Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49 [First Edition (U.S.)] 0801413885, 9780801413889

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Colonialism and Cold War

Colonialism and Cold War T H E U N IT E D S T A T E S A N D T H E ST R U G G L E FO R IN D O N E S IA N IN D E P E N D E N C E ,

1945-49

Robert J. M c M ahon

Cornell University Press ITHACA AND LONDON

Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation that aided in bringing this book to publication. Copyright G 1981 by Cornell University Press AU rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information address ComeU University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1981 by ComeU University Press. PubUshed in the United Kingdom by ComeU University Press Ltd., Ely House, 37 Dover Street, London W iX 4HQ.

International Standard Book Number 0-8014-1388-5 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 81-66648 Printed in the United States of America Librarians: library Of Congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the {wok.

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To m y parents, W M

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CONTENTS

Preface 1 . The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism 2. The United States, the East Indies, and the Colonial Question 3. Reoccupation: August-D ecem ber 1945 4. Toward the U nggadjati Agreem ent: Jan uaryNovem ber 1946 5. From Negotiations to War: Novem ber 1946-

July 1947

9 19 43 74 114

137

6. Intervention by the United Nations: Ju ly 1947January 1948 7. From Negotiations to War: January-Decem ber 1948 8. The Road to Independence: December 1948December 1949 9. The United States and Indonesian Independence

251 304

Epilogue: The United States and Indonesia, 1949-65 Bibliography of Archive Collections Index

3 17 329 3 31

168 206

MAPS

The N etherlands East Indies D ivision of Java under the Renville agreem ent

21 207

PREFACE

The proceedings w ere solemn and m oving, though surpris­ ingly matter-of-fact for such a historic occasion. Only about three hundred people w itnessed the thirty-two-minute cere­ m ony in the marble Burghèrzall (Hall of Citizens) in the seven­ teenth-century royal palace in Am sterdam . The seven Indone­ sian delegates and the members of the Dutch cabinet, along w ith other high-ranking Dutch officials and some members of the diplomatic corps, stood at their places along both sides of a red-felt-covered table as Queen Juliana w as escorted into the hall by two of her ministers. Dressed in black velvet, with a collar of em eralds glim m ering at her neck, she took the seat left vacant for her between Indonesian Prime M inister Mohammed Hatta and Dutch Prime M inister Willem Drees. A protocol covering the results of the recent round-table con­ ference w as read aloud, and the two leaders signed it. Then the queen signed an act of confirmation in which she gave her as­ sent to "the new order of law " between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic. "It is a privilege to perform this act of transfer as it stands in history," she declared, "o r rather in the face of God, w ho knows w hy this march hand-in-hand in free­ dom w as not achieved sooner nor later, and who knows the feelings of generations, but w ho also watches whether w e can use this plan for the progress of mankind. M ay this now be so ."1 ’ Quoted in Selden Chapin (ambassador in the Netherlands) to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, December 27,1949, in Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 7, The Far East and Australasia, pt. 1 (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 588-99.

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Preface Following her speech, the national anthems of both countries w ere played; and although a note on the program requested the participants and w itnesses to the ceremony not to sing, the sound of voices soon filled the hall. At 10:22 a .m ., December 27, 1949, the transfer of sovereignty w as completed, form ally end­ ing 347 years of Dutch rule over the East Indies. A sim ultaneous cerem ony in Djakarta, more than 8,000 miles aw ay, w as far less restrained. There, in front of the white palace of the IDutch governors, in the city they had called Batavia, Dutch H igh Com m issioner A . H. J. Lovink and Indonesian D eputy Prime M inister Sultan Hamengku Buwono solem nly signed the protocol of transfer. After their speeches, a military band played the Dutch national anthem as the Dutch tricolor w as hauled dow n, and then played the Indonesian national anthem as the flag of Indonesia w as hoisted in its place. The sight of the form erly banned red-and-white flag flying majesti­ cally over a building that had been the very symbol of the Dutch im perium drove the crowd of 20,000 to a frenzy. The celebration lasted long into the night, with the sounds of Javanese gongs and drum s blaring from loudspeakers at the street com ers. Seem ingly oblivious of the damp heat of a tropical evening, crow ds surged throughout the d ty scream ing, "Merdeka!" (free­ dom) and proudly w aving homemade red-and-white flags. A f­ ter four long and often bloody years of conflict, a night of festiv­ ity w as w ell earned. But the real Indonesian celebration did not take place until the next day, when Sukarno, the man who had come to personify the Indonesian independence movement, trium phantly re­ turned to Djakarta. Driven from the capital by the Dutch four years earlier, Sukarno w as now coming back to take up resi­ dence in the palace of the Dutch governors as the first president of an independent Indonesia. A huge crowd at Kamajoran air­ port roared as he stepped from his new ly painted red-and-white Dakota plane, w earing a sim ple white naval uniform and a tradi­ tional black fez. Along the four-mile route from the airport to the d ty, crowds snarled traffic in a boisterous and emotional tribute to their president as Sukarno stood in his open maroon Packard, sm iling, w aving, and warm ly responding to the continuous cries of "M erdeka!" The streets w ere full of exuberant people

10

Preface

and the colorful flag of the new republic w as everyw here. A crowd of 200/000 filled Koningsplein Square, facing the palace, as Sukarno gave a stirring five-m inute speech from the marble steps. He ended his address with the cry "Sekali merdeka!" (once free, forever free). One foreign diplomat, w aving in the direc­ tion of the vast crow ds, remarked to a colleague: "C ould the Dutch ever have held this, in the face of that?"2 Perhaps no process has had a greater influence on the m odem era than the dism antling of former colonial em pires in A sia and Africa after World War II. Decolonization has few parallels as an agent of historical change. Not only has it irrevocably altered the very political map of the globe, but it has also profoundly affected the international balance of pow er and challenged the continuation of W estern hegem ony over the world. "Betw een 1945 and i960," observed Geoffrey Barraclough, "no less than forty countries w ith a population of eight hundred million— more than a quarter of the w orld's inhabitants—revolted against colonialism and w on their independence. N ever before in hu­ man history had so revolutionary a reversal occurred w ith such rapid ity."3 The United States, which em erged as the w orld's preeminent m ilitary and economic pow er in the postwar period and which prided itself on its anticolonial tradition and heritage, w as in a unique position to influence these decolonization struggles. To be sure, A sian and African nationalist leaders w ere often dis­ appointed by the minimal moral and material support they re­ ceived from W ashington. Still, they looked to the United States as the nation most likely to sym pathize with their aspirations and often pointed to it as an inspiration in both its history and its ideals. One area where American diplom acy had a major 2Quoted in Time, January 9, 1950, p. 20. This account has been drawn also from the following additional sources: New York Times, December 27,1949, p. 18; December 28,1949, pp. 1, 5; December 29,1949, p. 12; and January 1,19 5 0 , IV, p. 2; Newsweek, January 9, 1950, pp. 30 -31; The Times (London), December 28, 1949, p. 6, and December 29,1949, p. 4; Washington Star, December 27,1949, p. 1; A li Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on M y journey: The Memoirs of A li Sastroamidjojo, Indonesian Patriot and Leader, ed. C. L. M. Penders (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979), p. 207. 3Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History (Baltimore: Pen­ guin, 1967), p. 153.

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Preface impact on the decolonization process w as the Netherlands East Indies, the spraw ling archipelago that since the early seven­ teenth century had been the jew el of the Dutch colonial empire. Direct Am erican pressure on the Dutch in the spring of 1949, as much as any other single factor, compelled the Netherlands to grant independence to its rich colony, and so paved the w ay to the historic cerem ony in the Burgherzall. This book exam ines the role of the United States in the often violent m ovement toward Indonesian independence. In recent years scholars have show n considerable interest in the con­ frontation between the United States and revolutionary m ove­ ments in the so-called Third W orld, but only rarely have they analyzed the role of Am erican foreign policy in the dénouement of the European im perial order. Yet the interaction between Am erican diplom acy and the rise of numerous independent states in A sia, Africa, and the M iddle East is of the utmost historical significance. Only through a careful analysis of the Am erican reaction to the colonial issue—and, conversely, the reaction of the colonized peoples ,to American diplom acy—can W ashington's relations with the Third World be understood in their proper historical context. The first two chapters provide background material. Chapter 1 surveys the history of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia and the subsequent rise of nationalism among the peoples of the East Indies. Chapter 2 exam ines Am erican-East Indian relations be­ fore 1945. Since Am erican policy toward the East Indies came to be subsum ed under the general problem of colonialism during World War U, this chapter also offers an interpretation of W ashington's historical opposition to European im perialism . It dem onstrates how idealism and self-interest merged in an Am erican anticolonial tradition—a tradition that influenced and conditioned the U .S. response to nationalism in Indonesia. The follow ing chapters focus more directly on the American role in the Dutch-Indonesian struggle, beginning w ith the Am erican reaction to the proclamation of the Republic of In­ donesia in A ugust 1945. U .S. diplomacy exerted an important influence on the conflict from its very inception, and these chap­ ters document and interpret the extent of that influence. At first W ashington sought to remain neutral and uninvolved, but that 12

Preface

policy w as tantamount to acquiescence in a return to the status quo ante bellum and it had a profound effect on the early stages o f the contest. By 1947 the United States had begun to take a more active interest in the East Indies. A s a member of the Good O ffices Committee of the United Nations and the UN Commis­ sion for Indonesia, the United States played a pivotal role in the mediation o f the dispute. Its m assive financial assistance to the Netherlands governm ent through the M arshall Plan, m oreover, drew the United States even more deeply into the Dutch-Indonesian imbroglio. When the Dutch launched a second mili­ tary offensive against the republic in December 1948, and were condemned by the international community as w ell as the Am erican public and Congress, the Truman administration be­ gan to reevaluate its policy toward the dispute. Shortly thereaf­ ter, the United States threatened to suspend all economic aid to Holland if it did not grant independence to Indonesia. This action proved to be the turning point of the struggle. Despite its importance, I have tried to avoid an exclusive focus on Am erican policy, which would necessarily distort any study of the decolonization process in the East Indies. Instead, I have attem pted to provide the necessary context for an understand­ ing of Am erican policy by exam ining Indonesian internal de­ velopm ents and the complicated and often tortuous negotia­ tions between the Dutch and the Indonesians, as w ell as the role of other pow ers. Great Britain, for exam ple, which occupied the Indies on behalf of the Allies in September 1945, influenced the initial phase of the conflict more than any other power. Conse­ quently, Chapters 3 and 4 closely evaluate British actions, which w ere crucial for the early establishment of the Republic of In­ donesia. These chapters also consider Indonesia as an issue in Anglo-Am erican relations and trace the w ay in which the United States m oved to supplant Britain's influence in the Indies after the w ithdraw al of British troops in Novem ber 1946. N onetheless, this w ork is prim arily a study of American di­ plom acy, and as such it focuses chiefly on American attitudes, policies, and actions. M y principal interest is to explain W ashington's response to the Indonesian revolution within the context of overall U .S. foreign policy objectives. Consequently, this book does not pretend to be a com prehensive history of the

13

Preface decolonization of the Dutch East Indies, nor does it pretend to offer the final word on the actions and motivations of the other m ajor actors: the Dutch, the British, and the Indonesians them­ selves. Although the process of decolonization in Indonesia and else­ where clearly transcends the immediate issues of postwar di­ plom acy, including the Cold War, W ashington's response to the colonial issue can be understood within that fram ework. The prim ary objective of American foreign policy during 1945-49 w as the rehabilitation and revitalization of W estern Europe. For most Am erican officials, the chief significance of Indonesia, a rich source of raw materials and an integrated part of the Dutch econom y, lay in its relationship to that overarching goal. They consequently filtered Indonesian developm ents throughgEuro^ pean prism during those early postwar years. This bookTtRenT attem pts to show how other, more dominant interests of Am er­ ican diplom acy, shaped by events outside Indonesia, con­ ditioned Am erican policy toward that area. In short, it seeks to illum inate the fundam ental relationship between Am erica's co­ lonial policy and a deepening Cold War. Two w orks in particular facilitated m y research. George M cTum an K ahin's Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pub­ lished in 1952, provided invaluable material on Indonesian in­ ternal developm ents. H is w ork, along w ith that of other Indone­ sian specialists, helped me to appreciate the subtleties and com­ plexities of Indonesian history. Alastair M. Taylor's Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, published in i960, provided a balanced and judicious account of the critical role played by the UN. Though at times I disagree with their judgm ents, I respect their consistently high standards of scholarship and thank both authors for their very useful insights. The other scholars on whom I have depended are cited in the notes. I am grateful to them all. I thank the highly competent staffs at the libraries of the Uni­ versity of Connecticut, the University of North Carolina, Cor­ nell U niversity, Yale University, the University of Virginia, and Princeton University. A lso helpful and courteous w ere the ar­ chivists at the National Archives (Washington, D .C .), the Library

14

Preface

of Congress (W ashington, D .C .), the W ashington N avy Yard, the W ashington National Records Center (Suitland, Md.)/ the Public Record Office (London), the Franklin D. Roosevelt Li­ brary (H yde Park, N .Y .), the Harry S. Truman Library (Indepen­ dence, Mo.)/ the Douglas M acArthur Memorial Archives (Nor­ folk, V a.), the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace (Stanford, C alif.), and the United Nations Library (New York). I especially thank the United Nations Library for kindly allowing me access to form erly classified Security Council records for the period 1947-49. I thank the University of Connecticut and the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library for their generous financial support. In addition, I thank Bruce M. Stave, of the U niversity of Connecticut, for helping to provide me with em ploym ent at a critical time, thus enabling me to begin this project. Several form er Am erican diplomats who helped to formulate and execute Am erican policy objectives in Indonesia in the 1940s graciously granted me personal interviews. For their coopera­ tion and their innumerable insights and anecdotes I thank Jam es Barco, Jam es N evins H yde, Phillip Jessup, Abbot Moffat, Frederick N olting, Charlton O gbum , Dean Rusk, and Joseph Scott. I am deeply indebted to Thomas G . Paterson, of the Univer­ sity of Connecticut, for his assistance and encouragement throughout the course of this project. H is warm friendship and the exam ple of his own scholarship helped me im m ensely. I also thank A . W illiam Hoglund and Edmund Wehrle for reading the m anuscript and offering valuable comments. M y colleagues at the U niversity of Connecticut were a constant source of friendly encouragem ent. I thank M atthew M agda, J. Donald M iller, and Thom as Zoum aras in particular for reading several earlier ver­ sions of this m anuscript, and for patiently and often enthusiasti­ cally listening to m y ideas. I am especially grateful to m y former colleague Aaron David M iller for his excellent advice during the final stages of the manuscript. The professional assistance of N ancy R eilly in typing the manuscript is also w arm ly acknowl­ edged.

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Preface M ost of all, I thank m y w ife, Alison, for reasons only she can truly understand. R obert J. M c M ahon Washington, D.C.

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Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

1

The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism The East Indian archipelago is a spraw ling chain of some three thousand islands lying between mainland Southeast A sia and the shores of Australia. This territory, ruled since 1949 by an independent governm ent of Indonesia and today the fifth most populous nation in the w orld, has long been recognized for its great economic and strategic value. In 1948 Stanley K. Hornbeck, one of the State Departm ent's leading Far Eastern experts, called the East Indies "the w orld's richest island em pire . . . a region of political, economic and strategic importance to the w hole w o rld ."1 That view has been echoed by U .S. officials throughout the past few decades. "W ith its 100 million people and its 3,000 mile arc of islands containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources," wrote Richard M. Nixon in 1967, "Indonesia constitutes the greatest prize in the Southeast Asia area."2A fter a brief tour of the islands in 1968, Senator Joseph A . Clark m arveled that "potentially, Indonesia is one of the richest nations in the w orld ."3 Writing only three years later, former Am erican am bassador to Indonesia Howard Palfrey Jones esti­ mated that Indonesia already ranked as the third richest country in the w orld in terms of natural resources. "It alone," he as1Stanley K. Hombeck, "The United States and the Netherlands East Indies, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 255 (January 1948): 124-25. 2Richard M. Nixon, "A sia after Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, 45 (October 1967): 111- 2 5 . Indonesia: Sick Man on the Mend, a Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator Joseph A . Clark on a Study Mission to Indonesia, M ay 2, 1968 (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 9.

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serted, "has the potential to become a major pow er in A s i a . . . . Strategically located, Croesus-rich in resources largely unex­ ploited, except in the case of oil, it is the pivot around which the future of Southeast A sia revolves."4 Such unbridled enthusiasm for the wealth and strategic value of Indonesia is hardly a recent developm ent. Indeed, it w as the lure of the fabled riches of the Indies, and especially its re­ nowned spice trade, that first brought European merchants to those islands back in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In order to facilitate economic penetration of the Indies, the N etherlands governm ent granted a m onopoly in Far Eastern trade to the East India Com pany in 1602. Although nom inally a private concern, the Dutch com pany had the complete backing of its governm ent's naval and m ilitary power; with this support, it quickly established commercial suprem acy over its chief rival, Portugal. Initially the com pany w as attracted to the extensive trade of the Moluccas—the legendary spice islands—but soon it began to focus on the well-established spice trade of the main island of Java as w ell. With Javanese society politically frag­ mented during the early seventeenth century, the Dutch found it relatively easy to gain an early foothold there. Through a combination of w ar and treaties, they were able to establish dominance of the Indonesian seas between 1650 and 1680. A s the spice trade declined, the East India Com pany explored new commercial opportunities. In the early eighteenth century the com pany began to concentrate on the production of coffee for the European market. This venture proved to be extrem ely 4Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. xv, 4. For a sampling of similar statements about the unparalleled wealth of the Indies, see Rupert Emerson, The Netherlands Indies and the United States (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), p. 34; Raymond Kennedy, The Ageless Indies (New York: John Day, 1942), pp. 169-74; Albert G. Hopkins, "Netherlands Indies: What Holland's Wealthiest Colonial Possession Means to Western Industry," Foreign Commerce Weekly, 16 (September 16,1944): 3; U .S. Economic Survey Team to Indonesia, Indonesia: Perspective and Proposals for United States Economic A id, a Report to the President (New Haven: Yale Universi­ ty Southeast Asia Studies, 1963), pp. 112 - 13 ; Malcolm Caldwell, Indonesia (Lon­ don: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 6; Crocker National Bank, Indonesia: The Inevitable Miracle (San Francisco, 1973), pp. 47-49; Allen M. Sievers, The Mystical World of Indonesia: Culture and Economic Development in Conflict (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 79.

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lucrative, enhancing considerably the economic value of Java. In order to protect their growing commercial em pire, the Dutch gradually expanded their territorial holdings in Java and the outer islands. Although the Dutch did not gain complete control over the Indies until w ell into the twentieth century, by the beginning of the eighteenth century they already controlled over half of Java while dominating the commercial activity of the rest of the archipelago.5 Despite its early successes, in 1798 the East India Com pany collapsed, a victim of its own corrupt administration and inept financial policies. The area form erly controlled by the company w as then placed under the direct control of the Netherlands governm ent. This shift did not lead to any substantial changes in policy, how ever, for, as one leading historian has noted, 'T h ere w as no sharp break w ith the Com pany's system : indeed, nearly all the old institutions, such as forced labor, deliveries in kind, feudalism , and m onopolies in certain crops were main­ tained. The old idea that colonies existed for the benefit of the mother country w as still predom inant."6 A fter a brief period of British rule over the East Indies, com­ mencing in 18 11, the Dutch regained control of their prized colony in 18 16 . When Dutch authorities attempted to reestablish their pow er in Java, however, they encountered determined resistance from certain native aristocrats. Using Islam , the reli­ gion of the vast m ajority of the archipelago's people, as a uni­ fying sym bol, Prince Diponegoro declared a "holy w ar" against the European intruders in 1825. With strong support from the peasantry, the Javanese prince w aged an effective and bloody guerrilla w ar against the Dutch for five years. Only with great difficulty did the Dutch bring the revolt under control by 1830. ’ George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cor­ nell University Press, 1952), pp. 3-4; Robert van Niel, "The Course of Indone­ sian H istory," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1963), pp. 279-82; Ailsa Zainu'ddin, A Short History of Indonesia (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 94-95; Leslie Palmier, Indonesia (New York: Walker, 1965), pp. 39-41; George Masselman, The Cradle of Colonialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 2 11- 13 . 6Am ry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems, and Poli­ tics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), p. 34. See also Caldwell, Indonesia, p. 43.

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The Growth of Indonesian N ationalism

The casualties w ere astonishingly high: nearly 15,000 on the Dutch side lost their lives and about 200,000 Javanese were killed. The rebellion w as sparked prim arily by Dutch encroach­ ment on the traditional prerogatives of native elites, but it also had strongly nationalistic overtones; the broad-based support for D iponegoro's rebellion w as indeed an ominous sign to the Dutch rulers. A s a result of the w ar in Java and a series of conflicts in Europe, Dutch finances became severely strained; accordingly, pressure mounted in governm ental circles in Hol­ land to draw greater profits out of the Indies.7 A s one Dutch policy m aker m used at the time: "A ll turns on the great question whether w e can compete with other countries; if so, Java is a gold mine; if not, it is nothing."* In order to ensure a greater rate of profits for the mother country, the Netherlands installed the infam ous cultivation sys­ tem of agriculture in the Indies in 1830. Geared to producing crops for export—especially coffee, sugar, and indigo—at the low est possible cost, the cultivation system crudely exploited the labor of the East Indian peasantry. The peasants were re­ quired to place a percentage of their land and labor at the gov­ ernm ent's disposal.9 The Dutch governm ent, according to one critic of this policy, compelled a peasant "to grow on his land w hat pleases it; it punishes him when he sells the crop so pro­ duced to anyone else but it; and it fixes the price it pays h i m . . . . A nd since after all, the entire business must yield a profit, this profit can be made in no other w ay than by paying the Javanese just enough to keep him from starving, which w ould decrease the producing pow er of the nation."10 A series of devastating fam ines between 1843 and 1848 testified to the sheer brutality of the Dutch agricultural program . ’ Justus M. van der Kroef, "Prince Diponegoro, Progenitor of Indonesian Nationalism ," Far Eastern Quarterly, 9 (August 1949): 424-50; Zainu'ddin, Short History of Indonesia, pp. 127-28; Palmier, Indonesia, pp. 65-67. 'Quoted in John S. Fum ivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (New York: Macmillan, 1944), p. 1 1 1 . ’ John S. Fum ivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (New York: New York University Press, 1956), pp. 220-23; Zainu'ddin, Short History of Indonesia, pp. 128 -31; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolu­ tion, pp. 1 1 - 1 3 ; van Niel, "Course of Indonesian H istory," pp. 284-85. “ Quoted in Zainu'ddin, Short History of Indonesia, p. 13 1.

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For the Netherlands, though, the success of the system w as self-evident; it could be m easured in cold financial terms. By 1877 the cultivation system had paid off all of the East India Com pany's debts and w as bringing a sizable amount of addi­ tional revenue into The H ague's home treasury. The East Indies, between 18 3 1 and 1877, earned on the average 18 million guil­ ders a year in profit; in view of a national budget that did not exceed 60 million guilders a year during the same period, the considerable contribution of the colony to the health of the home economy is unm istakable.11 "It is certain," wrote Dutch governor General J. van den Bosch, "that without the generous contributions of the Indies, the State w ould have been ruined and w e w ould have been forced to submit ourselves to the mercy of the opposition."12 "Ja v a ," one colonial minister rapturously de­ clared, "poured forth riches upon riches on the homeland as if by a m agician's w an d ."13 By the 1860s and 1870s, liberal voices in Holland began to protest against the excesses of the cultivation system , contend­ ing that a colony should not be used exclusively for the purpose of enriching the mother country. Their agitation led to some significant reform s, and in 1870 the cultivation system w as re­ placed by a less exploitive system of private enterprise. Toward the end of the century, the pressure within Holland for a more hum ane colonial policy increased substantially. In 1899 Conrad Th. Van Deventer, a leader of the Dutch Liberal Party, wrote a highly influential pam phlet, A Debt of Honor, in which he charged that the Netherlands governm ent had been immorally exploiting the natural wealth of the Indies while com pletely neglecting the w elfare of the native inhabitants of the islands. This point of view gained increasing sym pathy in Holland and led to the formation of the so-called Ethical Party. The Ethicals advocated the abolition of unjust taxation and appropriation, a sharp upgrading of social w elfare m easures for the Indonesians, nB. H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia, rev. ed. (Chicago: Quad­ rangle Books, i960), pp. 291-92. See also Sievers, Mystical World, pp. 112 -16 . ,2Quoted in C. L. M. Penders, ed., Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830-1942 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), p. 20. »Quoted in Fum ivall, Netherlands India, p. 127. 24

The Growth of Indonesian N ationalism

and the gradual preparation of native elites for political posi­ tions. In addition, the Ethicals em phasized education, believing that they could help to bring about a closer association between the Dutch and the natives by opening up educational opportuni­ ties for Indonesians. By 1902, the main goals of the Ethical Party w ere adopted as official policy by the Dutch governm ent, w ith a resultant paternalistic liberalization of Dutch rule in the Indies.14 A s one Dutch politician explained this new philosophy: "W e m ust bring up the child in such a w ay that it can learn to dis­ pense with our h elp ."15 But "the child" would not be satisfied w ith paternalistic reform s; on the contrary, Indonesian national­ ists soon began to extend the argum ents of the Ethical Party to their logical conclusion—nothing less than complete selfgovernm ent for the Indonesian people. The rise of nationalism as a potent force in the East Indies is a phenom enon of the twentieth century. While the beginnings of Indonesian nationalism probably go back as far as the initial period of Dutch penetration of the islands, active and organized resistance to Dutch rule dates from the first two decades of this century. The question logically arises as to w hy organized nationalist opposition to Dutch hegem ony took so long to de­ velop if the system im posed on the natives w as as brutalizing and exploitive as most leading authorities have m aintained.14 Part o f the explanation for this seeming paradox is that the East India Com pany and the cultivation system benefited elites w ith­ in Indonesian society, thus depriving the peasants—clearly the chief victim s of Dutch policies—of their natural leaders. On the few occasions w hen the aristocracy challenged Dutch rule, as in the case of Prince Diponegoro's rebellion, it found strong sup­ port within the Indonesian peasantry. For the most part, though, the personal interests of Indonesian elites w ere w ell served by Dutch rule; identification w ith peasant grievances w as thus a rare occurrence. Without the aid of the indigenous aris,4Bemhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 12 -15 ; Vlekke, Nusantan1, pp. 330-31; Fum ivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 226-30. For a criticism of the limits of the Ethical policy, see Zainu'ddin, Short History of Indonesia, pp. 154-57. “ Quoted in Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 14. “ See, for example, Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 7 ,1 1 - 1 4 ; Fum ivall, Netherlands India, pp. 136-39; Sievers, Mystical World, pp. 93-95,120-22.

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tocracy, the peasants w ere unable to comprehend the complex relationship between the Dutch imperium and the deterioration o f their own position within Indonesian society. Peasant frustra­ tion w as generally channeled not against the Dutch, but against the more visible sym bols of oppression—such as the indigenous aristocracy itself. "B y virtue of their indirect political rule and indirect economic exploitation," one historian has written, "the Dutch for three centuries w ere able to avoid collision with the reaction and opposition of the general Indonesian population to the conditions for which in an ultimate sense the Dutch were responsible."17 With the abandonment of the cultivation system after 1870, the reality of Dutch rule gradually became more apparent. W hen the indirectly adm inistered state m onopoly w as replaced by a more directly adm inistered private enterprise, the Indone­ sian people had much more direct contact with the Dutch and w ith Dutch economic pow er. Indonesian consciousness of Dutch political and economic control w as greatly heightened; increasingly, natives learned that there w as a direct relationship between Dutch im perialism and their own political and econom­ ic grievances. This distress w as further aggravated by the in­ creasingly heavy taxes that the Dutch compelled peasants to p ay.“ The initial stirrings of peasant discontent took the form of both violent and nonviolent protest movements. One of these m ove­ m ents, the Saminist rebellion, began in 1890 and grew into a fairly large-scale peasant revolt. Essentially the Sam inists op­ posed governm ental interference in peasant life; they wanted to return to the traditional, communalistic social organizations that had characterized Indonesian society before Dutch rule. The Dutch finally suppressed the movement in 19 17 , but only through the use of considerable armed force. While revolts of this type w ere not, strictly speaking, nationalistic—in fact, the Sam inists exhibited anarchistic tendencies—they did represent strong feelings of opposition to the Dutch Indies governm ent 17Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 41. “ Ibid., pp. 42-43; Sievers, Mystical World, pp. 122-27.

26

The Growth of Indonesian N ationalism

w hich awaited only the emergence of an organized nationalist elite to direct them into more clearly nationalistic channels.19 Ironically, the Dutch helped to provide the Indonesian peasants w ith such an educated nationalist elite. A s part of the Ethical Party program , the Netherlands governm ent had com­ mitted itself to broadening educational opportunities for na­ tives. This commitment w as reinforced by an expanding colonial governm ental structure that required the services of educated native elites. M oreover, Dutch officials believed that an educa­ tional program w ould turn the Indonesian populace aw ay from a grow ing Islamic modernist movement that Dutch authorities saw as a challenge to continued W estern hegem ony in the archipelago. A W estern-educated elite, the Dutch believed, w ould help Indonesians to reject Islam and move toward closer cultural association w ith the Dutch. "It is to our vital interest," wrote one Dutch colonial minister, "not to w ait until unexpected circumstances compel us to give that which w e can grant to the Indonesians voluntarily and in the form which seem s to us the b est."20 For a variety of reasons, then, the Dutch inaugurated a pro­ gram o f W estern education for a select group of Indonesians during the first two decades of the twentieth century. M any of the natives w ere to be educated in Europe, most of them in Holland itself. Yet in the long run this educational program proved counterproductive to Dutch interests, because only a small portion of those people educated in the West could find jobs in the East Indies commensurate with their training. The upper ranks of the East Indian civil service, for instance, re­ m ained closed to non-Europeans. The great m ajority of the edu­ cated Indonesians thus became increasingly discontented with the structure of a colonial society that blocked their personal advancem ent. Instead of creating a group of native leaders loyal MKahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 43-44. For a detailed study of these movements, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973). “ Quoted in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 48. See also Zainu'ddin, Short History of Indonesia, pp. 145-54.

27

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to the regim e, then, the Dutch actually created an elite whose interests w ere at variance with those of the colonial govern­ m ent.” By providing a program of W estern education, the Dutch also exposed Indonesian students to ideas that often w ere used to justify dem ands for greater self-governm ent and, ultim ately, independence. It w ould have been difficult for an Indonesian student not to draw parallels between the history of Dutch opposition to outside controls and the subjugation of his own people. Mohammed Hatta, who em erged as one of the leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement, explained this process: In the schools of the ruler himself Indonesian students w ere told about the Dutch freedom fighters and learned to appreciate them. They w ere also taught that the Netherlands are indebted to those courageous heroes for the independence of their country, then and now. They could not help thinking of their own heroes w ho only wanted to do what the heroes of the ruler himself had done: liber­ ate their country from the foreign yoke and keep it free from for­ eign blem ishes.”

The w hole tradition of Western political and social thought seem ed to justify the inclination of nationalistic students to oppose Dutch political and economic subjugation. In European schools, Indonesian students w ere exposed to the w ritings of Karl M arx; to m any of them Marxism seemed to explain the plight of their homeland. Equally intrigued by the works of Vladim ir Ilyich Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin, some of these stu­ dents came to «equate capitalism with imperialism and became convinced that true independence w ould have to be economic as w ell as political.” 21 21Ibid., pp. 46-49; Harry J. Benda, "Indonesia," in Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda (New Haven: Yale Uni­ versity Southeast Asia Studies, 1972), pp. 7-8; Palmier, Indonesia, pp. 79-80. ” Mohammed Hatta, "National Claim s," in Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings by Mohammed Hatta (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), p. 318. ” Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 49-52; Benda, "Indonesia," p. 5. Hat­ ta, himself educated in Holland, pointed to the importance of Western education in the development of leaders for the Indonesian nationalist movement. See Hatta, "Indonesia Free: Plea before the Court of Justice in The Hague, March 9, 1928," in Portrait of a Patriot, pp. 2 0 9 -11,2 14 -15 .

28

The Growth of Indonesian N ationalism

W hile the spread of W estern ideas w as beginning to discredit the notion that colonial people w ere not capable of governing them selves, the rapid pace of events in A sia at the turn of the century further underm ined that notion. The Filipino resistance to Spanish and Am erican rule, the rise of Chinese nationalism under Sun Yat-sen, the activities of the Congress Party in India, the successes of Kem al Atatürk against W estern military power, the rapid modernization of Japan, and especially R ussia's defeat at the hands of an A sian nation in the Russo-Japanese War—all o f these events w ere sharply etched on the minds of Indonesian nationalists.24According to Hatta: A shock w ent through the edifice of W estern imperialism w hen the Land of the Rising Sun defeated the Russian colossus in 1905. This brought about a revision of ideas both in the white as well as the coloured world. The herald of a new day had come! The booming of the cannons of Chushim a proclaimed to the world that the di­ vine right of the white man in A sia had ceased to be.8

A s a leading authority on the rise of Afro-Asian nationalism has noted: "O nce the rising colonial elite had shaken off their aw e of the almost magical m astery of pow er produced by the alien rulers, they dem anded that an end be put to the gross discre­ pancy between the ideals of freedom and equality which the W est preached and the colonialism which it practiced."24 The first organized and articulate expression of Indonesian nationalism , not surprisingly, came from a student group. The Budi Utomo (High Endeavor), founded by two Indonesian medical students in 1908, w as the cradle of the Indonesian nationalist movement. The organization aspired both to help the Indonesian peasantry and to create a movement that would embrace the w hole archipelago. Within a year it had attracted nearly 10,000 members from the ranks of Indonesian students and civil servants. But Budi Utom o's strength w as short-lived; it “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 50; Benda, "Indonesia," p. 4. 8Mohammed Hatta, "The Anti-Colonial Congress in Brussels in the Light of World H istory," in Portrait of a Patriot, pp. 185-99. “ Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, i960), p. 54.

29

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soon began to lose all but its most conservative and aristocratic members to new , more politically conscious organizations.27 The Indische Partij (National Indies Party) w as the first orga­ nization in the East Indies to translate the argum ents of the Ethical Party into specific nationalist dem ands. Founded in 19 12 by Douwes Dekker, editor of a leading Indonesian newspaper, the Indische Partij took as its motto 'T h e Indies for those who make their home there." Dekker asserted to Dutch Governor General Alexander Idenburg that the policy of the Ethicals in­ cluded preparing the colony for self-governm ent and that the ultimate consequence of that policy must be independence. Idenburg, insisting that the Indies would never be independent, declared the party illegal on March 3 1, 19 13 . Dekker then appealed to the queen herself in a series of open letters, arguing the case for Indonesian independence. "N o, Your M ajesty," he im plored in one letter, "this is not your country. It is our coun­ try, our hom eland. One day it w ill be free, free for ever—w e have sworn it!"2* Despite the eloquence of his plea, the Dutch responded by exiling Dekker and two other leaders to one of the outer islands and suppressed the party. The third m ajor nationalist organization, Sarekat Islam , be­ came the first to achieve a m ass following. Initially formed as a m erchants' protective association, Sarekat Islam w as reorga­ nized in 19 12 along more forthrightly nationalist lines. Riding the crest of a popular Islamic modernist movement, the new organization show ed that Islam could be used as a rallying point for native solidarity against Dutch rule. Gradually, however, Sarekat Islam strayed from its original purpose, becoming more of a political group and less of a religious one. By the early 1920s it had lost much of its earlier vitality.“ In response to pressure from this burgeoning nationalist m ovem ent, the Dutch created the Volksraad (People's Council) “ Dahm, History of Indonesia, pp. 24-28; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 64-65; Zainu'ddin, Short History of Indonesia, pp. 174-75; Ali Sastroadmijojo, "Survey of the Indonesian Nationalist Movement," Asian Horizon, 2 (Fall

i 949);29.

“ Quoted in Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 56. See also Penders, ed., Indonesia, pp. 228-32; Palmier, Indonesia, pp. 93-94; van Niel, "Course of Indonesian His­ tory," p. 293. “ Van Niel, "Course of Indonesian H istory," pp. 293-95.

30

The Growth of Indonesian nationalism

in 19 16 . Its members represented the major population groups in the Indonesian archipelago and its expressed purpose w as to ad v ise the colonial governm ent. But the Volksraad w as never tru ly representative, and while it gradually evolved into more th an a m erely advisory body, it never assum ed any real legisla­ tiv e function; rather, it served more as a forum for the airing of political view s and economic grievances. Indeed, "it w as a case o f too little too late."30 Real power w as still vested in the gov­ ern or general, w ho w as appointed by the Dutch crown, and to w hom all the heads of departm ents w ere responsible.31 W hile the Dutch w ere offering the carrot of increased native political participation to moderate nationalists with the Volks­ raad , they w ere using the stick of repression against national­ ists w hose dem ands w ere more radical. One such radical group w as the Indonesian Communist Party (PK 1). Founded in 1920 by Tan M alaka, a W estern-educated schoolteacher, the party de­ m anded total independence from Dutch rule. Within a few short years it had attracted nearly 3,000 members. Seriously miscal­ culating the depth of its popular support, how ever, the PKI launched a prem ature rebellion against the colonial governm ent in 1926-27. The poorly planned and executed revolt ended in a crushing defeat for the Com m unists and a destruction of their organization throughout the Indies. In fact, the pow er of the Indonesian Com m unist Party rem ained broken for the next two decades.32 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Indonesian nationalist orga­ nizations proliferated despite the best efforts of Dutch author­ ities to quash them. The Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), founded in 1927 under the chairm anship of a dynamic young engineer named Sukarno, posed a formidable threat to the colo­ nial regim e. Largely as a result of Sukarno's exceptional oratori­ cal skills and charismatic leadership, the PNI quickly became the forem ost nationalist party in the Indies. Sukarno, one of the few “ Zainu'ddin, Short History of Indonesia, p. 197. 31Ibid., pp. 197-98; van Niel, "Course of Indonesian H istory," pp. 292, 29697; Penders, ed., Indonesia, pp. 121-49. “ Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965); Ruth T. McVey and Harry J. Benda, eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents (Ithaca: Cornell University Modem In­ donesia Project, i960).

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prominent Indonesian nationalists w ho had not received the benefit of a European education, proclaimed the principle of noncooperation w ith the governm ent; he insisted that there could be no compromise with the im perialist enem y. "The P N I," he exclaimed in one speech, "takes up the inner essence of the colonial question, tackles the colonial question directly in its fundam entals, takes up the basic philosophy of the colonial question, that is to say—let us repeat—that in every colonial system there is a conflict of interest between the im perialist and the native people."33 Alarm ed by the growing strength of the PN I, and especially by the antigovem m ent and anticapitalist overtones of the movement, Dutch officials again resorted to repression. On December 24, 1929, they arrested Sukarno and seven other members of the party and shortly thereafter out­ law ed the PN I.34 The futility of opposition to Dutch rule w as becoming painful­ ly apparent to Indonesian nationalists. The pattern w as evident: once the Dutch determined that the popular support of a par­ ticular leader or party w as dangerous to their regim e, they sim ­ ply jailed the leader and banned the party. In order to combat that pattern, Mohammed Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, two W esterneducated and exceptionally able native leaders, decided that the nationalist m ovement would be better served by the creation o f sm all, well-educated cadres than by reliance on mass-based par­ ties. These highly trained cadres, which would slow ly grow in size and importance, would then serve as the vanguard of the independence movement. A s Hatta explained on one occasion: A bove all our tactics are determined by the circumstances w e are in. Fighting with visor raised, however much w e would have liked to, is no longer possible. It is the ruler himself, who forces us to continue the unequal fight with other weapons. W henever there is “ Quoted in ). D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (New York: Praeger, 19 7 2)/ P P -116 -17 . 34Ibid., pp. 90-108; Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 79-83; Kahin, National­ ism and Revolution, 91-92; Mohammed Hatta, "T he Growth of the PNI and Gov­ ernment Terrorism in Indonesia," in Portrait of a Patriot, pp. 321-32. For an analysis of the ideology of the PNI, see Jan M. Pluvier, Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics (Kuala Lumpar: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 24.

32

The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism open resistance against that unbearable authority the government retaliates w ith tyrannical measures. Even in the most secret meet­ ing-places the spies o f the rulers w ho lie in wait for their victims like vultures manage to penetrate. A nd naturally under those cir­ cum stances, the national struggle moves to underground action, w here the fighters can feel safe.35*

The Dutch w ere quick to grasp the threat of this so-called new PNI. In February 1934 Dutch authorities arrested both Hatta and Sjahrir and exiled the two leaders to the tiny island of Banda, w here they remained until 1942.* M eanwhile, Sukarno w as released from jail in December 19 3 1, to a triumphant hero's welcome. Within a few years he had become the living embodiment of the nationalist ideal and his popularity w ith the Indonesian m asses w as unsurpassed. Un­ daunted by the oppressive tactics of the colonial governm ent, he im m ediately returned to the activity for which he had previous­ ly been jailed. "O ur noncooperation," he declared, "entails activity and radicalism—radicalism of the spirit, thought and action, radicalism in every action, external as w ell as internal. This radicalism rejects all passivity, does not accept an attitude of 'K eep still, make no attacks,' but dem ands a militant postu re."37 In Ju ly 1932 Sukarno joined a new political party, called Partindo, which had adopted much of the program of the old PNI. Under his leadership, Partindo doubled its mem­ bership in less than a year, as Sukarno again demonstrated his uncanny ability to command the respect of the intellectuals as w ell as the acclaim of the m asses. This combination proved to be too volatile for Dutch authorities, and so in August 1933 they arrested Sukarno for the second time. Without even the benefit of a trial, the Dutch exiled the man w ho w as now the foremost leader of the Indonesian nationalist movement to one of the outer islands. Sukarno w ould remain in exile until 1942.38 With Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir in exile, the Dutch had effec­ tively seized the initiative from the nationalists by the mid35Hatta, "National Claim s," p. 317. "D ahin, History of Indonesia, pp. 68-70; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 92-93. "Q uoted in Dahm, Sukarno, p. 159. "L egge, Sukarno, pp. 123-35; Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 155-66.

33

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1930s. Those Indonesians who dared follow in the steps of their banished leaders w ere prom ptly arrested; the increased vigi­ lance of the Dutch secret police made underground activity equally hazardous. On the eve of the Japanese invasion, Dutch repression had thus successfully subdued and controlled the nationalist movement. Governor General B. C. de Jonge, the architect of this repressive policy, complacently predicted that the Dutch w ould rule the East Indies for at least another three hundred years.39 The outbreak of w ar in the Pacific in 1941 profoundly affected developm ents in the Netherlands East Indies. Intent on seizing the rich raw materials of the Dutch colony, especially its oil, the Japanese invaded and quickly overran the East Indies in Febru­ ary and March 1942, beginning an occupation that lasted un­ til the Japanese surrender to the A llies in August 1945. This relatively brief period of Japanese rule initiated momentous changes in Indonesian society; most significantly, it proved to be a w atershed in the history of the Indonesian nationalist m ovem ent." The surprisingly easy Japanese victory dealt a severe blow to Dutch prestige in the Indies. A s a wartime American intelli­ gence report em phasized: "The subsequent retreat and intern­ ment of the Dutch and their Allies altered radically the position of the white man in the estimation of the Indonesians."41 Wel"Zainu'ddin, Short History of Indonesia, p. 204; Harry J. Benda, 'T h e Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia," Jour­ nal Of Asian Studies, 25 (August i966):290-9i. See also Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 94. •T h is interpretation of the significance of the Japanese occupation has been generally accepted by scholars. See, for example, Benedict R. O 'G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation, 1944-194$ (Ithaca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1961), and Java in a Time of Revo­ lution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); George S. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1967; M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinius Nijhoff, 1955); Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-194$ (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958); Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 19 41-19 4 $ (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­ versity Press, 1953). 4IU .S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), "Effects of the Japanese Occupation," Research and Analysis Report no. 3293, 1945, in U.S. Department of State Records, Record Group (RG) 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereaf­ ter dted as DSR).

34

The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism

com ing the Dutch humiliation, Indonesian nationalists general­ ly greeted their new overlords as liberators. Tokyo's initial poli­ cy in the Indies encouraged such sentiment; the new rulers perm itted the display of the Indonesian flag and the singing of the Indonesian national anthem, for instance—activities that had been strictly forbidden by the Dutch. More important, ex­ pediency led the new Japanese administration to effect a trem endous rise in socioeconomic status for the educated class o f Indonesians. Within six months of the invasion, the Japanese interned practically the entire Dutch population of the Indies, opening up thousands of mid- and upper-level adm inistrative and technical jobs. Since the Japanese had only a limited num­ ber of m ilitary personnel, Indonesians, out of necessity, tilled m any of the vacated jobs. This new mobility became a signifi­ cant factor after the w ar; now there w as a large class in the East Indies w hose rapid elevation in status w ould be threatened by a return to Dutch rule and repressive prew ar conditions.42 This initial goodwill soon dissipated, however, as the Japanese m ilitary began to harness the Indonesian economy to m eet Japan 's wartim e needs. The aims of the Japanese occupa­ tion w ere quite explicit: "to plan for the prompt developm ent and utilization of m ilitary resources in the occupied areas and to look to strengthening and augm enting the Em pire's w ar potential."43 To Indonesians, economic exploitation at the hands o f fellow A sians bore a remarkable resemblance to economic exploitation at the hands of the Dutch. M oreover, the arrogance and brutality of m any Japanese helped to erode any lingering "Sutan Sjahrir, Out of Exile (New York: John Day, 1949), p. 237; Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972), p. 119 ; Elsbree, Japan's Role, pp. 96-10 1; Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 149; Genevieve C. Linebarger, "The Aftermath of Japanese Colonialism in Southeast A sia," in Robert Strausz-Hupé and Harry W. Hazard, eds., The Idea of Colonialism (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 208; John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Modem In­ donesia Project, 1964), pp. 13 -15 ; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 133; Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 19 51-19 4 5 (New York: Pantheon, 1978), pp. 176-77. "Japanese Military Affairs Bureau, Ministry of the Navy, "Statement by the Director upon the Inauguration of the Southern Area Administration Office: D raft," December 7 ,19 4 1, in Harry Benda, James K. Irikura, and Koichi Kishi, Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale U niversity Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 13. See also Elsbree, Japan's Role, pp. 164-66; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 104.

35

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belief that the new rulers w ere indeed liberators. H aving lost the support of the Indonesian population, Japan reevaluated its policy. Tokyo reluctantly came to realize that nationalism w as a real and pow erful force in the archipelago and that some accom­ modation w as needed if the aim s of its occupation policy w ere to succeed.44 One high-ranking m ilitary commander explained the rationale for this new policy: If w e judge the trend of native sentiments correctly and, while advancing their education, promise in the near future to meet their desires, the extremely sensitive natives will be impressed and although there m ay be material shortages they will tolerate this and steadily strengthen their cooperation. In effect, they will be­ come Imperial subjects and will form a powerful link in the new order of Greater East A sia during the w ar, not to mention after the w ar; thus the founding of a second Japan in a com er of the South Seas will become a certainty. On the other hand, if w e regard the natives as ignorant people and err in the w ays of w inning their hearts, w e shall receive an unexpected counterblow—as the saying goes, "E ven a small worm has a large spirit"— and w e must then be prepared to partake of the same bitter cup suffered by the former Dutch regime at the time of its collapse.*5

In order to achieve a rapproachement with the Indonesians, the Japanese turned to those nationalist leaders who comman­ ded w idespread support—Sukarno and Hatta. Japanese officials prom ised concessions to Indonesian nationalism in return for an Indonesian commitment to Tokyo's w ar effort. Sukarno and Hatta w illingly accepted this quid pro quo when Japanese au­ thorities assured them that the Indies would be granted inde­ pendence in the near future.46 This political arrangem ent between the Japanese rulers and prominent Indonesian nationalist leaders later led both Indone­ sian and Dutch enem ies of Sukarno and Hatta to accuse them of 44Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 104; Benda et al., Japanese Military Ad­ ministration, pp. 237-56. "Com m ander, Osamu Group, "Suggestions on the Future Status of Java," 1943, in Benda et al., Japanese Military Administration, pp. 238-39. "Legge, Sukarno, pp. 149-53; Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 221-24. 36

The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism

collaboration with the Japanese fascists. In fairness, Sukarno and Hatta hardly deserve the pejorative epithet "collabora­ tionist"; they w ere not dupes of Japanese propaganda, as some charged, but sincere nationalists w ho seized a unique opportu­ nity to further the nationalist movem ent.47 Even Sjahrir, who w orked in the anti-Japanese underground and w as the bitterest opponent o f those w ho actually did collaborate w ith the Japanese, recognized that Sukarno and Hatta agreed to do "e v ­ erything legally possible to give the nationalist struggle a broad­ er legal scope, and at the same time secretly support the revolu­ tionary resistance."4* The real value of Sukarno's and H atta's wartim e activity w as that, w hile ostensibly rallying Indonesians behind the Japanese effort, they w ere actually spreading and intensifying nationalist ideas among the populace and simul­ taneously forcing the Japanese to make concessions that even­ tually led to self-governm ent. Using all the m eans of m odem communication that the Japanese had placed at their disposal, the Indonesian leaders carried the nationalist m essage through­ out the archipelago, heightening the consciousness of the peasantry and preparing the w ay for the independence struggle that lay ahead.49 220. “ OSS, "Strategic Survey of the Netherlands Indies," Research and Analysis Report no. 707, January 3 1,19 4 1, DSR. “ Frederick E. Crockett, "H ow the Trouble Began in Java," Harper’s Magazine, March 1946, pp. 279-80; Harold Isaacs, No Peace for Asia (New York: Macmillan, 1947 )/ P - 1 “ 56

The United States and the Colonial Question

looked to the United States with great admiration and hope. Even the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung expressed great respect for Am erican traditions and indicated a special adm iration for George W ashington.37 The Atlantic Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, and the repeated anticolonial statem ents of the Roosevelt adm inistration encouraged nationalists in dependent lands to believe that their respective causes w ould receive a sym pathetic hearing in W ashington. A s Ho Chi Minh explained to a State Department representative: "M y people look to the United States as the one nation most likely to be sym pathetic to our cau se."3* If the United States believed in its stated principles, these nationalist leaders rea­ soned, then surely it w ould support self-governm ent for colonial peoples. Am erican criticism of European colonialism w as not restricted to pious public rhetoric. On the contrary, Roosevelt, H ull, and other high-ranking adm inistration spokesmen reiterated the anticolonial theme in num erous conversations both am ong them selves and w ith various foreign leaders, especially during the first few years of the w ar. The view s of Roosevelt him self, a man w hose dominance over American foreign policy during this time w as probably more complete than that of any other presi­ dent in recent history, set the tone for the administration. His ideas on colonialism w ere perhaps most forcefully articulated during a brief trip to Africa in February 1942, en route to the Casablanca conference. A fter a short stopover in the British col­ ony of Gam bia, the president expressed his horror at the stan­ dard of living that he observed there. "Those people are treated w orse than the livestock," he exclaimed to his son Elliott. "Their cattle live longer!"39In a letter to Churchill, the president labeled the area a "hell-hole."40 Later, at a press conference, he vividly recalled his im pressions of Gambia, em phasizing that it w as "the m ost horrible thing I have ever seen in m y life ." Disease r Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 138. “ Quoted in Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 609. “ Quoted in Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 75. On the importance of Roosevelt's trip to Africa, see especially Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 226-27. “ Quoted in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 227.

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w as ram pant, he continued, and "the natives are five thousand years back of u s."41 Those passionate rem arks typified Roosevelt's general atti­ tude toward European im perialism , a system that in his view brutally exploited the native population and at the same time created the seeds of. future w ars. "The colonial system means w ar," he insisted at one point. "Exploit the resources of an India, a Burm a, a Java; take all the wealth out of those countries, but never put anything back into them, things like education, decent standards of living, minimum health requirements—all you're doing is storing up the kind of trouble that leads to w ar."42*In m eetings w ith Russian, Chinese, and British diplo­ mats throughout 1942 and 1943, the president frequently gave vent to his anticolonialist sentim ents, suggesting various plans for reform in the postw ar w orld. Much to the dism ay of the British, at one point he casually offered his prescription for the future of India, gleefully draw ing a comparison with the Am er­ ican Revolution.42 On another occasion he suggested to Foreign M inister Anthony Eden in his characteristically breezy manner that the British might consider returning Hong Kong to the Chinese as a gesture of "goodw ill."44 But his most strident de­ nunciations of the colonial pow ers w ere reserved for the French in Indochina. "France has had the country—thirty million in­ habitants—for nearly one hundred years, and the people are w orse off then they w ere at the beginning," he said to the British am bassador. "France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that."45 Precisely how such ideas could be translated into sub­ stantive, practical policies, how ever, w as quite another story. The anticolonialism of the Roosevelt administration can best be understood within the larger context of American postw ar plans. During the w ar, American policy makers became con­ vinced that the postw ar prosperity of the United States and of 41Quoted in ibid., p. 356. 42Quoted in Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 74. "Christopher Thome, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 19 41-19 4 5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 242-43. "Lou is, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 227-29. "C ordell Hull, Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 2:1597. 58

The United States and the Colonial Question

the w orld w ould depend to a large extent on open access to foreign m arkets and sources of raw materials. American leaders unequivocally agreed that disastrous depressions and world w ars could be avoided in the future only by the universal adop­ tion of the open door principle of nondiscrimination in foreign trade and investm ent. Cordell Hull accurately reflected the think­ ing o f governm ent spokesm en when he recalled in his autobiog­ raphy that as early as World War I he had begun to realize that "unham pered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition with w ar."“ The les­ son seem ed sim ple: the 1930s had witnessed a multitude of discrim inatory and monopolistic trade practices that con­ travened the essential principles of free trade, and consequently helped to create conditions of economic w arfare and instabil­ ity—conditions that proved to be a fertile breeding ground for radical ideologies and ultim ately w orld conflict. American offi­ cials thus came to believe that the principle of nondiscrimination in foreign trade w as a basic prerequisite for w orld peace., order, and stability.47 A s Dean Acheson observed in March 1945: The governm ents of the world have learned, as they have never learned before, all the tricks of economic warfare. . . . If the situa­ tion w ere spread throughout the world, it would have a devastat­ ing effect upon recovery horn the war. Probably the only hope of maintaining stability— social, political, and economic— in the w orld, in the face of the great post-war troubles, is to adopt mea­ sures which will lead to an expansion of production, consumption, and trade.4*

The existence of colonial trading blocs in which the colonial economies w ere almost com pletely geared to the needs of the mother country, serving prim arily as sources of raw m aterials and labor and as protected markets for the manufactured goods **Ibid., 1:8 1. ^Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 1-8 ; William A . Williams, Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Delta Books, 1972), pp. 229-39; Lloyd Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp.

203-5, 319-

mU.S. Department of State Bulletin, 12 (March 15 , i945):470.

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of the metropolitan pow ers, represented one of the most glaring affronts to the American vision of an open world. In the Nether­ lands East Indies and other colonial areas, the United States had continually found itself faced with discrim inatory commercial regulations that denied its exports equal access to colonial mar­ kets. With these lessons of history in mind, many American diplom ats vigorously opposed the reestablishment of the colo­ nial economic system , which—with its m onopoly controls, quota restrictions, and preferential trade agreements—w as so clearly incompatible with the Am erican devotion to open door trading principles.49 Roosevelt adm inistration officials did not believe that they w ere selfishly pursuing American economic advantage in this regard. On the contrary, m any of these spokesmen sincerely believed that w hile a free world market would surely serve the economic interests of the United States—which by 1945 w as producing an astonishing 50 percent of the w orld's goods—it w as also necessary and desirable for the proper functioning of the international economy and the maintenance of global peace and prosperity. In this world view , American interests neatly coincided with those of the rest of the w orld, since, in the color­ ful w ords of Dean Acheson, "the United States w as the locomo­ tive at the head of mankind and the rest of the world w as the caboose."50 W ashington's anticolonialism w as sharply limited, however, since Am erican authorities were never w illing to accept the logical extension of their own rhetoric—in short, full and im­ m ediate independence for all colonial territories. U .S. spokes­ men alw ays stopped w ell short of advocating rapid, uncon­ ditional independence, indicating instead that an appropriate period of preparation, or tutelage, w ould be necessary before "G ardner, Economic Aspects, p. 176; Philip W. Bell, "Colonialism as a Problem in American Foreign Policy," World Politics, 5 (October i 952):8t -88; New Republic, January 22, 1945, p. 105; Ernest B. Hoas, "The Attempt to Terminate Colonial­ ism: Acceptance of the United Nations Trusteeship System ," International Orga­ nization, 7 (February i953):5; Lawrence K. Rosinger, "Independence for Colonial Asia—The Cost to the Western W orld," Foreign Policy Reports, 19 (February 1,

1944>:3° 3*

“ Cited in Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 19381970 (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971), p. 297.

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The United States and the Colonial Question

self-governm ent could be granted. In repeatedly pointing to the Am erican record in the Philippines as a model, the Roosevelt adm inistration made this point quite clear; after all, the United States had been preparing that colony for independence for alm ost fifty years. The very concept of total independence for colonial territories w as still regarded as a radical idea; most Am erican policy m akers, while eager to effect a fundam ental change in the traditional colonial system , sim ply did not believe that the underdeveloped world w as prepared to accept the re­ sponsibilities and burdens that self-rule would inevitably bring. A s Roosevelt him self once commented: "For a time at least there are m any minor children among the peoples of the world w ho need trustees. . . just as there are m any adult nations or peoples w hich m ust be led back into a spirit of good conduct.//S1 In short, like W ilson, Roosevelt w as a gradualist. It should not be surpris­ ing, then, that the Roosevelt administration at no time pressed Britain, France, or the Netherlands for an immediate grant of self-governm ent to their colonies. "O ur thought w as that it w ould come after an adequate period of years," Hull later ex­ plained, "short or long depending on the state of developm ent of respective colonial peoples, during which these people w ould be trained to govern them selves."52 Between the twin evils of early independence without ade­ quate preparation and complete restoration of the European colo­ nial structure, Am erican policy m akers sought alternatives. The compromise position that seemed to avoid both of these ex­ trem es, and which appeared most attractive to State Depart­ ment experts, w as international trusteeship. If form erly depen­ dent areas w ere placed under a system of international trus­ teeship, an adequate period of preparation for self-rule would be provided, and yet the ultimate dismemberment of the Euro­ pean em pires w ould be ensured. A s W elles argued before one of the postw ar planning committees, "The liberation of peoples 51Quoted in Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-45 (Washington, D .C .: Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 43. “ Hull, Memoirs, 2:1601. See also Pratt, "Anticolonialism ," p. 132; OSS, "British and American Views on the Applicability of the Atlantic Charter to Dependent A reas," August 30,1944, Research and Analysis Report no. 1972, DSR; Harold M. Vinacke, "United States Far Eastern Policy," Paâfk Affairs, 19 (December 1946): 351- 52.

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should be the main principle. M any of the peoples cannot undertake self-governm ent at this time. This is where trus­ teeship comes in. The United Nations should endeavor to de­ velop the ability of these peoples to govern them selves as soon as possible."” On March 17 , 1943, Hull presented Roosevelt w ith an outline of the State Departm ent's recommendations on this question. For a trusteeship system to succeed, the secretary of state observed, colonial adm inistrators would have to take at least four steps: provide protection and opportunity for the col­ ony to advance its general welfare; allow colonial peoples a larger share in local governm ent; establish dates when the col­ onies w ould become independent; and pursue developm ent of the colonies and their resources over which natives m ay have decisive influence.54 Roosevelt him self took the lead in advocating the trusteeship concept, although he never allowed him self to be tied down to specifics, as H ull's various memoranda recommended, [hiring Eden's visit to W ashington in March 1943, the president first unveiled his thinking on the subject, proposing a grand reorga­ nization of the colonial w orld; his plan included postw ar trus­ teeship for Indochina and Korea, among other areas.55 He con­ tinued to explore these ideas at the wartime conferences at Cairo and Tehran and in num erous conversations with foreign and adm inistration officials. At various times he advocated that In­ dochina, part of the East Indies, and all of the Japanesem andated islands in the Pacific, along with selected other terri­ tories, be placed under a system of international trusteeship. From its very inception, however, the trusteeship scheme w as m arred by the president's vague and often inconsistent propo­ sals on the matter. A t no time did he use his leadership to trans­ late such concepts and notions into concrete, workable policies, “ Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, August 8, 1942, in Box 66, Notter Files, DSR. For similar statements, see Committee on Colonial Problems, minutes, October 29,1943, in Box 70, ibid. “ Hull to Roosevelt, March 17, 1943, dted in Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington, D .C.: U .S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 471; Hull, Memoirs, 2:1600. “ Memorandum by Hull of a conversation with Roosevelt, Eden, and others, March 27, 1943, in FR, 1943, 3:36-38; memorandum by Harry Hopkins of a conversation with Roosevelt, Eden, and others, March 27, 1943, in ibid., pp. 38-40; Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 227-29.

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The United States and the Colonial Question

nor w as he able to heal the deep divisions within his own gov­ ernm ent over the future of the colonial em pires.16 N o area of the w orld better illustrates the am biguities and inconsistencies of Roosevelt's trusteeship planning than the East Indies. It is extrem ely difficult, first of all, to gauge how thoroughly the president ever committed him self to the trus­ teeship concept for the East Indies. On April 6, 1942, for in­ stance, he assured Queen Wilhelmina in a personal letter that the islands w ould be returned to the Dutch after the w ar, with no mention of trusteeship or eventual self-rule.67 But three months later, w hile Roosevelt w as entertaining the queen and her fam ily at his estate in H yde Park, N ew York, he urged her to make a definite commitment to postw ar self-governm ent for the Indies.“ One of the few times he explicitly applied trusteeship to the Indonesian archipelago w as during a White House m eeting on October 5 ,19 4 3 ; then he informed Hull and Adm iral William Leahy that he w ould like to see "appropriate points in the Dutch East Indies" placed under international trusteeship.“ Yet the available evidence hardly suggests that Roosevelt vigorously pursued this objective; instead, it appears that he believed his aim s for the future of colonialism—a gradual liberalization of im perial rule leading to eventual self-governm ent—w ere not in­ com patible with the policy plans of the Dutch. He w as apparent­ ly quite pleased when Queen W ilhelmina made a major policy pronouncem ent about the future of the Dutch colony in Decem­ ber 1942; in a speech clearly designed with an American audi­ ence in mind, she pledged—albeit vaguely—that her govern­ ment w ould grant increasing pow ers of self-rule to native nationalists.60 Unquestionably, Roosevelt never promoted trusteeship for “ Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-45," American Historical Review, 80 (December i975):i277-95; Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 27486, 356-58; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 19 321943 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 429-30. “ Roosevelt to Wilhelmina, April 6,1942, in FDR: His Personal Letters, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, vol. 4 (New York, 1950). “ Hull, Memoirs, 2:1595-96; Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 437. “ Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 150. “ Thom e, Allies of a Kind, p. 219; OSS, "Background Information on Dutch Promises Regarding the Netherlands Indies," Research and Analysis Report no. 478, January 25,19 4 3, DSR.

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the Dutch East Indies as forcefully and consistently as he did for French Indochina. H is violent antipathy to the French—which extended quite naturally to their valuable colony in Southeast A sia—led him to oppose the reestablishment of French rule in Indochina. This staunch opposition to the reimposition of French im perialism w as in no w ay comparable to the president's view s about the Dutch or Dutch colonialism. A combination of factors—his Dutch ancestry, his close personal relations with the Dutch royal fam ily, and his view that the Dutch, as opposed to the French, w ere liberal colonialists sincerely committed to reform ing past abuses—led the president to differentiate sharp­ ly between French and Dutch colonialism .61 Indeed, Roosevelt tended to view Dutch plans for the future of the East Indies in a som ewhat favorable light. In 1943 he again met with Wilhelmina in W ashington and they discussed the colonial issue in great depth. Elliott Roosevelt later reported his father's account of the meeting: You know it w as just about a year ago [1943] that Queen Wilhelmina w as here. In the White House. For a visit. A nd w e got to talking . . . I should say, I got h er to talking, about the Dutch colonies, and w hat w as going to happen to them after the war. Java, Borneo— all the Netherlands East Indies. Talked back and forth for more than six hours, over two or three evenings. I made the point that it w as Am erican arms that would be liberating those colonies from the Japanese. Am erican soldiers and sailors and marines. I mentioned the Philippines. . . . She agreed that the policy w e have in the Philippines would be the pattem she would follow in the Dutch East Indies, after the w ar. She promised me that her government would announce immediately after victory in Japan, that they w ere going to grant the people of the Dutch East Indies first dominion status, with the right of self-rule and equality. Then after their government has been established, if the people, b y free vote, decide that they w ant complete independence, they shall be granted it. Just as w e are granting it in the Philippines. 61Abbot L. Moffat to Joseph Ballantine (Office of Far Eastern Affairs), January 17 , 1945, in folder labeled "Indochina, Political: French Postwar Policy," Box 9, Records of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (PSA), Lot 54 D 190, RG59, DSR: LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," pp. 1285-86; Thome, A llies of a K ind, pp. 2 17 -18 ; Robert J. Leupold, "The United States and Indonesian Independence, 1944-1947: An American Response to Revolution," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1976, pp. 44-46.

64

The U nited States and the Colonial Question Th at's a commitment. A n d it means a sharp break aw ay from the leadership of the British.*1

Sim ilarly, in a discussion w ith Australian Am bassador Sir Frederick Eggleston in Novem ber 1944, Roosevelt mentioned that he w ould support Dutch efforts to retain control of the East Indies because he believed that they w ere sincere in their pledges to bring democracy to Southeast A sia. In sharp contrast, he quickly added, w ere the British; while he w ished that they w ould do the sam e for Burma and M alaya, he admitted that he had little hope.63 The vague and often contradictory nature of the president's thinking on the subject w as only one of a series of problems that plagued the trusteeship program from its very inception. Even more serious w as the staunch opposition of the European pow­ ers to trusteeship or any other form ula that w ould challenge their colonial sovereignty. Great Britain sharply differed with the United States on this issue, preferring to talk about eventual colonial self-governm ent rather than total independence, and favoring a single power exercising trusteeship authority in any given area rather than an international agency of control. In a celebrated speech, Churchill gruffly declared in 1942 that he had not become the king's first minister "in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Em pire."*4 When Stanley Hombeck brought up the status of Hong Kong during a discussion with British officials in London, he recorded that a "discordant note w as struck" which had "an electrifying effect."45 In the same vein, Churchill exclaimed angrily at Yalta, "U nder no circum­ stances w ould [I] ever consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Em pire."44 C hurchill's rem arks typified the general attitude o f the Euro­ pean colonial pow ers toward the American trusteeship propo­ sals. M any European leaders believed that anticolonial rhetoric “ Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 223. “ Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 424. "Times (London), November 11,19 4 2 , p. 1. “ Undated memorandum by Hombeck of a conversation with Salisbury and Sir Stafford Cripps, in folder labeled "Autobiography 1942-44," Box 497, Hom­ beck Papers. **FR, 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 844,858.

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only m asked underlying economic interests and feared that W ashington w ould seek to expand its power and influence in the colonial areas of Southeast A sia at the conclusion of the w ar. Others wondered if m isplaced American idealism and naiveté might not w reak havoc on the entire colonial system ." Dutch Am bassador Alexander Loudon spoke very bluntly and very strongly to Hull on at least one occasion about the constant "propaganda" in the United States regarding imperialism and racial equality. Such irresponsible statements had an extrem ely harm ful effect on the East Indies, he complained; it w as grossly unfair "that the Dutch East Indies are being held up as a horrible exam ple of imperialism and other aggravated violations of all the liberal policies that should govern international relations and peoples in every part of the w o rld ."" U .S. officials sought on num erous occasions to gain European acceptance of their trusteeship plans, but they encountered only icy hostility w henever they broached the subject. This opposi­ tion had to be taken quite seriously, since it threatened to create severe strains within the wartime alliance, and since the post­ w ar plans of the United States depended to a great extent on harm onious relations with the W estern European nations. La­ ter, H ull em phasized this point when he w rote, "W e had fre­ quent conversations w ith these parent countries, but w e could not press them too far with regard to the Southwest Pacific in view of the fact that w e w ere seeking the closest possible coop­ eration w ith them in Europe. We could not alienate them in the Orient and expect to w ork with them in E u ro p e."" Further opposition to the trusteeship concept came from w ith­ in the U .S. government itself. The War and N avy departments pro­ tested that H ull's trusteeship proposals conflicted w ith larger national security interests. American m ilitary planners were convinced that postw ar security required exclusive American control over the Japanese-m andated islands; international or United Nations supervision w as com pletely unacceptable from their perspective. In a conversation with Secretary of the N avy "Lou is, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 38-40; Thome, Allies of a Kind, pp. 218-23. "M emorandum by Hull of a conversation with Loudon, June 5 ,19 4 2 ,856D.00/ 153, DSR. "H u ll, Memoirs, 2:1559.

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Jam es Forrestal on March 30 ,19 4 5, Secretary of War H enry Stimson expressed fears "that w e might be tempted into making quixotic gestures the net result of which might be that w e would surrender the hardly w on islands which w e had taken in the Pacific to the principle of trusteeship, whereas the British, Dutch and French w ould n ot."70 The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Roosevelt to form ulate general principles on the trusteeship issue, but to avoid making any specific commitments or placing any specific territories under international trusteeship; all "ter­ ritorial settlem ents," the Joint Chiefs urged, should "be delayed until after the defeat of Jap an ."71 N ot even the State Department w as unified on the increasing­ ly tangled colonial question. Certain elements within the depart­ m ent, centered especially in the Office of European A ffairs, looked w ith askance on any plans to rem ove from the European pow ers one of their principal sources of strength. Convinced that Am erican plans for the postwar world would require Euro­ pean friendship and cooperation, the departm ent's "Europeanists" insisted that the colonial pow ers m ust have their sover­ eignty restored unconditionally. Led by influential Assistant Secretary of State Jam es Clem ent Dunn, these officials be­ lieved that any m eddling in colonial affairs would only risk the alienation of W ashington's traditional allies. To press such a potentially divisive issue during wartim e, m oreover, w ould rep­ resent the height of diplomatic im propriety. European-oriented by virtue of experience, education, and temperament, these men w ere horrified by m any of Roosevelt's and H ull's plans. Un­ fam iliar w ith the Third World, they w ere hardly sympathetic to the cause of colonial nationalism. "W hy are you fussing with Indonesia," Dunn contem ptuously asked a State Department officer on one occasion. "It's only a Dutch colony."72 Despite all '“Jam es Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York: Viking, 19 51), p. 37. See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 601; Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 276, 295-96. 71Memorandum from James Dunn (chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee) to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., February 26,1945, in Box 9, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, RG 334, DSR (hereafter dted as swncc Records). 72Quoted in Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 217. See also Laurence Salisbury,

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obstacles, they m anaged to maintain the most friendly and cor­ dial relations with European diplomats. And while never actual­ ly disloyal to Roosevelt and Hull, the departm ent's Europeanists fought in effect a rear-guard action throughout the w ar years, m aneuvering to m odify and compromise the adm inistration's anticolonial stance w henever possible. A side from Hull, whose opposition to European colonialism w as rooted in his devotion to free trade, the principal support for anticolonialism within the State Department came horn its A sian experts. Generally junior Foreign Service officers or academic specialists brought into the department during the w ar, these "A sian ists" w ere men far removed from the tradi­ tional centers of pow er in that most traditional of executive agencies. Yet in m any w ays their ideas were more in line with those of the president and were considerably more farsighted than those of their senior colleagues. Convinced that the United States had already made a firm and irrevocable commitment to colonial self-rule in its wartime pronouncements on the subject, they feared that a general retreat from those liberal principles w ould have a poisonous effect on the underdeveloped world. Since Am erican men and matériel would be liberating most of the Southeast A sian colonies from the Japanese, they believed that W ashington could not escape blame in the eyes of native nationalists if the colonial system s there w ere restored intact. "The return to European Govem ihents of colonies in A sia taken from the Japanese by American forces," argued Laurence Salis­ bury, chief of the small Division of Southwest Pacific A ffairs, or w ith Am erican participation, without definite and strong in­ timation from us that w e look forward to progressive improvement in the condition of the natives of those colonies will have a pro­ found effect upon the attitude of all Asiatics, including the Chinese, toward the United States. Mistrust of the United States, already prevalent among some of the peoples of Asia, will increase; Asiatics w ill be encouraged to believe that their future lies in unity against the Occidentals; and a greater semblance to truth w ill be "Personnel and Far Eastern Policy," Far Eastern Survey, 14 (December 19,

1945):36i -64.

68

The U nited States and the Colonial Question given to the propaganda which the Japanese have been assiduous* ly dissem inating among the Asiatic peoples.73

For a combination of reasons—political, economic, and strategic—these officials believed that European imperialism could not long withstand the force o f A sian nationalism in the postw ar w orld and that the United States had best align itself w ith the w ave of the future rather than that of the past. "The British, French and Dutch im perialist system s are probably on the w ay out in A sia," argued Far Eastern expert Raymond Ken­ nedy. "W e m ust not commit ourselves to underwriting these system s indefinitely/'74 China hand John Paton Davies echoed the theme. "W e cannot afford to align ourselves in an AngloAm erican bloc which w ould place us in opposition to the rise of nationalism in A sia," he wrote. "W e m ust not put ourselves in a position w here w e cannot move w ith the historical stream rather than attem pting to block a force which might prove too strong for u s."75 The consequences of alienating the peoples of A sia, in the view of these Far Eastern specialists, w ould be disastrous. O ne of the departm ent's Asianists w arned that unless a prompt reform of the colonial system w ere effected after the w ar, "there can be expected from the native peoples increasing bitterness and antagonism . The United States, as the close associate and ally of the colonial pow ers, w ill share with the latter that enmi­ ty ." In addition, he pointed out, the Soviet Union, w hose "poli­ cies and ideologies have gained a real hold over m any progres­ sive leaders in A sia and nearby areas," w ould stand to increase its pow er and influence in the area.76

"Memorandum by Salisbury, February 5 ,19 4 4 ,856D.00/2-544, DSR. 74Memorandum by Raymond Kennedy, "American Interests in Southeast A sia," March 26, 1945, in folder labeled "Southeast Asia, 1946-1948, U .S. Poli­ cy ," Box 5, PSA Records, DSR. "Q uoted in ibid. On this point, see also OSS, "Political Strategy for the Far East," Research and Analysis Report no. 2666, October 28,1944, DSR. "Memorandum by the Department of State's Liberated Areas Division, "Im ­ perialism versus an Enlightened Colonial Policy in the Area of the South East A sia Com m and," January 2 ,19 4 5, enclosed in M. B. Hall to Moffat, January 13, 1945, in folder labeled "Southeast Asia, 1946-1948, U .S. Policy," Box 5, PSA Records, DSR.

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Abbot Low M offat, Salisbury's successor as chief of the Di­ vision of Southwest Pacific A ffairs and a forthright advocate o f trusteeship, summarized the concerns of the Asianists in a memorandum that w as forwarded to Roosevelt by Hull on Septem ber 8, 1944. "It w ould seem of substantial m ilitary im­ portance," the memorandum began, "to secure for the United Nations the good w ill of the native peoples of southeast A sia am ong whom , for some years, there has been increasing nationalistic sentiment, and w ho, for the past three years, have been subjected to intense Japanese propaganda exploiting the old slogan of 'A sia for the A siatics'." The memorandum sug­ gested "that early, dramatic and concerted announcements by the nations concerned making definite commitments as to the future of the regions of southeast Asia would save m any Am er­ ican and Allied lives and facilitate m ilitary operations." It recom­ m ended that these announcements include specific dates w hen independence or self-governm ent w ould be accorded, steps to be taken to develop the native capacity for self-rule, and a pledge of economic autonomy and equality of economic treat­ ment toward other nations. These announcements w ould be further enhanced, M offat suggested, if each of the colonial pow ­ ers pledged a formal declaration of trusteeship under an interna­ tional organization for the period of tutelage. Such a program w ould serve the postw ar interests of the United States for the following reasons:

These areas are sources of products essential to both our wartime and peacetime economy. They are potentially important markets for Am erican exports. They lie athwart the southwestern approaches to the Pacific Ocean and have important bearing on our security and the security of the Philippines. Their economic and political stability w ill be an important factor in the maintenance of peace in A sia. Emergence of these regions as self-governing coun­ tries would appear desirable as soon as they are capable of selfrule, either as independent nations or in close voluntary associa­ tion with western powers, for example as dominions____Failure of the western powers to recognize the new conditions and forces in southeast A sia and an attempt to reestablish prewar conditions will

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almost surely lead to serious social and political conflict and may lead to ultimate unifying of oriental opposition to the west.77 The argum ents of Hull and M offat for an aggressive anticolo­ nial policy w ere compelling—and, in retrospect, remarkably prescient—but by late 1944 such ideas were clearly out of touch w ith the thinking of the administration as a whole. Larger po­ litical, strategic, and m ilitary concerns had already muted the adm inistration's anticolonial rhetoric and forced a retreat in its trusteeship planning. The intransigence of the European pow ­ ers and the overriding importance of maintaining harmony w ithin the W estern Alliance had induced the Roosevelt adm inis­ tration to take what it considered to be a more gradual and conciliatory attitude toward the problem of the colonial em pires. The m ilitary's insistence that national security interests demand­ ed a string of postw ar bases in the Pacific, a need that could not be foolishly compromised by abstract trusteeship principles, also contributed to this new approach. Significantly, in defer­ ence to the m ilitary viewpoint Roosevelt instructed the Am er­ ican delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944 to avoid all discussion of trusteeship and related m atters.7* This retreat from an anticolonial policy, which w as increasingly evi­ dent by the end of 1944, w as also dictated in part by military expediency. Arm y Chief of Staff George M arshall and the mili­ tary favored bringing the w ar to a speedy close without becoming involved in the political and economic problems facing the im­ perial pow ers. General M arshall believed that the United States should neither assist nor interfere with the reestablishment of the colonial regim es in A sia; and since the dependent territories there fell under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ^Draft memorandum for the president, by Moffat, September 8, 1944, 856D.01/10-544, DSR; memorandum from Hull to Roosevelt, September 8,1944, Map Room Files, Box 166, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N .Y. "Stettinius to Fonestal, December 30, 1944, Box 9, swncc Records, DSR; minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Three (Stimson, Stettinius, and For* restai), January 2, 1945, in Stimson-Forrestal Meetings folder, Box 732, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville; memo* randum from Stimson, Forrestal, and Stettinius to President Harry S. Truman, April 18 ,19 4 5 , in International Trusteeship folder, Box 735, Stettinius Papers.

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through the duration of the w ar, the m ilitary could override any conflicting State Department proposals.79 H ull and the A sianists within the State Department continued to resist this more accommodating policy toward European co­ lonialism . In the case of the East Indies, their efforts focused on proposed civil affairs procedures. The Netherlands East Indies, except for Sum atra, fell under the m ilitary jurisdiction of Gener­ al Douglas M acArthur's Southwest Pacific Area Command ( s w p a ) through the duration of the w ar; accordingly, the civil affairs procedures adopted as parts of the Indies w ere recon­ quered from the Japanese would set an extrem ely important precedent for future American policy toward Dutch colonial rule. In February 1944 M acArthur concluded a prelim inary civil affairs agreem ent with Lieutenant Governor Hubertus van Mook, which provided that "the full sovereignty of the Nether­ lands Governm ent w ill be restored to the Netherlands Indies as soon as the m ilitary situation, in the judgm ent of the Commander-in-Chief, perm its." It also stipulated that Dutch civil affairs officers w ould be used to the fullest extent possible during the liberation and reoccupation of the islands.*0 Hull and the Asian­ ists protested vigorously against the draft agreement; they be­ lieved, quite correctly, that such an agreement would subvert trusteeship planning. In a letter to General J. H. H illdring, direc­ tor of the Civil A ffairs Division of the War Department, Hull conceded that the State Department recognized Dutch sover­ eignty over the East Indies—a legal question—but added some im portant qualifications: H ow ever, in any military agreement of the nature under considera­ tion no commitments should be made which would prejudice the right of the Governm ent of the United States to bring up either ’’ Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, vol. 3 of U .S. Department of War, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D .C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), pt. 2, pp. 527-28. “’"Principles Governing Arrangements for Civil Administration and Jurisdic­ tion in Netherlands Territory in the Southwest Pacific A rea," December 10,1944, in FR, 1944, 5:1286-89; memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Hull, May 14, 1944, in ibid., pp. 379-85; Marshall to MacArthur, January 19,1944, and MacAr­ thur to Marshall, January 25, 1944, both in Box 3A, RG 4, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Va.; J. C. Dunn to J. H. Hilldring, December 2, 1944, 856D.01/12-444, DSR.

72

The United States and the Colonial Question prior to or after the resumption of sovereign rights by the Nether­ lands Governm ent certain proposals for discussion and agreement of a general character which it m ay be believed to be of rightful concern to the United States Governm ent and to all Governments w hich have subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and to the Four-Nation Declaration at M oscow, and certain particu­ lar proposals which m ay be of special mutual concern to the people of tiie Netherlands Empire and the people of the United States.*1

H ull's argum ents w ere to no avail. On December 10 ,19 4 4 , his successor as secretary of state, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., quietly approved the civil affairs agreement with the Netherlands. W ithout H ull's strong advocacy, the position of the Asianists w as of little consequence; the new secretary, m oreover, leaned heavily on Dunn and the Europeanists in important policy matters.*2 A s a result of this decision, the Roosevelt adm inistra­ tion, disregarding its own public pronouncements, the Atlantic Charter, and the Charter of the United Nations, placed its prestige and m ilitary pow er behind a policy of restoring the status quo ante bellum to the liberated territories of Southeast A sia. A final step in the retreat from anticolonialism came at the Potsdam Coniference of Ju ly 1945. There the Combined Chiefs of Staff, w ith Am erican approval, rem oved the East Indies from Am erican m ilitary jurisdiction and transferred the islands to the British Southeast A sia Command. This decision virtually iso­ lated U .S. forces from future involvem ent in the internal affairs o f the Indies, presum ably leaving the Dutch to restore prew ar conditions without American interference or international accountability. A t the same time, since British forces w ere gross­ ly unprepared for such an assignm ent, the transfer in command provided unparalleled opportunities for the Indonesian inde­ pendence movement. "Q uoted in Wolthuis, "United States Policy," pp. 377-78. See also memoran­ dum from Hombeck to Hull, February 3,19 4 4 , in James Clement Dunn folder, Box 15 1, Hombeck Papers. "Leupold, "United States and Indonesian Independence," pp. n o - 11.

73

3 Reoccupation: August-December 1 9 4 5 M ost senior Am erican officials w ere quite unprepared for the nationalist rebellions that erupted in Indochina and the East Indies in the w ake of the Japanese surrender. Despite the w arn­ ings o f a handful of State Department specialists who insisted that the w ar had irrevocably shattered the European colonial order, top policy m akers anticipated that the reassertion of European rule w ould be relatively smooth and orderly. One intelligence estimate even predicted that the Indonesians w ould w arm ly embrace the returning Dutch rulers as liberators. The view s of W alter Foote in this regard, though perhaps a bit extrem e, w ere not untypical. A s consul general in the Indies, Foote had spent fifteen years in the islands, longer than any other State Department official. Comfortable with the colonial lifestyle and close to m any Dutch leaders, he considered the statements floating around W ashington about the future of the European colonies to have no relevance to the Indies. 'T h e na­ tives of the Netherlands Indies," he reported confidently in June 1942, "are most definitely not ready for independence. That con­ dition is fifty or seventy-five years in the future. . . . The only feasible solution is for the Indies to remain under Netherlands sovereignty."1 From his vantage point in Australia, where he spent the w ar years, Foote elaborated on this theme in a report he prepared for General Douglas M acArthur in early 1944. In1Walter A . Foote, "Future of the Netherlands Indies," June 2 7 ,19 4 2 ,856D.001/ 154, in U .S. Department of State Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter dted as DSR).

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donesian political parties, he said, were too small to have any influence or importance. The reason for this w as that the natives were docile, peaceful, contented, and apathetic towards politics. They were sociable, fun loving, and w itty, but exhibited little or no interest in political affairs. This is easily understood when it is realized that the natives of the East Indies, practically without exception, are polite, mild, docile, friendly, and possess a sense of humor somewhat akin to our ow n. Their main interests in life are their w ives; children; rice fields; carabaos; chickens; a bamboo hut in a garden of banana and cocoanut trees; an occasional visit to the moving pictures (especial­ ly w hen "W esterns" are shown); [and] a new sarong now and then, especially around their N ew Year.

By the w ay o f illustration, Foote pointed out that he had had the sam e servants for nearly fifteen years and "found them to be rather proud, brave, loyal, ready to accept just reproof calm ly, but highly resentful of a personal injustice." He w as "convinced that the new s of the first landing of troops in the Indies w ill spread like w ild fire and w ill be the signal for jubilation."2 Although few officials in W ashington were quite so compla­ cent as Foote, most w ere convinced that the Dutch w ould en­ counter little resistance to the restoration of their control over the islands. Indeed, American postw ar plans for the Indies were based on the twin assum ptions that the Indonesians w ere politi­ cally apathetic and that they would be incapable of selfgovernm ent for decades to come. American policy makers be­ lieved that independence for the Indies w as a distant goal, not a serious consideration for the present; it w as inconceivable to them that native nationalists w ould mount a broad-based chal­ lenge to the reassertion of Dutch sovereignty. Still, the desire to avoid any potentially aw kw ard Am erican entanglement in the colonial problem s of Southeast A sia w as strong. This concern probably reinforced the important military and strategic consid­ erations that led at Potsdam to the transfer of the East Indies and 2Foote to MacArthur, January 29, 1944, 856D.00/166, DSR. See also excerpts from Walter Foote's diary, July-Septem ber 1942, in Walter A. Foote folder, Box 167, Stanley K. Hombeck Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University.

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other areas from an American to a British theater of operations. Throughout most of World War II, M acArthur's Southwest Pacific Area Command ( s w p a ) retained m ilitary jurisdiction over the entire Indonesian archipelago, with the exception of Sum atra, s w p a w as responsible for liberating all of the Japanese-occupied areas within its boundaries. Both Am erican and Dutch officials assum ed that this responsibility w ould in­ clude the restoration of Dutch sovereignty in the East Indies; their plans w ere set forth in the van M ook-M acArthur civil affairs agreem ent of December 1944. The Indies, except for Sum atra, rem ained within M acArthur's theater of operations until the Potsdam Conference of Ju ly 1945. A t Potsdam the Anglo-Am erican Chiefs of Staff suddenly agreed to transfer the Dutch East Indies, along with Thailand (Siam) and the southern half of Indochina, to the Southeast A sia Command ( s e a c ) of British Adm iral Lord Louis Mountbatten—a decision that w as to have far-reaching political consequences.3 The precise origins of the Potsdam transfer remain som ewhat cloudy, despite the profound implications of the decision. It is clear that in the closing years of the conflict British leaders actively began to press W ashington for increased responsibility in the direction of Allied operations against Japan. Speaking before the House of Commons on December 14, 1943, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden insisted that "even if w e are com pelled, for the time being, to devote the greater part of our human and m aterial resources to the task of defeating Germ any, w e are still principals in the Far Eastern W ar."4 Great Britain's interest in an expanded role in Southeast A sia w as clear-cut: not only w as London eager to recover its dam aged prestige in that part of 3F. S. V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East, in J. R. M. Butler, ed., History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series (London: Her M ajesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 415; Idrus N. Djajadiningrat, The Beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluxoe Talks (Itha­ ca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1958), pp. 7-8; Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, i960), pp. 5-6. ^Parliamentary Debates, 1943 (Official Record of the House of Commons), vol. 395, col. 1427; John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, August i94y-September 1944, vol. 5 of Butler, ed., History of the Second World War, pp. 438-50; Robert K. Wolthuis, "United States Foreign Policy towards the Netherlands Indies, 1937-1945," Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1968, pp. 408-9.

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the w orld and to restore British sovereignty over its own col­ onies, but it w as equally concerned that American anticolonial inclinations, if left unchecked, might threaten the very survival o f the British Em pire. A s the British Joint Planning Staff noted in a position paper prepared in April 1945: "It is desirable that the French and the Dutch should deal w ith us rather than the Am er­ icans on questions concerning the recovery of their posses­ sio n s."5 A t first, Am erican officials opposed any boundary changes in the Pacific. W hen the question w as introduced at the Hawaii m ilitary planning conference of Ju ly 1944, M acArthur argued that the British should not be allowed to assum e control of any territory that the United States recaptured from the Japanese. H e objected to a proposal that m ilitary control over the East Indies be transferred to the British, contending that past experi­ ence taught that if the British regained control of Dutch terri­ tory, it might be difficult ever to pry them loose. Despite this initial cold reception, how ever, London continued to explore w ith W ashington the possibilities of an alteration in the com­ m and structure.6 The British also approached the Dutch at this time in order to solicit their view s on a possible jurisdictional change. In M ay 1944 Mountbatten raised this question with Hubertus J. van M ook, w ho w as still serving as lieutenant governor general of the East Indies. Van M ook's prim ary concern w as the successful liberation of the Indonesian islands, and he realized that Am er­ ican m ilitary forces w ere far better equipped for that hazardous assignm ent than w ere the relatively ill-prepared British troops. Consequently, he and Eelco van Kleffens, the m inister for col­ onies and foreign affairs in the wartime Dutch governm ent, favored keeping the archipelago under U .S. m ilitary juris­ diction.7 Peter S. Gerbrandy, the wartime prime m inister, and sEhrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 1945, vol. 6 of Butler, History of the Second World War, p. 229. See also Akira iriye, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 86-88. ‘ MacArthur to Marshall, August 1, 1944, w affac Correspondence, Box 3B, RG 4, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Va.; William D. Leahy, / Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), pp. 251-55. 7Eden to Churchill, September 13 , 1944, in Prime M inister's Records (prem ) 3/326, Public Record Office, London (hereafter cited as PRO); Djajadiningrat,

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other members of his cabinet took a different view of the pro­ posal; they believed that a transfer to British control might ac­ tually be politically advantageous to Holland, partly because Churchill had assured Gerbrandy that "he w as going to stand up for the Dutch Em pire after the w ar."* Even though the final decision on a boundary change would of course be made by the Am erican and British governm ents, the Dutch forfeited an opportunity to influence that decision by allowing these sharp divisions within their governm ent to prevent it from pursuing a unified policy. M eanwhile, key Am erican m ilitary spokesmen w ere begin­ ning to reconsider their earlier position. Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary entry for Novem ber 1,19 4 4 , that General M arshall now favored an expanded British role in the Pacific operations. Concerned with the projected invasion of Japan and eager to curtail Am erican loss of life in the Far East, M arshall "suggested the laying of a new line of demarcation which w ill cut those territories outside of the southwestern Pacific jurisdic­ tion which M acArthur has charge of and leave him the Philip­ p in es." A w are of a long-standing rivalry between the two prom­ inent generals, Stimson anticipated that M acArthur might oppose this adjustm ent, but added that "w e all agree that that ought to be don e."9 A s Stim son feared, M acArthur continued to oppose any prop­ osed transfer of part of his command to s e a c . When M arshall inform ed him on February 7 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff w ished "to avoid the use of U .S. troops in m opping up the N etherlands East Indies area,"10 M acArthur replied that his forces should at Beginnings, p. 9. Van Mook has written that the Dutch government w as not consulted about the change in command: "The political and military reasons for this important realignment had little to do with the interests of the nations and the people concerned. The Dutch government was neither consulted nor advised about the impending change; neither, probably, was the French" (The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia [New York: Norton, 1950], p. 174). 'M eeting between Churchill and Gerbrandy, February 1 1 , 1944, prem 3/326, PRO; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 6. ’ Stimson diary, November 1,19 4 4 , in Henry Stimson Papers, Yale University Library. '“Marshall to MacArthur, February 7 ,19 4 5, in War Department M essages, Box 3B, MacArthur Archives.

7»

Reoccupation

least help to reestablish the Netherlands East Indies governm ent in Batavia before any responsibility w as transferred to the Brit­ ish , since restoration of the Dutch "w ould bring about the most favorable repercussions throughout the Far East and would raise the prestige of the United States to the highest level with results that w ould be felt for a great m any y ears."11 Despite his protests, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that in order to prepare for the projected invasion of Japan, the South­ w est Pacific Area should be dissolved and all responsibility for territory south of the Philippines should be transferred to British and Dutch authorities. On April 13 ,19 4 5 , they officially submit­ ted this proposal to the British Chiefs of Staff. The memoran­ dum read in part: "U .S. Chiefs of Staff clearly felt that the sooner changes on these lines could be introduced the better. They are not w edded to any particular line of demarcation and w ould no doubt be ready to consider any alternative you might like to suggest. They appreciate of course that they are setting you a difficult problem ."12 G radually even M acArthur began to accept the logic of an alteration in the command structure. A s m ilitary plans for the operation against the Japanese home islands crystallized, he realized that his command might be dangerously overextended if he continued to insist on maintaining the East Indies within his theater. On M ay 30 he informed M arshall that the prepara­ tion for the execution of "O lym pic"—the code name for the invasion of Japan—"w ill absorb com pletely all of the theater's United States resources even under existing conditions," and that "the utmost effort must be exerted to complete adequate preparations for and execute Olympic on tim e." A ny attempt to divert those resources to Java or Borneo, he added, "w ill pre­ vent the execution of Olym pic at the time scheduled."12 Ironically, while the United States w as gravitating toward the British point of view , British authorities w ere beginning to ques"M acArthur to Marshall, February 26, 1945, in War Department Messages, Box 3B, MacArthur Archives. See also interview with MacArthur by Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, August 1 , 1944, Cabinet Records (CAB) 127/33, PRO. “ Quoted in Ehrman, Grand Strategy, 6:228. “ MacArthur to Marshall, May 30 ,1945, in wafpac Correspondence, Box 3B, MacArthur Archives.

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tion the wisdom of their ow n recommendation. While still favor­ ing a shift in the command structure in Southeast A sia, they had become more cognizant of some of the logistical difficulties in­ volved in such a plan. In a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff, the British Joint Planning Staff recommended that the British "assum e control of the proposed area as soon as practicable," but added a note of caution: "W e should not take over the area before w e are assured that the necessary resources, which w e cannot provide and are now in the theatre, w ill be m ade avail­ able and that the United States w ill continue to allot mainte­ nance requirem ents and shipping."14 Mountbatten also advised extrem e caution in accepting the transfer of jurisdiction, notify­ ing M acArthur that he w as unprepared for such a large expan­ sion in his command and could not be ready to accept a transfer until October at the earliest.” N onetheless, the British Chiefs continued to urge as early a transfer as possible. At the Potsdam Conference they submitted a memorandum to the Combined Allied Chiefs of Staff, propos­ ing that the British should assum e "a greater share of the burden of strategic decisions" related to the w ar against Japan. "A lthough our contribution in the Pacific must alw ays remain sm all in comparison w ith that of the United States," they asserted, "it is natural that our interests and concern should grow as more of our forces begin to be deployed in the Pacific area."16 N ow that the European w ar w as concluded, Britain w as evidently prepared to resum e its presence in Southeast A sia in 2m effort to protect the interests of the British Em pire. According to som e Am erican officials in the Pacific, s e a c really stood for "Save England's A sian C olonies."17 MQuoted in Ehrman, Grand Strategy, 6:230. ,5Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia, 1943-1945 (New York: Philo­ sophical Library, 1951), p. 183; Supreme Allied Commander's (SAC) 270th Meet­ ing, August 20, 1945, Box 83, seac War Diaries, RG 33 1, Washington National Record Center, Suitville, Md. (hereafter dted as wnrc ). ’‘ Memorandum from British Chiefs of Staff to Combined Chiefs of Staff, in Foreign Relations of the United States: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, 2 vols. (Washington, D .C ., i960), 2 :13 13 -14 . Hereafter volumes in this series will be dted as FR, followed by the year. ,7British Chiefs of Staff Committee, "British Partidpation in the War against Japan ," June 30 ,19 45, in prem 8/29, PRO; Meeting of Cabinet Defense Commit-

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O n Ju ly 17 , the Am erican Chiefs of Staff approved the British proposal and agreed to a rapid command shift in order to free Am erican troops for the offensive against Japan. They stated: "The objective of the United States Chiefs of Staff in proposing the transfer has been to release United States resources and com m anders from the responsibility for containing and mop­ ping up the Japanese forces in the area in order that they might concentrate on the main effort. Hence they have proposed 15 A ugust as the date of turnover."1* Although some minor tech­ nical details had to be worked out before the transfer became official, Prime M inister Churchill and President Harry S. Tru­ m an form ally consented to the boundary change on Ju ly 24. The United States w as now freed from all of its responsibilities in the N etherlands East Indies. W hile Great Britain's m otives in pressing for the jurisdictional change are easily explicable, American m otives appear to be m ore com plex. Part of the rationale for the Am erican position, surely, w as the expressed one: by late 1944 and early 1945, the overriding concern of the United States w as the preparation for an offensive against Japan; any theater of operations that siphoned troops and supplies aw ay from that prim ary goal w as o f peripheral interest. These m ilitary considerations, how ever, w ere alm ost certainly reinforced by political considerations. It is unlikely that Am erican leaders w ould have made such a critical decision in ignorance of the unsettled conditions in both the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. In both areas, active nationalist m ovem ents had aspired to independence for de­ cades, and it w ould have been foolish indeed to expect their peaceful acquiescence to a reimposition of Dutch and French im perial rule. A s early as 1943, John Paton Davies, one of the State Departm ent's A sianists, had warned of such dangers: In s o far as w e p articip ate in seac op eration s, w e b ecom e in v o lv ed in die poltically explosive colonial problems of die British, Dutch tee, August 8, 1945, in ibid.; Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and In­ dochina: 1942-45," American Historical Review, 80 (December 1975), 1280; Chris­ topher Thom e, "Indochina and Anglo-American Relations, 1942-1945," Pacific Historical Review, 45 (February 1^ 6 ) :^ . “ Memorandum from U .S. Chiefs of Staff, July 17, 1945, in FR, 1945, 1, pt. 2 :13 15 -14 .

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ar

and possibly French. In doing so, w e compromise ourselves not only with the colonial peoples of A sia but also the free peoples of A sia, including the Chinese. Domestically, our Governm ent lays itself open to public criticisms— "W h y should Am erican boys die to recreate the colonial empires of the British and their Dutch and French satellites?" Finally, more Anglo-Am erican misunderstand­ ing and friction is likely to arise out of our participation in seac than out of any other theater. Therefore w e should concentrate our Asiatic efforts on operations in and from China.1*

During the w ar, the United States had tried to play both sides o f the colonial issue. W hile ostensibly prom oting the aspirations of colonial nationalist m ovem ents, W ashington had quietly reas­ sured the Dutch and French that it w ould not contest their right to reestablish sovereignty over their colonies. If the change in command structure had not occurred, then, the United States w ould have faced a profound dilemma: either to honor its com­ mitment to its European allies—even if that course entailed sup­ pression of a popular national liberation movement—or to back the cause o f colonial self-determ ination. The first position w ould have risked forfeiting the respect and goodwill that the United States had been building up in the underdeveloped w orld as a result of its anticolonial posture; the latter policy w ould have risked alienating the European im perial pow ers, w hose support in Europe w as considered essential to the success of A m erica's postw ar plans. A far easier solution, it seem ed, w as to avoid any involvem ent in internal colonial politics. By transferring its m ilitary commitment to the British, w ho had them selves re­ quested the change, the United States could sidestep any aw k­ w ard entanglem ent in Southeast A sia and continue to play both ’’ Memorandum by John Paton Davies, in FR, 1943, 6:188. For similar indica­ tions of American concern about involvement in Southeast Asia and possible political ramifications, see memorandum from C. D. Glover to Commander in Chief, Naval Plans Division, June 15 ,19 4 5 , in Box 173, Strategic Plans Division File, Naval Operational Archives, Washington N avy Yard; memorandum from M. M. Dupre, Jr., to Assistant Chief of Staff, Naval Plans Division, in Box 172, ibid.; "Imperialism versus an Enlightened Colonial Policy in the Area of the South East Asia Com mand," Department of State memorandum, January 2, 1945, enclosed in M. B. Hall to Abbot Moffat, in file labeled "Southeast Asia, 1946-1948, U .S. Policy," Box 5, Records of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian A ffairs, DSR (hereafter dted as PSA Records).

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sid es o f the colonial question. A n intelligence report on condi­ tions in the N etherlands East Indies, prepared by the State De­ partm ent in A ugust 1945, accurately reflected this thinking: In the event of considerable resistance, which m ay involve sup­ pression b y force of arm s and harsh reprisals against leading In­ donesians, the liberation of the Indies m ay assume the aspect of a reconquest of a colony, possibly w ith the participation of nonNetherlands military forces. The presence or absence of U .S. per­ sonnel w ill then be given a certain interpretation by the local population and influence its future attitude towards the U .S .10

But in avoiding one problem the United States created an even m ore serious one, for the British w ere w oefully unpre­ pared for the m agnitude of the task they had assum ed. They w ere now responsible for liberating from the Japanese an area w hose size alone w as staggering: it included 1.5 million square m iles o f land area w ith a population of more than 128 million people. M oreover, "throughout this vast area there existed no reliable civil police," according to Mountbatten, "an d (except in Shun) no d vü governm ent w ith even a shadow o f independent adm inistration."21 The sudden capitulation of the Japanese on A u gu st 14 further complicated the problem. Mountbatten found his command short of the men and shipping necessary to fulfill its expanded responsibilities and lacking any reliable intelli­ gence estim ates in regard to actual conditions in the East Indies. Since the liberation o f the British colonies of M alaya and Singa­ pore w as s e a c 7s top priority, the reoccupation of the Indies w as “ O ffice of Strategic Services (OSS), "Problems Arising from a Sudden Libera­ tion of the N .E .I.," Research and Analysis Report no. 3229, August 13 , 1945, DSR. Charles Wolf, who served as American vice-consul in the East Indies, has suggested that political factors may well have reinforced the decision to change the command structure. See Charles Wolf, The Indonesian Story: The Birth, Growth and Structure of the Indonesian Republic (New York: John Day, 1948), p. 16. See also Am ry Vandenbosch and Richard A . Butwell, Southeast Asia among the World Powers (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1957), p. 292; Harold M. Vinacke, "United States Far Eastern Policy," Pacific Affairs, 19 (December

i946):35»-52-

21Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks: Section E of the Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia, 1943-2945 (London: Her M ajesty's Stationery Office, 1969), p. 282. 83

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delayed even further. It w as not until Septem ber 29 that the first full contingent o f British troops landed in the East Indies— six w eeks after Japan 's surrender and the Republic of Indonesia's proclam ation of independence. Regardless of the m otives of those responsible for the abrupt change in the command struc­ ture, then, the net effect of that decision w as to create a political and m ilitary vacuum in Indonesia—a vacuum that w as quickly filled by the Indonesian nationalists.22 The six-week interval between the proclamation of the repub­ lic and the arrival of the initial British occupation forces pro­ vided the nationalists with a unique opportunity to stabilize their new ly form ed governm ent. The Indonesians feverishly attemp­ ted to create the first alternative to alien rule in their hom eland in over three hundred years. A fter the birth of the Republic of Indonesia on A ugust 17 , the Independence Preparatory Com ­ m ittee convened and quickly named Sukarno and Hatta presi­ dent and vice-president respectively; the two veteran national­ ists w ere obvious and unanim ous choices for the top leadership positions. The committee then appointed a commission to make final changes in the national constitution, a project begun dur­ ing the last month of the w ar. W ithin a w eek, a final draft of the constitution w as com pleted and prom ulgated throughout the archipelago. Under the prevailing em ergency conditions, Presi­ dent Sukarno dissolved the Independence Preparatory Commit­ tee on A ugust 29 and replaced it w ith the Central Indonesian Com m ittee, a body com posed of 135 prom inent nationalists chosen by Sukarno and Hatta from am ong the leading ethnic, religious, social, and economic groups in the East Indies and responsible for advising the president and his cabinet.23 Before its dissolution, the Preparatory Committee took several other m ajor steps. By decree it divided the republic into eight “ Calvin H. Oakes to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, August 1 1 , 1945, in Box 30, Records of the State-A rm y-N avy-A ir Force Coordinating Com­ mittee, DSR (hereafter dted as swncc Records); seac Operational Directive no. 38, August 17 ,19 4 5 , in Box 82, seac War Diaries, w n rc ;Donnison, British Military Administration, pp. 421-22. “ Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 16 -17 ; George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 138-40; Ben­ edict R. O 'G . Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, Occupation, and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 87-91.

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provinces, each to have a governor appointed by Sukarno. The com m ittee also m ade provision for a cabinet of tw elve m inisters, all responsible to the president. Finally, using the Japanesecreated m ilitary and youth groups as a base, the Preparatory Com m ittee began to establish an em bryonic Indonesian arm y— or, m ore properly, an auxiliary police force. The Badan Keamanan Rakjat or People's Peace-Preservation Corps (BKR) w as com posed of highly autonomous—indeed, virtually indepen­ dent—constituent units, having a territorial base and subject to no real central control. This new ly form ed "arm y" quickly joined the revolutionary struggle, helping to seize governm ent buildings from the Japanese and to arrest people w ho refused to leave them .24 M ost of the Indonesian adm inistrators w ho had w orked for the Japanese im m ediately declared their allegiance to the re­ public; some w ere even appointed by Sukarno to serve in his first cabinet. A s o f Septem ber i , 1945, the Indonesian departm ent heads w ho had been serving in the Japanese m ilitary govern­ m ent, along w ith the new departm ent heads named by Sukar­ no, became m inisters of the Republic of Indonesia, lik e w ise , Sukarno decreed that all Indonesian civil servants should now ignore Japanese orders and obey only the directives of the new republican governm ent. In response to this decree, the republic gained the im m ediate and enthusiastic backing of alm ost all Indonesian governm ent personnel. The Japanese w ere pow er­ less to check the desertion of their adm inistrative functionaries, and w ithout these personnel the Japanese adm inistration quick­ ly collapsed.25 The rapid establishm ent of the republican governm ent placed the Japanese m ilitary command in a quandary. The A llied South­ east A sia Com m and had explicitly ordered the Japanese to main­ tain the status quo in Indonesia before the arrival of Allied troops. The Japanese believed, how ever, as Sukarno had repeatedly MAnderson, Java, pp. 103-5; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 140-41. On October 5 ,19 4 5 , the name of the national army was changed to Tentara Keamanan Rakjat (People's Peace-Preservation Army), or TKR. Later, as the army became more centralized, its name was changed first to Tentara Republik In­ donesia (Army of the Republic of Indonesia), or TRI, and then to Tentara National Indonesia (TNI). "K ah in , Nationalism and Revolution, p. 139.

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stressed, that any effort to suppress the infant republic w ould lead to a costly and bloody struggle. Anxious to avert such a d ash , the Japanese vacillated: w hile trying to halt the growth of Indonesian m ilitary pow er, they chose not to contest the estab­ lishm ent o f the republican governm ent. But this strategy back­ fired, as Japanese attem pts to thwart the grow ing m ilitary strength of the republic led to fighting throughout late A ugust and Septem ber 1945. These armed clashes, which w ere usually spurred by Indonesian attempts to secure Japanese arm s, con­ tinued to rage at the time the first m ajor contingent of British troops landed in Java, on Septem ber 29, 1945.* The British w ere bewildered by the state of affairs they found in the East Indies. Contrary to their intelligence reports, which Mountbatten angrily criticized as "patently inadequate and erroneous," they found a functioning native governm ent, actively supported by the great m ajority of politically consdous Indonesians and operating at a high degree of effiden cy.27 A s defined by the Com bined Chiefs of Staff, the Southeast Asia Com m and had three m ajor responsibilities in the East Indies: to enforce the surrender and disarm ament of the Japanese armed forces; to release the Allied prisoners of w ar and internees; and to establish and maintain law and order in the country until the Dutch adm inistration could function effectively. The com pletely unexpected strength and popular support of the republic w ould necessitate a significant modification in those original instruc­ tions.“ Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, commander o f the A llied Forces in the N etherlands East Indies, gave the first in­ dication of a m odification of British goals in Indonesia. On Septem ber 29, before he arrived in Java, he explained at a press conference that his only task w as to rescue prisoners of w ar and “ Ibid., pp. 13 7 -3 8 ,14 1. r Mountbatten to British Chiefs of Staff, September 29,1945, in Box 90, sbac War Diaries, wn rc ;SA C 's 29th Miscellaneous Meeting, September 29 ,19 45, in ibid.; SA C 's 286th meeting, September 28,1945, in ibid.; David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948), pp. 37-38. “ Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks, p. 282; van Kleffens to van Mook, August 14 , 1945, in S. L. van der Wal, ed., Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende de NederlandsIndonesische Betrekkingen, 1945-1950 (The Hague: Martinius Nijhoff, 1971), 1:2 5 26 (hereafter cited as Officiele Bescheiden).

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internees and to disarm the Japanese. "W e have no interest in their politics/' Christison declared. "British and Indian troops w ill not become involved in internal politics." He further noted that the nationalist forces w ould be given a share in the respon­ sibility for m aintaining law and order. M oreover, Christison said that he had insisted on a conference between Indonesian nationalist leaders and Dutch colonial adm inistrators and w as n ow urging The H ague to make a statement clarifying its plans fo r the East Indies. "W hat form o f governm ent the Dutch are going to give them ," added the outspoken general, "I don't know . T hey'll certainly have to give them som ething."9 British Secretary of War J. J. Law son w as quoted the sam e day as hav­ in g stated that "Britain's obligation does not involve fighting for the French against the people of Indo-China or for the Dutch against Javanese nationalists."30 Both o f these w idely quoted statem ents w ere unm istakable indications that the initial role of the British forces in Indonesia w ould be limited. Indonesians quickly seized on Christison's rem arks as accord­ in g de facto recognition to their fledgling governm ent. It is high­ ly unlikely that this w as the general's intention, but his state­ m ent certainly conferred an aura of legitim acy on the young republic.31 Dutch authorities w ere infuriated by Christison's ®Extract from seac War Diary, September 30, 1945, in Box 90, seac War Diaries, w n r c ;Times (London), October 1,19 4 5 , p. 3; New York Times, September 30, 1945, p. 30. See Anderson, Java, pp. 135-36, for an examination of the controversy surrounding the remarks. Christison claims that he was misquoted. See, for example, Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks, p. 290; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 7. *N ew York Times, September 30, 1945, p. 30. Lawson is also quoted in U.S. Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, "British Policy toward Nationalists in Indonesia Strengthens Sukarno's Position," Research and A nalysis Report no. 3270, October 5 ,19 4 5, DSR. 3IIde Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 19451965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 18. An American intelligence report noted the profound political implications of Christison's statement: "The nationalist group is therefore now receiving recognition, if not as a government, as the nationalists originally desired, then at least as representatives of the Indonesian people, specifically of the national groups. This in itself is an enormous victory for Sukarno." See U .S. Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, "British Policy toward the N ationalists." The British Foreign Office was quite upset by Christison's blunt remarks. See ). C. Stemdale Bennett to British Chiefs of Staff, September 30, 1945, FO 37 1, F/7655/6398/61, PRO; I. A . Wilson Young to M aberly E. Dening, September 30 ,19 4 5, FO 3 7 1 F/7608/6398/61, PRO. 87

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apparent lack of sym pathy for their w eak position. "If new spa­ pers and broadcasts are tru e/' van Mook com plained to Mountbatten, "yo u r com m ander in Batavia created an im pression of virtually recognizing the Indonesian republic. I can hardly be­ lieve this public action w as taken w ith your consent and without even previous notice to m y governm ent or m yself."31 Despite the Dutch charges, the British never actually ques­ tioned Dutch sovereignty over the East Indies. In fact, Christison w as bluntly rem inded by the Foreign Office and Mountbatten on October ı that he w as to recognize only the N etherlands governm ent in Indonesia.31 Christison's pragm atic, if undip­ lom atic, approach w as sim ply an early attempt to cope w ith the new realities in the Indonesian archipelago. Reports from Java during the next few w eeks frequently pointed to the sur­ prising strength and popular support of the republic. British com m anders believed that only a policy of strict noninterven­ tion in Indonesian internal affairs could allow them to carry out their main tasks of freeing the prisoners of w ar and internees and disarm ing the Japanese; any involvem ent in political mat­ ters w ould only complicate their duties and overextend the Brit­ ish commitment. A s Mountbatten frankly explained to Dutch representatives on Septem ber 30, the British "w ere w illing to help the N etherlands Governm ent back to its law ful position, but could not get involved in civil w ar as a consequence o f an internal policy which seem s unsuitable to them ."3* A n added “ Van Mook to Mountbatten, September 30 ,1945, in Officiele Bescheiden, 1:19 3. Van Mook later wrote: "B y taking this precipitate step the Republic of Indone­ sia—which at that time was neither an administration nor even a unified move­ m ent-acquired a kind of international recognition which irrevocably prejudiced the future, and about which no previous consultation with the Dutch Govern­ ment or its representative had taken place" (Stakes of Democracy, pp. 187-88). Peter Gerbrandy later wrote: "British policy was the primary, if not the sole, cause of the collapse of the once stable kingdom of the Netherlands. That much is incontrovertible" (Indonesia [London: Hutchinson, 1950], p. 105). See also memorandum from ). Webb Benton (chargé, Netherlands) to Jam es Byrnes, October 10, 1945, 856E.00/10-1045, DSR; memorandum from Stanley Hombeck (ambassador, Netherlands) to Byrnes, October 14 ,19 4 5 ,856D.00/10-1445, DSR. “ Mountbatten to Christison, September 30,1945, in Box 90, seac War Diaries, w n r c ;Mountbatten to Christison, October 1,19 4 5 , Officiele Bescheiden, 1:2 18 -19 ; Foreign Office to Dening, October 1,19 4 5 , FO 371 F7649/6398/61, PRO. “ Minutes of meeting between British and Dutch officials, September 30,1945, in Officiele Bescheiden, 1:200; SA C 's 30th Miscellaneous Meeting, September 28, 1945, in Box 90, seac War Diaries, w n r c .

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com plication w as that a large percentage o f the occupying forces w as com posed o f Indian troops. British authorities questioned the w isdom o f using Indians to suppress fellow A sians, and w ere especially w orried about the political effect that such cir­ cum stances w ould undoubtedly have in India, where the clamor for independence w as grow ing louder.39 A w are of these problem s, Mountbatten instructed Christison to avoid any interference in the political affairs of the archipela­ go. A t the sam e time, he began to press Dutch officials to meet w ith representatives of the republic. Mountbatten defended this policy in purely m ilitary terms: if the Dutch and Indonesians did not negotiate, disorders might easily occur which the Dutch them selves had inadequate forces to control. This attempt to bring the tw o parties to the bargaining table, the adm iral in­ form ed the British C hiefs of Staff on October 5, "w as purely for the m aintenance of law and order as an im partial and humani­ tarian process directed at enabling the people to live their lives w ithout fear of bloodshed."36He asserted that the British should establish quite clearly the distinction between m aintaining law and order and any policy of suppressing the Indonesian inde­ pendence m ovem ent on behalf of the N etherlands governm ent. In effect, Mountbatten urged the Foreign Office to pressure the Dutch into m aking som e guarantee o f limited independence to Indonesia. "I consider it m ilitarily essential," he declared, "that N etherlands pronouncem ents o f the political future of N .E .I. are. im aginative and generous to avoid bloodshed w hich w ould in­ evitably involve British and Indian troops."37 Initially the Foreign Office believed that the Southeast A sia Com m and "w as going much too far" in advocating that the British pressure the Dutch to grant some form of Indonesian self-rule. In a letter to M aberly E. Dening, chief political adviser to M ountbatten, the Foreign O ffice warned that the argum ents* *M ountbatten to British Chiefs of Staff, September 29, 1945, FO 37 1 F7652/ 6398/61, PRO; Anderson, Java, pp. 132-35. *M ountbatten to British Chiefs of Staff, October 5 ,19 4 5 , FO 371 F8071/6398/ 6 1, PRO. *M ountbatten to Foreign Office, October 1 1 , 1945, FO 371 F83051/6398/61, PRO; memorandum from representatives of British Chiefs of Staff to Combined Chiefs of Staff, "The Situation in the Netherlands East Indies," October 30,1945, CCS 932, Operation and Planning Division Files, RG 165, Modem Military Branch, National Archives.

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favoring nonintervention in the East Indies must be balanced against the very harm ful effect that such a policy m ight have on Anglo-Dutch relations, particularly if the British appeared to take no interest in the restoration of Dutch territory and thereby to encourage consolidation of the nationalist m ovem ent.3* O nly gradually did the Foreign Office come to accept the logic of M ountbatten's position. It sent Dening to Java to assess con­ ditions, and his reports consistently corroborated the view point of the British m ilitary com m anders. N obody in Indonesia w anted "the old gan g" back, Dening observed. The danger from the British point of view w as "that w e shall be accused—and not entirely without reason—of holding the lists until the Dutch could do the shooting." He insisted that the Dutch m ust be convinced that they are no longer welcom e in Indonesia and that they m ust clarify their future plans. "The Dutch have an opportunity," Dening pointed out, "but their present attitude is not encouraging. The rem edy lies w ith them, but if they do not apply it, and soon, w e w ill also become in volved ."* The Defense Committee of the British cabinet discussed In­ donesian policy at a m eeting on October 10 , 1945. London's ultim ate policy objective w as to restore law and order as soon as possible; to effect the release of all prisoners of w ar and inter­ nees and the disarm am ent of the Japanese; and then to transfer the territory to the Dutch and w ithdraw . The British task w as com plicated because any appearance of restoring the Dutch adm inistration by force m ight have dangerous repercussions for Britain's general position in the Far East, yet "an y appearance of surrender to the extrem ists and failure to restore Dutch adm inis­ tration w ould have equally w ide and undesirable repercus­ sio n s." The C hiefs of Staff cautioned that the archipelago w as perfectly suited for guerrilla tactics that w ould require forces far in excess o f those that Mountbatten had for combat. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, bem oaning the hazardous British posi­ tion, suggested that the cabinet accept M ountbatten's recom-* *Foreign Office to Dening, October i , 1945, FO 371 F7649/6398/61, PRO. See also memorandum from Stem dale Bennett to Foreign Office, October 9, 1945, FO 3 7 1 F7659/6398/61, PRO. "D ening to Foreign Office, October 11,19 4 5 , FO 3 7 1 F8216/6398/61, PRO.

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m endation and urge the Dutch to explore "talking points" with the republicans.40 In a memorandum prepared for Prime M inister G em ent A ttlee on October 15 , the Foreign Office clarified this position: "W e naturally w ant the N .E .I. restored to the sovereign power. But w e cannot accept the theory that w e have a definite respon­ sibility to restore it at all costs in the face of local opposition." Though any dispute between the Dutch and the people of the East Indies w as not a British affair, the maintenance of law and order "m ay involve British troops in extensive fighting and the British Governm ent in m any political com plications." The partic­ ularly sensitive subject of Indian soldiers w as also a m ajor con­ cern; the use of Indian troops against fellow A sians w ould place Britain in an extrem ely aw kw ard position. British policy, the Foreign O ffice brief sum m arized, had two com plem entary aim s: to minimize the risk of having to use arm ed force and to urge the Dutch to negotiate w ith the republicans.41 In a m eeting that day w ith the Dutch am bassador, Attlee stressed these points. H e explained that w hile the British w ould carry out their obligations to the Dutch, "they could not assum e an unlim ited liability."42 The N etherlands governm ent at first vehem ently opposed an y negotiations w ith the republicans. The Dutch position w as sim ple: the republican governm ent w as a Japanese-created pup­ pet state; Sukarno and Hatta w ere quislings at best and w ar crim inals at w orst; Dutch sovereignty over the archipelago w as unquestionable. "The N etherlands Governm ent desires to stress the fact," a Dutch Foreign Office memorandum to the British asserted, "that the so-called Sukam o-govem m ent in Java is by no m eans the outcome of a spontaneous and w idespread popu­ lar m ovem ent but, as clearly proved by the facts, a Japanese puppet-Govem m ent of the Q uisling type (which has accepted the maxim 'to do or die w ith Japan'), and outspokenly totali"M inutes of cabinet defense meeting, October io , 1945, FO 3 7 1 F8658/6398/61, PRO. See also British Chiefs of Staff to Mountbatten, October 10 ,19 4 5 , in Officiele Bescheiden, 1:299-300. "B rief for Prime Minister from Foreign Office, October 15 ,19 4 5 , FO 3 7 1 F8426/ 6398/61, PRO. "R ecord of a conversation between Attlee and the Netherlands ambassador, October 15 ,19 4 5 , prem 8/70, PRO.

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tarian in character."” Added van Mook: "Sukarno's regim e is w holly unable to install order and prosperity to the Indies, and w ould, if left alone, succumb after a short time through internal dissen sion s."44 The Dutch w ere quite out of patience w ith the British, w ho, they felt, had unw ittingly aided the cause o f the nationalists. "It is w ell know n," com plained the N etherlands Foreign O ffice, that the present disability of the Netherlands to re-occupy Java w ith their ow n forces is caused by the fact that they were the last to be liberated from Germ an occupation and have ever since been dependent on the aid of their Allies for the rebuilding o f their arm y and navy. They have, moreover, continually been hampered by the fact that during the w ar and later under the demobilisation afterw ards, only very low priorities were granted to their interests. . . . The Netherlands Governm ent feels that their alliance w ith Great Britain entitles them to the fullest help of the British Govern­ ment and that they should not be abandoned for the time being to their ow n slender resources in finishing off the w ar w ith Japan and the Japanese policy of a greater East A sia of which the Sukarno incident forms an integral part.”

W hile Dutch plans for the future of the East Indies had not yet crystallized, the Dutch did envision granting their rich colony som e degree of autonom y in the not too distant future. Q ueen W ilhelm ina's speech of December 6, 1942, still served as the basis for this expectation. The queen's rather vague pronounce­ ment had called for a postw ar conference to explore the possi­ bilities of a change in colonial policy; she had indicated that Hol­ land w ould accept a commonwealth or federated structure based on the British m odel.46 Referring to the queen's declara“ Memorandum from Dutch Foreign Office to British Foreign Office, in Officiele Bescheiden, 1:188-89. “ Memorandum from van Mook to Dutch Foreign Office, endosed in memo­ randum by Dean Acheson, October 10, 1945, in folder labeled "S .E .A . Civil A ffairs Administration, 1944-46," Box 1 1 , PSA Records, DSR. “ Memorandum horn Dutch Foreign Office to British Foreign Office, in Officiele Bescheiden, 1:189. 4677k Netherlands Commonwealth and the Future: Important Statements of Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina on Post-War Aims (New York: Netherlands Information Bureau, 1945), pp. 20-22.

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tion, one prom inent Dutch authority had assured Am erican dip­ lom ats in March 1945 that "the basis o f a sound colonial policy . . . is to give the more prim itive societies a secure foundation for future progress and developm ent, to which w e add that this should lead to self-expression and self-governm ent."47 But any liberalization of Dutch policy w ould occur gradually; few , if any, leading Dutch officials w ere thinking in terms of an indepen­ dent Indonesia. M ost believed that Indonesia w as indispensable to the Dutch econom y and w ould continue to be indispensable in the postw ar period, especially in view of the desperate needs o f their w ar-ravaged hom eland. The very nature of the Dutch governm ent, m oreover, militated against a more progressive approach to the colonial question: it w as a provisional, em ergen­ cy adm inistration without an electoral mandate, and the Dutch constitution specifically stated that no fundam ental change in colonial policy could be instituted before the [hitch people had a chance to express their opinion on the issue.4* Events in Indonesia, how ever, rapidly underm ined the Dutch position. A gradual, evolutionary approach w as quite obviously insufficient to stem the tide of revolutionary upheaval. The Brit­ ish im m ediately grasped this reality and attempted to adjust their policy accordingly. From their perspective, the logic of negotiations w as inescapable. Mountbatten held a conference in *P ress interview of A . ). Lovink (Dutch Foreign Office), enclosed in George Atcheson (chargé, China) to Secretary of State, March 8 ,19 4 5, 8560.00/2-2345, DSR. *H om beck to Secretary of State, October 1 , 1945, 856E.00/10-145, DSR; memorandum by Wilson Young of a conversation with J. H. A . Logemann (Dutch minister for overseas territories), September 29,1945, FO 3 7 1 F7656/6398/ 6 1, PRO; memorandum by Acheson of a conversation with Alexander Loudon, October 10 ,19 4 5 , FR, 1945, 6:1163-64; Leslie H. Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 47; U .S. Forces, European Thea­ ter, M ission to the Netherlands, Monthly Report, November 27,1945, in Chief of N aval Operations Records, Naval Operational Archives, Washington N avy Yard. The New York Times reporter in Amsterdam asserted that many Dutch considered the loss of the Indies to be more devastating to the Netherlands than World War U. "It is feared that unrest may retard the recovery of the East Indies to a point where it affects recovery of the Netherlands. This margin is slender since the economy of the mother country is blended with and probably depen­ dent on that of the colonies." He went on to say: "There are disquieting possibili­ ties of native control of exports, which in the opinion of businessmen here would be 'disastrous' to the Netherlands" (New York Times, October 2 1,19 4 5 , p. 3 i)-

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Singapore on October i o - i i , 1945, at which time he tried to persuade Dutch representatives to meet with leading republi­ cans. It w as the only solution, he insisted, because arm ed clashes betw een Indonesian and Allied soldiers w ere already occurring, and until the Dutch clarified their policy tow ard the new governm ent, such incidents threatened to become m ore serious.4* A nnoyed by the "high-handed" approach of the British, Lieutenant Governor van Mook nevertheless realized that the Dutch w ere dependent on British policy—at least until the Dutch them selves w ere capable of fielding an adequate m ilitary force. He explained to his governm ent that talks w ith the repub­ licans had become a conditio sine qua non for continued British m ilitary support. The Netherlands governm ent accordingly allow ed van M ook to meet w ith Indonesian nationalists, but stressed that he should not meet with Sukarno, H atta, or an y other Japanese "collaborators." This stance w as com pletely un­ realistic: Sukarno w as the head of the governm ent, and to refu se to talk w ith him w as tantamount to rejecting all contact w ith the republic. A s M ountbatten had inform ed London, it w as abso­ lutely essential that the Dutch governm ent give van M ook "a com pletely free hand as to whom he se e s."50G eneral C hristison subsequently arranged two informal sessions on October 23 and October 3 1 between van Mook and top republican spokesm en, including Sukarno. W hen word reached The H ague that Su kar­ no had been present at the talks, the Dutch governm ent sh arp ly rebuffed van M ook and issued an official statem ent exp lain in g that he had been acting outside his authority. The stalem ate continued.51 The British w ere piqued by the Dutch failure to face realities. «»Records of 34th and 35th meetings of Supreme Allied Com m ander, O ctober 10 and 11,19 4 5 , in Officiele Bescheiden, 1:300-318. ®M ountbatten to British Chiefs of Staff, October 1 1 , 1945, in Officiele Bes­ cheiden, 1:338; SA C 's 291st meeting, October 17, 1945, in Box 93, seac W ar Diaries. »Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, pp. 30 -31; Sir N eville Bland (British am bassador, Netherlands) to the Foreign Office, November 3, 1945, FO 37 1 F9454/6398/61, PRO; New York Times, November 1,19 4 5 , p. 1. Van Mook defended his action in meeting with Sukarno. "Som ehow," he wrote, "a bridge had to be built betw een the two parties if we wanted to explore the possibilities of reconstruction" (Stakes of Democracy, pp. 2 11-12 ).

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A British intelligence report dryly described Dutch policy as "characterized by an unw illingness to realize the actualities of the situation."52 Dening hoped that negotiations w ith the In­ donesians m ight break the im passe, but he had serious doubts. "I am unable to rid m yself of the im pression," he cabled the Foreign O ffice, "that the Dutch w ill w ish to rule Indonesia for the benefit o f Holland and that they intend to rule it from Hol­ land and not from h ere." He added that "if the Dutch cannot be persuaded of the truth that the East has changed and changed radically as a result o f the w ar then a satisfactory solution is u n lik ely."53 Dening perceived that the Dutch w ere unw illing to recognize the legitim ate aspirations of the Indonesians to selfrule. There has been no indication, he commented, that the na­ tionalists w ere being invited to participate in any arrangem ent that m ight lead to self-governm ent. A ssessing the gloom y pros­ pects for a settlem ent, Dening concluded: "U nfortunately there are far too m any Dutchmen here w h o . . . still live in the past to offer m uch hope that they w ill achieve success in the future. I hope w e w ill not associate ourselves w ith any attempt the Dutch m ay m ake (and I am afraid they w ill make one) to force the Indonesians into subm ission."5* Indonesian leaders w ere also becoming increasingly disheart­ ened b y Dutch policy. In a letter to General Christison on Octo­ ber 9, Sukarno eloquently pleaded for his nation's indepen­ dence. "Is liberty and freedom only for certain favored peoples of this w orld ?" he asked. "Indonesians w ill never understand w hy it is, for instance, w rong for the Germ ans to rule Holland if it is right for the Dutch to rule Indonesia. In either case the right to rule rests on pure force and not on the sanction of the popula­ tio n s." He w arned the British m ilitary commander that the “ Memorandum from Director of Intelligence of British Arm y, "Situation in the Netherlands East Indies/' October 27,19 45, FO 371 ¥9770/6598/61, PRO. “ Dening to Foreign Office, October 24,1945, FO 371 ¥8889/6598/61, PRO. “ Dening to Foreign Office, October 28,1945, FO 371 F9031/6398/61, PRO. An American intelligence report indicated a similar concern that the Dutch might resort to armed force: "Since the Nationalists have no intention of submitting to dictation, it is expected that the Dutch will resort to a bloody campaign of military suppression" (U.S. Department of War, Strategic Services Unit, Re* search and Analysis Branch, "Indonesian Nationalist O pinions," December 9, 1945, XL 32100, RG 226, Modem Military Branch).

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Dutch underestim ated the spirit of the Indonesians and their capacity to w age a long and bloody struggle.” Mohammed Hatta sim ilarly berated Dutch policy on several occasions. In a state­ ment issued on October 18, the republican vice-president noted sarcastically that w hile van Mook "cam e here with the avow ed aim o f reim posing Dutch rule on us he is pained to find the Dutch about as popular as the p o x." O n examination w e find that the autonom y offered us by Dr. van M ook is as different from true autonomy as chalk is from cheese. Under fancy titles and a gilded facade Dr. van Mook is out to im pose on us a streamlined version of the old Dutch colonial poli­ cy— something far, far less than what w e already hold. The Dutch are graciously permitting us entry into the basement while w e have climbed all the w ay to the top floor and up to the attic.56

O fficials in the United States, following developm ents in the East Indies closely, w ere equally disappointed with the lim ited vision of Dutch leaders. One State Department officer stressed that few Dutch representatives "either at home or in the area appear to grasp the seriousness of the situation or to admit the sincerity of the N ationalists"; it w as unlikely, he speculated, that The H ague w ould make sufficient concessions to satisfy the republicans without either further hostilities or firm pressure by w orld opinion.97 A report prepared by the State Departm ent's Research and Intelligence Branch concluded that "un less some decisive and constructive steps to break the deadlock are taken in the near future, the situation m ay degenerate into more w ide­ spread violence, which in turn m ay result in a pacification cam­ paign necessitating arm ed action by British and Dutch troops "Sukarno to Christison, October 9,19 45, FO 371 F9462/6398/61, PRO. "O SS, Research and Analysis Branch, "Statement by Mohammed H atta," October 18, 1945, XL 24686, Modem Military Branch. See also Hatta to Chris­ tison, November 9,1945, in U .S. Department of War, Strategic Services Unit, XL 32951, Modem Military Branch; Sukarno to Christison, October 6 and October 9, 1945, in Officiele Bescheiden, 2:259, 285-90; Hatta to Brigadier General R. M. C. King, October 11,19 4 5 , in Officiele Bescheiden, 1:340-41. "C harles W. Yost (American representative to sbac)to Byrnes, "Situation in French Indochina and Netherlands East Indies," October 23, 1945, 851G.00/ 10-2345, DSR. For a similar view , see Commanding General, U .S. Forces, IndiaBurma Theater, to War Department, October 9, 1945, in folder labeled "M es­ sages via War Department," Box 8, PSA Records, DSR.

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against resisting Indonesians."” N evertheless, W ashington had no interest in getting involved in the Indonesian upheaval. "It w ould seem im portant to avoid any entanglem ent in the colo­ nial problem s of w estern pow ers in Southeast A sia," advised Abbot M offat, chief of the State Departm ent's Division o f South­ east A sian A ffairs, "un less essential to protect Am erican secu­ rity interests from some threat not presently visible. " ” The long-feared d ash between British troops and Indonesian nationalists erupted in late October 1945. In order to com ply w ith its appointed tasks, the British m ilitary command had been occupying key dties in Java for several w eeks. Indonesians were irritated by these British actions, believing them to be thinly veiled attem pts to bring in Dutch troops under British cover. A t Surabaya, in eastern Java, the pow der keg exploded. Ragged Indonesian soldiers m ounted a ferodous assault on the occupy­ ing British forces in a desperate attempt to halt their advance. H eavy casualties occurred on both sides and a British brigadier general, W illiam M allaby, w as killed. By early Novem ber, w ith the aid o f air and sea support, the British had finally gained control o f the d ty, but only at trem endous co st." The impact of the battle—regardless o f w ho w on or lost in conventional term s—cannot be overestim ated: it dem onstrated to the British that the republic w as enthusiastically backed by the Indonesian people, and that m any w ould sacrifice their lives if necessary for their new nation. The events at Surabaya shocked the British into realizing that without a substantial commitment o f more troops and equipm ent they w ould have to reach som e form of m odus vivendi w ith the republic. The alternatives for British policy m akers w ere now evident: if they could not persuade the "U .S . Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, Re­ search and A nalysis Branch, "Problems Facing the Allies in the N .E .I.," October 16 , 1945, XL 23086, Modem M ilitary Branch, and "The Political Issues and Occupation Problems in the N .E .I.," Report no. 3279, October 19 ,19 4 5, DSR. "M offat to John Carter Vincent (director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Octo­ ber 12 ,19 4 5 , in folder labeled "N .E .I. Arm s-Surplus Property D isposal," Box 1 1 , PSA Records, DSR. “ Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, pp. 35-39; Wehl, Birth of Indonesia, pp. 52-56; Anthony J. S. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-50 (Hawthorn, Australia: Longman, 1974), pp. 49-53. For the controversy surrounding M allaby's death, see ). G . A . Parrott, "Who Killed Brigadier M allaby?," Indonesia, no. 20 (1975), pp. 8 7 -110 .

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Dutch to make an accommodation w ith the nationalists, they w ould have to decide whether to w ithdraw or to reim pose Dutch sovereignty by force.61 Editorial opinion in the United States reacted sharply to the outbreak o f hostilities in Indonesia. "It is difficult to see," w rote the New Republic, "w hat 'm oral obligation' the British Labor gov­ ernm ent—theoretically opposed to colonial oppression—is under to maintain the Dutch em pire by force." "The reports from Surabaya," bluntly observed the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "bear a sickening resem blance to the new s from W arsaw, Rot­ terdam , Belgrade, A thens, Coventry and London w hen they w ere subjected to the bombs of the N azis." Great Britain, the new spaper charged, w as sim ply "doing the dirty w ork for the rich islands' overlords." The Nation sim ilarly bemoaned "the slaughter of hapless Indonesians at Surabaya." By backing "the principle of im perialist solidarity w ith unlim ited force, instead of insisting that the Dutch authorities negotiate w ith the Java nationalists, Britain's Labour governm ent em barked on seas w hich m ay w reck it." Added the Chicago Tribune: "O bviously the Dutch and the French are unable to restore their hated rule over the N etherlands East Indies and French Indo-China without outside aid. N o such aid should be given them ."62 Am erican officials also view ed the crisis in Indonesia w ith grow ing alarm . Although the United States never questioned Dutch sovereignty over the East Indies, Am erican policy m akers w ere concerned w ith the apparent inability and unw illingness of the Dutch to deal constructively w ith the republicans. State Departm ent analysts appreciated the deep roots of the national­ ist m ovem ent; they understood that it w as not sim ply a Japanese creation, as the Dutch claimed. They also realized that Sukarno w as not a quisling, but an authentic nationalist spokes“ U .S. Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, "Fight* ing at Soeibaja [sic] Postpones NEI-Indonesian Negotiations," November 2, 1945, Research and Analysis Report no. 3287, DSR; Mountbatten to British Chiefs of Staff, November 5 ,19 4 5, in Officiele Bescheiden, 1:527-30; Mountbatten to Cabinet, November 9, 1945, FO 371 F9918/6398/61, PRO; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 144-45. “ "Revolution in Indonesia," New Republic, October 29, 1945, pp. 558-59; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 27, 1945, p. 10; Nation, November 17 , 1945, pp. 509-10; Chicago Tribune, November 1,19 4 5 , p. 12.

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man w ho had a long prew ar record as a champion of Indonesian independence. The only alternative for the Dutch, in their view , w as to negotiate w ith the republicans in good faith; only if The H ague expressed a w illingness to offer some degree of home rule to the Indies could a potentially explosive deadlock be averted. This assessm ent w as based on Am erican intelligence reports o f the republican governm ent's strength.63 "It is w ell organized, disciplined, armed at least for guerrilla w arfare, and above all u nified," one State Department report estim ated. "The econom ic w eapons at their command are enorm ous and they are w ell aw are of them ." Furtherm ore, the Dutch w ere seen as incapable of quashing the republic: "If the m ovement is put dow n by force now it w ill rise again___ The Dutch w ill never be strong enough now to keep 70 million people under martial law in defin itely."64 The State Departm ent followed developm ents in Indonesia closely, but studied noninvolvem ent rem ained the keynote of Am erican policy toward the conflict. G iven the larger interests of Am erican foreign policy at the time, this position w as quite realistic. Colonial disputes, such as those sim m ering in the Dutch East Indies and in French Indochina, posed an insuper­ able dilem m a to Am erican authorities. On the one hand, W ashington w as eager to maintain friendly relations w ith the underdeveloped w orld, and active support for a reim position of the im perialist order in Southeast A sia w ould surely incur the w rath of A sian nationalists. A s one member of the State Depart­ m ent's Far Eastern D ivision explained, "The traditional position o f the United States as the champion of freedom and national self-determ ination has given the United States a place of disin­ terested prestige in m any parts of the w orld, which can be very “ Memorandum by John Cady (Southeast Asia Division) of a conversation with Jay Reid of New York Herald Tribune, October 15, 1945, 8560.00/10-1545, DSR; OSS, "Transitional Period in Indonesia's Internal Political Situation," Au­ gust 2 4 ,19 4 5, Research and Analysis Report no. 3232; "Indonesian Unrest Por­ tends Most Critical Situation in Southeast Asia Com m and," September 28,1945, Research and Analysis Report no. 3265; and "A 'Government of the Republic of Indonesia' Confronts Allied Reoccupation Forces in the Netherlands East In­ d ies," September 14 ,19 4 5 , Research and Analysis Report no. 3255, all in DSR. MOSS, "Situation Report" (by Jane Foster), October 15 ,19 4 5 , XL 24208, Mod­ em M ilitary Branch.

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gravely prejudiced by ill-considered action on our part and alm ost equally seriously prejudiced by inaction."*5 On the other hand, any expressions of outright support for the colonial independence m ovem ents w ould seriously under­ mine cooperative relations w ith H olland, Great Britain, and the other European im perial pow ers. In a prelim inary position pa­ per entitled "Basic Policies and Objectives o f the U .S. in the Pa­ cific and the Far E ast," the State-W ar-Navy Coordinating Com­ mittee ( s w n c c ) elucidated this central dilemma: "A problem for the United States is to harm onize, so far as possible and without prejudice to its traditional position, its policies in regard to the two objectives: increased political freedom for the Far East and the maintenance of the unity of the leading United N ation s." In order to balance those seem ingly contradictory goals, the s w n c c m em orandum recommended that the United States avoid in­ tervention in the British, French, and N etherlands dependencies in the Far East and the Pacific: Am erican interests w ould be best served, it suggested, by "a Far East progressively developing into a group o f self-governing states—independent or w ith Dom inion status—which w ould cooperate w ith each other and w ith the W estern pow ers on a basis of mutual self-respect and friendship."*6 This rather vague policy objective left one m ajor question un­ answ ered. Put sim ply: w as this neutral stance consistent w ith the anticolonial pronouncem ents of the w ar years? In a memo­ randum of October 5, 1945, Under Secretary of State Acheson urged s w n c c to clarify Am erican aim s in regard to the colonial issue. "The Atlantic Charter commits us, am ong other th in gs," “ "United States Policy toward the Netherlands Indies and Indochina," De­ cember 18, 1945 (prepared by Rupert Emerson), enclosed in Gordon Strong (Economic Division) to Oliver C. Lockhart (Economic Division), December 20, 1945, 856E.01/12-2945, DSR. “ Preliminary Report by swncc ,"Basic Policies and Objectives of the U .S. in the Pacific and the Far East," August 3 1,19 4 5 , in Box 99, swncc Records, DSR. For an earlier version of this policy statement, see policy paper prepared in Department of State: "A n Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War and the Objectives and Policies of the United States," June 22, 1945, in FR, 1945, 6:556-58, 574-78. For a similar analysis of American interests in regard to the colonial conflicts in Southeast Asia, see Office of Naval Intelli­ gence, "Basic Factors in World Relations," December 1945, in Box 106, Strategic Plans Division Records, Naval Operational Archives.

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he rem inded s w n c c representatives, "to a respect for the right o f all peoples to choose the form of governm ent under which they w ill live, and to the desirability of securing for all peoples im proved labor standards, economic advancem ent and social secu rity." He asked pointedly: "To w hat lengths w ill w e go to further these general objectives in the dependent areas of the Far East?"*7 A s this fundam ental question rem ained un­ answ ered, A m erica's drift aw ay from anticolonialism w as steadily becom ing more evident. Still, State Departm ent spokesm en insisted that the United States had not abandoned its commitment to the principles of independence for colonial peoples. They cautioned, how ever, that this continued dedication to anti-im perialism did not mean that the United States could interfere in the internal affairs of friendly pow ers any more than Great Britain, for exam ple, could interfere in Puerto Rico.“ Speaking in N ew York G ty on October 2 0 ,19 4 5 , John Carter Vincent, director of the State Departm ent's O ffice of Far Eastern A ffairs, reaffirm ed the Am erican devotion to self-determ ination, indicating that the United States con­ tinued to pursue colonial questions in term s of its experience in the Philippines. "D o w e feel that recognition given to the selfgoverning aspirations of dependent peoples w ill be conducive to peace and well-being in the Far East?" he inquired rhetorical­ ly. "I believe w e do. It is not our intention to assist or participate in forceful m easures for the im position of control by the territo­ rial sovereigns, but w e should be prepared to lend our assis­ tance, if requested to do so, in efforts to reach peaceful agree­ m ents in these disturbed areas."“ In a speech on October 24, Sukarno expressed his hope that V incent's statem ent signaled a new U .S. policy toward the In­ donesian conflict. "I appeal to the U .S.A . to enact and act as m ediator in the present political dispute in this part of the Pacific," he declared. "I am convinced that the Am erican peo^Memorandum from Acheson to swncc ,October 5 ,19 4 5 , in Box 99, swncc Records, DSR. “ U .S. Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, "Prob­ lems Facing the A llies"; memorandum by Kenneth Landon (Southeast Asia Division) of a conversation with Sharp and Mr. Fitzmaurice of Newsweek, Octo­ ber 18 ,19 4 5 , 856D.00/10-845, DSR. “ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 13 (October 2 1,19 4 5), 644-48.

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pie w ho have fought and w on this w ar for the realization of the great hum an ideals of justice and freedom w ill im partially deal w ith all m atters connected w ith the Indonesian problem in the interest of w orld peace."7DThe Dutch, w ho w ere initially per­ turbed by Vincent's speech, w ere quickly reassured by Secretary o f States Jam es Byrnes's statement of the Am erican position: a request for m ediation w ould have to come from the "territorial sovereign." Since The Hague considered the Indonesian crisis a strictly internal affair, Am erican intervention w as com pletely out o f the question. W ashington thus rejected Sukarno's request.71 This snub came as a bitter disappointm ent to Indonesian nationalists, m any of whom still clung to the hope that the United States w ould honor its wartim e pledges and champion the republican cause. Instead, W ashington insisted on a policy o f strict neutrality. But Indonesians w ere convinced that even this "neutrality" w as being violated by Am erican actions: not only w as the United States fully recognizing the right of the N etherlands to restore its prew ar rule, it w as also actually sup­ plying the Dutch w ith surplus lend-lease equipm ent w hile con­ tinuing to train a sm all contingent of Dutch troops in the United States. In a radiogram to President Trum an, Sukarno com­ plained that some Dutch troops in the Indies w ere using Am er­ ican arm s, m unitions, and trucks. "A siatic goodw ill toward A m ericans," the Indonesian president w arned, "is endangered by the fact that the Dutch continue to w ear U .S. arm y uniform s and canteens m arked 'U SA .' " n Am erican officials justified the granting of lend-lease material and surplus property credits to the N etherlands on the grounds that it w as consistent w ith Am erican policy to assist a friendly ally w hose sovereignty over its colonial dependency the United ’"’Quoted in van Kleffens to John Morgan (Northern European Division), Octo­ ber 25, 1945, 856D.00/10-2445, DSR. Sukarno telegramed a similar message directly to Truman on October 26,1945 (856E.00/10-2645, DSR). 71Byrnes to Walter Foote (American consul general, East Indies), October 3 1, 1945, 856E.00/10-2845, DSR; memorandum by Vincent, October 22,19 45, in FR, 1945, 6:1167-68; memorandum to Douglas MacArthur (from THS?), October 25, 1945, in folder labeled "Indochina (general) 1940-45," Records of the Office of French and Iberian Affairs, DSR (from the notes of Lisle A. Rose). nNew York Times, October 2 1,19 4 5 , p. 1, and November 9 ,19 4 5, p. 2.

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States had never questioned. N onetheless, this aid to the Dutch, w hich over the next two years totaled over $100 m illion, raised a storm o f controversy in the United States.73 "In the Far E ast," rem arked M ajor General Patrick H urley, "w e are furnishing lend-lease supplies and using all our reputation to underm ine dem ocracy and bolster im perialism and com m unism ." H ugh de Lacy, congressm an from W ashington, called attention on the floor of the H ouse of Representatives to "the use of Am erican lend-lease in the suppression of the liberties and freedom s of the peoples o f that lan d ." Since the official policy of the U .S. gov­ ernm ent, commented California Representative Ellis E. Patter­ son, is "not to interfere in other nations' internal affairs, and the upholding o f all peoples' right of self-determ ination, I am am azed that our N avy Department helped arm , train, and equip Dutch troops w ho are now fighting the Indonesian people in the N etherlands East In dies." A dded Congresswom an Clare Boothe Luce o f Connecticut: "N ow here does the w eakness of our for­ eign policy show up more d early than in our present bewildered inactivity about the tragic situation in Indonesia."74 In the face of this sharp critidsm , the State Department asked the Dutch and British to rem ove Am erican labels from all mili­ tary equipm ent being used in the East Indies. This m aneuver failed to stem the w ave of criticism, however. In fact, one observ­ er ridiculed it as a "Pontius Pilate gesture." Added The Nation: "O u r ow n governm ent has . . . a responsibility which cannot be dodged by rem oving Am erican tags from tanks used to crush Indonesian in surgen cy."73 In Novem ber the State Department finally ordered the termination of further sales of arm s and mili­ tary equipm ent to the Dutch, but the sale of nonm ilitary mate­ rial—m aterial that at least indirectly continued to benefit the ’’ For exact figures on American aid to the Netherlands, see swncc; Subcom­ mittee on Far Eastern Affairs, Special Ad Hoc Committee Country Report on Indonesia, July 22,1947, in Box 109, swncc Records, DSR. See also Acheson to Forrestal, December 10,1946, in folder labeled "NEI: American Surplus Property D isposal," Box 11, DSR. 74U .S. Congress, Senate, 79th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, vol. 4 1, pt. 13 , pp. A 5318, A5765, A5426, A 5318. ^Excerpt from memorandum of State Department Press and Radio News Conference, October 24, 1945, in folder labeled "Indonesia General (1945-46)," Box 1 1 , PSA Records, DSR; Junius B. Wood, "Twilight of Em pire," Nation's Business, March 1946, p. 89; Nation, November 17 ,19 4 5 , 510.

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position o f the Dutch vis-à-vis the Indonesians—rem ained un­ affected by this decision.7* According to Am erican officials, this course w as entirely consistent w ith the larger aim s of Am erican policy, w hich, as a State Department memorandum spelled out, required "establishing a realistic settlem ent of the problem s o f Southeast A sia w ith a view to protecting the security, the in­ terests, and the influence o f the W estern Pow ers in that section o f A sia ."77 On several occasions the Indonesian Republic accused the United States o f pursuing a pro-Dutch policy; these protests w ere relatively m ild, how ever, because the republic w as unw ill­ ing to risk alienating W ashington. The republicans sought to achieve independence through diplom acy. From the outset of their independence struggle, republican leaders w ere forced to choose between two alternative policies: diplomasi or perdjuangan (struggle). Such spokesm en as Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir be­ lieved that the m ilitary, organizational, and ideological w eak­ ness of the republic necessitated a diplomatic policy. Broadly conceived, their view w as that the republic m ust rely prim arily on achieving a negotiated settlem ent w ith the Dutch which w ould be guaranteed by the great pow ers; everything else w ould have to be subordinated to that central goal. Once a settlem ent had been attained, the nation could return to the tasks of transform ing and dem ocratizing Indonesian society. The logic of diplom acy thus dem anded that any radical or rev­ olutionary tendencies w ithin the nationalist m ovem ent be sus­ pended or suppressed to appease international opinion. The republic, according to this view point, had to dem onstrate that it w as a responsible, capable, and stable governm ent. By prom is­ ing to protect foreign properties and displaying a w illingness to welcom e foreign investm ents—as it did in its political m anifesto ’"Memorandum for the President: "Policy with Respect to Shipment of Mili­ tary Equipment to Dutch Territories," December 22,1945, in folder labeled "N EI: American Surplus Property D isposal," Box 1 1 , DSR; Southeast Asian Division draft memorandum, December 18 ,19 4 5, in ibid.; Lisle A. Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Green­ wood Press, 1976), p. 87. ’’ Southeast Asian Division draft memorandum, December 18, 1945, in PSA Records, DSR.

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o f N ovem ber ı — the Republic of Indonesia vied to project this im age to the w orld.7* The danger inherent in a policy o f diplom asi w as that the achievem ent o f international recognition, if the policy suc­ ceeded, m ight occur at the expense of internal social reform . Perdjuangan, the alternative strategy, based its hopes instead on the strength o f the national revolutionary m ovem ent. Its chief advocate, Com m unist leader Tan M alaka, stressed the in­ evitability of arm ed struggle; he refused to believe that true independence could be bestowed as a gift from the W estern pow ers. O nly through struggle to attain a common goal, he insisted, could Indonesian society be transform ed and a cohe­ sive, organized sense of purpose be created out o f the form less national m ovem ent.79 W hile these conflicting strategies continued to compete for popular support, the early trium ph of the diplom asi forces soon becam e apparent. Sukarno expressed his governm ent's w illing­ n ess to pursue diplomatic channels in a statement issued on October 25: Indonesia's interests do not only concern the development of a new world structure but also the achievement of a basis for lasting peace in the Pacific. Based on this precept the Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the opinion that discussions to solve the * Anderson, Java, pp. 307-8. The Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indone­ sia is reprinted in Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 172-75. For American intelligence analyses of the republic's desire to attract American and Western investment, see O SS, "Program of Nationalists," September 28, 1945, XL 18340, Modem M ilitary Branch; U .S. Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, "The Economic Situation in Java and Prospective Business Policies," Research and Analysis Report no. 3288, November 2 ,19 4 5, DSR. 79Anderson, Java, p. 308. John R. W. Smail has produced the most convincing analysis of the genuine revolutionary forces present within Indonesian society. He argues, much as Carl Becker did about the American Revolution, that two separate revolutions were taking place simultaneously: one over home rule and one over who would rule at home. "The difficulty with this 'diplomatic' policy," he contends, "w as that the Republic could not be maintained successfully against the Allies or the Japanese without the dynamism of the perdjuangan, itself necessarily subversive of the domestic status quo" (Bandung in the Early Revolu­ tion, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution [Ithaca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1964], p. 62).

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Indonesian problem can only succeed and guarantee lasting peace if they are conducted before the world at large.“ He stressed that the starting point of such negotiations w ould have to be the right of the Indonesian people to self-determ i­ nation; that concept w as not negotiable. On Novem ber i the republic issued its carefully w orded political m anifesto, giving further evidence of the governm ent's eagerness to seek inter­ national acceptance. Then on N ovem ber 9, in another m aneuver designed to court w orld opinion, Sukarno designated Sjahrir to head the first par­ liam entary cabinet o f the republic. The appointm ent w as prom pted partly by internal political considerations, but, more im portant, the W estern-educated Sjahrir, an adept negotiator w ith a polished and engaging style, w as far more acceptable to the Dutch than the m ercurial Sukarno, w ho w ould be forever tainted in Dutch eyes by his wartim e collaboration w ith the Japanese. Sukarno rem ained titular president, but he surren­ dered the day-to-day governing responsibilities to Sjahrir.*1 This governm ental change greatly pleased Am erican observers. "The m oderate and non-collaborationist character of the new gro u p ," predicted Abbot M offat, "w ill probably satisfy Dutch objections to negotiating w ith Sukarno, although the fact that the President has not relinquished his office m ay provide grounds for further objections from The H ague."*2 In actuality, the Dutch continued to m ove w ith extreme cau­ tion. J. H. A . Logem ann, m inister for overseas territories in the N etherlands governm ent, told a reporter for the New York Times that he expected the Indies to gain som ething akin to dom inion status in his lifetim e, but not independence. Presum ably he “ Quoted in Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, p. 40. “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 153-54, 168-69; Anderson, Java, pp. 180-89; Anak Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 19-20. There are many indications that the Dutch were pleased with Sjahrir's ascendancy. See, for example, van Mook, Stakes of Democracy, p. 2 11; Hombeck to Byrnes, Novem­ ber 16, 1945, 856E.00/11-1645, DSR; Chester W ilm ofs BBC interview with J. H. A . Logemann, November 28, 1945, dted in Bland to William Schermerhom, December 2 ,19 4 5, in Officiele Bescheiden, 2:265. “ Memorandum from Moffat to Vincent, November 2 1,19 4 5 , in folder labeled "N EI: September 1944-1947, Indonesian Parties and Leaders," Box 1 1 , PSA Records, DSR.

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m eant tw enty to thirty years, and Logem ann, rem arkably, w as reputed to represent the liberal w ing of Dutch opinion.* This stubborn failure to deal w ith the realities of Indonesian national­ ism characterized the long-awaited policy statement on Hol­ lan d 's future plans for the East Indies. Issued by van M ook on N ovem ber 6, the statem ent declared that Dutch objectives for the Indies continued to be based on the principles proclaimed by Q ueen W ilhelmina in December 1942. The N etherlands ex­ pressed its w illingness to expand Indonesian representation in the Volksraad, but that body w ould rem ain a pseudo-parlia­ m ent w ith no real legislative function. Indonesians w ould be appointed to head certain governm ental m inistries, although they w ould still be subordinate to the Dutch governor general. In effect, the Dutch offered cosmetic changes in the governm en­ tal structure w hile m aintaining for them selves the real pow er in the archipelago.*4 British spokesm en regarded the Dutch pro­ posals as a "reasonable offer," but to Indonesians the Dutch state­ m ent o f Novem ber 6 w as an insulting "com prom ise" that sug­ gested nothing less than a return to the old colonial relationship. "It is only a going-over of the old fam iliar statement of the Q ueen," rem arked Sukarno. "W e do not w ant anything to do w ith the N etherlands K ingdom ."“ The Dutch position w as w eakened, though, by its continued dependence on British m ilitary support. Van Mook reported to The H ague in early Novem ber that he and the Dutch m ilitary com m anders agreed that a force of approxim ately 75,000 men w ould be required to reestablish Dutch control over the East Indies. A fter careful consideration the N etherlands governm ent ascertained that no more than 30,000 soldiers could be available for duty in Indonesia by October 1946. With such an inadequate force at their disposal, Dutch officials rem ained highly vulner­ able to British advice.“ a New York Times, October 28,1945, p. 4. "D jajadiningrat, Beginnings, p. 4 1; Hombeck to Byrnes, November io, 1945, 856D.00/11-1045, DSR. “ Meeting between British, Dutch, and Indonesian representatives, November 17 , 1945, in Officiele Bescheiden, 2:100; New York Times, November 7 ,19 4 5, p. 13. “ Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, pp. 42-43; memorandum from General Hull to Chiefs of Staff, September 2 1,19 4 5 , OPD 336.2TS 2/56, Operation and Planning Division Files, Modem M ilitary Branch.

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The British governm ent, m eanwhile, w as undertaking a com­ plete réévaluation of its policy. On December 2 the Joint Plan­ ning Staff issued a detailed analysis of London's long-term poli­ cy objectives in the East Indies. The report contended that the British had successfully fulfilled two of their assigned tasks in Indonesia—enforcing the surrender and disarm ament of the Japanese and releasing A llied prisoners of w ar and internees— but had encountered considerable difficulty w ith the third assignm ent o f transferring the country to Dutch civil authorities. The latter task had become a far more com plex commitment than had been anticipated w hen the original directive w as drafted. The m ilitary prognosis in Java appeared bleak; the fighting at Surabaya had unm istakably dem onstrated the strength and determ ination of the nationalist forces. "A t no tim e," the Planning Staff pointed out, "h ave w e stated that w e intend to enforce Dutch rule on the Indonesians by force o f arm s." Britain w as legally obliged, noted the report, only to allow the Dutch to resum e effective control; it w as not obliged to place the Dutch in control against the opposition of the local popula­ tion. M oreover, the use of Indian troops in Indonesia com­ pounded the problem: British authorities w ere concerned that the prolonged use o f Indians to suppress the nationalists m ight sour British-Indian relations. The argum ents against w ithdraw al, how ever, w ere equally com pelling. British policy m akers acknowledged that they had a deep moral obligation to the Dutch as allies and w ould surely be accused by them of breaking faith in the event of an abrupt British w ithdraw al. Britain's long-term interests also dictated the cultivation of a friendly relationship w ith Holland in Europe. Another argum ent advanced by the Joint Planning Staff against a precipitous w ithdraw al from the East Indies w as the danger­ ous precedent that such a m ove m ight set. "The peoples of India, Ceylon, Burm a, and M alaya w ould undoubtedly draw the inference," the report w arned, "that by using a sufficient degree o f violence it w as possible to attain complete indepen­ dence. This w ould probably result in an increase in our m ilitary commitment in these areas." Finally, the Planning Staff pointed out that British strategic interests in the Far East required a strong and friendly governm ent in the East Indian islands, 108

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w hich w ould not be the case if the republicans w ere in pow er. Caught between the equally unattractive prospects of an early w ithdraw al or an increased m ilitary commitment, the report urged a m iddle course. The Planning Staff recommended a poli­ cy first suggested by Mountbatten: holding a position in W est Java until the Dutch w ere strong enough to replace the British. The advantages o f m aintaining a foothold in W est Java were fivefold: (1) the British could then limit their present com­ mitment; (2) their forces in W est Java w ould then be strong enough to control events there; (3) West Java w as easily defensi­ ble and contained the main resources of that key island; (4) by strengthening their position there the British could then help Indonesian m oderates to establish influence over the republican governm ent; and (5) the Dutch adm inistration w ould then have an opportunity to establish its adm inistration behind the British forces in Java.*7 London quickly adopted the report o f the Planning Staff as official policy, but not without some serious objections. J. C. Stem dale Bennett o f the Foreign O ffice argued that such a lim­ ited policy w ould be unwelcom e to the Dutch governm ent because it w ould leave the nationalists free to consolidate their strength in the greater part of Java, from which it w ould be difficult to dislodge them. Conversely, he reasoned that the m odification of British goals in the East Indies could be inter­ preted as a defeat for Great Britain. "It w ill be regarded as a victory by the extrem ists," he observed, "an d, w hile w e have to put the best face possible on this in our propaganda, it w ill in fact be a victo ry."® The British governm ent countered these res­ ervations w ith the hope that a negotiated settlem ent between the Dutch and the Indonesians could still be w orked out. Plagued by a w ave o f international criticism—from the sup­ porters of both the Dutch and the Indonesians—for their policy in the East Indies, British diplom ats increasingly looked to the United States for comfort. On Novem ber 9 Lord H alifax, the British am bassador in W ashington, met w ith Secretary of State "'Report by Joint Planning Staff, "Long Term Policy in the Netherlands East Indies," December 2 ,19 4 5, FO 37t F i 1234/6398/61, PRO. "Stem dale Bennett to Foreign Office, December 3,19 4 5 , FO 371 F11920/6398/ 6 1, PRO.

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Byrnes to explain his governm ent's actions and difficulties. H e rem inded Byrnes that Great Britain w as perform ing a task de­ fined by the A llied Com bined Chiefs of Staff—an assignm ent that had originally been an Am erican responsibility. The secre­ tary agreed that Britain w as acting for the A llies, but in response to H alifax's request for some indication that the United States appreciated Britain's predicam ent—a statement of support, pre­ sum ably—the Am erican governm ent rem ained strangely silent. British Foreign Office officials considered offering to share arbitration duties w ith the United States in the East Indies, but they ultim ately scrapped this plan. The British w ere too w ary of A m erica's identification w ith the anticolonial cause to invite its entry into a colonial dispute. A s Stem dale Bennett saw it: "The Am ericans did not approach these things in the sam e objective m anner as w e w ere frying to do and their support w ould prob­ ably be all on the side of the Indonesians."” In fact, nothing w as further from the truth. Despite paying occasional obeisance to the principles of self-determ ination, as in Vincent's speech of October 20, Am erican officials consistent­ ly refused to give any positive support to colonial nationalist m ovem ents. A t the sam e time, W ashington reassured the Euro­ pean im perial pow ers that it recognized their sovereignty over their form er colonies. Under Secretary of State Acheson spelled out the Am erican position in response to a query from an in­ terested congressm an: "W hile the U .S. recognizes the sovereignty of Great Britain, France and the N etherlands in their colonial territories in Southeast A sia, it is not the policy of this Governm ent to assist the colonial pow ers to reestablish by force their position in those territories. " w Although quickly dis­ sociating itself from any possible m ilitary confrontations, the United States clearly aligned itself w ith the colonial nations in opposition to the nationalists; its unw illingness to question the •L o rd Halifax to Foreign Office, November 10, 1945, FO 371 F9862/6398/61, PRO; memorandum by Stem dale Bennett to Foreign Office, December 4, 1945, FO 371 F11236/6398/61, PRO; Stem dale Bennett to Foreign Office, December 3, 1945, FO 371 F i 1920/6398/61, PRO; memorandum by I. A. Wilson Young of a conversation with John M. Allison (of American Embassy, London), November 24,1945, FO 371 F10466/6398/61, PRO. ^Acheson to Representative Frank R. Havenner, December 2 0 ,19 4 5 ,856D.00/ 11-2645, DSR-

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rights of the territorial sovereigns along with its lend-lease aid to the Dutch belied any official professions of Am erican "neu­ trality." O n December 19 , 1945, the State Department finally re­ sponded to the British request for an official public statement on the Indonesian conflict, breaking two months of silence: "The United States Governm ent has view ed with increasing concern recent developm ents in the N etherlands East Indies. It had hoped the conversations between the Indonesians and the N etherlands authorities w ould have resulted in a peaceful set­ tlem ent recognizing alike the natural aspirations of the Indone­ sian peoples and the legitim ate rights and interests of the N etherlands." Expressing disappointm ent w ith the breakdown of negotiations, the State Department indicated its interest in an early agreem ent between "the N etherlands authorities, as repre­ sentatives of the territorial sovereign, and the Indonesian lead­ ers. Such a settlem ent can be attained only through a realistic, broadm inded and cooperative approach on the part of all con­ cerned and a w ill to reconcile differences by peaceful m eans."91 D espite the rather innocuous language, the press release w as extrem ely significant—as much for w hat it did not say as for w hat it did say. There w as no longer any mention of the princi­ ples of self-determ ination or self-governm ent, or any expression o f w illingness to arbitrate the dispute. Still trying to straddle the fence on the sensitive subject of colonial relations, the United States attem pted to balance its position between "the natural aspirations of the Indonesian peoples and the legitim ate rights and interests of the N etherlands." The balance w as distorted, though, for Am erican recognition of the rights of the Nether­ lands as the "territorial sovereign" amounted to a denial of the republic's quest for status as an equal party to the dispute. Signi­ ficantly, there w as no mention of the Indonesian Republic itself in the Am erican statement. N evertheless, the State Department press release of Decem­ ber 19 w as a diplom atic trium ph for the United States: it encour­ aged the resum ption of negotiations without alienating any of the interested parties, a considerable accomplishment indeed. n U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 13 (December 23,1945), 1021-22.

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G eneral Christison and his staff regarded it as a "perfect and will-tim ed docum ent" that not only strengthened Britain's posi­ tion but also upheld van M ook's efforts to convince his govern­ ment o f the need to reach an accommodation w ith the nationalists.92 For its part, the Dutch Foreign Office commented that the Am erican policy statement w as helpful since it show ed an appreciation of the difficulties that the Dutch w ere en­ countering in the East Indies. The Dutch also realized, how ever, that the United States w as m aking a friendly but firm suggestion that they return to the conference table w ith a w illingness to m ake definite concessions to Indonesian nationalism .99Even the Indonesians—w hatever private doubts they might have held about the Am erican position—officially expressed their grati­ tude for the policy statement. Sutan Sjahrir sent an appreciative Christm as telegram to President Truman. "The last m essage of good w ill and encouragem ent issued by your State Depart­ m ent," Sjahrir rem arked, "h as given us great comfort in the struggle w e are w aging to establish freedom , justice and dem o­ cracy in Indonesia." He added: "W e look to you, as the head o f a country that has alw ays been in the forefront of the tight for liberty, justice, and self-determ ination, to use the benefit of your influence to stop the present bloodshed in Indonesia."9* Finally, the Dutch began to realize that the initiative to break the deadlock w ith the republicans w ould have to come from them. London had made clear that its continued support for the Dutch w as contingent on the reopening of talks w ith the repub­ licans, and now W ashington had pointedly expressed a sim ilar w ish. This pressure forced the Dutch to act. On December 25 a conference of Dutch and British officials w as held at Chequers, the official country residence of the British prim e m inister. A t the conclusion of the m eeting a joint comminiqué w as issued: The respective governments were agreed that a solution of the political problem should be considered as an essential contribution to the successful implementation of the task entrusted by the Su” Foote to Byrnes, December 23,1945,856.00/12-2345, DSR. ” Hombeck to Byrnes, December 2 1,19 4 5 , 856E.00/12-2145, DSR; Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, p. 50. ’ ‘ Sjahrir to Truman, December 25,19 4 5, in FR, 1945,6 :1186.

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preme Allied command to Great Britain in order to liquidate the Japanese occupation of these territories, and, so far as this is con­ cerned, it is the joint task of the British and the Netherlands Gov­ ernments and of the Indonesian people. The British and Nether­ lands Governments are therefore agreed on the course of conduct to promote that the leaders of the nationalist movement will come to an agreement with the Netherlands authorities.” The new year thus began on a hopeful note as the Dutch pledged to enter into constructive negotiations w ith the republi­ cans. ^Communiqué on a meeting between Prime Minister and Dutch ministers at Chequers, December 27, 1945, in Officiele Bescheiden, 2:468-69; Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, p. 50.

113

4 Toward the Linggadjati Agreement: January-November 1 9 4 6 The year 1946 w as a trying one for President Truman and his foreign policy advisers. The wartim e alliance w ith the Soviet Union had shattered, leaving broad areas of disagreem ent be­ tw een the two superpow ers on virtually every m ajor issue. In Eastern Europe, in Iran, in Germ any, in Greece, even in China, Am erican and Soviet interests clashed. The devastating effects o f W orld War n , m oreover, left much of W estern Europe in economic ruin. The dem ands on Am erican policy m akers w ere staggering. G iven these pressing problem s, it is hardly surprising that senior Am erican officials paid little attention to a colonial con­ flict in far-off Southeast A sia. Developm ents in Indonesia, of course, could not be isolated from other, more central concerns of Am erican diplom acy. Even so, Am erican policy m akers assigned very low priority to Southeast A sia, a region that had never been a traditional area of interest for the United States. W ashington took comfort in the fact that its closest ally, Great Britain, w as endeavoring to achieve a liberal, negotiated settle­ ment between the Dutch and the Indonesians. There w as no reason to believe that London w ould fail in its appointed task, nor w as there any reason to believe that W ashington could im­ prove on London's perform ance. The chief Am erican interest in the Dutchr-Indonesian conflict at this time w as to ensure that it did not become a m ajor international crisis, or become yet another bone o f contention between the W est and the Soviet Union. Ironically, the prom ising results of the Chequers conference 114

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had hardly been announced w hen the conflict in the East Indies suddenly did threaten to explode into a m ajor international cri­ sis. On January 17 ,19 4 6 , the delegates to the inaugural session o f the United Nations Security Council began debate on their very first agenda item: a com plaint by Iran that the continued pres­ ence o f Soviet troops within its borders constituted interference in Tehran's internal affairs. The Soviet Union countered this charge w ith an accusation of its own: that the British had been em ployed by "reactionary" elem ents against the "dem ocratic forces" of Greece. Ukranian delegate D. Z . M anuilsky proposed that the Security Council exam ine the threat to w orld peace posed by British m ilitary operations in Indonesia. He argued that the problem could not be considered an internal affair of the N etherlands, since British and Japanese soldiers w ere fighting the Indonesian people. M anuilsky appealed to the council to "carry out the necessary investigation" in an effort to end the fighting.1 Before this verbal assault on Great Britain in the United N a­ tions, the Soviet Union had pursued a cautious policy toward colonial issues. During the autum n of 1945, Russian comment on the Indonesian conflict had been m inimal, limited to mild criticism of the Dutch and British roles and the Am erican "hands-off" posture. A t the M oscow Foreign M inisters' Confer­ ence in December, Soviet Foreign M inister V. M. M olotov had show n considerable interest in the Netherlands East Indies, sug­ gesting at one point that the w ithdraw al of British troops from Java parallel the w ithdraw al o f Soviet troops from Manchuria and Am erican troops horn North China. The Soviets quickly dropped this proposal, how ever, when the British registered their firm opposition to it.2 This relatively conciliatory policy probably reflected the Krem lin's reluctance to put any further strain on the wartim e alliance. A strong Soviet condemnation of the European im perial pow ers w ould have represented a signifi­ cant step toward a complete dissolution of that alliance, and ’ United Nations Security Council, Official Records, ist yr., Supplement no. 1, Annex 4, p. 76 (hereafter dted as scon). ’ Minute by Stem dale Bennett, December 29 ,1945, FO 371 F81/1/61, Records of the British Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London (hereafter dted as PRO).

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M oscow, w hich sought W estern recognition o f its em erging sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, wanted to minimize any possible areas o f friction w ith the West. By early 1946, how ever, East-W est tensions w ere increasing, leading to this initial con­ frontation in the United Nations. A s political commentator Jam es Reston noted in the New York Times, the Soviet indictm ent o f British policy in Greece and Indonesia appeared to be one o f the first cracks in postw ar solidarity.3 Debate over the Ukranian complaint began on February 7. M anuilsky and his Russian counterpart, Andrei Y . V yshinsky, alleged that British and Japanese troops w ere w aging w ar for the purpose of suppressing the "Indonesian national liberation m ovem ent."4 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin scoffed at this charge, insisting that there w ere hardly enough British troops in the area "to interfere w ith anybody," and assuring his adversaries that as soon as negotiations w ere concluded in In­ donesia, Britain w ould be very glad to w ithdraw its troops. Since Dutch sovereignty over the East Indies had not been ques­ tioned, Bevin w ondered how the Security Council could legally send a com m ission to investigate a problem that fell under the jurisdiction of a sovereign pow er, a position the Dutch delegate w arm ly em braced.5 Privately, Bevin suggested that the real objective of the Soviet governm ent w as to secure a foothold in Southeast A sia. If the Soviets succeeded in their dem and for an independent inquiry into the conduct of British troops in the Dutch East Indies, he warned the cabinet, an unfortunate prece­ dent w ould be set: a sim ilar commission of inquiry could be dem anded should disorders break out in India.4 For its part, the United States decided, in the w ords of Secre­ tary of State Byrnes, that "w e have got to go along w ith Britain as 3New York Times, February io , 1946, IV, p. 5; Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View Of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1957), pp. 3 -12 . For the view that the Soviet action in the Security Council w as a retaliatory measure for Western criticism of Russian moves in Iran, see Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell Uni­ versity Press, i960), pp. 14 -15 ; William Henderson, Pacific Settlement of Disputes: The Indonesian Question, 1946-1949 (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1954), p. 13 ; Philip C. Jessup, The Birth of Nations (New York: Columbia Universi­ ty Press, 1974), p. 43. 4scor,ist yr., 14th meeting, February 10 ,19 4 6 , pp. 205-6. ’ Ibid., 11th meeting, February 7,19 46, p. 180. ’ Cabinet Records (CAB) 128, Confidential Annex, January 1,19 4 6 , PRO.

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far as w e can ."7 Am erican delegate Edward R. Stettinius accordin gly expressed the view that the best hope for an amicable settlem ent lay in a successful conclusion of negotiations then in progress. Those talks, he argued, w ould achieve results in har­ m ony w ith the purposes of the United Nations Charter and "m eet the legitim ate aspirations of the Indonesian people for self-governm ent." W hen put to a vote, the Ukranian draft reso­ lution to establish a commission of inquiry w as resoundingly defeated, much to the delight of the W estern pow ers, receiving support only from the Soviet Union and Poland.* N evertheless, the significance of this episode cannot be discounted. "The prac­ tical effect of the ussR-Ukranian m ove," suggested a State De­ partm ent intelligence report, "is to exert som e additional pres­ sure on the N etherlands and Great Britain to achieve a speedy solution of the conflict in Ja v a ."’ Both W ashington and London w ere hopeful, as they pointed out in the Security Council debates, that Dutch-Indonesian dif­ ferences w ould be bridged satisfactorily in the very near future. A t Chequers, Dutch spokesm en had agreed to resum e serious discussions w ith republican representatives, giving rise to much optim istic speculation. The Dutch, m oveover, had yielded to London's suggestion that it appoint a respected British diplom at to lend advice and assistance at the upcom ing talks. In the view o f som e Am erican and British analysts, the initially rigid Nether­ lands position w as softening considerably.10 Statem ents by 'Memorandum by Benjamin V. Cohen (counselor, State Department) of a telephone conversation with Byrnes, February 12 ,19 4 6 , 8560.00/2-1246, in U.S. Department of State Records, National Archives, Washington, D .C. (hereafter dted as DSR). •scon, is t yr., 16th meeting, February 11,19 4 6 , pp. 235-37; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 389; memorandum prepared in Department of State, December 26,19 45, in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D .C ., 1971), 8:78789 (hereafter volumes in this series will be dted as FR, followed by the year); memorandum by Moffat of a conversation with Bohlen, Vincent, and Cumming, February 7,19 4 6 , in folder labeled "N .E .1.1945-1946, British Relations," in Box 12 , Records of the Office of the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs, DSR (hereafter dted as PSA Records); J. Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," International Conciliation, March 1950, pp. 118 -19 . *U.S. Department of State, Office of Research and Intelligence (ORI), Division of Far East Intelligence, Situation Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480, January 23, 1946, RG 59, DSR. I0Hombeck to Byrnes, January 17 ,19 4 6 , in FR, 1946,8:797, Dening to Foreign Office, FO 3 7 1 F1193/1/61, PRO.

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Dutch political leaders fueled this optimism. On January 17 , for exam ple, J. H. A . Logem ann, the Dutch m inister for overseas territories, declared that his governm ent w as prepared to accord "the nationalist conception a fully recognized status w ithin the K ingdom ." Logem ann contended that in an international sense his nation w as row ing against the tide; it w as no use, he said, to talk about w hat his country had achieved in the Indies, as the colonial relationship w as now outdated and the w orld expected the N etherlands to steer a new course.11 Other indications, how ever, continued to point in the oppo­ site direction. The undisciplined actions of Dutch troops in Java, som e of whom actually made several attempts on the life o f Prime M inister Sjahrir, particularly concerned British officials. On January 6 Sir N eville Bland, the British am bassador to the N etherlands, caustically inform ed The Hague that the behavior o f Dutch troops w as adversely affecting the prospects for se­ rious negotiations.12 H is rem arks only heightened the ire o f Dutch diplom ats, w ho already believed the British guilty of un­ due m eddling in their affairs. Tension between the two form er allies w as now reaching unprecedented proportions; British contempt for the N etherlands' position w as grow ing increasing­ ly evident w hile the Dutch continued to believe that British actions in Indonesia w ere seriously com prom ising their hopes for a liberal settlem ent in the Indies. Reflecting the prevailing British view point, Dening commented that "internal dissension, both in Holland and in Batavia, seem s to render it im possible to determ ine a settled policy tow ards the Indonesian question."13 A t a m eeting of the cabinet on January 15 , Bevin said that The H ague's delay in fulfilling its Chequers pledges w as unfortunate "since it w as m ost im portant, both for financial reasons and because of political reactions in India, that w e should reduce as quickly as possible our m ilitary commitments in the Dutch East In d ies."14 TTie m ost pressing of London's concerns rem ained the “ Quoted in ibid. For Logemann's view of Dutch-Indonesian relations, see J. H. A . Logemann, "The Indonesian Problem ," Pacific Affairs, 20 (March 1947), 30-41. “ Bland to Foreign Office, January 6, 1946, FO 371 F310/1/61, PRO; Bland to Foreign Office, January 6, 1946, FO 371 F 311/1/61, PRO. “ Dening to Foreign Office, January 22, 1946, FO 371 F1250/1/61, PRO. 14C A B 128/5, January 15 ,19 4 6 , PRO.

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need for a prom pt w ithdraw al of Indian troops from the East Indies; their continued service in a colonial context w as stirring vigorous protests in India, and the British viceroy repeatedly urged his governm ent to w ithdraw them .15 Largely ow ing to British pressure, on February 10 , 1946, the N etherlands finally reopened form al talks with Indonesian rep­ resentatives. Van M ook and Sjahrir headed the Dutch and In­ donesian delegations, respectively, w hile the seasoned British diplom at Lord Inverchapel served as m ediator. Inverchapel (form erly Sir Archibald Clark Kerr) had accepted the unenviable task of attem pting to reconcile two w idely divergent points of view . A s he w as leaving his form er post as am bassador to the Soviet Union, no less experienced a negotiator than Joseph Sta­ lin w arned him that his new position w ould be an extrem ely trying one.16 From the outset, Inverchapel insisted that his role w ould be quite lim ited; he w ould help the Dutch and Indone­ sians to settle their principal differences, but the basic constitu­ tional issues could be resolved only by the parties them selves. London's chief concern, Bevin had instructed him, lay not in resolving intricate constitutional issues but in avoiding the dis­ astrous consequences of a continued failure to reach any settlem ent.17 Van M ook chose this inaugural meeting to submit to the re­ public an integrated Dutch plan for the future of the East Indies. H e proudly announced that the proposal represented a new departure in the relationship between the Netherlands and In­ donesia. "For the first time in the history of that relationship," he declared, "a definite goal is set for the political developm ent o f Indonesia. Recognizing the right of self-determ ination for the citizens o f this country, the proposals em body a clear and w ork­ able w ay tow ards democratic liberty." The gist of the Dutch plan w as that the people of Indonesia w ould freely decide their polit­ ical destiny after a given preparatory period. During the transi­ l5Record of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, January 9,1946, FO 3 7 1F684/1/61, PRO; report by Joint Planning Staff, "Indian Troops in Java," January 1946, FO 3 7 1 F748/1/61, PRO; Bevin to Bland, January 18 ,19 4 6 , FO 371 F1202/1/61, PRO. “ Draft letter from Inverchapel to Stalin, February 2, 1946, in Inverchapel Papers, FO 800, PRO. ,7Bevin to d a rk Kerr, January 25,1946, FO 371 F1089/1/61, PRO.

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tion period, the N etherlands governm ent intended to create a Com m onwealth of Indonesia that w ould be a partner in the Kingdom o f the N etherlands and w ould be "com posed of terri­ tories possessing different degrees o f autonom y." The dom estic affairs o f the commonwealth w ere to be "m anaged indepen­ dently by the Com m onwealth's own institutions/' but a repre­ sentative of the Dutch crown w as still to have "special pow ers to guarantee fundam ental rights, an efficient adm inistration and sound financial m anagem ent."1* Significantly, the proposals did not specifically state w hen the Indonesians w ould be "enabled freely to decide their political destin y," although a subsequent clarification by Dutch officials nebulously defined the transition period as term inating before the present generation had reached retirem ent ag e/9 The New York Times announced that the N etherlands plan "definitely ends the colonial era in Indonesia,"20but British and Indonesian spokesm en rem ained skeptical. Richard A llen o f the British Foreign Office pointed out that "the statement appears to be for the m ost part only an am plification of earlier statem ents w ithout any basic change o f policy." What w as offered to In­ donesia, he noted, w as status between a colony and a dom in­ io n .21 Sjahrir com plained that the new proposition provided only for Dutch domination of the archipelago and the vir­ tual liquidation o f the republic. He stressed that Indonesia had no interest in the proposed kingdom and w ould accept nothing less than commonwealth status sim ilar to A ustralia's in the British Em pire. The Indonesian prim e m inister intim ated to 1#U .S. Department of State, ORI, "Netherlands Proposals for the Future Status of Indonesia," Report no. 3507A, March 15,19 4 6 , DSR; New York Times, February 11,19 4 6 , p. 2. See also Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 20-21; David W ehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948), pp. 10 9 -11; Raymond Kennedy, "Dutch Plan for the Indies: A Bargaining Ö fter," Far Eastern Survey, 15 (April 10,1946), 97-102. MIdrus N. Djajadiningrat, The Beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe Talks (Ithaca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1958), P- 5 2 x New York Times, February 12,19 4 6 , p. 24. 21Quoted in Byrnes to Hombeck, February 7 ,19 4 6 , 856E.00/2-846, DSR. See also U .S. Department of State, ORI, Division of Far East Intelligence, "Progress of Netherlands-Indonesian Negotiations," Situation Report—Southern A reas, no. 3480.4, February 20,19 46, DSR.

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Am erican Consul General W alter Foote that acceptance o f the Dutch offer w ould surely lead to the fall of his parliam entary governm ent.22 Inverchapel agreed that the Dutch terms w ere unacceptable in their present form , but he urged Sjahrir to con­ sider them as a basis for discussion. In a subsequent conversa­ tion w ith Foote, Inverchapel expressed his belief that the In­ donesians w ould gain by stalling because the British w ould not fight and the Dutch w ere unable to. "M y opinion," Foote cabled the State Departm ent, is that "Indos hold all four aces."23 A s Sjahrir explained to Inverchapel, his freedom to accept the Dutch concessions w as severely circumscribed by virulent dom estic opposition to his diplomatic policy.24 H is accession to the prim e m inistership in Novem ber had signified a tem porary setback for the proponents of perdjuangan, but in the succeed­ ing m onths their strength had steadily grown. The opposition to diplom asi and Sjahrir coalesced around the program of Tan M alaka's Persatuan Perdjuangan (Fighting Front, or PP), which dem anded complete independence as its minimal goal. Tan M alaka outlined the P P s policy in a January speech: We are not willing to negotiate with any one else before we obtain our loo per cent freedom and before our enemy has left our shores and our seas in good order. We are not willing to negotiate with a thief in our house. Let us not have the idea that the public does not understand diplomacy. We are not willing to negotiate as long as the enemy is still in our country. If we are willing to hold negotia­ tions, we are doing it against the will of the general public.“ “ Foote to Byrnes, February 14, 1946, in FR, 1946, 8:810. Van Mook, on die other hand, considered the Dutch offer to be eminently reasonable. "The only difference between the Indonesian demand of immediate independence and the Netherlands proposals," he insisted, "is a difference between the impossible and possible w ay of realizing the same ideal." See van Mook to d a rk Kerr, February 25,19 46, in Officiele Bescheiden Bettrefende de Nederlands-Indonesische Bettrekkingen 2945-1950, ed. S. L. van der Wal (The Hague: Martinius N ijhoff, 19 7 1-

76), 3:44»-49-

“ Foote to Byrnes, February 26,1946, 856E.00/2-2646, DSR. See also Benedict R. CXG. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolutiont Occupation, and Resistance, 1944-46 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 304. “ Clark Kerr to Foreign Office, February 23,1946 , FO 3 7 1 F2887/1/61, PRO. “ Quoted in George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 173.

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A groundsw ell o f popular support greeted the prom ulgation of the P F s program ; nearly all Indonesian political parties, along w ith most senior officers of the arm y, pledged their support to Tan M alaka's burgeoning coalition. Sjahrir nonetheless d u n g to the belief that in view of Allied strength and British attitudes, there w as no realistic alternative to immediate negotiations w ith the Dutch; but his pow er w as steadily eroding. On February 23 Sjahrir bow ed to PP pressure and reluctantly tendered a letter o f resignation to President Sukarno. Sukarno then gave Tan M alaka the m andate to form a new cabinet. The PP, how ever, found itself unable to overcom e severe internal divisions and incapable o f translating its oppositionist front into a workable governing coalition. With the subsequent collapse of the P P s bid for pow ­ er, Sukarno again turned to the form er prim e m inister, and on M arch 12 Sjahrir skillfully form ed a new cabinet.26 The failure of Tan M alaka's coalition to create a viable govern­ ment vindicated the prim e m inister's diplomatic policy; Sjahrir's pow er base w ithin Indonesia w as correspondingly strength­ ened. The m andate o f his second governm ent called for "th e conduct of discussions based on full recognition of the Republic o f Indonesia." A s van M ook later noted, "The fact that Sutan Sjahrir's cabinet had survived the first attacks on its m oderation by the w ilder elem ents in the interior made it possible to begin real negotiations in M arch."27 W hen the talks with van M ook resum ed on March 13 , the republicans officially responded to the initial Dutch offer by dem anding recognition of the repub­ lic's sovereign pow er over the entire archipelago. Rejecting The H ague's plan for a transitional period, Sjahrir suggested that the republic w ould entrust the conduct of foreign affairs and the defense of both countries, for a specified period, to a body com­ posed of both Dutch and Indonesians. Last, the republican del­ egation proposed that all N etherlands troops w ithdraw from Indonesia im m ediately upon the conclusion of an agreem ent between the two parties.26 “ Ibid., pp. 172-76; Anderson, Java, pp. 310 -16 . ^Hubertus ). van Mook, The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia (New York: Norton, 1950), p. 2 13. See also U .S. Department of State, ORI, Division of Far East Intelligence, Situation Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480.7, April 10 ,19 4 6 , DSR. “ Anderson, Java, pp. 316 ,3 2 2 ; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 20.

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The Indonesian offer w as com pletely unacceptable to the Dutch. But just as another deadlock appared unavoidable, an adventitious circumstance probably averted a breakdown of negotiations. On March 6 ,19 4 6 , France had concluded an agree­ m ent w ith Vietnam which apparently solved a sim ilar colonial problem ; it had determ ined that Vietnam w ould be a free state in the Indochinese Federation, which in turn w ould constitute part o f the French Union. Encouraged by this unexpected prece­ dent, van M ook handed a translation of the settlement to the Indonesian representatives and suggested that they peruse it as a possible basis for healing the Dutch-Indonesian rift. Taking the initiative, van Mook then offered a fresh set of proposals based on the French-Vietnam ese agreem ent. A t the heart of van M ook's plan lay his w illingness to recognize the de facto author­ ity o f the republic and his offer to the republic to become a partner in a federative Indonesian Free State. In turn, the repub­ lic w ould have to cease all hostilities and to join in general deliberations w ith representatives from all parts of the East In­ dies, and w ith m inority groups, to determ ine the political struc­ ture o f the future Indonesian state and its relations w ith the N etherlands. Van Mook pursued this new approach because he w as deeply and sincerely concerned w ith the potentially grave consequences of a collapse of the talks. In addition, he w as firm ly convinced that the best hope of coming to term s w ith the republic lay in negotiations w ith the m oderate Sjahrir govern­ m ent.® For its part, the Sjahrir governm ent w as keenly aw are that w orld opinion w as gradually shifting and that the Dutch offer w as increasingly regarded in the W est as an honest and sincere effort to accommodate the nationalists' aspirations.30 W edded to its strategy of diplom asi, the republic could not risk forfeit*C lark Kerr to Foreign Office, March 21,19 46 , FO 3 7 1F4362/1/61, PRO; Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, pp. 54-56; van Mook, Stakes of Democracy, p. 213; Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story: The Birth, Growth, and Structure of the Indonesian Republic (New York: John Day, 1948), p. 37; Anderson, Java, pp. 322-23. Amer* ican officials were keenly aware that the Dutch were using the Franco-Vietnamese agreement as a model. See, for example, Foote to Byrnes, March 27, 1946, 856E.00/3-2746, DSR; Hombeck to Byrnes, April 3, 1946, 856E.00/4-346, DSR; Foote to Byrnes, March 3 1, 1946, FR, 8:818. 30An editorial in the New York Times, February 17 ,19 4 6 , p. 28, noted that "an almost worldwide recognition of the Dutch offer as a generous one" had re­ sulted in "the greatest pressure for peace in Java."

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ing international sym pathy by appearing obstinate in the face o f "gen erou s" Dutch offers.31 M oreover, Inverchapel alerted Sjahrir that the Indonesians could expect no further assistance from G reat Britain in the negotiations unless they made signifi­ cant concessions to the Dutch.32 On March 27, aw are of his governm ent's precarious position, the prim e m inister submitted to the Dutch a fresh set of proposals that represented a m arked retreat from the republic's earlier position. Instead of outright recognition of its sovereignty, the republic now dem anded only that the Dutch recognize its de facto authority in Java and Sum atra, w ith the exception of areas under control of the A llied M ilitary Adm inistration.33 This conciliatory overture by the republic brought the two delegations close enough to justify a renewed effort to reach a form al agreem ent. Van Mook considered it necessary at this juncture to consult The H ague, since, as he rem inded the repub­ licans, the final decision regarding the prelim inary agreem ent rested w ith the N etherlands governm ent. He suggested that Sjahrir send an Indonesian delegation to Holland to elucidate the republican point of view . Sjahrir quickly appointed his m inister of justice, Suw andi, to head a three-man republican negotiating team .3* A s both parties made arrangem ents for the trip to H olland, a general mood of optimism sw ept the proceed­ ings. The Indonesian delegation w as convinced that its trip w ould be crowned w ith success; van Mook sim ilarly predicted an early agreem ent; even the norm ally skeptical Inverchapel believed that a settlem ent w ould probably be reached w ithin a w eek to ten d ays.33 D espite this apparent breakthrough, the British w ere grow ing increasingly restive w ith the "leisurely fashion" in w hich the Dutch w ere conducting negotiations. The continued use of Indi­ 3,Dr. Sudarsono of the republican delegation explained to Djajadiningrat that his government adjusted its policy as a result of the international climate of opinion, which appeared to back the Dutch position. See Djajadiningrat, Begin­ nings, pp. 56-57. “ Foote to Byrnes, March 10 ,19 4 6 , in FR, 1946,8:814. "D jajadiningrat, Beginnings, pp. 57-59; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 2 1. "D jajadiningrat, Beginnings, pp. 59-60. "Ib id ., p. 60; New York Times, April 14 ,19 4 6 , p. 28; Foote to Bym es, March 3 1, 1946, in FR, 1946, 8:817-18.

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an troops in the East Indies rem ained a pressing problem for London; their prolonged deploym ent in Indonesia at the same tim e that Britain w as engaged in delicate negotiations regarding the decolonization of India itself placed Britain in a compromis­ ing position. In addition, as Bevin pointed out, Indonesian op­ erations "w ere already im posing an undue burden" on Britain's resources; it "should be m ade quite d ear to the Dutch that if negotiations w ere to break dow n, w e should not engage in op­ erations to reinstate them ."36 On M arch 25 Stem dale Bennett inform ed the Dutch am bassa­ dor that Britain w ould shortly begin a phased w ithdraw al of British and Indian troops from the East Indies. The Dutch gov­ ernm ent angrily protested that this decision w ould have an adverse effect on the negotiations and argued that British mili­ tary tasks in Indonesia had not yet been com pleted. Attlee in­ sisted that the Dutch had no grounds for complaint. He and Bevin patiently explained the British position to a high-level Dutch delegation at a tense m eeting in London on A pril 12 . The Dutch again protested W hitehall's decision, but the British w ere firm ; any further delay in evacuating Indian toops, they stressed, w ould cause undue agitation in India. The first troop w ith­ draw als w ere scheduled for early M ay and the British declared flatly that they planned to w ithdraw all o f their forces before the end o f 1946. A successful conclusion o f the upcom ing negotia­ tions in H olland, they em phasized, w as now im perative.37 W hen the Dutch-Indonesian conference convened on A pril 14 ,19 4 6 , at the H oge Veluw e, a hunting lodge outside Arnhem , the initial optim ism quickly dissipated. A fter five m inutes, re­ called one republican delegate, it became clear to the Indonesians that their m ission w as doom ed to fail. There w ere at least two m ajor stum bling blocks. One w as the question of Sum atra: the Dutch governm ent w as w illing to recognize the republic's de facto authority only in Java, not in Sum atra. This unyielding ^Record by Stem dale Bennett of a conversation with the Dutch ambassador, March 25, 1946, FO 371 F4879/1/61, PRO; memorandum from Netherlands Foreign Office to British Foreign Office, March 27, 1946, FO 371 F5175/1/61, PRO; 49th meeting of Chiefs of Staff, March 28,1946, FO 371 F5073/1/61, PRO; CAB 128/29, PRO. ^Record of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, April 12 ,19 4 6 , Prime Ministers' Records (prbm) 8/263, PRO. « 5

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stand overturned van M ook's prelim inary draft agreem ent and placed an insurm ountable obstacle before the republic's nego­ tiating team. It also overturned pledges that the Dutch had m ade to the British only two days earlier, much to London's dism ay.3* The Indonesians fully realized that by accepting that point they w ould not only overstep their ow n m andate, but also éndanger the very survival of the Sjahrir governm ent. They argued eloquently that the republic's authority in Sum atra w as the only effective one on the w hole island; indeed, an Am erican intelligence report later pointed out that Dutch control in Sum a­ tra w as "alm ost non-existent. "* Still, the Dutch refused to budge on that pivotal question. The second m ajor controversy arose over the form of the agreem ent: the republican delegation sought a form al treaty, w hile the Dutch drafted their proposals in the form of a protocol. The distinction w as more significant than mere diplom atic jargon. While the republicans desired a treaty agreem ent m odeled after the Franco-Vietnamese settle­ m ent, w hich w ould have accorded them a status equal to that of the N etherlands governm ent, The H ague balked at such a stip­ ulation, insisting that under Dutch law the N etherlands could conclude a treaty only w ith a foreign pow er. With these fun­ dam ental issues separating the two sides, the talks ended in failure.40 The collapse of the Hoge Veluw e conference resulted largely from internal pressures on the Dutch governm ent. Prime Min­ ister W illiam Scherm erhom 's interim governm ent anxiously aw aited the results o f the first postw ar parliam entary elections, scheduled for M ay 1946. H is extraparliam entary regim e, w hich had been form ed at the request of the queen after the liberation o f Holland in June 1945, could not count on a m ajority in the ^Minute by Edward T. Lambert, May 4,1946, FO 3 7 1 F6598/1/61, PRO. »U .S. Department of State, ORI, Division of Far East Intelligence, "Current Developments in Dutch-Indonesian Relations," Situation Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480.11, June 5, 1946, DSR. *The most informative account of Hoge Veluwe, based on Dutch summary records of the conference, can be found in Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, pp. 61-76. See also Foote to Byrnes, June 5,19 46 , in FR, 1946, 8:826. For the official Dutch explanation for the collapse of the talks, see statement of Logemann in Nether­ lands News Letter, May 10, 1946 (New York: Netherlands Information Bureau), pp. 1-4 .

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States G eneral, nor did it have a popular mandate to deal w ith the sensitive issue of colonial relations. The vehem ent public reaction w ithin the N etherlands to a republic that m any Dutch believed to be Japanese-created com pounded the problem. These dom estic constraints tugged at the Scherm erhom govern­ m ent, severely ham pering its freedom of action.41 Van Mook later suggested that the Dutch "national character, w ith its ex­ cess o f caution and its deficiency of im agination, stood in the w ay o f a large gesture that m ight have given the history of the conflict a turn for the better."42 In the more prosaic w ords of N eville Bland, the Dutch sim ply got "cold feet" and w ere now content to aw ait the outcome of the upcom ing general elections.49 A s a result of those elections, held on M ay 17 , the Scher­ m erhom governm ent w as defeated and Louis J. M. Beel became prim e m inister. Beel quickly named Johannes A . Jonkm ann to replace Logem ann as m inister of overseas territories and pledged a continuation of the previous governm ent's efforts to reach an accommodation w ith the nationalists. Since the new Dutch governm ent w ould not take office until Ju ly 2, the Scher­ m erhom governm ent now assum ed the character of a caretaker regim e. Determined nonetheless to make a final effort to resolve the im passe w ith the Indonesian republicans, Scherm erhom au­ thorized van M ook to present one more offer to the nationalists. This new proposal, w hich van M ook delivered to Sjahrir on M ay 19 , officially expressed the N etherlands' w illingness to accept de facto recognition of the republic's authority in Java, but it in­ sisted that the republic m ust become part of a federated Indone-4 4,U .S. Department of State, ORI, Division of Europe, Near East, and Africa Intelligence, "Netherlands: Campaign for the National Elections," Situation Re­ port—Western Europe, no. 112 1.14 1, April 19, 1946, and "Netherlands: Par­ liamentary Debate on Indonesia," Report no. 112 1.14 3 , May *7» 1946, both in DSR; van Mook, Stakes of Democracy, pp. 2 14 -15 ; Djajadiningrat, Beginnings, pp. 80-93,90-94; Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Government and Politics in the Netherlands during Reconstruction," in Jam es Kerr Pollock, ed., Change and Crisis in European Government (New York: Rinehart, 1947), p. 25; H. Arthur Steiner, "Postwar Government of the Netherlands East Indies," journal of Politics, 9 (November i947):624-5i; Ronald S. Kain, "Netherlands and Indonesia," Yale Review, 36 (December i946):295~96. "V an Mook, Stakes of Democracy, p. 215. "Blan d to Foreign Office, April 30, 1946, FO 371 F6484/1/61, PRO.

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sian state w ithin the Dutch kingdom , m oving eventually tow ard independence after a suitable interim period. This "n e w " approach in effect represented a substantial retreat from van M ook's earlier, unofficial offer. The Dutch rem ained intransi­ gent on the key issue of Sum atra.44 The "present Dutch o ffer," Foote tersely inform ed the State Departm ent, "differs in no im­ portant respects from previous o ffers."45 Predictably, Sjahrir view ed this proposed settlem ent as "a definite step backw ards." Stung by The H ague's rigidity, his governm ent stiffened its ow n minimum dem ands. On June 17 , 1946, Sjahrir issued a bold set of counterproposals that caught the Dutch by surprise. He now called for the enlargem ent o f the republic's de facto authority to encom pass all of Java and Sum a­ tra, including Allied-occupied territory; this response reflected his governm ent's apparent intention to prevent any further landing of Dutch troops. The prim e m inister also suggested that the republic form an alliance w ith, rather than a partnership under, the crow n.46 One Dutch spokesm an im m ediately de­ nounced the Indonesian proposals for their failure to acknowl­ edge The H ague's sovereignty. "It is a serious assault on the basis on which the negotiations have so far been conducted," he storm ed.47With the two parties further apart than ever, renew ed efforts to break the deadlock awaited the organization o f the new ly elected N etherlands governm ent. "The efforts o f the past seven m onths," concluded one State Department assessm ent, "h ave proved fu tile."48 M eanw hile, events w ithin Indonesia w ere rapidly m oving the Dutch-republican negotiations off center stage. O pposition to Sjahrir's policy of diplom asi, seem ingly defeated in M arch, w as strengthened by the crushing diplomatic setback at H oge "W ehl, Birth of Indonesia, pp. 122-23; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 25; Hombeck to Byrnes, June 20,1946, in FR, 1946, 8:830-31. "Foote to Byrnes, May 27, 1946, 856E.00/5-2746, DSR. "M inute by Lambert, June 22,1946, FO 3 7 1 F9574/1/61, PRO; New York Times, M ay 26,1946, p. 15 ; Anderson, Java, p. 381; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 24-25. 40Netherlands News Letter, July 15 ,19 4 6 , p. 2; memorandum by Wilson Young, June 27,19 46, FO 371 F9598/1/61, PRO. "U .S . Department of State, ORI, Division of Research for Europe, "The Beel Governm ent," Situation Report—Northern and Western Europe, no. 112 1.14 6 , July 22,1946, DSR.

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V eluw e. Convinced that the Dutch w ere now preparing to launch a preem ptive m ilitary strike against the republic, a coali­ tion o f key arm y leaders, m ajor political parties, and youth groups dem anded Sjahrir's ouster and insisted that the republic abandon diplom acy for armed struggle. Sjahrir found him self in a paradoxical position. W hile the continued existence of dissi­ dent forces w ithin the republic, according to the Dutch, w as the fundam ental obstacle to a settlement, a m ajor elem ent in Sjah rir's political strength—his acceptability to Dutch political opinion—prevented him from building the solid base o f support w ithin Indonesia that w ould have calmed Dutch suspicions.4* This latest crisis erupted on June 27, w hen a sm all group of radical youths, supported by disaffected arm y officers, boldly kidnapped the Indonesian prim e m inister. Their action back­ fired, how ever, for Sukarno prom ptly declared an em ergency and assum ed all governm ental pow ers for him self, as provided b y the Indonesian constitution. On the evening of June 50 the president m ade a stirring speech on Indonesian radio. Pleading for stability, he insisted that political opposition m ust be orderly and based on democratic principles. The kidnapping of Sjahrir, Sukarno w arned, w ould perm it the Dutch to exclaim to the w orld that Indonesia could not rule itself, and that chaos and disorder prevailed everyw here. H is appeal worked m asterfully: the prim e m inister w as returned the following day and opposi­ tion groups rallied around the governm ent, tacitly agreeing that the policy o f diplom asi w ould be allow ed to continue without further obstruction. With order now restored, Sjahrir quickly consolidated his position, and by October 2 he had form ed his third parliam entary governm ent.90 A t this juncture, w ith the two sides at a virtual im passe, Great Britain decided that only a renewed effort to bring the Dutch and the republicans bade to the bargaining table could avert a com plete breakdow n of relations between the two parties. "The * Anderson, Java, pp. 370-77. *For a detailed examination of the "Ju ly crisis," see ibid., pp. 370-403. See also Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 189-92; Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 123-24; Gilbert MacKereth (British consul general, East Indies) to Foreign Office, July 2,19 4 6 , FO 37 1 F9778/1/61, PRO.

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prolongation o f the present state of tension and the probable outbreak of hostilities could only be disastrous for the Dutch, the Indonesians and o urselves/' one senior Foreign Office offi­ cial noted. "The fact rem ains that failure to reach a political settlem ent before w e leave is almost bound to lead to bloodshed on a large scale."” Several British analysts feared that the Dutch w ere sim ply playing for time; their troops w ere gradually replac­ ing British forces in the Indies and w ould soon be able to act w ithout London's restraining hand. The Foreign Office realized, m oreover, that if fighting did take place after the British w ith­ drew , London w ould be greatly criticized by w orld opinion for its role in the Indies.9 W hitehall's recent decision to evacuate all British and Indian troops from the islands by Novem ber 30, 1946, regardless of developm ents, underscored the urgency of the situation. Attlee sum m arized the problem in a Ju ly 1 letter to Australian Prime M inister Joseph B. Chifley. Both the Dutch proposals of M ay 9 and the Indonesian proposals of June 17 represented a marked retreat from the positions reached w ith such difficulty in A pril, he explained. Unless the two parties could be persuaded to return to those earlier positions, condi­ tions in Indonesia w ould steadily deteriorate, and the British w ithdraw al in Novem ber w ould probably be the signal for bitter fighting.9 In order to get those discussions o ff the ground once m ore, London inform ed The Hague that it w as appointing another experienced British diplom at to fulfill the role of m ediator pre­ viously played by Inverchapel. In m id-August, Lord Killeam , Britain's special com m issioner for Southeast A sia, arrived in Batavia. In a series of talks with the Dutch and the republicans, he im pressed on them the significance o f the imminent depar­ ture of British troops and the consequent urgency of resum ing serious negotiations.94 The United States, which had carefully limited itself to the “ Memorandum by Wilson Young, June 27,1946, FO 371 F9598/i /6i , PRO. “ Ismay to Attlee, June 19 ,19 4 6 , prem 8/263, PRO. “ Attlee to Chifley, July 1,19 4 6 , FO 371 F9684/1/61, PRO. 54Aides-mémoires from British government to Netherlands government, June 29 and July 3,19 4 6 , Offkiele Bescheiden, 6:588,601; Acheson to Hombeck, August 5,1946, in FR, 1946,8:840; Acheson to Foote, August 8,1946, in FR, 1946,8:841-42.

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role o f interested but uninvolved bystander ever since the incep­ tion o f the tripartite discussions in February, w as also disturbed b y the continuing stalem ate. W ashington w as particularly con­ cerned that the lack of appreciable progress in Indonesia w ould lead the Soviet Union to reintroduce the question during the upcom ing session of the United Nations. On A ugust 5 the State Departm ent instructed Am bassador Hom beck to suggest infor­ m ally to The H ague that it take a more conciliatory negotiating position in order to forestall such actions by the Soviets.* This point w as reiterated in a conference with Am bassador Loudon in W ashington the follow ing w eek. During that m eeting, John H ickerson and H ugh Cum m ing of the State Departm ent's Office of European A ffairs inform ed the Dutch am bassador that w hile as individuals they w ere good friends of the N etherlands, they had to tell him in all frankness that they believed The H ague w as "on a bad w icket" in regard to w orldw ide opinion toward the Indonesian dispute. Since M oscow w ould alm ost certainly reintroduce the question at the upcom ing session of the Security Council, the tw o diplom ats pointed out, the Dutch should take "som e constructive action looking to a satisfactory solution" be­ fore that tim e.* These British and Am erican representations helped to break the logjam in Holland. Eager to achieve a settlement before the British w ithdraw al, the new ly organized N etherlands govern­ m ent appointed a commission general on Septem ber 2 to reach an agreem ent w ith the Indonesians. This official body, headed by form er prim e m inister Scherm erhom , w as fully authorized to negotiate a settlem ent w ith the republicans, although any agree­ ment w ould not become valid until it w as approved by the Dutch parliam ent. The appointm ent of the commission general w as definitely a conciliatory gesture; British and Am erican pressure had combined with the more realistic attitude of the Beel governm ent to effect this modification of the Dutch position.17 A s Jonkm ann later explained to Abbot M offat, chief “ Acheson to Hombeck, August 5,19 46 , in FR, 1946,8:840. “ Memorandum by Hickerson of a conversation with Loudon, August 15, 1946, in Box 3, Hickerson Files, Records of the Office of European Affairs, DSR. ^David ]. McCallum (U.S. naval attaché, Batavia) to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), September 8,1946, Naval Attaché Reports File, Naval History Division,

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o f the State Departm ent's D ivision of Southeast A sian A ffairs, the Dutch governm ent w as unw illing to undertake a colonial w ar at this point for both national and international reasons and therefore considered it essential to reach a peaceful agreem ent w ith the Indonesians.” In addition, it m ust be pointed out, most inform ed observers agreed that the Dutch did not yet have the m ilitary capability to embark on an extensive pacification cam paign.” Another hopeful developm ent came w ith the report of the Koets m ission. A t the invitation of the republic, Dr. P. J. Koets, the chief o f van M ook's cabinet, headed a sem iofficial party that undertook an exploratory trip into the center of Java to exam ine the republic's claim that its rule w as secure and that peace and order prevailed throughout the island. To the astonishm ent of the N etherlands governm ent, Koets, the first leadng Dutch offi­ cial to visit the interior since the reoccupation, substantiated the republic's claim s.” "The general picture w e sa w ," explained Koets, "w as that of a society which w as not in the course o f dissolution but w hich is being consolidated."61 K oets's report had a profound effect on Dutch attitudes toward the Indonesian crisis; it contradicted the prevalent notion that the republic w as about to fall apart, that Sjahrir had little support, and that eco­ nomic life had come to a standstill. Walter Foote, the senior Am erican diplom at in the East Indies, related this new developWashington National Records Center, Suitville, Md. (hereafter dted as w n r c ); Weekly Review, prepared by Southeast Asia Division, "Constructive Moves by Dutch in Indonesian Situation," July 31,19 4 6 , in folder labeled "Political Miscel­ laneous," Box 12 , PSA Records, DSR; Netherlands News Letter, August 15 ,19 4 6 , p. 1; van Mook to Jonkmann, September 2,19 46, in Offidele Bescheiden, 5:288-90; Wehl, Birth of Indonesia, pp. 134-35. “ Memorandum by Moffat of a conversation with Jonkmann, November 16, 1946, 856E.00/10-2346, DSR. "Report by Lieutenant General E. C. Mansergh (commander in chief, Allied forces in Netherlands East Indies), "Review of Situation of the Netherlands East Indies on the Conclusion of 'E xod u s,'" October 8,1946, enclosed in Killeam to Foreign Office, October 29,1946, FO 371 F15667/1/61, PRO. “ Wehl, Birth of Indonesia, p. 14 1; Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 42-43. “ Quoted in Wolf, Indonesian Story, p. 42. See also "Report of the Inspection Tour Made by Dr. Koets' Party in the Republican Territory of Java from 15th to 20th of September 1946," enclosed in McCallum to CNO, October 15, 1946, in Naval Attaché Reports File, Naval History Division, wnrc ;Killeam to Foreign Office, September 2 1,19 4 6 , FO 371 F13867/1/61, PRO.

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ment to the State Department: "Speaking w ith great sincerity and considerable enthusiasm , he [Koets] gave his listeners a picture o f a young and dynam ic governm ent fully supported by the great m ass of the population, and of a hard w orking people fired by a new ly acquired sense of national dignity and selfrespect, w ho had m anaged to achieve a remarkable degree of economic prosperity despite appalling handicaps." Foote com­ m ented optim istically that "in the short space o f less than two m onths . . . the situation changed sharply from one of political deadlock and open w arfare to one in which confident diplomatic negotiation is at last undisturbed by the d ash of arm s."*3 Under the chairm anship of Lord Killeam , Dutch-Indonesian negotiations form ally reopened on October 7. Progress now w as rapid. For the first time the Dutch offered to accept the republic's de facto authority in Sum atra, and w ith that central issue re­ solved the talks proceeded sm oothly. On October 14 the two parties took a m ajor step by conducting a truce agreem ent; it provided for the stabilization of existing m ilitary positions and appointed a truce commission com posed of Dutch, Indonesian, and British representatives to supervise the cease-fire. With both sides malting significant concessions, the final m eetings m oved to the m ountain resort of Linggadjati, about fifteen m iles from the d ty o f Cheribon. There, on Novem ber 15 , 1946, the N etherlands and the republic initialed a draft agreem ent. N ego­ tiations had trium phed—at least temporarily— over the threat of force.43 The Linggadjati agreem ent represented a series o f compro­ m ises on the part of both the Indonesian delegation and the Dutch com m ission general. According to the first artide of the agreem ent, The H ague agreed to recognize the republic as exer­ cising de facto authority over both Java and Sum atra—the m ajor stum bling block at Hoge Veluw e. The republicans m ade an equally significant concession by assenting to a federal form of governm ent for the proposed United States of Indonesia “ Foote to Byrnes, October 23,19 46 , 856E.00/10-2346, DSR. “ "Sum m ary of Dutch-Indonesian Talks under Chairmanship of Lord Kil­ leam ," October 7, 1946, in Officiele Bescheiden, 5:502-10; Killeam to Foreign Office, October 15,19 4 6 , in ibid., pp. 547-48; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 28-29.

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(U .S.I.); Borneo and East Indonesia w ere to have the sam e jurid­ ical status as the republic in the new Indonesian state. Another key elem ent in the draft agreem ent w as the provision that any com ponent state o f the U .S.I. w ould have the option to decide by democratic m eans w hen and on w hat terms it w ould join the U .S.I. U nggadjati also provided that the U .S.I. w as to be a sovereign and equal partner in a Netherlands Union—a point the republican delegation had dem anded; but the union w ould be headed by the Dutch crow n, which w ould adm inister areas o f joint interest, such as defense and foreign affairs. Both parties w ere to "cooperate" in the rapid formation of the U .S .I., w hich w as to be form ed no later than January 1,19 4 9 .“ The Dutch conceded a good deal more than they originally intended to, as one Foreign Office official noted, but they "suc­ ceeded in keeping the door open for the maintenance of Dutch influence, interests, and commercial predom inance in the N E I."45 The long delay in the granting of self-governm ent w as particularly puzzling to the British; Bland commented acidly that "the Dutch are slow but I never im agined they w ould be as slow as th at."46N evertheless, he believed that on the w hole the Dutch had m ade real concessions and the Indonesians should trust them. The chief problem with the settlem ent lay in its considerable am biguity; m any of the accord's key sections w ere subject to interpretation, presaging later difficulties. Despite its im perfections—and there w ere m any—U nggadjati w as universally hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough. It w as, in the w ords of Sum ner W elles, "the most encouraging develop­ ment of recent m onths."47 N early everyone on the scene fully realized that if a settlement had not been reached before the British troop w ithdraw al, arm ed conflict w ould alm ost surely MFor the text of the Unggadjati agreement, see "Dutch-Indonesian Draft Agreem ent," November 18 ,19 4 6 , 856D.00/11-1846, DSR; it is reprinted in Wehl, Birth of Indonesia, pp. 146-49. See also van Mook, Stakes of Democracy, pp. 222-24; Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 43-44; W. H. van Helsdinger, "The Netherlands Indonesian Draft Agreem ent," Pacific Affairs, 20 (June 1947>:i 84~87; Economist, November 23, 1946, p. 835. "M inute by Allen, November 18, 1946, FO 371 F17212/1/61, PRO. "Blan d to ForeignO ffice, November 13 ,19 4 6 , FO 371 F16409/1/61, PRO. v New York Herald Tribune, Paris ed., November 27,1946, quoted in Everett F. Drumright (first secretary, U .S. embassy, London) to Allen, November 27,19 46, FO 371 F17357/1/61, PRO.

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have broken out. "C ivil w ar between Dutch and Indonesians w ould have been certain/' commented one British Foreign Office official, "an d this w ould inevitably have spread over a large area o f South East A sia ."* Sim ilarly, van Mook stated em phatically that the only alternative for the Dutch w ould have been w ar.* In contrast w ith the rapidly deteriorating situation in nearby Indochina between the French and the Vietnam ese nationalists, U nggadjati indeed seem ed to represent a hopeful and rational precedent for other im perial pow ers to follow . W ithin days of the initialing of the U nggadjati agreem ent, the final contingent of British troops w ithdrew from the East Indies, term inating in dram atic fashion Britain's m ilitary commitment there. In little over a year, Great Britain had been forced to make decisions that w ould have a monumental impact on the future of D utch-Indonesian relations. A s a result of the abrupt altera­ tion of the wartim e command structure at Potsdam, the British had inherited an operation for which they had been w oefully unprepared. Anticipating a relatively routine assignm ent, Brit­ ish occupying forces instead found them selves embroiled in a bitter and politically explosive colonial conflict. Confronted on the one hand w ith a surprisingly effective and popular govern­ ment of native nationalists dem anding independence and, on the other hand, w ith a friendly wartim e ally that w as unalter­ ably opposed to any negotiations w ith w hat it considered to be a group of traitorous extrem ists, London had been com pelled to tiptoe through a m inefield of conflicting interests. G iven Brit­ ain 's lim ited resources, its urgent need to extricate Indian troops from an entangling colonial conflict, and the pressing na­ ture of its own im perial problem s, London succeeded adm irably in m aintaining an even-handed approach toward the Indone­ sian crisis. By insisting that the Dutch realize that the w ar had irrevocably upset the old colonial relationship and that only a sincere accommodation to Indonesian nationalism could pre­ vent arm ed conflict, and by firm ly and patiently explaining to “ Nash and P. J. Dixon (British delegates to Council of Foreign Ministers, New York) to Dening, November 16, 1946, FO 371 F16579/1/61, PRO. See also Killeam to Foreign Office, November 14 ,19 4 6 , FO 371 F16544/1/61, PRO. 69Quoted in Michael R. Wright (Killeam 's deputy) to Foreign Office, Novem­ ber 17 , 1946, FO 371 F16578/1/61, PRO.

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the Indonesians that a bid for too percent independence w ould be both unrealistic and self-defeating, the British m anaged to bring the two sides face to face, in the process helping to close the im m ense political and cultural gap between them. Inevitably Britain w ound up alienating both parties at various tim es, en­ gendering a particularly spiteful reaction on the part of the Dutch. N evertheless, given the com plexities of its position, Great Britain's accom plishm ents in the East Indies w ere con­ siderable. It is interesting—albeit fruitless—to speculate on the role that Am erican policy m ight have played in the unfolding dram a in Indonesia had the Potsdam transfer not taken place. Linggadjati, as the British keenly realized, represented only a sm all first step tow ard a m eaningful colonial settlement. The possibility that the agreem ent w ould break down and actual w arfare erupt w as ever present; m any British diplom ats even believed w ar likely. W ithin the inner councils of the British gov­ ernm ent, contingencies for an appropriate response to future w idespread fighting w ere considered and debated. While som e policy m akers argued that in such an eventuality Britain m ust be prepared to step in again as m ediator, this w as an unpopular m inority view . With the conclusion o f Linggadjati, m ost British officials w ere eager for a complete extrication from the Indies. Preoccupied w ith more pressing problem s, they desired no further commitment in the area, suggesting instead either joint arbitration w ith the United States or United N ations interven­ tion in case of further trouble. London, then, which had played such a dom inant role in Indonesian developm ents ever since the d ose o f the w ar, w as leaving a significant pow er vacuum in the Indies. O nly one nation had the interest, pow er, and capability to till that vacuum —the United States.

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5 From Negotiations to War: November 1946-Ju ly 1 9 4 7 By 1947/ W ashington's interpretation of the Soviet threat had led to a radical redefinition of Am erican national security in­ terests. This redefinition w ould have a profound effect on the Am erican view of developm ents in far-off Indonesia. N o longer w ould such areas as Southeast A sia and the M iddle East be seen as peripheral to vital Am erican interests; and no longer w ould the United States be content to have the British maintain order and stability in those areas. On the contrary, all international crises w ere now view ed as potentially vital to Am erican security interests. The new doctrine of national security taught that all areas of the globe w ere possible prizes or victim s in the struggle against an expanding Com m unist movement; given the grow ­ ing interrelationship o f w orld events, Am erican leaders ign ored . distant crises only at their peril. The concept of national secu­ rity, according to historian Daniel Yergin, "postulates the interre­ latedness of so m any different political, economic, and m ilitary factors that developm ents halfw ay around the globe are seen to have automatic and direct impact on Am erica's core interests."1 The United States w as extrem ely pleased w ith the lin ggad jati agreem ent. By providing for the peaceful evolution toward na­ tive self-rule w hile m aintaining intact Dutch political, m ilitary, and economic influence in the Indies, it seem ed to conform perfectly w ith Am erican policy objectives for postw ar Southeast A sia. The Departm ent of State congratulated the Dutch and the 1Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 195-96.

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Indonesians on their "high statesm anship" in reaching such an amicable settlem ent. From the outset of the dispute, W ashing­ ton had feared that the cirsis in the Indies might degenerate into full-scale w ar; now that a rational arbitration o f the difficulties had evidently been achieved, it w as greatly relieved.2 Respond­ ing to a request by the British governm ent, on December 17 the State Departm ent issued a polite press release—its first official comment on developm ents in Indonesia in nearly a year— w hich expressed this point of view . The United States govern­ m ent hoped, it pointed out, that the basic principles o f this agreement w ill enable the Dutch and Indonesian people to w ork together and in mutual respect for their w elfare and for the prosperity and stability of Southeast A sia. The evidence of high statesmanship displayed by both Dutch and Indonesian delegations in negotiating the settlement gives promise that the agreement w ill be implemented with continuing regard for the welfare o f the peoples concerned. The United States Governm ent w ill watch with dose interest the m easures undertaken to make this agreement effective and prog­ ress toward the political stabilization and economic rehabilitation o f the Indies w hich w e hope w ill result therefrom.3

Throughout 1946, official Am erican policy toward the Indone­ sian upheaval follow ed the policy developed during the dosing m onths of 1945. W hile not questioning the right of Holland to restore its prew ar rule, the United States indicated on several occasions that it w ould strongly disapprove of any attempt to reassert such control by force of arm s, w hile suggesting, con­ versely, that it w ould w arm ly applaud any movem ent toward self-governm ent in the Indies. W ashington thus sought to main­ tain the appearance o f neutrality, hoping that a nom inally im­ partial stance w ould not alienate either of the concerned parties. A ctually, Am erican "neutrality" w as still w orking to the distinct ’ Memorandum horn Vincent and Hickerson to Dean Acheson, November 27, 1946, in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D .C ., 1971), 8:855-56. Hereafter volum es in this series will be dted as FR, followed by the year. ’ Substance of a telegram from State Department, November 19 ,19 4 6 , FO 37 1 F16881/1/61, Records of the British Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London (hereafter dted as PRO); Foreign Office minute, November 2 1,19 4 6 , ibid.; U .S. Department of State Bulletin, 15 (December 29,1946), 1188.

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advantage o f the Dutch. Not only did the United States refuse to recognize the Republic of Indonesia as an equal party to the dispute—in direct contravention of its vigorous wartim e sup­ port for the principle of self-determ ination—but it also generous­ ly extended lend-lease and surplus-property credits in excess of $100 m illion to the N etherlands, facilitating, at least indirectly, the Dutch effort to reim pose im perial control.4 According to Stanley H om beck, w ho served as Am erican am bassador to Hol­ land during this period, the United States "in effect attem pted to support neither side and yet favored one and hoped not unduly to offend the oth er."5 This policy w as entirely consistent w ith the larger interests of the United States in Southeast A sia. Those interests required, first and forem ost, stability. Failure on the part of the European pow ers to adapt to the dem ands of A sian nationalism , a failure that m ight in turn lead to anachronistic colonial w ars, w as from W ashington's perspective the chief threat to stability in the re­ gion. The m ost hopeful long-range developm ent w ould be the creation of moderate nationalist regim es, m oving gradually to­ w ard self-governm ent within a commonwealth or federation structure, w ith the respective European im perial pow ers main­ taining considerable economic, political, and m ilitary influence in their form er colonies. W hile British actions in Burma and in India generally pleased Am erican policy m akers as they appeared to m ove, how ever haltingly, toward these goals, the intransigence of the French in Indochina w as view ed w ith keen disappointm ent. Am erican policy toward the Philippines, w hich w as form ally granted independence on Ju ly 4 ,19 4 6 , w as again continually upheld as the beacon for other colonial pow ers to follow . Indeed, the postindependence relationship between the United States and the Philippines, in which the United States m aintained its enorm ous influence over virtually all ‘ State-A rm y-N avy-A ir Force Coordinating Committee (swncc), Subcommit­ tee on Far Eastern Affairs, Special Ad Hoc Committee Report on Indonesia, July 22, 1947, in swncc Records, U .S. Department of State Records, National Ar­ chives, Washington, D .C. (hereafter dted as DSR). ’ Stanley K. Hombeck, "The United States and the Netherlands East Indies," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 255 (January 194S):

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aspects o f Philippine society, appears quite consistent w ith Am erican objectives for the region as a whole.* O f course the colonial problem in postw ar Southeast A sia w as an extrem ely com plex and emotional one, and it is not surpris­ ing that there w ere sharp differences within the State Depart­ ment over policy m atters. The m ajor bureaucratic conflict, as during the w ar, w as between the Office of Far Eastern A ffairs and the O ffice of European A ffairs. Members of the form er office generally had a broader understanding of the historical revolt of A sian peoples against W estern colonialism ; according­ ly, they tended to be sym pathetic toward the nationalist m ove­ m ents and regim es in Southeast A sia, believing that native aspirations toward self-governm ent w ere both understandable and legitim ate. A t the sam e time, they tended to be harshly critical of past colonial rule and distrustful o f European pledges o f greater native self-rule. In short, the Office of Far Eastern A ffairs, especially its small D ivision o f Southeast A sian A ffairs, clung to a liberal, anticolonial perspective. The O ffice of Euro­ pean A ffairs w as considerably less sym pathetic to the national­ ists. With little understanding of A sian affairs, policy m akers w ithin this office tended to view A sian events through a Euro­ pean lens. Convinced that the central focus of Am erican foreign policy in the postw ar years w as, as alw ays, W estern Europe, these diplom ats view ed the colonies in Southeast A sia as mere appendages of the European mother countries; they w ere con­ vinced that the rehabilitation and reintegration of W estern Europe w as an overarching goal of Am erican foreign policy in the postw ar years, and considered the European colonies in Southeast A sia as significant only insofar as they could contrib­ ute to the economic recovery of the respective mother coun­ tries. The Europeanists believed that Am erican cooperation w ith the European im perial pow ers, which w as necessary for the ‘ Memorandum from Landon to Vincent, "General Political Situation in South­ east A sia," March 14, 1946, 890.00/3-1446, DSR; memorandum by Cady, "The Importance of the Philippines with Respect to United States Policy in Southeast­ ern A sia," January 2,19 46, and memorandum by Moffat, "The Turning Point in Southern A sia," April 14, 1947, both in folder labeled "Southeast Asia, 19461948, U .S. Policy," Box 5, Records of the Office of the Philippines and Southeast Asian A ffairs, DSR (hereafter dted as PSA Records).

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success o f W ashington's postw ar plans, w ould only be upset by any frivolous m eddling in colonial affairs. W hile these cleavages often led to intense squabbles over poli­ cy, their significance should not be exaggerated. A ctually friere w as more agreem ent than disagreem ent over basic policy goals, and bureaucratic conflict appears to have had little effect on the larger fram ework of Am erican policy toward Southeast A sia during these years. Despite the liberal, anticolonial ideals espoused by so m any members of the Office of Far Eastern A ffairs, none believed that native nationalists w ere prepared for im m ediate independence, nor did any believe that Am erican interests w ould be served by a precipitous rem oval of European influence from that part of the w orld. Indeed, Abbot M offat, head of the Southeast A sian Division and easily one of the most liberal advocates of the nationalist cause within the departm ent, adm itted that the larger aim s o f Am erican policy required "establishing a realistic settlem ent of the problem s of Southeast A sia w ith a view to protecting the security, the interests, and the influence o f the W estern Powers in that section of A sia ." Both Europeanists and A sians, then, agreed that European influence and interests in their colonial territories should be m aintained, and that colonial rule should be liberalized so as to prepare responsible native elites for eventual self-rule and to allow Am erican commerce equal access to the rich colonial m arkets.7 A s long as Great Britain w as m aking the m ajor decisions in the Indies, the United States could afford the luxury of remain­ ing som ewhat aloof from that conflict. A s far as W ashington w as concerned, London w as serving the policy interests of the United States quite w ell w ith its efforts to help negotiate an equitable settlem ent between the Dutch and the Indonesians. W hen the United States could support those efforts by representations tow ard either one or both of the contending parties, it generally did, but in a decidedly low -key m anner. The great advantage of Testim ony of M offat, May 11,19 7 2 , in U .S. Congress, Senate, Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D .C .: U .S. Government Printing Office, 1973); Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 14 8 -50 ,2 17 -19 .

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rem aining on the sidelines w as that it kept the United States out o f yet another vexing international dispute; noninvolvem ent, m oreover, enabled the United States to maintain its leverage and prestige w ith both parties. This position coincided closely w ith a report prepared by the Office of N aval Intelligence in December 1945. "In w orld politics," it had declared, "Britain is sufficiently dependent upon the United States to follow this country's basic objectives."* The British w ithdraw al from the Indies, as their later w ithdraw al from areas of the N ear and M iddle East w ould do, presented W ashington w ith a new set of problem s. The creation of pow er vacuum s in Indonesia and elsew here w ould increasingly be view ed by Am erican policy m akers against the backdrop of the deepening Cold War and w ould inevitably lead to intensified U .S. interest and involve­ ment in those areas. The D utch-Indonesian struggle for control over the East Indi­ an archipelago certainly did not em erge as an overarching con­ cern of Am erican diplom acy at this time. With tension grow ing between the United States and. the Soviet Union over such troublesom e areas as Eastern Europe, Germ any, Iran, and Greece, Am erican policy m akers could hardly be expected to devote an inordinate amount of attention to the Indonesian im­ broglio. On the other hand, Indonesia could not be isolated from other, more central issues. The political and economic sta­ bilization of W estern Europe—one of the most serious of all post­ w ar problem s for the United States—w as inseparably linked to the tum ultuous developm ents in Indonesia and elsew here in Southeast A sia. Until the N etherlands, France, and Great Britain solved their colonial problem s, the economy of the United States, as w ell as that of Europe, w ould be deprived of the key natural resources produced in that region. A report prepared for President Truman in 1947 by the new ly created Central Intelli­ gence A gency em phasized this interrelationship. "O f im portant concern in relation to W estern European recovery," it noted, "is the existing instability in colonial (or form er colonial) areas upon the resources of which several European pow ers (the United 'O ffice of Naval Intelligence, "Basic Factors in World Relations," December 1945, Post World War II Command File, Naval Operational Archives, W ashing­ ton N avy Yard.

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Kingdom , France, and the Netherlands) have hitherto been accustom ed to d e p e n d .. . . The continuance of unsettled condi­ tions hinders economic recovery and causes a diversion of Euro­ pean strength into efforts to maintain or reim pose control by force."* The rehabilitation and reintegration of W estern Europe, the expansion of w orld production and trade, the competition w ith the Soviet Union for the loyalty and resources of the under­ developed w orld—all of those vital concerns of Am erican for­ eign policy w ere directly affected by the upheaval in Indonesia. "W orld politics and international relations," Hom beck observed in 1948, "are a chain-woven fabric. Effective conducting of for­ eign relations calls for constant and skillful correlating of m any strands and lin k s."10 In an increasingly interdependent w orld econom y, one of those crucial links w as the relationship between the needs of the industrialized W estern economies for raw m aterials and the underdeveloped w orld that produced so m any of those essential com m odities. Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, in a m ajor speech delivered before the Foreign Trade Convention on N ovem ber 13 , 1946, warned that an expanding domestic econ­ om y along w ith "the depletion of our natural resources" w ould m ake the United States considerably more dependent on the im portation of raw m aterials and m inerals. He added that m any o f those resources w ould have to come from the new ly em erg­ ing areas o f the w orld. "Because of our dependence upon im­ ports of strategic m etals and m inerals," Clayton em phasized, "w hat happens to Am erican-owned reserves of such m aterials abroad is a matter of national concern."11 'Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States," CIA 1, September 26, 1947, in President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman Library, Indepen­ dence, Mo. 10Hombeck, "United States and the Netherlands East Indies," p. 132. “ William Clayton, "The Foreign Economic Policy of the United States," li.S . Department of State Bulletin, 15 (November 24, i946):590-93. According to a report issued by the President's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy in 1954: "The transition of the United States from a position of relative self-sufficiency to one of increasing dependence upon foreign sources of supply constitutes one of the striking economic changes of our time. The outbreak of World War II marked the major turning point of this change. Both from the viewpoint of our long-term economic growth and the viewpoint of our national defense, the shift of the

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Such concern w as particularly appropriate in the case o f the Dutch East Indies, an area that Hom beck labeled "the w orld's richest island em pire/'*12 Am erican officials continually re­ m inded Dutch and Indonesian representatives that the United States desired the immediate normalization of commercial rela­ tions w ith Indonesia;13 and in its statement of December 17 , the State Departm ent expressed its hope that Linggadjati w ould lead to "the political stabilization and economic rehabilitation o f the In d ies." On several occasions throughout 1945 and 1946, the United States entered into negotiations w ith the N etherlands in an effort to conclude agreem ents that w ould ensure long-term Am erican access to rubber and tin. Dutch officials, how ever, resisted w hat they view ed as W ashington's attempt to reach trade agreem ents overly favorable to its interests.14 Reflecting the deep Am erican economic interest in the East Indies, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson em phasized in a cable of M arch 12 , 1947, that the United States "considers that immediate free and unham pered trade and commerce between N .E .I. and rest of w orld is one of most essential steps to w orld rehabilitation as w ell as to economic rehabilitation of the N .E .I.; that it believes 'open door' policy is an essential predicate o f such free and unham pered com m erce."15 Am erican interest in this regard w as quite direct. Before W orld War II the East Indies had supplied the United States w ith several im portant raw m aterials, notably rubber, tin, copra, United States from the position of a net exporter to that of a net importer is o f overshadowing significance in shaping our foreign economic policies." See the President's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, Staff Papers Presented to the Commission (Washington, D .C .: U .S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 224. On the interdependence of the world economy, see Thomas G . Paterson, SovietAmerican Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Balti­ more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 3-8. 12Hombeck, "United States and the Netherlands East Indies," pp. 124-25. 13See, for example, Foote to Byrnes, March 8 and October 2 1,19 4 6 , in FR, 1946, 8:813, 849-50. MRobert J. Leupold, "The United States and Indonesian Independence, 19441947: An American Response to Revolution," Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Kentucky, 1976, pp. 140-49. 15Acheson to H. Webb Benton (chargé, The Hague), March 12 , 1947, in FR, 1947, 6:905. See also Drumright to Dening, March 3 1,19 4 7 , FO 3 7 1 F4687/45/62, PRO.

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kapok, quinine, and palm oil, but the subsequent political unrest in the Indonesian archipelago had terminated the flow of those essential com m odities, causing alarm in political and business circles.1* Indonesia, in addition, w as the largest source of pe­ troleum in the Far East and possessed vast reserves o f untapped m ineral w ealth. Am erican dependence on certain Indonesian resources is strikingly revealed by a brief glance at prew ar trade statistics. Before the Pacific w ar, the United States relied on the East Indies for approxim ately 32 percent of its rubber needs, 10 percent o f its tin, 90 percent of its quinine, 90 percent of its kapok, 80 percent of its palm oils, and 25 percent of its tea.17 W alter Foote w rote a brief forew ord to a pam phlet published by tiie N etherlands Indies governm ent in which he extravagantly spelled out the importance of these raw m aterials to the United States: Indonesia, richest jewel of the East, where nature is gentle, and lavish in giving us rubber, so that we may ride with ease; vegetable oils for hungry people; fibres for industrial use; kapok for good mattresses and other purposes; tea and coffee over which we may gossip or philosophize; coal and iron for industries; precious soap and many other valuable items, is so important to manufacturing MU .S. Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, "The Economic Situation in Java and Prospective Business Policies," Research and Analysis Report no. 3288, November 2,19 4 5, and "Prelim inary Survey of the Tin and Rubber Industries of Southeast Asia after Four Years of Japanese Occupa­ tion ," Research and Analysis Report no. 3272, October 5, 1945, both in DSR; Office of Strategic Services (OSS), "The Rubber Industry of Southeast Asia: An Estimate of Present Conditions and Anticipated Capabilities," December 18, 1944, Research and Analysis Report no. 2589, DSR; U .S. Department of Com­ merce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Report on Netherlands Indies Rubber Industry, 1946 (Washington, D .C.: U .S. Government Printing Office, 1946) ; P. T. Bauer, "The Prospects of Rubber," Pacific Affairs, 29 (December 1947) :38i-9o; Charles H. Morrell, "The Future of the Netherlands East Indies as a World Economic U nit," Asiatic Review, 42 (July i946):262-6417OSS, "Pre-W ar Petroleum Statistics," Research and Analysis Report no. 1900, A pril 20, 1944, DSR; Netherlands Information Bureau, Facts and Figures (New York, 1948); U .S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Industrial Reference Service, "U .S. Trade with the Nether­ lands Indies in 1940" and "Summary of the Foreign Trade of the United States— Calendar Year 1940" (Washington, D .C .: U .S. Government Printing Office, 1942); "Indonesia: Peace Brings Trade Rebirth," Business Week, M ay 8,1948, pp. 117 -2 0 . 14 5

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industries everywhere that greedy eyes have looked upon it with e n v y.. . . “ In an attem pt to resum e commercial relations w ith the republie, in early 1947 an Am erican firm , the Isbrandtsen Steam ship Com pany, concluded a contract w ith the Perseroan Bank, an organ of the Indonesian governm ent. On February 5 the S .S . M artin Behrman, an Am erican governm ent-owned ship char­ tered to the Isbrandtsen Com pany, arrived at the republican port o f Cheribon to pick up a cargo of rubber, sugar, and other com m odities sought by the Am erican market. The arrival of the vessel in Indonesian w aters marked the first effort to develop direct trade relations between the United States and the republi­ can-controlled areas of the East Indies. One w eek before the M artin Behrman landed, how ever, the N etherlands Indies gov­ ernm ent had published new trade regulations, rendering illegal the export of such commodities from republican ports. In effect, the new im port-export regulations represented an embargo on nearly all of the products that the struggling republic had to seell. Intent on com pleting its lucrative transaction regardless o f the new law , the M artin Behrman defied the Dutch order and proceeded to load its cargo. Dutch officials m oved quickly. On M arch 7 they seized the cargo, placed Dutch soldiers and m arines on the ship, and under a court order began to unload the cargo.1’ There w ere strong protests in the United States about Dutch handling of the M artin Behrman incident. Joseph Curran, head o f the pow erful National Maritime Union, com plained to A ssistant Secretary Clayton that the "unfortunate" seizure readied "the days o f the Tripoli pirates."20 O fficially, the United States conMNetheriands Indies Government Information Service, What's It About in In­ donesia? (Batavia, 1947), p. 2. I9"S .S . 'Martin Behrman' Incident," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 16 (April 20,19 47)720; Marshall to Foote, February 4 and February 6 ,19 4 7, in FR, 1947, 6:896-97; Netherlands News Letter, April 1,19 4 7 , pp. 15 -17 . For the Dutch view of the incident, see Report of Commanding Officer, HMNS Kortenaer: "Report about the S.S. Martin Behrman from February 6,1947, till March 2nd," enclosed in Parke H. Brady (U.S. naval attaché, The Hague) to CNO, April 8,1947, in N aval Attaché Reports File, Naval History Division, Washington National Records Center, Suitville, Md. (hereafter dted as wn rc ). ™New York Times, March 13 ,19 4 7 , p. 55.

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ceded that the N etherlands governm ent "had acted w ithin its legal rights w ith respect to the action taken toward the M artin Behrman and its c a r g o .P r iv a t e ly , the State Department w as appalled by The H ague's apparent reversion to the discrim ina­ tory trade practices of the prew ar years.22 The practical effect of the Dutch regulations, noted new ly appointed Secretary of State George M arshall, w as to "paralyze trade w ith N EI, and to prolong and intensify economic disturbances already resulting from w orld shortages [of] commodities covered by these regulations."23 In private conversations w ith Dutch officials, the State Departm ent sought to arrange a quiet diplomatic adjust­ m ent of the M artin Behrman case, but the larger issues raised by the seizure deeply troubled Am erican policy makers: the Dutch appeared determ ined to deprive the w orld of critical raw mate­ rials that w ere in extrem ely short supply. "This Governm ent has therefore taken the position," wrote Acheson to an angry con­ gressm an, "that these m easures w ill retard the rehabilitation of the Indies and seriously affect w orld political and economic sta­ bilization, and has urged that the regulations be reconsidered."24 Despite Am erican efforts, the Dutch refused to rescind their im port-export regulations; Am erican trade thus continued to suffer. The Am erican economic interest in Indonesia encom passed more than just the desire to secure certain raw m aterials; In­ donesia also served as a significant outlet for Am erican invest­ ment capital. The United States ranked third, behind the “ "S .S . 'M artin Behrman' Incident," p. 720. “ Memorandum from Cumming to Hickerson, February 28, 1947, 656D.006/ 3-114 7, DSR; Benton to Marshall, March 14, 1946, 6560.006/3-1447, DSR. The Times (London) charged the Dutch with "discriminatory trade policies which have paralyzed foreign trade and brought foreign commerce to a virtual stand­ still" (March 26,1947, p. 4). “ Marshall to Benton, March 3,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947,6:899. “ Acheson to Representative Lawrence H. Smith, March 26, 1947, 656D.006/ 3-114 7, DSR. See also Acheson to Benton, March 8,1946, in FR, 1947,6:900-902; Marshall to Foote, May 7,19 4 6 , 656D.006/5-747, DSR; Southeast Asian Division, "Policy and Information Statement: Netherlands East Indies," in folder labeled "N .E .I.: Relations with U .S .," Box 12 , PSA Records, DSR; Drumright to George C . Whitteridge (British Foreign Office), March 5,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F3052/45/62, PRO; U .S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), Division of Research for the Far East, "Current Foreign Trade Situation in Indonesia," Situa­ tion Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480.25, February 12 ,19 4 7 , DSR.

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N etherlands and Great Britain, as a leading investor in the East Indies; Am erican investm ents in Indonesia, m oreover, w ere greater than those in all but one other country in the Far East.25 Som e o f the United States' largest corporations had considerable capital in the rich archipelago, with the Standard-Vacuum Oil C om pany's investm ent of approxim ately $100 million topping the list. The State Department—keenly aw are o f the strategic value of this petroleum —on several occasions expressed deep concern that renewed fighting might endanger Am ericanow ned oil installations.25 A total of thirty-one Am erican com­ panies ow ned Indonesian properties valued before the w ar at about $250 m illion, including the U .S. Rubber Com pany, the G oodyear Rubber Com pany, General M otors, and Procter & Gam ble. M any other Am erican corporations awaited only the stabilization of conditions in Indonesia before they w ould join the rush to exploit the vast, unexplored m ineral resources of the Indies.27 A s Acheson and other Am erican policy m akers often noted, the m aintenance o f open door trading principles w ould be essential to the full developm ent of commercial relations be­ tween the United States and Indonesia.2* For this reason, Am er­ ican officials w ere acutely interested in the economic philosophy of the young Indonesian governm ent. The republic's political m anifesto, which served as the foundation of its economic poli­ cy, declared that the republic w ould pursue a conciliatory eco­ nomic program , encouraging new foreign investm ent and pro­ tecting all existing foreign properties. It stated that Indonesia's raw-m aterial w ealth could make a substantial contribution to international trade and productivity, while the republic, in turn, "U .S . Department of Commerce, Investment in Indonesia, pp. 11- 12 . "B ryn es to Harriman, June 12, 1946, in FR, 1946, 8:826-27; Byrnes to Hornbeck, July 23,1946 , 856E.00/7-2346, DSR. "N etherlands Information Bureau, Indonesia: Facts and Figures (New York, 1948); "Indonesia: Peace Brings Trade Rebirth," Business Week, May 8,1948, pp. 118 -19 ; "Indies Unrest: Cost in Vital O utput," U.S. News and World Report, September 17 ,19 4 8 , pp. 26-27. "A cheson to Benton, M ardi 12 ,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947, 6:905; Marshall to Benton, M ay 16, 1947, in ibid., pp. 924-26; memorandum by Moffat, April 10, 1946, in folder labeled "N .E .I.: Arm s-Surplus Property D isposal," Box 1 1 , PSA Records, DSR; Acheson to Foote, August 12 ,19 4 6 ,656E. 1112/8-1246, DSR; Foote to Acheson, August 20, 1946, 656E. 1112/8-2046, DSR.

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From Negotiations to War: November 1946-July 1947 could benefit from foreign investm ent in its underdeveloped econom y. This m oderate policy w as part of the republic's larger diplom atic strategy; eager to allay suspicions about its potential­ ly "rad ical" character, Indonesia sought to present itself as a responsible regim e intent on safeguarding foreign investm ents and engaging in nondiscrim inatory international commerce. In num erous speeches and interview s throughout 1946 and early 1947, Dr. A . K. G ani, the republic's m inister for economic affairs, reassured all interested parties that his governm ent w anted to attract foreign capital and w ould deal fairly and reasonably w ith all investors.29 Republican representatives re­ iterated this position in several m eetings w ith State Depart­ m ent officers. In one such conference in W ashington, Sutan Sjahsam , the republic's special representative in commercial and economic m atters in the United States, em phasized that the Indonesian Republic w as eager to establish commercial and eco­ nomic relations w ith the United States. He explained that he had found commercial interests in N ew York City eager to trade w ith the republic, but those interests had inform ed him that the resum ption of Am erican trade w as entirely dependent on the attitude of the U .S. governm ent.30 The unsettled conditions in the East Indies thus continued to thwart all efforts to reeestablish commercial relations between the United States and In­ donesia. Great Britain's efforts to reeestablish normal commercial rela­ tions w ith Indonesia w ere also being blocked by the unsettled conditions in the islands and Dutch commercial policies. For the British, w ho w ere suffering from an acute shortage of food­ stuffs, trade w ith the East Indies w as o f particular im portance. The Dutch im port-export law s effectively blocked any such trade; betw een January and March 1947, the Dutch intercepted Brit” Foote to Byrnes, October 2, 1946, in ER, 1946, 8:846-47; Foote to Byrnes, October 25, 1946, 856E.00/10-2546, DSR; New York Times, April 9, 1947, p. 14; Charles Wolf, )r., The Indonesian Story: The Birth, Growth, and Structure of the Indonesian Republic (New York: John Day, 1948), pp. 77-83; John O. Sutter, lndonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940 -19 50,2 vols. (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 1959), 1:310 -12 ,4 8 0 . “ Memorandum by William S. B. Lacy (Southeast Asian Division) of a con­ versation with Sjahsam, April 14, 1946, in Box 3, Hickerson Files, Records of the Office of European A ffairs, RG 59, DSR.

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ish vessels eleven tim es to exam ine their cargoes and confis­ cated all produce subject to those law s. These actions infuriated British officials. The m inister of food attempted to im press on the prim e m inister the urgency of the situation, suggesting that London strongly pressure The H ague into rescinding the regula­ tions. Though larger diplom atic considerations led to the m uting o f British protests over the incidents, Britain's interest in obtain­ ing sugar, fats, vegetable oils, and tea from the Indies rem ained strong and it continued to press for a full restoration of trade relations.31 In order to facilitate the normalization of those relations and sim ultaneously to find an amicable solution to a com plicated colonial dispute, Am erican and British diplom ats pressed both the Dutch and the Indonesians for an early ratification of the U nggadjati agreem ent. The State Departm ent's position w as that the agreem ent represented "an equitable and w orking com prom ise, and that negotiators on both sides deserve the backing o f their respective governm ents." This departm ent m em orandum , concurred in by both the Office of European A ffairs and the Office of Far Eastern A ffairs, w ent on to say: "A failure on either side to ratify this agreem ent, or a protracted delay in ratification, w ill lead to a deterioration in good w ill so severe as to render im possible the resum ption of negotiations." W hile noting that certain sections of the agreem ent w ere ex­ trem ely vague, the memorandum expressed the belief that the unsettled issues w ould be "w orked out w ith m utual good w ill and to the satisfaction of both parties."32 The agreem ent's very vagueness, how ever, enabled the re­ public and the N etherlands to take m arkedly different view s of Linggadjati's m eaning. A fter the settlement w as initialed on N ovem ber 15 , 1946, it w as subjected to an endless series of questions and clarifications between the commission general 31Minutes from minister of food to prime minister, March 8 and April 17 ,19 4 7 , in Prime M inisters' Records (frem )8/596, PRO; memorandum by Treasury on financial and economic policy in regard to Netherlands East Indies, April 18, 1946, in Cabinet Records (CAB) 134/283, PRO; minute from Sir Orme Sargent to Attlee, March 16 ,19 4 6 , frem 8/596, PRO; Minutes of Far East Committee, A pril 23,19 4 7, CAB 134/282, PRO. “ Memorandum from Vincent and Hickerson to Acheson, November 27,19 46, in FR, 1946, 8:853-55. See also Marshall to Foote, January 6 ,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947 6:890.

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and the Indonesian delegation; indeed, Sjahrir w arned at one point that Linggadjati w as in danger of being "buried under interpretive m aterial."33 A t least two m ajor problem s delayed ratification o f the pact. One w as that the agreem ent continually referred to the need for "cooperation" between the Netherlands and the republic— cooperation in form ing the U .S .I., coopera­ tion in the joint problem s of defense, economic affairs, and for­ eign policy—although there w as no indication that m utual m is­ trust and enm ity could be easily overcom e. A s long as each party rem ained suspicious of the other's sincerity and trustwor­ thiness, true cooperation w as im possible. The other central problem w as the federal structure of the proposed U .S.I. This provision, on w hich the Dutch had insisted, called for a federa­ tion to consist of three sem iautonom ous states: the republic, East Indonesia, and Borneo. A s Charles W olf, form erly an Am erican vice-consul in the East Indies, correctly pointed out in 1947, this provision assum ed a "paper equality of areas which are not, cannot and w ill not be equal—econom ically, politically, or culturally." The area of the republic—Java and Sum atra— contained about 85 percent of the total Indonesian population, "an d at least the sam e percentage of the educated W esternized intellectual gro u p ." W olf added: "Before the w ar they accounted for betw een four-fifth and nine-tenths of the total export and im port trade of the w hole Indonesian archipelago."34 Unable to reconcile conflicting interpretations of the agree­ m ent, the two parties looked to its arbitration clause for a peace­ ful adjustm ent o f those difficulties. With each side harboring a considerable am ount of skepticism , w hile at the sam e time issuing the obligatory professions of goodwill, the Dutch and republicans ratified Linggadjati on March 2 5 ,1947.35 In the sober view of the British consul general in Batavia, the agreem ent w as # 33Quoted in David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London: George Allen & Un­ w in, 1948), p. 158. MWolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 44-45. See also Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, i960), pp. 30-33; George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 196-98. For a detailed analysis of the federal question, see A . Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945-1949 (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1955). *K ahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 198; Wolf, Indonesian Story, p. 46; New York Times, March 26,1947, p. 14; statement of Sjahrir, in United Nations Secur­ ity Council, Official Records ( sc o r ) , id y r„ m th meeting, August u , 19 4 7 , p. 1999 .

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signed "o n ly just in time to prevent the w hole Dutch m ili­ tary machine being set in m otion."16 W ashington prom ptly ex­ pressed to van M ook and Sjahrir its gratification w ith the signing o f the Linggadjati agreem ent and urged its prom pt im plem enta­ tion. On A pril 3 the United States officially recognized the re­ public's de facto jurisdiction over Java and Sum atra.37 W hen pressed by The H ague for a clarification of its recognition state­ m ent, the State Department assured the Dutch that its m essage w as draw n in consonance w ith the Linggadjati agreem ent and w as in no w ay intended as a derogation of Dutch sovereignty over the East Indies.18 Great Britain, Australia, India, China, and several Arab states also recognized the republic's de facto sovereignty at this tim e.18 N evertheless, the basic issues dividing the Dutch and republi­ cans—issues that Linggadjati attempted to skirt—persisted. "The signing of the Linggadjati agreem ent," explained one State Departm ent report, "does no more than to ease tensions be­ tween the two parties slightly and make further negotiations possible. In essence both the Indonesians and the Dutch cling to their original view poin t."40 W hether Linggadjati w ould w ork or not, departing am bassador Hom beck explained to Presi­ dent Trum an, rem ained "problem atic."41 Talks regarding im ple­ mentation of the accord made little progress during A pril and M ay, and observers noted a perceptible hardening of attitudes. The republicans objected to the N etherlands' interpretation of federalism ; they charged the Dutch w ith attem pting to set up "puppet states" in East Indonesia and Borneo which w ould re­ m ain under nom inal Dutch control. Those actions contravened both the letter and the spirit of Linggadjati, contended the re-* *GiIbert MacKereth to Foreign Office, March 19,1947, FO 3 7 1F3788/45/62, PRO. ^Acheson to Foote, April 3 ,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947, 6:912. *Acheson to Herman Baruch (ambassador in Netherlands), April 18, 1947, 856E.01/4-1847, DSR; Acheson to Benton, April 9, 1947, in FR, 1947, 6:916; Drumright to Allen, April 9 ,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F5036/45/62, PRO. *Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 33. «U .S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for the Far East, "Recent 'Developm ents in the Netherlands-Indonesian Conflict," Situation Report— Southern Areas, no. 3480.28, March 26,1947, DSR. 4,Memorandum by Hombeck of a conversation with Truman, March 3 1,19 4 7 , in folder labeled "Letters to President Trum an," Box 417, Hombeck Papers; memorandum from Hombeck to Truman, March 3 1,19 4 7 , in ibid.

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public, since the Dutch w ere acting unilaterally in those areas w hereas the agreem ent had specifically called for Dutch-repub­ lican cooperation. Republican suspicions w ere further aroused w hen they discovered that high-ranking Dutch officials w ere clandestinely fostering a secessionist m ovement in W est Java in an apparent attempt to w eaken the republic from w ithin. According to the republic, these Dutch actions fitted a distinct pattern: the N etherlands, it believed, w as pursuing a policy of "divide and ru le" in a deliberate effort to reim pose colonialism in the East Indies. In addition, the republic accused the Dutch of innum erable truce violations and vehem ently objected to their im port-export law s, w hich, even after the signing of the U ng­ gadjati agreem ent, im posed a virtual embargo on all republican trade.42 The H ague m ade some equally vociferous accusations. The republic, countered the Dutch, displayed no w illingness to abide by the term s of the U nggadjati pact. The chief Dutch grievance w as that the republic had begun to conduct an inde­ pendent foreign policy. The expansion of the Indonesian gov­ ernm ent's foreign relations—sym bolized by the activities of H adji A gus Salim , the republic's vice-m inister for foreign affairs, w ho opened a diplomatic headquarters in Cairo and attempted to im prove the republic's international standing—particularly irked N etherlands officials. The Hague believed that either the republic did not com prehend the subtle distinction between de. facto and de jure recognition or it w as intent on creating an international reputation for itself as an entity apart from the projected U .S.I. This action, along w ith repeated republican truce violations, prom pted the Dutch to question the sincerity of the republic's commitment to the terms of the U nggadjati agree­ m ent. With no sign of the m utual goodw ill and cooperative spirit dem anded by U nggadjati, yet another deadlock seem ed im m inent.43 H . L. H irschfeld, economic adviser to Prime M inis«U .S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for the Far East, "PostLinggadjati Developments in Indonesia," Situation Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480.29, April 9, 1947; Wolf, Indonesian’Story, pp. 106 -12; statement by Sjahrir, scon, 2d yr., 184th meeting, August 14 ,19 4 6 , pp. 1999-2000. «S. Pinckney Tuck (U.S. Embassy, Cairo) to Marshall, April 22,19 4 7, 756.83/ 4.2247, DSR; Hubertus ). van Mook, The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia (New York: Norton, 1950), pp. 224-25.

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ter Beel, revealed to a British diplom at on M ay 20 that further talks w ith the republic w ere futule because it w as playing for tim e, w hich the Dutch could not afford. In addition to the ex­ pense of m aintaining their m ilitary forces, he lam ented, the N etherlands w as "suffering a terrific financial drain in foreign exchange" because exports horn the East Indies w ere totaling less than half its im ports.44Som e leading Dutch politicians began to dem and m ilitary action.49 The British view ed these Indonesian developm ents w ith m ounting apprehension. On M ay 15 George C . W hitteridge of the British Foreign Office inform ed Am erican representatives that the Dutch and the Indonesians had reached a virtual stale­ m ate. He feared that unless Beel and Jonkm ann w ere able to exercise some m oderation, Indonesia might very w ell turn into another Indochina. "Such a developm ent w ould be disastrous," W hitteridge w arned, "and particularly so to Britain which is m ost anxious to have peace and am ity restored, and Indonesia opened to foreign trade so that Britain m ay obtain from Indone­ sia certain alm ost desperately needed products."46 A t a m eeting o f the cabinet on M ay 20, Prime M inister Attlee revealed that he w as increasingly disturbed by the recent re­ ports from Indonesia. N egotiations seem ed to be m aking little progress, he noted, and there w as now some reason to suspect that the Dutch m ight resort to force, an action that w ould am ount to a w ar of reconquest. "The political and economic consequences for u s," Attlee said, w ould be so serious that w e should spare no effort to dissuade the Dutch from adopting such a policy. Politically, w e should be criti"M em orandum of a conversation between F. C. Everson (British Em bassy, Washington) and M offat, Schnee, and Landon, M ay 23, 1947, 856D.00/5-2347, DSR. "Jo h n L. M. Mitcheson (British consul general, Batavia) to Foreign Office, FO 3 7 1 F373/45/62, PRO; U .S. Armed Forces, Pacific Command, Weekly Intelligence Digest, May 23, 1947, Naval Operational Archives, Naval History Divison, Washington N avy Yard; Lewis W. Douglas (ambassador to Great Britain) to M arshall, M ay 2 1,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947,6:927-28; Baruch to Marshall, M ay 10 ,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947,6:921-22. "M em orandum by Drumright of a conversation with Whitteridge, M ay 15 , 1947, 856D.00/5-1547, DSR. For a similar view regarding Britain's important economic stake in Indonesia, see Douglas to M arshall, June 11,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947, i:756-57-

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From N egotiations to War: November 1946-Ju ly 19 4 7 d zed for having made such a situation possible by keeping British forces in the Dutch East Indies until Dutch troops could be brought in; and an armed conflict between the Dutch and the Indonesians w as also bound to disturb our ow n relations with native popula­ tions throughout South-East A sia. Economically, a w ar of recon­ quest w ould delay for years the developm ent of food exports from die Dutch East Indies which w e w ere anxious to encourage in order to reduce our dependence on hard-currency countries.

M em bers o f the British governm ent, he stressed, w ere virtually unanim ous in believing that "strong pressure" m ust be brought to bear on the Dutch to induce them to reach an early agreem ent and put aside thoughts of using force. To this end, Foreign M inister Bevin suggested that W ashington be asked to act in concert w ith London to forestall an outbreak of hostilities in the Indies. The United States had considerable leverage w ith the N etherlands, he rem arked, since the Dutch badly wanted dol­ lars for rehabilitation in Indonesia.47 On M ay 2 1 Attlee summoned Dutch Am bassador Jonkheer E. M ichiels and told him that in London's view a resort to m ilitary force in the Indies w ould have disastrous consequences. A ny attem pt to destroy the republic, Attlee argued, w ould plunge the Dutch into a long and exhausting m ilitary cam paign w ith little likelihood of success; it w ould also alienate foreign opinion and m ight w ell bring about intervention by a third pow er or the United N ations. On the same day, Attlee instructed the Foreign O ffice to relay to the United States Britain's pessim istic appraisal o f the Indonesian stalem ate and to explore w ith W ashington possible m easures to cope w ith the crisis.4* The United States also began to take a more serious view of the D utch-Indonesian im passe at this juncture. This heightened sensitivity to developm ents in Indonesia w as due in part to the grow ing possibility of outright m ilitary confrontation there. Re­ ports from the U .S. m ilitary attaché in The Hague repeatedly ^ C A B 128/48, M ay 20,19 47, PRO; minute from Bevin to Attlee, M ay 20,1947, FO 371 F7032/45/62, PRO. “ Record of prime m inister's conference with Dutch ambassador, May 2 1, 1947, FO 371 F7092/45/62, PRO; Douglas to M arshall, M ay 23, 1947, 856E.00/ 5-2347, DSR.

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stressed the possibility of a Dutch m ilitary offensive, and in a conference w ith members of the A rm y's Intelligence D ivision, the Am erican naval attaché in the N etherlands reported that the Dutch had no doubt of their ability to win a quick victory in Java, and "w ere m erely w aiting for an OK from the US before starting their o ffen sive." These reports, especially in the w ake of the British troop w ithdraw al, deeply disturbed Am erican officials. A s a mem orandum by the A im y Intelligence Division pointed out, a Dutch resort to force w ould have disastrous conse­ quences. It "w ould result in a stalemate from which the Dutch could not extricate them selves"; in addition, it w ould probably destroy the current moderate Indonesian leadership, bring ex­ trem ists and com m unists into pow er, and lead to scorched-earth tactics that w ould adversely affect the economic rehabilitation of the Indies for years.4* The grow ing interest in Indonesia at this time also reflected the larger fram ework of Am erican global objectives as the Cold War intensified. President Trum an's containment speech of March 12 ,19 4 7 , represented a landm ark in postw ar U .S. foreign policy, as he declared his nation's resolve to contain the spread of communism. Although carefully couched in a specific request for congressional m ilitary aid for the tottering regim e in Greece and the financially pressed governm ent of Turkey, the Trum an Doctrine, as this policy came to be known, w as proclaim ed in unm istakably universalist language. "A t the present moment in w orld h istory," the president declared, nearly every nation must choose between alternative w ays of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One w ay of life is based upon the w ill of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative governm ent, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second w ay of life is based upon the will of a m inority forcibly im posed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the *W ar Department memorandum, "The Situation in Southeast Asia as It Affects the Availability of Strategic Raw M aterials," June 1947, in folder labeled "Southeast A sia, 1946-1948, U .S. Policy," Box 5, PSA Records, DSR.

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Front N egotiations to War: November 1946-Ju ly 19 4 7 suppression of personal freedom s. I believe that it m ust be the policy o f the United States to support free people w ho are resisting attem pted subjugation b y armed minorities or by outside pres­ sures.90

W ith relations between M oscow and W ashington progres­ sively deteriorating, Truman believed that the alarm ist rhetoric o f his containment speech w as needed to gain the dom estic support necessary to implement his program and to prepare his nation for an expansion of Am erican global commitments. The entire w orld w as a battleground, he im plied, between the forces o f com m unism and the forces o f the "free w orld ." Soon after the announcem ent o f the Truman Doctrine, Am erican policy mak­ ers began to form ulate plans to aid Europe's economic recovery. This com plem entary program , which became known as the M arshall Plan, sought to revitalize the economies of the W estern dem ocracies in an effort to create a bulwark against commu­ nism — especially the threat posed by the grow ing popularity o f Com m unist parties in the W estern European countries, w hich, the Trum an adm inistration believed, w ould exploit continued econom ic chaos.51 The Am erican response to the grow ing tension in the East Indies can be understood w ithin this larger context. Trum an proclaim ed that Am erica w as engaged in a w orldw ide struggle w ith an international Com m unist movem ent directed by the Soviet Union; each area o f the w orld, and especially those that threatened to explode into arm ed conflict that Com m unists m ight exploit, thus took on added significance for the architects o f U .S. foreign policy. M oreover, the central focus of that policy w as the rehabilitation o f the W estern European nations, and since the economic recovery of the N etherlands so heavily de­ pended on a return to full production in the East Indies, W ashington could ill afford to ignore the continuing political disturbances in Indonesia. By m id-1947, then, the Dutch-InKPublic Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington: U .S. Gov­ ernment Printing Office, 1963), pp. 178-79. ’’ Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1973 (New York: W iley, 1976); pp. 50-63; Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 174-234; Yergin, Stuttered Peace, pp. 274-335; Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 7 0 -114 ,15 1-2 0 0 .

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donesian clash w as being cast in a new light. Although still not an area of prim ary interest to the United States, Indonesia— because o f its interrelationship w ith critical Cold W ar issues— w as rapidly being elevated to the status of a m ajor w orld problem .“ Reflecting this increased interest, on M ay 16 George C . M ar­ shall, now secretary of state, instructed Herman Baruch, the new Am erican am bassador to The H ague, to present an aidemémoire to the Dutch Foreign Office detailing the Am erican position. M arshall explained in his cable to Baruch that the United States had been giving serious consideration to develop­ m ents in Southeast A sia. "Strong nationalist m ovem ents throughout [the] area are not isolated phenom ena of concern to [a] few colonial pow ers o n ly," he rem arked. On the contrary, the outcome o f such struggles "w ill have [a] profound effect on [the] future [of the] w orld ," since the area is "strategically lo­ cated athw art [the] Southwest Pacific and [is] of [the] greatest economic im portance." Therefore, the United States had a spe­ cial concern in regard to the future of Southeast A sia. M arshall expressed apprehension about the leaning of those nationalist m ovem ents toward "pan-A siatic" or "totalitarian" philosophies; "a s either trend w ould be contrary [to the] interests [of the] W estern dem ocracies," the United States believed that "every effort should be m ade [to] persuade [the] peoples [of] Southeast A sia voluntarily [to] seek association w ith [the] W estern dem o­ cratic p o w ers." The United States w as "convinced [that] such voluntary association [was] essential [to] w orld political and eco­ nomic stability."” Turning his attention specifically to Indonesia, the secretary o f state noted that the Am erican governm ent had hoped that the BThat Indonesia was generally regarded as a problem in relation to the issue of European reconstruction and not within the context of a developing Afro* Asian revolt against Western domination was suggested to me in several inter­ view s with former State Department officials: with Abbot M offat, Novem ber 14, 1975; with Frederick Nolting (of the Division of Northern European A ffairs and desk officer for the Netherlands, 1945-49), May 1, 1975; with Charlton Ogbum (of Division of Southeast Asian Affairs), May 2 ,19 7 4 ; with Jam es Barco (of the Division of United Nations Affairs), May 7 ,19 7 5 . “ Marshall to Baruch, M ay 16 ,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947, 6:924.

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N etherlands w ould w ork peaceably w ith the Indonesians to m ake an arrangem ent that w ould meet the "natural aspirations" of both the Indonesians and the Dutch. Accordingly, the United States learned of the Linggadjati signing with "profound plea­ su re ." W hile expressing optimism that the political aspects of the agreem ent w ould be w orked out, M arshall w as particularly concerned about "resolving conflicting economic interests." The United States, M arshall reiterated, believed "that [the] immedi­ ate opening o f trade and commerce throughout [the] NEI [on a] non-discrim inatory basis" w as the "first and most im perative step in stabilizing political and economic conditions and in re­ habilitating [the] Indonesian econom y." The State Department considered trade essential, not only as a m eans of strengthening the m oderates in the republic, but also as an inducem ent to the investm ent o f foreign capital. M arshall repeated the United States' interest in republican economic policies, noting that the State Departm ent insisted that foreign capital must be treated "fairly and reasonably." He concluded this frank m essage by instructing Baruch to inform Dutch officials that the United States w as w illing to meet w ith Dutch and Indonesian repre­ sentatives in an effort to aid the "econom ic rehabilitation of Indonesia on foundations which w ill strengthen [the] mutual respect and voluntary association [of the] Dutch and Indonesian p eo p les."54 A s Bevin had pointed out, W ashington's leverage w ith The H ague w as considerable; heavily dependent on Am erican aid, the Dutch could hardly ignore pressure—or friendly advice— from its principal ally. In late 1945, for exam ple, the ExportIm port Bank had authorized a $100 million loan for the Nether­ lands East Indies, but at the request of the State Department the agreem ent w as not concluded because of the uncertainties of the colonial revolt. In its telegram to Baruch, the departm ent in­ structed him to rem ind the Dutch Foreign Office that the nature of any economic and financial arrangem ents between the N etherlands and Indonesia w ould naturally be "one im portant factor" in determ ining whether the loan w ould ultim ately be “ Ibid., pp. 924-26.

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approved. The injection of the aid issue at this critical stage undoubtedly served as a forceful rem inder to the Dutch that the United States could use the lever o f economic assistance as a diplom atic w eapon w hen it so desired. A w are now that the United States, as w ell as Great Britain, w ould look on a m ilitary offensive w ith great disfavor, the N etherlands m ade another effort to reach a diplomatic accom­ m odation w ith the republic. On M ay 2 7 ,19 4 7 , the com m ission general presented Sjahrir w ith a fresh set of Dutch proposals. This new plan attem pted to solve the key issue of sovereignty by calling for de jure Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia until Janu­ ary 1 , 1949. Until that date, Indonesia w ould be ruled by an interim governm ent that w ould be largely dom inated by the Dutch, w ith a representative of the Dutch crown having juris­ diction over all final decisions. This interim regim e w as to be endow ed w ith extensive pow ers; it w ould supervise the incor­ poration of the federated states into the proposed U .S .I., and w ould control the foreign commerce of Indonesia pending the creation of that sovereign state on January 1 , 1949. The Dutch also called for the establishm ent o f a joint police force, com­ posed of an equal num ber of Dutch and Indonesian troops, w hich w ould be responsible for m aintaining law and order throughout the archipelago during the transition period, even in the republican-controlled areas. The N etherlands further speci­ fied that the republic w ould not have the right to conduct its ow n foreign relations.® The net effect o f the M ay 27 proposals w as to dim inish signifi­ cantly the position and role of the republic in the federal struc­ ture during the transition period. M oreover, the tone of the Dutch m essage w as unm istakably aggressive; The H ague de­ m anded a reply w ithin two w eeks.® Republican leaders realized that it w as intended to be, as van Mook intim ated to a British MThe Dutch proposals are repinted in Wehl, Birth of Indonesia, pp. 19 1-9 7. “ Ibid.; Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 118 -20 ; Secretary of State's weekly sum­ mary, June 9, 1947, DSR; U .S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for the Far East, "Dutch-Indonesian Notes of M ay and June 1947," Situation Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480.33, June 16 ,19 4 7 , DSR; Wehl, Birth of Indone­ sia, pp. 191-9 7.

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diplom at, an ultim atum , and that their options w ere now sharp­ ly lim ited: they could either accept H olland's harsh terms or prepare for w ar.57 The N etherlands hoped that London and W ashington w ould agree that the Dutch offer w as essentially reasonable, and that if it w ere carried out it w ould be equitable and fair to both sides; if they did, they m ight then express this view to the republic and urge republican leaders to com ply w ith the ultim atum .9* The British governm ent did find the Dutch proposals "to be on the w hole sound and sensible" and conveyed this opinion to the State Departm ent in an aide-mémoire dated June 4. Its com­ m uniqué reiterated Great Britain's desire for a rapid im ple­ m entation o f the Linggadjati agreem ent, stressing that Britain's economic interests dem anded an early resum ption of commer­ cial relations w ith Indonesia. The British governm ent, it contin­ ued, intended to approach the republic to recommend prom pt acceptance o f the Dutch plan, and w ondered if the United States w ould be w illing to undertake a sim ilar approach." The State Departm ent, w hile displeased that the Dutch pro­ posals w ere presented in the form of an ultimatum, nevertheless believed that the M ay 27 offer presented a "tim ely and valuable opportunity [to] achieve [the] essential step forw ard tow ards attaining [the] objectives contemplated [by] Linggadjati." Fol­ low ing the British suggestion, Acting Secretary of State Acheson directed Consul General Foote to inform the republic that the U .S. governm ent believed that the Dutch proposals "have been offered in good faith in [an] effort [to] implement Linggadjati," and that the "Republic w ould be w ell advised to respond prom ptly in [a] spirit o f good faith and com prom ise, thus ^Memorandum by Schnee of a conversation with Everson, Nolting, and Landon, M ay 29,1947, in FR, 1947,6:933; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 206-7. “ Memorandum by Schnee of a conversation with Landon and Helb, May 29, 1947, in FR, 1947, 6:933-34; Baruch to Marshall, June 3, 1947, in ibid., p. 936; Douglas to M arshall, June 4 ,19 4 7, in ibid., pp. 938-39. “ Aide-mémoire from British Embassy to Department of State, June 4 ,19 4 7, in ibid., pp. 939-40; aide-mémoire from British Embassy to Netherlands Foreign Office, June 4 ,19 47, FO 3 7 1 F7609/45/62, PRO; Mitcheson to Foreign Office, June 7 ,19 4 7 , FO 3 7 1 F7684/45/62, PRO.

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dem onstrating [the] sincerity [of] pledges undertaken [at] Linggadjati."“ W hen Acheson inform ed the Dutch o f the State Departm ent's action, they expressed deep appreciation for this Am erican assistance." M eanwhile, the Dutch dem ands w ere denounced by m ost m ajor republican political and m ilitary leaders. Sjahrir under­ stood that the Dutch w ere prepared to use m ilitary force, but he also realized that a complete acceptance of the hum iliating Dutch offer w ould have been tantamount to political suicide.. Consequently, he attem pted to go as far as he could tow ard m eeting the Dutch ultimatum without risking his ow n dom estic base of support. On June 8 he assured the Dutch com m ission general that the republic w ould accept the principle o f an in­ terim governm ent, but he attached so m any qualifications and conditions to the Dutch proposals that his reply am ounted to a virtual rejection o f them ." Angered by this ploy, the Dutch found his counterproposals "u n satisfactory."" "O ne should not trust those so-and-sos one yard ," van Mook confided to British Consul General M itcheson." Alarm ed by this sudden turn of events, and sensing crisis, the British Foreign Office on June 14 and again on June 16 urged the Dutch to exercise restraint and moderation in reacting to the republican counteroffer. By resorting to force, the Foreign O ffice w arned, the N etherlands "w ould forfeit the good w ill o f a ll."" Sim ultaneously, Britain proposed that the United States and Great Britain offer to m ediate the Dutch-Indonesian d isp u te." “ Acheson to Foote, June 5, 1947, in FR, 1947, 6:941-42; memorandum from Vincent and Matthews to Acheson, June 5,19 4 7, 856D.00/7-547, DSR. 61Memorandum by Schnee of a conversation with Loudon, von Vredenburch, Helb, Hirschfeld, Acheson, and others, June 6,19 4 7, in FR, 1947,6:945. “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 207; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 36; Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 12 1-2 2 . “ Foote to Marshall, June 10 ,19 4 7, in FR, 1947,6:946; Baruch to Marshall, June 10 , 1947, in ibid., pp. 946-47; Foote to Marshall, June 13 , 1947, in ibid., pp.

947^ -48.

“ Mitcheson to Foreign Office, June 8 ,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F7777/45/62, PRO. “ Foreign Office to Bland, June 14, 1947, and Bevin to Bland, June 16 , 1947, both in FO 371 F7584/45/62, PRO. “ Aide-mémoire from British Embassy to Department of State, June 16 ,19 4 7 , 856E.01/6-1647, DSR; Foreign Office to Inveichapel, June 16 ,19 4 7 , FO 3 7 1 F7584/ 45/62, PRO.

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A lthough the proposal w as endorsed by the offices of both European and Far Eastern A ffairs, President Truman rejected joint m ediation and instead instructed the State Department to com m unicate directly to both the Dutch and the republicans that the U .S. governm ent hoped "that they w ill continue in their efforts peacefully to settle their differences."67 On the follow ing d ay, the State Departm ent rem inded the Dutch "that the use of m ilitary force w ould not be regarded favorably by this Govt, w ould arouse serious adverse reaction [of] US public opinion, and w ould be self-defeating in purpose."“ A t the same time, the ‘ State Departm ent urged the republicans to resum e negotiations im m ediately on the basis of the N etherlands' M ay 27 pro­ posals.“ Realizing that the im passe w as fraught w ith danger and m indful of British and Am erican pressure, Sjahrir again tried to d o se the gap between the Dutch and republican positions. On June 20 he offered to accept the Dutch concept of the interim governm ent, induding recognition of the de jure position and special pow ers of the crow n's representative. Although these w ere m ajor concessions, the Dutch commission general re­ m ained unsatisfied and sum m arily broke off talks. On June 23 The H ague dispatched an aide-mémoire to the republic, again urging total compliance w ith its offer of M ay 27. Sjahrir con­ sidered his proposal o f June 20 to be the republic's maximum com prom ise; yet, to his dism ay, it w as not enough for the Dutch and far too much for m any of his republican supporters. When the m agnitude o f Sjahrir's concessions w as revealed in Indone­ sia, m ost of the m ajor political parties began to w ithdraw their support. H is position now untenable, Sjahrir resigned on June 27.70 In an effort to bring the two parties back to the bargaining ^Memorandum by Marshall, June 16 ,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947, 6:948; Inveichapel to Foreign Office, June 17 ,19 4 7 , FO 371 F8129/45/62, PRO. "M arshall to Baruch, June 17 ,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947, 6:950. "M arshall to Foote, June 17, 1947, in ibid., pp. 950-51; Marshall to Truman, June 18, 1947, President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. ’"Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 207-8; Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 122 24. See also Foote to Marshall, June 20 and June 25, 1947, both in FR, 1947,

6:955-58.

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table, the United States transm itted a strongly w orded aidemémoire to the republic on June 28. "This G o vt," it read, "h as view ed w ith increasing alarm the danger inherent in failure to im plem ent the Linggadjati A greem ent." The United States "m ust necessarily be concerned with developm ents in Indonesia because of the im portance of Indonesia as a factor in the w orld 's stability, both economic and political." W ashington urged the Indonesians to assent to the immediate formation of an interim governm ent and to accept Dutch sovereignty during the pro­ posed transition period. "In our reading of [the] Linggadjati A greem ent," the aide-mémoire continued, "it is d ear a transi­ tion period w as envisaged (between now and Jan 1949) during w hich N eth retains sovereignty and ultimate authority in Indonesia."71 A ctually, this reading is not supported by the lan­ guage of the Linggadjati pact; in fact, the idea that the Dutch w ould retain ultimate authority during the transition period appeared for the first time in The H ague's ultimatum o f M ay 27. The Am erican m essage led republican leaders, in the w ords of one historian, to "conclude that the United States, w hile anxious to avoid the outbreak of full-scale w ar in Indonesia, w as backing the Dutch as against the Republic. Thus, they felt the strength of their political position vis-à-vis the Dutch w eakened because of this obvious Am erican backing of som e of the m ost im portant of the Dutch dem ands."72 The aide-mémore conduded w ith an offer of financial aid and assistance in the rehabilitation of In­ donesia, after the interim regim e had been set up along m utual­ ly cooperative lines. The N etherlands, not surprisingly, w as ex­ trem ely grateful to the United States for this tim ely display of support.73 A t this point Abbot M offat, head of the State Departm ent's Southeast A sian Division, succinctly sum m arized Am erican policy objectives in Indonesia in a memorandum o f Ju ly 8 ,19 4 7 . "The objective of the United States," he stated, "is to secure a 71Marshall to Foote, June 26, 1947, in FR, 1947, 6:959-60; Marshall to Baruch, June 26, 1947, in ibid., pp. 960-61; Baruch to Marshall, June 30, 1947, 856E.01/ 6-3047, DSR. The American aide-mémoire is reprinted in Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 180-81. 77Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 209. ’’ Baruch to M arshall, June 29,1947, in FR, 1947,6:963-66; Foote to M arshall, in ibid., p. 967; White House daily summary, July 2,19 4 7 , DSR.

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From Negotiations to War: November 1946-July 1947 settlem ent of the present Indonesian situation which w ill meet the natural aspirations of Indonesian nationalism and, at the sam e tim e, preserve so far as possible for the N etherlands the economic strength which she derives from association w ith the In d ies." Linggadjati, he noted, appeared to fulfill that objective, as it provided for a Dutch-Indonesian partnership. Accordingly, the United States had pressed both parties for a prom pt im ple­ m entation of the Linggadjati settlement for political, economic, and strategic reasons. Politically, he argued, such a solution w as of great im portance to the United States because Indonesia, w ith its seventy m illion people, w as an integral part of Southeast A sia—a region that contained one-quarter of the w orld's population, and w hich since World War II had been successfully revolting against colonial status. The "achievem ent o f national­ ist aspirations and voluntary association w ith one o f the West­ ern dem ocracies," he wrote, "w ould be an im portant factor in m aintaining friendly relations between these em erging coun­ tries and the W est." O therwise, M offat w arned, Southeast A sia's opposition to W estern colonialism and im perialism m ight lead it into "the Soviet orbit." Am erica's economic interest in Indonesia w as also evident: Economically a prompt and reasonable solution is of intense im­ portance to this country because of our dependence on economic resources abounding in the area: tin, oil, rubber, palm oil, copra, kapoc, sugar, spices. Furthermore, there are important American investments in Indonesia now nonproductive which, when a so­ lution is achieved, will rapidly be expanded. The Republican in­ tention of improving living standards in Indonesia will also, if fulfilled, develop a potentially important market for American exports. H e added that Indonesia w as strategically valuable because it "lies athw art the Southwest approach to the Pacific Ocean and offers a vital source o f supplies essential to an Am erican w ar­ time econom y." M offat noted that it w as "especially important to the United States that a solution be achieved peacefully." A resort to force on the part of the Dutch w ould be politically disastrous, he cautioned, because it "w ould be construed as a new colonial w ar 165

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by one of the dem ocracies and w ould probably greatly strength­ en Soviet influence in the area." Such a w ar w ould also have serious economic repercussions; the republicans could destroy all m ajor foreign holdings, and a w ar w ould also deprive the w orld of desperately needed resources. In addition, Am erican intelligence sources believed the Indonesians to be far stronger and the Dutch far w eaker than commonly supposed. In a mili­ tary confrontation, one intelligence expert predicted, the Dutch w ould "fin d them selves com pletely bogged dow n by a w ar of attrition from which they could not em erge successfully." A fter briefly review ing the history of Am erican policy toward the Indonesian upheaval, M offat commented that only recently had W ashington "injected itself actively in the negotiations." This involvem ent w as prom pted by the Dutch threat to use force. The effect of the Am erican aide-mémoire of June 28, he speculated, had been "exceedingly beneficial," as it had strength­ ened the position o f the Indonesian m oderates. Expressing guarded optim ism , M offat rem arked that the only serious issue now separating the two sides w as the Dutch proposal for a joint gendarm erie; in conclusion, he expressed his firm belief that an amicable settlem ent could be quickly achieved.74 From M offat's perspective the lone issue now in dispute m ay have appeared relatively m inor, but for the Dutch and the In­ donesians the concept o f a joint gendarm erie rem ained a m ajor im pedim ent to a negotiated agreem ent. The Am erican aidemémoire had probably strengthened the republic m oderates, as M offat noted. Although Sjahrir had been ousted for his sup­ posedly intolerable concessions to the Dutch, the blunt Am er­ ican m essage convinced m any Indonesian leaders that the re­ public had little choice but to continue his moderate policy. Ironically, the new prim e m inister, Am ir Sjarifuddin, made a series of m ajor concessions that came closer to meeting The H ague's dem ands than anything proposed by Sjahrir. N ever­ theless, a final agreem ent rem ained elusive. The N etherlands w ould not budge from its insistence on a joint police force, w hile the republic believed that it could compromise no further. W ith the final republican offer falling short of total compliance w ith ^Memorandum by Moffat, July 8 ,19 4 7 ,856E.00/7-847, DSR.

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the Dutch ultimatum, the N etherlands abruptly terminated all negotiations, and on Ju ly 20 turned to the oldest form of di­ plom acy—w ar.” ’’ Sjarifuddin to Dutch delegation, July 5 ,19 5 7 , UN S/AC. 10/19; Dutch propo­ sals of July 15 , 1947, UN S/AC. 10/21; Sjarifuddin to Dutch delegation, July 16, 1947, UN S/AC. 10/22, all in Records of the Good Offices Committee, Dag Ham­ marskjöld Library, United Nations, New York (hereafter dted as GOC Records); Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 37-38; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 2 11- 12 ; Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 125-27. An American intelligence report con­ sidered the possibility that the Indonesians and Dutch might jointly request a senior American officer to command the proposed Dutch-Indonesian gendar­ merie. "Because of the vital importance of the Netherlands East Indies as a source of basic resources," the report pointed out, "it is believed that such an invitation, if made, should not be lightly thrown aside." See S. J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, to Chief of Staff, July 7,19 4 7, P&O 091 Netherlands, in Planning and Operation Division Files, Modem Military Branch, National Ar­ chives.

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6 Intervention by the United N ations: July 1947-January 1 9 4 8 The Dutch euphem istically term ed their m ilitary assault against the Indonesian Republic a lim ited "police action"; in fact, the offensive that commenced at m idnight, Ju ly 20, 1947, am ounted to full-scale w ar. Arm ored Dutch colum ns w ith full aerial support slashed through republican territory, encounter­ ing slight resistance. With a m odem arm y of over 100,000 disci­ plined troops, the N etherlands had little trouble realizing its im m ediate m ilitary objectives. W ithin two w eeks the Dutch arm y had captured most o f the chief tow ns and cities of W est and East Java, and it had seized the main ports of W est Sum atra, along w ith the rich agricultural and oil-producing areas of that island. O nly its inability to destroy the main body o f the elusive guerrilla-trained Indonesian troops m arred the Dutch arm y's perform ance.1 The N etherlands governm ent depicted its action as a justified and lim ited cam paign aim ed only at establishing conditions favorable to the im plem entation of the Linggadjati agreem ent. In a nationw ide broadcast to the Dutch people on Ju ly 2 1, Beel m aintained that his governm ent had resorted to force because the republic w as unable to restore order in Java and Sum atra; the republic, he claim ed, sim ply lacked the authority to carry out the conditions necessary to maintain the truce.2 Van M ook ‘George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cor­ nell University Press, 1952), pp. 2 13 -14 ; Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story (New York: John Day, 1948), p. 132. 2New York Times, July 2 1, 1947, p. 3, and July 22,19 4 7, p. 2. See also Nether­ lands to Secretary-General of UN, July 22, 1947, UN S/426; statement of van

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added that the Dutch governm ent had em barked on the police action "w ith the utm ost reluctance and regret" only after becom­ ing convinced that "the present Governm ent of the Republic o f Indonesia is either unw illing or unable to im plement both the truce agreem ent concluded on October 14 , 1946, and the Linggadjati Agreem ent signed on M arch 2 5 ,19 4 7 . " *3 But by turning to the persuasion o f arm s, the Dutch them­ selves w ere guilty of violating Linggadjati. One o f that pact's provisions explicitly stated that should a dispute arise w hich could not be resolved by the com m ission general and the repub­ lican delegation, a third party w ould be asked to arbitrate the problem . The Dutch police action w as thus a flagrant abrogation o f that nation's commitment to the Linggadjati agreem ent.4 If the tw o sides w ere apparently so close to an agreem ent, the key question is w h y the Dutch chose such a drastic course of action, ignoring the aibitration clause of the Linggadjati settlem ent and discounting Am erican and British disapproval. Dutch officials insisted that in view o f countless republican truce violations, they had reluctantly concluded that republican guarantees could no longer be trusted and that the Indonesian governm ent had no control over its extrem ist adherents. The underpinning of this argum ent w as economic. Signifi­ cantly, top business and financial circles in Am sterdam fully Kleffens, in United Nations Security Council, Official Records (scon), 2d yr., 17 1st meeting, July 3 1, 1947; White House daily sum m aiy, July 24, 1947, in U .S. Department o f State Records, National Archives, Washington, D .C. (hereafter dted as DSR); Parke H. Brady (naval attaché, Netherlands) to CNO, July 22, 1947, N aval Attaché Reports File, Washington National Records Center, Suit* ville, Md. (hereafter dted as w n r c ); Netherlands Indies Government Informa­ tion Service, The Indonesian Problem, Facts and Figures: What Happened Since the End of the Pacific War (Batavia, 1947), pp. 48-53. 3New York Times, July 2 1, 1947, p. 1; Baruch to Marshall, July 20, 1947, in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D .C ., 1972), 6:981-83 (hereafter volum es in this series will be dted as FR, followed by the year); Bernard Gage to Foreign Office, July 20 ,19 47, FO 3 7 1 F9744/45/62, Records of the British Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London (hereafter dted as PRO); Vinton Chapin (first secretary of em bassy at The Hague) to M arshall, July 25, 1947, 856.00/ 7-2547, DSR. 4According to A rtide 18 of the Linggadjati agreement: 'T h e Netherlands Gov­ ernment and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall settle by arbitra­ tion any dispute which might arise from this agreement and which cannot be solved by joint consultation. . . between those delegations or, if such agreement cannot be reached, by the President of the International Court of Justice."

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endorsed the Dutch governm ent's decision for w ar, insisting that they considered it essential for the protection o f Dutch and Indonesian economic interests. Sim on Posthum a, m anager o f the N etherlands Bank, explained publicly that the East Indies w as essential to the Dutch econom y because one-fifth o f Hol­ lan d 's population depended on income from Indonesia. Accord­ ing to this view point, the political disturbances in the East In­ dies w ere seriously ham pering efforts to restore the N ether­ lands' sputtering econom y to prew ar production levels, and this intolerable state of affairs necessitated The H ague's resort to force.5 J. J. van der V elde, the Dutch com m issioner for N orthern Sum atra, gave a more com plete explanation of the economic needs underlying the attack. H is country's action, he said, had been m otivated by a virtual economic crisis. Leading Dutch econ­ om ists w ere convinced that both Holland and Indonesia w ere in danger o f going bankrupt. The recovery of prew ar prosperity in both countries w as directly dependent on full restoration o f prew ar commercial activity. The N etherlands w as suffering from an acute dollar shortage; it desperately needed m achinery and equipm ent that could be purchased only in the United States, but did not possess sufficient products for export to build up the needed dollar balance. Indonesia possessed a w ealth of products dem anded by the Am erican market, but the unsettled conditions there precluded the restoration of commercial rela­ tions w ith the United States. Faced w ith these "im possible" eco­ nomic conditions, the N etherlands opted for m ilitary action, not as an act o f w arlike aggression, according to top Dutch econo­ m ists, but under the necessity o f opening Indonesia's ports and producing districts to trade.6The geographic targets of the police 5New York Times, July 28, 1947, p. 23; Charles Wolf, Jr., "H ornets' N est in Indonesia," Nation, 165 (August 2, 1947): 125; Raymond Kennedy, "Truce in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, 18 (March 24, i948):65~67; Gilbert Burck, "Report from Indonesia," Fortune, July 1948, pp. 90-91; I. Chaudhry, The Indonesian Struggle (Lahore: Faroz, 1950), pp. 157-58. *New York Times, August 10, 1947, IV, p. 5; minute by John Street, Ju ly 23, 1947, FO 371 F9837/45/62, PRO; Gage to Foreign Office, July 12 , 1947, FO 37 1 F9837/62, PRO; Eric C. Belliquist, "Political and Economic Conditions in the Low Countries," Foreign Policy Reports, 24 (May 1,19 4 8 )4 7 ; U .S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), Division of Research for Europe, "Euro­ pean Reconstruction Survey: The N etherlands,"—Northern and Western Europe, no. 3793.14, April 17 ,19 4 7 , DSR.

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action—concentrated as they w ere around the ports and m ajor production districts o f the islands—bear out this explanation. The rapidity of the Dutch advance caught the disorganized and ill-equipped Indonesian arm y by surprise. Unw illing to m eet their form idable adversary in open battle, Indonesian forces stealthily w ithdrew to the interior of Java, w here, accord­ ing to plan, they began to organize for guerrilla w arfare. Form er prim e m inister Sjahrir declared on Ju ly 23: "W e know w e are involved in an unequal combat but w e are fighting for our free­ dom and honor and our very existence. We shall fight to the last man— either w e w in or perish ."7*The Indonesian arm y, w hile certainly no match for Dutch m echanized colum ns, com prised approxim ately 200,000 troops, and w as quite capable of w aging a long guerrilla w ar of attrition. A s Am erican and British officials had noted on several occasions, the Indonesian terrain w as ideally suited for guerrilla w arfare. M oreover, the ongoing w ar in Indochina, w here irregular Vietnam ese troops w ere easily stalem ating a m odernized French arm y, clearly dem onstrated the effectiveness of guerrilla tactics.* Probably the republic's greatest w eapon against the Dutch, though, w as its appeal to the international community as the injured victim of an aggressive im perialist assault. A s one In­ donesian Foreign M inistry official noted: "B y going to w ar the Dutch m ay cause hostility in w orld opinion w hich they have not reckoned."9 On Ju ly 22, Prime M inister Sjarifuddin broadcast a statem ent from the Republican capital o f Jogjakarta, calling for a halt to the bloodshed and appealing to the republic's friends in India, China, Europe, and the United States to intervene "quick­ ly and effectively." The aim of the Dutch m ilitary action, he stated flatly, w as the com plete liquidation of the republic and the restoration o f the old colonial rule "under the cover of nice w ords and p h rases."10 A s the Indonesian arm y prepared for an extended guerrilla w ar, the republican governm ent turned once again to diplom acy. President Sukarno appointed Sjahrir an am bassador at large to 7New York Times, July 24,1947, p. 3. •W olf, Indonesian Story, pp. 133-34; J. K. Ray, Transfer of Power in Indonesia, 1 942-1949 (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967), p. 125. *New York Times, July 2 1,19 4 7 , p. 3. "Ib id ., July 23,19 4 7 , p. 2.

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plead the Indonesian case before the Security Council.11 H is first stop w as N ew Delhi, w here Prime M inister Jaw aharlal N ehru expressed his outrage at the Dutch offensive and prom ised In­ dian support for the republic. A fter m eeting w ith Sjahrir on Ju ly 24, N ehru gave a forceful indication of a grow ing selfconsciousness and solidarity am ong the form er colonial territo­ ries o f A sia: "W hat has become o f the U .N . Charter? The spirit of the new A sia w ill not tolerate such things. N o European country, w hatever it m ay be, has any business to set its arm y in A sia against the people of A sia. W hen it does so, A sia w ill not tolerate it."12 On Ju ly 25 Sukarno broadcast an urgent appeal to the United States, im ploring its help to bring about a peaceful settlem ent. "Ju st as your Am erican ancestors fought 170 years ago for your liberty and independence," the Indonesian president declared, "so are w e Indonesians righting for ours. Ju st as you then re­ belled against dom ination by a country far across the seas, so are w e ." He asked Am ericans "to stand by the principles o f justice and right for w hich you fought so valiantly only tw o years a g o ."13 International sym pathy, as Am erican officials w ere keenly aw are, w as largely on the side o f the republicans. In its w eekly sum m ary o f key international developm ents for Secretary M ar­ shall, the State Departm ent reported that the Dutch attack "started a w ave of sym pathy for the Indonesians w hich has sw ept around the w o rld ."14 Editorial opinion in the United States also rallied around the republican cause and harshly de­ nounced Dutch aggression. "M en w ere once more being killed for the sin of seeking freedom ," w rote Theodore H. White in the New Republic. "U nless Am erican or British 'good offices' can at the last moment persuade the Dutch to call o ff this w a r," w arned the Christian Century, "it m ay quickly become one o f the m ost horrible slaughters in all the black history of W estern im ­ perialism ." The New York Times echoed this popular sentim ent w ith its first anti-Dutch editorial: "This action cannot be inter­ 11 Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 135-37. uNew York Times, July 25,19 4 7, p. 3. «Ibid. «Secretary of State's weekly summary, August 18 ,19 4 7 , DSR.

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preted otherw ise, therefore, than as an effort by the Dutch G ov­ ernm ent to im pose by arm s w hat it believed it w as not going to gain by negotiation and which it did not choose to submit to arbitration." Even the Washington Post, w hich had consistently supported The H ague's policy in Indonesia, joined this indict­ m ent o f the Dutch police action. It w as "an unw ise decision," concluded the Post, "especially in the light of the governing agreem ent, w hich provides for arbitration o f disputes and third party m ediation." United N ations intervention w as now neces­ sary, because "the Dutch have a bear by the tail, and the present m ess is bound to add to the ruin in Indonesia, and thus deprive the w orld o f access to Indonesian resources at a time w hen they are badly n eed ed ."1* D espite this popular sentim ent, the Am erican governm ent refrained from an y public criticism o f the Dutch attack. In a statem ent released to the press on Ju ly 2 1, the State Departm ent detailed its previous efforts to prevent m ilitary m easures, and said it "profoundly regrets that negotiation has been discarded as the m eans of achieving the voluntary association between the N etherlands and Indonesian peoples contem plated by the Linggadjati A greem en t."16 W hile this guarded comment could be construed as an indirect criticism of the Dutch, the State Depart­ m ent w as careful not to assess blam e. The m ajor problem posed by the Dutch police action, from the Am erican point o f view , w as that a nation hostile to the Nether­ lands m ight introduce the question at the United N ations. H. Freem an M atthews noted this danger in a memorandum he prepared for Secretary M arshall on Ju ly 24. If an unfriendly country took the initiative in the Security Council, M atthews w arned, the subsequent debates over the police action w ould develop "in a m anner prejudicial to the N etherlands and to the interests o f the W estern Democracies in the Far E ast." Conse­ quently, he recom m ended that M arshall assure the Dutch am bassador that "the United States has the friendliest feelings lsTheorore H. White, "So the Dutch Are at W ar," New Republic, August 4, 1947, p. 8; Christian Century, 64 (July 3 0 ,1947):9i6; New York Times, July 22,1947, p. 2; Washington Post, July 24,19 47, p. 8. “ "U .S. Regrets Breakdown of Peaceful Negotiations in Indonesia," U.S. De­ partment of State Bulletin, 17 (August 3 , 1947V.230.

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tow ard the N etherlands and therefore desires to be helpful in the new situation which has arisen in the In dies/' M atthew s suggested that the secretary should ask the Dutch w hat action they w ould prefer the Am erican governm ent to take and w hether or not they desired the United States or som e other friendly pow er to bring up the matter at the United N ations, "th u s forestalling a hostile pow er from doing so ."17 Follow ing M atthew s' recom m endation, M arshall broached the subject of possible United N ations involvem ent during a conversation w ith Dutch officials on that same day. In response to a direct question by John M organ of the departm ent's D ivi­ sion of Northern European A ffairs, the recently appointed Dutch am bassador to the United States, Eelco van Kleffens, stated his belief that there w ould be no advantage in having the subject raised by one of the W estern dem ocracies. He explained that the N etherlands w ould sim ply stand on its record, as it had done previously. The am bassador w as confident that it w ould be im possible to show that international peace w as being threatened by the police action; it w as, he contended, purely an internal m atter. Van Kleffens confidently assured M arshall that the Dutch could accom plish their m ilitary aim s quickly and fu lly intended to resum e negotiations in the near future w ith "re ­ sponsible" elem ents in Indonesia.1* A lthough nothing concrete resulted from this exchange, it w as significant nonetheless as a barom eter of Am erican foreign policy priorities at that time. The United States' w illingness to assist the Dutch in presenting their version of developm ents in Indonesia to the w orld leaves little room for doubt that W ashington's "n eutral" posture toward the D utch-Indonesian conflict w as an odd brand of neutrality indeed. M atthew s' m em orandum and M arshall's subsequent conversation w ith van K leffens reveal an unm istakably pro-Dutch orientation. The gap between the anticolonial rhetoric of the w ar years and the ’'Memorandum from Matthews to Marshall, July 24, 1947, 856D.00/7-2447, DSR. "M emorandum by Morgan of a conversation with van Kleffens, Jonkheer C. Reuchlin (Dutch chargé), and Marshall, July 24,1947, in FR, 1947,6:986-87. The pro-Dutch view is also reflected in a memorandum by Lovett of a conversation with van Kleffens, Rusk, Matthews, and Morgan, August 6, 1947, in Box 3, Hickerson Files, DSR.

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reality o f W ashington's accommodating response to w hat w as nothing less than a colonial w ar of reconquest w as enorm ous. W ashington's carefully m easured response to the Dutch police action led several high-ranking British officials to specu­ late that, Am erican protestations to the contrary, the United States never vigorously opposed The H ague's m ilitary offensive and m ay have even tacitly encouraged it. "The Am erican atti­ tu d e," observed John Street, head of the North Am erican Divi­ sion of the British Foreign O ffice, "confirm s earlier im pressions that the State Departm ent w ould not be dism ayed by Dutch police action and the m anner in which the Dutch G ovt has gone out o f their w ay to link the US G ovt w ith us in their grateful acknowledgem ent o f assistance received suggests that the Dutch w ere aw are o f this Am erican attitude."19 M itcheson's cables from Batavia strongly corroborated that view . "Though there w as certainly no official support from Am erica for m ilitary action ," he suggested in one telegram , "nevertheless I gather that the Dutch Am bassador in W ashington obtained the im­ pression, from talks w ith certain officials, that they felt a good deal of sym pathy w ith the Dutch desire for a quick settlem ent by fo rce." Ju st before the outbreak of hostilities, M itcheson had reported to the Foreign Office that he had learned from secret "G rade A " sources "that the Dutch Governm ent and N EI G ov­ ernm ent have reason to believe that w hile United States official attitude is opposed to m ilitary action here at all costs, this line is only for public consum ption and that beneath the surface the Am ericans fu lly appreciate and sym pathize w ith van M ook's desire to cut short further discussion and to settle matters prom ptly by force."20 Lord Killeam also accepted this view ; he inform ed the Foreign O ffice in A ugust that he and his staff had believed all along "that Am erican encouragem ent m ust bear som e responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities in the N .E .I."21 These are serious charges and they require closer exam ina­ tion. It is certainly true, as Foreign O ffice representatives repeat­ edly noted, that Herm an Baruch and W alter Foote, the senior ‘’ Minute by Street, July 25,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F10031/45/62, PRO. “ Mitcheson to Foreign Office, July 24,1947, FO 3 7 1 F12126/45/62, PRO; Mitch­ eson to Foreign Office, June 27, 1947, FO 371 F8697/45/62, PRO. 21Killeam to Sargent, August 2 1,19 4 7 , FO 371 F12126/45/62, PRO.

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Am erican representatives at The H ague and Batavia respective* ly, w ere inclined to accept uncritically the Dutch view o f Indone­ sian developm ents. Their cables to the State Departm ent consis­ tently reflected that prejudice. It is also true that both men be­ lieved that police action w as the only viable alternative for the N etherlands, and on several occasions they m ade their view s know n to high-ranking Dutch officials. On M ay 23, for instance, Foote casually told M itcheson "that he personally felt that [the] Dutch w ould only w aste time and m oney by continuing negotia­ tion s." H e added that "W ashington w as now beginning to com e around to [the] local Dutch view in this connexion." In another telegram to London the British consul reported that "Foote probably did a great deal o f harm by openly favoring in private conversations the Dutch plan for m ilitary action, that he consid­ ered further negotiations a w aste of time and believed Am er­ ican opinion w ould accept fairly easily a fait accompli." The Am er­ ican consul general w as getting old, M itcheson explained, "an d he has lived here so long that his point o f view is very sim ilar to the old Dutch settlers." M any Dutch officials "probably assum ed his rem arks had some backing in W ashington, even though he presented them as personal v ie w s."22 A t the Dutch capital, m eanwhile, Am bassador Baruch freely adm itted that he believed the Dutch w ould be com pletely justified in resorting to force. He did stress that these w ere strictly personal view s, but it is entirely likely that the Dutch did not carefully distinguish betw een the personal view s of the United States' principal rep­ resentative in the field and the official view s of the Am erican governm ent.23 D espite the attitude o f Foote, Baruch, and possibly a few others, how ever, there is no hard evidence to suggest that the State Departm ent actually encouraged The Hague to em bark on its m ilitary assault against the Republic. On the contrary, there is every reason to suspect that the Trum an adm inistration sin­ cerely sought to prevent such action, believing that peaceful avenues of arbitration had by no m eans been exhausted. Y et it "M itcheson to Foreign Office, M ay 23 and July 24, 1947, FO 371 F7055/45/62 and F12126/45/62, PRO; minute by Allen, July 28, 1947, FO 371 F10638/45/62, PRO. "Blan d to Foreign Office, July 25,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F10049/45/62, PRO.

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seem s equally d ear that W ashington w as unw illing to exert sub­ stantial pressure on a friendly W estern ally. G iven Dutch re­ liance on Am erican economic assistance, that pressure could certainly have been applied. M any State Departm ent officers sim ply accepted the validity of Dutch claim s that H olland's des­ perate financial plight afforded it no alternative but m ilitary action. That common departm ental view , of w hich the Dutch w ere certainly aw are, coupled w ith the indiscreet rem arks of Foote and Baruch and W ashington's well-known desire to main­ tain harm ony w ithin the W estern alliance, probably led the N etherlands to believe that the United States w ould not react strongly to Dutch m ilitary action. "There is little doubt," Street insisted, "that the Dutch w ere aw are, w hen they opened hostili­ ties on the 21th Ju ly, that the Am ericans w ould confine action to polite expressions o f regret. " MThat judgm ent appears em inent­ ly reasonable. The initial Am erican response to the Dutch police action is probably best understood w ithin the context o f a global geopolit­ ical strategy that defined the rehabilitation and reintegration o f W estern Europe as its m ajor goal. "The greatest danger to the security o f the United States," spelled out a C IA analysis pre­ pared in Septem ber 1947, "is the possibility o f economic collapse in W estern Europe and the consequent accession to pow er of Com m unist elem ents."8 With Dutch cooperation essential to the success o f the proposed M arshall Plan, the United States could hardly afford to alienate The H ague by denouncing its colonial policy. Significantly, a Joint C hiefs of Staff study called the N etherlands "a vital area to Am erican national security"; according to the report, H olland ranked fifth in the w orld as a country o f direct strategic im portance to the United States.8 Am erican policy m akers, m oreover, tended to consider the N etherlands and Indonesia as inseparable. "The interest o f the United States in relation to the N etherlands East In d ies," Hornbeck w rote in 1948, "cannot reasonably be separated from our MMinute by Street, September 4 ,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F12126/45/62, PRO. ^Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States," Q A 1, September 26,1947, President's Secre­ tary's File, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman lib rary, Independence, Mo. ^Report by Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 29,1947, in FR, 19 4 7,1:74 1-4 6 .

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interest and concern in relation to the N etherlands in E u ro p e/'27 V iew ing Indonesia through a European prism , Am erican officials reasoned as follow s: H olland constituted an integral part of Europe; the rehabilitation of the Dutch econom y w as necessary for the full recovery o f all of W estern Europe; and the early resum ption o f trade between the N etherlands and Indonesia w as in turn essential to H olland's revitalization. The Trum an adm in­ istration w as quite obviously unw illing to endanger its entire European policy on account of a brash colonial m ilitary adven­ ture, especially since crucial negotiations regarding the proposed M arshall Plan w ere currently taking place in Paris. Besides, Dutch officials convincingly insisted that only m ilitary m easures could ensure the conditions necessary for a return to full produc­ tivity in Indonesia, a position to w hich Am erican diplom ats w ere quite sym pathetic. Concerned in large part w ith its own im perial interests, G reat Britain took a far less accommodating view of the Dutch police action. In a telegram to the Foreign O ffice, Lord Killeam su g­ gested that much more than just the N etherlands East Indies w as at stake. "A s one o f the colonial pow ers the behavior of the Dutch w ill reflect discredit on ourselves and the French," he pointed out, "an d m ay w ell prejudice such delicate m atters as [the] rela­ tionship between Europe and A sia which in M alaya, in Burm a and even in India is at a critical stage."2* John Street's evaluation o f the Dutch offensive w as more blunt. The police action, he stated, w as "basically stupid"; by resorting to open hostilities, "the Dutch in the long run (and possibly w ithin the next few years) w ill lose far more . . . than by trying to be patient and lim iting their dem ands to w hat an Indonesian coalition w ou ld accept." He added that the British w ere now "in the em barrass­ ing position of trying to follow an uneasy com prom ise betw een our ow n position vis-a-vis South East A sia and our desire not to split W estern E u rope."29 Although eager to bring about a rapid halt to the hostilities, “ Stanley K. Hombeck, "The United States and the Netherlands East In d ies," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 255 (January

I948):i30-3i.

“ Killeam to Foreign Office, July 18 ,19 4 7 , FO 371 F9741/45/62, PRO. “ Minute by Street, July 2 1,19 4 7 , FO 371 F9759/45/62, PRO.

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London w as unw illing to accept again the role of sole m ediator of the dispute. Instead, Bevin hoped that the United States w ould accept dual m ediation responsibility w ith Britain to put an early end to a conflict that "m ay be incalculably dam aging to the peace and stability o f A sia and to the revival of economic prosperity in that and other parts of the w orld ."30Following the foreign secre­ tary's instructions, on Ju ly 24 Lord Inverchapel delivered to the State Departm ent an aide-mémoire that expressed the British governm ent's distress at the recent turn of events in the East Indies. The m ilitary assault "represented a breakdown of the constant efforts m ade by H is M ajesty's Governm ent, w ith the concurrence and support of the United States Governm ent, dur­ ing the past two years to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem . It m ay be that m ilitarily the Dutch w ill gain an initial success, but the resulting situation in South East A sia w ill make the position o f the w estern pow ers very difficult in deed." A c­ cordingly, G reat Britain suggested that the United States join w ith it in inducing the N etherlands to accept som e form o f ar­ bitral solution to the conflict.31 W ashington's reply w as immediate but negative. Acting Secretary Robert Lovett explained to Lord Balfour in a conference that sam e day that the State Departm ent w as convinced that the Dutch w ould never agree to another proposal for outside arbitra­ tion, as they considered the police action to be a strictly internal affair. Balfour explained the Am erican position in a cable to the Foreign O ffice: "To approach the N etherlands Governm ent w ith such suggestions at present time w ould, as State Departm ent saw it, m erely expose us to a rebuff and m ight possibly prejudice the prospect o f whole-hearted Dutch cooperation in Paris talks." Lovett also reasoned that a direct offer to the Dutch by two friendly pow ers could still not prevent unfriendly pow ers from bringing the case before the Security Council.32 That fear w as alm ost im m ediately realized w hen India sudden­ ly threatened to bring the Indonesian conflict before the United “ Bevin to Inverchapel, July 23,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F10038/45/62, PRO. 31Aide-mémoire from British Embassy to Department of State, July 24,1947, in FR, 1947, 6:987-89; Douglas to Lovett and M arshall, July 25, 1947, 856E.00/ 7-2547, DSR. “ Bàlfour to Foreign Office, July 24,1947, FO 37 1 F10031/45/62, PRO.

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N ations. In a telegram to the British Foreign O ffice on Ju ly 25, N ehru argued that the so-called police action by [the] Dutch is [a] carefully and long pre­ pared military campaign whose real purpose is [to] inflict complete military defeat on [the] Republic and prepare [the] way for [a] political settlement entirely favorable to [the] Dutch. No one in India or anywhere in Asia will believe that if [the] Governments of [the] United Kingdom and [the] United States of America really desired [to] bring this conflict to [an] end they could not do it immediately without military intervention. Holland's economic as well as politi­ cal dependence on these two countries is such that its Government could not afford [to] forfeit their good will and support by [a] refusal to end hostilities and reach [a] settlement with [the] Indonesians by peaceful means. The Indian prim e m inister declared that it w as time that the United States and Great Britain determ ined w hat positive action they could take to bring about an immediate end to the conflict. If neither nation w ere w illing to become involved, "w e shall have no option but to take the matter before the UN Security C ouncil." In conclusion, N ehru w arned that "the failure for w hatever reason of these tw o great pow ers [to] intervene effectively in [the] cause o f peace and on [the] side of people struggling for freedom cannot but create [the] most unfortunate im pression in India and all A sian countries."31 John Carter Vincent, head of the State Departm ent's O ffice o f Far Eastern A ffairs, alerted Secretary M arshall to the Indian threat on Ju ly 28. U nless the United States acted quickly, he pointed out, India w ould probably place the issue in "the m ost extrem e form , thus inviting support from the Soviet Union and "Q uoted in Henry Grady (U.S. ambassador, India) to Marshall, July 26 ,19 47, in FR 1947, 6:990-91. See also Government of India to Secretary of State for India, July 18, 1947, FO 371 F10039/45/62, PRO; W. Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 368-69. India would not become officially independent until A ugust 15 ,19 4 7 . For an examination of the American response to the decolonization o f India, see Gary R. H ess, America Encounters India, 2941-2947 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); R. C. Jauhrai, American Diplomacy and Independ­ ence for India (Bombay: Vora, 1970); A . Guy Hope, America and Swaraj: The U.S. Role in Indian Independence (Washington: Public A ffairs Press, 1968).

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tending to divide the Security Council into a Russian*Asiatic bloc against the Anglo-Am erican Governm ents and Governm ents o f W estern Eu rope." In such an event "it w ould be difficult for the United States Governm ent to take a com pletely neutral and disin­ terested position."34 Consequently, Vincent suggested to Lovett that it m ight become desirable for the N etherlands to request either Am erican or British m ediation in accordance w ith the United N ations Charter.36 The proposed action o f the Indian governm ent placed W ashington in a quandary. The keynote o f Am erican policy w as W estern Europe; U .S. officials considered the postw ar rehabilita­ tion o f that area, as envisioned by the M arshall Plan, to be essential to Am erican interests—not only to restore a vital market for Am erican goods, but also to arrest the danger o f Com m unist advances in Europe. M arshall sum m arized this objective in a m ajor policy address on Ju ly 14. Either the United States "m ust finish the task o f assisting these countries to adjust them selves to the changed dem ands of a new a g e ," he said, or "it w ould be faced w ith a radical alteration of its ow n position in the w o rld ."36 But by concentrating on W estern Europe, the United States did not intend to isolate itself from other w orld problem s, for, as the Trum an Doctrine indicated, every region o f the globe w as a potential area of interest in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indonesia w as particularly signifi­ cant in this regard, as a report by a subcommittee of the StateA rm y-N avy-A ir Force Coordinating Committee em phasized: Indonesia is one of the most important regions of Southeast Asia because of its large population, wealth, and strategic location. In­ donesia is also in the forefront of the postwar nationalist struggle of Southeast Asiatic peoples that calls for a readjustment of old colonial "M em orandum from Vincent to M arshall, July 28, 1947, 501.BC Indonesia/ 7-2847, DSR. These problems were anticipated earlier in a memorandum by S. K. C . Kooper and Joseph Scott, July 23, 1947, in folder labeled "N .E .I. 1947-1948: UNO & Other O rganizations," Box 13 , Records of the Office of the Philippines and Southeast Asian A ffairs, DSR (hereafter cited as PSA Records). "M em orandum from Vincent to Lovett, July 29,1947, in F R 1947,6:993. "G eorge M arshall, "A Program for Preservation of our National Interests and o f European Civilization," address to the Governors' Conference at Salt Lake C ity, in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 17 (July 27, 1947):i 84-85.

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relationships. The outcome of this struggle and the conditions sur­ rounding it will have a profound effect on the future attitudes of Southeast Asia's peoples toward the Western democracies on the one 'land and toward the ussr on the other. The report concluded that "from a long range point of view , an Indonesian population hostile to the W estern pow ers w ould m ake Indonesia particularly vulnerable in the event of w a r/' w hereas "a friendly and prosperous Indonesia m ight have great value as an arsenal in the Pacific."37 A m ajor danger posed by the D utch-Indonesian hostilities, from W ashington's perspective, w as that a display of official Am erican support for the Dutch position could incur the w rath o f the new ly em erging areas of the w orld. This, again, w as the classic dilem m a that had been haunting the United States since the closing years of W orld War II: it could not risk alienating its traditional European allies by pursuing an anticolonial policy, but neither could it afford to abandon A m erica's historical identi­ fication w ith the principles of self-determ ination and thereby forfeit the respect and support of A sian and African nationalist m ovem ents. H enry Villard, deputy director of the O ffice of N ear Eastern and African A ffairs, elucidated the problem posed b y N ehru's threat to bring the Indonesian crisis before the Security Council. "U nder present circum stances," he reasoned, "the U .S. m ight be placed in an extrem ely unfortunate position of oppos­ ing Indonesia and her supporters. Such a position could do im m easurable dam age to Am erican prestige in the N ear, M iddle and Far E ast."38 On Ju ly 30 M arshall inform ed Truman that the Indian govern­ m ent had announced its intention to raise the subject o f the Dutch police action in the Security Council. Should it do so, he contended, the United States w ould be placed in a "difficult “ State-A rm y-N avy-A ir Force Coordinating Committee (s w n c c ), Subcommit­ tee on Far Eastern A ffairs, Country Report on Indonesia, July 2 2,19 4 7, s w n c c Records, DSR. “ Villard to Charles E. Bohlen (counselor to State Department), July 2 9 ,19 4 7, in FR, 6:994-96. See also H. Gordon Minnigesode (American consul, India) to M arshall, July 28,1947, 8560.00/7-2847, DSR; memorandum from Jam es K. Penfield (Office of Far Eastern Affairs) to Landon, August 2 2,19 4 7, 856E.00/8-547, DSR.

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position ." He spelled out the problem s presented by UN involve­ m ent: "W e w ould not be able to support the Dutch position involving the use o f force nor to oppose the establishm ent of a United N ations committee for investigation or settlem ent w hich w ould be bitterly resented by the Dutch and which could be exploited by Com m unist propaganda." The best hope of avoid­ ing this dilem m a in the Security Council w ould be "fo r the Dutch Governm ent to cease hostilities on its ow n initiative/' or "fo r the Dutch Governm ent to accept an offer of m ediation." M arshall recom m ended that the president authorize him to inform The H ague that the United States w ould be w illing to mediate the dispute, either by itself or jointly w ith Great Britain. If the United States pursued this course, he reasoned, w hen the case came up before the Security Council it w ould then be possible to state that m ethods o f conciliation w ere already in progress, and, in accor­ dance w ith the United N ations Charter, "discussion should be held in abeyance pending their outcom e."39 Trum an approved M arshall's recom m endation, and on Ju ly 3 1, 1947, Lovett tele­ phoned van Kleffens and indicated to him that the U .S. govern­ m ent w as disposed to be helpful to the Dutch in this delicate matter; it "w ould be available to offer its good offices in the hopes that it m ight rem ove from or com pose the difficulties in the Security C ouncil."90 British officials w ere piqued by W ashington's failure to consult w ith them before m aking this unilateral offer. "It is further evi­ den ce," suggested Street, "o f the thoroughly unhelpful attitude adopted by the Am ericans since the trouble b egan ."41 On A ugust 1 Balfour asked a State Departm ent official w hy his nation had not been inform ed in advance of the Am erican offer. He w as told that President Trum an's absence from W ashington due to his m other's death caused an unavoidable delay in the Am erican decision, and in addition that the Dutch had made it abundantly d ear that British m ediation w ould not be proper, as two Com"M em orandum from Marshall to Truman, July 30, 1947, in FR, 1947, 6:997. See also memorandum by Robert McClintock (Office of Special Political Affairs) of a conversation with Herschel Johnson, July 24,1947, in folder labeled "N .E .I. 1947-1948, UNO & and Other O rganizations," Box 13 , PSA Records, DSR. "’Memorandum by Lovett of a telephone conversation with van Kleffens, July 3 1,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947, 6:10001-3. 41Minute by Street, August 1,19 4 7 , FO 371 F10285/45/62, PRO.

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m onwealth countries, India and A ustralia, w ere preparing to bring the Indonesian conflict before the Security Council. On A ugust 4 H. Freem an M atthews conceded to Balfour that the State Departm ent had been rem iss in not inform ing the British in advance o f its m ediation offer, but said it had been an "off-thecu ff" offer, prom pted by A ustralia's decision to go before the Security Council.42 Foreign O ffice officials w ere unconvinced by these Am erican rationalizations. Street characterized the U .S. offer as "a breach o f good m anners." A llen suggested that W ashington acted "w ith w hat can only be described as bad m anners and bad taste" in m aking its unilateral offer. If the m ajor role in achieving a settle­ m ent fell to the Am ericans, he noted, all London could do w as "hope they w ill keep us fully inform ed as w e kept them over last tw o y e ars."43 The suspicion that the United States w as actually m aneuvering to assert its own influence in Southeast A sia troubled m any British diplom ats. "I think there is little doubt that the Am erican offer o f m ediation is not disinterested," wrote one Foreign O ffice representative.44The perceptions of M aberly Dening are particu­ larly revealing in this regard. "I m ust adm it," he w rote on A ugust 2, "I have little faith in the Am erican ability to use their good offices w ith tact and discretion." He added that "it looks as if they w ould bully the Indonesians to do all the Dutch w ant them to do. If this happens, India and A ustralia w ill expect us to resist this U .S. im perialism , and w e shall find ourselves in a pretty dilem ­ m a. I am afraid I do not trust the U .S. at all in their Far Eastern p o licy."45 These rem arks suggest that British thinking on U .S. interests and policy in Southeast A sia had come full circle in less than tw o years. It is certainly ironic that Dening, w ho in 1945 had w arned that any Am erican involvem ent in the Indies "w ould probably be all on the side of the Indonesians," now feared that a U .S. presence in Indonesia w ould w ork almost com pletely to the “ Balfour to Foreign Office, August 1 and August 4 ,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F10444/45/62 and F10472/45/62, PRO. “ M inutes by Street, August 5,19 4 7, and Allen, August 2,19 4 7 , FO 3 7 1 F10444/ 45/62 and F10496/45/62, PRO. “ Foreign Office minute, August 8 ,19 4 7, FO 371 F10706/45/62, PRO. “ Minute by Dening, August 2 ,19 4 7 , FO 3 7 1 F10496/45/62, PRO.

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benefit o f the Dutch. A nd U .S. action in the Security Council did little to dispel these fears. The Security Council debates on the Indonesian question opened on Ju ly 3 1, follow ing requests by India and A ustralia.46 "For d a y s/' the Indian representative lam ented, "w e have w aited for som eone, for anybody, to bring better counsel to the Nether­ lands Governm ent; for days w e have watched w ith horror and disappointm ent this senseless w ar by one o f our ow n M em bers."47 The Australian delegate added that further delay w ould not be justified. The D utch-Indonesian conflict "is one of international concern and already has far-reaching repercus­ sions. It affects the well-being and stability o f the w hole of the Southw est Pacific and South-east A sia. . . . The Council should also note that the hostilities proceeding are not m erely a police action but are in fact w arfare; that is, in international law , arm ed conflict betw een two States."4* In the subsequent debate, van Kleffens took strong exception to the view that the republic w as in fact a state. "The Republic of Indonesia is not a sovereign state," he argued, "an y more than the State o f East Indonesia or of Borneo." Indeed, "it is a political entity to be affiliated ultim ately w ith the other two states I have n am ed." Van Kleffens claimed that the republic w as com parable to N ew York State or Utah or Parahiba in Brazil, and reiterated his governm ent's contention that the Dutch police action w as strictly an internal affair o f the N etherlands and not an appropri­ ate m atter for international concern.49 Herschel V. Johnson, the “ UN S/477, Ju ly 30, 1947; UN S/479, July 30, 1947. For an interpretation of Indian and Australian actions within the context of their respective foreign policies, see Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the UN (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 38 -4 1, 67-69; Ravindra Varma, Australia and Southeast Asia: The Crystallisation of a Relationship (New Delhi: Abhinav, 1974), pp. 91-95; W. J. Hudson, "Australia and Indonesian Independence," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 8 (September

i967):226-39.

“ s c o r , 2d yr., 17 1st meeting, Ju ly 3 1,19 4 7 , p. 16 21. “ Ibid., pp. 1622-23. See also aide-mémoire from Australian government to Commonwealth Relations Office, July 25, 1947, FO 371 F 10 116/45/62, PRO; memorandum by John C. Ross (U.S. Mission to UN) of a conversation with Ralph H arry (Australian delegation), July 30 ,1947, in Box 8 1, Records of the U .S. M ission to the UN, RG 84, DSR. “ s c o r , 2d yr., 17 1st meeting, Ju ly 3 1,19 4 7 , pp. 1619-20. For an examination of the com plex legal technicalities involved in assessing the republic's sovereignty,

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Am erican representative, tried to avoid the question o f the re­ public's status in international law entirely. "I do think, how ev­ e r," he rem arked, "that the Council m ust take cognizance of righting on such a scale and in such conditions that the peace of that region and ultim ately of the w orld m ight be put in danger. " ” On A ugust l , after two days of acrim onious discussion, the council passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire, the first order o f its kind ever issued by the United Nations. The Am ericansponsored resolution read sim ply: "The Security Council, noting w ith concern the hostilities in progress between the arm ed forces o f the N etherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, calls upon the parties: (a) to cease hostilities forthw ith, and (b) to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful m eans and keep the Security County inform ed about the progress o f the settle­ m ent."*51 A lthough this Am erican com prom ise proposal w as consider­ ably w eaker than the Australian resolution that the United States had refused to back—w hich had called on the Dutch and Indone­ sians to cease all hostilities im m ediately and submit their dispute to arbitration by a third party, as provided by the U nggadjati agreem ent—it w as hailed nevertheless as a m ajor trium ph for the United N ations. George Barrett of the New York Times reflected this optim istic attitude w hen he commented that "the United N ations had probably w on its first m ajor victory and through this victory had given the new international organization a sorely needed boost in prestige." Likew ise, Johnson said that it w as a m ilestone decision that served notice that the United N ations intended to take action w herever necessary to maintain peace.52 A lthough both the Dutch and the Indonesians prom ptly assured the Security Council that they w ould im m ediately com ­ p ly w ith its cease-fire resolution, hostilities continued unabated. see A li Sastroam idjojo and Robert Delson, "The Status of Ute Republic o f In­ donesia in International L aw ," Columbia Law Review, 49 (March i949):344-6i. * s c o r , 2d yr., 172nd meeting, August 1,19 4 7 , pp. 1657-58. 51UN S/459. See also Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, i960), pp. 50 -51; ). Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," International Conciliation, March 1950, pp. 126 28. *N ew York Times, August 4 ,19 4 7, p. 3; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 5 1. 18 6

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Each side accused the other of ignoring the resolution and de­ fended its ow n m ilitary m easures as purely retaliatory. The re­ public sent several letters to the council, requesting that an arbitration com m ission be set up to im plement the cease-fire order and help to m ediate the basic issues dividing the two parties. W ith conditions rapidly deteriorating—and the ineffec­ tiveness o f its resolution becom ing increasingly apparent—the Security Council reopened debate on the Indonesian question on A ugu st 6.” A t this juncture the United States offered its good offices to the Indonesian Republic for the purpose of m ediating the conflict. On A ugust 6 Consul General Foote inform ed republican officials that the United States w as prepared to assist the two disputants to settle their differences. The Dutch had already accepted a sim ilar Am erican offer on A ugust 3; now the State Departm ent anxiously aw aited the reply o f the republican governm ent. On A ugust 7 Indonesian leaders announced their acceptance of the Am erican offer of good offices, but at the sam e time they asked the United States to use its influence to persuade the Dutch governm ent and the Security Council that an international arbitration com m ission should be dispatched without delay to Indonesia. Initially puzzled by the seem ingly contradictory In­ donesian response, Am erican diplom ats ultim ately interpreted it as a rejection of their overture in favor of UN intervention.M In the w ords o f the British consul general at Batavia, the Indo­ nesian reply am ounted to a "polite refusal of Am erican m edia­ tio n ."55 A significant shift w as already occurring in Indonesian atti­ tudes tow ard the United States; the republic w as beginning to believe that its interests w ould be better served by the United N ations. Indonesian republicans, w ho had previously displayed vigorous pro-Am erican sentim ents, now began to suspect "that covertly the United States w as partial to the Dutch and that, if it had strongly desired to, it could have stopped them from resort-* *U N S/469, August 5,19 4 7 ; UN S/475, August 6 ,19 47. “ M arshall to Foote, August 4 ,19 4 7, in FR, 19 4 7 ,6 :10 12 -13; Foote to Marshall, A ugust 8 ,19 4 7, in ibid., pp. 10 17 -18 ; Lovett to Foote, August 14 ,19 4 7 , in ibid., pp. 1028-29; Gani to President of Security Council, August 7,19 4 7 , UN S/477. “ Mitcheson to Foreign Office, August 8 ,19 4 7, FO, 3 7 1 F10791/45/62, PRO.

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ing to force."*4 In the ongoing Security Council debates, the Soviet Union berated the Am erican proposal as a devious attem pt to circum vent the United Nations. Soviet delegate A ndrei Grom yko charged: "The attem pt of the United States, in the m atter of arbitration, to force its 'good offices' on the Indone­ sian Governm ent and the Indonesian people, despite the In­ donesians' w ish that arbitration should be handled by a commis­ sion of the Security Council, indicate a lack of respect not only for the Indonesians, w ho are asking the United N ations to defend their vital interests, but also for the Security Council."*7 There w as a certain elem ent of truth to the Soviet charges; Am erican officials feared that Security Council action m ight prove em bar­ rassing to the Netherlands.*8 The republic, how ever, continued to seek United N ations in­ tervention, and on A ugust 12 , over Dutch objections, the Secu­ rity Council voted to invite a republican delegation to present its case before that body. On A ugust 14 Sjahrir delivered a passion­ ate exposition of the republic's plight. A fter detailing the history o f the Indonesian nationalist m ovem ent and the frustrating course o f Dutch-republican negotiations, he concluded w ith a ringing indictm ent of Dutch policy. "In view of these facts," Sjahrir said, "it appears that the N etherlands Governm ent has never at any time sincerely desired a peaceful settlem ent w ith the Republic. On the other hand, all N etherlands action—political, m ilitary and economic—w as nothing but preparation for aggres­ sive action against its partner in an agreem ent." A t the follow ing session the form er prim e m inister pleaded, "H ow can there be free negotiations w hen one party stands w ith a pistol pointed at the head of the other? We ask for direct action o f the Security “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 214. See also U .S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for the Far East, "M ajor Developments and Trends in the Netherlands-Indonesian Conflict," Situation Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480.40, October 8 ,19 4 7, DSR; Chaudhty, Indonesian Struggle, p. 164. ^ s c o r , 2d yr., 187th meeting, August 19 ,19 4 7 , pp. 2060-61. See also Ruth T. M cVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity M odem Indonesia Project, 1957), pp. 2 1-2 3. “ Memorandum from Gordon Knox to Herschel Johnson and Charles P. N oyes, August 16, 1947, in folder labeled "N .E .I., 1947-1948: UNO & Other O rganizations," Box 13 , PSA Records, DSR; memorandum by Lovett of a con­ versation with van Kleffens, Rusk, Matthews, and Morgan, August 6 ,19 4 7 , in Box 3, Hickerson Files, DSR.

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Council because w e have no faith in the honesty and good w ill of the N etherlands G overnm en t."" During these Security Council debates, two distinct problem s em erged: the m aintenance of the cease-fire order and the pro­ motion o f a long-term political settlem ent. A solution to the first problem w as of urgent im portance, as Dutch m ilitary operations w ere continuing under the guise of m opping-up actions. On A ugust 25 the Soviet Union proposed that a com m ission com­ posed of all Security Council members be set up to supervise the cease-fire. W hen the French vetoed that resolution, the council then voted to accept an Am erican proposal to establish w hat came to be called the Consular Com m ission. This com m ission, w hich in a conscious effort to exclude the Soviet Union com­ prised only those council members that had career consular of­ ficers in Indonesia, w as instructed to submit a report on the ob­ servance o f the cease-fire order to the council.*0Then, in another effort to halt the continuing hostilities, the Security Council issued a new cease-fire order on A ugust 26, calling on the par­ ties "to adhere strictly" to its earlier resolution forbidding any further m ilitary activity.61 In an attem pt to effect a long-term political agreem ent be­ tw een the N etherlands and Indonesia, the council members proposed various resolutions aim ed at establishing an arbitral body to m ediate the dispute. This w as the m ost divisive issue. The republic requested com pulsory arbitration, w hereas the N etherlands expressed its preference for some neutral govern­ m ent, such as die United States, to tender its good offices. A s the Security Council split into blocs on this pivotal question, the "sco n , 2d y r., 184th meeting, August 14 ,19 4 7 , pp. 2002-3, and 187th meeting, A ugust 19 ,19 4 7 , p. 2075. "Ib id ., 194th meeting, August 2 5 ,19 4 7 , pp. 2197-2220; Collins, "United Na­ tions and Indonesia," p. 129; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 152. Philip C. Jessup explained the strategy to exdude the Soviets from the Consular Commis­ sion: "The Western powers then resorted to a device which insured the nonpartidpation of the Soviet Union in the supervisory body. It w as a little less obvious than saying that the commission should not be composed of the representatives o f those members of the Security Council whose names, in French, did not begin w ith 'U / but the result w as achieved by having the commission composed of the representatives of those members of the Security Council who had career con­ suls in Batavia—the Soviet Union had no consul there" (The Birth of Nations [New York: Columbia University Press, 1974], p . 46). “ UN S/521, August 26,1947.

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United States again drafted an acceptable com prom ise proposal. Its resolution, which w as adopted on A ugust 26, brought into being w hat w as later called the Good O ffices Com m ittee o f the Security Council. This committee w ould be com posed o f three member nations; each party to the dispute w ould designate one country to represent its point of view , and those two nations in turn w ould select the third member.*2 By Septem ber 18 the com­ position o f the committee w as com pleted. A s expected, the N etherlands nam ed Belgium and the republic selected A ustra­ lia, their principal advocates respectively in the council debates, w hile the United States, because of its m iddle-ground position in the debates and its enorm ous prestige as the preem inent w orld pow er, w as designated to occupy the strategic third spot on the commission.*3 D espite the two cease-fire orders by the Security Council, conditions in Indonesia continued to deteriorate. The Consular Com m ission, w hich had begun to investigate various Dutchand republican-controlled areas in Java and Sum atra on Septem ­ ber 3, became so alarm ed at the prospect of a return to full-scale hostilities that it transm itted an urgent interim report to the council on Septem ber 22. The report stressed that the cease-fire orders had not been fully effective, as substantial fighting con­ tinued to rage throughout the archipelago. In this and a subse­ quent report on October 1 1 , the Consular Com m ission noted that the Dutch and republicans had pursued w idely divergent interpretations of the cease-fire directives. W hereas the republi­ can governm ent had ordered its troops to halt all hostilities and rem ain in their positions, the N etherlands governm ent had in­ structed its arm y "to proceed w ith the restoration of law and order w ithin the lim its of the lines laid dow n by it." The net effect w as that w hat the Dutch considered to be legitim ate m opping-up operations, the republic regarded as a blatant effort to extend Dutch control. There w as a grow ing possibility, the com­ m ission cautioned, that the already shaky truce w ould break dow n entirely, leading once more to all-out w ar. Colonel O liver “ UN S/514, August 22,1947; scoR, 2d yr., 193rd meeting, August 22,19 4 7, pp. 2177-78; UN S/525, August 26 ,19 47; Collins, "United Nations and Indonesia," P P - 131- 3 4 “ Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 55.

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D ixon, the senior Am erican m ilitary adviser to the com m ission, urgently inform ed the State Departm ent that he believed the Dutch w ere attem pting by m ilitary m eans to reestablish their control over Java.44 In light o f the Consular Com m ission's findings, there w as general agreem ent in the Security Council that the initial cease­ fire resolutions had been sadly ineffective. O pinions varied sharply, how ever, on m ethods to rem edy the problem. Both the Soviet Union and Poland submitted draft resolutions calling for a w ithdraw al of Dutch forces to the areas they had occupied before the police action o f Ju ly 20. The new ly nam ed Am erican representative to the United N ations, W arren A ustin, countered that the Security Council did not possess sufficient inform ation on the com plex crisis to justify such a decision or to be certain it w ould not prejudice the rights, claim s, or positions of the par­ ties. A lthough A ustin personally favored the w ithdraw al of Dutch troops, the State Department instructed him to oppose the Soviet-Polish motion, as it w ould be "clearly not acceptable to the D utch." Accordingly, he argued that it w ould be far more effective to request the Good O ffices Committee, then en route to Indonesia, to help the parties w ork out a cease-fire obser­ vance. This proposal, w hich w as included in an Am ericansponsored draft resolution, w as approved on Novem ber 1 , one d ay after the defeat of two Soviet-backed proposals calling for troop w ithdraw als.45 A n analysis of the various resolutions adopted dem onstrates that the United States successfully m anipulated the Security Council to serve its ow n policy objectives. Am erican policy mak­ ers had initially sought to avoid UN intervention entirely. Intent on m aintaining the support of both the European colonial pow -6 4 64UN S/573, September 2 2 ,1947; UN 8/581, October 11,19 4 7 ; memorandum by Landon of a conversation with Oliver Dixon, October 13 ,19 4 7 ,856E.00/10-1347, DSR. David McCallum, the U .S. naval attaché in Batavia, reached a similar conclusion. See McCallum to CNO, October 24, 1947, Naval Attaché Reports File, w n r c . “ UN S/575, October 3 ,19 4 7 ; UN S/568, October 29,1947; memorandum from Landon to Butterworth, October 15, 1947, in folder labeled "N .E .I. 1947-1948: UNO 8c Other O rganizations," Box 13 , PSA Records, DSR; s c o r 2d yr., 213d l m eeting, October 22,19 4 7, p. 2604; UN S/588, October 27,19 4 7; Taylor, Indone­ sian Independence, pp. 61-62.

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ers and the new ly em erging areas—the term "Third W orld" had not yet been coined—the State Departm ent repeatedly ex­ pressed concern that the UN debates w ould force W ashington to clarify its position on the Dutch police action, thereby en­ dangering its cherished "n eu trality." A s it turned out, these apprehensions w ere m isplaced. Instead, the United States m an­ aged to em erge as the key nation in the Security Council de­ bates, drafting every m ajor resolution that w as ultim ately accepted. Far from relinquishing its role as a neutral in the great colonial debate, then, the United States greatly enhanced it. N ot only w as the United States responsible for all com prom ise proposals o f the council, but it also shaped them so subtly that they consistently favored the Dutch position, w hile appearing to be reasonable and im partial. W hen Australia and the Soviet Union urged the establishm ent of an arbitration com m ission, for exam ple, the United States carefully m aneuvered to defeat that proposal in favor of a Good O ffices Committee. The distinction w as significant: Security Council arbitration, w hich the republic w anted, w ould have been binding on both parties, and obvious­ ly detrim ental to the interests of the N etherlands as the aggres­ sor, w hereas the Good O ffices Committee could only counsel and advise, a procedure that the Dutch could more com fortably accept. M oreover, by carefully guarding its m iddle-ground posi­ tion during the council debates, the United States w as assured that it w ould be the logical—indeed, only— choice for the pivotal third position on the Good O ffices Committee. In the m ilitary sphere, furtherm ore, the United States consistently blocked attem pts to force the Dutch to w ithdraw their troops, much to the gratification of its European ally. Am erican action in this regard represented a superb exam ple of the United States' post­ w ar use of the United N ations to suit its ow n purposes. B y shrouding itself in the robes o f the even-handed com prom iser, the United States not only disguised its pro-Dutch orientation, but also m anaged to accom plish its earlier goal of extending good offices to help settle the dispute, and did so in a m ultilater­ al rather than a bilateral fashion.66 The Good O ffices Committee (GOC) held its first inform al 66A detailed account of Security Council voting on the major proposals con­ cerning Indonesia can be found in Sydney D. Bailey, Voting in the Security Council (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pp. 224-26.

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m eeting in Sydney, A ustralia, on October 20 ,19 4 7. The commit­ tee faced a nearly im possible task; although form ed by the Security Council to help settle a dispute of the greatest com plex­ ity, it had not been granted pow er commensurate w ith its re­ sponsibility. On the contrary, it had only the right to make suggestions to the two parties, and even then, only w hen re­ quested by both sides. Indeed, Lovett privately adm itted to Bal­ four that tiie State Departm ent did not see any w ay in which the committee could succeed.*7 The Am erican representative to the G O C, Frank Porter Graham , the highly respected president of the U niversity of North Carolina and an experienced arbitrator o f labor disputes, later detailed the com m ittee's problem s: The committee at all times was up against such realities as: (1) not only the lack of power to act as arbitrators but also the lack of power even to mediate the dispute; and therefore, (2) the lack of power to make public its suggestions to the parties; (3) the necessi­ ty for the committee to be unanimous in order for its confidential suggestions to the parties to have some moral power; (4) the power of either one of the parties to continue to veto any suggestion of the committee even when unanimous; (5) the possibility of the political overthrow of either cabinet or the realignment of the political par­ ties on the basis of the negotiations in the Indonesian dispute.** Graham and his equally distinguished colleagues—Richard C . K irby, w ho had served on the Australian Com m onwealth Court o f Arbitration, and Paul van Zeeland, w ho had form erly been both prem ier and foreign m inister o f Belgium —began explora­ tory negotiations w ith representatives of the N etherlands and the republic on their arrival in Indonesia in later October. These initial m eetings quickly revealed the lim itations of the G O C 's role. M uch to the disappointm ent of republican officials, Gra­ ham adm itted to Prim e M inister Sjarifuddin that the GO C did not have the authority to com pose the dispute, only to "assist in the pacific settlement."** On N ovem ber 9 H enri van Vreden“ Inverchapel to Foreign Office, FO 371 F i 1910/45/62, PRO. “ Statement of Senator Graham on file Indonesian Situation, April 5, 1949, U .S. Congress, Senate, 81st Cong., ist sess.,Congressional Record, 95:3921. “ Summary Record of Eighth Meeting of the Good Offices Committee, October 29, 1947, UN S/AC.10/SR.8, in Records of the Good Offices Committee, Dag Hamm arskjöld Library, United Nations, N ew York (hereafter dted as GOC Records).

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butch, head of the Dutch delegation, assured the committee that the N etherlands governm ent w ould accept its assistance in helping to w ork out a cease-fire. But, he added candidly, "discussions o f a political nature should as a rule be excluded from the discussions regarding the im plementation o f the cease­ fire resolution."79 The N etherlands, then, w as sim ply unw illing to countenance effective GO C intervention; it had already accom plished m ost of its m ajor m ilitary aim s and w ould have had nothing to gain by subm itting the problem to an im partial arbitration com m ission. A s Graham later observed, "A strong obstructing Dutch factor w as the underlying and not alw ays subm erged determ ination of som e pow erful economic and political interests in the N ether­ lands not really to use the Committee of Good O ffices and to elim inate the Republic from any real part in the preparation for an organization of the prom ised United States of Indonesia."71 The Dutch quite obviously believed that time w as on their side; they could apply political and economic pressures to destroy the republic as a viable entity or at least to render it pow erless as a significant political force in the archipelago. With such clear-cut advantages over its already severely truncated adversary, the N etherlands w as perfectly content to allow a further deteriora­ tion o f the republic's position—and it w as certainly not in­ terested in having a m eddlesom e UN organ interfere in w hat it continued to regard as an internal m atter.72 One Dutch diplom at adm itted that his nation's strategic goal w as "sim ply to divide [Java] into an eastern and w estern h alf."73 A s the intransigence o f their position became more and more apparent, A lfred Brooks o f the Australian delegation to the GO C contem ptuously characterized the Dutch as "Prussians without g u ts."74 ’’’Memorandum from Dutch Delegation to GOC, November 9, 1947, UC S/ A C. 10/50, in ibid. nStatement of Graham, April 5,19 4 9 , in Congressional Record, 95:3922. ^Francis M. Shepherd (acting British consul general, Batavia) to Foreign O ffice, November 28,1947, FO 3 7 1 F 16 113/45/62, PRO; minute by Street, Decem­ ber 10 ,19 4 7, ibid.; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 279-81; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 223-24. "U .S . Naval Attaché, Nanking, to CNO, August 2 1,19 4 7 , Army-Intelligence Document File, RG 319, w n r c . 74Quoted in a conversation between Frank Graham and Henry Brandis (Gra­ ham 's assistant on the GOC), June 9 ,19 6 2, in Southern Oral History Program, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N .C.

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The Dutch police action had severely crippled the republic. N early two-thirds of Java, including its m ajor producing areas, as w ell as the m ajor economic centers of Sum atra, w ere now under Dutch control. Sharply reduced in size and economic resources, the republic desperately longed for outside assis­ tance. "In dos ardently desire action by Security Council at once," reported the Am erican naval attaché stationed in Batavia, "for they know Dutch have pow er to elim inate present Indo G ov if Dutch choose to disregard w orld opinion and take rem aining cities in Ja v a ."7* A s a result of the tim ely action of the Security Council, noted a republican memorandum to the GO C, "the N etherlands Governm ent w as unable to accom plish the m ilitary dom ination of the islan d s." The Dutch did succeed "in gaining control o f the main economic areas before A ugust 4th. Conse­ quently, any delay in reaching an overall political settlem ent, and the im plem entation of the cease fire, w ill enable the Nether­ lands Governm ent to consolidate its economic gains, and m ust therefore inevitably w eaken the position of the R ep u b lic.. . . We feel su re ," concluded the statem ent signed by Sjarifuddin, "that it w as not the intention of the Security Council that the rights and interests o f one party should be prejudiced by the acts of aggression o f the other p arty."74 With its position now virtually hopeless, the republican governm ent depended on prom pt and effective action by the GO C to ensure its very survival. H am pered by its lack o f real pow er, the GO C nonetheless w orked to bring the two parties to the bargaining table. The first m ajor problem it encountered w as the selection of a neutral site fo r the talks. The Dutch insisted that the m eetings be held some­ w here in Indonesia, w hile the republicans announced their strong opposition to holding the sessions in Dutch-controlled territory. Joseph Scott of the Am erican delegation, a representa­ tive o f the State Departm ent's Division of International Security A ffairs, proposed the perfect compromise solution: he sug­ gested that tire m eetings be held on a neutral ship provided by ’’ McCallum to CNO, August 27, 1947, in Naval Operational Archives, W ashington N avy Yard. ^Memorandum from Republic of Indonesia to GOC, November 28,1947, UN S/AC. 10/46, GOC Records, UN Library, New York. See also Sjahrir to KUleam, Septem ber 6 ,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F12416/45/62, PRO; statement by Sjarifuddin to GOC, December 10 , 1947, UN S/AC.10/CONF.2/SR.3, Annex II, GOC Records, UN Library.

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the U .S. governm ent and anchored in Indonesian w aters. A lthough the State Departm ent initially resisted this proposal, fearing that an Am erican vessel w ould tend to overem phasize W ashington's intervention in Indonesia, Graham insisted and his view prevailed. With this recommendation acceptable to both parties, the United States com m issioned the U .S.S. Renville to serve as the sym bolic vessel.77 W hile aw aiting the arrival of the Remrille, the GO C began to explore possible talking points between the Dutch and Indone­ sian delegations. Speaking before the representatives of both parties on December 7, Graham rem arked that the responsibility for a settlem ent lay m ainly w ith the Dutch and the Indonesians. The GO C "h ad brought no magic from Lake Success," he said; it possessed only "faith in the m iracles o f the hum an sp irit." The Am erican representative noted that the United N ations w as organizing a political fram ework for the peaceful settlem ent o f disputes corresponding to the interdependent economic fram e­ w ork o f the m odem w orld. It w as the responsibility o f the dele­ gates to transform the area of high potential for conflict in In­ donesia—w hose economic resources w ere desperately needed in the w orld—into an area of high potential for peace and free­ dom .78 The follow ing day, the first m eeting w as held on board the Renville. On the recommendation of Scott and Charlton O gbum , a member of the State Departm ent's Division o f Southeast A sian A ffairs, Graham presented the view that the two parties should adopt the Linggadjati agreem ent as a w orking basis for discussion.79 Drafted in the form of "a proposal subm itted for consideration," the Am erican suggestion reasoned: Had no relationship between the parties ever been defined, the concepts of a relationship would have to be explored without prec” Shepherd to Foreign Office (reporting a conversation with Graham), Novem ­ ber 27,19 4 7, FO 371 F15701/45/62, PRO; interviews with Joseph Scott, August 5, 1975, and Charlton Ogbum, May 2 ,19 7 4 ; Jessup, Birth of Nations, p. 48. ’•Sum m ary Record of ist Meeting between Republican and Netherlands Delegations, December 7, 1947, UN S/AC. 10/CONF.2/SR. 1 , GOC Records, UN Library. ’ •Memorandum from Scott to Graham, December 14 ,19 4 7 , in Indonesia Files, Frank Graham Papers, University of North Carolina Library; Summary Record of 41st M eeting of GOC, December 8 ,19 4 7, UN S/AC.10/SR.41, GOC Records, UN Library.

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edent or guidance. The work of the Committee would have to begin from scratch. Fortunately this is not the case. The Unggadjati Agreement, regardless of its present status, defines the areas in which an agreement between the parties must be obtained. It pro­ vides a frame of reference. . . . Each side, it may be assumed, would be less likely to take an extreme position if called upon to define its present program in terms of a compromise concept of its relation to the other to which it has subscribed.10 Since neither the Dutch nor the Indonesians could present concrete proposals of their ow n, both agreed to accept the Am erican recom m endation. The GO C then met separately w ith the N etherlands and the republican delegations in several infor­ m al sessions between December 1 1 and December 19 . The meet­ in gs proved unproductive, though, as each side steadfastly m aintained its ow n interpretation of the U nggadjati agreem ent. A t the final session, van Vredenburch dryly commented that an y further article-by-article exam ination of U nggadjati w ould probably only discover fresh areas of disagreem ent.01 A t this point van M ook confided to a British official that he could see no solution other than the disintegration of the republic. He added o ff the record that he had no confidence in the G O C 's efforts; he could not see such a man as Graham succeeding, since "h e w as too naive and too inexperienced in dealing w ith O rientals."02 The fragile truce also began to break dow n at this time. The republic charged that Dutch m opping-up operations at Raw ahgede had resulted in the killing o f more than 300 civilians and the w ounding of 200 m ore.03 "The D utch," com plained the republic in a statem ent released on December 14 , "h ave agreed only to those points contained in the initial suggestions of the °°Proposals Submitted by the U .S. Delegation for Consideration by the Com­ mittee, December 8 ,19 4 7, UN S/AC. 10/58, GOC Records, UN Library. "Sum m ary Record of 47th Meeting of GOC, December 19 ,19 4 7 , UN S/AC. 10/ SR.47, GOC Records, UN Library; Secretary of State's weekly summary, Novem ber 24,19 47, DSR. “ Shepherd to Foreign Office, December 4 ,19 4 7, FO 3 7 1 F16032/45/62, PRO. “ Memorandum from Republican Delegation's Special Committee, December 24, 1947, S/AC. 10/76, Annex I, GOC Records, UN Library. The impartial Rawahgede Observation Team of the GOC reported on January 12 , 1948, that "the action taken by the Netherlands Arm y w as deliberate and ruthless" (UN S/AC.10/85, ibid.). 19 7

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Com m ittee o f Good O ffices which they know w ould be to their advantage or w ould not affect them in their attem pts to control, adm inister and econom ically reconstruct in their own interest the territories behind w hat they claim to be their forw ard positions."“ The N etherlands prom ptly countered that it could have little faith in the outcome o f political discussions because o f continuing republican truce violations. The Renville's comman­ der, Captain D avid Tyree, summed up the new im passe in a terse m essage to W ashington: "Cannot hope for Republic to last much longer under present circum stances."*5 In a radio speech on December 19 , Dutch Prem ier Beel em phasized the gravity of these developm ents. He declared that "further delay is not justified" in reaching an agreem ent, "b e­ cause interests too great, too vital for the peoples o f Indonesia and the N etherlands and ultim ately for the w hole w orld are at stake." H e w arned: "It w ould be most regrettable if this appeal, this last appeal w ere not understood."“ Van Zeeland underscored the seriousness of the im passe at a m eeting of the GO C on December 2 1. If the committee failed, the Belgian delegate said, "it w ould mean a trem endous setback for the ideals connected w ith the United N ations, and a very bad situation w ould arise for all parties concerned: the United N a­ tions, the N etherlands, and the Republic." He added: 'T o m e the failure o f our efforts to bring about an arm istice and through it a peaceful settlem ent, m ight mean practically, in one step or in tw o, the end of the Republic." Van Zeeland recom m ended that the committee draft a conciliatory m essage to both parties, urging a resum ption o f constructive talks and a renew ed effort to achieve an acceptable agreement.*7 A t this critical juncture, Graham w arned the State Depart­ ment of the seriousness o f the D utch-Indonesian stalem ate. Lovett replied that W ashington believed it appropriate for the "Statem ent released by Republican M inistry of Information, December 14, 1947, UN S/AC10/CO N F.1/SR.7, ibid. "T yree to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, December 9 ,19 4 7, Naval Oper­ ational Archives, Washington N avy Yard. "Q uoted in memorandum from Republican Delegation to GO C, December 2 1, 1947, UN S/AC. 10/73, GOC Records, UN Library. "M em orandum submitted by Belgian representative to GOC, December 2 1, 1947, UN S/AC.10/SR.49, Annex I, ibid.

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GO C to take a "firm stand" w ith the two parties "so that sub­ stantive discussion can proceed." U nless each side evidenced a w illingness to enter into negotiations w ith a "conciliatory spir­ it," he pointed out, no progress w ould be made. The State De­ partm ent believed the time had now come for the United States to take a "strong position along these lin es" in order to produce a "p ositive and salutary effect on other GO C members and on p arties."* Taking the initiative, Graham drafted a special m essage to the tw o parties, w hich w as accepted by the full committee on De­ cem ber 25. The "Christm as M essage," as it came to be known, began by w arning the Dutch and Indonesians that a longer de­ lay, "how ever supported by different or divergent argum enta­ tio n ," w ould violate the spirit of the UN resolutions. It urged the tw o parties again "to reconsider, im m ediately, the w hole prob­ lem w ith greater realism , w ith reciprocal toleration, and w ith renew ed em phasis on all the hum an aspects of the disp u te." The m essage w ent on to detail a proposed com prom ise settle­ m ent, w hich in effect asked the republic to accept the Nether­ lands position on the m ilitary issues in return for a fair and peaceful determ ination of the political issues. The m ilitary aspect o f the Christm as M essage provided for a truce line to be set at the Dutch forw ard positions as of A ugust 4—a cease-fire line that the republic had consistently disputed. Politically, the proposal called for the restoration of republican civil adm inistra­ tion w ithin three m onths of the signing of the political agree­ m ent, and the subsequent w ithdraw al of Dutch forces from all territory occupied as a result of the police action. In addition, the G O C 's com prom ise overture suggested that free elections be held w ithin six to tw elve months to determ ine the future rela­ tionship between the republic and the United States of Indone­ sia; that the GO C w ould continue to assist the two parties in their efforts to im plement the settlement; that each side w ould begin gradual troop reductions; that free economic activity w ould be prom ptly and com pletely restored; and that an im par­ tial United N ations body w ould be appointed to observe condi­ tions pending the eventual establishm ent of the U .S .I.* “ Lovett to Graham, December 19 ,19 4 7 , in FR, 1947, 6:1084-85. “ UN S/AC. 10/75, December 25,19 47.

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Graham , a firm believer in the principle o f self-determ ination ever since his days as a professor of Am erican history, had increasingly come to appreciate the republic's interpretation o f events and had become disillusioned w ith Dutch policy. H e later castigated the Dutch version o f the proposed federated U .S .I., for exam ple, as really "ju st Dutch puppet states." D raw ­ ing an analogy w ith the Am erican Revolution, he offered his personal interpretation of Dutch actions: "It w ould be like form ­ ing the United States o f Am erica under the Tories. Ju st lock George W ashington up, and som e o f the others, and then put the Tories in charge of the several states and call it the United States of A m erica." M oreover, he considered the republic, as he explained to M arshall, to be "the rallying center o f the largest, ablest, and m ost dedicated single group o f Indos in this struggle fo r independence." The present leadership o f the republic, he m aintained, "seem s as m oderate, reasonable and responsive to W estern ideas of any likely to arise in [the] future."10 Yet for all o f his pro-Indonesian sentim ents—and som e members o f the State Departm ent unfairly accused him of serving as an advo­ cate for the republic91— the Christm as M essage, o f w hich G ra­ ham w as the principal author, definitely favored the Dutch posi­ tion. The explanation for this seem ing anom aly is actually quite sim ple: Graham realized that the Dutch preponderance of force w as so great and the position o f the republic so precarious that it w ould be a m ajor accom plishm ent to get The H ague's consent to an y agreem ent, no matter how favorable to Dutch interests. Consequently, he sought to achieve by the Christm as M essage a settlem ent that, under the auspices o f the United N ations, w ould ensure the continued survival o f the Indonesian Re­ public.92 On December 30 the republic announced its reluctant accep­ tance o f the com m ittee's plan. "A lthough the m ost recent pro"Interview with Frank Graham, June 10 ,19 6 2 , in Southern Oral History Pro­ gram, University of North Carolina, p. 19; Graham to M arshall, December 3 1, 19 4 7 ,5oi.BC-Indonesia/2*3i47, DSR; Graham to M arshall, December 20,19 47, in FR , 1947,6:1088. 91Interviews with Scott, August 4, 1975; Ogbum, May 2, 1974; and Jam es Barco, M ay 7 ,19 7 5 . "G raham to Professor Am ry Vandenbosch, December 3, 1948, Graham to Harold R. Isaacs, March 10 ,19 4 8 , both in Indonesia Files, Graham Papers. 20 0

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posais o f the Com m ittee o f Good O ffices involve considerable sacrifices on the part of the R epublic/' rem arked the republican delegation's m em orandum to die GO C, "and although they are not stricdy in accordance w ith the Republicans' ow n under­ standing o f the Security C ouncil's resolutions, the Indonesian Delegation accepts them as an integrated and balanced w hole for the settlement."** This qualified acceptance reflected the re­ public's realization that the proposals represented at least an opportunity to secure the continued existence of its govern­ m ent. The Dutch w ere even less pleased w ith the inform al sugges­ tions o f the Christm as M essage. In a memorandum addressed to the GO C on January 2, 1948, the N etherlands delegation accepted the com m ittee's plan for a truce agreem ent, but took strong exception to the political principles. A greeing only to those proposals that explicitly favored their ow n position, the Dutch rejected the heart o f die com m ittee's recom m endations and countered w ith a list of tw elve political proposals o f their ow n. These Dutch counterproposals elim inated all reference to the restoration o f republican civil adm inistration and the w ith­ draw al o f troops; rem oved the principle guaranteeing interna­ tional observation during the transition period; m ade no provi­ sion for representation o f the republic in the interim gov­ ernm ent; and deleted any mention of the Republic o f Indonesia. O n January 9, the N etherlands delegation inform ed the commit­ tee that unless it received w ord of the republic's unqualified acceptance o f these counterproposals w ithin three days, it w ould ask The H ague for further instructions, "indicating that there w as reason to believe that its Governm ent w ould decide to resum e their freedom o f action."91 Graham understood the urgency of this latest crisis; he real­ ized that the Dutch intended their m essage as an ultim atum , and that only tim ely GO C intervention could hope to prevent a return to full-scale hostilities. Earlier, the Am erican representa­ tive had advised the State Department that he believed the com"Republican memorandum to GOC, December 30, 1947, UN S/AC. 10/76, GO C Records, UN Library. "U N S/AC. 10/81 and UN S/A G 10/81 Rev. 1 , December 2 ,19 4 7, GOC Records, UN Library.

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m ittee had tw o alternatives: either to support the Dutch plan for a U .S.I. w ith or without the republic's participation or to sup­ port the republic's daim to sovereignty over Java and Sum atra. In respect to ultim ate sovereignty in Indonesia, Graham had insisted that there could be no com prom ise.’* On December 3 1 , Lovett in a telegram to Graham , outlined these tw o choices against the backdrop of overall Am erican foreign policy objec­ tives. "N etherlands is [a] strong proponent [of] US policy in Eu rope," the under secretary noted. Dept believes that [the] stability [of the] present Dutch Govt would be seriously undermined if Netherlands fails to retain very con­ siderable stake in NEI, and that the political consequences of fail­ ure [of] present Dutch Govt would in all likelihood be prejudicial to US position in Western Europe. Accordingly, Dept unfavorable to any solution requiring immediate and complete withdrawal Netherlands from Indies or any important part thereof. H ow ever, Lovett explained, the United States "h as long favored self-governm ent or independence for peoples w ho are qualified to accept consequent responsibilities." Therefore, the State De­ partm ent w as favorably disposed to a solution providing for Dutch sovereignty for a lim ited period "an d setting date in fu­ ture for independence of Indonesians, both Republican and non-Republican. " Another guide to Am erican policy tow ard Indonesia w as eco­ nomic interest. A s Lovett sum m arized it: "D ept desires speediest acceleration of trade between all of Indonesia and rest o f w orld. This desire of long standing now heightened by trem endous burden im posed on US ability to supply consum er goods under M arshall P lan ." Indonesia w ould be indispensable as a supplier of food and other commodities to meet needs defined by the European Recovery Program . "T h erefore," he declared, "D ept unfavorably disposed toward any solution w hich [w ould be] likely to protract existing disorder in N E I." Lovett concluded by inform ing Graham that he hoped these principles w ould prove useful in further Dutch-Indonesian discussions.96 "G raham to M arshall, December 2 2,19 4 7, in FR, 1947, 6:1090-93; oral report by Henry Brandis to State Department, January 2 9 ,19 4 8 ,856D.00/11-2948, DSR. "Lovett to Graham, December 3 1,19 4 7 , in FR, 19 4 7,6 :10 9 9 -110 1. 202

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With the two sides now in a virtual deadlock, Graham endeav­ ored to incorporate Lovett's principles in a new program that he intended to subm it inform ally to both parties. The U .S. del­ egation believed, Graham cabled the State Department on Janu­ ary 6, that "if conditions set by Dutch are not m odified, collapse o f Republic either under Dutch m ilitary action or through inter­ nal difficulties is m ost likely outcome and that w orld reaction w ill be m ost serious, particularly for U S, which holds [the] key position [on the] G O C " Accordingly, in a "last attem pt [to] prevent [a] crisis" and "resolve [the] legitim ate interests [of] both p arties," he outlined six supplem entary political principles. These additional principles provided for the republic's inclusion as one o f the com ponent states of the U .S .I.; called for the con­ tinuation o f the United N ations' presence during the interim period; and assured the republic of fair representation in any interim governm ent. On January 7, M arshall inform ed Graham that W ashington considered this approach to be "em inently fair and m anifestly practical" and noted that it "should form [the] basis o f [a] settlem ent which w ill be favorably received by [the Security Council] and w orld opinion." On January 10 , after re­ ceiving the support of the full committee, Graham transm itted the six additional political principles to both the Dutch and the republicans.97 Sim ultaneously, the State Departm ent began to pressure the Dutch to accept the G O C 's new proposals. In a m eeting w ith representatives of the Dutch governm ent on January 8, Am er­ ican diplom ats urged the N etherlands "in the strongest term s" to consider and accept prom ptly the political principles set forth b y Graham . Failure to accept G raham 's proposed solution, they explained bluntly, w ould prevent Am erican assistance in financ­ ing Indonesian reconstruction and w ould endanger Dutch par­ ticipation in the European Recovery Program .9* The N etherlands bow ed to this Am erican pressure. "I be"G raham to M arshall, January 6, 1948, and Marshall to Graham, January 7, 1948, in FR, 1948, 6:62-64, 68; UN S/AC. 10/84 Rev. 1 , January 10, 1948, GOC Records, UN Library. "M em orandum by Nolting of a conversation with Helb, Lacy, and others, 856D.00/1-848, DSR; Philip Bonsai (chargé, The Hague), to M arshall, January 12 , 19 4 8 ,856E.00/1-1248, DSR; General A. R. Bolling, Acting Director of Intelligence, Department of the Arm y, to Chief of Staff, June 15 ,19 4 8 , Planning and Opera­ tion Division Files, Modem Military Branch. 203

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lie v e ," reported Philip Bonsai, Am erican chargé at The H ague, "that at the Cabinet m eeting on January 1 1 , the matter w as presented by the Prime M inister and the Foreign M inister as one w hose rejection w ould involve the serious consequences flow ­ ing from a w ithdraw al of the prom ise o f economic assistance from the United States." On that sam e day, the Dutch inform ed the GO C of their acceptance of the six additional principles.99 On January 12 the committee members flew to Kaliurang, a m ountain resort near the republic's capital at Jogjakarta, to ex­ plain the proposed settlem ent to the republicans. The republic's representatives, understandably, w ere skeptical. Sjarifuddin re­ m arked that the republic had been convinced that Linggadjati's m eaning had been clear w hen it signed that ill-fated pact, only to have the Dutch pursue a unilateral interpretation, and he explained that the republic sought to avoid a repetition of that unfortunate experience. A fter analyzing the various aspects of the proposed settlem ent, Graham assured the republicans that the pact w ould not affect the republic's present status. "Y ou are w hat you a re ," he told them , "an d that is w hat you w ill re­ m ain ." With the greatest reluctance, they decided to accept the G O C 's plan. G raham 's assurances that the agreem ent w ould not adversely affect their current status w on the republicans over; they believed that Graham and the Am erican governm ent could be relied on to ensure that fair, U N -supervised plebiscites w ould be held in the territories overrun by the Dutch arm y. On January 14 the Republic of Indonesia officially accepted the com­ m ittee's proposals.1" On January 17 , 1948, the Dutch and the republicans signed the agreem ent on board the U .S.S. Renville. The Renville agree­ m ent, as it came to be know n, alm ost surely prevented another Dutch m ilitary action, but it left m any of the basic issues in "Bonsai to M arshall, January 19 ,19 4 8 ,856E.00/1-1948, DSR; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 89-90. '“ Summary records of 60th and 61st meetings of GOC, January 12 and 13 , 1948, UN/S/AC.10/SR.60, GOC Records, UN Library; Hadji A . Salim to Graham, June 19 ,19 4 8 , in Indonesia Files, Graham Papers; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-196$ (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), pp. 38-39; Johannes Leimena, The Dutch-Iridonesian Conflict (Jakarta, 1949), p. 7; T. B. Simatupang, Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's War (Ithaca: Cor­ nell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1972), p. 32.

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dispute unresolved. A s Richard Kirby, the Australian repre­ sentative, commented at the signing cerem onies: Bold signatures on impressive documents cannot alone dispel the troubles of this archipelago. Even the limited objectives and under­ standings of today's agreement will be impossible of performance unless the two parties approach the problem of implementation and the political discussions which will shortly commence, in a spirit of cooperation and tolerance. More important than the words of today's documents is the spirit behind the intention of the parties.101 H is cautionary w ords w ould prove to be prophetic. 101Statement by Kirby, January 17,19 4 8 , UN S/AC.10/CONF.2/SR.4, Annex IV, GO C Records, UN Library.

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7 From Negotiations to War: January-Decem ber 1 9 4 8 The Renville agreem ent represented a hum iliating defeat for the Republic o f Indonesia. Not only did it significantly dim inish the status o f the republic from that envisioned by the Linggadjati agreem ent, but it also accepted the crude Dutch conquest of republican territory as a fait accompli. Prime M inister Sjarifuddin agreed to the settlem ent in the face of strong dom estic opposition, and it quickly led to the dow nfall of his governm ent. Citing their disillusionm ent w ith the intolerable concessions m ade to the Dutch, two of the republic's m ajor political parties abruptly w ithdrew from Sjarifuddin's cabinet. H is delicate coali­ tion in a sham bles, he resigned on January 2 3 ,19 4 8 .1 Indonesian politicians w ere not alone in their dissatisfaction w ith the Renville settlem ent. The Soviet Union also castigated the pact, claim ing that it had been forced on the reluctant repub­ licans by U .S. pressure and the threat of a renew ed Dutch attack. Speaking before the United N ations on February 27, A ndrei Grom yko, the Soviet delegate, proclaim ed his nation's utter contempt for the agreem ent. "It should be placed in a m useum ," he declared sarcastically, "a s proof of how sham eful a docum ent can be produced w hen some of the members of the United N ations betray the interests o f the Indonesian people for 'U .S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), Division of Research for the Far East, "A nalysis of the Political Principles of the Renville Agreem ent," Situation Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480.48, February 11,19 4 8 , U .S. Department of State Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter dted as DSR); George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 230-31. 206

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the benefit o f the colonial pow ers. In this connection, I cannot help recalling the w ords of the well-known w riter and satirist M ark Tw ain, w ho said that a hen laid a norm al-sized egg and cackled as though it had laid a sm all planet. M ark Tw ain w as a w ise man and w e should remember his w ords n o w ."2 W hile it is certainly true that the term s of the Renville agree­ m ent w ere conspicuously unfavorable to the republic, it is equally clear that the republic's options w ere severely lim ited. U nless its leaders had been w illing to accept the logic of perdjuangan—full-scale guerrilla w arfare against the Dutch—diplo­ m asi rem ained the only viable alternative policy. A nd although the Renville settlem ent represented a dram atic setback in the republic's struggle to achieve independence, it did ensure the continued survival of the republican governm ent. Sjarifuddin's governm ent, m oreover, had agreed to sign the pact only after Frank Graham assured its representatives at Kaliurang that the agreem ent w ould not adversely affect the republic's status. This w as the Indonesians' trum p card: that the United States and the United N ations, both of which had placed their prestige and pow er behind the agreem ent, w ould guarantee a just im ple­ mentation of its term s. "Tell the Am erican people," Sjarifuddin pleaded after the Renville signing, "that w e count upon them to insure a fair plebiscite here. The plebiscite w ill chart the fu ­ ture destiny of a p eople."3 A s long as the republic continued to define its options w ithin a larger strategy of diplom asi, its leaders w ould be com pelled to cultivate Am erican support. The United States fully backed the Renville agreem ent, w hich had been largely drafted by Graham and cleared w ith the State Departm ent. The republic could have refused to sign it only at the risk of alienating the U .S. govern­ ment—a risk considered too great by nearly all republican lead­ ers. A lthough Sjarifuddin w as repudiated for his identification w ith Renville, the logic of his position w as soon vindicated. On January 29 M ohammed Hatta announced the form ation of a new cabinet; the new prim e m inister quickly revealed that his gov­ ernm ent w as firm ly committed to the prom pt im plem entation of ’ United Nations Security Council, Official Records ing, February 26,1948, pp. 312 , 315. *New York Times, January 19 ,19 4 8 , p. 10. 208

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Renville, the sam e position for w hich Sjarifuddin had been ousted.4 For its part, the United States unequivocally supported the negotiation o f the Renville settlem ent. A memorandum pre­ pared for Secretary M arshall on February 10 by the directors of the three State Departm ent offices w ith concurrent jurisdiction over the Dutch-Indonesian im broglio offered the follow ing assessm ent: The agreement reached represents an important achievement by tiie Security Council in a difficult and, until now, rapidly de­ teriorating situation. Without the Good Offices Committee, it seems highly unlikely that the parties would have succeeded in reaching a truce agreement, or any political settlement; indeed, it is not unlikely that the Republic of Indonesia would soon have been eliminated as a political factor in the Netherlands East Indies. W hile recognizing that the pact w as "largely favorable to the Dutch and as such represents several im portant com prom ises on the part o f the Indonesian Republic," they explained that it represented the necessary first step tow ard a lasting settlem ent. They cautioned, how ever, that "it w ill be fully effective only w ith the maximum cooperation by both parties." Accordingly, negotiations for the perm anent agreem ent m ust be entered into at once, "before any opportunity arises for exacerbation of the feelings of the parties"; they suggested that "the negotiations should be concluded as quickly as possible and agreem ent signed w ithin six w eeks at the m ost." Secretary M arshall should im press on the Dutch am bassador "the heavy responsibility already assum ed by the United States in helping to settle the Indonesian dispute and the im portance this Governm ent attaches to im m ediate adoption o f a perm anent agreem ent." The m em orandum concluded by urging M arshall to rem ind the Dutch that "because o f their superior tactical position . . . a far greater than halfw ay effort by the Dutch w ill be required if a successful settlem ent is to be reached and is to en dure."’ 4Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 231-34; Anthony J. S. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-50 (Hawthorn, Australia: Longman, 1974), p. 114 . ’ Memorandum from Dean Rusk (director, Office of United Nations Affairs), W. Walton Butterworth (director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs), and John D. 209

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For all its lim itations, Renville conform ed perfectly w ith the larger policy objectives o f the United States in postw ar South­ east A sia. By harm onizing continued Dutch control over the Indies w ith a timetable for eventual native self-rule, the agree­ m ent seem ed to ensure the delicate balance between European and nationalist interests that the United States had favored ever since the end of W orld W ar D. It w as a com prom ise form ula, m oreover, w hich could be accepted w ith varying degrees o f enthusiasm by all concerned offices w ithin the Am erican gov­ ernm ent; and, given the often w ide divergence o f opinion in W ashington over the Indonesian conflict, this w as in itself a rem arkable accomplishment.* Like the Linggadjati agreem ent before it, the Renville agree­ m ent w as subject to w idely divergent interpretations—unavoid­ ably so, in light o f the hasty m anner in w hich the agreem ent had been reached. The Good O ffices Committee had correctly sur­ m ised that another police action w ould have been undertaken had the committee not seized the initiative by presenting a com ­ prom ise plan. Consequently, the GO C hurriedly drafted a con­ ciliatory program that tended naturally to stress points of agree­ m ent w hile avoiding m ajor areas of contention. This strategy— along w ith appropriate Am erican pressure on both parties— resulted in a settlem ent w hose term s w ere extrem ely vague. A successful im plem entation of the pact, as the February 10 State Departm ent mem orandum pointed out, thus depended on the w illingness o f both sides to display good faith in executing its provisions.*7 Hickerson (director, Office of European Affairs) to George C. M arshall, February 10, 1948, in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D .C ., 1974), 6 :9 194. Hereafter volumes in this series w ill be dted as FR, followed by the year. ‘ Ibid. A brief summary of U .S. interests in postwar Southeast Asia is provided in Office of Naval Intelligence, "Basic Factors in World Relations," June 1948, Post World War II Command File, Naval Operational Archives, Washington N avy Yeard. 7U .S. Department of State, OIR, "Draft Agreement: Comparison of Nether­ lands and Republican Views on Structure of USI with the Renville Agreem ent," April 15 ,19 4 8 ; 'Tabular Comparison of Netherlands and Republican Views on the U SI" and "Tabular Comparison of Republican and Netherlands Concepts of the Netherlands-Indonesian U nion," Appendices III and V in Report no. 4679, "Dutch-Indonesian Negotiations: Major Issues and Tim ing," April 29, 1948, all in Indonesia Files, Graham Papers, University of North Carolina Library.

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Initial indications w ere hopeful, as the republicans prom ptly dem onstrated their w illingness to com ply w ith even the harsh­ est term s of the pact. In accordance w ith the truce agreem ent, the Hatta governm ent began the im m ediate w ithdraw al of some o f the republic's finest troops from the considerable pockets of resistance they occupied behind Dutch lines. By February 26, m uch to the surprise o f the Dutch, 35,000 republican troops had evacuated their strategic guerrilla bases within Dutch-occupied territory.* Colonel C . S. M eyers of the Am erican m ilitary obser­ ver group attached to the GO C rem arked w ith astonishm ent that the Dutch had not believed that there w ere any guerrilla forces behind their lines. "I am sure it w as a considerable shock to som e of our sm ug frien d s," he w rote to Graham , "to be com pelled to face up to it. There w ere around 35,000 o f them !"9 This w ithdraw al represented a m ajor concession on the part of the republic, as the bases w ere strategically invaluable. The Dutch, m oreover, had not yet given any indication that the prom ised U N -sponsored plebiscites w ould actually be held. On the contrary, Dutch actions in the afterm ath of the Ren­ ville signing soon repeated a fam iliar pattern. The N etherlands delayed political discussions w ith the republic until mid-March; in the m eantim e, it unilaterally m oved to form new states in the areas seized from the republic. In W est Java, in M adura, and in East Sum atra, the Dutch sponsored the creation o f new states that w ould be responsive to the interests of the N etherlands. This crude extension of their federal program to include form er republican territories w as actually a direct contravention of the Renville agreem ent, as republican officials charged and Am er­ ican and A ustralian members of the GO C privately adm itted.10 These new states did not represent a spontaneous expression of self-determ ination on the part of their populations, as Renville 'Interview with Charlton Ogbum, M ay 2 ,19 7 5 ; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolu­ tion, p. 234. ’ M eyer to Graham, M ay 13 ,19 4 8 , in Graham Papers. ,0Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 235; Central Intelligence Agency, "R e­ view of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States," C IA 3-48, February 12 ,19 4 8 , President's Secretary's File (PSF), Truman Papers, H arry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. See also "Suggestions by the United States Delegation on a Time Table of the Steps to Be Taken toward the Creation of the U SI," April 26, 1948, UN S/AC. 10 /115, GOC Records, UN l i ­ brary, N ew York. 211

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had explicitly stipulated; instead, the Dutch them selves had taken the lead in establishing these states, had not allow ed G O C supervision, and had blocked the "freedom o f assem bly, speech, and publication" and the "uncoerced and free discus­ sion and consideration of vital issu es" that they had agreed to ensure under the Renville agreem ent.11 W ith great fanfare, Queen W ilhelmina had dram atically de­ clared on February 3, 1948, that "colonialism is d ead ," but in light o f Dutch actions in Indonesia, her statem ent appeared in­ creasingly m eaningless to republican officials.12 Their suspicions of Dutch intentions increased substantially w hen van M ook announced the establishm ent of an interim federal governm ent on M arch 9. This governm ent, which w as to function until the creation o f the United States of Indonesia, still slated for Jan u ary i , 1949/ w as created independent from the Republic o f Indone­ sia. A lthough the Dutch form ally requested republican partic­ ipation in the interim regim e, this w as a hollow gesture, for, as the republicans pointed out, Renville had called for joint Dutchrepublican cooperation in the form ation of an interim govern­ m ent, not unilateral action by one party. The Dutch action, charged the Indonesian Republic, w as "a unilateral action pro­ ceeded to w ithout consultation of the Republic," and w as "con­ trary to the spirit as w ell as to the letter of the Renville A greem en t."13 The Dutch-created interim regim e "represented no real change in the pow er structure of Dutch-controlled In­ donesia. It w as m erely the old N etherlands Indies regim e in new dress and w as run by the personnel of the colonial regim e w ith a few anti-Republican Indonesians included to present a better facad e."14 On M arch 18 ,19 4 8 , political discussions between the two par­ ties finally resum ed, once again under the mediation o f the Good O ffices Com m ittee. The com position of the GO C had “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 235. uNew York Times, February 4,1948 , p. 1. “ Republican Delegation to Good Offices Committee, March 15 , 1948, UN S/AC. 10 /121 Appendix II, Records of the Good Offices Committee, UN Library (hereafter cited as GOC Records). See also U .S. Department of State, OIR, "Developm ents in the Indonesian Situation for the Period February through March, 1948," April 14 ,19 4 8 , in Graham Papers. “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 245.

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changed since the Renville negotiations. The Am erican repre­ sentative, Frank Graham , had asked President Trum an to re­ place him so that he could return to his duties as president of the U niversity o f N orth Carolina. Truman then named Coert duBois to serve as chief of the United States delegation. DuBois had recently retired after a long career in the Foreign Service; as a consul general in the East Indies during the 1930s he had be­ come closely acquainted w ith the problem s of the Indonesian archipelago, and this experience undoubtedly influenced his appointm ent as successor to Graham . DuBois had also de­ veloped cordial ties w ith Dutch political and business leaders w hile serving in the East Indies; the State Departm ent, w hich w as keenly aw are of Dutch objections to Graham , w anted an Am erican on the committee w ho w ould be more acceptable to N etherlands officials. The Belgian and Australian delegation chiefs had also departed, and they w ere succeeded by their re­ spective deputies—Raym ond H errem ans, a m inister in the Bel­ gian diplom atic service, and Thom as K. Critchley, an officer in the A ustralian Departm ent o f External A ffairs and an accom­ plished econom ist.15 The negotiations soon revealed that fundam ental areas o f dis­ agreem ent still existed between the Dutch and the republicans. A s the GO C later reported to the Security Council, the "m ajor issues dividing the parties are the very issues w hich have al­ w ays divided them and w hich the Linggadjati Agreem ent failed to reso lve."15 The m ost divisive issue w as still sovereignty: the republic insisted that it could m aintain its de facto authority, including its arm y and foreign relations, until the transfer of sovereignty to an independent federal United States of In­ donesia; the Dutch categorically denied the republic's right to an y such authority.17 Initially the Am erican delegation to the GO C pressed the re­ publicans to accept Dutch term s. On A pril 5 duBois met w ith »A lastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, i960), pp. 102-3; interview with Jam es Barco, M ay 7, 1975; Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History (New York: Prae­ ger, 1963), p. 77. 16UN S/848, June 2 1,19 4 8 . ,7J. Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," International Concilia­ tion, March 1950, pp. 154-57; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 117 -2 0 . 213

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republican officials and candidly inform ed them o f the A m er­ ican governm ent's interpretation of the Renville agreem ent. Under the term s o f that settlem ent, duBois stressed, there could be no doubt that sovereignty resided w ith the Dutch during the interim period; the republic, accordingly, had no right to con­ duct independent foreign relations. He criticized the republic's refusal to join the Dutch-created interim governm ent and asserted that the N etherlands had thus far m ade the m ost farreaching concessions that could be asked; any reluctance on the part o f the republic to join the provisional governm ent, he in­ sisted, reflected an unjustifiable suspicion of Dutch intentions. W hen Indonesian leaders pointed out that they had been prom ­ ised by Graham at Kaliurang that they could m aintain their foreign representatives, duBois said he regretted that the repu b ­ lic had been m isled. DuBois reiterated this position in another m eeting w ith republican officials on A pril 8. A sked directly if he believed the Dutch could be trusted, the Am erican representa­ tive quickly replied that the United States w as "absolutely con­ vin ced" that the Dutch intended to carry out the provisions of the Renville agreem ent and noted that the attitude o f top Dutch spokesm en had undergone a m arked change in the past few m onths.“ Other members o f the Am erican delegation to the GO C w ere far less sanguine about Dutch intentions. Charlton O gbum , a representative of the State Departm ent's Division o f Southeast “ DuBois to M arshall, April 6 and April 10 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 19 4 8 ,6 :135-36 ,14 3-4 4 . Arnold Brackman, who served as a correspondent in Indonesia at this time, later wrote that duBois was astonished to receive the assignment to the GO C. Be­ cause of past friendships with the Dutch, he informed the Department by letter that he could not, with a clear conscience, accept the post. DuBois believed that his pro-Dutch biases were sim ply too strong (Brackman, Indonesian Communism, p. 77). Jam es Barco, who at that time represented the State Department's Office of United Nations Affairs on the GOC, related a similar story in an interview. Barco explained that the department selected duBois specifically because he w as known to be pro-Dutch. There had been strong feelings in the departm ent that Graham had antagonized the Dutch, and there was a general consensus, Barco pointed out, that the next American representative should be more sympathetic to The H ague's position. In an interview Charlton Ogbum also em phasized duBois's initial tendency to accept uncritically the Dutch version of events. This tendency is also evident in the records of the GOC meetings. See particularly summary record of 105th meeting of GOC, May 10 ,19 4 8 , S/AC.10/SR.105, GOC Records, UN Library.

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A sian A ffairs, later recalled his steady disillusionm ent w ith Dutch actions: The one thing that came to us pretty soon and is bound to come to anybody pretty soon when he gets involved in one of these colo­ nial conflicts is that there's no way you can slice sovereignty; there's no way you can divide sovereignty. The compromise agree­ ments always look very good—there's going to be a division of authority and cooperation and equal participation—but when you come right down to it, one side or the other has to be the final arbiter___ According to the Dutch plan, no matter how they sliced it, the final say-so was going to be a Dutch say-so. . . . It became apparent to us that this was not going to work, that you could not leave the ultimate authority in Dutch hands, even temporarily, because the Dutch had no intention of relinquishing that authority now or at any conceivable time in the future. No matter what kind of native instrumentalities they worked through, they were going td retain the ultimate governing voice.1* A fter less than two months in the Indies, duBois also began to question Dutch policies. Despite his friendly personal relations w ith m any ranking Dutch diplom ats, the Am erican representa­ tive gradually began to doubt the sincerity of their pledges. On M ay 10 he conveyed this disillusionm ent to W ashington. "Like all other neutral observers," he said, the Am erican delegation w as convinced that the republic w as the "on ly force in Indonesia o f [any] real consequence apart [from the] N etherlands arm y." U nless the Dutch could convince the republicans of The H ague's interpretation o f Renville, "settlem ent by force appeared inevi­ tab le"; and though duBois did not doubt the Dutch arm y's abil­ ity to capture the republican capital and all the main roads w ith­ in ten days, it w as a "foregone conclusion" that the outcome w ould be a duplication o f the Indochina stalem ate and w ould result in a drastic reduction of the Indonesian export potential. H e reasoned that the republic w as "w orking for [the] freedom [of] all Indonesia and represents [the] spearhead [of the] inde­ pendence drive to Indonesian nationalists [in] all areas." Conse­ quently, the Dutch w ere m aking a "serious m istake [in] disWlnterview with Ogbum, M ay 2 ,19 7 5 . 215

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counting these factors"; it w as now crucial for them to "m ake every reasonable concession" to the republic.9 But instead o f offering concessions to the republic, the N etherlands proceeded w ith a further expansion o f its federal program . On M ay ı the Dutch-controlled interim governm ent announced a federal conference that w ould begin on M ay 27 at Bandung, a d ty in w estern Java. The Dutch sent invitations to thirteen Indonesian "states," all in nonrepublican territory. The head o f the N etherlands delegation explained the Dutch action this w ay: "E ven if the Republic contends that a federation w ith­ out its participation is an im possibility, the federalists are o f exactly the opposite opinion. They consider a federation w ith­ out the Republic in no w ay an im possibility." In his opening address to the convention, van M ook reiterated this theme: "It did not seem possible to continue w aiting for the moment w hen the Republic w ould join us: the problem s w e have to deal w ith are too urgent and o f too great im portance to all of us to post­ pone this conference any lon ger."21 Alarm ed by this unilateral action, the republic lodged official protests w ith the Good O ffices Committee and the United N a­ tions Security Council. In a letter to the committee, the republi­ can delegation charged that "the N etherlands Governm ent is preparing to present the Republic o f Indonesia w ith a new fait accompli. This is a policy which is in distinct contradiction to the Renville prin ciples."22 The author o f that agreem ent, Frank G ra­ ham , added considerable w eight to the republican view in a letter to Secretary of State M arshall. The Bandung Conference, Graham com plained, violated both "the intent and spirit o f the Renville A greem ent."2* DuBois w as equally disturbed by this arbitrary Dutch action. In a cable to the State Departm ent on M ay 2 1, he suggested that the Dutch w ere speeding the formation of the U .S.I. "in order that either (1) Republic w ill be forced [to] enter strictly on “ DuBois to M arshall, May 10 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948, 6:165-68. “ GOC, "Report to the Security Council on the Federal Conference Opened in Bandung on 27 M ay 1948," June 16 ,19 4 8 , UN 8/842, pp. 22-23; UN S/AC.10/130, Appendix II, GOC Records, UN Library. “ Republican Delegation to GOC, May 23,1948, UN S/AC.10/130, Appendix I. “ Graham to M arshall, June 10 ,19 4 8 , in Graham Papers. 216

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N etherlands term s or (2) if Republic stays out, resultant conflict can be presented [to the] w orld as d v il Indonesian conflict." This, duBois m aintained, is "precisely w hat [the] French endeav­ ored [to] accom plish [in] Indo-C hina." In the view of the U .S. delegation, the Dutch "h ave from the start never deviated from objective o f transferring sovereignty to an Indonesian Govern­ m ent in w hich Republican representatives w ill be in m inority and m ajor role w ill be played by Indonesians am enable [to the] N etherlands and opposed [to die] R epublic." DuBois repeated his conviction that die republic enjoyed the confidence of the Indonesian people to a "far greater extent than any other group" and that the republicans w ere both the m ost representative group in Indonesia and the m ost capable o f governing the archipelago. If the N etherlands continued to carry out its federal program w ithout the participation o f the republicans, he cautioned, the resultant provisional federal governm ent o f the U .S .I. "w ill be [an] unnatural organization w hich only Dutch arm s, if anything, can m aintain." H e w arned the departm ent that, regardless o f Dutch intentions, a final breakdown o f nego­ tiations w ould be follow ed autom atically be a "crum bling truce" and the resum ption o f hostilities. In conclusion, he sum m arized the pessim istic appraisal of the Am erican delegation. If the re­ public w ere forced either to accept a political setdem ent so dis­ advantageous to its interests that it could not live up to the term s or to reject such a setdem ent com pletely, "w e fear results w ill be extrem ely unfortunate [with] respect [to] both Nether­ lands and U S long-run interests [in] Indonesia."2* A report prepared by the State Departm ent's O ffice o f Intelli­ gence Research on June 2, 1948, exam ined the im plications for d ie United States of the threatened breakdown of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations. N oting that the Am erican delegation to the G O C had recentiy expressed apprehension about the latest Dutch actions, the memorandum em phasized the strong possi­ bility o f another arm ed assault against the republic. "A m ong the indications substantiating fears that the N etherlands is prepar­ in g to pursue such a unilateral course," it pointed out, "are the continued strengthening o f Dutch arm ed forces, the continua-24 24DuBois to M arshall, M ay 2 1,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948,6:180-83. 217

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tion o f the blockade against the republic, and the political offen ­ sive at Bandung aim ed at an early formation of a USI govern­ m ent." If the Dutch succeeded in form ing a provisional regim e w ithout the republic, the report cautioned, a com plete break­ dow n o f Dutch-republican negotiations could occur. "The con­ sequences o f a breakdow n w ould be an imm ediate outbreak o f w idespread hostilities." If another m ilitary action occurred, m oreover, the economic recovery of Indonesia could be drasti­ cally curtailed, as guerrilla w arfare w ould inevitably follow . According to the report, Dutch economic recovery could also be significantly affected, as the continuing need to m aintain costly arm ed forces in Indonesia "w ill continue to drain the N ether­ lands lim ited economic resources." In addition, "the present m oderate Republican leadership, w hich seeks a peaceful settle­ m ent, w ould be discredited, and there w ould be an im m easur­ able increase in the appeal to the Indonesian m asses of extrem ist and Com m unist propaganda." A particularly telling issue for the United States, the memo­ randum contended, w as the "obvious danger that the US w ill be identified w ith N etherlands policies by the South East A sia peo­ ples and countries sym pathetic to Indonesian N ationalist aspira­ tio n s." It noted that "the favorable predisposition o f Indonesian nationalists tow ard the U S in 1945 and 1946 is slow ly degenerat­ ing into suspicion." This developm ent could aid the Soviet U nion's drive to supplant the United States as cham pion o f the colonial nationalist m ovem ent. "A s a consequence, the u s s r w ill have added opportunity to secure em otional and political alle­ giance that m ight otherw ise accrue to the U S ."* On June 3 duBois inform ed the State Departm ent that the Am erican delegation had concluded that a continuation o f pres­ ent Dutch policy toward the republic w ould also endanger Am erican economic interests in the archipelago. O nly a settle­ m ent satisfactory to the republic, he stressed, w ould w ork to the advantage o f the United States. According to the U .S. delega­ tion, Am erican economic interests in Indonesia w ere threefold: (a) the earliest possible restoration of the islands to stability and “ U .S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for the Far East, "Im­ plications for the U .S. of Threatened Breakdown in Indonesian Negotiations," Situation Report—Southern Areas, no. 3480.54, June 2,19 4 8 , DSR. 218

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full production; (b) the "m axim um reasonable protection" of H olland's economic stake in Indonesia in the interest o f the "sou nd recovery [of] Holland and w estern Europe"; and (c) the protection of established U .S. interests plus assurances o f equal­ ity o f opportunity for Am erican investors and enterprise. The prew ar Dutch policy of m onopoly controls, duBois explained, had enabled the N etherlands to assert complete political control over the archipelago; a settlem ent favorable to the republicans w ould rem ove that control perm anently and leave the "door potentially fu lly open for US bu sin ess." A dditionally, as "the chief source for capital fu n d s," the United States w ould be the only nation in a position to provide adequate assistance in the reconstruction and developm ent of Indonesia during the early years of the provisional U .S.I. Republican leaders w ould un­ doubtedly seek a counterweight to the initially predom inant Dutch economic interests in the archipelago, duBois suggested, and "private Am erican capital is only logical contender." M oreover, "U S political prestige in Indonesia w ill soar on [the] strength [of a] political settlem ent satisfactory to nationalist sentim ent." He noted that the restrictions on the sovereignty of the future U .S.I. w hich the Dutch envisaged w ould only harm the prospects for a W estern-oriented Indonesian state and w ould "lead eventually to [the] complete dislodgem ent [of] N etherlands interests" at the very least. DuBois suggested that the Dutch delegation's approach to the sovereignty issue w as "conditioned as much by fears o f opening Indonesia to free com petition [from] other foreign enterprises as by [the] fear of Indonesian m easures against Dutch economic interests."26 W ith Dutch-republican relations rapidly deteriorating, the Am erican and Australian delegations to the GO C began to real­ ize that they w ould have to take a more active role in breaking the im passe. Consequently, the two delegations jointly drafted a com prom ise plan for an overall political settlem ent. The duBois-Critchley proposals, as they became known, attem pted to solve the fundam ental issue o f sovereignty during the transi­ tion period. According to the plan, elections w ould be held “ DuBois to M arshall, June 3,19 4 8 , in FR, 19 4 8 ,6 :2 11-13 . A similar view of the potential value of Indonesia to American business was expressed in "Indonesia: Peace Brings Trade Rebirth," Business Week, May 8,1948, pp. 117 -2 0 . 2 19

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throughout Indonesia for delegates to a constituent assem bly, w hich w ould serve as both a provisional legislature and a consti­ tutional convention. The election w ould be held by secret ballot­ ing under the d o se supervision of the Good O ffices Com m ittee. The Constituent A ssem bly w ould convene as soon as possible after the election and, acting as a provisional parliam ent, pro­ ceed to form an interim governm ent responsible to it. The A ssem bly w ould also delineate the states to be induded in the United States of Indonesia. During this period the A ssem bly w ould attain control over all internal and external affairs o f the archipelago, induding control of arm ed forces, foreign relations, trade, and currency; sovereignty and ultim ate authority, how ev­ er, w ould rem ain w ith the N etherlands. The acting governm ent w ould then serve as a constitutional convention, drafting a con­ stitution for the United States of Indonesia w hich w ould safe­ guard legitim ate Dutch economic, m ilitary, and cultural in­ terests. A fter the Dutch and Indonesians ratified the new con­ stitution, the N etherlands w ould officially transfer sovereignty to the U .S .I.27 DuBois cabled a copy of this plan to W ashington on Ju n e 5 and asked for the State Departm ent's approval. He contrasted the realistic approach of the duBois-Critchley proposals w ith the unrealistic federal policy being pursued by the Dutch at the Bandung Conference. The fact w as, duBois em phasized, that the "non-Republican Indonesians [were an] elem ent [of] m inor im portance [in the] Indonesian situation." A fter nearly three years of "N etherlands prom ises, N etherlands m ilitary succes­ ses, N etherlands distribution o f com m odities, and increasing physical hardships in the Republican areas," the Dutch had "not yet succeeded [in] attracting [a] single one clearly of conse­ quence to their side or prom pting one dem onstration [of] popu­ lar enthusiasm for their cau se." The basic problem , he explained, w as that sovereignty could not be divided; the actual govern­ m ent o f Indonesia w ould have to be in the hands o f either the Dutch or the Indonesians. The republic w ould never surrender to the Dutch the pow ers of self-governm ent that it had exercised ^"Proposed Working Paper by the Committee of Good Offices on an Outline o f a Political Settlem ent," enclosed in duBois to Marshall, June 5, 1948, in FR, 1948,6:219-23.

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for three years, duBois commented, and "w e do not see w h y it sh o u ld ." If die N etherlands strategy o f form ing a federal In­ donesian governm ent without the republic's participation w ere pursued, "econom ic and political stability" in Indonesia w ould "be postponed until time w hen Indonesians [are] able [to] throw Dutch out o f islan d s." There w as a strong chance, duBois cautioned, "that if N etherlands [is] allow ed [to] carry through its plan, H olland w ill prove sink w ithout stopper so far as U S eco­ nomic and financial assistance [are] concerned." The duBois-Critchley plan, how ever, w ould result in the "sp eed y form ation" o f an "orderly and by no m eans incompe­ tent Indonesian Governm ent strongly disposed [to] cooperate w ith Dutch and rely heavily [on] Dutch assistance." A U .S.I. form ed under these conditions w ould be inclined to exert a "stron g pro-w estern influence throughout Southeast A sia" and to represent a "vitally im portant achievem ent" by "givin g lie to Com m unist propaganda throughout Far E ast." Time w as run­ ning out, duBois w arned, and the opportunity now available w ould not recur. A ccordingly, he concluded that "u n less De­ partm ent can subscribe [to the] essentials [of the] US Delegation plan, on w hich com prom ise w ould render w hole plan worth­ less, I believe m y usefulness and that of the US Delegation here w ill be com pletely n ullified."“ In reply, M arshall cabled duBois that the State Departm ent w ish ed the delegation "to continue to regard itself as free agent m aking such choices on spot as USDel believes w ill lead to agreem ent betw een parties and in accordance w ith larger in­ terests o f United States." W ithout specifically commenting on the duBois-Critchley plan—w hich the departm ent, curiously, later claim ed that it had not yet received—M arshall in effect authorized the Am erican delegation to act in w hatever m anner it deem ed appropriate to avert another outbreak of hostilities.2* “ DuBois to M arshall, June 7,19 4 8 , in ibid., pp. 226-28. “ M arshall to duBois, June 8, 1948, in ibid., p. 229. It is curious that the departm ent would claim that it had not even received a copy of the duBoisCritchley proposals. DuBois enclosed a copy of the plan in a telegram he sent to the department on June 5. There had never been any problem previously with communications and it is difficult to understand w hy there would have been a problem at this time. The department, moreover, was still claiming that it had not received a copy of the proposals long after the contents of the American-

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On June 10 the Am erican and Australian delegations to the GO C inform ally submitted their com prom ise plan to Dutch and Indonesian officials. DuBois personally handed the draft pro­ posal to van M ook that day. The Am erican representative, w ho w as a personal friend of the Dutch spokesm an, later said that it w as one o f the m ost difficult things he had ever done. Van M ook quickly perused the plan without saying a w ord to duBois. V isibly angry, he abruptly dism issed the aging A m er­ ican diplom at.30 The Am erican and Australian representatives w ere convinced that this direct approach, no m atter how unpalatable to the Dutch, w as the only w ay to preserve peace in the archipelago. In a statem ent released on that day, the two delegations observed that negotiations between the Dutch and the republi­ cans appeared to have reached a standstill. In the five m onths since the signing of the Renville agreem ent, "n o significant progress has been m ade toward a political settlem ent betw een the Kingdom o f the N etherlands and the Republic o f Indone­ sia ." The failure thus far "raises the question o f w hether the Com m ittee's effort can be of value unless the Com m ittee can m ake a positive contribution to an agreem ent w hich it has in the past refrained from attem pting." O nly by "com ing forw ard w ith such a suggestion now that the delegations of the parties appear unable to make further progress tow ards an agreem ent," they explained, "can be acquit ourselves of our obligation and ju stify Australian plan had become public knowledge. It is far more likely that an interdepartmental dispute over the approach offered by duBois delayed the departm ent's response to the American representative's overture. Several for­ mer State Department officials (Barco, Scott, Philip Jessup, Dean Rusk) assured me that such conflicts did in fact exist. For further evidence of interdepartmental conflicts over Indonesia policy, see Philip C. Jessup, The Birth of Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 5 1, 56. “ Interview with Charlton Ogbum, M ay 2, 1975. The Belgian delegation, which generally reflected the Dutch point of view , refused to go along with the American-Australian plan. DuBois and Critchley found the Belgian delegation's reservations about their plan irreconcilable and so proceeded to present the working paper without their Belgian colleagues' concurrence. See summary record of 116 th meeting of GOC, June 9, 1948, S/A C .10/SR.116, GOC Records, UN Library. DuBois had repeatedly complained to Washington about the Bel­ gian delegates' inability to depart from the Dutch view of events. See, for exam­ ple, Hickerson to Alan G. Kirk (ambassador to Belgium), M ay 6 ,19 4 8 , 501.BC Indonesia/4-2148, DSR. 222

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the seven and a half months the Committee has spent in In­ donesia endeavoring to assist the parties."31 The republicans alm ost im m ediately accepted the duBoisCritchley proposals as a basis for further discussion. The Dutch, on the other hand, view ed the Am erican-Australian overture w ith haughty disdain, objecting to the plan on both procedural and substantive grounds.32 Hendrik N . Boon, the chief o f politi­ cal affairs in the N etherlands Foreign O ffice, com plained to the Am erican Em bassy in The H ague that duBois's action had "cre­ ated havoc [in] all respects." The Dutch governm ent believed that there w as no justification for the "precipitate action" taken b y the Am erican delegation. Cooperation am ong members of the G O C, he added, w as now im possible.33 On June 14 the Dutch am bassador met w ith Under Secretary of State Lovett to explain the Dutch position. Van Kleffens, w ho had previously com plained that duBois w as "o ff the beam " in his negotiating efforts, reiterated his governm ent's intention to negotiate a set­ tlem ent on the basis of the Renville principles and suggested that the rash action o f duBois and Critchley w ould now make that task m ore difficult.3435 O n June 16 the N etherlands abruptly broke off all negotiations w ith the republic, using the purported leak of the confidential duBois-Critchley proposals to an Am erican correspondent as a pretext. In actuality, the reporter in question, Daniel Schorr of Time, had more likely received the contents of the Am ericanA ustralian plan from Dutch officials them selves.33 N evertheless, 31DuBois and Critchley to van Mook, June 10, 1948, S/AC.10/CONF.2/BUR/ W .i, GOC Records, UN Library. 32DuBois to M arshall, June 14 ,19 4 8 , 501.BC Indonesia/6-1348, DSR; DuBois to Butterworth, June 23, 1948, 501.BC Indonesia/6-2348, DSR; van Mook to GOC, June 14 ,19 4 8 , S/AC. 10/136, GOC Records, UN Library. 33Quoted in Baruch to Marshall, June 11,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948, 6:237-38. "M em orandum by Lovett of a conversation with van Kleffens and Butter* worth, June 14, 1948, in ibid., pp. 243-44; memorandum by Nolting of a con­ versation with van Kleffens, Lovett, and Lacy, 856D.00/6-548, DSR. See also White House daily summary, June 15 ,19 4 8 , DSR; Baruch to M arshall, June 14, 1948, 856D.00/6-1448, DSR. 35Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 248. Daniel Schorr recalled that, as hır as he knew , the Dutch were not responsible for the leak. "They did seem about ready to break off negotiations," he wrote, "and seemed to be looking for the first occasion. They had early warnings of the leak because they clearly were monitoring outgoing press cables. M y recollection is that they made their first 223

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the Dutch privately charged Coert duBois w ith responsibility for the leak. DuBois, in turn, categorically denied that he or any member o f the Am erican delegation w as responsible, explaining to the State Departm ent that Schorr's source "w as alm ost cer­ tainly D utch."36 This curious incident illustrates the lengths to w hich the N etherlands w as w illing to go in order to avoid the consideration of substantive issues; the Am erican m em bers of the G O C suspected that the Dutch w ere sim ply looking for an excuse to circum vent the committee entirely. During a committee m eeting on June 2 1, O gbum charged that the Dutch had de­ liberately m aneuvered the GO C into an im possible position: by "a peculiarly cow ardly device" they had im plied that the Am er­ icans w ere responsible for the controversial leak, and then, because o f the leak, had begun negotiating directly w ith the republicans, bypassing the GO C and rending it pow erless to fulfill its appointed function. "It seem s to m e," Frank Graham observed, that "the Dutch are up to their old 'shinanagins.' They used their old alibi of a leak to the press. . . . The con­ troversial leak m ay have come from the Dutch rather than from other sou rces."37 The Dutch refusal even to discuss the duBois-Critchley pro­ posals is particularly revealing of The H ague's policy objectives in the post-Renville period. In part, the decision to reject the pro­ posals can be explained by dom estic political considerations: a general election w as scheduled for Ju ly 7 in H olland and the Indonesian question w as em erging as a central issu e.38 More move in the Security Council before anything had been published" (personal communication, M ay 20,1976). See also Daniel Schorr, Clearing the A ir (Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1977), p. 4. 36Du Bois to Marshall, june 16 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948, 6:248, 250. ^Summ ary records of 123rd meeting of GOC, June 2 1, 1948, UN S/AC.10/ SR. 123, GOC Records, UN Library; Graham to Brandis, July 24,1948, in Indone­ sia Files, Graham Papers. *G eorge W. Renchard (secretary of embassy, The Hague) to M arshall, Ju ly 12 , 1948, 856.00/7-1248, DSR. A s a result of the election, the Dutch Labor Party lost two seats in Parliament to the Catholic Party, which had charged it with pur­ suing too liberal a policy in Indonesia. The Catholic Party thus attained a domi­ nant voice in the governing coalition. Shortly after the election, E. M. J. A. Sassen, a conservative member of the Catholic Party, became minister for over­ seas territories. Determined to pursue a "tougher" policy vis-à-vis the republic, in October Sassen replaced van Mook—who he believed w as too flexible—with

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im portant, though, the protracted delay in im plem enting the Renville agreem ent had w orked to the advantage of the Dutch, and the Am erican-Australian plan for an overall settlem ent con­ tained an elem ent of risk for The H ague which it w as unw illing to accept. Its prim e fear w as that free elections m ight substanti­ ate w hat it already suspected: that the republic represented the nationalist aspirations of the vast m ajority of the archipelago's people. Such a result w ould have exposed the federal program as a sham . By refusing to consider the duBois-Critchley propo­ sals, m oreover, the Dutch could retain the advantages that their preponderance o f force had given them , and could proceed w ith their plans to shape the future of the Indonesian archipelago unilaterally.” The vehem ent Dutch reaction to the duBois-Critchley propo­ sals placed the United States in an extrem ely sensitive position. The Departm ent o f State had consistently upheld the Renville principles as the basis for a lasting settlem ent between the In­ donesians and the Dutch. Am erican representatives in Indone­ sia, how ever, perceived that the Dutch intended to ignore Ren­ ville w hile pursuing a federal policy aim ed at excluding the republic horn any interim regim e. W hen duBois inform ed W ashington that a new approach to the D utch-Indonesian con­ flict w as necessary, the State Departm ent again assured him that the Am erican delegation to the GO C should consider itself a "free agent" in m aking suggestions that it believed w ould lead to an agreem ent betw een the two parties in accordance w ith the larger interests of the United States. DuBois, understandably, interpreted this m essage to mean that the departm ent w ould support an y attem pt he m ight m ake to resolve the continuing stalem ate. W hen the Dutch categorically rejected the joint Am erican-Australian w orking paper, duBois hoped that State Departm ent pressure w ould force The H ague to reconsider the proposals.40Instead, departm ent officials rebuked the Am erican delegation for constituting itself "a s an arbitral b od y" and re-* Louis Beel, who became high commissioner for foe crown (Anthony J. S. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-50 [Hawthorn, Australia: Longman, 1974], p. 149; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 137). *T aylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 132-36. «D uBois to M arshall, June 12 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948, 6:240-43.

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m inded it o f the lim ited nature o f "good offices."41 In addition, at the United N ations Security Council, Am erican D eputy Repre­ sentative Philip C . Jessup argued on June 23 that the council should vote not to receive the U .S.-A ustralian w orking paper because it w as evident that the w hole GO C did not consider its subm ission desirable. This decision, Jessu p explained to Dean Rusk, w as "in line w ith our general policy of supporting the Dutch as m uch as w e cou ld ."42 This negative reaction baffled the Am erican representatives in Indonesia. A fter all, they regarded the compromise plan as an em inently just and practical solution to Dutch-Indonesian dif­ ferences. They believed, as A ndrew Roth had written in The Nation, that the "Australian-Am erican draft m ust be considered a fair basis for discussion by anyone desiring a peaceful settle­ ment here w ithout prejudice to the right of dem ocratic selfdeterm ination.//4} In a cable to W ashington on Ju ly 28, O gbum com plained that the Am erican delegation "h as faced increasing difficulties in follow ing course presum ably acceptable to Depart­ m ent since w e have had no knowledge how Departm ent in­ tends [to] adapt itself to em erging issu es." He continued: "W e have had no comment w hatever from Departm ent on USA ustralian w orking paper. W hile w e assum e Departm ent had rejected our analyses situation, w e have no idea w hat or w hose analyses are accepted."44 In reality, the w ork of the U .S. delegation had been sacrificed to the larger interests of Am erican foreign policy, w hich at this juncture dictated solidarity w ith W ashington's European allies. The success of the M arshall Plan w as the central focus for A m er­ ican policy m akers in m id-1948; any friction that m ight result from a seem ingly peripheral issue such as colonial relations in Indonesia w as to be studiously avoided. It w as not that the State Departm ent rejected the analysis of its representatives in the field, as O gbum surm ised; rather, the maintenance o f friendly relations w ith the N etherlands w as an overriding concern.4 4,MarshaU to duBois, June 14 ,19 4 8 , in ibid., pp. 245-46. “ s c o r , 3d y r., 226th meeting, June 23, 1948, pp. 32-34; transcript of a tele­ phone conversation between Jessup and Rusk, July 6,1948, in Box 8 1, Records of the U .S. M ission to the UN, RG 59, DSR. 43Andrew Roth, "Am erican Flipflop in Indonesia," Nation, July 10 ,19 4 8 , p. 40. “ Ogbum to M arshall, July 28,1948, in FR, 1948, 6:293.

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The success o f the European Recovery Program (ERP) de­ pended, to a large extent, on the interrelationship between the econom ies o f W estern Europe and the econom ies of the colonial dependencies of Southeast A sia. Acheson underscored that fact before the H ouse Committee on Foreign A ffairs during the M ar­ shall Plan hearings. If the ERP w as to succeed, he pointed out, the W estern European countries w ould have to increase their exports substantially. "M ost of them—w e hope a very large part—w ill go to southeast A sia ," he said. "Before the w ar, over a billion dollars of exports w ent to southeast A sia. N ow practically none go th ere." The "D utch and British and French possessions in southeast A sia ," commented another adm inistration spokes­ m an in an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Com­ m ittee, are "extrem ely im portant" to the success of the M arshall Plan because "th ey have historically been earners o f dollars for the hom e countries." This w as particularly true, he em phasized, o f the Dutch East Indies and British M alaya, w ith their rich supplies of tin and rubber. "The estim ate of allocations needed" for tiie ERP, he added, "is in very substantial part a judgm ent as to w hen or if those territories w ill be politically pacified, and if so, how soon thereafter they w ill be able to begin m aking sub­ stantial exports of petroleum products, rubber, tin, and other m inerals, w hich could m ake a decisive difference in the dollar interests o f the controlling European countries."45 It w as a fundam ental assum ption o f the M arshall Plan, then, that the European countries w ould resum e their prew ar control over the colonies of Southeast A sia. G iven this expectation, for m ost policy m akers Indonesian developm ents continued to be filtered through a European prism . This view unavoidably prej­ udiced the Am erican stance of "n eu trality." In fact, w hile its representatives on the GO C w ere trying to settle the D utch"Testim ony of Dean Acheson, January 29, 1948, in U .S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: U.S. Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recov­ ery Program, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948, pt. 1, p. 739; testimony of Richard M. Bissell (secretary, Subcommittee on Economic and Financial Analysis for the President's Committee on Foreign Aid), January 12, 1948, in U .S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: European Recovery Program, 80th C ong., 2d sess., 1948, pt. 1, p. 273. For the importance of Southeast Asia to the success of ERP, see Economic Cooperation Administration, Far East Program D ivision, Division of Statistics and Reports, The Role of ECA in Southeast Asia (W ashington: U .S. Government Printing Office, 1951). 227

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Indonesian conflict in an im partial m anner, the U .S. govern­ m ent w as allocating $506 m illion in ERP aid to the N etherlands, w ith the stipulation that $84 m illion w as to be used for recon­ struction o f the N etherlands Indies. This aid, w hich w as form al­ ly authorized in the spring of 1948, had profound im plications for the D utch-Indonesian dispute: clearly, Am erican financial assistance w ould inevitably strengthen the N etherlands vis-àvis the Indonesian Republic; and the United States, w hich con­ tinued to pose as an im partial m ediator, distributed economic aid specifically earm arked for Indonesia through the N ether­ lands—an action that most republican officials believed w as yet another indication that W ashington's im partiality w as a sham . 'T h e practical effect of EC A [Economic Cooperation Adm inistra­ tion] aid on the political conflict," noted a State Departm ent intelligence report, "is to strengthen the economic, political, and m ilitary position o f the N etherlands in In d o n esia.. . . Reactions to EC A grants by the Dutch and by Indonesians show that this effect is clearly understood by both sid es."46 Indeed, both Dutch and Indonesians speculated that the Mar­ shall Plan represented a new stage in Am erican policy toward the Indonesian conflict. The Dutch press in Holland and in the Indies suggested that the European Recovery Program indicated that the United States had reversed its previous position o f w ith­ holding financial aid until a political settlem ent had been reached; this reversal, it suggested, w as due to W ashington's realization that Dutch economic recovery w as closely tied to the economic recovery of Indonesia.47 The M arshall Plan w as as w arm ly applauded in the N etherlands as it w as coldly de­ nounced in the Republic o f Indonesia. In a memorandum to the States G eneral on February 5, Prime M inister Beel expressed his belief that "w ithout Am erican aid the future of Europe w ould be extrem ely d im ."46 W hen the first M arshall Plan ship arrived in Rotterdam on A pril 26, 1948, carrying 4,000 tons of w heat, an im prom ptu cerem ony w as held during w hich the United States “ U .S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for the Far East, "Po­ litical Implications of E.C .A . Aid to Indonesia," Situation Report—Southern A reas, no. 3480.56, October 29, 1948, and "The Role of Indonesia in the Euro­ pean Recovery Program ," Report no. 3480.51, April 7,19 4 8 , DSR. 47Cited in OIR, "Political Im plications." "Bon sai to M arshall, February 17,1948,756.00/2-1748, DSR.

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w as repeatedly lauded. The N etherlands Inform ation Service took out a full-page advertisem ent in nearly all Dutch daily new spapers that w eek, hailing this first ship as "the sym bol of our second liberation: liberation from black insecurity."** Rela­ tions betw een the United States and the N etherlands, despite the protracted dispute in the Indies, could not have been more friendly. Som e A sian specialists in the State Departm ent had w arned that the European Recovery Program w ould inevitably com­ prom ise the U .S. position in Southeast A sia. "It is apparent," w rote W illiam S. B. Lacy o f the D ivision o f Southeast A sian A ffairs in N ovem ber 1947, "that the drafters of the ERP legis­ lation deliberately avoided the basic political problem of sovereignty w hich besets the relationship between colonial peo­ ples in southeast A sia and elsew here, and their m etropolitan p o w ers." A nother departm ent officer commented that the M ar­ shall Plan w ould inevitably lead to "a greater w ave o f criticism against the United States in Southeast A sia. . . . The fact that tw o o f the ERP countries, France and H olland, are conducting m ilitary operations in these colonies lays U .S. open to the charge that it is assisting them in a colonial w a r." Sim ilarly, in a m em orandum for President Trum an, the C IA noted that "to the extent that the European recovery program enhances Dutch and French capabilities in Southeast A sia, native resentm ent toward the United States w ill increase. This tendency w ill be exploited and intensified by Com m unist propaganda on the theme o f U .S. 'im p erialism '."50These objections, despite their prescience, appear to have had little impact on the upper reaches of the Trum an adm inistration, w here the conviction that the economic recovery o f W estern Europe w as the key to the m yriad foreign policy problem s of the United States rem ained virtually unchal­ lenged. "Baruch to Marshall, April 27, 1948, 840.50-Recovery/4*2748, DSR; Bonsai to M arshall, M ay 11,19 4 8 , 840.50-Recovery/5-1148 , DSR. “ Lacy to Butterworth, November 25,1947, in folder labeled "S .E .A .: European Recovery Program ," Box 4, Records of the Office of the Philippines and South­ east Asian Affairs, DSR (hereafter cited as PSA Records); Haldore Hanson to Butterworth, November 12 ,19 4 7 , in ibid.; CIA, "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States," O A 2, November 14, 1947, PSF, Truman Papers.

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The European orientation o f Am erican foreign policy w as further reinforced by the deepening Cold War. With the Com ­ m unist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, Am erican poli­ cy m akers strengthened their resolve to defend W estern Europe horn the perceived Soviet threat. "The Com m unist coup in C zechoslovakia/' suggested a Joint C hiefs o f Staff paper, "m ay have been one o f those events w hich from time to time change the course o f history. . . . In the circum stances, there is no alternative but to revitalize the m ilitary potential o f W estern Europe, w ith active United States participation and assistance, as rapidly as possible."91 Adm inistration efforts in this regard soon began to focus on the Brussels Pact, the defense agreem ent signed in March by Great Britain, France, Belgium , Luxem ­ bourg, and the N etherlands, as a possible m odel. The speed w ith w hich the Brussels Pact w as agreed upon, noted a CIA report, w as "a m easure o f the sense of common danger pervad­ ing W estern E u rope."92 President Truman applauded the treaty and the State Departm ent and Congress subsequently began to form ulate a sim ilar treaty for W estern Europe. The result w ould ultim ately be the North Atlantic Treaty O rganization ( n a t o ). H igh-level m eetings w ith European diplom ats, including Dutch representatives, began in June 1948, about the sam e time that the duBois-Critchley proposals w ere being submitted to the Dutch and the republicans. W ashington's reluctance to support its representatives' initiative in Indonesia m ay w ell have derived from an unw illingness to pressure a friendly ally w hile in the m idst of delicate negotiations regarding an issue that the ad­ m inistration regarded as the prim ary objective o f Am erican diplom acy.93 W hile preoccupation w ith European policy dom inated official circles, the argum ent that Dutch transgressions in Indonesia should be dow nplayed to avoid antagonizing the N etherlands and the W estern dem ocracies w as by no m eans unanim ously nJC S 1868/13, "M ilitary Collaboration between the United States and the Western Union N ations," July 12,19 4 8 , P&O 14 6 -14 8 ,092TS, OPD Records, RG 319, Modem Military Branch. “ CIA, "Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States," CIA 4-48, April 8,1948, PSF, Truman Papers. “ On these negotiations, see especially FR, 1948, 3 :1-3 5 1.

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accepted. O ther, equally vital issues w ere involved in the In­ donesia crisis, as dissenting voices in the Truman adm inistra­ tion repeatedly advised. M ajor General A . R. Bolling, acting director o f intelligence for the A rm y, noted some of these other interests. "A fter five months of political m aneuvering," Bolling asserted, "it appears that negotiations are about to break dow n because the Dutch, w ho never bound them selves to accept GO C recom m endations, have not been w illing to live up to the spirit o f the political principles em bodied in the Renville A greem ent." The general w arned that the Dutch w ere w illing to establish a U .S .I., "but only on such term s as w ould perm it Dutch control." If negotiations collapsed, the Dutch w ould probably launch another police action; renew ed fighting w ould then drive the m oderate nationalists underground, "encourage extrem ism , and result in guerrilla fighting approaching the scale of sim ilar fighting in Indo-C hina." A breakdown of talks w ould thus place the United States in an untenable position: "The U .S. w ill be accused o f turning its back on native independence m ovem ents; U .S. prestige in the Far East w ill be irreparably dam aged; and the Indonesian Republic and other sincere independence m ove­ m ents in Southeast A sia w ill turn to Russia in desperation." This outcom e w ould be particularly unfortunate, since Indonesia w as "a vital source of strategic w ar m aterials."54 MBoUing to Chief of Staff, June 15 ,19 4 8 , P&O 091 Netherlands, Planning and Operation Division Files, Modem Military Branch. A t this time the U .S. govern­ ment also commissioned several studies to assess the strategic importance of Indonesian oil to the United States. See, for example, memorandum from Arm ed Services Petroleum Board to Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 18 ,19 4 8 , "A vaila­ bility of Petroleum and Petroleum Products in the East Indies," P&O 463.7; memorandum from General Albert C. Wedemeyer (director, Planning and Op­ eration Division, U .S. Army) to William S. B. Lacy, "The Relation of the East Indies to the Overall Petroleum Situation," June 23,1948, P&O 463; and memo­ randum from W. G. Lalbor (captain, U .S. Navy) to Aim ed Services Petroleum Board, "Availability of Petroleum and Petroleum Products in the East Indies," Ju ly 27, 1948, P&O 463, all in Planning and Operation Division Files, Modem M ilitary Branch. These studies deplored the "highly uncertain political situation in the East Indies, which makes the ultimate petroleum potential of the area not readily foreseeable." According to these evaluations, East Indies oil, while not absolutely critical to the strategic and military needs of the United States, was quite valuable, and production levels were expected to increase over the next few years. M oreover, in the event of a denial of oil from the Middle East, the importance of Indonesian oil to the United States would be greatly increased. "It is incontestable," concluded one study, "that any surplus of petroleum produc-

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The duBois-Critchley plan, Bolling observed, appeared to serve Am erican interests by keeping negotiations open and by sponsoring an equitable im plementation of Renville. 'T h e suc­ cess o f this program ," the general argued, "w ould establish a United States of Indonesia capable of providing a pro-w estern, stabilizing influence o f the greatest im portance over all South­ east A sia ." A failure to keep negotiations open w ould be dis­ astrous for United States policy: If the Dutch were allowed freedom of action, military operations would eventually be renewed, financed directly or indirectly with ERP funds; the U.S. would be accused of betraying the Republic of Indonesia which has followed U.S. guidance in the negotiations thus far and thereby force it to accept Russian sponsorship; and the moderate practical thinking Republican Government, the very thing the French are seeking in Indo-China, would be forced underground to carry on a relentless fight against the Dutch.15 Bolling's argum ents found w ide acceptance in certain quarters o f the State Departm ent, especially am ong m any of the A sianists in both the O ffice of Far Eastern A ffairs and the O ffice of Intelligence and Research, and am ong m any o f the interna­ tionalist-m inded diplom ats in the O ffice of United N ations A ffairs. Unlike their counterparts on the European desks and in the upper levels of the State Departm ent hierarchy, these offi­ cers, w hile certainly cognizant of the im portance of m aintaining friendly relations w ith the N etherlands, tended to view interna­ tional developm ents from a broader historical perspective. Looking tow ard the future, they foresaw the grow ing political and economic im portance of the underdeveloped w orld and argued that the United States could not afford to alienate the new ly em erging areas by supporting European colonialism in tions in this area, beyond minimum essential civilian needs of the area, would be a welcome addition to the U .S. military petroleum situation, and would result in economies in tankers and tanker fuel needed for potential supply of U .S. forces in the Far East." “ Bolling to Chief of Staff, June 15,19 4 8 . See also Arm y Intelligence Division, Memorandum for the Record (by Lieutenant Colonel Milner), "Dutch-Republi­ can Negotations in Indonesia," P&O 091 Netherlands, Planning and Operations Division Files, Modem Military Branch.

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Southeast A sia or elsew here. In a letter to Dean Rusk, w hich received w ide circulation in the State Departm ent, Philip Jessup offered an excellent sum m ary of these view s. The United States, he w rote, "ought to take som e steps w hich w ould overcom e the general im pression that w e are taking an old-fashioned 19th century im perialist attitude tow ard the em erging nationalist groups, particularly in East A sia and Southeast A sia ." He ex­ plained his reasoning as follow s: In the long run, it seems to me that one of the dominant considera­ tions which we ought to keep in mind is the fact that looking forward ten or twenty years, we are pretty sure that there will be a very large Asiatic bloc in the United N ations.. . . It is by no means too soon in my opinion to begin to lay our lines in such a way as to establish and maintain ourselves as the particular friend of the Asiatic bloc. In my opinion, we ought to develop with them rela­ tions as dose as those which we have over the years established with the Latin-American group.1* In the afterm ath o f the abortive duBois-Critchley plan, the State Departm ent found itself in a quandary. W hile full support for the uncom prom ising Dutch position, as Bolling's memoran­ dum suggested, w ould entail hazardous consequences for Am erican foreign policy, W ashington w as not inclined to back a program such as that em bodied in the duBois-Critchley propo­ sals over the determ ined resistance of a key European ally. In an effort to End a m iddle ground, the departm ent gradually began to recognize that the Am erican delegation to the GO C w ould have to take the initiative in presenting an acceptable compro­ m ise settlem ent to the tw o disputants; a proposed w orking pa­ per, w hile it "w ould have to be m odified to meet insurm ountable Dutch objections" to the duBois-Critchley plan, w ould be large­ ly m odeled on that program . W hen a combination of illness and State Departm ent displeasure forced Coert duBois to leave In­ donesia in early Ju ly, he w as replaced by H. M erle Cochran, a “ Jessup to Rusk, July 20,19 48, in Philip Jéssup Papers, Library of Congress, W ashington, D .C .; memorandum from Rusk to Hickeroon, Butterworth, Satterthwaite, and Paul C. Daniels (Office of Inter-American Affairs), July 27,1948, in folder labeled "Southeast A sia, 1946-1948, U .S. Policy," Box 5, PSA Records, D 5 R.

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career Foreign Service officer w ith well-know n sym pathies for the N etherlands. The departm ent instructed Cochran to begin studying fresh approaches to break the D utch-Indonesian im­ passe. "It seem s to u s/' the departm ent cabled the Am erican Em bassy in The H ague, "that Cochran should have w hen he departs from Batavia detailed workable proposals w hich in essentials this G o vt could support as basis for agreed settle­ m ent."57 On Ju ly 12 ,19 4 8 , Frederick N olting, the acting assistant chief o f the D ivision o f Northern European A ffairs, drafted a memo­ randum for Under Secretary of State Lovett, outlining proposed Am erican policy tow ard the Indonesian struggle. The memoran­ dum —approved by W. W alton Butterworth, director o f the O ffice of Far Eastern A ffairs; Dean Rusk, director of the O ffice of United N ations A ffairs; and Sam uel Reber, deputy director of the O ffice of European A ffairs—noted that State Departm ent experts had just recently com pleted a revision of the duBoisCritchley w orking paper. The revised plan, Nolting pointed out, "w ill undoubtedly require of the Dutch further com prom ise, and a certain flexibility in negotiation which is at present lack­ in g ." N onetheless, he explained, there w as no other viable course; only effective GO C action could break the current dead­ lock. "The ideal solution, of course, w ould be for the Dutch and the Republic to settle their dispute between them selves. The Dutch apparently believe that they can do this. Our representa­ tives on the spot believe that they cannot, and that the attempt to do so w ill result in partition o f the islands and possibly in eventual civil w a r." Lovett w as scheduled to meet w ith Dutch officials the follow ­ ing day, and N olting recom m ended that the under secretary im press upon them the im portance o f resum ing constructive negotiations. They should be rem inded "that considering our relations w ith the N etherlands in connection w ith the W estern European Union, the ERP, and other spheres in w hich w e are partners, it is a m atter o f more than passing interest to us to help prom ote a settlem ent in Indonesia w hich w ill be both lasting ^M arshall to Baruch, June 25,1948, in FR, 1948,6:270-71; Baruch to M arshall, August 9 ,19 4 8 ,12 3 Cochran, H. Merle, DSR.

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and beneficial to the Dutch as w ell as the Indonesian p eoples." N olting suggested that Lovett candidly inform the Dutch that w hile "the N etherlands Governm ent appears now to feel that it can reach a settlem ent on its own initiative, w ith the role of the G ood O ffices Committee lim ited to inducing the Republic to accept a new Dutch proposal," Am erican officials had reached the conclusion "that any proposal originating w ith the Dutch, or w ith the Bandung Conference, w ill not gain the acceptance of the R epublic."“ Follow ing N olting's recom m endation, on Ju ly 13 Lovett gave van K leffens and Blom the State Departm ent's frank assessm ent o f recent developm ents in Indonesia. "In the course of the con* versation ," the under secretary recorded, "I told Dr. van Klef­ fens that I found the present state of affairs in Indonesia very unsatisfactory since it appeared to me that little progress had been m ade in negotiating a final political settlem ent during the past several m onths." He added that the areas of disagreem ent betw een the two parties had appeared to increase in recent w eeks, noting that the republican position had so hardened that it now seem ed "h igh ly unlikely" that the republic w ould accept an y unilateral Dutch proposals for a final solution. "I stated m y v ie w ," Lovett w rote, "that since neither party appeared to be prepared to accept a proposal offered by the other, a compro­ m ise solution could be offered only by the GO C. " In regard to the Dutch federal program , Lovett inform ed van Kleffens and Blom that the form ation of federal states in Indonesia w ith or w ithout the republic w as "tantam ount to partition of the area"; the State Departm ent view ed such a contingency as "h igh ly undesir­ ab le," as it believed that "the preservation of the unity o f the entire archipelago w as extrem ely im portant not only to the In­ donesian Republic but to the Dutch people and the rest o f the w o rld ." The under secretary concluded this candid conversation b y asking the Dutch representatives to consider "the probabil­ ity that a final solution w ould require certain concessions to the realities of the situation at the expense of an ideal solution."“ "M em orandum prepared (or Lovett by Nolting, July 12 , 1948, in FR, 1948, 6:279-81. "M em orandum by Lovett of a conversation with van Kleffens and Blom, July 13 ,19 4 8 , in ibid., pp. 282-83.

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This lively discussion evidently had the intended effect on The H ague. On Ju ly 2 1 Dutch officials inform ed W ashington that "the N etherlands Prime M inister had expressed his hope that the US delegate w ould begin to prepare, upon his arrival at Batavia, a w orking paper acceptable to both sides which w ould provide a practical basis for a final settlem ent of the N etherlands-Indonesian Republican D ispute." The H ague insisted that the w orking paper include at least the two follow ing principles: (1) "the preservation of N etherlands sovereignty in the interim period, and (2) a provision that the existing body o f N etherlands Indies law w ould be adm inistered during the interim period." O nly about tw o m onths w ould be required to reach a final settle­ m ent, the prim e m inister predicted optimistically.*0 Buoyed by this softening of the Dutch position, Cochran im m ediately be­ gan to form ulate an acceptable draft agreem ent. A t this point, the urgency of drafting a conciliatory plan for an overall settlem ent w as underscored by the continuing deteriora­ tion in Dutch-republican relations.61 Dutch officials blam ed the volatile conditions on Indonesian com m unists, w hose strength and influence w ithin the republican governm ent, they charged, w as steadily grow ing. This w as a fam iliar Dutch refrain: begin­ ning w ith the Trum an Doctrine speech, The H ague consistently played on the anticom m unist sentim ents of the Am erican gov­ ernm ent, exaggerating the strength of communist elem ents w ithin the nationalist movem ent in a calculated effort to culti­ vate W ashington's support.61 In actuality, com m unist strength w ithin the republic w as quite sm all. The Indonesian Com m unist Party (PKI) had only 3,000 members in the sum m er of 1948, and even though PKI leaders estim ated they had another 60,000 supporters in the Socialist and Labor parties, com m unists re­ m ained a com paratively sm all m inority w ithin the nationalist "M em orandum of a conversation by Lacy, July 2 1,19 4 8 , in ibid., p. 285. “ For an indication of the deterioration in Dutch-republican relations, see Republican Delegation to GOC, September 9,1948, "Report by the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia on Recent Developments in Indonesia," UN S/AC.10/ CONF.2/BUR.32, GOC Records, UN Library. “ See, for example, Brady to CNO, June 4 ,19 47, which forwarded two lengthy reports on communism in the Indies which had been prepared by the Dutch M inistry of Overseas Territories, Attaché Reports File, Washington National Records Center, Suitville, Md. (hereafter dted as w n r c ).

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Front Negotiations to War: January-D ecem ber 1 9 4 8 m ovem ent.0 N onetheless, this m inority w as grow ing, and State Departm ent analysts w ho had once scoffed at Dutch charges began to take them m ore seriously in m id-1948. Reflecting on the increased Am erican concern about Indone­ sian com m unism , Charles Reed, chief o f the State Departm ent's D ivision of Southeast A sian A ffairs, w arned that if the commu­ nists ever came to pow er in Indonesia, "the situation there w ould be com parable to that in Indochina." Reed realized that the com m unist factor could force a réévaluation o f Am erican policy objectives in Indonesia. "M uch w ill depend upon the situation elsew h ere," he predicted, "an d the possibility that our need for strategic m aterials from Southeast A sia m ay outw eigh our desire for independence o f the indigenous populations o f the area, if such independence is to be a paw n in the hands of m ilitant and organized com m unists."44 The new Am erican consul general in Batavia, Charles Livengood, w as sim ilarly concerned about the appeal o f Indonesian communism; he urged Secretary M arshall to announce that the Trum an Doctrine applied to Indonesia, and that the United States w ould exert the necessary pressure to ensure its observance there.45 M ost observers w ithin the State Departm ent held, conversely, that it w as actually Dutch policy that w as directly responsible for the increasing popularity of communism in the republic. The failure o f the Dutch to com ply w ith the term s of the Renville agreem ent had led to a m ounting disillusionm ent w ithin the republic w ith the policies of the Hatta governm ent; the com­ m unists, naturally, fed on this discontent. A fter all, the prim e m inister's dom estic critics reasoned, the republic had agreed to Dutch occupation of its richest areas and to the w ithdraw al o f its finest troops from strategic guerrilla positions behind Dutch lines and had gained no perceptible advantage in return. In­ stead, the Dutch had proceeded to create new states and “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 277. “ Reed to Benninghoff (Office of Far Eastern Affairs), August 27, 1948, 856D.00/8-2748, DSR. “ Livengood to M arshall, August 2 ,19 4 8 ,856E.00/8-248, DSR. In June 1948 the State Department organized a conference of U .S. officials serving in Southeast A sia to analyze the problem of communism in the area. It met at Bangkok, June 2 1-2 6 . See folder labeled "S .E .A ., 1948: Southeast Asia Conference," in Box 2, PSA Records, DSR. 237

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seem ed intent on form ing a provisional federal governm ent w ithout the republic's participation. The strategy of diplom asi, as dissident republicans contended, had thus far only increased the pow er o f the N etherlands at the expense of the republic.*6 Leftist opposition to the Sukam o-H atta leadership w as fueled by this w idespread disillusionm ent w ith the republic's diplom at­ ic strategy, sym bolized by the hum iliating Renville settlem ent. On February 26, 1948, the m ajor parties constituting the leftist opposition to the Hatta governm ent had reorganized into the People's Democratic Front (Front Dem okrasi Rakjat, or FDR), under the chairm anship of form er prim e m inister A m ir Sjarifuddin. The FD R's program , w hich w as rem arkably sim ilar to that advanced by Tan M alaka in 1946, called for the repudiation of the Renville agreem ent, the cessation of all negotiations w ith the Dutch until their total w ithdraw al from Indonesia, and the nationalization of Dutch and other foreign properties w ithout com pensation. With considerable support from labor and the arm y, the FDR presented a form idable challenge to the m oder­ ate policies of the Hatta cabinet. One of the FD R's strongest w eapons against Hatta and his supporters w as its charge that the republican governm ent w as truckling to the United States. Sjarifuddin, w ho believed him self more responsible than an y other republican official for signing the Renville pact, felt partic­ ularly bitter tow ard the United States; he w as convinced that W ashington had betrayed the republic by failing to ensure a fair im plem entation of the agreem ent as it had repeatedly prom ised. The dram atic return of the legendary Com m unist leader M usso to Indonesia in early A ugust 1948 provided the FDR w ith the charism atic leadership it sorely lacked. A fter a tw elve-year ab­ sence in the Soviet Union, the man w ho had led the abortive Com m unist revolt of 1926 and founded the underground PKI in 1935 quickly m oved to consolidate the leftist forces opposing the Hatta governm ent. The PKI readily accepted M usso's leadership and the other parties w ithin the FDR coalition soon fell in line, accepting his revolutionary program . Once again the line be­ tween the proponents of diplom asi and perdjuangan w as stark­ ly draw n.67 “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 253-56. ‘ ’ Ibid., pp. 259-79; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 129-40.

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Am erican officials w ere concerned that a continuation o f pre­ sent Dutch policy w ould increase this internal opposition, threatening the very survival of the moderate Hatta governm ent and raising the specter of a Com m unist ascendancy within Indone­ sia. O n A ugust 3 1 the State Departm ent inform ed Cochran that it agreed w ith his assessm ent that Dutch attitudes, "intentional or unintentional," appeared to be hastening the fall of the Hatta governm ent, and it feared that the successor of that governm ent w ould be "strongly Left W ing if not Com m unist controlled." The departm ent urged Cochran to "take all practicable steps" to hasten the resum ption of political negotiations w ith the republic in an effort to forestall the possibility of a Com m unist takeover.* On the follow ing day the departm ent inform ed the Am erican representative that it agreed w ith his conviction that the "d e­ teriorating situation m akes [it] im perative [that a] plan for [a] political settlem ent be form ulated and presented at [the] earliest possible m om ent."* O n Septem ber 7 Cochran transm itted the Am erican delega­ tion's proposed draft agreem ent to W ashington and urged the State Departm ent to support it. "U SD el's considered opinion," Cochran said, "is that action should be quick as possible since w e are convinced situation w ill deteriorate further unless overall political agreem ent reached." The State Department prom ptly approved the Cochran plan, and recommended that the delega­ tion present it im m ediately to both parties as w ell as to the A ustralian and Belgian delegations. Expressing its deep concern about the "Com m unist threat to present m oderate Repub re­ g im e/' the State Departm ent em phasized that the stability of the H atta regim e w ould best be ensured through the acceptance by both parties o f a "ju st and practical settlem ent" of the D utchrepublican dispute. Accordingly, M arshall instructed the Am er­ ican Em bassy in The H ague to inform the Dutch Foreign Office that the United States supported the proposals of the Am erican delegation and attached the greatest importance to bolstering the Hatta governm ent at this juncture "in order [to] prevent further sw ing tow ard Com m unism within Republic." The “ M arshall to Cochran, August 31,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948,6:312. See also memoran­ dum from Barco to Rusk, September 3,19 4 8 , in ibid., pp. 318-22; White House daily summary, September 1,19 4 8 , DSR. “ M arshall to Cochran, September 1,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948, 6:314.

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secretary noted that w ithout question N etherlands officials in Batavia could "d eftly contribute to strengthening H atta's position and should do so prom ptly as possible in order [to] prevent further deterioration."70 Cochran subm itted his proposals for an overall settlem ent to the two parties on Septem ber 10 in the form o f a confidential note. The Cochran plan w as sim ilar to the duBois-Critchley proposals, although it m ade several significant concessions to the Dutch point of view . Like the Am erican-Australian w orking paper, it provided for an elected federal representative assem bly that w ould serve as both an interim governm ent and a constitu­ tional convention. In order to appease Dutch objections to that earlier draft agreem ent, the Cochran plan strengthened the federal character o f the U .S .I., ensuring against republican dom ination o f the governm ent. In addition, the pow er o f the N etherlands representative w as increased m easurably; he re­ tained the right to veto any proposed legislation.71 Still The H ague rem ained unsatisfied.72 On Septem ber 17 , the new ly appointed N etherlands foreign m inister, Dirk U. Stikker, traveled to W ashington in an effort to explain his governm ent's position to Am erican policy m akers. "The problem of negotia­ tion alone versu s the use of force in the Indonesian problem ," he later recalled, "w as still not decided. A nd before m aking up m y ow n m ind, I determ ined personally to find out the thinking o f the Am erican Governm ent on Indonesia—w hich I under­ stood to be decisive for the scope of action available to us. It w as essential, in m y view , to have d ear indications of w hether or not there w as any flexibility in the Am erican position."73 ’"Cochran to M arshall, September 7,19 4 8 ; Marshall to Cochran, September 8 and September 9,1948 ; Marshall to Baruch, September 9 ,19 48 , all in ibid., pp. 322-29. See also memorandum horn Milner to General Cortlandt V. Schuyler, "Conference on Status of Dutch-lndonesian Negotiations," attended by Milner (of Planning and Operation Division), Lacy, Lieutenant Colonel Dixon (of Arm y Intelligence Division), and Captain Nathaniel M. Martin (of P&O), September 22, 1948, P&O Netherlands, Planning and Operation Division Files/ Modem M ilitary Branch. 71"Draft Agreement for Overall Political Settlem ent," September 10 ,19 4 8 , UN S/AC. 10/184, GOC Records, UN Library. See also Taylor, Indonesian Indepen­ dence, pp. 142-43; Collins, "United Nations and Indonesia," pp. 16 1-6 2. ’’ Cochran to M arshall, September 1 1 and September 13 , 1948, in FR, 1948,

6:333-34/ 336-37-

’’ Dirk U. Stikker, Men of Responsibility: A Memoir (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 109.

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In a m eeting w ith M arshall, Stikker conveyed his govern­ m ent's view that som e of the provisions of the Cochran plan w ere unacceptable. He pointed out, m oreover, that his govern­ m ent had been surprised by the procedure follow ed in the subm isssion o f the proposals, as they had been presented without an y prior consultation w ith Dutch officials. M arshall rem arked that for his part he w as "v ery im pressed by the fact that for the first tim e all the elem ents of the Am erican Governm ent con­ cerned w ith this problem both in the N etherlands Indies and here w ere unanim ous in regarding the proposals as fair and in their conviction that it w as of the utm ost im portance to act prom ptly."74 In another conversation, Under Secretary Lovett told Stikker that the State Departm ent w as determ ined "that the grow ing Com m unist strength in Indonesia be contained and, if possible, elim inated." It w as the "grave and im m ediate" Com ­ m unist threat that m ost alarm ed Am erican policy m akers. Lovett explained: "I said that it appeared to u s that Indonesian nationalism m ust be accommodated in a just and practical w ay as a condition precedent to dealing w ith Com m unism in that area and for these very reasons, M r. Cochran had offered his plan in the m ost expeditious w ay possible in the belief that its acceptance by both parties w ould strengthen M r. Hatta and his governm ent sufficiently to enable him successfully to liquidate Com m unists w ithin the Republic." Lovett concluded the discus­ sion by expressing the Am erican governm ent's hope that the Dutch w ould accept the Cochran plan "w ith its essentials un­ changed as soon as possible."75 Ju st before Stikker's visit, the A rm y Intelligence D ivision had inform ed the State Departm ent that it enthusiastically sup­ ported the Cochran plan, as it had the duBois-Critchley propo­ sals earlier. On Septem ber 14 S. J. Cham berlin, director of intel­ ligence for the A jm y, w rote that "since the Republic, even according to Dutch adm issions, has w ide popular support, the ^Memorandum by Marshall of a conversation with Stikker, van Kleffens, and Blom, September 17 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948,6:345-45. ^Memorandum by Lovett of a conversation with Stikker, van Kleffens, and Blom, September 17 , 1948, in ibid., pp. 345-47. Lovett w as urged to take this position in a memorandum from Hickerson, Butterworth, and Rusk, September 15 ,19 4 8 , 8560.00/9-1548, DSR. For Stikker's version of these conversations, see Men of Responsibility, pp. 116 -17 . See also Jessup, Birth of Nations, pp. 60-61.

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Dutch m ust be persuaded to adopt a liberal policy tow ard the Republic if they expect to form a USI w ith the w ide base of popular support necessary for its su rvival." The nationalist m ovem ent w as in danger o f passing into Com m unist hands, and such an eventuality w ould adversely affect the United States' economic and strategic interests in Indonesia. Reflecting on the Am erican stake in the archipelago, Cham berlin noted, "Indonesia is an im portant source for the U .S. o f strategic w ar m aterials—tin, rubber, petroleum , quinine, and kapok. It is in the interest o f the U .S. that all possible steps be taken to estab­ lish political stability in Indonesia so that economic rehabilita­ tion can proceed, and these strategic m aterials become available to U .S. w hen n eeded." Sum m arizing the Intelligence D ivision's reasons for supporting the Cochran plan, he explained: If this plan succeeds the ID feels that in the long run, the best interests of the Dutch will be protected; the danger of widespread guerrilla warfare will be averted; the moral position of the U.S. regarding nationalist movements will be upheld; the Communist menace can be met by joint Dutch-Republic opposition; and eco­ nomic stability, with its promise of availability of war materials of strategic interests to the U.S. can be restored. The A rm y Intelligence D ivision, accordingly, urged the State Departm ent "to exert pressure" to have the Dutch and repub­ licans accept the Cochran plan.7* The issue o f communism in Indonesia suddenly came to a head in late Septem ber 1948. A t M adiun, a d ty in eastern Java, Indonesian Com m unists tx>ldly launched a revolt against the Hatta governm ent. Attem pting to capitalize on an unm istakable leftw ard drift w ithin the Indonesian republic—a drift that had been fueled by the increasing disillusionm ent w ith Renville and the apparently disastrous and unwarranted faith o f republican leaders in the United States' pledges to support the agreem ent— the PKI m ade its bid for pow er.77 "If govt can quell this u pris­ *Cham berlin to General Wedemeyer, September 14 ,19 4 8 , P&O 092, Planning and Operation Division Files, Modem M ilitary Branch. ^Som e authors have argued that the Communist revolt in Indonesia in September, coupled with Communist revolts in Burma in March of the same year and in M alaya in June, took place under orders from Moscow. According to

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in g ," C onsul G eneral Livengood cabled W ashington, "it w ill be in m uch stronger position internally and for negotiations; if it can not, it w ill either disintegrate or require immediate assis­ tance from outside." Cochran met w ith Hatta on Septem ber 10 and sim ilarly inform ed the prim e m inister that, although he regretted the M adiun revolt, "crisis gives Republican Govern­ m ent opportunity [to] show its determ ination [to] suppress Com m unism . H atta used the opportunity m asterfully. Acting sw iftly and decisively, the republican governm ent m oved to suppress the M adiun insurgents. The attem pted coup proved to be pre­ m ature; the Com m unists had foolishly overestim ated their strength. By October the abortive revolt had been crushed, and once again Hatta and the republican m oderates w ere in firm control o f the nationalist m ovem ent.79 The prom pt action of the republic in suppressing the Com ­ m unist rebellion at M adiun im pressed Am erican officials. The State Departm ent could no longer question the staunch anti­ com m unism of the republican regim e; and w ith the continuing stalem ate in Indochina and the spectacular successes of Mao this theory, the Soviet Union decided on a more aggressive policy in Southeast A sia, proclaimed the policy at a Communist youth conference in Calcutta in February 1948, and then instructed the respective Communist parties in South­ east A sia to foment rebellions in the very near future. Although direct evidence of such a conspiracy is lacking, the theory nonetheless has its adherents. See, for exam ple, Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program, and Tactics (Vancouver University of British Columbia Press, 1965), pp. 35-36; Brackman, Indonesian Communism, pp. 91-92; Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 112 - 13 ; Jeanne S. Mintz, Moham­ med, Marx, and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 92-93. Ruth T. McVey analyzed this thesis and dismissed it in her Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings (Ithaca: Cornell University M odem Indonesia Project, 1958). A s a result of an investigation of all available sources, she concluded that there was little reason to suspect that the Calcutta Conference led to the Madiun revolt; instead, the rebellion grew out of domestic conditions within Indonesia. ’’ Livengood to M arshall, September 20, 1948, and Cochran to M arshall, September 20,1948, in FR, 1948,6:356-57. ” The most detailed examination of the Madiun revolt can be found in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 256-303. See also Virginia Thompson and Richard A dloff, "The Communist Revolt in Java," Far Eastern Survey, 17 (November 17 , 1948):257l-6o; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 134-47; George McTuman Kahin, "The Crisis and Its Afterm ath," Far Eastern Survey, 17 (November 17 ,

1948):26i-64.

*43

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Tse-tung's Com m unists against the Koum intang in China, the rapid dénouem ent o f the M adiun affair took on added signifi­ cance. W ashington increasingly came to view the Indonesian Republic as a bulw ark against communism in Southeast A sia. The republic, noted Lovett approvingly, w as the "o n ly govt in Far East to have met and crushed an all-out Com m unist offensive."*0Significantly, shortly after the M adiun rebellion the C IA dispatched its first regular agent to the republican capital of Jogjakarta in an effort to provide covert assistance to the repub­ lic's anticom m unist leadership.*1 Considered against this back­ drop, the intransigence of the Dutch w as becom ing m ore and more intolerable. On Septem ber 17 the republican delegation voted to accept the Cochran Plan. The N etherlands delayed its reply until October 14 , a full month after the plan had been presented. W hile accepting it as a basis for discussion, the Dutch delega­ tion had "objections of such a serious nature" to som e of Coch­ ran 's proposals that they attached a series of am endm ents so sw eeping that they am ounted to a substitution o f Dutch counterproposals.*2 "The provisions w hich the N etherlands "Lovett to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad, December 3 1, 1948, in FR, 1948, 6:618-20. See also Butterworth to Lovett, September 2 1,19 4 8 , in folder labeled "SEA , Secretary's Press Conference," Box 2, PSA Records, DSR. Several former State Department officials (Jessup, Barco, Nolting, Rusk) empha­ sized to me the importance of the Madiun affair in favorably affecting the Amer­ ican governm ent's perception of the Indonesian Republic. See also Acheson to Louis B. Wehle (former chief, Foreign Economic Administration, Netherlands), March 15 , 1949, in Box 75, Wehle Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park; John F. Cady, "Am erica's Postwar Role in Southeast A sia," in Kan Kyo Kim, ed., Essays on Modem Politics and History Written in Honor of Harold M. Vinacke (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969), p. 59; Fischer, Story of Indonesia, p. 114 ; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 146; Brackman, Indonesian Com­ munism, p. 107. nI thank George McT. Kahin for bringing this point to my attention. See his essay "The United States and the Anticolonial Revolutions in Southeast A sia, 1945-50," in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira iriye, eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 350, 360. The person in question, Arthur Campbell, is mentioned briefly in FR, 1948,6:372-74, but is not identified as a CIA agent. "Republican Delegation to Cochran, September 20, 1948, UN S/AC. 10/186, GOC Records, UN Library; Netherlands Delegation to U .S. Delegation, October 14, 1948, UN S/AC. 10/185, >bid. See also UN S/AC. 10/198 and UN S/AC.10/ CONF.2/BUR/W.3, ibid. For a detailed examination of the Dutch counterpropo­ sals, see Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 146-53.

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w ishes to elim inate are o f course the heart o f the U S p la n / lam ented H arding Bancroft o f the State Departm ent's O ffice o f United N ations A ffairs. 'T h e am endm ents required by the N etherlands Governm ent w ould in fact leave no U S plan at all."*3 Hatta com plained to Cochran that the "Dutch do not actually w ant to come to an agreem ent that is not in line w ith their preconceived d esign ." H e added: "The am endm ents pro­ posed by [the] Dutch radically alter [the] contents and purport of [the] Cochran plan and m oreover flagrantly contradict the Ren­ ville principles."*4 Even H. M erle Cochran, w ho adm itted that "n o one could have come to Batavia w ith [a] more friendly attitude toward [the] N etherlands than I d id ," began to doubt the sincerity of Dutch pledges. Like Graham and duBois before him , Cochran gradually cam e to question w hether the N etherlands had any intention o f reaching an accommodation w ith the Indonesian Republic. On N ovem ber 1 he inform ed the State Departm ent that he believed a crisis w as now inevitable unless the Nether­ lands delegation "revealed better faith in resum ing negotia­ tio n s." Speaking w ith T. Elink Schuurm an of the Dutch delega­ tion tw o days later, the Am erican representative rem arked that progress tow ard a settlem ent "had been slow principally be­ cause o f [the] adam ant position taken by [the] N etherlands Delegations."** Cochran expressed this increasing disillusion­ m ent in a telegram to W ashington on Novem ber 6. N oting that the State Departm ent w as understandably reluctant to put "im ­ proper pressure" on The H ague, he nonetheless urged the de­ partm ent to consider exerting direct influence if conditions failed to im prove: We have responsibility not to put US funds into Netherlands colo­ nial enterprise involving suppression militarily of truly nationalis­ tic aspirations. Furthermore I am convinced moral suasion or mere threat sanctions by military would be less effective than simple “ Bancroft to Barco, October 14, 1948, 501.BC Indonesia/10-1548. See also Secretary of State's weekly summary, October 11,19 4 8 , DSR. 84Hatta to Cochran, October 2 1,19 4 8 , reprinted in Cochran to M arshall, Octo­ ber 23,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948,6:431. “ Cochran to M arshall, November 6, November 1 , and November 4 ,19 4 8 , in ibid., pp. 467,448,455.

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procedure US Government telling Netherlands Government at high level that no more financial aid of any sort will be forthcoming if police action taken against Republic and as long as Netherlands fails consummate settlement through GOC permitting Republic enter USI honorably and peacefully.* But Cochran had not yet given up all hope that the Dutch and Indonesians could reach an agreem ent; he suggested that the "greatest possibility of achieving [a] settlem ent" rested w ith the direct talks between Hatta and Stikker which had commenced on N ovem ber 4 ." The N etherlands governm ent had decided on direct talks w ith the republic's prim e m inister in a determ ined effort to block GO C participation in the negotiations. Cochran and the State Departm ent, although initially appalled by this tactic, gradually came to appreciate Stikker's honesty and ability and even began to express guarded optimism about the chances for a successful agreem ent." A t first this optimism appeared justified, as Hatta offered m ajor concessions to the Dutch position on such critical issues as the nature o f the interim governm ent, the pow ers o f the Dutch representative during the transition period, and the right of H olland to retain sovereignty during that period. O nly m inor details appeared unresolved, and a hopeful Stikker flew to The H ague in late Novem ber for further instructions from his governm ent." W hen the foreign m inister returned to Indonesia to renew the discussions w ith Hatta, how ever, there w as a m arked change in the atm osphere. Accom panied now by E. J. M . A . Sassen, the m inister for overseas territories, and a group of parliam entary advisers, Stikker and the Dutch delegation took a harder line. A ccusing the republic of a m ounting num ber of truce violations, the Dutch now insisted on a stricter observance of the cease-fire. “ Cochran to M arshall, November 6,1948, in ibid., p. 467. See also Cochran to M arshall, October 29,1948, in ibid., p. 441; Butterworth to Lovett, Novem ber 12, 1948, 501.BC Indonesia/11-1148, DSR. ^Cochran to M arshall, November 11,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948,6:482. "S e e , for example, Lovett to Baruch, November 10, 1948, and Lovett to Cochran, November 10 ,19 4 8 , both in ibid., pp. 478,479. "Stikker, Men of Responsibility, pp. 122-29; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp.

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O n this and other points/ the negotiations quickly stalled.10 Baruch reported from Holland that if the talks failed, the use of force by die Dutch w ould be inevitable. On December 5, 1948, w ith the tw o parties again stalem ated, the Dutch delegation once m ore departed for the N etherlands. Explaining this abrupt action to Cochran, the Dutch delegation asserted om inously: "U nd er the circum stances, the N etherlands Governm ent is forced to draw the unavoidable conclusion that it is absolutely im possible to reach agreem ent w ith the Republican G overn­ m en t."91 O n Decem ber 5 Cochran reported to W ashington that "there is now [a] definite breakdown of direct talk s." There w as no indication "o f any present disposition on [the] part of [the] N etherlands to negotiate either w ithin GO C or in any other w a y ." Believing that a second police action m ight now be immi­ nent, Cochran urged the State Departm ent to help bring the Dutch back to the bargaining table. "If representations are to succeed," he em phasized, "they m ust be strong."” Follow ing Cochran's advice, the State Departm ent transm it­ ted an aide-m ém oire to the N etherlands governm ent on Decem­ ber 7. Expressing disappointm ent w ith the suspension of the Stikker-H atta talks, the departm ent said that the "U nited States Governm ent is convinced that a resum ption of bona tide nego­ tiations is im perative." The aide-mémoire reiterated the Am er­ ican belief that "the preponderant desire of the Indonesian peo­ ple to govern them selves finds its chief expression in the Repub­ lic o f Indonesia, w hich m ust be considered not as a geographical concept but as a political force." Mohammed Hatta, w ho acted "w ith skill and fortitude against a Com m unist revolt," had re­ cently "given persuasive evidence of his desire to cooperate in a reasonable solution of the political differences between the N etherlands and the Republic," but his "m oderate and condlia"Stikker, Men of Responsibility, pp. 129-37; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 158-59. See also "Report to the GOC from the Republican Delegation on the Informal Conversations between Hatta and the Dutch," December 7,19 4 8 , UN S/AC. 10/213, GOC Records, UN Library. 91Baruch to M arshall, December 2,19 4 8 , 856D.00/12-248, DSR; Dutch Delega­ tion to Cochran, December 5,19 48 , in Special Report by the GOC to the Security Council, UN S/1129, Appendix III. "C ochran to M arshall, December 5,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948, 6:523-26.

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tory policy" w ould be endangered by any arbitrary Dutch ac­ tion. W ashington w arned that a resort to m ilitary m easures, even if follow ed by initial successes, w as likely to lead to pro­ tracted guerrilla w arfare. "Such an outcome could seriously de­ plete the resources o f the N etherlands and tend to nullify the effect o f appropriations m ade to the N etherlands and Indonesia under the Economic Cooperation A dm inistration." A lthough the United States did not raise the possibility o f a suspension o f M arshall Plan funds if the Dutch em barked on a second police action—as an earlier draft of this m essage had done—that op­ tion w as nonetheless im plicit. This frank statem ent o f the Am er­ ican governm ent's view s, the aide-mém oire concluded, w as in­ tended "o n ly to give the N etherlands Governm ent the benefit o f its perspective so that the N etherlands Governm ent w ill em bark upon no course o f action w hich, w hile undertaken w ith the m ost unexceptionable m otives, could result in w eakening tire new ly em erging W estern European structure to the lasting d is­ advantage o f the com ponent nations."91 Dutch authorities deeply resented this pointed Am erican m essage. M em bers o f the N etherlands Foreign O ffice reacted to the aide-m ém oire w ith "pained and angry su rprise"; A . H . J. Lovink rem arked that it w as "v e ry plain speaking" and he "understood fu lly w hat it m eant." Likew ise, the Dutch cabinet w as "unanim ously bitter" about W ashington's intervention; Stikker later w rote that "the United States did not understand that this type o f action alw ays has the opposite effect from w hat is intended." On Decem ber 10 the N etherlands replied w ith an equally blunt aide-mém oire o f its ow n. "The N etherlands G ov­ ernm ent is convinced," this m essage asserted, "that the conclu­ sion and view s contained in the United States aide-memoire are based on an insufficient understanding o f the circum stances w hich have led to the present situation."9* Top-ranking State Departm ent officers alerted Lovett that The nAide-mémoire from Department of State to Netherlands Embassy, December 7,1948, in ibid., pp. 531-35"Quoted in Lloyd V. Steer (chargé, The Hague) to Marshall, December 7, 1948, in ibid., p. 530; Stikker, Men of Responsibility, pp. 138-39; aide-mémoire from Netherlands Embassy to Department of State, December 9 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948,

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H ague's aide-m ém oire "strongly foreshadow s the possibility of an outbreak o f hostilities in Indonesia." Realizing this, Prime M inister Hatta hastily drafted a letter to the Dutch delegation on Decem ber 13 in w hich he attem pted to satisfy earlier Dutch objections to the republican position. W ashington applauded H atta's efforts as providing a "reasonable basis [for the] resum p­ tion [of] negotiations" and reflecting the "conciliatory attitude [of the] Repub G o vt." Reed called it the most conciliatory state­ m ent ever m ade by a top-ranking official of the republic. N onetheless, the N etherlands flatly rejected the prim e m inis­ ter's overture, and on December 17 presented him w ith an ulti­ m atum that, as Cochran sum m arized it, called "fo r surrender to the position" o f The H ague "on every m aterial p o in t."* The Dutch m aintained that this w as "tru ly the last possible m ove from the N etherlands sid e" and gave the republic only one day to rep ly.* Cochran angrily criticized this crude and arrogant approach. A fter detailing all his efforts to help the two parties to reach an agreem ent, he inform ed the Dutch: "I cannot, how ever, consis­ tently w ith m y obligations as a member o f the Committee of G ood O ffices, press Dr. Hatta to reply sum m arily on the condi­ tions im posed by your telegram because it calls for a nonnegotiated blanket assent which w ould preclude the possibility o f bona fide negotiations, rather than effect their resum ption."*7 Equally shocked by the preem ptive Dutch action, W. Walton Butterworth instructed the Am erican Em bassy in The H ague to rem ind the N etherlands Foreign Office "o f the great urgency of "M em orandum prepared for Lovett by Hickerson, Butterworth, and William Sanders (acting chief, Office of United Nations Affairs), December 13 ,19 4 8 , in ibid., p. 550; Hatta to Dutch Delegation, December 13 ,19 4 8 , in Special Report, UN S/1129 and Corr. 1; Lovett to Cochran, December 14, 1948, in FR, 1948, 6:558-59; Lovett to American Embassy, Belgium, December 15, 1948, UN S/ A C. 10/220, GOC Records, UN Library; Reed to Butterworth, December 15,19 4 8 , 856D.00/12-1548, DSR; Dutch Delegation to Hatta, December 17 , 1948, in Sup­ plementary Report of the GOC to the Security Council, UN S/1129 and Corr. 1; Cochran to Dutch Delegation, December 17 , 1948, UN S/AC. 10/220, GOC Re­ cords, UN Library. "Q uoted in White House daily summary, December 17 ,19 4 8 , DSR. "C ochran to Dutch Delegation, December 17 , 1948, UN S/AC. 10/220, GOC Records, UN Library. For Cochran's report to the GOC in the days before the second policy action, see Summary Record of the 169th Meeting of the GOC, December 24,1948, S/AC. 10/SR. 169, ibid.

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the situation and o f the great im portance that the Departm ent attached to a peaceful settlem ent o f the Indonesian problem ." Butterworth rem arked that "it seem ed incredible to the Depart­ m ent that the N etherlands w ould resort to police action ."* But the drift tow ard w ar w as now irreversible; Dutch officials had already m ade the "incredible"—and fateful—decision. On De­ cem ber 19 , 1948, they suddenly launched their second police action against the Republic o f Indonesia. "M em orandum by Butterworth of a telephone conversation with Steere, De­ cember 18 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948,6:571-72.

250

8 The Road to Independence: December 1 9 4 $ —December 1 9 4 9 The m ain objective of the new Dutch m ilitary cam paign w as to capture the d ty of Jogjakarta, the seat of the republican gov­ ernm ent. The assault began in the early hours of December 19, 1948, as Dutch bom bers strafed the nearby airport. The attack caught Indonesian leaders by surprise. Although the possibility of another police action had been seriously considered, Prime M inister Hatta and other nationalist leaders firm ly believed that the Dutch w ould not strike until the opportunity for construc­ tive negotiations had been exhausted; it w as unlikely, they reasoned, that The H ague w ould risk insulting the United States b y resorting to arm ed action w hile Cochran w as still cajoling the Dutch to resum e negotiations. A s Hatta and a top m ilitary advis­ er had concluded only hours before the attack: "U nquestionably the Dutch could attack; but w ouldn't this m ean that they had gone m ad?"1 The elem ent o f surprise thus combined w ith the overwhelm ­ ing superiority o f Dutch troops and w eaponry to ensure the early success of the police action. By m id-afternoon of December 19 the Dutch arm y not only had seized Jogjakarta, but had cap­ tured Sukarno, Hatta, and half of the republican cabinet as w ell. The victory appeared complete: the d ty and the leaders that had com e to sym bolize the Indonesian nationalist m ovem ent w ere now in the hands of the Dutch m ilitary. Unprepared for the w ell-planned Dutch onslaught and ill equipped to fight a con'T . B. Simatupang, Report from Barman: Experiences during the People's War (Ithaca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1972), p. 17.

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ventional w ar, Indonesian troops offered only slight resistance; they quickly fled the occupied city, regrouped in the country­ side, and began to prepare for a prolonged guerrilla struggle.2 During the next w eek, the Dutch m ilitary machine overran nearly all o f the m ajor republican-held cities in Java and Sum a­ tra. By the end of December, Dutch control o f the republic's principal cities and tow ns w as virtually com plete. Intent on pre­ senting the w orld w ith a fait accom pli, N etherlands officials reported that the Dutch arm y had encountered little or no resis­ tance from the Indonesian population; their troops, they claim ed, had been greeted as liberators. In order to guarantee that their version of the offensive w as w idely reported, the Dutch im posed strict censorship on all outgoing new s stories and refused to allow outside observation by either the G ood O ffices Com m ittee or the m ilitary observer group attached to it. The dem ise o f the Republic o f Indonesia, The H ague hoped, w ould be both sw ift and com plete. The Dutch realized that their second police action w as a calculated gam ble. Its success hinged on tw o factors: the quick suppression o f all republican resistance and the w illingness of the international com m unity to accept the Dutch offensive as a fait accompli. On both counts, Dutch hopes w ould be profoundly shattered.3 The N etherlands had expected to be criticized for its unilateral abrogation of a UN -sponsored agreem ent, but it w as unpre­ pared for the floodtide o f condem nation that greeted the police action. The m ost virulent reaction came from the new ly inde­ pendent nations. N ehru charged that the Dutch action w as "contrary to the principles of the United N ations ch arter." Speaking before the Indian National Congress on Decem ber 19 , 2Anthony J. S. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-50 (Hawthorn, A us­ tralia: Longman, 1974), pp. 15 1-5 2 ; George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 337-58; Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 19 71), p. 137. For an Indonesian military leader's firsthand account of the fall of Jogjakarta, see Simatupang, Report from Banaran, pp. 17-27. JKahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 338-39. Cochran informed the State Department of the Dutch censorship of news stories. There was "little likeli­ hood," he cabled W ashington, "o f firsthand information reaching outside world as to actual situation in Repub." See Cochran to Lovett, December 2 1, 1948, in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D .C ., 1974), 6:594. Hereafter volum es in this series w ill be cited as FR, followed by the year.

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the prim e m inister declared: "N o one can prevent the tide of independence in Asiatic countries. Our foreign policy is that no foreign pow er should rule over any Asiatic country. A reaction to the Dutch action w ill be heard soon all over A siatic countries/ and w e w ill have to consider our course o f action in the cir­ cum stances."4 The follow ing day the Arab League expressed outrage at the Dutch m ilitary offensive and pledged support for the Indone­ sian Republic in the United N ations Security Council. On De­ cem ber 22 the governm ent o f Ceylon announced that its harbor and airfield facilities could no longer be used for ships and air­ craft carrying troops or w ar m aterials intended for use against the Indonesians; Pakistan and India quickly m ade sim ilar pro­ nouncem ents. In Australia/ maritime w orkers banned the trans­ port o f all w ar-related m aterials to Indonesia and urged fellow dockw orkers around the w orld to im pose boycotts o f their ow n. On Decem ber 24 the Philippines expressed "dism ay and grave fears" in regard to The H ague's resort to arm ed force. Burm ese students in Rangoon and Indian students in Bom bay dem on­ strated against the Dutch attack, w hile in Karachi, angry Paki­ stanis m arched against the Dutch Em bassy.5 The United States governm ent w as equally dism ayed by the latest Dutch transgressions. On learning of the Dutch decision for w ar, Robert Lovett im m ediately cabled Philip Jessu p, the acting United States representative at the United N ations, that "it w ill be necessary for [the] SC to meet in em ergency session to deal w ith w hat m ay prove to be a grave threat to internatl peace and security." Later the sam e day, W. Walton Butterworth re­ m arked to Helb of the Dutch Em bassy that "the N etherlands as a responsible member of the Atlantic com m unity had done itself a grave disservice and in doing so had done one to the Christian n ation s." H e intim ated that "very unhappy tim es w ere in store for m an y." On the next day, December 19 , Helb told W illiam S. B. Lacy o f the State Departm ent's Division of Southeast A sian * *New York Times, December 20,1948, pp. 1,-14 . ’ Ibid., December 2 1 and December 24,1948; League of Arab States to Security Council, December 2 1,19 4 8 , UN S/1128; Times (London), December 23, Decem­ ber 24, and December 28, 1948; Loy W. Henderson (ambassador in India) to M arshall, December 22,1948,8560.00/12-2248, DSR.

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A ffairs that his governm ent had learned of the United States' intention to bring the issue of the police action before the Secu­ rity Council and w as concerned about the effect that the develop­ m ent m ight have on Dutch public opinion. Lacy rem inded the Dutch diplom at of the Am erican governm ent's "unalterable opposition to [the] police action" and explained that W ashing­ ton "could hardly fail to respond to the obvious moral pressures w hich had resulted from the Dutch resort to force."* The State Departm ent quickly determ ined that the United N a­ tions, w hich had already assum ed direct responsibility for help­ ing to settle the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, w ould be the proper forum to express its opposition to the Dutch police action. But the departm ent believed that although the United States should form ally go on record as condem ning the police action, it should act in concert w ith other nations. A s Lovett told Jessu p, "W e do not desire U S [to] assum e a position of outstanding and solitary leadership in dealing w ith this case." President Trum an rein­ forced this position in a conversation w ith Acting Secretary o f State Lovett on December 20. He said that the United States should label the Dutch police action as an act o f aggression, but should be careful to "avoid taking any action in the Security Council w hich w ould involve u s subsequently, in consequence, in adopting positions which w e w ould be unable to m aintain, either through the defection of our allies or because o f the inade­ quacy of our ow n facilities."7 Am erican action in the Security Council, then, w as to be critical but lim ited. The W hite H ouse and the State Departm ent w ere clearly upset by the Dutch action and sought to denounce it in the Security Council; they did not, how ever, w ish to endanger otherwise friendly relations w ith the N etherlands over the question of Indonesia, nor w ere they w ill­ ing to sponsor direct sanctions of any kind against the Dutch. O n December 2 1 Paul Hoffm an, adm inistrator of the Euro‘ Lovett to Jessup, December 18 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948, 6:577-78; Philip C. Jessup, The Birth of Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 7 1; memo­ randum by Butterworth of a conversation with Helb, December 18 ,19 4 8 , in FR, 1948, 6:578-79; memorandum by Lacy of a conversation with Helb, December 19 ,19 4 8 , in ibid., pp. 585-84. 7Lovett to Jessup, December 19 ,19 4 8 , in ibid., p. 585; memorandum by Lovett of a conversation with Truman, in ibid., pp. 587-88.

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The Road to Independence pean Cooperation Adm inistration, announced that his agency, w ith the concurrence of the State Departm ent, had suspended further M arshall Plan aid to Indonesia pending clarification of current developm ents.* In a memorandum to Hoffm an, Lovett explained that the departm ent's decision w as based exclusively on econom ic criteria. Recent developm ents in Indonesia "lead us to the conclusion that, at least in certain parts o f Indonesia, econom ic and political conditions over the next few m onths are likely to be so unsettled as to make it very uncertain that the investm ent o f funds in that area w ill achieve the purpose in­ tended under the EC A program ."9 This announcem ent w as largely sym bolic, how ever, since only $ 14 m illion of the $68 m illion allocated to Indonesia w as directly affected; the rem ain­ der had already been distributed. M oreover, $298 m illion had been allocated directly to the N etherlands under the European Recovery Program , and that substantial sum rem ained un­ affected by the E C A 's decision.10 It is not surprising, then, that U .S. aid to the N etherlands becam e a controversial subject in the afterm ath of the Dutch attack. Sum itro Djojohadikusom o, acting head of the Indone­ sian delegation to the United N ations, charged that Am erican financial assistance w as so crucial to Holland that The H ague had been able to allocate its ow n funds at the rate of $ 1 m illion a d ay tow ard the support of an arm y of 130,000 in Indonesia. Sum itro elucidated this point in a memorandum to Secretary of State M arshall: *New York Times, December 23, 1948, p. 1; interview with Harry Kahn, Jr. (chief, Netherlands desk, ECA), January 9, 1953, in Harry Price Oral History Interview s, Truman Library, Independence, M o.; statement of Dr. Alan Valen­ tine (chief, ECA Mission to Netherlands), February 1 1 , 1949, U .S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Extension of European Recovery Program: Hearings, 81st Cong., ist sess., pt. 1, pp. 260-73; statement of Valentine, Febru­ ary 14 , 1949, U .S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Extension of European Recovery Program: Hearings, 81st Cong., ist sess., pp. 313-30. ’ Memorandum from Lovett to Hoffman, December 20,1948(7), and Hoffman to van Kleffens, December 22, 1948, both in folder labeled "EC A Operation in Indonesia," Box 1 1 , Records of the Office of Philippines and Southeast Asian A ffairs (hereafter dted as PSA Records), U .S. Department of State Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter dted as DSR). wNew York Times, December 22, 1948, p. 1; "U .S. Business and Indonesia," Business Week, January 8, 1949, p. 10 1; Blair Bolleş, "Indonesia Raises Knotty Colonial Issues for U .S .," Foreign Policy Bulletin, 28 (December 3 1,19 4 8 ):!.

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In view of the fact that the present Dutch military campaign is an act of war in Indonesia, a threat to peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and dangerously impairing the implementation of the Euro­ pean Recovery Program, furthermore, in view of the fact that the Netherlands are diverting E.R.P. dollars for the purpose of waging a colonial war against freedom-loving people, we respectfully but urgently request the United States Government to discontinue rendering American dollars to the Netherlands under the Euro­ pean Recovery Program or otherwise.“ A front-page story in the New York Times revealed on Decem ber 22 that, according to Am erican officials, this aid had enabled the N etherlands "to send supplies and equipm ent to Indonesia that otherw ise m ight have been im possible." A nd ERP dollars w ere not the sole source o f Am erican aid to the Dutch. "B eside $298 m illion in M arshall Plan aid for the N etherlands and $6 1 m illion for Indonesia, the Dutch, since the w ar, have received ExportIm port Bank credits of $300 m illion, credits for the purchase of U .S. w ar surplus supplies totaling $130 m illion, and $19 0 m illion w orth o f civilian supplies as m ilitary relief."12 The im plication w as obvious: the United States, through its financial assistance to the N etherlands, w as indirectly support­ ing a colonial w ar. That fact belied any official protestations against Dutch belligerency. According to George Kahin, an Am erican graduate student studying in Indonesia at the tim e, m ost Indonesians believed, understandably, that the Dutch w ould have been unable to launch their second police action had it not been for the considerable economic assistance pro­ vided by the M arshall Plan. The more knowledgeable Indone­ sians insisted m ost adam antly, Kahin w rote, "that the subsidiz­ ing o f the N etherlands hom e econom y under the M arshall Plan allow ed the Dutch to divert a m ajor portion of the w ealth o f that econom y to the reconquest o f Indonesia. This w as a financial outlay, they insisted, which could not possibly have been m ade

"Sum itro to M arshall, December 19, 1948, 501.BC Indonesia/12-1948, DSR. Sum itro's statement w as reprinted in New York Times, December 2 1,19 4 8 , p. 7. See also memorandum by Lovett of a conversation with Sumitro, December 20, 1948, in FR, 1948, 6:590-92. nNew York Times, December 22,1948, p. 1.

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had not M arshall funds replaced this drain on the home econom y."13 Som e opponents o f Dutch policy, accordingly, joined w ith Sum itro in urging W ashington to cut o ff all M arshall Plan aid to the N etherlands. John W. Burton, the Australian foreign secre­ tary, stated that either Am erican or British pressure could have prevented the police action, and he could not understand W ashington's reluctance to use ERP as a diplom atic w eapon. O fficials in Burm a w ere sim ilarly convinced that M arshall Plan aid m ade the Dutch offensive possible, and urged the United States to reconsider its economic assistance to H olland.14 On Decem ber 20 the governm ent of India transmitted a sharply w orded aide-m ém oire to the State Departm ent w hich reflected this critical point of view . The m essage com plained that ERP assistance w as being used by the Dutch and the French to oppose national freedom in Southeast A sia and m aintain colo­ nial dom ination. "Intense popular feelings roused against the N etherlands Governm ent in Indonesia and elsew here as w ell as the French Governm ent in Indo-C hina," the mem orandum w arned, "h ave thus a tendency to become hostile to concept o f W estern Union and M arshall A id P lan ."13 W ithin the United States, outspoken critics of the police action sim ilarly recom m ended the curtailm ent of all Am erican financial assistance to the Dutch. W riting on behalf of the six m illion m em bers of the Congress of Industrial O rganizations on Decem­ ber 23, President Philip M urray suggested this action to the Secretary of State: A t a time w hen the w orld is striving desperately to find a road to peace, w e feel that the action of the Netherlands governm ent in »Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 402-3. Sumitro later commented that A sian intellectuals were unshakably convinced that American economic in­ terests made both Dutch military actions acceptable to the United States. Asians w ere convinced that in every case the United States would place the interests of Europeans above the interests of Asians (memorandum by Charlton Ogbum of a conversation with Sumitro, May 19 ,19 4 9 , 501 ,BC Indonesia/5-1949, DSR). 14Andrew B. Foster (chargé, Australia) to Marshall, December 20, 1948, 856D.00/12-1748, DSR; J. R. Andrus (chargé, Burma) to M arshall, December 22, 1948, 856D.00/12-2248, DSR. 15Aide-mémoire from Government of India to Department of State, December 20,1948,8560.00/12-1748, DSR.

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suddenly and w antonly attacking the people of Indonesia con­ form s neither to the m orality of our civilization nor to the practical political needs of the people of w estern Europe and the United States. W e feel that insofar as Am erican aid is now available to the Netherlands governm ent, it is being used for purposes inconsis­ tent w ith the original intent and objectives of the European Recov­ ery Program .“

W alter W hite, secretary of the National Association for the Advancem ent of Colored People, also called for the suspension o f all M arshall Plan aid to the N etherlands;17 and on Decem ber 28 form er vice-president H enry W allace dem anded that the United States im m ediately cease all ERP aid to the Dutch and place an em bargo on all arm am ent shipm ents to H olland.1* The Nation added a w ord of caution, noting that "the direct u se of E .R .P . as a political club could provide a dangerous precedent," but suggested, nonetheless, that "the State Departm ent ought to address a solem n m essage to the N etherlands Governm ent that its im proper use of Am erican aid is endangering the w hole future o f E .R .P . and could lead to a refusal by C ongress to pro­ vide further supplies for H olland."w Throughout the United States, the public outcry against Dutch aggession w as intense. On December 23 Senator G eorge M alone of N ebraska declared at a press conference that "w ith ­ out the m oney w e gave the Dutch under the M arshall Plan they could not do w hat they are doing in Indonesia." Senator M ar­ garet Chase Sm ith of M aine expressed grave concern that Dutch belligerency in Indonesia threatened the very structure o f w orld peace em bodied in the United N ations. Speaking on Jan u ary 4, she w arned: "The potency o f the U .N . is threatened by renew ed “ M urray to Lovett, reprinted in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 19 (January 16 , 1948):82. I7Quoted in New York Times, December 24,1948, p. 2. For analyses of the black com m unity's reaction to colonialism and American foreign policy, see Jam es L. Roark, "Am erican Black Leaders: The Response to Colonialism and the Cold War, 19 43-19 53," African Historical Studies, 4 (i97i):253-7o; Mark Solomon, "Black O itics of Colonialism and the Cold W ar," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years (Chica­ go: Quadrangle Books, 19 71), pp. 205-39. wNew York Times, December 28,1948, p. 14. nNation, January 1,19 4 9 , p. 4. 258

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fighting in the Dutch-Indonesian w ar. Holland has defied the U .N . b y starting w hat it calls 'police action/ People have been killed b y the use of arm s. If the U .N . fails to stop this w ar, then its ow n future is threatened." Popular radio commentator Wal­ ter W inchell stated flatly over the Am erican Broadcasting Cor­ poration netw ork that "the terribly stupid blunder of the Dutch over Indonesia is w orth tw enty-five divisions to the commu­ n ists."20 Business and editorial opinion also reacted sharply. Business Week, reflecting a view common w ithin a large segm ent o f the business com m unity, lam ented that "U .S . business w ill have to w ait a little longer to see w here it stands in the fabulous Indonesian m arket." M atthew Fox, a prom inent businessm an w hose Am erican-Indonesian Corporation had lined up several prospective deals w ith the republican governm ent, sim ilarly be­ m oaned the absence o f stability in the archipelago, com plaining that the Dutch police action had once again im peded the restora­ tion o f Am erican trade w ith Indonesia. The press w as equally vociferous in its condem nation o f Dutch aggression. The staid Christian Science Monitor harshly denounced The H ague's mili­ tancy, w hile the New York Times em phasized that the police action w ould deal a "hard blow " to both the United N ations and W estern prestige in the East, and the Chicago Tribune angrily suggested that Q ueen Juliana and top Dutch officials deserved to be hanged for their indefensible actions.21 Dom estic and international criticism of the Dutch m ilitary ac­ tion placed the United States in an extrem ely delicate position. Am erican policy m akers sought to place the blam e for the cur­ rent hostilities squarely on Dutch shoulders, yet to avoid a rup­ ture w ith its European ally. Dean Rusk brilliantly sum m arized these dilem m as in a cable to Jessu p on December 23. The direc­ tor o f the State D epartm ent's O ffice of United N ations A ffairs observed that Dutch action in Indonesia brought into "sharp conflict" several im portant United States national interests: x New York Times, December 23, 1948, p. 3, and January 4, 1949, p. 3; Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 120. 2>"U .S. Business and Indonesia," pp. 10 1-2 ; New York Times, December 23, 1948, p. 18 (see also ibid., December 26,1948, sec. IV, p. 6; ibid., December 3 1, 1948, p. 14); Christian Science Monitor, January 3, 1948, p. 8; New York Times, December 30,1948, p. 29; Chicago Tribune, December 30,1948, p. 12 .

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O n the one hand w e are deeply interested in political and econom ­ ic stability [in the] W estern European countries and [the] solidar­ ity [of] W estern Europe as [a] w hole. O n the other hand w e have [a] long established policy favoring [the] rapid developm ent [of] non-self-govem ing people toward self-govt and independence and establishm ent] in so-called colonial areas of govts based on [the] consent and agreem ent [of the] peoples concerned.

The United States opposed Dutch action in Indonesia because it encouraged the "spread of Com m unism in Southern A sia " and dealt a "serious blow " to the developm ent of m oderate national­ ism in that area. Dutch handling of the Indonesia crisis, m oreov­ er, placed United States cooperation w ith W estern Europe in jeopardy on such m atters as the European Recovery Program and the Atlantic Pact, and endangered the United N ations sys­ tem for the m aintenance of w orld peace. "W e have no d esire," Rusk em phasized, "to condone or w ink at Dutch action [in] Indonesia." A lthough the State Departm ent "agrees unequivocally that N etherlands] is at fault in resum ing m ilitary action," Rusk quick­ ly added, "that in itself does not decide w hat w e do about a country w hich is at fault in such situations." A s a perm anent m em ber o f the Security Council, the United States should sup­ port all UN actions aim ed at m aintaining the peace. This did not m ean, how ever, that W ashington should assum e those respon­ sibilities alone: "U S cannot accept [the] role [of] w orld police­ man either in m ilitary or political sense if other perm anent mem­ bers refuse to join in SC action." Rem inding Jessu p that the Am erican governm ent had "n o intention [of] bringing about [a] general break w ith [the] Dutch over [the] Indonesian question," R usk spelled out the paradoxes inherent in a strongly antiDutch stance: For us to insist upon full compliance w ith highest standard of conduct as price of our association w ith other govts and peoples w ould lead us quickly into position of not too splendid isolation. O n that basis w e m ight have already broken w ith Russia (Berlin, Korea, etc.), Albania (Greece), Yugoslavia (Greece), Bulgaria (Greece), France (Indo-China), and U K (Palestine), A rab States (Palestine), India (Kashm ir and H yderabad), Pakistan (Kashmir), 260

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Instead, he argued, "w e m ust pursue our basic objectives under w hatever conditions w e find, shaping such conditions to extent w e can ." Such flexibility w as necessary, he reasoned, if the United States w as to avoid putting itself "in such a position that an y w rong committed anyw here in w orld and left unpun­ ished constitutes diplom atic defeat and hum iliation for U S /' Consequently, Rusk w ent on, the United States should prop­ erly label and condem n Dutch aggression in Indonesia, acting in concert w ith other nations; but at the sam e time, W ashington "d id not intend to propose or support sanctions against the N etherlands in Eu rope." Rusk thus ruled out the possibility of using M arshall Plan aid as a bargaining lever against the Dutch. The United States w as equally reluctant to "esp ou se" the In­ donesian case before the Security Council. A s he explained Am erican realpolitik to Jessup: "W e are pursuing our ow n in­ terests and policies, as they appear both outside and inside fram ew ork U N . Today pursuit of our policy m ay make us critical o f Dutch; tom orrow pursuit o f sam e policy in different circum­ stances m ay m ake us equally critical of Indonesians."22 A n A rm y Intelligence Division m em orandum , also distrib­ uted on December 23, generally concurred w ith R usk's assess­ m ent o f Am erican interests vis-à-vis the Dutch-Indonesian dis­ pute. "The initiation of sanctions o f any kind against the Nether­ lands G overnm ent," it w arned, "w ould be counter to the mili­ tary interests of the U .S ." Reflecting on the active role the United States governm ent had already taken in the Indonesian crisis, the m em orandum noted that the "State Departm ent has exerted pressure on the Dutch by a strong Aide Memoire and oral repre­ sentations, to the extent consistent w ith dealings w ith a friendly nation and w ithout placing undue strain on W estern Union rela­ tion sh ip s." Further pressure on the Dutch— in the form o f joint­ ly sponsored Security Council resolutions critical o f the police action, but short of sanctions—w ere now appropriate, and

a Rusk to Jessup, December 23,19 48 , in FR, 1948, 6:597-600. 261

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w ould not drive the Dutch out o f the W estern Union. The posi­ tion paper reasoned: It is not believed that the Dutch w ould w ithdraw from W estern Union over the issue, as they w ould have no place to go except into the Soviet cam p. H ow ever, the U .S. might lose prestige through­ out the Far East, if w e do not adequately support legitimate inde­ pendence m ovem ents. The U .S. State Department has further con­ sidered that a settlement w ith the present moderate Republican leaders w ould preclude Com m unist domination of the indepen­ dence m ovem ent.

The long-term m ilitary interest o f the United States, according to the A rm y Intelligence D ivision, required "the developm ent of a friendly Indonesia, the release of Dutch troops there engaged, and their return to Europe." The establishm ent of a "frien d ly Indonesia" w ould best serve Am erican economic and strategic needs in Southeast A sia: A politically and econom ically stable Indonesia w ould be valuable to the U .S . in order that an important source of strategic raw m ate­ rials (oil, tin and rubber) m ay be made available to this country, and in order to curtail the influx of Com m unism into Indonesia. If a final peaceful political settlement is achieved it is expected that Indonesian economic levels w ill be raised, trade restored, and Soviet penetration there offset and curtailed.

A settlem ent could best be accom plished "b y a peaceful and equitable im plem entation of the principles o f the Renville Agreem ent and by facilitating the economic reconstruction of the Indies"— essentially, the position of the State Departm ent.23 In accordance w ith State Departm ent directives, Acting A m bassador Philip Jessu p called for an em ergency session of the UN Security Council to discuss the Indonesian crisis. Speak­ ing before the hastily convened assem bly on Decem ber 22, he sharply denounced the Dutch police action, declaring that his governm ent "fails to find any justification for renew al o f m ilitary operations in Indonesia." He continued: "It is our considered "M addocks to Wedemeyer, December 23,19 48 , P&O 091 Netherlands, Plan­ ning and Operations Division Files, Modem M ilitary Brandi, National Archives. 262

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view that the renew ed outbreak o f hostilities in Indonesia m ay prove to be a grave threat to international peace."24A ccordingly, he offered a draft resolution, jointly sponsored by Colom bia and Syria, w hich called for an im m ediate cease-tire and w ithdraw al of troops, and instructed the Good O ffices Committee to assess blam e for the outbreak of hostilities. A fter much heated discus­ sion, the Security Council adopted the cease-fire resolution on Decem ber 24, along w ith an Australian-sponsored am endm ent requesting the im m ediate release of the republican leaders. The council rejected the im portant w ithdraw al clause, how ever, along w ith the clause instructing the GO C to assess blam e for the onset of the new conflict.8 Initially, W ashington w as pleased by the m ildness of the UN response. Lovett inform ed Sir O liver Franks, the British am bas­ sador to the United States, that "it w as our hope that reasonable and m oderate m easures taken im m ediately w ould reduce pres­ sure upon u s to take more extrem e m easures ultim ately, mea­ sures such as sanctions." He later instructed the Am erican Em bassy in The H ague to inform Foreign Secretary Stikker that the State Departm ent considered it essential for the N etherlands to com ply im m ediately w ith the Security Council directive; "o th erw ise," he w arned, "N etherlands action could have most serious effect upon solidarity W estern Europe and upon US public opinion w ith respect to cooperation w ith W estern E u ro p e."24Prom pt com pliance w ith the cease-fire resolution w as thus crucial in the opinion of State Departm ent analysts in order to forestall criticism of the council's lim ited m easures. That criticism had been both pointed and im m ediate. A s the Indonesian delegation to the United N ations bitterly noted, the resolution w as "m eaningless and com pletely inadequate," as it perm itted the Dutch to continue "m opping-up operations" in “ United Nations Security Council, Official Records (scon), 3d yr., 389th meet­ ing, December 22,1948, pp. 42-49. “ Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, i960), pp. 172-73; J. Foster Collins, "The United Na­ tions and Indonesia," International Conciliation, March 1950, pp. 16 9 -71; UN S/1150. “ Memorandum by Lovett of a conversation with Franks, December 24,1948, in FR, 1948,6:602; Lovett to American Em bassy, United Kingdom, December 24, 1948, in ibid., p. 603. 263

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the recently occupied territory.*7 Still, several days after the Security Council had issued its cease-fire order, the N etherlands had not yet taken any positive steps tow ard fulfilling its provisions.3* This failure angered Jessu p, w ho advised the State Departm ent that a follow -up resolution w ould be necessary. He cabled Lovett that the N etherlands reaction to the United N a­ tions resolution w as "not satisfactory to us or other m em bers of S C "; there w ould be m ounting pressure, the Am erican repre­ sentative predicted, "fo r som ething to at least save the face of the SC in case of continued Dutch noncom pliance."3* Increasing­ ly dism ayed by this continuing Dutch intransigence—brought into sharp focus by Dutch delegate J. H. van R oyen's arrogant declaration that it w as not yet possible for the N etherlands gov­ ernm ent even to m ake a statem ent30—the United States and other Security Council members recognized the need for further action. Consequently, on December 28 the council adopted two new resolutions—proposed by China and Colom bia respective­ ly and supported by the United States—w hich called on the Dutch to free all republican leaders im m ediately and requested the Consular Com m ission to m ake "a com plete report on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia, covering in such report the observance o f the cease-tire orders and the conditions pre­ vailing in areas under m ilitary occupation or from w hich arm ed forces now in occupation m ay be w ithdraw n. " 31 A n analysis of the Security Council resolutions of December 24 and Decem ber 28, 1948, is quite revealing o f the lim ited na­ ture o f the Am erican response to the second Dutch police ac­ tion. The United N ations directives had requested the Dutch to ^Press statement by Dr. D. Sumitro, acting head, Republican Delegation to United Nations, in New York Times, December 25,1948 , p. 6. In an editorial, the Times argued that the United Nations cease-fire resolution w as so mild that it w as almost a "Christm as present" to the Dutch (ibid., December 26,1948, sec. IV, p. 6). “ Collins, "United Nations and Indonesia," p. 17 1; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 341. The GOC reported to the Council on December 26 that the Dutch army continued to advance into Republican territory despite the cease-fire resolution (report of GOC to Security Council, UN S/1156). “ Jessup to Lovett, December 27 and December 28,1948, in FR, 1948,6:607-8, 6 11- 12 . See also Jessup, Birth of Nations, p. 8 1. * s c o r , 3d yr., 393d meeting, December 27,19 48, pp. 2-3. 31UN S/1162, December 28,1948; UN S/1165, December 28,1948.

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cease all hostilities in Indonesia, but had not dem anded that the N etherlands m ilitary forces w ithdraw to the positions held be­ fore the offensive, nor had the resolutions attem pted to assess blam e for the inception of the current m ilitary m easures. To Indonesian republicans, these om issions represented a betrayal of their cause by the United States as w ell as the United N ations. Short o f adm onishm ents, it appeared to them that the Security Council w ould do nothing to restrain Dutch aggression; and republican leaders believed that the Am erican governm ent w as all too w illing to sacrifice Indonesian interests to the priority of W estern European solidarity.32 In reality, the UN m easures con­ form ed neatly w ith the Am erican policy goals outlined by Rusk. The United States, w hile eager to place itself on record as oppos­ ing the Dutch police action, w as equally intent on m aintaining friendly relations w ith The H ague and avoiding the im ple­ m entation o f sanctions against the N etherlands in Europe. From that perspective, the lim ited action taken by the Security Coun­ cil w as ideal: w hile firm ly aligning itself w ith the new ly em erg­ ing nations that w ere harshly critical of the Dutch, W ashington carefully sidestepped the problem s inherent in placing too much pressure on The H ague. In short, the United States contented itself w ith half-m easures. Entangled once again in a vexing colonial dilem m a, the Am erican governm ent thus attem pted to steer a m iddle course, hoping that it could avoid alienating either party to the dispute. But events w ere rapidly rendering this m iddle course unten­ able, and State Departm ent authorities soon began a réévalua­ tion o f Am erican policy tow ard Indonesia. On December 3 1 A cting Secretary of State Lovett sent a telegram to Am erican diplom atic and consular officers abroad outlining departm ent policy vis-à-vis the Indonesian crisis. W ashington w as "pro­ foundly concerned by Dutch action, m anner in w hich action taken and com plications arising therefrom ," he said. "B y taking action for w hich m oral justifications difficult [to] find, Dutch have unquestionably hurt W estern cause throughout A sia ." The police action, Lovett lam ented, had "undone much of post­ w ar efforts of U S diplom acy southern A sia." The objectives of “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 345-44. 265

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that policy had been twofold: "( i) prevention [of] division [of the] w orld on lines A sia v s. W est, and (2) w inning confidence and support o f political m ovem ents through w hich aspirations and convictions [of] Asiatic peoples exp ressed." By attacking the "m oderate" republican governm ent o f Sukarno and H atta—a regim e that w as the "o n ly govt in Far East to have m et and crushed an all-out Com m unist offen sive"—the N etherlands "m ay have destroyed last bridge between W est and Indo nationalists and have given Com m unists everyw here w eapon of unansw erable m ass ap p eal." He w as particularly concerned that the Dutch w ould be unable to attain their m ilitary objectives in Indonesia and instead w ould get bogged dow n in an interm i­ nable guerrilla w ar. Independent estim ates of m ilitary conditions foresaw that the Dutch arm y in Indonesia m ight find itself in a position analogous to the French arm y in Indochina, "w here ruinous inconclusive w ar now entering third year w ith result Com m unists in firm control nationalist m ovem ent." There w as nothing the United States could do at present, Lovett pointed out, except "fix responsibility on Dutch and make ow n position clear for sake U S standing in A sia ." Foreshadow ing a m ore ac­ tive Am erican intervention, he stressed that the United States m ust seek to "keep issues d ear since in future [it] m ay be re­ quired [to] take m easures unpleasant to N eth ."3* In another background cable, sent to m ost m ajor U .S. dip­ lom atic m issions abroad on January 5, 1949, the State Depart­ m ent further explained U .S. policy tow ard the Indonesian con­ flict. A lthough W ashington ran som e risk "in relying upon any nationalist m ovem ent in Southeast A sia to adopt a pro-W estern orientation and to hold a firm anti-Com m unist front, it cannot be assum ed that every nationalist m ovem ent in SEA has a com­ m unist com plexion." The departm ent sum m arized recent U .S. decisions as follow s: In the course of the past few m onths, the Department had come to believe that the Sukam o-H atta Governm ent might w ell constitute the last bridge between the W est and the Indonesian nationalists. Rather than scrap this bridge in the probably futile hope that 9 “ Lovett to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad, December 3 1, 1948, in FR, 1948,6:618-20. 266

The Road to Independence million Dutch w ould be able indefinitely to control 75 million In­ donesians against the w ill of effective elements, w isdom had appeared to require that on the basis of a calculation of the obvious risks, the United States should endeavor to persuade the Nether­ lands to offer such concessions to the nationalist movement as w ould have made possible an agreem ent.3*

The m ost effective leverage that the United States could bring to bear on the N etherlands, o f course, w as the suspension o f all M arshall Plan aid. This w as the course recom m ended by m any critics o f Dutch policy, both in the United States and overseas, but such action w as categorically rejected by leading State De­ partm ent and EC A officials. A s Butterworth explained to Sir Benegal Rama Rau, the Indian am bassador to the United N a­ tions, "A resort to unilateral punishm ent of Holland by cancella­ tion o f EC A w ould establish a dangerous precedent o f attempt­ ing to achieve solutions to w orld problem s by direct individual nation approach and o f em ploying economic aid to achieve po­ litical g o als." During the sam e conversation, Rusk added that such an approach "could only result in the ultim ate destruction o f the U N , the support o f w hich is the com er stone of both Indian and Am erican foreign policy"; and Joseph C. Satterthw aite, director o f the departm ent's O ffice of N ear Eastern and A frican A ffairs, commented that use of the EC A program in the m anner suggested by the Indian governm ent w ould be tanta­ m ount to "econom ic im perialism ."35The respected political com­ m entator A rthur Krock reflected official thinking w hen he offered the follow ing assessm ent of the problem in the New York Times: The halt o f recovery funds to Indonesia actually slow s the whole M arshall Plan project, since they operate in the interest of the4 3 34Lovett to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad, January 5,19 49 , 890.00/1-549, DSR. “ Memorandum by J. S. Sparks (assistant chief, Division of South Asian Affairs) of a conversation with Rau, Butterworth, Satterthwaite, and Rusk, Janu­ ary 3 ,19 4 9 , in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 1:12 3-2 5. ECA officials concurred with this judg­ ment. See interview with Kahn, Harry Price Oral History Interviews; statement by Valentine, February 11,19 4 9 , in House Committee on Foreign A ffairs, Exten­ sion of ERP: Hearings, pp. 260-73; statement by Valentine, Senate Foreign Rela­ tions Committee, Extension of ERP: Hearings, pp. 313-30 .

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European econom y. A n d if Holland w ere eliminated as a recipient the surrounding M arshall Plan structure would be shaken as b y an earthquake, and w ith it our security policy. . . . The delicate fabric of W estern security against Russian communism, w oven w ith such difficulty and still far from complete, could readily be shattered by an Am erican attempt to isolate Holland unless it com pletely re­ cedes from its present action.36

A lthough W ashington rem ained reluctant to threaten the Dutch w ith its ultim ate w eapon, the suspension of all EC A pay­ m ents, Am erican policy m akers increasingly began to realize, as Lovett's telegram of December 3 1 indicated, that in the future the United States "m ay be required to take m easures unpleasant to N eth ." Several developm ents at this juncture began to push the State Departm ent in the direction o f a more active policy. One w as the decision by the Indian governm ent, announced b y N ehru on January 2, to convene im m ediately a conference o f A sian nations in N ew Delhi for the purpose o f condem ning Dutch actions in Indonesia. This announcem ent deeply dis­ turbed Am erican officials; they w ere already apprehensive that the Dutch offensive m ight intensify sim m ering tensions be­ tween A sia and the W est, fueled by the colonial issue, and feared that a conference in N ew Delhi m ight raise the specter o f a w orld bitterly divided on that em otional question. A t a time w hen the United States w as determ ined to present as solid a front against the Soviet Union as possible, such a developm ent w as dangerously unwelcom e. George F. Kennan, director of the State D epartm ent's Policy Planning Staff, inform ed Loy W. Hen­ derson, the U .S. am bassador in India, that the departm ent w as "d eep ly concerned over [the] longrange im plications [of the] present Indonesian situation as w e see it aggravating polariza­ tion betw een [the] Atlantic com m unity and A sia ."37 H enderson * *N ew York Times, December 26,1948, sec. IV, p. 3. ^Kennan to Henderson, January 4,1949 , 890.00/1-448, DSR. See also Fred W. Riggs, "U .S. Firm on Indonesia as Asians Meet in New D elhi," Foreign Policy Bulletin, 28 (January 2 1, i949):2~3; Cochran to Lovett, January 3, 1949, in FR, 1949,7, pt. 1:119 ; Lovett to Embassy in Philippines, January 11,19 4 9 , in ibid., p. 14 1; Ton That Thien, India and Southeast Asia, 1947-1960 (Geneva: Libraire Droz, 1967), pp. 99-102; Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bang­ ladesh (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 369. 268

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sim ilarly w arned that a grow th ç f "P an -A sian ism "w o u ld be "extrem ely dangerous" to the iM jted States^ a-view generally echoed in W ashington.38 But the Departm ent of State also fully realized that any attem pt to block the gathering w ould only further alienate the nations of A sia. Accordingly, a policy of strict noninterference w as adopted, w ith most concerned offi­ cers expressing the hope that the convocation w ould not m ove in a radical, anti-W estern direction.* A t the sam e time, the Am erican dilem m a w as exacerbated by the continuing refusal of the Dutch to abide by the Security C ouncil's directives. A s Cochran inform ed the departm ent on Jan u ary 4, "There has been no N etherlands com pliance even by verbal form ula and reasonable compliance w ith resolution no longer possib le."40 Dutch defiance o f the United N ations placed the United States in an extrem ely aw kw ard position: not only did it w eaken a m ajor Am erican policy objective, w hich, in Butterw orth's w ords, w as " to place itself in the best possible light w ith the A siatic and Islam ic countries w hose sym pathy w ith the Indonesian Republic is great,"41 but The H ague's blatant disre­ gard for the United N ations also called into question the viability o f that organization, thus threatening w hat Rusk called a "cor­ nerstone" o f postw ar Am erican foreign policy. C ochran's cables to W ashington, which consistently casti­ gated Dutch actions, also argued that only strong m easures against the N etherlands could lead to a just settlem ent in In­ donesia. He inform ed Lovett on January 3 that as a result o f the police action, he no longer had an "appropriate role" to play as the Am erican representative on the Good O ffices Com m ittee. In fact, Cochran pointed out reluctantly, the committee had been rendered so ineffective by the Dutch assault that it m ight as w ell be dissolved; only prom pt and effective action by W ashington could ju stify his continued presence in Indonesia. He im plored the State Departm ent to take the follow ing steps: “ Henderson to Lovett, January 6,1949, 890.00/1-549, DSR. “ Lovett to Henderson, January 5,19 4 9 , 890.00/1-149, DSR; Satterthwaite and Butterworth to Lovett, January 6, 1949, in folder labeled "N ew Delhi Confer­ ence—N ehru," Box 2, PSA Records, DSR. “ Cochran to Lovett, January 4,1949 , in FR, 1949,7, pt. 1:12 6 . “ Memorandum from Butterworth to Charles E. Bohlen (counseler, Depart­ ment of State), January 7,19 4 9 , in ibid., p. 136. 269

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U S dearly and publidy disassociate itself from present N ether­ lands policy. This requires definite unequivocal statement b y us m ade either individually or in S C that in our view Netherlands is aggressor. This is to be followed or accompanied by public notice that further E C A aid both to Netherlands and Indonesia is sus­ pended until fair and reasonable settlement of Indonesian question has actually been achieved.

Recognizing the reluctance of Am erican policy m akers to use EC A assistance as a "political w eapon ," Cochran offered his personal view : "Should w e not be equally consdentious and solicitous to see that funds given under [the] guise [of] econom ic recovery are not used to conduct w hat is generally view ed as w ar o f aggression against a people seeking prom ised free­ dom ?"42 G radually the State Departm ent began to accept the com pell­ ing logic for taking a stronger stand against Dutch transgres­ sions. On January 6 Rusk inform ed Jessu p o f this changing atti­ tude and instructed him to cover the follow ing points in his next Security Council speech: that the United States "can find no adequate justification for the m ilitary action taken b y the N etherlands"; that the continuation of the m ilitary action after the resolution o f December 24 "is an act of defiance o f that resolution on the part of the N etherlands"; that the Indonesian problem cannot be solved by force; and that the United States believes that a just settlem ent between the N etherlands and Indonesia can be reached only "if all elem ents of coercion and duress are rem oved" and if negotiations are conducted "o n the basis of the free and democratic procedures as reflected in the principles set forth in the Linggadjati and Renville agree­ m en ts."42 On the sam e day, Butterworth noted that the State Departm ent had directed Jessup to speak before the Security Council "to the end that the United States fu lly and fin ally dissociate itself from N etherlands police action, place the blam e for the rupture of negotiations squarely on the N etherlands, and ^Cochran to Lovett, Januaiy 3,19 4 9 , in ibid., pp. 119 -2 1. See also Cochran to Lovett, January 4,19 49 , in ibid., pp. 126-28. ^Lovett to Jessup, january 6 ,1949 , in ibid., pp. 13 1-3 2 . See also Jessup, Birth of Nations, pp. 83-84. 270

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com pel the N etherlands to state in practical and definite term s its plans for a solution of the Indonesian problem /'44 Lovett revealed this firm er policy in a m eeting w ith Dutch officials on January 1 1 . Speaking w ith van Kleffens and Helb, the acting secretary underscored Am erican displeasure w ith re­ cent Dutch actions: I replied that the Indonesian problem had been blown up, as a result o f Dutch m ilitary action, to a point w here it w as extrem ely difficult to handle. I said that public and Congressional opinion m ight force us in a direction w hich w ould be extrem ely adverse to the interests both of the Netherlands and of the United States, including jeopardizing E C A aid to Holland and the North Atlantic Security Pact .. . . I replied that w e had to face the political reality of an extrem ely adverse reaction to the Dutch attack and that w hat the Dutch have stated as their intentions in Indonesia w as not sufficient to take the heat out of the situation. . . . I mentioned particularly the serious possibilities inherent in the Asian confer­ ence called b y N ehru.

Lovett rem inded the Dutch representatives that the United States w as "greatly disturbed" by developm ents since the Dutch m ilitary offensive; it believed now "that the situation w as one in w hich alm ost anything could h appen ."41 Philip Jessu p 's speech before the UN Security Council on Jan u ary 1 1 signaled this shift of em phasis in Am erican policy; for the first time, the United States condem ned outright the N etherlands police action and subsequent flouting of the Secu­ rity C ouncil's cease-fire resolution. "The United States G overn­ m en t," he declared, "can find no adequate justification for the m ilitary action taken by the N etherlands in Indonesia." The continuance o f the Dutch m ilitary m easures after the resolution o f Decem ber 24 "w as an act of defiance on the part of the N etherlands authorities," Jessu p stated flatly. "N o excuses offered by the Dutch Governm ent can conceal the fact that they have failed to com ply w ith the Security Council dem ands, both “ Memorandum from Butterworth to Bohlen, January 7,19 49 , in FR, 19 4 9 ,7 :1, 136. “ Memorandum by Lovett of a conversation with van Kleffens and Helb, Janu­ ary 11,19 4 9 , in ibid., pp. 139 -4 1. 271

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in refusing to cease-fire im m ediately and in refusing to release the political prisoners im m ediately." Criticizing the Dutch for their continuing "m opping-up operations," the Am erican repre­ sentative commented sarcastically: "I am sure that the Security Council has no intention of approving action consolidating m ilitary victories w hich them selves w ere gained as a result o f open defiance of an order of the C ouncil." Jessu p ended his biting speech by cataloguing the "history of non-cooperation on the part of the N etherlands in the w ork of the Good O ffices Com m ittee in Indonesia" and suggesting that bona fide negotia­ tions be resum ed prom ptly on the basis of the ill-fated Cochran plan .46 Still desiring to act in concert w ith other pow ers—as Lovett instructed Jessu p , "w e did not w ith to carry the banner and m ake ourselves solely responsible for w hatever action w as taken"— the United States sought support for a new Security Council resolution that w as circulated as a "w orking p ap er" on Jan u ary 14 .47 A revised version o f the resolution, jointly spon­ sored by Cuba, China, and N orw ay and backed by the U nited States, w as officially submitted to the council on January 2 1. The Dutch vigorously objected to the new proposal. Van R oyen charged that it w ould put the N etherlands "un der the guar­ dianship o f the United N ations"; the Dutch people, he storm ed, "h ave not guided the developm ent of Indonesia for three hun­ dred and fifty years to surrender their responsibility at the last m inute before the final consum m ation of that developm ent: the achievem ent o f Statehood for Indonesia."46 A dded Stikker, in a speech to the Foreign Press Association at The H ague: "I can foresee only chaos if the resolution is allow ed to stand as it is now before the Security Council, chaos in Indonesia and subse­ quently chaos in the N etherlands—and all this because o f a lack o f confidence, a lack of faith in the spiritual forces and valu es of the W est, a basic m istrust of our proclaim ed intentions, o f our m ost form al p led ges."49 4th yr., 398th meeting, January 11,19 4 9 , pp. 2-10 . ^Memorandum by Rusk of a conversation with Jessup, January 18, 1949, in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 1:16 8; Jessup to Lovett, January 12 ,19 4 9 , in ibid., pp. 144-46. “ s c o r , 4th yr., 406th meeting, January 28,1949, pp. 18 -19 . "N ew York Times, January 22,1948, p. 7. “ sco r ,

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D espite the Dutch objections, the council unanim ously adopted the resolution on January 28. The new directive w as considerably stronger than any previous resolution: it called on the N etherlands to cease all hostilities at once, to release the republican political prisoners "im m ediately and unconditional­ ly ," and to resum e negotiations w ith the republic on the basis of the principles enunciated in the U nggadjati and Renville agree­ m ents. It suggested, furtherm ore, that an interim governm ent be established by M arch 15 , 1949, that elections for a constitu­ ent assem bly be com pleted by October 1 of that year, and that a transfer o f sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia take place no later than Ju ly 1,19 5 0 . The resolution also reconstituted the G ood O ffices Committee as the United N ations Com m ission for Indonesia and expanded its pow ers: it w as now "authorized to m ake recom m endations" to the two parties or to the Security Council and w as perm itted to m ake decisions on the basis o f agreem ent betw een tw o of its three representatives.90 A t last, it seem ed that the United States and the United N ations had taken decisive action. H ow effective the new resolution w ould be, how ever, re­ m ained problem atical. A story that appeared in the New York Times on February 3 proved to be quite em barrassing to W ashington. It d ted reliable State Departm ent sources w ho had intim ated that the United States w ould give the Dutch a "reasonable tim e" to w ork out a solution between them selves and the Indonesians. "The provisions o f last w eek's Security Council resolution," the story pointed out, "w ill not be applied at this tim e."51 This report w as officially denied by adm inistra­ tion spokesm en, w ho indignantly insisted that "w e only agreed not to press [the] Dutch too fast or too hard in Batavia, in order [to] give reasonable time for psychological and political adjust­ m ent necessary to carry out provisions SC re s."52 Jessu p reiter­ ated this point in a telegram to Rusk. N oting the flap caused at* *U N S/1234. The revisions from the original draft are explained in Jessup to Lovett, January 17 , 1949, in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 1:163-66. See also Jessup, Birth of Nations, pp. 84-88. 51New York Times, February 3,19 4 9 , p. 1 1 . See also Jessup, Birth of Nations, pp. 88-89. n A cheson to Baruch, February 3 ,19 4 9 , in FR, 19 4 9 ,7 , pt. 1:204.

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the United N ations by the controversial New York Times story, he said: "W e are taking line that Dutch should have reasonable time but that time m ust be used to arrange com pliance w ith SC resolution and not circum vention o f it."33 Personally, Jessu p believed that the firm Am erican stand in the Security Council had "secured im portant advantage in term s o f relations w ith A siatic and N ear Eastern states." The solid Am erican backing of the January 28 resolution, m oreover, had strengthened the United N ations and the general United States policy o f support for the United N ations, in his opinion. "O n the other h an d ," he cautioned, "an y w eakening of our position in support of action taken by SC w ould be highly injurious to U N , to our position in SC and to our relations w ith other dele­ gation s."34 A report prepared for President Trum an by the C IA on Jan u ­ ary 19 closely analyzed the im portant interlocking security in­ terests of the United States w hich w ere "sim ultaneously affected" by the Dutch police action and their subsequent refus­ al to com ply w ith Security Council directives. The objective of the Dutch police action, the report asserted, "w as to reduce a com plex political and economic deadlock to an older and sim ­ pler pattern o f colonial control." According to the report, how ever, Dutch aggression in the Indies had far-reaching im­ plications for Am erican foreign policy. "If Indonesia had its ow n private 'iron cu rtain '," the C IA suggested, "long-term U S secu­ rity interest m ight not be involved. But Indonesia does not exist in a vacuum and basic U S security interests are not sim ple and lim ited. U S security rests on the strategic consequences of related events in China, India, Southeast A sia, and the offshore islands; and w hat happens in Indonesia both affects and is influ­ enced by these even ts." The report analyzed the interrela­ tionship betw een developm ents in Indonesia and overall U .S. policy objectives as follow s: U S security also rests on the outcome of already well-established social trends in A sia generally, and on the judgm ents and prefer­ ences o f the A siatic m asses. It also depends on the final character “ Jessu p to R usk, February 4 ,19 4 9 , in ib id ., p. 206. “ Ib id ., pp. 205-6.

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of

According to the C IA estim ate, the imm ediate dam age o f the Dutch police action came in three areas. The first w as the colo­ nial problem , w hich had nagged W ashington since the close of W orld W ar II. "The essence of this problem since 19 4 5," the report noted, "h as been how to satisfy the nationalist aspira­ tions o f colonial peoples w hile at the same time m aintaining the econom ic and political stability of European colonial p o w ers." W hile the problem rem ained unsolved before the Dutch offen­ sive, it w as "at least kept from developing to the point w here a critical U S decision w ould be required." The Dutch police ac­ tion, how ever, "h as pushed the US close to this critical point. U S security interests in Europe and the Far East are in danger of appearing as m utually exclusive, w hen, in fact, the pow er posi­ tion o f the U S vis-a-vis the u s s r requires that they be pursued concurrently." The other areas in w hich the Dutch offensive affected basic A m erican security interests w ere in its im pact on the political stabilization o f the Far East and in its im pact on U .S. economic program s. By threatening to prolong the nationalist struggle in Indonesia, the Dutch m ight inadvertently allow the Com m unists to join in the nationalist m ovem ent and m anipulate it to their ow n advantage. "The Dutch 'police actio n /" the report sug­ gested, "p rovides am ple m aterial for a prolonged Com m unist propaganda cam paign and the greater part of this m aterial w ill seem irrefutable w hen presented in the context of Asiatic nationalism versus W estern im perialism ." The C IA cautioned

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that the prim ary target of a Com m unist propaganda d rive w ould be the colonial pow ers of W estern Europe, "w ith the U S subject to probable identification as an im perialistic fellow traveler." Finally, the C IA estim ated that the Dutch attack had an im portant economic dim ension. The interest of the U nited States in m aintaining the availability of Indonesian com m odities for the U .S. econom y, for the European Recovery Program , and as a source o f dollar credits for the N etherlands governm ent w ould be seriously im peded. "It only rem ains to point out that Dutch 'action' has cut the US position to the bone by touching on nearly all basic US security interests sim ultaneously. Fur­ therm ore, this has occurred at a moment o f dubious balance, w hen possible gains in W estern Europe have to be m easured against possible losses in the Far E ast."” These interlocking security interests, so clearly depicted in this report, w ould continue to be cut to the bone as long as the Dutch dragged their feet in com plying w ith the resolutions of the Security Council, especially the one of January 28, a fact that w as becom ing increasingly recognized in Congress. On Febru­ ary 7 Senator O w en Brew ster of M aine introduced a resolution, signed by nine other Republican senators, w hich called for the suspension o f all EC A and other financial aid to the N etherlands until it stopped its m ilitary m easures against the republic. "It is a w ell-settled ru le," the M aine legislator noted w ryly, "th at he w ho pays the piper is entitled to call the tu n e." Speaking before the Senate on February 7, Brew ster termed the Dutch police action m urderous, "a crushing sneak attack like Jap an 's on Pearl H arbor, like N azi G erm any's on H olland itself." Dutch business had shut Am erican business out of the lucrative Indonesian m arket, yet Am erican EC A m oney w as indirectly financing the Dutch colonial adventure. "If the Dutch have $4,000,000,000 in assets in Indonesia and are shutting out Am erican b u sin ess," Brew ster snapped, "w h y are w e financing the Dutch at a rate of $500,000 a year?" A pplauding the m oderate character o f the republicans, "w h o have consistently fought all radical ten­ dencies and w ithin the past year have suppressed b y force of “ Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States," CIA 1-49, January 19 ,19 4 9 , President's Secre­ tary's File, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, M o.

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arm s a sm all Com m unist u p risin g/' he asked rhetorically: "D o w e intend to support nineteenth-century Dutch-British-French im perialism in A sia which w ill create a climate for the grow th of com m unism ? O r do w e intend to support the m oderate republi­ can nationalists throughout A sia?"* The Brew ster resolution particularly w orried Trum an adm in­ istration officials, since it w as offered as an am endm ent to the bill extending the European Cooperation Program and threat­ ened to delay passage o f that im portant m easure. In the face o f this congressional pressure, W ashington intensified its ef­ forts to secure Dutch acceptance of the Security C ouncil's Jan u ary 28 directive. To accom plish that objective, and to dispel an y lingering doubts about the Am erican governm ent's posi­ tion, the State Departm ent sent Cochran to the N etherlands to talk w ith leading Dutch officials. On February 7 the senior Am erican diplom at met w ith the three m ajor architects of Dutch foreign policy: Foreign M inister Dirk Stikker, M inister for O ver­ seas Territories E. J. M . A . Sassen, and Prime M inister W illem D rees. Speaking frankly, Cochran expressed "great disappoint­ m ent" w ith the course of events that had led to the police action and stressed the United States' desire to help its "old friend and a lly " to extricate itself from its "difficult situation." He re­ ported to W ashington: "I spared no details in picturing how bad their predicam ent w as and how much w orse it m ight become u n less N etherlands Governm ent im plem ented SC resolution." Cochran em phasized that w hile the United States backed the United N ations directive, it w as not an Am erican m easure but represented the consolidation o f ideas contributed by several nations; m oreover, W ashington w as under m ounting pressure from C ongress and the Am erican public to take far stronger steps, such as suspending all EC A paym ents to the Nether­ lands. D espite this "keen criticism " w ithin the United States, Cochran assured the Dutch leaders, the State Departm ent w as m aking "great efforts" to protect its ally. N evertheless, "non­ *Congressioml Record, February 7,19 49, U .S. Congress, Senate, 81st Cong., ist sess., 95:831; statements by Owen Brewster, February 14 ,19 4 9 , U .S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Extension of European Recovery Program: Hearings, p . 477, and February 7, 1949, Senate, 8 i s t C o n g ., ist sess., Congres­ sional Record, 95:831,834.

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com pliance by N etherlands now w ith SC Resolution w ould give press and C ongress added reason for attack and for suggesting cutting o ff all fu n d s." Insisting that he w as "speaking entirely personally and not briging any threat from m y Departm ent that EC A w ould be stopped," Cochran pointed out that "w h atever m ight be attitude of Departm ent of State such danger w ould be risked if behavior of N etherlands is such as to w arrant SC calling it before its tribunal again on handling of Indonesian question ." The Dutch policy m akers w ere notably distressed by Coch­ ran 's blunt appraisal of their "predicam ent." Stikker stressed the political difficulties involved for the present Dutch coalition governm ent in accepting the detailed Security Council resolu­ tion; D rees added that the resolution interfered w ith Dutch sovereignty in Indonesia in political, m ilitary, and econom ic areas. Cochran countered that they w ere exaggerating the com­ plications of the resolution; the United States recognized The H ague's difficulties and w as "anxious [to] help N etherlands get out o f difficulty but can only succeed if N etherlands G overn­ ment accepts and im plem ents SC R esolution." Sassen then argued that his governm ent had em barked on the offensive in an effort to combat communism and to preserve the rights of W estern peoples in the Far East. But the police m easures, Cochran snapped, had had exactly the opposite effect. In the first place, "it had upset truly conservative Republican G overn­ m ent w hich w ith ow n leaders and resources had successfully put dow n Com m unist uprising few w eeks earlier and had dem ­ onstrated to w orld its faith in dem ocracy." Second, "it had set o ff resentm ent in all o f A sia w ith resultant N ew Delhi con­ feren ce." The conference, w hich has unanim ously voted to condem n the Dutch assault on the republic, set a dangerous precedent: it gave an "incentive to first actual steps tow ard constituting A siatic bloc w hich m ay conceivably develop fur­ ther and establish line o f dem arcation if not opposition to W estern gro u p s."57 The fundam ental problem revealed by these frank discussions and by the UN debates w as that, despite all Dutch claim s to the contrary, H olland's objectives in Indonesia w ere inherently in^C ochran to Lovett, February 9 ,19 4 9 , in FR, 1949, 7 :1, 2 16 -19 .

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com patible w ith the resolutions o f the Security Council. By this tim e the United States, along w ith the nations o f the Security Council, had become convinced that the Republic of Indonesia represented the nationalist aspirations o f the vast m ajority of the archipelago's people, and that it w as a m ature, responsible re­ gim e that w as prepared faithfully to execute the full responsibili­ ties o f self-governm ent. The N etherlands, beginning w ell before the second police action, sought to elim inate the Indonesian Republic as a viable political force. In its place the Dutch in­ tended to create a fragm ented and im potent federal structure— the proposed U .S .I.—w hich w ould exercise only nom inal sovereignty w hile rem aining loyal to The H ague and allow ing the Dutch to m aintain de facto control over the East Indies. Dutch delegate van R oyen's statem ents during the Security Council debates are particularly revealing in this regard. He condem ned the "irresponsible and extrem ist" elem ents w ho had controlled the republic and accused them of relying on Com m unist elem ents for support. Because of republican "terror­ ism ," he argued, the N etherlands governm ent had found it necessary to exercise its sovereignty in order "to purge the Re­ public by arm ed force." On another occasion the Dutch repre­ sentative stated flatly that all republican authority had collapsed and w as "n o longer existent.//SBIn Indonesia, another prom inent Dutch diplom at conveyed this view to republican officials in a rem arkably blunt conversation. A s a member o f the republican governm ent reported the m eeting to the GO C: "H e told u s that the Dutch Governm ent no longer recognized the Republic as a political organization w ith a territory of her own and according­ ly no longer recognized our position."99 W hile Cochran w as pressuring The H ague to reconsider its policy, that policy w as being steadily underm ined by persistent Indonesian guerrilla activity, w hich, as Stikker adm itted private­ ly to Cochran, w as reaching "serio u s" proportions.90 A s noted “ s c o r , 4th yr., 388th meeting, December 22, 1948, p p . 2-3; 397th meeting, January 7,19 4 9 , p . 7; and 400th meeting, January 14 ,19 4 9 , p . 28. See also Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 179-84. "Republican Delegation to GOC, January 24,1949, S/AC.io/25o/Add.2, GOC Records, UN Library. “ Cochran to Lovett, February 9 ,1949 , in FR, 1949, 7 :1,2 14 ; Dirk Stikker, Men of Responsibility: A Memoir (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 144.

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earlier, the Dutch had counted on presenting the w orld w ith a fait accom pli; they had hoped to crush republican resistance sw iftly, thereby silencing all opposition to their federal pro­ gram . But as the N etherlands had seriously m iscalculated the w ave of international condem nation that had greeted their offensive, so too did they seriously underestim ate the groundsw ell o f popular resistance to their police action w ithin Indone­ sia. By the m iddle of January, Dutch officials w ere adm itting privately that Indonesian guerrilla activity had set back econom ­ ic progress in the islands anyw here from six m onths to tw o years.61 According to George Kahin, w ho w as one of the few Am erican civilians in the archipelago at this tim e, "both Repub­ lican m ilitary resistance and civilian noncooperation developed a m agnitude and intensity that w as stunning to them ." B y late January, he noted, Dutch troops in Indonesia "w ere actually more on the defensive than on the o ffen sive."62 The rem arkable resurgence of Indonesian guerrilla activity, coupled w ith stinging international denunciation o f the police action, com pelled Dutch officials to reevaluate their policy. Am erican displeasure w ith The H ague's intransigence w as par­ ticularly instrum ental in prom pting this reconsideration o f poli­ cy. Dutch policy m akers w ere w ell aw are of the overw helm ing im portance o f ERP assistance to the postw ar recovery of their nation. It w as "not a question of w hether you w ere in favor o f it," Stikker later recalled, "because it w as absolutely a m ust— you couldn't do w ithout it."63 He conceded this point in a m ajor 61CIA Information Reports, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) nos. 522110 and 522937, Army-Intelligence Document File, Washington National Records Cen­ ter, SuitviUe, Md. (hereafter cited as wnrc). “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 391. See also Newsweek, March 2 1,19 4 9 , pp. 44-45; Nugroho Notosusanto, Sonu Effects of the Guerrilla on Armed Forces and Society in Indonesia, 1948-1949 (Canberra: Department of Defence and Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1974); Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 249-52; J. K. Ray, The Transfer of Power in Indonesia (Bombay: Manaktales, 1967), William Henderson, Pacific Settlement of Disputes (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1954), pp. 52-53; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 153-57. A fascinating inside account of the guerrilla warfare can be found in Simatupang, Report from Parm­ an, Simatupang w as a colonel in the Indonesian army. "Interview with Dirk Stikker, April 23, 1964, European Recovery Program Interviews, Truman Library, pp. 1, 4. See also interview with E. H. van der Beugel (director, ERP Division, Dutch Foreign A ffairs M inistry), June 1,19 6 4 , in 280

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speech before the Dutch Second Cham ber on February 4. Coop­ eration w ith the United States in regard to the M arshall Plan and N a t o , the foreign m inister declared realistically, had becom e a cornerstone o f Dutch and W estern European foreign policy, and although N etherlands policy should never be determ ined solely by W ashington's w ishes, it w as foolish in his view for The H ague to ignore Am erican advice.64 A cabinet crisis ensued, w ith Beel, now high com m issioner for the crown in Indonesia, recom m ending a m ore flexible position, and Sassen, the m inis­ ter for overseas territories, refusing to bow to Am erican pres­ sure. B eel's more realistic assessm ent of H olland's dilem m a pre­ vailed , and Sassen, w ho had advocated total noncompliance w ith the Security Council resolution of January 28, resigned on February 1 1 . The path tow ard a com prom ise settlem ent now appeared open.65 D uring the next tw o w eeks the Dutch governm ent unveiled tiie details o f a com prom ise proposal that w as officially announced on February 26. In presenting the new Dutch plan, Beel em phasized that the N etherlands governm ent w as in full agreem ent w ith the aims o f the Security Council resolution of Jan u ary 28; it only suggested different means to attain the sam e objectives. The Beel plan offered an accelerated timetable for a transfer o f sovereignty to the United States o f Indonesia. A round-table conference w ould be held at The H ague on M arch 12 , 1949, "to discuss the conditions for and the w ays along ibid., pp. 3 ,5 ; interview with Dr. Van den Brink (minister for economic affairs), Novem ber 24, 1952, in H arry Price Oral History Interviews, p. 1, Truman Li­ brary. “ Quoted in Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 197. S. I. P. van Campen has argued that the Netherlands' signing of the Brussels Pact in March 1948 repre­ sented a reorientation in that country's foreign policy; to a certain extent, it then became part of a greater whole—Western Europe. After the Brussels Pact, the Dutch defined their ultimate interest in terms of Western European security. Since Dutch officials fully realized that the security of Western Europe w as dependent on the power of the United States, they were particularly vulnerable to American pressure. European security thus superseded the need to hang on to Indonesia; and American displeasure with Dutch colonial policies brought the issue to a head. See S. I. P. van Campen, The Quest for Security: Some Aspects of Netherlands Foreign Policy, 1945-1950 (The Hague: Martinius N ijhoff, 1958), pp. 80-88,145-47“ Stikker, Men of Responsibility, pp. 146-^47; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp.

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w hich the earliest possible transfer of sovereignty" could be accom plished. A ll Indonesian groups, including the republi­ cans, w ould be invited to attend the conference, along w ith the United N ations Com m ission for Indonesia. A n interim federal governm ent w ould then be established by M ay i , w ith the final transfer o f sovereignty to be com pleted by Ju ly ı —a full year ahead o f the date proposed by the Security Council directive. Contrary to the provisions o f that directive, how ever, the N etherlands contended that it w ould be im possible to restore the republican governm ent to Jogjakarta before the conference, and, as Beel m ade clear, The H ague intended to go ahead w ith the conference w ith or w ithout the republic's representatives.*6 W ashington view ed the latest Dutch overture w ith a great deal o f skepticism . On first learning o f the Beel plan, Butterw orth expressed his m isgivings in a conversation w ith H ubert A . G raves, counselor at the British Em bassy. "It app eared ," Butterworth pointed out, "that the Indonesians w ere to have little choice in the m atter and that the transfer of sovereignty w as to be m ade contingent upon certain agreem ents and upon Dutch term s." He em phasized, m oreover, that "u n less and until the Dutch took steps to carry out at least the initial requirem ents o f the Security Council resolution," it w ould be difficult to enter into negotiations of a serious and binding character; "an d w ith­ out these there appeared to be little chance of it ever becom ing operative."67 In a discussion w ith British officials, Secretary of State Acheson sim ilarly criticized the Beel plan, stressing that there appeared to be little hope of its adoption "until initial conditions of SC res w ere put into force." He did not believe that the Dutch offer could w ork until all republican political prison­ ers w ere released, so that they could negotiate w ith both the Dutch and the federalists w ithout the stigm a o f negotiating under duress, w hich w ould unavoidably be the case if they rem ained, even nom inally, in Dutch custody. "U nder best of MNetherlands to Security Council, UN S/1274; Beel to u n c i , February 26,1949, S/AC. 10/271, and memorandum from Beel, February 27, 1948, S/AC. 10/271/ A d d .i, both in u n c i Records, UN Library; Acheson to Cochran, February 16, 1949, in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 1:233-35. ^Memorandum by Butterworth of a conversation with Graves, February 1 1 , 1949, in FR, 19 49 ,7, pt. 1:225. 282

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circum stances," Acheson com plained, "'B e e l Plan' m eans con­ ditional transfer sovereignty in indefinite future w hereas SC Res fixes definite date for transfer sovereignty."“ D ean R usk, now assistant secretary of state for United N a­ tions affairs, inform ed van Kleffens and Helb o f these Am erican reservations on February 26. The restoration o f republican au­ thority at Jogjakarta, he asserted, seem ed to be a sine qua non for a just settlem ent and for com pliance w ith the Security Coun­ cil order. Rusk w arned the Dutch representatives that the U .S. governm ent anticipated another Dutch-republican im passe on this m ajor point.69 M eanw hile, other factors w ere influencing W ashington to take a stronger stand against the continuing Dutch defiance of the United N ations. The overw helm ingly negative response to the Beel plan w ithin Indonesia underlined for Am erican policy m akers the bankruptcy o f the Dutch position. Not only did the republican leadership, as m any observers expected, refuse the Dutch invitation for a round-table conference, but the heads of the Dutch-created federal states in Indonesia rejected the Dutch offer as w ell. The desertion of the federalists—the backbone of the N etherlands policy in Indonesia—w as a crushing blow to Dutch plans: their federal strategy had required the solid sup­ port of prom inent nonrepublican Indonesians, and now that backing had dissipated, leaving the Dutch standing em barrass­ in gly alone. "The pro-Republican attitude of the Federalists/' reported the U .S. N aval attaché in Batavia, "w as a rude blow to the original Dutch intention of disregarding the Republic and its leaders in form ing the Interim G overnm ent." Even the federal­ ists, he said, "consider Sukarno and Hatta to be the real nationalist lead ers."70 The federalists' defection had undoubtedly been spurred by the m ounting successes of the republican guerrillas. Through­ out Java and Sum atra, the Dutch increasingly found them selves on tiıe defensive, pressed by rem arkably effective native troops. “ Acheson to Cochran, February 17, 1949, in ibid., p. 234. See also White House daily summary, February 17,19 4 9 , DSR. “ Rusk to Cochran, February 26,1949, in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 1:265-66. “ F. G. K erm an (naval attaché, Batavia) to CNO, January 22, 1949, Naval Attaché Reports File, wrote; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 408. 283

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This reversal in the fortunes o f the Dutch arm y im pressed the federalist leaders; they reasoned realistically that an y attem pt to shape the future o f the archipelago w ithout the republic's par­ ticipation w ould be both ill conceived and self-defeating.71 The State Departm ent w as equally im pressed by the vigor o f the republican resistance. In a conversation w ith Helb on M arch 9, Charles Reed and Charlton O gbum observed that the para­ m ount question in the Indonesian conflict now w as w hether or not the N etherlands had the m ilitary potential to establish law and order throughout Indonesia unilaterally. They m aintained flatly that the Dutch w ere doom ed to fail. By w ay o f com pari­ son, the Am erican diplom ats pointed to analogous conflicts rag­ ing in Indochina and M alaya. The Dutch m ilitary force in In­ donesia w as about the sam e as that of the French in Indochina, and the Dutch had a m uch larger territory to police; in M alaya, m oreover, the British w ere having great difficulty trying to pacify a guerrilla force of only 3,000 to 5,000 m en. Reed and O gbum noted that three m onths after the inception o f the police action, guerrilla activity continued unabated. In the opinion of Am erican intelligence experts, the N etherlands w ould never be able to accom plish the economic rehabilitation o f Indonesia; in­ stead, they w ould be "bled to death" in the course o f a long cam paign.72 These developm ents, along w ith increasing criticism by con­ gressional opponents of the Trum an adm inistration's Indonesia policy, created a crisis atm osphere in W ashington. Am erican policy m akers now faced a vexing dilem m a: they had already 71Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 408-13. ^Memorandum by Ogbum of a conversation with Reed and Helb, March 9, 1949, 501.BC Indonesia/3-949, DSR. See also Livengood to Acheson, February 25, 1949, 8560.00/2-2549, DSR. In his memoirs, Stikker made an interesting contrast between the conflict in Indonesia and that in M alaya: "It took the United Kingdom years to achieve complete pacification in M alaya several years later. World opinion w as not against them, their communications by air and sea with London were open, there were no embargoes on delivery of weapons and, finally, the territory w as relatively much smaller than the three thousand islands of Indonesia, where, generally speaking, the vast majority of the population sym pathized with the rebels. Small wonder, therefore, that in such completely different circumstances, our forces could not have similar success" (Men of Re­ sponsibility, p. 144).

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placed substantial pressure on The H ague w ith little apparent effect; short of directly threatening Holland w ith a suspension of all financial assistance—a course still considered anathem a in official circles—there seem ed little more that W ashington could do to change Dutch policy. Yet the U .S. governm ent could not avoid the em barrassing fact that its M arshall Plan aid to the N etherlands in 1948 w as alm ost identical to the am ount of m oney spent by the Dutch governm ent to sustain its m ilitary effort against the Indonesian Republic. This painful detail gained w ide currency am ong State Departm ent critics after the New York Times m ade it public in Jan u ary.73 Continuing Am er­ ican econom ic assistance to the N etherlands certainly seem ed to belie Jessu p 's anti-Dutch rhetoric in the Security Council. A s form er vice-president H enry W allace charged, "M arshall Plan aid has been used to m aintain [Europe's] colonial system by force o f arm s."74 The strong congressional reaction to Dutch aggression in In­ donesia, sym bolized by the Brew ster am endm ent, exacerbated the adm inistration's problem . Storm y debate took place on Capitol H ill in M arch 1949 as both houses of Congress m et to consider the proposed extension o f the M arshall Plan pro­ gram —and the Brew ster am endm ent. A ddressing the Senate on M arch 29, Senator George Aiken o f Verm ont drew a connection betw een the Indonesian crisis and the proposed Atlantic Pact. "W hat good w ould the Atlantic Pact be in prom oting the safety and security o f the United States," he asked, "if by w inking at the Dutch actions in Indonesia w e force a billion O rientals to look elsew here for friendship and even trade?"73 A fter again condem ning the Dutch for their failure to m aintain an open door policy tow ard Am erican capital and exports, Brew ster re­ turned to the crux o f the issue—A m erica's indirect subsidy o f the Dutch colonial w ar: nNew York Times, January 12 , 1949, p. 6. See also Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 403. 74Statement by Henry A . Wallace, February 23, 1949, U .S. Congress, House Foreign A ffairs Committee, Extension of European Recovery Program: Hearings, p.

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I think there is no question that w e are actually supporting an arm y of 150,000 Dutch in Indonesia to suppress the Republic of Indone­ sia w hich w e claim is entitled to its freedom and independence. It coslÿ $1,000,000 a d ay, or approxim ately $350,000,000 a year. That is approxim ately the amount w e have turned over to the Dutch during the period since the w ar. W e have turned over to the Dutch approxim ately $700,000,000, close to $1,000,000,000. The $700,000,000 w e have supplied has made it possible for the D utch to maintain their forces in Indonesia carrying on a w ar w hich w e say is an utterly unjust and illegal one, in defiance of the Security Council.7*

Senator W ayne M orse o f Oregon w holeheartedly concurred w ith his colleague's observations. "I do not see how w e can escape the conclusion," M orse com m ented, "that to w hatever extent w e have been helpful to the Dutch econom y under the M arshall Plan, w e necessarily thereby have been helpful to the Dutch Governm ent in carrying out its violations o f w hat I con­ sider to be one of the m ost basic principles of our pledges under the United N ations Charter, the pledge that w e w ould seek at least to protect the interests of people in the w orld w ho sought to m ake a fight for freedom as w e believe in freedom ."77 A lthough this senatorial opposition reflected a pervasive hos­ tility on the part of the Am erican public to Dutch aggression in Indonesia, it is certainly w orth noting that The H ague w as not w ithout its supporters in the United States. N ew spapers as geographically distant as the Worcester (M assachusetts) Gazette, the Steubenville (Ohio) Herald Star, the Birmingham (Alabama) News, and the San Diego Tribune-Sun applauded the Dutch for taking a forthright stand against communism in Indonesia and sim ultaneously criticized the State Departm ent for backing antiDutch resolutions in the Security Council. The St. Louis Globe Democrat accused the United States of "indirectly" aiding com­ m unism in Indonesia "an d offending a w estern Europe govern­ m ent" w hose support w as crucial for the success of the Euro­ pean Recovery Program . "There are grow ing indications," observed the New Orleans Times-Picayune, "that the Indonesian ’•Statement by Owen Brewster in ibid., p. 3386. "Statem ent by Senator W ayne Morse, April 6,1949 , in ibid., pp. 4877-878. 286

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struggle is not a sim ple colonial revolution/ but rather has been m ade part and parcel of the Politburo's m aster plan for w orld dom ination." Dutch intervention in the East Indies/ declared com m entator H. V. Kaltenborn over the N ational Broadcasting Corporation network/ "is the only thing that could m ake it possible for a non-com m unist republican regim e to take effec­ tive control o f Java and Sum atra." Constantine Brown, a col­ um nist for the Washington Evening Star, added that the Dutch w ere "determ ined to do w hat som e of the greater pow ers have been too tim id to undertake, that is to elim inate the M oscowtrained subversives w ho aim eventually to control the EastIndies, w hich contain rich sources of strategic m aterials."7* Com m on to these Dutch supporters w as a respect for the strategic natural resources of the Indonesian archipelago and a corresponding fear that the Soviet Union m ight eventually con­ trol them . Com m entator Carroll Alcott reflected this belief in a radio address over station w in s in N ew York City: "If the Dutch can set up a non-Com m unist federation in the East Indies they'll be doing all o f u s a service in the long run -----The Far East is the greatest reservoir of raw strategic m aterials and m anpower in the w orld. In the hands of the Com m unists and Russia those resources, organized against the W est, in all probability could prove a m ore decisive blow against the W est than a Com m unistorganized Eu rope."79 Louis B. W ehle, form er head o f the Foreign Economic A d­ m inistration in the N etherlands and a tireless defender of Dutch colonial policy, concurred. In a letter to Senator A rthur Vandenberg on February 15 , he w arned abut the potential dangers of Com m unist encroachm ents in Indonesia: "If Russia could make a coup in Java and Sum atra and islands to the south, and m ain­ tain airfields and subm arine bases there (with native oil, coal, bauxite, rubber, food-stuffs and labor), she m ight secil her off from participation in action in the Pacific, w here the U .S. w ould 79Worcester (Massachusetts) Gazette, December 2 1, 1948; Steubenville (Ohio) Herald Star, December 2 2 ,1949; Birmingham (Alabama) News, December 2 2 ,1948; San Diego Tribune-Sun, December 2 2 ,1948; St. Louis Globe Democrat, December 23, 1948; New Orleans Times-Picayune, January 7,19 4 9 ; Washington Evening-Star, De­ cember 28, 1948; all cited in Holland Was Right in Indonesia (New York: Nether­ lands Information Bureau, 1949), pp. 6-9, 23-2 4 ,33,4 9 . ’’ Quoted in ibid., January 6,1949 , p. 52. 287

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have to battle m ostly alone to keep Russia out o f the Philippines and then A lask a." W ehle expressed the belief on another occa­ sion that "the Indies w ould be Soviet R ussia's most precious strategic w eapon for dom inating the Pacific."“ H arry D. G ideonse, president o f Brooklyn College, developed this them e further in a speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Em phasizing the economic im portance o f In­ donesia in w orld commerce, he declared: "W e m usn't forget that a very large part of the w orld 's and W estern Europe's rub­ ber, palm oil, tin, tea and tobacco come from Indonesia, and that the restoration of the flow o f raw m aterials, not to speak o f the m arkets that you can find there in return, depends on condi­ tions o f sufficient security on the islands to w arrant new capital investm ents." The success of the M arshall Plan, m oreover, re­ quired "that there be som e kind of restored order, som e kind of restored productivity in those areas o f the w orld econom y from w hich W estern Europe has draw n part o f the dollar exchange w ith w hich it can continue to buy its goods from the United States." Sum ner W elles and Stanley Hom beck, both now retired from State Departm ent service, inform ed Gideonse that they enthusiastically supported his view point. H e developed this position further at a later speech at Rutgers U niversity. "W e cannot afford to ignore the fact," he rem arked, "that A m erica's prew ar exports to Europe w ere partially paid by Am erican im­ ports from Europe's dependencies in Southeast A sia and A frica. These are not m erely 'colonial' problem s. They are problem s affecting the base o f w orld trade as a w hole."*1 Am erican businessm en w ere also deeply concerned w ith the possibility that Com m unists m ight take over the Indonesian “ Wehle to Vandenberg, February 15 ,19 4 9 , Box 75, and Wehle, "W ould U .N . Policy G ive Indonesia O ver to Soviet Rule?", unpublished artide, March 17 , 1949, Box 54, both in Louis B. Wehle Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N .Y . *’ Harry D. Gideonse, American Polity in Indonesia (Brooklyn, 1949), pp. 9 -10 ; Hombeck to Wehle, February 23,19 4 9 ; W elles to Gideonse, June 10 ,19 4 9 ; and speech by Gideonse to 19th Annual Labor Institute at Rutgers University, June 13 , 1949, all in Box 75, Wehle Papers. For a more extreme statement of this pro-Dutch point of view —and concern for the "com m unist" character of the republic—see speech by Colonel John V. Grombach (chief of liaison between War Department and State Department, 1942-46), April 3, 1949, in Box 92, H. Alexander Smith Papers, Princeton University Library. 288

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nationalist m ovem ent. In a conversation w ith State Departm ent representatives, H . L. Riddle of the G oodyear Tire and Rubber Com pany questioned the dependability of "ou r little brow n brothers in Indonesia." Since Indonesia w as probably "the key to the w hole Far E ast," he feared that all o f East A sia w ould be lost to the W est if the United States could not keep Com m unists from controlling Indonesia.*2 O fficials o f the Standard-Vacuum Oil Com pany sounded sim ilar w arnings in several communica­ tions w ith the State Departm ent. In a detailed m em orandum Standard asserted: O f all the countries in the Far East, Indonesia is one of the m ost im portant, if not the m ost important, from the standpoint of natu­ ral resources. Its strategic location and its resources make Indone­ sia an attractive target for the communists. If Indonesia should com e under communist influence, then Indo-China, Siam , M alaya and the Philippines w ill be subjected to communistic pressure from China on the N orth and Indonesia on the South. Under such pres­ sure, it w ill be difficult to prevent these countries from falling under com m unist dom ination.0

A lthough m ost Am erican policy m akers disagreed w ith this kind of analysis, they too had a deep appreciation for Indone­ sia's strategic im portance and w ere equally apprehensive about the threat of Com m unist advances in Southeast A sia. This con­ cern w as expressed in an in-depth réévaluation o f United States policy tow ard Southeast A sia w hich the State Departm ent pre­ pared for the National Security Council on March 29,1949 . "It is now d e a r," the report pointed out, "that SEA as a region has becom e the target o f a coordinated offensive plainly directed by the K rem lin ." It stated flatly: "There can be little doubt that the Krem lin seeks ultim ate control over SEA as a paw n in the strug­ gle betw een the Soviet W orld and the Free W orld." H ere the “ Memorandum by Ogbum of a conversation with H. L. Riddle (Assistant com ptroller, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company), April 4 ,19 4 9 ,856D.00/4-449, DSR. “ Memorandum of Standard-Vacuum Oil Com pany to Department of State in Respect of Indonesia, enclosed in Philo W. Parker (chairman of board, Stanvac) to Jessup, September 31,1949,8560.00/9-1346, DSR. See also L. W. Elliott (presi­ dent, Stanvac) to Acheson, August 1 1,1 9 4 9 ,856D.00/8-1149, DSR.

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assessm ent o f N SC -51, as the docum ent w as called, diverged fundam entally from the view s o f those sym pathetic to the N etherlands. N oting the necessity o f developing "an effective counterforce to com m unism " in die region, die report em pha­ sized that it w as "essential that relations between SEA and the Atlantic Com m unity be rationalized." The "heart of the prob­ lem " lay w ith the'irrational and self-defeating policies being pursued by the Dutch and the French in Southeast A sia. "N ineteenth century im perialism is no antidote to com m unism in revolutionary colonial areas. It is rather an ideal culture for the breeding of the com m unist virus. The satisfaction o f m ilitant nationalism is the first essential requirem ent for resistance to Stalinism ." The State Departm ent found the N etherlands and France guilty o f continuing colonial policies that w ere: (1) anti-historical in direction; (2) an economic drain on and politi­ cal liability for us; (3) a vain and insupportable extravagance for the Dutch and the French; (4) a drag on the economic and m ilitary revitalization o f W estern Europe; (5) the greatest single immediate factor contributing to the expansion of communism in S E A ; (6) the principal obstacle to the developm ent o f an effective counter-force to communism in the Far East; (7) the major cause of white-colored polarization; and (8) doom ed to ultimate failure.

Contrary to the claim s o f the Dutch and their supporters, the State Departm ent found the Republic o f Indonesia to represent the "m ost virile expression" of nationalism in the archipelago. 'T h e principal leaders of the Republic w ere, notw ithstanding their long revolutionary ordeals, essentially men o f m oderation. Their anti-Stalinism w as dram atically proved, w hile they w ere subjected to a Dutch blockade, by the unexcelled skill w ith w hich they liquidated the com m unist revolt led by the Krem lin agent M u so." The Dutch "are now and in the long run the disruptive elem ent in the Indonesian scen e." The Am erican people "h ave no inclination to underw rite this Dutch im perial­ ism " w ith ERP aid. "A n d , finally, even if w e thus subsidized the Dutch and if they 'pacified' Indonesia, the so-called solution w ould be tem porary—historical forces can be dam m ed-up for a time but sooner or later they burst their bounds w ith redoubled h avo c." Accordingly, N SC -51 reasoned that Am erican interests 290

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lay in "th e creation o f a sovereign Indonesian state w hich w ill satisfy the fundam ental dem ands o f militant nationalism in the archipelago." To accom plish that goal, "the earliest feasible cessation o f hostilities and transfer o f authority from the Dutch to the Indonesians is im perative, and w ill probably require addi­ tional pressure on the Dutch."*4 The view contained in N SC -51, w hich by now com m anded w idespread support throughout the governm ent, w as rein­ forced by the continuing failure of the Dutch to m ove in any m eaningful w ay tow ard a truly independent Indonesia. This continued intransigence, w hich by M arch 1949 w as threatening to disrupt not only appropriations for ECA but the Atlantic Pact as w ell, forced yet another high-level réévaluation o f U .S. poli­ cy. Finally, the State Departm ent began to recognize, as m any of its critics had long suggested, that only strong and firm pressure on The H ague by W ashington, including the threat to discon­ tinue all econom ic assistance, could lead to a reversal o f its present Indonesian policy. W hile m any factors led the State Departm ent to accept reluc­ tantly this line of action, one appears to be crucial: that as a result o f Dutch actions in Indonesia and stubborn noncom­ pliance w ith UN resolutions, the very survival of the centerpiece o f U .S. foreign policy, the European Recovery Program and the Atlantic Pact, w as being directly threatened. The Brew ster am endm ent, by linking developm ents in Indonesia w ith con­ gressional action on pending European economic and defense program s, truly put the State Departm ent in a bind. The depart­ m ent clearly saw that the Brew ster am endm ent, and the general congressional opposition to adm inistration policies in Indonesia w hich it sym bolized, could easily lead to the defeat in Congress o f ERP appropriations and the M ilitary A ssistance Program (M AP), a key com ponent o f n a t o .85 The possible defeat of M AP on account o f Dutch actions in Indonesia w as quite sim ply unM"U .S. Policy toward Southeast A sia, a Report to the National Security Coun­ cil by the Secretary of State," March 29,1949 (N SC-51), P&O 092 A sia, Planning and Operations Division Files, Modem M ilitary Brandi. N SC-51 w as approved by the president on July 1,19 4 9 . “ Acheson to Douglas and Harriman, March 4,19 4 9 , in FR, 1949, 4:163; sum­ m aries of daily meetings with secretary, March 3 and March 15 ,19 4 9 , in Box 1, Records of the Executive Secretariat, RG 59, DSR.

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acceptable to the overall foreign policy priorities o f the Trum an adm inistration. A ccordingly, the State Departm ent lobbied its case on Capitol Hill throughout M arch, only to find that the Indonesian stalem ate w as hanging om inously over the legisla­ tive future of the adm inistration's European p o licy." W ashington's European allies, especially the British, consid­ ered the Brew ster am endm ent a serious threat to the future of the W estern European defense program . If congressional dis­ pleasure w ith som e aspect of one W estern European country's foreign policy could cause the United States to refuse to sell arm s to that country, then the defense of the w hole continent could be endangered. A s Foreign M inister Bevin explained to A cheson during a conference in W ashington, this possibility raised a fun­ dam ental question: w ould the United States refuse arm s to a country involved in a conflict o f which it disapproved? The In­ donesian case could establish an extrem ely dangerous prece­ dent, he suggested, indicating that the United States could let an em otional public w ave sw eep it along to the detrim ent o f a European arm y dependent on Am erican arm s. A cheson, w ho acknow ledged that the Indonesian situation w as "a cloud on the horizon," w as clearly uncom fortable w ith Bevin 's pointed questions.17 W hen Stikker met w ith Acheson in W ashington on M arch 3 1 to discuss the future signing of the Atlantic Pact, the secretary of state decided to use the occasion to underscore Am erican dis­ satisfaction w ith recent developm ents and to im press on the Dutch foreign m inister the urgent need to break through the current im passe in Dutch-republican relations. Speaking can­ didly, Acheson described the adverse reaction o f the Am erican people and Congress to the Dutch police action. The "deep“ Em est A. Gross (acting assistant secretary of state) to Tom ConnaUy (chair­ man, Senate Foreign Relations Committee), February 25,19 4 9 , in 8-833 folder, Box 1 , Records of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, RG 46, National Archives; "Indonesia," position paper prepared by State Department for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, undated, in S-833 folder, Box 4, ibid.; Ogbum to Rusk, March 24,1949, in folder labeled "EC A Operations in Indonesia, 194819 5 1," Box 1 1 , PSA Records, DSR; summary of daily meeting with secretary, March 30,1949, Box 1, Records of the Executive Secretariat, DSR. ‘ 'Transcript of proceedings, North Atlantic Pact discussions, April 2, 1949, Records of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 1948-49, RG 353, DSR. 292

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rooted conviction on the part o f our people" that the "D utch w ere w ron g" and "gu ilty o f aggression /' the secretary said, "h as n ow led to a situation w hich gravely jeopardizes the continua­ tion o f EC A assistance to the N etherlands." N oting the support in C ongress for the Brew ster am endm ent, he pointed out that "th e basic cause for its grow ing support—nam ely, the failure of the N etherlands to reach an equitable settlem ent w ith the In­ donesians— m ust be prom ptly rem oved." The M ilitary A ssis­ tance Program w as also endangered by congressional opposition to Dutch colonial policy. Acheson said frankly that in the ab­ sence o f a settlem ent in Indonesia there w as "n o chance w hatev­ er o f the C ongress authorizing funds for m ilitary supplies to the N eth erlan ds." In concluding this "forceful presentation" of the A m erican position, the secretary told Stikker that the United States m ust receive "prom pt tangible evidence" o f the N ether­ lan d s' w illingness to negotiate a just settlem ent w ith the re­ public; it w as not just a m atter o f principle, Acheson observed, but a "question o f hard political facts."” Behind A cheson's careful w ords lay a threat: if the Dutch governm ent did not im m ediately enter into m eaningful negotia­ tions w ith republican representatives, W ashington w ould have to consider w ithdraw ing all economic assistance to The H ague. Dutch officials understood all too w ell the seriousness of that w arning. Since they w ere heavily dependent on Am erican financial and m ilitary support, an outright rupture w ith the U nited States over the Indonesian question w ould have been dis­ astrous to H olland. "N othing m ade any im pression upon the D utch," one Am erican diplom at later w rote, "until the United States m ade it quite d ear that no M arshall Plan aid w ould be forthcom ing until the Dutch settled w ith the Indonesians." In h is w ell-chosen w ords: "M oney talked."” Acheson w as equally blunt on this point in his m em oirs. "W ithholding help and ex­ horting the ally or its opponent," he observed, "can be effective "M em orandum by Acheson of a conversation with Stikker and van Kleffens, March 3 1, 1949, in FR, 1949, 4:258-61. See also Acheson to Cochran, April 2, 1949, in FR, 19 4 9 ,7, pt. 1:355-57; Acheson to Cochran, April 2 , 1949, in find., p.

357-

"H ow ard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), pp. 1 1 1 - 1 2 .

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only w hen the ally can do nothing w ithout help, as w as the case in In don esia."* A lthough in retrospect it seem s d ear that the conversation betw een Acheson and Stikker on March 3 1 led to a m ajor shift in Dutch policy, it w as by no m eans d ear to Am erican officials at the time. Indeed, they feared that the Dutch and Indonesians m ight once again repeat the all too fam iliar pattern o f previous negotiations: the presentation and subsequent consideration o f fairly detailed w orking papers, follow ed by the subm ission of counterproposals, and finally stalem ate, w ith the Dutch pro­ ceeding w ith their federal strategy and the republicans appeal­ ing to the United N ations to uphold their claim s. In order to avoid the repetition of that pattern, the United States kept steady pressure on the Dutch. Acheson met w ith Stikker again on tw o occasions after their March 3 1 m eeting. On A pril 2 he "forcibly" expressed to the Dutch foreign m inister the Am erican hope that the Dutch "w ould now really set about settling this situation." He em phasized the im portance o f sending van Royen to Batavia "w ith broad instructions to do w hatever w as necessary to settle [the] Indonesian affair w ithout being cir­ cum scribed w ith detailed or picayune conditions."*1 On A pril 5 he spoke w ith Stikker again in N ew York. Follow ing C ochran's recom m endations, Acheson stressed that the restoration o f the republican governm ent in Jogjakarta w as essential if the Dutch w ere to reach a binding agreem ent w ith the republic. H e also argued that Dutch troops m ust be w ithdraw n from the d ty and its im m ediate environs and that republican police m ust be per­ m itted to supplem ent available dvU police in order to m aintain ®D ean Acheson, Present at the Creation: M y years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 341, 857. See also Stikker, Men of Responsibility, pp. 145-46. The British Foreign Office also recognized the importance of American pressure. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin informed the State Department that he w as gratefully appreciative of Acheson's intervention with Stikker, which he said had contributed so materially to the successful settlement between the Dutch and the republicans (dted in Butterworth to Acheson, M ay 12 , 1949, 8560.00/5-1249, DSR). ’ ’ Rusk to Cochran, April 7, 1949, in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 1:362. A fter his meeting with Stikker on April 2, Acheson informed his top advisers that as a result of these conversations "he w as very hopeful that the Dutch would really go to work and try to settle this situation" (summary of daily meeting with secretary, A pril 4,19 49 , in Box 1, Records of the Executive Secretariat, DSR). 294

The Road to Independence

public order and safeguard republican officials. A t the end of their conversation, Stikker indicated his agreem ent that the In­ donesian conflict had to be settled, as "it w as adversely affecting alm ost every im portant problem in Europe."” O n A pril 14 negotiations between the Dutch and the republi­ cans reopened in Batavia, under the auspices of the United N a­ tions Com m ission for Indonesia. It quickly became apparent that the key issue, as Acheson had em phasized to Stikker, w ould be the term s under w hich the republican governm ent w ould be returned to Jogjakarta. The republican delegation, led by M oham m ed Rum , insisted that die restoration of the republic m ust precede a cease-fire, w hile the Dutch delegation, under the chairm anship of J. H. van Royen, argued for the opposite sequence. O nly the forceful intervention of Cochran prevented yet another im passe. Convinced that the Dutch at this point w ere sincerly committed to an independent Indonesia, the Am erican representative urged the republic to yield on several crucial points. He drafted a com prom ise form ula, largely based on the Dutch proposals, which Sukarno, Hatta, and the m ajority o f the republican leaders reluctantly accepted on M ay 6. Signifi­ cantly, M oham m ed N atsir, a key member of the republican del­ egation and a m ajor nationalist leader w ho w ould em erge w ith­ in a year as prim e m inister of Indonesia, resigned in protest. On M ay 7 the Cochran-sponsored prelim inary agreem ent w as for­ m ally accepted by the Dutch and republican delegations. The R um -van Royen agreem ent, as it w as called, represented a series o f m ajor concessions on the part of the Indonesian Re­ public. A s a condition for the restoration of the republican gov­ ernm ent in Jogjakarta, Sukarno and Hatta gave their "personal assuran ces" that they w ould urge the republic to issue a cease” Rusk to Cochran, April 7,19 49 , in FR, 1949,7, pt. 1:362-64; Cochran to Rusk, A pril 3,19 4 9 , in ibid., pp. 359-61. Acheson also discussed the Indonesian crisis with Bevin on April 4. "W ith respect to Indonesia," Acheson noted, "I recog­ nized the situation could go to pieces. The Dutch had stupidly delayed many obvious decisions. I had urged the earliest dispatch of van Roijen to that area and had assured the Dutch that Cochran will work with them. The main thing is to get the Dutch and the Republicans talking together" (memorandum by Ache­ son of a conversation with Bevin and others, April 4,1949, in FR, 1949, 6:51-54). See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 4 16 -19 , for an interesting analysis of the Indonesian interpretation of the Acheson-Stikker talks. 295

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fire order, to cooperate in the restoration o f peace and the m aintenance of law and order, and to participate in a round­ table conference at The H ague "w ith a view to accelerating the unconditional transfer o f real and com plete sovereignty to the United States o f Indonesia." W hile the agreem ent called for the full restoration o f republican authority in the residency o f Jog­ jakarta, it did not call for Dutch w ithdraw al from an y o f the other areas o f the republic overrun during the second police action, nor did it even mention the long-prom ised plebiscites in those form er areas of the republic that the Dutch had seized during the first police action. In effect, the agreem ent legiti­ m ized Dutch conquest o f those areas. Even more disappointing for the republicans, the R um -van Royen agreem ent stipulated that only one-third o f the representation in the proposed pro­ visional assem bly o f the U .S.I. could be republican; the republic w ould thus be only one o f fifteen states—albeit much the largest and m ost im portant—w ithin the future U .S .I., a m ajor victory for The H ague's vaunted federal program and a crushing set­ back to advocates o f a unitary state.” To m any nationalists, the Rum -van Royen agreem ent repre­ sented yet another betrayal of the Indonesian revolution b y ci­ vilian republican officials. This feeling w as probably strongest w ithin, although by no m eans confined to, the Indonesian arm ed forces. Convinced that it w as the strength o f the Indone­ sian resistance that had brought the Dutch back to the Batavia negotiations, republican m ilitary leaders reasoned that their hard-w on gains on the battlefield had been surrendered at the conference table. "It w as generally believed am ong educated R epublicans," w rote George Kahin, "that the Roem -Van Royen Agreem ent had been engineered through strong Am erican pressure on the Republican leaders."” In their eyes, the republi®Cochran to Acheson, April 28,1949, in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 1:59 1-9 3; Cochran to Acheson, in ibid., pp. 409-10; summary record of 5th meeting of u n c i , M ay 7, 1949, S/A C .io/C O N F.ysr.5, u n c i Records, UN Library; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 423; Taylor; Indonesian Independence, pp. 2 13 -17 . **Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 426. See also Simatupang, Report from Banaran, pp. 9 9 -112 ; John R. W. Smail, Introduction to ibid., pp. 1-6 ; A li Sastroadmidjojo, Milestones on M y Journey, ed. C. L. M. Penders (St. Luda: Universi­ ty of Queensland Press, 1977), pp. 193-96; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 160.

29 6

The Road to Independence

can leadership w as seriously discredited for once again capitu­ lating to the Dutch and the Am ericans. For their part, the republican leaders believed that the R um van Royen agreem ent w as just another pragm atic com prom ise that brought them significantly closer to their ultim ate goal: a truly independent Indonesia. Som e o f these leaders had feared that if they rejected the Cochran-sponsored settlem ent, the U nited States m ight w ithdraw its support. If they agreed to it, Cochran had prom ised them , the United States w ould "stand behind" the transfer o f sovereignty; he had also hinted that Indonesia could then expect substantial Am erican economic assistance in the postindependence period. In short, the adher­ ents o f diplom asi once again trium phed over the adherents o f perdjuan gan.* B y the sum m er o f 1949 it appeared that the republic's dip­ lom atic strategy w as finally bearing fruit. On Ju ly 6, a day that is still com m em orated in Indonesia, Sukarno and Hatta tri­ um phantly returned to Jogjakarta. The ensuing celebrations, Cochran cabled W ashington, w ere both "dignified and im pres­ siv e ."96 The follow ing day, General Sudirm an, the w idely respected and influential leader of the republic's arm ed forces and the one m an w ho could have refused to accept the negoti­ ated settlem ent and led the arm y back to a final struggle against the Dutch, left his guerrilla base to m eet w ith Sukarno and Hatta in Jogjakarta. In a dram atic and highly sym bolic m eeting, Sudir­ m an in effect subordinated his forces to the civilian leadership of the republic, confirm ing a relationship that w ould endure for m ore than a decade. On Ju ly 19 a series o f conferences began in Java betw een representatives o f the republic and representatives o f the federal states (now know n as the Federal Consultative A ssem bly, or BFO). The two delegations reached m ajor com­ prom ises under w hich the federal states w ere ensured a strong role w ithin the future U .S.I. and agreed, in turn, to support the republic's dem and for a com plete and unconditional transfer o f sovereignty at the upcom ing round-table conference. On A u­ gu st 1 the N etherlands and the republic finally agreed to a cease"K ah in , Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 421-26; A li Sastroadmidjojo, M iles­ tones, p. 495. "C ochran to Acheson, Ju ly 7,19 4 9 , in FR, 19 49 ,7, pt. 11455.

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fire, w hich w as to go into effect on A ugust 1 1 in Java and on A ugust 15 in Sum atra. Shortly thereafter, the republican and BFO delegations departed for The H ague, w here the round­ table conference w as to open on A ugust 23.” O fficials in W ashington, w ho w ere follow ing these develop­ m ents closely, w ere extrem ely pleased and hopeful. On the eve o f the round-table conference's opening session, the State De­ partm ent inform ed Cochran that since m ost o f the rem aining substantive issues w ere o f concern only to the Dutch and In­ donesian delegations, it w ould be best for the United N ations Com m ission for Indonesia ( u n c f i ) to let the parties w ork out an agreem ent betw een them selves. A t the sam e tim e, since the United States w as "vitally interested in the outcome o f the con­ troversy and the settlem ent reached at The H agu e," Cochran and the u n c f i should stand ready to aid the tw o parties by presenting solutions to an y problem s that m ight arise. "T h e prim ary result of the Conference should be the establishm ent o f a genuinely independent Indonesian state." W ashington's in­ terest lay in the stability o f Southeast A sia and the developm ent o f "frien d ly, peace-loving and econom ically sound govern­ m ents" there; it w as equally im portant "that the adjustm ent in Indonesia be accom plished in a fashion w hich w ill not vitiate the N etherlands' position as a leading democratic nation." The fear o f future Com m unist advances in A sia w as beginning to dom i­ nate all other factors in the policy equation. "U nless an am icable settlem ent, allow ing room for the peaceful adjustm ent o f nationalist aspirations, is accom plished by the p arties," the State Departm ent rem inded Cochran, "Southeast A sia and Indonesia w ill be m ore susceptible to Com m unist expansion. This hazard w ould constitute a m ajor source o f trouble for the U .S. and the free w o rld ."* D espite the departm ent's hopes, at least three m ajor issues threatened to break up the conference com pletely. On all three o f these issues—the N etherlands-Indonesian Union, the debt *Sm ail, Introduction to Simatupang, Report from Banaran, pp. 3-6; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 427-31; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 22226; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 19 451965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), p. 67. "A cheson to Cochran, August 23,19 4 9 , in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 11474-78. See also memorandum for Acheson, M ay 11,19 4 9 , in folder labeled "Docum ents Relat­ ing to the Development of US Policy," Box 12 , PSA Records, DSR. 298

The Road to Independence

question, and W est Irian (West N ew Guinea)—Cochran's tim ely and forceful intervention w as crucial and alm ost certainly saved the conference from dissolution. The question of the proposed N etherlands-Indonesian Union arose first. T. B. Sim atupang, a m em ber o f the republican delegation, aptly sum m arized the central dispute: "A lread y at the beginning of the conference, the U nion had become a m atter that could no longer be rejected. There rem ained only the question o f its substance and form . We w anted a very loose Union, in the nature of a free cooperative relationship w ithout any general, perm anent organization. The Dutch w ere anxious to create a tight Union, providing for broad cooperation and a large perm anent apparatus."99 Although the union w ould consist of two sovereign and independent nations, according to the Dutch plan, the head of the federation w as to be the queen of H olland, w ho w ould be not just a figurehead, as in the case o f the British sovereign via-à-vis the Com m onwealth, but the "head of a united nation" w ith considerable pow ers. To the republican and BFO delegations, this Dutch concept w as m erely "a cloak for their intention to continue their colonial rule o f In don esia."1“ A fter nearly a month of debate on the issue, the Dutch and Indonesian delegations reached a deadlock. They then asked Cochran to help resolve the dispute, not as a member of the UNCFi but as a private individual—an unm istakable testam ent to h is standing w ith both sides. "H is authority and influence w ere so g reat," recalled one member of the republican delegation, "th at agreem ent on all m atters w as achieved that sam e d a y ." By synthesizing the tw o conflicting positions, Cochran offered the follow ing w ording as a com prom ise: "The Head of the Union sym bolizes and personifies the voluntary and lasting coopera­ tion betw een the Union Partners." H is com prom ise proved acceptable to all three delegations; it soothed Indonesian fears that the Dutch w ere trying to restrict their sovereignty and offered the N etherlands the im portant sym bolism of a perm a­ nent union headed by the queen.101 "Sim atupang, Report from Banaran, p. 174. 100Sastroam idjojo, Milestones, p. 201. ‘“ Ibid., pp. 20 1-3; Cochran to Acheson, September 19 ,19 49 , in FR, 1949,7, pt. 1:494-97; Cochran to Acheson, September 23,19 49 , in ibid., pp. 497-98; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 229-32.

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The intricate debt question proved even more divisive. Initial­ ly the Dutch dem anded that Indonesia assum e the total debt o f die N etherlands East Indies, am ounting to 6 .1 billion guilders (approxim ately $ 1.7 3 billion): overseas debts of 3 .1 billion guil­ ders and internal debts o f 3 billion guilders. The Indonesian delegates countered that w hile they w ere w illing to assum e all debts incurred before the Dutch surrender to the Japanese in M arch 1942, o f the debts incurred after that date they w ould take over only those that resulted in direct benefits to the In­ donesian people. Particularly odious to the Indonesians w as the concept that after independence they w ould be responsible for all debts incurred by the Dutch arm y in its attem pts to suppress them . According to the Indonesian delegations' calculations, the N etherlands actually ow ed Indonesia 540,000 guilders, a posi­ tion the Dutch labeled "fan tastic." On this seem ingly intractable issue negotiations stalled.1" A t this critical juncture Cochran once again seized the initia­ tive and offered to m ediate the debt problem personally. Initial­ ly the republican delegates resisted his offer. Fearing that Am er­ ican interest in strengthening the Dutch econom y w ould lead Cochran to recom m end a settlem ent unfavorable to their in­ terests, they pressed for the full u n c f i to act as arbitrator. But both Indonesian delegations ultim ately accepted C ochran's m ediation offer; they w ere pleased by his fair settlem ent o f the N etherlands-Indonesian Union issue and did not w ant to jeopardize their standing in W ashington by an outright rejection o f die Am erican representative's overture.109 Consequently, at a "top secret m eeting" w ith members of the Dutch and Indone­ sian delegations in Cochran's quarters, he read them a proposed com prom ise settlem ent that he adm itted "probably w ould not please either delegation." He w as right. Cochran's com prom ise solution, w hich called for Indonesia to assum e Dutch debts totaling 4.3 billion guilders (approxim ately $ 1.3 billion) w as still far too high for the Indonesians. The Dutch w ere equally upset; in fact, the Dutch am bassador prom ptly registered his govern­ m ent's displeasure to D eputy Under Secretary of State R usk in “ Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 239-44; Sastroamidjojo, M ilestones, pp. 203-4; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 438-40. “ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 441-43. 300

The Road to Independence

W ashington, suggesting that the Dutch cabinet m ight be forced to resign over the issu e.104 But Cochran w as firm —and persistent. In a cable to R usk he explained that his effort to reach a settlem ent w as designed to m ake the Indonesians realize that they could not com pletely w ip e out debts arising from the police actions and other causes that did not benefit the Indonesian people, and at the sam e time to im press on the Dutch that it w as in their ow n interests to conclude a financial settlem ent w ith Indonesia that did not im­ pair its sovereignty and w ould "be politically acceptable and so fair as to afford USI [a] reasonable chance to succeed." Unless the N etherlands w as soon w illing to accept a "realistic arrange­ m ent" on the debt question, the conference w ould be "hopeless­ ly deadlocked"; and if the conference did break dow n, he w arned, m ilitary activities could w ell resum e in Indonesia. Sovereignty w ould probably pass to the Indonesians by January l , w hatever the results of the round-table conference. Accord­ in gly, Cochran suggested, if the Dutch truly desired to have sovereignty transferred w ithin the N etherlands-Indonesian U nion, they "should treat [the] Indonesians as partners and not seek [to] tie them up like bad debtors and deprive them [of] support essential to liv e ."“ ® C ochran's view s eventually prevailed. A t a climactic m eeting on October 24, the Dutch and Indonesian delegations accepted the com prom ise plan, w hich Cochran insisted w as "fair and technically so u n d ."106 N either side w as pleased w ith the com­ prom ise; indeed, one republican delegate later suggested that it w as only "pressure tactics" by Cochran that led the Dutch and Indonesian delegations to accept his plan .107 The debt settle­ m ent, m oreover, papered over serious differences between the Dutch and the Indonesians w hich w ould haunt relations be­ tw een the tw o countries after independence. N evertheless, by preventing a dissolution of the conference, Cochran's interven­ tion accom plished its chief goal. 1MC oduan to Acheson, October 8, 1949, in FR, 1949, 7, pt. 1:505-9; Acting Secretary of State Jam es Webb to Cochran, October 8,1949, in ibid., pp. 5 11- 12 . •“ Cochran to Rusk, in ibid., pp. 5 12 -15 . '“ Cochran to Acheson, October 23,1949 , in ibid., pp. 546-47. 107A li Sastroam idjojo, M ilestones, p. 205.

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The one rem aining barrier to a successful conclusion o f the round-table conference—the future status of W est Irian— proved to be the m ost difficult of all to resolve. Long before the conference convened, the Dutch and the Indonesians had ar­ ticulated their w idely divergent view s on W est Irian. The In­ donesians, pointing to the fact that the island had traditionally been part o f the N etherlands East Indies, insisted that it m ust be part o f an y independent Indonesian state; they pointed out that the Linggadjati and Renville agreem ents had stipulated that sovereignty w as to be transferred over the entire territory o f the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch, advancing a combination o f reli­ gious, econom ic, ethnological, and sociological argum ents, claim ed that W est N ew G uinea (as they called it) had no essen­ tial ties w ith the other areas o f Indonesia and w as so underde­ veloped that it should retain a special relationship w ith the N etherlands. The issue w as an extrem ely em otional one. To the Dutch, the retention o f W est Irian w ould probably certify their continuing role as a Pacific pow er. To a nation of nine m illion people, on the verge o f surrendering control over a vast archipelago w ith a population estim ated at approxim ately 80 m illion, such psycho­ logical factors cannot be underestim ated. M any Dutch leaders feared that the loss of Indonesia w ould reduce the N etherlands to the status of "a D enm ark." To the Indonesians, how ever, continued Dutch rule in W est Irian w ould be an insult. "W e could not accept the id ea," recalled one republican delegate, "that one portion of our hom eland w ould be separate from it, even if only tem porarily."108 On October 29 the Dutch and In­ donesian delegations reached a predictable deadlock on this question. Once again it seem ed that the conference m ight end in failure.109 Cochran inform ed the State Departm ent that unless a com­ prom ise solution to the W est Irian problem w ere found quickly, the conference w ould surely break dow n. On October 3 1 he '“ Sim atupang, Report from Banaran, p. 180. ‘"T aylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 235-39. On the background of the West Irian dispute, see especially Robert G Bone, Jr., The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Borat) Problem (Ithaca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Pro­ ject, 1958); Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 302

The Road to Independence

drafted and subm itted for consideration to both parties a pro­ posal that called for the N etherlands to m aintain control o f W est Irian, w ith the stipulation that w ithin a year after the transfer of sovereignty the future status o f the island w ould be determ ined through negotiations between the N etherlands and Indonesia.110 Cochran, w ho had earlier assured Dutch officials privately that he supported their claim s to W est Irian, urged Indonesian repre­ sentatives to accept his recom m endation. He pleaded w ith them not to let the round-table conference collapse over this issue. "I pictured great results Indonesians w ere achieving and future ah ead ," he cabled W ashington. "I said [I] could m ake no prom ­ ise w hat decision on N ew Guinea m ight be year from now but felt they should go home w ith success now gained and depend on later negotiations for determ ination N ew G u in ea."111 The BFO delegation, w hich took an even more staunchly nationalis­ tic view on W est Irian than the republican delegation, accepted C ochran's com prom ise only w ith the greatest reluctance. Un­ w illin g to accept responsibility for a breakdown of the confer­ ence, how ever, both Indonesian delegations conceded to C ochran's com prom ise form ula. H is tim ely intervention had once again staved o ff defeat. Once again, how ever, serious problem s w ere postponed rather than resolved. On returning to Batavia, one BFO delegate commented prophetically that "b y the exclusion o f Irian Barat from the transfer of sovereignty, in fact, the projected Dutch-Indonesian Union is a stillborn ch ild ."112 The round-table conference closed on Novem ber 2. Although it left som e m ajor nagging problem s—the Dutch-Indonesian U nion, the debt settlem ent, and W est Irian—the conference achieved its overarching goal. The deliberations at The H ague had paved the w ay for a com plete and unconditional transfer of sovereignty to an independent Indonesian state. The transfer w as form alized at joint cerem onies in Am sterdam and Djakarta on Decem ber 27, 1949. Finally, Indonesia became a sovereign, independent nation. '"C ochran to Acheson, October 30,1949, in FR, 1949,7, pt. 1:550-54; Cochran to Acheson, October 3 1,19 4 9 , in ibid., pp. 554-58. "'C ochran to Acheson, October 3 1,19 4 9 , in ibid., pp. 554-55. '"A n ak Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, p. 70. 303

9 The United States and Indonesian Independence

Unquestionably, the United States played a m ajor role in help­ ing the Indonesians to secure independence from the Dutch. Am erican support w as a sine qua non for the continuance o f The H ague's presence in the archipelago; once that support w as w ithdraw n, the Dutch position became untenable. To infer, how ever, that Am erican policy toward the Indonesian revolu­ tion w as m otivated by a historic opposition to colonialism w ould grossly m isrepresent the Am erican record in the East Indies during the im m ediate postw ar years. On the contrary, through­ out the four bitter years o f Dutch-republican conflict, Am erican authorities continually sided w ith the N etherlands, believing that the support of a European ally w as more dependable and m ore useful than that of a group o f untested A sian nationalists. O nly after the second Dutch police action did Am erican policy m akers begin to shift their allegiance. A nd even then W ashing­ ton m oved haltingly and often reluctantly, m otivated not by som e altruistic attachment to the hallowed principles o f selfdeterm ination, but by more tangible factors: the w eight o f dom estic and international opinion, concern for the viability o f the United N ations, and the strength o f a vigorous Indonesian guerrilla m ovem ent that thwarted all [>utch efforts to pacify the islands and exposed The H ague's policy as an abject failure. It w as only then, w hen the Dutch them selves appeared to be the greatest threat to stability and order in Indonesia, and in the process endangered appropriations for the M arshall Plan and the passage of the Atlantic Pact, that the United States placed its pow er and prestige behind the republican nationalists. 304

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D espite the avow ed principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter o f the United N ations, then, and despite the repeated pronouncem ents of Roosevelt and adm inistration spokesm en throughout W orld W ar II, the United States never pursued an anticolonial policy tow ard the N etherlands East Indies. Am er­ ican attachm ent to the principles o f self-determ ination rem ained rhetorical; such sentim ents w ere never translated into substan­ tive policy. The retreat from these anticolonial statem ents began at least as early as 1944 and can best be explained by the conflu­ ence o f several developm ents. First, postw ar planning anticipated the need for d o se coop­ eration w ith the European nations, the m ajor im perial pow ers. A ctive encouragem ent o f native self-rule w ould have interjected a potentially inflam m atory issue into Am erican-European rela­ tions, thereby threatening this fundam ental Am erican policy consideration. W inston Churchill, the unofficial spokesm an for the im perial pow ers, expressed his unalterable opposition to Am erican m eddling in colonial affairs on several occasions, and Am erican leaders, m indful o f the need for harm onious postw ar relations, chose not to press the issue. In addition, the W ar and N avy departm ents, intent on securing Am erican bases in the Pacific, overrode all State Departm ent proposals for a com pre­ hensive international trusteeship program . Finally, and m ost significant, Am erican authorities never equated the prin dples o f anticolonialism and self-determ ination w ith support for the early and dram atic independence o f all colonized peoples. On the contrary, Am erican policy m akers unanim ously d u n g to the view that the dependent areas of the w orld w ould be prepared to act as responsible members of the global fam ily o f nations only after an appropriate period o f pre­ paration under the guidance o f their respective European m other countries. Am erican sponsorship o f independence for the Philippines w as constantly pointed to as an appropriate precedent. N ative self-governm ent for m ost other dependen­ c e s w as a distant goal, in the view of Am erican officials, not an im m ediate prospect. The Am erican devotion to selfdeterm ination, then, w as sharply lim ited; W ashington favored gradual, evolutionary changes in w hat it believed to be a hopelessly outdated im perial system . It certainly did not favor or anticipate revolutionary upheaval. 305

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This is not to deny, how ever, that Am erican policy m akers w ere m otivated b y a sincere desire to reform the colonial struc­ ture. Indeed, traditional Am erican ideals in this regard neatly dovetailed w ith tangible m aterial interests. U .S. leaders view ed the European im perial order as an anachronism that not only thw arted legitim ate native aspirations for ultim ate self-rule but also denied Am erican business equal access to the rich m arkets and raw m aterials of the underdeveloped areas of the w orld. Convinced that such barriers to free trade w ere injurious not only to Am erican commercial interests but to international peace and stability as w ell, officials in W ashington eagerly sought to transform w hat they considered to be the m ost objectionable aspects o f traditional colonialism . W oodrow W ilson pursued sim ilar objectives in the period im­ m ediately follow ing W orld W ar I. A n ardent internationalist and firm believer in free trade, W ilson also tried to liberalize the prevailing colonial structure by elim inating all obstacles to the natural flow o f international commerce. A t the V ersailles Peace Conference he struggled to have these principles incorporated in the proposed League of N ations m andate system . In W ilson's view , such a program w ould extend liberal Am erican values and institutions to backw ard peoples w hile at the sam e time opening up hitherto closed areas o f the globe to Am erican com m erce. W ilson's approach, w hile visionary, w as essentially a gradual, evolutionary one. He did not envision a radical transform ation or restructuring o f the im perial system ; rather, he favored a slow reform o f that system under the progressive guidance o f the League o f N ations. M ost significant, W ilson never questioned the hierarchic relationship between the advanced, industrial na­ tions and the underdeveloped w orld. W hile strenuously object­ ing to the m ore exploitive aspects of European im perialism , he never challenged the assum ption that W estern hegem ony w as essential to w orld stability and order. Indeed, he consistently argued the need for continued W estern control and guidance over the backw ard areas of the globe. In short, his vision w as o f a m ore progressive, less exploitive im perialism ; his squabble w ith the European pow ers w as over the form of their dom i­ nance rather than its substance.1 'N . Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (New York: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1968), pp. 236 -37,24 6 -51. 306

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There is a rem arkable degree o f continuity between the Wil­ son adm inistration and the Roosevelt adm inistration on the co­ lonial question. Both presidents view ed traditional im perialism as atavistic; both fervently believed that Am erican economic in­ terests could best be served by a liberalization o f the prevailing colonial structure. Both w ere convinced that the peaceful penetration o f Am erican commerce, ideas, and institutions into the underdeveloped w orld w ould be a boon not only to the narrow econom ic interests of the United States, but also to the m aterial and spiritual progress of the colonized peoples—and to the larger goal of global peace and stability. Like W ilson, Roosevelt w as dedicated to the principles o f self-determ ination but defined it very narrow ly. Both men believed that colonial self-rule w as inevitable, but that it w as a developm ent for the future, not the present. Both believed that liberalization o f the colonial system should be carried out under W estern domi­ nance. In short, both W ilson and Roosevelt w ere convinced that traditional im perialism w as outdated and in need o f reform , but they com plained more about the form of the im perial system than about its substance. A nd, perhaps m ost im portant o f all, they view ed the threat o f revolutionary upheaval as an even greater danger than im perialism to the interests o f the United States and the w orld com m unity. D uring the Roosevelt adm inistration, staunch opposition from the European pow ers blocked the developm ent of a com­ prehensive plan to deal w ith the colonial problem . Since adm in­ istration officials considered harm onious relations w ith W est­ ern Europe to be an overriding policy objective, anticolonialist sentim ent w as sharply tem pered, although never com pletely abandoned. U .S. policy m akers continued to d in g to the notion that they could use their nation's enorm ous pow er and prestige to effect a liberalization of the im perialist order. W hile notably short on specifics, this strategy envisioned gently nudging the European allies into accepting the inevitability o f native self-rule and beginning to develop, accordingly, concrete plans to pre­ pare native elites for that ultim ate responsibility. The exam ple of the Philippines w as often heralded as an appropriate m odel for the European m other countries to em ulate. Am erican policy tow ard the N etherlands East Indies can be understood w ithin this larger context. Toward the end o f the 307

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w ar, Am erican diplom ats had repeatedly reassured Dutch offi­ cials that the United States did not question their right to reas­ sert sovereignty over the Indonesian archipelago. A t the sam e tim e, those diplom ats hoped that Dutch im perialism could be liberalized so as to elim inate its m ost exclusionary and exploitive features. The need to cooperate w ith The H ague in postw ar Europe, how ever, effectively blunted this reform ing zeal and prevented the State Departm ent from translating such vague sentim ents into substantive policy. The em ergence of a broadbased nationalist m ovem ent in Indonesia, capped by the proc­ lam ation o f the Republic o f Indonesia on A ugust 17 , 1945, fu r­ ther com plicated the Am erican dilem m a. U nw illing to counte­ nance support for an untested and inexperienced nationalist regim e, especially one under the fiery leadership o f a Japanese collaborator such as Sukarno, W ashington gravitated more and m ore tow ard the Dutch position. A fter all, Am erican officials had advocated the reform o f the im perialist system , not its de­ struction; they had pressed for gradual, evolutionary changes, not abrupt, revolutionary ones. W ashington had alw ays assum ed that European influence and control, w hile lim ited, w ould and should continue in the underdeveloped w orld. By challenging the reassertion o f W estern hegem ony, A sian nationalists w ere thus threatening the very foundation o f Am er­ ican plans for a new order in the Far East. G iven the perspective of 1945, it is difficult to im agine the United States pursuing a different policy. The Dutch w ere trusted allies w ho had ruled the East Indies for over three hun­ dred years. W hile the United States had traditionally objected to the excesses o f the im perialist system , it also recognized and applauded the stability and order that the colonial pow ers had brought to the underdeveloped w orld. Faced w ith a choice be­ tw een a native governm ent o f revolutionary nationalists and a return to Dutch control over the archipelago, the United States not surprisingly chose to support the N etherlands. N evertheless, the United States could not com pletely disavow its identification w ith the cause of the colonized peoples o f the w orld. To do so w ould have been inconsistent w ith traditional Am erican beliefs and w ould have contradicted proclam ations m ade throughout the w ar; active support for the reim position of 308

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im perial rule, m oreover, w ould have seriously dam aged Am er­ ican prestige in the underdeveloped w orld. The United States sought to sidestep this dilem m a by m aintaining a position of public neutrality and strict noninvolvem ent tow ard all colonial disputes. The resulting policy w as distorted and contradictory: w hile declaring its strict im partiality toward the grow ing rift betw een the Dutch and the Indonesians, W ashington consis­ tently bolstered the position o f its European ally. A s Stanley H om beck astutely observed, "W e in effect attem pted to support neither side and yet favored one and hoped not unduly to offend the o th er."2 A n early indication of this attitude w as revealed in the Am er­ ican governm ent's stance toward the question of lend-lease sup­ plies. W ashington continued to supply surplus property credits and lend-lease equipm ent to British and Dutch troops in In­ donesia long after it had proclaim ed its neutrality tow ard the D utch-Indonesian dispute, and even though it w as w ell aw are that the m aterial w as being used to suppress Indonesian nationalists. A fter Sukarno delivered several strongly w orded protests to the W hite H ouse in October and N ovem ber 1945, the Trum an adm inistration ordered the rem oval o f all Am erican insignia from the equipm ent; the equipm ent itself continued to be freely supplied. O fficial Am erican sym pathy for the Dutch position w as m ost strikingly revealed by the form that W ashington's neutrality took. By recognizing the N etherlands' right to rule Indonesia as the "territorial sovereign ," as it did in its policy statem ent of Decem ber 19 , 1945, the United States in effect denied the In­ donesian Republic's quest for status as an equal party to the dispute. This w as a severe blow to the young nationalist regim e, w hich had hoped that A m erica's repeated wartim e pronounce­ m ents in favor of self-determ ination for all peoples m ight be translated into an aggressive anti-im perialist program . A l­ though the Am erican m essage w as couched in the niceties of international law , its intent w as unm istakable: the United States w ould not challenge the right of the Dutch to reestablish their 2Stanley K. Hombeck, "The United States and the Netherlands East Indies," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 255 (January

i948):i3*-33.

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im perial control over the islands. Am erican diplom ats m ight try to nudge the Dutch gently into pursuing a more liberal approach to the colonial issue—one that w ould perhaps grant certain con­ cessions to Indonesian nationalism —but the republic could ex­ pect no significant m oral or m aterial aid from W ashington. W hen Sukarno appealed to the United States to assum e the role o f an im partial arbitrator, his request w as sum m arily rejected, since, as Secretary o f State Jam es Byrnes explained, such a re­ quest could be honored only if it came from the "territorial sovereign ." Indonesian leaders quickly learned that Am erican neutrality had a distinctly nonneutral flavor. By the end o f 1945, then, the United States w as pursuing a policy that represented a virtual repudiation of the anticolonial ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Charter o f the United N ations. Rather than challenge the reim position o f the Dutch colonial structure, the Trum an adm inistration conscious­ ly acquiesced in it. The dom inant view point w ithin the State Departm ent and throughout the governm ent w as that the need for W estern solidarity obviated any secondary interest in m ounting a crusade to reform European colonialism . A t first W ashington sought to achieve this objective b y re­ m aining neutral and uninvolved, but this w as hardly a viable policy option for the w orld's leading pow er. A s one N ational Security Council study so aptly put it, "Evasion of m ajor inter­ national issues is a real possibility for Costa Rica; for the U .S. it is an illusion. O ur silence is as loud as our w o rd s."3 In addition, Indonesia w as sim ply too strategically and econom ically valu­ able for the United States to rem ain a passive observer, especial­ ly w hen the dispute threatened to escalate into all-out w arfare. G radually, then, the United States began to exert its consider­ able influence on the Dutch and the republicans, first through unilateral pressure and later through the United N ations. O ffi­ cially the United States position toward the D utch-Indonesian struggle rem ained one of nom inal neutrality, and Am erican par­ ticipation on the Good O ffices Committee helped to bolster W ashington's im age as an im partial and even-handed m ediator. 3"U .S. Policy toward Southeast A sia" (N SC-51), March 29,1949, M odem Milit­ ary Branch, National Archives.

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In actuality, though, Am erican actions consistently violated this surface neutrality. Am erican policies and statem ents at the United N ations and m ediation efforts on the GO C repeatedly w orked to the advantage o f the Dutch, as most interested obser­ vers quickly realized. W hen M arshall Plan aid began to flow to the N etherlands in 1948, m oreover, the United States w as placed in the anom alous position of serving on a United N ations com m ission as a nom inally im partial arbitrator w hen in fact its financial assistance w as at least indirectly m aking H olland's aggressive policy financially feasible. In short, W ashington w as helping to settle a dispute it w as actually financing. Its pro-Dutch orientation rem ained dom inant until the early m onths of 1949. The rehabilitation and reintegration of W estern Europe and the corresponding desire to present a solid front against the Soviet Union led the United States to support The H ague's position in Indonesia. Am erican support w as not uncrit­ ical, o f course; W ashington strongly advised the Dutch against resorting to m ilitary force before both police actions and con­ tinually urged the N etherlands to reach an equitable settlem ent w ith the Indonesian nationalists. It w as pressure from W ashing­ ton, in fact, that led the N etherlands reluctantly to accept the Renville settlem ent. But the United States never pushed the Dutch too far; it w as extrem ely careful to maintain friendly rela­ tions w ith its European ally. The success of the Trum an Doc­ trine, the European Recovery Program , and n a t o necessitated the steadfast support o f the European nations, including, of course, the N etherlands. The intensification o f the Cold War during these years underscored this need. Am erican officials, m oreover, view ed Indonesia as an adjunct to the m etropolitan country; it w ould contribute to the economic health o f the N etherlands, w hich in turn w ould contribute to the economic health of W estern Europe. The M arshall Plan, consequently, assum ed that the European im perial pow ers w ould resum e their form er positions in Southeast A sia. A s Lovett rem inded Graham in January 1948: Netherlands is [a] strong proponent [of] U S policy in Europe. Dept believes that [the] stability [of the] present Dutch G ovt w ould be seriously underm ined if Netherlands fails to retain very consider­

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able stake in N EI, and that [the] political consequences o f failure [of] present Dutch G ovt w ould in all likelihood be prejudicial to U S position in W estern Europe. Accordingly, Dept unfavorable to any solution requiring immediate and complete w ithdraw al Nether­ lands horn Indies or any important part thereof.4

In the w ake o f the second Dutch police action, Am erican policy changed drastically. The nearly universal denunciation of The H ague's m ilitancy by the international com m unity m erged w ith sim ilar sentim ent in the Am erican'public and C ongress to bring the issue to a head. Events w ithin Indonesia, m oreover, exposed Dutch policy as hopelessly flaw ed: republican guerrilla troops fought the Dutch arm y to a standstill, w hile the Dutchsponsored Indonesian federalist leaders sum m arily abandoned the N etherlands. N SC -51 then helped to crystallize long-run Am erican objectives in Southeast A sia, pointing out that "nineteenth century im perialism ," as practiced by the Dutch, w as sim ply "n o antidote to com m unism in the revolutionary colonial areas." Dutch efforts to pacify the archipelago, the re­ port added, w ere doom ed to failure and w ere an economic drain on the United States and the European Recovery Program . G iven the fact that the republic w as "m oderate" in character and had already dem onstrated its staunch opposition to commu­ nism , N SC -51 recom m ended that the United States unequivocal­ ly support independence for Indonesia; it w as a gam ble, su rely, but at that juncture it seem ed the only viable policy. "The sym ­ pathetic encouragem ent of Asiatic nationalism is bound to be a rough p assage," the report concluded, but it is the only channel lying between polarization and Stabiliza­ tion. It is only b y follow ing this difficult course that w e can hope to facUitate— in collaboration with like-m inded nations— the develop­ ment o f an effective counter-force to communism in the Far East leading eventually to the emergence o f S E A as an integral part of the free w orld, contributing spontaneously and fully to our w elfare and security.* 4Lovett to Graham, December 3 1,19 4 7 , in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D .C ., 1972), 6:1099-1100. *"U .S. Policy toward Southeast A sia."

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It w as prim arily European rather than A sian considerations, how ever, that proved to be the prim e factor in the Am erican decision to pressure the Dutch into granting independence to the Indonesians. A s a result o f Dutch intransigence in Indone­ sia, C ongress placed substantial pressure on the Trum an adm in­ istration to m ove in that direction by threatening to cut off funds to the European Recovery Program and to hold up pas­ sage of the Atlantic Pact. Those program s, w hich lay at the heart o f the adm inistration's Cold W ar strategy, w ere far too im por­ tant to be jeopardized by a colonial w ar in Indonesia—a conflict that to m ost senior Am erican policy m akers w as an annoying sideshow . G iven the thrust of Am erican foreign relations in the postw ar period, perhaps the chief significance o f this Am erican support for Indonesian independence lies in its singularity. Adm ittedly, Am erican support came rather late—only after the Dutch had tw ice violated internationally sanctioned agreem ents—but the salient fact is that it did come; the United States did align itself w ith a national liberation m ovem ent against a friendly European im perial pow er. Significantly, at the sam e time that the United States w as applauding the transfer o f sovereignty to native nationalists in Indonesia, it w as opposing a sim ilar struggle for independence in nearby Indochina, and w as already consider­ ing plans to underw rite the French colonial w ar in that embat­ tled land. There are o f course som e extrem ely significant differences betw een the Indonesia and Indochina cases. Unlike the Indone­ sian independence m ovem ent, the Vietnam ese nationalist m ovem ent w as led from its very inception by Com m unists. C aptive o f a Cold W ar ideology that view ed all local Com m u­ nists as part o f a m onolithic Com m unist m ovem ent directed by M oscow , Am erican policy m akers never seriously considered support for Ho C hi M inh and his follow ers. In Indonesia the elu sive "third force" o f m oderate nationalism that W ashington sought to create in Indochina already existed; it had proved its m ettle, m oreover, by suppressing thé PKI during the ill-fated M adiun rebellion. A s early as 1945, Indonesia's nationalist lead­ ers recognized that their bid for independence could best be ensured through cooperation w ith the W est; accordingly, they

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consistently tried to present an im age o f a responsible, m oderate regim e interested in W estern assistance and intent on protecting foreign investm ent. Another key difference between the decolonization struggles in Indonesia and Indochina w as that *^LTnHr>riociar> ^ n flw ^ ac internationalized after the first police action. United N ations involvem ent m ade it virtually im possible for the Dutch to pre­ sent the w orld w ith a fait accom pli. A nd the United States, w hich sincerely hoped that the United N ations w ould not suffer the fate o f the League o f N ations, view ed the Indonesian case as an early test o f that b od y's viability. France could use its Security Council veto to block an y United N ations consideration o f its colonial difficulties. Vietnam 's international support, in addi­ tion, w as alw ays much w eaker than Indonesia's. India and A u s­ tralia consistently placed their prestige on the side of the young republic, and as a predom inantly M uslim land Indonesia had vigorous support am ong the em erging M uslim nations o f A sia, A frica, and the M iddle East. Eager to maintain its leverage and prestige w ith those new ly em erging areas, W ashington had to w eigh that factor in its policy deliberations. In contrast, U .S. policy tow ard Indochina could be form ulated w ithout concern for strong outside pressure. A final factor affecting Am erican policy tow ard the tw o colo­ nial struggles w as the relative pow er and internal stability of France and the N etherlands. W hile Dutch support for the M ar­ shall Plan and the Atlantic Pact w as alw ays deem ed extrem ely im portant b y Am erican policy m akers, all agreed that French support w as absolutely crucial. W ithout French support, the Trum an adm inistration's European policy w ould have col­ lapsed; and to endanger such support by m eddling in French colonial affairs w ould have been the height of diplom atic folly in the view o f senior adm inistration policy m akers. The French Com m unist Party, m oreover, w ould surely have gained great political capital from any "im perialist" intervention by W ashing­ ton, a fact that w as clearly recognized by Am erican officials. In addition, the stability o f France itself during the late 1940s w as a constant source o f concern for Am erican diplom ats; any outside pressure by the United States on an issue as sensitive as colonial policy in Indochina w ould have placed great strain on the

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French governm ent and possibly led to Com m unist participa­ tion in the cabinet. Dutch postw ar governm ents, on the other hand, w ere seen as largely reliable and relatively stable, and Com m unist strength w ithin Holland w as negligible.6 The im portant and dram atic differences between W ashing­ ton 's response to postw ar nationalism in Indonesia and Indochi­ na should not obscure some equally significant sim ilarities. A lthough the United States eventually supported the Indone­ sian Republic and played a m ajor role in persuading the Dutch to w ithdraw from their prized colony, the support came only very slow ly and reluctantly. M oreover, it w as tied less to a deep understanding of the transform ing dynam ic of A sian national­ ism than to global geopolitical considerations stem m ing from A m erica's Cold War struggle w ith the Soviet Union. Indeed, the tum ultuous nature of the postindependence relationship be­ tw een W ashington and Djakarta am ply attests to the fact that Am erican understanding of Indonesian nationalism rem ained quite lim ited and shallow . The inability of Am erican policy m akers to come to grips w ith Indonesian nationalism points to a larger failure of Am erican policy in A sia during the postw ar period. W hile the tragic in­ tervention in Indochina and the attem pted isolation of China for over tw o decades are more obvious m anifestations of this gener­ al failure, the case of Indonesia is equally reflective. W ashing­ ton 's ill-conceived attem pts to align Indonesia w ith the W est through a m utual security agreem ent and then through a Pacific defense pact, its insensitivity to the em otional appeal of the W est Irian issue, its exaggerated concern for Dutch interests in Indonesia, its serious m iscalculation of the internal and external Com m unist threat, its m isunderstanding of Sukarno's appeal to the Indonesian people, its callousness toward Indonesian "n eu­ tralist" sensibilities, and finally, its outright intervention in In­ don esia's civil w ar of 1958— all are sym ptom atic o f a deeper ‘ For a comparison of American policy toward Indonesia and Indochina during diese years, see Evelyn Colbert, "The Road Not Taken: Decolonization and Independence in Indonesia and Indochina," Foreign Affairs, 5 1 (April 1973): 60828. On American policy toward Indochina, see Gary R. H ess, " llie First Amer­ ican Commitment in Indochina: The Acceptance of the 'Bao Dai Solu tion /1950," Diplomatic History, 4 (Fall i978):33i-50.

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problem : of American official'? tn rnm prrhrnd that nationalism , not com m unism , w as the most dynam ic fo rc e jn IndoneslcTand throughout A şja-dupn g the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, Am erican policy tow ard Indonesia and m uch of the Third W orld during the postw ar era has been characterized by a pervasive reluctance to accept Third W orld countries on their own term s. The United States has instead consistently subordinated the interests and concerns of develop­ ing countries and the im portance o f local and regional develop­ m ents to a larger geopolitical strategy that has generally filtered all events through the prism of A m erican-Soviet rèlâtîonsT^Âs in Indonesia during the 1940s, Third W orlcf countries have m ore often than not been view ed by Am erican officials as little more than paw ns in the global struggle between W ashington and M oscow.

316

Epilogue: The United States and Indonesia, 1 9 4 9 -6 5

A s Indonesia m oved into the postindependence period, dip­ lom atic relations w ith W ashington appeared to be based on a firm foundation. Grateful for Am erican support during the latter phase o f their independence struggle, Indonesian leaders w ere on the w hole quite favorably disposed tow ard the United States. This tendency w as reinforced by their need for Am erican mili­ tary and econom ic assistance as w ell as by their generally vehe­ m ent antipathy tow ard communism. To be sure, Indonesia, like India and Burm a, w as determ ined to pursue an independent or neutral foreign policy in an effort to avoid being draw n into the orbit o f either of the two m ajor pow er blocs. N onetheless, to m ost inform ed observers it w as clear that Djakarta w ould m ove closer and closer to W ashington. President Sukarno aptly ex­ plained his nation's position during a conversation w ith Cochran. "H e referred to Am erica as the m other," the new ly appointed am bassador noted, "an d the new young Asiatic countries as grow n sons w ho looked to their m other w ith affec­ tion and understanding but w ho did not w ish her to interfere w ith the running o f their ow n liv e s."1 Am erican policy m akers w ere careful not to interfere w ith the m ost im portant internal m ovem ent w ithin the new nation: the ’ Memorandum by Jessup of a conversation with Cochran and Sukarno, Febru­ ary 3, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D .C ., 1976), 6:976. Hereafter volum es in this series w ill be cited as FR, followed by the year.

317

E p il o g u e

effort to destroy the Dutch-sponsored federal system . C on­ vinced that their revolution w ould not be com plete until the unitary state proclaim ed in A ugust 1945 had been established, m any Indonesian nationalists, alm ost im m ediately after inde­ pendence, began to agitate against the alien-im posed federal structure. O ne by one, the federal states voted to dissolve them­ selves and join the republic. W ithin eight m onths the m ovem ent w as com plete; on A ugust 17 ,19 5 0 , a unitary Republic o f Indone­ sia w as proclaim ed. In the face o f strong protests by the Dutch governm ent, Cochran urged W ashington to view this develop­ m ent w ith patience and understanding. He and other Am erican officials agreed that the young nation's internal structure w as far less im portant to the United States than its international orientation.2 Indeed, the United States w as hopeful that Indonesia w ould soon realize that its true national interests lay in alignm ent w ith the W est. Am erican officials, keenly aw are o f the archipelago's strategic and economic value in any future conflict w ith the Soviet Union, believed that strong pro-W estern leadership in Indonesia w ould have a salutary effect on the other states of Southeast A sia. On January 9 ,19 5 0 , Secretary of State Acheson spelled out these concerns in a memorandum for President Tru­ m an. "Because o f the dynam ic character o f [Indonesia's] N ationalist m ovem ent," he w rote, "because o f its great w ealth and because it is the second largest M oslem country in the w orld, its political orientation has [a] profound effect upon the political orientation of the rest o f A sia ." With the Com m unist threat to the A sian m ainland increasing, "the im portance of keeping Indonesia in the anti-Com m unist camp is of greater and greater im portance. The loss o f Indonesia to the Com m unists w ould deprive the United States of an area of the highest politi­ cal, economic and strategic im portance."3 For these reasons, the United States quickly m oved to shore up the new governm ent by providing it w ith desperately 2Cochran to Acheson, April 3,19 5 0 , in ibid., 1000-1005. 0 ° the unitary move­ ment, see George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Itha­ ca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 446-69. M em orandum from Acheson to Truman, January 9 ,19 50 , in FR, 1950,6:964-

66.

318

Epilogue

needed economic/ technical/ and m ilitary assistance. On Janu­ ary 9 Trum an approved the provision o f $5 m illion in m ilitary aid to the Indonesian constabulary in order to help maintain Indonesia's internal security "against communist encroach­ m en t." The follow ing month the Export-Im port Bank an­ nounced that it had agreed to lend Indonesia $100 m illion to finance the purchase o f capital goods in the United States for the reconstruction o f its econom y. In A pril a m ission headed by R. A llen G riffin arrived in Indonesia to survey the new nation's needs for technical assistance under the Point IV program . Later in the year the United States dispatched a m ilitary survey m is­ sion to Indonesia to review D jakarta's defense needs.4 D espite these hopeful beginnings/ underlying problem s con­ tinued to plague United States-Indonesian relations. Indeed/ m any of the problem s of the postindependence years closely resem bled those that plagued Am erican relations w ith the In­ donesian Republic during the years of revolutionary struggle against the Dutch. The inability of the United States to appreci­ ate the depth o f Indonesian nationalism/ the tendency to view all local and regional developm ents w ithin the context o f a glob­ al geopolitical strategy aim ed at containing communism and the Soviet Union, the gross exaggeration o f the Com m unist threat to Indonesia, both internal and external, and the effort to balance Indonesian interests w ith Dutch interests—all w ere critical ele­ m ents affecting Am erican policy tow ard Indonesia throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. The outbreak o f the Korean War in June 1950 had a great im pact on United States-Indonesian relations. A s the fighting in Korea continued, Am erican officials became more than ever convinced that there could be no com prom ise w ith com m unism , and that there could be no room for neutrality in the w orldw ide struggle betw een the United States and the Soviet Union. The Departm ent of State inform ed Cochran in Ju ly 1950 that Indone­ sia sim ply had to choose between the Soviet Union and the "free w o rld ," a them e that it em phasized continually. In early 19 5 1 Am erican officials even sounded out Indonesian leaders on the possibility of entering into a Pacific defense pact w ith the United 4Ibid., pp. 914ft. 319

E p il o g u e

States and the other noncomm unist nations o f A sia.1 But these efforts, no m atter how w ell intentioned from W ashington's perspective, w ere anathem a to a young governm ent struggling to m aintain its independence of action. To Indonesian officials, W ashington's thinly disguised efforts to align Djakarta w ith the W est struck at the very heart o f the republic's nationalist ideolo­ g y. In October 1950 Indonesia inform ed the United States that it could not accept an y m ilitary assistance under the M utual De­ fense A ssistance Program , as such acceptance of aid w ould tend to be interpreted by the Com m unist countries as "h avin g taken sides."* A lthough som e Am erican officials w ere reasonably sensitive to Indonesia's interest in m aintaining an independent foreign policy, m ost U .S. diplom ats view ed Indonesians as hopelessly naive to the Soviet threat. The Chinese m ove into Korea w as part o f an "overall Soviet plan to control A sia ," Cochran patiently explained to Sukarno on one occasion, and a resolute defense against communism on the continent o f A sia w as "vital if Indonesia itself [was] to be sp ared ."5*7 A m erica's failure to appreciate the depth o f Indonesian nationalist sentim ent in the im m ediate postindependence years is w ell illustrated by two cases: the abortive Cochran-Subardjo agreem ent o f January 1952 and the continuing Dutch-Indonesian struggle over the future disposition of W est Irian. Between Decem ber 19 5 1 and February 1952 the United States tried unsuc­ cessfully to conclude an economic and m ilitary assistance agree­ m ent w ith Indonesia under the term s of the M utual Security Act o f 19 5 1. Pleased w ith the strong pro-Am erican, anticom m unist orientation o f Prim e M inister Sukim an and Foreign M inister Subardjo, and buoyed by Indonesia's support for the Japanese peace treaty, the State Departm ent believed that Indonesia w as finally ready to align itself unequivocally w ith the W est. Cochran and the State Departm ent hoped to accom plish this objective, at least in part, through a m utual security pact. Their tim ing, how ever, could not have been w orse. M any o f Indone5Acheson to Cochran, Ju ly 26, 1950, in ibid., p. 1040; Cochran to William J. Sebald (political adviser to General MacArthur), January 3 1, 19 3 1, FR , 19 5 1, 6, pt. 1:14 2-4 3; Cochran to Acheson, February 3 ,19 5 1, in ibid., pp. 145-47. ‘ Cochran to Acheson, October 10 ,19 5 0 , in FR, 1950,6:1078-80. ’ Cochran to Acheson, December 8 ,19 50 , in ibid., p. 1098. 320

Epilogue

sia's m ajor political figures, already uncom fortable w ith Sukim an's pro-W estern foreign policy, interpreted the proposed Cochran-Subardjo agreem ent as a direct threat to Indonesia's vaunted independent foreign policy; although their com plaints w ere probably far m ore sym bolic than substantive, they .were convinced that the agreem ent violated fundam ental nationalist values. A s a result o f this ill-tim ed Am erican initiative, the Sukiman cabinet fell in February 1952. This incident w ould serve as a forceful rem inder to future Indonesian cabinets o f the risks in­ herent in identifying them selves too closely w ith W ashington.* The inability o f Am erican officials to understand Indonesia's virtual obsession w ith W est Irian proved to be an even more serious obstacle to the developm ent of a d ose relationship be­ tw een W ashington and Djakarta during this period. According to the term s of the round-table agreement^ the Dutch and the Indonesians w ere to hold discussions w ithin a year after the transfer o f sovereignty to determ ine the future disposition o f the area. Those discussions quickly bogged dow n, how ever, as the Dutch show ed no inclination to relinquish control over W est Irian. Sukarno saw the continuing Dutch presence there as an insult to his nation and held that the Indonesian revolution w ould not be com plete until W est Irian became part o f the In­ donesian state, a view that w as endorsed by nearly all m ajor Indonesian leaders. The Dutch w ere equally em otional on the W est Irian issue; they continued to cling to this one rem aining vestige o f their colonial em pire in Southeast A sia, probably m ore for psychological reasons than for economic and political ones. Once again the United States found itself in the m iddle, w ith both sides actively courting its support. Eager to establish a d o se relationship w ith Djakarta and yet unw illing to offend a loyal N a t o ally on such an em otionally charged issu e, W ashing­ ton opted for a position o f strict neutrality. M any tim es Sukarno im plored Am erican leaders to support Indonesia's claim to W est Irian, insisting that only one w ord from W ashington w as needed to bring Indonesia d o ser to the United States, but to no avail. The dispute, w hich w as not settled until 1962, rem ained *FR, 19 5 1, 6, pt. 1:729ft.; Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: ComeU U niversity Press, 1962), pp. 198-207. 321

E p il o g u e

one o f the m ost im portant issues dividing the United States and Indonesia during the 1950s.9 Serious differences betw een W ashington and Djakarta over W est Irian and other m atters grew steadily throughout the 1950s. One of the prim e reasons for this grow ing estrangem ent w as the Eisenhow er adm inistration's intolerance of Indonesia's self-styled "active and independent" foreign policy. Indonesia's neutralism directly clashed w ith Secretary of State John Foster D ulles' strategy of form ing regional defense pacts as a m eans of solidifying the pro-Am erican, anticom m unist forces around the globe. Indonesia opposed the form ation of the Southeast A sia Treaty O rganization ( s e a t o ) in 1954; and, alm ost as a counter­ m ove, President Sukarno and Prime M inister A li Sastroam idjojo assem bled a conference of the A fro-A sian nations at Bandung the follow ing year. Com ing at the height of the Cold W ar, the Bandung initiative w as view ed w ith extrem e displeasure in W ashington; much as the N ew Delhi Conference did six years earlier, the Bandung Conference raised the specter o f an A froA sian bloc of nonaligned nations. From D ulles' perspective, this w as indeed a dangerous developm ent. For him there w as no room for neutrality in the global struggle against com m unism ; b y advocating neutralism , he w as convinced, such Third W orld leaders as Sukarno w ere just dupes of M oscow. In a celebrated speech in 1956, Dulles sanctim oniously labeled neutralism "im ­ m oral," a rem ark that infuriated Indonesians.10 A nother m ajor cause of strain during these years w as Sukar­ n o's increasing reliance on Soviet aid and his tolerance of the Indonesian Com m unist Party, w hose strength and influence in♦ See, for exam ple, Cochran to Acheson, March 23,19 50 , in FR, 1950,6:989-90; Cochran to Acheson, October 26,1950 , in ibid., p. 109 1; note, in FR, 19 5 1,6 , pt. 1:746. On the importance of the West New Guinea issue in United StatesIndonesian relations, see especially the works by former American ambassadors in Indonesia Howard P. Jones and John M. Allison: Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland (Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1973), pp. 297-344; Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 197 »)/ P P - 174 - 8 2 ,0U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 34 (June 18, 19561:999; ibid., 35 (Ju ly 23, I956):i47; A li Sastroam idjojo, Milestones on My Journey, ed. C. L. M. Penders (St. Lucia: U niversity of Queensland Press, 1977), pp. 236-37, 280; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 375. 322

Epilogue

creased exponentially during the 1950s. D w ight D. Eisenhow er invited Sukarno to visit W ashington in m id-1956 in an effort both to stem Indonesia's seem ing m ove tow ard the left and to establish a closer relationship w ith the man w ho once again w as beginning to dom inate Indonesian politics. Initially Am erican officials view ed the trip as a rousing success, but w hen Sukarno follow ed his Am erican visit w ith long stops in M oscow and Peking, their enthusiasm receded. Shortly thereafter Sukarno announced his plan to establish a system of "guided dem ocra­ cy" in Indonesia, a plan that Dulles later equated w ith Commu­ nist-style dictatorship. A t the sam e time, the continuing electoral successes o f the PIG exacerbated Am erican uncertainty about Indonesia's future orientation.11 By m id-1956 Am erican policy tow ard Indonesia w as domi­ nated by one overarching concern: to prevent a Com m unist takeover o f Indonesia. But by reducing com plicated Indonesian internal developm ents to a sim ple Cold War form ula, Am erican policy m akers alm ost totally m isread the dram atic events that w ere shaking Indonesian society to its very roots. W hen a longsim m ering regionalist rebellion led to outright civil w ar in early 1958, the United States foolishly chose to give covert support to the dissidents in Sum atra and Sulaw esi in the apparent hope that the rebels in the outer islands w ould serve as an effective counter to the Com m unists, w hose stronghold w as on the main island o f Java. A s a result of this ill-conceived intervention, the United States not only got caught supporting the losing side but m anaged to alienate nationalists of all political hues w ith w hat w as generally seen as a heavy-handed neo-colonial adventure. The capture o f A llan Pope, a C IA pilot w ho w as flying bomber m issions for the rebels, along w ith the capture of large caches o f Am erican w eapons in rebel territory, exposed the Am erican role.12 "The general opinion in Indonesia," recalled form er In­ to n e s , Indonesia, pp. 235-35; Anak Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 369-70. On the growth and strength of the Indonesian Communist Party, see especially Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 19 5 11963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-196$ (Ithaca: Cornell Uni­ versity Press, 1974). “ Although a full account of the C IA 's role during the so-called Colonels' Revolt of 1958 has never been revealed, numerous memoirs and secondary

323

E p il o g u e

donesian foreign m inister A nak A gung, "w as unanim ous that the C IA had a hand in the rebellion"; this suspicion "w as to linger on for a long time and w as the main cause o f further deterioration in Indonesia-U S relations, despite the effort o f the U S governm ent to bring som e im provem ent. " u In the afterm ath o f its disastrous intervention in Indonesia's d v il w ar, the Eisenhow er adm inistration tried desperately, and w ith som e lim ited success, to repair its relations w ith Djakarta. Follow ing the advice o f new ly appointed am bassador H ow ard P. Jones, W ashington initiated a program o f m ilitary assistance to the Indonesian arm ed forces in m id-1958. The rationale for the program w as that the Indonesian m ilitary w as strongly anti­ com m unist and, partly as a result of its im pressive victory dur­ ing the rebellion, had em erged as a rival center o f pow er. The United States hoped that it could bolster the position o f the m ilitary as a counterforce to Sukarno and the PKI; the orienta­ tion o f the all-im portant Indonesian A rm y, headed b y the in­ fluential and vigorously anticom m unist m ajor general A . H. N asution, w as a key to this strategy. Jones predicted that an eventual d ash betw een the arm y and the PKI w as virtually inevitable.14 This new policy direction, w hile infinitely more farsighted than the previous one, met w ith little im m ediate success. W est Irian rem ained a m ajor stum bling block, as the United States refused to depart from its neutral position, w hich am ounted to nothing less than support for the status quo—that is, continued Dutch control. Am erican support for the Indonesian m ilitary, m oreover, w as cautiously lim ited. W hen N asution visited W ashington in October i960, Am erican officials inform ed him accounts allude to the operation; see especially David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 136-46; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administra­ tion of John F. Kennedy (New York: Delta, 1967), pp. 363, 369; Ray G in e, Se­ crets, Spies, and Scholars (Washington: Acropolis, 1966), pp. 18 1-8 3; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and his Times (Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1978), pp. 490-92; Anak Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 380-81; Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Putnam, 1976), pp. 225-48. ,3Anak Agung, Txoenty Years Indonesian Policy, pp. 380-81. MJones, Indonesia, pp. 147-56.

Epilogue

that they could sim ply not meet his considerable arm s requests. The Soviets w ere m ore generous. In January 19 6 1 he traveled to M oscow and signed a m ajor arm s agreem ent w ith the Soviet Union, a developm ent that deeply disturbed Am erican officials. They feared that the Indonesians m ight use this new Soviet equipm ent, as Sukarno had repeatedly w arned, in an effort to liberate W est Irian from Dutch ru le.15 The seem ingly intractable W est Irian dispute as w ell as the general deterioration in United States-Indonesian relations w ere am ong the num erous foreign policy problem s inherited by President John F. Kennedy. Surrounded by advisers w ho w ere sym pathetic to the aspirations o f A sian and African nationalists, K ennedy prom ised that his adm inistration w ould pursue new directions in its relations w ith the Third W orld. One area of particular concern w as Indonesia, w here an outright d ash be* tw een Indonesian and Dutch troops over W est Irian appeared increasingly likely. Convinced that such a d ash w ould seriously affect Am erican interests in Southeast A sia, and equally certain that the decade-old W est Irian dispute w as only increasing the appeal o f the PKI w ithin Indonesia, the Kennedy adm inistration rejected the long-held Am erican position o f neutrality; Indone­ sian sovereignty, it believed, w as not only inévitable but in the long-term interest o f the United States. In February 1962 the president dispatched his brother, Attorney General Robert F. K ennedy, to Indonesia and the N etherlands for discussions w ith officials o f both countries. A s a result of his trip, both parties agreed once again to try negotiations. A month later the talks opened in M iddleburg, Virginia, outside W ashington, w ith veteran Am erican diplom at Ellsw orth Bunker acting as m ediator. On A ugust 15 , 1962, an agreem ent w as finally reached: Indonesia w ould acquire adm inistrative control over W est Irian by M ay 1,19 6 3 , w ith a plebiscite to be conducted no later than 1969, under United N ations supervision, to let the 700,000 native Papuans choose betw een continued Indonesian rule and independence.15 “ Ibid., pp. 189-90; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 372; G u y). Pauker, "General N asution's Mission to M oscow ," Asian Survey, 1 (March i9 6 i):i3-22. “ Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 361-80; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, pp. 6 13-16 ; Jones, Indonesia, pp. 202-14. For a detailed analysis of the

325

E p il o g u e

That Am erican diplom atic support for Indonesia's claim to W est Irian did not usher in a new era o f friendly relations be­ tw een the two countries w as a keen disappointm ent to the Ken­ nedy adm inistration. Roger H ilsm an, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs during the Kennedy years, suggested that the initiative sim ply came too late to bear much fruit. The PKI and the Soviet aid program s w ere far too entrenched by 1962. A com plicated triangular relationship between Sukarno, the arm y, and the Indonesian Com m unist Party, m oreover, w as w ell de­ veloped by that time, and Sukarno probably believed that he could turn aw ay from the PKI only at his peril. He considered the p arty's support essential in order to balance the pow erful arm y; the PKI, in addition, w as a key source of dom estic sup­ port for Sukarno's "guided dem ocracy."*17 Kennedy had hoped that after the W est Irian settlem ent the United States could m ove forw ard w ith desperately needed eco­ nomic assistance and financial stabilization program s in Indone­ sia, but those hopes w ere quickly dashed as the m ercurial Sukarno turned his attention to another external issue: the crea­ tion o f M alaysia. Sukarno's violent opposition to the Britishsponsored Federation of M alaysia, consisting of M alaya, Singa­ pore, and the British crow n colonies of North Borneo, effectively thwarted the proposed Am erican aid program to Indonesia. A s his "crush M alaysia" cam paign intensified throughout 1963, re­ lations betw een W ashington and Djakarta steadily deteriorated. Ju st before his fateful trip to Dallas, President Kennedy had approved a recom m endation that he visit Indonesia in an effort to turn Sukarno aw ay from his confrontation policy and tow ard peaceful cooperation w ith the W est; an assassin 's bullet, how ev­ er, destroyed the initiative.1* Kennedy adm inistration's policy toward Indonesia, see Frederick P. Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963," Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1969. 17Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 400-402; Anak Agung, Twenty Years Indone­ sian Foreign Policy, pp. 397-400. On the triangular relationship of Sukarno, the arm y, and the PKI, see Herbert Feith, "Dynam ics of Guided Dem ocracy," in Ruth T. McVey, ed ., Indonesia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963), PP- 309-409“ Jones, Indonesia, pp. 262-98; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 382-407. For a detailed account of Indonesia's dispute with M alaysia, see J. A . C . Mackie, 326

Epilogue

U nder the new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, A m ericanIndonesian relations reached their low est ebb. Abandoning the previous adm inistration's policy, the Johnson adm inistration offered its unequivocal support for M alaysia in its w ar o f w ords w ith Indonesia. In Ju ly 1964 Johnson met w ith M alaysian Prime M inister Tunku A bdul Rahm an and in a joint communiqué pledged Am erican m ilitary support for the new M alaysian Fed­ eration. The Am erican Congress, m oreover, aroused by Sukar­ n o's confrontation w ith M alaysia and his increasingly antiAm erican tone, voted to suspend all Am erican aid to Indonesia. Sukarno's reaction w as predictable. On March 25, 1964, in the presence o f Am bassador H oward P. Jones, he delivered a pas­ sionate speech in w hich he told the United States to "go to hell w ith your a id ." During his Independence D ay speech on A u­ gust 17 o f that year he delivered another ringing diatribe against the United States, once again telling Am erica to "g o to h ell." Anti-Am erican dem onstrations erupted throughout Indonesia in 1964; in Djakarta and Surabaya, angry mobs attacked U .S. Inform ation Service libraries. The United States subsequently w ithdrew its Peace Corps program from Indonesia. Sukarno stepped up his rhetorical assaults on the United States; in 1965 he even w ithdrew Indonesia from the United Nations. The dow nw ard spiral in U .S.-Indonesian relations appeared to have no end, certainly not w hile Sukarno rem ained in pow er.19 A new era in U .S.-Indonesian relations opened in 1965, w hen the arm y crushed an attem pted coup led by elem ents of the Indonesian Com m unist Party. Although Sukarno's precise role during the so-called G estapu w as am biguous, the attem pted coup seriously discredited him. Under the firm leadership of G eneral Suharto, the arm y gradually began to strip the aging revolutionary hero of his pow er. Am erican officials watched w ith undisguised glee as their form er nem esis w as replaced by staunch anticom m unist Suharto and the arm y-sponsored slaughter o f hundreds of thousands of leftists w as carried to its

Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966 (London: Oxford Universi­ ty Press, 1974). ’’ Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 407-9; Jones, Indonesia, pp. 301-29, 342-51; Anak Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 400-406. 327

E p il o g u e

bloody conclusion. To the Johnson adm inistration, engaged in a steadily escalating conflict against communism in Vietnam , the ruthless purge of com m unists in Indonesia w as an unm ixed blessing. W ashington, m oreover, quickly discovered that the new rulers in Djakarta shared its passion for economic develop­ m ent and regional stability. Out of the chaos and destruction, a new relationship between the tw o nations w as forged.

328

Bibliography of Archive Collections

D ag Ham m arskjöld Library, United N ations, N e w York Records of the Good O ffices Com m ittee, 19 4 7-4 9 Records of the United Nations Com m ission for Indonesia, 1949 H oover Institution on W ar, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California Stanley K. Hom beck Papers Library of Congress, W ashington, D .C . Philip C . Jessup Papers W illiam D. Leahy D iary Douglas M acArthur Memorial A rchives, Norfolk, Virginia Douglas M acArthur Papers National A rchives, W ashington, D .C . Records of the Departm ent o f State M odem M ilitary Records Records of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Princeton U niversity Library, Princeton, N ew Jersey H . Alexander Sm ith Papers Bernard Baruch Papers Public Record O ffice, London Records o f the British Foreign Office Cabinet Records Prime M inisters' Records Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers Louis B. W ehle Papers H arry S. Trum an Library, Independence, M issouri European Recovery Program Interviews H arry Price O ral H istory Interviews H arry S. Trum an Papers

329

B ib l io g r a p h y

of

A

r c h iv e

C o l l e c t io n s

U niversity of N orth Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Frank P. Graham Papers Southern Oral H istory Collection W ashington National Records Center, Suitland, M aryland A rm y Intelligence Document File Records o f the Foreign Economic Adm inistration Southeast A sia Com m and W ar Diaries W ashington N a v y Yard, W ashington, D .C . N aval Operational Archives Yale U niversity Library, N ew H aven, Connecticut H enry L . Stim son Diary

330

INDEX

Acheson, Dean, 5 9 -6 0 ,110 -11,14 4 , 148, 227; and colonial issue, 10010 1; and Linggadjati agreement, 16 1-6 2; and Martin Behrman case, 147; as secretary of state, 282-83,

Australia, 65, 7 4 ,12 0 ,15 2 , 253, 263, 314 ; and Good Offices Committee, 190, 192-93, 2 11, 219, 239; re­ action to first Dutch police action, 184-85

Africa, 57, 288, 314 Aiken, George, 285 Albania, 260 Alcott, Carroll, 287 Algeria, 43 A li Sastroam idjojo, 322 Allen, Richard, 12 0 ,18 4 American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 259 American-Indonesian Corporation,

Badan Keamanan Rakjat (BKR; Peoples' Peace Preservation Corps),

291-95/ 318

259

Anak Agung Gde Agung, 323-24 Arab League, 253 Arm y Intelligence Division, 156, 241-42, 261-62 A sia, Southeast, 46, 64, 65, 76, 185, 256; British policy toward, 8 0 ,13 5 , 178, 184; and European Recovery Program, 227-29, 257, 3 11- 12 ; U .S. policy toward, 68, 70, 75, 82, 99, 114 ,13 7 ,1 3 9 - 4 2 ,15 8 ,16 5 ,18 1, 218, 2 31-33, 237, 244, 262, 266, 274, 288-90, 298, 318, 325 Atatürk, Kemal, 29 Atlantic Charter, 41-42, 54-55, 73, 305, 310 Atlantic Pact. See n a t o . Attlee, Clement, 9 1,12 5 , 130, 150,

154-55

Austin, Warren R ., 19 1

85

Balfour, Lord, 179, 183-84, 193 Bancroft, Harding, 245 Bandung Conference: in 1948, 216, 220, 235; in 1955, 322 Barradough, Geoffrey, 1 1 Baruch, Herman, 158 -59 ,17 5-76 Beel, Louis J. M ., 15 4 ,19 8 , 236; on Beel Plan, 281-83; elected prime minister, 126; explains first Dutch police action, 168; on Marshall Plan aid, 228 Belgium , 190, 230, 239 Bevin, Ernest, 9 0 ,119 , 12 5 ,15 5 , 159, 294; and Brewster amendment, 292; view s on Soviet interests in Southeast A sia, 116 BFO (Federal Consultative Assem bly),

297-99/ 303

Bland, Sir N eville, 118 , 134 Blom, Nico S ., 235 Bolling, A . R ., 230-33 Bonsai, Philip, 204 Boon, Hendrik N ., 223 Borneo, 64, 7 9 ,13 4 ,15 1- 5 2 / 18 5 Brewster, Owen, 276-77, 285-86 Brewster Amendment, 277-78, 285-86, 291-93

331

In d e x

Brooks, Alfred, 194 Brown, Constantine, 287 Brussels Pact, 230, 281 Budi Utomo, 29-30 Bukharin, Nikolai, 28 Bulgaria, 260 Bunker, Ellsworth, 325 Burma, 58, 6 5 ,10 8 ,13 9 ,17 8 , 253, 257,

3*7

Burton, John W ., 257 Butterworth, W. Walton, 250, 253, 267, 270, 282 Byrnes, Jam es F ., 1 0 2 ,1 1 0 ,1 1 6 - 1 7 Cairo Conference, 62 Casablanca Conference, 57 Central Indonesia Committee, 84 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 2 ,17 7 , 229, 230, 244; analysis of second Dutch police action, 274-76; and Indonesian rebellion of

1958, 323-24

Ceylon, 178, 253 Chamberlin, S. J., 241-42 Chiefs of Staff, British, 89, 90 Chifley, Joseph B ., 130 China, 57, 58, 68, 8 2 ,1 1 4 ,1 1 5 ,1 5 2 , 17 1, 274, 3 15 , 32 1; co-sponsors Security Council resolution, 264, 272 Christison, Sir Philip, 86-89, 9 4 ' 112 Churchill, Winston, 54, 57, 65, 8 1, 305 Civil A ffairs Division, U .S. War Department, 72 Clark, Joseph A ., 19 Clark Kerr, Sir Archibald. See Inverchapel, Lord. Clayton, William, 14 3 ,14 6 Cochran, H. M erle, 245-47, 249, 251, 269-70, 294-95, 297; as ambassador to Indonesia, 3 17 -2 1; and Cochran Plan, 236, 239-42; and Good O ffices Committee, 233-34; at Round-Table Conference, 298-303; view of Madiun revolt, 243 Cochran Plan, 239-42, 244-45 Colby, Bainbridge, 48 Cold War, 14 2 ,15 6 , 3 13 , 315; effect on U.S.-Indonesian relations, 14, 158, 3 1 1 Colombia, 263, 264

332

Combined Allied Chiefs of Staff, 73, 76, 80, 8 6 ,110 Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 257 Congress Party (India), 29 Consular Commission, 189, 264 Costa Rica, 310 Critchley, Thomas K ., 2 13 Cuba, 58, 272 Cultivation system , 23-25 Cumming, Hugh S ., 13 1 Curran, Joseph, 146 Czechoslovakia, 230 D avies, John Paton, 69, 81-82 Debt of Honor, A (Van Deventer), 24 de Jonge, B. C ., 34 Dekker, Douwes, 30 Dening, Maberiy E., 89-90, 95, 118 , 184 Diponegoro, Prince, 22-23, 25 Division of International Security A ffairs, U .S. Department of State,

*95

Division of Northern European A ffairs, U .S. Department of State,

*74

Division of Southeast Asian A ffairs, U .S. Department of State, 97, 13 2 ,16 4 ,19 6 , 2 14 -15 , 229, 237, 2 5 354; view s on colonial nationalism, 140-41 Division of Southwest Pacific A ffairs, U .S. Department of State, 68, 70 Dixon, O liver, 190-91 Drees, Willem, 9, 277-78 DuBois, Coert, 2 13 -17 , 218-25, 233,

245

DuBois-Critchley Proposals, 219 -23, 225-26, 230, 232^33, 240-41 Dulles, John Foster, 43, 322-23 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 7 1 Dunn, Jam es Clement, 67, 73 East India Com pany, 20-22, 25 East Indonesia, 134, 15 1, 15 2 ,18 5 East Sumatra, 2 11 Economic Cooperation Adm inistra­ tion. See European Recovery Program. Eden, Anthony, 58, 62, 76

Index Eggleson, Sir Frederick, 65 Eisenhower, Dwight D ., 322-24 Ethical Party, 24-25, 27 Europe, Western, 14 ,15 7 , 263; and Brussels Pact, 230; and colonial nationalism, 142-43, 307; and European Recovery Program, 17 7 78, 18 1, 227, 229, 248, 258, 260,

275- 76/ 288/ 312

European Recovery Program (Mar­ shall Plan), 18 1, 280-81, 288, 314 ; and Brewster Amendment, 276- 78, 285-86, 291-93; suspension of funds to Netherlands considered, 248, 261; and U .S. policy in In­ donesia, 13 ,17 7 -7 8 , 202, 226-29, 232, 234, 255-58, 267-68, 290, 304 / 3 « / 3 13 Export-Import Bank, 159, 256, 319 FDR (Front Demokrasi Rakjat; Peo­ ple's Democratic Front), 238 Foote, Walter A ., 12 1, 128, 16 1; attitude toward Dutch policy, 17 5 76; view s on future of East In­ dies, 74-75; view s oh Koets mission, 132-33; view s on wealth of In­ dies, 145-46 Forrestal, Jam es, 67 Four-Nation Declaration, 73 Fox, M atthew, 259 France, 6 1, 69, 10 0 ,110 ,14 2 -4 3 ,18 9 , 277; and Brussels Pact, 230; and European Recovery Program, 229; and French Indochina, 58, 64, 8 7 ,1 2 3 ,1 2 6 ,1 3 5 ,1 7 1 , 217 , 257, 260, 266, 284, 290, 3 13 -15 ; and Inter­ national Rubber Committee, 49 Franks, Sir O liver, 263 Gambia, 57-58 Gani, A . K ., 149 General Motors Corporation, 4 6 ,14 8 Gerbrandy, Peter S ., 40-41, 77-78, 88 Germ any, 76, 114 , 142, 276 Gideonse, Harry D ., 288 Good Offices Committee, 13 ,2 3 1,2 7 9 , 3 10 - 11; attempts to implement Linggadjati agreement, 2 11- 14 , 2 1&~ 17 , 219-27, 233-35, 246; and ne­ gotiation of Linggadjati agreement,

190-204, 210; and second Dutch police action, 252, 263, 269, 272-73 Goodyear Rubber Com pany, 4 6 ,14 8 , 289 Graham, Frank P ., 196-97, 208, 2 11, 2 13 -14 , 224-25; and Good Of­ fices Committee, 193-94; and Renville agreement, 189-204, 208; view of Bandung Conference, 216 G raves, Hubert A ., 282 Great Britain, 13 , 22, 58, 6 1, 65, 68, 14 1, 230, 257, 260, 277, 284, 309; commercial interests in East Indies, 149-50; concern with the possi­ bility of Dutch police action, 155, 160-63; and International Rubber Committee, 49-50; and occupation of Indies, 56, 83-136, 14 1-4 2; and transfer of Indies to s e a c , 73, 76-84 Greece, 1 1 4 ,1 1 5 , 142, 156, 260 Grew , Joseph, 52 G riffin, R. Allen, 319 Grom yko, Andrei, 188, 206-7 Halifax, Lord, 109 -10 Hamengku Buwono, Sultan, 10 Hatta, Mohammed, 9 6 ,10 4 , 2 51, 283; and Atlantic Charter, 42; coop­ eration with Japanese, 36 -38 ,9 1,9 4 ; and early nationalist movement, 28-29, 32-33; at independence cere­ m ony, 9; and Madiun rebellion, 242-43, 266; named vice-president, 84; negotiations with Dutch, 245-47; as prime minister, 208-9, 237-39; and proclamation of independence,

38

H awaii Conference, 77 Helb, H. A ., 253-54, 271, 283, 284 Henderson, Loy W ., 268-69 Herremans, Raymond, 2 13 Hickerson, John D ., 13 1 Hilldring, J. H ., 72 Hilsman, Roger, 306 Hirschfeld, H. L ., 153 Ho Chi Minh, 56-57, 3 13 Hoffman, Paul, 254-55 Hoge Veluwe Conference, 12 5 -2 9 ,13 3 Hong Kong, 58, 65 Hombeck, Stanley K ., 53, 65, 139, 14 3,177-78 ,28 8 ,30 9 ; as ambassador

333

In d e x

Hombeck, Stanley K. (cont.) to Netherlands, 13 1,14 4 ; on Linggadjati agreement, 152; on wealth of Indies, 19 H ull, Cordell, 59, 67-68; attitude toward colonialism, 55, 6 1; attitude toward Japanese expansion, 5253; and International Rubber Committee, 50; and trusteeship, 62, 66, 70-73 Hurley, Patrick, 103 Idenburg, Alexander, 30 India, 58, 139, 15 2 ,17 1 ,17 8 ; and first Dutch police action, 17 9 -8 1,18 4 85; and N ew Delhi Conference, 268; and second Dutch police action, 253, 257; troops in Indonesia, 8 9 ,9 1,10 8 ,118 -19 ,12 4 -2 5 / 260,274,

314/ 317

Joint Planning Staff, British, 77, 80, 108-9 Jones, Howard P., 19-20, 324-25, 327 Jonkmann, Johannes A ., 12 7 ,13 1- 3 2 ,

154

Juliana, Queen, 9, 259 Kaltenborn, H. V ., 287 Kahin, George M cT., 14 , 256-57, 280, 296 Kennan, George F ., 268 Kennedy, John F ., 43, 325-26 Kennedy, Raymond, 69 Kennedy, Robert F ., 325 Killeam , Lord, 1 3 0 ,13 3 ,1 7 5 ,17 8 Kirby, Richard, 193, 205 Koets, P. J., 132-33 Korea, 62, 260 Korean War, 319-20 Krock, Arthur, 267-68

Indische Parti) (National Indies Party),

30

Indochina, 58, 64, 74, 8 1, 87, 9 9 ,13 5 , 2 17 , 232, 257, 260, 298; guerrilla warfare in, 17 1, 2 15 , 2 31, 237, 243, 266, 284; U .S. policy toward, 3 13 -15 . See also Vietnam. Indonesian Communist Party. See PKI. International Rubber Committee,

49-50

Inverchapel, Lord (Sir Archibald Clark Kerr), 119 , 12 1 ,1 3 4 , 179 Iran, 114 -15 , 142 Isbrantsen Steam ship Com pany, 146 Japan, 9 1 ,1 1 5 , 300; and establishment of Republic of Indonesia, 8486; interest in Indonesian oil, 5 153; occupation of Indies, 3 4 -3 9 ,113 ; trade with Indies, 47; and World War n, 76-83 Jessup, Philip C , 189, 253-54, 2596 1, 285; on duBois-Critchley proposals, 226; speeches before Security Council, 262-63, 270-74; on U .S. policy toward emerging nations, 233 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 67, 7 1, 78-79, 8 1,17 7 Johnson, Herschel V ., 185-86 Johnson, Lyndon B., 327-28

334

Lacy, William S. B., 229, 253, 254 Lawson, J. J., 87 League of Nations, 44, 306, 314 Leahy, William, 63 Lenin, V. I., 28 Linggadjati agreement, 133-36 , 150-53/ 195-96/ 206, 210, 2 13 , 270, 273; and first Dutch police action, 168-69; U .S. attitude toward, 137-38/ 144/ *59/ 16 1-6 2, 164-65 Livengood, Charles, 237, 243 Logemann, J. H. A ., 106-7, 118 Loudon, Sir Alexander, 6 6 ,13 1 Lovett, Robert A ., 223, 3 11- 12 ; and first Dutch police action, 179, 18 1, 183; and Good Offices Committee, 193, 202-3; on Madiun rebellion, 244; meetings with Dutch officials, 234-35, 241; and second Dutch police action, 253-55, 265-66, 268, 271-72 Lovink, A . H. J., 10 , 248 Luce, Clare Boothe, 103 Luxembourg, 230 M acArthur, Douglas, 72, 74-80 McCallum, David, 195 Madiun rebellion, 242-44, 3 13 M alaya, 5 1, 65, 8 3 ,10 8 ,17 8 , 227, 284, 289, 326-27 M allaby, William, 97

Index Malone, George, 258 M anuilsky, D. Z ., 115 Mao Tse-tung, 56, 243-44 M arshall, George, 7 1, 158-59, 200, 216 , 237; and first Dutch police action, 17 3 -7 4 ,18 2 -8 3 ; instructions to Good O ffices Committee, 203, 22 1; and M arshall Plan, 18 1,; meet­ ing with Stikker, 239-41; and Renville agreement, 209; and s e a c transfer, 78-79 M arshall Plan. See European Recovery Program. Martin Behmtan, S. S ., 146-47 M atthews, H. Freeman, 173-74, *84 M eyers, C. S ., 2 11 M ichiels, Jonkheer E ., 155 M iddle East, 13 7 ,14 2 , 182, 314 M ilitary Assistance Program (MAP), 291-93 M itcheson, John L. M ., 16 2 ,17 5 ,18 7 M offat, Abbot Low , 70 -71, 9 7 ,14 1, 164—66 M olotov, V. M ., 115 - 16 M oluccas, 20 M organ, John, 174 M orse, W ayne, 285 Moscow Foreign M inisters' Confer­ ence, 115 Mountbatten, Adm iral Lord Louis, 76-77, 80, 83, 86, 88-90, 93-9 4,109 M urray, Philip, 257-58 M usso, 238, 290 Mutual Defense Assistance Program,

321

Mutual Security Act, 320 (National Association for the Advancem ent of Colored People), 258 Nasution, A . H ., 324-25 National Carbon Com pany, 46 National Maritime Union, 146 National Security Council, 289-91 N a t o (North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­ tion), 260, 2 7 1, 281, 291-93, 304, 3 1 1 , 3 12 , 314, 32 1 N atsir, Mohammed, 295 N avy Department, U .S., 66, 305 N ehru, Jaw aharlal, 17 2 ,18 0 , 252-53, 268, 271 NAACP

N ew Delhi Conference, 268-69, 271, 278, 322 Nixon, Richard M ., 19 Nolting, Frederick, 234-35 N orw ay, 272 Office of European A ffairs, U .S. Department of State, 6 7 ,13 1,14 0 4 1, 15 0 ,16 3 Office of Far Eastern A ffairs, U .S. Department of State, 10 1,14 0 -4 1, 15 0 ,16 3 , 180-81 Office of Intelligence Research, U.S. Department of State, 2 17 -18 , 232 Office of N aval Intelligence, 142 Office of Near Eastern and African A ffairs, U .S. Department of State, 182, 267 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 39,

56

Office of United Nations Affairs, U .S. Department of State, 232, 245, 259 O gbum , Charlton, 196, 2 14 -15 , 226, 284 Open Door policy, 44, 59-60,144, 148, 285 Pakistan, 253, 260 Partindo, 33 Patterson, Ellis E ., 103 Peace Corps, 327 Pemudas, 39 Persatuan Perdjuangan (PP; Fighting Front), 12 1 Perseroan Bank, 146 Peta, 38-39 Philippines, 79, 253, 288, 289, 305; U .S. policy toward, 4 1, 55, 56, 6 1, 64, 10 1,13 9 -4 0 , 305 PKI (Indonesian Communist Party): and Madiun rebellion, 242-43, 313; and rebellion of 1926-27, 3 1; U.S. concern with growth of, 237-38, 322-27 PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), 3 1-3 2 Point IV, 319 Poland, 19 1 Policy Planning Staff, U .S. Depart­ ment of State, 268 Pope, Allan, 324 Portugal, 20

335

In d e x

Posthuma, Simon, 170 Potsdam Conference, 73, 75-76, 8 0 -8 1,13 5 Pratt, Julius, 43 Procter & Gamble, 46, 148 Puerto Rico, 10 1 Rahman, Tunkt* Abdul, 327 Rau, Benegal Rama, 267 Reber, Sam uel, 234 Reed, Charles, 237, 249, 284 Renville agreement, 207, 237-38, 270, 273, 3 1 1 ; negotiations regard­ ing implementation of, 2 12 , 2 14 16, 222, 225; signing of, 204-5; U .S. view s on, 2 0 8 -11, 2 31, 262 Reston, Jam es, 116 Riddle, H. L ., 289 Roosevelt, Elliott, 57, 64-65 Roosevelt, Franklin D ., 5 1, 54, 60, 67, 68, 70, 305; attitude toward colo­ nialism , 43-44, 55, 57-58/ 6 1, 306; and trusteeship, 62-65 Roth, Andrew , 226 Round-Table Conference (The Hague), 9, 281, 297-303 Royal Dutch Petroleum Com pany, 4 8 -4 9

Rum, Mohammed, 295-97 Rum -van Royen agreement, 295-97 Rusk, Dean, 233-34 ,26 7,273,30 0 -30 1; on second Dutch police action, 259-61, 265; on U .S. policy in Security Council, 226, 270, 283 Russo-Japanese War, 29 Salim , Hadji A gus, 153 Salisbury, Laurence, 68-69 Sam inist rebellion, 26-27 Sarekat Islam, 30 Sassen, E. J. M. A ., 246, 277^-78, 281 Satterthwaite, Joseph C , 267 Schermerhom , William, 126-27, 1 3 1 Schorr, Daniel, 223, 224 Schuurman, T. Elink, 245 Scott, Joseph, 195 SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Orga­ nization), 322 Sim atupang, T. B ., 299 Singapore, 83, 94, 326 Sjahrir, Sutan, 112 , 132, 17 1-7 2 ; and early Indonesian nationalist move-

336

ment, 32-33, 37; on importance of United States to Indonesia, 4 1; and Linggadjati agreement, 15 1; named prime minister, 106; ne­ gotiations with Dutch, 118 - 2 4 ,12 7~ 29, 16 2 -6 3,16 6 ; at Security Coun­ cil, 188-89 Sjahsam , Sutan, 149 Sjarifuddin, Am ir, 166, 193, 195; appointed prime minister, 166; and FDR, 238; and first Dutch police action, 17 1; and Renville agreem ent, 204, 206, 208-9 Smith, M argaret Chase, 258-59 South Africa, 260 Southeast A sia Command ( s e a c ) , 73, 76, 80, 82, 86, 89 Southwest Pacific Area Command ( s w p a ) , 72, 76, 79 Soviet Union, 58, 180, 268, 275, 28688, 3 1 1 , 3 13 , 3 15 , 32 1, 325; and colonial nationalist movements, 69, 165, 218, 2 31-32 , 260-62, 289; policy at United Nations, 115 - 17 , 13 1,18 0 - 8 1, 18 8 ,19 1-9 2 , 206-7; U .S. policy toward, 137, 14 3 ,15 7 Stalin, Joseph, 119 , 290, 312 Standard Oil Com pany of N ew Jersey, 46-49 Standard-Vacuum Oil Com pany, 49, 148, 289 State Department, U .S., 8 1, 83, 1 1 1 , 13 1, 149, 235, 237, 319-20; and aide-mémoire to Netherlands, 24748; and Cochran Plan, 239, 241; and colonial independence move­ ments, 99-100, 103-4, 308, 310; and first Dutch police action, 172, 176, 17 9 ,18 3 ,18 7 ,19 1- 9 2 ; and Good O ffices Committee, 198-99, 20 1-3, 218, 22°, 226, 245-47; in­ telligence reports of, 96-97, 128, 2 17 -18 , 228, 232; and Linggad­ jati agreement, 137-38, 144, 150, 16 1-6 3; and Madiun rebellion, 243; reaction to second Dutch police action, 254-55, 257» 259-60, 262-70, 273/ 277-78/ 284, 291-93; and Renville agreement, 208-10, 216 , 225 State-W ar-Navy Coordinating Committee (swncc ), 100,181-82

Index States General, 127, 228 Stem dale Bennett, J. C , 10 9 ,110 ,12 5 Stettinius, Edward R ., Jr., 7 3 ,1 1 7 Stikker, Dirk U ., 248, 263, 272, 279; on importance of Marshall Plan to Netheriands, 280-81; meeting with Cochran, 277-78; negotia­ tions with Hatta, 246-47; visits United States, 240-41, 292-95 Stimson, H enry, 67, 78 Street, John, 17 5 ,17 7 ,17 8 ,18 3 Subardjo, 320-21 Sudirm an, 297 Suharto, 327 Sukarno, 9 5 -9 6 ,10 4 ,10 7 ,12 2 ,12 9 , 17 1, 238, 283, 297, 3 15 , 317 , 320; appeals to United States, 10 1-2 ,17 2 , 309; captured by Dutch, 251; cooperation with Japanese, 36-38, 91-92, 94, 308; diplomatic policy of, 105-6; estrangement from United States, 321-27; at indepen­ dence ceremony, 10 - 11; named president, 84-85; and Partindo, 33; and PN I, 31-3 2 ; and proclamation of independence, 38; and Rum van Royen agreement, 295-96; U .S. attitude toward, 98, 266 Sukim an, 320 Sumatra, 72, 7 6 ,19 5 , 287, 298; and first Dutch police action, 168, 170, 190, 195; guerrilla activity in, 283; oU of, 48, 52; republic's de facto sovereignty in, 12 5 -2 6 ,13 3 ; and second Dutch police action, 252 Sumitro Djojohadikusomo, 255-56 Sun Yat-sen, 29 Suwandi, 124 Syria, 263 Tan M alaka, 3 1,10 6 ,12 1- 2 2 , 238 Taylor, Alastair M ., 14 Tehran Conference, 62 Thailand (Siam), 76, 83, 289 Truman, H arry S ., 1 3 ,1 0 2 ,1 1 2 ,1 4 2 , 15 2 ,17 6 , 178, 229, 2 31, 274, 292, 309, 310 , 318 -19 ; and British joint mediation offer, 163; and Brussels Pact, 230; and first Dutch police action, 182-83; and Potsdam Con­ férence, 8 1; and second Dutch

police action, 254; and Truman Doctrine, 156-57 Truman Doctrine, 15 6 -5 7 ,18 1, 23637 / 3 1 1 Trusteeship, 61-66, 70-73, 305 Turkey, 156 Tyree, David, 198 United Nations, 15 5 ,2 8 3 ,3 2 5 ; Charter of, 4 1, 57, 7 3 ,1 1 7 ,1 3 1 ,1 7 2 ,1 8 1 , 305, 310 ; consideration of Indone­ sian dispute by Security Council, 14 / 173 - 74 / 193 - 94 /196/ 199 / 206, 2 11, 233, 252, 258-59, 277-78; U .S. policy in, 115 - 17 , 180, 254, 26265, 267, 269, 274, 291, 304, 3 1 1 , 314 United Nations Commission for Indonesia (u n c f i ), 13,2 7 3 ,2 8 2 ,2 9 5 , 298-300 United States of Indonesia (U .S.I.), 160, 19 4 ,19 9 , 279, 296-97; and Cochran Plan, 240; and Unggadjati agreement, 133-34/ 15 i/ *53; and Renville agreement, 2 12 -13 ; and Rum -van Royen agreement, 296-97; Security Council resolutions regarding, 273, 281; U .S. view s of Dutch policy toward, 216, 2 18 2 1, 2 3 1, 242, 246 U .S. Rubber Com pany, 4 6 ,14 8 Vandenberg, Arthur, 287 Van den Bosch, J., 24 Van der Velde, J. J., 170 Van Deventer, Conrad Th., 24 Van Kleffens, Eelco, 7 7 ,17 4 ,18 3 ,18 5 , 223, 235, 27 1, 283 Van Mook, Hubertus J., 77,78 ,9 4 ,9 6 , 107, 112 , 126, 135, 222; on British policy toward republic, 88> and civil affairs agreement, 72; on first Dutch police action, 168-69; and federal program, 212 , 216; and negotiations with Sjahrir, 1 1 9 ,1 2 1 24, 12 7 -2 8 ,16 2 ; on Sukarno, 92 Van Royen, J. H ., 264, 272, 279, 292-97 Van Vredenburch, Henri, 193-94 , 1 9 7 Van Zeeland, Paul, 19 3 ,19 8 Versailles Peace Conference, 44, 306 Vietnam, 56, 123, 126, 1 3 5 ,1 7 1 , 328 V illaid, H enry, 182

337

In d e x

Vincent, John Carter, 10 1, n o , 180-81 Volksraad, 3 0 -3 1,10 7 Vyshinsky, Andrei Y ., 116 W allace, H enry, 238, 285 War Department, U .S., 66, 72, 305 W ehle, Louis B ., 287-88 W elles, Sumner, 5 1, 55, 61-62, 134, 288 W estern European Union, 234, 257, 262 West Irian (West N ew Guinea), 299, 302-3, 3 15 , 321-22, 325-26

33 »

West Java, 153, 2 11 White, Walter, 258 W hitteridge, George C , 154 W ilhelmina, Queen, 63-65, 92, 107, 2 12 W ilson, W oodrow, 44-45, 6 1, 306-7 W inchell, W alter, 259 W olf, Charles, 8 3 , 1 5 1

Yalta Conference, 65 Yergin, Daniel, 137 Yugoslavia, 260

C o lo n ialism a n d C o ld W ar Designed by Richard E. Rosenbaum. Composed by Eastern Graphics in 10 point Linotron 202 Palatino, 2 points leaded, with display lines in Palatino. Printed offset by Thomson/Shore, Inc. on W arren's Number 66 Antique Offset, 50 pound basis. Bound by John H. Dekker & Sons, Inc. in Joanna book cloth and stamped in Kurz-Hastings foil.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

McMahon, Robert )., 1949Colonialism and cold war. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1 . United States—Foreign relations—Indonesia. 2. Indonesia—Foreign relations—United States. 3. Indonesia—Politics and government—1942-1949.4. United States—Foreign relations—19 4 5 -19 5 3.1. Tide. E183.8.I5M 35 327.730598 81-66648 ISBN 0-8014-1388-5 AA CR2