcribed it for publication. It seems to be ,

,

,

com-

plete as

it

stands.

Three elderly gentlemen

apparently fictional— Clinias from Crete Megillus, a Spartan, and an unnamed Athenian begin a journey on foot from Cnossus in Crete to the shrine of Zeus' birthplace on Mount Ida. The Athenian begins a conversation on 'laws and constitutions' (which continues till the ,

all

,

—

end of book III) by querying the central purpose of his Cretan and Spartan friends' famously similar civic institutions: the optimal conduct of war, as Clinias maintains. y4s one might expect in an Athenian, this strikes him as too narrow and exclusive a focus on one aspect of civic life, and that a secondary one: wars are undertaken to make secure the activities of peacetime. Laws should indeed see

to the

training of citizens in the virtues of wartime, but also, and even more, in those of peace. broader and culturally deeper education and range of experience are needed to produce truly good human beings. Athens itself, how-

A

ever,

had been ruined by

predilection for the personal freedoms provided by democratic institutions; the best laws would follow the Cretan and Spartan its

lead by establishing strong civic authority at the fullest possible

At

the

end of book

development of

and

all the

III Clinias reveals that

discipline, but they

human

would aim

virtues.

one of ten commissioners entrusted zvith establishing the laws for a new city being founded in Crete, and the conversation continues, with the Athenian now offering his advice on the laws that will be needed to achieve this objective. Since these are to be citizens of a free, self-governing state, the laws

whom

they apply:

commands

is

must have 'preambles'

purposes for which they are instituted, so as those to

he

that explain the

gain the willing acquiescence of backed by threats (contained in the bare to

text of the law) are otherwise not appropriately addressed to a free person (book IV). And it is in the preliminary discussion and preambles to the laws set out in the

following books

— running

administrative, trade, property,

gamut from family law and education to and criminal law that we find the philosophithe

—

cal core of the dialogue's

jurisprudence and social and political theory. Of special note are the theory of punishment and its legitimate purposes in book IX and the elaborate argument in book to prove the existence of gods and to establish the lazv forbidding behavior that denies them due deference and enacting the appropriate punishments for infractions.

X

1318

Laws

1319

I

Understandably most people nowadays read the ,

ideas

more than for any

stitution of

Laws

Laws

for

its

practical applications. Scholars debate

replaces

—and

implicitly criticizes

—

theoretical

whether the con-

the constitution of

Re-

untrammeled by law. And they compare and contrast the accounts of the rule of law and its philosophical basis given in Statesman and Laws. But Plato's Academy was not merely an institute for higher education and for research in mathematics the sciences philosophy and ethical and political thought; Plato and his associates were called upon also for concrete advice about 'laws and constitutions' in reforming existing states and founding new ones. In writing Laws Plato was public, with

its

rule by philosopher-kings essentially

—

—

,

,

,

perhaps not engaging in pure constitutional and legislative theory as in Statesman and Republic. In considering Laws in relation to these other works one ,

,

should bear in mind

this

context of possible practical applications.

J.M.C.

Book Athenian: Tell me, gentlemen, establishing your codes of law? Is Clinias:

to it

I

whom

do you give

a god, or a

the credit for

man?

A god, sir, a god — and that's the honest truth. Among us Cretans

—

—

Zeus; in Sparta which is where our friend here hails from they say it is Apollo, I believe. Isn't that right? Megillus: Yes, that's right. Athenian: You follow Homer, presumably, and say that every ninth year Minos used to go to a consultation with his father Zeus and laid down laws for your cities on the basis of the god's pronouncements? it is

1

,

Clinias: Yes, that's our Cretan version,

Rhadamanthus

and we add

that Minos' brother,

— doubtless you know the name—was an absolute paragon

We

Cretans would say that he won this reputation because of the scrupulously fair way in which he settled the judicial problems of of justice. his day.

Athenian:

A

distinguished reputation indeed, and one particularly ap-

propriate for a son of Zeus. Well then, since you and your companion have been raised under laws with such a splendid ancestry, I expect you

be quite happy if we spend our time together today in a discussion about constitutions and laws, and occupy our journey in a mutual exchange of views. I've heard it said that from Cnossus to Zeus' cave and shrine is quite a long way, and the tall trees along the route provide shady restingplaces which will be more than welcome in this stiflingly hot weather. At

will

Translated by Trevor

J.

Saunders. Text: Bude, bks. I-VI ed.

E.

A. Dies, Paris (1951, 1956). 1.

Odyssey

xix. 178-79.

Minos was

a legendary king of Crete.

des Places, VII-XII ed.

1320

Lazos

our age, there

is

refresh ourselves

every excuse for having frequent rests in them, so as

by conversation.

In this

way we

come

to

end whole journey without having tired ourselves out. Clinias: And as you go on, sir, you find tremendously tall and graceful cypress trees in the sacred groves; there are also meadows in which we can pause and rest. Athenian: That sounds a good idea. Clinias: It is indeed, and it'll sound even better when we see them. Well then, shall we wish ourselves bon voyage and be off? Athenian: Certainly. Now, answer me this. You have meals which you eat communally; you have a system of physical training, and a special type of military equipment. Why is it that you give all this the force of law? Clinias. Well, sir, I think that these customs are quite easy for anyone to understand, at any rate in our case. You see the Cretan terrain in general does not have the flatness of Thessaly: hence we usually train by running shall

to the

of the

c

,

d

e

626

(whereas the Thessalians mostly use horses), because our land is hilly and more suited to exercise by racing on foot. In this sort of country we have to keep our armor light so that we can run without being weighed down, and bows and arrows seem appropriate because of their lightness. All these Cretan practices have been developed for fighting wars, and that's precisely the purpose I think the legislator intended them to serve when he instituted them. Likely enough, this is why he organized the common meals, too: he observed that when men are on military service they are all obliged by the pressure of events, for their own protection, to eat together throughout the campaign. In this, I think, he censured the stupidity of ordinary men, who do not understand that they are all engaged in a never-ending lifelong war against all other states. So, if you grant the necessity of eating together for self-protection in war-time, and of appointing officers and men in turn to act as guards, the same thing

should be

done

men

b

in peace-time too.

The

legislator's position

would be

that

what most

call 'peace' is really

only a fiction, and that in cold fact all states are by nature fighting an undeclared war against every other state. If you see things in this light, you are pretty sure to find that the Cretan legislator established all these institutions of ours, both in the public sphere and the private, with an eye on war, and that this was the spirit in which he gave us his laws for us to keep up. He was convinced that if we don't come out on top in war, nothing that we possess or do in peace-time is of the slightest use, because all the goods of the conquered fall into the possession of the victors.

Athenian: You certainly have had a splendid training, sir! It has, I think, enabled you to make a most penetrating analysis of Cretan institutions. c

But explain this point to me rather more precisely: the definition you gave of a well-run state seems to me to demand that its organization and administration should be such as to ensure victory in war over other states. Correct?

— Laws

1321

I

Clinias:

Of

course,

and

companion supports my definition. what other answer could one possibly make, if I

think our

Megillus: My dear sir, one is a Spartan? Athenian: But if this is the right criterion as between states, what about

between

as

villages? Is the criterion different?

Clinias: Certainly not.

Athenian:

It is

the same, then?

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: Well now, what about relations between the village's separate households? And between individual and individual? Is the same true? Clinias:

The same

is

true.

—

Athenian: What of a man's relations with himself should he think of himself as his own enemy? What's our answer now? Clinias: Well done, my Athenian friend! (I'd rather not call you 'Attic', 2 because I think it is better to call you after the goddess as you deserve.) You have made the argument clearer by expressing it in its most elementary ,

form.

Now

you

will find

it

that

much

easier to realize that the position

took up a moment ago is correct: not only is everyone an enemy of everyone else in the public sphere, but each man fights a private war

we

against himself.

Athenian: You do surprise me, Clinias: This,

sir, is

where

a

my

friend.

man wins

the

What do you mean? first

and best

of victories

over himself. Conversely, to fall a victim to oneself is the worst and most shocking thing that can be imagined. This way of speaking points to a war against ourselves within each one of us. Athenian: Now let's reverse the argument. You hold that each one of us is either 'conqueror of' or 'conquered by' himself: are we to say that the same holds good of household, village and state? Or not? Clinias: You mean that they are individually either 'conquerors of' or

'conquered by' themselves? Athenian: Yes. Clinias: This again is a good question to have asked. Your suggestion is most emphatically true, particularly in the case of states. Wherever the better people subdue their inferiors, the state may rightly be said to be 'conqueror of' itself, and we should be entirely justified in praising it for its victory. Where the opposite happens, we must give the opposite verdict. Athenian: It would take too long a discussion to decide whether in fact there is a sense in which the worse element could be superior to the better, so let's leave that aside. For the moment, I understand your position to

amount to this: sometimes evil citizens will come together in large numbers and forcibly try to enslave the virtuous minority, although both sides are members of the same race and the same state. When they prevail, the state may properly be said to be 'inferior to' itself and to be an evil one; but 2.

Athena, goddess of wisdom and patron of Athens in Attica.

1322

when a

Lazos

we

they are defeated,

good

can say

'superior

to' itself

and

that

it is

state.

Clinias. That s a paradoxical

c

it is

to disagree

way

of putting

it, sir,

but

it is

impossible

3 .

Athenian: But now wait a minute. Let's look at this point again: suppose a father and mother had several sons should we be surprised if the majority of these brothers were unjust, and the minority just? Clinias: By no means. Athenian: We could say that if the wicked brothers prevail the whole household and family may be called 'inferior to' itself, and 'superior to' itself if they are subdued but it would be irrelevant to our purpose to labor the point. The reason why we're now examining the usage of the common man is not to pass judgment on whether he uses language properly or improperly, but to determine what is essentially right and wrong in a given law. Clinias: Very true, sir.

—

d

—

Megillus:

agree

—

been nicely put, so far. Athenian: Let's look at the next point. Those brothers tioned they'd have a judge, I suppose? I

it's

—

I've just

men-

Of course. Athenian: Which of these judges would be the better, the one who put all the bad brothers to death and told the better ones to run their own Clinias:

e

one who put the virtuous brothers in command, but let the scoundrels go on living in willing obedience to them? And we can probably add a third and even better judge the one who will take this single quarrelling family in hand and reconcile its members, without killing any of them; by laying down regulations to guide them in the future, he will be able to ensure that they remain on friendly terms with each other. Clinias. Yes, this judge the legislator would be incomparably better. Athenian: But in framing these regulations he would have his eye on lives, or the

—

628

—

the exact opposite of war. Clinias: True enough. b

Athenian: But what about the man who brings harmony to the state? In regulating its life, will he pay more attention to external war, or internal? This 'civil' war, as we call it, does break out on occasion, and is the last thing a

man would want

he would wish

have

to see in his

own

country; but

if it

did flare up,

over and done with as quickly as possible. Clinias: He'll obviously pay more attention to the second kind. Athenian: One side might be destroyed through the victory of the other, and then peace would follow the civil war; or, alternatively, peace and friendship might be the result of reconciliation. Now, which of these results

3.

Clinias

is

to

it

struck by the paradox that

morally 'superior', and

when

'superior'

when

'inferior'

numbers conquer,

numbers conquer,

it is

morally

the state

'inferior'.

is

Lazos

1323

I

would you prefer, supposing the city then had to turn its attention to a foreign enemy? Clinias: Everybody would prefer the second situation to the first, so far as his own state was concerned. Athenian: And wouldn't a legislator have the same preference? Clinias:

He

Athenian: the

aim

certainly would.

Now

surely, every legislator will enact his every

of achieving the greatest

Clinias:

Of

law with

good?

course.

Athenian: The greatest good, however, is neither war nor civil war (God forbid we should ever need to resort to either of them), but peace and goodwill among men. And so the victory of a state over itself, it seems, does not after all come into the category of ideals; it is just one of those things in which we've no choice. You might just as well suppose that the sick body which has been purged by the doctor was therefore in the pink of condition, and disregard the body that never had any such need. Similarly, anyone who takes this sort of view of the happiness of a state or even an individual will never make a true statesman in the true sense if, that is, he adopts foreign warfare as his first and only concern; he'll become a genuine lawgiver only if he designs his legislation about war as a tool for peace, rather than his legislation for peace as an instrument

—

of war.

has the air of having been correctly argued. Even so, I shall be surprised if our Cretan institutions, and the Spartan ones as well, have not been wholly orientated towards warfare. Clinias:

What you

say,

sir,

Athenian: Well, that's as may be. At the moment, however, there's no call for a stubborn dispute on the point. What we need to do is to conduct our inquiry into these institutions dispassionately, seeing that we share this common interest with their authors. So keep me company in the 4 conversation I'm going to have. Let's put up Tyrtaeus for example, an Athenian by birth who became a citizen of Sparta. He, of all men, was particularly concerned with what we are discussing. He said: ,

'I'd

not mention a man, I'd take no account of him,

no matter' (he goes on) 'if he were the richest of men, no matter if he had a huge number of good things' (he enumerated pretty nearly all of them) 'unless his prowess in war were beyond compare.' Doubtless you too have heard the lines; Megillus here knows them backwards, I expect. Tyrtaeus (mid-seventh century) was noted for his poems in praise of courage in war. The Athenian quotes the first line of the poem verbatim and then summarizes the next nine; at 629e he gives a somewhat adapted quotation of lines 11 and 12. For the 4.

whole poem see

J.

M. Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus

(Loeb), vol.

I,

pp. 74-77.

1324

Laws

Megillus: Clinias:

certainly do.

I

And

they have certainly got as far as Crete: they were brought

across from Sparta.

Athenian:

c

Now

then, let's jointly ask our poet some such question as this: 'Tyrtaeus, you are a poet, and divinely inspired. are quite sure of your wisdom and virtue, from the special commendation you have

We

bestowed on those active service.

find ourselves,

this point

we

particularly distinguished themselves in Megillus here, Clinias of Cnossus and

we—

think, emphatically in

agreement with you; but we want to be quite clear that we are talking about the same people. Tell us: do you clearly distinguish, as we do, two sorts of war? Or what?' I fancy that in reply to this even a man far less gifted than Tyrtaeus would state the facts of the case and say 'Two'. The first would be what we all call 'civil' war, and as we were saying just now, this is the most bitterly fought of all; and we shall all agree, I think, in making the other type of war the one we fight when we quarrel with our foreign enemies from outside the state, which is a much less vicious sort of war than the other. I

d

On

who have

Clinias:

agree.

I

Athenian: 'Well now, Tyrtaeus, which category of soldiers did you shower with your praises and which did you censure? Which was the type of war they were fighting, that led you to speak so highly of them? The war fought against foreign enemies, it would seem at any rate, you have told us in your verses that you have no time for men who cannot "stand the sight of bloody butchery

—

e

and do not attack

So here

is

the next thing

in close

we'd

praise, Tyrtaeus, for those

war

'It

looks as

if

foe.'"

you reserve your

special

who fight with conspicuous gallantry in external

against a foreign enemy.' Clinias: Surely.

630

say:

combat with the

I

suppose he'd agree

to this,

and say

'Yes'?

Athenian: However, while not denying the courage of those soldiers, we still maintain that those who display conspicuous gallantry in total war are very much more courageous. We have a poet to bear witness to this, 5 Theognis a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says: ,

'

Cyrnus find ,

He

5.

Theognis

is

worth

(late sixth

a

his

man you

can trust in deadly feuding:

weight in silver and gold.'

century) belonged to the landed gentry of Megara (probably

Megara near Athens, in spite of what is said here). He wrote lively, indignant poems from a conservative point of view about the social and political changes of his day. Some 1400 lines of his work survive: see J. M. Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus (Loeb), vol. I, pp. 216-401. The Athenian quotes lines 77-78. the

Laws

1325

I 6

our view, who fights in a tougher war, is far superior to to just about the same degree as the combination of justice, the other self-control and good judgment, reinforced by courage, is superior to courage alone. In civil war a man will never prove sound and loyal unless he has every virtue; but in the war Tyrtaeus mentions there are hordes of

Such

a

man,

in

—

and die fighting most of whom, apart from a very small minority, are reckless and insolent rogues, and just about the most witless people you could find. Now, what conclusion does my argument lead to? What is the point I am trying to make clear in saying all this? Simply that in laying down his laws every legislator who is any use at all and especially your legislator here in Crete, duly will never have anything in view except the highest instructed by Zeus virtue. This means, in Theognis' terms, 'loyalty in a crisis'; one might call it 'complete justice'. The virtue that Tyrtaeus praised so highly is indeed a noble one, and has been appropriately celebrated by the poet, but strictly speaking, in order of merit it comes only fourth. mercenaries

who

are ready to dig their heels in

—

Clinias:

And

b

,

c

—

that, sir, is to

d

reduce our Cretan legislator to the status of

a failure.

Athenian: No, my dear fellow, it is not. The failure was entirely on our part. We were quite wrong to imagine that when Lycurgus and Minos' established the institutions of Sparta and this country the primary end they had in view was invariably warfare. Clinias: But what ought we to have said? Athenian: We had no particular axes to grind in our discussion, and I think we ought to have told the honest truth. We ought not to have said that the legislator laid down his rules with an eye on only a part of virtue, and the most trivial part at that. We should have said that he aimed at virtue in its entirety, and that the various separate headings under which he tried to frame the laws of his time were quite different from those employed by modern legal draftsmen. Each of these invents any category he feels he wants, and adds it to his code. For instance, one will come up with a category on 'Inheritances and Heiresses', another with 'Assault', and others will suggest other categories ad infinitum. But we insist that the correct procedure for framing laws, which is followed by those who do the job properly, is precisely the one we have just embarked upon. I am delighted at the way you set about explaining your laws: you rightly started with virtue and explained that this was the aim of the laws the legislator laid down. However, you did say that he legislated entirely by reference to only one part of virtue, and the most inconsiderable part at that. Now there I thought you were wrong: hence all these additional ,

6.

See Tyrtaeus 16-18.

7.

Traditional founders of the Spartan and Cretan constitutions.

e

631

1326

Laws

remarks. So what in

is this

your argument? Shall

distinction I tell

I

could have wished to hear you draw

you?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: 'Now, Sir/ you ought to have said, 'it is no accident that the laws of the Cretans have such a high reputation in the entire Greek world.

They

sound laws, and achieve the happiness of those who observe them, by producing for them a great number of benefits. These benefits fall into two classes, "human" and "divine." The former depend on the latter, and if a city receives the one sort, it wins the other too the greater are

—

include the lesser;

if

not,

it

goes without both. Health heads the

list

of the

by beauty; third comes strength, for racing and other physical exercises. Wealth is fourth— not "blind" wealth 8 but the clear-sighted kind whose companion is good judgment and good judgment itself is the leading "divine" benefit; second comes the habitual selfcontrol of a soul that uses reason. If you combine these two with courage, you get (thirdly) justice; courage itself lies in fourth place. All these take lesser benefits, followed

—

,

a natural

precedence over the others, and the lawgiver must of course rank them in the same order. Then he must inform the citizens that the other instructions they receive have these benefits in view: the "human" benefits have the "divine" in view, and all these in turn look towards reason, which is supreme. The citizens join in marriage; then children, male and female, are born and reared; they pass through childhood and later

life,

and

finally reach old age.

At every stage the lawgiver should people, and confer suitable marks of honor or disgrace.

supervise his Whenever they associate with each other, he should observe their pains, pleasures and desires, and watch their passions in all their intensity;

he

must use the laws themselves as instruments for the proper distribution of praise and blame. Again, the citizens are angry or afraid; they suffer from emotional disturbances brought on by misfortune, and recover from them when life is going well; they have all the feelings that men usually experience in illness, war, poverty or their opposites. In all these instances the lawgiver's duty is to isolate and explain what is good and what is in the

bad

way

each individual reacts. Next, the lawgiver must supervise the way the citizens acquire money and spend it; he must keep a sharp eye on the various methods they all employ to make and dissolve (voluntarily

under duress) their associations with one another, noting which methods are proper and which are not; honors should be conferred upon those who comply with the laws, and specified penalties imposed on the disobedient. When the lawgiver comes to the final stages of organizing the entire life of the state, he must decide what honors should be accorded the dead and or

how

the

manner

of burial should be varied. His survey completed, the author of the legal code will appoint guardians (some of will have

whom

8.

Plutus, the

god

of wealth,

was

traditionally represented as blind.

Laws

1327

I

rational

grounds

for their actions, while others rely

that all these regulations

may be welded

on "true opinion"), so

into a rational whole, demonstra-

bly inspired by considerations of justice and self-restraint, not of wealth and ambition/ That is the sort of explanation, gentlemen, that I should have liked you to give, and still want now an explanation of how all

—

met in the laws attributed to Zeus and the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus laid down. I wish you could have told me why the system on which they are arranged is obvious to someone with an expert technical or even empirical knowledge of law, while to laymen like ourselves it is entirely obscure. Clinias: Well then, sir, where do we go from here? Athenian: I think we ought to go back and start again. As before, we should consider first the activities that promote courage; then, if you like, we'll work through the other kinds of virtue, one by one. We'll take the way we deal with the first as a model, and try to while away the journey by discussing the others in the same way. Then after dealing with virtue as a whole, we shall show, God willing, that the regulations we have just these conditions are

—

—

listed

had

view. splendid idea!

this in

Megillus:

A

Our

friend here

is

an admirer of Zeus, so

examining him, to start with. Athenian: I'll try to examine not only him, but you and myself as well we all have a stake in the discussion. Tell me, then, you two: do we maintain that the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been invented by your legislator for the purpose of war?

try

Megillus: Yes.

Athenian: What about a third such institution, and a fourth? To make a full list like this will probably be the right procedure in the case of the other 'parts' of virtue, too (or whatever the right terminology is: no matter,

meaning is clear). and any Spartan, for that matter

so long as one's

—

—

would mention the legisMegillus: I lator's invention of hunting as the third item. Athenian: Let's have a shot at adding a fourth, and a fifth too, if we can. Megillus: Well, I might try to add a fourth: the endurance of pain. This conspicuous feature of Spartan life. You find it in our boxing matches, and also in our 'raids', which invariably lead to a severe whipping. 9 There is also the 'Secret Service', as it is called, which involves a great deal of hard work, and is a splendid exercise in endurance. In winter, its members go barefoot and sleep without bedclothes. They dispense with orderlies and look after themselves, ranging night and day over the whole country. Next, in the 'Naked Games', men display fantastic endurance, contending as they do with the full heat of summer. There are a great

is

9.

a very

An

official

organization of young Spartans,

slave class (helots) in subjection.

who had

the job of keeping the Spartan

1328

Laws

many it

d

other practices of the same kind, but would go on pretty well forever.

if

you produced

a detailed

list

Athenian: You've put it all very well, my Spartan friend. But what is to be our definition of courage? Are we to define it simply in terms of a

and pains only, or do we include desires and pleasures, and seduce us so effectively? They mold the heart like wax

fight against fears

which cajole even the hearts

of those

who

loftily

believe themselves superior to such in-

fluences.

Megillus: Yes,

I

think so

— the fight

is

against

all

these feelings.

Athenian: Now, if we remember aright what was said earlier on, our friend from Cnossus spoke of a city and an individual as 'conquered by' themselves. Isn't that right? Clinias: Surely. e

34

Athenian: Well, shall

we

only the man who is 'conquered by' pains, or shall we include the victim of pleasures as well? Clinias: The term 'bad' we apply, I think, to the victim of pleasures even more than to the other. When we say that a man has been shamefully 'conquered by' himself, we are all, I fancy, much more likely to mean someone defeated by pleasures than by pains. Athenian: But the legal code of those lawgivers (inspired as they are by Zeus and Apollo) certainly did not envisage a courage with one hand tied behind its back, able to hit out on the left, but powerless in face of the cunning

supposed

and seductive blandishments from the

to resist in

Clinias: Yes, both,

Athenian: cities that

We

b

c

Surely

it

was

I

think.

ought

to

mention next what practices

exist in your two a taste of pleasure rather than teach him how to remember how a man could not avoid pains, but was sur-

give a

it

right.

both directions?

man

you rounded by them, and then avoid

call 'bad'

persuaded by awards of honor, to get the better of them. Now where in your codes of law is the institution that does the same for pleasure? Could you say, please, what institution you have that makes one and the same body of citizens courageous in face of pains and of pleasures alike, so that they conquer where they ought to conquer and never fall victims to these their most intimate and dangerous enemies? forced, or

Megillus: I was certainly able to point to a good many laws that were designed to counteract pains, stranger, but I doubt if I should find it so easy to give striking and clear examples in the case of pleasures. I might have some success, perhaps, in finding minor cases. Clinias. No more would I be able to find an obvious illustration of this sort of thing in the laws of Crete. Athenian: My dear sirs, this should not surprise us. (I hope, by the way, that

if

in his desire to discover

criticize

some

legal detail in

goodness and truth any of us is led to the homeland of either of his companions.

;

Laws

1329

I

we shall receive such criticism from each other tolerantly and without truculence.)

Clinias: as

you

You have put

it

quite fairly,

my

Athenian

friend.

We

must do

say.

Athenian: Truculence, Clinias, would be hardly the thing our age. Clinias:

No

for

men

of

indeed.

Athenian: The criticisms people bring against the way Sparta and Crete are run may be right or wrong: that is another issue. At any rate, I am probably better able than either of you to report what most people generally say. However, granted that your codes of law have been composed with reasonable success, as indeed they have been, one of the best regulations you have is the one which forbids any young man to inquire into the relative merits of the laws; everyone has to agree, with one heart and

anyone says differently, the citizens must absolutely refuse to listen to him. If an old man has some point to make about your institutions, he must make such remarks to an official, or someone of his own age when no young man

voice, that they are all excellent

is

and

exist

by divine

fiat

if

present.

Clinias: That's absolutely right, sir

removed in time from think you have hit on

You are — you must be a wizard! these laws, but

the legislator

far

who

laid

down

his intentions very nicely,

and

state

I

them with

perfect accuracy.

Athenian: Well, there are no young men here now. In view of our age, the legislator surely grants us the indulgence of having a private discussion on these topics without giving offense. Clinias: So be it: don't hesitate to criticize our laws. There is no disgrace in being told of some blemish— indeed, if one takes criticism in good part, without being ruffled by it, it commonly leads one to a remedy. Athenian: Splendid. But criticism of your laws is not what I propose: that can wait until we have scrutinized them exhaustively. I shall simply mention my difficulties. Among all the Greek and foreign peoples who have come to my knowledge, you are unique in that you have been instructed by your lawgiver to keep away from the most attractive entertainments and pleasures, and to refrain from tasting them. Yet when it came to pains and fears, your legislator reckoned that if a man ran away from them on every occasion from his earliest years and was then faced with hardships, pains and fears he could not avoid, he would likewise run away from any such a training, and become their slaves. I think this same lawgiver ought to have taken this same line in the case of pleasures too. He ought to have said to himself: 'If our citizens grow up without any experience of the keenest pleasures, and if they are not trained to stand firm when they encounter them, and to refuse to be pushed into any disgraceful action, their fondness for pleasure will bring them to the

enemies

who had received

1330

Laws

same bad end

as those

who

capitulate to fear. Their slavery will be of a different kind, but it will be more humiliating: they will become the slaves of those who are able to stand firm against the onslaughts of pleasure and

who

are past-masters in the art of temptation— utter scoundrels, sometimes. Spiritually, our citizens will be part slave, part free, and

only in a

limited sense will they deserve to be called courageous and free.' Just consider this argument: do you think it has any relevance at all? Clinias. Yes, I think it has, at first blush. But it is a weighty business,

and and

jump

to

to confident conclusions so quickly

may

well be childish

naive.

Athenian: Well then, Clinias and our friend from Sparta, let's turn to the next item we put on the agenda: after courage, let's discuss self-control. We found, in the case of war, that your two political systems were superior to those of states with a more haphazard mode of government. Where's the superiority in the case of self-control? Megillus: That's rather a difficult question.

common meals and the gymnastic exercises to

promote both virtues. Athenian: Well, my friends,

political

systems

I

Still,

I

should think the

are institutions well calculated

should think the

real difficulty is to

make

reflect in practice the trouble-free perfection of theory.

(The human body is probably a parallel. One cannot rigidly prescribe a given regimen for a given body, because any regimen will invariably turn out, in

some

respects, to injure our bodies at the same time as it helps them in others.) For instance, these gymnastic exercises and common meals, useful though they are to a state in many ways, are a danger in their

—

encouragement of revolution witness the example of the youth of Miletus, Boeotia and Thurii. More especially, the very antiquity of these practices seems to have corrupted the natural pleasures of sex, which are common to man and beast. For these perversions, your two states may well be the first to be blamed, as well as any others that make a particular point of gymnastic exercises. Circumstances may make you treat this subject either light-heartedly or seriously; in either case you ought to bear in mind that when male and female come together in order to have a child, the pleasure they experience seems to arise entirely naturally. But homosexual intercourse and lesbianism seem to be unnatural crimes of the first rank, and are committed because men and women cannot control their desire for pleasure. It is the Cretans we all hold to blame for making up the story of Ganymede 10 they were so firmly convinced that their laws came from Zeus that they saddled him with this fable, in order to have a divine :

'precedent'

we may 10.

when

enjoying that particular pleasure. That story, however, dismiss, but not the fact that when men investigate legislation, they

A handsome boy carried

xx.231

ff.

off to

be Zeus' companion and cupbearer: see

Homer

Iliad

Laws

1331

I

and pains as they affect society and the character of the individual. Pleasure and pain, you see, flow like two springs released by nature. If a man draws the right amount from the right one at the right time, he lives a happy life; but if he draws unintelligently at the wrong time, his life will be rather different. State and individual and every living being are on the same footing here. Megillus: Well, sir, I suppose that what you say is more or less right; at any rate, we're baffled to find an argument against it. But in spite of

investigate almost exclusively pleasures

think the legislator of Sparta avoiding pleasure (our friend here will that

I

still

is

right to

come

recommend

a policy of

to the rescue of the

laws of

he wants to). The Spartan law relating to pleasures seems to me the best you could find anywhere. It has completely eliminated from our country the thing which particularly prompts men to indulge in the keenest pleasures, so that they become unmanageable and make every kind of a fool of themselves: drinking parties, with all their violent incitements to

Cnossus,

if

every sort of pleasure, are not a sight you'll see anywhere in Sparta, either in the countryside or in the towns under her control. None of us would fail to inflict there and then the heaviest punishment on any tipsy merrymaker he happened to meet; he would not let the man off even if he had the festival of Dionysus as his excuse. Once, I saw men in that condition on wagons in your country, and at Tarentum, among our colonials, I saw the entire city drunk at the festival of Dionysus. We don't have anything like that.

Athenian: My Spartan friend, all this sort of thing is perfectly laudable in men with a certain strength of character; it is when they cannot stop themselves that it becomes rather silly. A countryman of mine could soon come back at you tit for tat by pointing to the easy virtue of your women. There is one answer, however, which in Tarentum and Athens and Sparta too is apparently thought to excuse and justify all such practices. When a foreigner is taken aback at seeing some unfamiliar custom there, the reply he gets on all hands is this: 'There is no need to be surprised, stranger: this is what we do here; probably you handle these things differently.' Still,

my friends, the subject of this conversation is not mankind

in general

but only the merits and faults of legislators. In fact, there is a great deal more we ought to say on the whole subject of drinking: it is a custom of some little importance, and needs a legislator of some little skill to understand it properly. I am not talking about merely drinking wine or totally abstaining from it: I mean drunkenness. How should we deal with it? One policy is that adopted by the Scythians and Persians, as well as by the Carthaginians, Celts, Iberians and Thracians belligerent races, all of them. Or should we adopt your policy? This, as you say, is one of complete abstention, whereas the Scythians and Thracians (the women as well as

—

down

over their clothes; in this they reckon to be following a glorious and splendid custom. And the the

men) take

their

wine

neat,

and

tip

it

all

1332

Laws

Persians indulge on a grand scale (though with and other luxuries which you reject.

more decorum)

in these

Megillus: Oh, but my fine sir, when we get weapons in our hands we rout the lot of them. Athenian: Oh, but my dear sir, you must not say that. Many a time an army has been defeated and routed in the past, and will be in the future, without any very obvious reason. Merely to point to victory or defeat in battle is hardly to advance a clear and indisputable criterion of the merits or demerits of a given practice. Larger states, you see, defeat smaller ones

and the Syracusans enslave the Locrians, the very people who are supposed to be governed by the best laws you could find in those parts; the Athenians enslave the Ceians, and we could find plenty of other similar instances. It is by discussing the individual practice itself that we in battle,

should try to convince ourselves of its qualities: for the moment, we ought to leave defeats and victories out of account, and simply say that suchand-such a practice is good and such-and-such is bad. First, though, listen to my explanation of the correct way to judge the relative value of these practices.

Megillus: Well then, let's have the explanation. Athenian: I think that everyone who sets out to discuss a practice with the intention of censuring it or singing its praises as soon as it is mentioned

employing quite the wrong procedure. You might as well condemn cheese out of hand when you heard somebody praising its merits as a food, without stopping to ask about what effect it has and how it is taken (by which I mean such questions as how it should be given, who should take it, what should go with it, in what condition it should be served, and is

the state of health required of those who eat it). But this is just what I think we are doing in our discussion. have only to hear the word 'drunkenness', and one side immediately disparages it while the other praises it— a pointless procedure if there ever was one.

We

Each puts up

enthusiastic witnesses to endorse its recommendations: one side thinks that the number of its witnesses clinches the matter, the other points to the sight of the teetotalers conquering in battle— not that the facts of the case are beyond dispute even here. Now, if this is the way we are going to work one by one through the other customs, I for one shall find it goes against the grain. I want to discuss our present subject, drunkenness,

by

following a different

— and,

demonstrate the right

way to conduct an inquiry into such matters as

I

think, correct

— procedure,

to see

if

I

can

these

Thousands and thousands of states, you see, differ from your states in their view of these things, and would be prepared to fight

in general.

pair of it

out in discussion. Megillus. Certainly,

available,

11.

we ought

if

a correct

not to shy

method

of inquiry into such matters

away from hearing what

Accepting the conjecture of turous in

c5.

it is.

is

Laws

1333

I

Athenian: Let us conduct the inquiry more or less like this: suppose somebody were to praise goat-keeping, and commended the goat as a valuable article of possession; suppose somebody else were to disparage goats because he had seen some doing damage to cultivated land by grazing on it without a goatherd, and were to find similar fault with every animal he saw under incompetent control or none at all. What do we think of the censure of someone like that? Does it carry any weight at all? Megillus: Hardly.

Athenian: If a man possesses only the science of navigation, can we say that he will be a useful captain on board a ship, and ignore the question whether he suffers from seasickness or not? Can we say that, or can't we? Megillus: Certainly not, at any rate if, for all his skill, he's prone to the complaint you mention. Athenian: What about the commander of an army? Is he capable of taking command just by virtue of military skill, in spite of being a coward in face of danger? The 'seasickness' in this case is produced by being, as it

were, drunk with terror. Megillus: Hardly a capable commander, that. Athenian: And what if he combines cowardice with incompetence? Megillus: You are describing a downright useless fellow a commander

—

of the daintiest of dainty

women,

not of

men

at all.

Athenian: Take any social gathering you like, which functions naturally under a leader and serves a useful purpose under his guidance: what are we to think of the observer who praises or censures it although he has never seen it gathered together and running properly under its leader, but always with bad leaders or none at all? Given that kind of observer and that kind of gathering, do we reckon that his blame or praise will have

any value? Megillus: How could it, when he has never seen or joined any of these gatherings run in the proper way? Athenian: Hold on a moment. There are many kinds of gatherings, and presumably we'd say drinkers and drinking-parties were one?

Megillus: Of course.

Athenian: Has anyone ever seen such a gathering run in the proper way? You two, of course, find the answer easy: 'Never, absolutely never'; drinking-parties are just not held in your countries, besides being illegal. But I have come across a great many, in different places, and I have investigated pretty nearly all of them. However, I have never seen or heard of one that was properly conducted throughout; one could approve of a few insignificant details, but most of them were mismanaged virtually all the time. Clinias:

What

are

you

getting

at, sir?

Be a

little

more

explicit.

As you

experience of such events, so that even if we did find ourselves at one we would probably be unable to tell off-hand which

said,

we have no

features

were

correct

and which

not.

1334

Laws

Athenian: Very

But you can try to understand from my explanation. You appreciate that each and every assembly and gathering for any purpose whatever should invariably have a leader? Clinias:

Of

Athenian: their leader

likely.

course.

We

moment ago

said a

that

if it is

a case of

men

fighting,

must be brave.

Clinias: Yes, indeed.

Athenian: And a brave man, surely, is less thrown off balance by fears than cowards are. Clinias: That too is true enough. Athenian: If there were some device by which we could put in charge of an army a commander who was completely fearless and imperturbable, this is what we should make every effort to do, surely? Clinias:

It

certainly

Athenian: But the

is.

man we

are discussing

now

not going to take the lead in hostile encounters as between enemies, but in the peaceful meetings of friends with friends, gathering to foster mutual goodwill. is

Clinias: Exactly.

Athenian: But we can assume that this sort of assembly will get rather drunk, so it won't be free of a certain amount of disturbance, I

—

Of course not I imagine precisely the opposite. Athenian: To start with, then, the members of the gathering Clinias:

suppose.

will

need

a leader?

Of course they will, more than anybody else. Athenian: Presumably we should if possible equip them with Clinias:

who

a leader

can keep his head?

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian: And he should also, presumably, be a man who knows how to handle a social gathering, because his duty is not only to preserve the existing friendliness among its members, but to see that it is strengthened as a result of the party. Clinias: Quite true.

Athenian: So, when men become merry with drink, don't they need someone put in charge of them who is sober and discreet rather than the opposite? If the man in charge of the revellers were himself a drinker, or young and indiscreet, he ought to thank his lucky stars if he managed to avoid starting some serious trouble. Clinias: Lucky? I'll say so! Athenian: Consequently, an attack on such gatherings in cities where they are conducted impeccably might not in itself amount to unjustified criticism, provided the critic were attacking the institution itself. But if he abuses the institution simply because he sees every possible mistake being made in running it, he clearly does not realize, first, that this is a case of mismanagement, and secondly that any and every practice will appear in

Laws

1335

I

on without a sober leader to control it. Surely you appreciate that a drunken steersman, or any commander of anything, will always make a total wreck of his ship or chariot or army, or whatever

same

the

else

he

light

may

if it is

carried

be directing?

there's truth in that, certainly. But the next step is for you to tell us what conceivable benefit this custom of drinking parties would be to us, given proper management. For instance, to take our exam-

Clinias: Yes,

sir,

an army were properly controlled, its soldiers would win the war and this would be a considerable benefit, and the same reasoning applies to our other instances. But what solid benefit would it be to individuals or the state to instruct a drinking party how to behave itself? ple of a

moment

ago,

if

Athenian: Well, what solid benefit are we to say it is to the state when just one lad or just one chorus of them has been properly instructed? If the question were put like that, we should say that the state gets very little benefit from just one; but ask in general what great benefit the state derives from the training by which it educates its citizens, and the reply will be perfectly straightforward. The good education they have received will make them good men, and being good they will achieve success in other ways, and even conquer their enemies in battle. Education leads to victory; but victory, on occasions, results in the loss of education, because men often swell with pride when they have won a victory in war, and this pride fills them with a million other vices. Men have won many 'Cadmean victories', and will win many more, but there has never been such a thing

'Cadmean education

as

Clinias:

It

'. 12

looks to us,

my

friend, as

if

you mean

—

the time with friends over a drink provided considerable contribution to education.

we

imply that passing behave ourselves is a to

—

Athenian: Most certainly. Clinias: Well then, could you now produce some justification for this view? Athenian: Justification? Only a god, sir, would be entitled to insist that there are so many conflicting opinions. But if necessary this view is correct I am quite prepared to give my own, now that we have launched into a

—

discussion of laws and political organizations. Clinias: This is precisely what we are trying to discover opinion of the business we are now debating.

— your own

Athenian: Well then, let that be our agenda: you have to direct your efforts to understanding the argument, while I direct mine to expounding it as clearly as I can. But first listen to this, by way of preface: you'll find every Greek takes it for granted that my city likes talking and does a great 12.

Compare our expression

victors than the vanquished.

armed men sprang up and

'Pyrrhic victory',

i.e.,

Cadmus, founder

killed each other.

of

more disastrous for the Thebes, sowed the teeth of a dragon; one which

is

1336

Laws

deal of

it,

whereas Sparta

is

few words and Crete don't want to make you

a city of

cultivates the

than the tongue. I feel that I am saying an awful lot about a triviality, if I deal exhaustively and at length with such a limited topic as drinking. In fact, the genuinely correct way to regulate drinking can hardly be explained adequately and clearly except intellect rather

in the context of a correct theory of culture; and it is impossible to explain this without considering the whole subject of education. That calls for a

very long discussion indeed. So what do you think we ought to do now? What about skipping all this for the moment, and passing on to some other legal topic? Megillus: As it happens, sir perhaps you haven't heard my family represents the interests of your state, Athens, in Sparta. I dare say all children, when they learn they are proxeni 13 of a state, conceive a liking for it from their earliest years; each of us thinks of the state he represents as a fatherland, second only to his own country. This is exactly my own experience now. When the Spartans were criticizing or praising the Athenians, I used to hear the little children say, 'Megillus, your state has done the dirty on us,' or, 'it has done us proud.' By listening to all this

—

—

and

constantly resisting on your behalf the charges of Athens' detractors, I acquired a whole-hearted affection for her, so that to this day I very much enjoy the sound of your accent. It is commonly said that when an Athenian

good, he is 'very very good', and I'm sure that's right. They are unique in that they are good not because of any compulsion, but spontaneously, by grace of heaven; it is all so genuine and unfeigned. So you're welcome to speak as long as you like, so far as I'm concerned. Clinias: I endorse your freedom to say as much as you like, sir: you'll see that when you've heard what I have to say, too. You have probably heard that Epimenides, a man who was divinely inspired, was born hereabouts. He was connected with my family, and ten years before the Persian attack he obeyed the command of the oracle to go to Athens 14 where he performed certain sacrifices which the god had ordered. He told the Athenians, who were apprehensive at the preparations the Persians were making, that the Persians would not come for ten years, and that when they did, they would go back with all their intentions frustrated, after is

,

sustaining greater losses than they had inflicted. That was when my ancestors formed ties of friendship with you Athenians, and ever since then my forebears and I have held you in affection.

Athenian: Well then, on your part you are prepared to listen, apparently; on my side, I am ready and willing to go ahead, but the job will certainly tax

13.

my

A

abilities. Still,

the effort

must be made. To

assist the

proxenos looked after the interests of a foreign state in his

own

argument,

we

country.

chronology is a trifle confused. He thinks that Epimenides, a seer and wonderworker, lived about 500 b.c., which is 100 years later than his actual date. 14. Clinias'

Lazos

1337

I

ought to take the preliminary step of defining education and its potentialities, because we have ventured on a discussion which is intended to lead us to the god of wine, and we are agreed that education is as it were the route we have to take. Clinias: Certainly let's

do

that,

if

Athenian: I am going to explain see if you approve of my account. Clinias:

Your explanation,

you

like.

how one

should describe education:

then, please.

Athenian: It is this: I insist that a man who intends to be good at a particular occupation must practice it from childhood: both at work and at play he must be surrounded by the special 'tools of the trade'. For instance, the man who intends to be a good farmer must play at farming, and the man who is to be a good builder must spend his playtime building toy houses; and in each case the teacher must provide miniature tools that copy the real thing. In particular, in this elementary stage they must learn the essential elementary skills. For example, the carpenter must learn in his play how to handle a rule and plumb-line, and the soldier must learn to ride a horse (either by actually doing it, in play, or by some similar activity). We should try to use the children's games to channel their pleasures and desires towards the activities in which they will have to engage say that the correct way to bring up and educate a child is to use his playtime to imbue his soul with the greatest possible liking for the occupation in which he will have to be absolutely perfect when he grows up. Now, as I suggested, consider the

when

they are adult. To

sum

up,

we

argument so far: do you approve of my account? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: But let's not leave our description of education

and say one of us is educated and the other uneducated, we sometimes use latter term of men who have in fact had a thorough education-

When we abuse that this

in the air.

or

commend

the upbringing of individual people

one directed towards petty trade or the merchant-shipping business, or something like that. But I take it that for the purpose of the present discussion we are not going to treat this sort of thing as 'education'; what we have in mind is education from childhood in virtue a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. I suppose we should want to mark off this sort of training from others and reserve the title 'education' for it ,

alone.

A

training directed to acquiring

money

or a robust physique, or

even to some intellectual facility not guided by reason and justice, we should want to call coarse and illiberal, and say that it had no claim whatever to be called education. Still, let's not quibble over a name; let's stick to the proposition we agreed on just now: as a rule, men with a correct education become good, and nowhere in the world should education be despised, for when combined with great virtue, it is an asset of incalculable

1338

Laws

value.

If it

ever becomes corrupt, but can be put right again, this

a

is

which everyone should undertake to the limit of his strength. Clinias: True. We agree with your description. Athenian: Here is a further point on which we agreed some time ago 15

lifelong task

:

those

who

can control themselves are good, those

who

cannot are bad.

Clinias: Perfectly correct. c

Athenian: Let's take up this point again and consider even more closely just what we mean. Perhaps you'll let me try to clarify the issue by means of an illustration. Clinias: By all means. Athenian: Are we to assume, then, that each of us is a single individual? Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: But that he possesses within himself a pair of witless and mutually antagonistic advisers, which we call pleasure and pain? Clinias: That is so. Athenian: In addition to these two, he has opinions about the future, d

whose general name is 'expectations'. Specifically, the anticipation of pain is called 'fear', and the anticipation of the opposite is called 'confidence'. Over and against all these we have calculation', by which we judge the relative merits of pleasure and pain, and when this is expressed as a public decision of a state, Clinias:

I

what comes

it

receives the

title 'law'.

can scarcely follow you; but assume

I

do,

and carry on with

next.

Megillus: Yes, I'm in the same difficulty. Athenian: I suggest we look at the problem in this way: let's imagine that each of us living beings is a puppet of the gods. Whether we have been constructed to serve as their plaything, or for some serious reason, e

something beyond our ken, but what we certainly do know is this: we have these emotions in us, which act like cords or strings and tug us about; they work in opposition, and tug against each other to make us perform actions that are opposed correspondingly; back and forth we go across the is

boundary

645

where vice and virtue meet. One of these dragging forces, according to our argument, demands our constant obedience, and this is the one we have to hang on to, come what may; the pull of the other cords we must resist. This cord, which is golden and holy, transmits the power of calculation a power which in a state is called the public law; being golden, it is pliant, while the others, whose composition resembles a variety of other substances, are tough and inflexible. The force exerted by law is excellent, and one should always co-operate with it, because although line

,

'calculation'

is

a noble thing,

assistants, so that the b

we do

15.

it is

gold in us

gentle, not violent,

may

and

its

efforts

need

prevail over the other substances. If give our help, the moral point of this fable, in which we appear as

See 626e.

Laws

1339

I

puppets, will have been well and truly made; the meaning of the terms

and 'self-inferior 16 will somehow become clearer, and the duties of state and individual will be better appreciated. The latter must digest the truth about these forces that pull him, and act on it in his life; the state must get an account of it either from one of the gods or from the human expert we've mentioned, and incorporate it in the form of a law to govern both its internal affairs and its relations with other states. A further result will be a clearer distinction between virtue and vice; the light cast on that problem will perhaps in turn help to clarify the subject of education and the various other practices, particularly the business of drinking parties. It may well be thought that this is a triviality on which a great deal too much has been said, but equally it may turn out that the '

'self-superior'

topic really does deserve this extended discussion. Clinias: You are quite right; we certainly ought to give full consideration to

anything that deserves our attention in the 'symposium'

we

are hav-

ing now.

Athenian: Well then, tell me: if we give drink to this puppet of ours, what effect do we have on it? Clinias: What's your purpose in harking back to that question? Athenian: No particular purpose, for the moment. I'm just asking, in a general way, what effect is had on something when it is associated with something else. I'll try to explain my meaning even more clearly. This is what I'm asking; does drinking wine make pleasures and pains, anger and love,

more

intense?

Very much so. Athenian: What about sensations, memory, opinions and thought? Do these too become more intense? Or rather, don't they entirely desert a man Clinias:

if

himself with drink? Clinias: Yes, they desert him entirely.

he

fills

Athenian: So he reverts

to the

mental

state

he was in as a young child?

Clinias: Indeed.

Athenian:

And

Clinias: Yes, at

Athenian:

it's

its

A man

then that his self-control would be

at its

lowest?

lowest. in that condition,

we

agree,

is

very bad indeed.

Clinias: Very.

Athenian: So it looks as if it's not only an old a second childhood, but the drunkard too. Clinias: That's well said,

man who

will

go through

sir.

Athenian: Now, is there any argument that could even begin to persuade us that we ought to venture on this practice, rather than make every possible effort to avoid it?

16. Cf.

620d

ff.

1340

Laws

Clinias: Apparently there

is;

any rate, produce it. at

this is

what you

say,

and

a

minute ago you were ready to Athenian: A correct reminder; I'm ready still, now that you have both said you would be glad to listen to me. Clinias: We 11 be all ears, sir, if only because of your amazing paradox that a man should, on occasions, voluntarily abandon himself to extreme depravity. Athenian: You mean spiritual depravity, don't you? Clinias: Yes.

And what about degradation of the body, my friend — emaciation, disfigurement, ugliness, impotence? Shouldn't we be startled to find a man voluntarily reducing himself to such a state? Clinias: Of course we should. Athenian: We don't suppose, do we, that those who voluntarily take themselves off to the surgery in order to drink down medicines are unaware Athenian:

of the fact that very soon after, for days

such

that,

if it

were

to

on end,

their condition will

be anything more than temporary,

it

be

would make

insupportable? We know, surely, that those who resort to gymnasia for vigorous exercises become temporarily enfeebled? life

we are aware Athenian: And of the fact Clinias: Yes,

of

all this.

that they

go there of

their

own

accord, for the sake of the benefit they will receive after the initial stages? Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: So shouldn't we look at the other practices in the same light? Clinias: Yes indeed. Athenian: So the same view should be taken of time spent in one's cups if, that is, we may think of it as a legitimate parallel. Clinias:

Of

Athenian: time devoted

course.

Now

time so spent turned out to benefit us no less than to the body, it would have the initial advantage over physical exercises in that, unlike them, it is painless. Clinias: You're right enough in that, but I'd be surprised if we could discover any such benefit in this case. Athenian: Then this is the point it looks as if we ought to be trying if

to

explain. Tell me: can

Clinias:

I

we

conceive of two roughly opposite kinds of fear?

Which?

Athenian: These: when suppose?

we

expect evils to occur,

we

are in fear of them,

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: And we often fear for our reputation, when we imagine we are going to get a bad name for doing or saying something disgraceful. This is the fear which we, and I fancy everyone else, call 'shame'. Clinias: Surely.

Athenian: These are the two fears I meant. The second resists pains and the other things we dread, as well as our keenest and most frequent pleasures.

Laws

1341

1

Very true. Athenian: The legislator, then, and anybody of the slightest merit, values this fear very highly, and gives it the name 'modesty'. The feeling of confidence that is its opposite he calls 'insolence', and reckons it to be the biggest curse anyone could suffer, whether in his private or his public life. Clinias:

Clinias: True.

Athenian: So this fear not only safeguards us in a lot of other crucial areas of conduct but contributes more than anything else, if we take one thing with another, to the security that follows victory in war. Two things, then, contribute to victory: fearlessness in face of the enemy, and fear of ill-repute

among

one's friends.

Clinias: Exactly.

Athenian: Every individual should therefore become both afraid and unafraid, for the reasons we have distinguished in each case. Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Moreover, if we want to make an individual proof against all sorts of fears, it is by exposing him to fear, in a way sanctioned by the

we make him unafraid. Clinias: Evidently we do.

law, that

Athenian: But what about our attempts to make a man afraid in a way consistent with justice? Shouldn't we see that he enters the lists against impudence, and give him training to resist it, so as to make him conquer in the struggle with his pleasures? A man has to fight and conquer his feelings of cowardice before he can achieve perfect courage; if he has no experience and training in that kind of struggle, he will never more than ,

half realize his potentialities for virtue. Isn't the

same

true of self-control?

Will he ever achieve a perfect mastery here without having fought and conquered, with all the skills of speech and action both in work and play, the crowd of pleasures and desires that stimulate him to act shamelessly and unjustly? Can he afford not to have the experience of all these struggles? Clinias:

It

would seem hardly

likely.

Athenian: Well then, has any god given

me

a

drug

to

produce

fear, so

more the impression grows on him, after every draft, that he is assailed by misfortune? The effect would be to make him apprehensive about his present and future prospects, until finally even the boldest of men would be reduced to absolute terror; but when he had recovered from the drink and slept it off, he would that the

more

a

man

agrees to drink of

it,

the

invariably be himself again.

drink does that, sir? There's hardly an example we could point to anywhere in the world. Athenian: No. But if one had cropped up, would a legislator have been able to make any use of it to promote courage? This is the sort of point we might well have put to him about it: 'Legislator whether your laws Clinias:

And what

are to apply to Cretans or to

any other people

—

—

tell

us

this:

wouldn't you

1342

Lazvs

be particularly glad to have a criterion of the courage and cowardice of your citizens?

b

Clinias: Obviously, every legislator would say 'Yes'. Athenian: 'Well, you'd like a safe test without any serious risks, wouldn't you? Or do you prefer one full of risks?' Clinias: They will all agree to this as well: safety is essential.

Athenian: 'Your procedure would be to test these people's reactions when they had been put into a state of alarm, and by encouraging, rebuking and rewarding individuals you would compel them to become fearless. You

c

would

disgrace on anyone who disobeyed and refused to become in every respect the kind of man you wanted; you would discharge without penalty anyone who had displayed the proper courage and finished inflict

his

training satisfactorily;

and the

refuse point-blank to apply the the drink in other respects?'

you would punish. Or would you even though you had nothing against

failures test,

Of course he would apply it, sir. Athenian: Anyway, my friend, compared with current practice, this training would be remarkably straightforward, and would suit individuals, small groups, and any larger numbers you may want. Now if a man retreated into some decent obscurity, out of embarrassment at the thought of being seen before he is in good shape, and trained against his fears alone and in privacy, equipped with just this drink instead of all the usual paraphernalia, he would be entirely justified. But he would be no less justified if, confident that he was already well equipped by birth and Clinias:

d

e

breeding, he were to plunge into training with several fellow drinkers, While inevitably roused by the wine, he would show himself strong enough to escape its other effects: his virtue would prevent him from committing even one serious improper act, and from becoming a different kind of person. Before getting to the last round he would leave off, fearing the way in which drink invariably gets the better of a man. Clinias: Yes,

19

sir,

even he would be prudent enough

to

do

that.

Athenian: Let's repeat the point we were making to the legislator: Agreed then, there is probably no such thing as a drug to produce fear, either by divine gift or human contrivance (I leave quacks out of account: ^

they re beyond the pale). But is there a drink that will banish fear and stimulate over-confidence about the wrong thing at the wrong

What do we say Clinias:

b

moment?

to this?'

suppose

say 'There

and mention wine. Athenian: And doesn't this do just the opposite of what we described a moment ago? When a man drinks it, it immediately makes him more cheerful than he was before; the more he takes, the more it fills him with boundless optimism: he thinks he can do anything. Finally, bursting with self-esteem and imposing no restraint on his speech and actions, the fellow loses all his inhibitions and becomes completely fearless: he'll say and I

he'll

is',

Laws

1343

I

do anything, without about

a

qualm. Everybody,

I

think,

would agree with us

this.

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Now let's think back again to this point: we said that there were two elements in our souls that should be cultivated, one of them in order to make ourselves supremely confident, its opposite to make ourselves supremely fearful. Clinias: The latter being modesty, I suppose. Athenian: Well remembered! But in view of the fact that one has to

and intrepid when assailed by fears, the question whether the opposite quality will have to be cultivated in opposite

learn to be courageous arises

circumstances. Clinias: Probably so.

Athenian: So the conditions in which we naturally become unusually bold and daring seem to be precisely those required for practice in reducing our shamelessness and audacity to the lowest possible level, so that we become terrified of ever venturing to say, suffer, or do anything disgraceful. Clinias: Apparently.

Athenian:

—

Now

aren't

we

affected in this

way by

all

the following

conditions anger, love, pride, ignorance and cowardice? We can add wealth, beauty, strength and everything else that turns us into fools and makes us drunk with pleasure. However, we are looking for an inexpensive and less harmful test we can apply to people, which will also give us a

chance

to train

them when they

them, and

this

we have

are relaxed over a drink.

in the scrutiny

Can we

we

point to a

can

more

make

of

suitable

—

pleasure than this provided some appropriate precautions are taken? Let's look at it in this way. Suppose you have a man with an irritable and savage temper (this is the source of a huge number of crimes). Surely, to

and run the risk that he may default, is a more dangerous way to test him than to keep him company during a festival of Dionysus? Or again, if a man's whole being is dominated by sexual pleasures, it is dangerous to try him out by putting him in charge of your wife and sons and daughters; this is to scrutinize the character of his soul at the price of exposing to risk those whom you hold most dear. You could cite dozens of other instances, and still not do justice to the superiority of this wholly innocuous 'examination by recreation'. In fact, I think neither the Cretans nor any other people would disagree if we summed it all up like this: we have here a pretty fair test of each other, which for cheapness, safety and speed is absolutely unrivaled. Clinias: True so far. Athenian: So this insight into the nature and disposition of a man's soul will rank as one of the most useful aids available to the art which is concerned to foster a good character the art of statesmanship I take it?

make

contracts with him,

—

Clinias: Certainly.

,

1344

Laws

Book Athenian:

652

insight

It

looks as

we somehow

II

the next question get into men's natural if

we have

to

ask

is this: is

the

temperaments the only thing drinking parties? Or does a properly run drinking party confer some other substantial benefit that we ought to consider very seriously? What do we say to this? We need to be careful here: as far as I can see, our argument does tend to point to the answer 'Yes', but when we try to discover how and in what sense, we may get tripped up by it. Clinias: Tell us why, then. Athenian: I want to think back over our definition of correct education, and to hazard the suggestion now that drinking parties are actually its safeguard provided they are properly established and conducted on the in favor of

b

653

,

right lines.

Clinias: That's a large claim!

Athenian:

maintain that the earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue

b

I

and vice first enter the soul. (But for a man to acquire good judgment, and unshakable correct opinions, however late in life, is a matter of good luck: a man who possesses them, and all the benefits they entail, is perfect.) I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses before he can understand the reason

why. Then when he does understand, his reason and his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly trained by inculcation of appropriate habits. Virtue

c

this general

concord of reason and emotion. But there is one element you could isolate in any account you give, and this is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate what we ought to hate from first to last, and love what we ought to is

love. Call this 'education',

and

I,

at

any

rate,

think

you would be giving

proper name.

it its

Clinias: Yes,

we

approve of what you have just said about education and that goes for your previous account, too Athenian: Splendid. Education, then, is a matter of correctly disciplined feelings of pleasure and pain. But in the course of a man's life the effect sir,

entirely

1

.

and in many respects it is lost altogether. The gods, however, took pity on the human race, born to suffer as it was, and gave it relief in the form of religious festivals to serve as periods of rest from its labors. They gave us the Muses, with Apollo their leader, and Dionysus; by having these gods to share their holidays, men were to be made whole again, and wears

d

off,

thanks to them,

Now, let's

1.

there

see

See 643a

find refreshment in the celebration of these festivals. a theory which we are always having dinned into our ears:

is

if it

ff.

we

squares with the facts or not.

It

runs like

this: virtuallv all

Laws

1345

II

young things find it impossible to keep their bodies still and their tongues quiet. They are always trying to move around and cry out; some jump and skip and do a kind of gleeful dance as they play with each other, while others produce all sorts of noises. And whereas animals have no sense of order and disorder in movement ('rhythm' and 'harmony', as we call it), we human beings have been made sensitive to both and can enjoy them. This is the gift of the same gods whom we said were given to us as companions in dancing; it is the device which enables them to be our chorus-leaders and stimulate us to movement, making us combine to sing 2 and dance and as this naturally 'charms' us, they invented the word

—

'chorus

'. 3

So

shall

that education

we

comes

take

it

that this point

originally

is

established?

Can we assume

from Apollo and the Muses, or not?

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: So by an 'uneducated' man we shall mean a man not been trained to take part in a chorus; and we must say that has been sufficiently trained, he is 'educated'.

who if

a

has

man

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian: And of course a performance by a chorus of dancing and singing? Clinias:

Of

is

a

combination

course.

Athenian: And this means that the well-educated man will be able both to sing and dance well ? Clinias: So it seems. Athenian: Now let's see just what that word implies. Clinias:

What word?

say 'he sings well' or 'he dances well'. But should we expand this and say 'provided he sings good songs and dances good dances'?

Athenian:

Or

We

not?

Clinias: Yes,

Athenian:

we

Now

should expand then, take a

it.

man whose

opinion about what

is

good

is

good), and likewise in the case of the bad (it really is bad), and follows this judgment in practice. He may be able to represent, by word and gesture, and with invariable success, his intellectual concepcorrect

(it

really

is

good, even though he gets no pleasure from it and feels no hatred for what is bad. Another man may not be very good at keeping on the right lines when he uses his body and his voice to represent the good, or at trying to form some intellectual conception of it; but he may be very much on the right lines in his feelings of pleasure and pain, because tion of

what

is

he welcomes what is good and loathes what is bad. Which of these two will be the better educated musically, and the more effective member of a chorus? Clinias: As far as education is concerned, sir, the second is infinitely superior.

2.

Reading

3.

A

hei de in a3.

playful etymology: choros (chorus)

is

derived from chara (charm,

joy, delight).

1346

e

Lazvs

Athenian: So if the three of us grasp what 'goodness' is in singing and dancing, we have also a sound criterion for distinguishing the educated man from the uneducated. If we fail to grasp it, we'll never be able to make up our minds whether a safeguard for education exists, or where we ought to look for it. Isn't that so? Clinias: Yes,

it is.

Athenian: The next quarry we have to track down, like hounds at a hunt, will be what constitutes a 'good' bodily movement, tune, song and dance. But if all these notions give us the slip and get away, it will be pointless utterly to prolong our discussion of correct education, Greek or foreign. Clinias: Quite.

Athenian: Good. Now, what is to be our definition of a good tune or bodily movement? Tell me imagine a courageous soul and a cowardly soul beset by one and the same set of troubles: do similar sounds and

—

655

movements of the body result in each case? Clinias: Of course not. The complexion is different, to start with. Athenian: You are absolutely right, my friend. But music is a matter of rhythm and harmony, and involves tunes and movements of the body; this means that while it is legitimate to speak of a 'rhythmical' or a 'harmonious' movement or tune, we cannot properly apply to either of them the chorusmasters metaphor brilliantly colored'. But what is the appropriate language to describe the movement and melody used to portray the brave

b

man and

coward? The correct procedure is to call those of brave men good and those of cowards disgraceful'. But let's not have an inordinately the

long discussion about the details; can we say, without beating about the bush, that all movements and tunes associated with spiritual or bodily excellence (the real thing or a representation) are good? And conversely bad if they have to do with vice? Clinias: Yes, that's a reasonable proposal. You may assume we agree. Athenian: Here's a further point: do we all enjoy every type of perforc

d

mance by

a chorus to the

Clinias:

As

Clinias:

What?

same degree? Or

is

that far

from being true?

could be! Athenian: But can we put our finger on the cause of our confusion? Is it that 'good' varies from person to person? Or that it is thought to vary, although in point of fact it does not? No one, I fancy, will be prepared to say that dances portraying evil are better than those portraying virtue, or that although other people enjoy the virtuous Muse, his own personal liking is for movements expressing depravity. Yet most men do maintain that the power of music to give pleasure to the soul is the standard by which it should be judged. But this is an insupportable doctrine, and it is absolute blasphemy to speak like that. More likely, though, it's something else that's misleading us. far as

it

Athenian: Performances given by choruses are representations of character, and deal with every variety of action and incident. The individual

Laws

1347

II

performers enact their roles partly by expressing their own characters, partly by imitating those of others. That is why, when they find that the speaking or singing or any other element in the performance of a chorus appeals to their natural character or acquired habits, or both, they can't help applauding with delight and using the term 'good'. But sometimes they find these performances going against the grain of their natural character or their disposition or habits, in which case they are unable to take any pleasure in them and applaud them, and in this case the word they use is 'shocking'. When a man's natural character is as it should be, but he has acquired bad habits, or conversely when his habits are correct but his

he

calls

and

approval fail to coincide: the performances 'pleasant, but depraved'. Such performers, in

natural character

is

vicious, his pleasure

his

company of others whose judgment they respect, are ashamed to make this kind of movement with their bodies, and to sing such songs as though the

they genuinely approved of them. But in their heart of hearts, they enjoy themselves.

You are quite right. Athenian: Now, does a man's enjoyment of bad bodily movements or bad tunes do him any harm? And does it do him any good to take pleasure Clinias:

in the opposite kind?

Clinias: Probably.

Athenian: 'Probably'? Is that all? Surely there must be a precise analogy here with the man who comes into contact with depraved characters and wicked people, and who does not react with disgust, but welcomes them with pleasure, censuring them half-heartedly because he only half-realizes, as in a dream, how perverted such a state is: he just cannot escape taking on the character of what he enjoys, whether good or bad even if he is ashamed to go so far as to applaud it. In fact we could hardly point to a

—

greater force for

good

— or evil — than

this inevitable assimilation of char-

acter. I

don't think

we

Athenian: So,

in a society

where

Clinias: No,

could. the laws relating to culture, education

be in future, properly established, do we imagine that authors will be given a free hand? The choruses will be composed of the young children of law-abiding citizens: will the composer be free to teach them anything by way of rhythm, tune and words that amuses him when he composes, without bothering what effect he may have on them

and recreation are, or

as regards virtue

will

and

vice?

Clinias: That's certainly not sensible; how could it be? Athenian: But it is precisely this that they are allowed to all states

do

in virtually

— except in Egypt.

Clinias: Egypt! Well then, you'd better

tell

us what legislation has been

enacted there.

enough. Long ago, apparthey realized the truth of the principle we are putting forward only

Athenian: Merely ently,

now,

that the

to

hear about

it is

startling

movements and tunes which

the children of the state are to

1348

Laws

must be good ones. They compiled a list of them according to style, and displayed it in their temples. Painters and everyone else who represent movements of the body of any kind were restricted to these forms; modification and innovation outside this traditional framework were prohibited, and are prohibited even today, both in this field and the arts in general. If you examine their art on the spot, you practice in their rehearsals

thousand years ago (and I'm not speaking loosely: I mean literally ten thousand), paintings and reliefs were produced that are no better and no worse than those of today, because the same artistic rules were applied in making them. will find that ten

Clinias: Fantastic!

Athenian: No: simply a supreme achievement of legislators and statesmen. You might, even so, find some other things to criticize there, but in the matter of music this inescapable fact deserves our attention: it has in fact proved feasible to take the kind of music that shows a natural correctness and put it on a firm footing by legislation 4 But it is the task of a god, or a man of god-like stature; in fact, the Egyptians do say that the tunes that have been preserved for so long are compositions of Isis. Consequently, as I said, if one could get even a rough idea of what constitutes 'correctness in matters musical, one ought to have no qualms about giving the whole subject systematic expression in the form of a law. It is true that the craving for pleasure and the desire to avoid tedium lead us to a constant search for novelty in music, and choral performances that have been thus consecrated may be stigmatized as out-of-date; but this does not have very much power to corrupt them. In Egypt, at any rate, it does not seem to have .

7

had

a corrupting effect at

Clinias: So

all:

would seem,

quite the contrary.

judge from your account. Athenian: So, equally without qualms, we can surely describe the proper conditions for festive music and performances of choruses more or less like this. When we think things are going well for us, we feel delight; and to put it the other way round, when we feel delight, we come to think that things are going well. Isn't that so? Clinias:

it

to

It is.

Athenian: In addition, when we can't keep still.

we

are in that state

—

I

mean

'delight'

Clinias: That's true.

Athenian: Our youngsters are keen to join the dancing and singing themselves, but we old men think the proper thing is to pass the time as spectators. The delight we feel comes from their relaxation and merrymaking. Our agility is deserting us, and as we feel its loss we are only too pleased to provide competitions for the young, because they can best stir in us the memory of our youth and re-awaken the instincts of our younger days. Clinias: Very true. 4.

Deleting tharrounta in a7.

Lazos

1349

II

Athenian: So we'd better face the fact that there is a grain of truth in contemporary thought on the subject of holiday-makers. Most people say that the man who delights us most and gives us most pleasure should be highly esteemed for his skill, and deserves to be awarded first prize, because the fact that we are allowed to relax on such occasions means that we ought to lionize the man who gives most people most pleasure, so that, as

I

said just

now, he deserves

And

right, isn't it?

wouldn't

Maybe. Athenian: Ah, my

it

to carry off the prize. In theory that's

be equally right in practice?

Clinias:

fine fellow,

such a conclusion 'may be' rash!

We must

make some distinctions, and examine the question rather like this: suppose somebody were to arrange a competition, and were to leave its character entirely open, not specifying whether it was to be gymnastic, artistic or equestrian. Assume that he gathers together all the inhabitants of the state, and offers a prize: anyone who wishes should come and compete in giving and this is to be the sole criterion; the competitor who gives the audience most pleasure will win; he has an entirely free hand as to what method he employs, but provided he excels in this one respect he will be judged the most pleasing of the competitors and win the prize. What effect do we think such an announcement would have? Clinias: In what way do you mean? Athenian: Likely enough, I suppose, one competitor will play the Homer and present epic poetry, another will sing lyric songs to music, another will put on a tragedy, and another a comedy; and it will be no surprise putting on a if somebody even reckons his best chance of winning lies in puppet-show. Now, with all these competitors and thousands of others entering, can we say which would really deserve to win? Clinias: That's an odd question! Who could answer it for you with authority before hearing the contestants, and listening to them individually on the spot? Athenian: Well then, do you want me to give you an equally odd answer? pleasure,

Clinias: Naturally.

with the smallest infant children. They'll decide for the exhibitor of puppets, won't they?

Athenian: Suppose the decision Clinias:

Of

rests

course.

with the older children, they will choose the producer of comedies. Young men, ladies of cultivated taste, and I dare say pretty nearly the entire populace, will choose the tragedy. Clinias: Yes, I dare say. Athenian: We old men would probably be most gratified to listen to a reciter doing justice to the Iliad or Odyssey or an extract from Hesiod: we'd say he was the winner by a clear margin. Who, then, would be the proper

Athenian:

If it

rests

,

winner? That's the next question,

isn't it?

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: Clearly you and I are forced to say that the proper winners would be those chosen by men of our vintage. To us, from among all the

1350

Laws

customs followed

in

every city

all

over the world today,

this looks like

the best. Clinias: Surely.

Athenian: I am, then, in limited agreement with the man in the street. Pleasure is indeed a proper criterion in the arts, but not the pleasure experienced by anybody and everybody. The productions of the Muse are at their finest when they delight men of high calibre and adequate education but particularly if they succeed in pleasing the single individual whose education and moral standards 5 reach heights attained by no one else. This is the reason why we maintain that judges in these matters need high moral standards: they have to possess not only a discerning 6 taste but courage too. A judge won't be doing his job properly if he reaches his verdict by listening to the audience and lets himself be thrown off balance by the yelling of the mob and his own lack of training; nor must he shrug his shoulders and let cowardice and indolence persuade him into a false verdict against his better judgment, so that he lies with the very lips with which he called upon the gods when he undertook office. The truth is that he sits in judgment as a teacher of the audience, rather than as its pupil; his function (and under the ancient law of the Greeks he used to be allowed to perform it) is to throw his weight against them, if the pleasure they show has been aroused improperly and illegitimately. For instance, the law now in force in Sicily and Italy, by truckling to the majority of the audience and deciding the winner by a show of hands, has had a disastrous effect on the authors themselves, who compose to gratify the depraved tastes of their judges; the result is that in effect they are taught by the audience. It has been equally disastrous for the quality of the pleasure felt by the spectators: they ought to come to experience more elevated pleasures from listening to the portrayal of characters invariably better than their own, but in fact just the opposite happens, and they have no one to thank but themselves. Well, then, now that we have finished talking about that, what conclusion is indicated? Let's see if it isn't this

—

659

,

b

c

Clinias:

d

What?

Athenian: For the third or fourth time, I think, our discussion has come full circle. Once again, education has proved to be a process of attraction, of leading children to accept right principles as enunciated by the law and endorsed as genuinely correct by men who have high moral standards and are full of years and experience. The soul of the child has to be prevented from getting into the habit of feeling pleasure and pain in ways not sanctioned by the law and those who have been persuaded to obey it; he should follow in their footsteps and find pleasure and pain in the 5.

'Moral standards' here and 'high moral standards' just below translate arete else,

where normally

translated 'virtue.'

'Discerning taste' translates phronesis elsewhere usually translated 'good judgment' or 'wisdom' it is one of the four basic virtues Plato recognizes, along with justice, 6.

—

,

courage, and self-control (or moderation or restraint

sophrosune).

Laws

1351

II

have what we call songs, which These are in fact deadly serious devices

e

producing this concord' we are talking about; but the souls of the young cannot bear to be serious, so we use the terms 'recreation and 'song' for the charms, and children treat them in that spirit. We have an analogy in the sick and ailing; those in charge of feeding them try to administer the proper diet in tasty foods and drinks, and offer them un-

660

same things

as the old. That

is

are really 'charms' for the soul.

why we

for

may

wholesome items

in revolting foods, so that the patients

desirable habit of

welcoming the one kind and loathing the

just

what

get into the

other. That

is

the true legislator will persuade (or, failing persuasion, compel)

grand and marvelous language: to compose correctly by portraying, with appropriate choreography and musical setting, men who are moderate, courageous and good in every way. Clinias: Good Heavens, sir, do you really think that's how they compose nowadays in other cities? My experience is limited, but I know of no such the

man with a creative

flair to

do with

his

proceeding as you describe, except among us Cretans or in Sparta. In dancing and all the other arts one novelty follows another; the changes are made not by law but are prompted by wildly changing fancies that are very far from being permanent and stable like the Egyptian tastes you're explaining: on the contrary, they are never the same from minute

b

c

to minute.

Athenian: Well said, Clinias. But if I gave you the impression that I was speaking of the present day when I referred to the procedure you mention, thoughts that led I expect it was my own lack of clarity in expressing my you astray and caused me to be misunderstood. I was only saying what that made I want to see happen in the arts, but perhaps I used expressions you think I was referring to facts. It always goes against the grain to pillory habits that are irretrievably on the wrong lines, but sometimes one has to. So, seeing that we are agreed in approving this custom, tell me this, if you will: is it more prevalent among you Cretans and the Spartans than among the other Greeks?

d

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: And what if it became prevalent among the others as well? Presumably we'd say that that was an improvement on present practice? Clinias: Yes, I suppose it would be a tremendous improvement if they adopted the procedure of Crete and Sparta which is also in accordance with the recommendations you made just now. Athenian: Now then, let's make sure we understand each other in this business. The essence of the entire cultural education of your countries is surely this: you oblige your poets to say that the good man, because he whether is temperate and just, enjoys good fortune and is happy, no matter he is big and strong, or small and weak, or rich, or poor; and that even if he is 'richer than Midas or Cinyras', and has not justice, he is a wretch.

—

7.

See 653b.

e

1352

and

how

Laws lives a life of misery.

Td

not mention a man', says your poet, 8 and take no account of him', even if all his actions

and Td and possessions were what people commonly call 'good', if he were without justice, nor even if, with a character like that, he attacked in close combat with the foe'. If he is unjust, I wouldn't want him to 'stand the sight of bloody butchery' nor 'outdo in speed the north wind of Thrace', nor ever achieve any of the things that are generally said to be 'good'. You see, right he

these things

is,

men

usually

misnamed. It is commonly said that health comes first, beauty second, and wealth third. The list goes on indefinitely: keen sight and hearing, and acute perception of all the objects of sensation; being a dictator and doing whatever you like; and the seventh heaven is supposed to be reached when one has achieved all this and is made immortal without further ado. You and I, presumably, hold that all these things are possessions of great value to the just and pious, but that to the unjust they are a curse, every one of them, from health all the way down the list. Seeing, hearing, sensation, and simply being alive, are great evils, if in spite of having all these so-called good things a man gains immortality without justice and virtue in general; but if he survives for only the briefest possible time, the evil is less. I imagine you will persuade or compel the authors in your states to embody this doctrine of mine in the words, rhythms and 'harmonies' they produce for the education of your youth. Isn't that right? Look here, now: my position is quite clear. Although so-called evils are in fact evil for the just, they are good for the unjust; and so-called 'goods', while genuinely good for the good, are evils for the wicked. Let me ask the same question as before: are you and I in call

'good' are

agreement, or not? Clinias: In

some ways

I

think

we

are,

but certainly not in others.

Athenian: I expect this is where I sound implausible: suppose a man were to enjoy health and wealth and permanent absolute power and, if you like, I'll give him enormous strength and courage as well, and exempt him from death and all the other 'evils', as people call them. But suppose he had in him nothing but injustice and insolence. It is obvious, I maintain, that his life is wretchedly chappy.

—

Clinias: True, that's precisely

Athenian: Very well, then.

where you

How

should

fail to

we

convince.

put

it

now?

If

a

man

is

brave, strong, handsome, and rich, and enjoys a life-long freedom to do just what he wants to, don't you think if he is unjust and insolent that his life will inevitably be a disgrace? Perhaps at any rate you'd allow the

—

—

term 'disgrace'? Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Will you go further, and say he will

live 'badly'? 9

Tyrtaeus: see 629a and note.

The Athenian makes further brief quotations from the same poem. Midas and Cinyras, kings of Phrygia and Cyprus respectively, were notorious 8.

for 9.

extreme wealth.

The expression

Clinias

is

ambiguous: it may mean 'miserably' or 'wickedly'. In thinking of the first meaning. is

his reply,

— 1353

Lazos II

No, we'd not be so ready to admit that. Athenian: What about going further still, and saying he will live 'unpleasantly and unprofitably'? Clinias: How could we possibly be prepared to go as far as that? Athenian: 'How'? My friend, it looks as if it would be a miracle if we ever harmonized on this point: at the moment your tune and mine are scarcely in the same key. To me, these conclusions are inescapably true in fact, my dear Clinias, rather more true and obvious than that Crete is an island. If I were a lawgiver, I should try to compel the authors and every inhabitant of the state to take this line; and if anybody in the land Clinias:

said that there are

men who live a pleasant life in spite of being scoundrels,

or that while this or that is useful and profitable, something else is more just, I should impose pretty nearly the extreme penalty. There are many

should persuade my citizens to say, which would flatly contradict what Cretans and Spartans maintain nowadays, apparently to say nothing of the rest of the world. Zeus and Apollo! Just you imagine, my fine fellows, asking these gods who inspired your laws, 'Is the life of supreme justice also the life that gives most pleasure? Or are there two kinds

other things

I

one being "the supremely just," the other "the most pleasurable"?' Suppose they replied 'There are two.' If we knew the right question to ask, we might perhaps pursue the point: 'Which category of men should we call the most blessed by heaven? Those who live the supremely just pleasurlife, or the most pleasurable?' If they said 'Those who live the most able life', then that would be, for them, a curious thing to say. However, statement; I prefer to I am unwilling to associate the gods with such a think of it in connection with forefathers and lawgivers. So let's suppose those first questions have been put to a forefather and lawgiver, and that of

life,

he has replied that the

man who

lives the life of greatest pleasure enjoys

the greatest happiness. This is what I'd say then: 'Father, didn t you want me to receive as many of the blessings of heaven as I could? Yet in spite of that you never tired of telling me to order my life as justly as possible .

In taking

up

that kind of position our forefather or lawgiver will,

appear in rather an odd

light:

it

will look as

if

I

think,

he cannot speak without

contradicting himself. However, if he declared that the life of supreme justice was the most blessed, I imagine that everybody who heard him would want to know what splendid benefit, superior to pleasure, was to be found in this kind of life. What was there in it that deserved the

commendation of the law? Surely, any benefit a just man got out of it would be inseparable from pleasure? Look: are we to suppose that fame and praise from gods and men are fine and good, but unpleasant (and vice versa in the case of notoriety)? ('My dear legislator,' we'd say, 'of course not'.) Or, if you neither injure another nor are injured yourself by someone else, is that unpleasant, in spite of being fine and good? Is the opposite pleasant, but disgraceful and wicked? Clinias: Certainly not.

Athenian: So the argument that does not drive a wedge between 'pleasant' on the one hand and 'just' and 'fine' and 'good' on the other, even if

1354

Laws

achieves nothing

do something to persuade a man to live a just and pious life. This means that any teaching which denies the truth of all this is, from the lawgiver's standpoint, a complete disgrace and his worst enemy. (Nobody would willingly agree to do something which would not bring him more pleasure than pain.) Looking at a thing from a distance makes nearly everyone feel dizzy, especially children; but the lawgiver will alter that for us, and lift the fog it

else, will

that clouds our judgment:

argument

or other

—by habituation, praise, or

— he will persuade us that our ideas of justice and injustice are

like pictures

of justice,

somehow

10

drawn

in perspective. Injustice looks pleasant to the

because he regards

from

enemy

own

personal standpoint, which is unjust and evil; justice, on the other hand, looks unpleasant to him. But from the standpoint of the just man the view gained of justice and injustice it

his

always the opposite. Clinias: So it seems. Athenian: And which of these judgments are we to say has a better claim to be the correct one? The judgment of the worse soul or the better? Clinias: That of the better, certainly. Athenian: Then it is equally certain that the unjust life is not only more shocking and disgraceful, but also in fact less pleasant, than the just is

and

holy.

Clinias:

On

Clinias:

What

argument, my friends, it certainly looks like it. Athenian: But just suppose that the truth had been different from what the argument has now shown it to be, and that a lawgiver, even a mediocre one, had been sufficiently bold, in the interests of the young, to tell them a lie. Could he have told a more useful lie than this, or one more effective making everyone practice justice in everything they do, willingly and without pressure? Clinias: Truth is a fine thing, and it is sure to prevail, but to persuade men of it certainly seems no easy task. Athenian: Yes, but what about that fairy story about the Sidonian? 11 1 hat was well-nigh incredible, but it was easy enough to convince men of it, and of thousands of other similar stories. this

m

sort of stories?

Athenian: The sowing of the teeth and the birth of armed men from them. This remarkable example shows the legislator that the souls of the young can be persuaded of anything; he has only to try. The only thing he must consider and discover is what conviction would do the state most good; in that connection, he must think up every possible device to ensure that as far as possible the entire stories and doctrines an absolute

the matter in

any other

light,

community preserves in its songs and and lifelong unanimity. But if you see have no hesitation in disputing my view.

10.

Accepting the conjecture of enantidi in

11.

Cadmus. See 641c and

note.

c3.

Laws

1355

II

No, I don't think either of us would be able to dispute that. Athenian: Then it will be up to me to introduce the next point. I maintain should charm the souls of the chilall three of them that our choruses dren while still young and tender, and uphold all the admirable doctrines we have already formulated, and any we may formulate in the future. We must insist, as the central point of these doctrines, that the gods say the best life does in fact bring most pleasure. If we do that, we shall be telling the plain truth, and we shall convince those whom we have to convince more effectively than if we advanced any other doctrine. Clinias: Yes, one has to agree with what you say. Athenian: To start with, it will be only right and proper if the children's chorus (which will be dedicated to the Muses) comes on first to sing these doctrines with all its might and main before the entire city. Second will 12 come the chorus of those under thirty, which will call upon Apollo Paean to bear witness that what they say is true, and pray that he will vouchsafe to convince the young. Thirdly, there must be the songs of those between Clinias:

—

—

and sixty. That leaves the men who are older than this, who are, of course, no longer up to singing; but they will be inspired to tell stories in which the same characters will appear. Clinias: You mention these three choruses, sir: what are they? We are not very clear what you mean to say about them. Athenian: But the greater part of the discussion we have had so far has thirty

been precisely Clinias: still

We

for their sake! still

haven't seen the point. Could you try to elucidate

further? 11

said at the beginning of our discussion that all young things, being fiery and mettlesome by nature, are unable they are always making uncoto keep their bodies or their tongues still ordinated noises and jumping about. No other animal, we said, ever devel-

Athenian:

If

we remember, we

—

ops a sense of order in either respect; man alone has a natural ability to do this. Order in movement is called 'rhythm', and order in the vocal sounds the combination of high and low notes is called 'harmony and the union of the two is called 'a performance by a chorus'. We said that the gods took pity on us and gave us Apollo and the Muses as companions and leaders of our choruses; and if we can cast our minds back, we said that their third gift to us was Dionysus. Clinias: Yes, of course we remember. Athenian: Well, we've mentioned the choruses of Apollo and the Muses; the remaining one, the third, must be identified as belonging to Dionysus. Clinias: What! You had better explain yourself: a chorus of elderly men dedicated to Dionysus sounds a weird and wonderful idea, at any rate at sixty, really first hearing. Are men of more than thirty and even fifty, up to going to dance in honor of Dionysus?

—

—

12.

The god

13.

See 653d

of healing. ff.

;

1356

Laws

Athenian: You are absolutely right— to show how this could be reasonable in practice does need, I think, some explanation. Clinias:

c

It

certainly does.

Athenian: Are we agreed on the conclusions we have reached so far? Clinias: Conclusions about what? Athenian: About this that every man and child, free-man and slave, male and female in fact, the whole state is in duty bound never to stop repeating to each other the charms 14 we have described. Somehow or other, we must see that these charms constantly change their form; at all costs they must be continually varied, so that the performers always long to

—

d

—

sing the songs, and find perpetual pleasure in them. Clinias: Agreed: that's exactly the arrangement we want, Athenian. This last chorus is the noblest element in our state;

more conviction than any other group, because

of the age

it

carries

and discernment

members. Where, then, should it sing its splendid songs, if it is to do most good? Surely we are not going to be silly enough to leave this question undecided? After all, this chorus may well prove to be consummate masters of the noblest and most useful songs. Clinias: No; if that's really the way the argument is going, we certainly of

its

can't leave this undecided.

Athenian: So what would be a suitable method of procedure? See

if

this will do.

What, then? Athenian: As he grows Clinias:

e

old, a

man becomes

apprehensive about singing; gives him less pleasure, and if it should happen that he cannot avoid it, it causes him an embarrassment which grows with the increasingly sober tastes of his advancing years. Isn't that so? Clinias: Indeed it is. Athenian: So naturally he will be even more acutely embarrassed at standing up and singing in front of the varied audience in a theater. And it

men

were forced to sing in the same condition as members of choruses competing for a prize lean and on a diet after a course of voice-training then of course they would find the performance positively unpleasant and humiliating, and would lose every spark of enthusiasm. Clinias: Yes, that would be the inevitable result. Athenian: So how shall we encourage them to be enthusiastic about singing? The first law we shall pass, surely, is this: children under the age of eighteen are to keep off wine entirely. We shall teach them that they must treat the violent tendencies of youth with due caution, and not pour fire on the fire already in their souls and bodies until they come to undertake the real work of life. Our second law will permit the young man under thirty to take wine in moderation, but he must stop short of drunkenness and bibulous excesses. When he reaches his thirties, he should regale himself at the common meals, and invoke the gods; in particular, he should if

of that age

—

666

b

14.

See 659e.

Laws

1357

II

what is at once the play-time and the prayer-time of the old, which the god gave to mankind to help cure the crabbiness of age. This is the gift he gave us to make us young again: we forget our peevishness, and our hard cast of mind becomes softer and grows more malleable, just like iron thrust in a fire. Surely any man who is brought into that frame of mind would be ready to sing his songs (that is 'charms', as we've called them often enough) with more enthusiasm and less embar-

summon Dionysus

to

rassment? I don't mean in a large gathering of strangers, but in a comparatively small circle of friends. Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: As a method of inducing them to join us in our singing, there wouldn't be anything you could particularly object to in this. Clinias: By no means. Athenian: But what sort of philosophy of music will inspire their songs? Obviously, it will have to be one appropriate to the performers. Clinias:

Of

Athenian:

What

notes

course.

And

would

men

of almost divine distinction. be appropriate for them? Those produced by the

the performers are

choruses? Cretans, at any rate— and the same goes for the Spartans— would hardly be up to singing any song except those we learned to sing by growing familiar with them in our choruses. Athenian: Naturally enough. In cold fact, you have failed to achieve Clinias: Well,

sir,

we

the finest kind of song. You organize your state as though it were a military camp rather than a society of people who have settled in towns, and you keep your young fellows together like a herd of colts at grass. Not a man among you takes his own colt and drags him, furiously protesting, away

from the rest of the herd; you never put him in the hands of a private groom, and train him by combing him down and stroking him. You entirely out not fail to lavish proper care on an education which will turn him merely a good soldier but a capable administrator of a state and its towns. Such a man is, as we said early on, a better fighter than those of Tyrtaeus, precisely because he does not value courage as the principal element in virtue: he consistently relegates it to fourth place wherever he finds it, whether

in the individual or the state.

Clinias:

I

suspect,

sir,

you

are being rather rude about our legislators

again.

Athenian: If I am, my dear fellow, it is entirely unintentionally. But if you don't mind, we ought to follow where the argument leads us. If we know of any music that is of finer quality than the music of choruses and the public theaters, we ought to try to allocate it to these older people. They are, as we said, embarrassed at the other kind; but music of the highest quality is just what they are keen to take part in. Clinias: Yes, indeed.

Athenian: The most important point about everything that has some inherent attractive quality must be either this very quality or some kind of

1358

Laws

'correctness' or (thirdly)

c

its

usefulness. For instance,

I

maintain that eating

and drinking and taking nourishment in general are accompanied by the particular attractive quality that we might call pleasure; as for their usefulness and correctness we invariably speak of the 'wholesomeness' of the foods we serve, and in their case the most 'correct' thing in them is ,

precisely this. Clinias: Quite.

—

Athenian: An element of attractiveness the pleasure we feel goes with the process of learning, too. But what gives rise to its 'correctness'

and usefulness,

its

excellence

and

nobility, is

—

its

accuracy.

Clinias: Exactly.

d

Athenian: What about the arts of imitation, whose function is to produce likenesses? When they succeed in doing this, it will be quite proper to say that the pleasure if any that arises out of and accompanies that success constitutes the attractive quality of these arts. Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: Generally speaking,

would depend not so much representation of the size and

suppose, the 'correctness' in such cases on the pleasure given, as on the accurate I

qualities of the original?

Clinias: Well put.

e

Athenian: So pleasure would be the proper criterion in one case only. A work of art may be produced with nothing to offer by way of usefulness or truth or accuracy of representation (or harm, of course). It may be produced solely for the sake of this element that normally accompanies the others, the attractive one. (In fact, it is when this element is associated with none of the others that it most genuinely deserves the name 'pleasure'.) Clinias: You mean only harmless pleasure? Athenian: Yes, and it is precisely this that I call 'play', when it has no particular

good or bad

effect that

deserves serious discussion.

Clinias: Quite right.

Athenian: And we could conclude from all this that no imitation at all should be judged by reference to incorrect opinions about it or by the criterion of the pleasure 668

every sort of equality.

it

What

gives. This

equal

is

particularly so in the case of

equal and what is proportional is and this does not depend on anyone's opinion that it is so, nor does it cease to be true if someone is displeased at the fact. Accuracy, and nothing else whatever, is the only permissible criterion. Clinias: Yes, that is emphatically true. Athenian: So do we hold that all music is a matter of representation is

is

proportional,

and imitation? Clinias: Of course.

b

Athenian: So when someone says that music is judged by the criterion of pleasure, we should reject his argument out of hand, and absolutely refuse to go in for such music (if any were ever produced) as a serious genre. The music we ought to cultivate is the kind that bears a resemblance to its model, beauty.

— Laws

1359

II

Very true. Athenian: These people, then,

Clinias:

who

are anxious to take part in the finest possible singing, should, apparently, look not for a music which is sweet, but one which is correct; and correctness, as we said, lies in the imitation and successful reproduction of the proportions and characteristics of the

model. Clinias:

It

does indeed.

Athenian: This is certainly so in the case of music: everyone would admit that all musical compositions are matters of imitation and representation. In fact, composers, audiences and actors would register universal agreement on this point, wouldn't they? Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: So it looks as if a man who is not to go wrong about a given composition must appreciate what it is, because failure to understand its nature will

— w hat

mean

it is

do and what in fact it is a representation of virtually no conception of whether the author has

trying to

that he gets

achieved his aim correctly or not. Clinias: No, virtually none, naturally. Athenian: And if he cannot gauge the correctness of the composition, surely he won't be able to judge its moral goodness or badness? But this putting it. is all rather obscure. Perhaps this would be a clearer way of Clinias:

What?

Athenian: There

are, of course,

thousands of representations that

strike

the eye? Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: Now, imagine someone who didn't know the character of each of the objects that are imitated and represented. Would he ever be able to estimate the correctness of the finished article? This is the sort of point I have in mind: does it preserve the overall proportions of the body

and the position of each of its various parts? Does it hit off the proportions exactly and keep the parts in their proper positions relative to one another? And what of their colors and contours? Have all these features been reproduced higgledy-piggledy? Do you think that if a man did not know the character of the creature represented he would ever be able to assess these points? Clinias:

Of course

not.

man, and that all his parts with their colors and contours have been caught by the artist's skill? Suppose a man knows all that; is he without further ado necessarily ready to judge whether the work is beautiful or falls short of Athenian: What

beauty

in

some

if

we knew

that the thing

molded

or painted

is

a

respect?

Clinias: In that case,

sir,

pretty well

all

of us

would be judges

of the

quality of a representation.

Athenian: You have hit the nail on the head. So anyone who is going to be a sensible judge of any representation— in painting and music and every other field should be able to assess three points: he must know,

—

1360 b

first,

Laws

what has been represented; second,

how

has been copied; and then, third, the moral value of this or that representation produced by language, tunes and rhythms. correctly

it

Clinias: Apparently so.

Athenian:

c

We

ought not

mention the peculiar difficulty about music, which is discussed much more than any other kind of artistic representation and needs much more careful handling than all the others. A man who goes wrong on this subject will suffer a good deal of harm because he feels attracted to evil dispositions; and his mistake is very to fail to

difficult to detect,

because the authors hardly have the same degree of creative ability as the actual Muses. The Muses would never make the ghastly mistake of composing the speech of men to a musical idiom suitable for women, or of fitting rhythms appropriate to the portrayal of slaves and slave-like people to the tune and bodily movements used to represent free men (or again of making rhythms and movements appropriate to free

men accompany d

a combination of tune

and words

that conflicted with

those rhythms). Nor would they ever mix up together into one production the din of wild animals and men and musical instruments and all kinds of other noises and still claim to be representing a unified theme. But

human

authors, in their silly way, jumble

all

these things together into

complicated combinations; in Orpheus' words, anyone 'whose delight in life is in its springtime will find them a rich source of amusement. And in the midst of all this confusion, he will find that the authors also divorce ,

rhythm and movement from the tune by putting unaccompanied words into meter, and rob tune and rhythm of words by using stringed instruments and pipes on their own without singers. When this is done, it is extraordinarily difficult to know what the rhythm and harmony without speech are supposed to signify and what worthwhile object they imitate and represent. The conclusion is inevitable: such practices appeal to the taste of the village idiot.

670

b

fondness for speed and dexterity (as in reproducing the noises of wild animals) which prompts the use of pipes and lyre otherwise than as an accompaniment to dancing and singing. Using either instrument on its own is in fact sheer showmanship that has nothing to do with art. But enough of theory: what we are considering is not what sort of music our citizens over thirty and fifty should avoid, but what sort they should go in for. I think our argument so far seems to point to the conclusion that the fifty-year-olds who have the duty of singing must have enjoyed an education that reached a higher standard than the It is

this

music of choruses. They must, of course, have a nice appreciation of rhythms and harmonies and be able to understand them. Otherwise how could a man assess the correctness of the tunes, and tell whether the Dorian mode was appropriate or not in a given case, or judge whether the author has set the tunes to the right rhythm or not? Clinias: Clearly he couldn't.

Athenian: The belief of the general public, that they can form an adequate judgment of merit and demerit in matters of harmony and rhythm, is

Laws

1361

II

laughable: they have only been drilled into singing to the pipes and marchthe ing in step, and they never stop to think that they do all this without smallest understanding of it. In fact, every tune with the right elements is

correct,

but

if it

has the wrong ones,

it is

faulty.

Clinias: Inevitably.

Athenian: What about the man who doesn't even understand what the elements are? As we said, will he ever be able to decide that any aspect of the piece

is

correct?

No, how could he? Athenian: So it looks as if once again we are discovering

Clinias:

that

it

is

virtually indispensable for these singers of ours (who are not only being encouraged to sing but compelled to do it in a willing spirit, if I may put least this point: they should it like that), to have been educated up to at

each be able to follow the notes of the tunes and the basic units of rhythm, so that they may examine the harmonies and rhythms and select those that men of their age and character could appropriately sing. If that is how they sing, they will give themselves harmless pleasure, and at the same time stimulate the younger generation to adopt virtuous customs with the proper enthusiasm. Assuming the education of these singers reaches that level, they will have pursued a more advanced course of training than will be given to ordinary men, or even the authors themselves.

The author is more or less obliged to have a knowledge of rhythm and harmony, but there is no necessity for him to be able to assess the third poi n t whether the imitation is a morally good one or not. The men we are talking about, however, must be equally competent in all three fields, so that they can isolate the primary and secondary degrees of goodness; otherwise they will never prove capable of charming the young in the

—

direction of virtue.

Athenian: Our argument has done its level best: we have to consider whether it has succeeded in its original intention of showing that our defense of Dionysus' chorus was justified. A gathering like that, of course, inevitably gets increasingly rowdier as the wine flows more freely. (In fact, our initial assumption in the present discussion of this business was that such a tendency is unavoidable.) unavoidable. Athenian: Everyone is taken out of himself and has a splendid time; to the exuberance of his conversation is matched only by his reluctance their lives listen to his companions, and he thinks himself entitled to run Clinias: Yes,

as well as his

it is

own.

He certainly does. Athenian: And didn't we say

Clinias:

when

happens the souls of the drinkers get hot and, like iron in a fire, grow younger and softer, so that anyone who has the ability and skill to mold and educate them, finds them molding as easy to handle as when they were young? The man to do the the good lawgiver. When our drinker grows is the same one as before and cheerful and confident and unduly shameless and unwilling to speak

—

that

this

1362

d

Laws

keep quiet, to drink and sing, at the proper times, the lawgiver's job will be to lay down drinking laws which will be able to make this fellow willing to mend his ways; and to do battle with this disgraceful over-confidence as soon as it appears, they will be able to send into the arena, with the

blessing of justice, this divine

and 'shame

'. 15

and splendid

fear

we have

called 'modesty' J

Clinias: Exactly.

Athenian: The cool-headed and sober should guard and co-operate with these laws by taking command of those who are not sober; fighting the enemy without cool-headed leaders is actually less dangerous than fighting drink without such help as this. If a man cannot show a willing spirit and obey these commanders and the officials of Dionysus (who

are upwards of sixty yeais of age), the dishonor he incurs must equal or even exceed that incurred by the man who disobeys the officials of the god of war. Clinias: Precisely.

Athenian. So,

672

they drank and made merry like that, the revelers who took part in the proceedings would surely benefit? They would go their way on better terms with each other than they were before, instead of loathing each other, which is what happens nowadays; and this would be because they had rules to regulate the whole of their intercourse and had followed every instruction given by the sober to the tipsy. if

Clinias: Precisely

—

indeed the party were to go as you describe. Athenian: So let's not abuse the gift of Dionysus any longer in the old unqualified terms, saying that it is bad and does not deserve to be received into the state.

if

One

could, indeed, enlarge on its benefits even more. But in front of the general public I would be chary of mentioning the main benefit conferred by the gift, because people misconstrue and

misunder-

b

stand the explanation. Clinias:

What

is

the benefit?

Athenian: There is a little-known current of story and tradition 16 which says that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Hera, and that he gets his revenge by stimulating us to Bacchic frenzies and all the mad dancing that results; and this was precisely the reason why he

made

c

us a present of wine. This sort of story, however, I leave to those who see no danger in speaking of the gods in such terms. But I am quite certain of this: no animal that enjoys the use of reason in its maturity is ever born with that faculty, or at any rate with it fully developed. During the time in which it has not yet attained its characteristic level of intelligence, it is completely mad: it bawls uncontrollably, and as soon as it can get on its feet it jumps about with equal abandon. Let's think back: we said that this situation gave rise to music and gymnastics.

15.

646e

16. Cf.

ff.

Euripides, Cyclops,

3.

Laws

1363

II

Clinias:

We

remember, of course.

And

was the source of man's appreciation of rhythm and harmony, and Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus were the Athenian:

also that this

who

co-operated to implant Clinias: Yes, indeed.

gods

it

in us.

Athenian: In particular, it seems that according to the common story wine was given to men as a means of taking vengeance on us it was intended to drive us insane. But our interpretation is entirely the opposite: the gift was intended to be a medicine and to produce reverence in the soul, and health and strength in the body. Clinias: Yes, sir, that's a splendid recapitulation of the argument. Athenian: We are now half-way through our examination of singing and dancing. Shall we carry on with the other half in whatever way

—

recommends itself, or shall we pass it over? Clinias: What halves do you mean? Where do you put your

dividing-

line?

Athenian: We found that singing and dancing, taken together, amounted, in a sense, to education as a whole. One part of it the vocal was concerned with rhythms and 'harmonies'. part

—

—

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: The second part concerned the movement of the body. Here too we had rhythm, a feature shared with the movement of the voice; but the body's movements were its own particular concern, just as in the other half the tune was the special job of the vocal movements. Clinias: True enough. Athenian: When the sound of the voice penetrates the soul, we took that to be an education in virtue, and we hazarded the term 'music' to describe

it.

And quite rightly. Athenian: When the movements

Clinias:

of the body,

which we described as

'dancing in delight', are such as to result in a fine state of physical fitness, we ought to call the systematic training which does this 'gymnastics'. Clinias: Exactly.

which is roughly the half of the subject of choruses that we said we had examined and finished with; so that's that. Shall we discuss the other half? Or what method should we Athenian: So much, then,

follow

for music,

now?

Clinias: Really,

my

dear fellow!

You

are having a conversation with

—

Cretans and Spartans, and we have discussed music thoroughly leaving gymnastics still to come. What sort of answer do you think you'll get to that question, from either of us? Athenian: I should say that question was a pretty unambiguous answer. I take it that your question, as I said, amounts in fact to a reply, an order even, to finish off our examination of gymnastics. Clinias:

You understand me

perfectly:

do

just that.

1364

Laws

Athenian: Yes, I must. Of course, discussing a subject so familiar to you both is not very difficult. You see, you have had much more experience of this particular skill than of the other. Clinias: True enough.

d

Athenian: Again, the origin of this form of recreation too lies in the fact that every animal has the natural habit of jumping about. The human animal, as we said, acquired a sense of rhythm, and that led to the birth of dancing. The tune suggested rhythm and awakened the memory of it,

and out

of the

union of the two was born choral singing and dancing as

a recreation.

Clinias: Exactly.

Athenian: We have already discussed one of these two; going to set about the discussion of the other.

now we

are

Clinias: Yes, indeed. e

Athenian: However, if you are agreeable, the use of drink its final flourish. Clinias:

What

flourish

Athenian: Suppose a

do you mean? state takes this practice

sufficiently seriously to control

674

give our discussion of

let's

it

by

we

are

now

discussing

and use it to cultivate similar enjoyment of other pleasures a set of rules

moderate habits; suppose it permits a on the same principle, seeing it simply as a device for mastering them. In each and every case, our method will be the one that must be followed. But if the state treats a drink as recreation pure and simple, and anybody who wants to can go drinking and please himself when and with whom he does it, and do whatever else he likes at the same time, then my vote

would be in favor of never allowing this state or individual to take wine at all. I would go further than Cretan and Spartan practice: I would support the law of the Carthaginians, which forbids anyone on military service to take a drink of wine, and makes water the only permissible beverage during the entire campaign. As for civilians, it forbids slaves, male and b

female, ever to touch wine;

it

forbids magistrates during their year of on duty are absolutely prohibited from

steersmen and jurymen touching it, and so too is any councillor who is going to take part in an important discussion; nobody at all is permitted to drink wine during the day, except for reasons of training or health, nor at night if they intend to office;

c

procreate children (this prohibition applying to men and women alike); and one could point to a great many other situations in which any sensible person with a respect for the law would find it proper not to drink wine. This kind of approach would mean that no state would need many vines

and as part of the regulations covering agriculture in general and the whole question of diet, the production of wine in particular would be restricted to the most modest quantities. With your permission, gentlemen, take that as the final flourish to our discussion of wine. Clinias: Splendid! Permission granted.

let's

— Laws

1365

III

Book

III

Athenian: We can take that as settled, then. But what about systems? How are we to suppose they first came into existence? I that the best and easiest way to see their origins is this.

What? Athenian: To use

political feel

sure

Clinias:

we

the

same method

that

we always have

to

adopt when

look into a state's moral progress or decline.

Clinias:

What method have you

in

mind?

Athenian: We take an indefinitely long period of time and study the changes that occur in it.

How

do you mean? Athenian: Look, do you think you could ever grasp how long it is that states have existed and men have lived under some sort of political organiClinias:

zation? Clinias: No, not very easily.

Athenian: But at any rate you realize it must be an enormously long time? Clinias: Yes,

I

see that , of course.

Athenian: So surely, during this period, thousands upon thousands of states have come into being, while at least as many, in equally vast numbers, have been destroyed? Time and again each one of them has adopted every type of political system. And sometimes small states have become bigger, and big ones have grown smaller; superior states have deteriorated and

bad ones have improved. Clinias: Inevitably.

Athenian: Let's try to pin down just why these changes took place, if we can; then perhaps we shall discover how the various systems took root and developed. Clinias: Admirable! Let's get down to it. You must do your best to explain your views, and we must try to follow you. Athenian: Do you think there is any truth in tradition? Clinias:

What

sort of tradition

do you mean?

Athenian: This: that the human race has been repeatedly annihilated by floods and plagues and many other causes, so that only a small fraction of

it

survived.

Clinias: Yes, of course,

all

that sort of thing strikes

everyone as en-

tirely credible.

Athenian: I

Now then, let's picture just one of this series of annihilations

mean

the effect of the flood. Clinias: What special point are

Athenian: That those nearly

all

hill-shepherds

who

we

to notice

about

it?

escaped the disaster must have been pretty

— a few embers of mankind preserved,

on the tops of mountains.

I

imagine,

1366

Laws

Clinias: Obviously.

Athenian: Here's a further point: such

men must have been

in general

unskilled and unsophisticated. In particular, they must have been quite innocent of the crafty devices that city-dwellers use in the rat-race to do each other down; and all the other dirty tricks that men play against one

another must have been unknown. Clinias: Quite likely.

Athenian: And we can take it, can't we, that the cities that had been built on the plains and near the sea were destroyed root-and-branch? Clinias: Yes,

we

Athenian: So

all their

can.

were destroyed, and any worthwhile discovery they had made in politics or any other field was entirely lost? You see, my friend, if their discoveries had survived throughout at the same level of development as they have attained today, it is difficult to see what room there can ever have been for any new invention. Clinias: The upshot of all this, I suppose, is that for millions of years these techniques remained unknown to primitive man. Then, a thousand or two thousand years ago, Daedalus and Orpheus and Palamedes made their various discoveries, Marsyas and Olympus pioneered the art of music, Amphion invented the lyre, and many other discoveries were made by other people. All this happened only yesterday or the day before, so tools

to speak.

Athenian: How tactful of you, Clinias, to leave out your friend, who really was born 'yesterday'! Clinias: I suppose you mean Epimenides? Athenian: Yes, that's the man. His discovery, my dear fellows, put him streets ahead of all the other inventors. Hesiod had foreshadowed it in his poetry long before, but it was Epimenides who achieved it in practice, so

you Cretans claim Clinias:

We

1 .

certainly

do claim

that.

Athenian: Perhaps we can describe the state of mankind after the cataclysm like this: in spite of a vast and terrifying desolation, plenty of fertile land

was

pened

available,

and although animals

in general

had perished

it

hap-

some cattle still survived, together with perhaps a small stock of goats. They were few enough, but sufficient to maintain the correspondingly few herdsmen of this early period. that

Clinias: Agreed.

Athenian: But

at the

moment we

are talking about the state, and the business of legislation and political organization. Is it conceivable that any trace at all of such things survived even, so to speak, in the memory?

—

T Epimenides' (

Works and Days 40-41) of the

ff.

and

note.

was believed to have been inspired by Hesiod's mention virtue of mallow and asphodel. For Epimenides, see 642d

'magic brew'

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Clinias:

Of course

not.

Athenian: So out of those conditions all the features of our present-day life developed: states, political systems, technical skills, laws, rampant vice

and frequent Clinias:

What do you mean?

Athenian: period,

virtue.

who

can we really suppose that the men of that had had no experience of city life in all its splendor and

My

dear

sir,

became totally wicked or totally virtuous? Clinias: A good point. We see what you mean. Athenian: So it was only as time went on, and the numbers of the human race increased, that civilization advanced and reached its present

squalor, ever

stage of development? Clinias: Exactly.

Athenian: The process was probably not sudden, but gradual, and took a considerable time.

Clinias: Yes, that's perfectly plausible.

Athenian: I imagine men were all numbed with fear at the prospect of descending from the hills to the plains. Clinias: Naturally enough. Athenian: And what a pleasure it must have been to see each other, there being so few of them at that time! However, pretty well all vehicles they might have used to visit each other by land or sea had been destroyed, and the techniques used to construct them had been lost, so that I suppose they found getting together none too easy. They suffered from a scarcity of timber, because iron, copper and mineral workings in general had been overlaid with sludge and had been lost to sight, so that it was virtually impossible to refine fresh supplies of metal. Even if there was the odd tool left somewhere on the mountains, it was quickly worn down to nothing by use. Replacements could not be made until the technique of mining

sprang up again

among men.

Clinias: True.

Athenian:

And how many generations later did

that

happen, on our

cal-

culation? Clinias:

A

good many, obviously.

Athenian: Well then, during that period, or even longer, all techniques that depend on a supply of copper and iron and so on must have gone out of use? Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: For several reasons, then, war and an end. Clinias:

How

civil

war

alike

came

to

so?

Athenian: In the first place, men's isolation prompted them to cherish and love one another. Second, their food supply was nothing they needed to quarrel about. Except perhaps for a few people in the very early stages,

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was no shortage of flocks and herds, which is what men mostly lived on in that age. They always had a supply of milk and meat, and could always add to it plenty of good food to be got by hunting. They also had an abundance of clothes, bedding, houses, and equipment for cooking and other purposes. (Molding pottery and weaving, skills that have no need of iron, were a gift from God to men his way, in fact, of supplying them with all that kind of equipment. His intention was that whenever the human race was reduced to such a desperate condition it could still take root and develop.) Because of all this, they were not intolerably poor, nor there

b

—

driven by poverty to quarrel with each other; but presumably they did not grow rich either, in view of the prevailing lack of gold and silver. Now the c

community

in

which neither wealth nor poverty

exists will generally

produce the finest characters because tendencies to violence and crime, and feelings of jealousy and envy, simply do not arise. So these men were good partly for that very reason, partly because of what we might call their 'naivete'. When they heard things labeled 'good' or 'bad', they were so artless as to think it a statement of the literal truth and believe it. This lack of sophistication precluded the cynicism you find today: they accepted as the truth the doctrine they heard about gods and men, and lived their lives in accordance with it. That is why they were the sort of people we have described. Clinias: Megillus and I, at least, agree with your account. Athenian: If we compare them with the era before the flood and with the modern world, we shall have to say that the many generations which lived in that way were inevitably unskilled and ignorant of techniques in general, and particularly of the military devices used on land and sea nowadays. They must also have been innocent of the techniques of warfare peculiar to city-life— generally called 'lawsuits' and 'party-strife'— in which men concoct every possible device to damage and hurt each other by word and deed. Weren't our primitive men simple and manlier and at the same time more restrained and upright in every way? We have already explained why. ,

d

e

Clinias: Yes, you're quite right. 680

Athenian: Let's remind ourselves that this reconstruction, and the conelusions we shall draw from it, are supposed to make us appreciate how early man came to feel the need of laws, and who their lawgiver was. Clinias: Well reminded! Athenian: Presumably they felt no need for legislators, and in that era law was not yet a common phenomenon. Men born at that stage of the world cycle- did not yet have any written records, but lived in obedience to accepted usage and 'ancestral' law, as we call it. 2.

A

'cycle' is

the flood)

apparently thought of as the interval between one cosmic upheaval

and the

next.

(e.g.

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Clinias: Quite likely.

Athenian: But Clinias:

What

already a political system, of a

this is

sort.

sort?

—

Athenian: Autocracy the name which everyone, I believe, uses for the political system of that age. You can still find it in many parts of the world today, both among Greeks and non-Greeks. I suppose this is what Homer 3 is describing in his account of the household of the Cyclopes :

No

laws no councils for debate have they:

They

,

live

on the

tips of lofty

In hollow caves; each

man

mountains

lays

down

To wife and children with no regard ,

the law for neighbor.

sounds as if he was a charming fellow. I have gone through other verses of his, and very polished they were too. Not that I know his work to any great extent we Cretans don't go in for foreign poetry very much. Megillus: But we at Sparta do, and we think Homer is the prince of epic poets, even though the way of life he describes is invariably Ionian rather than Spartan. In this instance he certainly seems to bear you out when he points in his stories to the wild life of the Cyclopes as an explanation of Clinias: That poet of yours

—

their primitive customs.

Athenian: Yes, he does testify in my favor. So let's take him as our evidence that political systems of this kind do sometimes develop. Clinias: Very well. Athenian: And they arise among these people who live scattered in separate households and individual families in the confusion that follows the cataclysms. In such a system the eldest member rules by virtue of having inherited power from his father or mother; the others follow his lead and make one flock like birds. The authority to which they bow is that of their patriarch: they are governed, in effect, by the most justifiable of

all

forms of kingship.

Clinias: Yes, of course.

Athenian: The next stage is when several families amalgamate and form larger communities. They turn their attention to agriculture, initially in the foot-hills, and build rings of dry stones to serve as walls to protect themselves against wild animals. The result now is a single large unit, a common homestead. Clinias: I suppose that's quite probable. Athenian: Well then, isn't this probable too? Clinias:

3.

Odyssey

What? ix. 112-15.

1370

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Laws

Athenian: As these original relatively tiny communities grew bigger, each of the small constituent families lived under its own ruler the eldest member and followed its own particular customs which had arisen because of its isolation from the others. The various social and religious standards to which people had grown accustomed reflected the bias of their ancestors and teachers: the more restrained or adventurous the ancestor, the more restrained or adventurous would be the character of his descendants. Consequently, as I say, the members of each group entered the larger community with laws peculiar to themselves, and were ready to impress their own inclinations on their children and their children's

—

—

children.

Clinias: Naturally. c

Athenian: And of course each group inevitably approved of laws and looked on those of other people with rather less favor.

its

own

Clinias: Exactly.

Athenian: So

it

looks as

if

we have

unwittingly stumbled on the origin

of legislation. Clinias:

d

We

certainly have.

Athenian: At any rate the next and necessary step in this amalgamation is to choose some representatives to review the rules of all the families, and to propose openly to the leaders and heads of the people— the 'kings', so to speak the adoption of those rules that particularly recommend themselves for common use. These representatives will be known as lawgivers, and by appointing the leaders as officials they will create out of

—

the separate autocracies a sort of aristocracy, or perhaps kingship. And while the political system passes through this transitional stage they will administer the state themselves.

would certainly come about by stages. Athenian: So we can now go on to describe the birth of a third type of political system, one which in fact admits all systems and all their modifications and exhibits equal variety and change in the actual states Clinias: Yes, that sort of change

as well. Clinias:

e

What type

is

this?

Athenian: The one which Homer too listed as the successor of the second. This is how he describes the origin of the third 4 'He founded Dardania' I think this is how it goes 'when holy Ilium,

—

—

A

town upon

For 682

still

the plain for mortal

:

men had ,

not been built:

they lived upon the lower slopes of many-fountained Ida.'

He composed

these lines, as well as those about the Cyclopes, under some sort of inspiration from God. And how true to life they are! This is because 4.

Iliad xx. 216-18.

'He'

is

Dardanus; Ilium

is

Troy.

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poets as a class are divinely gifted and are inspired when they sing, so that with the help of Graces and Muses they frequently hit on how things really

happen.

They do indeed. Athenian: Let's carry on with

Clinias:

something

to

our purpose.

Clinias:

Of

course.

I

take

the story it

we

are telling:

what we ought

this is

it

may

to

suggest

do? b

Athenian: Ilium was founded, according to us, when men had descended from the hills to a wide and beautiful plain. They built their city on a hill of moderate height near several rivers which poured down from Ida above. Clinias: So the story goes.

Athenian:

I

suppose

we may assume

that this descent of theirs took

many

ages after the flood? Clinias: Yes, naturally, many ages later. Athenian: I mean that apparently the disaster we've just described must have been forgotten to a quite remarkable degree if they founded their city on the lower reaches of several rivers flowing down from the mounplace

tains,

and put

c

were none too high. they were far removed in time from any

their trust in hills that

Clinias: Yes, a clear proof that

such experience. Athenian: With the increase in the human population one supposes, were already being founded.

many

other

cities,

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian: These cities also mounted an expedition against Ilium, probably by sea as well, because by then all mankind had overcome its fear and

had taken

to ships.

Clinias: So

it

seems.

Athenian: And after a siege of about ten years the Achaeans sacked Troy. Clinias: Indeed they did. Athenian: They besieged Ilium for ten years, and during this period the domestic affairs of the individual attackers took a turn for the worse. The younger generation revolted, and the ugly and criminal reception they gave the troops when they returned to their own cities and homes led to murder, massacre and expulsion on a large scale. When the exiles came back again they adopted a new name, and were now known as Dorians instead of Achaeans, in honor of Dorieus, who had rallied them while they were in exile. A full and exhaustive account of subsequent events can be found in your traditional Spartan stories. Megillus: Of course.

Athenian: of the arts

5.

At 636e

d

When we were

starting to discuss legislation, the question

and drinking cropped up, and we made ff.

a digression

3 .

But

now

e

1372

we

Laws

do have a chance to come to grips with our subject. As if God himself were guiding us, we've come back to the very point from which really

we

digressed: the actual foundation of Sparta. You maintained that Sparta was established on the right lines, and you said the same of Crete, because it has laws that bear a family resemblance to Sparta's. have had a rather random discussion about various foundations and political systems,

We

we have achieved

much: we have watched the first, second and third type of state being founded in succession over a vast period of time, and now we discover this fourth state (or 'nation', if you like) whose historical foundation and development we are tracing down to its maturity today 6 After all this, perhaps we can get some idea of what was right and wrong in the way these foundations were established. Can we see what but

at least this

.

kind of laws are responsible for continued preservation of the features

and the ruin of those that collapse? What detailed alterations will produce happiness in a state? If we can understand all this, Clinias and Megillus, we shall have to discuss the whole business all over again: it will be like making a fresh start. However, we may be able to find some that survive

fault in

our account so

far.

Megillus: Well, sir, if some god were to give us his word that if we do make a second attempt to look at the problem of legislation, we shall hear an account of at least the quality and length of the one we have just had,

one would willingly extend our journey, and the present day would seem not a moment too long— though it is in fact more or less the day when the Sun-god turns past summer towards winter. Athenian: So it looks as if we must press on with the investigation. I

for

Megillus: Certainly.

Athenian: Let's imagine that we are living at the time when the territory of Sparta, Argos and Messene, and the districts nearby, had in effect come under the control of your ancestors, Megillus. Their next decision, or so the story goes, states

was

to split their forces into three

—Argos, Messene and Sparta.

and

establish three

Megillus: That's quite right.

Athenian: Temenos became king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, and Procles and Eurysthenes of Sparta. Megillus: True.

Athenian: And all their contemporaries swore to them that they would go to their help if anybody tried to subvert their thrones. Megillus: Precisely.

Athenian:

Now when a monarchy is overthrown (and indeed when any

other type of authority has been destroyed at any time) surely no one but

6.

The four are:

(1)

single families

under autocratic

rule, (2) collections of families

aristocratic rule, (3) the cities of the plains (e.g. Troy)

league of such

cities,

now

to

be discussed.

under

with various constitutions,

(4) a

— Laws

1373

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the rulers themselves are to blame? That was the line we took when the or have we forgotten by now? subject cropped up a little time ago

—

Megillus: No, of course not. Athenian: So now we can put our thesis on a firmer footing, because it looks as if our study of history has led us to the same conclusion as before. This means we shall carry on our investigation on the basis of the actual facts rather than conjecture. The facts are, of course, as follows: each of the three royal families, and each of the three royal states they ruled, exchanged oaths in accordance with mutually binding laws which they

had adopted to regulate the exercise of authority and obedience to it. The kings swore never to stiffen their rule as the nation continued down the years; the others undertook, provided the rulers kept to their side of the bargain, never themselves to overthrow the kingships nor tolerate an

attempt to do so by others. The kings would help the kings and peoples if they were wronged, and the peoples would help the peoples and the kings likewise. That's right, isn't it? Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: Now whether it was the kings or someone else who laid down laws for this political system thus established in the three states, the crucial provision, surely,

was

this

Megillus: What?

Athenian: Whenever a given state broke the established laws, an alliance of the other two would always be there to take the field against it. Megillus: Obviously. Athenian: Of course, most people only ask their legislators to enact the kind of laws that the population in general will accept without objection. But just imagine asking your trainer or doctor to give you pleasure when he trains or cures your body! Megillus: Exactly.

you often have to be health and vigor without undue

Athenian: In

body

to

fact,

satisfied

if

you can

restore

your

pain.

Megillus: True. Athenian: In another respect too the people of that time were particularly well placed to make legislation a painless process. Megillus: What respect? Athenian: Their legislators' efforts to establish a certain equality of property among them were not open to one particularly damaging accusation which is frequently made in other states. Suppose a legal code is being

framed and someone adopts the policy of a change in the ownership of land and a cancellation of debts, because he sees that this is the only way in which equality can be satisfactorily achieved. 'Hands off fundamentals' is the slogan everybody uses to attack a legislator who tries to bring in that kind of reform, and his policy of land-redistribution and remission of debts earns him only curses. It's enough to make any man despair. So

1374

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Laws

another tremendous advantage the Dorians enjoyed: the absence of resentment. No one could object to the way the land was parceled out, and large long-standing debts did not exist. Megillus: True. is

Athenian: Then legislation turn out

685

why on such

earth,

my

friends, did this foundation

and

its

dismal failure? Megillus: What do you mean by that? What's your objection? Athenian: Three states were founded but in two of them the political system and the legal code were quickly corrupted. Only the third settlement survived that of your state, Sparta. Megillus: A pretty difficult problem you're posing! Athenian: Nevertheless, it demands our attention. So now let's look into it, and while away the journey, as we said when we set out, by 7 amusing ourselves with laws it's a dignified game and it suits our time a

—

—

b

of

life.

Megillus: Of course. We must do as you say. Athenian: No laws could form a better subject for our investigation than those by which these states have been administered. Or are there any bigger or more famous states whose foundation we might examine? Megillus: No, it's not easy to think of alternatives. c

Athenian: Well then, it's pretty obvious that they intended the arrangements they made to protect adequately not only the Peloponnese but the Greeks in general against any possible attack by non-Greeks as for example occurred when those who then lived in the territory of Ilium

—

power of the Assyrian empire, which Ninos had founded, and provoked the war against Troy by their arrogance. You see, a good trusted to the

deal of the splendor of the Assyrian empire still remained, and the dread of its united organization was the counterpart in that age of our fear of

King of Persia today. The Assyrians had a tremendous grudge against the Greeks: Troy, which was part of the Assyrian empire, had been captured for a second time To meet such dangers the Dorian army formed the Great

d

.

a single unified body, although at that period it was distributed among the three states under the command of the kings (who were brothers, being sons of Hercules). It seemed to be excellently conceived and equipped

even than the army which sailed against Troy. For a start, people thought the sons of Hercules were, as commanders, a cut above the grandsons of Pelopsp secondly, they rated the prowess of the army itself higher than that of the expedition which went to Troy. After all, they calculated, that had consisted of Achaeans, the very people the Dorians had defeated. So may we take it that this was the nature and purpose of the arrangements better

e

they

made?

7.

For the

8.

Agamemnon and

first

capture, see Iliad v.640.

Menelaus,

who

led the expedition against Troy.

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Megillus: Certainly.

Athenian: And for various reasons they probably expected these arrangements would be permanent and last a long time. They had been comrades in a great many toils and dangers in the past, and now they had been brought under the control of a single family (the kings being brothers);

and they had

also consulted a large

number

of prophets, notably

Apollo's at Delphi.

Megillus: Yes, that's probable enough, of course. Athenian: But apparently these large expectations evaporated pretty quickly, except, as we said a minute ago, in the case of just one small part your state, Sparta. And right up to the present day Sparta of the alliance

—

has never stopped fighting the other two members. But if they had done as they intended and had agreed on a common policy, their power would have been irresistible, militarily speaking. Megillus:

It

certainly would.

Athenian: So just how did their plans misfire? This is surely a problem we ought to look into: why was such a vast and tremendous organization unlucky enough to be destroyed? Megillus: True: this is the right direction to look. Neglect these, and you'll never find any other laws or political systems preserving (or eliminating) such remarkable and important features. Athenian: What a stroke of luck! It looks as if we've somehow got on to a crucial point.

No

doubt about it. Athenian: Well now, my fine fellow, what hackneyed thoughts we've been having, without realizing it! When people see some tremendous achievement, they always think to themselves, 'What terrific results it would have led to, if someone had known how to set about putting it to proper use!' Here and now, perhaps our ideas on the topic we are discussing are just as wrong and unrealistic as anybody else's who looks at anything in that sort of way. Megillus: Well really, what do you mean? What are we supposed to Megillus:

think you're driving at

when you

say that?

Athenian: I was poking fun at no one but myself, my friend. I was thinking about the army we are discussing and it occurred to me how splendid it was and what a marvellous tool (as I said) had been put into if only someone had put it to the proper use at the hands of the Greeks

—

the time!

Megillus:

and we

And you were quite right and

heartily agreed with

you

sensible in everything

you

said,

— equally rightly and sensibly.

Athenian: Maybe so. Still, my view is that everyone who sets eyes on something big and strong and powerful immediately gets the feeling that if the owner knew how to take advantage of its size and scale he would get tremendous results and be a happy man.

1376

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Megillus:

>87 it

And

this

again

is

surely right and proper.

Or do you

see

differently?

Athenian: Well now, just consider what criteria a man ought to employ if he is going to be 'right' to give such praise in an individual case. What about the one we are discussing, for a start? Suppose those who undertook the organization of the

army

age had known their job: somehow, they would have succeeded in it but the question is how. They ought, of course, to have consolidated their army and kept it on a permanent footing; this would have ensured them their own freedom while they ruled over anybody else they liked, and in general it would have enabled them to do whatever they or their children wanted all over the world, among Greeks and non-Greeks indifferently. This is what men would praise them in that

—

b

for, isn't it?

Megillus:

It is

indeed.

Athenian: Again, anyone

who

notices a case of great wealth or exceptional family distinction or something like that takes precisely the same line. He assumes that just because a man enjoys these advantages his

—

c

every wish will be granted or at any rate most of them, and the most important ones. Megillus: Quite likely. Athenian: Now then, this shows that there is one specific desire common to all mankind. Isn't this the upshot of our discussion? Megillus: What desire? Athenian: That events should obey whatever orders one feels like giving

invariably,

if

possible, but failing that, at least

where human

affairs

are concerned.

Megillus: Very true. Athenian: So seeing that this is the constant wish of us all, right from childhood to old age, isn't it inevitably what we are always praying for too?

Megillus: Of course. d

Athenian: And I suppose our prayers on behalf of those whom we love will be for precisely what they themselves pray for on their own behalf?

Megillus: Certainly.

Athenian:

A man who

is

a father loves the child

who

is

his son?

Megillus: Of course. Athenian: Yet there is a good deal in the son's prayers that the father will beg the gods never to grant. Megillus: You mean when the son who prays is still young and irresponsible?

e

Athenian: Yes, and I'm thinking too of when the father is senile or even unduly impulsive because of second childhood, and has lost all sense of what is right and proper. He gets into the same state as Theseus when he

—

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died so wretchedly 9 and his prayers become very vehement indeed. But if the son understands the situation, do you think he will join in his father's prayers, given those circumstances? dealt with Hippolytus,

who

,

Megillus: I know what you mean. Your point, I take it, is that you should demand your own way in your prayers only if your wishes are supported by your rational judgment and this, a rational outlook, should be the object of the prayers and efforts of us all, states and individuals alike. Athenian: It should indeed, and in particular let me remind myself it should always be the aim of a state's legislator when he frames the provisions of his laws. And I remind you again to recollect the beginning

—

— —

of our discussion

— of what you two recommended: you said that the good

10 should construct his entire legal code with a view to war for my part, I maintained that this was to order him to establish his laws with an eye on only one virtue out of the four. I said he ought to keep virtue as a whole in mind but especially and preeminently the virtue that heads the list judgment and wisdom, and a strength of mind such that desires and appetites are kept under control. Our discussion has come full circle, and being the speaker at the moment I make the same point as before. You can treat it as a joke if you like, but if you prefer, you can take it seriously: I maintain that, if you lack wisdom, praying is a risky business, because you get the opposite of what you want. If you like to suppose that I am in earnest, do so: I'm confident that if you follow the line of argument we opened up a moment ago you'll soon discover that the cause of the ruin of the kings and the whole enterprise was not cowardice nor

legislator

;

—

commanders or in those whose role it was caused by every other sort of vice,

a lack of military expertise in the

was

to

obey them. The disaster

about mankind's most vital concerns. And if that was true then it is even more so today; and precisely the same will be true in the future. If you like. I'll try to press on with the next stages in the argument and develop the point. As you are my friends, I'll do my very best to make it clear. Clinias: To make a speech in your praise, sir, would be a tasteless thing to do. Our actions rather than our words will show our regard for you:

and

we a

in particular ignorance

shall give

you our

closest attention. This

gentleman approves or not. Megillus: Well said, Clinias. Clinias:

And

so

we

shall,

Let's

God

is

the best

do as you

willing.

way

to tell

whether

say.

Now let's have your explanation.

Athenian: Well then, to go back on to the track of the argument, we maintain that crass ignorance destroyed that great empire, and that it has Hippolytus' stepmother Phaedra falsely accused him of sexual misconduct towards herself; Theseus, her husband, prayed for the death of his son. The prayer was granted, 9.

but then Theseus discovered Hippolytus' innocence. 10.

625d

ff.

1378

Laws

tendency

a natural so,

it

means

good sense

to

produce precisely the same

that the legislator

as possible,

must

results today.

try to inspire states

and eradicate

folly, as far as

If

this is

with as

much

he can.

Clinias: Obviously. 689

Athenian: So what kind of ignorance would deserve the See if you agree with my description. I suggest this kind.

What? Athenian: The kind involved when

title 'crass'?

Clinias:

a

man

thinks something

is

fine

and

good, but loathes it instead of liking it, and conversely when he likes and welcomes what he believes is wicked and unjust. I maintain that this disaccord between his feelings of pleasure and pain and his rational judg-

ment b

constitutes the very lowest depth of ignorance. It is also the most 'crass', in that it affects the most extensive element in the soul (the element

that experiences pleasure

sive part of a state, the

and

pain,

common

which corresponds

people). So

to the

most exten-

when

the soul quarrels with natural ruling principles, you have

knowledge or opinion or reason, its there what I call 'folly'. This applies both to the state in which people disobey their rulers and laws, and to the individual, when the fine principles in which he really believes prove not only ineffective but actually harmful.

c

d

these examples of ignorance that I should put down as the worst kind of discord in a state and individual, not the mere professional ignorance of a workman. I hope you see what I mean, gentlemen. Clinias: We do, my friend, and we agree with what you say.

Athenian: So let's adopt this as an agreed statement of policy: no citizens who suffer from this kind of ignorance should be entrusted with any degree of power. They must be reproved for their ignorance, even if their ability to reason is outstanding and they have worked hard at every nice accomplishment that makes a man quick-witted. It is those whose characters are at the other extreme who must be called 'wise', even if, as the saying is, 'they cannot read, they cannot swim'; and it is these sensible people who must be given the offices of state. You see, my friends, without concord, how could you ever get even a glimmer of sound judgment? It's out of the question. But we should be entirely justified in styling the greatest and most splendid concord of all 'the greatest wisdom'. Anyone

who

e

It's all

wisdom, but the man who lacks it will invariably turn out to be a spendthrift and no savior to the city quite the reverse, because he suffers from this particular kind of ignorance. So as we said just now, let's adopt this as the statement of our views. Clinias: Adopted it is. Athenian: Now, I take it that states must contain some people who govern and others who are governed? lives a rational life shares in this

Clinias: Naturally. 690

Athenian: Good. Well then, what titles are there to either rank? Can we count them? (I mean both in the state and in the family, in each case

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irrespective of size.)

One claim, surely, could be made by father and mother;

and in general the title of parents to exercise control over their children and descendants would be universally acknowledged, wouldn't it? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Close behind comes the title of those of high birth to govern those of low birth. Next in order comes our third demand: that younger people should consent to be governed by their elders. Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: The fourth

is

that slaves should be subject to the control of

their masters.

No doubt about Athenian: And I suppose

Clinias:

the

it.

the

fifth is that

the stronger should rule and

weaker should obey.

Clinias:

A

pretty compelling claim to obedience, that!

Athenian: Yes, and one which prevails throughout the animal kingdom by decree of nature, as Pindar of Thebes once remarked But it looks as if the most important claim will be the sixth, that the ignorant man should follow the leadership of the wise and obey his orders. In spite

—

of you,

11

.

my

clever Pindar,

what

I'd called the 'decree of nature' is in fact

the rule of law that governs willing subjects, without being force; I'm certainly not prepared to say it's unnatural.

imposed by

Clinias: Quite right.

Athenian: And we persuade a man to cast lots, by explaining that this, the seventh title to authority, enjoys the favor of the gods and is blessed by fortune. We tell him that the fairest arrangement is for him to exercise authority if he wins, but to be subject to it if he loses. Clinias: That's very true. Athenian: 'So you see, O legislator' (as we might jocularly address someone who sets about legislation with undue optimism), 'you see how many titles to authority there are, and how they naturally conflict with each other. Now here's a source of civil strife we've discovered for you, which you must put to rights. First, though, join us in trying to find out how the kings of Argos and Messene went astray and broke these rules, and so destroyed themselves and the power of Greece, for all its splendor at that time. Wasn't it because they didn't appreciate the truth of Hesiod's 12 remark that the half is often greater than the whole ? He thought that when it is harmful to get the whole, and the half is enough, then enough is better than a feast, and is the preferable alternative.' Clinias: True enough.

The Athenian alludes 714e and 890a. 11.

12.

Works and Days

40.

to a

few

lines of a

poem now

largely lost (frg. 109 Snell):

cf.

1380

Laws

Athenian: So where do we suppose starts? Among kings or people?

this destructive process invariably

Most instances suggest that this is probably a disease of kings whose life of luxury has made them arrogant. Athenian: So it is clear that it was the kings of that era who were first infected by the acquisitive spirit in defiance of the law of the land. The precise point to which they had given their seal of approval by their word and oath became the ground of their disagreement, and this lack of harmony (which is, in our view, the 'crassest' stupidity, though it looks like wisdom) put the whole arrangement jarringly off key and out of tune: Clinias:

hence

destruction.

its

Clinias: Quite likely.

Athenian: Very well. Then what precautions ought a contemporary legislator to have taken in his code to nip this disease in the bud? God knows, the answer's not difficult nowadays, and the point is quite simple to understand though if anyone had foreseen the problem then, assuming it was possible to do so, he'd have been wiser than we are.

—

What do you mean?

Megillus:

Athenian: Hindsight, Megillus! In the perspective of today it's easy to understand what should have been done then, and once understood it's equally easy to explain. Megillus: You'd better be even clearer than that. Athenian: The clearest way of putting it would be Megillus: What?

Athenian:

If

you neglect

the rule of proportion

and

this.

fit

excessively large

small ships, or give too much food to a small body, or too high authority to a soul that doesn't measure up to it, the result is always sails to

disastrous.

one,

and

Body and

become puffed up: disease breaks out in other arrogance quickly leads to injustice. Now, what

in the

soul

the

are getting at? Simply this: the mortal soul simply does not exist, my friends, which by dint of its natural qualities will ever make a success of supreme authority among men while it is still young and responsible to

we

no one.

Full of folly, the worst of diseases,

it inevitably has its judgment corrupted, and incurs the enmity of its closest friends; and once that happens, its total ruin and the loss of all its power soon follow. A firstclass lawgiver's job is to have a sense of proportion and to guard against

this

danger.

Nowadays

However, Megillus: What?

at that time.

it is it

looks as

Athenian: some god what was going to happen. .

into

two

13 ,

13. Procles

.

.

so as to restrict

a reasonable guess that this

its

and Eurysthenes, the

if

there was.

.

was

in fact

done

.

who was concerned on your behalf and saw He took your single line of kings and split it powers

first

to

more reasonable proportions. After

kings of Sparta, were the twin sons of Aristodemus.

1381

Lazos III that, a

man who combined human 14

nature with

your leadership was

some

of the

powers

of a

he blended the obstinacy and vigor of the Spartans with the prudent influence of age by giving the twenty-eight elders the same authority in making important 15 saw that your government was decisions as the kings. Your 'third savior still fretting and fuming with restless energy, so he put a kind of bridle on it in the shape of the power of the ephors 16 a power which came very close to being held by lot. This is the formula that turned your kingship into a mixture of the right elements, so that thanks to its own stability it ensured the stability of the rest of the state. If things had been left to the discretion of Temenus and Cresphontes and the legislators of that time, whoever in fact they were, not even Aristodemus' part 17 would have survived. You see, they were tiros in legislation: otherwise it would never have occurred to them to rely on oaths 18 to restrain the soul of a young man who had taken over power from which a tyranny could develop. But the fact is that God has demonstrated the sort of thing a position of authority ought to have been then and should be now, if it is to have any prospects of permanency. As I said before, we don't need any great wisdom to

god observed

that

still

in a feverish state, so

'

—

now — after

not difficult to see the point if you have a historical example to go by. But if anyone had seen all this then, and had been able to control the various offices and produce a single authority out of the three, he would have saved all the splendid projects

recognize

all this

all, it's

from destruction, and neither the Persians nor anyone else would ever have sent a fleet to attack Greece, contemptuously supposing that we were people who counted for very little. of that age

Clinias: That's true.

Athenian: After

all,

disgrace. In saying this, that

war by land and

way the Greeks repulsed them was a I don't mean that those who won the battles of did not do so magnificently. By 'disgrace' mean

Clinias, the

sea

I

only one of those three states fought to defend Greece. The other two were rotten to the core. One of them 19 even hindered Sparta's attempts to help the defense, and fought her tooth and nail, while the other, Argos (which used to be paramount when the territory was first that, to start with,

who

created the Spartan Council of Elders.

14.

Lycurgus,

15.

The expression Third

custom of offering Zeus banquets. Plato probably means Theopompus, a king of

savior'

the Savior the third libation at

is

proverbial,

and

refers to the

Sparta in the eighth century. 16.

Five annually elected officials

who

in addition to

wide executive and

exercised close control over the conduct of the kings. 17. I.e., Sparta: see

683c

18.

See 684a.

19.

Messene. Cf. 698c-e.

ff.

and 684e

ff.

judicial

powers

1382

693

Laws

divided up), although called upon to repel the barbarian, ignored the request and failed to contribute to the defense. A detailed history of the course of that war would have some pretty ugly charges to make against Greece: indeed, there is no reason why it should report that Greece made any defense at all. If it hadn't been for the joint determination of the Athenians and the Spartans to resist the slavery that threatened them, we should have by now virtually a complete mixture of the races Greek with Greek, Greek with barbarian, and barbarian with Greek. We can see a

—

parallel in the nations

whom

the Persians lord it over today: they have then horribly jumbled together again into the scattered

been split up and communities in which they are

b

now live.

Well now, Clinias and Megillus,

why

we making

these accusations against the so-called 'statesmen' and legislators of that day and this? Because if we find out why they went wrong we shall discover what different course of action they ought to have followed. That is what we were doing just now, when we said that legislation providing for

c

powerful or extreme authority is a mistake. One should always remember that a state ought to be free and wise and enjoy internal harmony, and that this is what the lawgiver should concentrate on in his legislation. (It ought not to surprise us if several times before now we have decided on a number of other aims and said they were what a lawgiver should concentrate on, so that the aims proposed never seem to be the same from minute to minute. When we say that the legislator should keep selfcontrol or

good judgment or friendship

we must bear in mind that Nor should we be disconcerted if

in view,

these aims are the same, not different. we find a lot of other expressions of which the same is true.) Clinias: Yes, when we think back over the argument we'll certainly try to remember that. But you wanted to explain what the legislator ought to aim at in the matter of friendship and good judgment and liberty. So tell all

d

us

now what you were going to say. Athenian: Listen to me then. There

two mother-constitutions, so to speak, which you could fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchy is the proper name for the first, and democracy for the second. The former has been taken to extreme lengths by the Persians, the latter by are

my

e

country; virtually all the others, as I said, are varieties of these two. It is absolutely vital for a political system to combine them, if (and this is of course the point of our advice, when we insist that no state formed without these two elements can be constituted properly) if it is to enjoy

—

freedom and friendship applied with good judgment. Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: One state was over-eager in embracing only the principle of monarchy, the other in embracing only the ideal of liberty; neither has achieved a balance between the two. Your Spartan and Cretan states have

done

694

and time was when you could say much the same of the Athenians and Persians, but things have changed since then. Let's run through the reasons for this, shall we? better,

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1383

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Clinias: Yes, of course

—

if,

that

is,

we mean

to finish

what we have

set

out to do.

Under Cyrus, the life of the Persians was a judicious blend of liberty and subjection, and after gaining their own freedom they became the masters of a great number of other people. As rulers, they granted a degree of liberty to their subjects and put them on the same footing as themselves, with the result that soldiers felt more affection for their commanders and displayed greater zeal in the face of danger. The king felt no jealousy if any of his subjects was intelligent and had some advice to offer; on the contrary, he allowed free speech and Athenian: Then

let's listen to

the story.

valued those who could contribute to the formulation of policy; a sensible man could use his influence to help the common cause. Thanks to freedom, friendship, and the practice of pooling their ideas, during that period the Persians made progress all along the line. Clinias: It does rather look as if that was the situation in the period

you

describe.

Athenian: So how are we to explain the disaster under Cambyses, and 20 the virtually complete recovery under Darius ? To help our reconstruction of events, shall we have a shot at some inspired guessing? Clinias: Yes, because this topic we've embarked on will certainly help our inquiry. Athenian: My guess, then, about Cyrus, is that although he was doubtless a good commander and a loyal patriot, he never considered, even superficially, the problem of correct education; and as for running a household, I'd say he never paid any attention to it at all. Clinias: And what interpretation are we to put on a remark like that? Athenian: I mean that he probably spent his entire life after infancy on campaign, and handed over his children to the women to bring up. These women reared them from their earliest years as though they were already Heaven's special favorites and darlings, endowed with all the blessings that implies. They wouldn't allow anyone to thwart 'their Beatitudes' in anything, and they forced everybody to rhapsodize about what the children said or did. You can imagine the sort of person they produced. Clinias: And a fine old education it must have been, to judge from

your account. Athenian: It was a womanish education, conducted by the royal harem. The teachers of the children had recently come into considerable wealth, but they were left all on their own, without men, because the army was preoccupied by wars and constant dangers. Clinias: That makes sense. Cambyses, son of Cyrus, was King of Persia from 529 to 521. 'Disaster' refers to the military failures of his reign, his tyrannical madness, and the short-lived seizure of his throne by Gomates (see 695b and note). Cambyses was succeeded by Darius (521-486), who followed the prudent policies described in 695c-d. See Herodotus, III, 61 ff.

20.

1384

Laws

Athenian: The children's father, for his part, went on accumulating herds and flocks for their benefit and many a herd of human beings too, quite apart from every other sort of animal; but he didn't know that his intended heirs were not being instructed in the traditional Persian disci-

—

695

pline. This discipline (the Persians

being shepherds, and sons of a stony soil) was a tough one, capable of producing hardy shepherds who could camp out and keep awake on watch and turn soldier if necessary. He just didn't notice that

given his sons the education

Mede and that it had been debased by their so-called 'blessed' status, That is why Cyrus' children turned out as children naturally do when their teachers have never corrected them. So, when they succeeded to their of a

b

women and eunuchs had

21

inheritance

on the death

were living in a riot of unrestrained debauchery. First, unwilling to tolerate an equal, one of them killed the other; next, he himself, driven out of his senses by liquor and lack of selfcontrol, was deprived of his dominions by the Medes and 'the Eunuch' (as he was then called), to whom the idiot Cambyses was an object of conof Cyrus, they

tempt. 22 Clinias: So the story goes,

c

Athenian:

And

and

goes on, I for the Persians by Darius and it

seems probable enough. think, to say that the empire was regained it

'the Seven'.

Clinias: Certainly.

d

Athenian: Now let's carry on with this story of ours and see what happened. Darius was no royal prince, and his upbringing had not encouraged him to self-indulgence. When he came and seized the empire with the aid of the other six, he split it up into seven divisions, of which some faint outlines still survive today. He thought the best policy was to govern it by new laws of his own which introduced a certain degree of equality for all; and he also included in his code regulations about the tribute promised to the people by Cyrus. His generosity in money and gifts rallied the Persians to his side, and stimulated a feeling of community and friendship among them; consequently his armies regarded him with such all

affection that they

added

Cyrus had bequeathed at least as much again. But Darius was succeeded by Xerxes, whose education had reverted to the royal pampering of old. ('Darius'— as perhaps we'd be entitled to say to him 'you haven't learned from Cyrus' mistake, so you ve brought up Xerxes in the same habits as Cyrus brought up Cambyses.') So Xerxes, being a product of the same type of education, naturally had a career that closely reproduced the pattern of Cambyses' misfortunes. Ever since then, hardly any king of the Persians has been genuinely 'great', except in style and title. I maintain that the reason for this is not just bad to the territory

—

e

an education of extreme luxury.

21.

I.e.,

22.

Gomates impersonated Cambyses' dead brother

in order to seize the

kingdom.

Laws

1385

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and fantastically however old or however

luck, but the shocking life that the children of dictators

no man, you see, young, will ever excel in virtue if he has had this sort of upbringing. We repeat that this is the point the legislator must look out for, and so must we here and now. And in all fairness, my Spartan friends, one must give your state credit for at least this much: rich man, poor man, commoner and king are held in honor to the same degree and are educated in the same way, without privilege, except as determined by the supernatural 23 instructions you received from some god when your state was founded. A man's exceptional wealth is no more reason for a state to confer specially exalted office on him than his ability to run, his good looks, or his physical or even if he has some virtue, if strength, in the absence of some virtue rich parents almost

always

lead:

696

b

—

excludes self-control. Megillus: What do you mean by that, sir? Athenian: Courage, I take it, is one part of virtue. Megillus: Of course. Athenian: So now that you've heard the story, use your own judgment: would you be glad to have as a resident in your house or as a neighbor a man who in spite of considerable courage was immoderate and licentious?

it

Megillus: Heaven forbid!

c

Athenian: Well then, what about a skilled workman, knowledgeable

own

in

but unjust? Megillus: No, I'd never welcome him. Athenian: But surely, in the absence of self-control, justice will never spring up. Megillus: Of course not. 24 Athenian: Nor indeed will the 'wise' man we put forward just now, who keeps his feelings of pleasure and pain in tune with right reason and

his

field,

obedient to it. Megillus: No, he certainly won't. Athenian: Now here's another point for us to consider, which will help us to decide whether civic distinctions are, on a given occasion, conferred correctly or incorrectly.

And what is that? Athenian: If we found self-control existing in the all other virtue, should we be justified in admiring Megillus:

Megillus: it

I

624a

ff.

24.

689d

ff.

it?

Or

not?

really couldn't say.

Athenian: A very proper reply. If you had opted would have struck an odd note, I think. Megillus: So my reply was all right, then.

23.

soul in isolation from

and 69 Id

ff.

for either alternative

d

1386

Laws

Athenian: Yes. But if you have something which in itself deserves to be admired or execrated, a mere additional element isn't worth talking e

697

about:

much

better pass

it

Megillus: Self-control

is

over and say nothing. the element you mean,

suppose. Athenian: It is. And in general, whatever benefits us most, when this element is added, deserves the highest honor, the second most beneficial thing deserves the second highest honor, and so on: as we go down the list, everything will get in due order the honor it deserves. Megillus: True. Athenian: Well then, shan't we insist again 25 that the distribution of these honors is the business of the legislator? Megillus: Of course. I

Athenian: Would you prefer us to leave the entire distribution to his discretion and let him deal with the details of each individual case? But as we too have something of a taste for legislation, perhaps you'd like us to try our hands at a three-fold division and distinguish the most important class, then the second and the third. b

Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: We maintain that if a state is going to survive to enjoy all the happiness that mankind can achieve, it is vitally necessary for it to distribute honors and marks of disgrace on a proper basis. And the proper basis is to put spiritual goods at the top of the list and hold them provided the soul exercises self-control in the highest esteem; bodily goods and advantages should come second, and third those said to be provided by property and wealth. If a legislator or a state ever ignores these guidelines by valuing riches above all or by promoting one of the other inferior goods to a more exalted position, it will be an act of political and religious folly. Shall we take this line, or not? Megillus: Yes, emphatically and unambiguously. Athenian: It was our scrutiny of the political system of the Persians that made us go into this business at such length. Our verdict was that their corruption increased year by year; and the reason we assign for this is that they were too strict in depriving the people of liberty and too energetic in introducing authoritarian government, so that they destroyed all friendship and community of spirit in the state. And with that gone, the policy

—

c

d

of rulers

e

is

framed not

—

in the interests of their subjects the people,

but to support their own authority: let them only think that a situation offers them the prospect of some profit, even a small one, and they wreck cities and ruin friendly nations by fire and sword; they hate, and are hated in return, with savage and pitiless loathing. When they come to need the common people to fight on their behalf, they discover the army has no loyalty, no eagerness to face danger and fight. They have millions and

25. Cf.

631e

ff.

Laws

1387

III

millions of soldiers

—

all

useless for fighting a war, so that just as

if

man-

power were in short supply, they have to hire it, imagining that mercenaries and foreigners will ensure their safety. Not only this, they inevitably become so stupid that they proclaim by their very actions that as compared with gold and silver everything society regards as good and valuable is in their eyes so

much

trash.

Megillus: Exactly.

Athenian: So let's have done with the Persians. Our conclusion is that the empire is badly run at the moment because the people are kept in undue subjection and the rulers excessively authoritarian. Megillus: Precisely.

Athenian: Next we come to the political system of Attica. We have to demonstrate, on the same lines as before, that complete freedom from all authority is infinitely worse than submitting to a moderate degree of control.

—

At the time of the Persian attack on the Greeks on virtually everyone we Athenians had living in Europe, is perhaps a better way of putting it a constitution, inherited from the distant past, in which a number of public offices were held on the basis of four property-classes. Lady Modesty was the mistress of our hearts, a despot who made us live in willing subjection to the laws then in force. Moreover, the enormous size of the army that was coming at us by land and sea made us desperately afraid, and served to increase our obedience to the authorities and the law. For all these reasons we displayed a tremendous spirit of co-operation. You see, about ten years before the battle of Salamis, Datis had arrived at the head of a Persian army; he had been sent by Darius against the Athenians and the Eretrians with explicit instructions to make slaves of them and bring them home, and he had been warned that failure would mean death. With his vast

numbers

of soldiers, Datis

made

short

he completely overpowered and captured.

work

He then

—

of the Eretrians,

whom

sent to Athens a blood-

—

curdling report that not a single Eretrian had got away propaganda which asked us to believe that Datis' soldiers, hand in hand in a long line, had combed over every inch of Eretria. Well, whatever the truth or otherwise of this tale, it terrified the Greeks; the Athenians were particularly scared, and they sent off envoys in all directions, but no one was prepared to

—

help them except the Spartans who were, however, prevented by the Messenian war, which was going on at that time, or perhaps by some other distraction (I'm not aware of any information being given on the point). However that may be, the Spartans arrived at Marathon one day too late for the battle. After this, reports of vast preparations and endless threats on the part of the king came thick and fast. The years went by,

and then we were told that Darius was dead, but that his son, young and impetuous, had inherited the kingdom and was determined not to give up the invasion. The Athenians reckoned that all these preparations were directed against themselves, because of what had happened at Marathon;

1388

and when they heard

b

c

Laws

had been dug through Athos, the bridging of the Hellespont and the huge number of Xerxes' ships, they calculated that neither land nor sea offered any prospects of safety. No one, they thought, would come to help them. They remembered the previous attack and the success of the Persians in Eretria: no one had assisted the Athenians then, no one had faced the danger by fighting at their side. On land they expected the same thing to happen this time; and as for the sea, they realized that escape by this route was out of the question, in view of the thousand or more ships coming to the attack. They could think of only one hope, and a thin, desperate hope it was; but there was simply no other. Their minds went back to the previous occasion, and they reflected how the victory they won in battle had been gained in equally desperate circumstances. Sustained by this hope, they began to recognize that no one but they themselves and their gods could provide a way out of their difficulties. All this inspired them with a spirit of solidarity. One cause was the actual fear they felt at the time, but there was another kind too, encouraged by the traditional laws of the state. I mean the 'fear' they had of the canal that

learned to experience as a result of being subject to an ancient code of laws. In the course of our earlier discussion 26 we have called this fear 'modesty' often enough, and we said that people who aspire to be good

must be its slave. A coward, on the other hand, is free of this particular kind of fear and never experiences it. And if 'ordinary' fear had not overtaken the cowards on that occasion, they would never have combined to defend d

themselves or protected temples, tombs, fatherland, and friends and relafives as well, in the way they did. We would all have been split up and scattered over the face of the earth. Megillus: Yes, sir, you are quite right, and your remarks reflect credit both on your country and yourself. Athenian: No doubt, Megillus; and it is only right and proper to tell

you

of the history of that period, seeing that you've been blessed with your ancestors character. then, you and Clinias, consider: have these remarks of ours any relevance at all to legislation? After all, this is the object of the exercise— I'm not going through all this simply for the story.

Now

e

0

Look: in a way, we Athenians have had the same experience as the Persians. They, of course, reduced the people to a state of complete subjection, and we encouraged the masses to the opposite extreme of unfettered liberty, but the discussion we have had serves well enough as a pointer to the next step in the argument, and shows us the method to follow. Megillus: Splendid! But do try to be even more explicit about what

you mean. Athenian: Very well. When the old laws applied, my friends, the people were not in control: on the contrary, they lived in a kind of 'voluntary slavery' to the laws.

26.

At 647a, 671 d.

Laws

1389

III

Megillus: Which laws have you in mind? Athenian: I'm thinking primarily of the regulations about the music of that period (music being the proper place to start a description of how life became progressively freer of controls). In those days Athenian music comprised various categories and forms. One type of song consisted of prayers to the gods, which were termed 'hymns'; and there was another

which you might well have called 'laments'. 'Paeans' category, and there was also a fourth, called a 'dithyramb'

quite different type,

made up

a third

(whose theme was, I think, the birth of Dionysus). There existed another kind of song too, which they thought of as a separate class, and the name they gave it was this very word that is so often on our lips: 'nomes' ('for the lyre', as they always added). Once these categories and a number of others had been fixed, no one was allowed to pervert them by using one 2,

composition belonging to another category. And what was the authority which had to know these standards and use its knowledge in reaching its verdicts, and crack down on the disobedient? Well, certainly no notice was taken of the catcalls and uncouth yelling of the audience, as it is nowadays, nor yet of the applause that indicates approval. People of taste and education made it a rule to listen to the performance with

sort of tune in a

through to the end; children and their attendants and the general public could always be disciplined and controlled by a stick. Such was the rigor with which the mass of the people was prepared to be controlled in the theatre, and to refrain from passing judgment by shouting. Later, as time went on, composers arose who started to set a fashion of breaking the rules and offending good taste. They did have a silent attention right

natural artistic talent, but they were ignorant of the correct and legitimate standards laid down by the Muse. Gripped by a frenzied and excessive

jumbled together laments and hymns, mixed paeans and dithyrambs, and even imitated pipe tunes on the lyre. The result was a total confusion of styles. Unintentionally, in their idiotic way, they misrepresented their art, claiming that in music there are no standards of right and wrong at all, but that the most 'correct' criterion is the pleasure of a man who enjoyed the performance, whether he is a good man or not. On these principles they based their compositions, and they accompanied them with propaganda to the same effect. Consequently they gave the ordinary man not only a taste for breaking the laws of music but the arrogance to set himself up as a capable judge. The audiences, once silent, began to use their tongues; they claimed to know what was good and bad in music, and instead of a 'musical meritocracy', a sort of vicious 'theatrocracy' arose. But if this democracy had been limited to gentlemen and had applied only to music, no great harm would have been done; in the event, however, music proved to be the starting point of everyone's conviction that he was an authority on everything, and of a general lust for pleasure, they

27.

The Greek word

is

nomoi,

which

also

means daws'.

Cf. 722d, 775b, 799e.

1390

Laws

disregard for the law. Complete license was not far behind. The conviction that they knew made them unafraid, and assurance engendered effrontery. You see, a reckless lack of respect for one's betters is effrontery of peculiar viciousness, which springs from a freedom from inhibitions that has gone much too far. Megillus: You're absolutely right.

Athenian: This freedom will then take other forms. First people grow unwilling to submit to the authorities, then they refuse to obey the admonitions of their fathers and mothers and elders. As they hurtle along towards the end of this primrose path, they try to escape the authority of the laws; and the very end of the road comes when they cease to care about oaths and promises and religion in general. They reveal, reincarnated in themselves, the character of the ancient Titans 28 of the story, and thanks to getting into the same position as the Titans did, they live a wretched life of endless misery. Again I ask: what's the purpose of saying all this?

My

tongue has been galloping on and obviously I ought to curb it constantly; I must keep a bridle in my mouth and not let myself be carried away by the

argument so

as to 'take a toss

from the

hoss', as the saying

repeat the question: what's the point of this speech I've Megillus: Well asked!

Athenian: The point

is

is.

Let

me

made?

one we've made before.

Megillus: What?

Athenian: We said that a lawgiver should frame his code with an eye on three things: the freedom, unity and wisdom of the city for which he legislates. That's right, isn't it?

Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: That was why we selected two political systems, one authoritarian in the highest degree, the other representing an extreme of liberty; and the question is now, which of these two constitutes correct govern-

ment? We reviewed a moderate authoritarianism and a moderate freedom, and saw the result: tremendous progress in each case. But when either the Persians or the Athenians pushed things to extremes (of subjection in the one case and its opposite in the other), it did neither of them any good at all. Megillus: You're quite right.

Athenian:

We

had precisely the same purpose when we looked

at the

settlement of the Dorian forces, Dardanus' dwellings in the foothills, the foundation by the sea, and the original survivors of the flood; earlier, we discussed music and drink from the same point of view, as well as other topics before that. ideal

28.

way

object

was always

of administering a state,

to find out

what would be

the

and the best principles the individual

Children of Heaven and Earth, long-standing enemies ultimately overthrown by the

Olympian gods. 29.

The

See 693b.

Laws

1391

III

can observe in running his

own

wonder, Clinias and Megillus,

if

life.

But has

there's

it

some

been worth our while?

test of this that

we

I

could

set ourselves?

can see one, sir. As luck would have it, I find that all the subjects we have discussed in our conversation are relevant to my needs here and now. How fortunate that I've fallen in with you and Megillus! I won't keep you in the dark about my position indeed, I think that meeting you is a good omen for the future. The greater part of Crete Clinias:

I

think

I

—

attempting to found a colony, and has given responsibility for the job to the Cnossians; and the state of Cnossus has delegated it to myself and nine colleagues. Our brief is to compose a legal code on the basis of such the local laws as we find satisfactory, and to use foreign laws as well fact that they are not Cretan must not count against them, provided their and you a favor? Let's quality seems superior. So what about doing me take a selection of the topics we have covered and construct an imaginary community, pretending that we are its original founders. That will allow us to consider the question before us, and it may be that I'll use this

is

—

—

framework

for the future state.

Athenian: Well, Clinias, that

it

some

I

—

for

my

part

am

that's certainly

entirely at

welcome news! You may take

your disposal, unless Megillus has

objection.

Clinias: Splendid!

Megillus: Yes, I too am at your service. Clinias: I'm delighted you both agree. Now then, to found our state. in theory

let's try

—

initially

only

—

Book IV Athenian: Well, now, how should we describe our future state? I don't mean just its name: I'm not asking what it's called now, nor what it ought to be called in the future. (This might well be suggested by some detail of the actual foundation or by some spot nearby: perhaps a river or spring or some local gods will give the new state their own style and title.) This is my real question: is it to be on the coast, or inland? Clinias: The state I was talking about a moment ago, sir, is approximately eighty stades from the sea. Athenian: Well, what about harbors? Are there any along the coast on that side of the state, or are they entirely absent? Clinias: No, sir. The state has harbors in that direction which could 1

hardly be bettered.

Athenian: it

A

grow everything

1.

Nine or ten

What about the surrounding countryside? Does are there some deficiencies?

pity, that.

miles.

or

1392

Laws

No, it grows practically everything. Athenian: Will it have some nearby state for a neighbor? Clinias:

none— that's just why it's being founded. Ages

Clinias: Absolutely

there

was

a migration

from the

district,

which has

left

ago,

the land deserted

goodness knows how long. Athenian: What about plains and mountains and forests?

for

How is

it

off

for each of these?

Very much like the rest of Crete in general. Athenian: Rugged rather than flat, you mean? Clinias:

Clinias: Yes, that's right.

Athenian: Then the

have tolerably healthy prospects of becoming virtuous. If it were going to be founded near the sea and have good harbors, and were deficient in a great number of crops instead of growing everything itself, then a very great savior indeed and lawgivers of divine stature would be needed to stop sophisticated and vicious characters developing on a grand scale: such a state would simply invite it. As it is, we can take comfort in those eighty stades. Even so, it lies nearer the sea than it should, and you say that it is rather well off for harbors, which makes matters worse; but let's be thankful for small mercies. For a country to have the sea nearby is pleasant enough for the purpose of everyday life, but in fact it is a 'salty-sharp and bitter neighbor 2 in more senses than one. It fills the land with wholesaling and retailing, breeds shifty and deceitful habits in a man's soul, and makes the citizens distrustful and hostile, not only among themselves, but also in their dealings with the world outside. Still, the fact that the land produces everything will be some consolation for these disadvantages, and it is obvious in any case that even if it does grow every crop, its ruggedness will stop it doing so in any quantity; if it yielded a surplus that could be exported in bulk, the state would be swamped with the gold and silver money it received in return and this, if a state means to develop just and noble habits, is pretty nearly the worst thing that could happen to it, all things considered (as we said, if we remember, earlier in our discussion). Clinias: Of course we remember, and we agree that our argument then was right, and still is now. Athenian: The next point is this: how well is the surrounding district supplied with timber for building ships? Clinias: There are no firs or pines worth mentioning, and not much by way of cypress, though you'll find a small quantity of plane and Aleppo pine, which is, of course, the standard material shipwrights must have to state will

'

construct the interior parts of a boat. Athenian: That too is a feature of the country Clinias: Oh?

2.

Apparently

in part a quotation

from Aleman,

See D. A. Campbell, Greek Lyric (Loeb), vol.

II,

which

will

do

it

no harm.

a Spartan poet of the seventh century.

pp. 468-69.

1393

Laws IV

Athenian: It's a good thing that a state should find it difficult to lower itself to copy the wicked customs of its enemies. Clinias: And what on earth has been said to prompt that remark? Athenian: My dear sir, cast your mind back to the beginning of our discussion and watch what I'm up to. Do you remember the point we made about the laws of the Cretans having only one object, and how in particular the two of you asserted that this was warfare? I took you up on the point and argued that in so far as such institutions were established with virtue as their aim, they were to be approved; but I took strong exception to their aiming at only a part of virtue instead of the whole. Now it's your turn: keep a sharp eye on this present legislation, in case I lay down some law which is not conducive to virtue, or which fosters only a part of it. I'm going on the assumption that a law is well enacted only if it constantly aims, like an archer, at that unique target which is the only object of legislation to be invariably and uninterruptedly attended by some good result; the law must ignore everything else (wealth or anything like that), if it happens not to meet the requirements I have stipulated. This 'disgraceful copying of enemies' to which I was referring occurs when people live by the sea and are plagued by such foes as Minos, who once forced the inhabitants of Attica to pay a most onerous tribute (though of course in saying this I've no wish at all to hark back to our old grudges against you ). 3 Minos exercised tremendous power at sea, whereas the Athenians had not yet acquired the fighting ships they have today, nor was their country so rich in supplies of suitable timber that they could readily construct a strong fleet; consequently they couldn't turn themselves into sailors at a moment's notice and repel the enemy by copying the Cretan use of the sea. Even if they had been able to do that, it would have done them more good to lose seven boys over and over again rather than get into bad habits by forming themselves into a navy. They had previously been infantrymen, and infantrymen can stand their ground; but sailors have the bad habit of dashing at frequent intervals and then beating a very rapid retreat indeed back to their ships. They see nothing disgraceful craven refusal to stand their ground and die as the enemy attacks, nor in the plausible excuses they produce so readily when they drop or, as they put it, 'retreat without their weapons and take to their heels dishonor'. This is the sort of terminology you must expect if you make your soldiers into sailors; these expressions are not 'beyond praise' (far at all in a

—

from

it):

men ought never to be trained in bad habits,

least of all the citizen-

Even from Homer, I suspect, you can see that this is bad policy. He has Odysseus pitching into Agamemnon for ordering the ships to be put to sea just when the Achaeans were being hard put to it in their fight with the Trojans. In his anger, Odysseus says to him: elite.

3.

The Athenians

Androgeos, son of Minos, King of Crete, who then exacted and seven boys as victims for the Minotaur, a Cretan monster.

killed

tribute of seven girls

a

1394

Laws

Why

e

bid the well-benched ships be put to sea ,

When in our ears the noise of battle rings? Do you want the Trojans' dearest wish fulfilled and Put

,

utter ruin send us to the grave?

and watch the Achaeans buckle to the fight! No: they'll scuttle off and shrink away from battle. The advice you give will mean the end of usd

707

So

the ships to sea ,

Homer

too realized that it is bad tactics to have triremes lined up at sea in support of infantry in the field. This is the sort of habit-training that

soon make even lions run away from deer. And that's not all. When a state which owes its power to its navy wins a victory, the bravest soldiers never get the credit for it, because the battle is won thanks to the skill of steersman, boatswain and rower and the efforts of a motley crowd of ragamuffins, which means that it is impossible to honor each individual in the way he deserves. Rob a state of its power to do that, and you will

b

condemn

it

Clinias: it

c

was by

to failure.

suppose

more

or less inevitable. But in spite of that, sir, fighting at sea at Salamis against the barbarians that the Greeks I

that's

— —

saved their country according to us Cretans, anyway, Athenian: Yes, that's what most people say, Greek and non-Greek alike. Still, my friend, we Megillus here and myself are arguing in favor of two battles fought on land: Marathon, which first got the Greeks out of

—

danger, and Plataea, which finally made them really safe. We maintain that these battles improved the Greeks, whereas the fighting at sea had the opposite effect. I hope this isn't too strong language to use about battles

d

that at the time certainly helped to ensure our survival (and I'll concede you the battle at Artemisium as well as the one at Salamis). That's all very well, but when we examine the natural features of a country and its legal

system, our ultimate object of scrutiny is of course the quality of its social and political arrangements. We do not hold the common view that a man's highest good is to survive and simply continue to exist. His highest good is

to

become

as long as

and to continue to exist in that state think we've already taken this line before.

as virtuous as possible

life lasts.

But

I

Of course. Athenian: Then we need consider only one thing: is the method we are following the same as before? Can we assume it is the best way to found a state and legislate for it? Clinias: Yes, it's by far the best. Athenian: Now for the next point. Tell me, what people will you be settling? Will your policy be to accept all comers from the whole of Crete, Clinias:

e

on the grounds that the population

4.

Iliad xiv. 96-102.

in the individual cities has

exceeded

Lazos

1395

IV

number

be supported by the land? I don't suppose you're taking all comers from the Greeks in general though in fact I notice that some settlers from Argos and Aegina and other parts of Greece have come to settle in your country. But tell me what you intend on this occasion: where do you think your citizen body will come from this time? Clinias: They will probably come from all over Crete; as for the other Greeks, I imagine settlers from the Peloponnese will be particularly welcome. You are quite right in what you said just now, that there are some the

that can

—

here from Argos: they include the Gortynians, the most distinguished of the local people, who hail from the well-known Gortyn in the Peloponnese. Athenian: So it won't be all that easy for the Cretan states to found their colony. The emigrants, you see, haven't the unity of a swarm of bees:

they are not a single people from a single territory settling down to form a colony with mutual goodwill between themselves and those they have left behind. Such migrations occur because of the pressures of land-shortage or some similar misfortune: sometimes a given section of the community may be obliged to go off and settle elsewhere because it is harassed by civil war, and on one occasion a whole state took to its heels after being

overcome by an attack it could not resist. In all these cases to found a state and give it laws is, in some ways, comparatively easy, but in others it's rather difficult. When a single people speaks the same language and observes the same laws you get a certain feeling of community, because everyone shares the same religious rites and so forth; but they certainly won't find it easy to accept laws or political systems that differ from their own. Sometimes, when it's bad laws that have stimulated the revolt, and the rebels try in their new home to keep to the same familiar habits that ruined them before, their reluctance to toe the line presents the founder and lawgiver with a difficult problem. On the other hand, a miscellaneous combination of all kinds of different people will perhaps be more ready but to get them to 'pull and puff as one' to submit to a new code of laws (as they say of a team of horses) is very difficult and takes a long time. There's no escaping it: founding a state and legislating for it is a superb test that separates the men from the boys. Clinias: I dare say; but what do you mean? Please be a little clearer. Athenian: My dear fellow, now that I'm going back to considering legislators again, I think I'm actually going to insult them: but no matter, so long as the point is relevant. Anyway, why should I have qualms about it? It seems true of pretty nearly all human affairs. Clinias: What are you getting at? Athenian: I was going to say that no man ever legislates at all. Accidents and calamities occur in a thousand different ways, and it is they that are

—

the universal legislators of the world. If it isn't pressures of war that overturn a constitution and rewrite the laws, it's the distress of grinding poverty; and disease too forces us to make a great many innovations,

plagues beset us for years on end and bad weather is frequent and prolonged. Realizing all these possibilities, you may jump to conclusions

when

1396 b

Lazos

and say what I said just now, that no mortal ever passes any law at all, and that human affairs are almost entirely at the mercy of chance. Now of course this same view could equally plausibly be taken of the profession of the steersman or doctor or general but at the same time there's another point that could be made about all these examples, and with no less justifi-

—

cation.

What?

Clinias:

c

Athenian: That the all-controlling agent in human affairs is God, assisted by the secondary influences of 'chance' and 'opportunity'. A less uncompromising way of putting it is to acknowledge that there must be a third factor, namely 'skill', to back up the other two. For instance, in a storm the steersman may or may not use his skill to seize any favorable oppor-

may

tunity that

offer.

I'd

say

it

would help

a great deal

if

he did,

wouldn't you? Clinias: Yes.

d

Athenian: So the same will apply in the other cases too, and legislation in particular must be allowed to play the same role. If a state is to live in happiness, certain local conditions must be present, and when all these coincide, what the community needs to find is a legislator who understands the right way to go about things. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: So a professional man in each of the fields we've enumerated could hardly go wrong if he prayed for conditions in which the workings of chance needed only to be supplemented by his own skill. Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian:

And

the other people we've instanced

would of course be able to tell you what conditions they were praying for, if you asked them. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: And I fancy a legislator would do just the same. Clinias:

I

all

agree.

Athenian: 'Well now,

e

ments.

legislator,' let's

What

say to him, 'tell us your requireare going to give you will enable

conditions in the state we you to run it properly on your own from now on?' What's the right answer to a question like that? (We're giving the legislator's answer for him, I take it.) Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: Then

710

what he'll say: 'Give me a state under the absolute control of a dictator, and let the dictator be young, with a good memory, quick to learn, courageous, and with a character of natural elevation. And if his other abilities are going to be any use, his dictatorial soul should also possess that quality which was earlier agreed to be an essential adjunct this is

to all the parts of virtue.'

think the 'essential adjunct' our self-control. Right?

Clinias: is

I

—

companion means, Megillus,

Athenian: Yes, Clinias but the everyday kind, not the kind we speak of in a heightened sense, when we compel self-control to be good judgment

— 1397

Laws IV as well.

I

mean

the spontaneous instinct that flowers earlier in

life

in

children and animals and in some cases succeeds in imposing a certain restraint in the search for pleasure, but fails in others. We said that if this quality existed in isolation from the many other merits we are discussing, it

was not worth consideration. You Clinias: Of course.

see

my

point,

I

take

it.

must have, in addition to the others, if the state is going to get, as quickly and efficiently as possible, a political system that will enable it to live a life of supreme happiness. You see, there is no quicker or better method of establishing a Athenian: This

is

the innate quality our dictator

system than this one, nor could there ever be. Clinias: Well sir, how can a man convince himself that he is talking sense in maintaining all this? What arguments are there for it? Athenian: It's easy enough, surely, to see that the very facts of the case

political

make

the doctrine true.

Clinias: is

What do you mean?

young, restrained, quick

and elevated

If

we were

to learn,

you say, who memory, courageous

to get a dictator,

with a retentive

—

and don't forget to add 'lucky' too, in this one point: he Athenian: should be the contemporary of a distinguished lawgiver, and be fortunate enough to come into contact with him. If that condition is fulfillled, God will have done nearly all that he usually does when he wants to treat a state with particular favor. The next best thing would be a pair of such dictators; the third best would be several of them. The difficulties are in direct proportion to the numbers. Clinias: It looks as if your position is this: the best state will be the product of a dictatorship, thanks to the efforts of a first-rate legislator and a well-behaved dictator, and this will be the quickest and easiest way to bring about the transformation. The second best will be to start with an oligarchy is that your point, or what? and the third to start with

—

—

a democracy.

Athenian: Certainly next best

is

not.

The

ideal starting point

constitutional kingship,

is

dictatorship, the

some sort of democracy. largest number of powerful

and the third

is

Oligarchy comes fourth, because it has the people, so that it admits the growth of a new order only with difficulty. And we maintain, of course, that such a growth takes place when circumstances throw up a genuine lawgiver who comes to share a degree of power with the most influential persons in the state. Where the most influential element is both extremely powerful and numerically as small as it could be, as in a dictatorship, you usually get a rapid and trouble-free transition. Clinias: How? We don't understand. Athenian: We've made the point more than once, I think. Perhaps you two have not so much as seen a state under the control of a dictator.

No, and I don't particularly want to, either. Athenian: Still, suppose you did: you'd notice something on just now. Clinias:

we remarked

1398

Laws

Clinias: What's that?

Athenian: That when a dictator wants to change the morals of a state, he doesn't need to exert himself very much or spend a lot of time on the job. He simply has to be the first to set out on the road along which he wishes to urge the citizens whether to the practice of virtue or vice and give them a complete moral blueprint by setting his own personal example; he must praise and commend some courses of action and censure others, and in every field of conduct he must see that anyone who disobeys

—

is

disgraced.

And why should we expect the citizens to obey, with such alacrity, a man who combines persuasion with compulsion like that? Athenian: My friends, there's no quicker or easier way for a state to Clinias:

change

its

laws than

to follow the leadership of those in positions of

power;

no other way now, nor will there be in the future, and we shouldn't let anyone persuade us to the contrary. Actually, you see, it's not simply this that is impossible or difficult to achieve. What is difficult, and a very rare occurrence in the history of the world, is something else; but when it does occur, the state concerned reaps the benefit on a grand scale indeed, there's no blessing that will pass it by. Clinias: What occurrence do you mean? Athenian: A situation in which an inspired passion for the paths of restraint and justice guides those who wield great power. The passion may seize a single supreme ruler, or perhaps men who owe their power to exceptional wealth or high birth; or you may get a reincarnation of Nestor, who, superior as he was to all mankind for the vigor of his speech, is said to have put them in the shade even more by his qualities of restraint. In Trojan times, they say, such a paragon did exist, but he is certainly unheard of today. Still, granted someone like that did in fact exist in the past or is going to in the future, or is alive among us now, blessed is the life of this man of moderation, and blessed they who listen to the words that fall from his lips. And whatever the form of government, the same doctrine holds true: where supreme power in a man joins hands with wise judgment and self-restraint, there you have the birth of the best political there

is

system, with laws to match; you'll never achieve it otherwise. So much for my somewhat oracular fiction! Let's take it as established that though in one sense it is difficult for a state to acquire a good set of laws, in another sense nothing could be quicker or easier granted, of course, the conditions I've laid down.

—

Clinias:

How

so?

Athenian: What about pretending the fiction is true of your state, Clinias, and having a shot at making up its laws? Like children, we old men love a bit of make-believe.

what

we

waiting for? Let's get down to it. Athenian: Let us therefore summon God to attend the foundation of the state. May he hear our prayers, and having heard, come graciously and benevolently to help us settle our state and its laws. Clinias: Yes,

are

1399

Laws IV

May

he come indeed. Athenian: Well now, what political system do

Clinias:

we

intend to impose on

the state?

about what you really mean by that question. Do you mean we have to choose between a democracy, an oligarchy, and an aristocracy? Presumably you're hardly contemplating a Clinias: Please be a

little

more

— or so we'd think,

explicit

any rate. Athenian: Well then, which of you would be prepared to answer first and tell us which of these terms fits the political system of your homeland? Megillus: Isn't it right and proper for me to answer first, as the elder? Clinias: Perhaps so. Megillus: Very well. When I consider the political system in force at Sparta, sir, I find it impossible to give you a straight answer: I just can't say what one ought to call it. You see, it really does look to me like a dictatorship (it has the ephors, a remarkably dictatorial institution), yet on occasions I think it gets very close to being run democratically. But then again, it would be plain silly to deny that it is an aristocracy; and there is also a kingship (held for life), which both we and the rest of the world speak of as the oldest kingship of all. So when I'm asked all of a sudden like this, the fact is, as I said, that I can't distinguish exactly which of these

dictatorship

at

systems it belongs to. Clinias: I'm sure I'm in the same predicament as you, Megillus. I find acutely difficult to say for sure that the constitution we have in Cnossus

political

it

any of these categories. Athenian: And the reason, gentlemen, is this: you really do operate constitutions worthy of the name. The ones we called constitutions just

comes

now

into

are not really that at

all:

they are just a

number

of

ways

of running

which involve some citizens living in subjection to others like slaves, and the state is named after the ruling class in each case. But if that's the sort of principle on which your new state is to be named, it should be called after the god who really does rule over men who are rational enough to let him. Clinias: What god is that? Athenian: Well, perhaps we ought to make use of this fiction a little a state, all of

more,

if

we

are going to clear

up

the question at issue satisfactorily.

Clinias: Yes, that will be the right procedure. Athenian: It certainly will. Well now, countless ages before the formation 5 of the states we described earlier they say there existed, in the age of ,

Cronus, a form of government and administration which was a great success, and which served as a blueprint for the best run of our present-

day

states.

we simply must hear about it. Athenian: Yes, I agree. That's just why I introduced it into the discussion.

Clinias:

5.

Then

I

think

Accepting the conjecture of anerotetheis in

e4.

1400

Laws

Clinias:

c

You were

do

and seeing how relevant it is, you'll be entirely justified in giving a systematic account of what happened. Athenian: I must try to meet your wishes. The traditional account that has come down to us tells of the wonderfully happy life people lived then, and how they were provided with everything in abundance and without any effort on their part. The reason is alleged to be this: Cronus was of course aware that human nature, as we've explained 6 is never able to take quite right to

so,

,

d

complete control of all human affairs without being filled with arrogance and injustice. Bearing this in mind, he appointed kings and rulers for our states; they were not men, but beings of a superior and more divine order spirits.

We act on

of sheep

the

and herds

same

principle

nowadays

in dealing

of other domesticated animals:

we

with our flocks don't put cattle in

charge of cattle or goats in charge of goats, but control them ourselves, because we are a superior species. So Cronus too, who was well-disposed to man, did the same: he placed us in the care of the spirits, a superior order of beings, who were to look after our interests an easy enough

—

e

task for them,

and

a

tremendous boon

because the result of their attentions was peace, respect for others, good laws, justice in full measure, and a state of happiness and harmony among the races of the world. The story has a moral for us even today, and there is a lot of truth in it: where the ruler of a state is not a god but a mortal, people have no respite from to us,

and misfortune. The lesson is that we should make every effort to imitate the life men are said to have led under Cronus; we should run our public and our private life, our homes and our cities, in obedience to what little spark of immortality lies in us, and dignify these edicts of reason with the name of law But take an individual man, or an oligarchy, or even a democracy, that lusts in its heart for pleasure and demands to have its fill of everything it wants the perpetually unsatisfied victim of an evil greed that attacks it like the plague well, as we said just now, if a power like that controls a state or an individual and rides roughshod over the laws, it's impossible to escape disaster. This is the doctrine we have to examine, Clinias, and see whether we are prepared to go along with it or what? Clinias: Of course we must go along with it. toil

714

.

—

b

c

Athenian: You realize that some people maintain that there are as many different kinds of laws as there are of political systems? (And of course we've just run through the many types of political systems there are popularly supposed to be.) Don't think the question at issue is a triviality: it s supremely important, because in effect we've got back to arguing about the criteria of justice and injustice. These people take the line that legislation should be directed not to waging war or attaining complete virtue, but to safeguarding the interests of the established political system, whatever that is, so that it is never overthrown and remains permanently in force.

6.

See 691c.

1401

Laws IV

They say

that the definition of justice that

formulated Clinias:

measures up

to the facts

is

best

like this.

How?

Athenian: It runs: 'Whatever serves the interest of the stronger'. Clinias: Be a little more explicit, will you? Athenian: The point is this: according to them, the element in control at any given moment lays down the law of the land. Right? Clinias: True enough. Athenian: 'So do you imagine,' they say, 'that when a democracy has won its way to power, or some other constitution has been established (such as dictatorship), it will ever pass any laws, unless under pressure, except those designed to further its own interests and ensure that it remains permanently in power? That'll be its main preoccupation, won't it?' Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian: So the author of these rules will call them 'just' and claim that anyone who breaks them is acting 'unjustly', and punish him? Clinias: Quite likely. Athenian: So this is why such rules will always add up to 'justice'. Clinias: Certainly, on the present argument. Athenian: We are, you see, dealing with one of those 'claims to authority '.

7

Clinias:

What

claims?

Athenian: The ones rule

whom.

It

seemed

we examined

before,

when we asked who should

that parents should rule children, the elder the

and there was a large number of other titles to authority, if you remember, some of which conflicted with others. The claim we're talking about now was certainly one of these: we which meant that said, I think, that Pindar turned it into a law of nature 8 he 'justified the use of force extreme', to quote his actual words Clinias: Yes, those are the points that were made. Athenian: Now look: to which side in the dispute should we entrust our state? In some cities, you see, this is the sort of thing that has happened

younger, and the noble those of low

birth;

—

.

thousands of times. Clinias:

What?

Athenian:

When

offices are filled competitively, the

winners take over

the affairs of state so completely that they totally deny the losers and the losers' descendants any share of power. Each side passes its time in a

narrow scrutiny

someone with memories and lead a revolution. Of course,

of the other, apprehensive lest

of past injustices should gain

some

office

our position is that this kind of arrangement is very far from being a genuine political system; we maintain that laws which are not established for the

good

of the

7.

See 690a

8.

See 690b and note.

ff.

whole

state are

bogus laws, and when they favor

1402

Lazos

particular sections of the

community,

their authors are not citizens but

party-men; and people who say those laws have a claim to be obeyed are wasting their breath. We've said all this because in your new state we c

man

aren't going to appoint a

because of his wealth or some other claim like that, say strength or stature or birth. We insist that the highest office in the service of the gods must be allocated to the man who is best to office

obeying the established laws and wins that sort of victory in the state; the man who wins the second prize must be given second rank in that service, and so on, the remaining posts being allocated in order on the same system. Such people are usually referred to as 'rulers', and if I have at

d

called

them servants

of the laws'

not because I want to mint a new believe that the success or failure of a state hinges it's

expression but because I on this point more than on anything else. Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is not far off; but if law is the master of the government and the

government

is its

slave, then the situation

is full

of promise

and men enjoy

the blessings that the gods shower on a state. That's the way I see it. Clinias: By heaven, sir, you're quite right. You've the sharp eye of an old man for these things. all

e

Athenian: Yes, when we're young, we're all pretty blind to them; old age is the best time to see them clearly. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Well, what now? I suppose we should assume our colonists have arrived and are standing before us. So we shall have to finish off the topic by addressing them. Clinias:

Of

Athenian:

course.

Now

then, our address should go like this: 'Men, according to the ancient story, there is a god who holds in his hands the beginning

and end and middle of

716

and straight he marches in the cycle of nature. Justice, who takes vengeance on those who abandon the divine law, never leaves his side. The man who means to live in happiness latches on to her and follows her with meekness and humility. But he who bursts with pride, elated by wealth or honors or by physical beauty when young and foolish, whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief that so far from needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to others

b

has deserted. And in his desolation he collects others like himself, and in his soaring frenzy he causes universal chaos. Many people think he cuts a fine figure, but before very long he pays to Justice no trifling penalty and brings himself, his home and state to rack and ruin. Thus it is ordained. What action, then, should a sensible man take, and what should his outlook be? What must he avoid doing or thinking?' Clinias: This much is obvious: every man must resolve to belong to those who follow in the company of God.

c

Athenian: 'So what conduct recommends itself to God and reflects his wishes? There is only one sort, epitomized in the old saying "like approves of like" (excess apart, which is both its own enemy and that of due

there's a

all

things,

man whom God

Lazvs

1403

IV

God who

preeminently the "measure of 9 more so than any "man," as they say So if you want

proportion). In our view

it is

is

much to recommend yourself to someone of this character, you must do your level best to make your own character reflect his, and on this principle the moderate man is God's friend, being like him, whereas the immoderate and unjust man is not like him and is his enemy; and the same reasoning

all

things,"

.

applies to the other vices too. 'Let's be clear that the consequence of all this is the following doctrine (which is, I think, of all doctrines the finest and truest): If a good man sacrifices to the gods and keeps them constant company in his prayers

worship he can give them, this will be the best and noblest policy he can follow; it is the conduct that fits his character as nothing else can, and it is his most effective way of achieving a happy life. But if the wicked man does it, the results are bound to be just the opposite. Whereas the good man's soul is clean, the wicked man's

and

offerings

and every kind

of

and it is never right for a good man or for God to receive which means that even if impious people do gifts from unclean hands lavish a lot of attention on the gods, they are wasting their time, whereas the trouble taken by the pious is very much in season. So this is the target but what "missiles" are we to use to hit it, and at which we should aim what "bow" is best carried to shoot them? Can we name these "weapons"? The first weapon in our armory will be to honor the gods of the underworld next after those of Olympus, the patron-gods of the state; the former should be allotted such secondary honors as the Even and the Left, while the 10 That's latter should receive superior and contrasting honors like the Odd soul

is

polluted,

—

—

.

the best

way

a

man

can

hit his target, piety. After these

gods, a sensible

them the heroes. Next in priority will be rites celebrated according to law at private shrines dedicated to ancestral gods. Last come honors paid to living parents. It is meet and right that a debtor should discharge his first and greatest obligation and pay the debt which comes before all others; he must consider that all he has and holds belongs to those who bore and bred him, and he is meant to use it in their service to the limit of his powers. He must serve them first with his property, then with hand and brain, and so give to the old people what they desperately need in view of their age: repayment of all that anxious care and attention they lavished on him, the longstanding "loan" they made him as a child. Throughout his life the son must be very careful to watch his tongue in addressing his parents, because there is a very heavy penalty for careless and ill-considered language; Retribution,

man

will

worship the

spirits,

and

after

messenger of Justice, is the appointed overseer of these things. If his parents get angry, he must submit to them, and whether they satisfy their anger 9.

Protagoras, a philosopher and sophist of the

fifth

century, maintained that 'man

is

the

measure

10.

A reference to the Pythagorean list of opposites: Odd, Even; Right, Left; Male, Female;

of

Good, Bad; and

all things'.

a

number

of others.

1404

Laws

m speech or in action,

he must forgive them; after all, he must reflect, it's natural enough for a father to get very angry if he thinks he's being harmed

718

b

by his own son. When the parents die, the most modest burial will be best, and the ceremonies should not be more elaborate than custom demands nor inferior to those with which his forefathers laid their own parents to rest. Year by year he should honor the departed by similar acts of devotion; he will honor them best by never failing to provide a perpetual memorial to them, spending on the dead a proper proportion of the money he happens to have available. If we do that, and live in accordance with these rules, each of us will get the reward we deserve from the gods and such beings as are superior to ourselves, and live in a spirit of cheerful confidence for most of the years of our life.' The laws themselves will explain the duties we owe to children, relatives, friends and fellow citizens, as well as the service heaven demands we render to foreigners; they will tell us the way we have to behave in the company of each of these categories of people, if we want to lead a full and varied life without breaking the law. The laws" method will be partly persuasion and partly (when they have to deal with characters that defy persuasion) compulsion and chastisement; and with the good wishes of the gods they will make our state happy and prosperous. There are a

number

who thinks as I do simply must mention, but they are not easily expressed in the form of a law. So he should, I think, put up to himself and those for whom he is going to legislate an example of the way to deal with the remaining subjects, and when he has explained them all as well as he can, he should set about laying down his actual code of laws. So what's the particular form in which such topics are expressed? It's none too easy to confine one's exposition of them to a single example, but let's see if we can crystallize our ideas by looking at the matter rather like this. Clinias: Tell us what you have in mind. Athenian: I should like the citizens to be supremely easy to persuade along the paths of virtue; and clearly this is the effect the legislator will try to achieve throughout his legislation, d

of other topics

Clinias:

Of

which

a legislator

course.

Athenian: It occurs to me that the sort of approach I've just explained 11 provided it is not made to totally uncouth souls, will help to make people more amenable and better disposed to listen to what the lawgiver recommends. So even if the address has no great effect but only makes his listener a trifle easier to handle, and so that much easier to teach, the legislator should be well pleased. People who are anxious to attain moral excellence with all possible speed are pretty thin on the ground and it isn't easy to find them: most only go to prove the wisdom of Hesiod's remark that the road to vice is smooth and can be traveled without sweating, because it is very short; but 'as the price of virtue', he says. ,

t?

11.

Reading

toi

nunde in d2.

1405

Laws IV The gods have imposed the sweat of our brows And long and steep is the ascent that you have to make And rough at first; but when you get to the top 2 Then the rugged road is easy to endure } ,

,

,

719

very well. Athenian: He certainly did. But after this discussion I'm left with certain impressions which I want to put forward for your consideration.

sounds as

Clinias:

It

Clinias:

Do

if

he

hit off the situation

so, then.

Athenian: Let's have a word with the legislator and address him like this: Tell us, legislator, if you were to discover what we ought to do and say, surely you'd tell us?' Clinias:

Of

b

course.

13 Athenian: 'Now didn't we hear you saying a few minutes ago that a legislator ought not to allow the poets to compose whatever happened to take their fancy? You see, they'd never know when they were saying something in opposition to the law and harming the state.' Clinias: You're quite right. Athenian: Well, then, if we took the poets' side and addressed the legislator, would this be a reasonable line to take?

Clinias:

What?

Athenian: This: 'There is an old proverb, legislator, which we poets never tire of telling and which all laymen confirm, to the effect that when a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the Muse, he cannot control his thoughts. He's like a fountain where the water is allowed to gush forth unchecked. His art is the art of representation, and when he represents men with contrasting characters he is often obliged to contradict himself, and he doesn't know which of the opposing speeches contains the truth. But for the legislator, this is impossible: he must not let his law say two different things on the same subject; his rule has to be "one topic, one doctrine." For example, consider what you said just now. A funeral can be extravagant, inadequate or modest, and your choice falls on one of these which you recommend with unqualified praise. But the moderate three if I were composing a poem about a woman of great wealth and how she gave instructions for her own funeral, I should recommend the elaborate burial; a poor and frugal character, on the other hand, would be in favor of the cheap funeral, while the moderate man of moderate means would recommend accordingly. But you ought not to use the term "moderate" in the way you did just now: you must say what "moderate" means and how big or small it may be. If you don't, you must realize that a remark such as you made still has some way to go before it can be a law.'

c

d

—

—

12.

Works and Days 287-92.

13.

See 656c

ff.

e

1406

Laws

Clinias: That's quite right.

720

Athenian: So should the legislator whom we appoint skip any such announcement at the beginning of his laws? Is he to say without ceremony what one should and should not do, and simply threaten the penalty for disobedience before passing on to the next law, without adding to his statutes a single word of encouragement or persuasion? It's just the same with doctors, you know, when we're ill: one follows one method of treatment, one another. Let's recall the two methods, so that we can make the same request of the legislator that a child might make of its doctor, to treat him as gently as possible. You want an example? Well, we usually speak,

I

and doctors'

think, of doctors

assistants, but of course

we

call the

latter 'doctors' too.

b

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian:

And

these 'doctors' (who may be free men or slaves) pick up the skill empirically, by watching and obeying their masters; they've no systematic knowledge such as the free doctors have learned for them-

and pass on to these two categories? Clinias: Of course. selves

c

d

Athenian:

Now

their pupils.

You'd agree

here's another thing

you

in putting 'doctors' into

notice.

A

state's invalids in-

clude not only free men but slaves too, who are almost always treated by other slaves who either rush about on flying visits or wait to be consulted in their surgeries. This kind of doctor never gives any account of the particular illness of the individual slave, or is prepared to listen to one; he simply prescribes what he thinks best in the light of experience, as if he had precise knowledge, and with the self-confidence of a dictator. Then he dashes off on his way to the next slave-patient, and so takes off his master s shoulders some of the work of attending the sick. The visits of

by contrast, are mostly concerned with treating the illnesses of free men, his method is to construct an empirical case-history by consulting the invalid and his friends; in this way he himself learns something from the sick and at the same time he gives the individual patient all the instruction he can. He gives no prescription until he has somehow gained the free doctor,

the invalid s consent; then, coaxing

e

him

into continued cooperation, he tries to complete his restoration to health. Which of the two methods do you think makes a doctor a better healer, or a trainer more efficient? Should they use the double method to achieve a single effect, or should the method

too be single

more

— the

less

satisfactory

approach that makes the invalid

recalcitrant?

The double, sir, is much better, I think. Athenian: Would you like us to see how this double method and the Clinias:

single

work out when applied

to legislation?

Clinias: Yes, I'd like that very

Athenian: Well then,

in

much. heaven's name, what

will be the first

legislator will establish? Surely the first subject

he will turn

law our

to in his

—

1407

Laws IV regulations will be the very

first

step that leads to the birth of children in

the state. Clinias:

Of

course.

And

Athenian:

this first step

is,

in all states, the

union of two people

in the partnership of marriage?

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian: So the correct policy for every state will probably be to pass marriage laws first. Clinias: No doubt about it. Athenian: Now then, to start with, let's have the simple form. It might run more or less like this:

A man If

must marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five. he does not, he must be punished by fines and disgrace

and the

and disgrace

fines

version of the marriage law; this

A man must marry between that there

is

a sense in

So much for the simple will be the double version:

will then be specified.

the ages of thirty

and

thirty-five, reflecting

which nature has not only somehow endowed

race with a degree of immortality, but also planted in us all a longing to achieve it, which we express in every way we can. One expression of that longing is the desire for fame and the wish not to lie the

human

nameless in the grave. Thus mankind is by nature a companion of eternity, and is linked to it, and will be linked to it, forever. Mankind is immortal because it always leaves later generations behind to preserve its unity and identity for all time: it gets its share of immortality by means of procreation. It is never a holy thing voluntarily to deny oneself this prize, and he who neglects to take a wife and have children does precisely that. So if a man obeys the law he will be allowed to go his way without penalty, but If a man disobeys, and reaches the age of thirty-five without having married, he must pay a yearly fine (of a

sum

bachelor

to

be specified; that ought to stop him thinking that

is all

cakes and

and be deprived too of state

pay

life

as a

ale), all

to their elders

the honors

which the younger people

in the

on the appropriate occasions.

one has heard this law and compared it with the other, one can judge whether in general laws should run to at least twice the length by combining persuasion and threats, or restrict themselves to threats alone and be of 'single' length only. Megillus: The Spartan instinct, sir, is always to prefer brevity. But if I were asked to sit in judgment on these statutes and say which of the two I'd like to see committed to writing in the state, I'd choose the longer one, and my choice would be precisely the same for every law drafted in the

When

1408

Laws

which you've given us specimens. Still, I suppose Clinias here too must approve this present legislation, seeing that it's his state that is contemplating the adoption of laws modeled on it. Clinias: You've put it all very well, Megillus. Athenian: However, it would be pretty fatuous to spend our time talking alternative versions of

b

about the length or brevity of the text: it's high quality that we should value, I think, not extreme brevity or length. One of the kinds of laws we mentioned just now is twice as valuable for practical purposes as the other, but that s not all: as we said a little while ago, the two types of doctors were an extremely apt parallel 14 A relevant point here is that no legislator ever seems to have noticed that in spite of its being open to them to use :

two methods

c

in their legislation,

compulsion and persuasion (subject to the limitations imposed by the uneducated masses), in fact they use only one. They never mix in persuasion with force when they brew their laws, but administer compulsion neat. As for myself, my dear sirs, I can see a third condition that should be observed in legislation not that it ever is.

—

Clinias:

What

condition do you mean? Athenian: Providentially enough, the point is brought out by the very conversation we've had today. Since we began to discuss legislation dawn has become noon and we've reached this splendid resting-place; we've d

talked about nothing but laws

—and yet

suspect it was only a moment we really got round to framing any, and that everything we've said up till now has been simply legislative preamble. Now why have I pointed this out? I want to make the point that the spoken word, and in general all compositions that involve using the voice, employ 'preludes' (a sort of limbering up, so to speak), and that these introductions are I

ago that

designed to aid the coming performance. For instance, the domes' of songs to the harp, and all other kinds of musical composition, are preceded by preludes of fantastic elaboration. But in the case of the real 'nomes', the kind we call 'administrative', nobody has ever so much as breathed the word 'prelude' or composed one and given it to the world; the assumption has been that such a thing would be repugnant to nature. But in my opinion the discussion we've had indicates that it is perfectly artistically

e

1

"

and this means that the laws which seemed 'double' when I described them a moment ago are not really double' in the straightforward natural;

sense the term suggests:

have tzvo dements 'law' and The 'dictatorial prescription', which we compared to the prescriptions of the 'slavish' doctors, is the law pure and simple; and the part that comes before it, although in point of fact 'persuasive' (as Megillus put it), nevertheless has a function, analogous to that of a preamble in a speech. It seems obvious to me that the reason why the legislator gave it's

just that they

,

'preface to law'.

/23

14.

The point seems

15.

I.e.,

be that in the case of the doctors, one kind of treatment was 'much better' (720e) than the other (not simply twice as good). In other words, if you double the length of your laws, you more than double their value. to

laws, the Greek

word nomoi meaning both

'laws'

and 'melodies'.

1409

Laws IV that entire persuasive address

was

to

—

make the person to whom he promul-

—

gated his law accept his orders the law in a more co-operative frame of mind and with a correspondingly greater readiness to learn. That's why, as I see it, this element ought properly to be termed not the 'text' of the law, but the 'preamble'. So after all that, what's the next point I'd like made? It's this: the legislator must see that both the permanent body of laws and the individual sub-divisions are always supplied with preambles.

The gain

we gave

will be just as great as just

it

was

in the case of the

two specimens

now.

I'm concerned. I'd certainly instruct our lawgiver, master of his art though he is, to legislate in no way but that. Athenian: Yes, Clinias, I think you're right to agree that all laws have their preambles and that the first task must be to preface the text of each part of the legal code with the appropriate introduction, because the announcement it introduces is important, and it matters a great deal whether it is clearly remembered or not. However, we should be wrong to demand that both 'major' laws and minor rules should invariably be Clinias:

As

headed by a

b

far as

preface.

treatment. (They

all

in

d

needs this the nature of the case, but it's

Not every song and speech,

have introductions

c

after

all,

not always appropriate to use them.) Still, the decision in all these cases must be left to the discretion of the orator or singer or legislator. Clinias: I think all this is very true. But let's not waste any more time

our theme and make a fresh start, if you are agreeable, on the subject you dealt with before, when you were not professing to compose in preamble form; let's go over the topic again ('second time lucky', as they say in games), on the understanding that we are not talking at random, as we did just now, but composing a preface; and we should begin by agreeing that this is what we are doing. We've heard enough said just now about the worship of the gods and the services 16 let's try to deal with the subsequent to be rendered to our ancestors; topics until you think the entire preface has been adequately put together. Then you will go on to work through the actual laws. Athenian: So our feeling at the moment is that we have already produced an adequate preface about the gods and the powers below them, and about delaying,

sir.

Let's get

back

to

parents living and dead. Your instructions now, I think, are that as it were, take the covers off the remainder of the preface.

I

e

724

should,

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Well now, the next thing is concentrate or relax the efforts he devotes

this:

how

far

should a

man

to looking after his soul, his

body, and his property? This is a suitable topic, and it will be to the mutual advantage of both speaker and listeners to ponder it and so perfect their education as far as they can. So beyond a shadow of a doubt here's the next subject for explanation and the next topic to listen to. Clinias: You're quite right. 16.

See 715e-718a.

b

1410

Laws

Book

V

Athenian: Everyone who was listening to the address just now about the gods and our dearly beloved ancestors, should now pay attention. the things a man can call his own, the holiest (though the gods are holier still) is his soul, his most intimate possession. There are two

Of

all

elements that

make up

whole of every man. One is stronger and superior, and acts as master; the other, which is weaker and inferior, is a slave; and so a man must always respect the master in him in preference to the slave. Thus when I say that next after the gods our masters and their attendant spirits, a man must honor his soul, my recommendation is correct. But hardly a man among us honors it in the right way: he only the

—

thinks he does.

You

see,

nothing that

is

evil

—

can confer honor, because to

honor something is to confer marvelous benefits upon it; and anyone who reckons he is magnifying his soul by flattery or gifts or indulgence, so that he fails to make it better than it was before, may think he is honoring it, but in fact that is not what he is doing at all. For instance, a person has only to reach adolescence to imagine he is capable of deciding everything; he thinks he is honoring his soul if he praises it, and he is only too keen to tell it to do what it likes. But our present doctrine is that in doing this he is not honoring but harming it; whereas we are arguing that he should honor it next after the gods. Similarly when a man thinks that the responsievery fault lies not in himself but in others, whom he blames for his most frequent and serious misfortunes, while exonerating himself, he doubtless supposes he is honoring his soul. But far from doing that, he is injuring it. Again, when he indulges his pleasures and disobeys the recommendations and advice of the legislator, he is not honoring his soul at all, but dishonoring it, by filling it with misery and repentance. Or, to take the opposite case, he may not brace himself to endure the recombility for his

mended

and

and troubles and pains, and simply give up; but his surrender confers no honor on his soul, because all such conduct brings disgrace upon it. Nor does he do it any honor if he thinks that life is a good thing no matter what the cost. This too dishonors his soul, because he surrenders to its fancy that everything in the next world is an evil, whereas he should resist the thought and enlighten his soul by demonstrating that he does not really know whether our encounter with the gods in the next world may not be in fact the best thing that ever happens to us. And when a man values beauty above virtue, the disrespect he shows his soul is total and fundamental, because he would argue that the body is more to be honored than the soul falsely, because nothing born on earth is to be honored more than what comes from heaven; and anyone who holds a different view of the soul does not realize how wonderful is this possession which he scorns. Again, a man who is seized by lust to obtain money by improper means and feels no disgust in the acquisition, toils

fears

—

Laws

V

1411

—

does his soul no honor by such gifts far from it: he sells all that gives the soul its beauty and value for a few paltry pieces of gold; but all the gold upon the earth and all the gold beneath it does not compensate for lack of virtue.

will find that in the event he

To sum up, the legislator will list and classify certain things as disgraceful and wicked, and others as fine and good; everyone who is not prepared to make all efforts to refrain from the one kind of action and practice the other to the limits of his power must be unaware that in all such conduct he is treating his soul, the most holy possession he has, in the most disrespectful and abominable manner. You see, practically no one takes into account the greatest 'judgment', as it is called, on wrongdoing. This is to grow to resemble men who are evil, and as the resemblance increases to shun good men and their wholesome conversation and to cut oneself off from them, while seeking to attach oneself to the other kind and keep their company. The inevitable result of consorting with such people is that what you do and have done to you is exactly what they naturally do and say to each other.

Consequently,

this condition is not really a 'judgment' at

because justice and judgment are fine things: it is mere punishment, suffering that follows a wrongdoing. Now whether a man is made to suffer or not, he is equally wretched. In the former case he is not cured, in the latter he will ultimately be killed to ensure the safety of many others. all,

what is superior, and, as perfect as possible what is deficient. Nothing that nature gives a man is better adapted than his soul to enable him to avoid evil, keep on the track of the highest good, and when he has captured

To put it in a nutshell, where practicable, to make

'honor'

is

to cleave to

quarry to live in intimacy with it for the rest of his life. For those reasons the soul has been allotted the second rank of honor comes the honor naturally due to the third as everyone will realize body. Here again it is necessary to examine the various reasons for honoring it, and see which are genuine and which are false; this is the job of a legislator, and I imagine he will list them as follows. The body that deserves nor to be honored is not the handsome one or the strong or the swift yet the healthy (though a good many people would think it was); and it is certainly not the one with the opposite qualities to all these. He will say that the body which achieves a mean between all these extreme conditions is by far the soundest and best-balanced, because the one extreme makes the soul bold and boastful, while the other makes it abject and groveling. The same is true of the possession of money and goods: its value is measured by the same yardstick. Both, in excess, produce enmity and feuds in private and public life, while a deficiency almost invariably leads his

1

;

—

—

—

to slavery.

one should be keen on making money for the sake of leaving his children as rich as possible, because it will not do them any good, or the state either. A child's fortune will be most in harmony with his

No

1.

The

first

rank has been given to the gods (726e-727a).

1412

b

Laws

circumstances, and superior to all other fortunes, if it is modest enough not to attract flatterers, but sufficient to supply all his needs; to our ears such a fortune strikes exactly the right note, and it frees our life from

Extreme modesty, not gold, is the legacy we should leave our children. We imagine that the way to bequeath them modesty is to rebuke them when they are immodest, but that is not the result produced in the young when people admonish them nowadays and tell them that youth must show respect to everyone. The sensible legislator will prefer to instruct the older men to show respect to their juniors, and to take especial care not to let any young man see or hear them doing or saying anything disgraceful: where the old are shameless the young too will inevitably be disrespectful to a degree. The best way to educate the younger generation (as well as yourself) is not to rebuke them but patently to practice all your anxiety.

c

what you preach to others. If a man honors and respects his relatives, who all share the worship of the family gods and have the same blood in their veins, he can reasonably expect to have the gods of birth look with benevolence on the procreation of his own children. And as for friends and companions, you will find them easier to get on with in day-to-day contact if you make more of their services to you and esteem them more highly than they do, and put a smaller value on your own good turns to your friends and companions than they do themselves. In dealings with the state and one's fellow citizens, the best man by far is the one who, rather than win a prize at Olympia or in any of the other contests in war and peace, would prefer to beat everyone by his reputation for serving the laws of his country a reputation for having devoted a lifetime of service to them with more distinction than anyone else. As to foreigners, one should regard agreements made with them as life

d

—

e

particularly sacrosanct. Practically all offenses committed as between or against foreigners are quicker to attract the vengeance of God than offenses as between fellow citizens. The foreigner is not surrounded by friends and

companions, and stirs the compassion of gods and men that much more, so that anyone who has the power to avenge him comes to his aid more

and that power is possessed preeminently by the guardian spirit or god, companion of Zeus the God of Strangers, who is concerned in each readily;

730

case.

Anyone who

takes the smallest thought for the future will therefore take great care to reach the end of his days without having committed

during his

any crime involving foreigners. The most serious of offenses against foreigners or natives is always that affecting suppliants; the god the victim supplicated and invoked when he won his promise becomes a devoted protector of his suppliant, who can consequently rely on the promise he received never to suffer without vengeance being taken for the wrongs done to him. b

life

We've now dealt fairly thoroughly with a man's treatment of his parents, himself and his own possessions, and his contacts with the state, his friends,

Laws

V

1413

and countrymen. The next question for consideration is the sort of person he must be himself, if he is to acquit himself with distinction in his journey through life; it's not the influence of law that we're concerned with now, but the educational effect of praise and blame, which makes the individual easier to handle and better disposed towards the laws that are to be established. Truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike. Let anyone who intends to be happy and blessed be its partner from the start, his relatives, foreigners

may live as much of his life as possible a man of truth. You can trust a man like that, but not the man who is fond of telling deliberate lies (and anyone who is happy to go on producing falsehoods in ignorance

so that he

Neither state is anything to envy: no one has any friends if he is a fool or cannot be trusted. As the years go by he is recognized for what he is, and in the difficulties of old age as life draws to its close he isolates himself completely; he has just about as much contact with his surviving friends and children as with those who are already dead. A man who commits no crime is to be honored; yet the man who will not even allow the wicked to do wrong deserves more than twice as much respect. The former has the value of a single individual, but the latter,

of the truth

is

an

idiot).

who reveals the wickedness of another to the authorities, is worth a legion. Anyone who makes every effort to assist the authorities in checking crime should be declared

to

be the great and perfect citizen of his

state,

winner

of the prize for virtue.

The same praise should also be given to self-control and good judgment, and to all the other virtues which the possessor can communicate to others as well as displaying in his own person. If a man does so communicate them, he should be honored as in the top rank; if he is prepared to communicate them but lacks the ability, he must be left in second place; but if he is a jealous fellow and churlishly wants to monopolize his virtues, then we should certainly censure him, but without holding the virtue itself in less esteem because of its possessor on the contrary, we should do our best to acquire it. We want everyone to compete

—

generous spirit, because this is the way a man will be a credit to his state by competing on his own account but refraining from fouling the chances of others by slander. The jealous man, who thinks he has to get the better of others by being rude about them, makes less effort himself to attain true virtue and discourages his competitors by unfair criticism. In this way he hinders the whole state's struggle to achieve virtue and diminishes its reputation, in so far as it depends

in the struggle for virtue in a

—

on him. should combine in his character high spirit with the utmost gentleness, because there is only one way to get out of the reach of crimes committed by other people and which are dangerous or even impossible to cure: you have to overcome them by fighting in self-defense and rigidly punishing them, and no soul can do this without righteous indignation. On the other hand there are some criminals whose crimes are curable, and

Every

man

1414 the

Laws

first

thing to realize here

that every unjust

man

unjust against his No man on earth would ever deliberately embrace any of the supreme evils, least of all in the most precious parts of himself and as we said, the truth is that the most precious part of every man is his soul. So no one will ever voluntarily accept the supreme evil into the most valuable part of himself and live with it throughout his life. No: in general, the unjust man deserves just as much pity as any other sufferer. And you may is

is

will.

—

d

pity the criminal

whose disease

curable,

is

and

restrain

and abate your

anger, instead of persisting in it with the spitefulness of a shrew; but when you have to deal with complete and unmanageably vicious corruption,

e

732

you must let your anger off its leash. That is why we say that it must be the good man's duty to be high-spirited or gentle as circumstances require. The most serious vice innate in most men's souls is one for which everybody forgives himself and so never tries to find a way of escaping. You can get some idea of this vice from the saying that a man is in the nature of the case 'his own best friend', and that it is perfectly proper for him to have to play this role. It is truer to say that the cause of each and every crime we commit is precisely this excessive love of ourselves, a love which blinds us to the faults of the beloved and makes us bad judges of goodness and beauty and justice, because we believe we should honor our

own ego

rather than the truth.

Anyone with

aspirations to greatness possessions, but acts of justice, not

must admire not himself and his own only when they are his own, but especially when they happen to be done by someone else. It's because of this same vice of selfishness that stupid

b

people are always convinced of their own shrewdness, which is why we think we know everything when we are almost totally ignorant, so that thanks to not leaving to others what we don't know how to handle, we inevitably

come

to grief

when we

try to tackle

ourselves. For these reasons, then, every man must steer clear of extreme love of himself, and be loyal to his superior instead; and he mustn't be put off by shame at the thought of abandoning that 'best friend'. it

There is a certain amount of more detailed but no less useful advice which one hears often enough, and one should go through it to oneself by way of reminder. (Where waters ebb, there is always a corresponding flow,

c

d

and the

act of

remembering

is

the 'flow' of thought that has

drained away.) So then: excessive laughter and tears must be avoided, and this is the advice every man must give to every other; one should try to behave decently by suppressing all extremes of joy and grief, both when one's guardian angel brings continued prosperity and when in times of trouble our guardians face difficulties as insurmountable as a high, sheer cliff. We should always have the hope that the blessings God sends will decrease the troubles that assail us, change our present circumstances for the better, and make us lucky enough to see our good fortune always increase. These are the hopes that every man should live by; he must remember all this

Laws

V

1415

advice and never spare any effort to recall it vividly to his that of others, at work and in leisure time alike.

Now

own mind and

from the point of view of religion, we've expounded pretty thoroughly what sort of activities we should pursue and what sort of person the individual ought to be; but we have not yet come down to the purely secular level. But we must, because we are addressing men, then,

e

not gods.

Human nature

involves, above

all,

pleasures, pains,

and

desires,

and no

mortal animal can help being hung up dangling in the air (so to speak) in total dependence on these powerful influences. That is why we should not only because it enjoys a fine and glorious praise the noblest life reputation, but because (provided one is prepared to try it out instead of recoiling from it as a youth) it excels in providing what we all seek: a predominance of pleasure over pain throughout our lives. That this result is guaranteed, if it is tried out in the correct manner, will be perfectly obvious in an instant. But what is 'correctness' here? One should consider this point in the light of the following thesis. We have to ask if one condition

—

our nature while another does not, and weigh the pleasant life against the painful with that question in mind. We want to have pleasure; we neither choose nor want pain; we prefer the neutral state if we are thereby relieved of pain, but not if it involves the loss of pleasure. We want less pain and more pleasure, we do not want less pleasure and more pain; but we should be hard put to it to be clear about our wishes when faced

733

suits

with a choice of two situations bringing pleasure and pain in the same proportions. These considerations of number or size or intensity or equality (or their opposites) which determine our wishes all influence or fail to influence us whenever we make a choice. This being inevitably the way

which pleasures and pains come frequently and with great intensity, but with pleasure predominating; if pains predominate, we reject that life. Similarly when pleasures and pains are few and small and feeble: if pain outweighs pleasure, we do not want that life, but we do when pleasure outweighs pain. As for the 'average' life, which experiences only moderate pleasures or pains, we should observe the same point as before: we desire it when it offers us a preponderance of pleasure (which we enjoy), but not when it offers us a preponderance of pain (which of things,

we want

b

c

a life in

d

we should think of all human lives as bound up in these two feelings, and we must think to what kind of life our natural wishes incline. But if we assert that we want anything outside this range, we are talking out of ignorance and inexperience of life as it is really lived. So when a man has considered his likes and dislikes, what he would we abhor).

In that sense, then,

do and what not, and adopted that as a working rule to guide him in choosing what he finds congenial and pleasant and supremely excellent, he will select a life that will enable him to live as happily as a man can. So what are these lives, and how many are there, from which he must make this choice? Let us list them: there is the life of self-control for one, the life of wisdom for another, and the life of courage too; and

willingly

e

1416

Laws

us treat the healthy life as another. As opposed to these, we have another four lives the licentious, the foolish, the cowardly and the diseased. Now let

—

anyone who knows what the gentle in

all

life

of self-control

respects, with mild pleasures

desires without frenzy; the licentious

life

and

is

like will describe

pains, light appetites,

he will say

is

it

as

and

violent through

and through, involving extreme pleasures and pains, intense and raging appetites and desires of extreme fury. He will say that in the life of selfcontrol the pleasures outweigh the pains, and in the licentious life the pains exceed the pleasures, in point of size, number and frequency. That is why we inevitably and naturally find the former life more pleasant, the latter more painful, and anyone who means to live a pleasant life no longer has the option of living licentiously. On the contrary, it is already clear (if our present position is correct) that if a man is licentious it must be without intending to be. It is either because of ignorance or lack of self-control, or both, that the world at large lives immoderately.

The healthy and unhealthy should be regarded in the same way: they both offer pleasures and pains, but the pleasures outweigh the pains in the healthy life, vice versa in the unhealthy. But what we want when we choose between lives is not a predominance of pain: we have chosen as the pleasanter life the one where pain is the weaker element. And so we can say that the self-controlled, the wise and the courageous, experience pleasure and pain with less intensity life

and on a smaller and more restricted scale than the profligate, the fool and the coward. The first category beats the second on the score of pleasure, while the second beats the other when it comes to pain. The courageous

man

does better than the coward, the wise man than the fool; so that, life for life, the former kind the restrained, the courageous, the wise and the healthy is pleasanter than the cowardly, the foolish, the licentious and the unhealthy.

To sum up, the

of physical fitness, and spiritual virtue too, is not only pleasanter than the life of depravity but superior in other ways as well: it

life

makes for beauty, an upright posture, efficiency and a good reputation, so

that

if

a

man

lives a life like that

it

will

make

his

whole existence

infinitely

happier than his opposite number's.

At

this point

we may

stop expounding the preface to the laws, it being now complete. After the 'prelude' should come the 'tune', 2 or (more accurately) a sketch of a legal and political framework. Now it is impossible,

when

dealing with a

web

any piece of weaving, to construct the warp and the woof from the same stuff: the warp must be of a superior type of material (strong and firm in character, while the woof is softer and suitably or

workable). In a rather similar

way

it

will

be reasonable

to distinguish

between the authorities who are going to rule in a city and the citizens whose education has been slighter and less testing. You may assume, you

2.

A

pun: the Greek nomos means both 'tune' and

'law'. Cf.

722d-e.

Laws

1417

V

two elements in a political system: the installation of office, and equipping those officials with a code of laws.

see, that there are

individuals in

But before all that, here are some further points to notice. Anyone who a shepherd or cattle-man or breeder takes charge of a herd of animals will never get down to looking after them of horses or what have you without first performing the purge appropriate to his particular animalcommunity: that is, he will weed out the unhealthy and inferior stock and send it off to other herds, and keep only the thoroughbreds and the healthy animals to look after. He knows that otherwise he would have to waste endless effort on sickly and refractory beasts, degenerate by nature and ruined by incompetent breeding, and that unless he purges the existing stock these faults will spread in any herd to the animals that are still physically and temperamentally healthy and unspoilt. This is not too serious in the case of the lower animals, and we need mention it only by way of illustration, but with human beings it is vitally important for the legislator to ascertain and explain the appropriate measures in each case, not

b

only as regards a purge, but in general. To purge a whole state, for instance, several methods may be employed, some mild, some drastic; and if a legislator were a dictator too he'd be able to purge the state drastically, which is the best way. But if he has to establish a new society and new laws without dictatorial powers, and succeeds in administering no more than the mildest purge, he'll be well content even with this limited achievement. Like drastic medicines, the best purge is a painful business: it involves 3 chastisement by a combination of 'judgment' and 'punishment', and takes the latter, ultimately, to the point of death or exile. That usually gets rid of the major criminals who are incurable and do the state enormous harm. The milder purge we could adopt is this. When there is a shortage of food, and the underprivileged show themselves ready to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the privileged, they are to be regarded as a

d

—

—

disease that has developed in the

c

e

736

body politic, and in the friendliest possible

way they should be (as it will tactfully be put) 'transferred to a colony'. Somehow or other everyone who legislates must do this in good time; but our position at the moment is even more unusual. There's no need for us here and now to have resort to a colony or arrange to make a selection of people by a purge. No: it's as though we have a number of streams from several sources,

flowing

down

some from

to unite in

one

it

some of it off, however you organize

a society,

torrents, all

We

have to apply ourselves to seeing as pure as possible, partly by draining

lake.

mingles, is partly by diverting

that the water, as

some from mountain

springs,

it

it

into different channels.

looks as

if

Even

so,

there will always be trouble

and risk. True enough: but seeing that we are operating at the moment on a theoretical rather than a practical level, let's suppose we've recruited our citizens and their purity meets with our approval. After all, when we

3.

See 72.8b-c.

b

1418

Laws

c

have screened the bad candidates over a suitable period and given them every chance to be converted, we can refuse their application to enter and become citizens of the state; but we should greet the good ones with all possible courtesy and kindness. We should not forget that we are in the same fortunate position as the Heraclids when they founded their colony: we noticed 4 how they avoided vicious and dangerous disputes about land and cancellations of debts and distribution of property. When an old-established state is forced to resort

d

with these problems, it finds that both leaving things as they are and reforming them are somehow equally impossible. The only policy left them is to mouth pious hopes and make a little cautious progress over a long period by advancing a step at a time. (This is the way it can be done. From time to time some of the reformers should be themselves great land-owners and have a large number of debtors; and they should be prepared, in a philanthropic spirit, to share their prosperity with those debtors who are in distress, partly by remitting debts and partly by making land available for distribution. Their policy will be a policy of moderation,

e

to legislation to deal

dictated

737

b

by the conviction

that poverty

is

a matter of increased greed rather

than diminished wealth. This belief is fundamental to the success of a state, and is the firm base on which you can later build whatever political structure is appropriate to such conditions as we have described. But when these first steps towards reform falter, subsequent constitutional action in any state will be hard going.) Now as we say, such difficulties do not affect us. Nevertheless, it's better to have explained how we could have escaped them if they had. Let's take it, then, that the explanation has been given: the way to escape those difficulties is through a sense of justice combined with an indifference to wealth; there is no other route, broad or narrow, by which we can avoid them. So let's adopt this principle as a prop for our state. Somehow or other we must ensure that the citizens' property does not lead to disputes among them otherwise, if people have longstanding complaints against each other, anyone with any sense at all will not go any further with organizing them, if he can help it. But when, as with us now, God has given a group of people a new state to found,

—

in

c

which so

far there is

no mutual malice— well,

to stir up ill-will towards each other because of the way they distribute the land and houses would be so criminally stupid that no man could bring himself to do it. So what's the correct method of distribution? First, one has to determine

what

the total

number

of people

ought to be, then agree on the question of the distribution of the citizens and decide the number and size of the subsections into which they ought to be divided; and the land and houses

must be divided equally d

4.

and the

See 684d-e.

among

these subsections.

A

number of citizens cannot be fixed without considering neighboring states. The land must be extensive enough

suitable total for the

the land

(so far as possible)

Laws

1419

V

5 support a given number of people in modest comfort, and not a foot more is needed. The inhabitants should be numerous enough to be able to defend themselves when the adjacent peoples attack them, and contribute at any rate some assistance to neighboring societies when they are wronged. When we have inspected the land and its neighbors, we'll determine these points and give reasons for the action we take; but for the moment let's just give an outline sketch and get on with finishing our legis-

to

lation.

assume we have the convenient number of five thousand and forty farmers and protectors of their holdings, and let the land with its houses be divided up into the same number of parts, so that a man and his holding always go together. Divide the total first by two, then by three: you'll see to ten. it can be divided by four and five and every number right up Everyone who legislates should have sufficient appreciation of arithmetic to know what number will be most use in every state, and why. So let's fix on the one which has the largest number of consecutive divisors. Of course, an infinite series of numbers would admit all possible divisions for all possible uses, but our 5040 admits no more than 59 (including 1 to 10 without a break), which will have to suffice for purposes of war and every peacetime activity, all contracts and dealings, and for taxes and Let's

grants.

understand these mathematical facts should try to deepen his understanding of them even in his spare time. They really are just as I say, and the founder of a state needs to be told of them, for the following reasons. It doesn't matter whether he's founding a new state from scratch or reconstructing an old one that has gone to ruin: in either case, if he has any sense, he will never dream of altering whatever instructions may have been received from Delphi or Dodona or Ammon 6 about the gods and temples that ought to be founded by the various groups in the state, and the gods or spirits after whom the temples should be named. (Alternatively, such details may have been suggested

Anyone who

is

legally obliged to

ago of visions or divine inspiration, which somehow moved people to institute sacrifices with their rituals either native or taken from Etruria or Cyprus or some other country so that on the strength of these reports they consecrated statues, altars, temples and sites of oracles, providing each with its own sacred plot of land.) The legislator must not tamper with any of this in the slightest detail. He must allocate to each division of citizens a god or spirit or perhaps a hero, and when he divides up the territory he must give these priority by setting aside plots of land for them, endowed with all the appropriate resources. Thus when the different divisions gather together at fixed times they will have an opportunity of satisfying their various needs, and the citizens will

by

stories told long

5.

Reading posous

6.

There were

in dl

— —

with accent on the second

sites of prestigious oracles of

northwest Greece, and the Egyptian god

syllable.

Apollo

at

Delphi, Zeus at

Dodona

in

Ammon at the oasis of Siwa in the Libyan desert.

1420

Laws

—

recognize and greet each other at the sacrifices in mutual friendship and there can be no greater benefit for a state than that the citizens should be

well-known one to another. Where they have no insight into each other's characters and are kept in the dark about them, no one will ever enjoy the respect he merits or to

which he

is

the office he deserves or obtain the legal verdict entitled. So every citizen of every state should make a fill

show that he is straightforward and genuine, not shifty, and try to avoid being hoodwinked by anyone who is. The next move in this game of legislation is as unusual as going 'across particular effort to

the line' in checkers,

and may well cause surprise

at first hearing.

But

and experience will soon show that the organization of a state is almost bound to fall short of the ideal. You may, perhaps if you don't know what it means to be a legislator without dictatorial powers refuse reflection

—

—

countenance such a state; nevertheless the right procedure is to describe not only the ideal society but the second and third best too, and then leave it to anyone in charge of founding a community to make a choice between them. So let's follow this procedure now: let's describe the absolutely ideal to

society, then the second-best, then the third. this occasion we ought to leave the choice to Clinias, but we should not forget anyone else who may at some time be faced with such a choice and wish to adopt for his

On

own

purposes customs of his native country which he finds valuable. You 11 find the ideal society and state, and the best code of laws, where the old saying 'friends' property is genuinely shared' is put into practice as widely as possible throughout the entire state. Now I don't know whether in fact this situation a community of wives, children and all

—

property— exists anywhere today, or

will ever exist, but at

any rate in such a state the notion of private property' will have been by hook or by crook completely eliminated from life. Everything possible will have been done to throw into a sort of common pool even what is by nature 'my own', like eyes and ears and hands, in the sense that to judge by appearances they all see and hear and act in concert. Everybody feels pleasure and pain at the same things, so that they all praise and blame with complete unanimity. To sum up, the laws in force impose the greatest possible unity on the state and you'll never produce a better or truer criterion of an absolutely perfect law than that. It may be that gods or a number of the children of gods inhabit this kind of state: if so, the life they live there, observing these rules, is a happy one indeed. And so men need look no further for their ideal: they should keep this state in view and try to find the one that most nearly resembles it. This is what we've put our hand to, and if in some way it could be realized, it would come very near immortality and be second only to the ideal. Later, God willing, we'll describe a third best. But for the moment, what description should we give of this second-best state? What's the method by which a state like this is produced? First of all, the citizens must make a distribution of land and houses; they must not farm in common, which is a practice too demanding for

—

Laws

V

1421

those born and bred and educated as ours are. But the distribution should be made with some such intention as this: each man who receives a portion of land should regard it as the common possession of the entire state. The land is his ancestral home and he must cherish it even more than children cherish their mother; furthermore. Earth is a goddess, and mistress of mortal men. (And the gods and spirits already established in the locality

same respect.) Additional measures must be taken to make sure that these arrangements are permanent: the number of hearths established by the initial distribution must always remain the same; it must neither increase nor decrease. The

must be

way

treated with the

every state to ensure this will be as follows: the recipient of a holding should always leave from among his children only one heir to inherit his establishment. This will be his favorite son, who will succeed him and give due worship to the ancestors (who rank as gods) of the family and state; these must be taken to include not only those who have

best

for

already passed on, but also those

who

are

still

alive.

As

for the other

where there are more than one, the head of the family should marry off the females in accordance with the law we shall establish later; the males he must present for adoption to those citizens who have no children of their own priority to be given to personal preferences as far as possible. But some people may have no preferences, or other families too may have surplus offspring, male or female; or, to take the opposite children, in cases

—

problem, they may have too few, because of the onset of sterility. All these cases will be investigated by the highest and most distinguished official we shall appoint. He will decide what is to be done with the surpluses or deficiencies, and will do his best to discover a device to keep the number of households down to 5040. There are many devices available: if too many children are being born, there are measures to check propagation; on the other hand, a high birthrate can be encouraged and stimulated by conferring marks of distinction or disgrace, and the young can be admonished by words of warning from their elders. This approach should do the trick, and if in the last resort we are in complete despair about variations from our number of 5040 households, and the mutual love of wives and husbands produces an excessive flow of citizens that drives us to distraction, we have that old expedient at hand, which we have often mentioned before. We can send out colonies of people that seem suitable, with mutual goodwill between the emigrants and their mother-city. By contrast, we may be flooded with a wave of diseases or by the ravages of wars, so that bereavements depress the citizens far below the appointed number. In this event not to import citizens who have been brought up by a bastard education, if we can help it; but not even God, they say, can grapple

we ought

with necessity. So let's pretend our thesis can talk and gives us this advice: 'My dear sirs, don't ignore the facts and be careless enough to undervalue the concepts of likeness, equality, identity and agreement, either in mathematics or in any other useful and productive science. In particular, your first task now is

1422

Laws

keep to the said number as long as you live; you must respect the upper limits of the total property which you originally distributed as being reasonable, and not buy and sell your holdings among yourselves. The lot by which they were distributed is a god, so there will be no support for you there, or from the legislator either. And there are two warnings the law has for the disobedient: (A) You may choose or decline to take to

c

part in the distribution, but

you do take part you must observe the following conditions: (i) you must acknowledge that the land is sacred to all the gods; (ii) after priests and priestesses have offered prayers for that intention at the first, second and third sacrifices, if

Anyone buying

or selling his allotted land or house must suffer the penalty appropriate to the crime. 7 1.

You

d

are to inscribe the details on pieces of cypress wood and put these written records on permanent deposit in the temples. (B) You must appoint the official who seems to have the sharpest eyes to superintend the observance of the rule, so that the various contraventions may be brought to

your notice and the disobedient punished by the law and the god alike. What a boon this rule is to all the states that observe it, given the appropriate arrangements, no wicked men as the saying goes will ever understand; such knowledge is the fruit of experience and virtuous habits. Such arrangements, you see, involve very little by way of profit-making, and there is no need or opportunity for anyone to engage in any of the vulgar branches of commerce (you know how a gentleman's character is coarsened by manual labor, which is generally admitted to be degrading), and no one will presume to rake in money from occupations such as that.' All these considerations suggest a further law that runs like this: no private person shall be allowed to possess any gold or silver, but only coinage for day-to-day dealings which one can hardly avoid having with workmen and all other indispensable people of that kind (we have to pay wages to slaves and foreigners who work for money). For these purposes,

—

e

742

we

b

—

must possess coinage, legal tender among themselves, but valueless to the rest of mankind. The common Greek coinage is to be used for expeditions and visits to the outside world, such as when a man has to be sent abroad as an ambassador or to convey some official message; to meet these occasions the state must always have a supply of Greek agree, they

coinage.

a private individual

should ever need to go abroad, he should first obtain leave of the authorities, and if he returns home with some surplus foreign money in his pocket he must deposit it with the state and take local money to the same value in exchange. If

he is found keeping it for himself, must be confiscated by the state.

2. If it

7.

set

laws making up the legal code proposed for Clinias' off from the surrounding text and numbered consecutively. In this translation the

city are

Laws

1423

V

who knows

concealment fails to report it, he must be liable to a curse and a reproach (and so must the importer), and in addition be fined in a sum not less than that of the foreign currency brought in.

3. If

anyone

of

its

marries or gives in marriage, no dowry whatsoever must be given or received. Money must not be deposited with anybody whom one does not trust. There must be no lending at interest, because it will be quite in order for the borrower to refuse absolutely to return both

When

interest

a

man

and

principal.

The best way to appreciate that these are the best policies for a state to follow is to examine them in the light of the fundamental aim. Now we maintain that the aim of a statesman who knows what he's about is not in fact the one which most people say the good legislator should have. They'd say that if he knows what he's doing his laws should make the state as huge and as rich as possible; he should give the citizens gold mines and silver mines, and enable them to control as many people as possible by land and sea. And they'd add, too, that to be a satisfactory legislator he must want to see the state as good and as happy as possible. But some of these demands are practical politics, and some are not, and the legislator will confine himself to what can be done, without bothering his head with wishful thinking about impossibilities. I mean, it's pretty well inevitable that happiness and virtue should come hand in hand (and this is the situation the legislator will want to see), but virtue and great wealth are quite incompatible, at any rate great wealth as generally understood (most people would think of the extreme case of a millionaire, who will of course be a rogue into the bargain). In view of all this. I'll never concede to them that the rich man can become really happy without being virtuous as well: to be extremely virtuous and exceptionally rich at the same time is absolutely out of the question. 'Why?' it may be asked. 'Because/ we shall reply, 'the profit from using just and unjust methods man is more than twice as much as that from just methods alone, and a who refuses to spend his money either worthily or shamefully spends only half the sum laid out by worthwhile people who are prepared to 8 spend on worthy purposes too. So anyone who follows the opposite policy will never become richer than the man who gets twice as much profit and makes half the expenditures. The former is a good man; the latter is not actually a rogue so long as he uses his money sparingly, but on some occasions 9 he is an absolute villain; thus, as we have said, he is never good. Ill-gotten and well-gotten gains plus expenditure that is neither just nor unjust, when a man is also sparing with his money, add up to wealth; the absolute rogue, who is generally a spendthrift, is quite impoverished. The

8. I.e.,

as well as

9.

when he

I.e.,

on

'neutral' objects.

makes

money

(by dishonest means).

1424 c

Laws

man who spends

his

money

for honest

ends and uses only

just

methods

come by it, will not easily become particularly rich or particularly poor. Our thesis is therefore correct: the very rich are not good; and if they are not good, they are not happy either/ The whole point of our legislation was to allow the citizens to live supremely happy lives in the greatest possible mutual friendship. However, they will never be friends if injuries and lawsuits arise among them to

d

on

grand scale, but only if they are trivial and rare. That is why we maintain that neither gold nor silver should exist in the state, and there should not be much money made out of menial trades and charging interest, nor from prostitutes; the citizens' wealth should be limited to the products of farming, and even here a man should not be able to make so much that he can't help forgetting the real reason why money was invented

mean

for the care of the soul

and body, which without physical and cultural education respectively will never develop into anything worth mentioning). That's what has made us say more than once that the pursuit of money should come last in the scale of value. Every man directs his efforts to three things in all, and if his efforts are directed with a correct sense of priorities he will give money the third and lowest place, and his soul the highest, with his body coming somewhere between the two. In (I

e

a

particular,

744

values prevails in the society we re now describing, then it has been equipped with a good code of laws. But if any of the laws subsequently passed is found giving pride of place to health in the state rather than the virtue of self-control, or to wealth rather than health this scale of

if

and habits of

then quite obviously its priorities will be wrong. So the legislator must repeatedly try to get this sort of thing straight in his own mind by asking 'What do I want to achieve?' and 'Am I achieving it, or am I off target?' If he does that, perhaps he'll complete his legislation

own efforts and leave nothing to be done by others. There's no other way he could possibly succeed. So when a man has drawn his lot, he must take over his holding on the by

b

restraint,

his

terms stated 10 It would have been an advantage if no one entering the colony had had any more property than anyone else; but that's out of the .

question,

and some people

with relatively large fortunes, others little. So for a number of reasons, and especially because the state offers equality of opportunity, there must be graded propertyclasses, to ensure that offices and taxes and grants may be arranged on the basis of what a man is worth. It's not only his personal virtues or his ancestors' that should be considered, or his physical strength or good looks: what he's made of his wealth or poverty should also be taken into account. In short, the citizens must be esteemed and given office, so far as possible, on exactly equal terms of 'proportional inequality', so as to avoid ill-feeling. For these reasons four permanent property-classes must with relatively

c

10.

See 741b-c.

will arrive

Laws

1425

V

be established, graded according to wealth: the 'first', 'second', 'third', and 'fourth' classes, or whatever other names are employed. A man will either keep his original classification, or, when he has grown richer or poorer than he was before, transfer to the appropriate class. In view of all this, the next law I'd pass would be along the following lines. (We maintain that if a state is to avoid the greatest plague of all better term I mean civil war, though civil disintegration would be a

extreme poverty and wealth must not be allowed to arise in any section of the citizen-body, because both lead to both these disasters. That is why the legislator must now announce the acceptable limits of wealth and poverty.) The lower limit of poverty must be the value of the holding (which is to be permanent: no official nor anyone else who has ambitions to be thought virtuous will ever overlook the diminution of any man's holding).

allow a

The

man

legislator will use the holding as his unit of

and up

to possess twice, thrice,

measure and

to four times

its

value.

If

anyone acquires more than this, by finding treasure-trove or by gift or by a good stroke of business or some other similar lucky chance which presents him with more than he's allowed, he should hand over the surplus to the state and its patron deities, thereby escaping punishment and getting a good name for himself.

man breaks this law, anyone who wishes may lay 4. If

a

information and be rewarded with half the amount involved, the other half being given to the gods; and besides this the guilty person must pay a fine equivalent to the surplus out of his

own

pocket.

property of each citizen over and above his holding of land should be recorded in a public register kept in the custody of officials in so far legally appointed for that duty, so that lawsuits on all subjects may go smoothly because the facts are clear. as they affect property

The

total

—

—

After

this,

the legislator's

first

job

is

to locate the city as precisely as

possible in the center of the country, provided that the site he chooses is a convenient one for a city in all other respects too (these are details which can be understood and specified easily enough). Next he must divide the

country into twelve sections. But

first

he ought

to reserve a sacred area

and enclose its boundaries; he will then divide the city itself and the whole country into twelve sections by lines radiating from this central point. The twelve secfor Hestia,

Zeus and Athena

(calling

it

the 'acropolis'),

equal in the sense that a section should be smaller out if the soil is good, bigger if it is poor. The legislator must then mark five thousand and forty holdings, and further divide each into two parts; he should then make an individual holding consist of two such parts coupled so that each has a partner near the center or the boundary of the state as the case may be. (A part near the city and a part next to the boundary should form one holding, the second nearest the city with the tions should be

made

second from the boundary should form another, and so

on.)

He must

1426

Laws

a pply to the

two parts the rule I've just mentioned about the relative quality of the soil, making them equal by varying their size. He should also divide the population into twelve sections, and arrange to distribute among them as equally as possible all wealth over and above the actual holdings (a comprehensive list will be compiled). Finally, they must allocate e

the sections as twelve 'holdings' for the twelve gods, consecrate each section to the particular god which it has drawn by lot, name it after him,

and

Again, they must divide the city into twelve sections in the same way as they divided the rest of the country; and each man should be allotted two houses, one near the center of the state, one near the boundary. That will finish off the job of getting the state founded. But there s a lesson here that we must take to heart. This blueprint as

whole

a

it

tribe'.

never likely to find such favorable circumstances that every single detail will turn out precisely according to plan. It presupposes men who won't turn up their noses at living in such a community, and who a

746

call

is

will tolerate a

moderate and fixed

level of wealth

throughout their lives, of the size of each individual's family as we've suggested. Will people really put up with being deprived of gold and other things which, for reasons we went into just now, the legislator is obviously going to add to his list of forbidden articles? What about this description of a city and countryside with houses at the center and in all directions round about? He might have been relating a dream, or modeling a state and its citizens out of wax. The ideal impresses well enough, but the

and the supervision

b

must reconsider it as follows (this being, then, a reprise of his address to us). 'My friends, in these talks we're having, don't think it has escaped me either that the point of view you are urging has some truth in it. But I believe that in every project for future action, when you are displaying the ideal plan that ought to be put into effect, the most satisfactory procedure is to spare no detail of absolute truth and beauty, But if you find that one of these details is impossible in practice, you ought to put it on one side and not attempt it: you should see which of the remaining alternatives comes closest to it and is most nearly akin to your policy, and arrange to have that done instead. But you must let the legislator finish describing what he really wants to do, and only then join him in considering which of his proposals for legislation are feasible, and which are too difficult. You see, even the maker of the most trivial object must make it internally consistent if he is going to get any sort of reputation.' legislator

11

c

d

Now

that

should try

we've decided

to realize (after

to

divide the citizens into twelve sections,

we

enough) the enormous number of divisors the subdivisions of each section have, and reflect how these in turn can be further subdivided and subdivided again until you get to 5040. L This is the mathematical framework which will yield you your 11.

See 739a

12.

5040 = 12 x 420.

to 7),

all, it s

clear

ff.

and several

A

'section' (420)

(e.g. 12, 15, 20)

has

many

divisors (including

all

numbers from

can be conveniently subdivided. Division of

all

1

the 12

Laws

1427

V

brotherhoods, local administrative units, villages, your military companies and marching-columns, as well as units of coinage, liquid and dry measures, and weights. The law must regulate all these details so that the proper proportions and correspondences are observed. And not only that: the legislator should not be afraid of appearing to give undue attention

be bold enough to give instructions that the citizens are not to be allowed to possess any equipment that is not of standard size. He'll assume it's a general rule that numerical division in all its variety can be usefully applied to every field of conduct. It may be limited to the complexities of arithmetic itself, or extended to the subtleties of plane and solid geometry; it's also relevant to sound, and to motion (straight up or down or revolution in a circle). The legislator should take all this into account and instruct all his citizens to do their best never to operate outside that framework. For domestic and public purposes, and all professional skills, no single branch of a child's education has such an enormous range of applications as mathematics; but its greatest advantage is that it wakes up the sleepy ignoramus and makes him quick to understand, retentive and sharpwitted; and thanks to this miraculous science he does better than his natural abilities would have allowed. These subjects will form a splendidly appropriate curriculum, if by further laws and customs you to detail.

He must

can expel the spirit of pettiness and greed from the souls of those who are to master them and profit from them. But if you fail, you'll find that without noticing it you've produced a 'twister' instead of a man of learning just what can be seen to have happened in the case of the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other races whose approach to wealth and life in general shows a narrowminded outlook. (It may have been an

—

incompetent legislator who was to blame for this state of affairs, or some stroke of bad luck, or even some natural influences that had the same effect.) And that's another point about the choice of sites, Clinias and Megillus, that we mustn't forget. Some localities are more likely than others to produce comparatively good (or bad) characters, and we must take care to lay down laws that do not fly in the face of such influences. Some sites are suitable or unsuitable because of varying winds or periods of heat, others because of the quality of the water; in some cases the very food grown in the soil can nourish or poison not only the body but the soul as well. But best of all will be the places where the breeze of heaven blows, where spirits hold possession of the land and greet with favor (or disfavor) the various people who come and settle there. The sensible legislator will ponder these influences as carefully as a man can, and then try to lay down laws that will take account of them. This is what you must do too, Clinias. You're going to settle a territory, so here's the first thing you have to attend to.

Clinias: Well said,

sections,

if

sir.

I

must follow your advice.

carried far enough, will ultimately give

units mentioned just

below would be subdivisions

you

5040.

The brotherhoods and

of the tribes (a tribe = 420 citizens).

1428

Laws

Book VI Athenian: Well then, now that I've got all that job will be to appoint officials for the state. Clinias:

off

my

chest,

your next

certainly will.

It

Athenian: There are two stages involved in organizing a society First you establish official positions and appoint people to hold them: you decide how many posts there should be and how they ought to be filled. Then each office has to be given its particular laws: you have to decide which laws will be appropriate in each case, and the number and type required. But before we make our choice, let's pause a moment and explain a point 1

.

that will affect

it.

And

Clinias:

what's that? Athenian: This. It's obvious to anyone that legislation is a tremendous task, and that when you have a well constructed state with a well-framed legal code, to put incompetent officials in charge of administering the code is a waste of good laws, and the whole business degenerates into farce. And not only that: the state will find that its laws are doing it damage

and injury on

a gigantic scale.

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian:

and

state.

Now let's

notice the relevance of this to your present society appreciate that if your candidates are to deserve promotion

You

power, their characters and family background must have been adequately tested, right from their childhood until the moment of their election. Furthermore, the intending electors ought to have been well brought up in law-abiding habits, so as to be able to approve or disapprove to positions of

of the candidates for the right reasons and elect or reject them according to their deserts 2 But in the present case we are dealing with people who .

—

have only just come together and don't know each other and they're uneducated too. So how could they ever elect their officials without going

wrong?

Clinias:

It's

pretty well impossible.

Athenian: But look here, 'once in the race, you've no excuses', as the saying is. That's just our predicament now: you and your nine colleagues, you tell us, have given an undertaking to the people of Crete to turn your energies to founding this state; I, for my part, have promised to join in with this piece of fiction I'm now relating. Seeing that I've got on to telling a story, I'd be most reluctant to leave it without a head: it would look a grim sight wandering about like that! Clinias:

And

a fine story

Athenian: Surely, but lines, so far as

1.

I

I

it's

been,

sir.

also intend to give

Cf. 735a; after the preliminaries of

Deleting

te

actual help along those

can.

735b-750e, the Athenian

sion of political offices. 2.

you

in c9

and reading

pros to in dl.

now resumes

his discus-

1429

Laws VI

Then

Clinias:

let's

carry out our program, certainly.

Athenian: Yes, we shall, God willing, if we can keep old age at bay for long enough. Clinias: 'God willing' can probably be taken for granted. Athenian: Of course. So let's be guided by him and notice something else.

What?

Clinias:

Athenian: That we'll find we've been pretty bold and foolhardy in launching this state of ours. Clinias: What's made you say that? What have you in mind? Athenian: I'm thinking of the cheerful way we're legislating for people who'll be new to the laws we've passed, without bothering how they'll ever be brought to accept them. It's obvious to us all, Clinias, even if we're not very clever, that at the start they won't readily accept any at all. Ideally, we'd remain on the spot long enough to see people getting a taste of the laws while they're still children; then when they've grown up and have become thoroughly accustomed to them, they can take part in the elections to all the offices of the state. If we can manage that (assuming acceptable ways and means are available), then I reckon that the state would have a firm guarantee of survival when its 'schooldays' are over. Clinias: That's reasonable enough. Athenian: So let's see if we can find ways and means. Will this do? I maintain, Clinias, that of all the Cretans, the citizens of Cnossus have a

They must not be content with simply doing all that religion demands for the mere soil of your settlement: they must also take scrupulous care to see that the first officials are appointed by the best and safest

special duty.

methods. first

of

other

And

all.

absolutely vital to give your best attention to choosing, Guardians of the Laws. (Less trouble need be taken over the it's

officials.)

Clinias: So can

we

find a reasonable

way

of going about

it?

Athenian: Yes. 'Sons of Crete' (I say), 'as the Cnossians take precedence over your many cities, they should collaborate with the newly arrived settlers in choosing a total of thirty-seven men from the two sides, nineteen from the settlers, the rest from Cnossus itself' the gift of the Cnossians to this state of yours, Clinias. They should include you in the eighteen, and make you yourself a citizen of the colony, with your consent (failing

—

which, you'll be gently compelled). Clinias: But why on earth, sir, haven't you, and Megillus too, enrolled as joint administrators?

Athenian: Ah, Clinias, Athens is a high and mighty state, and so is Sparta; besides, they're both a long way off. But it's just the right thing for you and the other founders, and what I said a moment ago of you applies equally to them. So let's take it we've explained how to deal with the present situation. But as time goes on and the constitution has become established, the election of these officials should be held more or less as follows. Everyone who serves in the cavalry or infantry, and has fought in the field while young and strong enough to do so, should participate.

1430

Laws

They must proceed to election in the temple which the state considers to be the most venerable; each elector should place on the altar of the god a small tablet on which he has written the name of the person he wishes to vote for, adding the candidate's father, tribe, and deme; and he should append his own name with the same details. For at least thirty days anyone who wishes should be allowed to remove any tablet bearing a name he finds objectionable and put it on display in the market-place. Then the officials must exhibit to the state at large the three hundred tablets that head the list, on the basis of this list the voters must then again record their nominations, and the hundred names that lead this second time must be publicly displayed as before. On the third occasion anyone who wishes should walk between the victims of a sacrifice and record which of these three hundred he chooses. The thirty-seven who receive most votes must then submit to scrutiny and be declared elected. Well then, Clinias and Megillus, who will make all these arrangements about these officials in our state, and their scrutiny? We can surely appreciate that as the state apparatus is as yet only rudimentary such people to be on hand; but they could hardly be available before

have

any officials at have been appointed. Even so, we must have them, and these two hundred persons mustn't be feeble specimens, either, but men of the highest caliber. As the proverb says, 'getting started is half the battle', and a good beginning we all applaud. But in my view a good start is more than 'half', and no one has yet given it the praise it deserves. all

Clinias: That's quite true.

Athenian: So as

we acknowledge

not skip discussion of

the value of a

in this case. Let's get

good beginning,

let's

quite clear in our own minds how we can tackle it. I've no particular points to make, except one, which is vitally relevant to the situation. Clinias: And what's that? it

it

Athenian: Apart from the city which is founding it, this state we are about to settle has, so to speak, no father or mother. I'm quite aware, of course, that many a foundation has quarreled repeatedly with its founderstate, and will again, but in the present circumstances we have, as it were, the merest infant on our hands. I mean, any child is going to fall out with his parents sooner or later, but while he's young and can't help himself, he loves them and they love him; he's forever scampering back to his

family and finding his only allies are his relatives. That's exactly the way I maintain our young state regards the citizens of Cnossus and how they regard it, in virtue of their role as its guardians. I therefore repeat said just

now — there's no harm

—

what

I

saying a good thing twice that the citizen of Cnossus should choose colleagues from among the newly arrived colonists and take charge of all these arrangements; they should choose at least a hundred of them, the oldest and most virtuous they can find; and they themselves should contribute another hundred. They should enter the

in

new state and collaborate in seeing that the officials are designated

according to law, and after designation, scrutinized.

When

they've done

1431

Laws VI

Cnossus should resume living in Cnossus and leave the infant state to work out its own salvation and flourish unaided. The duties for which the members of the body of thirty-seven should be appointed are as follows (not only here and now, but permanently): first, they are to act as Guardians of the Laws; second, they are to take charge of the documents in which each person has made his return to the officials of his total property. (A man may leave four hundred drachmas undeclared if he belongs to the highest property-class, three hundred if to the second, two hundred if to the third, and one hundred if he belongs to the fourth.)

all that,

5. If

the citizens of

anyone

is

found

to possess

anything in addition to the registered

sum, the entire

surplus should be confiscated by the

state,

and on top of that anyone who wants to should bring a charge against him and an ugly, discreditable and disgraceful charge it will be, if the man is convicted of being enticed by the prospect of gain to hold the laws in contempt. The accuser, who may be anyone, should accordingly enter a charge of 'money-grubbing' against him, and prosecute in the court of the Law-Guardians themselves.

—

found guilty, he must be excluded from the common resources of the state, and when a grant of some kind is made, he must go without and be limited to his holding; and for as long as he lives his conviction should be recorded for public inspection by all and sundry. 6. If

A

the defendant

is

than twenty years; he should be not less than fifty years old on appointment, and if he is appointed at sixty, his maximum tenure must be ten years, and so on. And if a man survives beyond seventy, he should no longer expect to hold

Law-Guardian must not hold

office for longer

such an important post as membership of this board. That gives us three duties to assign to the Guardians of the Laws. As the legal code is extended, every new law will give this body of men additional duties to perform, over and above the ones we've mentioned. Now for the election of the other officials, one by one. Next, then, we have to elect Generals and their aides-de-camp, so to speak: Cavalry-Commanders, Tribe-Leaders, and controllers of the tribal

companies of infantry ('Company-Commanders' will be a good name these officers, which is in fact what most people do call them). Generals.

The Guardians

of the

Laws must compile

a preliminary

list

for

of

candidates, restricted to citizens, and the Generals should then be elected from this list by all those who have served in the armed forces at the proper age, or are serving at the time. If anybody thinks that someone

not on the preliminary

must name

his

then, having

list is

proposed

sworn

better qualified than

substitute,

his oath,

and say

someone who

whom

is,

he

he should replace;

he must propose the alternative candidate.

1432

Laws

Whichever of the two the voting favors should be a candidate in the election. The three candidates who receive most votes should become Generals and take over the organization of military affairs, after being scrutinized in the same way as the Guardians of the Laws. e

Company-Commanders. The elected Generals should make their own preliminary list of twelve Company-Commanders, one for each tribe; the counternominations, the election and the scrutiny must be conducted as they were for the Generals themselves.

The Elections. For the moment, before a council and executive committees have been chosen, your assembly must be convened by the Guardians of the Laws in the holiest and most capacious place they can find; and they

must

756

heavy-armed soldiers, the cavalry, and finally all other ranks, in separate blocks. The Generals and Cavalry-Commanders should be elected by the whole assembly, the Company-Commanders by the shieldbearers, and their Tribe-Leaders by the entire cavalry; as for light-armed troops, archers, or whatever other ranks there may be, the appointment seat the

of their leaders should be left to the Generals' discretion.

Cavalry-Commanders. That will leave us with the appointment of the Cavalry-Commanders. The preliminary list must be drawn up by the same persons as drew up the list of Generals, and the election and counterproposals should be conducted in the same way; the cavalry must hold b

the election watched by the infantry, and the two candidates with the most votes must become leaders of the entire mounted force.

Disputed Votes. Votes may be disputed no more than twice. If anyone contests the vote on the third occasion, the tellers must decide the issue by voting among themselves. The council should have thirty dozen members, as three hundred sixty

be a convenient number for subdivision. The total will be divided into four sections of ninety, this being the number of members to be elected from each property-class. The first step in the election is to be compulsory for all: everyone must take part in the nomination of members of the will

c

highest class, and

anybody who

must pay the approved fine. When the nominations are completed, the names must be noted down. On the next day, using the same procedure as before, they will nominate

members

neglects his duty

of the second class.

On

d

the third day, nominating for Councillors from the third class will be optional, except for voters of the first three classes: voters of the fourth

and lowest

make

class will

be exempted from the fine

if

they do not care to

a nomination.

The fourth day will see the nomination for representatives of the fourth and lowest class; everyone must take part, but voters of the third and fourth class who do not wish to nominate should not be fined unlike

—

1433

Laws VI voters of the second

and

first classes,

who must be fined

treble

and quadru-

they do not make a nomination. On the fifth day the officials must display to the entire citizen body the names duly noted down, and on the basis of these lists every man must cast his vote or pay the standard fine. One hundred eighty must be selected from each property-class, and half of them finally chosen by lot. These,

ple the standard fine respectively

after scrutiny, are to

if

be Councillors for the year.

system of selection like that will effect a compromise between a monarchical and a democratic constitution, which is precisely the sort of compromise a constitution should always be. You see, even if you proclaim that a master and his slave shall have equal status, friendship between them is inherently impossible. The same applies to the relations between

A

an honest

a scoundrel. Indiscriminate equality for all amounts both fill a state with quarrels between its citizens.

man and

to inequality,

and

correct the old saying

How

is,

that 'equality leads to friendship'!

It's

enough problem

right

and it rings true, but what kind of equality has this potential is a which produces ripe confusion. This is because we use the same term for two concepts of 'equality', which in most respects are virtual opposites. The first sort of equality (of measures, weights and numbers) is within the competence of any state and any legislator: that is, one can simply distribute equal awards by lot. But the most genuine equality, and the best, is not so obvious. It needs the wisdom and judgment of Zeus, and only in a limited number of ways does it help the human race; but when states or even individuals do find it profitable, they find it very profitable indeed. The general method I mean is to grant much to the great and less to the less great, adjusting what you give to take account of the real nature of each— specifically, to confer high recognition on great virtue, but when you come to the poorly educated in this respect, to treat them as they

We

statesmanship consists of essentially strict justice. This is what we should be aiming at now, Clinias: this this is the kind of 'equality' we should concentrate on as we bring our state into the world. The founder of any other state should also concentrate on

deserve.

—

maintain, in

fact, that

and take no notice of a bunch of dictators, or a single one, or even the power of the people. He must always make justice his aim, and this is precisely as we've described it: it consists of granting the 'equality' that unequals deserve to get. Yet on occasion a state as a whole (unless it is prepared to put up with a degree of friction in one part or another) will be obliged to apply these concepts in a rather rough and ready way, because complaisance and toleration, which always wreck complete precision, are the enemies of strict justice. You can now see why it was necessary to avoid the anger of the man in the street by giving him an equal chance in the lot (though even then we prayed to the gods of good luck to make the lot give the right decisions). So though force of circumstances compels us to employ both sorts of equality, we should employ the second, which demands good luck to prove successful, this

as

same goal when he frames

little

as possible.

his laws,

1434

Laws

So much,

my

friends, for the justification of our policy,

which

is

the

must follow if it means to survive. The state is just like a ship at sea, which always needs someone to keep watch night and day: as it is steered through the waves of international affairs, it lives in constant peril of being captured by all sorts of conspiracies. Hence the need of an unbroken chain of authority right through the day and into the night and then on into the next day, guard relieving guard in endless succession. But a large body will never be able to act quickly enough, and most of the time we have to leave the majority of council members free to live their private lives and administer their own establishments. We must policy a state

members of the council into twelve groups, one for each month, and have them go on guard by turns. They must be available therefore divide the

promptly, whenever anyone from abroad or from within the state itself approaches them wishing to give information or inquire about those topics

on which a

must arrange to answer to its own. They must be

state

receive replies

the questions of other states and particularly concerned with the

constant revolutions of all kinds that are apt to occur in a state; if possible, they must prevent them, but failing that they must see that the state gets

know as soon as possible, so that the outbreak can be cured. That is why this executive committee has to be in charge of convening and dissolvto

ing not only statutory meetings but also those held in some national emergency. The authority that should see to all this a twelfth of the council

—

will of course be off duty for eleven-twelfths of the year: it's the section of the council on duty that must co-operate with other officials and

keep

a watchful eye

on the

state.

That will be a reasonable arrangement for the city, but what about the rest of the country? How should it be superintended and organized? Well

now, the

entire city

and the

entire country

have been divided into twelve

sections; there are the roads of the central city; there are houses, public

buildings, harbors, the market,

and fountains; there

enclosures and similar places. Shouldn't appointed to look after them?

all

above all, sacred these things have officials are,

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian:

We

can say, then, that the temples should have Attendants and Priests and Priestesses. Next, there are the duties of looking after streets and public buildings, ensuring that they reach the proper standards, stopping men and animals doing them damage, and seeing that conditions both in the suburbs and the city itself are in keeping with a civilized life. All these duties require three types of officials to be chosen: the 'CityWardens' (as they will be called) will be responsible for the points we've just mentioned, and the 'Market-Wardens' for the correct conduct of the market.

who have hereditary priesthoods should not be turned out of office. But if (as is quite likely in a new foundation) few or no temples are thus provided for, the deficiencies must be made Priests or Priestesses of temples

good by appointing of the gods. In

all

Priests

and

Priestesses to be Attendants in the temples these cases the appointments should be made partly by

1435

Laws VI

and partly by lot, so that a mixture of democratic and non-democratic methods in every rural and urban division may lead to the greatest possible feeling of solidarity. In electing Priests, one should leave it to the god himself to express his wishes, and allow him to guide the luck of the draw. But the man whom the lot favors must be screened to see that he is healthy and legitimate, reared in a family whose moral standards could hardly be higher, and that he himself and his father and mother have lived unpolluted by homicide and all such offenses against heaven. They must get laws on all religious matters from Delphi, and appoint Expounders of them; that will provide them with a code to be obeyed. Each priesthood must be held for a year and no longer, and anyone who intends to celebrate our rites in due conformity with religious law should not be less than sixty years old. The same rules should apply to Priestelection

esses too.

There should be three 3 Expounders. The tribes will be arranged in three sets of four, and every man should nominate four persons, each from the same set as himself; the three candidates who receive most votes should be scrutinized, and nine names should then be sent to Delphi for the oracle to select one from each group of three. Their scrutiny, and the requirement as to age, should be the

same

must which

as in the case of the Priests; these three

hold office for life, and when one dies the group of four tribes in the vacancy occurs should make nominations for a replacement. The highest property-class must elect Treasurers to control the sacred funds of each temple, and to look after the temple-enclosures and their produce and revenues; three should be chosen to take charge of the largest temples, two for the less large, and one for the very small. The election and scrutiny of these officials should be conducted as it was for the Generals. So much by way of provision for the holy places. As far as practicable, nothing should be left unguarded. The protection of the city is to be the business of the Generals, Company-Commanders, Cavalry-Commanders, Tribe-Leaders and members of the Executive and the City-Wardens and Market-Wardens too, once we have them elected and satisfactorily installed in office. The whole of the rest of the country should be protected as follows. Our entire territory has been divided as exactly as possible into twelve equal sections, and every year one tribe must be allocated by lot to each of them. Every tribe must provide five 'Country-Wardens' or 'Guards-in-Chief', each of whom will be allowed 4 to choose from his own tribe twelve young men who must be not younger than twenty-five nor older than thirty. The effect of the lot will be that each group will take a different section every month, so that they all get experience and knowledge of the entire country. The guards and their

—

3.

Reading

4.

Alternatively, "

tribe

.

.

treis

in d5. .

.

.

'Guards-in-Chief,

who will

be allowed to choose from their

own

On the translation in the text there will be 60 assistant guards; on this alternative

translation, 12.

1436

Lazos

charge are to hold their respective commissions for two years. Starting from the original sections (i.e., districts of the country) assigned by lot, the Guards-in-Chief are to take their groups round in a circle, transferring them each month to the next district on the right ('on the right should be understood to mean 'to the East'). But it's not enough that as many of the guards as possible should get experience of the country at only one season of the year: we want them to add to their knowledge officers in

of the actual territory

by discovering what goes on

every district at every season. So their leaders for the time being should follow up the first year by spending a second leading them back through the various districts, moving this time to the left. For the third year, a tribe must choose other Country- Wardens, and five new Guards-in-Chief, each in charge of twelve assistants.

While stationed

To

in

in the various districts, their duties

should be as follows. protected against enemies

they must see that the territory is as thoroughly as possible. They must dig ditches wherever necessary, and excavate trenches and erect fortifications to check any attempt to harm the land and the livestock. They will requisition the beasts of burden and start with,

slaves of the local residents for these purposes, and employ them at their discretion, picking as far as possible times when they are not required for their normal duties. The wardens must arrange that the enemy would be

impeded

at

beasts of burden or cattle)

every road

movement by our own side (by men or would be facilitated; and they must see that

every turn, whereas is

as easy for the traveler as can be

managed.

The rain God sends must do the countryside good, not harm, so the wardens must see that the water flowing off the high ground down into any sufficiently deep ravines between the hills is collected by dikes and ditches, so that the ravines can retain and absorb it, and supply streams and springs for all the districts in the countryside below, and give even the driest of spots a copious supply of pure water. As for water that springs from the ground, the wardens must beautify the fountains and rivers that

form by adorning them with trees and buildings; they must use drains to tap the individual streams and collect an abundant supply, and any grove or sacred enclosure which has been dedicated nearby must be embellished by having a perennial flow of water directed by irrigation into the very temples of the gods. The young men should erect in every quarter gymnasia for themselves and senior citizens, construct warm baths for the old folk, and lay up a large stock of thoroughly dry wood. All this will help to relieve invalids, and farmers wearied by the labor of the fields and it will be a

much

—

kinder treatment than the tender mercies of some fool of

a doctor.

and similar projects will beautify and improve a district, and permit some welcome recreation into the bargain. The Wardens' really serious duties should be as follows. Each squad of sixty must protect its own district not only from enemies, but from those who profess to be friends. If a slave or a free man injures a neighbor or any other citizen, All these

1437

Laws VI the

Wardens must

try the case

brought by the

plaintiff.

The

five leaders

should deal with the trivial cases on their own authority, but in the more important cases (when one man sues another for any sum up to three minas) they should sit in judgment with one group of twelve assistants as a bench of seventeen. Apart from the officials whose decisions (like those of kings) are final, no judge shall hold court, and no official shall fill his position, without being liable to be called to account for his actions. The Country-Wardens are to be no exception, if they treat the people in their care at all high-handedly by giving them unfair orders or by trying to grab and remove any agricultural equipment without permission, or allow their palms to be greased, or go so far as to deliver unjust verdicts. For giving way to boot-lickers they must be publicly disgraced. When the actual injury they have done to an inhabitant of their district does not exceed one mina in value, they should voluntarily submit to a trial before the villagers and neighbors. Whenever larger sums are involved (or even smaller sums, if the accused is not prepared to submit to trial because he's confident that by moving to a fresh district every month he will get away and 'get off' too), the injured party should file suit against him in the

common 7. If

courts.

the plaintiff wins the day,

then this elusive fellow

who was

not prepared to pay a penalty with a

good grace must pay him double the amount

at issue.

The way of life of the Country-Wardens and their officers during their two years on duty will be something like this. First, in every district of the country there should be communal restaurants, at which everyone will have to eat together. 8. If

a

Warden

away from

fails to

turn

up

at these

meals even for one day, or sleeps

his quarters at night, except

on the express orders

of his

superiors or because of some unavoidable necessity, the five leaders may post his name in the market-place as a deserter from his post; if they do, he will have to bear the disgrace of having turned

and everyone who happens to meet him will be give him a beating if he wants to, without being punished

traitor to the state,

entitled to for

it.

goes so far as to commit this sort of offense, his fifty-nine colleagues must look into the business.

one of the actual

If

all

9. If

officers

one of them notices

(or is told)

what

is

going on and

fails to

bring

a case,

same laws should be invoked against him, and he must be punished with greater severity than his juniors: that is, he is to be stripped of his right to exercise any authority over the young. the

1438

Lazos

The Guardians of the Laws should keep a sharp eye on these offenses and try to stop them being committed at all; failing that, they must see that the proper penalties are inflicted. e

No

one will ever make a commendable master without having been a servant first; one should be proud not so much of ruling well but of serving well and serving the laws above all (because this is the way we serve the gods), and secondly, if we are young, those who are full of years and honor. It is vital that everyone should be convinced that this rule applies to us all. The next point, then, is that when someone who has joined the Country-Wardens gets to the end of his two years, he ought to be no stranger to a meager daily ration of uncooked food. In fact, after being selected, the groups of twelve assistant Wardens must assemble with the five officers and resolve that, being servants, they will not possess other servants and slaves for themselves, nor employ the attendants of other people (the farmers and villagers) for their own private needs, but only for public tasks. With that exception, they must expect to double as their own servants and fend for themselves; and on top of all that they must reckon to investigate the entire country, summer and winter, in arms, to protect and get to know every district in succession. Everyone should be closely familiar with his own country: probably no study is more valuable. This is the real reason why the youths must go in for hunting with dogs, and other types of chase quite apart from the pleasure and profit that everyone gets out of such activities. So much for these 'secret-service men' or 'Country-Wardens' (call them what you will), and their regimen a regimen into which everyone who means to play his part in keeping his country safe must throw himself heart and soul. The next election on our list was that of the Market-Wardens and CityWardens. There are to be three of the latter, who will divide the twelve sections of the city into three groups, and like their counterparts (the Country- Wardens), will look after the roads, both the streets within the city boundaries and the various routes that extend into the capital from the country; and they must also supervise the buildings, to see that they

—

763

b

—

c

d

—

are constructed to the statutory standards. In particular, they that the water which the Guards-in-Chief have transmitted

good condition reaches the fountains pure and in sufficient quantities, so that it enhances the beauty and amenities of the city. So these officials too must be men of some caliber, with time to go in for public affairs, which means that every citizen nominating City-Wardens must confine his choice to members of the highest property-class. When they have held the election and produced a short list of six candidates with the most votes, the officials responsible are to select three of them by lot; and these, after scrutiny, should hold office in accordance with the to

e

them

must ensure and sent on

in

laws provided for them. Next, five Market-Wardens must be elected from the property-classes. In general, their election

and second should be conducted as for the first

1439

Laws VI

City-Wardens: ten should be selected from the list of candidates by voting, and then five selected by lot, who after due scrutiny should be appointed to office. (Voting is compulsory for all in every election, and everyone who fails in his duty and is denounced to the authorities should be fined fifty drachmas and get the reputation of being a scoundrel. Attendance at the assembly (the general meeting of the state) is to be optional, except for members of the first and second property-classes, who will be fined ten drachmas if their absence from such a meeting is proved. But the third and fourth classes will not be forced to attend and should not be subject

any penalty unless the authorities, for some pressing reason, instruct everyone to come.) To get back to the Market-Wardens: they are to maintain due order in the market, and look after the temples and fountains, to see that no one damages them. They must punish anyone who commits an offense, a slave or foreigner by whipping him and putting him in chains; but if a native citizen misbehaves himself in this way, the Market-Wardens should be authorized to decide the case on their own and fine the culprit up to a hundred drachmas, the limit being increased to two hundred if to

with the City-Wardens. In their own sphere, the City-Wardens too should have the same power of fining and punishing, and inflict fines up to one mina on their own, and up to two minas in association with the Market-Wardens. The right thing to do next will be to appoint officials in charge of (A) two categories of them in each case, culture and (B) physical training one (1) to handle the educational side and the other (2) to organize competitions. By (1) 'education officials' the law means superintendents of gymnasia and schools, who see that they are decently run, supervise the curriculum and organize such related matters as the attendance and accommodation of the boys and girls. (2) 'Officials in charge of competitions' means judges of competitors in athletics and contests of the arts (there being here again two categories (AB) of officials, one for the arts, one for athletics). (B2) Men and horses in athletic contests can have the same judges, but (A2) in the arts, choruses should properly have (A2a) one set of judges, while solo dramatic performances (given by reciters of poetry, lyre-players, pipe-players and such people) ought to have another (A2b). So I suppose a good start will be to select (A2a) the authority to supervise children, men and girls as they enjoy themselves in choruses by dancing and every other type of cultural activity. One official, who is to be not less than forty years old, will suffice, and one of not less than thirty (A2b) will also be enough to present the solo performances and give an adequate decision between the contestants. The Chief Organizer of the Choruses (A2a) must be chosen in some such way as this. All those who are keen on such things should attend the election meeting and be liable to a fine if they don't (this is a point for the Guardians of the Laws to decide), whereas others who do not wish to attend should not be compelled. In proposing their choice the electors should confine themselves to the experts, and in the scrutiny there must be only one reason for accepting or rejecting they

sit

in association

—

1440

Laws

the candidate the lot has favored: that he is experienced or inexperienced as the case may be. One of the ten nominees with the most votes must be selected by lot, scrutinized, and be in charge of the choruses for the year

c

according to law. Similarly with the year's entrants for solo performances and combined pieces on the pipes: only after the application of the same criterion should the candidate (A2b) favored by the lot take charge of them and decide between them, having referred the decision in his own case to his judges. Next, (B2) Umpires for athletic contests and exercises of horses and men must be chosen from the second and also the third propertyclass; it will be compulsory for members of the first three classes to take part in the election, but the lowest class may be let off without a fine. The Umpires should number three, chosen by lot from the twenty candidates

who head

d

and duly sanctioned by the scrutineers, If anyone is judged and found wanting in the scrutiny after being drawn by lot for any office, another person must be chosen in his place by the same methods, and his scrutiny conducted in the same way. The remaining official in this field is the director of the entire education of the boys and girls. Here too there should be one official in charge under the law. He must be not younger than fifty years old, and the father of legitimate children preferably both sons and daughters, though either alone will do. The chosen candidate himself and those who choose him should appreciate that this is by far the most important of all the supreme the poll,

—

e

offices in the state.

766

Any

living creature that flourishes in

its first

stages of

growth gets a tremendous impetus towards its natural perfection and the final development appropriate to it, and this is true of both plants and animals (tame and wild), and men too. Man is a 'tame' animal, as we put it, and of course if he enjoys a good education and happens to have the right natural disposition, he's apt to be a most heavenly and gentle creature; but his upbringing has only to be inadequate or misguided and he'll become the wildest animal on the face of the earth. That's why the legislator should not treat the education of children cursorily or as a secondary matter; he should regard the right choice of the man who is going to be in charge of the children as something of crucial importance, and appoint

b

c

as their Minister the best all-round citizen in the state. So all the officials except the council and members of the Executive 5 should meet at the

temple of Apollo and hold a secret ballot, each man voting for whichever Guardian of the Laws he thinks would make the best Minister of Education. The one who attracts the largest number of votes should be scrutinized by the officials who have elected him, the Guardians of the Laws standing aside. The Minister should hold office for five years, and in the sixth he should be replaced by his successor after an election held under the

same rules. If any public

of his tenure left to

5.

See 758a

ff.

and there are more than thirty days run, the officials concerned must follow the same

official dies in office

1441

Laws VI

procedure as before and appoint a replacement. If a guardian of orphans dies, the relatives on both the mother's and the father's side (as far as the children of first cousins), provided they are living in the state, should appoint a successor within ten days, or be fined a drachma for every day they let pass without appointing the children's new guardian. Of course, any state without duly established courts simply ceases to be a state. If a judge is silent, and (as in arbitration) has no more to say than the litigants in a preliminary hearing he'll never be able to come to a satisfactory decision on the cases before him. That's why a large bench and so does a small one, if its finds it difficult to return good verdicts members are of poor caliber. The point in dispute between the parties must always be made crystal clear, and leisurely and repeated interrogation over a period of time helps a lot to clarify the issues. That is the justification

d

—

for

making

litigants bring their

charges

initially

before a court of neighbors,

be their friends and understand best the actions which provoke the dispute. If a litigant is dissatisfied with the judgment of this court, he may apply to a second, but if the first two courts are both unable to settle the argument, the verdict of the third must close the case. In a sense, to establish a court is to elect officials. Every official, you see, sometimes has to set up as a judge as well; and a judge, although strictly he has no official position, becomes in a way an official of considerable importance during the day on which he sits in judgment and gives his verdict. So on the assumption that judges too are officials, let's specify what judges will be appropriate, the disputes they will decide, and how many should sit on each case. The court appointed by the common choice of the litigants themselves for their own private cases should have absolute authority. Cases may be brought before the other courts for two reasons: one private person may charge another with having done him wrong, and bring him to court so that the issue can be decided; or someone may believe that one of the citizens is acting against the public interests and wish to

who

will

come and

to the

community's

assistance.

Now we

e

must specify

the character

767

b

c

identity of the judges.

First, let's set

up

a

common court for all private persons who are contest-

ing an issue with each other for the third time. It is to be formed in some such way as this. All officials whose tenure lasts for a year or longer should assemble in a single temple on the day just before the new year opens in

summer

d

swearing to the god, they their choicest fruit, so to speak: each board of officials should contribute one judge, the man who appears to be the outstanding member of his board and seems likely to judge the cases of his fellow citizens during the coming year in the best and most god-fearing manner. When the judges have been chosen, their scrutiny should be conducted before their very electors, and if any one of them is rejected, a replacement should be chosen under the same rules. Those who pass the scrutiny are

month after must offer him the

the

solstice; then, after

judgment on the cases of the litigants who refuse the decision of the other courts. They are to vote openly, and to sit in

to accept it

will be

e

1442

Laws

compulsory for the Councillors and the other officials who elected the judges to watch and listen to the trials; others may attend if they wish. If anyone accuses a man of having knowingly returned a false verdict, he must go to the Guardians of the Laws to prefer the charge. 10. If

the accused

is

found guilty as charged,

have to pay to the injured party half the damages awarded; if he is thought to deserve a stiffer punishment, his judges must calculate the additional penalty he should suffer or additional fine he ought to pay to the state and his prosecutor. he will

As

768

for charges of crimes against the state, the first

in the street play his part in judging them. a

b

c

wrong done

e

is

to let the

man

A wrong

done to the state is who would be justifiably annoyed if they

were excluded from deciding such cases. But although we should allow the opening and closing stages of this kind of trial to be in the hands of the people, the detailed examination should be conducted by three of the highest officials, chosen by agreement between prosecutor and defendant. If they are unable to reach agreement themselves, the council should decide between their respective choices. Everyone should have a part to play in private suits too, because anyone excluded from the right to participate in trying cases feels he has no stake in the community whatever. Hence we must also have courts organized on a tribal basis, where the judges, being chosen by lot as occasion arises, will give their verdicts uncorrupted by external pressures. But the final decision in all these cases is to be given by that other court which deals with

litigants

who

cannot

settle their case either

before their neighbors or in the tribal courts, and which for their benefit has been made (we claim) as incorruptible a court as can be assembled by human power.

much

our courts (and we admit that to call their members either 'officials' or 'non-officials' without qualification raises difficulties of terminology). We've given a sort of superficial sketch, which in spite of including a number of details, nevertheless omitted a good many, because a better place for presenting an exact legal procedure and classification of suits will be towards the end of our legislation. So this theme may be dismissed till we are finishing off. We have already explained most of the rules for establishing official posts, but we still can't get a completely clear and exact picture of every individual detail of the entire constitutional organization of the state: for that, we need to take every single topic in proper sequence and go through the whole subject from beginning to end. So far, then, we've described the election of officials, and that brings us to the end of our introduction. Now to start the actual legislation: there's no need to postpone or delay it any longer. Clinias: I very much approve of your introduction, sir, and I'm even more impressed by the way you've rounded it off so that it leads into the opening of the next theme. So

d

to all its citizens,

need

for

—

1443

Laws VI

Athenian: So far, then, these ideas we old men have been tossing about have given us splendid sport. Clinias: Splendid indeed, but I fancy you really meant they were 'a splendid challenge for men in their prime of life'. Athenian: I dare say. But here's another point. I wonder if you agree with me?

What about? What point? Athenian: You know how painting

Clinias:

a picture of anything

seems

to

be

always looks as if the process of touching up by adding color or relief (or whatever it's called in the trade) will never finally get to the point where the clarity and beauty of the picture are beyond improvement. Clinias: Yes, I too get much the same sort of impression, though only from hearsay I've never gone in for that sort of skill. Athenian: Well, you haven't missed anything. But we can still use this passing mention of it to illustrate the next point. Suppose that one day somebody were to take it into his head to paint the most beautiful picture in the world, which would never deteriorate but always improve at his hands as the years went by. You realize that as the painter is not immortal, he won't achieve anything very permanent by lavishing such care and attention on his picture unless he leaves some successor to repair the ravages of time? Won't his successor also have to be able to supplement 6 deficiencies in his master's skill and improve the picture by touching it up ? a never-ending business.

It

—

Clinias: True.

Athenian: Well then, don't you think the legislator will want to do something similar? First of all he'll want to write his laws and make them as accurate as he can; then as time goes on and he tries to put his pet well, do you think there's any legislator so stupid theories into practice as not to realize that his code has many inevitable deficiencies which must be put right by a successor, if the state he's founded is to enjoy a continuous improvement in its administrative arrangements, rather than suffer a de-

—

cline?

Clinias: Yes, legislator will

I

think

want

— indeed I'm sure — that

this is the sort of thing

any

to do.

Athenian: So if a legislator were able to discover a way of doing this that is, if by instruction or pointing to concrete examples he could make someone else understand (perfectly or imperfectly) how to keep laws in good repair by amending them I suppose he'd never give up explaining

—

method until he'd got Clinias: Of course.

his

isn't this

Athenian: Now that framing laws, for which 6.

Deleting

across?

what you two and What do you mean?

Athenian: So Clinias:

it

eis to

I

ought

to

be doing now?

we (in the evening of life) are on the we have guardians already chosen (our

prosthen in c6.

point of juniors),

1444

oughtn't

Laws

we

to

combine our law-giving with an attempt

to turn them into

law-'givers' as well as law-'guardians', as far as we can? Clinias: Of course we ought, assuming we're up to it.

Athenian: Anyhow,

we ought

to try,

and do our

level best.

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Let's address them as follows: 'Colleagues and protectors of our laws, we shall inevitably leave a great many gaps in every section of our code. However, we shall certainly take care to outline a sort of sketch of the complete system with its main points, and it will be your

—

job to take this sketch

—

and

fill

in the details.

You ought

to hear

what

your aims should be when you do this. Megillus and Clinias and I have mentioned it to each other more than once, and we are agreed that our formula is a good one. We want you to be sympathetic to our way of thinking and become our pupils, keeping in view this aim which the three of us are unanimous a giver and guardian of laws should have. The central point on which we agree amounted to this. "Our aim in life should be goodness and the spiritual virtue appropriate to mankind. There are various things that can assist us: it may be some pursuit we follow, a particular habit, or something we possess; we may get help from some desire we have or some opinion we hold or some course of study; and all this is true of both male and female members of the community, young or old. Whatever the means, it's this aim we've described that we must all strain every muscle to achieve throughout our lives. No man, whoever he is, should ever be found valuing anything else, if it impedes his progress not even, in the last resort, the state. Rather than have the state tolerate the yoke of slavery and be ruled by unworthy hands, it may be absolutely necessary to allow it to be destroyed, or abandon it by going into exile. All that sort of hardship we simply have to endure rather than permit a change to the sort of political system which will make men worse." This, then, is the agreed statement; now it's up to you to consider this double aim of ours and censure the laws that can do nothing to help us; but you must commend and welcome the effective ones with enthusiasm, and cheerfully live as they dictate. You must have no truck with other pursuits which aim at different "goods" (as people call them).' The best way to start the next section of our code will be to deal with matters of religion. First, we should go back to the figure of 5040 and reflect again how many convenient divisors we found both in this total and its subdivision the tribe (which is one-twelfth of the total, as we specified, i.e., exactly the product of twenty-one multiplied by twenty). Our grand total is divisible by twelve, and so is the number of persons in a tribe (420) and in each case this subdivision must be regarded as holy, a gift of God, corresponding to the months of the year and the revolution of the universe. This is exactly why every state is guided by innate intuition to give these fractions the sanction of religion, though in some cases the divisions have been made more correctly than in others and the religious backing has proved more successful. So for our part we claim that we had

1445

Laws VI

every justification for preferring 5040, which can be divided by every number from one to twelve, except eleven (a drawback that's very easily cured: one way to remedy it is simply to omit two hearths). The truth of this could be demonstrated very briefly in any idle moment. So let's trust to the rule we've just explained, and divide our number along those lines. We must allocate a god, or child of a god, to each division and subdivision of the state and provide altars and the associated equipment; we must establish two meetings per month for the purposes of sacrifice, one in each of the twelve tribes into which the state is divided, and another in each of the twelve local communities that form the divisions of each tribe. This arrangement is intended to ensure, first, that we enjoy the favor of the 7 gods and heaven in general, and secondly (as we'd be inclined to stress ) that we should grow familiar and intimate with each other in every kind

d

of social contact.

You it

see,

is vital

the bride

when people

are going to live together as partners in marriage,

e

that the fullest possible information should be available about

and her background and the family

she'll

marry

into.

One should

regard the prevention of mistakes here as a matter of supreme importance so important and serious, in fact, that even the young people's recreation must be arranged with this in mind. Boys and girls must dance together at an age when plausible occasions can be found for their doing so, in order that they may have a reasonable look at each other; and

—

they should dance naked, provided sufficient modesty and restraint are displayed by all concerned. The controllers and organizers of the choruses should be in charge of all these arrangements and maintain due order; and in conjunction with the Guardians of the Laws they will settle anything we leave out. As we said, it's inevitable that a legislator will omit the numerous details of such a topic; those who administer his laws from year to year will have to learn from experience and settle the details by annual refinements and amendments, until they think they've made the rules and procedures sufficiently precise. In the case of sacrifices and dances, a reasonable and adequate period to allow for experiment, in general and in detail, will be ten years. So long as the original legislator is alive, the various officials should bring him into the consultations, but when he is dead they must use their own initiative in putting up to the Guardians of the Laws proposals for remedying the deficiencies in their respective spheres. This process should

772

b

c

continue until every detail is thought to have received its final polish. After that, they must assume that the rules are immutable, and observe them along with the rest of the code which the legislator laid down and imposed on them originally. Not a single detail should be altered, if they can help it; but if they ever believe that the force of circumstances has

become irresistible, they must consult all the officials, the entire citizen body and all the oracles of the gods. If the verdict is unanimously in favor. 7.

See 738b-e.

d

1446

Laws

then they may amend, but never in any other conditions whatever; the law will be that the opposition must always win the day. To resume, then: when a man of twenty-five has observed others and been observed by them and is confident that he has found a family offering

someone to his e

taste

who would make a suitable partner for the procreation

of children, he should get married, First,

however, he ought

to

and

any case before he reaches thirty. hear the correct method of trying to find a in

and congenial partner. As Clinias says, the appropriate preface should stand at the head of every law. Clinias: Well reminded, sir and at just the right moment in our conversuitable

—

sation,

I

fancy.

Athenian: Quite

773

b

c

'My boy/

say to this son of a good family, 'you must make a marriage that will be approved by sensible folk. They will advise you not to be over keen to avoid marrying into a poor family or to seek to marry into a rich one; other things being equal, you should always prefer to marry somewhat beneath you. That will be best both for the state and the union of your two hearths and homes, because it is infinitely better for the virtue of a man and wife if they balance and complement each other than if they are both at the same extreme. If a man knows he's rather headstrong and apt to be too quick off the mark in everything he does, he ought to be anxious to ally himself to a family of quiet habits, and if he has the opposite kind of temperament he should marry into the opposite kind of family. One general rule should apply to marriage: we should seek to contract the alliance that will benefit the state, not the one that we personally find most alluring. Everyone is naturally drawn to the person most like himself, and that puts the whole state off balance, because of discrepancies in wealth and character, and these in turn generally lead, in most states, to results we certainly don't want to so.

let's

see in ours.' If

we

marry

give explicit instructions in the form of a law

— 'no rich man

to

no powerful person to marry into a powerful house, the headstrong must be forced to join in marriage with the phlegmatic and the phlegmatic with the headstrong' well, it's ludicrous, of course, but it will also annoy a great many people who find it hard to understand into a rich family,

—

d

why

the state should be like the mixture in a mixing-bowl. When you pour in the wine it seethes furiously, but once dilute it with the god of the teetotalers, and you have a splendid combination which will make

you

good and reasonable drink. Very few people have it in them to see that the same principle applies to the alliance that produces children. For these reasons we are forced to omit such topics from our actual laws. However, we must resort to our 'charms 8 and try to persuade everybody to think it more important to produce well-balanced children than to marry his equal and never stop lusting for wealth. Anyone who is set on enriching a

'

e

8.

See 659e.

1447

Laws VI

himself by his marriage should be headed off by reproaches rather than compelled by a written law. So much for marriage: these exhortations should be added to our previous account of how we should become partners in eternity by leaving a 9 descendants to serve God forever in our stead A correctly composed preface would have all that and more to say about the obligation to marry.

line of

.

11. If

anyone disobeys (except

involuntarily),

and unsociably keeps him-

unmarried at the age of thirty-five, he must pay an annual fine: one hundred drachmas if he belongs to the highest property-class, seventy if to the second, sixty if to the third, and thirty if to the fourth; the sum to be consecrated to Hera. self to

himself so that he

774

is still

b

he refuses to pay his annual fine, debt must be increased ten times.

12. If his

(The fine

is

to

be collected by the treasurer of the goddess.

he fails to collect it, he will have to owe the sum himself. 13. If

Every treasurer must give an account of himself in this respect at the scrutiny.) So much for the financial penalty to be paid by anyone refusing marry, but

to

12. (cont.)

he should also be barred

from receiving the respect due

to

him from

his

whom

should ever readily take the slightest notice of him. If the bachelor tries to chastise a man, everyone should take the victim's side and protect him.

juniors,

none

of

bystander fails to give the victim help, law should see that he gets the reputation of being a rotten,

c

14. If a

the

lily-

livered citizen.

We've already discussed dowries, 10 but we ought to repeat that even the poor do have to marry and give in marriage on limited resources,

if it

will not affect their prospects of a long life one way or the other, because in this state no one will go without the necessities of life. Nor will wives

be so inclined to give themselves airs, and their husbands will be less humiliated by kowtowing to them for financial reasons. If a man obeys this law, so

much

to his credit.

he does not, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmas for the trousseau in the case of the lowest property-class (or more than a hundred or a hundred and fifty or two hundred according to class). 15. If

9.

10.

See 721b-d. See 742c.

d

1448

Laws

he must

owe

as

much

again to the treasury, and the amount given or received must be dedicated to Hera and Zeus. e

The treasurers

16.

gods are to exact these sums in the same way as we said the treasurers of Hera had to collect the fines in every case of these

of refusal to marry, or pay out of their

own

The

a valid betrothal

right to

make

pockets.

should

rest initially

with the bride's

secondly with her grandfather, thirdly with her brothers by the same father. If none of these is available, the right should belong to the relatives on the mother's side in the same order. If any exceptional misfortune occurs, the nearest relatives shall be authorized to act in conjunction with the girl's guardians. That leaves us with the pre-marriage sacrifices and any other relevant rites that should be performed before, during or after the wedding. A citizen should ask the Expounders about these matters, and be confident that if he does as they tell him, everything will be in order. As for the wedding-feast, neither family should invite more than five friends of both sexes, and the number of relatives and kinsmen from either side should be limited similarly. No one should incur expense beyond his means: that is, no more than a mina in the case of the wealthiest class, father,

75

b

mina for the next and so on down the scale according to Everyone should commend the man who obeys the regulation, but half a

17.

The Guardians

of the

class.

Laws must

chastise the disobedient as a philishas never been trained to appreciate the melodies 11 of the Muses of marriage. tine

who

To drink

c

to the point of inebriation is

improper whatever the place (except at the feasts of the god who made us the gift of wine), and it's dangerous too, especially if you want to make your marriage a success. On the day of their wedding particularly, when they are at a turning-point in their lives, bride and groom ought to show restraint, so as to make as sure as they can

being practically impossible to tell the day or night in which by the favor of God conception will take place) that any child they may have should have parents who were sober when they conceived him. Apart from that, children should not be conceived when the parents' bodies (it

drunken relaxation; the fetus should be compactly formed and firmly planted, and its growth should be orderly and undisturbed. But when he s drunk a man reels about all over the place and bumps into things, and a raging passion invades his body and soul; this means that as a sower of his seed a drunkard will be clumsy and inefficient, and he'll produce unbalanced children who are not to be trusted, with devious are in a state of

d

11.

'Nomes': the same pun as in 700b, 722d-e.

1449

Laws VI

with misshapen bodies too. That's why all the year round, throughout his life (but particularly during the age of procreation), a man must take great care to do nothing to injure his health, which if he can help it, and nothing with any hint of insolence or injustice, will inevitably rub off on to the souls and bodies of his children, and produce absolutely degenerate creatures who have been stamped with the likeness of their father. At the very least, he must shun such vices on the day of his wedding and the following night, because if a human institution gets off to a good and careful start, there is a sort of divine guarantee that

characters,

it

and

in all probability

e

will prosper.

The bridegroom must regard one of the two homes included in the lot as the nest in which he will bring up his brood of young; here he must be married, after leaving his father and mother, and here he must make his home and become the breadwinner for himself and his children. You see, when people feel the need of absent friends, the ties that bind them are strengthened, but when they overdo it and are too much together so that they're not apart long enough to miss each other, they drift apart. That's why the newly-weds must leave their father and mother and the wife's relatives in the old home and live somewhere else, rather as if they had gone off to a colony; and each side should visit, and be visited by, the other. The young couple should produce children and bring them up, handing on the torch of life from generation to generation, and always worshipping the gods in the manner prescribed by law. Now for the question of property: what will it be reasonable for a man to possess? Mostly, it's not difficult to see what it would be, and acquire this. The terms it; but slaves offer difficulties at every turn. The reason is we employ are partly correct and partly not, in that the actual language we use about slaves is partly a reflection and partly a contradiction of our

776

b

c

practical experience of them.

We

don't yet see your point, sir. Athenian: No wonder, Megillus. The Spartan helot-system is probably just about the most difficult and contentious institution in the entire Greek world; 12 some people think it's a good idea, others are against it (though

Megillus:

Oh? What do you mean?

which the Mariandynians have been reduced at Heraclea, and by the race of serfs to be found in Thessaly). Faced with these and similar cases, what should our policy be on the ownership of slaves? The point I happened to bring up in my discussion of the subject, and which naturally made you ask what I meant, was this: we know we'd all agree that a man should own the best and most docile after all, many a paragon of a slave has done much slaves he can get more for a man than his own brother or son, and they have often been less feeling is

aroused by the slavery

to

—

12.

were a numerous class of state serfs, in part the descendants of non-Doric population conquered by the Dorian settlers (c. 1000 b.c.); see

The Spartan

the original

633b above.

helots

d

1450 e

Laws

the salvation of their masters' persons and property and entire homes. know quite well, don't we, that some people do tell such stories

We

777

about slaves? Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: And don't others take the opposite line, and say that a slave's soul is rotten through and through, and that if we have any sense we won't trust such a pack at all? The most profound of our poets actually says (speaking of Zeus) that you make a man Far-sounding Zeus If

Everyone sees the problem

Some people

a slave , that very

takes half his wits

day

away } 3

and takes one side or the other. class in anything: they treat them like

differently,

don't trust slaves as a

animals, and whip and goad them so that they make the souls of their slaves three times no, a thousand times more slavish than they were. Others follow precisely the opposite policy. Megillus: True.

—

b

c

d

e

Clinias: Well then,

view of this conflict of opinion, what should we do about our own country? What's our line on the possession of slaves, and the way to punish them? Athenian: Look here, Clinias: the animal 'man' quite obviously has a touchy temper, and it looks as if it won't be easy, now or in the future, to persuade him to fall neatly into the two categories (slave and freeman master) which are necessary for practical purposes. Your slave, therefore, will be a difficult beast to handle. The frequent and repeated revolts in Messenia, and in the states where people possess a lot of slaves who all speak the same language, have shown the evils of the system often enough; and we can also point to the various crimes and adventures of the robbers who plague Italy, the 'Rangers', as they're called. In view of all this you may well be puzzled to know what your general policy ought to be. In fact, there are just two ways of dealing with the problem open to us: first, sir,

in

the slaves are to submit to the condition without giving trouble, they should not all come from the same country or speak the same tongue, as far as it can be arranged; secondly, we ought to train them properly, if

not only for their sakes but above all for our own. The best way to train slaves is to refrain from arrogantly ill-treating them, and to harm them even less (assuming that's possible) than you would your equals. You see, when a man can hurt someone as often as he likes, he'll soon show whether or not his respect for justice is natural and unfeigned and springs from a genuine hatred of injustice. If his attitude to his slaves and his conduct

towards them are

free of

any

taint of

impiety and injustice,

didly effective at sowing the seeds of virtue. Just the

13.

Odyssey

xvii. 322-23.

be splensame can be said of he'll

1451

Laws VI

which any master or dictator or person in any position of authority deals with someone weaker than himself. Even so, we should certainly punish slaves if they deserve it, and not spoil them by simply giving them a warning, as we would free men. Virtually everything you say to a slave should be an order, and you should never become at all neither the women nor the men. (Though this is how familiar with them a lot of silly folk do treat their slaves, and usually only succeed in spoiling them and in making life more difficult more difficult, I mean, for the slaves to take orders and for themselves to maintain their authority.)

the

way

in

778

—

—

Clinias: You're quite right.

Athenian: So

number

now

that the citizen has

of suitable slaves to help

will be to outline a housing-plan,

him

been supplied with

a sufficient

in his various tasks, the next thing

won't

it?

b

Clinias: Certainly.

new, and has no buildings already existing, so it rather looks as if it will have to work out the details of its entire architectural scheme for itself, particularly those of the temples and city walls. Ideally, Clinias, this subject would have been dealt with before we discussed marriage, but as the whole picture is theoretical anyway, it's perfectly possible to turn to it now, as we are doing. Still, when we put the scheme into Athenian: Our

state is

practice, we'll see to the buildings,

God willing, before we regulate marriage, But here and now,

c

means. Athenian: Temples should be built all round the marketplace and on high ground round the perimeter of the city, for purposes of protection and sanitation. Next to them should be administrative offices and courts partly because the legal cases of law. This is holy ground, and here involve solemn religious issues, partly because of the august divinities whose temples are nearby judgment will be given and sentence received. Among these buildings will be the courts in which cases of murder, and all other crimes which deserve the death penalty, may properly be heard. As for city walls, Megillus, I'd agree with the Spartan view that they should be left lying asleep and undisturbed in the ground. My reasons?

d

and marriage let's just

will then

crown our labors

in this field.

give a swift sketch of the building program.

Clinias:

By

all

—

—

As

the poet neatly puts

should be

would

made

it,

of bronze

in those

and

words so often

iron, not stone'.

take us for, and rightly,

if

we

14

cited, 'a city's walls

Besides,

sent our

what

fools people

young men out

into the

e

countryside every year to excavate trenches and ditches and various structures to ward off the enemy and stop them coming over the boundaries at 15 and then were to build a wall round the city! A wall never contributes all

—

apt to encourage a certain invites them to take refuge behind

anything to a town's health, and in any case softness in the souls of the inhabitants.

14.

We

do not know

the poet referred

Aeschylus, Persians 349. 15.

See 760e.

to,

It

is

but the sentiment

is

fairly

common:

see e.g.

779

1452

Laws

instead of tackling the enemy and ensuring their own safety by mounting guard night and day; it tempts them to suppose that a foolproof way of protecting themselves is to barricade themselves in behind their walls and it

gates,

and then drop

they were brought into this world for a life of luxury. It never occurs to them that comfort is really to be won by the sweat of the brow, whereas the only result of such disgusting luxury and idleness is a fresh round of troubles, in my view. However, if off to sleep, as

if

men

are to have a city wall at all, the private houses should be constructed right from the foundations so that the whole city forms in effect a single wall: that

the houses should be easy to defend because they present to the street a regular and unbroken front. whole city looking like a single house will be quite a pretty sight, and being easy to guard it will is, all

A

be superior to any other for safety. The job of seeing that the buildings always keep to the original scheme should properly belong to their occupants, but the City- Wardens should keep an eye on them and even impose

any negligent person to do his duty. They should also supervise all the sanitary arrangements of the town and stop any private person encroaching on public land by buildings or excavations. The same officials must take particular care to see that rainwater flows away properly, and in general they must make all the appropriate arrangements inside and outside the city. To deal with all these points, and to supplement any other deficiency in the law (which cannot be exhaustive), the Guardians of the fines to force

Laws

are to

make

additional rules in the light of experience. So much for these buildings, together with those round the marketplace, and gymnasia and all the schools: they are now ready and waiting to be entered, and the theaters are prepared for the arrival of their audiences. let's pass on to the next item in our legislation, the time after the wedding.

Now

By

means. Athenian: Let's suppose the ceremony is over, Clinias; between then and the birth of a child there may well be a complete year. Now, in a state Clinias:

all

which sets its sights higher than others, how this year is to be spent by a bride and groom (you remember we broke off when we got to this point) is not the easiest thing in the world to specify. We've had knotty problems but the common man will find our policy this time more to swallow than ever. However, we should never shrink from

like this before, difficult

speaking the truth as Clinias:

Of

we

see

it,

Clinias.

course.

Athenian: Take someone who proposes to promulgate laws to a state about the correct conduct of the public life of the community. What if he reckons that in principle one ought not to use compulsion even in so far as one can use it in private affairs? Suppose he thinks that a man ought to be allowed to do what he likes with the day, instead of being regulated at every turn. Well, if he excludes private life from his legislation, and expects that the citizens will be prepared to be law-abiding in their public life as a community,

—

he's

making

a big mistake.

Now, what's made me

say this?

It's

because

we

1453

Laws VI

communal meals no more and no less than they did before their wedding. I know that this custom of eating together caused eyebrows to be raised when it was introduced in your parts of the world, but I suppose it was dictated by war or some other equally serious emergency that pressed hard on a small people

are going to assert that our newly-marrieds ought to attend

in a critical situation.

But once you had had

enforced experience of comthe custom contributed to your

this

munal meals, you realized just how much security. It must have been in some such way feeding established

itself

that the practice of

communal

among you.

sounds plausible enough. Athenian: As I was saying, it was once an astonishing custom and some people were apprehensive about imposing it. But if a legislator wanted to impose it today, he wouldn't have half so much trouble. But the custom points to another measure, which would probably prove equally successful, legislaif tried. Today, it's absolutely unheard-of, and that's what makes the tor 'card his wool into the fire', as the saying is, and make so many efforts fruitlessly. This measure is neither easy to describe nor simple in execution. Clinias: Well then, sir, what's the point you're trying to make? You Clinias: That

seem

be awfully reluctant to tell us. Athenian: Listen to me, then: let's not waste time lingering over this business. The blessings that a state enjoys are in direct proportion to the to

degree of law and order to be found in

it,

and the effects of good regulations

fields are usually vitiated to the extent that things are controlled either incompetently or not at all in others. The point is relevant to the

in

some

subject in hand. lus,

you have

Thanks

to

a splendid

some and

—

providential necessity, Clinias and Megilastonishing institution: as I was saying

—

men. But it is entirely wrong of you to have omitted from your legal code any provision for your women, so that the practice of communal meals for them has never got under way. On the contrary, the female sex, the half which in any case is inclined half the human race has been left to its to be secretive and crafty, because of its weakness own devices because of the misguided indulgence of the legislator. Because you neglected this sex, you gradually lost control of a great many things which would be in a far better state today if they had been regulated by law. You see, leaving women to do what they like is not just to lose half

communal meals

for

—

the battle (as

it

—

may seem): a woman's natural potential for virtue is inferior

man's, so she's proportionately a greater danger, perhaps even twice as great. So the happiness of the state will be better served if we reconsider the point and put things right, by providing that all our arrangements apply to men and women alike. But at present, unhappily, the human race has not progressed as far as that, and if you're wise you won't breathe a to a

world where states do public institution at all. So when it comes to the point, how on earth are you going to avoid being laughed to scorn when you try to force women to take their food and drink in

word about such a practice in other not recognize communal meals as a

public? There's nothing the sex

is

parts of the

likely to

put up with more reluctantly:

1454

Laws

women have got used to a life of obscurity and retirement, and any attempt to force

d

and

them

they'll

into the

open

be more than a

provoke tremendous resistance from them, match for the legislator. Elsewhere, as I said,

will

the very mention of the correct policy will be

met with howls of protest. So if you want our discussion

But perhaps this state will be different. about political systems to be as complete as theory can ever be. I'd like to explain the merits and advantages of this institution that is, if you are equally keen to listen to me. If not, then let's skip it. Clinias: No, no, sir: we're very anxious to hear the explanation. Athenian: Let's listen, then. But don't be disconcerted if I appear to be starting a long way back. We've time to spare, and there's no compelling reason why we shouldn't look into the business of legislation from all

—

e

possible angles. Clinias: You're quite right.

Athenian: Let's go back to what we said at the beginning 16 Here's something that everyone must be perfectly clear about: either mankind had absolutely no beginning in time and will have no end, but always existed and always will, or it has existed for an incalculably long time from its .

782

origin.

Clinias: Naturally.

b

Athenian: Well, now we may surely assume that in every part of the world cities have been formed and destroyed, and all sorts of customs have been adopted, some orderly, some not, along with the growth of every sort of taste in food, solid and liquid. And the various changes in the seasons have developed, which have probably stimulated a vast number of natural changes in living beings. Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: Well,

we

believe, don't we, that at a certain point virtues made their appearance, not having existed before, and olives likewise, and the gifts of Demeter and Kore, ]/ which Triptolemus, or whoever it

was,

handed on

So long as these things did not exist, we can take animals resorted to feeding on each other, as they do now? to us?

it

that

Clinias: Certainly. c

Athenian: We observe, of course, the survival of human sacrifice among many people today. Elsewhere, we gather, the opposite practice prevailed,

and there was

a time

when we

didn't even dare to eat beef, and the gods were not animals, but cakes and meal soaked other 'pure' offerings like that. People kept off meat on the

sacrifices offered to the

honey and grounds that it was an act of impiety to eat it, or to pollute the altars of the gods with blood. So at that time men lived a sort of 'Orphic 18 life, in

'

16.

See 676a

17.

Grains.

18.

The Orphics held

ff.

that a

human

soul could be reborn in the

body of another human being or an animal, and the soul of an animal in another animal or a human being. Hence they strictly prohibited killing and meat-eating.

1455

Laws VI

keeping exclusively to inanimate food and entirely abstaining from eating the flesh of animals. Clinias: So

it's

commonly

said,

and

it's

Athenian: Then the question naturally to

easy enough to believe.

arises,

why have

I

related

all this

you now?

A

Clinias:

perfectly correct assumption,

sir.

Athenian: Now then, Clinias, I'll try to explain the next point, if I can. Clinias: Carry on, then. Athenian: Observation tells me that all human actions are motivated by a set of three needs and desires. Give a man a correct education, and these instincts will lead him to virtue, but educate him badly and he'll end up at the other extreme. From the moment of their birth men have a desire for food and drink. Every living creature has an instinctive love of satisfying this desire whenever it occurs, and the craving to do so can fill a man's whole being, so that he remains quite unmoved by the plea that he should do anything except satisfy his lust for the pleasures of the body, so as to

make

himself

immune

Our third and last to come upon

to all discomfort.

greatest

us: it is need, the longing we feel most keenly, is the the flame of the imperious lust to procreate, which kindles the fires of passion in mankind. These three unhealthy instincts must be canalized away from what men call supreme pleasure, and towards the supreme good.

We

keep them in check by the three powerful influences of fear, law, and correct argument; but in addition, we should invoke the help of the Muses and the gods who preside over competitions, to smother their growth and dam their tide. The topic which should come after marriage, and before training and

must

try to

education,

the birth of children. Perhaps, as we take these topics in shall be able to complete each individual law as we did before, is

we when we approached

order,

the question of

communal meals

—

I

mean

that

when

we've become intimate with our citizens, perhaps we shall be able to see more clearly whether such gatherings should consist of men only or whether, after all, they should include women. Similarly, when we've won control of certain institutions that have never yet been controlled by law, we'll use them as 'cover', just as other people do, with the result I indicated detailed inspection of these institutions,

we

be able to lay down laws that take account of them better. Clinias: Quite right. Athenian: So let's bear in mind the points we've just made, in case

we

just

now: thanks

to a

more

may

we need to refer to them later on. Clinias: What points in particular are you telling us to remember? Athenian: The three impulses we distinguished by our three terms: the desire for 'food' (I think we said) and 'drink', and thirdly 'sexual stimu-

find

lation'.

Clinias: Yes,

sir,

we'll certainly

remember,

just as

you

tell

us.

Athenian: Splendid. Let's turn our attention to the bridal pair, and instruct them in the manner and method by which they should produce

1456

Laws

children.

(And

if

we

fail to

persuade them, we'll threaten them with a law

or two.)

How

do you mean? Athenian: The bride and groom should resolve to present the state with the best and finest children they can produce. Now, when human beings co-operate in any project, and give due attention to its planning and execution, the results they achieve are always of the best and finest quality; but Clinias:

they act carelessly, or are incapable of intelligent action in the first place, the results are deplorable. So the bridegroom had better deal with his wife if

and approach the task of begetting children with a sense of responsibility, and the bride should do the same, especially during the period when no children have yet been born to them. They should be supervised by women whom we have chosen 19 (several or only a few— the officials should appoint

number they think right, at times within their discretion). These women must assemble daily at the temple of Eileithuia 20 for not more than a third of the day, and when they have convened each must report to her colleagues the

any wife or husband of childbearing age she has seen who is concerned with anything but the duties imposed on him or her at the time of the sacrifices and rites of their marriage. If children come in suitable numbers, the period of supervised procreation should be ten years and no longer! But if a couple remain childless throughout this period, they should part, and call in their relatives and the female officials to help them decide terms of divorce that will safeguard the interests of them both. If some dispute

about the duties and interests of the parties, they must choose ten of the Guardians of the Laws as arbitrators, and abide by their decisions on the points referred to them. The female officials must enter the homes of the young people and by a combination of admonition and threats try to make them give up their ignorant and sinful ways. If this has no effect, they must go and report the case to the Guardians of the Laws, who must resort to sterner methods. If even the Guardians prove ineffective, they should make the case public and post up the relevant name, swearing on their oath that they are unable to reform so-and-so. arises

Unless the person whose name is posted up succeeds in convicting in court those who published the notice, h e must be deprived of the privilege of attending weddings and parties 18. (a)

celebrating the birth of children. 19. If

he persists

in attending,

anyont who wishes should chastise ished for it.

19.

No

20.

Goddess

him by beating him, and not be pun-

such women have been mentioned. hereabouts suggests a lack of revision.) of childbirth.

(In other

ways

too the state of the text

1457

Laws VI 18. (b) If a

to

win

the

woman day

misbehaves and her name

is

posted up, and she

fails

in court,

same regulations are to apply to her too: she must be excluded from female processions and distinctions, and be forbidden to attend the

weddings and

parties celebrating the birth of children.

children have been produced as demanded by law, if a man has intercourse with another woman, or a woman with another man, and the other party is still procreating, they must suffer the same penalty as was specified for those who are

When

20.

still

having children.

21. After the

period of child-bearing, the chaste

man

or

woman

should

be highly respected; the promiscuous should be held in the opposite kind of 'repute' (though disrepute would be a better word). the majority of people conduct themselves with moderation in sexual matters, no such regulations should be mentioned or enacted; but after the if there is misbehavior, regulations should be made and enforced

When

pattern of the laws we've just laid down. Our first year is the beginning of our whole

and every boy's and family shrines under the

life,

year of birth should be recorded in their heading 'born'. Alongside, on a whitened wall, should be written girl's

every brotherhood the sequence-numbers of the

officials

who

up

in

facilitate the

numbering of the years. The names of the living members of the brotherhood should be inscribed nearby, and those of the deceased expunged. The age limits for marriage shall be: for a girl, from sixteen to twenty (these will be the extreme limits specified), and for a man, from thirty to thirty-five. A woman may hold office from the age of forty, a man from thirty. Service in the armed forces shall be required of a man from twenty to sixty. As for women, whatever military service it may be thought necessary to impose (after they have finished bearing children) should be performed up to the age of fifty; practicable and appropriate duties should be specified for each individual.

Book VII Athenian: Now that the boys and girls have been born, I suppose their education and training will be the most suitable topic to deal with next. This is not something we can leave on one side: that would be out of the question. However, we shall clearly do better to confine our remarks to advice and instruction, and not venture on precise regulations. In the privacy of family life, you see, a great many trivial activities never get publicity,

and under the stimulus

of feelings of pleasure or pain or desire

1458

Laws

they can

too easily fly in the face of the lawgiver's recommendations and produce citizens whose characters are varied and conflicting, which is a social evil. although these activities are so trivial and so common that one cannot decently arrange to punish them by law, they do tend to undermine the written statutes, because men get into the habit of repeatedly all

Now

breaking rules in small matters. That's why in spite of all the difficulties of legislating on such points, we can't simply say nothing about them. But

must try to clarify my point by showing you some samples, as it were. At the moment, I expect it looks as if I'm rather concealing my meaning. I

Clinias: You're quite right,

Athenian: is

I

take

it

it

we were

to qualify as 'correct',

it

does. justified in asserting that

simply must show that

it is

if

an education

capable of making

our souls and bodies as fine and as handsome as they can be? Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: And I suppose (to take the most elementary requirement), that if a person is going to be supremely good-looking, his posture must be as erect as possible, right from his earliest years? Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Well now, we observe, don't we, that the earliest stages of growth of every animal are by far the most vigorous and rapid? That's why a lot of people actually maintain that in the case of man, the first five years of life see more growth than the next twenty. Clinias: That's true.

Athenian. But we re aware that rapid growth without frequent and appropriately graded exercises leads to a lot of trouble for the body? Clinias: Yes, indeed.

And

Athenian:

ment

isn't

it

precisely

needs most exercise? Clinias: Good Heavens, sir, are that

when

a

body

is

getting

most nourish-

it

we going

to

demand such

a thing of

new-born babies and little children? Athenian: No— I mean even earlier, when they're getting nourishment in their

mother's body.

Clinias: What's that

you say?

My

dear

sir!

womb? Athenian: Yes,

do. But

Do you

really

mean

in the

hardly surprising you haven't heard of these athletics of the embryo. It's a curious subject, but I'd like to tell you about it. Clinias:

Do

Athenian:

I

it's

so, of course.

something it would be easier to understand in Athens, where some people go in for sport more than they should. Not only boys, but some elderly men as well, rear young birds and set them to fight one another. But they certainly don't think just pitting them one against another will give such creatures adequate exercise. To supplement this, each man keeps birds somewhere about his person a small one in the cup of his hand, a larger one under his arm— and covers countless stades in walking It's

—

1459

Laws VII

about, not for the sake of his own health, but to keep these animals in good shape. To the intelligent person, the lesson is obvious: all bodies find

and invigorating to be shaken by movements and joltings of all kinds, whether the motion is due to their own efforts or they are carried on a vehicle or boat or horse or any other mode of conveyance. All this enables the body to assimilate its solid and liquid food, so that we grow healthy and handsome and strong into the bargain. In view of all this, can we say what our future policy should be? If you like, we could lay down precise rules (and how people would laugh at us!): (1) A pregnant woman should go for walks, and when her child is born she should mold it like wax while it is still supple, and keep it well wrapped up for the first two years of its life. (2) The nurses must be compelled under legal penalty to

it

helpful

contrive that the children are always being carried to the country or temples or relatives, until they are sturdy

enough

to stand

on

their

own

feet. (3)

then, the nurses should persist in carrying the child around until it's three, to keep it from distorting its young limbs by subjecting them to too

Even

The nurses should be as strong as possible, and there must be plenty of them and we could provide written penalties for each infringement of the rules. But no! That would lead to far too much of what I mentioned just now.

much

pressure.

Clinias:

(4)

—

You mean

Athenian:

(women and

.

.

.

.

.

.

we'd provoke. And the nurses match) would refuse to obey us

the tremendous ridicule

slaves,

with characters to

anyway. Clinias:

Then why did we

Clinias:

Good

should be specified? Athenian: For this reason. A state's free men and masters have quite different characters to the nurses', and there's a chance that if they hear these regulations they may be led to the correct conclusion: the state's general code of laws will never rest on a firm foundation as long as private life is badly regulated, and it's silly to expect otherwise. Realizing the truth of this, they may themselves spontaneously adopt our recent suggestions as rules, and thereby achieve the happiness that results from running their households and their state on proper lines. Clinias: Yes, that's all very reasonable. Athenian: Still, let's not abandon this style of legislation yet. We started to talk about young children's bodies: let's use the same sort of approach to explain how to shape their personalities. insist that the rules

idea.

take this as our basic principle in both cases: all children, and especially very tiny infants, benefit both physically

Athenian: So

let's

young and mentally from being nursed and kept in motion, as far as practicable, throughout the day and night; indeed, if only it could be managed, they ought to live as though they were permanently on board ship. But as that's impossible, we must aim to provide our new-born infants with the closest possible approximation to this ideal.

1460

Laws

Here's

some

further evidence, from

which the same conclusions should be drawn: the fact that young children's nurses, and the women who cure Corybantic conditions have learned this treatment from experience and have come to recognize its value. And I suppose you know what a mother does when she wants to get a wakeful child to sleep. Far from keeping him still, she takes care to move him about, rocking him constantly in her arms, not silently, but humming a kind of tune. The cure consists of movement to the rhythms of dance and song; the mother makes her child pipe dozen just as surely as the music of the pipes bewitches the frenzied 1

,

,

Bacchic reveler

2 .

Clinias: Well then,

sir,

have

we any

particular explanation for

Athenian: The reason's not very hard Clinias:

What

all this?

to find.

is it?

Athenian: Both these conditions are a species of fear, and fear is the result of some inadequacy in the personality. When one treats such conditions by vigorous movement, this external motion, by canceling out the internal agitation that gives rise to the fear and frenzy, induces a feeling of calm and peace in the soul, in spite of the painful thumping of the heart experi-

enced by each patient. The result

very gratifying. Whereas the wakeful children are sent to sleep, the revelers (far from asleep!), by being set to dance to the music of the pipes, are restored to mental health after their derangement, with the assistance of the gods to whom they sacrifice so propitiously. This explanation, brief as it is, is convincing enough. is

Clinias: Yes, indeed.

Athenian: Well then, seeing how effective these measures are, here's another point to notice about the patient 3 Any man who has experienced terrors from his earliest years will be that much more likely to grow up timid. But no one will deny that this is to train him to be a coward, not a hero. .

Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: Contrariwise, we'd agree that a training infancy

demands

that

we overcome

the terrors

and

in

courage right from

fears that assail us?

Clinias: Exactly.

Athenian: So we can say that exercising very young children by keeping them in motion contributes a great deal towards the perfection of one aspect of the soul's virtue. Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian. Further, good humor and bad humor will be a conspicuous element in a good or bad moral character respectively. Frenzied pathological states accompanied by a strong desire to dance, popularly supposed to be caused by the Corybantes, spirits in attendance on the goddess Cybele. The condition was cured homoeopathically by the disciplined music and 1.

dancing of

Corybantic

ritual.

2.

Reading bakcheion

3.

Reading

in e3

autois in b6.

with acute accent on the second syllable.

1461

Laws VII Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: So how can we instil into the new-born child, right from the start, whichever of these two characteristics we want? We must try to indicate how far they are within our control, and the methods we have to use. Clinias: Quite so. Athenian: I belong to the school of thought which maintains that luxury makes a child bad-tempered, irritable, and apt to react violently to trivial things. At the other extreme, unduly savage repression turns children into cringing slaves and puts them so much at odds with the world that they become unfit to be members of a community. Clinias: So how should the state as a whole set about bringing up children who are as yet unable to understand what is said to them or respond to any attempt to educate them? Athenian: More or less like this. Every new-born animal is apt to give a sort of loud yell is

— especially the human child, who in addition prone

also exceptionally

Clinias:

He

certainly

to yelling

to tears.

is.

Athenian: So if a nurse judges from these reactions

is

trying to discover

what

a child wants, she

what it is offered. Silence, she thinks, means she is giving it the right thing, whereas crying and bawling indicate the wrong one. Clearly these tears and yells are the child's way of signaling and ominous signs they are, too, because this stage his likes and dislikes lasts at least three years, and that's quite a large part of one's life to spend to

—

badly

(or well).

Clinias: You're right.

Athenian:

Now don't you two

on the whole be has any right to be?

will

a

more

of a

think that a morose and ungenial fellow

moaner and

a

grumbler than

a

good man

any rate. Athenian: Well then, suppose you do your level best during these years to shelter him from distress and fright and any kind of pain at all. Shouldn't we expect that child to be educated into a more cheerful and genial dispoClinias: Yes, I think so, at

sition?

Clinias: Certainly,

and

especially,

sir, if

one surrounded him with

lots

of pleasures.

Athenian: Now here, my dear sir, is just where Clinias no longer carries me with him. That's the best way to ruin a child, because the corruption invariably sets in at the very earliest stages of his education. But perhaps I'm wrong about this: let's see. Clinias: Tell us what you mean. Athenian: I mean that we're now discussing a topic of great importance. So you too, Megillus, see what your views are, and help us to make up our minds.

My

position

is this:

the right

way

of

life is

neither a single-

minded pursuit of pleasure nor an absolute avoidance of pain, but a genial (the word I used just now) contentment with the state between those

1462

Laws

extremes— precisely

the state, in fact,

which we always say

is

that of

God

himself (a conjecture that's reasonable enough, supported as it is by the statements of the oracles). Similarly if one of us aspires to live like a god, this is the state he must try to attain. He must refuse to go looking for pleasure on his own account, aware that this is not a way of avoiding pain, nor must he allow anyone else to behave like that, young or old, male or female least of all newly-born children, if he can help it, because

age when habits, the seeds of the entire character, are most effectively implanted. I'd even say, at the risk of appearing flippant, that all expectant mothers, during the year of their pregnancy, should be supervised more closely than other women, to ensure that they don't experience that's the

frequent and excessive pleasures, or pains either. An expectant mother should think it important to keep calm and cheerful and sweet-tempered throughout her pregnancy. Clinias: There's no need to ask Megillus which of us two has made the better case,

agree with you that everyone should avoid a life of extreme pleasure and pain, and always take the middle course between them. Your point has been well and truly put, and you've heard it well and truly endorsed. sir.

I

Athenian: Admirable, Clinias! Well then, here's a related point that the three of us should consider. Clinias: What's that? Athenian: That all the rules we are now working through are what people generally call 'unwritten customs', and all this sort of thing is

what they mean when they speak of 'ancestral law'. Not only that, but the conclusion to which we were driven a moment ago was the right one: that although 'laws' is the wrong term for these things, we can't afford to say nothing about them, because they are the bonds of the entire social framework, linking all written and established laws with those yet to be passed. They act in the same way as ancestral customs dating from time immemorial, which by virtue of being soundly established and instinctively observed, shield and protect existing written law. But if they go wrong and get out of true well, you know what happens when carpenters props buckle in a house: they bring the whole building crashing down, one thing on top of another, stays and superstructure (however well built) alike all because the original timberwork has given way. So you see, Clinias, this is what we have to bear in mind in thoroughly binding your state together while it is still a new foundation; we must do our best precisely

—

—

not to omit anything, great or small, whether 'laws', 'habits' or 'institutions', because they are all needed to bind a state together, and the permanence

one kind of norm depends on that of the other. So we ought not to be surprised to see a flood of apparently unimportant customs or usages making our legal code a bit on the long side. Clinias: You're quite right, and we'll keep the point in mind. Athenian: Up to the age of three the early training of a boy or girl will be helped enormously by this regimen, provided it is observed punctiliof the

1463

Laws VII

ously and systematically. In the fourth, fifth, sixth and even seventh year of life, a child's character will need to be formed while he plays; we should now stop spoiling him, and resort to discipline, but not such as to humiliate 4 him. We said, in the case of slaves that discipline should not be enforced so high-handedly that they become resentful, though on the other hand ,

mustn't spoil them by letting them go uncorrected; the same rule should apply to free persons too. When children are brought together, they discover more or less spontaneously the games which come naturally to them at that age. As soon as they are three, and until they reach the age of six, all children must congregate at the village temples the children of each village to assemble at the same place. They should be kept in order and restrained from bad behavior by their nurses, who should themselves be supervised, along with their groups as a whole, by the twelve women elected for the purpose, one to be in charge of one group for a year at a time, the allocations to be made by the Guardians of the Law. The twelve must be elected by the women in charge of supervising marriage, one must be chosen from each tribe, and they must be of the same age as their electors. The woman allotted to a given tribe will discharge her duties by

we

794

—

temple daily and punishing any cases of wrongdoing. She may use a number of state slaves to deal with male and female slaves and aliens on her own authority; however, if a citizen disputes his punishment, she must take the case to the City-Wardens, but if he does not dispute it, she may punish him too on her own authority. When the boys and girls have reached the age of six, the sexes should be separated; boys should spend their days with boys, and girls with girls. Each should attend lessons.

b

visiting the

The males should go to teachers of riding, archery, javelin-throwing and slinging— and the females too, if they are agreeable, may attend at any rate the lessons, especially those in the use of weapons. In this business,

you

see, pretty nearly

Clinias:

How

c

d

everyone misunderstands the current practice.

so?

Athenian: People think that where the hands are concerned right and whereas of course left are by nature suited for different specialized tasks in the case of the feet and the lower limbs there is obviously no difference in efficiency at all. Thanks to the silly ideas of nurses and mothers we've all been made lame-handed, so to speak. The natural potential of each arm fault, is just about the same, and the difference between them is our own because we've habitually misused them. Of course, in activities of no consequence using the left hand for the lyre and the right for the plectrum and so on— it doesn't matter in the slightest. But to take these examples as a model for other activities too, when there's no need, is pretty stupid. The Scythian practice is an illustration of this: a Scythian doesn't use his

—

—

left fit

4.

hand exclusively

to

in the arrow, but uses

See 777d

ff.

draw

his

bow and

his right

hand exclusively

to

both hands for both jobs indifferently. There are

e

Laws

1464

—

examples to be found in driving chariots, for instance, and other activities from which we can see that when people train the left hand to be weaker than the right they are going against nature. As we said, that doesn't matter when it's a case of plectra of horn and similar instruments. But it matters enormously when one has to use iron weapons of war (javelins, arrows or whatever), and it matters most of all when you have to use your weapons in fighting hand to hand. And what a difference there is between a man who has learned this lesson and one who has not, between the trained and the untrained fighter! You know how a trained pancratiast or boxer or wrestler can fight on his left, so that when his opponent makes him change over and fight on that side, he doesn't stagger round as though he were lame, but keeps his poise. And I reckon we have to suppose that precisely the same rule applies to the use of weapons and to all other activities: when a man has two sets of limbs for attack and defense, he ought to leave neither of them idle and untrained if he can help it. In fact, if you were born with the body of a Geryon or a Briareus, you ought to be able to throw a hundred shafts with your hundred hands, All these points should come under the supervision of the male and female officials, the latter keeping an eye on the training the children get at play, the former superintending their lessons. They must see that every boy and girl grows up versatile in the use of both hands and both feet, so that they a lot of other similar

—

b

c

d

don't ruin their natural abilities by their acquired habits, so far as they can be prevented. In practice, formal lessons will

fall

into

two

categories, physical training

body, and cultural education to perfect the personality. Physical training can be further subdivided into two branches: dancing and wrestling. Now when people dance, they are either acting the words of the composer, and a dignified and civilized style is their prime concern, or they are aiming at physical fitness, agility and beauty. In this case they are preoccupied with bending and stretching in the approved fashion, so that each limb and other part of the body can move with its own peculiar grace a grace which is then carried over and infused into dancing in general. As for wrestling, the kind of trick introduced as part of their technique by Antaeus and Cercyon because of their wretched obsession with winning, and the boxing devices invented by Epeius and Amycus, are absolutely useless in a military encounter and don't merit the honor of being described." But if the legitimate maneuvers of regular wrestling extricating the neck and hands and sides from entanglement are practiced for the sake of strength and health with a vigorous desire to win and without resort to undignified postures, then they are extremely useful, and we mustn't neglect them. So when we reach the proper place in our legal code we must tell the future teachers to present all this kind of for the

e

—

796

—

b

dropping on boxing (Amycus). 5.

E.g.

to the

ground

in wrestling (Antaeus),

and the use of gloves

in

Laws VII

1465

6

8

with gratitude. Nor should we omit to mention the chorus-performances that may appropriately be imitated: for instance, here in Crete the 'games in armor' of the Curetes and those of the Dioscuri' in Sparta. And at Athens our Virgin Lady I believe, charmed by the pleasure of performing in a chorus, and disapproving of empty hands in recreation, thought she should perform the dance only when arrayed in full armor. Our boys and girls should imitate her example wholeheartedly, and prize the gift which the goddess instruction in an attractive way,

and the pupils

to receive

it

,

,

c

made them, because it increases their fighting skill and embellishes their festivals. Young boys, right from the early stages up to the age of has

military service, should be equipped with weapons they parade and process in honor of any god; and

and horses whenever

when

they supplicate

and sons of gods they must dance and march in step, sometimes briskly, sometimes slowly. Even contests and preliminary heats, if they are to prove their worth in war and peace to the state and private households, must be conducted with these purposes in view and no other. Other kinds of physical exercise, Megillus and Clinias, whether serious or by the gods

of recreation, are beneath the dignity of a gentleman. I've now pretty well described the sort of physical education

d

way

needed to be described, as I said early on?' So there it If you know of a better system than that, let's have it.

No

Clinias:

sir, if

we

is,

which

in all its detail.

cry off these ideas of yours a better

e

program

of

competitions and physical training won't be easy to find. Athenian: The next subject is the gifts of Apollo and the Muses. When we discussed this before 10 we thought we'd exhausted the topic, and that physical training alone remained for discussion. But it's clear now that a number of points were omitted points which everyone ought in fact to ,

—

go through them in order. Clinias: Yes, they should certainly be mentioned. Athenian: Listen to me then. You've done that before, of course, but such a curious eccentricity calls for extreme caution in the speaker and his audience. You see, I'm going to spin a line that almost makes me afraid 10. to open my mouth; still, I'll pluck up my courage and go ahead.

hear

So

first.

Clinias:

let's

What

is

this thesis of yours, sir?

maintain that no one in any state has really grasped that children's games affect legislation so crucially as to determine whether the laws that are passed will survive or not. If you control the way children play, and the same children always play the same games under the same

Athenian:

I

who

6.

Cretan

7.

Castor and Pollux.

8.

Athena.

9.

See 673b In

spirits

Books

797

ff.

I— II.

protected the infant Zeus.

b

1466 rules

Laws

and

in the

same

conditions,

and get pleasure from the same

you'll find that the conventions of adult

—

d

games

too are

left

in peace

without

are always being

changed and constantly modified and new ones invented, and the younger generation never enthuses over the same thing for two days running. They have no permanent agreed standard of what is becoming or unbecoming either in deportment or their possessions in general; they worship anyone who is always introducing some novelty or doing something unconventional to shapes and colors and all that sort of thing. In fact, it's no exaggeration to say that this fellow is the biggest menace that can ever afflict a state, because he quietly changes the character of the young by making them despise old things and value novelty. That kind of language and that kind of outlook is again I say it the biggest disaster any state can suffer. Listen: I'll tell you just how big an evil I maintain it is. Clinias: You mean the way the public grumbles at old-fashioned ways of doing things? Athenian: Exactly. Clinias: Well, you won't find us shutting our ears to that kind of argument you couldn't have a more sympathetic audience. Athenian: So I should imagine. Clinias: Go on then. Athenian: Well now, let's listen to the argument with even greater attention than usual, and expound it to each other with equal care. Change, we shall find, except in something evil, is extremely dangerous. This is true of seasons and winds, the regimen of the body and the character of alteration.

c

But in

life

toys,

fact

—

—

e

798

b

the soul

— in short, of everything without exception (unless, as

said just

now, the change affects something evil). Take as an example the way the body gets used to all sorts of food and drink and exercise. At first they upset it, but then in the course of time it's this very regimen that is responsible for its putting on flesh. Then the regimen and the flesh form a kind of partnership, so that the body grows used to this congenial and familiar system, and lives a life of perfect happiness and health. But imagine someone forced to change again to one of the other recommended systems: initially, he's troubled by illnesses, and only slowly, by getting used to his new way of life, does he get back to normal. Well, we must suppose that precisely the same thing happens to a man's outlook and personality, When the laws under which people are brought up have by some heavensent good fortune remained unchanged over a very long period, so that no one remembers or has heard of things ever being any different, the soul is filled with such respect for tradition that it shrinks from meddling with it in any way. Somehow or other the legislator must find a method

Now

c

I

my

of bringing about this situation in the state. here's own solution of the problem. All legislators suppose that an alteration to children's games really is just a 'game', as I said before, which leads to no serious

or genuine damage. Consequently, so far from preventing change, they

1467

Laws VII feebly give

it

They don't appreciate that

their blessing.

if

children introduce

novelties into their games, they'll inevitably turn out to be quite different

people from the previous generation; being different, they'll demand a different kind of life, and that will then make them want new institutions and laws. The next stage is what we described just now as the biggest evil but not a single legislator takes fright at the prospect. that can affect a state Other changes, that affect only deportment, will do less harm, but it is a very serious matter indeed to keep changing the criteria for praising or censuring a man's moral character, and we must take great care to avoid

—

doing

so.

Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: Well then, are we still happy about the line we took earlier, when we said that rhythms and music in general were means of representing the characters of good men and bad? Or what? Clinias: Yes, our view remains exactly the same. Athenian: So our position is this: we must do everything we possibly can to distract the younger generation from wanting to try their hand at presenting new subjects, either in dance or song; and we must also stop pleasure-mongers seducing them into the attempt. Clinias: You're absolutely right. Athenian: Now, does any of us know of a better method of achieving such an object than that of the Egyptians? Clinias:

What method

Athenian: To

is

that?

our dances and music. The first job will be to by drawing up the year's program, which should show

sanctify all

settle the festivals

the dates of the various holidays

or spirits in

and the individual gods, children

whose honor they should be

what hymn should be sung

taken. Second,

it

of gods,

has to be decided

various sacrifices to the gods and the type of dancing that should dignify the ritual in question. These decisions should be taken by some authority or other, and then the whole body of at the

the citizens together should ratify

them by

sacrificing to the Fates

and

all

and by pouring a libation to consecrate the various songs respective divinities and other powers.

the other gods, to their

anybody disobeys and introduces any different hymns or dances in honor of any god, the priests and priestesses, in association with the Guardians of the Laws, will have the backing of sacred and secular law in expelling him. 22.

If

he resists expulsion, he must be liable to a charge of impiety for the hands of anyone who wishes to bring it. 23.

If

Clinias:

And

serve

him

rest of his life at the

right.

Athenian: Now seeing that we've got on our step and behave ourselves.

to this topic,

we must watch

1468

Laws

How

do you mean? Athenian: No young man, much Clinias:

d

an old one, on seeing or hearing anything paradoxical or unfamiliar, is ever going to brush aside his doubts all in a hurry and reach a snap decision about it. More probably, like a traveler who has come to a crossroads, alone or with others, and is rather uncertain about the right road, he'll pause, and put the problem to himself or his companions; and he won't continue his journey until he's pretty less

sure of his direction and bearings. That's precisely what we must do now. Our discussion has led us to a legal paradox, and naturally we must go into

e

800

it

in details

and not

—

at

our age

— rashly claim

to pontificate in

such

an important field off the cuff. Clinias: You're absolutely right. Athenian: So we won't hurry over the problem, and only when we've looked into it properly shall we draw any firm conclusions. Still, there's no point in being deterred from completing the formal presentation of these 'laws' we're dealing with now, so let's press on till we get to the end of them. God willing, the completion of the whole exposition may perhaps point to an adequate solution of our present problem. Clinias: You've put it very well, sir; let's do as you say. Athenian: So let's assume we've agreed on the paradox: our songs have turned into 'nomes' (apparently the ancients gave some such name to tunes on the lyre perhaps they had some inkling of what we're saying, thanks to the intuition of someone who saw a vision either in his sleep or while awake). However that may be, let's adopt this as our agreed policy: no one shall sing a note, or perform any dance-movement, other than those in the canon of public songs, sacred music, and the general body of chorus performances of the young any more than he would violate any other 'nome' or law. If a man obeys, he shall go unmolested by the law; but if he disobeys, the Guardians of the Laws and the priests and priestesses must punish him, as we said just now. Can we accept this as a statement

—

—

b

of policy? Clinias:

c

We

can.

Athenian: Then how could one put these rules in proper legal form, without being laughed to scorn? Well now, there's a new point we ought to notice: in this business, the safest method is to sketch a few model rules. Here's one for you: imagine a sacrifice has been performed and the offerings burnt as demanded by law and someone standing in a private capacity near the altar and offerings a son or brother, say breaks out into the most extreme blasphemy: wouldn't his words fill his father and his other relations with alarm and despondency and forebodings of despair? Isn't that what we'd expect?

—

Clinias:

Of

—

course.

Athenian: But it is hardly an exaggeration to say that in our corner of the world this is exactly what happens in pretty nearly every state. When an official has performed a public sacrifice, a chorus or rather a mob of

—

1469

Laws VII

—

choruses arrives and takes up position not far from the altar and sometimes right next to it. Then they swamp the holy offerings with a flood of absolute blasphemy. With words and rhythms and music of the most morbid kind they work up the emotions of their audience to a tremendous pitch, and the prize is awarded to the chorus which succeeds best in making the community burst into tears the very community which has just offered sacrifice. Well, that's certainly a 'nome' on which we must pass an unfavorable verdict, isn't it? If there is ever any real need for the public to listen to such lugubrious noises, on days that are unclean and unlucky, it will be much better, and entirely appropriate, to hire some foreign choruses to sing such songs (just as one hires mourners to accompany funerals with Carian dirges). In particular, the costume appropriate to for such funeral dirges will not be garlands or trappings of gilt, but quite the opposite kind of thing. polish off the topic as quickly as possible I merely repeat the question we're always asking ourselves: are we happy to adopt this, for a start, as one of our model rules of singing?

d

—

e

—

—

What? Athenian: The

Clinias:

rule of auspicious language. This

the characteristic

is

801

absolutely vital for our kind of song. Or shall I simply lay down the rule without repeating the question? Clinias: Lay it down by all means: your law's been approved without that

is

a single vote against

it.

Athenian: After auspicious language, then, what will be the second law of music? Surely this: that the gods to whom we sacrifice should always be offered our prayers. Clinias:

Of

course.

And

poets should appreciate that prayers are requests for something from the gods, so they must take great care that they never inadvertently request an evil under the impression that it is a benefit. What a ludicrous calamity it would be

Athenian:

the third law,

I

suppose, will be

this:

b

kind of prayer! Clinias: It certainly would. Athenian: Now didn't our remarks a short time ago persuade us that 'Gold and Silver, the gods of Wealth, ought to have neither temple nor home in our state'?

to offer that

11

Clinias: Absolutely.

this:

we

say this doctrine holds for us? Surely that authors in general are quite unable to tell good from bad. We

Athenian: So what lesson can

conclude that a composer who embodies this error in his words or even in his music, and who produces mistaken prayers, will make our citizens pray improperly when it comes to matters of importance and, as we were saying, we shan't find many more glaring mistakes than that. So can we establish this as one of our model laws of music?

—

11.

See 727e

ff.,

741 e

ff.

c

I

1470

Laws

What?

Clinias:

Athenian: That a poet should compose nothing that conflicts with society's conventional notions of justice, goodness and beauty. No one should be allowed to show his work to any private person without first submitting it to the appointed assessors and to the Guardians of the Laws, and getting their approval. (In effect, we've got our assessors already appointed mean the legislators we chose to regulate the arts, and the person we elected as Minister of Education.) Well then, here's the same question yet again: are we satisfied to adopt this as our third principle and our third model law? Or what do you think? Clinias: Of course we'll adopt it. Athenian: The next point is that it will be proper to sing hymns and panegyrics, combined with prayers, in honor of the gods. After the gods,

—

we may pray

to

similarly give the spirits

and heroes

their

meed

of praise,

and

each of them as appropriate.

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: And the next law, which should be adopted quite ungrudgingly, will run as follows: deceased citizens who by their physical efforts or force of personality have conspicuous and strenuous achievements to their credit, and who have lived a life of obedience to the laws, should be regarded as proper subjects for our panegyrics. Clinias:

Of

course.

man with hymns and panegyrics during his lifetime is to invite trouble: we must wait until he has come to the end of the course after running the race of life successfully. (Men and women who have shown conspicuous merit should qualify for all these honors Athenian: But

to

honor a

without distinction of sex.) The following arrangements should be made with regard to singing and dancing. Among the works we've inherited from the past there are a great many grand old pieces of music dances too, for occasions when we want to exercise our bodies from which we should not hesitate to choose those suitable and appropriate for the society we are organizing. Censors of at least fifty years of age should be appointed to make the selection, and any ancient composition that seems to come up to standard should be approved; absolutely unsuitable material must be totally rejected, and substandard pieces revised and re-arranged, on the advice of poets and musicians. (Although we shall exploit the creative talents of these people, we shan't with rare exceptions put our trust in their tastes and inclinations.

—

—

—

Instead,

we

—

wishes of the lawgiver and arrange to his liking our dancing and singing and chorus performances in general.) Music composed in an undisciplined style is always infinitely improved by the imposition of form, even if that makes it less immediately attractive. But music doesn't have to be disciplined to be pleasant. Take someone who has right from childhood till the age of maturity and discretion grown familiar with a controlled and restrained style of music. Play him some of the other sort, and how he'll loathe it! 'What vulgar stuff!' he'll say. shall interpret the

1471

Laws VII

appeal of popular music, it's the disciplined kind he'll call frigid and repellent. So as I said just now, on the score of pleasure or the lack of it, neither type is superior nor inferior to the other. The difference is simply this: the one musical environment is

Yet,

if

he's been brought

good

invariably a

up

to enjoy the strong

influence, the other a bad.

Clinias: Well said!

Athenian: In addition, we shall have to distinguish, in a rough and ready way, the songs suitable for men and those suitable for women, and give each its proper mode and rhythm. It would be terrible if the words failed to fit the mode, or if their meter were at odds with the beat of the music, which is what will happen if we don't match properly the songs elements which must to each of the other elements in the performance therefore be dealt with, at any rate in outline, in our legal code. One possibility is simply to ensure that the songs men and women sing are accompanied by the rhythms and modes imposed by the words in either case; but our regulations about female performances must be more precise than this and be based on the natural difference between the sexes. So an elevated manner and courageous instincts must be regarded as characteristic of the male, while a tendency to modesty and restraint must be presented in theory and law alike as a peculiarly feminine trait. Now to deal with how this doctrine should be taught and handed on. What method of instruction should we use? Who should be taught, and

e

—

—

—

when should

the lessons take place? Well,

you know

that

when

803

a ship-

starting to build a boat, the first thing he does is to lay down the keel as a foundation and as a general indication of the shape. I have own procedure now is exactly analogous. I'm trying to distina feeling

wright

is

my

guish for you the various ways in which our character shapes the kind of life we live; I really am trying to 'lay down the keel', because I'm giving

—

proper consideration to the way we should try to live to the 'characterkeel' we need to lay if we are going to sail through this voyage of life but successfully. Not that human affairs are worth taking very seriously take them seriously is just what we are forced to do, alas. Still, perhaps it will be realistic to recognize the position we're in and direct our serious yes, you'd certainly be efforts to some suitable purpose. My meaning?

b

—

—

right to take

me up on

that. c

Clinias: Exactly.

maintain that serious matters deserve our serious attention, but trivialities do not; that all men of good will should put God at the 12 has been created center of their thoughts; that man, as we said before as a toy for God; and that this is the great point in his favor. So every

Athenian:

I

,

every woman should play this part and order their whole life in a quite different accordingly, engaging in the best possible pastimes frame of mind to their present one.

man and

Clinias:

12.

See 644d

—

How ff.

do you mean?

d

— 1472

Laws

Athenian: The usual view nowadays,

purpose of serious activity is leisure that war, for instance, is an important business, and needs to be waged efficiently for the sake of peace. But in cold fact neither the immediate result nor the eventual consequences of warfare ever turn out to be real leisure or an education that really deserves the name and education is in our view just about the most important activity of all. So each of us should spend the greater part of his life at peace, and that will be the best use of this time. What, then, will be the right way to live? A man should spend his whole life at play' sacrificing, singing, dancing so that he can win the favor of the gods and protect himself from his enemies and conquer them in battle. HeTl achieve both these aims if he sings and dances in the way we've outlined; his path, so to speak, has been marked out for him and he must go on his way confident

—

I

fancy,

is

that the

—

—

—

that the poet's

Some

words

are true.

things , Telemachus , your native wit will

And Heaven

tell

you

,

prompt the rest. The very gods I'm sure Have smiled upon your birth and helped to bring you up 13 will

,

,

.

And

those we bring up, too, must proceed in the same spirit. They must expect that although our advice is sound as far as it goes, their guardian deity will

make them

them

further suggestions about sacrifices

and dancing

whose honor they should hold their various games, and on what occasions, so as to win the gods' good will and live the life that their own nature demands, puppets that they are, mostly, and hardly real at all. Megillus: That, sir, is to give the human race a very low rating indeed. telling

the various divinities in

Clinias: Don't be taken aback, Megillus. You must make allowances for me. I said that with thoughts on God, and was quite carried away.

my

So,

if

you

like, let's

take

it

that our species

is

not worthless, but

something

rather important.

To resume,

then. So far,

we have provided

for the public

gymnasia and

the state schools to be housed in three groups of buildings at the center of the city; similarly, on three sites in the suburbs, there should be training

grounds

and open spaces adapted for archery and the discharge of other long-range missiles, where the young may practice and learn these for horses,

Anyway,

we

haven't explained all this adequately before, let's do so now, and put our requirements into legal form. Foreign teachers should be hired to live in these establishments and provide the pupils with complete courses of instruction in both military and cultural subjects. Children must not be allowed to attend or not attend school at the whim of their father; as far as possible, education must be skills.

13.

Odyssey

iii.

if

26-28.

1473

Lazos VII

compulsory

for 'every

to the state first

Let

me

to boys. to

make

and

man and boy'

saying

is),

because they belong

their parents second.

stress that this

The

(as the

law of mine

will

apply

just as

much

to girls as

must be trained in precisely the same way, and I'd like proposal without any reservations whatever about horse-

girls

this

e

riding or athletics being suitable activities for males but not for females. You see, although I was already convinced by some ancient stories I have

heard,

I

now know

for sure that there are pretty well countless

numbers

generally called Sarmatians, round the Black Sea, who not only ride horses but use the bow and other weapons. There, men and women have an equal duty to cultivate these skills, so cultivate them equally they do. And while we're on the subject, here's another thought for you. I of

women,

maintain that

if

these results can be achieved, the state of affairs in our

corner of Greece, where

men and women do

not

have

a

common purpose

throw all their energies into the same activities, is absolutely stupid. Almost every state, under present conditions, is only half a state, and develops only half its potentialities, whereas with the same cost and effort, it could double its achievement. Yet what a staggering blunder for a legislator to make!

and do

805

not

dare say. But a lot of these proposals, sir, are incompatible with the average state's social structure. However, you were quite right when you said we should give the argument its head, and only make up our minds when it had run its course. You've made me reproach myself for having spoken. So carry on, and say what you like. Clinias:

b

I

make, Clinias, is the same one as I made a moment ago, that there might have been something to be said against our proposal, if it had not been proved by the facts to be workable. But as things are, an opponent of this law must try other tactics. We are not going to withdraw our recommendation that so far as possible, in education and everything else, the female sex should be on the same footing as the male. Consequently, we should approach the problem rather like this. Look: if women are not to follow absolutely the same way of life as men, then surely we shall have to work out some other program for them? Athenian: The point

c

I'd like to

d

Clinias: Inevitably.

Athenian: Well then, if we deny women this partnership we're now prescribing for them, which of the systems actually in force today shall we adopt instead? What about the practice of the Thracians and many other peoples, who make their women work on the land and mind sheep and cattle, so that they turn into skivvies indistinguishable from slaves?

Or what about

e

the other states in that part of the Athenians deal with the problem: we 'concen-

the Athenians

and

all

world? Well, here's how we trate our resources', as the expression is, under one roof, and let our women take charge of our stores and the spinning and wool-working in general. Or we could adopt the Spartan system, Megillus, which is a compromise. You make your girls take part in athletics and you give them a compulsory

806

1474

Laws

education in the arts; when they grow up, though dispensed from working wool, they have to 'weave' themselves a pretty hard-working sort of life

which

by no means despicable or useless: they have to be tolerably efficient at running the home and managing the house and bringing up children but they don't undertake military service. This means that even if some extreme emergency ever led to a battle for their state and the lives of their children, they wouldn't have the expertise to use bows and arrows, like so many Amazons, nor could they join the men in deploying any other missile. They wouldn't be able to take up shield and spear and copy Athena so as to terrify the enemy (if nothing more) by being seen in is

—

b

14

,

some kind

of battle-array gallantly resisting the destruction threatening their native land. Living as they do, they'd never be anything like tough

enough

c

Sarmatian women, who by comparison with such femininity would look like men. Anyone who wants to commend your Spartan legislators for this state of affairs, had better get on with it: I'm not going to change my mind. A legislator should go the whole way and not stick at half-measures; he mustn't just regulate the men and allow the women to live as they like and wallow in expensive luxury. That would be to give the state only half the loaf of prosperity instead of the whole of

to imitate the

it.

Megillus: visitor

d

run

Clinias:

him

his

What on

earth are

we

to do, Clinias?

Are we going

to let

our

down Sparta for us like this? Yes, we are. We told him he could

be frank, and we must give head until we've properly worked through every section of our

legal code.

Megillus: Very well.

Athenian: So

I

suppose

I

should try to press straight on with the next

topic?

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian:

e

807

Now

that our citizens are assured of a

moderate supply of necessities, and other people have taken over the skilled work, what will be their way of life? Suppose that their farms have been entrusted to slaves, who provide them with sufficient produce of the land to keep them in modest comfort; suppose they take their meals in separate messes, one for themselves, another nearby for their families, including their daughters and their daughters' mothers; assume the messes, are presided over by officials, male and female as the case may be, who have the duty of dismissing their respective assemblies after the day's review and scrutiny of the diners habits; and that when the official and his company have poured libations to whatever gods that day and night happen to be dedicated, they all duly go home. Now, do such leisured circumstances leave them no pressing work to do, no genuinely appropriate occupation? Must each of them get plumper and plumper every day of his life, like a fatted 14.

A

reference to 796b-c.

1475

Laws VII

maintain that's not the right and proper thing to do. A man who lives like that won't be able to escape the fate he deserves; and the fate of an idle fattened beast that takes life easy is usually to be torn to pieces by some other animal one of the skinny kind, who've been emaciated by a life of daring and endurance. (Our ideal, of course, is unlikely to be realized fully so long as we persist in our policy of allowing individuals to have their own private establishments, consisting of house, wife, children and so on 15 But if we could ever put into practice the second-best scheme we're now describing, we'd have every reason to be satisfied.) So we must insist that there is something left to do in a life of leisure, and it's only fair that the task imposed, far from being a light or trivial one, should be

beast? No:

we

—

.

most demanding of all. As it is, to dedicate your life to winning a victory at Delphi or Olympia keeps you far too busy to attend to other tasks; but a life devoted to the cultivation of every physical perfection and every moral virtue (the only life worth the name) will keep you at least twice as busy. Inessential business must never stop you taking proper food and exercise, or hinder your mental and moral training. To follow this regimen and to get the maximum benefit from it, the whole day and the whole night is scarcely time enough. In view of this, every gentleman must have a timetable prescribing what he is to do every minute of his life, which he should follow at all times from the dawn of one day until the sun comes up at the dawn of the next. However, a lawgiver would lack dignity if he produced a mass of details about running a house, especially when he came to the regulations for curtailing sleep at night, which will be necessary if the citizens are going to protect the entire state systematically and uninterruptedly. Everyone should think it a disgrace and unworthy of a gentleman, if any citizen devotes the whole of any night to sleep; no, he should always be the first to wake and get up, and let himself be seen by all the servants. (It doesn't matter what we ought to call this kind of thing either 'law' or 'custom' will do.) In particular, the mistress of the house should be the first to wake up the other women; if she herself is woken by some of the maids, then men, women and children should say 'How shocking!' all the slaves to one another, and so too, supposing they could, should the very walls of the house. While awake at night, all citizens should transact a good proportion of their political and domestic business, the officials up and the

—

—

—

down

the town, masters

and mistresses

in their private households.

By

nature, prolonged sleep does not suit either body or soul, nor does it help us to be active in all this kind of work. Asleep, a man is useless; he may as well be dead. But a man who is particularly keen to be physically active

and sets aside for sleep only as much time as is necessary for his health and that is only a little, once that little has become a regular habit. Officials who are wide awake

and mentally

15.

alert stays

Reading nun

ei

in b3.

awake

as long as possible,

—

1476

Lazos

at night in cities inspire fear in the

wicked, whether citizens or enemies, but by the just and the virtuous they are honored and admired; they benefit themselves and are a blessing to the entire state. And an additional advantage of spending the night in this way will be the courage thus

members of the state. When dawn comes up and brings another

inspired in individual

day, the children must be

sent off to their teachers. Children must not be left without teachers, nor slaves without masters, any more than flocks and herds must be allowed

without attendants. Of all wild things, the child is the most unmanageable: an unusually powerful spring of reason, whose waters are not to live

yet canalized in the right direction,

sly,

unruly animal there

a great

bridles

,

is.

makes him sharp and That's why he has to be curbed by

so to speak. Initially,

mother, and

when he

the

most

many

leaves the side of his nurse

and

young and immature, this will be his tutor's duty, but devolve on his instructors in the various subjects subjects

is still

—

on it will which will be an extra discipline in themselves. So far, he will be treated as a young gentleman deserves. However, both the boy and his tutor or teacher must be punished by any passing gentleman who finds either of them misbehaving, and here the child must be treated as though he were later

a slave.

Any

passer-by

who

due punishment, must for a start be held in the deepest disgrace, and the Guardian of the Laws who has been put in charge of the young must keep under 24.

fails to inflict

observation this fellow who has come across miscreants of the kind we mentioned and has either failed to inflict the necessary punishment, or not inflicted it in the approved fashion.

Our sharp-eyed and

supervisor of the education of the young must redirect their natural development along the right lines, by always setting them on the paths of goodness as embodied in the legal code. But how will the law itself adequately convey its teaching to this Guardian? So

efficient

the instruction he has

had from the law has been cursory and obscure, because only a selection of topics has been covered. But nothing, as far as possible, should be omitted; the Guardian should have every point explained to him so that he in turn may enlighten and educate others. Now, the business of choruses has already been dealt with: we've seen what types of song and dance should be selected or revised, and then consecrated. But what type of prose works should be put in front of your far,

How

should they be presented? Now here, my dear Director of Youth, is something we've not explained. Of course, we've told you what military skills they must practice and learn, but what about (a) literature, (b) playing the lyre, (c) arithmetic? We stipulated that they must each understand enough of these subjects to fight a war and run a house and administer a state; for the same reasons they must acquire such knowledge about the heavenly bodies in their courses sun, moon and stars as will pupils?

—

—

1477

Laws VII

help them with the arrangements that every state is forced to make in this respect. You ask what arrangements we are referring to? We mean that the days must be grouped into months, and the months into years, in such a way that the seasons, along with their various sacrifices and festivals, may each receive proper recognition by being duly observed in their natural sequence. The result will be to keep the state active and alert, to render

make men

informed on these matters. All this, my friend, has not yet been adequately explained to you by the legislator. So pay attention to the points which are going to be made next. We said that you have insufficient information about literature, for a start. Now, what's our complaint against the instructions you were given? It's simply that you've not yet been told whether a complete mastery of the subject is necessary before one can become a decent citizen or whether the gods

due honor, and

to

better

and similarly in the case of the lyre. Well, we maintain that these subjects do have to be tackled. About three years will be a reasonable time for a child of ten to spend on literature, and a further three years, beginning at the age of thirteen, should be spent on learning the lyre. These times must be neither shortened nor lengthened: neither the child nor its father must be allowed to extend or curtail these one shouldn't attempt

it

at all;

periods of study out of enthusiasm will be against the law.

for,

or distaste

of,

the curriculum; that

Cases of disobedience must be punished by disqualification from the school prizes we shall have to describe a little later.

25.

though, you yourself must grasp just what must be taught by the teachers and learned by the pupils in those periods of time. Well, the children must work at their letters until they are able to read and write, but any whose natural abilities have not developed sufficiently by the end of the prescribed time to make them into quick or polished performers First,

should not be pressed.

The question now arises of the study of written works which the authors have not set to music. Although some of these works are in meter, others they are writings that simply reproduce lack any rhythmical pattern at all ordinary speech, unadorned by rhythm and music. Some of the many authors of such works have left us writings that constitute a danger. Now, my splendid Guardians of the Laws, how are you going to deal with these works? What will be the right instructions for the lawgiver to give you about coping with them? I reckon he's going to be very much at a loss.

—

Clinias:

What

is

the difficulty you're talking about, sir?

It

looks as

if

you're faced by a genuine personal problem.

Athenian: Your assumption are

my

is

quite right, Clinias. But the

partners in legislation, and I'm obliged to

and when I do not. Clinias: Oh? What makes you bring up this point? What's the matter?

tell

two

you when

I

of

you

think

I

anticipate a difficulty

that aspect of the business at

1478

Laws

Athenian: voices. That's

I'll

tell

you: the idea of contradicting

always

Clinias: Well, bless

of

difficult.

my

legislative proposals flout

e

many thousands

soul!

Do you

really

imagine that your existing

popular prejudices in

few tiny details? comment. The point you're making, I take it, just a

Athenian: Yes, that's fair is that although a lot of people set their face against the path we are following in our discussion, just as many are enthusiastic about it (or even if they are fewer in number, they're not inferior in quality)— and you're telling me to rely on the support of the latter and proceed with boldness and resolution along the legislative path opened up for us by our present discussion,

and not

to

hang back.

Clinias: Naturally.

811

Athenian: Best foot forward, then. Now, what I say is this. We have a great many poets who compose in hexameters and trimeters and all the standard meters; some of these authors try to be serious, while others aim at a comic effect. Over and over again it's claimed that in order to educate young people properly we have to cram their heads full of this stuff; we have to organize recitations of it so that they never stop listening to it and acquire a vast repertoire, getting whole poets off by heart. Another school of thought excerpts the outstanding work of all the poets and compiles a treasury of complete passages, claiming that if the wide knowledge of a fully informed person is to produce a sound and sensible citizen, these extracts must be committed to memory and learned by rote. I suppose you're now pressing me to be quite frank and show these people where they are right and where they've gone wrong? Clinias:

b

Of

course.

Athenian: Well then, in a nutshell, what sort of estimate will do them all justice? I imagine everybody would agree if I put it rather like this. Each of these authors has produced a lot of fine work, and a lot of rubbish too but if that s so, I maintain that learning so much of it puts the young at risk.

Clinias: So

the

what recommendation would you give the Guardian

of

Laws?

Athenian: What about?

The model work that will enable him to decide what material all the children may learn, and what not. Tell us, without any hesitation. Athenian: My dear Clinias, I suspect I've had a bit of luck. Clinias:

c

Clinias:

How's

that?

Athenian: Because I haven't got far to look for a model. You see, when I look back now over this discussion of ours, which has lasted from dawn up till this very moment a discussion in which I think I sense the inspiration of heaven well, it's come to look, to my eyes, just like a literary composition. Perhaps not surprisingly, I was overcome by a feeling of

—

d

immense

my

satisfaction at the sight of 'collected works', so to speak, because, of all the addresses I have ever learned or listened to, whether in verse or in this

kind of free prose style I've been using,

it's

these that

1479

Laws VII

most eminently acceptable and the most entirely appropriate for the ears of the younger generation. So I could hardly commend a better model than this to the Guardian of the Laws in charge of education. Here's what he must tell the teachers to teach the children, and if he comes across similar and related material while working have impressed

me

as being the

through prose writings, or the verse of poets, or when listening to unwritten compositions in simple prose that show a family resemblance to our discussion today, he must on no account let them slip through his fingers, but have them committed to writing. His first job will be to compel the teachers to learn this material and speak well of it, and he must not employ as his assistants any teachers who disapprove of it; he should employ only those who endorse his own high opinion, and entrust them with the teaching and education of the children. That, then, is my doctrine on literature and teachers, so let

its

me

e

812

finish there.

can judge from our original program, we've not strayed off the subjects we set out to discuss. But is our general policy the right one, or not? I suspect it would be difficult to say for sure. Athenian: That, Clinias, as we have often remarked, is something which will probably become clearer of its own accord when we've completely Clinias: Well,

sir,

as far as

I

expounding our laws. Clinias: True enough. Athenian: After the teacher of

finished

b literature, surely,

we have

to

address the

lyre-master?

Of

Clinias:

course.

Athenian: Now when we allocate these masters the duties of teaching this instrument and giving instruction in the subject in general, I think we ought to remember the line we took earlier. Clinias:

What

line

do you mean?

Athenian: We said 16 1 think, that the sixty-year-old singers of Dionysus should be persons who are particularly sensitive to rhythm and the way in which 'harmonies' are constructed, so that when faced with good or vicious musical representations, and the emotions aroused by them, they may be able to select the works based on good representation and reject those based on bad. The former they should present and sing to the community at large, so as to charm the souls of the young people, encouraging each and every one of them to let these representations guide them along

c

the path that leads to virtue. Clinias: You're absolutely right.

view, here's how the lyre-master and his pupil must employ the notes of their instruments. By exploiting the fact that each string makes a distinct sound, they must produce notes that are identical in pitch to the words being sung. The lyre should not be used

Athenian: With

this object in

an elaborate independent melody: that is, its strings must produce no notes except those of the composer of the melody being played; small to play

16.

See 644b

ff.

and 669b

ff.

d

1480

Laws

intervals should not be

e

nor quick tempo with slow, nor low notes with high. Similarly, the rhythms of the music of the lyre must not be tricked out with all sorts of frills and adornments. All this sort of thing must be kept from students who are going to acquire a working knowledge of music in three years, without wasting time. Such conflict and confusion makes learning difficult, whereas the young people should above all be swift learners, because they have a great many important

813

combined with

compulsory subjects

large,

down for them as it is — and in due time, as we shall see what these subjects are. But all

laid

our discussion progresses, these musical matters should be controlled, according to his brief, by our official in charge of education. As regards the actual singing, and the words, we have explained earlier what tunes and style of language the chorus-masters must teach: we said— remember?— that these things should be consecrated and each allocated to a suitable festival, so as to benefit

by the welcome pleasure they give. Clinias: Here again you've spoken the truth Athenian: the whole truth and nothing but the

society

—

—

truth!

So these are must adopt

the regulations the person appointed as our Director of Music and enforce: let's wish him the best of luck in his task, b

We, however, must supplement our previous regulations about dancing and the training of the body in general. We've filled in the gaps in our

now

tuition in the case of music, so

same way. Both boys and

girls,

deal with physical training in the of course, must learn to dance and perform let's

physical exercises? Clinias: Yes.

c

Athenian: So it won't come amiss if we provide dancing masters for the boys and dancing mistresses for the girls, so as to facilitate practice. Clinias: Agreed. Athenian: So now let's summon once again the official that has the hardest job of

music and

the Director of Children. He'll be in charge both of of physical training, so he won't get much time off.

Clinias:

How then will a man of his advancing years be able to supervise

so

all

much?

Athenian: There is no problem here, my friend. The law has already given him permission, which it will not withdraw, to recruit as assistant supervisors any citizens he may wish, of either sex. He will know whom d

to choose,

and a sober respect

for his office

and

a realization of

its

impor-

tance will make him anxious not to choose wrongly, because he'll be well aware that only if the younger generation has received and goes on receiving a correct education shall we find everything is 'plain sailing', whereas if not well, it would be inappropriate to describe the consequences, and as the state is young we shall refrain from doing so, out of

—

respect for the feelings of the excessively superstitious. Well then, on these topics too I mean dances and the entire range of movements involved in physical training we have already said a great

—

—

1481

Laws VII

We

gymnasia for all physical exercises of a military kind archery and deployment of missiles in general, skirmishing, heavyarmed fighting of every variety, tactical maneuvers, marches of every sort, pitching camp, and also the various disciplines of the cavalryman. In all these subjects there must be public instructors paid out of public funds; their lessons must be attended by the boys and men of the state, and the girls and women as well, because they too have to master all these techniques. While still girls, they must practice every kind of dancing and fighting in armor; when grown women, they must play their part in maneuvering, getting into battle formation and taking off and putting on weapons, whole army to if only to ensure that if it ever proves necessary for the leave the state and take the field abroad, so that the children and the rest

deal.

are establishing

—

of the population are left unprotected, the

women

will at least be able to

—

defend them. On the other hand and this is one of those things we can't swear is impossible suppose a large and powerful army, whether Greek or not, were to force a way into the country and make them fight a desperate battle for the very existence of the state. It would be a disaster for their society if its women proved to have been so shockingly ill-educated that they couldn't even rival female birds, who are prepared to run every risk and die for their chicks fighting against the most powerful of wild animals. What if, instead of that, the women promptly made off to temples and thronged every altar and sanctuary, and covered the human race with the disgrace of being by nature the most lily-livered creatures under the sun? Clinias: By heaven, sir, no state in which that happened could avoid disgrace quite apart from the damage that would be caused. Athenian: So let's lay down a law to the effect that women must not neglect to cultivate the techniques of fighting, at any rate to the extent indicated. These are skills which all citizens, male and female, must take

—

—

care to acquire. Clinias: That gets

Athenian:

Now

my

vote, at least.

for wrestling.

We've

partly dealt with this already, but

my

eyes is its most important feature. But it's not easy to find words to explain it unless at the same time someone gives an actual demonstration with his body. So we'll postpone a decision

we

haven't described what in

on this point till we can support our statements with concrete examples and prove, among other points we've mentioned, that of all physical movements, those involved in our kind of wrestling are the most closely related to those demanded in warfare, and in particular that we should practice wrestling for the sake of military efficiency, rather than cultivate the latter

be better wrestlers. Clinias: You're right in that, at least. Athenian: So let's accept what we've said so far as an adequate statement of what wrestling can do for a man. The proper term for most of the other movements that can be executed by the body as a whole is 'dancing .Two varieties, the decent and the disreputable, have to be distinguished. The

in order to

1482 first is

Laws a representation of the

movements

of graceful people,

and the aim

an effect of grandeur; the second imitates the movements of unsightly people and tries to present them in an unattractive light. Both have two subdivisions. The first subdivision of the decent kind represents handsome, courageous soldiers locked in the violent struggles of war; the second portrays a man of temperate character enjoying moderate pleasures in a state of prosperity, and the natural name for this is 'dance of peace'. The dance of war differs fundamentally from the dance of peace, and the correct name for it will be the 'Pyrrhic'. It depicts the motions executed to avoid blows and shots of all kinds (dodging, retreating, jumping into the air, crouching); and it also tries to represent the opposite kind of motion, the more aggressive postures adopted for shooting and discharging javelins and delivering various kinds of blows. In these dances, which portray fine physiques and noble characters, the correct posture is maintained if the body is kept erect in a state of vigorous tension, with the limbs extended nearly straight. A posture with the opposite characteristics we reject as not correct. As for the dance of peace, the point we have to watch in every chorus-performer is this: how successfully or how disastrously— does he keep up the fine style of dancing to be expected from men who've been brought up under good laws? This means we'd better distinguish the dubious style of dancing from the style we may accept without question. So can we define the two? Where should the line be drawn between them? 'Bacchic' dances and the like, which (the dancers allege) are a 'representation' of drunken persons they call Nymphs and Pans and Sileni and Satyrs, and which are performed during 'purifications' and 'initiations', are something of a problem: taken as a group, they cannot be termed either 'dances of peace or dances of war', and indeed they resist all attempts to label them. The best procedure, I think, is to treat them as separate from 'wardances' and 'dances of peace', and put them in a category of their own which a statesman may ignore as outside his province. That will entitle us to leave them on one side and get back to dances of peace and war, both of which undeniably deserve our attention. Now, what about the non-combatant Muse? The dances she leads in honor of the gods and children of gods will comprise one broad category of dances performed with a sense of well-being. This is how we shall distinguish between the two forms this feeling may take: (1) the particularly keen pleasure felt by people who have emerged from trouble and danger is

to create

—

to a state of happiness; (2) the quieter pleasures of those

whose past good fortune has not only continued but increased. Now, take a man in either of these situations. The greater his pleasure the brisker his body's movements; more modest pleasures make his actions correspondingly less brisk. Again, the more composed the man's temperament, and the tougher he has been trained to be, the more deliberate are his movements; on the other hand, if he s a coward and has not been trained to show restraint, his actions are wilder and his postures change more violently. And in general, when

Lazos VII

1483

man

uses his voice to talk or sing, he finds it very difficult to keep his body still. This is the origin of the whole art of dancing: the gestures that express what one is saying. Some of us make gestures that are invariably a

in

harmony with our words, but some on many other ancient terms

of us

fail.

In fact,

one has only

to

have come down to us, to see that they should be commended for their aptness and accuracy. One such term describes the dances performed by those who enjoy prosperity and seek only moderate pleasures: it's just the right word, and whoever coined it must have been a real musician. He very sensibly gave all such dances the name 'emmeleiai' }' and established two categories of approved dancing, the 'war-dance' (which he called 'Pyrrhic') and 'dance of peace' ('emmeleiai'), thus giving each its apt and appropriate title. The lawgiver should give an outline of them, and the Guardian of the Laws should see where they are to be found; then, after hunting them out, he must combine the dance-sequences with the other musical elements, and allocate each sacrifice and feast in the calendar the style of dance that is appropriate. After thus consecrating the whole list of dances, he must henceforth refrain from altering any feature either of the dancing or the singing: the same state and the same citizens (who should all be the same sort of people, as far as possible), should enjoy the same pleasures in the same fashion: that is the secret of a happy and a blessed life. So much for the way men of superior physique and noble character should perform in choruses of the kind we've prescribed. We are now obliged to examine and pronounce on the misshapen bodies and degraded outlook of those performers who have turned to producing ludicrous and comic effects by exploiting the opportunities for humorous mimicry offered by dialogue, song and dance. Now anyone who means to acquire a discerning judgment will find it impossible to understand the serious side of things in isolation from their ridiculous aspect, or indeed appreciate anything at all except in the light of its opposite. But if we intend to acquire virtue, even on a small scale, we can't be serious and comic too, and this is reflect

precisely

why we must

trapped by

when

that

learn to recognize buffoonery, to avoid being our ignorance of it into doing or saying anything ridiculous

no call for it. Such mimicry must be left to slaves and hired aliens, and no one must ever take it at all seriously. No citizen or citizeness must be found learning it, and the performances must always contain some new twist. With that law, and that explanation of it, humorous amusements usually known as 'comedy' may be dismissed. But what about our 'serious' poets, as they're called, the tragedians? Suppose some of them were to come forward and ask us some such question as this: 'Gentlemen, may we enter your state and country, or not? And may we bring our work with us? Or what's your policy on this point?' there's

—

What would be 17.

The key

to the

—

the right reply for us to sequence of thought

is

make

that 'in

to these inspired geniuses?

harmony' (816a) = emmelos.

1484

Laws

honored guests, we're tragedians ourselves, and our tragedy is the finest and best we can create. At any rate, our entire state has been constructed so as to be a "representation" of the finest and noblest life the very thing we maintain is most genuinely a tragedy. So we are poets like yourselves, composing in the same genre and your competitors as artists and actors in the finest drama, which true law alone has the natural powers to "produce" to perfection (of that we're quite confident). So don't run away with the idea that we shall ever blithely allow you to set up stage in the market-place and bring on your actors whose fine voices This,

I

think: 'Most

—

,

c

you declaim to women and children and the general public, and talk about the same practices as we do but treat them differently indeed, more often than not, so as virtually to contradict us. We should be absolutely daft, and so would any state as a whole, to let you go ahead as we've described before the authorities had decided whether your work was fit to be recited and suitable for public performance or not. So, you sons of the charming Muses, first of all show your songs to the authorities for comparison with ours, and if your doctrines seem the same as or better than our own, we'll let you will carry further than ours. Don't think we'll let

—

d

e

produce your plays; but if not, friends, that we can never do.' So as regards chorus performances in general and the question of learning a part in them, custom will march hand in hand with law dealing with slaves and their masters separately, if you are agreeable. Clinias: How could we fail to agree, at any rate for the moment? Athenian: For gentlemen three related disciplines still remain: (1) computation and the study of numbers; (2) measurements of lines, surfaces and solids; (3) the mutual relationship of the heavenly bodies as they revolve in their courses. None of these subjects must be studied in minute detail by the general public, but only by a chosen few (and who they are, we shall say when the time comes, when our discussion is drawing to a close). But what about the man in the street? It would certainly be a disgrace for him to be ignorant of what people very rightly call the 'indispensable rudiments'; but it will be difficult impossible, even for him to make a minute study of the entire subject. However, we can't dispense with the basic necessities, which was probably the point in the mind of the coiner of that saying about God, to the effect that 'not even God will be found 18 at odds with necessity' presumably divine necessities, because if you interpret the remark as referring to necessities in the mortal realm, as do most people who quote such things, it's by far the most naive remark that could be made.

—

818

—

b

—

—

Clinias: Well, then,

sir,

what

necessities, divine rather than the other

sort, are relevant to these studies?

18.

Perhaps the poet Simonides

Greek Lyric (Loeb), vol.

Ill,

(late sixth

pp. 434-37.

and early

fifth

century); see D. A. Campbell,

1485

Laws VII

which

some practical and theoretical knowledge will always be essential for every god, spirit or hero who means to take charge of human beings in a responsible fashion. A man, at any rate, will fall a long way short of such godlike standards if he can't recognize one, two and three, or odd and even numbers in general, or hasn't the faintest notion how to count, or can't reckon up the

Athenian: These,

I

think: the necessities of

at least

days and nights, and is ignorant of the revolutions of the sun and moon and the other heavenly bodies. It's downright stupid to expect that anyone who wants to make the slightest progress in the highest branches of knowledge can afford to ignore any of these subjects. But what parts of them should be studied, and how intensively, and when? Which topics should be combined, and which kept separate? How will they be synthesized? These are the first questions we have to answer, and then with these preliminary lessons to guide us we may advance to the remaining studies. This is the natural procedure enforced by the necessity with which we maintain no god contends now, or ever will. Clinias: Yes, sir, those proposals of yours, put like that, seem natural

and

correct.

Athenian: They certainly are, Clinias, but such a preliminary statement of them is difficult to put into legal form. If you like, we'll postpone more precise legislation

less,

later.

you're deterred by the way our countrycommonly neglect this sort of subject. But your fears are quite groundso try to tell us what you think, without keeping anything back on

Clinias:

men

till

It

looks to us,

sir,

as

if

that account.

Athenian: I am indeed deterred, for the reasons you mention, but I am even more appalled at those who have actually undertaken those studies, but in the wrong manner. Total ignorance over an entire field is never dangerous or disastrous; much more damage is done when a subject is known intimately and in detail, but has been improperly taught. Clinias: You're right. Athenian: So we should insist that gentlemen should study each of these subjects to at least the same level as very many children in Egypt, who acquire such knowledge at the same time as they learn to read and write. First, lessons in calculation have been devised for tiny tots to learn while they are enjoying themselves at play: they divide up a given number of garlands or apples among larger or smaller groups, and arrange boxers or wrestlers in an alternation of 'byes' and 'pairs', or in a sequence of either, and in the various further ways in which 'byes' and 'pairs' naturally succeed each other. Another game the teachers play with them is to jumble up bowls of gold and bronze and silver and so on, or distribute whole sets of one material. In this way, as I indicated, they make the uses of elementary arithmetic an integral part of their pupils' play, so that they get a useful introduction to the art of marshaling, leading and deploying an army, or running a household; and in general they

make them more

alert

and resourceful persons. Next, the

a

1486 d

Laws

—

teacher puts the children on to measuring lengths, surfaces and solids study which rescues them from the deep-rooted ignorance, at once comic

and shocking,

What

Clinias:

e

that all

men display in this

sort of ignorance

field.

do you mean,

in particular?

Athenian: My dear Clinias, even I took a very long time to discover mankind's plight in this business; but when I did, I was amazed, and could scarcely believe that human beings could suffer from such swinish stupidity. I blushed not only for myself, but for Greeks in general. Clinias: Why so? Go on, sir, tell us what you're getting at. Athenian: I'll explain or rather. I'll make my point by asking you a few questions. Here's a simple one: you know what's meant by a 'line', I suppose?

—

Of

Clinias:

course.

Athenian: Very well. What about 'surface'? Clinias: Surely.

Athenian: You appreciate that these are two distinct things, and that 'volume'

is

a third?

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian:

And you

regard

all

these as commensurable?

Clinias: Yes. 820

Athenian: And one length, I suppose, is essentially expressible in terms of another length, one surface in terms of another surface, and one volume in terms of another volume? Clinias: Exactly.

some of these can't be thus expressed, either 'exactly' or approximately. What if some can, and some cannot, in spite of your thinking they all can? What do you think of your ideas on the subject now? Athenian: Well, what

if

Clinias: They're worthless, obviously.

Athenian: What about the relationship of line and surface to volume, or surface and line to each other? Don't all we Greeks regard them as in some sense commensurable? Clinias:

b

We

certainly do.

Athenian: But if, as I put it, 'all we Greeks' believe them to be commensurable when fundamentally they are incommensurable, one had better address these people as follows (blushing the while on their behalf): 'Now then, most esteemed among the Greeks, isn't this one of those subjects we 14 said it was disgraceful not to understand not that a knowledge of the basic essentials was much to be proud of?'

—

Clinias:

Of

Athenian: c

which are

course.

Now

there are a

of additional

and

related topics

a fertile breeding-ground for mistakes similar to those

mentioned. 19.

number

Reading ephamen

in b5.

we've

1487

Laws VII Clinias:

What

sort of topics?

commensurables and inWe must be very poor specimens if on inspection we can't tell them apart. These are the problems we ought to keep on putting up to each other, in a competitive spirit, when we've sufficient time to do them justice; and it's a much more civilized pastime for old men than Athenian: The commensurables.

real

relationship between

checkers. Clinias: Perhaps so.

Come to think of

it,

checkers

is

not radically different

from such studies. Athenian: Well, Clinias, I maintain that these subjects are what the younger generation should go in for. They do no harm, and are not very difficult: they can be learned in play, and so far from harming the state, they'll do it some good. But if anyone disagrees, we must listen to his case.

Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: However, although obviously we shall sanction them if that proves to be their effect, we shall reject them if they seem to disappoint our expectations. Clinias: Obviously indeed. No doubt about it. Athenian: Well then, sir, so that our legal code shall have no gaps, let's regard these studies as an established but independent part of the desired curriculum independent, that is, of the rest of the framework of the state, so that they can be 'redeemed' like 'pledges', in case the arrangements fail to work out to the satisfaction of us the depositors or you

—

the pledgees. Clinias: Yes, that's a fair

way

to present

them.

Athenian: Next, consider astronomy. Would a proposal to teach it to the young meet with your approval, or not? Clinias: Just tell us what you think. Athenian: Now here's a very odd thing, that really is quite intolerable.

Clinias:

What?

We

generally say that so far as the supreme deity and the universe are concerned, we ought not to bother our heads hunting up explanations, because that is an act of impiety. In fact, precisely the opposite

Athenian:

seems

be true. Clinias: What's your point? Athenian: My words will surprise you, and you may well think them out of place on the lips of an old man. But it's quite impossible to keep quiet about a study, if one believes it is noble and true, a blessing to society and pleasing in the sight of God. Clinias: That's reasonable enough, but what astronomy are we going to find of which we can say all that? Athenian: My dear fellows, at the present day nearly all we Greeks do Sun and Moon an injustice. the great gods to

—

—

1488

Laws

How so? Athenian: We say Clinias:

and certain other heavenly bodies with them, never follow the same path. Hence our name for them: 'planets 20 that they,

.'

Good

heavens, sir, that's absolutely right. In the course of my life I've often seen with my own eyes how the Morning and the Evening Star, and a number of others, never describe the same course, but vary Clinias:

from one like that

to another;

and we

all

know that the sun and moon always move

21 .

Athenian: Megillus and Clinias, this is precisely the sort of point about the gods of the heavens that I am insisting our citizens and young men must study, so as to learn enough about them all to avoid blasphemy, and to use reverent language whenever they sacrifice and offer up their pious prayers. Clinias: Right enough if it's possible, in the first place, to acquire the knowledge you mention. On the assumption that investigation will enable us to correct any errors in our present statements, I too agree that this subject must be studied, in view of its grandeur and importance. So do your level best to convince us of the case you're making, and we'll try to follow you and take in what you say.

—

Athenian:

My point is not an easy one to appreciate, but it's not unduly

difficult either,

keep

and won't take up

a lot of time, as

—

my

I'll

prove to you by my wasn't so very long

explanation brief even though it ago, when I was no youngster, that I heard of these things. were difficult, I'd never be able to explain it to you, old ability to

If

the subject

men

that

we

all are.

what

Clinias: You're right. But

young men

so suitable for

much about

it,

at

any

is this

to learn, yet

subject

you say

unknown

rate, as clearly as

you

to us?

is

Try

so wonderful, to tell

us that

can.

Athenian: Yes, try I must. This belief, my dear fellows, that the moon and sun and other heavenly bodies do in fact 'wander', is incorrect: precisely the opposite is true. Actually, each of them perpetually describes just one fixed orbit, although it is true that to all appearances its path is always changing. Further, the quickest

body

wrongly supposed to be the slowest, and vice versa. So if the facts are as stated, and we are in error, we're no better than spectators at Olympia would be, if they said that the fastest horse in the race or the fastest long-distance runner was the slowest, and the slowest the fastest, and composed panegyrics and songs extolling the loser as the winner. I don't suppose the praises showered on the runners would be at all apt or welcome to them they're only men, after all! At Olympia, such a mistake would be merely ludicrous. But what are we to think of the is

—

20.

Greek

21.

Reading

planeta

,

lit.

'wanderers'.

tauta in c5.

Laws VII

1489

analogous theological errors we're committing nowadays? In this field such mistakes are not funny at all; and it certainly gives the gods no pleasure to have us spread false rumors about them. if you're right about the facts. Clinias: Very true Athenian: So if we can prove I am right, all such topics as these must be studied to the level indicated, but in the absence of proof they must be left alone. May we adopt this as agreed policy?

—

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: So it's high time to call a halt to our regulations about the subjects to be studied in the educational curriculum, and turn our attention to hunting and all that sort of thing. Here too we must adopt the same procedure as before, because the legislator's job is not done if he simply lays down laws and gets quit of the business. In addition to his legislation, he must provide something else, which occupies a sort of no-man's land between admonition and law. This is a point, of course, that we've come across often

we

enough

as

we

talked of this and that, as for instance

young

when

We

hold that although education at that level is certainly the sort of topic on which suggestions are needed, it would be plain silly to think of these suggestions as formal laws. Even when the actual laws and the complete constitution have been thus formally committed to writing, you don't exhaust the praises of a supremely virtuous citizen by saying 'Here's a good man for you, a devoted and utterly obedient servant of the laws' Y our praise will be more comprehensive if you can say, 'He's a good man because he has given a lifetime of unswerving obedience to the written words of the legislator, whether they took the form of a law, or simply expressed approval or disapproval'. There is no truer praise of a citizen than that. The real job of the legislator is not only to write his laws, but to blend into them an explanation of what he regards as respectable and what he does not, and the perfect citizen must be bound by these standards no less than by those backed by legal sanctions. We can cite our present subject as a kind of witness to demonstrate the dealt with the training of very

children.

.

You know how 'hunting' takes a great many forms, almost all of which are nowadays covered by this one term. There is a variety of ways of hunting water animals, and the same goes for the birds more

point

clearly.

—

and the animals that live on land too and not only the wild ones, either: we also have to take into account the hunting of men, not merely by their enemies in war (such as the raids carried out by robbers and the pursuit of army by army), but by their lovers, who 'pursue' of the air,

their

quarry for

When

many

different reasons,

comes

down

some admirable, some

execrable.

laws about hunting he cannot leave all this unexplained, but neither can he produce a set of menacing regulations by imposing rules and punishments for all cases. So how are we going to tackle this kind of thing? He the legislator having asked himself 'Are these suitable exercises and activities for the young, or not?'. the legislator

to lay

his

—

—

1490

d

Laws

must then approve or condemn the various forms of hunting. The young men, for their part, must listen to the lawgiver and obey him, without being seduced by the prospect of pleasure or deterred by vigorous effort; and they should pay much more attention to carrying out warm recommendations than to the detailed threats and punishment of the formal law. With those preliminaries, we may now put in due form our approval or disapproval of the various forms of hunting, commending the kind that is a good influence on the younger generation and censuring the other sort.

them

So

let's

follow

up with

a talk to the

young people, and address

in this idealistic vein:

'Friends,

e

now

we hope

you'll never be seized

by

a desire or passion to fish

indeed to hunt water animals at all; and don't resort to creels, which a lazybones will leave to catch his prey whether he's asleep or awake. We hope you never feel any temptation to capture men on the high seas and take to piracy, which will make you into brutal hunters and outlaws; and we hope it never so much as occurs to you to turn thief in town or country. Nor should any young man ever be seduced by a fancy to trap birds away with such an uncivilized desire! That leaves only land animals for the athletes of our state to hunt and capture. Now sometimes this is done by what is called "night-hunting," when the participants, sluggards that they are, take it in turn to sleep. This sort of hunting is not to be recommended, nor is the sort that offers periods of rest from exertion, where the savage strength of the animals is subdued by nets and traps, rather than because a hunter who relishes the fight has got the better of them. All men who wish to cultivate the "divine" 22 courage have only one type of hunting left, which is the best: the capture of fourfooted animals with the help of dogs and horses and by your own exertions, when you hunt in person and subdue all your prey by chasing and striking in the sea or to angle or

—

824

them and hurling weapons

may

at them.'

be taken as an explanation of what we approve and condemn in this entire business. Here's the actual law: (1) No one should restrain these genuinely 'holy' hunters from taking their hounds where they like and as they like; but the night-trapper, who relies on nets and snares, must not be allowed by anyone, at any time or place, to hunt his prey. (2) The fowler is not to be restrained on fallow-land or on the mountain side, but any passer-by should chase him off cultivated or holy ground. (3) The fisherman is to be allowed to fish anywhere except in harbors and sacred rivers, ponds and lakes, provided only that he does not make the water turbid by using noxious juices. So here's where we have to say that our regulations about education are finally complete. Clinias: That's good news! This address

22.

See 631b-d.

Laws VIII

1491

Book

VIII

Athenian: Now then, the next job is to enlist the aid of the oracles reported from Delphi to draw up a program of festivals to be established by law, and discover what sacrifices the state will find it 'meet and right' to offer and which gods should receive them. It will probably be within our own discretion to decide the number and the occasions. Clinias: Yes, I dare say the number will be up to us. Athenian: So let's deal with that first. There are to be no less than three hundred and sixty-five of them, so as to ensure that there is always at least one official sacrificing to some god or spirit on behalf of the state, its citizens and their property. The Expounders, Priests, Priestesses and Prophets are to hold a meeting with the Guardians of the Laws and fill in the details the legislator has inevitably omitted (in fact, this same combined board will also have to spot where such deficiencies exist in the first place). The law will provide for twelve festivals in honor of the twelve gods who give their names to the individual tribes. Every month the citizens should sacrifice to each of these gods and arrange chorus performances and cultural and gymnastic contests, varied according to the deity concerned and appropriate to the changing seasons of the year; and they must divide festivals for women into those that must be celebrated in the absence of men, and those that need not be. Further, they must not confuse the cult of the gods of the underworld with that of the 'heavenly' gods (as we must style them) and their retinue. They are to keep the two kinds of celebration separate, and put the former by law in the twelfth month, which is sacred to Pluto. Men of battle should feel no horror for such a god as this on the contrary, they should honor him as a great friend of the human race. The union of body and soul, you see, can never be superior to their separation (and I mean that quite seriously). There's a further point they will have to appreciate if they are going to allocate these events satisfactorily. Although on the score of leisure-time and abundance of all necessities our state has no rivals at the present day,

—

has to live the good life, just like the individual person; and the first requirement for a happy life is to do yourself no injury nor allow any to be done to you by others. Of course, the first half of the requirement presents no great problem; the difficulty lies in becoming strong enough and the one and only thing that brings such to be immune to injury immunity is complete virtue. The same applies to a state: if it adopts the ways of virtue, it can live in peace; but if it is wicked, war and civil war will plague it. That's the situation in a nutshell, and it means that each and every citizen must undertake military training in peace-time, and not leave it till war breaks out. So a state that knows its business should reserve at least one day per month (and more than one, if the authorities think fit) for military maneuvers, to be held without regard for the weather, come rain come shine. Men, women and children should participate, and the authorities will decide from time to time whether to take them out on it still

828

b

c

d

829

—

b

1492

Laws

maneuvers en masse or in sections. They must never fail to mount a program of wholesome recreation, accompanied by sacrifices; and the program ought to include 'war-games' which should simulate the conditions of c

actual fighting as realistically as possible. On each field-day they should distribute prizes and awards of merit, and compose speeches in commendation or reproof of each other according to the conduct of individuals not only in the contests but in daily life too: those who are deemed to have

acquitted themselves particularly well should be honored, while the failures should be censured. But not everyone should produce such composi-

For a

composer must be

years old, and he must not be one of those people who for all their poetical and musical competence have not a single noble or outstanding achievement to their credit. The tions.

d

e

start, a

at least fifty

compositions that ought to be sung (even if in terms of art they leave something to be desired) are those of citizens who have achieved a high standard of conduct and whose personal merits have brought them distinction in the state. The official in charge of education, together with the other Guardians of the Laws, are to select them and grant them alone the privilege of giving their Muses free rein; other people are to be entirely forbidden. No one should dare to sing any unauthorized song, not even if it is sweeter than the hymns of Orpheus or of Thamyras. Our citizens must confine themselves to such pieces as have been given the stamp of approval and consecrated to the gods, and to compositions which on the strength of their authors' reputation are judged to be suitable vehicles for commendation or censure. (I intend the same regulations to apply to men and women alike, both as regards military excursions and freedom to compose unsuper1

vised.)

The

830

should think things over and employ this sort of analogy: 'Let's see, now, once I've organized the state as a whole, what sort of citizen do I want to produce? Athletes are what I want competitors against legislator

—

a million rivals in the so',

one would reply,

most

vital struggles of all. Right?'

correctly.

Well then,

if

we were

'Very

much

training boxers or

some other similar contest should we go ring unprepared by a daily work-out against an opponent?

pancratiasts or competitors in straight into the

b

we were

boxers, surely we'd have spent days on end before the contest in strenuous practice, learning how to fight, and trying out all those maneuvers we intended to use when the time came to fight to win? We'd come If

as close as

we

could to the real conditions of the contest by putting on

practice-gloves instead of thongs, so as to get as much practice as possible in delivering and dodging punches. And if we ran particularly short of sparring partners then we'd go to the trouble of hanging up a lifeless

dummy idiots c

to practice against;

and we

certainly wouldn't be put off

by the

who might laugh at us. Come to that, if one day we ran out of sparring

partners completely, living or otherwise, and had no one to practice with

L Orpheus'

singing

Thamyras was

a

bard

was

who

charm animals and trees and even rocks. not even the Muses could rival his music.

said to be able to

boasted that

Laws VIII at all,

1493

we'd go so

far as to

with a vengeance! After

box against our

all,

how

else

own shadows — shadow-boxing

can you describe a practice-session

which you just throw punches at the air? Clinias: No, sir, there's no other term for it than the one you've just used. Athenian: Very well. So when the fighting force of our state comes to brace itself to face the most important contest of all to fight for life and children and property and the entire state is it really to be after less intensive training than combatants such as these have enjoyed? Is our in

—

—

going to be so scared that their practice against each other may look silly to some people that he will neglect his duty? I mean his duty of instructing that maneuvers on a small scale, without arms, should be held every day, if possible (and for this purpose he should arrange teams to compete in every kind of gymnastic exercise), whereas the 'major' exercises, in which arms are carried, should be held not less than once per month. The citizens will compete with each other throughout the entire country, to see who is best at occupying positions and laying ambushes, and they must reproduce the conditions of every kind of battle (that will give them real practice, because they will be aiming at the closest possible approximation to the real targets ). 2 And they should use missiles that are moderately dangerous: we don't want the competitions they hold against each other to be entirely unalarming, but to inspire them with fear and do something to reveal the brave man and the coward; and the legislator should confer honors or inflict disgrace as appropriate, so as to prepare the whole state to be an efficient fighter in the real struggle that lasts a lifetime. In fact, if anyone is killed in such circumstances, the homicide should be regarded as involuntary, and the legislator should decree that the killer's hands are clean when once he has been purified according to law. After all, the lawgiver will reflect, even if a few people do die, others who are just as good will be produced to replace them, whereas if fear dies (so to speak), he'll not be able to find in all these activities a yardstick to separate the good performers from the bad and that would be a bigger disaster for the state than the other. Clinias: Yes, sir, we'd agree that this is the sort of law that every state should pass and observe. Athenian: Now we all know, don't we, the reason why this kind of teamwork and competition is not to be found in any state at the present time, except on a very modest scale indeed? I suppose we'd say it was because the masses and their legislators suffer from ignorance? citizens' legislator

—

Clinias:

Maybe

so.

Athenian: Not a

my

dear Clinias! two causes, and pretty powerful ones at that. Clinias: What are they?

2.

The

bit of

it,

translation of this parenthesis

obscure Greek.

is

We

ought

to say there are

something of a paraphrase of some

difficult

and

1494

Laws

Athenian: The first is a passion for wealth which makes men unwilling to devote a minute of their time to anything except their own personal property. This is what every single citizen concentrates on with all his heart

and

soul; his ruling passion

is

his daily profit

and

he's quite incapable

of worrying about anything else.

d

Everyone is out for himself, and is very quick off the mark indeed to learn any skill and apply himself to any technique that fills his pocket; anything that doesn't do that he treats with complete derision. So we can treat this as one reason why states are not prepared to undertake this 3 or any other praiseworthy activity in a serious spirit, whereas their insatiable desire for gold and silver makes them perfectly willing to slave away at any ways and means, fair or foul, that promise to make them rich. It doesn't matter whether something is sanctioned by heaven, or forbidden and absolutely disgusting it's all the same to them, and causes not the slightest scruple, provided it enables them to make beasts of themselves by wallowing in all kinds of food and drink and indulging every kind of sexual pleasure.

—

e

Clinias: You're quite right.

Athenian: So

one cause: let's treat this obsession as the first obstacle that prevents states from following an adequate course of training, either for military or for any other purposes: naturally decent I've described

folk are turned into traders or merchant-venturers or just plain servants, 832

and bold fellows are made into robbers and burglars, and become bellicose and overbearing. Quite often, though, they are not naturally corrupt: they're simply unlucky.

b

How

do you mean? Athenian: Well, if you have to live out your life with a continual hunger in your soul, aren't you 'unlucky' to a degree? What other term could I use? Clinias: Very well, that's one reason. What's your second, sir? Athenian: Ah, yes, thank you for jogging my memory, Clinias 4 According to you, one cause is the insatiable and lifelong acquisitive urge which obsesses us all and stops us undertaking military training Clinias:

:

—

proper way. All right now tell us the second. Athenian: I dare say it looks as if I'm putting off getting round to it because I don't know what to say? Clinias: No, but you do seem to be such a 'good hater' of this sort of character that you're berating it more than the subject in hand requires. Athenian: That's a very proper rebuke, gentlemen. So you're all ready for the next point, it seems. in the

Clinias: Just c

tell

us, that's

all!

Athenian: The cause I want to put forward are those 'non-constitutions' that I've often mentioned earlier in our conversation democracy, oligarchy and tyranny. None of these is a genuine political system: the best

—

3.

Military exercises.

4.

This speech and Clinias' next one are attributed to Megillus in the

Bude

text.

Laws VIII

name

for

1495

them

all

would be

under none of them do the rulers are always willing

'party rule', because

willing rulers govern willing subjects: that

is,

enough, but they never hold power with the consent of the governed. They hold it by constant resort to a degree of force, and they are never prepared to allow any of their subjects to cultivate virtue or acquire wealth and least of all will they tolerate a man who can or strength or courage fight. So much for the two main roots of pretty nearly all evil, and certainly the main roots of the evils we're discussing. However, the political system which we are now establishing by law has avoided both of them. Our state enjoys unparalleled leisure, the citizens live free of interference from each other, and I reckon these laws of ours are quite unlikely to turn them into money-grubbers. So it's a reasonable and natural supposition that a political system organized along these lines will be unique among contemporary constitutions in finding room for the military training-cum-sport and described in the detail it deserves, too. that we've just described

—

d

—

Clinias: Splendid.

Athenian: The next thing we have to bear in mind about any athletic contest is this: if it helps us to train for war we must go in for it and put up prizes for the winners, but leave it strictly alone if it does not. Isn't that right? It will be better to stipulate from the start the contests we want, and provide for them by law. First, I take it we should arrange races, and contests of speed in general? Clinias: Yes,

we

e

should.

Athenian: At any rate, what makes a man a fine soldier more than anything else is general agility, a ready use of his hands as well as his feet. If he's a good runner, he can make a capture or show a clean pair of heels, and versatile hands will stand him in good stead in tangling with the enemy in close combat, where strength and force are essential.

833

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: But as

much

as

Clinias:

it

if

he hasn't any weapons, neither

ability will help

him

might.

Of course

not.

Athenian: So in our contests the first competitor our herald will summon will be (as now) the single-length runner, and he will come forward armed; we shan't put up any prizes for competitors who are tmarmed. So, as I say, the competitor who intends to run one length will come on first, carrying his arms; second will come the runner over two lengths, and third the middle-distance runner; the long-distance man will come on fourth. The fifth competitor we shall call the 'heavy-armed' runner, from his heavier equipment. We shall start by sending him in full armor over a distance of sixty lengths to some temple of Ares and back. His course will be over comparatively level ground, whereas the other runner, 5 an archer in full archer rig, will run a course of 100 lengths over hills and constantly The passage is confusingly written. (A 'length' = a about 200 yards; 60 lengths = about 7 miles; 100 lengths = about IIV2 miles.) 5.

The runner in a

sixth race?

'stade'

=

b

1496 c

Laws

changing terrain to a temple of Apollo and Artemis. While we're waiting for these runners to return, we'll hold the other contests and finally award the prizes to the winners of each event. Clinias: Fine.

d

Athenian: Let's arrange these contests in three groups, one for boys, one for youths, and one for men. When youths and boys compete as archers and heavy-armed runners, we shall make the course for youths two-thirds of the full distance and for the boys one-half. As for females, girls below the age of puberty must enter (naked) for the single-length, double-length, middle and long-distance races, their competition being confined to the stadium. Girls from thirteen till the marriage-age must enter till they are at least eighteen, but not beyond the age of twenty. (They, however, must put on some suitable clothing before presenting themselves as competitors in these races.)

So much for men's and women's races; now to deal with trials of strength. e

Instead of wrestling and other he-man contests that are the fashion nowadays, we'll have our citizens fight each other armed man to man, two a

—

side,

834

and any number per team up

We

ought to take our cue from the authorities in charge of wrestling, who have established criteria which will tell you whether a wrestler's performance is good or bad. We must call in the leading exponents of armed combat and ask them to assist us in framing rules about the blows one needs to avoid or inflict to win in this sort of of contest, and similarly the points we need to look for to decide the loser. The same set of rules should also apply to the female competitors (who must be below the age of marriage). To replace the pancration 6

we

to ten.

shall establish a general contest of light-infantry; the

weap-

ons of the competitors are to be bows, light shields, javelins, and stones cast by hand and sling. Here too we'll lay down rules, and give the honor of victory to the competitor who reaches the highest standard as defined

b

by the regulations. The next thing for which we must provide rules is horse-racing. In Crete, of course, horses are of rather limited use and you don't find very many of them, so that the comparatively low level of interest in rearing and racing them is inevitable. No one in this country keeps a team of horses for a chariot, nor

c

ever likely to covet such a thing, so that if we established contests in something so foreign to the local customs, we'd be taken for idiots (and rightly). The way to modify this sport for the local Cretan is

put up prizes for skill in riding the animals— as foals, when half-grown, and when fully grown. So our law should provide for contests in which jockeys can compete with each other in these categories; TribeLeaders and Cavalry-Commanders should be entrusted with the job of deciding the actual courses and deciding which competitor has won (in full armor, of course: just as in the athletic events, if we established contests for unarmed competitors we'd be failing in our duty as legislators). And terrain

6.

A

is

to

form of wrestling-cum-boxing that permitted kicking and choking as

well.

1497

Laws VIII

and javelin-throwing in the saddle, people should amuse themselves by competing in this sort of contest too. As for women, there's no point in making it legally compulsory for them to join in all this, but if their previous training has got them into the habit, and girls and young women are in good enough shape to take part without hardship, then they should be permitted to do so and not discouraged. That brings us to the end of our discussion of competitions and the teaching of physical training, and we've seen what strenuous efforts are involved in the contests and the daily sessions with instructors. In fact, we've also dealt pretty thoroughly with the role of the arts, although arrangements about reciters of poetry and similar performers, and the chorus-competitions obligatory at festivals, can wait till the gods and the minor deities have had their days and months and years allocated to them; then we can decide whether festivals should be held at two-year or fouryear intervals, or whether the gods suggest some other pattern. On these occasions we must also expect the various categories of competitions in since your Cretan

is

no

fool at archery

the arts to be held. This

is

the province of the stewards of the games, the

Minister of Education and the Guardians of the Laws, who should all meet as an ad hoc committee and produce their own regulations about the date

and dance, and specify who should compete and who may watch. The original legislator has often enough explained the sort of thing each of these performances should be, and has dealt with the songs, the spoken addresses and the musical styles that accompany the rhythmical movements of the dancers. His successors must emulate his example in their own legislation and match the right contests with the right sacrifices at the right times, and so provide festivals at which the of each chorus-competition

may make

merry. Athenian: It's not difficult to see

state

how

to cast these

and similar matters

and making this or that alteration won't help or harm the state very much. But now for something which is not a triviality at all. It's a point on which it is difficult to convince people, and God himself supposing, that is, we could in fact is really the only person to do it somehow get explicit instructions from him. Since that's impossible, it looks as if we need some intrepid mortal, who values frankness above all, to specify the policy he believes best for the state and its citizens, give a firm 'no' to our most compelling passions, and order his audience of corrupted souls to observe standards of conduct in keeping with, and implied by, the whole organization of the state. There will be no one to back him up. He'll walk alone, with reason alone to guide him. Clinias: What new topic is this, sir? We don't see what you're getting at. Athenian: That's not surprising. Well, I'll try to put the point more explicitly. When I came to discuss education, I envisaged young men and women associating with each other on friendly terms. Naturally enough, I began to feel some disquiet. I wondered how one would handle a state like this, with everyone engaged on a life-long round of sacrifices and festivals and chorus-performances, and the young men and women wellin the

form of

a law,

—

1498

836

b

c

Laws

nourished and free of those demanding and degrading jobs that damp down lust so effectively. Reason, which is embodied in law as far as it can be, tells us to avoid indulging the passions that have ruined so many people. So how will the members of our state avoid them? (Actually, most desires may well be kept in check by the regulations we have already framed. If so, we needn't be surprised. After all, the law against excessive wealth will do a great deal to encourage self-control, and the educational curriculum is full of sound rules designed for the same purpose. The officials too, who have been rigorously trained to watch this point closely, and to keep the young people themselves under constant surveillance, will do something to restrain ordinary passions, as far as any man can.) But there are sexual urges too of boys and girls and heterosexual love among adults. What precautions should one take against passions which have had a such a powerful effect on public and private life? What's the remedy that will save us from the dangers of sex in each? It's a great problem, Clinias. We're faced with the fact that though in several other respects Crete in general and Sparta give us pretty solid help when we frame laws that flout common custom, in affairs of the heart (there's no one listening, so let s be frank) they are totally opposed to us. Suppose you follow

—

nature's rule

and

law that was in force before the time of Laius You'd argue that one may have sexual intercourse with a woman but not with men or boys. As evidence for your view, you'd point to the animal world, where (you'd argue) the males do not have sexual relations with each other, because such a thing is unnatural. But in Crete and Sparta your argument would not go down at all well, and you'd probably persuade nobody. However, another argument is that such practices are incompatible with what in our view should be the constant aim of the legislator that is, we're always asking 'which of our regulations encourages virtue, and which does not?' Now then, suppose in the present case we agreed to pass a law that such practices are desirable, or not at all undesirable- what contribution would they make to virtue? Will the spirit establish the

7

.

d

—

—

of courage spring to

in the soul of the

seduced person? Will the soul of the seducer learn habits of self-control? No one is going to be led astray by that sort of argument quite the contrary. Everyone will censure the weakling who yields to temptation, and condemn his all-too-effeminate partner who plays the role of the woman. So who on earth will pass a law like that? Hardly anyone, at any rate if he knows what a genuine law life

—

e

really 837

is.

Well,

how do we show

things straight,

you have

the truth of this?

If

you want

to get these

analyze the nature of friendship and desire and 'love', as people call it. There are two separate categories, plus a third which is a combination of both. But one term covers all three, and that causes no end of muddle and confusion. Clinias:

How's

to

that?

myth, Laius (Oedipus father) abducted his host Pelops son, thus inaugurating homosexual attachments between men and teenage boys. 7.

In

7

1499

Lazos VIII

When two

Athenian:

we

equals,

say that one

poor man's 'friendship'

people are virtuous and is

they are poles apart. In either

we

ardent,

call

it

we

a 'friend' of the other; but

for the

when

alike, or

they are

also speak of the

man who has grown rich, even though case, when the friendship is particularly

'love'.

we do. Athenian: And a violent and stormy

Clinias: Yes, attracted to

see

it

someone widely

mutual

different to himself,

When men

reciprocated.

friendship

of the other two.

third kind of lover

is

The

is,

first

really after.

is

problem here There

is

show

a

calm and third category, com-

a is

man is seldom do we

when

and only

are alike, however, they

affection that lasts a lifetime. But there

pounded

it

a

to discover

what

this

the further difficulty that he

confused and torn between two opposing instincts: one tells him to enjoy his beloved, the other forbids him. The lover of the body, hungry for his partner who is ripe to be enjoyed, like a luscious fruit, tells himself to have his fill, without showing any consideration for his beloved's character and disposition. But in another case physical desire will count for very little and the lover will be content to gaze upon his beloved without lusting for him a mature and genuine desire of soul for soul. That body should sate itself with body he'll think outrageous; his reverence and respect for self-control, courage, high principles and good judgment will make him want to live a life of purity, chaste lover with chaste beloved. This combination of the first two is the 'third' love we enumerated a himself

is

—

moment

ago.

So there's your

list

law obvious

of the various forms love can take: should the

and keep them out of our community? Or isn't it the love that in our state we'd want to see the virtuous kind spring up that aims to make a young man perfect? It's the other two we'll forbid, if we can. Or what is our policy, Megillus, my friend? Megillus: Indeed, sir, I heartily endorse what you've said on the subject. Athenian: So it looks as if I've won you over, my dear fellow, as I guessed I would, and there's no call for me to inquire what line the law of Sparta takes on this topic: it is enough to note your assent to my argument. Later on I'll come back to the subject and try to charm Clinias also into agreeing with me. Let's assume you've both conceded my point, and press on with our laws without delay. forbid

them

all,

—

Megillus: Fair enough. Athenian: I want to put the law on this subject on a firm footing, and at the moment I'm thinking of a method which is, in a sense, simplicity itself. But from another point of view, nothing could be harder.

Megillus:

What

are

you

getting at?

Athenian: We're aware, of course, that even nowadays most men, in spite of their general disregard for the law, are very effectively prevented from having relations with people they find attractive. And they don't refrain reluctantly, either

Megillus:

— they're more than happy

What circumstances have you

in

mind?

to.

— 1500

Laws

Athenian:

When

it's

one's brother or sister

whom

one finds

attractive.

And the same law, unwritten though it is, is extremely effective in stopping a man sleeping — secretly or otherwise — with his son or daughter, or making any kind of

amorous approach

faintest desire for

to

them. Most people

feel

not the

such intercourse.

Megillus: That's perfectly true.

Athenian: So the desire Megillus:

for this sort of pleasure

is stifled

by a few words?

What words do you mean?

Athenian: The doctrine that 'these

acts are absolutely unholy,

nation in the sight of the gods, and that nothing

is

more

an abomi-

revolting'.

We

from them because we never hear them spoken of in any other way. From the day of our birth each of us encounters a complete unanimity of opinion wherever we go; we find it not only in comedies but often in refrain

the high seriousness of tragedy too, when we see a Thyestes on the stage, or an Oedipus or a Macareus, the clandestine lover of his sister 8 .

watch these characters dying promptly by

their

own hand

We

as a penalty

for their crimes.

Megillus: You're right in this, anyway, that when no one ventures to challenge the law, public opinion works wonders.

Athenian: So legislator wants cruelly,

it's

we were to

justified in

what we

tame one of the desires

said just now.

that

When

the

dominate mankind so

easy for him to see his method of attack.

He must

try to

make

— slave and women and children, and the entire without any exception — believe that common opinion has the backing of everyone

free,

state

this

reli-

He

couldn't put his law on a securer foundation than that. Megillus: Very true. But how on earth it will ever be possible to produce

gion.

such spontaneous unanimity Athenian: I'm glad you've taken

me up on

the point. This

what law of

is just

was getting at when I said I knew of a way to put into effect this ours which permits the sexual act only for its natural purpose, procreation, and forbids not only homosexual relations, in which the human race is I

deliberately murdered, but also the

sowing of seeds on rocks and stone, where it will never take root and mature into a new individual; and we should also have to keep away from any female 'soil' in which we'd be sorry to have the seed develop. At present, however, the law is effective only against intercourse between parent and child, but if it can be put on a permanent footing and made to apply effectively, as it deserves to, in other cases as well, it'll do a power of good. The first point in its favor is that

a natuval law.

But

also tends to check the raging fury of the sexual instinct that so often leads to adultery; it discourages excesses in it is

food and drink, and inspires there are a great

many

it

men

with affection for their own wives. And other advantages to be gained, if only one could

get this law established.

8.

Thyestes had intercourse with his

own

daughter; Oedipus married his

own

mother.

Laws VIII

1501

But suppose some impatient young man were standing here, bursting with seed, and heard us passing this law. He'd probably raise the echoes with his bellows of abuse, and say our rules were stupid and unrealistic.

Now

this is just the sort of protest

knew

of a very simple

had

I

— and yet very

into effect permanently.

in

mind when

difficult

easy to see that

It's

I

remarked

— way of putting

it

can be done,

that

this

I

law

and easy

to

given sufficient religious backing, it will get a grip on every soul and intimidate it into obeying the established laws. But in fact we've reached a point where people still think we'd fail, even granted those conditions. It's just the same with the supposed impossibility of the common meals: people see no prospect of a whole state keeping up the practice permanently. The proven facts of the case in your countries do nothing to convince your compatriots that it would be natural to apply see how:

if

the rule

the practice to

is

women.

It

was

this flat disbelief that

made me remark on

the difficulty of turning either proposal into an established law.

Megillus: You're absolutely right. Athenian: Even so, I could put up quite a convincing case for supposing that the difficulties are not beyond human powers, and can be overcome. Do you want me to try to explain? Clinias:

Of

Athenian:

course.

When

told in a decent

and

is

in the

will a

and willing

find

Now

it

it

spirit?

pink of condition, or

Clinias: He'll find

Athenian:

man

easier to

When

when

we've

all

off sex,

and do as he's

he's not neglected his training

he's in

a great deal easier

of course

keep

if

poor shape?

he's in training.

heard the story of

how

Iccus of

about winning contests at Olympia and elsewhere. He was so ambitious to win, they say, and his expertise was strengthened by a character of such determination and self-discipline, that he never had a woman or even a boy during the whole time he was under intensive training. In fact, we are told very much the same about Crison, Astylus,

Tarentum

set

Diopompus, and a great many others. And yet, Clinias, their characters were far less well educated than the citizens you and I have to deal with, and physically they were much lustier. Clinias: Yes, you're right

these athletes did in fact

do

— our ancient sources are quite definite that as

you

say.

Athenian: Well then, they steeled themselves to keep off what most people regard as sheer bliss, simply in order to win wrestling matches and races and so forth. But there's a much nobler contest to be won than that, and I hope the young people of our state aren't going to lack the stamina for it. After all, right from their earliest years we're going to tell them stories and talk to them and sing them songs, so as to charm them,

we

trust, into believing that this victory is the noblest of all.

Clinias:

a

What

victory?

Athenian: The conquest of pleasure. If they win this battle, they'll have happy life but so much the worse for them if they lose. That apart, the

—

1502

Laws

fear that the act

a ghastly sin will, in the end, enable

is

them

to

tame the

passions that their inferiors have tamed before them. Clinias: Quite likely.

Athenian: So thanks to the general corruption, that's the predicament we've got into at this point in our consideration of the law about sex. My position, therefore, is that the law must go ahead and insist that our citizens' standards should not be lower than those of birds and many other wild animals which are born into large communities and live chaste and unmarried, without intercourse, until the time comes for them to breed. At the appropriate age they pair off; the male picks a wife, and female chooses a husband, and forever afterwards they live in a pious and law-abiding way, firmly faithful to the promises they made when they first fell in love. Clearly our citizens ought to reach standards higher than the animals'. But if they are corrupted by seeing and hearing how most other Greeks and non-Greeks go in for 'free' love on a grand scale, they may prove unable to keep themselves in check. In that case, the law-guardians must turn themselves into law-makers and frame a second law for people to observe. Clinias: So if they find it impossible to enforce the ideal law now proposed, what other law do you advise them to pass? Athenian: The second best, Clinias, obviously. Clinias:

Namely?

Athenian:

My point is that the appetite for pleasures, which is very strong

and grows by being

can be starved (you remember)

body is given plenty of hard work to distract it. We'd get much the same result if we were incapable of having sexual intercourse without feeling ashamed; our shame would lead to infrequent indulgence, and infrequent indulgence would

make

fed,

if

the

the desire less compulsive. So in sexual matters our citizens ought to

regard privacy

— though not complete abstinence — as a decency demanded

by usage and unwritten custom, and lack

of privacy as disgusting. That will

—

establish a second legal standard of

decency and indecency not the ideal standard, but the next to it. People whose characters have been corrupted (they form a single group we call the 'self-inferior') will be made prisoners of three influences that will compel them not to break the law. Clinias:

What

influences

Athenian: Respect for

do you mean?

religion, the

ambition to be honored, and a mature

passion for spiritual rather than physical beauty. 'Pious wishes!' you'll say; 'what romance!' Perhaps so. But if such wishes were to come true, the world would benefit enormously.

However, God willing, perhaps we'll succeed in imposing one or other of two standards of sexual conduct. (1 Ideally, no one will dare to have relations with any respectable citizen woman except his own wedded wife, or sow illegitimate and bastard seed in courtesans, or sterile seed in males in defi)

ance of nature.

(2)

Alternatively, while suppressing

sodomy

entirely,

we

might insist that if a man does have intercourse with any woman (hired or procured in some other way) except the wife he wed in holy marriage with the blessing of the gods, he must do so without any other man or woman

— 1503

Laws VIII

know about

he fails to keep the affair secret, I think we'd be right to exclude him by law from the award of state honors, on the grounds that he's no better than an alien. This law, or 'pair' of laws, as perhaps we should say, should govern our conduct whenever the sexual urge and the passion of love impel us, wisely or unwisely, to have intercourse. Megillus: Speaking for myself, sir, I'd be very glad to adopt this law of yours. Clinias must tell us his view on the subject himself. getting to

Clinias:

I'll

do

it.

If

moment

has not stop our friend from going on to the next

that later, Megillus,

arrived. For the nonce, let's

when

842

I

think a suitable

stage of his legislation.

Megillus: Fair enough.

Athenian: Well then, this is the stage we've reached now. We can assume that communal meals have been established (a thing that would be a problem in other countries, we notice, but not in Crete, where no one would think of doing anything else). But how should they be organized? On the Cretan model, or the Spartan? Or is there some third type that us better than either? I don't think this is a difficulty, and there's not much to be gained from settling the point. The arrangements we have made are quite satisfactory as they are. The next question is the organization of a food-supply in keeping with our communal meals. In other states the sources of supply are many and varied in fact, at least twice as many as in ours, because most Greeks draw on both the land and the sea for their food, whereas our citizens

would

b

suit

c

—

will use the land alone. For the legislator, this

makes things

simpler.

It's

not just that half the number of laws or even substantially fewer will do, but they'll be more suitable laws for gentlemen to observe. Our state's legislator, you see, need not bother his head very much about the merchantshipping business, trading, retailing, inn-keeping, customs duties, mining, money-lending and compound interest. Waving aside most of these and a thousand other such details, he'll legislate for farmers, shepherds, bee-

d

keepers, for the protectors of their stock and the supervisors of their equipment. His laws already cover such major topics as marriage and the birth

e

and rearing

of the state's officials, so the next topic to legislation effort to

is

and the appointment which he must turn in his

of children, as well as their education their food,

produce

and the workers who co-operate

in the constant

it.

Let's first specify the 'agricultural' laws, as they're called.

The

first

law

—

sanctioned by Zeus the Protector of Boundaries shall run as follows: No man shall disturb the boundary stones of his neighbor, whether fellow citizen or foreigner (that is, when a proprietor's land is on the boundary of the state), in the conviction that this would be 'moving the immovable 9 in the crudest sense. Far better that a man should want to try to move the biggest stone that does not mark a boundary, than a small '

9.

A

proverbial expression of disapproval for fundamental social and political change.

Cf. 684e.

843

1504

b

Laws

one separating friend's land from foe's, and established by an oath sworn to the gods. Zeus the God of Kin is witness in the one case, Zeus the Protector of Foreigners in the other. Rouse him in either capacity, and the most terrible wars break out. If a man obeys the law he will escape its penalties, but if he holds it in contempt he is to be liable to two punishments, the first at the hands of the gods, the second under the law. No man, if he can help it, must move the boundary stones of his neighbor's land, but if anyone does move them, any man who wishes should report him to the farmers, who should take him to court. 26. If

anyone

is

found guilty of such

a charge,

he must be regarded as a man who has tried to reallocate land, whether clandestinely or by force; and the court must bear that in mind when assessing what penalty he should suffer or what fine he should pay.

c

Next we come to those numerous petty injuries done by neighbor to neighbor. The frequent repetition of such injuries makes feelings run high, so that relations between neighbors become intolerably embittered. That's why everyone should do everything he can to avoid offending his neighbor; above all, he must always go out of his way to avoid all acts of encroachment. blurting a man is all too easy, and we all get the chance to do that; but it's not everyone who is in a position to do a good turn. 27. If a

man

oversteps his boundaries and encroaches on his neighbor's

land, he should

pay for the damage, and also, by way of cure for such uncivilized

and inconsiderate behavior, give the injured party that amount.

1

a further

sum

of twice

and similar cases the Country- Wardens should act as inspectors, judges and assessors (the entire divisional company in the graver 10 cases, as indicated earlier, and the Guards-in-Chief in the more trivial). In all these

28. If a

man

these officials

graze on someone else's land, must inspect the damage, reach a decision, and assess

lets his cattle

the penalty.

anyone takes over another man's bees, by making rattling noises to please and attract them, so that he gets them for himself, he must pay for the injury he has done. 29. If

?

30. If

anyone burns

his

own wood

without taking sufficient precautions

to protect his neighbor's,

he must be fined a

10.

See 761d-e.

sum decided by

the officials.

— Laws VIII 31. If

when

them and the

1505

planting trees a

man

fails to

leave a suitable gap between

his neighbor's land,

same regulation

is

to apply.

These are points that many legislators have dealt with perfectly adequately, and we should make use of their work rather than demand that the grand architect of our state should legislate on a mass of trivial details that can be handled by any run-of-the-mill lawgiver. For instance, the water supply for farmers is the subject of some splendid old-established laws but there's no call to let them overflow into our discussion! It is fundamental that anyone who wants to conduct a supply of water to his own land may do so, provided his source is the public reservoirs and he does not intercept the surface springs of any private person. He may conduct the water by any route he likes, except through houses, temples and tombs, and he must do no damage beyond the actual construction of the conduit. But in some naturally dry districts the soil may fail to retain the moisture when it rains, so that drinking water is in short supply. In that case the owner must dig down to the clay, and if he fails to strike water at that depth he should take from his neighbors sufficient drinking water for each member of his household. If the neighbors too are short of water, he should share the available supply with them and fetch his ration daily, the amount to be fixed by the Country-Wardens. A man may injure the farmer or householder next door on higher ground by blocking the flow of rainwater; on the other hand he may discharge it so carelessly as to damage the man below. If the parties are not prepared to co-operate in this matter, anyone who wishes should report the matter to an official a City-Warden in the city, and a Country-Warden in the country and obtain a ruling as to what each side should do. Anyone refusing to abide by the ruling must take the consequences of being a grudging and illtempered fellow:

—

—

found guilty, he should pay twice the value of the damage 32. If

penalty for disobeying the

to the injured party as a

officials.

Everyone should take his share of the fruit harvest on roughly the following principles. The goddess of the harvest has graciously bestowed two gifts upon us, (a) the fruit which pleases Dionysus so much, but which won't keep, and (b) the produce which nature has made fit to store. So our law about the harvest should run as follows. 33.

Anyone who consumes any

whether on

his

own

ushers in the vintage,

must owe

11.

The autumn equinox.

part of the coarse crop of grapes or figs,

land or another's, before the rising of Arcturus 11

1506

Laws

(a) fifty

his (b) (c)

a

If

drachmas,

own

to

be presented to Dionysus,

if

he takes the

fruit

from

trees,

one hundred if from his neighbor's, and sixty-six and two-thirds drachmas if from anyone

man wants

nowadays), he come from his

to gather in the 'dessert'

may own

grapes or

else's trees.

they are called do so whenever and however he likes, provided they trees; but figs (as

he takes them from anyone else's trees, without permission, he must be punished in accordance with the provisions of the law which forbids the removal of any object except by the depositor. 12 34. (a)

845

if

slave fails to get the landowner's permission before touching any of this kind of fruit, he must be whipped, the number of lashes to be the same as the number (b) If a

of grapes in the

A

b

resident alien

bunch or

may buy

figs

picked off the

dessert fruit

fig tree.

and gather

in as he wishes. If a foreigner on a visit from abroad feels inclined to eat some fruit as he travels along the road, he may, if he wishes, take some of the dessert crop gratis, for himself and one attendant, as part of our hospitality. But foreigners must it

be prevented by law from sharing with us the 'coarse' and similar 35. If a foreigner,

master or slave, touches such

fruit in

fruits.

ignorance of

the law, (a) the slave is to

man

(b) the free

the crop that

wine, or dried

is

be punished with a whipping; is to be dismissed with a warning and told to stick to unsuitable to be kept in store in the form of raisins,

figs.

There should be nothing to be ashamed of in helping oneself inconspicuously to apples and pears and pomegranates and so on, but 36. (a)

a

man under

caught at it, he should be cuffed and driven off, provided he suffers no actual injury.

c

A

if

thirty

is

should have no legal redress for such an assault on his person. (A foreigner is to be entitled to a share of these fruits too, on the same terms as he may take some of the dessert grapes and figs.) If a man above thirty years of age touches some fruits, consuming them on the spot and taking none away with him, he shall share them all on the same terms as the foreigner, but citizen

he disobeys the law, he should be liable to be disqualified from competing for awards of merit, (b) if

d

anyone draws the attention of the assessors awards are being decided. if

12.

in

This offense

842e-843b.

is

to the facts

when

the

thus brought under the umbrella of the general law mentioned

1507

Laws VIII

Water is the most nourishing food a garden can have, but it's easily fouled, whereas the soil, the sun and the winds, which co-operate with the water in fostering the growth of the plants that spring up out of the ground, are not readily interfered with by being doctored or channeled off or stolen. But in the nature of the case, water is exposed to all these hazards. That is why it needs the protection of a law, which should run as follows.

anyone deliberately spoils someone else's water supply, whether spring or reservoir, by poisons or excavations or theft, the injured party should take his case to the City-Wardens and submit his estimate of the If

damage 37.

in writing.

Anyone convicted

of fouling water

by magic poisons

should , in addition to his fine, purify the spring or reservoir, using what13 ever method of purification the regulations of the Expounders prescribe as appropriate to the circumstances and the individuals involved.

A man may

bring

home any

crop of his

own by any

route he pleases,

provided he does no one any damage, or, failing that, benefits to at least three times the value of the damage he does his neighbor. The authorities

must act as inspectors in this business, as well as in all other cases when someone uses his own property deliberately to inflict violent or surreptitious damage on another man or some piece of his property without his permission.

When

the

damage does not exceed

three minas, the injured

party must report it to the magistrates and obtain redress; but if he has a larger claim to bring against someone, he must get his redress from the culprit by taking the case to the public courts. 38. If

one of the

officials is

judged

to

have

settled the penalties in a

biased fashion, he must be liable to the injured person for double the

damages.

Offenses committed by the authorities in handling any claim should be taken to the public courts by anyone who may wish to do so. (There are thousands of procedural details like this that must be observed before a penalty can be imposed: the complaint has to be lodged, the summonses issued and served in the presence of two witnesses, or whatever the proper number is. All this sort of detail must not be left to look after itself, but not important enough for a legislator who is getting on in years. Our younger colleagues must settle these points, using the broad principles laid down by their predecessors as a guide for their own detailed regulations, which they must apply as need arises. They must thus proceed by it is

trial

and error until they think they have got a

satisfactory set of formalities,

and once the process of modification is over, they should rules of procedure and render them lifelong obedience.)

13.

For these

officials,

see 759d-e.

finalize their

— 1508

As

Laws for craftsmen in general,

our policy should be this. First, no citizen of our land nor any of his servants should enter the ranks of the workers

whose vocation lies in the arts and crafts. A citizen's vocation, which demands a great deal of practice and study, is to establish and maintain good order in the community, and this is not a job for part-timers. Following two trades or two callings efficiently or even following one and supervising a worker in another

So in our

—

—

is

must be

almost always too

difficult for

human

nature.

no metal worker must turn to carpentry and no carpenter must supervise workers in metal instead of practicing his own craft. We may, of course, be met with the excuse that supervising large numbers of employees is more sensible because more state this

a cardinal rule:

—

profitable

— than just following one's own trade. But no! In our state each

must have one occupation only, and bread. The City-Wardens must have the job

individual

that's

his

of enforcing this rule.

39. If a citizen

born and bred turns his attention

to

how some

he must earn

craft instead

of to the cultivation of virtue,

City-Wardens must punish him with marks of disgrace and dishonor until they've got him back on the right lines. the

40. If a foreigner

follows two trades,

Wardens must punish him by prison or fines or expulsion from the state, and so force him to play one role, not many. the

As

and cases of refusal to take delivery of their work, or any other wrong done to them by other parties or by them to others, the City- Wardens must adjudicate if the sum at issue does not exceed fifty drachmas; if more, the public courts must decide the dispute as the law directs. In our state no duties will have to be paid by anyone on either imports or exports. No one must import frankincense and similar foreign fragrant stuff used in religious ritual, or purple and similar dyes not native to the country, or materials for any other process which only needs imports from abroad for inessential purposes; nor, on the other hand, is anyone to export anything that it is essential to keep in the state. The twelve Guardians of the Laws next in order of seniority after the five eldest must act as inspectors and supervisors in this entire field. But what about arms and other military equipment? Well, if we ever need, for military purposes, some technique, for craftsmen's pay,

vegetable product, mineral, binding material or animal that has to be obtained from abroad, the state will receive the goods and pay for them, and the Cavalry-Commanders and the Generals are to be in charge of importing them and exporting other goods in exchange. The Guardians of the Laws will lay down suitable and adequate regulations on the subject.

Nowhere goods It

to

in the

whole country and whole

be retailed for

looks as

agricultural

if

the right

produce

state are these

— or any other

profit.

way

to organize the

will be to

food supply and distribute

adopt something

like the regulations in

— 1509

Laws VIII

must divide each crop into twelve parts corresponding to the twelve periods in which it is consumed. Take wheat or barley, for instance (though the same procedure must be followed for all the other crops too, as well as for any livestock there may be for sale in force in Crete. Every citizen

each

district):

shares,

one

each twelfth part should be

for the citizens,

one

split

for their slaves,

proportionately into three

and the

third for

workmen

communities of resident aliens in need of the necessities of life, and occasional visitors on some public or private business). It should be necessary to sell only this third share of all the necessities of life; there should be no necessity to sell any part of the other two. So what will be the right way to arrange the division? It's obvious, for a start, that the shares we allocate will in one sense be equal, but in

and foreigners

in general

(i.e.,

another sense unequal. Clinias:

What do you mean?

Athenian: Well, the land will grow a good crop of one thing and a bad crop of another. That's inevitable, I take it. Clinias:

Of

course.

—

Athenian: None of the three shares for masters, slaves and foreigners must be better than the others: when the distribution is made, each group should be treated on an equal footing and get the same share. Each citizen

must take his two shares and distribute them at his discretion to the slaves and free persons in his charge (quality and quantity being up to him). The surplus should be distributed by being divided up according to the number of animals that have to be supported by the produce of the soil, and rationed out accordingly. Next, the population should have houses grouped in separate localities. This entails the following arrangements. There should be twelve villages, one in the middle of each of the twelve divisions of the state; in each village the settlers should first select a site for a market-place with its

Magnesian gods, and sanctuaries of other ancient deities who are still remembered, must be honored as they were in earlier generations.) In each division they must establish shrines of Hestia, Zeus, Athena, and the patron deity of the district; after this their first job must be to build houses on the highest ground in a circle round these temples, so as to provide the garrison with temples for gods and their retinue of

spirits.

(Local

the strongest possible position for defense.

Thirteen groups of craftsmen must be formed to provide for all the rest of the territory. One should be settled in the central city and the others distributed all round it on the outskirts in twelve further sub-groups corresponding to the twelve urban districts; and the categories of craftsmen

must be established in each village. They must all be under the supervision of the chief Country-Wardens, who must decide the number and type required in each district and say where they should settle in order to prove their full worth to the farmers and cause them as little trouble as possible. Similarly the board of City-Wardens must assume permanent responsibility for the craftsmen in the city. useful to farmers

1510

Laws

The detailed supervision

of the market

of the Market-Wardens. Their

damage

first

job

is

must naturally be in the hands to ensure that no one does any

temples round the marketplace; secondly, to see whether people are conducting their business in an orderly or disorderly fashion,

and

to the

inflict

punishment on anyone who needs

every commodity the citizens are required to

it.

They must ensure

sell to

the aliens

is

that

sold in

manner prescribed by law. The law will be simply this. On the first day of the month the agents (the foreigners or slaves who act for the citizens) must produce the share that has to be sold to the aliens, beginning with the twelfth part of corn. At this first market an alien must buy corn and related commodities to last him the whole month. On the tenth day the respective parties must buy and sell a whole month's supply of liquids. The third 14 market should be on the twentieth, when they should hold a sale of the livestock that individuals find they need to buy or sell, and also of all the equipment or goods sold by the farmers, and which aliens cannot get except by purchase skins, for example, and all clothing, woven material, felt, and all that sort of thing. But these goods (and barley and wheat ground into flour and every other kind of food) should never be bought by, or sold to, a citizen or his slave through retail channels. The proper place for 'retail' trading (as it's generally called) in corn and wine is the foreigners' market, where foreigners are to sell these goods to craftsmen and their slaves; and when the butchers have cut up the animals, it is to foreigners that they must dispose of the meat. Any foreigner who wishes may buy any kind of firewood wholesale any day from the district agents and sell it to other foreigners whenever he likes and in whatever the

—

quantity he pleases. All other goods and equipment needed by various people should be brought to the general market and put up for sale in the place allotted them. (The Guardians of the Laws and the Market- Wardens, in conjunction with the City-Wardens, will have

marked out suitable spaces and decided where each article is to be sold.) Here they must exchange money for goods and goods for money, and never hand over anything without getting something in return; anyone who doesn't bother about this and trusts the other party must grin and bear it whether or not he gets what he's owed, because for such transactions there will be no legal remedy. If the amount or value of the object bought or sold is greater than is allowed by the law which forbids increase or diminution of a man's property above or below a given limit, the excess must immediately be registered with the Guardians of the Laws; but if there is a deficiency, it must be cancelled. The same rules are to apply to the registration of the property of resident aliens. Anyone who wishes may come to live in the state on specified conditions, (a) There will be a community of foreigners open to anyone willing and able to join it. (b) The alien must have a skill and (c) not stay longer than 14.

Reading

trite

in b8.

Laws VIII

1511

twenty years from the date of registration, (d) He need pay no alien-tax, even a small one (apart from behaving himself), nor any tax on any purchase or sale, (e) When his time has expired, he is to collect his possessions and depart, (f) If during this period he has distinguished himself for some notable service to the state, and is confident he can persuade the council and the assembly to grant his request for an official extension of his stay, either temporarily or for life, he should present himself and make out his case; and he must be allowed to enjoy to the full whatever concessions the state grants him. (g) Children of resident aliens must be craftsmen, and (h) their period of residence must be deemed to have started when they reach the age of fifteen. On these conditions they may stay for twenty years, after which they must depart to whatever destination they like. If they wish to stay longer, they may do so provided they obtain permission as already specified, (i) Before a departing alien leaves he must cancel the entries that he originally made in the records kept in the custody of the officials.

Book IX accordance with the natural arrangement of our legal code, will come the legal proceedings that arise out of all the occupations

Athenian: Next,

in

we have mentioned up affairs

and related

till

now. To some

topics are concerned,

extent, so far as agricultural

we have

already listed the acts

should be prosecuted, but the most serious have yet to be specified. Our next task is to enumerate these one by one, mentioning what penalty each should attract and to which court it should be assigned. that

Clinias: That's right.

Athenian: The very composition of all these laws we are on the point of framing is, in a way, a disgrace: after all, we're assuming we have a state which will be run along excellent lines and achieve every condition favorable to the practice of virtue. The mere idea that a state of this kind could give birth to a man affected by the worst forms of wickedness found in other countries, so that the legislator has to anticipate his appearance by threats this, as I said, is in a way a disgrace. It means we have to lay down laws against these people, to deter them and punish them when they appear, on the assumption that they will certainly do so. However, unlike the ancient legislators, we are not framing laws for heroes and sons of gods. The lawgivers of that age, according to the story told nowadays, were descended from gods and legislated for men of similar stock. But we are human beings, legislating in the world today for the children of humankind, and we shall give no offense by our fear that one of our

—

citizens will turn out to be, so to speak, a 'tough egg',

whose

character

be so 'hard-boiled' as to resist softening; powerful as our laws are, they may not be able to tame such people, just as heat has no effect on tough beans. For their dismal sake, the first law I shall produce will deal will

1512

Laws

with robbery from temples, in case anyone dares to commit this crime. Now in view of the correct education our citizens will have received, we should hardly want any of them to catch this disease, nor is there much reason to expect that they will. Their slaves, however, as well as foreigners

and the slaves

of foreigners,

may

well

make

frequent attempts at such

crimes. For their sake principally— but still with an eye on the general weakness of human nature— I'll spell out the law about robbery from

temples, and about impossible to cure.

all

the other similar crimes

Following the practice

we

agreed

earlier,

which are

we must

first

difficult or

even

compose pream-

bles, in the briefest possible terms, to

stand at the head of all these laws. Take a man who is incited by day and kept awake at night by an evil impulse which drives him to steal some holy object. You might talk to him and exhort him as follows: 'My dear fellow, this evil impulse that at present drives you to go robbing temples comes from a source that is neither human nor divine. It is a sort of frenzied goad, innate in mankind as a result of crimes of long ago that

remained unexpiated; it travels around working doom and destruction, and you should make every effort to take precautions against it. Now,

what these precautions

When any of these thoughts enters your head, seek the rites that free a man from guilt; seek the shrines of the gods who avert evil, and supplicate them; seek the company of men who have a reputation in your community for being virtuous. Listen to them as they say that every man should honor what is fine and just — try take note

to bring yourself to say

are.

But run away from the company of the wicked, with never a backward glance. If by doing this you find that your disease abates somewhat, well and good; if not, then you should look upon death as the preferable alternative, and rid yourself of life.' These are the overtures we make to those who think of committing all these impious deeds that bring about the ruin of the state. When a man obeys us, we should silently omit the actual law; but in cases of disobedience, we must change our tune after the overture and sing this resoundit

too.

ing strain: 41. If a

man

is

caught thieving from a temple and

is (a)

a foreigner or

slave, a brand of his

misfortune shall be

made on

and hands, and he be decided by his judges.

his face

be whipped, the number of lashes to Then he shall be thrown out beyond the boundaries of the land, naked. shall

(Perhaps paying this penalty will teach him restraint and make him a better man: after all, no penalty imposed by law has an evil purpose, but generally achieves one of two effects: it makes the person who pays the penalty either more virtuous or less wicked.) (b) If a citizen is

ever

perpetrated, that

is,

—

shown to be responsible for such a crime to have some great and unspeakable offense against the

1513

Laws IX

gods or

his parents or the state,

the penalty is death.

The judge should consider him as already beyond cure; he should bear in mind the kind of education and upbringing the man has enjoyed from his earliest years, and how after all this he has still not abstained from acts of the greatest evil. But the very tiniest of evils will be what the offender suffers, indeed, he will be of service to others, by being a lesson to them when he is ignominiously banished from sight beyond the borders of the state. And if the children and family escape taking on the character of the father, they should be held in honor and win golden opinions for the spirit and persistence with which they have shunned evil and embraced the good. In a state where the size and number of the farms are to be kept permanently unaltered, it would not be appropriate for the state to confiscate the property of any of these criminals. But if a man commits a crime and is thought to deserve a penalty in money, then provided he possesses a surplus over and above the basic equipment of his farm, he must pay his fine. The Guardians of the Laws must scrutinize the registers and discover the precise facts in these cases, and make an exact report to the court on each occasion, so as to prevent any farm becoming unworked because of a shortage of money. If a man appears to deserve a stiffer fine, and if some of his friends are not prepared to bail him out by contributing the money to set him free, his punishment should take the form of a prolonged period of imprisonment (which should be open to public view), and various humiliations. But no one, no matter what his offense, is ever to be deprived of his citizen rights completely, not even if he has gone into exile beyond our frontiers for it. The penalties we impose will be death, imprisonment, whipping, or various degrading postures (either standing or sitting), or being rusticated and made to stand before temples on the boundaries of the state; and payments of money may be made in certain cases which we have just mentioned, where such a punishment is appropriate. In cases involving the death penalty the judges are to be the Guardians of the Laws, sitting in conjunction with the court whose members are selected by merit from the officials of the previous year. The method of bringing

855

b

c

d

these cases to court, the serving of the summonses and similar procedural details must be the concern of the legislators who succeed us; what we have to do is legislate about the voting. The vote should be taken openly,

but before this our judges should have ranged themselves according to seniority and sat down close together facing the prosecutor and defendant; all citizens who have some spare time should attend and listen carefully to such trials. First, the prosecutor should deliver a single speech, then the defendant; the most senior judge should follow these addresses by crossquestioning, and continue until he has gone into the arguments in sufficient detail. One by one, the other judges should follow the most senior and work through any points on which either litigant has left him dissatisfied

by some kind of error or omission.

A judge who feels no such dissatisfaction

e

1514

Laws

should hand on the interrogation to his colleague. All the judges should endorse those arguments that appear pertinent by appending their signatures and then depositing the documents on the altar of Hestia. The next day they must reconvene in the same place, and after similar interrogation and examination again append their signatures to the depositions. Having followed this procedure three times, after giving due consideration to the evidence and witnesses, each judge should cast a sacred vote, swearing in the name of Hestia to give, as far as lies in him, a judgment just and true. In this way they should conclude this category of trial.

We come next, after these matters of religion, to cases of political subversion. We should treat as the biggest enemy of the entire state the man who makes

the laws into slaves,

and the

state into the servant of a particular

by subjecting them to the diktat of mere men. This transgressor the law uses violence in all that he does and stirs up sedition. Second

interest,

of

in the scale of

wickedness, in our estimation, should come the holder of some high state office, who while not an accessory to any such crimes, nevertheless (or, if

fails to

detect

them and

exact the vengeance of his fatherland

he does detect them, holds back through cowardice). Every

who

is

take

him

any good to court

at all

must denounce the

plotter to the authorities

on a charge of violently and

illicitly

man and

overthrowing the

The court should consist of the same judges as for robbers from temples, and the procedure of the entire trial should be the same as constitution.

was for them, a majority vote being sufficient for the death penalty. As a rule, penalties and disgrace incurred by a father should not be passed on to any of his children, except where a man's father, grandfather and great-grandfather have all in turn been sentenced to death. The state it

should deport such cases to the state and city from which their family originally came; and they should take their property with them, apart from all the basic equipment of their farm. Next, sons of citizens who have more than one son over ten years of age should be nominated by their father or grandfather on either the mother's or the father's side. Ten of them should be chosen by lot, and the names of those whom the lot selects should be reported to Delphi. The god's choice should then be installed as heir to the

abandoned property

—and he, we hope, will have better luck.

Clinias: Splendid.

Athenian: The same regulations about the judges that should try the case, and the procedure to be followed at the trial, will apply in yet a third instance, when a man is brought to court on a charge of treason. In the same way, a single law should apply to all three cases and decide whether the children of these criminals (traitor, temple-robber, and the violent wrecker of the laws of the state) should remain in their fatherland or leave it. Again, a single law and legal penalty should apply to every thief, no

matter whether his theft

is

great or small:

must pay twice the value of the stolen article, if he loses the day and has sufficient surplus property over and above his farm with which to make the repayment. 42. (a) he

1515

Laws IX

he has not, he must be kept in prison until he pays up or persuades the has had him convicted to let him off. (b) if

43. If a

he shall let

him

man

man who

convicted of stealing from public sources, be freed from prison when he has either persuaded the state to off or paid back twice the amount involved.

Clinias:

is

How on earth can we be serious,

odds whether

his theft

is

large or small, or

sir,

in saying that

whether

it

it

makes no

comes from sacred

And what

about all the other different circumstances of a theft? Shouldn't a legislator vary the penalties he inflicts, so that he can cope with the various categories of theft? Athenian: That's a good question, Clinias: I have been walking in my sleep, and you have bumped into me and woken me up. You have reminded me of something that has occurred to me before, that the business as we of establishing a code of law has never been properly thought out can see from the example that has just cropped up. Now, what am I getting at? It wasn't a bad parallel we made, you know, when we compared all those for whom legislation is produced today to slaves under treatment from slave doctors. Make no mistake about what would happen, if one of those doctors who are innocent of theory and practice medicine by rule of thumb were ever to come across a gentleman doctor conversing with a gentleman patient. This doctor would be acting almost like a philosopher, engaging in a discussion that ranged over the source of the disease and pushed the inquiry back into the whole nature of the body. But our other doctor would immediately give a tremendous shout of laughter, and his observations would be precisely those that most 'doctors' are always so ready to trot out. 'You ass/ he would say, 'you are not treating the patient, but tutoring him. Anybody would think he wanted to become a doctor rather than get well again.' Clinias: And wouldn't he be right to say that? Athenian: Perhaps he would if he were to bear in mind this further point, that anyone who handles law in the way we are now, is tutoring the citizens, not imposing laws on them. Wouldn't it be equally right to or secular sources?

b

c

—

1

d

e

—

say that? Clinias: Perhaps so.

moment, we are in a fortunate position. Clinias: How do you mean? Athenian: I mean the lack of any necessity to legislate. We are simply carrying out our own review of every kind of political system and trying Athenian: However,

how we

at the

could put into effect the absolutely ideal kind, as well as the least good sort that would still be acceptable. This is particularly true of our legislation, where it looks as if we have a choice: either we can examine ideal laws, if we want to, or again, if we feel like it, we can look to see

1.

See 719e-720e.

858

1516

Lazos

minimum

standard we are prepared to put up with. So we must choose which course we want to take. Clinias: This is a ridiculous choice to give ourselves, my friend: it's not at the

b

as

if

we were

by some

legislators forced

irresistible necessity to legislate

minute's notice, without being allowed to put the business off till tomorrow. We, God willing, can do as bricklayers do, or workmen starting some other kind of erecting. We can gather our materials in no particular order and then select and select at leisure the items which are approat a

—

—

priate for the forthcoming construction. Our assumption should be, therefore, that we are constructing something, but not under any constraint;

we work

c

our convenience and spend part of the time preparing our material, part of the time fitting it together. So it would be quite fair to describe our penal code as already partially laid down, while other material for it lies ready to hand. Athenian: At any rate, Clinias, this will be the more realistic way to conduct our review of legislation. Well then, may we please notice this point that concerns legislators? Clinias:

at

What

point?

Athenian: I suppose

d

compositions and written speeches by many other authors are current in our cities, besides those of the legislator? Clinias: Of course they are. Athenian: To whose writings ought we to apply ourselves? Are we to read the poets and others who have recorded in prose or verse compositions their advice about how one should live one's life, to the neglect of the compositions of the legislators? Or isn't it precisely the latter that deserve our closest attention? Clinias: Yes,

e

it

literary

certainly

is.

Athenian: And I suppose the legislator, alone among writers, is to be denied permission to give advice about virtue and goodness and justice? Is he alone to be prevented from explaining their nature and how they should be reflected in our conduct, if we aim to be happy? Clinias: No, of course not. Athenian: Then is it really more scandalous in the case of Homer and Tyrtaeus and the other poets to have composed in writing 2 bad rules for the conduct of life, but less so for Lycurgus and Solon, and all others who have turned legislator and committed their recommendations to writing? The proper view, surely, is this: a city's writings on legal topics should turn out, on being opened, to be the finest and best of all those it has in

859

circulation; the writings of other

men

should either sound in harmony with them, or provoke ridicule by being out of tune. So what is the style in which a state's laws ought to be written, in our opinion? Should the regulations appear in the light of a loving and prudent father and mother? Or should they act the tyrant and the despot, posting their orders and For Tyrtaeus, see 629a and note. Lycurgus was the traditional founder of the Spartan constitution. Solon legislated for Athens in 594 and wrote poems justifying his measures. 2.

— 1517

Laws IX

on walls and leaving it at that? Clearly, then, at this stage, we must decide whether we are going to try to talk about laws in the right spirit. Succeed or no, we shall at any rate show our good intentions. If we take this course and have to face some difficulties en route then let's face them. Good luck to us, and God willing, we shall succeed. Clinias: You've put it splendidly. Let's do as you suggest. Athenian: In the first place, we must continue the attempt we've just made: we must scrutinize our law about robbers of temples, theft in general, and every variety of crime. We should not let it daunt us if in the full spate of our legislation we find that although we have settled some matters, our inquiry into others has still to be completed. We are still aiming at the status of legislators, but we haven't achieved it yet; perhaps eventually we may succeed. So now let's look at these topics I've mentioned if, that is, you are prepared to look at them in the way I have explained. threats

,

—

Clinias: Certainly

we

are prepared.

Athenian: Now, on the whole subject of goodness and to try to see quite clearly just

where we

justice,

we ought

and where there are differdo ordinary men agree? What

agree,

ences of opinion between us. Again, how far differences are there between them ? (Naturally, we should claim that we wanted there to be at least a small 'difference between' us and ordinary

men!) Clinias:

you say

What

sort of 'differences

between

us'

have you

in

mind when

that?

Athenian: I'll try to explain. When we talk about justice in general just men, just actions, just arrangements, we are, after a fashion, unanimous that all these things are 'good'. One might insist that even if just men happen to be shocking in their physical appearance, they are still preeminently 'good' because of their supremely just character. No one would think a man was talking nonsense in saying that. Clinias: Wouldn't that be right? Athenian: Perhaps. But if everything that has the quality of justice is 'good', we ought to note that we include in that 'everything' even the things done to us, which are about as frequent, roughly speaking, as the things we Clinias:

do

to others.

What now,

Athenian:

then?

Any just action we do has

in proportion to the

degree to which

the quality of being 'good' roughly

it

has the quality of

justice.

Clinias: Indeed.

Athenian: So surely, anything done to us, which has the quality of justice, is to that extent agreed to be 'good'? This wouldn't involve our argument in any contradiction. Clinias: True.

agree that something done to us is just, but at the same time shocking, the terms 'just' and 'good' will be in conflict with each other the reason being that we have termed 'just' actions 'most shameful'.

Athenian:

If

we

—

Clinias:

What

are

you

getting at?

1518

Laws

Athenian:

not difficult to understand. The injunctions of the laws we laid down a little while ago would seem to be in flat contradiction to what we are saying now. It s

How

Clinias:

so?

Athenian: Our ruling was, I think, that the temple-robber and the enemy of properly established laws would suffer a 'just' death. But then, on the brink of establishing a great many such rules, we held back. We saw ourselves becoming involved with penal suffering of infinite variety and on a grand scale. Of all sufferings, these were particularly just; but they

were also the particularly shocking ones. Thus, shall find 'just' and 'good' invariably turning out

one minute we be the same, and the

surely, to

moment

next

discover they are opposites. Clinias: Likely enough.

Athenian: This is the source of the inconsistency in the language of the ordinary man: he destroys the unity of the terms 'good' and 'just'. Clinias: That is indeed how it looks, sir. Athenian: Now, Clinias, we ought to examine our own position again.

How

far is

it

consistent in this business?

Clinias: Consistent?

What

consistency do you mean? Athenian: Earlier in our discussion I think I have said quite categorically or if I haven't before, assume I'm saying it now that

—

—

Clinias:

What?

Athenian: ... all wicked men are, in all respects, unwillingly wicked. This being so, my next argument necessarily follows. Clinias: What argument? Athenian: That the unjust man is doubtless wicked; but that the wicked man is in that state only against his will. However, to suppose that a voluntary act is performed involuntarily makes no sense. Therefore, in the ^

eyes of someone who holds the view that injustice is involuntary, a man who acts unjustly would seem to be doing so against his will. Here and

now,

that

the position

have to accept: I allow that no one acts unjustly except against his will. (If anyone with a disputatious disposition or a desire to attract favorable notice says that although there are those who are unjust against their will, even so many men do commit unjust acts voluntarily, I would reject his argument and stick to what I said.) Well then, how am I to make my own arguments consistent? Suppose the two of you, Clinias and Megillus, were to ask me, 'If that's so, sir, what advice have you for us about laying down laws for the city of the Magnesians? Do we legislate, or don't we?' 'Of course we legislate'. I'd say, and you'd ask: 'Are you going to make a distinction for the Magnesians between voluntary and involuntary acts of injustice? Shall we impose stiffer penalties on voluntary wrongdoing and acts of injustice, and smaller penalties on the involuntary? Or shall we treat them all on an equal footing, on the grounds that there simply is no such thing as an act of voluntary injustice?' Clinias: You are perfectly right, sir. So what use shall we make of this position we have just taken up? is

I

— Lazos

1519

IX

Athenian: That's a good question. of

First of all,

we

shall

make

this

use

it

Clinias:

What?

few minutes ago we were quite right to say that in the matter of justice we were in a state of great muddle and inconsistency. With that in mind, we may go back to asking questions of ourselves. 'We have not yet found a way out of our confusion in these things. We have not defined the difference between these two categories Athenian: Let's cast our minds back.

A

b

and involuntary. In all states, every lawgiver who has ever appeared treats them as distinct, and the distinction is reflected in his laws. Now, is the position we took up a moment ago to overrule we make just all dissent, like a decision handed down from God? Shall this one assertion and dismiss the topic, without adducing any reasons to show that our position is correct?' Impossible. What we must do, before we legislate, is somehow make clear that there are two categories, but that the distinction between them is a different one. Then, when one imposes the penalty on either, everybody will be able to appreciate the arguments for it, and make some kind of judgment whether it is the appropriate penalty to have imposed or not. Clinias: We think you state the position fairly, sir. We must do one of two things, either stop insisting that unjust acts are always involuntary, prelimior, before going any further, demonstrate its validity by means of a

of wrongs, voluntary

nary distinction. Athenian: The

c

d

denying the proposition when I believe it to represent the truth, is absolutely unacceptable to me. man. But if the two things I should be breaking the laws of both God and do not differ by virtue of being 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', how do they differ? What other factor is involved? That is what we have to try, somehow first

of the

two

or other, to show. Clinias: It is surely impossible,

Athenian: So

this is

what we

alternatives,

sir,

to

approach the problem

shall try to do. Look:

when

in

any way.

citizens

come

e

together and associate with each other, they obviously inflict many injuries and to these the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' can be freely applied. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: But no one should describe all these injuries as acts of injustice, and conclude that therefore the unjust acts committed in these cases of ;

injury

fall

into

two

categories, (a) involuntary (because

if

we add them

all

up, you see, the involuntary injuries are no less numerous and no less great than the voluntary ones), and (b) voluntary as zuell. Rather than do that, consider the next step I am going to take in my argument: am I on to something or just driveling? My position, Clinias and Megillus, is not that, if someone hurts someone else involuntarily and without intending not legislate so as to make it, he is acting unjustly but involuntarily. I will this an involuntary act of injustice. Ignoring its relative seriousness or triviality,

I

shall refuse to put

'injustice' at all.

Indeed,

if

my

down view

such an injury under the heading of is

sustained,

we

shall often say of a

862

1520

Laws

—

b

benefactor that 'he is committing the injustice of conferring a benefit' an improper benefit. You see, my friends, in effect we should not simply call it 'just' when one man bestows some object on another, nor simply 'unjust' when correspondingly he takes it from him. The description 'just' is applicable only to the benefit conferred or injury inflicted by someone with a just character and outlook. This is the point the lawgiver has to watch; he must keep his eyes on these two things, injustice and injury. He must use

c

the law to exact

damages for damage done, as far as he can; he must restore losses, and if anyone has knocked something down, put it back upright again; in place of anything killed or wounded, he must substitute something in a sound condition. And when atonement has been made by compensation, he must try by his laws to make the criminal and the victim, each separate case of injury, friends instead of enemies. Clinias: So far, so good. Athenian: Now to deal with unjust injuries (and gains too, as when one man's unjust act results in a gain for someone else). The cases that are in

curable

by

we must

disease.

We

our cure for Clinias: d

on the assumption that the soul has been infected must, however, state what general policy we pursue in cure,

injustice.

What

this policy?

is

Athenian: This: when anyone commits an act of injustice, serious or trivial, the law will combine instruction and constraint, so that in the future either the criminal will never again dare to commit such a crime voluntarily, or he will do it a very great deal less often; and in addition, he will pay compensation for the damage he has done. This is something we can achieve only by laws of the highest quality. We may take action, or simply

we may grant him pleasures, or make him suffer; we may honor him, we may disgrace him; we can fine him, or give him gifts. We may use absolutely any means to make him hate injustice and embrace talk to the criminal;

e

true justice

or at

any

rate not hate

But suppose the lawgiver finds a man who's beyond cure what legal penalty will he provide for this case? He will recognize that the best thing for all such people is to cease to live best even for themselves. By passing on they will help others, too: first, they will constitute a warning against injustice, and secondly they will leave the state free of scoundrels. That is why the lawgiver should prescribe the death penalty in such cases, by way of punishment for their crimes but in no other case whatever. it.

—

863

—

one way, what you have said seems eminently reasonable. However, we should be glad to hear a clearer explanation of two points: first, the difference between injustice and injury, and secondly the various senses of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' that you distinguished so elaborately in the course of your argument. Athenian: I must try to meet your request and explain these points. Clinias: In

b

Doubtless in the course of conversation you make at least this point to each other about the soul: one of the constituent elements (whether 'part' or state is not important) to be found in it is 'anger', and this innate

1521

Laws IX impulse, unruly and difficult to fight as

by

its

it is,

causes a good deal of havoc

irrational force.

Clinias: Yes, indeed.

Athenian: The next point is the distinction we make between 'pleasure' and 'anger'. We say Pleasure wields her power on the basis of an opposite kind of force; she achieves whatever her will desires by persuasive deceit that

is

irresistibly

compelling. 3

Clinias: Quite right.

be saying nothing but the truth if we named ignorance as a cause of wrongdoing. The lawgiver would, in fact, do a better job if he divided ignorance into two: (1) 'simple' ignorance, which he would treat as the cause of trivial faults, (2) 'double' ignorance, which is the error of a man who is not only in the grip of ignorance but on top of that is convinced of his own wisdom, believing that he has a thorough knowledge of matters of which, in fact, his ignorance is total. When such ignorance is backed up by strength and power, the lawgiver will treat it as the source of serious and barbarous wrongdoing; but when

Athenian: Thirdly,

we would

lacks power, he will treat the resultant faults as the peccadilloes of children and old men. He will of course regard these deeds as offenses, and will legislate against these people as offenders, but the laws will be

it

most gentle character, full of understanding. Clinias: Your proposals are perfectly reasonable. Athenian: Most of us agree that some people are 'conquerors of' their desire for pleasure and feelings of anger, while others are 'conquered' by

of the

them.

And

Clinias:

that It

is

certainly

of'

is.

never heard anyone say that some people are their ignorance, while others are 'conquered by' it.

Athenian: But 'conquerors

in fact the situation.

we have

Very true. Athenian: But we do say

Clinias:

every

man

that each of these influences often

to take the opposite course to the

one which

attracts

prompts him and

wishes to take. Clinias: Yes, times without number. Athenian: May I now clearly distinguish for you, without elaboration, what in my view the terms 'just' and 'unjust' mean. My general description of injustice is this: the mastery of the soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires, whether they lead to any actual damage or not. But no matter how states or individuals think they can achieve the good, it is a conception of what the good is that should govern every man and hold sway in his soul, even if he is a little mistaken. If it does, every action done in accordance with it, and any part of a man's nature that becomes subject to such control, we have to call 'just', and best for the entire life and this in spite of the popular belief that damage done in of mankind such circumstances is an 'involuntary' injustice. However, we are not

which he

really

—

3.

Reading

biaiou in b8.

1522

Laws

now

engaging

b

in a captious dispute

about terminology. But since it has clear that there are three kinds of basic faults, we ought first to impress these upon our memory even more firmly. Our first kind is a painful one, and we call it anger and fear.

become

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: The second kind consists of pleasures and desires. The third, which is a distinct category, consists of hopes and opinion— a mere shot at the truth about the supreme good. 4 If we divide this last category twice, 5 we get three types; and that makes, according to our present argument, a total of five in all. We must enact different laws for the five kinds, and we must have two main categories,

And what

Clinias:

c

are these?

Athenian: The first category covers every occasion when crimes are committed openly with violence; secondly, we have crimes that take place under cover of darkness, involving secrecy and fraud. Sometimes we find a combination of both methods, in which case our laws will have to be very harsh indeed, if they are going to do their job.

Of

Clinias: d

course.

Athenian: Now let's go back to the point where we started to digress, and carry on with our enactment of the legal code. Our regulations about those who pillage from the gods, and about traitors, had, I think, already been made, we had also dealt with those who do violence to the laws in order to subvert the existing constitution. A man who commits one of these crimes might be suffering from insanity, or be as good as insane either because of disease, or the effects of advanced senility, or because

he

is still

in the years of childhood.

proof of any of these states is ever shown to the judges selected in each case, on the submission of either the criminal or his 44. (a) If clear

and in the opinion of the court the man was in that condition when he committed his crime, h e must pay, without fail, simple recompense for any damage he may have inflicted on anyone, but the other details of the penalty should be counsel,

e

waived, (b) if he has killed someone and his hands are polluted by murder, he must depart to a place in another country and live there in exile for a year. 45. If

he comes back before the legally appointed time, or even puts a

any part of

foot into

4.

5.

of

Reading

.

.

.

his native country.

kai doxes, ton alethous peri to ariston ephesis triton ... in b7. ,

Assuming that the 'third' category here is equivalent to that of 'ignorance' as a cause wrongdoing (863c-d), the reference here is to the 'simple' and 'double' forms

of

ignorance there noted, of which the latter was divided into that 'with power' and that without power'. That would yield 'three types', as the Athenian goes on to say here.

1523

Laws IX he must be imprisoned in the public

two

for

of

which he

shall

of the

Laws

be released.

we have made points the way forward: we need not scruple lay down a comprehensive set of laws that will cover every category murder. First we should deal with those committed with the use of

The to

years, after

by the Guardians

jail

force,

start

but unintentionally:

anyone has unintentionally killed a man who is not an enemy occurs immediately, or (a) in a contest or public games— whether death later as a result of the wounds,

46 A.

If

(b) in

war

similarly,

military training, whether in javelin-exercises without the protecof tion of armor, or when some weapons are being carried in imitation (c) in

wartime usage, the offender shall

be

free of pollution

when he

has been purified in

accordance with the relevant law from Delphi. result of their (d) All doctors, if their patient dies as an unintended treatment, are to be free of pollution according to law. B. If one man kills another by his own act, (a)

by

his

own

but unintentionally,

hand,

without weapons, or

(i)

weapon, administration of food or drink, application of fire or cold, or deprivation of air, whether himself, or ((3) (i) he does the deed (ii) through the agency of others, penalties in all cases it must be reckoned his own act and he must pay (ii)

by

tool,

as under: If

he

kills

(a) a slave,

dead man's master against the damage, reflecting what the loss would be if his own slave had been killed. C. If he fails to indemnify the master, he must pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man, the judges making an estimate of it, and he must resort to greater and more numerous purifications than those who have killed in contests; and such ex-

he must indemnify the

pounders

as are chosen

by the oracle are

to

be in charge of these purifica-

tions. B. cont. (b) If

he

kills a

slave of his

own,

him purify himself, and be quit of the murder according to law. (c) If he kills a free man, inadvertently, he must undergo the same purifications as the killer of a slave. let

should not take lightly an old story that comes from our collection of ancient tales. It runs as follows: Having lived in the full proud spirit of freedom, the man murdered by violence, freshly dead, turns his fury on

He

1524

Lazvs

the person responsible.

The dead man

and loathing at his own violent sufferings; he abominates the sight of his own murderer going about localities once familiar to himself; to the full limit of his powers he visits his own anguish on the perpetrator of the crime, the man and his deeds; and his allies are the memories that haunt the murderer. Therefore D.

A

(a)

entire year,

whole (b) If

must keep

killer

is full

of fear

clear of his victim for all the seasons of

an

by staying away from the dead man's usual haunts and the

of his native country.

the deceased

the killer

is

a foreigner,

should keep clear of the foreigner's homeland as well for an

identical period.

man

obeys

law without demur, the deceased's next of kin, who will take note of his compliance with these requirements, will grant him pardon and will be entirely correct to live on peaceable terms with him. If

a

E. If the killer

this

disobeys,

by daring to enter temples and perform sacrifices, polluted as he is, and then (b) by refusing to complete the above-mentioned period abroad, the deceased s next of kin must prosecute the killer on a charge of murder. (a)

In case of conviction, F. If

all

penalties are to be doubled.

the next of kin does not prosecute the crime,

must be deemed to have arrived at his own door, owing to the murdered man's supplications for atonement. Anyone who wishes may bring a charge against the next of kin and force him to keep away from his native country for five years, according to law. the pollution

G.

(a) If a

foreigner

who

anyone

kills a

foreigner

who

is

living in the state,

wishes should prosecute under the same laws.

(b) If the killer is (i)

a resident alien,

he must (ii)

go abroad

for a year;

a non-resident alien,

he must

keep away, for the whole of his life, from the country that lays down these laws, in addition to performing the purifications; this is to apply whether he kills (1) a non-resident alien, (2) a resident alien, or (3) a citizen.

H.

If

he returns

(a) illegally,

Guardians of the Laws must punish him by death, and if he has any property, they must present it to his victim's nearest relative; the

(b)

unintentionally,

being shipwrecked on the coast, he must camp out where the sea washes by his feet and await an opportu(i)

nity to sail (ii)

away;

being forcibly brought in overland by someone,

the first official of the state that

comes across him must dispatch him unharmed beyond the border.

set

him

free

and

1525

Laws IX

someone kills a free man by his own hand, but the deed is done in anger, we must first make an internal distinction within this type of crime. Anger is common to (1) those who kill a man by blows or similar means, owing to a sudden impulse: here the action is immediate, there is no previous intention to kill, and regret for the deed follows at once; (2) those who have been stung by insults or opprobrious actions and who pursue their vengeance until, some time later, they kill somebody: they intend to establish kill, and the deed causes no repentance. So it looks as if we have to two categories of murder; broadly speaking, both are done in anger, but a proper description would be 'falling somewhere midway between "voluntary" and "involuntary" '; however, each type comes closer to one or other of these extremes. The man who nurses his anger and takes his vengeance later not suddenly, on the spur of the moment, but with premeditation approximates to the voluntary murderer. The man whose anger bursts forth uncontrollably, whose action is instant, immediate, and

If

— —

without premeditation, resembles the involuntary killer. Yet even so, he therefore is not an entirely involuntary killer: he only resembles one. It is

sometimes difficult to categorize murders done under the influence of anger, and to know whether to treat them in law as voluntary or involuntary. The best course, which corresponds most closely to reality, is to classify them both under what they most resemble, and to distinguish them by the presence or absence of premeditation. We should lay down comparatively severe penalties for those who have killed in anger and with premeditation, and lighter ones for those who have killed on the spur of the moment without previous intent. Something which resembles a greater evil should attract a greater punishment, whereas a lesser penalty should be visited on that which resembles a lesser evil. This, then, is the course our laws should take. Clinias: Indeed it is. Athenian: Then let's go back to our subject and carry on as follows: with his own hand, and the deed is done in a fit of anger, without previous intent, his penalty should in general be that appropriate to a man who has killed without anger; but in addition he should be obliged to go into exile for two years, by way of a curb for his anger. B. If a man kills in anger, but with premeditation, his penalty should in general be that inflicted in the previous instance;

47 A.

If

someone

kills a free

man

but his exile should be for three years as against the other's two, the period of punishment being longer because of the greater violence of his passion.

from exile should run as follows. criminal (It is not easy to make hard and fast rules: sometimes the fiercer as defined by the law may turn out easier to manage, whereas the man who is supposedly more manageable may turn out to be a more difficult case, having committed a murder with some savagery; the other,

In such cases, regulations for the return

1526

Laws

may have

conversely,

my

dispatched his victim without brutality. However,

account does describe the cases you'll find are typical.) The Guardians of the Laws should act as assessors of all these points, and when the period of exile prescribed for either category has come to an end, they should send twelve of their number, as judges, to the borders of the country. During the time that has elapsed these twelve should have

made

a

more

exact investigation into what the exiles did, so as to decide whether to grant pardon and permission to return; and the exiles are bound to acquiesce in the judgment of these authorities. C.

still

a returned exile of either category anger and commits the same offense, he must go into exile and never come back. (a) If

is

ever again overcome by

he does come back, penalty will be the same as that imposed on the foreigner

(b) If his

who

re-

turns [46H].

D

(a) If

man

a

kills his

own

slave,

he must purify himself.

he kills another's slave, in anger, he must pay double damages to the owner. E. If a killer in any category flouts the law and in his unpurified state pollutes the market-place, the sports stadium, and other holy places, anyone who wishes should prosecute both the killer and the relative of (b) If

dead

the

man who

allows the killer to do this, and compel the relative to exact payment of twice the fine and the other expenses; and the prosecutor shall be legally entitled to take for himself the money so paid. a slave kills his

F. (a) If

own

master, in anger, the relatives of the deceased shall treat the killer in whatever way they like (except that under no circumstances whatever may they let him go

on

and be free of pollution. slave murders a free man who

living),

(b) If a

master shall deliver him up will be obliged to kill him, the his

not his master, in anger, to the relatives of the deceased, is

manner

who

of the execution being within

their discretion.

G. (This (a) If

a rare occurrence, but not unknown.) a father or mother kills a son or daughter in anger is

by beating them

or by using the

some other form of violence, murderers must undergo the same purifications

cases,

and go

(b)

When

ies

with them.

H.

If

they

as apply in the other

into exile for three years.

come

back, the female killer

must be separated from her husband and the male from his wife, and they must have no more children; and they must never again share hearth and home with those whom they have robbed of a son or brother, or join in religious ceremon-

someone

is

impious enough

to

disobey these regulations,

he shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone I. (a) If a man kills his wedded wife in a fit of anger, or a wife

who wishes.

her husband.

1527

Laws IX

undergo the same purifications and spend three years in exile, his return, a person who has done such a deed must never join

they must

On

(b)

his children in religious

ceremonies nor eat

at the

same

table with them.

the parent or the child disobeys, he shall equally be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone If

J.

who

wishes.

K.

in

If

anger

a brother kills a brother or a sister, or (b) a sister kills a brother or a sister, the same purifications and periods of exile as applied to parents and children should be specified as applying in these cases too. (That is, they (a)

should never share hearth and home with the brothers whom they have deprived of their fellow brothers nor with parents whom they have deprived of children, nor join in religious ceremonies with them.) L. If anyone disobeys this law, he will be subject to the relevant law of impiety already laid down, as is only right and proper. M. If anyone gets into such an ungovernable temper with his parents and begetters that in his insane fury he dares to kill one of them, and of the (a) is let off responsibility for murder by a voluntary statement deceased before death, he must perform the same purifications as those who commit involuntary murder; and when he has followed the rest of the procedure prescribed for those cases, he may be considered purified. (b) If he is not let off, the perpetrator of such a crime will be indictable under many laws. He will be subject to the most huge penalties for assault, and likewise for impiety for temple-robbery— he has plundered the shrine that is his parent's body, and deprived it of life. Consequently if one man could die

many

times, the

murderer of

his father or

mother

who

has acted in anger

death over and over again. To this one killer no law will allow the plea of self-defense; no law will permit him to kill his father or mother, who brought him into the world. The law will instruct him to put up with all manner of suffering before he does such a thing. But what other penalty than death could the law appropriately lay down

would deserve

to die the

for this criminal?

The law,

then, should run:

(b) cont.

the penalty for the

be death. brother in a political brawl or some

murderer of a father or mother

is

to

a brother kills his own similar circumstances, in self-defense when his victim had struck first, he should be regarded as free of pollution (as though he had killed

N.

(a) If

an enemy). (b)

The same applies

if

a citizen kills a citizen, or (ii) a foreigner kills a foreigner.

(i)

1528

Laws

(c) If

in self-defense

a citizen kills a foreigner, or

(i)

a foreigner kills a citizen,

(ii)

the culprit

should be in the same position with regard

from pollution, and likewise (iii)

O.

If

to the

freedom

if

a slave kills a slave.

however

a slave, in self-defense, kills a free

he should be subject to the

man,

same laws

as the parricide [47M]. P. The regulations stated about the acquittal from responsibility for murder granted by a father are to apply to every acquittal in such cases (when, that is, one man voluntarily absolves another of responsibility, on the grounds that the murder has been committed involuntarily):

e

the criminal

must undergo the

from the country according Let this

purifications

and spend one year away

to law.

more

or less suffice as a description of involuntary murders, which involve violence and anger. Our next task is to speak of voluntary murders, which are premeditated and spring from sheer injustice the lack of control

—

over the desire for pleasure and over one's lusts and jealous feelings. Clinias: True.

Athenian:

First of all,

we ought

again to

make

as complete a

list

as

possible of these sources of crime. 7

The

0

chief cause

which tyrannizes a soul that has gone wild with most usually for money, the object of most men's

is lust,

desire. This lust is

strongest

and most frequent longing. Because

men and

their misdirected education,

in

them

money

of the innate depravity of has the power to produce

a million cravings that are impossible to satisfy

—

all centering on the endless acquisition of wealth. The cause of this incorrect education is the pernicious praise given to wealth by the public opinion of Greeks and

b

non-Greeks alike. In fact, wealth takes only third place in the scale of goodness; 6 but they make it preeminent, to the ruination of posterity and themselves. The best and the noblest policy for all cities to follow is to tell the truth about wealth, namely that it exists to serve the body, just as the body should be the servant of the soul. Although the ends which wealth naturally serves are indeed 'good', wealth itself will take third place, coming after the perfection of the soul and the body. Taking, therefore!

argument as our guide, we shall find that the man who means to be happy should not seek simply to be wealthy, but to be wealthy in a way consistent with justice and self-control. Murders needing still more murders in expiation would not occur in cities that had taken this lesson to heart. But as things are, as we said when we embarked on this topic, we have here one cause, and an extremely prominent cause at that, of the most this

c

serious charges of deliberate murder.

6.

See the

lists at

697b

ff.

and

743e.

1529

Laws IX

Second, an ambitious cast of mind: this breeds feelings of jealousy, which who are dangerous companions to live with, particularly for the person actually feels jealous, but potentially harmful to the leading citizens of the state as well.

murder has been prompted by the cowardly or has fears of a guilty man. When a man is committing some crime, already committed it, he wants no one to know about it, and if he cannot eliminate a possible informer in any other way, he murders him. In the third place,

many

a

These remarks should constitute the preface applying

to all these crimes.

we must tell the story which is so strongly believed by so many people when they hear it from those who have made a serious study

In addition,

of such matters in their mystic ceremonies. It is this: Vengeance is exacted for these crimes in the after-life,

and when a man returns to this world again he is ineluctably obliged to pay the penalty prescribed by the law of nature— to undergo the same treatment as he himself meted out to his victim, and to conclude his earthly existence by encountering a similar fate at the hands of someone else. merely hearing If a man obeys and heartily dreads such a penalty after the overture, there is no need to play over the relevant law. But in case of disobedience the following law should be stated in writing: 48 A. (a) If a man by his own hand viciously kills a fellow citizen, with premeditation, and he must be excluded from the places where people usually gather, not pollute temples or market or harbors or any other common place of assembly, whether or not someone makes a proclamation against the culprit in these terms. (The reason is that the law itself makes the proclamation. It makes a permanent and public proclamation on behalf of the

whole B. If a

state,

and always

will.)

man

fails in his

duty

proclamation, and

is

to prosecute the culprit or bar

a relative (no

more

him by

distant than a cousin) of the

deceased on either the father's side or the mother's, his the pollution together with the enmity of the gods, should arrive at own door. (The curse imposed by the law turns the edict of heaven against him.) He must be subject to prosecution at the hands of any man who wishes to take vengeance for the deceased, and the man who thus wishes to take vengeance must scrupulously perform all the ,

the other ritual details the god prescribes must for such cases; and when he has published the proclamation, he go and make the criminal submit to the imposition of the penalty, under

appropriate ablutions and

all

the law.

easy for a legislator to demonstrate that all this should be accompanied by a number of prayers and sacrifices to those gods who make it of their business to prevent murders occurring in society. The Guardians the Laws, in association with expounders, soothsayers, and the god, should rule who these gods are to be, and specify the procedure for bringing such It is

1530

Laws

would be most

cases that

in

harmony with

the requirements of religion; they should then follow it themselves in bringing these cases to court, which should be the same as the one given final authority over temple-robbers. 7

48 A. cont.

man

found guilty, he must be punished by death and be deprived of burial in the country of his victim. (In this way we can show he has not been forgiven, and (b) If a

is

avoid impiety.) C. (a)

If

the defendant

makes

off

and refuses

to submit to trial, remain in exile permanently. (b) If such a person sets foot within the country of the murdered man, 8 the first of the relatives of the deceased who comes across him, or indeed any citizen, should either (i) kill him with impunity, or (ii) tie him up, and hand him over to the judges who tried the case

he must

them

for

to carry out the execution.

When a man undertakes a prosecution, he should immediately demand sureties from the accused. The latter must duly provide his sureties, who must be deemed, in the eyes of the judges who constitute the D.

court in these cases, to be credit-worthy; and these three credit-worthy sureties must pledge themselves to produce the accused at his trial. If a man refuses, or is unable, to produce sureties,

so that

must

him and keep him bound and under guard, they can produce him at the hearing of the case.

the authorities

arrest

man

does not actually kill with his own hands, but simply plans the murder, and although responsible for it by virtue of plotting arrangements, continues to live in the state with his soul polluted by homicide, E. If a

his trial for this

crime should proceed along the same lines as before, except as regards the bail. If he is convicted, he may be granted burial in his native land, but the other details of the punishment should conform with the regulations previously laid down for this category. 9

These same regulations about the actual commission and mere plotting of a murder should apply when F.

(a)

(i)

foreigners prosecute foreigners,

(ii)

(iii)

(b)

as

citizens prosecute foreigners

and foreigners

citizens,

and

slaves prosecute slaves.

But an exception should be

made

in the business of the surety. Just

was

said [48D.1 that actual murderers should provide sureties, the person who proclaims the ban arising from the murder should simultaneously demand sureties in these cases too [48F(a)(i-iii)l. it

7.

855c-856a.

8.

Reading touton

9.

That

is,

in d7.

for those

who

do

kill

with their

own

hand.

Laws IX

1531

G. If a slave intentionally himself or planned it, and the public executioner

kills a free is

man, whether he did the deed

convicted,

should haul him

off in the direction of the deceased's

grave to a point from which the culprit can see the tomb. He should then scourge him, giving as many strokes as the successful prosecutor instructs. If the homicide survives the scourging, he is to be executed. H. If a man kills an innocent slave, fearing that he will inform against his own shocking and disgraceful conduct, or prompted by some similar motive, he should submit to trial, when a slave has died in these circumstances, precisely as he would have submitted to trial for murder if he had killed

c

a citizen.

Certain crimes, which

may

occur,

make

the

mere composition

of laws

them an unpleasant and distasteful business, but it is impossible to omit them from our code. I mean deliberate and wholly wicked murders of relatives, whether the murderer commits the crime in person or merely for

d

Generally speaking, these killings occur in states that are badly administered or have a defective system of education, but occasionally one of them might crop up even in a country where one would hardly look for it. What we have to do is to repeat our explanation of a moment ago, hoping that anyone who hears it will be more willing and able to avoid committing murders that are absolutely the most detestable in the plots

it.

Heaven. The 'myth', or 'explanation', or whatever the right word has come down to us in unambiguous terms from the lips of priests of

sight of is,

long ago.

e

on guard

vengeance for the spilling of the blood of relatives; she operates through the law we have just mentioned, and her decree is that a man who has done something of this kind is obliged to suffer precisely what he has inflicted. If ever a man has murdered his father, in the course of time he must suffer the same fate from violent treatment at the hands of his children. A matricide, before being reborn, must adopt the female sex, and after being born a woman and bearing children, be dispatched subsequently by them. No other purification is available when common blood has been polluted; the pollution resists cleansing until, murder for murder, the guilty soul has paid the penalty and by this appeasement has soothed the anger of the deceased's entire line. Thus the fear of such vengeance, exacted by the gods, should hold a man in check. But this is the law the human legislator will lay down in case some people should be overwhelmed by the terrible misfortune of committing such a crime: Justice stands

to exact

they should dare to tear the soul from the body of their father, mother, brothers or children, deliberately and with premeditation, the proclamations of banishment from places of public resort, and the sureties, should be identical to those detailed in previous cases. I.

873

(a) If

b

1532

Laws

(b) If a

man

convicted of such a murder, having killed one of the aforementioned persons, is

the court-assistants

and the

execute him, and throw him out, naked, at a specified place where three roads meet outside the city. All the officials, on behalf of the entire state, must take a stone and throw it at the head of the corpse, and thus purify the entire state. After this, they must carry the corpse to the borders of the land and eject it, giving it no burial, as the law instructs.

But what about the

fate

man who

person

who

above all, his 'nearest and What penalty ought he to undergo? I am

killer of the

dearest', as the expression is?

talking about the

officials shall

kills himself,

out of the hands of destiny,

is,

who

(1)

uses violence to take his

not acting in obedience to any legal decision of his state, (3) whose hand is not forced by the pressure of some excruciating and unavoidable misfortune, (4) has not fallen into some irremediable disgrace that he cannot live with, and (5) imposes this unjust judgment on himself in a spirit of slothful and abject cowardice. In general,

what

(2) is

observances should take place with regard to purification and interment in this case, are matters known to God; the relatives must seek guidance from expounders and the relevant laws, and act in these instances according to their instructions. But ritual

49. (a)

People

who

perish in this

way must be

buried individually, with

no one to share their grave. (b) They must be buried in disgrace on the boundaries of the twelve territorial divisions, in deserted places that have no name. (c) The graves must not be identifiable, either by headstone or title. burden or any other animal kills anyone (except when the incident occurs while they are competing in one of the pub50. (a) If a beast of

lic

contests),

must prosecute the killer for murder; (ii) the next of kin must appoint some Country-Wardens (whichever ones he pleases, and as many as he likes), and they must try the case: (iii) if the animal is found guilty, they must kill it and throw it out beyond the frontiers of the country, (b) If some inanimate object causes loss of human life (but not if it is a stroke of lightning or some similar weapon wielded by God it must be one of the other things that kill a man by falling on him, or because he falls on it), (i) the next of kin must appoint the nearest neighbor to sit in judgment on the object, and thus effect the purification of himself and the the relatives

(i)

—

deceased's entire (ii)

the

way

line;

condemned object must be thrown over the

frontiers, in the

specified in the case of animals.

someone is found dead, and the killer is not known and cannot be discovered by diligent efforts to trace him. 51. If

1533

Laws IX the proclamations

down in former cases, being when the prosecutor has estab-

should be the same as laid

made, however, against 'the murderer': lished his case, he must give notice in the market-place to the killer and convicted murderer of so-and-so, that he must not enter holy places nor any part of the country of the deceased; he must threaten that if he does turn up and is recognized, he will be executed, denied burial, and his body ejected from the country of his victim. So much, then, for the law on that sort of murder. In the following conditions, however, it will be right to regard the killer as innocent: he catches a thief entering his home and kills him, he shall be innocent. (b) If he kills a footpad in self-defense, he shall be innocent.

52. (a) If

(c) If

he

anyone sexually

may be

killed

violates a free

woman

at night to steal his

goods,

or boy,

with impunity by the victim of the violence, or by the

victim's father or brothers or sons. (d) If a

husband discovers

his

wedded

wife being raped and

kills

the at-

tacker,

regard him as innocent. (e) If a man kills someone while saving the life of his father (provided the latter is not committing a crime), or while rescuing his mother or the law will

children or brothers, or the mother of his children, he shall be completely innocent.

Athenian: Let us assume we have completed our legislation concerning the training and education that the soul needs during a man's life (a life that is worth the living if these needs are met, but not if they are not), and the penalties that should apply in cases of death by violence. We have discussed, too, the training and education of the body, and the related topic in this case is the violent treatment, voluntary or involuntary, of one

man by another. So far as we can, we must distinguish the various categories, see how many there are, and say what penalties will be appropriate for each.

It

looks as

if

this

could properly form the next subject of our

legis-

lation.

Even the biggest bungler you could find among would-be legislators will put cases of wounding and mutilation immediately after cases of murder. Woundings ought to be distinguished as murders were: some are inflicted involuntarily, some in anger, some through fear, while others are committed voluntarily and with premeditation. A preliminary address must be given about all these categories as follows: It is vital that men should lay down laws for themselves and live in obedience to them; otherwise they will be indistinguishable from wild animals of the utmost savagery. The reason is this: no man has sufficient natural gifts both to discern what benefits men in their social relationships

1534

and

Laws

be constantly ready and able to put his knowledge to the best practical use. The first difficulty is to realize that the proper object of true political skill is not the interest of private individuals but the common good. This is what knits a state together, whereas private interests make to

disintegrate.

the public interest

well served, rather than the private, then the individual and the community alike are benefited. it

The second

If

is

even if a man did get an adequate theoretical grasp of the truth of all this, he might then attain a position of absolute control over a state, with no one to call him to account. In these circumstances he would never have the courage of his convictions; he would never devote his life to promoting the welfare of the community as his first concern, making his private interests take second place to the public good. His human nature will always drive him to look to his own advantage and the lining of his own pocket. An irrational avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure will dominate his character, so that he will prefer these two aims to better and more righteous paths. Blindness, self-imposed, will ultimately lead the man's whole being, and the entire state, into a morass of evil. But if ever by the grace of God some natural genius were born, and had the chance to assume such power, he would have no need of laws to control him. Knowledge is unsurpassed by any law or regulation; reason, if it is genuine and really enjoys its natural freedom, should have universal power: it is not right that it should be under the control of anything else, as though it were some sort of slave. But as it is, such a character is nowhere to be found, except a hint of it here and there. That is why we need to choose the second alternative, law and regulation, which embody general principles, but cannot provide for every individual case. I have pointed this out because we are now going to settle the penalty or fine to be imposed on someone who has wounded or harmed someone else. Anyone could quite easily and properly take us up on any point and ask: 'What attacker, what wound, what victim do you mean? How was the attack made, and when? The circumstances of these cases differ in a thousand and one different ways.' Now to leave all these details to the judgment of the courts is impracticable, and equally impracticable to leave them none. In every case, however, one point in particular simply must be left to the courts: in each separate instance, they must decide whether the crime did in fact take place, or not. But on the other hand it is hardly feasible to produce laws oneself to cover every case, serious or trivial; one can scarcely leave the courts no discretion at all about the fine or punishment that ought to be imposed on a criminal of this kind. Clinias: Well, then, where do we go from here? Athenian: We conclude that some details ought to be left to the courts, but not others; these should be regulated by the legislator. Clinias: Which points, then, ought to be in the legal code, and which ought to be referred to the judgment of the courts? Athenian: In this connection, here's the next thing to notice: sometimes

we

difficulty

is

that

find in a state that the juries are useless,

dumb

things; the individual

— Laws IX

1535

mystery known only to themselves and give their decisions by secret ballot. It's even more serious when so far from keeping silent when they hear a case they make a tremendous disturbance as though they were in a theatre, and hurl shouts of applause or disapproval at the speaker on either side in turn. All this puts the state at large into an awkward predicament. It is a wretched business to be forced to lay down laws for courts of that type, but if one is forced, the right thing to do is to hand over to them the assessment of penalties only in very trivial cases, providing for the majority in explicit laws of one's own if, that is, one ever does legislate for a state organized in this way. But in a country where the regulation of the courts is as satisfactory as can be achieved and the jurymen-to-be have received a good education and been examined by all kinds of tests, it is right and proper to grant them complete discretion on all points to do with the punishments or fines that convicted criminals should suffer. In the present case we cannot be blamed if we leave to their discretion the most frequent and important points that arise, because they are points which even inadequately educated jurymen could grasp and apply when they have to give each individual crime a penalty appropriate both to the damage done and to the wickedness which is at the root of the actual deed. We believe, in fact, that the people for whom we are legislating may well turn out quite conspicuously able judges of these matters, so we should leave most decisions to them. Even so, in enacting earlier parts of our legal code, we mentioned the practice of sketching some examples of penalties models for the judges to imitate, to stop them exceeding the due limits of justice. We suited the action to the word; it was the right course then and it is the right course now, as I once again resume our legislation. Our law on wounding, then, should be written in the following terms:

jurymen keep

their opinions a

—

53 A.

If

a

man

deliberately intends to

kill

a fellow citizen (unless the

one of those whose death is sanctioned by the law [52(a-e)D, and wounds him without being able to kill him, no pity should be wasted on the man who has inflicted a wound with that sort of intention: he should be treated with no more respect than a killer, and made to stand trial for murder. latter is

we

should have due respect for the luck that has saved him from total ruin, and for his guardian angel too, who in pity for the attacker and the wounded man has stopped the injury of the latter from proving fatal, and prevented the disastrous ill luck of the former from bringing a curse down upon his head. We should duly thank his guardian spirit and not obstruct But

its

wishes:

53 A. cont. He who has inflicted the

wound

be spared the death penalty, but he must suffer life-long banishment to some neighboring state, with full freedom to enjoy all the income from his property; he must pay full shall

1536

Laws

compensation for whatever injury he has done the wounded man, the sum to be assessed by the court that tries the case. (The court will consist of the same people who would have tried him for murder if his victim had died of the wounds sustained.) B. If with similar premeditation (a)

a child

(b) a

slave

death

is

C.

If

to

wounds wounds

his parents, or his master,

be the penalty.

similarly

wounds a brother or a sister, or (b) a sister wounds a brother or a sister, and is convicted of wounding with premeditation, (a) a

brother

death

is

D

to

be the penalty.

with intent to kill a wife wounds her husband, or

If

(a)

(b) a

he or

husband wounds his wife, she must go into permanent

they have sons or daughters who are still in their minority, the trustees must administer their property in trust, and care for the children as though they were orphans. If the offspring are adult, they should themselves take possession of the property, and be under no obligation to support the exile. 10 If anyone who succumbs to such misfortune is childless, the relatives of the exile, as far as the children of the cousins on both the male and female side, must hold a meeting, and in consultation with the Guardians of the Laws appoint an heir for this property, the 5040th in the state. exile. If

(They should look at the matter in the following light: none of the 5040 farms belongs to its occupant or his family in general as much as to the state, which is entitled to it not only as a piece of public property but also

own private own properties

as

its

its

54.

his (a)

as holy

and the

state

ought

and prosperous as

to

do

its

best to keep

possible.) Therefore:

When one of the properties falls away from this condition of holiness

and prosperity to

possession;

such an extent that the possessor leaves no children succeed him, being unmarried, or married but childless, and meets to

end convicted of (i) deliberate murder, or (ii)

some other crime

penalty

is

against gods or citizens for which the death specifically laid down by law, or if

someone without male issue goes into permanent exile, first of alf this property must be cleansed and purified according to law; then the relatives must hold the meeting we mentioned just now, and in consultation with the Guardians of the Laws pick out a family that has the best reputation for virtue of all the families in the state and is (b)

10.

Reading me

for ede in c6.

1537

Laws IX

same time fortunate enough to have produced several children. One of these they must adopt on behalf of the deceased's father and forebears, who will receive him as their son; from them he will take his name, which should be an omen of good fortune. The relatives should pray that as a result of his adoption he will bring them children, and guard the hearth and look after the family affairs, both sacred and at the

secular, with greater success than his adoptive father enjoyed. In this

way (c)

they should install him, according to law, as heir to the property, When such disasters as we have mentioned [54. (a, b)] overwhelm

the sinner,

him

they should let

lie

nameless in his grave, childless and deprived of

his family estate.

not universally true that one district extends right up to the boundary of another. In some cases there is a no man's land in between, which will extend so as to touch either boundary and occupy an intermediate position between the two. This, we said, was true of an act done in anger: it falls somewhere between voluntary and involuntary.

We can see

that

it is

11

Our

regulations concerning

wounding

inflicted in

anger should therefore

run as follows: 55 A. (a)

man wound

If

the

he must (b) if

found

guilty,

and

turns out to be curable,

incurable,

pay quadruple damages.

he has

If

is

pay double damages;

it is

he must (c)

a

which, though curable, makes the acutely embarrassed and ashamed,

inflicted a

wounded man

feel

wound

pay triple damages. B. If one man wounds another and injures not only his victim but the state, by rendering him unable to defend his fatherland against the enemy,

he must

he must , in addition to the other penalties,

make

restitution to the state

has sustained, viz. he must perform not only his own military service but that of the incapacitated person as well by serving for the loss

in the

C.

If

it

army on

he

fails

his behalf.

so to serve,

under the law to a charge of evading military service, at the hands of anyone who wishes. A. cont. The assessment of the damages, double, triple, or quadruple, must be made by the judges who found him guilty. D. If one relative wounds another in any of these ways, the fellow clansmen and close relatives, male and female, as far as sons of cousins on both the male and female side, must hold a meeting, and he shall be liable

11.

See 866d-867c.

1538

Laws

when

they have reached their verdict, they must entrust the assessment to the natural parents. If the assessment is challenged, the assessment of the relatives on the male side must be taken as final. If they cannot agree themselves, they must, in the end, hand over the matter to the

Guardians of the Laws.

When children inflict this kind of wound on their parents, it is essential for the judges to be parents over sixty years of age who have children of their own and not merely adopted ones. If a man is found guilty, these judges must decide whether a man who could do such a thing as E.

should

whether the penalty should be something even more severe, or perhaps something a trifle less severe. None of the relations of the culprit should act as a judge, not even if he is of the age required by law. this

die, or

12

F. (a) If a

slave

wounds

a free

man

owner must hand him over to the in whatever way he likes. the

in anger,

wounded man, who may

treat

him

owner fails to hand him over, he must remedy the damage himself. (c) If anyone alleges that the affair is the result of collusion between the slave and the wounded party, he must contest the point at law. If he does not win the case, he must pay triple damages. If he does win, he must prosecute the author of the collusion with the slave on a charge of kidnapping. 56. If anyone involuntarily wounds someone else, he must pay simple damages. (No legislator is capable of regulating the workings of chance.) The judges are to be the same as those appointed to try children who wound their parents; and they will have the duty of assessing the amount of the damages. (b) If the

Athenian: All the

we have

so far mentioned involve the use of violence, and so too do the various kinds of assault. In these cases, the point that every man, woman and child should bear in mind is this: Age is always very much more highly regarded than youth, and this is so both among the gods and among men, if they intend to live in security and happiness. Therefore, the assault of an older man by a younger in public is a disgusting sight, and the gods hate to see it. No young man

who

is

injuries

struck by an old

man

should ever make a

but put up with his bad temper, and so establish a claim to similar respect when he himself

grows

Our

fuss,

old.

law, then, should run as follows:

Everyone

our community must show, by his words and actions, respect for his senior. A man should avoid crossing any person (male or female) who is twenty years older than himself, regarding him or her in the same way as he would his father or mother. For the sake of the gods 12.

in

Such as deprivation of

burial.

Laws IX

1539

must always keep himself from striking anyone old enough to have been his parent. Similarly, he must refrain from striking a foreigner, whether the latter is a long-established resident or a recent immigrant. He must never go so far as to punish such a person by hitting him, either by attacking him first, or in self-defense. of birth, he

he thinks the foreigner is unruly and insolent in an attack on himself, and needs to be punished, he must arrest him and take him, without hitting him, to the court of the City-Wardens, so that the foreigner may learn to banish all thoughts of ever striking a citizen again. The City-Wardens must take the man and interrogate him, with proper 57 A.

d

(a) If

god who

respect for the

is

the protector of foreigners.

foreigner seems to have been in the

wrong

If

e

in fact the

in striking the citizen,

must put a stop to this unruliness, so characteristic of a foreigner; they must give him as many strokes of the lash as will equal the number of blows he himself inflicted. the City -War dens

he is not in the wrong, they must warn and rebuke the man who made the arrest, and dismiss the pair of them. B. If one man strikes another who (a) is about the same age, or (b) is older, but has no children, whether the attacker is an old man striking an old man, or a young man striking a young man, the man attacked must defend himself by natural means with his own bare hands, without a weapon. But if a man over forty years of age has the face to fight someone, whether (i) he strikes the first blow, or (b) If

880

—

(ii)

fights in self-defense,

he will get the reputation of being an uncivilized boor with the of a slave,

A man who

and

this

ignominious punishment will serve him

manners

right.

persuaded by these words of exhortation will give us no trouble; but stubborn people, who ignore the preamble, ought to be ready to take more notice of the following regulations: C. if

is

easily

anyone strikes a man twenty years or more his senior, any bystander, he is neither of the same age nor younger than the combatants, should If

separate them,

wretched coward. If he is of the same age as the person attacked, or younger, he should go to his assistance as if it were his own brother or father being wronged, or some still more

or be treated

under the law as

a

senior relative.

D. In addition, the

stand

13.

I.e.,

man who

trial for assault. If

someone twenty years

dares to strike his senior as defined 13 must

he loses the case,

older.

b

1540

Lazvs

he must be imprisoned for not less than a year. If the court fixes a longer imprisonment, the period it decides on shall stand.

or a resident alien, strikes a man twenty years or more his senior, the same regulation [57C] about assistance from passers-by shall be enforced in the same way as before. (a) A man found guilty of such a charge, if he is a foreigner not resident in the state, E. If a foreigner,

must pay his penalty by spending two years in prison. (b) If it is a resident alien who is in breach of these regulations, he must go to prison for three years, except that the court may specify

by way of penalty. F. The passer-by who comes across any of these cases of assault and does not give assistance as required by law must be fined: a member of the first property-class one hundred dracha longer period

mas, a

member

of the second fifty drachmas, a

member

of the third

drachmas, and a member of the fourth twenty drachmas. The court in such cases is to consist of the Generals, Company-Commanders, thirty

Tribe-Leaders and Cavalry-Commanders.

Some

laws,

it

seems, are

made

for the benefit of honest

men,

to teach

them

the rules of association that have to be observed if they are to live in friendship; others are made for those who refuse to be instructed and whose naturally tough natures have not been softened enough to stop

them turning points

am

to absolute vice.

It

will be they

who have prompted

the

going to make, and it is for their benefit that the lawgiver will be compelled to produce his laws, although he would wish never to find any occasion to use them. Consider a man who will dare to lay hands

on

I

just

mother or their forebears by way of violent assault. He will fear neither the wrath of the gods above nor the punishments said to await him in the grave; he will hold the ancient and universal tradition in contempt, on the strength of his "knowledge' in a field where he is in fact a total ignoramus. He will therefore turn criminal, and will stand in need of some extreme deterrent. Death, however, is not an extreme and final penalty; the sufferings said to be in store for these people in the world to come are much more extreme than that. But although the threat of these sufferings is no idle one, it has no deterrent effect at all on souls like these. If it did, we should never have to deal with assaults on mothers, and wicked and presumptuous attacks on other forebears. I conclude, therefore, that the punishments men suffer for these crimes here on earth while they are alive should as far as possible equal the penalties beyond the grave. Our next enactment, then, should run as follows: his father or

G. If a man who is not in the grip of insanity dares to strike his father or mother, or their father or mother, the first point is that the passerby must render assistance as provided in former cases. the resident alien renders assistance, he shall be invited to a front seat at the games; (a)(i) If

Laws IX

1541

he does not render assistance, he must go into permanent exile from the land. (ii) if

the non-resident alien renders assistance,

(b) (i) If

he shall be

commended.

he does not render assistance, he must be reprimanded. (c) (i) If a slave renders assistance, he shall be set free. (ii) If he does not render assistance, he must receive a hundred strokes of the lash. If the crime was committed in the market-place, the whipping should be administered by the Market-Wardens; if in the city but not in the market, by the City Warden in residence; if somewhere in the countryside, by the chief Country-Wardens. (ii) If

Everyone of citizen birth who passes by, whether man, woman or child, must shout 'you wicked monster' at the attacker, and repel him. If the passer-by makes no attempt to repel him, he must be liable under the law to a curse from Zeus, guardian of the family and protector of parents. H. If a man is convicted of an assault on his parents, he must be permanently rusticated from the city to some other part of the country, and be banned from all sacred places. (d)

he returns to the city, he must be punished by death, (b) If he does not keep away from sacred places, the Country-Wardens must punish him by a whipping, and by any other I.

(a) If

method J.

(a) If

at their discretion.

any

free

man

eats or drinks in

him in some other him on meeting,

associates with failing to cut

company with such

similar fashion, even

a person, or

by deliberately

any temple, or market-place, or any part of the city, before he has been purified, bearing in mind that he has come into contact with a misfortune that brings a curse upon a man. K. If he disobeys the law and in defiance of it pollutes temples and city, any official who discovers the fact and does not take the man to court will find that this is one of the most serious charges against him at he must not enter

his scrutiny

14 .

L. If a slave strikes a free

man, foreigner or

citizen, the

passer-by

who

does not render assistance must pay the penalty prescribed for his property-class. M. The passers-by in conjunction with the person attacked must bind the slave and hand him over to his victim; the victim must take him, put him in chains, and give him as many strokes of the whip as he likes, 14.

At the end of

in office before

their

term

officials

had

to

submit

being discharged; see 945e-947b.

to

an examination of

their

conduct

1542

Laws

provided he does not diminish the value of the slave to his master; he should then hand him over to the latter's legal ownership. This legal ownership must be subject to the following provision. Any slave who has struck a free man, other than on the orders of the officials, must be tied up; his master must receive him from the assaulted person and not release

him before

the slave persuades his victim that he deserves to

live free of constraint.

The same regulations should apply in all cases (a) of women against each other, (b) of women against men, and (c) of men against women.

Book X Athenian: So

884

much

for cases of assault.

Now let's state a single compre-

hensive rule to cover acts of violence. It will run more or less like this. No one may seize or make off with other people's property, nor use any of his neighbor s possessions without getting the permission of the owner. Contempt for this principle has always been (and still is and always will be) the source of all the evils just mentioned. But there are other acts of

which the worst are the insolence and outrageous actions of the young. These actions are most serious when they affect sacred objects; and the damage is particularly grave when it is done to sacred property that also belongs to the public, or is held in common by the violence, too, of

885

members

of a sub-division of the state, such as a tribe or some similar association. Second, and second in order of gravity, comes wanton to sacred objects that are privately

owned,

particularly

damage tombs; third come

from those already dealt with) on parents. A fourth category of outrageous conduct is when someone ignores the wishes of the authorities and seizes or removes or uses something belonging to them without iheir permission; and any violations of the civil rights of the private citizen which demand legal redress will constitute a fifth class. We have to frame a comprehensive law that will cover each individual case. As for robbery from temples, whether clandestine or open and violent, we have already specified in general terms the appropriate punishment; but our statement of the penalty for offensive remarks about the gods or outrageous actions against their interests should be prefaced by these words of exhortation: No one who believes in gods as the law directs ever voluntarily commits an unholy act or lets any la wless word pass his lips. If he does, it is because of one of three possible misapprehensions: either, as I said, he believes (1) the gods do not exist, or (2) that they exist but take no thought for the attacks (apart

1

b

human

race, or (3) that they are influenced

by

sacrifices

and supplications

Clinias: So what's the right thing for us to

do or say

to these people?

and can c

1.

easily be

See 854d

ff.

won

over.

Laws

X

1543

Athenian: My friend, let's imagine they put their case. Clinias:

What

listen to the ridicule

and scorn with which

I

ridicule?

Athenian: They'll probably go in for bantering, and address us like this: 'Gentlemen of Athens, of Sparta and of Crete, you are quite right. Some of us are indeed absolute atheists, whereas others do believe in such gods as you describe. So we demand of you what you yourselves demanded of the laws, that before you resort to threats and bullying, you should try to convince us by argument and cogent proofs that gods do exist, and that they are in fact above being seduced by gifts into turning a blind eye to injustice. But you see, it's precisely in these and similar terms that we hear them spoken of by the most highly thought-of poets and orators and prophets and priests and thousands of other people too. That's why most of us make little effort to avoid crime, but commit it first and try to put things right afterwards. So from lawgivers who profess to use the velvet glove rather than the iron fist we claim the right to be tackled by persuasion first. Even if, when you state your case for the existence of gods, your elegance of expression is only marginally superior to your opponents', persuade us that your argument is a better expression of the truth, and then perhaps we'll believe you. Isn't that fair enough? Well then, try to reply to our challenge.' Clinias: Well sir, don't you think that the gods' existence is an easy truth to explain?

Athenian:

How?

and the sun and the stars and the universe in general; look at the wonderful procession of the seasons and its articulation into years and months! Anyway, you know that all Greeks and all foreigners are unanimous in recognizing the existence of gods. Athenian: My dear sir, when I think of the contempt these scoundrels no, I withwill probably feel for us, I'm overcome with embarrassment draw that word: let's say they 'alarm' me because you don't appreciate the real grounds of their opposition to you. You think it's just because they can't resist temptation and desire that they are attracted to the godless life. Clinias: Well, just look at the earth

—

—

Clinias:

What

other reason could there be, sir? reason which you two, living rather off the beaten track

Athenian: A as you do, simply wouldn't appreciate.

you

It

will

have completely passed

by.

Clinias:

What

Athenian:

are

you

talking about

now?

A form of ignorance that causes no end of trouble, but which

passes for the height of wisdom. Clinias:

How

do you mean?

Athenian: In Athens a number of written works are current which are not found in your states (which are, I understand, too well run to tolerate them). The subject of these writings (some of which are in verse, others in prose) is theology. The most ancient accounts, after relating how the primitive substances the sky and so on came into being, pass rapidly

—

—

— 1544

Lazos

on to a description of the birth of the gods and the details of how once born they subsequently treated each other. On some subjects, the antiquity of these works makes them difficult to criticize, whatever their influence good or bad on their audience; but when it comes to the respect and attention due to parents, I for one shall never recommend them either as a good influence or as a statement of the honest truth. Still, there's no need to bother with this old material: we may freely allow it to be arranged and recounted in any way the gods find amusing. But the principles of our modern pundits do need to be denounced as a pernicious influence. Just look at the effects of their arguments! When you and I present our proofs for the existence of gods and adduce what you adduced— sun, moon, stars and earth and argue they are gods and divine beings, the

—

—

proselytes of these clever fellows will say that these things are just earth and stones, and are incapable of caring for human affairs, however much our plausible rhetoric has managed to dress them up. Clinias:

Even

would make the situation

were unique,

that theory you've just described trouble. But as similar doctrines in fact exist in their thousands, if it

sir,

even worse. Athenian: What now, then? What's our reply? What must we do? It's as though we were on trial before a bench of godless judges, defending ourselves on a charge arising out of our legislation. 'It's monstrous,' they say to us, 'that you should pass laws asserting that gods exist.' Shall we defend ourselves? Or shall we ignore them and get back to our legislation, so that the

is

mere preface doesn't turn out longer than the actual code? You

we're going to postpone passing the appropriate legislation until we've proved properly to those with a taste for impiety all the points they see,

if

insisted

we had

to cover, so that they feel

uneasy and begin

to find their

views going sour on them, our explanation will be anything but brief. Clinias: Even so, sir, as we've often said in the comparatively short time we've been talking, there's no reason at the moment to prefer a brief explanation to a full one: after all, no one's 'breathing down our neck' (as they say). It would be an awful farce, if we appeared to be putting brevity first and quality second. It s vital that somehow or other we should make out a plausible case for supposing that gods do exist, that they are good, and that they respect justice more than men do. Such a demonstration would constitute just about the best and finest preamble our penal code could have. So let's overcome our reluctance and unhurriedly exert what powers of persuasion we have in this field, devoting ourselves wholeheartedly to a full exposition of our case. Athenian: How keen and insistent you are! I take it you're suggesting we should now offer up a prayer for the success of our exposition, which we certainly can't delay any longer. Well now, how can one argue for the existence of gods without getting angry? You see, one inevitably gets irritable and annoyed with these people who have put us to the trouble, and continue to put us to the trouble, of composing these explanations. If only they believed the stories which they

Laws

X

1545

and sucklings from their nurses and mothers! These almost literally 'charming' stories were told partly for amusement, partly in full earnest; the children heard them related in prayer at sacrifices, and saw acted representations of them a part of the ceremony a child always loves to see and hear; and they saw their own parents praying with the utmost seriousness for themselves and their families in the firm conviction that their prayers and supplications were addressed to gods who really did exist. At the rising and setting of the sun and moon the children saw and heard Greeks and foreigners, in happiness and misery alike, all prostrate at their devotions; far from supposing gods to be a myth, the worshippers believed their existence to be so sure as to be beyond suspicion. When some people contemptuously brush aside all this evidence without a single good reason to support them (as even a half-wit can see) and oblige us to well, how could one possibly admonish them and deliver this address at the same time teach them the basic fact about gods, their existence, without using the rough edge of one's tongue? Still, we must make the best of it: we don't want both sides maddened at once, they by their greed for pleasure, we by our anger at their condition. So our address to men with such a depraved outlook should be calm, and run as follows. Let's use honeyed words and abate our anger, and pretend we're addressing just one representative individual. 'Now then, my lad, you're still young, and as time goes on you'll come to adopt opinions diametrically opposed to those you hold now. Why not wait till later on to make up your mind about these important matters? The most important of all, however lightly you take it at the moment, is otherwise to get the right ideas about the gods and so live a good life: you'll live a bad one. In this connection, I want first to make a crucial and irrefutable point. It's this: you're not unique. Neither you nor your friends are the first to have held this opinion about the gods. It's an illness from which the world is never free, though the number of sufferers varies from time to time. I've met a great many of them, and let me assure you that none of them who have been convinced early in life that gods do not exist have ever retained that belief into old age. However, it is true that some men (but not many) do persist in laboring under the impression either that although the gods exist they are indifferent to human affairs, or alternatively that they are not indifferent but can easily be won over by prayers and sacrifices. Be guided by me: you'll only see this business in its truest light if you wait to gather your information from all sources, particularly the legislator, and then see which theory represents the truth. In the meantime, don't venture any impiety where gods are concerned. You may take it that it will be up to your lawgiver, now and in the future, to try to enlighten you on precisely these topics.'

had

as babes

—

—

—

Clinias: So far,

very well said. Athenian: Certainly, Megillus and Clinias, but what an amazing doctrine we've got involved in, without noticing it! Clinias:

What

sir,

that's

doctrine

do you mean?

1546

Laws

Athenian:

e

truth of

I

mean

the one

as the highest

all.

Clinias: Please be

more

explicit.

Athenian: Some people,

come

which many people regard

believe, account for all things

which have which are coming into existence now, and all do so in the future, by attributing them either to nature, I

to exist, all things

things which will art, or chance.

Clinias: Isn't that satisfactory? 189

Athenian: Oh,

—

expect they've got it more or less right they're clever fellows. Still, let's keep track of them, and see what's really implied in the theories of that school of thought. I

By all means. Athenian: The facts show— so they claim— that the greatest and finest things in the world are the products of nature and chance, the creations of art being comparatively trivial. The works of nature, they say, are grand and primary, and constitute a ready-made source for all the minor works constructed and fashioned by art— artefacts, as they're generally called. Clinias: How do you mean? Athenian: I'll put it more precisely. They maintain that fire, water, earth and air owe their existence to nature and chance, and in no case to art, and that it is by means of these entirely inanimate substances 2 that the secondary physical bodies the earth, sun, moon and stars have been produced. These substances moved at random, each impelled by virtue of its own inherent properties, which depended on various suitable amalgamations of hot and cold, dry and wet, soft and hard, and all other haphazard combinations that inevitably resulted when the opposites were mixed. This is the process to which all the heavens and everything that is in them owe their birth, and the consequent establishment of the four seasons led to the appearance of all plants and living creatures. The cause of all this, they say, was neither intelligent planning, nor a deity, nor art, but— as we've explained— nature and chance. Art, the brain-child of these Clinias:

b

—

c

d

—

living creatures, arose later, the mortal child of mortal beings; it has produced, at a late stage, various amusing trifles that are hardly real at allmere insubstantial images of the same order as the arts themselves (I

mean

for instance the

productions of the arts of painting and music, and all their ancillary skills). But if there are in fact some techniques that produce worthwhile results, they are those that co-operate with nature, like medicine and farming and physical training. This school of thought maintains that

government, e

in particular, has

very

a matter of art; similarly legislation

on technique, and Clinias:

What

its

are

little is

to

nature,

and

is

never a natural process but

enactments are quite

you driving

do with

largely

is

based

artificial.

at?

Athenian: My dear fellow, the first thing these people say about the gods is that they are artificial concepts corresponding to nothing in nature; 2.

Or

possibly, 'by these entirely inanimate agencies'

(i.e.,

nature and chance).

Laws

1547

X

they are legal fictions, which moreover vary very widely according to the different conventions people agree on when they produce a legal code. In particular, goodness according to nature and goodness according to the law are two different things, and there is no natural standard of justice at all. On the contrary, men are always wrangling about their moral standards and altering them, and every change introduced becomes binding from the

moment

it's

made, regardless of the

fact that

it

is

entirely artificial,

and based on convention, not nature in the slightest degree. All this, my friends, is the theme of experts— as our young people regard them— who in their prose and poetry maintain that anything one can get away with by force is absolutely justified. This is why we experience outbreaks of impiety among the young, who assume that the kind of gods the law tells them to believe in do not exist; this is why we get treasonable efforts to convert people to the 'true natural life', which is essentially nothing but a life of conquest over others, not one of service to your neighbor as the law enjoins. Clinias: What a pernicious doctrine you've explained, sir! It must be the ruin of the younger generation, both in the state at large and in private families.

Athenian: That's very true, Clinias. So what do you think the legislator ought to do, faced with such a long-established thesis as this? Is he simply to stand up in public and threaten all the citizens with punishment if they don't admit the existence of gods and mentally accept the law's description of them? He could make the same threat about their notions of beauty and justice and all such vital concepts, as well as about anything that encourages virtue or vice; he could demand that the citizens' belief and actions should accord with his written instructions, and insist that anyone not showing the proper obedience to the laws must be punished either by death, or by a whipping and imprisonment, deprivation of civic rights, or by being sent into exile a poorer man. But what about persuading them? When he establishes a legal code for his people, shouldn't he try to talk them into being as amenable as he can make them? Clinias: Certainly, sir. If even limited persuasion can be applied in this field, no legislator of even moderate ability should shrink from making the effort. On the contrary, he should argue 'till the cows come home', as the saying is, to back up the old doctrine that the gods exist, and to support the other arguments you ran through just now. In particular, he should defend law

some no

itself

less

and

art as either part of

powerful agency

of reason. That,

I

think,

is

—being in

fact, to tell

the point you're making,

Athenian: Really, Clinias, you are presented as

nature or existing by reason of

you suggest,

are enthusiastic!

in addresses

the truth, creations

and

But

composed

I

agree.

when for a

these themes

popular audi-

ence, aren't they found rather difficult to understand? And don't the addresses tend to go on for ever? Clinias: Well, sir, we put up with one long discussion, about inebriation in the cause of culture, so surely

we

can tolerate another, about theology

1548

Laws

and so

And

forth.

of course this helps intelligent legislation tremendously, because legal instructions, once written down, remain fixed and permanent'

ready

up

stand

to

to scrutiny forever.

So there's no reason for alarm if at make difficult listening, because your slow learner will be able to go back again and again and examine them. Nor does their length, provided they're useful, justify any man in committing what seems to me' at least, an impiety: I mean refusing to facilitate these explanations as best he can. first

they

Megillus: Yes, sir, I entirely approve of what Clinias says. Athenian: As well you may, Megillus, and we must do as he suggests. Of course, if this sort of argument had not been disseminated so widely over pretty well the entire human race, there would be no call for arguments to prove the existence of gods. But in present circumstances we've no choice. When the most important laws are being trampled under foot by scoundrels, whose duty is it to rush to their defense, if not the legislator's? Megillus: Nobody's.

Athenian:

Now then, Clinias,

you must take your share in the explanation, so tell me your opinion again. I assume the upholder of this doctrine thinks of fire and water, earth and air as being the first of all substances, and this is precisely what he means by the term 'nature'; soul, he thinks' was derived from them, at a later stage. No, I do more than 'assume': I'd say he argues the point explicitly. Clinias: True.

Athenian: head, so to

Now

by heaven, haven't we discovered the fountainspeak, of the senseless opinions of all those who have ever then,

undertaken investigation into nature? Scrutinize carefully every stage in their argument, because it will be crucial if we can show that these people who have embraced impious doctrines and lead others on are using fallacious arguments rather than cogent ones— which I think is in fact the case. Clinias:

You

re right, but try to explain their error.

Athenian: Well, line of argument. Clinias.

Don t if we

it

looks as

hesitate,

if

we have

realize

to

embark on

you think we

a rather unfamiliar

be straying outside attempt such an explanation, but if this is the only way to reach agreement that the beings currently described as gods in our law are properly so described, then this, my dear sir, is the kind of explanation legislation

we must

sir. I

ll

give.

Athenian: So it looks as if I must now argue along rather unfamiliar lines. Well then, the doctrine which produces an impious soul also 'produces',

in

a sense, the soul itself, in that

denies the priority of what was in fact first cause of the birth and destruction of all things, and regards it as a later creation. Conversely, it asserts that what actually came later, came first. That's the source of the mistake these people have made about the real nature of the gods. it

the

Clinias: So far, the point escapes me. Athenian: It's the soul, my good friend, that nearly everybody seems to have misunderstood, not realizing its nature and power. Quite apart

Laws

1549

X

from the other points about it, people are particularly ignorant about its birth. It is one of the first creations, born long before all physical things, and is the chief cause of all their alterations and transformations. Now if that's true, anything closely related to soul will necessarily have been created before material things, won't it, since soul itself is older than matter? Clinias: Necessarily.

Athenian: Opinion, diligence, reason, art and law will be prior to roughness and smoothness, heaviness and lightness. In particular, the grand and primary works and creations, precisely because they come in the category 'primary', will be attributable to art. Natural things, and nature herself— will be secondary to use the mistaken terminology of our opponents products from art and reason.

—

Clinias:

Why

do you say 'mistaken'?

Athenian: When they use the term 'nature', they mean the process by which the primary substances were created. But if it can be shown that soul came first, not fire or air, and that it was one of the first things to be created, it will be quite correct to say that soul is preeminently natural. This is true, provided you can demonstrate that soul is older than matter, but not otherwise.

Very true. Athenian: So this is precisely the point we have to tackle next? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: It's an extremely tricky argument, and we old men must be careful not to be taken in by its freshness and novelty, so that it eludes our grasp and makes us look like ridiculous fools whose ambitious ideas lead to failure even in little things. Just consider. Imagine the three of us had to cross a river in spate, and I were the younger and had plenty of experience of currents. Suppose I said, 'I ought to try first on my own account, and leave you two in safety while I see if the river is fordable for you two older men as well, or if not, just how bad it is. If it turns out to be fordable, I'll then call you and put my experience at your disposal in helping you to cross; but if in the event it cannot be crossed by old men like yourselves, then the only risk has been mine.' Wouldn't that strike you as fair enough? The situation is the same now: the argument ahead runs too deep, and men as weak as you will probably get out of your depth. I want to prevent you novices in answering from being dazed and dizzied by a stream of questions, which would put you in an undignified and humiliating position you'd find most unpleasant. So this is what I think I'd better do now: first I'll ask questions of myself, while you listen in safety; then I'll go over the answers again and in this way work through the whole argument until the soul has been thoroughly dealt with and its Clinias:

priority to matter proved.

Clinias:

We

think that's a splendid idea,

sir.

Please act on your sug-

gestion.

Athenian: Come then, if ever we needed to call upon the help of God, assist it's now. Let's take it the gods have been most pressingly invoked to the proof of their own existence, and let's rely on their help as if it were

1550

Laws

a rope steadying us as

Now when

we

enter the deep waters of our present theme. I'm under interrogation on this sort of topic, and such questions

as the following are put to

someone asks

do

me, the

safest replies

seem

to

be these. Suppose

things stand still, and does nothing move? Or is precisely the opposite true? Or do some things move, while others are motionless?' reply will be 'I suppose some move and others remain Sir,

all

My

must be some space in which the stationary objects remain at rest, and those in motion move?' 'Of course.' 'Some of them, presumably, will do so in one location, others in several?' 'Do you mean', we shall reply, 'that "moving in one location" is the action of objects which at rest.' 'So surely there

are able to keep their centers immobile? For instance, there are circles which are said to stay put" even though as a whole they are revolving.' 'Yes.' 'And we appreciate that when a disk revolves like that, points near and far from the center describe circles of different radii in the same time;

motion varies according to these radii and is proportionately quick or slow. This motion gives rise to all sorts of wonderful phenomena, because these points simultaneously traverse circles of large and small circumference at proportionately high or low speeds an effect one might have expected to be impossible.' 'You're quite right.' 'When you speak of motion in many locations I suppose you're referring to objects that are always leaving one spot and moving on to another. Sometimes their motion involves only one point of contact with their successive situations, sometheir

—

times several, as in rolling. 'From time to time objects meet; a moving one colliding with a stationary one disintegrates, but if it meets other objects traveling in the opposite direction they coalesce into a single intermediate substance, half one and half the other.' 'Yes,

agree to your statement of the case.' 'Further, such combination leads to an increase in bulk, while their separation leads to diminution— so long as the existing states of the objects remain unimpaired; but if either combination or separation entails the abolition of the I

existing

state, the objects

concerned are destroyed. 'Now, what conditions are always present when anything is produced? Clearly, an initial impulse grows and reaches the second stage and then the third stage out of the second, finally (at the third stage) presenting percipient beings with something to perceive. This then is the process of change and alteration to which everything owes its birth. thing exists as such so long as it is stable, but when it changes its essential

A

state

completely destroyed.' So, my friends, haven't motion, except two? Clinias:

we now

classified

and numbered

all

it is

forms of

Which two?

Athenian: My dear chap, they are the two which constitute the purpose of every question we've asked. Clinias: Try to be more explicit. Athenian: What we really had in view was soul, wasn't it? Clinias: Certainly.

real

— Laws

X

1551

Athenian: The one kind of motion is that which is permanently capable of moving other things but not itself; the other is permanently capable of moving both itself and other things by processes of combination and separation, increase

and diminution, generation and destruction. Let these

stand as two further distinct types in our complete list of motions. Clinias: Agreed. Athenian: So we shall put ninth the kind which always imparts motion 3 to something else and is itself changed by another thing. Then there's the

motion that moves both itself and other things, suitable for all active and passive processes and accurately termed the source of change and motion in all things that exist. I suppose we'll call that the tenth. Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian:

Now which of our (roughly)

fied in singling out as the

Clinias:

most powerful and

superior,

and

be

justi-

radically effective?

the others are inferior to

all

Athenian: Well said! So shouldn't in the points we've just made?

What

Athenian: Clinias:

we

We can't resist the conclusion that the motion which can generate

itself is infinitely

Clinias:

ten motions should

It

correct

one or two inaccuracies

do you mean? to call that motion

sort of inaccuracy

wasn't quite right

Why

we

it.

the 'tenth'.

not?

Athenian: It can be shown to be first, in ancestry as well as in power; although oddly enough a moment ago we called it 'ninth' the next kind we'll put second.

—

Clinias:

What

are

you

getting at?

we

one thing producing a change in another, and that in turn affecting something else, and so forth, will there ever be, in such a sequence, an original cause of change? How could anything whose motion is transmitted to it from something else be the first thing to effect an alteration? It's impossible. In reality, when something which has set itself moving effects an alteration in something, and that in turn effects something else, so that the motion is transmitted to thousands upon thousands of things one after another, the entire sequence of their movements must surely spring from some initial principle, which can hardly be anything except the change effected by self-generated motion. Clinias: You've put it admirably, and your point must be allowed. Athenian: Now let's put the point in a different way, and once again answer our own questions: 'Suppose the whole universe were somehow the theory which most of our philosoto coalesce and come to a standstill pher-fellows are actually bold enough to maintain which of the motions we have enumerated would inevitably be the first to arise in it? Selfgenerating motion, surely, because no antecedent impulse can ever be transmitted from something else in a situation where no antecedent impulse exists. Self-generating motion, then, is the source of all motions, and Athenian: This: when

find

—

3.

Inserting

te

after heauten in c4.

—

— 1552

Laws

the primary force in both stationary be able to avoid the conclusion that

and moving objects, and we shan't it is the most ancient and the most potent of all changes, whereas the change which is produced by something else and is in turn transmitted to other objects, comes second.' Clinias: You're absolutely right.

now we've question we should

Athenian: So another

reached answer.

this point in

our discussion, here's

What?

Clinias:

—

Athenian: If we ever saw this phenomenon self-generating motion arise in an object made of earth, water or fire (alone or in combination) how should we describe that object's condition? Clinias:

moves

Of

itself,

course,

are

we

Athenian: That's Clinias:

It

what you're

really asking

say that

'alive'?

to

it is

me

is this:

when an

object

right.

emphatically

is alive.

Athenian: Well then, when we see that a thing has a soul, the situation is exactly the same, isn't it? We have to admit that it is alive. Clinias: Yes, exactly the same. Athenian: Now, for heaven's sake, hold on a minute. I suppose you'd be prepared to recognize three elements in any given thing? Clinias:

What do you mean?

Athenian: The definition of this,

first

point

and the

is

what

third

is

the object actually is, the second is the the name. And in addition there are two

questions to be asked about every existing thing. Clinias:

Two?

Athenian: Sometimes we put forward the mere name and want to know the definition, and sometimes we put forward the definition and ask for the name. Clinias:

I

take

it

the point

we want

to

make

at the

moment

is this.

Athenian: What? Clinias: In general, things can be divided into two, and this is true of some numbers as well. Such a number has the name 'even' and its definition

is 'a

number

divisible into

two equal

parts'.

Athenian. Yes, that s the sort of thing I mean. So surely, in either case whether we provide the name and ask for the definition or give the definition

and ask

call it

'even'

for the

and

name

define

it

— we're referring as

'a

number

to the

same

object?

divisible into two',

it's

When we the

same

thing we're talking about. Clinias:

It

certainly

is.

Athenian: So what's the definition of the thing we call the soul? Surely we can do nothing but use our formula of a moment ago: 'motion capable of

moving Clinias:

itself'.

Do you mean

that the entity

which we

all call 'soul' is

precisely

which is defined by the expression 'self-generating motion'? Athenian: I do. And if this is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven't we

that

got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul

is

identical with the original

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1553

X

source of the generation and motion of all past, present and future things and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion in everything. Clinias: Dissatisfied? No! On the contrary, it has been proved up to the hilt that soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there

is.

Athenian: But when one thing is put in motion by another, it is never thereby endowed with the power of independent self-movement. Such derived motion will therefore come second, or as far down the list as you fancy relegating it, being a mere change in matter that quite literally 'has no soul'. Clinias: Correctly argued.

and complete statement of the truth, when we said that soul is prior to matter, and that matter came later and takes second place. Soul is the master, and matter its Athenian: So

it

was an equally

is

indeed absolutely

correct, final

natural subject. Clinias: That

true.

Athenian: The next step is to remember our earlier admission that if soul were shown to be older than matter, the spiritual order of things would be older than the material. Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: So habits, customs, will, calculation, right opinion, diligence and memory will be prior creations to material length, breadth, depth and strength,

if

(as is true) soul is prior to matter.

Clinias: Unavoidably.

Athenian: And the next unavoidable admission, seeing that we are going to posit soul as the cause of all things, will be that it is the cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice and all the opposites.

Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: And surely it's necessary to assert that as soul resides and keeps control anywhere where anything is moved, it controls the heavens as well.

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian: One soul, or more than one? I'll answer for you both: more than one. At any rate, we must not assume fewer than two: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity. Clinias: That's absolutely right.

Athenian: Very well, then. So soul, by virtue of its own motions, stirs into movement everything in the heavens and on earth and in the sea. The names of the motions of soul are: wish, reflection, diligence, counsel, opinion true and false, joy and grief, cheerfulness and fear, love and hate. Soul also uses all related or initiating motions which take over the secondary movements of matter and stimulate everything to increase or diminish, separate or combine, with the accompanying heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, roughness and smoothness, white and black, bitter and sweet.

1554

Laws

These are the instruments soul uses, whether b

(soul itself being,

it

cleaves to divine reason

were told, a divinity), and guides everything an appropriate and successful conclusion, or allies itself with unreason and produces completely opposite results. Shall we agree this is the if

the truth

to

or

case,

do we

still

suspect that the truth

may

be different?

By no means. Athenian: Well then, what kind of soul may we say has gained control of the heavens and earth and their entire cycle of movement? Is it the rational and supremely virtuous kind, or that which has neither advantage? Would you like our reply to run like this? Clinias:

c

How?

Clinias:

Athenian:

movement

Tf,

my

fine fellow'

of the heavens

and

(we should say)

all

that

is

in

whole course and them reflect the motion and 'the

revolution and calculation of reason, and operate in a corresponding fashion, then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path.' Clinias: True. d

Athenian: Tf however these things move in an unbalanced and disorganized way, we must say the evil kind of soul is in charge of them.' Clinias: That too is true. Athenian: 'So what is the nature of rational motion?' Now this,

friends,

is

a question to

which

it is

difficult to give

an answer that will

make sense, so you're justified here in calling me in to help with your Athenian:

e

my

reply

answering this question we mustn't assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately: let's not produce darkness at noon, so to speak, by looking at the sun direct. We can save our sight by looking at an image of the object we're asking about. Clinias:

Still,

How

in

do you mean?

Athenian: What about selecting from our

list of ten motions the one which reason resembles, and taking that as our image? I'll join you in recalling it, and then we 11 give a joint answer to the question. Clinias: Yes, that's probably your best method of explanation. Athenian: Do we still remember at any rate this from the list of points we made earlier, that all things are either in motion or at rest?

we do. Athenian: And some of those in motion move in a Clinias: Yes,

898

single location, others

in a succession of locations?

Clinias: That

is so.

Athenian: Of these two motions, that taking place in a single location necessarily implies continuous revolution round a central point, just like wheels being turned on a lathe; and this kind of motion bears the closest

and likeness to the Clinias: What do you mean?

possible affinity

cyclical

movement

of reason.

— Laws

X

1555

Athenian: Take reason on the one hand, and motion in a single location on the other. If we were to point out that in both cases the motion was determined by a single plan and procedure and that it was (a) regular, (b) uniform, (c) always at the same point in space, (d) around a fixed center, (e) in

the

same

and were to illustrate sphere being turned on a lathe, then no one incompetent makers of verbal images.

position relative to other objects,

both by the example of a could ever show us up for Clinias: You're quite right. Athenian: Now consider the motion that is never uniform or regular or at the same point in space or round the same center or in the same relative position or in a single location, and is neither planned nor organized nor systematic. Won't that motion be associated with every kind of unreason? Clinias: Absolutely true,

Athenian: So

now

there's

it

will.

no

difficulty in saying right out that since

we

find that the entire cycle of events is to be attributed to soul, the heavens we have to say that we see revolving must necessarily be driven round because they are arranged and directed either by the best kind of soul or

—

by the other

sort.

Clinias: Well,

sir,

would be produced by one or more

judging from what has been said,

I

think

rank blasphemy to deny that their revolution is souls blessed with perfect virtue. Athenian: You've proved a most attentive listener, Clinias.

it

Now attend

to this further point.

Clinias:

What?

Athenian: If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon and the other heavenly bodies, does it not impel each individually? Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: Let's take a single example: our results will then obviously apply to all the other heavenly bodies. .? Clinias: And your example is the sun. Everyone can see its body, but no one can see Athenian: not that you could see the soul of any other creature, living or its soul dying. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that we are in fact held in the embrace of some such thing though it is totally below the level of our bodily senses, and is perceptible by reason alone. So by reason and understanding let's get hold of a new point about the soul. .

.

.

.

.

—

Clinias:

What?

Athenian: it

If

soul drives the sun,

we

shan't go far

wrong

if

we

say that

operates in one of three ways. Clinias: And what are they?

Athenian: Either (a) the soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries it wherever it goes, just as our soul takes us around from one place to another, or (b) it acquires its own body of fire or air of some kind (as certain people maintain), and impels the sun by the external contact

1556

Laws

body with body, or (c) it is entirely immaterial, but guides the sun along its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful of

powers. Clinias: Yes,

soul

b

manages

it

must necessarily be by one

of these

methods

that the

the universe.

Athenian: Now, just wait a minute. Whether we find that it is by stationing itself in the sun and driving it like a chariot, or by moving it from outside, or by some other means, that this soul provides us all with light, every single one of us is bound to regard it as a god. Isn't that right? Clinias: Yes, one would be absolutely stupid not to. Athenian: Now consider all the stars and the moon and the

years and what can we do except repeat the same story? A soul or souls— and perfectly virtuous souls at that— have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other the

months and

means,

and

shall insist that these souls are gods.

still

Clinias:

You mean

Athenian:

d

the seasons:

Can anybody admit all put up with people who deny that 'everything is full of gods'? 4 Clinias: No sir, nobody could be so mad. Athenian: Now then, Megillus and Clinias, let's delimit the courses of action open to anyone who has so far refused to believe in gods, and get rid of him. this

c

we

all

.

.

.

he should demonstrate to us that we're wrong to posit soul as the first cause to which everything owes its birth, and that our subsequent deductions were equally mistaken, or, if he can't put a better case than ours, he should let himself be persuaded by us and live the rest of his life a believer in gods. So let's review the thesis we argued for the existence of gods against the non-believers: was it cogent or .

.

.

either

&

feeble?

Clinias: Feeble, sir?

Not

in the least.

Athenian: Very well. So far as atheists are concerned, our case as complete. Next we have to use some gentle

we may

regard

persuasion on the believes in gods but thinks they are unconcerned about human affairs. 'My splendid fellow,' we'll say, 'your belief in the existence of gods probably springs from a kind of family tie between you and the gods that draws you to your natural kin and makes you honor them and recognize their existence. What drives you to impiety is the good fortune of scoundrels and criminals in private and public life which in reality is not good fortune at all, although it is highly admired as such

man who

—

by popular opinion misplaced enthusiasms: poetry and literature of every kind invest it with a pernicious glamour. Or perhaps you observe men reaching the enc their lives, full of years and honor, leaving behind them their children s children, and your present disquiet is because you've discovered

and

900

its

^

4.

A

remark attributed

to Thales

(c.

600

esc.),

traditionally the

first

philosopher.

— Laws

X

1557

from hearsay or personal observation) a few of the many ghastly acts of impiety which (you notice) are the very means by which some of these people have risen from humble beginnings to supreme power and dictatorships. The result is that although by virtue of your kinship with the gods you'd clearly be reluctant to lay such things at their door, your mental confusion and your inability to find fault with them has brought you to your present predicament where you believe they exist, but despise and neglect human affairs. Now, we want to prevent your thoughts from becoming more impious than they are already: let's see if argument will ward off the disease while it is still in its early stages. We must also try to make use of the original thesis we argued so exhaustively against the absolute atheist, by linking the next step in the exposition on to it.' So you, Clinias and Megillus, must do what you did before: take the young man's place and answer on his behalf. If any difficulty crops up in the argument. I'll take over from you two as I did just now, and conduct you across (either

the river. Clinias:

Good

idea.

You play your part, and

we'll carry out

your sugges-

tions to the best of our ability.

Athenian: Still, perhaps it won't be too difficult to show our friend that gods are just as attentive to details as to important matters more so, in fact. You see, he was here a moment ago and heard that their special job an expression of their perfect virtue is to watch over the universe. Clinias: Yes, he certainly did hear that said. Athenian: The next thing is for our opponents to join us in asking this question: what particular virtue have we in mind when we agree that the gods are good? Now then: don't we regard moderation and the possession

—

—

of reason as a

Clinias:

mark

We

of virtue,

and

their opposites as

marks

of vice?

do.

Athenian: What about courage and cowardice? Are come under virtue and vice respectively?

we

agreed they

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian:

And

we'll label the

one

set of qualities 'disgraceful'

and the

other 'admirable'? Clinias: Yes, we must.

And

the base qualities are characteristic of anyone, they are characteristic of us; the gods, we shall say, are not affected by them,

Athenian:

if

either radically or slightly.

Clinias:

No

one would disagree with that

either.

we

regard neglect and idleness and riotous living as part of the soul's virtue? Or what's your view?

Athenian: Well, then, shall Clinias: Really!

Athenian: As part of

vice, then?

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: So

it's

Clinias: Right.

the opposite qualities that will be ascribed to virtue?

1558

Laws

Athenian: Very well then. In our view all idle and thoughtless bons vivants will be just the kind of people the poet said were dike nothing so much as stingless drones '. 5 Clinias: Very apt, that. Athenian: So we mustn't say that God has precisely the sort of character he himself detests, and we mustn t allow any attempt to maintain such a view.

Of course not; it would be intolerable. Athenian. Take someone who has the special job of looking after some particular sphere of action, and who is preoccupied with his major duties to the neglect of the small. Could we possibly commend him, except for reasons that would ring quite hollow? Let's consider the point in this light: Clinias:

doesn't this sort of conduct

Two

—divine or human —

fall

into

two categories?

do we say? Athenian. Either a man thinks it makes no difference to his job as a whole if he neglects the details, or important though they are, he nevertheless lives in idleness and self-indulgence and neglects them. Or is there some other possible reason for his neglecting them? (Of course, if it is simply impossible to look after everything, and a god or some poor mortal fails to take care of something when he has not the strength and therefore the ability, no question of positive neglect of either major or minor duties will arise.) Clinias: No, of course not. Athenian: Now let our two opponents answer the questions of the three of us. They both admit gods exist, but one thinks they can be bought off, the other that they are careless about details. 'First of all, do you both admit that the gods know and see and hear everything, and that nothing within the range of our senses or intellect can escape them? Is this your position, or what? Clinias:

Clinias:

categories,

'It is.'

Athenian: 'And

they can do anything which power of mortals and immortals?' Clinias: Yes, of course they'll agree to that too. also, that

is

within the

Athenian: Further, the five of us have already agreed that the gods are good supremely so, in fact.

—

Clinias: Emphatically.

Athenian: So surely, given they're the sort of beings we've admitted, it's absolutely impossible to agree that they do anything out of sloth and self-indulgence. Among us mortals, you see, laziness springs from cowardice, and sloth from laziness and self-indulgence. Clinias: That's very true. Athenian: Then no god neglects anything because of sloth and laziness, because no god, presumably, suffers from cowardice. Clinias: You're quite right.

5

.

Works and Days 304

.

Laws

X

1559

Athenian: Now if in fact they do neglect the tiny details of the universe, the remaining possibilities are surely these: either they neglect them because they know that no such detail needs their attention, or well, what other explanation could there be, except a lack of knowledge? Clinias: None. Athenian: So, my dearest sir, are we to interpret you as saying that the gods are ignorant, and display negligence where it is necessary to be solicitous, because they don't know ? Or alternatively that they realize the necessity, but do what the most wretched of men are said to do, namely fail in their duty because they are somehow overcome by temptation or pain, even though they know that there are better options than the one

—

they've in fact chosen? Clinias: Indeed not.

Athenian:

surely

has something to do with the world the most god-fearing of all living creatures,

human

and man himself

of the soul, isn't

Now

is

life

he?

dare say. Athenian: And we regard like the universe as a whole. Clinias:

Clinias:

I

Of

all

mortal creatures as possessions of gods,

course.

Athenian: So whether you argue these possessions count for little or much in the sight of the gods, in neither case would it be proper for our owners to neglect us, seeing how very solicitous and good they are. You see, there's another point we ought to consider here. Clinias:

What?

Athenian:

a point

It's

about perception and physical strength. Aren't

they essentially at opposite poles, so far as ease and difficulty are concerned? Clinias:

What do you mean?

Athenian: Although big, they are

much

little

easier,

things are

when

more

difficult to see or

there are only a

few

hear than

of them, to carry or

control or look after. Clinias: Yes,

much

easier.

Athenian: Take a doctor who has been given the entire body to treat. Will he ever get good results if he neglects the individual limbs and tiny parts, in spite of being willing and able to look after the major organs? Clinias: No, never. Athenian: Nor yet will helmsmen or generals or householders, nor 'statesmen' or anybody of that ilk, succeed in major day-to-day matters if they neglect occasional details. You know how even masons say the big stones don't lie well without the small ones. Clinias:

Of

course.

Athenian: So

let's

not treat

God

as less skilled than a mortal craftsman,

same expertise to all the jobs in his own line whether they're big or small, and gets more finished and perfect results the better he is at his work. We must not suppose that God, who is supremely wise.

who

applies the

1560 903

Laws

and willing and able

superintend the world, looks to major matters but like a faint-hearted lazybones who throws up his hands at hard work neglects the minor, which we established were in fact easier to look after.

—

Clinias:

No

to

we

should never entertain such notions about gods. It's a point of view that would be absolutely impious and untrue. Athenian: Well, it looks to me as if we've given a pretty complete answer to this fellow who's always going on about the negligence of heaven. sir,

we

Clinias: Yes, b

have.

Athenian: At any rate, our thesis has forced him to admit he was wrong. But I still think we need to find a form of words to charm him into agreement. Clinias: Well,

my

what do you suggest? Athenian: What we say to the young man should serve

The

of this thesis:

c

friend,

convince him supervisor of the universe has arranged everything to

with an eye to its preservation and excellence, and its individual parts play appropriate active or passive roles according to their various capacities. These parts, down to the smallest details of their active and passive functions, have each been put under the control of ruling powers that have perfected the minutest constituents of the universe. Now then, you perverse fellow, one such part a mere speck that nevertheless constantly contri-

—

butes to the good of the whole— is you, you who have forgotten that nothing is created except to provide the entire universe with a life of prosperity.

d

You

forget that creation

not for your benefit: you exist for the sake of the universe. Every doctor, you see, and every skilled craftsman always works for the sake of some end-product as a whole; he handles his materials so that they will give the best results in general, and makes the parts contribute to the good of the whole, not vice versa. But you're grumbling because you don't appreciate that your position is best not only for the universe but for you too, thanks to your common origin. And since a soul is allied with different bodies at different times, and perpetually undergoes all sorts of changes, either self-imposed or produced by some other soul, the divine checkers-player has nothing else to do except promote a soul with a promising character to a better situation, and relegate is

one

that

e

deteriorating to an inferior, as they all meet the fate they deserve.' Clinias: do you mean? is

is

appropriate in each case, so that

How

Athenian:

fancy

could explain

how

easy it could be for gods to Suppose that in one's constant efforts to serve its interests one were to mold all that is in it by transforming everything (by turning fire into water permeated by soul, for instance), instead of producing variety from a basic unity or unity from variety, then after the first or second or third stage of creation everything would be arranged I

I

control the universe.

904

in

infinite

6

.

of the universe finds his task remarkably easy. 6.

an

number of perpetually changing patterns But in fact the supervisor

Deleting

me

in e4.

Laws

1561

X

what do you mean? Athenian: This. Our King saw (a) that all actions are a function of soul and involve a great deal of virtue and a great deal of vice, (b) that the combination of body and soul, while not an eternal creation like the gods sanctioned by law, is nevertheless indestructible (because living beings could never have been created if one of these two constituent factors had been destroyed), (c) that one of them— the good element in soul— is naturally beneficial, while the bad element naturally does harm. Seeing would most all this he contrived a place for each constituent where it easily and effectively ensure the triumph of virtue and the defeat of vice throughout the universe. With this grand purpose in view he has worked out what sort of position, in what regions, should be assigned to a soul to match its changes of character; but he left it to the individual's acts of Clinias: Again,

determine the direction of these changes. You see, the way we react to particular circumstances is almost invariably determined by our desires and our psychological state. Clinias: Likely enough. Athenian: So all things that contain soul change, the cause of their change lying within themselves, and as they change they move according to the ordinance and law of destiny. Small changes in unimportant aspects of character entail small horizontal changes of position in space, while a substantial decline into injustice sets the soul on the path to the depths of the so-called "under" world, which men call "Hades" and similar names,

will to

and which haunts and terrifies them both during their lives and when they have been sundered from their bodies. Take a soul that becomes particularly full of vice or virtue as a result of its own acts of will and the powerful influence of social intercourse. If companionship with divine experiences an exceptional change of location, being conducted by a holy path to some superior place elsewhere. Alternatively, opposite characteristics will send it off to live in the opposite region. And in spite of your belief that the gods neglect you,

virtue has

my

made

lad, or rather

This

is

it

exceptionally divine,

it

young man.

the sentence of the gods that dwell

7 upon Olympus

— to go to join worse souls as you grow worse and better souls as you grow better, and alike in life and all the deaths you suffer to do and be done by according to the standards that birds of a feather naturally apply among themselves. Neither you nor anyone else who has got into trouble will ever be able to run fast enough to boast that he has escaped this sentence a sentence to which the judges have attached special importance, and which should take every possible care to avoid. Make yourself ever so small and hide in the depths of the earth, or soar high into the sky: this

—

7.

Odyssey xix.43.

1562

b

Laws

sentence will be ever at your heels, and either while you're still alive on earth or after you ve descended into Hades or been taken to some even more remote place, you'll pay the proper penalty of your crimes. You'll find the same is true of those whom you imagine have emerged from misery to happiness because you've seen them rise from a humble position to high estate by acts of impiety, or some similar wickedness.

These actions,

seemed

were like a mirror which reflected the gods' total lack of concern. But you didn't appreciate how the role of the gods contributes to the total scheme of things. What a bold fellow you must be, if you think you've no need of such knowledge! Yet without it no one will ever catch so much as a glimmer of the truth or be able to offer a reasoned account it

c

to you,

of happiness or misery in

life.

So

if

Clinias here

and

this

whole group of

men convince you that you don't really understand what you're saying about the gods, then the divine assistance will be with you. But it may be old

that

d

you need some further explanation, so

listen

while

if

you have any sense

you'll

we

address our third opponent. Now as far as I'm concerned, we've proved, not too inadequately, that gods exist and care for mankind. However, there remains the view that they can be bought off by the gifts of sinners. No one should ever assent

and we must fight to the last ditch to refute it. Clinias: Well said. Let's do as you suggest. Athenian: Look— in the name of the gods themselves !— how would they be bought off, supposing they ever were? What would they have to be? What sort of being would do this? Well, if they are going to run the entire universe forever, presumably they'll have to be rulers. to this thesis,

e

Clinias: True.

Athenian:

Or

Now

then,

do the gods in fact resemble? resemble them? Let's compare small instances with

what rulers and see what rulers

rather,

great,

what

sort of ruler

our purpose. What about drivers of competing teams of horses, or steersmen of boats in a race? Would they be suitable parallels? Or we might compare the gods to commanders of armies. Again, it could be that they re analogous to doctors concerned to defend the body in the war against disease, or to farmers anxiously anticipating the seasons that usually discourage the growth of their crops, or to shepherds. Now since we've agreed among ourselves that the universe is full

of

will serve

many good

outnumber

things and many bad as well, and that the latter the former, we maintain that the battle we have on our hands

never finished, and demands tremendous vigilance. However, gods and spirits are fighting on our side, the gods and spirits whose chattels we are. What ruins us is injustice and senseless aggression; what protects us is

b

and sensible moderation— virtues that are part of the spiritual characteristics of the gods, although one can find them quite clearly residing among us too, albeit on a small scale. Now there are some souls living on is

justice

earth in possession of ill-gotten gains, who in their obviously brutish way throw themselves before the souls of their guardians (whether watch-dogs, shepherds, or masters of the utmost grandeur) and by wheedling

words

Laws

1563

X

and winning entreaties try to persuade them of the truth of the line put about by scoundrels that they have the right to feather their nest with impunity at mankind's expense. But I suppose our view is that this vice we've named acquisitiveness is what is called 'disease' when it appears in flesh and blood, and 'plague' when brought by the seasons or at intervals of years; while if it occurs in the state and society, the same vice turns up under yet another name: 'injustice'.

—

c

—

—

Clinias: Certainly.

who

argues that gods are always indulgent to the unjust man and the criminal, provided they're given a share in the loot, must in effect be prepared to say that if wolves, for instance, were to give watch-dogs a small part of their prey, the dogs would be appeased

Athenian: Thus anyone

d

by the gift and turn a blind eye to the plundering of the flock. Isn't this what people are really suggesting when they say that gods can be squared? Clinias:

It

certainly

is.

Athenian: So consider all those guardians we instanced a moment ago. Can one compare gods to any of them, without making oneself ridiculous? What about steersmen who are turned from their course 'by libations and burnt offerings', 8 and wreck both the ship and its crew? Clinias:

Of course

e

not.

they are not to be compared to a charioteer lined up at the starting point who has been bribed by a gift to throw the race and let others win. Clinias: No sir, to describe the gods like that would be a scandalous com-

Athenian:

And presumably

parison.

Athenian: Nor, of course, do they stand comparison with generals or doctors or farmers, or herdsmen, or dogs beguiled by wolves. Clinias: What blasphemy! The very idea! Athenian: Now aren't all the gods the most supreme guardians of all, and don't they look after our supreme interests? Clinias: Very much so. Athenian: So are we really going to say that these guardians of the most

90/

valuable interests, distinguished as they are for their personal skill in guarding, are inferior to dogs, or the mere man in the street, who'll never abandon justice, in spite of the gifts that the unjust immorally press

upon him? Clinias: Of course

an intolerable thing to say. There's no sort of impiety that men won't commit, but anyone who persists in this doctrine bids fair to be condemned and with every justification as the worst and not. That's

—

—

most impious of the impious. Athenian: Can we now say

that our three theses

— that the gods

exist,

and that they are absolutely above being corrupted into flouting justice have been adequately proved? Clinias: Certainly, and we endorse these arguments of yours. that they are

8.

Iliad ix.500.

concerned for

us,

—

1

1564 c

Laws

Athenian:

fancy that being so anxious to get the better of these scoundrels, we ve put our case rather polemically. But what prompted this desire to come out on top, my dear Clinias, was a fear that the rogues should think that victory in argument was a license to do as they please

and

act

on any and every theological

our anxiety

d

Still, 1

belief they

happen

to hold.

Hence

speak with some force. However, if we've made even a small contribution to persuading those fellows to hate themselves and cherish the opposite kind of character, then this preface of ours to the law of impiety will have been well worth composing. Clinias: Well, there is that hope. But even without those results, the lawgiver will not be at fault for having discussed such a topic. Athenian: Now then, after the preface we'll have a form of words that convey the purpose of our laws a general promulgation to all the ungodly that they should abandon their present habits in favor of a life of piety. Then in cases of disobedience the following law of impiety should apply: to

—

e

Anyone who comes

across a case of impiety of word or deed should go to the aid of the law by alerting the authorities. The first officials to be notified should bring the matter, in pointed to try this category of case.

due

legal form, before the court ap-

an official who hears of the incident fails to perform this duty, he must himself be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who wishes to champion the cause of the laws. 58. If

When

908

verdicts of guilty' are returned, the court is to assess a separate penalty for each impious act of each offender. Imprisonment is to apply in all cases. (The state will have three prisons: (1) a public one near the market-place for the general run of offenders, where large numbers may

be kept in safe custody, (2) one called the 'reform center', near the place where the Nocturnal Council 9 assembles, and (3) another in the heart of the countryside, in a solitary spot where the terrain is at its wildest; and the title of this prison is somehow to convey the notion of 'punishment'.) since impiety has three causes, which we've already described,

Now

b

c

and each

divided into two kinds, there will be six categories of religious offenders worth distinguishing; and the punishment imposed on each should vary in kind and degree. Consider first a complete atheist: he may have a naturally just character and be the sort of person who hates scoundrels, and because of his loathing of injustice is not tempted to commit it; he may flee the unjust and feel fondness for the just. Alternatively, besides believing that all things are 'empty of' gods, he may be a prey to an uncontrollable urge to experience pleasure and avoid pain, and he may have a retentive memory and be capable of shrewd insights. Both these people suffer from a common failing, atheism, but in terms of the harm they do to others the former is much less dangerous than the latter.

9.

See 961

is

ff.

1565

X

Laws

The former will talk with a complete lack of inhibition about gods and sacrifices and oaths, and by poking fun at other people will probably, if he continues unpunished, make converts to his own views. The latter holds the same opinions but has what are called 'natural gifts': full of cunning and guile, he's the sort of fellow who'll make a diviner and go in for all sorts of legerdemain; sometimes he'll turn into a dictator or a demagogue or a general, or a plotter in secret rites; and he's the man who invents the So there can be many different types of atheist, but for the purpose of legislation they need to be divided into two groups. The dissembling atheist deserves to die for his sins not just once or twice but many times, whereas the other kind needs simply admonition combined with incarceration. The idea that gods take no notice of the world similarly produces two more categories, and the belief that they can

tricks of the so-called 'sophists'.

be squared another two. So

much

for

our distinctions.

Those who have simply fallen victim to foolishness and who do not have a bad character and disposition should be sent to the reform center by the judge in accordance with the law for a term of not less than five years, and during this period no citizen must come into contact with them except the members of the Nocturnal Council, who should pay visits to admonish them and ensure

59. (a)

their spiritual salvation. (b)

When his imprisonment is over, a prisoner who appears to be enjoying

mental health should go and live with sensible people; but if appearances turn out to have been deceptive, and he is reconvicted on a similar charge, he should be punished by death. There are others, however,

who in addition to not recognizing the existence

unconcerned about the world or can be bought off, become subhuman. They take everybody for fools, and many a man they delude during his life; and then by saying after his death that they can conjure up his spirit, and by promising to influence the gods through the alleged magic powers of sacrifices and prayers and charms, they try to wreck completely whole homes and states for filthy lucre. of gods, or believing they are

found guilty, the court must sentence him to imprisonment as prescribed by law in the prison in the center of the country; no free man is to visit him at any time, and slaves must hand him his ration of food fixed by the Guardians of the Laws. When he dies the body must be cast out over

60. If

one of these people

is

the borders of the state unburied.

man

lends a hand in burying him, he must be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who cares to prosecute. If the prisoner leaves children suitable for citizenship, the guardians 61. If

any

free

orphans must look after them too, from the day of conviction, no less than ordinary orphans. of

their father's

1566

Lazos

All these offenders

must be covered by one general law, which by forbidding illegal religious practices will cause most of them to sin less in word and deed against religion, and which in particular will do something to enlighten them. The following comprehensive law should be enacted with all these cases. one is to possess a shrine in his

to deal

No takes

it

into his

own

head to offer sacrifice, he and he should hand over

private home.

When

a

man

go to the public shrines in order to do so, his offerings to the priests and priestesses responsible for consecrating them; then he, and anyone else he may wish to participate, should join in the prayers. The grounds for these is

to

stipulations are as follows. To establish gods and temples a job that needs to be very carefully pondered if it is to be

—

910

is

not easy;

it's

done properly.

Yet look at what people usually do all women in particular, invalids of every sort, men in danger or any kind of distress, or conversely when they have just won a measure of prosperity: they dedicate the first thing that comes to hand, they swear to offer sacrifice, and promise to found shrines

gods and

and children of gods. And the terror they feel when they see apparitions, either in dreams or awake a terror which recurs later when they recollect a whole series of visions— drives them to seek a remedy for each individually, with the result that on open spaces or any other spot where such an incident has occurred they found the altars and shrines that fill every home and village. The law now stated must be observed for

spirits

—

not only for

b

these reasons but also in order to deter the impious from managing to conduct these activities too in secret, by establishing shrines and altars in private houses, calculating to win the favor of the gods on the quiet by sacrifices and prayers. This would make their wickedness all

infinitely

worse, and bring the reproach of heaven both on themselves and on the virtuous people who tolerate them, so that, by a sort of rough justice, the state

c

would

catch the infection of their impiety. legislator, because this is the law to be enacted: The possession of shrines in private houses

proved and the

Still,

is

whole God won't blame the

forbidden.

If

a

man

is

and worship at shrines other than the public ones, injustice committed is not an act of serious impiety (whether the possessor is a man or a woman), anyone who notices the fact must lay information before the Guardians of the Laws, who should give orders for the removal of the private shrines to public temples. to possess

62. (a) If the culprits disobey,

must be punished until they carry out the removal. But if a man is proved guilty of a serious act of impiety typical of

they (b)

^

an adult, and not just the peccadillo of a child, either by establishing a shrine on private land or by sacrificing on public land to gods not included in the pantheon of the state, must be punished by death for sacrificing with impure hands.

The Guardians

of the Laws, after deciding whether the crime was a childish peccadillo or not, must then take the matter straight to court, and exact from the culprits the penalty for their impiety.

1567

Laws XI

Book XI Athenian: The next subject needing to be reduced to due order will be our transactions with each other. I suppose something like this will serve as a general rule. Ideally, no one should touch my property or tamper with it, unless I have given him some sort of permission; and if I am sensible I shall treat the property of others with the same respect. Let's take as our first example treasure which someone who was not one of my ancestors stored away for himself and his family. I should never

913

pray to the gods to come across such a thing; and if I do, I must not disturb find) can always it nor tell the diviners, as they are called, who (I shall invent some reason for advising one to remove something deposited in the ground. The financial benefit I'd get from removing it could never rival what I'd gain by way of virtue and moral rectitude by leaving it alone; by preferring to have justice in my soul rather than money in my

b

pocket, I'd

get— treasure

for

treasure— the better bargain, and

for a better

part of myself, too.

'Hands off immovables' is aptly applied to a great many situations, and this is one of them. And we should put our trust in the traditional view of such conduct— that it injures our descendants. Suppose a man takes no thought for his children and becomes indifferent to the legislator, and removes what neither he himself nor his father nor any of his fathers before him deposited, without the consent of the depositor; suppose he thus undermines the finest law there is, that simple rule of thumb, formulated 1

man of great nobility, 'Don't pick up what you didn't put down'— well, when a man treats these two legislators so contemptuously and picks up something he had not put down (and sometimes no bagatelle, either, but a huge treasure trove), what penalty should he suffer? God

as

it

was by

c

2

a

3

the penalty of heaven; but the first person to notice such an occurrence in the city should report it to the City -Wardens; if somewhere in the city's market, to the Market-Wardens; and if in some place in the country, he should inform the Country-Wardens and their Chiefs. On

d

knows

receiving the information the state should send to Delphi and in submission to the oracles of the god do whatever he ordains about the objects and the person who removed them. If the informant is a free man, he should

acquire a reputation for virtue, but 63. (a)

if

a free

man

fails to

inform,

he must get a reputation for vice. If

the informant

is

with freedom by the

and

be presented which will give 4 his master what he is worth, but

a slave, then as a state,

1.

Cf. 842e

2.

Solon.

3.

Solon and the Magnesian

4.

Reading apodidouses

note.

in a8.

legislator.

reward he

will deservedly

914

1568 (b)

Laws if

a slave fails to inform,

he must be punished

by death.

The natural thing

do next

important or

trivial.

to If

a

man

is

to

apply

leaves

some

this

same

rule to

all objects,

own

property

object of

no ereat

piece of his

somewhere, deliberately or inadvertently, anyone who finds it should let it be, on the assumption that such things are under the protection of the goddess of the wayside, to whom they are consecrated by law. 64. If in defiance of this rule

someone picks up an

value and takes it home, and (a) he is a slave, he should be soundly beaten years of age; (b) if

he

is

a free

by any passer-by who

is

not less than thirty J

man,

in addition to

being thought ungentlemanly and lawless, he must pay the person who left the article ten times its value.

one

man

accuses another of being in possession of some piece of his own property, whether valuable or not, and the accused person admits he has it but denies that it belongs to the complainant, the latter should i the object has been registered with the authorities according to law summon the person in possession of it before the authorities, and the possessor must produce it; then if on being presented for inspection it proves to have been recorded in the registers as the property of one of the disputants, the owner must take it and depart; but if it belongs to some other party not present, then whichever disputant furnishes a credit- worthy guarantor should exercise the absent party's right of removal and take the article away on his behalf for delivery into his possession. If on the other hand the article in dispute has not been registered with the authorities, it mu st be left Wlth the three oldest officials pending settlement If

of the case;

.

and if it is an animal that is thus kept in safe custody, the loser of the suit must pay the officials for its keep. The officials are to settle the case within j

three days.

Anyone who wishes— provided

own

he's in his right

mind— may

seize his

and (within the permitted limits) treat him as he likes. He may also arrest a runaway slave, in order to stop him escaping, on behalf of a relative or friend. If anyone demands the release of someone who is being taken for a slave and arrested, the captor must let him go, but the releaser must furnish three credit-worthy sureties. On these terms and on no other

the

slave,

man may

65. If a

be released.

man

secures a release except on these conditions, he liable to a charge of violence and if convicted, he must pay to the captor twice the damages claimed in the

must be

suit.

Freedmen too may be arrested if they fail to perform their services to their manumittor, or perform them inadequately. (The services are these: three

— 1569

Laws XI

month a freedman must proceed to the home of his manumittor and offer to do anything lawful and practicable; and as regards marrying he must do whatever his former master thinks right.) He must not grow more wealthy than his manumittor; if he does, the excess must become the property of the master. The freedman must not stay in the state longer than twenty years, but like the other aliens he must then take all his times a

b

5

property and leave, unless he has gained permission from the authorities and his manumittor to remain. If a freedman or one of the other aliens 6 acquires property in excess of the limit allowed the third property-class, then within thirty days of this event he must pack up and be off, without any right to ask the authorities to extend his stay. 66. If a

freedman disobeys these regulations and

is

c

taken to court and

convicted, he must be

by the

state.

tried in the tribal courts, unless the litigants

have

punished by death and

Such cases should be

his property confiscated

previously settled their charges against each other before their neighbors that is, judges they have chosen themselves. other piece of If a man formally seizes as his own any animal or some 7 property of any other man the person in possession must return it to the warrantor or donor, provided the latter is suable and solvent, or to the person who validly transferred it to him by some other procedure. If he received it from a citizen or a resident alien, he must do so within thirty days; but if he took delivery from a complete alien, he must return it

within the five months of which the third shall be the

summer

month

in

d

which the

solstice occurs.

person makes an exchange with another by buying or selling, the transfer must be made by handing over the article in the appointed part of the market-place (and nowhere else), and by receiving the price on the nail; no payment for delivery later or sale on credit is to be allowed.

When one

e

exchanges one thing for another in any other place or under any other arrangement, trusting to the honesty of the other party to the exchange, he must do so on the understanding that when sales are made other than under the rules now stated the law does not permit him to sue. (Anyone may collect contributions to clubs on a friendly basis, but if some disagreement arises over the collection he must do so on the understanding that in this business no one under any circumstances will be allowed to If

a

go

man

to law.)

drachmas or more must be obliged to remain in the state for ten days, and the buyer (in view of the complaints that people are apt to make in this connection, and so

A

seller of

an

5.

See 850a

ff.

6.

See 744a

ff.

7.

Reading autou

article

and 754d in dl.

ff.

who

receives a price of fifty

916

1570 that,

Laws if

necessary, restitution

may

be

made

according to law) must be

informed of his address. Here are the rules under which legal restitution may be demanded or refused. If someone sells a slave suffering from consumption or stone or strangury or the so-called 'sacred' disease 8 or some other mental or physical complaint that is chronic and difficult to cure and which the ordinary man could not diagnose, and if the purchase

b

was made by

a doctor or trainer, or

of the parties,

and

if the facts were pointed out before the time of sale, the buyer shall have no right to return him to the vendor, But if a layman is sold such a slave by a professional, the purchaser may return him within six months, except in the case of the 'sacred' disease, when the period for restitution is to be extended to a year. The case should be heard before a bench of three doctors appointed by joint

nomination

c

If

a

layman

if

the vendor loses he

sells to a

must pay twice

layman there should be

the selling price,

a right of restitution

and

a

hearing as in the previous instance, but the loser should pay only the simple price. If the slave is a murderer, and both buyer and seller are aware of the fact, there shall be no right of restitution for the purchase; but if the buyer acted in ignorance he shall have a right of restitution as

soon as he realizes the situation, and the case should be tried before the five youngest Guardians of the Laws; if the vendor is judged to have known the facts, he must purify the house of the buyer under the Expounders' rules

d

and pay him three times the

price.

Anyone exchanging money

e

for

money

or for anything else, animate or inanimate, should always give and receive full value as the law directs. Let's do as we did in other parts of our legislation and allow ourselves a preface dealing with the whole range of crimes that arise in this connection. Everyone should think of adulteration as essentially the same sort of thing as lying and deceit which in fact people commonly describe as quite respectable. But they are wrong to defend this sort of conduct as

'frequently justified,

on appropriate occasions', because what they mean by the 'appropriate' place and occasion they leave vague and indefinite, and their dictum does nothing but harm both to themselves and to others'

Now

he must always lay however wide or narrow they may be. So let's define some limits now: a man must tell no lie, commit no deceit, and do no fraud in word or deed when he calls upon the gods, unless he wants to be thoroughly loathed by them as anyone is who snaps his fingers at them and swears false oaths, or (though they find this less offensive) tells lies in the presence of his superior. Now the 'superiors' of bad men are the good, and of the young their elders (usually)— which means

down

917

a legislator cannot afford to leave this vague:

precise limits,

—

that parents are the superiors of their offspring, men are (of course) the superiors of women and children, and rulers of their subjects. All these people in positions of authority deserve the respect of us all, and the authorities of the state deserve it in particular. This is in fact what prompted these 8.

Epilepsy.

1571

Laws XI

Anyone who is so lacking in respect for men and reverence for gods as to pull off some swindle of the market-place by swearing oaths

remarks. the

and calling heaven to witness (even though the rules and warnings of the Market-Wardens stare him in the face), is a liar and a cheat. So in view generally of the low level of religious purity and holiness most of us achieve, let me emphasize what a good habit it is to think twice before taking the names of the gods in vain. should be invoked: If any cases of disobedience arise, the following law his the seller of any article in the market must never name two prices for goods, but only one, and if he doesn't get it, he will (quite rightly) remove not his wares without raising or lowering his price that day; and he must push anything he has for sale, or take an oath on its quality.

man

disobeys these regulations, any citizen passing by, provided he is not less than thirty years of age, should punish the taker of the oath and beat him with impunity. 67. If a

passer-by ignores these instructions and disobeys them, he must be liable to the reproach of having betrayed the laws. 68. If the

proves to be beyond persuasion by our present address and sells expose a faulty article, the passer-by who has the knowledge and ability to him should prove his case before the authorities, and, if a slave or resident should alien, may then take the faulty article for himself; a citizen, however, dedicate it to the gods of the marketplace.

If

a

man

expose the offender, he should be pronounced a rogue, as he has cheated the gods.

69. If a citizen fails to

such adulterated merchandise, apart from being deprived of it, must be whipped (one lash for every drachma of the asking price of the object he was selling), after a herald has announced in the market-place the reason why the culprit is going 70.

to

Anyone discovered

selling

be flogged.

The Market-Wardens and the Guardians of the Laws, having ascertained from experts the details of the adulterations and malpractices of sellers, should record in writing rules which specify what vendors must and must not do; these regulations should then be inscribed on a pillar and displayed who in front of the Market-Wardens' office for the information of those transact business in the market-place. (As for the City-Wardens, we have already given an adequate description of their duties, but if it seems some additional rules are needed, the wardens should consult the Guardians of the Laws, write out what they think missing, and record both the new and the old rules of their office on a pillar in front of their quarters.) Hard on the heels of tricks of adulteration come the practices of retail then trade. First we should give a word of advice on the whole subject, lay down legislation for it. The natural function in the state of retail trading in general is not to do harm, but quite the opposite. When goods of any

1572

c

Laws

kind are distributed disproportionately and unequally, anyone who makes the distribution equal and even cannot fail to do good. It needs to be stated that this redistribution, in which money too plays an effective role, is precisely the purpose the trader is meant to serve. Hired laborers, innkeepers and other workmen of varying degrees of respectability all perform the function of satisfying the needs of the community by ensuring an even distribution of goods. Why then is trading thought to be such a low and disreputable occupation? Why has it come to be so abused? Let's see if we can discover the reason, so that we can use our legislation to reform at any rate some branches of commerce, even if not the whole institution. This looks like an important task that calls for exceptional resource. Clinias: Clinias:

d

educated

when

e

How do you mean? My dear Clinias, only

men

a small part of

of rare natural talent

—

mankind— a few

highly-

able to steel itself to moderation desires; given the chance to get a lot is

by various needs and of money, it's a rare bird that's sober enough to prefer a modest competence to wealth. Most people s inclinations are at the opposite pole: their demands are always violent demands, and they brush aside the opportunity of modest gain in favor of insatiable profiteering. That's why all branches of retailing, trade and inn-keeping suffer from abuse and extreme unpopularity. Now here s something I m determined to mention, ludicrous though it is; it'll never happen, and Heaven help us if it did. But just picture to assailed

yourselves some eminently virtuous men forced for a time to go in for inn-keeping or retailing or some similar occupation, or some eminently virtuous women similarly forced by some stroke of fate to take up that kind of life. We'd soon realize how desirable and pleasing each of these trades really is, and if they were carried on according to honest standards we d value them all as highly as we do our mother or our nurse. But what happens? A man goes off to some remote point on a road running through 919

the middle of

he receives

nowhere and sets up his establishment the weary traveler with welcome lodging

to sell provisions;

— peace and

for the victim of violent storms, cool refreshment for the sufferer stifling

quiet

from

heat— but then

instead of greeting them as friends and offering them in addition to his hospitality some gifts as a token of goodwill, he treats them like so many enemy prisoners that have fallen into his hands, b

and holds them up to ransom for a monstrously steep and iniquitous sum! It's these and similar swindles, which are practiced in all branches of the trade, that have given the occupation of helping the worn-out traveler such a bad name, and in every case the legislator has to find a remedy. The old saying is quite right: it s difficult to fight against two enemies, especially

when

they are fundamentally different (as with diseases, for instance, and there are a lot of other examples). Our present battle is a case in point, it is a battle against two foes, wealth and poverty wealth that corrupts our souls by luxury, poverty that drives us by distress into losing all sense of shame. So what remedy for this disease will be open to an enlightened community? First, it should keep its trading

—

c

class as

1573

Laws XI

small as possible; second, trade should be made over to a class of people whose corruption will not harm the state unduly; third, some means must be found to prevent those engaging in such activities from slipping too easily into an utterly shameless and small-minded way of life. After these remarks, our law on the subject should run like this, with Heaven's blessing: God is now re-establishing and re-founding Magnesia, and no inhabitant who holds one of the 5040 hearths must ever, willingly or otherwise, become a retailer or a wholesaler, or perform any service

whatever

for private individuals

who

are not his equals in status, with

the exception of those services that a free man will naturally render to his father and mother and remoter ancestors, and to all free persons older than himself. Of course, it is not easy to lay down in a law precisely what not, and the point is consistent with the dignity of a free man and what is

be determined by those who have won distinctions for their aversion to the latter and devotion to the former. Anyone who by some trick goes in for retail trading in a way forbidden to a gentleman should be indicted by anyone who wishes before a court of judges with a high

will

have

to

reputation for virtue, on a charge of disgracing his clan. 71. If

he

is

unworthy he must

judged

to

be sullying his paternal hearth by following an

calling,

be imprisoned

for a year

and so be taught

to refrain

from

such conduct. he does not then refrain, he must be imprisoned for two years, and the period of imprisonment must be doubled indefinitely on each subsequent conviction. 72. If

anyone who intends to go in for retail trading must be either a resident alien or a temporary visitor. Thirdly, as a third law, such people must behave with as much virtue and as little vice as possible while they share in the life of the state. To that end, the Guardians of the Laws must not simply be regarded as guardians of those whom it is easy to keep from wickedness and crime thanks to their good birth and education. There are those who do not enjoy such advantages, and need more careful supervision, because they engage in pursuits which are very powerful inducements to vice. So since retail trading is an occupation of great variety and embraces many cognate activities, the Guardians of the Laws must hold a meeting about it, or at any rate about such branches of essential to the state, after it as they have concluded are unavoidable and the others have been eliminated; and just as we ordered in the case of adulteration— a closely connected matter— experts in each branch should be in attendance. The meeting must see what ratio of expenditure to receipts will give the retailer a decent profit, and the ratio arrived at must be recorded in writing, put on display, and then imposed on the various traders by the Market-Wardens, City-Wardens and Country-Wardens.

Now for a second law:

1574

Laws

Perhaps thus

mum a

trade will benefit the population at large and to those members of society who engage in it.

harm

man

retail

do mini-

—

an agreed contract unless he had contracted to do something forbidden by law or decree, or gave his consent under some iniquitous pressure, or was involuntarily prevented from fulfilling his contract because of some unlooked-for accident an action for such an unfulfilled agreement should be brought in the tribal courts, if the parties have not previously been able to reconcile their differences before arbitraIf

fails to fulfill

—

tors (their neighbors, that

The

class of craftsmen

is).

who have

enriched our lives by their arts and have Athena and Hephaestus as its patrons, while Ares and Athena will be patrons of those who protect the products of these craftsmen by skills of a different order— the techniques of defense. (The consecration skills will

of this latter class to these gods is perfectly justified, in that both classes are in the continuous service of land and people, the latter by taking the lead in the struggles of war, the former by producing tools and

goods

return for pay.) So if they respect their divine ancestors, they will think a disgrace to break their word in a professional matter. 73. If

one of the craftsmen culpably

fails to

in it

complete his work within

the stipulated time, out of disrespect for the god from he wins his bread, fondly thinking that he can count on the indulgence of the divinity with he has some personal relationship,

whom

whom

pay a penalty to the god, (b) and secondly under the provisions of the law applicable to his case, he must owe the price of the works of which he has cheated his employer, and perform his task all over again within the stipulated period, (a) first

he will

,

free

of charge.

And

the law will give the contractor for a work the same advice as it gave a seller, not to take advantage by setting too high a price on his services, but to name their actual value without further ado. The contractor has precisely the same duty, because as a craftsman he knows what the job is worth. In a state of gentlemen a workman must never use his craft, which is at bottom accurate and straightforward, to take 'craft' advantage of laymen, and anyone who is thus imposed upon shall be able to sue the culprit. But if anyone lets a contract to a workman and fails to pay him the price stipulated in a valid legal agreement, and snaps his fingers at those partners in our social framework, Zeus the patron of the state, and Athena, so that his delight at being in pocket wrecks the fundamental bonds of society, then the following law, with the backing of the gods, must reinforce the cohesion of the state: 74. it

(a)

a

man

takes delivery of a piece of within the agreed time, If

he must be charged double; (b) if a whole year elapses.

work and

fails to

pay

for

1575

Laws XI

then notwithstanding the rule that loans in general do not bear interest, 9 he must pay an obol per drachma for every month in arrear.

d

Actions in these cases should be brought before the tribal courts. Now that we have broached the subject of craftsmen in general, we ought in all fairness to glance at those whose job it is to keep us safe in

war, such as generals and other experts in military techniques. These persons are just as much craftsmen as ordinary workmen, though of a different kind, so when one of them undertakes some public task, voluntarily or under orders, and performs it well, the law will never tire of praising anyone who pays him the honor he deserves honor being in effect a military man's pay. But if anyone receives the benefit of some splendid military action and fails to pay that price, the law will censure him. For the benefit of the military, then, let us enact following regulation-cumcommendation, by way of advising rather than compelling the people at

—

Those fine men who safeguard the whole state either by exploits of valor or by military expertise must be accorded honor but honor of the second rank, because the highest honor should be given first and foremost to those who have proved conspicuously conscientious in respecting the large.

e

922

—

written regulations of the good legislator. Athenian: We've now pretty well completed our provisions for the most important agreements that men make with each other, with the exception

and the care and attention due to them from their guardians. So now we've more or less provided for the first topic, here's the next thing on which we are obliged to impose some sort of order. All our regulations must start from two basic facts: (a) people at the point of death like to settle their affairs by a will, (b) sometimes, by chance, they die intestate. What a difficult and contentious business it is, Clinias! That's what I had in mind when I said we were 'obliged' to deal with it: to leave it unregulated is quite out of the question. If you allow a will unchallengeable validity whatever condition a man near the end of his life may have been in when he drew it up, he might make any number

of those relating to orphans

of mutually inconsistent provisions that contradicted not only the spirit of the laws but also the inclinations of those who survive him, and indeed his own earlier intentions before he set out to make his will. After all,

most of

us,

when we

think death

is

at

hand,

just

go

to pieces

and can

t

think straight. Clinias:

How

do you mean,

sir?

Athenian: When a man is about to die, Clinias, he becomes refractory, and keeps harping on a principle that spreads alarm and despondency

among

legislators.

Clinias:

How's

that?

200 per cent per do not bear interest. 9.

I.e.,

annum

(6

obols =

1

drachma). Cf. 742c for the rule that loans

b

c

1576

Laws

Athenian: In his anxiety for complete authority he's apt himself with some warmth.

d

Clinias:

To what

to

express

effect?

Athenian: 'Ye gods!' says he, allowed to give— or not give—

'it's

a fine thing

if

I'm not going to be

my own

property to anyone I please! Why and less to another depending on whether

shouldn't I give more to one man they have shown themselves good or bad friends to me? My illnesses, my old age and all my other various misfortunes have sorted them out well enough.' Clinias: Well,

don't you think that's well said? Athenian: Clinias, my view is that the ancient lawgivers were too easygoing, and legislated on the basis of a superficial and inadequate appreciation of the human condition.

e

sir,

How do you mean? Athenian: My dear fellow, because Clinias:

923

they feared the line of argument I have mentioned, they passed the law allowing a man to dispose of his own property in his will exactly as he pleases. But when people have come to death s door in your state, you and I will make a rather more appropriate response: 'Friends,

you

you "creatures

of a day" in

more senses than

one,

it's

difficult

your present circumstances to know the truth about your own property and also know yourselves," as the Delphic inscription puts for

in

it.

Therefore,

b

as legislator, rule that neither you nor this property of yours belongs to yourselves, but to your whole clan, ancestors and I,

descendants

alike,

and your clan and

property in turn belong, even more absolutely, That being so, I should be reluctant to tolerate someone worming himself into your good graces when you are smitten with its

to the state.

illness

or old age, and wheedling I

shall legislate

with a view

you

into

making

a will that

is

not for the best.

nothing except the interest of your clan and is only right) that of the individual to second

to

the entire state, relegating (as place. So as you go on your journey,

which is the way of all flesh, show and goodwill towards us: we will look after your affairs for the future and guard your interests with the utmost care, down to the restraint

c

smallest detail.' Let that stand

and the dying,

Anyone who

d

by way of preamble and consolation

for both the living

Clinias. Here's the actual law:

property by writing a will should first, if he has had children, write down the name of that son who in his opinion deserves to be his heir, and he should also record precisely which, if any, of his other children he offers for adoption by someone else. If, however, he is still left with one of his sons not adopted into an estate, who will presumably be dispatched by law to a colony 10 the father should be permitted to present him with as much of his property as he likes, apart from the family estate and all its associated equipment; and if there is more than one son in that settles his

,

10. Cf. 740e.

1577

Laws XI

—

property among them excluding in whatever proportion he pleases. But he should not distribute the estate any part of his property to any son who has a home. He should treat a daughter analogously: if she is promised in marriage, he should not let her share his goods, but only if she is not promised. If subsequent to the will one of the sons or daughters is discovered to have come into possession of an estate in Magnesia, he or she should abandon his or her legacy to the testator's heir. If the testator is leaving no male offspring but only

position, his father

is

to distribute his

—

female, he should select whichever of his daughters he pleases and in his will provide someone to be a husband for her and a son for himself, and

man

should allow for when drawing up his will: if his son (his own or adopted) dies in infancy before he can reach man's estate, the will should specify in writing a child who is to take his place and who, one hopes, will have better luck. When a man who has no children at all writes a will, he may reserve one tenth of his acquired property and give it to anyone he wishes; record this person as his heir.

And

here's another disaster a

—

the rest he should leave to his adopted heir, so that in making him his son with the blessing of the law he gains his goodwill by treating him fairly. When a man's children need guardians, and the deceased has made a will and stated in writing the number of guardians he wants his children

all

have and who they should be (provided they are ready and willing to undertake the office), the choice of guardians put on record in this way should be binding. But if a man dies absolutely intestate or without selecting guardians, then the two nearest relatives on the father's side and the two nearest on the mother's, together with one of the deceased s friends, must be authorized to act as guardians; and the Guardians of the Laws should appoint them for any orphan who stands in such need. Everything to do with guardianship and orphans should be the concern of the fifteen eldest Guardians of the Laws, who should divide themselves by seniority into groups of three, one group to act one year and another the next, until the five terms of office have been completed in rotation; and so far as possible there should be no gaps in the sequence. When a man dies absolutely intestate and leaves children in need of guardians, these same laws must be brought into operation to relieve their distress. But if he meets with some unforeseen accident and leaves just daughters, he must forgive the lawgiver if he arranges the giving of them in marriage with an eye on only two out of three possible considerations: close kinship, and the security of the estate. The third point, which a father would have taken into account— namely to select from among the entire citizen body someone whose character and habits qualify him to be his own son and his daughter's bridegroom these considerations, I say, will have to be passed over, because it's impracticable to weigh them. So here's how the best law we can manage in such a field should run. If a man fails to make a will, and leaves only daughters, then on his death (a) a brother on his father's side (or, if without an estate of his own, a brother on his mother's side) should take the daughter and the estate of the deceased. to

—

1578

Laws

(b) If there is a brother's

son available, but no brother, then if the parties are of a similar age the same procedure is to apply. In the absence of all these, (c) a sister s son is to benefit under the same regulations, (d) Next in line is to be the brother of the deceased's father, next (e) that brother's

and

son,

the son of the sister of the deceased's father. And in all cases where a man leaves only female offspring, the succession is to pass through the family according to the same rules of kinship, through finally

(f)

brothers and brothers and sisters' sons, the males in any one generation always taking precedence over the females. As for age, the assessor must determine the propriety or otherwise of the marriage by inspection, viewing the males naked and the females stripped down to the navel. If the family suffers from such a dearth of relatives that not even a

grandson

either of tne deceased s brother or of the son of the deceased's grandfather exists, then in consultation with her guardians the girl may single out of her own free choice any other citizen, provided he does not object,

who

b

should then become the deceased's heir and the daughter's bridegroom. However, 'flexibility above all': sometimes suitable candidates from within the state itself may be in unusually short supply, so if a girl is hard put

husband among her compatriots, and has in view someone who has been dispatched to a colony whom she would like to inherit her to

c

it

to find a

father s property, then if the man is related to her, he should enter into the estate under the provisions of the law; if he is not of her clan, then provided there are no near kin living in the state, he shall be entitled by virtue of the choice of the daughter of the deceased and that of her guardians to marry her and return to his homeland to take over the establishment of the intestate father.

When

a

man

and leaves neither male nor female issue, met by the foregoing law, and a man and a woman from the clan should 'go in harness' and enter into the deserted establishment with full title to the estate. The order of precedence on the female side is to be: (a) the deceased's sister, (b) his brother's dies intestate

the situation should in general be

d

daughter,

the sister

son, (d) the sister of the deceased s father, (e) the daughter of the father's brother, and (f) the daughter of the father's sister.

A woman list

(c)

from

s

should set up home with a man from the other according to the degrees of kinship and the demands of religion for this list

11

which we made provision

earlier.

But let's not forget the severity of such laws. It can sometimes be hard for a near relative of the deceased to be instructed to marry his kinswoman,

by e

a

law

that to all

difficulties spirit,

appearances takes no account of the thousands of social that deter people from obeying such instructions in a willing

so that they invariably prefer to put

up with anything

rather than

comply— I mean difficulties like physical or mental illnesses or defects in the man or woman one is told to marry. I dare say some people imagine the lawgiver

II.

See 741 a-e.

is

not bothered about these things at

all,

but they're wrong.

Lazos

1579

XI

and those for whom he legislates, let's compose a sort of impartial preamble begging those who are subject to the legislator's orders to forgive him if in his concern for the common good he finds it hardly possible to cope with the personal inconvenience experienced by individuals; and the people for whom the lawgiver's regula-

So

in the interests of the lawgiver

tions are intended should also be forgiven for their occasional understand-

able inability to carry out the orders which, in all ignorance, he gives them. Clinias: Well then, sir, what would be the most reasonable way of

dealing with such cases?

Athenian: It is essential, Clinias, to choose people to arbitrate between laws of that sort and the persons affected by their provisions.

How

do you mean? Athenian: Sometimes a nephew with a wealthy

Clinias:

might be reluctant to take his uncle's daughter because he fancies his chances and is bent on making a better marriage; in another case a man would have no choice but to disobey the law because the instructions devised by the lawgiver would lead to untold trouble— as for instance if they tried to compel him to marry someone suffering from lunacy or some other terrible physical or mental defect that would make the life of the partner not worth living. This policy should be embodied in a law with the following provisions: If in practice people attack the established laws about wills on any point whatever, but especially where a marriage is concerned, and swear that if the legislator were alive and present in person he would never have forced them to either of the courses to which they are in fact being forced (to marry this man or that woman), but one of the relatives or a guardian takes the opposite line, then we must remember that the fifteen Guardians of the Laws have been bequeathed to orphan boys and girls by the legislator to act as their fathers and arbitrate on their behalf; so litigants on any of these matters must go to them to get disputes settled, and carry out their decisions as binding. But if a litigant believes that this is too great an authority to be vested in the Guardians of the Laws, he should take them before the court of the Select Judges and get a decision on the points at issue. father

he loses the day, the lawgiver should visit him with censure and disgrace, a punishment which any sensible person will regard as more severe than a huge fine.

75. If

be to give our orphan children a sort of second birth. We have already described the training and education they should all receive after their first; after this second and parentless birth we have to see that these children who have had the ill luck to be bereaved and made

The

effect of this will

be pitied as little as possible for their misfortune. In the substitute parents at least as good first place, the Guardians of the Laws should lay down rules for them; in particular, we as the original ones instruct the three Guardians on duty for the year to look after them as though they were their own children; and for the guidance of these officials and the guardians we shall compose a suitable preamble on the education

orphans are

to

—

—

— 1580 92 7

Laws

of orphans.

And

luckily enough,

I

fancy,

we have

described already

how

death the souls of the departed enjoy certain powers which they use to take an interest in human affairs. 12 The stories which tell of these things are true, but long, so one should trust to the ancient and widely disseminafter

ated for

it

common

that the doctrine

c

is

on the true

point,

and

also take the legislator's

—unless, of course, one believes them

word

be way of things, a guardian should fear, in the first place, the gods above, who are aware how deprived orphans are, and secondly the souls of the departed, whose natural instinct is to watch with particular care over their own children, showing benevolence to people who respect them and hostility to those who treat them badly. And he should also fear the reactions of those who, full of years and honor, are still living, because in a state which thrives under good laws their grandchildren will show them glad and tender affection, and old men have sharp eyes and ears for such things: if you do the right thing by an orphan, they'll be kind to you, whereas they'll soon show you their displeasure if you take advantage of an orphan's exposed position, because they regard orphans as a supreme and sacred trust. A guardian or official with even the slightest sense has a duty to give close attention to all these warnings, and take great care over the training and education of orphans, helping them in every possible way, just as if he were contributing to the arrant fools.

b

traditions

Now

if

own self and family. A man who complies with the preface

good

to

this is really the

of his

to the

law and refrains from any

an orphan will be spared first-hand experience of the fury against such actions, but

ill-treatment of

d

legislator's 76.

if

a

man

refuses to comply,

and harms

a child deprived of

its

father

or mother,

pay double the damages that he would have committed against a child with both parents living. he must

to

pay

for a crime

But do we really need precise rules to control a guardian's treatment of an orphan, and an official's supervision of a guardian? They already possess a pattern of

e

how

to

bring

up

free-born children, in the education they their own, and in the way they manage their private

themselves give up possessions and of course the rules they have to guide them on those matters are pretty exact. If they were not, it would be reasonable to lay down rules of guardianship as a special and separate category, and make an orphan's life different from that of ordinary children by working out

regime of its own. But in fact in our state being an orphan doesn't differ very much from living under one's own father, although in a detailed

928

public esteem, and the amount of attention the children get, orphanhood is usually much less desirable. That is why in dealing with this topic rules about orphans the law has gone to such lengths in encouraging

12.

See 865d-e.

1581

Laws XI

and threatening. And

here's the sort of threat that will

come

in

very handy

Anyone acting as a guardian of a boy or girl, and any Guardian of the Laws who supervises that guardian by virtue of being appointed to control him, must show this child who has had the misfortune of bereaveindeed.

than his own children, and be just as zealously concerned for his ward's property as he is for his own more so, in fact; and everyone who acts as a guardian will have just that one law to observe on the subject of orphans. But

ment no

less affection

—

contravened in such respects, (a) a guardian should be punished by his official, (b) an official should be summoned before the court of Select Judges by the guardian and punished by a fine of twice the damages as estimated

77.

if

this

by the

law

is

court.

suspected by the relatives or indeed by any other citizen of neglect or malpractice, he should be summoned before the same court. If

a

guardian

78.

is

He must be

fined four times the

the fine going to the child

and

sum he

is

found

to

have taken, half

half to the successful prosecutor.

once he has grown up an orphan concludes that he was badly treated by his guardian, he may bring a suit for incompetent guardianship, provided he does so within five years of its expiry. If

found guilty, the court is to estimate what he is to suffer or pay; (b) if an official is found guilty of injuring the orphan (i) through negligence, the court must assess how much he is to pay to the child; (ii) by criminal conduct, then in addition to paying the sum assessed, he must be ejected from the office of Guardian of the Laws,

79.

(a)

If

a

guardian

is

and the government must supply the ian of the

Laws

state

and country with a

fresh

Guard-

to take his place.

The bitterness with which fathers quarrel with their children and children with their fathers is often excessive. A father is apt to think that the legislator ought to give him legal authority, if he wishes, to make a public proclamation through a herald that under the provisions of the law his son is his son no longer; for their part, sons believe that if they have a father whose suffering from disease or old age has become a disgrace, they are entitled to prosecute him on a charge of lunacy. Such disputes are usually found where men's characters are irredeemably corrupt, because when the corruption is confined to one party as when the son is corrupt but not the father, or the other way round the bad feeling is not sufficient to lead to trouble. Now in any other state a child repudiated by his father would not necessarily find himself a stateless person, but in the case of Magnesia, to which these laws will apply, a man disowned by his

— —

— 1582 929

Laws

father will be obliged to migrate to another country, because the 5040 homes cannot be increased even by one. Consequently before this punishment can be legally inflicted on him, he must be repudiated not only by his father

but by the entire clan. Procedure in such cases is to be governed by some such law as this: anyone who has the extreme misfortune to want justifiably or not to expel from the clan the child he has fathered and reared, must not be allowed to do so casually and on the spur of the

—

b

c

d

moment. First of all he must assemble all the relatives on his own side and all the relatives of the son on the mother's side, as far as cousins in each case, and accuse his son before them, explaining why he deserves to be drummed out of the clan by its united action. The son shall have the right of reply, to argue that none of these penalties is called for. If the father carries his point, and wins the vote of more than half the relatives (he himself and the mother and the accused son being excluded from the voting, as well as those males and females who are not yet of adult age), then by this procedure and on these terms he shall be entitled to repudiate his son, but in no other way whatever. If some other citizen wishes to adopt the repudiated son, no law is to stop him (a young man's character is by nature bound to change frequently enough in the course of his life), but if after ten years no one has been moved to adopt the disowned person, the supervisors of surplus children intended for the colony 13 must take him too under their wing so that he may be suitably established in the same colony as the others.

Now

e

suppose

age or a cantankerous temper or all three make a man more wayward than old men usually are, unbeknown to all except his immediate circle; and suppose he squanders the family resources on the grounds that he can do as he likes with his own property, so that his son is driven to distraction but hesitates to bring a charge of lunacy, This is the law the son must observe. First of all he must go to the eldest Guardians of the Laws and explain his father's misfortune, and they, after

due

illness or old

must advise him whether to bring the charge or not. If they advise that he should, they must come forward as witnesses for the prosecution and plead on his behalf. investigation,

80. If the case is

proved,

must lose all authority to manage trivialities, and be treated like a child for the the fathei

Whenever a man and 930

his wife find

it

his

own

affairs,

even in

rest of his days.

impossible to get on with each other

because of an unfortunate incompatibility of temperament, the case must come under the control of ten men— middle-aged Guardians of the Laws— and ten of the women in charge of marriage, of the same age. Any arrangements they make which reconcile the couple should stand, but if feelings are too exacerbated for that they must do their best to find each some

13.

Cf. 740e.

1583

Laws XI

other congenial partner. It's quite likely that the existing partners are people of rough temper, so one should try to fit them in harness with mates of a more phlegmatic and gentle disposition. And when the quarreling couple have no children or only a few, the procreation of children must be kept

view

in

in the setting

up

new homes; where

of the

sufficient children

b

already exist, the divorce and the remarriages should facilitate companionship and mutual help in the evening of life. If a wife dies and leaves male and female children, we'll lay down a law advising, though not compelling, the husband to bring up his existing children without importing a stepmother; but if there are no children, he must be obliged to remarry so as to beget sufficient children for his home

and

for the state.

If

the

husband

dies, leaving

an adequate number of

c

mother should remain in her position and bring them up; judged that she is too young to live unmarried without injuring

children, their

but if it is her health, her relatives should report the facts to the women in charge of marriages and do whatever seems advisable to both sides; and if there have been no children born as yet, they should bear that in mind too. (The minimum acceptable number of children is to be fixed by law as one of

each

d

sex.)

no dispute about the parentage of a child, but a ruling is required as to which parent it should follow, the offspring of intercourse between a slave woman and a slave or a free man or a freedman should become the absolute property of the woman's owner; if a free woman has

Whenever

there

is

intercourse with a slave, the issue should belong to his master. If a free man has a child by his own slave woman, or a free woman by her own slave, and the facts are crystal clear, the female officials are to send the

woman's child along with its father to another country, and ians of the Laws must similarly send away the free man's free

its

the

e

Guard-

child with

mother.

No god

man with his wits about him will ever advise anyone to parents. On the contrary, we should be quick to appreciate

or any

neglect his

very relevant the following preface on the subject of worshipping gods will be to the respect or disrespect in which we hold our father and mother. Time-honored cult observances all over the world fall into two categories. Man exalts some of the gods because he can see them with his own eyes, others he represents, by setting up statues of them, and believes that his worship of these inanimate 'gods' ensures him the abundant gratitude and benevolence of their real and living counterparts. This means that no one who has living in his house his father or mother, or their mothers and fathers, treasures old and frail, must ever forget that so long as he possesses

how

such a 'shrine' at his hearth and looks after of worship will ever do him as much good. Clinias:

What do you mean by

Athenian:

I'll

tell

you. After

it

properly, no other objects b

'properly'?

all,

my

931

friends,

such themes are worth

a hearing.

i

1584

Laws

Clinias: Tell us, then.

Athenian: Our version of the story of Oedipus is that when he was insulted by his sons he called down a curse on them and you know how people have never stopped relating how the gods heard and answered his

—

prayer.

And Amyntor

him; Theseus

into a rage with his son Phoenix and cursed did the same to Hippolytus, and there are thousands of

similar cases,

which

fell

go to show that the gods take the parents' side against the children, no man, you 11 find, can curse anyone as effectively as a parent can curse his child; and that's absolutely right. So if it is true that the gods listen to the prayers of fathers or mothers who have been wantonly insulted by their children, isn't it reasonable to suppose that when by contrast the respect we show our parents delights them so much that they pray hard to heaven for a blessing on their children, the gods will be just as ready to listen as before, and grant us it? If not, they'd be conferring blessings unjustly which we maintain is a peculiarly inapproall

—

priate thing for a

god

to do.

Very much so. Athenian: So as we said just now, we must reckon that the most precious object of worship a man can have is his father or grandfather, weak with or his mother in a similar condition, because when he honors and respects them God is delighted if he weren't, he wouldn't listen to their prayers. These 'living shrines', in the shape of our forefathers, affect us Clinias:

—

far

more wonderfully than

because when we look after them they invariably join their prayers to ours, whereas if we insult them, they oppose us. As ordinary statues do neither of these things, a man who treats his father and grandfather and so on as they deserve will have objects of

lifeless ones,

worship that are much more

effective than

any others

in

winning

him

the favor of heaven. Clinias: Excellently put.

Athenian. Anyone with

about him holds the prayers of his parents in fear and respect, knowing that the cases in which such prayers have been brought to pass have been many and frequent. This being the way of things, a good man will regard his elderly forebears as a veritable god-send, right up till they breathe their last; and when they pass on, they will be sorely missed by the next generation, 14 and be a terror to the wicked. Let everyone be convinced by this argument and do their parents all the his wits

honor enjoined by law. But if even so a man gets the reputation of being deaf to such prefaces, then the right law to pass to deal with him will run as follows. If anyone in this state of ours looks after his parents less diligently than he should and fails to carry out their wishes in all respects with more indulgence than he shows to those of his sons and descendants in general, and indeed to his own desires too, the neglected parent must report the fact, either in person or by messenger, to the three most senior Guardians 14.

Reading

neois in a3.

1585

Laws XI

Laws and

women

charge of marriages. These officials must take the matter in hand, and provided the offender is still a young man under the age of thirty, chastise him with a whipping and imprisonment. (In the case of a woman, the same chastisement may be inflicted until she is forty.) Older persons, if they persist in neglecting (and perhaps actually of the

three of the

ill-treating) their parents,

of the 101 81. If a

most elderly

man

is

found

the court is to assess

no

in

should be

summoned

c

before a court consisting

citizens of the state. guilty,

be exacted, and absolutely can pay must be excluded from consider-

what penalty

fine or penalty that a

man

or fine

is

to

ation. If

ill-treatment prevents a parent

from complaining, any

free

man who

d

discovers the situation should alert the authorities.

he does not, he must be regarded as a scoundrel and be at the hands of anyone who wishes. 82. If

liable to a suit for

damage

a slave, he should be given his freedom; if he belongs to the criminal or his victim, he must be released by the authorities; and if he belongs to some other citizen, the public treasury is to see that the

If

the informant

is

owner is reimbursed. Official action must be taken him in revenge for giving information.

to stop

anyone injuring

We

have already dealt with fatal injuries inflicted by the use of drugs, but we have not yet discussed any of the less harmful cases of voluntary and premeditated injury, inflicted by giving food or drink or by applying ointments. Full treatment of the question is hindered by the fact that so far as is

the

e

human beings are concerned, poisoning is of two kinds. First there sort we have just explicitly mentioned: the injury a body suffers

from some physical substance by natural processes. The other kind is a matter of spells and charms and 'enchantments': not only are the victims persuaded that they are being seriously injured by people with magic influence, but even the perpetrators themselves are convinced that it really is in their power to inflict injury by these methods. It is not easy to know the truth about these and similar practices, and even if one were to find out, it would be difficult to convince others; and it is just not worth the effort to try to persuade people whose heads are full of mutual suspicion, that even if they do sometimes catch sight of a molded waxen figure in a doorway or at a junction of three roads or on their parents' grave, they every time, because they cannot be sure these things work. All this means that our law about drugs must be a double law, reflecting the two methods by which poisoning may be attempted. But first, by entreaty, exhortation and advice, we'll explain that no such thing should ever be attempted, that one should not alarm and terrify the common man, like an impressionable child, and that legislators and judges should not be put to the necessity of curing men of such fears. We shall point out for

should ignore

933

b

it

c

— 1586

Laws

a start that unless the person who tries to use poison happens to be a diviner or soothsayer, he acts in ignorance of how his spells will turn out,

and unless he happens to be an expert in medicine, he of the effect he will have on the body. So the wording d

acts in ignorance

of our

law about

the use of poisons should be as follows: a doctor poisons a man without doing either him or any member of his household fatal injury, or injures his cattle or bees (fatally or otherwise), and is found guilty on a charge of poisoning, 83.

(a)

If

he must be punished

by death.

(b) If the culprit is a

layman, to decide the proper penalty or fine to be

the court is

84. (a) If a diviner or

someone, by

e

soothsayer

is

spells or incantations or

deemed

to

inflicted in his case.

be in

effect injuring

charms or any other poison of

that

found guilty of

this

kind whatever, 15 he must die. (b) If

someone with no knowledge

of divination

is

16

kind of poisoning, the same procedure that

is,

the court

or fine for

When

934

one

him

is

is

be followed as with the other laymen [83. (b)] decide what it thinks is the appropriate penalty

to

to

to pay.

man harms

another by theft or violence and the damage is extensive, the indemnity he pays to the injured party should be large, but smaller if the damage is comparatively trivial. The cardinal rule should be that in every case the sum is to vary in proportion to the damage done, so that the loss is made good. And each offender is to pay an additional penalty appropriate to his crime, to encourage him to reform. Thus if a man has been led to do wrong by the folly of someone else, being overpersuaded because of his youth or some similar reason, his penalty should tend to be light; but it is to be heavier when his offense is due to his own folly

he

—

and

inability to control his feelings of pleasure and pain as when has fallen victim to cowardice and fear, or some deep-rooted jealousy

or lust or fury. This additional penalty

crime (what

b

to

be

inflicted not

because of the

be undone), but for the sake of the future: we hope that the offender himself and those that observe his punishment will either be brought to loathe injustice unreservedly or at any rate recover appreciably from this disastrous disease. All these reasons and considerations

c

done can

is

make

s

t

necessary for the law to aim, like a good archer, at a penalty that will both reflect the magnitude of the crime and fully indemnify the victim. The judge has the same aim, and when he is faced by his legal duty of assessing what penalty or fine the defendant must pay, he must follow closely in the legislator's footsteps; and the latter must turn himself it

15.

Reading

16.

Reading on

haistisinoun in el. tes in e3.

1587

Laws XI

and sketch some specimen measures consistent with his written prescriptions. That, Clinias and Megillus, is the job to which we must now devote our best efforts; we have to describe what type of penalty is called for in all categories of theft and violence granted, of course, that the gods and children of gods are prepared to see us legislate into a sort of artist

—

in this field.

Lunatics must not be allowed to appear in public; their relations must keep them in custody in private houses by whatever means they can imd

provise. 85. If

they

fail to

do

so,

one hundred drachmas for a member of the highest property-class (whether it is a slave or a free man that he fails to keep an eye on), eighty for a member of the second class, sixty for the third, and forty for the lowest. they

must pay a

fine:

There are several kinds of madness, brought on by several causes. The cases we have just mentioned are the result of illness, but there are some people with an unfortunate natural irritability, made worse by poor discipline, who in any trivial quarrel will shout their heads off in mutual abuse. Such a thing is highly improper in a well-run state. So this single law should apply to all cases of defamation: no one is to defame anybody. If you are having an argument you should listen to your opponent's case, and put your own to him and the audience, without making any defamatory remarks at all. When men take to damning and cursing each other and to calling one another rude names in the shrill tones of women, these mere words, empty though they are, soon lead to real hatreds and quarrels of the most serious kind. In gratifying his ugly emotion, anger, and in thus disgracefully stoking the fires of his fury, the speaker drives back into primitive savagery a side of his character that was once civilized by education, and such a splenetic life makes him no better than a wild beast; bitter indeed, he finds, are the pleasures of anger. Besides, on such occasions all men are usually quick to resort to ridicule of their opponents, and no one who has indulged that habit has ever acquired the slightest sense of responsibility or remained faithful to many of his principles. That is why no one must ever breathe a word of ridicule in a temple or at a public sacrifice or at the games or in the marketplace or in court or in any public gathering, and the relevant official must always punish such offenses. he fails to do so, he must be disqualified from competing for awards of merit, as being a man who disregards the laws and fails to perform the duties imposed 86.

e

935

b

If

upon him by 87. If in

the legislator.

someone fails to refrain from abusive language, it first or by way of reply,

other localities

whether he the passer-by

resorts to ,

provided he

is

older than the offender, should lend his

c

1588

Laws

support to the law and eject by force this fellow indulgence to anger, that bad companion.

who

has

shown such

passer-by fails to do so, he must be liable to the appointed penalty. 88. If the

The view we are putting forward now

that

when

man

embroiled slanging-match he is incapable of carrying on the dispute without trying to make funny remarks, and when such conduct is motivated by anger we censure it. Well then, what does this imply? That we are prepared to tolerate a comedian's eagerness to raise a laugh against people, provided that when he sets about ridiculing our citizens in his comedies, he is not inspired by anger? Or shall we divide comedy into two kinds, according to whether it is good-natured or not? Then we could allow the playful comedian to joke about something, without anger, but forbid, as we've indicated, anyone whatever to do so if he is in deadly earnest and shows animosity. We must certainly insist on this stipulation about anger; but we still have to lay down by law who ought to receive permission for ridicule and who not. No composer of comedies, or of songs or iambic verse, must ever be allowed to ridicule either by description or by impersonation any citizen whatever, with or without rancor. Anyone who disobeys this rule must be ejected from the country that same day by the presidents of the games. is

a

is

in a

d

e

936

89. If the latter fail to take this action,

must be fined three hundred drachmas, in whose honor the festival is being held. they

to

be dedicated to the god

Those who have earlier been licensed to compose verse against each other should be allowed to poke fun at people, not in savage earnest, but in a playful spirit and without rancor. The distinction between the two kinds must be left to the minister with overall responsibility for the education of the young; an author may put before the public anything the minister approves of, but if it is censored, the author must not perform it to anyone personally nor be found to have trained someone else to do so, whether 17

b

a free

man

or a slave.

he does, he must get the reputation of being a scoundrel and an enemy of the laws. 90.

If

not the starving tout court or the similarly afflicted who deserve sympathy, but the man who in spite of his moderation or some other It

is

virtue or progress towards

nevertheless experiences some misfortune. That being so, it will be a matter for surprise if a virtuous person, whether slave or free, even if the state and society he lives in is run with only average skill, is ever so grossly neglected as to be reduced to abject poverty.

17.

See 816e.

it,

1589

Laws XI

So the legislator will be quite safe if he lays down a law running more or less like this. No one is to go begging in the state. Anyone who attempts to do so, and scrounges a living by never-ending importunities, must be expelled from the market by the Market- Wardens, from the city by the CityWardens, and from the surrounding country conducted by the CountryWardens across the border, so that the land may rid itself completely of

c

such a creature.

woman damages any piece of someone else's property, person who suffers the loss was not himself partly to

then provided the blame because of inexperience or careless conduct, the slave's owner must either make good the damage in full, or hand over the actual offender. But if the owner counter-claims that the prosecution has been brought as a result of the injured person and the culprit putting their heads together to rob him of his slave, he must sue the allegedly injured party on a charge

d

value of the

e

If

a slave

man

of collusion.

If

or

he wins the day, he

slave as assessed

by the

is

to receive twice the

court.

he loses, he must both make good the damage and hand over the slave. 91. If

92. If a beast of

burden or a horse or dog or some other animal damages

a piece of a neighbor's property, its

owner

is

to

pay

for the

damage on

the

same

basis.

anyone deliberately refuses to appear as a witness, the person who needs his evidence must serve a summons on him; and on being duly summoned the man is to present himself at the trial. If he knows something and is

If

he should give evidence accordingly; if he claims he knows nothing, he must swear an oath to three gods, Zeus, Apollo and Themis, to the effect that quite definitely he has no information, and thus be dismissed from the proceedings. If a man is summoned to give evidence and fails to answer the summons, he must be liable by law to a suit for damage. No juryman is to vote in a trial in which he has been put up as a witness and given evidence. A free woman is to be allowed to be a witness and to speak in support of a litigant, provided she is over forty years of age, and to bring prosecutions, provided she has no husband; but if she has a husband living, she must be limited to acting as a witness. Slaves (male and female), and children, should be allowed to support a case by giving evidence, but only in a trial for murder and provided a credit-worthy surety is put up to guarantee their appearance at the trial

prepared

to testify,

evidence is objected to as false. If either disputant claims someone has borne false witness, he should enter an objection to all or part of the testimony before a verdict in the case is decided on. The objections, under the seal of both parties, should be placed in official custody and produced at the trial for perjury. If anyone is convicted twice on this charge, he may not be compelled under any law to bear witness again; if he is convicted a third time, he must never be allowed to be a witness in the future; and if if

937

b

their

i

c

1590

Laws

he does have the face to give testimony on a further occasion after a third conviction, anyone who wishes should report him to the authorities, who should haul him before a court.

he is found guilty, he must be punished by death. 93.

If

When a court decides to throw out evidence on the ground that the winning d

side has triumphed because certain witnesses have perjured themselves, and more than half the evidence is condemned, the suit lost on the strength of it should come up for retrial, and after due inquiry a ruling should be

given that the false evidence was, or was not, the decisive influence on the verdict; and this ruling, whichever way it goes, will automatically settle the original action.

Although human life is graced by many fine institutions, most of them have their own evil genius, so to speak, which pollutes and corrupts them. Take justice, for instance, which has civilized so much of our behavior: e

how

could

be a blessing to human society? And granted justice is a blessing, can advocacy fail to be a blessing too? But valuable though they are, both these institutions have a bad name. There is a certain kind of immoral practice, grandly masquerading as a 'skill', which proceeds on the assumption that a technique exists itself, in fact of conducting one's 18 own suits and pleading those of others, which can win the day regardless it

fail to

—

—

and wrongs of the individual case; and that this skill itself and the speeches composed with its help are available free free, that is, to anyone offering a consideration in return. Now it is absolutely vital that this skill— if it really is a skill, and not just a knack born of casual trial and error should not be allowed to grow up in our state if we can prevent it. The lawgiver will have nothing to say to those who obey his command that one should either listen to justice and not contradict her, or leave for some other country; but if anyone disobeys him, the law shall pronounce as follows: if anyone seems to be trying to misrepresent to the judges where the course of justice lies, and to enter one plea after another in support of either his own or someone else's case, when equity would call a halt, then anyone who wishes should indict him on a charge of perverse of the rights

938

—

—

b

pleading or criminal advocacy. He should be tried in the court of select judges and if he is found guilty the court should decide whether it thinks his motive is avarice or pugnacity. 94.

(a)

If

the court believes his motive

is

pugnacity,

must determine how long he must refrain from prosecuting anyone or helping someone else to do so. (b) If the motive appears to be avarice, it

c

(i)

a foreigner

must leave

the country

and never

return,

on pain

of death;

18.

Punctuating with the second dash after aute in e5 and a

comma

after alloi in e6.

1591

Laws XI a citizen

(ii)

95.

of his If

a

must

die, for letting a love of

money become the obsession

life.

man

is

convicted twice of committing such an offense through

pugnacity, he must

die.

Book

XII

passes himself off as an ambassador or herald of the state and enters into unauthorized negotiations with a foreign power, or, when actually sent on such a mission, delivers a message other than the one with which he was sent or contrariwise if he is shown to have misreported, in his capacity as an ambassador or herald, the communications which enemy or friendly states have given him, he must be open to prosecution for If

a

man

941

—

violating the law of

by impiety against the pronouncements and instructions

Hermes and Zeus. 96. If

he

is

convicted,

the penalty or fine

he must pay will have

to

be assessed.

and robbery with violence an act of brazen insolence. The sons of Zeus take no pleasure in fraud and force, and none of them has ever committed either of these crimes. So no one who commits such an offense should be seduced into believing the lies of poets or other story-tellers: the thief or thug mustn't think 'There's no shame in this after all, the gods do it themselves.' That is neither plausible nor true, and no one who breaks the law by such an act can possibly be a god or child of gods. The lawgiver is in a much better position to understand these things than all the poets in the world. Anyone who is convinced by this doctrine of ours is a happy man, and long may he so continue; but anyone who refuses to listen should have some such law as Theft of property

is

b

uncivilized,

—

contend with: all theft of public property, great or small, should attract the same punishment. The greed of the pilferer is just as great as any other thief's it's only his efficiency that's inferior; whereas anyone who makes off with some valuable object he did not deposit indulges his criminal tendencies to the full. In the eyes of the law, the one deserves a lighter penalty than the other not because of the amount of the theft, but

c

this to

—

because he 97.

(a)

if

is

probably curable while the other

anyone successfully prosecutes

is

not.

d

Thus

in court a foreigner or slave

on a charge of theft of some piece of public property, a decision must be reached as to the fine or penalty he should pay in view of the fact that he can probably be cured. (b) If a citizen, in spite of the education he will have enjoyed, is convicted of plundering or attacking his fatherland, whether he is caught in the

i

942

1592

Laws

act or not,

he must be

punished by death, as being virtually beyond cure.

Military service

b

on which we need to give a great deal of advice and have a large number of regulations. The vital point is that no one, man or woman, must ever be left without someone in charge of him; nobody must get into the habit of acting alone and independently, either in sham fighting or the real thing, and in peace and war alike we must give our constant attention and obedience to our leader, submitting to his guidance even in tiny

When

details.

c

a subject

the order

given

we

should stand, march, exercise, wash, feed, stay awake at night on duty as guards or messengers, and even in the midst of dangers not pursue the enemy or yield without a sign from our commander. In short, we must condition ourselves to an instinctive rejection of the very notion of doing anything without our companions; we must live a life in which we never do anything, if possible, except by combined and united action as

weapon

d

is

is

members of a group. No better or more powerful or efficient

ensuring safety and final victory in war, and never will. This is what we must practice in peacetime, right from childhood— the exercise of authority over others and submission to them in turn. Freedom from control must be uncompromisingly eliminated from the life of all men, and of all the animals under their domination. In particular, all choruses should be calculated to encourage prowess in the field, and for the same reason people must learn to put a brave and cheerful face on it when they have to put up with poor food and drink, extreme cold and heat, and rough bedding. Most important, they must not ruin the natural powers of head and feet by wrapping them round with artificial protection, so discouraging the spontaneous growth of the cap and shoes that nature provides. When these two extremities exists for

are in

sound condition they help to keep the whole body at the peak of efficiency, whereas their ruin is its ruin too. The feet are the most willing servants the body has, and the head is the organ of supreme control, the natural t3

seat of all the principal senses of the body. That s the praise of military life that ought, in view, to ring in a young man's ears. Here are the regulations. When a man is called up, or detailed for some special duty, he is obliged to perform his military service.

my

If

he

his

coward and fails to present himself, without the permission of commanders, a prosecution for failure to serve should be brought is

a

before the military authorities after return from the field. Such cases must be judged by the soldiers who have fought in the campaign; the various categories (infantry, cavalry and the other branches of the

armed

b

forces)

should meet separately, infantrymen being brought before infantrymen, cavalrymen before cavalrymen, and the others before their own

com-

rades similarly.

defendant is found guilty, he must in future be debarred from competing for any kind of military distinction.

98. If a (a) (i)

1593

Laws XII (ii)

bringing a charge against anyone else for refusing to perform military

service, (b)

and

the court

fine

he

is

to pay.

when

Afterwards, the

must assess the additional penalty or

commanders

the charges of refusal to serve have been decided, must reconvene each arm of the forces and in the presence

on those applying for awards of distinction. Supporting statements by eye-witnesses and other evidence adduced by the candidates must not relate to any previous campaign, but only to the one they have just fought. The prize in each case is to be a wreath of olive, which the winner should take to the temple of whichever god of war he pleases and dedicate it, suitably inscribed, as life-long evidence that the first, second or third prize was awarded to him. If a man does go on active service, but returns home before the commanders withdraw the troops, he should be prosecuted on a charge of desertion before the same court as is concerned with refusal of service.

of the candidates' fellow soldiers seek decisions

he is found guilty, same penalties should apply as before

c

d

99. If the

[98].

brings a prosecution ought to be very wary of inflicting an unjustified punishment, whether in cold blood or by accident. and well said to be the daughter of Respect, and both Justice is said are the natural scourges of falsehood. So in general we must be careful not to offend against justice, and particularly as regards the abandonment Naturally, everyone

who

—

—

mustn't reproach an enforced abandonment in mistake for an ignominious one, and so inflict penalties as undeserved as the victims are undeserving of them. Although it is by no means easy to tell the two cases apart, a rough and ready distinction must be attempted in the legal code. We can explain the point with the help of a story. If Patroclus had pulled round after being carried to his tent without his of

weapons

in the field:

e

we

944

—

weapons (as has happened in thousands of other cases) the weapons which the poet tells us were presented to Peleus by the gods as a dowry when he married Thetis, and which had been taken by Hector then it would have been open to all the scoundrels of the time to reproach the

—

son of Menoetius for abandoning his arms. Again, sometimes men have lost their weapons because of being thrown down from a height, or when at sea, or when suddenly caught up by a tremendous onrush of water during their struggles in a storm. There are countless similar circumstances one could plausibly adduce to excuse and palliate a disaster that positively invites denigration. So we must do our best to distinguish the more serious and reprehensible disasters from the other kind, and in a rough and ready way the distinction can be expressed by varying our expressions of rebuke. Thus 'he abandoned his shield' can sometimes be properly replaced by 'he 1

1.

See

Iliad

xvi

fin.,

and companion killed

by Hector.

xvii.125

ff.,

xviii.78

of Achilles, while

ff.

In the Trojan war, Patroclus, son of Menoetius

wearing the armor of Achilles' father Peleus, was

b

1594 lost

Laws

his weapons'.

When you

are robbed of your shield with some force, in the same way as if you had thrown it away

you have not abandoned it deliberately: the two cases are fundamentally

different.

The

distinction

should be written into the legal code in the following terms: If

a

man

finds the

enemy

and instead of turning round and defending himself with the weapons he has, deliberately lets them drop or throws them away, preferring a coward's life of shame to the glorious and blessed death of a hero, then there should certainly be a penalty for losing his weapons by abandonment. But when he has lost his weapons m the other way we've described the judge must not fail to take the fact into account. It is the criminal you need to punish, to reform him, not someone who's simply been unlucky— that's useless. So what will be the right penalty when someone has made good his escape by throwing away the weapons that could have protected him? Unfortunately, it's beyond the power of man to do the opposite of what people say some god did to Caeneus of Thessaly— that is, change him from a woman into a man. If only we could inflict the reverse transformation, from man to woman, that would be, in a sense, the most appropriate punishment for a man who has thrown away his shield. But what we can do is to reward him for saving his skin by giving him the closest possible approximation to such a penalty: we can make him spend the rest of his days in utter safety, so at his heels

that he lives with his ghastly disgrace for as long as possible. Here's the law that will deal with such people: 100. If a

man is convicted on a charge of shamefully dropping his weap-

ons of war; no general or any other army officer must employ again, or appoint him to any position whatever; (a)

(b) is,

him

as a soldier

and in addition to being thus permitted, like the natural coward he to avoid the risks that only real men can run, the guilty man must

also

pay

sum

money: one thousand drachmas if he belongs to the highest property-class, five hundred if to the second, three hundred if to the third, and one hundred if to the lowest. 2 101. If

a

an

of

officer

disobeys and posts the coward again,

the officers Scrutineer is to

hundred if

if

condemn him

to

pay the same

one he belongs to the highest property-class, five to the second, three hundred if to the third, and one hundred

thousand drachmas

fine:

if

to the fourth.

Well then, what will be the proper policy for us to adopt on the subject of Scrutineers? So far, we simply have a corps of officials, some appointed for a single year by the luck of the draw, others chosen from a preliminary slate of selected candidates to serve for several years. What if one of them proves so inadequate to the dignity and weight of his office that he gets 'out of true' and does something crooked? Who will be capable of making 2.

In Plato's text the regulation called here 100(b)

comes

after 101.

1595

Laws XII

desperately difficult to find someone of high moral standards to exercise authority over the authorities, so to speak, but try we must. So where are our god-like 'straighteners' to be found? The point is this: a state has many crucial parts that prevent it from disintegrating, just as a ship has its stays and bracing ropes and a

a

man like

that

go straight again?

It is

tendons and associated sinews. (Features of this kind are a very widespread phenomenon, and in spite of the many different names we give them in different contexts, they are basically the same sort of thing.) Now the office of Scrutineer is the single most crucial factor determining

body

its

whether

the Scrutineers are better men display irreproachable impartiality

a state survives or disintegrates.

If

they scrutinize, and and integrity, the entire state and country flourishes and prospers. But if their investigation of the officials is conducted badly, then the sense of justice that unites all the interests in the state is destroyed, with the result that all the officials go their different ways and refuse to pull together any longer; they fragment the state into lots of smaller states by filling it with

than the

officials

the party-strife that so speedily wrecks it. That is why it is absolutely vital that the moral standards of the Scrutineers should be exemplary. So let's try to produce these officials by some such procedure as this:

should congregate in a precinct dedicated jointly to Apollo and the Sun, in order to present to the god three out of their number. Each citizen is to propose that person, apart from himself, whom he believes to be perfect in every way; the candidate is to be at least fifty years of age. This preliminary list should be divided into two halves (on the assumption that the total is an even number; if not, the person with the fewest votes should be excluded before the division is made), and the half consisting of those with the most votes should be selected to proceed to the next stage after the other half with

Every year

after the

summer

solstice the entire state

fewer votes have been eliminated. If some names receive the same number of votes, so that the selected candidates are too numerous, the excess should be removed by eliminating the youngest candidates. The selected candidates that remain should be voted for again until only three are left, each with a different number of votes. If two of them, or all three, attract equal support, then the decision should be left to chance and the gods of good luck: the first, second and third choices must be determined by lot, crowned with olive and given the rewards of their success. Next, a public proclamation must be made to the effect that the state of the Magnesians, securely re-established, presents to the Sun-god her three best men; and these, her choicest fruits, in accordance with the law of old, she consecrates for the term of their judicial office as a joint gift to Apollo and the Sun. In the first year twelve such Scrutineers are to

now by

the grace of

God

be appointed, each to retain office till the age of seventy-five; thereafter three more are to be added every year. The Scrutineers are to divide all the officials into twelve groups and look into their conduct by making all such inquiries as are consistent with the dignity of a gentleman. During their period of office as Scrutineers they are to live in the precinct of Apollo and the Sun where they were

1596

Laws

When they have sat in judgment, either privately and individually,

elected.

e

or in association with colleagues, on those at the end of their term of office in the service of the state, they must make known, by posting written notice in the market-place, what penalty or fine in their opinion each official ought to pay. Any official who refuses to admit that he has been judged impartially should haul the Scrutineers before the Select Judges, and if he is deemed innocent of the accusations he should accuse the Scrutineers themselves, if he so wishes. But

he

102. If

convicted, and (a) the Scrutineers had decided on death as his penalty, h e must die (a penalty which in the nature of the case cannot be increased); but (b)

is

his penalty

if

then double

is

one that

it is

possible to double,

he must pay.

Now we ought to hear about the scrutiny of the Scrutineers What

will

During

*47

it

be,

and

how

will

their lifetime these

it

themselves.

be organized?

men,

whom

the

whole

state has

thought fit with the highest honors, should sit in the front seat at all the moreover, when the Greeks assemble to perform sacrifices or see

to dignify festivals,

spectacles together, or congregate for other sacred purposes, the leaders of the delegations sent by the state should be chosen from the Scrutineers; and the Scrutineers are to be the only citizens whose heads may be

graced all be priests of Apollo and the Sun; the chief priesthood should be an annual office, held by the Scrutineer who has come top of the list of those appointed that year which must be recorded under his name, so as to provide a framework for the calendar for as long as the state endures. After the death of a Scrutineer, his laying-out, his last journey and his tomb must be on a grander scale than for ordinary citizens. All cloth used must be white, dirges and laments must be banned, and a chorus of fifteen girls and another of fifteen youths must stand one on each side of the bier

by

b

c

a

crown

of laurel.

They should

—

and sing

his glory in

day the

hymn of praise to the dead priest, celebrating song throughout the day. As dawn comes up the following

alternately a kind of

bier shall be taken to the

tomb escorted by a hundred of the youths who attend the gymnasia, chosen by the relatives of the dead man. In front must go the young men who are as yet unmarried, each rigged out in his

own military equipment; their d

weapons, and

the cavalry should bring their horses, the infantry so on. Around the bier itself, towards the front, will be

boys chanting the traditional strains, followed by girls, and women have finished bearing children. The Priests and Priestesses will bring

who

up the

they are of course banned from other funerals, but provided the oracle at Delphi also approves, they shall attend this one, as it will not defile them. The Scrutineer's tomb shall be an oblong crypt built of choice 3 stone of the most indestructible kind obtainable; in this, on benches of stone set side bv rear;

3.

Reading protimon

in d7.

1597

Laivs XII

him who has gone to his reward. On top of the tomb they will pile a circular mound, and plant a sacred grove of trees around it— except on one side, to allow for the indefinite extension of the tomb, where more earth will have to be piled up to cover subsequent burials. Every year side, they will lay

e

the citizens will hold competitions in the Scrutineers' honor, one athletic, one equestrian, and one of the arts. All these honors will be bestowed on

Scrutineers If

whose conduct has borne

a Scrutineer relies

on

scrutiny.

his election to protect

him and goes

to the bad,

thus showing he's only too human after all, the law will order a charge prosecute. to be brought against him by anyone who feels inclined to The trial should be held in court according to the following procedure. Guardians of the Laws, and all the Scrutineers, active or retired, must sit brought in conjunction with the court of the Select Judges, and the charge

by the prosecutor against the defendant must be to the so is a disgrace to his distinctions and his office.' 103.

If

the defendant

he must be ejected

is

from

948

effect that 'so-and-

convicted, his office,

denied the special tomb, and stripped

of the honors he has already received.

win one fifth of the votes, the he must pay a fine of twelve hundred drachmas if he belongs to highest property-class, eight hundred if to the second, six hundred if to the third, and two hundred if to the lowest. 104.

If

the prosecutor fails to

Rhadamanthus should be admired for the way in which, according to that his report, he decided the suits that came before him. He realized contemporaries were absolutely convinced of the existence of gods and not surprisingly, as most people alive then were actually descended from them, and this is traditionally true of Rhadamanthus himself. I suppose should be given the task of it was because he thought that no mere man judging, but only gods, that he managed to make his judgments so swift and straightforward. Whatever the subject of dispute, he made the litigants take an oath, a device which enabled him to get through his list of cases rapidly and without making mistakes. Nowadays, however, some people

t

—

remarked) don't believe in gods at all, while others believe they the worst and are not concerned about mankind; and there are others most numerous category who hold that in return for a miserable sacrifice here and a little flattery there, the gods will help them to steal enormous sums of money and rescue them from all sorts of heavy penalties. So in hardly the modern world the legal procedure used by Rhadamanthus will law must do. The climate of opinion about the gods has changed, so the change too, and a legislator who knows his business ought to abolish the oaths sworn by each side in a lawsuit. When a man brings a charge against someone, he should put his accusations in writing without taking an oath; (as

we