Collision Course: America & East Asia in the Past & the Future 9789814379441

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COLLISION COURSE

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organisation in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modem Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change . The Institute's research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies Programme (RES), Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme (RSPS), Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme (RSCS) , and the Indochina Programme (ICP). The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organisations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

COLLISION COURSE America and East Asia in the Past and the Future

BRYCE HARLAND

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES Singapore

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studic!'l Hcng Mui Keng Temace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119~96 Internet e - mail: publi h Qt mcrlion.lseas..ac .sa WWW : http://merlion.isea.s.ac . glpub.htm.J All rights reserved. No part of thill publication I'WlY be reprodla:ed. tared in a retrieval system. or tran mined in llllY form or by ilDY means. electronic. mechanical. photocopying. re ording or othcrwi.w:. without the prior penni ion of the Institute of Southeast A. ian Studles.

© 1996 Institute: of Southeast Asian Studies. Sangapore

The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication "JI.J exclusively with the author and his interpretatiOIIJ do not n«UUirily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or iLJ swpportus.

Cataloplnaln Publication Data Harland. Bryce. Collision course: America and East Asia in the past and the future . I. East Asia - Foreign relations - United States. 2. United States -Foreign relations- East Asia. 3. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 - United States. I. Titles. DS33.4 U6H28 1996 sb 96-22480 ISBN 981-3055-30-8 (soft) ISBN 981-3055-37-5 (hard) Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed and bound in Singapore by Prime Packaging Industries Pte Ltd.

For Annit and Toz

CONTENTS PREFACE INTRODUCTION The Past and the Future

ix

Xll

CHAPTER 1 The West Strikes Asia

1

CHAPTER 2 America Assens Itself

21

CHAPTER 3 Turmoil in China Leads to War in the Pacific

37

CHAPTER4 Cold War Sets In

57

CHAPTER 5 War in Korea Deepens Confrontation

73

CHAPTER 6 Vietnam- Failure, and Success

89

CHAPTER 7 The Anti-Soviet Coalition

109

CHAPTERS Japan Challenges America Again

124

Vlll

Ctlflrrnts

CHAPTER 9 Smaller Dragons join In

137

CHAPTER 10 China against a Wall

154

CHAPTER 11 The Asian Diaspora

167

CHAPTER 12 Regi onalism in Asia

182

CHAPTER 13 Whtther America7

194

POSTSCRIPT The Eye of the Viewer

203

Bibliography

209

Index

214

The Author

221

PREFACE

The relationship between America and East Asia is attracting attention all round the world : its future is one of the great issues of our time. The purpose of this book is to put it in a historical perspective - to see how the relationship has developed. and where it seems to be leading. It is based on a belief in the relevance of history - which is, after all , only an attempt to understand human experience in the past. If we cannot learn from experience . we may find ourselves repeating it. In the past half century East Asia has been transformed , from one of the poorest and most turbulent parts of the world into one of the most rapidly developing, and one of the more peaceful. America has played a critical pan in this transformation , by providing ideas , money and markets, as well as security. Now the terms of the relationship are changing. Asian countries are competing vigorously with America in the economic field. Their fast growth has given them the confidence to assen themselves, and to uphold the vinues of their own heritage . Attempts by the United States to bring them into line with its own values and interests have provoked resistance. They have generated tension with one Asian country after another, and made them more conscious of what they have in common. Rancour and hostility have come to qualify relationships that were formerly characterised mainly by goodwill, or at least tolerance . America remains confident that the deep divisions within Asia will ensure continued need for

x Preface

America's military presence. That confidence may not always be as well founded as it has been in the past. This book sets out to trace the evolution of America's relations with East Asia, and to see where past experience has a bearing on present problems. It takes a long view: the aim is to set the present in the context of the past, and not just the recent past. It tries to look ahead too - not in the sense of projecting economic trends and making predictions based on them, but rather in that of pointing out risks and opportunities. The collision that the title refers to is not inevitable: it is a danger to be recognised in advance, so that it can be avoided. The main message is that , to avoid such a collision, America must stop trying to remake Asia in its own image, and accept that Asians have their own ways of doing things. Americans still have much to teach Asians, as the latter recognise by going to study in the United States, but Americans also have much to learn from Asians. In particular, they need to relearn the self-discipline shown by their own forebears- how to give up good things today for the sake of a better tomorrow. The book is based on 40 years' experience, reading and reflection . Much of my life has been spent dealing with various aspects of America's relations with Asia, from various places. Now I have tried to supplement my experience with further reading, so as to give a connected account of the development of those relations. To a large extent I have had to rely on others for facts : without their help I could not have hoped to cover such a wide field, and present the broad picture. The conclusions drawn are my own, even when similar ones have been drawn independently by other people. For anyone who wants to know how my views have arisen out of my experience, I have included a tailpiece entitled "The Eye of the Viewer". Most of the book was written during the (northern) summer of 1993. Various interruptions prevented me from completing it until the autumn of 1995. In revising the original text, I have tried to take account of developments during the intervening two years, without changing the balance of the book. The original argument remains unchanged. I am grateful to all those who have encouraged and assisted me in this project. Among them I am particularly indebted to Gerald Segal, Michael Yahuda, Max Beloff, Robert O'Neil, Richard Ullman,

Preface xi

Evelyn Colbert, Gary Hawke, Gideon Rachman and Tommy Koh . I also wish to thank those institutions which made it possible for me to re-visit East Asia and the United States in 1993 - notably the Asia Society in New York and the Carnegie Endowment in Washington. My friends and former colleagues have been more than generous with their hospitality - especially Denis and Anne McLean in Washington, Michael and Wen Powles in Peking, David and jan McDowell in Tokyo, and john McArthur in Taipei. So has Anne Manindell in Princeton, who has been a staunch friend to me , and to New Zealand. My son David has shared with me some of his wide knowledge of China, if not all my views. My greatest debt is to my wife . Anne Blackburn: without her encouragement, tolerance and sustained support this book could not have been written.

INTRODUCTION

The Past and the Future Many books have been written about the interaction between America and Asia . Is there any need to write, or read, another one now? The question may become less obvious as time passes, and tensions rise . At this stage three answers can be given, in ascending order of importance. • Most of the existing books have been written by Americans or by Asians: for all their merits , few claim to be detached. And at the moment , detachment may not go amiss. • Many of these books, and especially those written during the last couple of decades, deal with a single Asian country and its relations with the United States, rather than with the wider picture, and the interconnections between the relationships involved. • Few of the books already available have been written since the Cold War ended. The collapse of the Soviet Union radically altered the relationship between America and Asia . It removed the common threat that had kept the United States and most Asian countries working more or less closely together . and had kept the differences between them under control. It reduced, if it did not remove , the main constraint on the tensions that had already developed in most of the relationships. It has made them more fragile, and less

lnrroductwn

XII I

predictable. So the present sttuauon IS different from those that earher books have dealt with And it matters more than 1t sometimes has in the past, because Asian countries have become stronger Their relations with the United States now have a greater potential. for good or ill , not only for Americans and for Asians . but for the rest of the Pacific world , and even for Europe The basic point is simple: America no longer needs As1an alhes as it did during the Cold War . It may come to need them again m the future, but for the time being it does not, because it sees no threat it cannot meet alone, or in some temporary coalitton . So Americans feel free to pursue their own interests , as they see them . And two interests seem to dominate their minds . The first IS to strengthen the American economy, and to deal with pressmg social probleTTIS. The second is to advance human rights and democracy wherever possible in the world . The assumption behind the latter is that American values are shared by other peoples - that everyone else wants what Americans want . The United States is therefore justified in using its influence, and if necessary its power, to advance its goals. It is inhibited only by the pressing need to get the American house in order, at least economically. and to avoid foreign commitments that may prove costly. in money or in lives . As regards Asia . the main concern of the United States is to reduce the trade deficits it has with the fast-growth economies. preferably by getting them to buy more American goods and services. But to many Americans it is no less imponant to get Asian governments to respect human rights and extend democratic institutions. Some want to use the econom1c power of the United States to promote these objectives. Most Amencans assume that the divisions between Asian countnes are so deep-seated. and so intractable. that the Unne.d States will have no difficulty in mamtaining a dominant position in the Pacific . despite the growing strength of Asian counmes. The demise of the Soviet Union has not affected Asta m the same way . Even in the absence of an external threat hke that from the Soviet Union, Asian countries still need Amenca . Since 1945 , the eastern side of Asta has been transformed mto the fastest growing pan of the world economy. That transformauon could not havt come about. at least in such a shon ume . Without American resources and American markets But the result IS

xiv Introduction

dependence on the United States. Although its share is declining, America still takes about a quarter of the total exports of the fast-growth Asian economies. Trade among them is growing, but they are still a long way from regional self-sufficiency. Divided by culture and history, they tend to be suspicious of one another. Some Asians even play up the divisions and fears to enhance their own influence. Nearly all want the United States to provide them with security, mainly against one another. To this extent, American assumptions are justified. But this is only one part of the picture. During the past century or so, Asians have learned a lot from Americans - so much that some talk of "globalisation". The contemporary cultures of Asia are materialistic and egalitarian, and most Asian economies are market-based. But few Asians have fully accepted American political values. Stability and continuity are important to them. Asian leaders have achieved a lot, for their peoples as well as themselves: the range of incomes in East Asia is narrower than in most other parts of the world, and incomes are higher. They have not relied much on democracy , and until recently they have not been much criticised for it, as least by Americans. They find it difficult to understand why they are being criticised more now, when their peoples generally are better off and have more freedom than in the past. When Americans claim to be upholding universal values, Asians tend to respond by stressing the strengths of their own cultures, and the weaknesses of others. The governmen ts concerned come under some domestic criticism, but they usually retain broad popular support, as long as living standards are rising. Success is their main claim to authority. For all the talk of "globalisation", Asian and American cultures are still very different. Most Americans are individualists: they value privacy, freedom, scope for initiative and enterprise. Asians put more store by the group they belong to - family, firm, or nation. They value loyalty and obedience, as well as security and stability. Duty and self-discipline matter more than freedom. In economic matters, Americans claim to put the interests of the consumer first: Asians admit to thinking first of the producer, and the country as a whole. Their approach tends to be longer-term , and they are more willing to forego immediate rewards. Asians

Introduction

xv

have a higher rate of saving, at both the individual and the national level. Americans tend to spend freely, and to live beyond their incomes. They do not readily accept increased taxes or make other sacrifices, unless they believe some great cause is involved. For 40 years, Communism provided such a cause: to defeat it. Americans did make sacrifices, as they had earlier to defeat Nazism. Now Communism has been defeated and discredited. and no comparable threat has emerged to give Americans a sense of purpose. What cause is there left that they will make sacrifices for? Asian and American cultures are so different that closer contact can easily lead to conflict . Violence has played a large pan in the development of the relationship: Americans have fought Asians three times in the past half century The decline of Communism has reduced the danger of funher conflict, but not eliminated it. Ideological differences are not , after all, the only ones that can create tension. Predictably, the triumph of capitalism has resulted in its fragmentation : Asian capitalism is no longer considered to be the same as Western capitalism . Differences over specific issues. when they become inflamed , are given wider significance. and begin to affect public attitudes to other countries. Nationalism re-emerges, in new forms , and aggravates the tensions . Without further acceleration of growth in the world economy. through the liberalisation of trade, such tensions are likely to escalate , and could eventually give rise to funher conflict. ln the light of the record, that possibility cannot be ignored . But war is not the most immediate danger. Asian countries are becoming more interdependent: trade and investment within the region have grown fast, though no faster than that with the rest of the world. Yet regional co-operation is not nearly as developed as it is in Europe, or even in the Americas. Economic dynamism breeds competition, rather than co-operation. Many regional organisations have been set up in Asia, on both broad and narrow bases. Few have lasted for long, except ASEAN - and ASEAN has achieved more in the political sphere than in the economic. One reason is that Asian economies are still more parallel than complementary. They all depend on external markets, and especially on the United States. As long as the American market remains open, exclusive regionalism has

xvi

Introduction

little attraction for Asian countries. The question is how long it will remain open. If the fiscal deficit were substantially reduced, deflation is likely to affect the demand for imports, from all sources, at least for a time. Asians are more worried about the North American Free Trade Agreement, which some fear will give Mexico an advantage over them in the United States, through its local content requirement. But what worries Asians most is that American attempts to force open Asian markets could lead to unilateral action, and more protectionism. High levels of unemployment in the Western world are increasing that danger in both Europe and North America. And Western markets take something approaching half Asia's total exports. What would Asian countries do if the American market became less open? They find if difficult to work closely together, but they might then see no alternative. And co-operation might be easier for them if the United States were also pressing them on human rights and democracy. The regional conference held in Bangkok early in 1993, as a prelude to the United Nations meeting in Vienna, showed that human rights is an issue that can bring Asians together against the United States. The more America asserts its power, and uses that power to advance its political objectives, the more Asians are likely to resist. If the United States pushed human rights too hard, and used trade as a means of pressure, it might come to appear as a common threat to them, and help to overcome their divisions. America could conceivably do for Asia what Asia has so far been unable to do for itself -, develop an effective form of regional co-operation. America has done a lot for Asia. It has played a large part in raising the region from poverty to prosperity, and improving the living conditions of most people in it. But it has not fully succeeded in imparting American political values - not even in japan, where the post-war occupation provided an unrivalled opportunity . Asian cultures have proved too tough, too resilient, for Americans to refashion. The Vietnam war showed that there is a limit to the price Americans will pay to achieve their own objectives in Asia, and that price is getting higher. Asian countries are growing stronger, and they are becoming more important to the United States as economic partners. If they formed some sort of trading bloc, they would have great bargaining power. The

Introduction

xvii

interest of the United States clearly lies in encouraging them to stick to a multilateral approach to international trade, and letting them work out their own political arrangements. They will in any case develop in their own way. even if they use Western models. as Japan has shown. Americans have long had a sense of mission towards Asia. and especially towards China. In the 19th century. and later, they tried to conven the Chinese to Christianity, with only limited success. Now it is democracy the Chinese are being asked to embrace . To Americans, democracy, like Christianity, is universally valid : to Asians it can look more like a Western ideology. The Chinese, like the Japanese. are determined to maintain their own identity: "globalisation" is not an Asian objective. Instead of going on trying to teach Asians, Americans might benefit by learning from them . at least in the economic field. The fundamental problem in the American economy is clear and simple. The country at large. and many of its people. are living beyond their means- consuming more than they produce. spending more than they earn. They are not peculiar in this: most of the Western world suffers from the same problem. But not Asia: Asians still know how to save . They do it by disciplining themselves, by taking long-term views of their own interests. by giving things up today for the sake of a better tomorrow. Americans once knew how to do this: they need to re-learn the lesson. Asians can help them . This book traces the development of America's relations with China. japan. and the countries adjacent to them. These are the parts of Asia in which the United States has been . and is, most deeply involved. and which are therefore most relevant to the subject. Americans were junior panners in the Western campaign to open up China, but they took the lead in opening up japan. As the power of the United States grew. it assened itself more : turmoil in China brought America into conflict with Japan, and led to a war that engulfed the Pacific. But when japan was defeated, China fell under Communist control, not American. To prevent any funher expansion of Communism, America wem to war again, first in Korea and later in Vietnam. Public opposition made it impossible to sustain the effon. To extricate the United States. Nixon ended the 20-year confrontation with China, and came to terms with Mao. America and China worked more closely

xviii

Introduction

together after Mao's death and the fall of the Gang of Four, but tensions arose over trade and human rights, and changes in the Soviet Union weakened the constraints on them. The Tiananmen incident in 1989 caused another swing in American attitudes, and opened a new round of confrontation. Meanwhile, japan had emerged as a leading economic power, largely by exporting high technology products to America. Its success created a trade surplus, which helped to finance the American fiscal deficit, but aroused resentment, and generated protectionist pressures. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore followed in japan's footsteps, and got into similar difficulties with the United States. So did China as Teng's economic reforms bore fruit. Asians were migrating to America in large numbers: many did well, and aroused envy, which threatened to colour American attitudes to Asia again. Americans were worried about their economy, and their society: President Clinton called for sacrifice, at a time when the demise of Communism was making it harder to elicit. The United States began to press Asian governments harder on trade and human rights. They came together to resist the pressure on human rights, but not yet on trade . The story has not ended: it will go on, probably for a long time. It is interesting in itself, and worth re-telling. It also carries a warning. America and Asia have clashed in the past, and could clash again in the future . Both sides are changing: Asia is steadily becoming stronger, both absolutely and relatively. Any future clash will not necessarily have the same result as those in the past.

CHAPTER

1

The West Strikes Asia

In the middle of the 19th century, a storm struck East Asia. It arose in the West, and came at first mainly from Britain. The role of America was subsidiary, but it grew as the storm went on, and helped to spread it. In the 20th century, America was to have much the greater impact on Asia, and Asia on America. But until about 1900 Europe set the pace. Europeans and Asians had been in touch with each other for a long time . Herodotus mentions a Greek called Aristeas of Proconnesus who travelled to Central Asia in the 5th century BC and heard about a people called the Hyperboreans 'who reach to the sea'. If these were the Chinese, it is interesting that, according to Aristeas, each of the peoples he encountered encroached on its neighbour, except the Hyperboreans. There is no written record of any direct contact in classical times. Alexander's career of conquest took him and his armies as far east as Afghanistan and Pakistan, but he seems not to have heard of China. It was ,the Chinese who made the expeditions to Central Asia that led to the opening of the silk trade, probably in the 1st century BC. The Romans came to love silk, and were willing to pay for it with gold and silver, even when it became clear that this was affecting their own economy. The trade prospered, as did the peoples along the silk route, until some Persian monks of the Nestorian faith (an Asian form of Christianity) smuggled the eggs of the silk worm out of China in the 6th century AD, and silk production began in the Levant. Contact between Europe and Asia seems to have fallen off, especially

2

Collision Course

after the eruption of Islam in the 7th century. The backward remnant of the Roman Empire in the West was left isolated and embattled. but slowly rallied round the Church, and began to fight back. The Crusades led the Papacy to look for allies in Asia, about the time when the conquests of the Mongols, led by Chinggis Khan, were opening Central Asia to Europeans again. In 1245, the Pope sent a Franciscan friar to make contact with the Mongols, and he did so at the Great Khan's headquarters at Karakoram in Mongolia. On his return to Europe, King Louis IX of France sent another friar, who also got to Karakoram. In his report, he for the first time identified 'Cathay' with what the Romans had called 'Seres'. Merchants followed friars. Two Venetians named Polo also visited the Great Khan, who asked the Pope through them to send a hundred missionaries to his court. The Papacy did not respond immediately, but the Polos were sent back , with another letter. This time, they took with them the young son of Nicolo. Marco Polo attracted the attention of Kubilai Khan, by then established in China, and stayed for 17 years working for the Emperor. When he eventually returned to Italy, he gave Europe the fullest account it had yet had of China, and told it for the first time of Japan . By then, the Papacy had taken up Kubilai's invitation and sent yet another Franciscan ,John of Monte Corvino, to establish a permanent mission in China. Others joined him , and two substantial missions were set up. They thrived, until the Chinese rebelled against the Mongols and drove them out of China in the mid-14th century. The Christians, and other foreigners they had brought in to help them rule the Chinese, went with them . Trade apparently went on , though mainly through intermediaries like the Arabs. It may have served other purposes too. Printing with movable type seems to have been invented in Korea about 1400: it appeared in Europe about 1440, though there is no conclusive evidence that it came from Asia. Contact between Europe and Asia had disappeared from sight. What led to its re-emergence, and to the establishment of continuing links, was the opening of sea routes and the Reformation in Europe . Luther's revolt against Papal supremacy galvanised Rome into reforming the Catholic Church, and arming it with new orders of militant priests. The Jesuits were founded by the Spaniard,

The West Strikes Asia

3

Ignatius Loyola, in 1540. Their particular vocation was to use the secular learning of the Renaissance to defend the Church and extend its influence : jesuits were distinguished as much for their learning as for their dedication. Loyola saw that the maritime discoveries made recently by the Spaniards and the Portuguese were opening new opportunities for the Church, in Asia as well as the Americas. One of his early associates, Francis Xavier, joined the Portuguese and went out to their headquarters in India, the port of Goa. From there he went on, via Malacca, to the Far East. Arriving in japan in 1549, Xavier was welcomed by the military ruler, Oda Nobunaga, as a counter-weight to the Buddhists who were resisting him. Having gained a foothold , Xavier went back to Macao, in the hope of doing the same thing in China. There he died, without having achieved his objective . In Japan , the Jesuits went on making converts, and were soon joined by Spanish Franciscans from Manila. But the aggressiveness of the latter, and their success, alarmed Oda's successors, and especially the military ruler, or Shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu. He feared that the Spaniards were going to take over japan as they had the Philippines. His reaction was to throw out all the missionaries and other foreigners , to persecute those japanese who refused to give up Christianity, and to ban all contact with the outside world. In China, the Italian jesuit Matteo Ricci took a different approach. Arriving in Macao in 1582 , he used his linguistic skill, his knowledge of mathematics , and his phenomenal memory to impress Chinese scholar-officials. Ricci avoided challenging the Confucian philosophy or the veneration of ancestors that went with it. Having won access to the Court in Peking, Ricci saw the crucial importance to the Emperor of establishing a reliable calendar, and he persuaded Rome to send out an astronomer.,. who accurately forecast an eclipse after his Moslem rival had failed to do so. Once again, other orders followed the jesuits, and adopted a more aggressive approach. They criticised the jesuits for playing down the differences between Christianity and Confucianism, and took their case to Rome . After a controversy that lasted for nearly a century, the Pope finally decided against the jesuits. This drew the attention of the Chinese court to the claims of the Papacy, and stimulated its suspicions. Christianity was not effectively banned,

4

Collision Course

but its adherents were intermittently persecuted, and the activities of European missionaries were restricted. The jesuits were permitted to stay on in Peking as astronomical advisers. The jesuits were highly literate, as well as learned and well informed about China. Their reports made it better known in Europe than it had ever been before. They helped to set off the passion for things Chinese which became known as 'Chinoiserie'. Ironically, they also provided Voltaire and other critics of the Church with what they regarded as evidence that a secular society was more rational and humane than one based on organised Christianity . Thus China unwittingly played a part in creating the intellectual climate that led to the French Revolution , and to the universalism that flowed from it.

* * * Europeans were fascinated by China : the Chinese showed no such interest in Europe. Not for nothing did they call their country the Middle Kingdom. Until the end of the 18th century, they had never had to deal with a civilisation as sophisticated as their own. The only significant element in their culture that was not indigenous was Buddhism. Picked up during the expeditions to Central Asia that also opened the silk trade, it filled a gap left by secularism, but was not incompatible with Confucianism and Taoism. Buddhism led to some contacts with India, but they were infrequent, and they had little effect outside the sphere of religion . There was also trade between China and other Asian countries, by sea as well as by land . Much of this was carried by intermediaries, but the Chinese were directly involved, and they developed a maritime technology that was more advanced than that of West Asia or Europe . Early in the 15th century, under the Ming, the Chinese dynasty that had replaced the Mongols, a series of expeditions was sent out to strengthen the mutually profitable relationships with peoples who paid tribute to the Emperor. Led by a palace eunuch called Cheng Ho , large fleets sailed through the Indonesian archipelago and into the Indian Ocean, as far afield as Madagascar. But Cheng Ho aroused the jealousy of the scholar officials on whom the Ming relied to run the Empire . When the old threat

The West Strikes Asia

5

from the steppes loomed up again, they took the opportunity to convince the Emperor that he could not afford the luxury of maritime ventures, and the expeditions ceased abruptly. It is an interesting question what would have happened if the Emperor had supported Cheng Ho. Would the Chinese have gone on from Africa to discover Europe, or the Americas? If so, what would they have done with their discoveries? These are matters for speculation. What is clear is that, in his extensive operations in the Indian Ocean, Cheng Ho did not take possession of the places he found, or subject their peoples to Chinese rule- though he did find , and leave, Chinese communities in some of them. Why were the Chinese so little interested in the outside world? Under earlier dynasties, and particularly under the Sung, from the lOth to the 13th centuries, China had been more open, and the Chinese had made some remarkable advances in technology. Some were in agriculture, some in navigation, but the critical one was the development of block printing for the production of books, which spread new techniques quickly and widely. When the Mongols invaded China, it was technologically the most advanced part of the world, and probably the most prosperous. But the Mongols and their foreign servants aroused the resentment of the Chinese, which led to a sharp reaction. The Ming prided themselves on being purely Chinese. To them, Chinese civilisation was as near to perfection as it was possible to get. Security and stability were their objectives: any change could only be for the worse. The new form of Confucianism which had become the official ideology favoured a static society in which each person had duties appropriate to his position. And the system of Imperial examinations ensured that this ideology was shared by all the officials who helped the Emperor to carry out his duties. Not foi the successful student of the classics any form of physical labour: education conferred the right to give orders, and to be obeyed by those who were not educated. The carefully preserved long fingernail symbolised the outlook and values of the Mandarin. Trading, and traders, were despised, and practical work of any kind was looked down upon. In any case, there was little pressure to apply the technological advances of the Sung: China was already quite heavily populated, so labour was usually cheap, and rarely in short supply.

6 Collision Course

Chinese inventions like gunpowder, the central rudder, and the magnetic compass were left to others to exploit, and eventually use against the Chinese . The Ming were displaced in the mid-17th century by another in the long line of dynasties originating from the steppes. But the Manchu were already partly sinicised, and they did not repeat the mistake of the Mongols . They merely superimposed their own people, who were never very numerous, on the existing Chinese bureaucracy. This meant that they depended on Chinese scholarofficials to carry out their orders and run the Empire. They could and did use force when they thought it necessary, but they also sought to win respect and obedience by following Confucian principles. So the Manchu Emperors, whose dynasty was called the Ching, tended to become more Chinese than the Chinese themselves, and even less flexible than their own mandarins. Their behaviour had disastrous effects later, but it was not entirely irrational. China is a very large country: it took the Manchu several decades to get the South under their control. To keep the whole Empire peaceful and contented, the Emperor had to have the mandarins' support, and to be sure of that he had to have their respect. He had to show that he shared their ideology, and practised it. He also had to keep the whole system under tight control, and prevent outsiders from disturbing its stability. The Manchu regime was at its strongest in the 18th century, under the two long-lived Emperors, Kang Hsi and Chien Lung. But its stability was already being undermined, particularly by two changes in dietary habits- one in China and the other in Europe. When the Spaniards took the Philippines, they imported a number of the plants they had found in the Americas, including maize and sweet potatoes. Somehow or other, these soon found their way to China. They grew on land that would not produce rice or wheat, and thus in time they expanded the food supply. Together with the peace provided by the Manchu, this made possible a rapid increase in the population. There are no precise figures, but the ones that do exist suggest that it more than doubled in the 18th century. The pressure of population on resources increased sharply. Presumably at least partly as a result, the tranquillity of the Empire was broken in the 1790s by the first in a series of agrarian revolts which took years to put down, and thus weakened the authority of

The West Strikes Asia

7

the Emperor. Meanwhile, in Europe the taste for tea was spreading rapidly, even reaching the British colonies in North America. After they won their independence, William Pitt reduced the import duty on tea sharply, and consumption rose again. But the Chinese were not attracted by the products of Britain's new textile industries, cheap though they were. The only thing Britain could supply for which there was a strong demand in China was opium, which was grown in Bengal. The reason for the strong demand was presumably the same population pressure that caused the agrarian revolts. Whatever it was , the growth of the opium trade caused concern in Peking - not least because it led to an outflow of silver and a fall in revenue. The opium trade was not approved of by everyone in Britain either. But to the Government it was the only alternative to a heavy drain on bullion, of the kind the Romans had suffered through their passion for silk. So the East India Company was allowed to grow opium in Bengal and sell it to private traders who shipped it to China. China's trade with the outside world was channeled through a group of merchants in Canton, who extracted all they could from it, for themselves as well as for the Emperor. The British, and other Europeans, disliked this system, and sought direct access to Peking to press for the opening of the Chinese market. At first they approached the Chinese politely. In 1793, an experienced diplomat was sent out at the head of a 100-man mission to propose the establishment of regular relations on the European model. Lord Macartney and his embassy were permitted by the Chinese to go to Peking, to present tribute to the Emperor. They were treated courteously, even when Macartney refused to comply with Chinese protocol and kowtow to the Emperor. But the British proposals were not accepted. The formal reply of the Emperor is the classic statement (translations vary) of the Manchu attitude to the West (Peyrefitte 1993): ' ... there is nothing we lack .. . We have never set much store on strange and ingenious objects, nor do we need any more of your country's manufactures.' Yet the Emperor watched Macartney closely, and managed every aspect of his visit. Macartney never threatened, but he arrived in a

8 Collision Course

big warship, and was accompanied by soldiers. The respectful, if unyielding, treatment he received may have owed something to a realisation that the outside world was changing, and China might not be as secure as it seemed to be. Like the Chinese, the Japanese kept Europe at arm's length. From the mid-17th century, only the Dutch were allowed to trade with Japan, through a small island in the port of Nagasaki. But, unlike the Chinese, the Japanese were interested in Europe, and particularly in its advancing technology. Through the Dutch, they watched, and managed to keep themselves informed. They even began to apply some of the new European discoveries, notably in the field of medicine. Behind closed doors, their own society was changing too . Prolonged peace did not lead to a population explosion in Japan, as it did in China. It did stimulate internal trade and the emergence of a class of commercial entrepreneurs. At the same time, it added to the frustrations of the large class of samurai, who were trained to fight rather to work. Peace did nothing to weaken the strong sense of national identity engendered by insularity and cultural distinctiveness. No less ethnocentric than the Chinese, the Japanese were still willing to learn from outsiders in order to maintain their independence.

* * * The world was changing. Britain was leading Europe, and America, into the Industrial Revolution. Nothing like that had happened before, anywhere. What made it completely new was the harnessing of a new source of energy - steam. That was what made possible the rapid expansion of textile production, and also of metal goods, including firearms. Before long, steam was applied to transport, on land and on sea. In the 1830s, the British Navy began to acquire iron-hulled ships powered by steam. Technology was translated into power. The British had also found a new ideology- the doctrine of free trade, as propounded by Adam Smith. This enabled them to believe that other countries would be better off if they opened up their markets to Britain's exports, and Britain would be justified in forcing them to do so. As soon as their rivals, the French, were·defeated in 1815, they began looking again towards China, .AnotheN liplomatic mission was sent out, this time under

The West Strthes Asia

9

Lord Amherst, to persuade the Chinese to enter into regular relations, and to open their market. Amherst was given even shoner shrift than Macanney had received, and took it with even less equanimity. In 1834, the East India Company's monopoly on trade with China ended, and the British Government sent an official Superintendent of Trade to Canton. Lord Napier fared no better than his predecessors. The businessmen involved in the opium trade, who were led by William Jardine, began to argue openly for the use of force . A show-down was rapidly approaching. The Chinese played into the hands of those who were advocating war. After lengthy deliberation, the Emperor decided to ban the opium trade , and sent a senior official to Canton to put the decision into effect. Commissioner Un , as foreigners called him, barricaded all the traders in their compound until they surrendered their stocks of opium. Jardine went to London and urged the Government to stand up for the rights of British subjects. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, did not respond immediately. But when Jardine succeeded in whipping up public pressure , Palmerston agreed. For the first time, the British Government was ready to challenge the Chinese Empire. And so the storm struck. At Palmerston's request, a strong naval force was sent from India, including four of the new armed steamers as well as six older and bigger warships. By-passing Canton, they went straight to the hean of the Empire, and forced the Coun in Peking to negotiate . But the resulting agreement was rejected, both by the Emperor and by Palmerston. The latter was not satisfied with the cession of Hong Kong, 'a barren island with hardly a house upon it' . The British force then destroyed the forts protecting Canton and occupied pan of the city, until they were paid a large amount of money to withdraw. Reinforced from India, they went nonh again, captured Shanghai, and seized China's jugular anery, the Grand Canal. When they moved up the Yangtse to Nanking, the Chinese sued for peace, and signed a treaty which was accepted by the Emperor. The Treaty of Nanking confirmed the cession of Hong Kong, and opened five Chinese pons Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai- to residence by British subjects for trading purposes. Opium was not mentioned: the trade went on . Britain was the country most deeply involved in the opium

10 Collision Course

trade, but it was not the only one. Americans had begun trading with China as soon as they had made good their independence: since the early 1800s they had been selling opium, grown for them in the Turkish Empire. On receiving the Treaty of Nanking, the President of the United States sent a Congressman from Massachusetts to China as a diplomatic envoy. Caleb Cushing negotiated a separate treaty with the Chinese, which gave Americans the same rights as the British had won. It added that Americans accused of committing crimes in China were to be tried by American officials, 'according to the laws of the United States'. The French followed the Americans, and got full freedom for Christian missionaries. The British themselves completed what came to be known as the Treaty System by getting the Chinese to agree that any privilege granted to other foreigners should automatically apply to British subjects. The Chinese saw advantage in extending the 'most favoured nation' provision to all foreigners. The first results of the long-sought opening up of China were disappointing to most of the seekers. Of the new Treaty Ports, only Shanghai quickly became prosperous. Exports of Chinese silk grew rapidly, as did imports of opium, but not those of Western industrial products. For the Chinese, the results were worse than disappointing: they were devastating. The Imperial Government had been forced to accept, for the first time, equality of status with other governments. It had been forced to give up control of some key aspects of China's foreign relations, and even of its internal affairs. The prestige and authority of the Empire had been seriously diminished, and its ability to keep the peace impaired. Its weakness was quickly demonstrated by the outbreak of two new rebellions, which shook it to the core. The Taiping rebellion started in the area behind Canton, which had been most affected by Western intrusions. The leader, Hung Hsiu-chuan, had read some missionary tracts and claimed he had visions in which God called him to save mankind, especially from the Manchu. His version of Christianity did not meet with the missionaries' approval, because Hung claimed to be the brother of jesus. But it quickly gathered adherents, first among the Hakka minority, and later among those suffering from floods, famine, and the disruption caused by the Opium War. By 1850, the movement was strong enough to beat off forces sent against it by

The Wesr Srnkcs Asia

ll

Peking. Soon afterwards , Hung proclaimed himself founder of a new dynasty called the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace. Its untrained but fanatical hordes drove northwards, and captured Nanking in 1853. Further advances to the north and west were halted by forces loyal to the Emperor. The Taiping also failed to consolidate their hold on the Yangtse valley. The leaders fell out among themselves and began killing one another. The landed gentry, who had never supported the rebellion, gradually rallied to the official sent by the court, Tseng Kuo-fan: heavy fighting wem on throughout the 1850s, with widespread carnage and devastation. The Nien rebellion had comparable effects further north, in the area between the Huai and Yellow rivers. Even without the religious appeal of the Taiping, the Nien deprived Peking of control over a large part of China. Despite all its troubles, the Manchu court was unwilling to accept the full implications of the Treaty of Nanking. The British and the French found separate pretexts for sending expeditionary forces to the north again, and imposing another treaty on the Chinese in 1858. Even then, the court would not yield on the critical point of representation in Peking. To break the resistance , the British force , led by Lord Elgin, marched on Peking, where they sacked the Summer Palace designed by the jesuits- though not the Imperial Palace built by the Ming. At this point, in 1860, the Taiping were threatening Shanghai. The British and the French decided that their interest now lay in supporting the Manchu. With their encouragement, an American adventurer called Townsend Ward helped to organise an army officered by foreigners and supported by steam-powered gunboats. With the help of this 'Ever Victorious Army', which was later led by 'Chinese' Gordon, the Taiping were driven back, but it still took several years of hard fighting to put down the two rebellions. Tseng Kuo-fan and other officials who had to deal with the rebellions realised that , if the Empire was to survive , it would be necessary to learn from the West how to use its technology. Troops were trained by European methods, factories were built to make arms and ammunition for them, Western textbooks were studied and a few students were sent abroad for training. But officials brought up in the Confucian tradition were still inhibited in their attempts at 'Self-Strengthening'. Their aim was to borrow

12 Collision Course

Western technology but preserve Chinese culture. The Manchu court was even more reluctant to accept Western ideas. Despite the severe lessons it had received, it gave only half-hearted support to the 'Self-Strengthening' movement. Provincial leaders were allowed to pursue their own pragmatic policies, but there was no coherent policy for China as a whole.

*

*

*

In Japan the story was different . Insularity had given the Japanese a more flexible attitude than the Chinese. They were acutely conscious that Japan was not the Middle Kingdom, but a small country that was separate, distinct, and in need of knowledge from abroad. Almost from the beginning of their history, they had borrowed ideas from China, often through Korea Tang administration and architecture, Buddhism, and later NeoConfucianism. The Japanese had assimilated all these borrowings into their own culture, so that they strengthened the Japanese sense of identity. It was further strengthened by the threat of invasion by the Mongols in the 13th century, which Japanese believed was averted by a divine wind, or Kamikaze. Experience with Europeans in the 17th century reinforced the Japanese sense of identity, and the determination to keep control of their own destiny. The decision made by Tokugawa Ieyasu to cut Japan off from the outside world was a logical expression of the sense of distinctness, and of vulnerability, that the Japanese had developed. The feudal regime imposed by Ieyasu and maintained by the Shoguns who succeeded him gave Japan internal peace, which lasted for over 200 years. But, as we have seen, the Japanese took an interest in what was going on in the outside world. If they were as ethnocentric as the Chinese, they did not suffer from the sense of cultural superiority that made it so hard for the Chinese to learn from others. There were other differences too . The elite in Japan were not scholars but soldiers, and the samurai were much more numerous than the gentry in China. Uke mandarins, they were not supposed to dirty their hands by tilling the soil or going into trade . Peace gave them few opportunities to use their military training, and frustration made some of them violent and disruptive. But some

The West Stnlrcs Asia

13

found other oullets for their energies - in education. in bureaucracy, and in politics. Pragmatic and aggressive, the samurai were a potentially dynamic element in society. rather than the conservative one they seemed to be . Into this hitheno closed country burst the Americans. Why they, and not the British or the French? American ships crossing the Pacific had to sail near Japan, and their crews sometimes got stranded there . This became more common when whaling expanded in the early 19th century - to provide oil for American lamps. The advent of steam added another reason for opening up Japan- the need for coal supplies on the trans-Pacific route . The interesting thing is not that America took the lead, but that it came from the United States Government . As early as 1835, American diplomats were authorised to negotiate for the opening of Japanese ports and in 1846 two ships of the US Navy sailed into Tokyo Bay with this purpose . Another went to Nagasaki in 1849 to pick up some stranded American seamen. Finally. one of the most senior officers in the Navy, Commodore Matthew Perry, was sent with two steam ships and two others, to force the issue . Having served notice, he returned the next year with eight ships - a quaner of the US Navy - and this time succeeded in negotiating with the Shogunate a treaty that met American demands . The US Government did not let the matter rest there. A New York businessman with experience in the Far East, Townsend Harris, was appointed American Consul. He arrived in Japan in 1856, just as the British and the French were launching the second war on China. Harris used the threat of European intervention to get the Shogunate to sign a full-blown commercial treaty with the United States in 1858. which set up the same system as the British had created in China. except for the cession of territory ..The European powers, including Russia , quickly followed the United States. A decade of turbulence ensued . The Shogunate's actions were highly unpopular in Japan . espectally with the samura1. most of whom wanted to 'expel the barbarian'. The reaction was panicularly strong in the western pan of the country. which had never been well disposed to the Shogunate . Impetuous young samurai in the fiefs of Satsuma and Choshu led attacks on foreigners , and on forugn ships in the narrow stra1ts between the main Japanese islands. A combined naval force . which included Amencan as well

14 Collision Course

as British. French, and Dutch ships. then bombarded the port of Shimonoscki . The British had previously shelled Kagoshima in Satsuma. These direct experiences of Western power made even hot-heads realise that expelling foreigners was not practicable. For several more years, Choshu tried to force the Shogunate to change its policy. but it achieved little until it came to terms with its rival. To maintain its position after the Perry visit, the Shogunate had been obliged to involve the Emperor in Kyoto , who had hitherto been a mere figurehead . With the help of some court officials, the young samurai leaders of Satsuma and Choshu eventually got the Emperor's authority to overthrow the Shogunate, and 'restore' direct Imperial rule. What is striking here is the speed and decisiveness of the Japanese reaction to Western intrusion, compared with that of the Chinese. The young samurai leaders seem to have grasped quickly the implications of the bombardment s, and of what was happening in China, and to have seen that the only way to deal with the threat was to beat the West at its own game. But they were not alone . They won the support of their feudal lords, and at least the acquiescence of other samurai. Those who had gone to the West early found that they were in demand as soon as they returned to Japan, and were able to apply what they had learned. Their basic outlook had not changed: they were still fiercely determined not to fall into the power of foreigners. But they had realised that this could only be avoided by using Western methods and building up the strength of the Japanese state. The welfare of individuals, and their families . was not forgotten : the new leaders did very well for themselves. But what mattered most to them, and to other Japanese , was the power and prestige of the country, personified by the Emperor. Patriotism was the driving force of the Meiji Restoration. The first task of the new leaders was to bring the whole of Japan under the control of the Imperial Government. They persuaded the lords of Satsuma and Choshu to exchange their feudal rights for the role of governors. When all the other lords had followed their lead, the feudal domains themselves were abolished, and the lords were paid off in government bonds. Meanwhile, a national army was created , organised and trained on

The West Strikes Asia

15

Western lines, and conscription was introduced to man it. The same year, 1873, feudal dues were converted into a uniform land tax , to be paid in money. But the Government's revenue still did not cover the costs it had incurred. It was investing heavily in the development of new industries, but it was not prepared to borrow abroad, for fear of losing its freedom of action . In 1880, a financial crisis forced it to come to grips with the problem. It did so by cutting expenditure, and selling off those industries it had set up that were not strategic. These sales, often made at bargain prices, provided an investment for the lords who had been paid off, as well as for established firms like the Mitsui. Together with newer entrepreneurs - some but not all of them samurai - and with the active support of the Government, they built up a series of diversified industrial groups called Zaibatsu. But the initiative did not all come from the top . From the outset, there was no shortage of people trying to take advantage of the opening up of the country. Farmers, who had to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of all the changes, responded to the challenge by developing a new technique for reeling silk which improved the quality of the product. This made silk japan's biggest export, and gave it a favourable balance of trade from the 1880s on. When the Meiji Emperor assumed power, he issued an Oath, which contained five pledges. The last was (Storry 1967, p. 103): 'Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundations of Imperial rule' . The Shogunate had begun sending students abroad in the early 1860s, and the Imperial Government increased the numbers. It also expanded the use of foreign experts, but they wue replaced as quickly as possible with japanese trained overseas, and were never allowed to get into positions of control. This was particularly true of the armed forces. The army was modelled on the French, and after 1870 the Prussian: the navy on the British. Their effectiveness was tested as early as 1874 in an expedition to Taiwan. Two years later, the army passed the more severe test of a samurai rebellion in Satsuma, led by one of those responsible for the Meiji Restoration. Between these two events, the japanese navy had followed Perry's

16

Collision Course

example and opened up Korea by force , after several Western powers had failed. Unlike the Taiwan expedition, the Korean one brought japan into serious competition with China.

* * * China had also had its Restoration. Unlike the japanese one, it was genuine. It looked backwards, not forward. The dominant Chinese reaction to foreign invasion and internal rebellion was to restore and strengthen the old Manchu system, rather than to overthrow it. The regime was now headed by a young Manchu woman, who was the mother of the boy Emperor, and Co-Regent for him. Tsu Hsi had learned how to use the authority of the Emperor to control the court, but she had little understanding of wider problems. She depended on the provincial leaders to put down the rebellions and restore order. But she was not prepared to commit herself fully to their policies, let alone to take the lead in Self-Strengthening. She played the provincial leaders off against the court officials, who were even more conservative. So there was no central direction, as there was in japan, and no unified national policy. Foreign intrusions must have aroused indignation, but only slowly did it congeal into nationalism. Patriotism neither inspired the Manchu Restoration, nor restrained its leaders from pursuing their own interests in the traditional way - through nepotism and corruption. The Dowager Empress herself set the worst example. When the most successful of the provincial leaders, and the one most loyal to the throne, Li Hung-chang, was tryi:pg to build up a navy to match the japanese, much of the money required was diverted to the building of a new Summer Palace for her. To prevent the japanese from taking over Korea, Li went to war in 1894. In the critical battle each side had the same number of ships, but the japanese had better ones, and they had learned more from their British instructors about using them. Outside observers, mistaking size for power, had expected the Chinese to win. The japanese demonstrated, not for the last time, that size is not always decisive. Technology, training, and motivation won the day. The Chinese had once again been humiliated, and received another lesson in the political realities of the late 19th century. But

Tht West StriJta Asia

17

the japanese got a lesson too. After their victory, they negotiated a treaty in which China gave them Taiwan, and also the southern tip of Manchuria, the Uaotung peninsula, with the pon of Dalien (Pon Anhur) . But the Russians had designs on Manchuria too , and they got the suppon of the French and the Germans in forcing the japanese to give up the peninsula. This set off a scramble for concessions, in which all the powers joined, except the United States. The Americans tried to protect their interests by proclaiming the Open Door policy, and seeking to uphold the integrity of China. The Japanese kept their eyes on Korea and Manchuria. Seeing that they were in competition with the Russians, who were allied with the French and working with the Germans in the Far East, they looked to Britain for suppon. Defeat by Japan seemed to give the young Emperor, now nominally in full control, an opponunity to assen his authority. He threw his weight behind a group of reformers and instituted a series of radical changes, beginning with the examination system. After 100 days, the Dowager Empress showed her power by having the Emperor seized and confined, while she once again became Regent. Perhaps she showed her true feelings by giving her suppon to the anti-foreign movement called by outsiders the Boxers, who then attacked diplomats in Peking and besieged their missions. As in the case of Commissioner lin's seizure of the opium in 1839, this action alienated all the foreign powers at once, and they joined in sending an expeditionary force to relieve the Legations. Yet again, China was forced to accept humiliating terms, and pay a large indemnity to each of the countries involved. The Dowager Empress, who had fled from the foreign troops, returned to Peking, with the acquiescence of the powers, and entenained the wives of foreign diplomats to tea at the new Summer Palace. After the Sino-Japanese war, it was widely expected that China would soon be split up among the great powers, as Africa had just been. The expectation was not unfounded. The Russians were well on the way to taking Manchuria, the French Yunnan, the Germans Shantung, and the British the Yangt:se valley. ln the next couple of years, they all staked their claims. Why did they not persist? The main reason lay outside the Far East. Germany's decision to build a navy that could match the British shifted the focus of po~r

18

Collision Course

rivalries back to Europe. The Boer war highlighted Britain's isolation, and it began looking for allies. Japan was waiting: the AngloJapanese alliance was concluded in 1902. Thus covered against French intervention, the Japanese confronted the Russians in Manchuria, and defeated them, both on land and at sea. Japan took over the Liaotung peninsula and the Chinese Eastern Railway, but in doing so it paid lip-service to the idea of the integrity of China. Perhaps the Japanese already had wider ambitions , and did not want to create problems for themselves in the future by precipitating a scramble for China. In any case, the European powers were losing interest. The lines were already being drawn for the forthcoming struggle between Germany and the Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia . That conflict would leave the field open to Japan - except for the United States. The Manchu were able to hang on for another decade after the Boxer rebellion. The Dowager Empress had to accept reforms not unlike those the Emperor had made during the Hundred Days. The examination system was abolished in 1905: that was the death knell of the old regime . A series of provincial assemblies were set up, with the promise of a national one later. Before the promise was fulfilled , the Dowager Empress died, a day after the nephew she had first put on the throne and later thrust aside. He was replaced with another boy, so that control stayed in the hands of the officials who were loyal to the Empress. They were hardly in a position to reassert the authority of the throne. Its real power had long since been sapped by the emergence of strong provincial leaders, who controlled their own resources, and most of the Emperor's as well. In a forelorn hope, the court encouraged railway building by foreign companies, and the creation of a national army. These belated efforts only precipitated disaster. Railway building ran into popular opposition, particularly in the inland province of Szechuan. After an accidental explosion, the troops sent to deal with it mutinied, and were joined by others. The nationalist leader, Sun Yat-sen, who had long been groomed by the Japanese, seized the opportunity, and declared China a republic. The boy Emperor in Peking abdicated, and the general in control of the city, Yuan Shih-kai, became President.

Th e West Strihes Asia

19

The storm from the west that had struck East Asia in the middle of the 19th century had wrought havoc with the old order there. By riding it out for seventy years, the Manchu had demonstrated the toughness of the old system, and the strength of the loyalties it commanded. In the end, it had succumbed, not to invasion or partition, or to internal rebellion, but to the slower processes set in motion by China's opening to the West. The mandarins had been forced to accept that China's culture was not so superior to others as to make it invulnerable. But they had still not learned how to create a state strong enough to stand up to the West, and beat it at its own game. The Japanese had learned that lesson, quickly and thoroughly, though not painlessly. Insularity, and the pride it bred , had made them more determined to keep control of their own destiny, and more willing to learn for the purpose . If the difference between the reactions of the Chinese and the Japanese can be summed up in a single word, it is nationalism. That is what gave the Japanese the cohesion and drive that the Chinese so conspicuously lacked. That is what enabled Japan to compete with the West on its own terms, and within fifty years of its opening to defeat one of the great European powers. That is what put Japan in a position to take advantage of the war in Europe to extend its acquisitions in Manchuria and try to establish its ascendancy over the whole of China. The traditional order in East Asia had been turned upside down . The Middle Kingdom had lost its age-old pre-eminence, and the moral authority it had exercised aver its neighbours. Japan's traditional respect for its cultural mentor had turned into the kind of contempt that was to make it China's cruellest tormentor. Without the storm from the West, East Asia would have changed greatly in the 19th century, but it would hardly have changed so radically, and with such longterm implications The West had changed too. The first Industrial Revolution, made possible by the harnessing of water and steam, had given way to the second, in which electricity would play a big part. Britain, the originator of the whole sequence , had already been overtaken by Germany and America. By the end of the 19th century, the British were losing their economic strength , and the political power it gave them. The effort required to prevent Germany from dominating Europe and the seas would soon reveal the

20 Collision Course

fragility of Britain's posmon, and hasten its decline. America, having re-established its unity in 1865, had begun to exploit its vast resources, and to develop its economic power. As it did so, it developed also its sense of Manifest Destiny, to encompass the Pacific Ocean. By the end of the century, some Americans were looking for ways to demonstrate their country's new strength. Asia was still not nearly as important to the United States as Europe was, but it seemed to offer growing opportunities, and less resistance. So America was poised to take over from Britain leadership of the Western cause in East Asia, just as japan was poised to take over from China the leading position in the region itself. One storm had blown itself out, after devastating the landscape. Another was in the making. Sources Collis, Foreign Mud. Fairbank, China: A New History . Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig. East Asia: The Modem Transformation. Hudson, Europe & China. Peyrefitte, The Collision of Two Civilisations. Reischauer and Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition. Spence, The Search for Modem China. Storry, History of Modem japan.

CHAPTER

2

America Asserts Itself

The thineen former British colonies in Nonh Allterica emerged from their war of independence weak in all but spirit. The war had impoverished them: it had actually ruined some of those who had initiated the revolution. The colonies were not fully united: the confederation that had been cobbled together to fight the British was loose , and not likely to make the new nation strong enough to stand on its own feet. America was still isolated- 3,000 miles from Europe, at the outer edge of the civilised world, alienated from Britain but not close to the shaky French monarchy. To offset these disadvantages Americans had some leaders of extraordinary political vision and skill- Washington and Franklin in the older generation, jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, and Monroe among their juniors. Morale was high: they had succeeded in winning their independence from Britain, the most powerful country in Europe. Above all, Americans had vitality- ambition, imagination, drive. And not only their leaders. Breaking in a new land had given them a self-reliance and resilience that would stand them in good stead when they went out into the world. Their self-reliance owed more than a little to a Calvinist religious background, which gave them confidence in themselves, and in the righteousness of their causes. One result of achieving independence was that Americans were freed from the restrictions imposed on them by Britain's Navigation Acts, which had played their part in causing the revolution. By the same token, Americans now lost the benefits of the British system

22

Collision Course

of trade protection, such as they were . American ships were excluded from the West Indies, which had provided a large pan of their trade before the war. New England was particularly hard hit , as it depended heavily on sea-borne trade . Its merchants and seafarers had to find new sources of income quickly. But it was their rivals in New York who first found a way . As soon as the war was over, a group of merchants there got together and built a ship to send to China. It was loaded with borrowed silver. and with ginseng, a root grown in America which the Chinese were known to prize as an aphrodisiac . The Empress vf China reached Canton in 1784, and brought back a cargo of tea, porcelain, silk, and nankeen -the cotton cloth from which gentlemen's breeches were made. The venture was profitable enough to encourage others, but silver was scarce, and American ginseng did not satisfy the Chinese. Some Bostonians solved the problem by sending two small ships round South America to buy furs from the people of Vancouver Island and sell them in Canton. On the way, they stopped in the Hawaiian Islands to pick up sandalwood , for which there was also a demand in China. Ships from the pon of Salem in Massachusetts went the other way, round South Africa , and traded in India and Indonesia before going to China. American ships were not allowed to buy the opium grown by the British East India Company in Bengal, which the British themselves used as a substitute for silver in the China trade. For some years, Americans had to make do with furs and sandalwood , and such opium as they could get in India, but by 1805 they had found another source, Turkey. A Boston firm , Perkins and Company, which was financed by the London bankers, Barings, encouraged Turkish production, and did so well that during the Napoleonic wars it supplied as much as a quarter of all the opium entering China through Canton. One American firm, Olyphant and Co., kept out of the opium business for religious reasons. By the 1820s, all the rest were involved. One of the leading figures was Warren Delano, whose grandson would one day become President of the United States. 'All the best people did it', he is quoted as saying (Gibney 199 2, p. 44). In 1812 the United States fought another war with Britain, in the course of which the new American capital, Washington, was burned by British troops. The United States had gone to war to maintain the freedom of navigation on the high seas. That was

America Asserts Itself

23

presumably one reason for creating a Pacific Squadron of the US Navy in 1822. It may have been coincidental that from 1821 opium had to be unloaded outside Chinese jurisdiction, and kept on store-ships anchored down-river from Canton. The American naval presence was at this stage neither big nor regular. The United States was content to let Britain make the running in dealings with China, in the hope that Americans would get the benefit of any gains won by the British. Forty-six years after the first American trading ship went to Canton, American missionaries began to arrive . Once again, the British had led the way. The London Missionary Society sent Robert Morrison out in 1807, but the hostility of Chinese scholarofficials forced him to retreat to Malacca, where he began translating the Bible into Chinese. British missionary societies switched their attention to other parts of the Pacific: a permanent mission was set up in New Zealand at the end of 1814. The two Americans who arrived in Canton in 1830 were sent by an inter-denominational body that was already active in Hawaii. They were quickly followed by a medical man, Dr Peter Parker, who set up an eye clinic in Canton in 1834. His work may have been appreciated by the Chinese more than that of the Reverend Doctor Gutzlaff, an American of Prussian origin, who is said to have handed out bibles from one side of an opium vessel while her cargo was being unloaded from the other. The missionary effort did not develop quickly: the numbers involved were small until the 1860s. Perhaps the biggest impact it ever made was made at the beginning. In 1836, Hung Hsiu-chuan came in contact with a Protestant missionary - probably the American Edwin Stevens - and was given some religious tracts, which he later used to interpret one of his dreams as a vision of God. In 1847 Hung returned to Canton and studied the Biblemost of which had now been translated into Chinese - with another American, Isaacher Roberts. Soon afterwards, Hung set up his Society of God Worshippers, out of which grew the Kingdom of Heavenly Peace. Some of the missionaries may at first have been pleased, but as the Taiping movement developed most of them turned against it. The main effect of Hung's Christian associations was to alienate the Confucian scholar-officials, and thus help the Manchu to survive the greatest challenge to their regime.

24 Collision Courst

By the time of the Opium War, Americans were well established in Canton as traders. Among those who made their fortunes and retired to Boston in comfort was john P. Cushing. It was another Cushing, Caleb, a Congressman from Massachusetts, who was asked by President john Tyler, after he had read the Treaty of Nanking, to go and negotiate a similar treaty for the United States. Cushing's instructions were drafted by the Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, who was also from Boston. He was told to secure for Americans access to the newly opened treaty ports on the same terms as the British. The Treaty of Wanghia, which was signed in 1844, fulfilled this requirement. It also gave Americans the right to be tried by American officials under American law - the right of extra-territoriality. Without taking part in the war, the United States had obtained all the benefits of Britain's military success. And the Most Favoured Nation principle ensured that it would continue to do so. But the immediate results were disappointing, at least from a commercial point of view. American manufactured products did not sell well in China: some of them just piled up in the warehouses. Opium remained the staple, though it was supplemented by shipping, and by arms sales. The US Navy played little pan in the opening up of China, but it took the lead in the opening up of japan. As we have seen, American naval vessels went there as early as 1835, and made several visits during the 1840s. The original objective of repatriating stranded American sailors gradually widened into getting japanese ports opened to American shipping. Earlier attempts having failed, President Fillmore decided to send a larger force, and put it under the command of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, a hero of the campaign against the Barbary Corsairs in the Mediterranean. The settling of the dispute with Britain over Oregon in 1846, together with the acquisition of California after the war with Mexico in 1848, had given the United States a frontage of 1,200 miles on the Pacific Ocean. The phrase 'Manifest Destiny' had been coined in 1845 in relation to Texas, and was used again in the case of Oregon; at this stage it hardly applied to the Pacific. The specific impetus for the Perry mission seems to have come, once more, from shipping interests in Boston. Daniel Webster again drafted the instructions, though Perry was held in such high esteem that he was invited to re-write them himself. In the final version, they

America Asserts Itself 25

authorised him to adopt a threatening tone if necessary, but to use force only in self-defence. In the event, he did not need to do so. Perhaps his personality was forceful enough, when the Japanese were aware of what had happened recently in China. But Perry felt that the United States should be prepared to go further: he suggested that it should acquire the Bonin Islands as a base. Dr Peter Parker, who became American Commissioner in China in 1855, and found the Chinese unwilling to widen the Cushing Treaty, called on Washington to apply pressure by occupying Formosa. When his successor was appointed in 185 7, he was told that the interests of the United States in China lay in 'lawful commerce' and 'the protection of the lives and property of its citizens' (Pratt 1955 , pp. 274-5). Rather surprisingly, the Civil War did not put a stop to naval activity in the Far East. American ships took part in the joint operation that led to the bombardment of Shimonoseki in 1864. (This was not the first time the US Navy had resorted to force: in 1856 it had demolished some Chinese forts near Canton after they had fired on an American boat.) But the Civil War did mark the end of a phase in America's relations with East Asia. It was followed by a marked decline in American interest, which lasted for about thirty years. The main reason was that most Americans were absorbed in the opening up of their own country, and the exploitation of its vast resources. The Civil War had given American industry a great boost: post-war Republican administrations continued to encourage it with high tariffs and other forms of support. Foreign trade was less profitable than domestic ventures, and trade with the Far East was less attractive than trade with Europe. More American missionaries were going to China, and to Japan, but they were running into strong resistance, because they were trying to change the whole culture of the Chinese and the Japanese. Frustration sometimes soured them. Even the scholarly S. Wells Williams welcomed the use of force against the Chinese in 1858 (Thomson et al. 1981 , p.47): ' .. . they are among the most craven of people, cruel and selfish as heathenism can make men, so we must be backed by force if we wish them to listen to reason'.

26 Collision Course

There was another reason for the change in American attitudes towards China - the entry of large numbers of Chinese into the United States. The gold rush in California and the building of trans-continental railways created a strong demand for labour, at the time when the disruption caused by the Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion were making more Chinese willing to leave their homes to make a living. The companies building the railways found the Chinese good workers, and cheaper than most others. But when the railways were completed, they were no longer needed, and had to compete more with white workers for other jobs. Most Chinese men came to America on their own, stayed single, and went home as soon as they had enough money. But the inflow was so high that the total number went on growing rapidly throughout the 1860s. As it grew, the Chinese came to be seen as a threat to the wages and morals of other people, and some of those who felt threatened resorted to violence. In 1868 a former American representative in China, Anson Burlingame, negotiated on behalf of the Chinese Government a treaty with the United States which guaranteed both Chinese and Americans the right to migrate on the same terms as people from other countries. But popular pressure in California led to the passing of a number of laws that discriminated against Chinese, and in 1871 the US Supreme Court ruled that Chinese were not eligible for American citizenship. This precluded them from resorting to the sort of political action taken by other immigrant groups. Beginning in 1882, the US Congress passed a series of laws that suspended all new immigration by Chinese workers. It was in this period that the phrase 'Yellow Peril' came into common usage, not only in America but also in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The saving grace was another change in American attitudes. About 1890 Americans began to look outward again. Their economy had grown by leaps and bounds during the 70s and 80s: the United States' share of the world's manufacturing output had doubled between 1860 and 1880. American agriculture had expanded just as fast , and was flooding Europe with cheap food . More Americans were now well enough off to travel, and when they went to Europe they resented being treated as country cousins. Imperialism was in the air, deliberately encouraged by Bismarck to divert the French and the Russians from their problems

America Asserts Itself 27

with the new Germany. lt drew, to some extent, on the ideas of Darwin and Spencer - panicularly the latter's doctrine of 'the survival of the fittest'. The earlier American fear of Britain was declining, as more and more differences were resolved by negotiation, and Americans began to take more pride in their 'Anglo-Saxon' heritage. One of the heralds of the new expansionism, an historian named Fiske, published in 1885 an essay entitled 'Manifest Destiny'. He argued (Pratt 1995, p. 369) that the work begun by English colonists in America was 'destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that is not already the seat of an old civilisation shall become English in its language, in its religion, in its political habits and institutions, and to a predominant extent in the blood of its people'. A clergyman, josiah Strong, also published in 1885 a book that invoked Darwin and argued that the Anglo-Saxon was 'divinely commissioned to be . . . his brother's keeper'. Five years later, a leading political scientist, j.W. Burgess, widened the theme by bringing in the Germans. The Teutonic nations were , he claimed , 'called to carry the political civilisation of the modem world into those parts of the world inhabited by unpolitical and barbaric races'. All these prophets were listened to , but none perhaps as keenly as Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan , USN. His book Th e Influence of Sea Power Upon History , 1660-1783 , which was also published in 1890, argued that without sea power no nation could reach the front rank. He was aniculating a view that was already held in the Government. The Secretary of the Navy had called in 1889 for a fleet of twenty up-to-date battleships, twelve for the Atlantic and eight for the Pacific. In 1890 Congres&authorised the building the first three of them . The Far East was not at first the main focus of this heightened nationalism. The Monroe Doctrine kept attention directed towards the south- especially the Caribbean. ln 1895 President Cleveland, who was generally against expansionism, demanded that Britain conform to the Doctrine by submitting to arbitration its dispute with Venezuela about the boundaries of British Guiana. Atavistic passions were aroused: there was even talk of war. (Kipling found

28

Colltswn Courw

the situation so distressing that he decided to leave his muchloved home in Vermont and go back to England.) Britain eventually backed down : the Gennan Kaiser had just sent a telegram of congratulation s to the President of the Transvaal Republic in South Africa for repulsing a British raid. jingoism was now as common in America as it was Britain. Earlier in 1895, a revolt had broken out against the Spanish colonial regime in Cuba. The rebels set up a republican government, and the Spaniards tried to suppress it by force . American interests were deeply involved. The public was provided by the Hearst and Pulitzer press with details of the atrocities committed by the Spaniards, but not those perpetrated by the rebels. At the end of 1896, the Republican McKinley was elected President, in place of the Democrat Cleveland. Six months later, the Spanish Prime Minister was assassinated, and his successor offered the Cubans limited autonomy. The offer was rejected. Early in 1898, the American battleship Maine sank in the harbour of Havana after an explosion, apparently caused by a mine . Demands for intervention overcame the President's reluctance , and in April the United States went to war with Spain. A former Police Commissioner of New York City, Theodore Roosevelt. had been appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the McKinley Administratio n. He had seen the war coming. Knowing that a Spanish naval squadron was stationed at Manila, he got Commodore George Dewey appointed commander of the US Navy's Asiatic Squadron, and instructed him to stan offensive operations as soon as war was declared. On 1 May 1898 Dewey's ships attacked the Spanish squadron, and destroyed it. This time the US Navy had used force with a vengeance, and demonstrated that America was a power to be reckoned with in the Pacific. The Spaniards were beaten in Cuba itself, and the war ended quickly. Cuba became independent , but the United States took the Philippines. Guam and Pueno Rico. Hawaii was annexed, as well as eastern Samoa, to complete a chain of bases across the Pacific Ocean. American business had hitheno not favoured expansionism , but m 1898 its attitude changed. The year before, Congress had adopted the Dingley tariff, which raised duties to even higher levels than they had already reached. American manufactured

America Asserts Itself

29

products were now competing in European markets, as well as American food, and the balance of trade had moved in favour of the United States . European governments were becoming concerned: the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary seemed to be speaking for others when he complained of' destructive competition from transoceanic countries' and called on European countries to fight the common danger. This could be interpreted as a threat of retaliation. (It is ironical that the United States was then in something the same position with regard to Europe as Asian countries are in now with regard to America itself.) American businessmen asked themselves where they would tum for markets if they were shut out of Europe , and some of them answered , the Far East. But in that direction another threat had recently arisen . China's defeat by Japan in the war of 1895 had set off a scramble by the European powers for spheres of influence . Russia, France and Germany forced Japan to give up its biggest prize, the liaotung Peninsula in southern Manchuria. Not long afterwards . at the end of 1897, the Russians sent a naval squadron into Port Arthur and extracted from the Chinese a 25-year lease of the peninsula . The Germans had eased the way by sending a squadron of theirs into the harbour of Kiaochow in Shantung province and getting a lease for 99 years . Britain, which had hitherto resisted this sort of concession-grabbing, now adopted a policy of 'compensation'. Having staked a claim to the whole of the Yangtze valley by means of a 'non-alienation' agreement, the British leased the port ofWeihaiwei on the northern coast of Shantung, opposite Port Arthur. They also leased the area on the mainland opposite Hong Kong that came to be known as the New Territories. By this time American businessmen were getting worried. Chambers of Commerce on both coasts were urging the State Department to take energetic measures to protect American interests. In New York an American Asiatic Association was formed to lobby for the preservation of American rights and interest in the Orient. The New York ]ounwl of Commerce reversed its previous line by declaring itself in favour of expanding the US Navy. Missionaries, and their supporters in the United States, joined in by warning that America would be failing in its duty if it abandoned China. In the jingoistic atmosphere of the time , the McKinley Administration was under pressure to take action.

30

Collision Course

john Hay. who had JUSt become Sec retary of State. had previously been American Mmister in London Early in 1898. the British had talked to him about China - how to keep ns door open to all countries that wanted to trade . and to stop tts divtston into spheres of influence . Pragmatism prevailed in London . Bmain soon switched to 'compensation·. But the tdea of using 'the collecttve influence of the trading nations' stayed m Hay's mind . When he got back to Washington later in the same year ( 1898 ). he recetvcd suggestions from an Englishman named Hipptsley who worked for the Inspectorate of Maritime Customs in Chma . Htppisley was afraid that the British might use the New Temtories to get goods into China without paying the duties on whtch the Chmese Government depended . He suggested to Hay that the Umted States invite the European powers to affirm that the Chmese tariff alone would apply to all goods entering their spheres of mfluence Hay evidently saw this as a way to meet the pressure for action by the United States Government. He sent a note to each of the European governments concerned asking for an assurance that it would -

Not interfere with Treaty Pons in its sphere Apply the Chinese tariff to all impons Charge other nationals no more than its own for harbour and rail services.

Five of the six governments to which the note was sent gave positive answers. The Russian reply was equivocal: Hay interpreted it as favourable. In March 1990 he told the six governments that the United States regarded the exchanges as a binding agreement. Three months later, in june 1900, Boxer forces entered Peking. the German Minister was shot, and all the foreign Legations were besieged, including the Americans'. Hay feared that the European powers would seize the opponunity to panition China among themselves. In july, while an international force was being assembled to relieve the beleaguered diplomats in Peking, he sent another note to each of the governments involved, stating - for the first time- that (Pratt 1955, p . 438) 'the policy of the Government of the United States is to . . .

America Asserts Itself 31

preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity [sic] .. . and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impanial trade with all pans of the Chinese Empire'. Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Russian responded positively. Japan did not, but Hay later claimed that all the powers held similar views. The United States sent 2,500 troops from the Philippines to take pan in the relief expedition, whose total strength came to 19,000 men- in addition to a German Field Marshal. When it reached Peking in August, the Boxer movement collapsed, the Dowager Empress fled in disguise, and the Chinese Government was forced to pay an indemnity of $333 million. The American share of this was $25 million. Half that amount was put into a fund for the education of young Chinese in America. The United States, along with the other powers, gained the right to keep troops in Tientsin to police the railway to Peking, and did so. Hay's policy met the public demand for action on China: the United States did nothing funher of note . The question raised by some historians is whether he achieved anything more than a success in domestic politics. China was not dismembered, as Hay among others had feared , but how much of the credit does he deserve? The main reason his fear was not fulfilled was that the focus of great power rivalries was shifting back to Europe, but in the early 1900s the Russians at least were still seeking gains in Manchuria. They were defeated by the Japanese , not the Americans. The Japanese found, however, that they needed American help in negotiating a peace treaty. That treaty, like most others signed after 1900, endorsed the principle of maintaining the territorial integrity of China. It is unlikely that this would have happened without the American initiative. The United States had not acted as forcefully in the case of China as it had in those .of Venezuela and Cuba, and was soon to act in the case of Panama. It had , nevenheless, assened its claim to a say in the affairs of China. Its acquisition of the Philippines and Hawaii, together with the expansion of the US Navy, ensured that that claim would not be ignored. At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, President Roosevelt, as he now was, assured the Japanese that the neutrality of the United States was 'benevolent'. The success of the Japanese forces

32

Collision Course

had its effect on that benevolence. When Japan's resources became strained and it wanted peace, it asked Roosevelt to arrange a peace conference, and he was glad to oblige. Before the conference met, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, his Secretary of War, William H. Taft, had given the Japanese approval in advance for their taking over Korea, in return for Japan's recognition of American sovereignty over the Philippines. Roosevelt endorsed Taft's action: the United States did not protest when Korea passed under Japanese rule . But some Japanese were disappointed with the outcome of the Portsmouth conference, and the Americans got some of the blame. Soon afterwards, anti-Japanese feeling in California flared up into rioting, despite a 'gentlemen's agreement' between the two Governments to stop Japanese immigration. Concern about Japan was one of the things that prompted Roosevelt to send the whole American fleet round the world in 1908, and to include Tokyo in its itinerary. But, after he had handed over to Taft, he stressed to his successor that the United States should not 'give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them'. Anti-Japanese feeling in California made it increasingly difficult to keep such a delicate balance in American policy. Japanese actions towards China were soon to make this even harder. War broke out in Europe in 1914- what was to be called The Great War. Invoking its alliance with Britain, Japan declared war on Germany: its forces took over the German concessions in Shantung, as well as the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline Islands in the central Pacific. Early in 1915, the Japanese secretly presented to Yuan Shih-kai, the President of the Republic of China, a list of Twenty-One Demands, the last group of which would have given Japan control over the Chinese Government through a system of 'advisers' . Yuan leaked the Demands. There was no reaction from Britain or from France, but there was one from the United States. A statement by President Wilson's Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan (Pratt 1955, p . 541), said that the United States 'cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking . . . between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of

America Asserts Itself 33

China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy'. Most of the Demands were met by Yuan, but the Japanese decided to leave the last group for 'future discussion'. After the United States came into the War in 1917, the Japanese hinted to the Americans, as they had earlier to the British and the French, that, if they were not well looked after, they might change sides. The United States recognised, in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, that Japan had special interests in China, 'particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous'. At the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, President Wilson reluctantly agreed to the transfer of German rights in Shantung to Japan. The Chinese were not mollified by the assurance that Shantung would eventually be handed back to China, and they refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles. This helped to ensure that it did not get the approval of the US Senate. By the end of the War, Americans had come to view Japan with suspicion, and with some apprehension. In 1919 the larger part of the American battle fleet was moved to the Pacific, on a permanent basis. Washington had long disliked the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and was anxious that it should not be renewed when it expired in 1921. Britain was prepared to give it up, provided Japan's face could be saved. The British had their own worries, about the size of the American fleet, as well as the Japanese. So they agreed readily that the United States should convene a conference on the limitation of naval armaments, to meet in Washington. What they may not have expected was that the American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, would open it by putting forward specific proposals, which were based on existing strengths but involved sacrifices by all three main parties. The Japanese objected to the proposed 5:5:3 ratio for capital ships, and they got some modification of it. They also won agreement that no new bases should be built in the Pacific west of Hawaii, and thus precluded the establishment of a permanent American base in the Philippines. Japan then accepted, as a substitute for the Anglo-Japanese alliance, a treaty in which the United States, Britain, France and Japan undertook to consult if any difference arose between two of them.

34

Collision Courst

Finally, Japan signed another treaty in which nine powers committed themselves ' to respect the sovereignty . the independence, and the territorial integrity of China·. and 'to ref ram from taking advantage of conditions in Chma in ord~r to seek special rights or privileges'. The Washington Conference was considered at the time to be a success. It did in fact stabilise the new balance of power that had emerged in the Pacif-ic - essentially a balance between America and Japan. It inhibited the Japanese from making funher inroads into China. and may have delayed the proc~ss . but did not bring it to a halt. By raising false expectations in thlS respect. the Washington treaties contributed in due course to the growing tension between Japan and America. As America's attitude towards Japan had changed . so had its view of China. The first Open Door note had been designed merely to protect American business interests in China: only in the second did the United States set the policy goal of preserving China's 'territorial and administrative entity' . But . in the course of the next two decades. that became the basis of Amencan policy in the Far East. The reasons went beyond diplomacy. From the 1890s on. the missionary connection played an increasingly important pan in forming American public attitudes. By 1900 there were about 1,000 American missionaries in China . with over 150,000 Protestant Chinese communicant s. The six colleges Americans had founded increased in numbers after the abolition of the old Chinese examination system in 1905. Scholarships funded out of the Boxer Indemnity strengthened links with American universities, several of which supponed institutions in China. Missionary work involved large numbers of church-goers in America, who were called upon to suppon it, financially as well as spiritually. and who tended to take a benevolent interest in China. The fall of the Manchu contributed to the change in the American outlook. It was easier to sympathise with a Republic than with a monarchy, even if the imperfections of the former were all too plain. China also had the attraction of novelty. After the War, a stream of American and European intellectuals visited China, some for lengthy periods: john Dewey and Benrand Russell were only the best known. They helped to broaden the religious effon into an educational one, without changing its basic character.

America Asserts Itself 3 5

Private philanthropists joined in: the Rockefeller Foundation took over the funding of the missionary-founded Peking Union Medical College, and made it the leading institution of its kind in China. The wave crested about 1925. By then, the number of Protestant missionaries had risen to 5,000, that of Chinese converts to half a million. Many Americans had come to share their protective, if not proprietary, attitude towards China. Immigration played its pan in the reversal of American attitudes towards China and Japan. The last Chinese Exclusion Act was passed by Congress in 1892 . After that, the number of Chinese in the United States declined - by 15 per cent in the 90s alone . Hostility towards them declined more slowly, but gradually it lost some of its virulence. Attention shifted to the japanese , who were corning into the United States in large numbers around the tum of the century, and who experienced the same kind of treatment the Chinese had suffered earlier. Despite the efforts of the japanese and American Governments, hostility went on rising, until in 1924 Congress stopped further japanese immigration . The American action, and the attitudes behind it, was resented in japan and acted as a stimulant to rising nationalism. In the first quarter of the 20th century the United States had emerged as the leading Western power in East Asia , while japan had replaced China as the leading Asian country. In the process, American sympathies had shifted from japan to China. This change became even more marked in the 1920s, as japanese manufactured products began to penetrate the American market. China remained less important as a market for American exports than japan, but it was less of a competitor. Unlike Britain, or any other European power, the United States had set out to maintain China's integrity against japan. Americans were not yet ready to back their generous words with force , so the words were not fully effective. But they did not pass unnoticed, particularly by the japanese. Frustrated and increasingly disillusioned, they were looking more and more towards China as a field of opportunity. Some felt that japan had become strong enough to stand up to the West, and do what the West had failed to do - modernise China. Others realised that America had grown strong too. The War had completed the process of its emergence as a leading military, as well as industrial power- perhaps already the leading power. Americans were not

36

Collision Courst

yet ready to take on the burdens of world leadership: the United States was falling back into Isolationism. But it had demonstrated that it had the potential, and could sometimes use it. Europe still took a much bigger share of America 's trade than Asia . but Americans had begun to see the Far East as the market of the future , and they had claimed a say in its affairs by proclaiming the Open Door policy. The United States had the means of carrying out this policy. The question was whether. and when , it coulJ summon up the will to use its power. What could make Amencans feel that East Asia was wonh fighting for :> Sources Carrington , Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Work. Gibney, The Pacific Centu ry: America and Asia m a Chungr nx ~Vu rl d Ke nnedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Mo rison . The Oxford Hi story of the American PeopltPratt , A History of United Stall's Foreign Policy . Thomson . Stanley, and Perry . Sentimentallmpnialt sts

CHAPTER

3

Turmoil in China Leads to War in the Pacific

China was not dismembered by foreign powers: it merely disintegrated. Japan tried to take advantage of the collapse to establish its own ascendancy, but it ran into growing resistance, first from Chinese nationalism, and later from the United States. America refused to accept Japan's expansion at the expense of China. Its economic sanctions eventually led to war - the first war between America and an Asian power. America won, at some cost to itself, and more to others. Much of Asia was devastated. America tried to remake Japan in its own image, with partial success . But the stage was set for a Communist take-over in China.

* * * Under the Manchu, provincial leaders had put down the Taiping and Nien rebellions, and had taken the initiative in modernizing the armed forces and the economy. In the process they took control over their own resources, and most of the Emperor's as well. After the dynasty was overthrown, one of them, Yuan Shihkai, became President of the new Republic. He quickly disposed of the parliament that had just been elected, and outlawed Sun Yatsen's Nationalist Party. But without the mystique of the Empire Yuan could not establish his authority over other provincial leaders, even when he had foreign support. And when he made himself emperor, he lost much of what support he had. After he died in 1916, another northern general became President: he tried to

38

Collision Course

strengthen his position by helping Britain and France in their war with Germany. But he in tum was ousted, by a general still loyal to the Manchu, who put the boy Emperor Pu Yi back on the throne - until yet another general pushed him off again . The parade went on . The forms of a national government were preserved: there was always a President recognized by the foreign powers. But Peking had lost what was left of its moral authority. Provincial leaders, generals. and local strong men became a law unto themselves, and struggled for power. Without losing its nominal unity , China crumbled into a congeries of petty fiefdorns . often warring among themselves. Warlords ruled the land for the next decade . But economic growth was getting under way. The Treaty ports had acted as a nursery for capitalism: foreign trade led to foreign investment, the development of consumer industries as well as mining and transport , and the extension of Chinese enterprises. Shanghai was already the centre of business activity. and it grew fastest, but further up the Yangtze Wuhan emerged as an industrial complex, and so did Canton in the south. The war in Europe boosted growth, by limiting imports and encouraging local production. The business community thrived . The peasants did not: the warlords exacted higher rents and taxes. and did little for them. Rural living standards went down. So the gap between the ports and the countryside widened, with serious political consequences later on. The question began to arise, and was to go on arising, whether fast economic growth was compatible with the unity of China. For the time being at least. growth along the coast was accompanied by the fragmentation and stagnation of the interior. Nationalism was at last stirring. It had taken far longer to emerge in China than it had in japan, but it had begun to appear early in the century in popular protests against French territorial aggrandisement, and against the American Exclusion Acts. Sun Yat-sen's campaign against the Manchu had appealed to patriotic feelings, as well as to older loyalties. He evoked a particularly strong response among Chinese living overseas. The ovenhrow of the Manchu, and the slide into warlordism that followed, made many educated Chinese -especially those educated abroad, or at foreign schools in China - ask themselves where their country

Turmoil1n China Leads to War rn the Paofu

39

and its civilisation were going . The Japanese highlighted the question . Their Twenty-One Demands, and Yuan's acceptance of most of them, aroused strong public protests, which took the form of trade boycotts. Japan had made itself the main target for Chinese nationalism. At President Wilson's request, the Peking government declared war on Germany in 191 7, and sent Chinese labourers to France, to free British and French troops to fight the Germans. Hopes rose that when the war was over their concessions in Shantung would be returned to China. But it was not to be . Britain and France had already promised them to Japan, and at the peace conference in Paris Wilson had to acquiesce. The Treaty of Versailles provoked a storm of protest from Chinese, in Paris as well as in Peking. Several universities had been set up there by foreigners : the most prestigious was the government-founded Peking University. Some of Peita's staff had been deeply impressed by the Russian Revolution, and by the subsequent struggle of the Communists against foreign intervention. The May 4 movement. as the Chinese protests became known, was not specifically Marxist , but it drew inspiration from the example of the Bolsheviks. and stimulated Chinese interest in Marxism. For Chinese, nationalism meant the struggle against imperialism and foreign domination: in this the Bolsheviks had shown the way. Lenin had long seen in China an opponunity to tum the flank of the capitalist world . As soon as the third Communist International, the Comintem, was set up in 1919. agents were sent out to contact Chinese who might be responsive . At the same time . the Soviet government made a vinue of necessity by renouncing Czarist acquisitions in Manchuria. Soviet agents found Chinese radicals, and helped them to set up the Chinese Communist Pany in 1921. They also got in touch with Sun Yat-sen. whose fonunes had reached a low ebb and who was looking for ne-w sources of suppon. Sun responded to the Soviet approaches . and agreed to fom1 a working alliance between the Nationalist and Communist panies. Moscow then provided the means- advisers. arms. and money - for Sun to set up a revolutionary base in Canton. Sun ~nt his military lieutenant , Chiang Kai-shek. to the Soviet Union for six months' training. On his return to Canton, the Soviet agent known as Borodin helped Chtang to establish a training school on Whampoa Island. and begin building a military machine . By 1926

40

Collision Course

Sun was dead, and Chiang had become leader of the Nationalists. He then launched a Northern Expedition, with the aim of bringing the whole of China under the control of a Nationalist government. His Soviet-trained and armed troops quickly defeated or overawed the warlords in the south, and got control of the Yangtze valley. The Communists saw an opportunity to stir up a social revolution, using the working people in the big cities. As Chiang's forces reached Shanghai, the Communist unions launched a general strike, and prepared to welcome the liberators. At this point Chiang turned against them . With the active support of an underworld organisation called the Green Gang, and with the sympathy if not cooperation of the foreign business community. the Communists were slaughtered and their organisation broken. Chiang proceeded to set up a Nationalist Government in Nankmg, which was soon recognized by the foreign powers. The United States took the lead by signing a treaty allowing China. for the first time since the Opium War. to fix its own tariff. Chiang made some progress towards reunifying China. He established firm control over Shanghai and its hmterland , the lower Yangtze valley . which was the most developed part of the country - though , like the Manchu , he could not deprive the local authorities of their control over the land tax, which was the main source of revenue. Chiang pursued the Communist remnant led by Mao Tse-tung into a remote pan of the south and besieged it there : the Communists escaped only by embarking on the appa rently impossible Long March to the far north-west. Meanwhile , Chiang had sent another expedition to the north. to take control of Peking. He got the northern warlords to accept his authority, and came closer to reuniting China. But in the process he ran into the japanese, first in Shantung, and then in Manchuria.

* * * japan had prospered during the war in Europe, and many japanese felt at that stage that cooperation with the West was the best policy for japan. Things Western were all the rage in the Tokyo of the twenties. Constitutional governments collaborated with America and Britain, even to the extent of signing the Washington treaties. In the Nine-Power Treaty japan undertook to respect China's

Tunnoil in China Leads to Wa r in the Pacific 41

territorial integrity: it went funher by agreeing to give up the former German concessions in Shantung, and actually began to do so. At the same time, defence spending was cut, from half the Japanese budget to a quarter. But resistance was building up within Japan. The army was disappointed when its troops were withdrawn from Siberia in 1922, after three years' occupation. It was even more upset by the spending cut. With the passing of time, it was less dominated by the samurai, though it still benefited from the prestige of the old military caste. Its officers, as well as its conscript soldiers, were now drawn largely from the peasantry, and they shared the attitudes of the farmers . Already resentful of the vogue for things Western, they were thoroughly aroused by the Depression. The Wall Street crash of 192 9 hit Japan hard: its total expons fell by 40 per cent, and the price of its main export, silk, dropped to a quarter of its previous level. (The SmootHawley tariff of 1930 hit Japanese industry almost as hard.) Losing their main source of supplementary income, Japanese farmers were reduced to selling their daughters, so it was said - and believed in the army. Some of the younger officers - especially those serving with the Kwantung army in Manchuria - saw themselves as saviours of their country. They believed that the only way of escaping from dependence on the West, which had proved so disastrous, was for Japan to make itself self-sufficient, just as Western countries were trying to make themselves. To these extremists, that meant using force to complete Japan's domination of Manchuria. Chiang's drive to the north in 1928 had alarmed more than extremists in Japan. The Japanese army resisted his expedition in Shantung, but he went inland, and reached Peking anyway. Shortly afterwards, the Chinese warlord in Manchuria was assassinated, apparently by Japanese officers. He was succeeded ·by his son, Chang Hsueh-liang. The Young Marshal, as he was called, rallied to the Nationalist cause: by accepting Chiang's authority he completed the nominal reunification of China. This was too much for the Japanese hawks to accept. In July 1931 they contrived a pretext for attacking Chinese forces in Mukden, and then went on to take over most of Manchuria. Preoccupied with a rebellion against him in the south, Chiang ordered the Young Marshal to withdraw his forces from the region, and Chang obeyed. The

42

Collision Courst

Japanese Government, not daring to disavow the hawks m the Kwantung army, for fear of more violent reactions in Tokyo, endorsed the actions taken there . In 1932 the puppet state of Manchukuo was set up, and the last Chinese Emperor. Pu Yt . was made head of it . Chiang's Government appealed to the League of Nauons. whtch sent an international mission to investigate the Manchuna n 'Incident'. On the basis of its report. the league condemned Japan, though only for resorting to force. not as an aggressor. Japan reacted by withdrawing from the League . and setung an example for Germany to follow later. For the first time since the foundmg of the League, the United States joined in investigating the case and dealing with it. America actually went further than some members of the League were willing to go. President Hoover·s Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, announced in January 1932 that the United States did not intend to recognize 'any situation. treaty or agreement' that defied the basic laws of peaceful international behaviour (Bartlett 1954. p. 530). Britain. under Ramsay MacDonald's National Government. declmed to endorse the American initiative , on the ground that Chtna was in an 'unsettled and distracted state'. The United States took no further action at the time - and was widely criticized later for making empty gestures. But Stimson had put down a marker. and none of his successors moved it. Whether the Japanese realized it or not. they had got themselves into a quagmire . Like other expanding powers. before and after them, they soon discovered that to protect one acquisition they had to make another, and another. In 1933 they took the Chinese province of Jehol, between Manchuria and the Great Wall - and not this time without fighting. Then they crossed the Wall and attacked Chinese forces in Hopei province, which included Peking. The Tangku truce gave them a 'dernilitiarized zone' covering most of north China. Soon afterwards the puppet Pu Yi proclaimed himself Emperor in Changchun, as if he intended to follow in his ancestors' footsteps and conquer China. But Japanese aggression, far from ending Chinese resistance, tended to strengthen it. The Communist remnant led by Mao completed its long March in 1934, and began building up its base in the northwestern province of Shensi. Chiang made another

Turmoil in China Leads to War in the Pacific

43

effort to eliminate the 'bandits', but to do it he had to have the support of the Young Marshal and his Manchurian troops. They hated the Japanese more than the Communists. When Moscow called for a United Front against Fascism, and Mao offered to join forces against the Japanese, the Young Marshal responded and began to work with the Communists . Chiang flew to his headquarters in Sian to investigate. He was seized by Manchurian soldiers, lectured, recaptured after an attempted escape, in embarrassing circumstances - and then sent back to Nanking, accompanied by the Young Marshal, on condition that he stop fighting other Chinese and fight the Japanese instead. It would have been difficult for him not to comply. Japan's entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact implied the end of the German military aid on which Chiang had been relying in his campaign against the Communists. None was yet forthcoming from America or any other Western country. The only source from which the Chinese Nationalists could still be sure of getting military aid was the Soviet Union. Chiang still did not launch any offensive against the Japanese: his strategy was to build up his forces , and wait for international pressures to halt Japan. But the situation was tense, especially around Peking. In July 193 7 fighting broke out at the Marco Polo bridge - not far from where Peking Man had been discovered, the first known user of fire . The Japanese took the opportunity to consolidate their hold on the whole Peking-Tientsin area . Chiang then attacked their forces around Shanghai, where he was, at the outset, stronger than they were. The Japanese sent in fifteen new divisions, not all well trained . Heavy fighting ensued, with large casualties on both sides. The Japanese finally broke the Chinese lines with an amphibious landing near Hangchow, and Chiang's troops were forced to retreat towards Nanking. Chiang had appealed to the League, and did not take up a Japanese offer of terms . The former warlord who was supposed to be defending Nanking abandoned the capital to its fate. Japanese troops entered the city and went on the rampage, raping and killing thousands of Chinese civilians. Chiang withdrew further up the Yangtze to Hankow, one of the three cities that made up Wuhan. The Japanese pursued him, and drove him out of there as well. Chiang then took refuge beyond the Yangtze gorges in the remote and land-locked province

44

Colhswn Courst

of Szechuan. The Japanese could not get at him there, except from the air . But they went on to take Canton, in an attempt to cut off his supplies Japan now controlled most of eastern China, or at least the cities and lines of communication in that half of the country. which was the more populous and the more productive. The Japanese tried to force Chiang to give in by setting up a puppet regime headed by Sun's other former lieutenant, Wang Ching-wei But. safe now in Chungking, Chiang refused to give in. And Mao's forces were learning how to mobilise the peasants and harrass the Japanese without confronting them. Japan's hold on China was still far from secure, but there was no question of g1ving it up . The quagmire was getting deeper, and harder to escape from .

• • • Amencan sympathy for the Chinese was growing, roughly in proportion to Japanese aggression . Chiang had encouraged it by marrymg Mei-ling, one of the three American-educated daughters of 1he businessman Charlie Soong, himself one of the first Chinese to be educated in the United States. (Her sister, and rival, Chinglmg. had married Sun .) Under her influence he went further and got himself baptized Americans were now deeply involved in business. especially the oil trade , as well as in education , but the m1ss1onary connection was the heart of the relationship, and the mfluence of the missionaries was pervasive. In 1931 , the year of the Manchurian Incident , Pearl Buck, the daughter of American missiOnaries. published her novel The Good Earth, which painted a sympathetic picture of the Chinese peasant for American readers. The book quickly became a best-seller, as did the film later made from it. America was in the depths of the Depression , and many :\mencans were experiencing hardship themselves . The new Pres1dent who was elected at the end of 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt . was at first totally preoccupied with domestic problems, and took httle 1merest in foreign affairs. Despite his family's early as.soClauon 'W1th China. he had no consistent policy towards it unul 1937. Then . the day before Nanking fell, japanese planes attacked an Amencan gunboat, the USS Panay. while it was

Turmoil in China Leads to War in the Pacific 45

embarking foreign evacuees. The Japanese Government saw the danger: it apologised promptly, and paid damages. But the Nanking massacre had aroused indignation in the United States, and raised questions about American relations with Japan. Roosevelt vetoed suggestions for economic sanctions against Japan at that stage, but he did authorise talks with the British about naval cooperation. While supporting Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Germany, he made no attempt to come to an understanding with Japan. Opinion polls showed that three quarters of Americans sympathised with the Chinese. Even leading Isolationists like Senators Norris and Nye supported a move to stop the supply of arms and raw materials to Japan. Roosevelt did not support it, but the United States Government did protest strongly at Japanese infringements of the Open Door principle, and it denounced the idea put forward from Tokyo of a New Order in East Asia, in effect replacing the Washington treaties. Americans were evidently more willing to take a stand against aggression in Asia than in Europe. But the two issues were now coming together. Ever since the 1890s, the Japanese army had seen Russia as its main enemy. (The navy had long cast the United States in the role.) That was one rationale for its actions in Manchuria, though not the only one. The army was pleased when Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact, and proceeded to build up forces on the western borders of Manchuria. But when they clashed with Soviet forces in 1939, the Japanese were badly beaten at Nomonhan. Coming with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, this defeat forced the Japanese to change their approach. First they made their peace with the Russians in Manchuria: then, after meeting Stalin in Moscow, Foreign Minister Matsuoka signed a Neutrality Treaty with the Soviet Union. When the Germans invaded that country soon afterwards, Japan honoured its obligation to stay neutral,* rather than the military alliance with Germany and Italy signed the year before during the Battle of Britain. The Tripartite Treaty was intended to deter the United States from entering the war. In fact, by identifying Japan more closely with Germany in American eyes, •

Japan's action - or inaction - enabled Stalin to use forces from the border of Manchuria to stop the Germans from taking Moscow at the end of 1941. Nomonhan can be regarded as one of the decisive battles of the war.

46 Collision Course

it further reduced resistance to that course. The Neutrality Treaty with the Soviet Union served Japan's purposes better, at least in the short term. The Japanese were free to take full advantage of Germany's success in Europe by moving south, against the French, British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia. After the fall of France in 1940, Britain felt unable to resist Japan's demands for the closing of the Burma Road, the only remaining land route from the south into Nationalist China. But the United States Government did not feel so constrained. Roosevelt was not seeking war with Japan: he believed that Europe was the critical theatre, and that America had to build up its strength for the coming struggle there . He also knew that the Japanese did not want war with the United States. He thought that they could be deterred from further aggression by sending most of the American fleet to Hawaii , and by applying economic sanctions. Even before war broke out in Europe , the United States had given Japan notice that when their commercial treaty expired in 1940 it would not be renewed. After the Japanese occupied the southern half of French Indochina in July 1941, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen , and the supply of oil to Japan stopped. This move was used by those in Tokyo who were arguing for war. They claimed that , without American supplies, the oil reserves of the Japanese navy would begin to decline within three months, and its ability to fight would be affected . The only practical alternative to American oil was that from the Dutch East Indies, but if the Japanese took that source they would be vulnerable to the American fleet in Hawaii. So, the hawks argued, the choice for Japan lay between giving in to American demands and attacking the American fleet. The Japanese Government tried to avoid the apparent dilemma by seeking talks . Roosevelt agreed, and asked his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to conduct the talks, in Washington. Hull was not a hawk, but he was unyielding on the fundamental issue -Japanese aggression. His response to the last Japanese proposals for a 'modus vivendi' made it clear that the oil embargo would not be lifted unless Japan withdrew its forces not only from Indochina and from China, but also from Manchuria. The Japanese Government was not prepared to give up all that Japan had gained since 1931. After further agonising in Tokyo, the Japanese navy was authorised to attack Pearl Harbor.

Tunnoil in China Leads

to

War in the Pacific

47

japanese leaders seem to have had no clear idea how japan could win the war they were staning. They evidently believed that, by knocking out the American fleet at the beginning, they could establish a strong position in the western Pacific, and repel any counter-attack. They were relying on Germany to give the United States so much to do in Europe that it would not have much to spare for japan. At bottom, they probably believed that Americans were not tough enough to face a long war with heavy losses. They put their trust in the self-discipline of the japanese people.

* * * The war between japan and the United States arose directly out of their long-standing disagreement over China. The disintegration of that country after the ovenhrow of the Manchu dynasty had drawn japan into a vacuum of power, and its attempt to establish an hegemony over China had brought it into confrontation with America. But China was the occasion of their clash, rather than the cause. In the 1920s, the japanese were relatively satisfied with the liberal international order centred in America, and went along with the Washington treaties that enshrined it. The japanese accepted at that stage at least some constraints on their expansionism. But they were disappointed with the results, and especially with the decline in japan's economic fonunes. It seems to have been the Crash of 1929, and its aftermath, the SmootHawley tariff of 1930, that catalysed the reaction against the West and its liberalism, and gave the young army officers in Manchuria the opponunity to seize the initiative in 1931. The take-over of Manchuria, with its corollaries in China itself, set japan and America on the course that led eventually to war. But the reasons for their collision went deeper, and its origins lay much further back. Ever since the 17th century the japanese had been struggling to resist pressure from the West, and to maintain their national identity. It was the United States that broke their resistance and forced them to open up their ports, and as America became more powerful it was increasingly the focus of their hopes and fears. After l929,japanese nationalists saw themselves fighting to escape from a failing international system that produced few benefits for japan, but kept it dependent on the United States. like other

48

Collision Course

people at the time, they believed that they could regain control of their own destinies only by acquiring an empire and making it self-sufficient. They were to learn, the hard way, that this approach did not work: after suffering the humiliation of defeat, they would go back to something like the policy of the 20s. But the essential motivation would not change. And neither would the underlying issue between japan and America- Who runs the Pacific?

* * * japan had underestimated America. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor knocked out all eight of the US Navy's battleships, and many American aircraft. With the sinking of the British battleships Prince of Wales and Renown off the coast of Malaya a week later, the crippling of the American fleet opened the way for the Japanese army to conquer the whole peninsula, and then to take the supposedly invulnerable base of Singapore. The Philippines took longer, but the outcome was determined at the beginning by the destruction on the ground of the bombers the United States had sent to deter a japanese attack. Even after the departure of MacArthur, Americans and Filipinos held out on Corregidor Island for another month . But by the middle of 1942 Japanese forces controlled the whole of Southeast Asia, the northern side of New Guinea, and the islands of the central Pacific. They were also well on the way to driving the British out of Burma, and cutting the supply route to Nationalist China. It was a spectacular naval and military success. At one blow it destroyed the mystique of the British Empire in Asia, and spelt the end of European imperialism. japan had created an enlarged empire for itself, which it hoped would be strong enough to withstand any counter-attack. What the japanese do not seem to have taken fully into account were the political and economic reactions. The unheralded bombing of Pearl Harbor shocked Americans into greater unity than they had shown before, and stronger support for Roosevelt's stand against aggression. Hitler helped by declaring war on the United States, and bringing it fully into the conflict. Without Pearl Harbor, internal divisions in America would have taken longer to overcome, and America's entry into the war, when it came, might not have been so widely accepted. Roosevelt had long taken the view that

Turmoil in China Leculs

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War in the Pacifk

49

defeating Germany must have top priority in the allocation of American resources; but he was a Navy man, and the Navy was now headed by Admiral King, who had devoted his career to studying the requirements of a war against japan. King personified the Navy's hun pride, and its determination to avenge Pearl Harbor. When Roosevelt met Churchill at Casablanca early in 194 3, King got the reluctant agreement of the British to aim at retaining the initiative in the Pacific and preparing for a full-scale offensive against japan. Other tasks were given higher priority - Atlantic sea-routes, aid to Russia , the invasion of Sicily, and preparations for the invasion of France. But- and here again the japanese had miscalculated - American industry was taking up the capacity that had been under-utilised before the war and producing war materiel on a vast scale. Its output proved to be great enough to soften the competition for resources, and to give King what he needed to take the offensive in the Pacific. After the conquest of Southeast Asia, the next steps for the japanese were to cut Australia off from America, and to drive the Americans out of Hawaii. Both attempts failed, because the US Navy's aircraft carriers had not been destroyed at Pearl Harbor. Few though they were in number, they were able to prevent the japanese from establishing a base on the southern coast of New Guinea from which to attack Australia. The carriers then had to turn north, to meet the threat to Hawaii. With the help of intercepted communications, the Americans sank four japanese carriers, for the loss of one of their own, in the battle of Midway. The japanese navy had not been destroyed, but it had been stopped, and was never to regain the initiative. Pan of the reason was that the US Navy had launched an intensive submarine campaign, which was already aggravating the shortage of merchant shipping in japan. japanese industry did not have the capacity to match American production, or replace the ships sunk by American submarines. American efforts to drive the japanese back from the South Pacific were inhibited, not only by the competition for resources, but also by the rivalry between the army and the navy. The japanese fought hard to keep their gains, and it took over a yearmost of 194 3 - to dislodge them from the Solomon islands. But they were slowly pushed back, there and in New Guinea, and they

50 Collision Course

had to shorten their defensive perimeter. To compensate, they tried to strenghten their political position. Burma and the Philippines were given nominal independence in the middle of 1943, though Indonesia was not accorded that status until 1945. The idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was revived by holding a meeting of puppet leaders in Tokyo. The effect was limited by the treatment the japanese gave their allies in their own countries, and the conference did not do much to alleviate japan's growing difficulties. The only consolation was the defeat of British attempts to reopen the supply route through northern Burma to China. This frustrated American hopes of building up 'Free China' as a base from which to launch air attacks on japan. Fighting went on in China, but it had less bearing on the outcome of the war against japan than on the struggle between Nationalists and Communists for control of China after the war. Perhaps its greatest immediate significance was that it kept a large part of the japanese army tied down in China. But it is questionable whether any transfer of those forces to the Pacific at this stage would have altered the result of the fighting there . By the end of I94 3 the United States had regained the initiative, by launching a new thrust across the central Pacific. This was carried out by the US Navy, using Marines as ground troops, and relying on ships for support, rather than land bases. The campaign began in the British colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, with landings on Funafuti and Tarawa atolls. From there , the Americans went on, early in I944, to the once German Marshall Islands, and then to the Marianas. The speed of the American advance alarmed the japanese. Saipan in the Marianas was not much more than a thousand miles from Tokyo - within the range of American bombers. When the Americans landed on Saipan in june 1944, the japanese navy launched a major fleet operation which led to the Battle of the Philippine Sea. By then, the US Navy was getting the full benefit of wartime industrial production, and had no shortage of ships, aircraft, or fuel. The japanese were defeated, with heavy losses. In Tokyo, the Prime Minister, General Tojo, resigned, and senior statesmen began discussing how to end the war. But the japanese army and navy were not yet ready to give up . Another general became Prime Minister, and the war went on. The war party may have been helped by the Cairo Declaration,

Tunnoil in China Leads to War in the Pacific

51

issued by the Allied leaders at the end of 1943. It renewed the call for Unconditional Surrender, first heard at Casablanca. It also confirmed that, when Japan was defeated, it would have to give up all its conquests, including Manchuria , Taiwan, and Korea . That was a prospect few Japanese were yet ready to face . Using Saipan as a base, American aircraft began bombing Japan at the end of 1944. Meanwhile, MacArthur's troops had landed in the Philippines, having defeated or neutralised the Japanese forces in New Guinea. Once more , the Japanese navy tried to stop the rot. It confronted the Americans in Leyte Gulf, and gave them some anxious moments. But by now the Japanese were fighting under serious difficulties, and their strength was much reduced . They were again defeated, losing their four remaining carriers in the battle. Their surviving battleships were ineffective without air cover, and the Americans were free to move on towards Japan . Landings on the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa early in 1945 cost heavy casualties, because Japanese soldiers fought to the death. But the bombing of Japan went on: it rose to a peak in March with incendiary raids that left many thousands of Japanese city dwellers dead or homeless and many buildings in ruins . By this time, Germany was near defeat. Just before the Germans surrendered, the Russians told the Japanese that when the Neutrality Pact expired in 1946 it would not be extended. Together with the American bombing, this made Japanese leaders realize that they could not hold out much longer. Their reaction was to try and get the Russians to mediate peace. The Russians did not respond : they had already promised the Americans that they would enter the war against Japan soon after Germany was defeated, and they had their reasons for doing so. Early in August , the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and its forces advanced into Manch1;1ria. Shortly before that, a single American aircraft had dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Roosevelt's successor, President Truman, had authorised its use, with the support of most of his advisers , to avoid the need for an invasion of Japan that seemed bound to cause -further heavy casualties. The Japanese Government was now divided. Civilian leaders were ready to give up , on the one condition that the throne was preserved. The Americans refused to promise that, but did not exclude the possibility. The response did not satisfy Japanese military leaders, even when the Americans dropped

52

Collision Course

a second atomic bomb, this time on Nagasaki. The Emperor had already made it clear that he favoured surrender: despite their professed loyalty to the throne , the military did not obey. Finally, Hirohito had to take the unprecedented step of broadcasting to the Japanese people and telling them that they must 'endure the unendurable'.

* * * Japan's formal surrender was signed on an American battleship anchored in Tokyo Bay, not far from the place where Perry's ships had anchored nearly a century before. MacArthur had already been appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Although there were consultative bodies both in Tokyo and in Washington, he was untrammelled by them, and would brook no interference, least of all from the Russians . The Occupation was to be run by Americans , with only limited participatio n from Commonwealth countries. They had little more say in policy than the Russians. MacArthur's determination to keep the Russians out of Japan was welcome to Japanese leaders. Since they had grasped the fact of defeat, their main concern had been to protect the throne, and preserve the continuity of national life. They saw the Soviet Union as the main threat - especially after MacArthur had made it clear that the Emperor would not be treated as a war criminal, and that SCAP would work through the Japanese Government. In this way, the prestige and influence of the throne was mobilised to ensure that the Occupation would not be contested. The price the Emperor had to pay was to accept temporary subordination to MacArthur, to renounce his 'divinity', and go out among his people. When a new constitution was put forward early in 1946, he was described as a 'symbol of the state and the unity of the nation, under the sovereignty of the people' (Reischauer 1990, p . 191). He was deprived of all political functions . But continuity was preserved. and with it the self-respect of the Japanese people. The Americans were triumphant, and at times imperious, but they were not vindicative . Once it was clear that there would be no resistance to the Occupation, they relaxed and took a magnanimous attitude towards the defeated enemy. This must have surprised

Tunnoil in China Leads to War in the Pacific

53

some japanese, after all the propaganda they had been exposed to . It may have encouraged disillusionment with their military leaders, and with war itself. The American victory had convinced them that the West did, after all, have what it took to succeed in the modem world. Things American were once again all the rage in Japan, as they were at the time in most parts of the world . Americans were surprised, and flattered, to find that the japanese were keen to learn everything they could from, and about, the United States. For their own part, they were more than willing to teach, to help the japanese out of their bad old ways, and to remake japan in America's image. For a while, it looked as if they were succeeding. But problems soon began to arise . By 194 7, Americans were deeply concerned about Soviet expansion in Europe, and were getting worried about Communism at home. The United States Government at least was losing confidence in Chiang Kai-shek, and becoming doubtful whether he could prevent the Communists from taking over China. japan was already coming to be seen in America, not so much as a defeated enemy, but rather as a potential supporter, and even ally, in a new global struggle. But japanese did not all see themselves in the same light. Whoever drafted Article IX of the new constitution, it had been almost universally accepted that Japan should 'forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation', and never again maintain land, sea, or air forces (Reischauer 1990, p . 191). For all their fears of the Soviet Union, they were not so easily convinced that the emergence of the Soviet threat made it necessary for the United States to change course abruptly, or for japan to follow in its wake . Ideological divisions had reappeared as soon as the war was over and political prisoners were released, and even under MacArthur. the Russians had enough room for manoeuvre to give leftists a helping hand . The change in American policy helped them as well, by reviving suspicions of the United States, and of alleged American militarism. The issue did not come to a head until the 50s, but it was one of the factors that made Japanese politics in the post-war period unsettled, and its governments short-lived. The japanese economy took time to recover from the war too . Although industry had benefited from the arms build-up of the thirties, it had been severely strained by the war itself. The American

submannc campaign had aggravat~d its problems: the bombing - esJXClally the fire bombing- had completed the collapse . By t~ ttme Japan surrend~n:d . not much physical plant was unaffected. Agriculture was less hard hit than industry. but food was scarce. Many cny dwellers went hungry during the winter of 1946--4 7. The United States responded to the obvious human need by sendmg food aid - sometimes over the protests of its Allies . MacArthur was anxious to deprive the Communist s 0f an tssue they could use to their own advantage . Even before the war ended . some Japanese economists had begun planning for reconstruction : they were encouraged by SCAP, which had a number of New Dealers in its ranks. But progress was retarded by pohucal mstability. and by the Allied insistence on breaking up the Zaibatsu . The one great success of the early occupation was the land reform programme. which made most japanese farmers small propnetors. After the Cold War set in. the Americans became more concerned about the state of the Japanese economy, and especially about the high rate of inflation . In 1949. a prominent banker was sent out . with a high-power ed team, to advise the japanese Government how to deal with the problem. The Dodge Mission prescnbed a severe dose of hscal austerity. with the aim of balancing the budget and stabilismg the currency. Unpalatable though the medtcme was. the Japanese swallowed it , and benefited from it. By 1950. industnal production was recovering, though it was still hardly up to pre-war levels. The Japanese economic miracle was sull m the making. The campaign against the Zaibatsu had quietly been abandoned. The power of the trade unions was being checked. Thanks largely to the Americans, teniary educatiOn was being extended more widely. and the lower levels were being liberalised. Currency stabthty was encouraging enterpnse and investment. japan was poised to take full advantage of its greatest asset - a sktlled and dtSCtplined work-force. motivated by national pride . .md wtllmg to make sacrifices for the national good . japan had turned deciSively agatTlSt mihtarism . Most japanese had realiSed that prosperity and secunty are not to be achieved by rruhtary conquest . no rrumer how spectacular . A consensus was gradwlly formmg that econorruc success was the way forward success ach~tved through excellence m competition. When success

Twrmoilrn Ouna Lradl w Wear m dw PtJ£lfu.

~5

came , as u ~gan to do in the 50s. tt underlined the message But the Japanese goal had not changed . and it was not the same as the American . The satisfaction of the indiVldual consumer was not . for the Japanese , the ultimate cons1derauon . Defeat and near survauon had only strengthened the feeling that secunty was what mattered most- security from the assaults of the outs1de world . And such security was felt to depend on national sohdanty . The strength of the country was mo~ important to most Japanese than the we lfare of any indiVldual . or even hlS family . So the individual. and the individual firm , were prepared to take the long Vlew , and to make sacrifices, when necessary . for the common good .

•

• •

During the war. Americans had shown a capacity for sacnhce too . Many thousands had died , and many more had been hun . to uphold American inte~sts and values against Germany and Japan . 8Ul it had taken a sudden and violent attack on the Umted States itself to create the sense of threat, and the common purpose . that were required to evoke such sacrifices. The quesuon at the end of the war was whether that common purpose could be sustamed Americans were not unaffected by the experience of war : there was much talk of leammg lessons. But they were sull the same people . Their culture was still that formed by the frontier the md1V1dual had to stand on his own feet and look after htmself. Freedom was the highest goal - freedom to earn what you could . and to d o what you liked with u . After hve years of "'ra r. and ten years of Depression ~fore that . there was an urge to enJoy what you had . and to show that you were enjoymg u too . Such an outlook was not conducive to sdf-dtsctplme . let alone sustamed sacnhce . What was there to prevent Americans from shppmg mto hedomsm at ho~ . and isol.auonlSm abroad? How was the great power that America was now known to po~ss to be moblitsed and maintained? What could mduce it to go on pl.aymg the central role it had fallen into, in Asia as wdl as m Europe)

56 Collision Course Bertram, Capes of China Slide Away. Fairbank, China: A New History . Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, East Asia: The Modern .Transformation Snow, Red Star Over China. Spence, The Search for Modern China.

japan Beasley, The Rise of Modern japan. lriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific. Okita, japan's Challenging Years . Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation . Storry, History of Modern japan.

World War II Calvocoressi, Guy and Pritchard, Total War. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War. Morison, The Two-Ocean War. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun . Thome , Allies of a Kind .

CHAPTER

4

Cold War Sets In

Would America tum inwards again, as it had after the First World War? That was the great question of the immediate post-War years, at least for Europeans, and it was underlined by some of President Truman's early actions. The question was to be answered clearly in the negative. Within five years the United States had taken on the leadership of an alliance that included most of Western Europe, and was soon to be extended in effect to the Western Pacific. This came about largely because the Soviet Union insisted on having complete control of Eastern Europe , while the United States insisted that governments must be freely elected. Differences over Germany and Eastern Europe quickly broke up the wanime coalition and staned the Cold War. But Asia played a pan in the process too . The victory of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalists, coinciding as it did with Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons, turned growing concern about Communism in America into widespread fear, verging at times on-hysteria. The charge that the Democrats had 'lost' China made it necessary for Truman to defend South Korea when it was attacked by the Communist Nonh, and bring Asia to the centre of the Cold War. The defeat of Germany and japan left America by far the most powerful country in the world. The war effon had mobilised resources that had not been fully used during the 1930s, and had increased production by SO per cent. The American share of total world production had risen from the quaner to a third. This feat had been achieved while five million men were under anns, a large

58 Collision Course

proportion of them deployed overseas. Britain had played a critical part in the early stages of the war, but it was largely American armies that had completed the defeat of Germany, just as it was the American navy and air force that completed the defeat of Japan. With the cooperation of Britain and other allies, the United States had made two atomic bombs, which it used to obviate an invasion of Japan. America now had a monopoly of the most destructive weapon yet invented. Americans had some justification for feeling that they had won the war, even if others had suffered more from it. Victory gave Americans what has been called a sense of Imperium. They felt they were entitled to a big say in the way the world was to be run in the future . And they were not always tolerant of competing views. The British were at first particularly suspect, under Churchill as unregenerate imperialists, and under Attlee as free-loading socialists. Though the Russians were also suspect as Communists, they were still seen more as comrades-inarms than as rivals. What Americans were most opposed to was the son of international politics they thought had caused the war - 'Power Politics'. Roosevelt had revived Wilson's idea of Collective Security and Hull had worked out proposals for a new world-wide organisation to keep the peace. In theory at least, they were both against Spheres of Influence: Hull especially believed that the whole world should be open to trade. The corollary was spelt out by Roosevelt's adviser, Harry Hopkins, to Stalin in 1945 (Schlesinger 1986, p . 181 ): The cardinal basis of President Roosevelt's policy which the American people had fully supported had been the concept that the interests of the U.S. were worldwide and not confined to North and South America and the Pacific Ocean'. Stalin saw things differently. The Soviet Union had suffered greatly from the war: much of what had been built at such cost during the 30s had been destroyed, and much of the country was devastated. Soviet annies had borne the brunt of German aggression, and had played a leading part in defeating it. Equipped with the help of Britain and America, they were now strong and confident. But economically the Soviet Union was far from strong - hardly

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59

even self-supporting. And politically it was far from united. The Patriotic War had to some extent eclipsed the Purges, and given Stalin the standing of a world leader, but he did not feel secure. To maintain his own position, and to get the Soviet people to accept funher hardships, he had to have an Enemy. In a speech in Moscow in February 1946, he declared that Communism and Capitalism were incompatible and another war was inevitable. He called for increased defence production, and said that consumer goods must wait on rearmament. At the same time, he was making it clear by his actions that he would not tolerate unfriendly regimes on the borders of the Soviet Union, even if they had the support of their own peoples. The British had a long-standing suspicion of Russian policy in Eastern Europe, springing originally from their involvement in India. They were also worried about the future of Western Europe. Roosevelt had said at Yalta, shortly before his death, that the American people would not agree to keep troops in Europe for much more than two years after the end of hostilities. If the United States withdrew, as it had in 1919, and left Europeans to fend for themselves, how were they to stand up to the Russians? Concern grew when, soon after Germany's capitulation, Truman gave in to Congressional pressure and cut off lend-Lease aid to Britain, as well as to the Soviet Union. The newly-elected Labour Government realised that the British economy was in a precarious state; it had to accept unpalatable conditions for the loan it obtained from the United States to fill the gap. So it was a key objective for Attlee and his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, as it had been for Churchill, to keep America involved in Europe. Though out of office, Churchill was still the most effective spokesman for Britain. Speaking in front of Truman at Fulton, Missouri- the President's home state, -in March 1946, he said (McCullough 1992, p. 489): 'From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent'.

The speech was not well received in America: it was widely regarded as war-mongering. With one World War just over, most Americans were reluctant to face the possibility of another. There was even some understanding for the Soviet Union. The former

60 Collision Course

Vice-President, Henry Wallace, was not the only person in Washington who felt that the Russians were as much entitled to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe as the Americans were to one in their own Hemisphere. Henry Stimson, the former Secretary of State, and of War, considered not unreasonable the claim of the Soviet Union to a preferred position there. Truman was increasingly irritated by Soviet actions, but he liked Stalin, whom he had met at Potsdam, and still hoped to be able to work with him. So he distanced himself from Churchill, and from what he had said at Fulton. But events were moving in the direction Churchill had prophesied. Disagreements had arisen between the Soviet Union and the Western powers almost as soon as the war began. One of the earlier ones was over Italy's surrender in 1943: Stalin complained that America and Britain had excluded the Soviet Union from the occupation regime . Further differences arose over Poland. Britain had gone to war with Germany over its invasion of that country, and had a Polish exile government in London. America had a large Polish community, with six million votes. Both were shocked when Soviet forces failed to support a rising against the Germans in Warsaw in 1944. At Yalta they insisted that the post-war government of Poland must be freely elected, and Stalin acquiesced. But once Soviet forces had occupied the country and defeated the Germans, he felt no need to carry out the commitment. Hopkins warned Stalin that Poland had become 'the symbol of our ability to work out problems with the Soviet Union', to no avail (Schlesinger 1986, p. 179). Similar differences arose as Soviet forces occupied other countries in Eastern Europe- first Romania, then Bulgaria. In October 1944 Churchill had offered Stalin a division into spheres of influence, which Stalin accepted, and partly honoured, at least in the case of Greece. But the United States was reluctant to accept such deals: Hull insisted that all political questions should be left to the world organisation he was setting up. The Russians, for their part, did not at this stage seek to impose Communist governments, but they did seek to eliminate those political elements they regarded as unfriendly to them, and to this the Americans objected. But it was over Germany that the disagreement became strongest. The Russians were determined to get all the reparations they could, and to make sure that Germany

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61

could never again threaten the Soviet Union. The Western powers were not at first totally unsympathetic , but once they took responsibility for the western parts of Germany they sought to limit the cost to themselves by getting the German economy going again. This difference led to increasingly bitter exchanges between the Soviet Union and its former allies. Early in 1946 the area of disagreement widened. The Russians failed to fulfil the commitment they had given earlier to withdraw their troops from Azerbaijan, in northern Iran. They also demanded oil concessions from the Iranian Government. The British were worried: they feared that this was the beginning of a Soviet thrust into the Nonhern Tier of the Middle East. Bevin urged the Americans to stand up to the Russians. The United States, no longer self-sufficient in oil, saw reason for Britain's concern, and responded to Bevin's appeal. The issue was raised in the United Nations Security Council, which met in New York, under the attention of the media, and of the American people. In March, soon after Churchill's speech, the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, attended in person and took pan in the debate. This dramatised the issue of Soviet expansionism for the man in the street, and gave it the appearance of a global challenge to the West. Truman encountered little opposition when he sent an American battleship and an aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean, to remind the Russians of America's military power. The President was having serious problems at home . Rapid demobilisation was threatening to bring back unemployment, pent-up demand was fuelling inflation, and powerful unions were demanding higher wages for their members. A series of strikes broke out, one of which threatened to stop railway traffic throughout the country. In May, Truman told Congress he was going to draft the railway workers into the army, and got a standing ovation. The railway strike collapsed, but later in the year the veteran labour leader John L. Lewis called the miners out. Once again, Truman won applause by standing up to the unions. But, in the elections in November, the Democratic Party lost control of Congress, for the first time in 18 years. The Republicans won majorities in both houses of Congress, and used them to press the issue of Loyalty. The new Speaker of the House, Joseph Manin, set the tone in his inaugural speech: 'There is no room in

62

Collision Course

the government of the United States for any who prefer the Communistic system' (McCullough 1992, p. 551). Long afterwards, he explained his action by saying that The long tenure of the Democratic Party had poisoned the air we breathed' (ibid) . Truman decided to pre-empt the issue. Soon after the elections, he accepted a recommendation from the House Un-American Activities Committee to set up a commission on employee loyalty. The following April he did so. By then the British had served notice that their resources were strained to the limit, and they would have to stop their aid to Greece and Turkey within a month. They invited the United States to take up the burden of supporting two governments that were under pressure from the Soviet Union. Truman reacted promptly. On 12 March 1947 he addressed Congress, and asked for $400 million for aid to Greece and Turkey. Believing that Congress would not agree unless he emphasised the Communist threat, he spoke of a way of life 'based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority', and of protests the United States had made against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Then he said (ibid, p . 548): 'I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'. This sentence, which became known as the Truman Doctrine, proved to be one of the key points of departure in American foreign policy. In April 194 7, the journalist Walter Lippmann reponed that Europe was on the brink of economic collapse. Returning form a conference of foreign ministers in Moscow that once again failed to reach agreement on Germany and Austria, Marshall, the wartime army chief who was now Secretary of State, broadcast his conclusion that the Russians were obstructing a settlement. In a Commencement address at Harvard early in june, he invited European governments to take the initiative in working out a plan for economic recovery that the United States could support. He stressed that 'Our policy is directed not against any country or

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63

doctrine but against hunger, poveny, desperation and chaos' (ibid, p. 563). The Soviet Union was invited to take pan in a conference in Paris to prepare the programme Marshall had asked for, and Molotov arrived with a large delegation . But, once there , he refused Soviet cooperation. The governments of Western Europe went ahead on their own , and drew up the programme, which they put to the United States in September. That summer, the New York quanerly Foreign Affairs had published an anicle on The Sources of Soviet Conduct'. It was attributed to 'X', but was soon known to be the work of George F. Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Depanment. The anicle analysed the reasons for Soviet expansionism , and proposed a strategy of Containment to deal with the problem. It concluded by saying (Kennan 194 7, p . 582) : 'Providence . . . , by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history has plainly intended them to bear'. The Russians themselves helped to drive home the message , and to overcome residual opposition in Congress to the Marshall Plan . In September they held a meeting in East Germany and set up the Cominform to coordinate the activities of Communist panies around the world . In February 1948 the Communists already in the government of Czechoslovakia staged a coup and took complete control of what had once been a democratic state . In March , Congress approved the reintroduction of conscription in the United States. In April it voted $5 ,300 million for the first year of the European Recovery Programme. As the British Ambassador in Washington observed (Gaddis 1987, p. 62), 'The Soviet Union has not only succeeded in preventing the United States from retreating into pre-war isolationism but it is now ensuring that the United States will take an increasingly active pan in the affairs of Western Europe'. The process went on . With American and British

64 Collision Course encouragement, the West Germans were getting their economy going again. The Soviet Union reacted in june 1948 by cutting off all road and rail traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. Truman was facing an election that he was expected to lose . He was determined that the Western powers should not be driven out of Berlin, but he was also determined to avoid war if possible. Rejecting a proposal to force a passage into the city. he ordered an airlift of supplies, and kept it going throughout the winter, and the election campaign. One effect of the Blockade was to facilitate the formation of a Western military alliance . The Republican Chainnan of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenburg, who had been an isolationist until Pearl Harbor. had already pushed through a resolution authorising the Administration to negotiate alliances with non-American powers. Britain, France and the Benelux countries had signed a treaty in Brussels providing for mutual support in the event of aggression . In April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington. For the first time in its history, the United States had committed itself in advance to the defence of Western Europe . Communism had not yet become the dominant issue in American politics: it played relatively little pan in the election of 1948. But it was a focus of concern that spread across party lines. Wallace's candidature for the Presidency showed that it was still a divisive issue within the Democratic Party. though less so than in 1945 and 1946. But it had effectively rallied Republicans and conservative Democrats behind Truman's cautious but firm resistance to Stalin. For this the Soviet leader's own actions were largely responsible. At each critical juncture, the Russians had done something more to arouse American suspicion and hostility - even if they were themselves reacting, at least on some occasions, to what they saw as provocation from the West. The Soviet Union - or at least Soviet expansionism - was giving Americans a new sense of direction, and bringing them together behind the policy of Containment. By 1949, the emerging consensus had overcome the urge to relax and tum away from the outside world. It had induced a conservative and tax-cutting Congress, not sympathetic to the President, to support his initiatives and to vote large sums of money for aid to Europe. So it had begun to harness the economic power of the United States to the reconstruction and

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65

security of countries it did not entirely trust, like Britain, France and Germany. But the impact of Communism did not stop there. The British had observed as early as 1946 a tendency to see the hand of the Soviet Union in every development that seemed to threaten America, and to link those in one pan of the world with those in another on this basis. Perhaps this was inevitable, when there were only two great powers left, and each had interests in various regions. But ideology was turning the clash of interests into what was perceived to be something greater - a struggle between Right and Wrong, if not between Good and Evil. America was not merely reacting to what it saw as the Communists' pursuit of world domination. Americans saw themselves increasingly as leaders of the Free World. The fact that this world included some regimes that were far from democratic or liberal did not, at that time or for long after, seem to Americans a serious problem. The struggle was one between Democracy and Totalitarianism, and that justified tactical expedients. Each local episode, whatever its origins, whatever the specific circumstances, was seen as pan of the global picture, and became a test of wills, and of strength, that Americans felt they could not afford to lose. The most powerful country in the world was far from feeling itself secure.

* * * If the Cold War broke out over Europe , it had from the beginning had an Asian dimension. Whatever the inwardness of the relationship between Stalin and Mao, the Chinese always insisted that Mao was a Communist, and he headed the Chinese Communist Parry. To people in the West, if not in China, that 'identified him and his followers with the Soviet Union. No matter that Stalin went on helping Chiang Kai-shek, at least until the end of the war, or that Mao's reliance on the peasants was hardly consistent with Marxist doctrine: the Chinese Communists were generally seen as pan of Moscow's attempt to destroy capitalism and take over the world. By the end of the Long March in 1934, Mao had established himself as leader of the CCP. After setting up his headquaners in Pao An, and consolidating the old base area in Shensi province, he

66 Collision Course

set out to tum the japanese invasion to advantage, by presenting the Communist Party as the vanguard of the patriotic struggle to liberate China from the foreign aggressor. With the help of the Young Marshal , he forced Chiang to give up. for the time being, his attempts to eliminate the Communist 'Bandits'. and to accept their cooperation against the japanese. When the Communists began launching large-scale offensives, the japanese drove them back, and took reprisals against the peasants who had JOined them . These too Mao turned to advantage , in stirring up hatred of the japanese. Gradually, the Communists evolved what was to be their basic strategy for the next ten years - that of harrassing the enemy without confronting his forces, and using his retaliation to widen their own support. land reform was also used to win over the poorer peasants, and to create a network of organisations at village level that eventually involved almost everyone in the struggle. The techniques were consciously developed, refined in the light of experience, and applied to a widening area . In due course, they deprived the japanese of control over any territory they did not physically occupy, and confined them largely to the cities- many of them still walled. With no competition from the Nationalists, membership of the CCP grew steadily, from about 40,000 in 1937 to over a million in 1945. Even before the japanese surrendered. the Communists controlled most of the countryside north of the Yangtze , with a population of something like 100 million. The japanese invasion gave the Communists an opportunity, which they used to good effect. The Nationalists were not so successful in mobilising patriotism. Driven out of the lower Yangtze basin in 1937, Chiang withdrew into Szechuan province, beyond the Gorges, and set up a war-time capital in remote Chungking. There he and his Government were fairly safe from the japanese, except for air raids, and they could hold out indefinitely. But they suffered from other problems. Having lost most of their legitimate sources of revenue, they became even more heavily dependent than before on other sources. like the criminal underground and the opium trade. And even so, they had to resort increasingly to printing money. American aid, when it began to flow freely after Pea.rl Harbor, did not do much to relieve the problem, partly because it was directed mainly to the military, and partly because much of it never reached China. Chiang's in-laws, the Soongs,

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became adept at diverting American money into their own bank accounts in the United States, and their example was followed by anyone who could. Corruption spread, demoralisation grew, and the power of the Nationalists to attract support diminished . They were hardly in a position to compete with the Communists for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. The success of the Communists revived Chiang's fears , and his determination to destroy them. Early in 1941 , Nationalist forces attacked the New Fourth Army, a Communist force fighting the japanese south of the Yangtze. The Nationalists also intensified their blockade of the Communist areas in the northwest. The Americans were now looking to China as a potential base for bombing japan, and they were afraid that the struggle between Nationalists and Communists would impede the effort. So they set out to bring the two sides together in some sort of a coalition, using military aid as an inducement. Chiang accepted the American general, joseph Stilwell, as his Chief of Staff, and committed himself to a political settlement with the Communists. But he did not follow Stilwell's advice , and did not cooperate with the Communists. Instead, he relied more and more heavily on military people he regarded as loyal, and on his security apparatus. The Americans who were trying to help him became more and more frustrated and disillusioned . Some at least must have felt relieved when the US Navy's thrust across the Pacific removed the need for bases in China. But by then the United States was deeply involved in what was later called the China Tangle. Roosevelt had presented Chiang at the Cairo Conference as one of the world's great leaders , and could hardly afford to break with him. Continuing the attempt to bring Nationalists and Communists together, the American Ambassador, former Senator Patrick j. Hurley, went to Yenan as soon as the japanese capitulated and personally escorted Mao to Chungking. In October he and Chiang announced that they had agreed on the need to convene a national assembly. But with the collapse of japan the struggle in China had entered a new phase. Nationalists and Communists were already racing each other to take over the territory occupied by the Japanese, and both saw Manchuria as the great prize. The United States felt committed to supporting the Chinese Government, and provided the means for Chiang to move his forces north. In November the

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Nationalists launched an offensive against the Communists who had moved overland to pre-empt them. At this, Hurley suddenly resigned, accusing his own staff of undermining the Nationalist Government. Caught by surprise, with little knowledge of China, Truman turned to the retiring head of the Army, General Marshall, who had served in the Tientsin garrison in the 1920s. The United States promised more aid, and Chiang agreed to a cease-fire. But Manchuria was not covered by it, and fighting went on there. The political conference that had also been agreed on failed to take place. Marshall did not give up immediately. In June he got the two sides to agree to another cease-fire, this time covering Machuria, but in july the Nationalists launched yet another offensive there. Now the Communists began to tum against America. The United States was criticised for interfering in Chinese politics, and a convoy esconed by US Marines was ambushed on the road from Tientsin to Peking. Truman warned Chiang that, if he was not more flexible, 'it will be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the people of America'. Chiang replied that the desire for peace had to be mutual, and blamed the Communists. In january 194 7 Marshall acknowledged that his mission had failed, and returned to Washington to become Secretary of State. Against American advice, Chiang had poured his best troops into Manchuria. By the end of 1945 he had three million men there, to the Communists' one million. The Nationalists held all the main centres, at least in the south; but they did not trust the local people, and their behaviour often alienated their own supponers. The Communists established a base round Harbin, a nonhero city founded by the Russians in the 1890s. Soviet forces had occupied Manchuria at the end of the war, and taken the surrender of the Japanese troops in the region. They withdrew slowly, taking everything they could move with them, but leaving Japanese arms to the Communists. Applying the techniques they had developed from Yenan, the latter extended their control of the countryside and built up their forces - which included many Koreans. The fighting did not at first go their way. During 1946 the Nationalists drove them back towards the nonh, and got control of the coast. But by the end of the year the Communist

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general Lin Piao was able to launch a counter-offensive from Harbin, and to capture an important railway junction. Pushed back again, Lin regrouped his forces, and set out to isolate the Nationalist-held cities by breaking the rail connections between them. The Nationalists began to abandon their American-supplied arms and equipment, which the Communists captured and used against them. American diplomats on the ground saw apathy and defeatism spreading fast among the Nationalists, and concluded that Chiang's attempt to hold Manchuria was doomed. The Nationalist Government's position was also undermined by its own economic ineptitude. The end of the war had further disrupted the Chinese economy, and aggravated the problem of financing the struggle against the Communists. The Government's response was to print money even more quickly. Prices rose accordingly, by thiny times between September 1945 and February 1947. Strikes proliferated, even though they were illegal, and the Communists got control of many unions. Wages were sometimes raised: then unemployment increased. Price controls were tried, and failed to halt inflation. Chiang got his Soviet-trained son, Ching-kuo, to enforce currency reforms in,Shanghai, only to drive business away and create a shortage of food in the city. By the end of 1948, the reforms had failed, and the economy was on the brink of collapse. The Nationalists had lost the confidence of most educated people, many of whom saw the Mandate of Heaven passing to the Communists. The war came to a climax about the same time. In a battle that went on for three months, the Communist Commander-in-Chief, Chu Teh, outmanoeuvred the Nationalists on the Huai river, in the area where the Nien Rebellion had taken place a century before. Lin Piao captured Tientsin soon after: then the Nationalists in Peking surrendered. Chiang had lost nonhern China. He resigned as President, and his successor tried to negotiate terms, while the Communist forces paused on the Yangtze to regroup. With victory in their grasp, they would brook no foreign interference. When the British frigate HMS Amethyst moved up the Yangtze to evacuate diplomats from Nanking, it was shelled, and other ships sent to relieve it were driven back. The days of the gunboat were gone. Communist forces crossed the Yangtze in April, Nanking fell without fighting, and Shanghai soon after. The Communists

70 Collision Course

advanced quickly through the south, taking Canton in October, as well as Amoy, the port from which the Nationalist remnants were escaping to Taiwan. Mao had waited until he had complete control of the mainland to proclaim his triumph. On 1 October 1949, he mounted the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Peking to announce the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China. Only then did most Americans fully grasp what had happened. The Nationalist case had been assiduously publicised by Time and Life magazines, whose proprietor, Henry Luce, came from a missionary family, and who had long been close to Chiang and his wife . They had strong support in Congress, mainly from Republicans like Congressman Walter judd. But China had been overshadowed, first by the events that had led to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, then by the protracted crisis over Palestine, and finally by the Berlin Blockade. Truman's stand on Berlin made it difficult for his opponent, Dewey, to attack him on foreign policy during the 1948 election campaign, which was fought mainly on domestic issues. But Truman's victory, unexpected by almost everyone except him, changed the scene. The Republicans were disappointed and embittered, and they blamed Dewey for their defeat. Taft, their leader in the Senate, had accused the Administration of being 'Soft on Communism' as early as 1946, and his influence rose as Dewey's fell. The denunciation of the former State Department official, Alger Hiss, as a Communist agent, and his long-drawn-out trial for perjury, provided grist to the mill of those seeking to discredit the Democrats. But it was the Administration itself that brought the China issue to the fore . In August 1949 the State Department published a lengthy report on United States Relations With China, which became known as the China White Paper. In the Preface, Dean Acheson, who had succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State, argued that the main reason for the fall of the Nationalists was their own corruption and lack of leadership. This gave the China Lobby the opening it needed: it accused the Democrats of having 'lost' China. Republicans were not the only ones who took up the cry: so did the young Democratic Congressman from Massachusetts, john F. Kennedy. The witch-hunt was on. At this moment, Truman had to announce that an atomic explosion had taken place in the Soviet Union. Public concern

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about Communism turned to fear, and someone was at hand to exploit it. Senator joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin, hitherto almost unknown, made headlines by claiming that he had a list of 'known Communists' in the State Department. He never produced more than one name, that of the academic Owen Lattimore, who had worked in the Department briefly just after the war. But McCarthy's charge was widely believed, and used to discredit the whole Administration. It was nearly a year before another Republican senator, Margaret Chase Smith of Maine , tried to dissociate herself and her party from what she called 'the four horsemen of calumny- fear, ignorance, bigotry and smear'. Few other politicians, or people in public life, were prepared to expose themselves to the dreaded charge of being 'Soft on Communism'. That charge would not lose its power until it had driven America into two costly wars in Asia. The wave of fear had early effects on the Administration. Acheson came under severe personal criticism when he refused to tum his back on Hiss, despite the latter's conviction for peijury. Acheson sponsored a report from the National Security Council (NSC-68) which said that the Republic was in peril and called for a massive military build-up. Truman did not immediately accept the need to reverse his policy of reducing defence expenditure, but he had already authorised the development of the hydrogen bomb. And, despite the White Paper, the Administration made no move towards recognizing the Peoples Republic of China. When Mao went to Moscow at the end of 1949 and signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union, American suspicions seemed to be confirmed. The question was put aside, and the United States moved to block attempts by the Government in Peking to take over the Chinese seat in the United Nations. The scene was set for a confrontation. The onset of the Cold War had prevented a return to isolationism in America. The Soviet Union had come to be seen by most Americans as a threat to the United States and the American way of life. This gave them a sense of direction they had seldom if ever had before except in wartime, and engendered some willingness to make sacrifices for the cause of Containment. The price was fear, verging at times on hysteria, which affected political freedom in America, and caused serious anxiety abroad. Once aroused, some wondered, would America stop at Containment? If Communism

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was as evil as Americans were coming to believe, would they be prepared to live with it indefinitely? Would Truman be able to go on keeping a balance between firmness and restraint? He was about to be tested, and to be found wanting in neither determination nor sense of proponion. Sources The Cold War Acheson, Present at the Creation .

Bullock. Ernest Btvin: Foreign Secretary. Byrnes. Spcaln ng Franldy . Chfford , Counsel to the President. Dockrtll, The Cold War 1945-1963. Gaddis, The Long Peace. Halle , The Cold War As History . Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct ." Kennan , Memoirs 1925-1950. McCullough . Truman . Schlesinger. The Cycles of American History .

China Bertram , Capes of China Slide Away. Fatrbank. China: A New History . Fatrbank. Reischauer and Craig, East Asia. Snow . Red Star Over China . Spence , The Search for Modern China.

CHAPTER

5

War in Korea Deepens Confrontation

Fighting broke out in Korea, when armed forces from the North invaded the South in June 1950. Once again, the United States was caught by surprise, but reacted promptly and forcefully. Americans found themselves stuck in another long and bloody war, this time without much hope of victory. Frustration embittered them, and deepened the hostility between the United States and China. But the war stimulated a great outpouring of American resources to those Asian countries that resisted Communism, and thus laid the foundation for fast economic growth in the region. Until the war, American policy towards Korea had not been entirely consistent. Roosevelt favored international trusteeship, as he did for other colonies, and Stalin accepted the idea at Teheran in 1944. But as the atomic bomb was developed it became less important to get the Russians into the war with Japan, and Washington had growing doubts about a Soviet occupation of Korea. The United States had concentrated on Japan itself, and when the Japanese capitulated it had no troops in the peninsula. But it proposed that responsibility for the occupation of Korea be shared, with the Russians confining themselves to the area north of the 38th parallel. The Russians agreed, perhaps in the hope of getting a similar arrangement for Japan - though this was never a real possibility. Washington did not quickly give up the goal of cooperating with Moscow on Korea. The idea of trusteeship was reaffirmed by Byrnes and Molotov at their meeting in Moscow in December 1945. But the general MacArthur put in charge of the

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American zone of occupauon . Hodge. was deterrnmed from the outset to keep it out of Communis t hands. He encouraged the more conservative Koreans. of whom the veteran nationaliSt Syngman Rhee made himself leader. to stand up to the leftwingers. who were initially stronger Rhee increased his populanty by opposing trusteeship, and demanding early independence. This brought him into conflict with Hodge. but also brought the Umted States into conflict with the Sovtet Union . By 194 7 Korea was beginning to be seen as one of the key issues m the emergmg Cold War - 'a symbol to the watching world'. as a State Depanmen t official put it. But Europe was the main theatre. everyone except MacAnhur agreed, and American forces were increasmgly stretched to meet their commitmen ts. Korea was considered in Washingto n to be imponant , but not imponant enough to justify keeping two American divisions there. It was decided that they should be withdrawn by 1949. To cover the withdrawal. the United States took the issue to the United Nations: the General Assembly endorsed the result of the elections held in the south in 194 7. and recognised the independen ce of the Republic of Korea . with Rhee as its President. The Soviet Union opposed the resoluuon in the Assembly, but had no veto there. The Communis t leader in the nonh . Kim II Sung, then set up the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. with its capital in Pyongyang . The panition of Korea was largely a result of the breakdown in cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during 1946 and 194 7. But it also owed a good deal to ideological divisions among Koreans. and to their weakness for factionalism . Most Koreans shared a strong hostility to the japanese. whose rule had been harsh, if economically successful. (The population of Korea had trebled between 1900 and 1949. and it had become one of the best educated in Asia.) While some, like Rhee, looked to America for inspiration and suppon. others sought them in the Soviet Union, or from the Chinese Communis ts. These groups competed with one another for power, and were not scrupulous about the methods they used. The anti-Comm unists led by Rhee sought and got the help of Koreans who had collaborated with the japanese, including some who had served in the japanese army and police. This made it easier for the Communis ts to present themselves as the only true patriots, until Rhee went for

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independence. After the break in 1947, the North launched a guerrilla campaign in the South, which exacerbated existing political and economic problems there , but did not succeed in destroying Rhee's regime. Late in 1949 Kim II Sung apparently obtained Stalin's agreement to launching an invasion of the South, and Mao's as well. Tension built up along the 38th parallel during 1949. Troops from the South intruded into the North, as well as vice versa. The United States was concerned enough for Acheson to warn Rhee against making the ROK look like an aggressor. But the withdrawal of American troops went on, and was completed in the middle of 1949. In january 1950 Acheson spoke to the National Press Club in Washington about the situation in the Far East. Reiterating his view that Chiang Kai-shek had failed through his own ineptitude, he suggested that the Soviet Union was the real enemy of China. (Mao was in Moscow, and his negotiations with the Russians were going slowly.) Acheson went on to say that the United States would maintain the defence of japan (Bartlett 1954, p. 762) . 'This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to japan and then goes to the Ryukyus . .. The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands . There was no specific reference to Korea in this context, or to Taiwan. Acheson did, however, say that should an attack occur on other areas in the Pacific , 'the initial reliance would be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilised world under the Charter of the United Nations'. These remarks reflected the accepted view of the United States Government at the time, as Acheson always maintained. But they had far-reaching effects. The omission of Korea was evidently taken by Kim II Sung to mean that the United States would not necessarily come to the defence of South Korea if it was attacked. And that was enough for him. The North Koreans underestimated the United States, just as the Japanese had underestimated it in 1941. Truman did not want another war, which he feared could tum into a world war. But he seems to have had no hesitation in deciding that the United States must take a stand against aggression (McCullough 1992 , p. 780).

'The auack upon Korea makes ll plam beyond all doubt that Commumsm has passed beyond the use of subverston to con4uer mdependent nations and will now use armed mvas10n and war' Confrontation with the Sovtet Union, and the rising fear of Communism. had reached the pomt where the President felt that the Umted States could not fail to respond to the challenge in Korea . The charge that the Democrats had 'lost China' must have played tts part too At the time . hts decision won almost universal support m America , and widespread approval abroad . In Truman's absence from Washington , Acheson had , after consultmg the Prestdent by telephone , had the Korean question ratsed m the United NatiOns Secunty Council. The Russians had heen boycotting Council meeungs since Februa ry, in protest against the non-seating of the Chmese Communists. With no opposition, the Counctl called for the immedtate cessation of hostilities and the \\1thdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. On retummg to Washmgton . Truman agreed with his advisers that the lme must be drawn m Korea 'most emphatically'. He authorised M.KArthur to send arms and supplies to the South Korean forces. Before deciding on any other military action, he ordered the US Navy s Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan . The next day . .is the mvasion rolled on , he authorised naval and air support to the South Korean forces he also ordered the speeding up of .-\mencan atd to the French in Indochina . The assumpuon in Washmgton was that Peking was a party to the North Korean .tggresston . as well as Moscow. Little cons1derauon seems to have heen gJVen to the possibility that the mttiauve was coming from k:1m 11 Sung Tatwan had hnherto been a subject of dtsagreement in \Vashmgton . The Chma Lobby . and tts supporters m Congress, had been pressmg the AdmmlStrauon to make sure the ISland did nol fall mto CommuniSt hands Acheson had resiSted the pressure, to av01d dnvmg the Chmese closer to the Russians The North Kor~n .1ggressto n brought htm round to the VJew of hiS cmtcs, though he sull m.s15ted that the Seventh Fleet must prevent a Nauorullst mvaswn of the mamland . as well as a Commumst

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attack on Taiwan. The French, and their contacts in Washington , been pressing for more help in Indochina: they, and the British , had begun to deploy arguments based on the analogy of Munich. Again, Korea overcame American hesitations, and got the United States more involved in Indochina. So, almost before it entered the Korean war, the United States had given that conflict a regional dimension. When on 30 june Truman received a recommendation from MacArthur for sending two divisions of ground troops to Korea, he approved it at once. But the wrote in his diary, 'Must be careful not to cause a general Asiatic war' . Even with American suppon, the South Korean forces were quickly pushed back down the peninsula, until they held only the area round the pon of Pusan in the southeastern comer. MacAnhur called for reinforcements, and got them. Truman asked Congress for an extra $10 billion, for what he insisted was not a war but a police action under the United Nations. Congress readily met his requests for money, as it already had the earlier one to extend the draft law. The atmosphere was one of bipanisan cooperation . 'Never before', wrote the journalist joseph Harsch , 'have I felt such a sense of relief and unity pass through the city'. MacArthur played his pan, by making effective use of the resources he was given. In one of his boldest military moves, he launched an amphibious landing at Inchon, which quickly led to the recapture of the capital, Seoul. The United Nations forces, which now included contributions from over a dozen countries, advanced up to the 38th parallel. MacArthur wanted to go on , in Hot Pursuit, and to destroy the enemy's forces . Few in Washington objected, except the Soviet experts, Kennan and Bohlen. Truman authorised the crossing of the 38th parallel, with the proviso that the border between North Korea and China was not to be crossed, and that only Korean troops were to be used close to that border. Then came a warning from Peking: if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel. China would send troops into North Korea. The warning was not heeded. MacAnhur's forces crossed the parallel on 9 October. With Congressional elections coming up, Truman flew to meet MacAnhur on Wake Island in the central Pacific, and decorated him again for his success. He tried to get across the point that the war was to be kept limited. Two weeks

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later, the President learned that Chinese troops were now in North Korea, opposing the United Nations forces. That day, two Puerto Ricans tried to kill him. He survived the assassination attempt, only to find that the political consensus on the war had broken down, and he was under severe criticism. At the end of November 19 50, the Chinese launched an offensive with quarter of a million men. MacArthur, who had been talking of bringing the boys home by Christmas , again demanded reinforcements, including Chinese Nationalist troops. He also proposed a naval blockade of China, and the bombing of the Chinese mainland. Truman rejected his proposal. The President agreed with Marshall, who was now Secretary of Defense, that there must be no war with China: To do this would be to fall into a carefully laid Russian trap'. The risk of starting a global war was much in the minds of all those involved in the decision-making: the Soviet atomic bomb was already doing its work, as the American bomb had in Western Europe . But Truman was not willing to give up what he had set out to do. 'We shall continue to work in the United Nations for concerted action to halt this aggression in Korea', he declared. And, for all his apprehensions, he was not prepared to exclude the use of the atomic bomb. His replies at a press conference on 30 November were taken to mean that the Administration was actively considering this possibility. The British Prime Minister, Attlee , immediately flew to Washington to object. Truman refused to give him a written commitment, but said he would not use the bomb without consulting the British Government. In his diary Truman wrote, 'It looks like World War Ill is here'. The Chinese offensive pushed the United Nations forces back across the 38th parallel. Seoul fell to the Communists for the second time . During the retreat, the American field commander, General Walker, was killed in a motor accident. His replacement, General Matthew Ridgway, eventually stabilised the situation. From the sidelines in Tokyo , MacArthur called for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and the dropping of thirty to fifty atomic bombs on Manchuria and the cities of China . Truman again rejected his proposals. This time he told MacArthur clearly that the objective was 'to demonstrate that aggression will not be . accepted by us or by the United Nations' (McCullough 1992, p. 833).

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'Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea , would not be beneficial if they thereby involved japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities'. The President declared a national emergency, asked Congress for even more money for defence , and called on every American ' to put aside his personal interests for the good of the country'. By the end of january 1951 , Ridgway's forces had begun to advance. They retook Seoul in mid-March , and were back on the 38th parallel by the end of that month . Truman instructed that a cease-fire proposal should be prepared for putting to the Communists. But MacArthur pre-empted the move by issuing a public statement threatening the Chinese with 'an expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases'. He also wrote to the Republican ex-Speaker, Martin, agreeing with his view that Chinese Nationalist troops should be used in Korea. The real war against communism was in Asia , not in Europe, MacArthur argued , and there was no substitute for victory. Martin made the letter public. American casualties now numbered over 50 ,000 and MacArthur's line drew widespread public support Truman had come to the conclusion that MacArthur would have to go. But the President was under attack already, and he was not willing to move until he had the full support of the] oint Chiefs of Staff. Early in April, they unanimously agreed that, from a military point of view, it was necessary that MacArthur be relieved of his commands. Truman acted immediately, and publicly dismissed MacArthur. Some Republicans saw this as a windfall to them: there was even talk of impeaching the President. Opinion polls showed that there was majority support for MacArthur, though not for war with China. After the General had delivered an emotional address to Congress, Senate committees held hearings to investigate the background to his dismissal , and the hearings went on for seven weeks. The turning point came when the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff made clear their support for the President's decision . The Chairman of the JCS , General Omar Bradley, summed up the view of the military establishment by saying that MacArthur's line would 'involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place , at the wrong time, and with the

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wrong enemy'. Marshall added that there could be no easy or decisive victory without another world war. In june 1951, the Soviet representative at the United Nations suggested publicly that negotiations should begin for a cease-fire. When they did, they proved to be difficult and protracted. There was by now deep hostility between the two sides, which produced many acrimonious exchanges. Fighting went on while the talks were taking place, for nearly two years, and casualties continued to mount. Frustration grew, and gave plenty of scope for the activities of McCarthy and his imitators. Early in 1952, Truman announced the decision he had taken before the war broke out not to seek re-election to the Presidency. Eisenhower accepted the Republican nomination, in preference to the Democratic one, and was elected by a large majority. During the campaign, he said that, if elected, he would go to Korea himself. He did, and threatened the Chinese with nuclear attack- a threat that was made privately. The cease-fire negotiations ended when an agreement was signed in july 1953. Stalin had died in March, and his successor, Malenkov, was trying to reduce tension so that he could increase production of consumer goods. The agreement left the two sides in positions not very different from those they were in before the war broke out. But Truman's original objective had been achieved: the North Koreans had failed to get control of the South. He had also succeeded in keeping the war limited, even after China had become involved. The price paid was high. In addition to the devastation of Korea , and the heavy casualties, Korean and Chinese as well as American, it included the intensification of McCarthyism in the United States, the militarisation of the Cold War in Europe , and the extension of the American alliance system to the Pacific. Asia did not replace Europe as the main threatre, but it did become the area in which tensions ran hottest, and could most easily lead to armed conflict. *

*

*

Long before the Korean war broke out, MacArthur had been advocating a peace treaty with japan that would end the Occupation on lenient terms . The japanese themselves were becoming restive: Prime Minister Yoshida took the question up with Washington at

War in Korea Deepens Confrontation 81

the beginning of 1950. But on this issue, as on Taiwan, Washington was divided. The State Department agreed with MacArthur, the Pentagon did not. The success of the Communists in China, and the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty, strengthened Acheson's hand. Despite military objections, and misgivings of his own, Truman accepted a recommendation for the appointment of john Foster Dulles as a special adviser to the Secretary of State, with responsibility for working out a peace settlement with japan. Dulles was a Republican lawyer, who had worked closely with Dewey and with Vandenburg. Arriving in Tokyo from Seoul on the day of the North Korean invasion, he argued against MacArthur's initial inclination to play it down. The war quickly dissolved resistance in Washington to the idea of a peace treaty. In September, Truman said that a new effort should be made to work out a peace treaty, and Dulles was beginning negotiations. But his task was still not straightforward. The Soviet Union and China were opposed to what they regarded as a 'soft' peace with japan, and India would be influenced by them. Britain agreed that it would be counterproductive to put limitations on Japanese rearmament, but it did want some economic restrictions written into the treaty. Australia and New Zealand were alone in seeking treaty limitations on rearmament. Dulles was prepared to disregard Soviet and Chinese objections, but he could hardly disregard those of the Commonwealth countries as well. He had to find a way of placating at least the Australians and the New Zealanders, without prejudicing his objective of keeping Japan free of restrictions it might later rebel against. The solution he hit upon was a Pacific security arrangement. Ever since the Second World War, Australia and New Zealand had been looking for an American guarantee of their security. Japan was still their main worry, but some concern had also been aroused by the outbreak of Communist rebellions in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia. The formation of the North Atlantic alliance brought the question to the fore in 1949: out of office, even Churchill lent his weight to the idea of a Pacific pact, assuming that Britain would be included. But it still did not find favour in Washington. In May Acheson issued a statement agreeing with Nehru that 'a Pacific defence pact could not take shape until present internal conflicts in Asia were resolved'. The point became clearer when

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Chiang Kai-shek and the President of the Philippines agreed to work for an anti-Communist association that would include South Korea and perhaps Thailand. With the election of more conservative governments at the end of 1949, Australia and New Zealand were coming closer to the American outlook on Pacific security questions. At a conference of Commonwealth foreign ministers early in 1950, they declined to follow Britain in recognising the Peoples Republic of China. And on the outbreak of war in Korea, they both supponed the United States in the United Nations, and sent army and navy units to fight the Nonh Koreans. Soon afterwards, the Australian Foreign Minister, Spender, took an opponunity to raise the question of a security guarantee with President Truman , and got a sympathetic response. But it was only when Dulles took up the question that things began to happen. In january 1951 Dulles went back to Tokyo, this time as a Presidential envoy, to work out the application of the principles the United States Government had laid down for the peace settlement. These included the continued stationing of American forces in japan, to avoid the creation of any vacuum of power. At the outset, he seems to have envisaged a regional arrangement that would include japan, as well as the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. He realised before he left Tokyo that this was not practical politics for the japanese: and in Manila he found it was not acceptable to the Filipinos either. When he reached Canberra, he found that Australia and New Zealand were preparing themselves to accept the peace treaty he had in view, despite their fears of japan, in return for an American guarantee of their security, but they preferred to keep the arrangement on a narrow basis. America's interest coincided with theirs: Dulles did not want Britain included, not least because France would then have to be brought in as well. He had also taken to hean the lesson of Acheson's Defensive Perimeter speech: he recognised the risks involved in drawing lines that left out some vulnerable countries. So he settled for separate treaties with the Philippines, and with Australia and New Zealand. But, skilfulllawyer as he was, he made them interlocking, and mutually reinforcing. An armed attack on one of the panies, which the others would act to meet 'in accordance with their constitutional processes', was defined to include an attack on its armed forces, vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific area, as well as their

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actual territories. This clause, which reappeared in all the later treaties, effectively tied the other parties to American strategy. It also set up a framework that could be extended as the need arose. The system centred on the United States, even more than NATO did, and it left American hands much freer. The hub and spokes design ensured American control. When Eisenhower was elected President, he appointed Dulles Secretary of State. McCarthyism was now at its height. During the election campaign, Eisenhower felt unable to defend Marshall, his military mentor, against the Senator's attacks. Whatever his personal views, he was bound, as a Republican President, to take a strong line on Communism. But he was also under pressure to reduce taxes, which meant cutting defence spending. To reconcile these conflicting demands, Eisenhower adopted a 'New Look' defence policy. It envisaged that countries threatened with Communist aggression would rely on their own forces , but they would be backed by the threat of 'Massive Retaliation' by the United States. This led to the use of nuclear threats to achieve diplomatic objectives, which Dulles himself called 'Brinkmanship'. He often used dramatic words, like 'crusade' and 'rollback', and sometimes adopted bellicose postures, especially on Asian issues. His bark proved to be worse than his bite. His minimum objectives- what he was in the end prepared to accept - were limited: in most cases he was doing no more than maintain the status quo . But the tactics he used aroused concern, particularly in Europe. They increased tension, not so much between the United States and the Soviet Union, but more between America and is closest allies. As soon as the Korean war was over, the spotlight moved to Indochina. Despite increased American aid, French forces were having growing difficulty in coping with the Communists led by Ho Chi Minh, and pressure was rising in France to end the war. Stalin's death, coming soon after the testing of the hydrogen bomb, intensified the pressure. Even Churchill, now Prime Minister again, felt that the time had come to talk to the Russians. His proposal in May 1953 for East-West negotiations was not well received in Washington. But the Korean armistice agreement called for a peace conference to be held later, and early in 1954 the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting for the first time in five years, agreed that it should take place in Geneva in the Spring. It

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was also agreed, with great reluctance on the part of the Americans, that Indochina should be discussed, as well as Korea, and that the PRC should be invited to take part. The Republican leader in the Senate, William Knowland, denounced this as an act of appeasement, and a step towards recognition of Peking. The conservative Government in Paris, led by joseph Laniel, had already said that the burden of Indochina was too heavy for France alone to bear. It sought American support for a new military effort in 1954, and the United States agreed to provide more money. But the fighting was going in favour of the Communists, especially in the remote northwest parts of Vietnam, near the border of Laos. While they were exploring the possibility of negotiations, the French deployed a division around the frontier settlement of Dien Bien Phu. The Communists then besieged it . Caught in a trap, largely of their own making, the French appealed to the United States for air support. Dulles responded by urging that the threat of Communism in Southeast Asia be met by 'united action'. Eisenhower advanced the Domino Theory. Vice-President Nixon hinted that American troops might have to be sent to Vietnam. The British argued against armed intervention, and made their agreement to collective action conditional on the opening of negotiations. But the decisive voices came from within the United States Government. The joint Chiefs of Staff considered that 'the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces [to Indochina] would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities'. Senator Knowland said on television that he would support American intervention only if the Chinese Communists intervened in force . And President Eisenhower himself did not think the preservation of Indochina was a task the United States should undertake alone. The Laniel Government fell on 12 june: the new Premier, Pierre Mendes-France, abandoned the attempt to get the United States to intervene , and set out to achieve a negotiated settlement. Dulles's statement of 29 March represented a change in the American approach to security arrangements in the area. Hitherto it had been accepted that the United States should confine its commitments to the Island Chain and should not undertake any treaty obligations on the mainland of Southeast Asia. It had also been accepted that the initiative for any regional security arrangement would have to come from within the region. To

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prevent a Communist takeover without using American forces, Dulles abandoned both principles. The British went along, partly because of their concern for Malaya and Singapore, but mainly to get the Americans to accept the need for a negotiated settlement in Indochina. Dulles showed great reluctance to do this. He refused to take pan in the Geneva conference on Indochina, and personally snubbed Chou En-lai. When the conference finally agreed to divide Vietnam temporarily at the 17th parallel, the United States refused to associate itself with the settlement. Dulles's main aim now was to prevent the southern half of the country from falling under Communist control. This was the purpose of the treaty signed in Manila in September by Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan and the United States. The formulae used in it were similar to those already included in the treaties with Australia and New Zealand and with the Philippines. In effect, it extended the coverage of the American security system to four countries on the mainland of Southeast Asia , Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. The Dien Bien Phu crisis was a turning point, for the United States as well as for France. The possibility of direct American intervention, when specifically raised, was rejected, by a Republican Administration. The prospect of Congressional elections may have had some effect: the Republicans were claiming credit for the ending of the war in Korea , and could hardly afford to take tht country into another one in Asia at that time . Anti-Communism, which had peaked during the later stages of the war, was beginning to ebb. McCarthy had overreached himself by attacking the Army, and met his Waterloo in the televised Congressional hearings on his charges that summer. But international tension did not abate quickly. Indeed, it reached a new height early in · 1955. Once again, Dulles conjured up the spectre of nuclear war with China, this time over what were known as the Offshore Islands. In September 1954, the Chinese Communists had begun shelling the Nationalist positions on the small islands of Quemoy and Matsu , in the bay of Amoy. The Manila conference was just assembling to sign the South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty. Dulles was going on to Taipeh, where Chiang was pressing for a separate treaty with the United States, to make up for Taiwan's exclusion from the Manila Pact. Nehru believed that Mao was still

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afraid the Nationalists might invade the mainland with American support. Dulles had talked of that possibility,as had Congressional leaders. Whatever the Communists' reasons, they were attacking the Nationalists, whose position in Taiwan was now considered essential to the security of the region. The JCS wanted the United States to help defend Quemoy. Dulles knew that, as this would probably involve the use of nuclear weapons, the British would object. He recommended, and the President agreed, that New Zealand should be asked to introduce a resolution in the United Nations Security Council calling for a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait. The President also agreed to the United States concluding a security treaty with the Chinese Nationalists covering Taiwan, which it did in December. The declared concern of the Administration was to prevent a breakdown of morale in Taiwan, but it seems likely that Eisenhower and Dulles were trying to restrain Chiang from taking action that would involve America in a war with China. In january 1955, the Communists increased their pressure on the Tachen islands, some even smaller ones to the north of Quemoy and Matsu. The United States got the Nationalists to evacuate them, but not Quemoy and Matsu. Eisenhower told Churchill that 'the psychological effect in the Far East of deserting our friends on Formosa would risk a collapse of Asiatic resistance'. Peking had rejected a New Zealand-sponsored invitation to take part in a Security Council discussion on the problem. Congress authorised the use of armed force in any situation that looked like the beginning of an attack on Taiwan. A serious rift threatened to open between the United States and its allies on the issue: the Australian Prime Minister, Menzies, told the Americans that 'Australian and other British opinion would be opposed to accepting war over the "offshore islands"'. But Dulles did not relent immediately. In a television broadcast on 8 March he spoke of atomic and conventional weapons as being 'interchangeable'. The crisis ended only towards the end of April, when Chou En-lai, attending the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, made a conciliatory statement, and offered to negotiate with the Americans. The Communist shelling of the Offshore Islands stopped in May. In july the United States and the Peoples Republic of China opened ambassadorial talks in Geneva. How had the crisis been resolved? The Americans had supported

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Chiang in holding on to Quemoy and Matsu, as well as entering into a treaty obligation to defend Taiwan. But the Nationalists had not attacked the mainland. Dulles had reversed Theodore Roosevelt's maxim, 'Talk softly, and carry a big stick'. He talked of nuclear war, but avoided it. His Brinkmanship succeeded, and demonstrated that the New Look defence policy could work. The main cost was further strain on relations with the British, and particularly with Eden, who had finally succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister. His experiences in the two Far Eastern crises of 1954-55 had led him to overestimate Dulles's role in foreign policy, and underestimate that of Eisenhower. They had also made him anxious to show that Britain did not always have to follow America's lead. The breakdown of Anglo-American relations during the Suez crisis of 1956 owed more than a little to the tensions that had arisen over China from 1951 on. SEATO proved to be a damp squib- or, as Mao called it, a 'paper tiger'. The analogy implied by the acronym was misleading: the name was at first disapproved of by the Americans themselves, for that reason. The membership lacked the relative homogeneity and solidarity of NATO. Even the sense of common threat was weak, especially in the case of Pakistan. There was no effective military organisation: the planning process was hamstrung by policy differences, which grew as tension mounted over Laos. Vietnam was never fully accepted as a partner, or even as a protege: the guarantee of its security remained essentially an American one. Only Thailand clearly benefited from SEATO. The Manila treaty gave it, for the first time, an assurance that the United States would come to its defence if it was attacked. That opened the way for the development of American bases in Thailand, which would become more important as the situation in Vietnam deteriorated. Although SEATO had a corporate existence, it was the treaty rather than the organisation that mattered. And the treaty was simply an extension to the mainland of the Hub and Spokes system Dulles had set up in 1951. The Americans retained full control, limited only by the residual influence of the British. By the end of 1955, the relationship between the United States and Communist China had settled into a pattern. Washington and Peking were hostile to each other, in private as well as in public. They had begun talking to each other, but only in a strictly limited

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framework, and with little result for a long time. The Americans went on using their influence to keep the Chinese out of the United Nations: the Chinese responded by throwing their weight behind the neutralist movement that emerged from the Bandung Conference. The situation could have been described as No War, No Peace. It was a continuing armed confrontation, which denied both countries, and their allies, the possibility of normal intercourse. That confrontation was to last altogether for twenty years - until America became involved in another costly and frustrating war in Asia, and had to seek China's help to get out of it. Sources Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy. Colbert, Southeast Asia in Internatinal Politics . Dulles, "Security in the Pacific", Foreign Affairs. Lowe , The Origins of the Korean War. McCullough , Truman. Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Woodard, "Australian Foreign Policy on the Offshore Islands Crisis of 1954-5 and Recognition of China", Australian journal of International Affairs no. l (1 992) .

CHAPTER Vietnam -

6

Failure, and Success

The Vietnam war was a critical episode in America's relations with Asia: perhaps it was the critical point, so far. There are at least three specific reasons for this judgement. -

The war was the culmination of the effon the United States had been making, ever since the Second World War, to stop the expansion of Communism in Asia.

-The ultimate withdrawal of American troops and aid demonstrated that there were limits to the price that Americans were prepared to pay to achieve this goal. -

The outpouring of American resources during the war made possible the fast economic growth that took place in Southeast as well as East Asia in the sixties, and ensured that Communism did not spread beyond Indochina.

The Domino Theory, as expounded by Eisehower and Dulles in the fifties, was not borne out by the event, but that was at least panly because of the effon made by the United States in Vietnam. In Asia , as in Europe , America succeeded in containing Communism. But in the process it lost its own unity.

• • • The United States first became involved in Vietnam -

or French

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Indochina, as it was then- near the end of the Second World War, when it was looking for help against japan. Franklin Roosevelt was sympathetic to anti-colonial movements, and did not discourage the Office of Strategic Services from making contact with the Vietnamese resistance led by Ho Chi Minh. Ho was a long-time Communist, who had been sent out by Moscow in 1925 to organise the movement against the French, and the japanese with whom they were collaborating. He got on well with the OSS people who worked with him: he professed an admiration for George Washington, as did Mao. But the relationship did not long survive the circumstances that gave rise to it. When japan collapsed in 1945, the British helped the French to return to Indochina, and begin re-establishing their Empire. The deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the following year made France more imponant to the Americans. When the French sought help for Indochina, the United States responded modestly - initially for European reasons, rather than Asian. But the success of the Chinese Communists, and the recognition of Ho's regime by Peking and Moscow, put the question into an Asian context. When the Nonh Koreans invaded the South in 1950, one of the first things the United States did was to step up its aid to the French. Indochina was already seen as a theatre in the Cold War, and the war there as pan of the wider struggle against Communism. Ho was a Communist, and he had the suppon of Peking as well as Moscow. But the movement he led drew its growing strength mainly from Vietnamese nationalism. Like the Americans, the Vietnamese had had to fight for their independence: in Vietnam's case the struggle had lasted longer - about a thousand years . Unlike Britain, China never fully accepted the outcome: the Chinese went on treating the Vietnamese as recalcitrant tributaries. The Vietnamese. for their pan. developed a strong sense of identity, and a fierce determination to maintain it. The French missionaries who arrived in the 17th century benefited from this feeling, and stimulated it- not least by giving the Vietnamese a Romanised script. to replace Chinese characters. But in the mid-19th century, after the Optum War. the French began to take over. Initially on the pretext of protecting the Cambodians. they established a military presence. and gradually took control of Vietnam , as well as

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Cambodia, and Laos. Culturally and economically the most advanced part of the French Empire, Indochina came to play something of the role that India did in the British Empire - a symbol of status and power. But the rationales were different. 'Trusteeship' was the idea the British evolved during the 19th century: 'Assimilation' was the French objective. Some Vietnamese did assimilate, and were accepted as Frenchmen. Others reacted, not so much against the theory as against the way it was applied. French colonial rule was never gentle, and it tended to become harsher as resistance grew. The handling of Vietnamese protests in the thirties played its part in the rise of the Viet Minh. After the War, the French made promises of political development, and set up a framework of autonomous government. But these moves were overshadowed by the escalation of the military effort to suppress the Viet Minh, and the realities did not change much. The conflict intensified, the costs rose, and in the end the will of the French broke. The Vietnamese did not get what they thought they had earned - their independence as a nation. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, Chou En-lai persuaded them to accept a cease-fire which left French forces in control of the southern half of the country, on the understanding that nation-wide elections would take place within two years. The Russians supported this arrangement, for their own reasons: Stalin's successors were looking for ways of easing tension with the West, and preventing the rearmament of Germany. The Chinese had different objectives. In the aftermath of the Korean War, they were still worried about American intentions, and they were glad to have North Vietnam in Communist hands. But they did not want the Vietnamese to replace the French as rulers of a united Indochina. China's actions after 1975 throw light on its aims, and its strategy, over the preceding twenty years . Far from supporting and encouraging the takeover of South Vietnam by the Communists in the North, the Chinese usually used what influence they had to slow down the process, and to uphold Cambodia against Vietnam. Belief in the monolithic nature of Communism made it difficult for Americans to understand the equivocal character of China's support for Vietnam, or to exploit it, at least until the war was over. Ho and his colleagues must have felt bitter about the treatment

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they got from the Chinese and the Russians at Geneva: the Vietnamese later talked about the betrayal of their cause . But they depended on Chinese and Soviet suppon, and had to accept what was negotiated for them . Large numbers of Communists were withdrawn from the South: the organisation there was not disbanded, but it was weakened . The movement of a million Catholics from the Nonh to the South tipped the scales funher. The Catholic nationalist, Ngo Dinh Diem. who had been appointed as Prime Minister by the effete Emperor Bao Dai, took over from the French and won American recognition of his government. He refused to sign the Geneva agreement, or to hold the elections it called for . Distancing himself from the French. Dlem broke with Bao Dai and was elected President of the Republic of Vietnam. This widened his suppon, at home and abroad. By 195 7 he was well enough established to hold a large and lengthy international conference in Saigon, without serious interruption from the Communists. But Diem did not take full advantage of the reprieve . As a bachelor, with strong family loyalties, he relied heavily on his brothers, not all of whom followed his high principles. Under American influence, he also came to rely on the army he had inherited from the French, and especially on officers he thought loyal to himself. He did take advice from other quaners as well. A British official from Malaya, Sir Roben Thompson, helped to plan a system of Strategic Hamlets to cut the Communists off from the peasants. But there was no ethnic division in South Vietnam comparable with that between Malays and Chinese in Malaya, and the Vietnamese administration was not as effective as the British. Far from winning the peasants' suppon, the Strategic Hamlets alienated them, and helped the Communists. By 1959 Hanoi had begun sending trained cadres back to the South, to strengthen the armed resistance to the Government in Saigon. In 1960, the National Liberation Front was created, in the hope of broadening the base of the movement. But Ho was proceeding cautiously: Whether or not he had studied the experience of the Nonh Koreans, and the japanese, he was careful to avoid the mistake of giving the Americans a sudden violent shock. The steady infiltration of men and supplies was hard to present as aggression, and provided no clear casus belli like the crossing of the 38th Parallel.

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*

*

*

john F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States at the end of 1960. A wealthy Catholic from Boston, he had helped Diem when he was there in exile. During the election campaign his opponent, Nixon, revived the old charge that the Democrats were 'Soft on Communism'. The television debates between the candidates were competitions in anti-Communism, in which Laos played a prominent part. Kennedy did not change after his election. In his Inaugural Address he outdid Truman by saying that America would 'pay any price . . . to assure the survival and success of liberty' (Public Papers 1961). (Seven years later, after the Tet offensive, Alistair Cooke observed that 'Vietnam was the price of the Kennedy Inaugural'.) Kennedy appointed as his Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, the successful head of the Ford Motor Company, who was a master at assembling and deploying facts and figures to support a case. As Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff Kennedy appointed General Maxwell Taylor, who had criticised Massive Retaliation and favoured instead Flexible Response, with greater reliance on conventional forces. Under their leadership, the Pentagon gave the impression of believing that there was no problem which could not be solved by the application of modem technology. Quantitative analysis seemed to replace qualitative judgement. In relation to Vietnam, the new team emphasised Counter-Insurgency, with extensive use of helicopters, and Nation-Building, without much democracy. But these techniques did not solve the problem: Diem was losing ground, and the Communists were gaining. After a couple of years Kennedy began to have doubts about the war. But the high-flown rhetoric he himself had used, with the politicaf competition represented by Nixon, made withdrawal unthinkable. The only politically acceptable course of action was to step up aid to South Vietnam, and send Americans to make sure it was used properly. So Kennedy authorised the attachment of American soldiers as advisers to South Vietnamese units on combat operations. For the first time, Americans were involved in actual fighting with Vietnamese Communists. This change of policy did not solve the problem either. The political situation was deteriorating. The hitherto non-political

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Buddhists reacted against the Diem family's dtscnmmatton m favour of Catholics. A confrontation developed , m whtch a BuddhLSt monk burned himself to death . Televiston took the tmage mto American homes, and Diem got little sympathy . Kennedy felt that a stronger hand was needed in Satgon. and he appotmed as Ambassador the former ~publican Vtce-Prestdenttal candtdate . Henry Cabot Lodge . With little if any previous expenence m Asta . Lodge blamed Diem for the problems that the Untted tales was facing , and encouraged a group of Vietnamese army ofhcers to plan a coup against their President. Some sem r people m Washington were against the idea , but Lodge was not ordered to drop it. With his acquiescence, the coup took place on 2 November 1963: Diem was killed the next day . Three weeks later. Kennedy himself was assassinated m Dallas, Texas. The ovenhrow of Diem was widely welcomed , m Amenca and elsewhere in the West, but it proved to have its d isadvantages. For all his shoncomings. he was a dedicated nationalist. and as such he commanded respect . even from hts enemies Hi electtons may have been rigged, but the fact that he had been elected President enhanced his legitimacy, not least in the outside world . His successors had no comparable claim. They were a group of army officers, of diverse backgrounds and diverse loyalties. who could not even work together for long. So Diem's death made it necessary for the United States to take more direct responsibility. not only for fighting the Communists, but also for running the country. At one stroke it destroyed what in retrospect looks like the best chance there was to make South Vietnam a viable non-Communist state. A comparison with South Korea and Taiwan suggests that the job could still have been done by a determined leader who stayed in power for a long time, and took good advice . Diem may have lacked the political skill required, and relied too heavily on his brothers instead of his advisers, but if he could not rise above family and corruption there was little prospect of anyone else doing so. South Vietnam did not collapse immediately, or for some time. The United States was forced to take more responsibility, but it could not take over altogether. Most Americans were still strongly opposed to colonialism. So one general after another had to be propped up and presented to the world as President. And if they

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were seldom widely acclaimed, they were seldom rejected either. Long accustomed as they were to harsh and extortionate rulers, the Vietnamese still tended to accept whatever government was in power, and carry out its instructions. A growing number accepted the Communist line, and gave the VietCong practical help, if they did not actually join them. But the drift never seems to have reached critical proportions. Even after the Americans had gone, the Communists could not take over the South without large-scale military operations by a well-equipped army. The resistance to Communism in the South must have been stronger and more determined than it looked at the time.

* * * Lyndon johnson, who succeeded Kennedy as President of the United States, had been to Saigon as Vice President, and likened Diem to Churchill. But foreign affairs were not johnson's top priority. He attached most importance to building what he called a 'Great Society', in which all Americans could enjoy the fruits of their country's success. His first objective with regard to Vietnam was to prevent conservatives in Congress from using the war to sabotage his welfare programme. So Guns could not be allowed to compete with Butter: America was rich enough to afford both. johnson aimed to do enough in Vietnam to avoid any appearance of defeat: he was determined not to be the first President to lose a war. But he also aimed to keep the costs within the tolerance of Congressmen, and their constitutents. In the election of 1964 he was opposed by Senator Barry Goldwater, a general in the Air Force Reserve, who promised to use American air power to end the war. johnson rejected that option during the campaign, and promised not to send Americans to fight in Vietnam. But he took advantage of clashes between American destroyers and North Vietnamese gunboats off the coast of North Vietnam to take a strong public stand against Communist aggression, which won him general support. Opinion polls indicated that 85 per cent of Americans supported the Administration. Only two senators voted against the resolution that had been prepared in advance authorising the President to commit American forces to the defence of any country in Southeast Asia threatened by Communist aggression or

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subversion. Not one member of the House of Representatives opposed the motion. johnson had reason for believing that the American people wanted to go on supponing South Vietnam. Kennedy's rhetoric still seemed to reflect the public will, and withdrawal was still unthinkable. johnson went on. Having won the election handsomely, he authorised the bombing of Nonh Viemam. That did not stop the deterioration of the situation on the ground in South Vietnam, so he authorised the use of American combat troops. These two decisions changed the character of the war: the United States was now fighting the Vietnamese Communists directly. But johnson still proceeded cautiously. He was anxious to avoid a war with China, and he kept the bombing well away from the Chinese border. Some clandestine operations were already going on in Nonh Vietnam, but an invasion was ruled out. johnson also excluded the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Nor did he give the generals all the troops they wanted. But he did authorise a build-up that put half a million Americans in South Vietnam within a year. This enabled Westmoreland, the American commander in Saigon, to adopt more aggressive tactics than had been possible before. Search and Destroy missions became the order of the day, and some were effective . The Communists' casualties rose sharply, and the Kill Ratio was against them. But Hanoi found ways of replacing its losses, by sending more men and women down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia, and more of the supplies that were being provided by the Chinese and the Russians. Despite the increased pressure, the Nonh Vietnamese managed to build up their forces for the counteroffensive they were planning against the cities of the South, including Saigon.

* * * The blow fell on 30 january 1968. A temporary truce had been declared for the Vietnamese festival of Tet. The assumption was that the Communists would not dare to break it, for fear of alienating popular support. But they did. Long-planned and carefully prepared attacks were launched at night on cities and

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other key points up and down the country. The most widely publicised was the assault on the American Embassy in Saigon, though the Communist seizure of Hue in the north lasted longer, and cost more lives. The Tet offensive did not achieve its main objective, which was to weaken the American and South Vietnamese position on the ground. The Communists themselves suffered severely, both in the attacks and from the riposte that followed. The local element in their forces was further reduced, and the replacements from the North were not always popular. Influencing American opinion does not seem to have been a primary objective: until then, and even later, Hanoi put this second to success on the ground. But it was in America that Tet had its greatest impact. The point it made was that even half a million American soldiers could not make Saigon secure. The Communist attacks gave Americans a shock that was comparable with the invasion of South Korea, if not with Pearl Harbor. But this shock had the opposite effect. Instead of bringing Americans together to resist the aggressor, Tet divided them, and the division limited the reaction. Frustration led to demands for widening the war, just as it had in the case of Korea, but these demands were increasingly drowned out by protests against the war itself, and demands that it be ended. Public opinion, which had so strongly supported the growing American involvement in the war, was now turning against it. The change was not instantaneous, and it took a long time to complete. The military wanted to send more troops, and call up the reserves to replace them, as well as expand the bombing. johnson considered these options seriously. But the change in the public atmosphere was brought home to him by his new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford. (McNamara had been eased out of the job, because he had lost his earlier enthusiasm for the war.) Hitherto a Hawk himself, Clifford found on taking office that even leading conservatives in Congress like Senator Stennis were beginning to question whether the effort could be sustained. The equally conservative Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler, brought the point home by telling the President that the cost could not be met without tax increases. Clifford then called in a number of elder statesmen, including Acheson, who seems to have played

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a key part in convincing johnson that escalation had to stop. At the end of March, johnson went on television to announce that he was restricting the bombing of North Vietnam, and was ready to open negotiations. He added (Karnow 1983, p . 565): 'I have concluded that I should not permit the presidency to become involved in the partisan divisions that are developing in this political year ... Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your president'. The comer had been turned.

* * * In the past, it had been America's enemies who had miscalculated: this time it was the Americans themselves. They had underestimated the power of Vietnamese nationalism to inspire sacrifice. It took a long time for Washington to grasp that heavy losses, whether in the field or from bombing, only strengthened the resolution of the Vietnamese leaders, and the patriotism of their people. Johnson was amazed when Ho turned down what he saw as a generous offer of American aid in return for withdrawal from the South. It was harder for Americans in the 20th century than it had been in the 18th century to see that material considerations are not always paramount. But this was not the most serious miscalculation madt in Washington about the Vietnam war: that was about Americans themselves. johnson was politically acute: he clearly sensed at an early stage that public tolerance had its limits. He was careful to let students defer their military service, so that most middle class parents would not have to send their sons to Vietnam. He eschewed the option of appealing to patriotism - 'wrapping himself in the Stars and Stripes' - even when the cost was getting high, and ordinary people could not understand why they should pay it. Trying to drive a tank with a two-stroke, was one way his approach was described at the time. But, acute though he was, johnson missed the change that was going on in public attitudes. The rhetoric of anti-Communism was still being used, especially by politicians, but it was losing its power to move people. After

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Kennedy had called Khrushchev's bluff and made him take Soviet missiles out of Cuba in 1962, Communism did not look as much of a threat as it had in the 50s, and nuclear war itself looked rather more frightening. The war in Vietnam demonstrated again the costs of stopping Communism in Asia, and through television brought them horne to individual Americans. They were already becoming less certain of their priorities, and their values. The students who were protesting on campuses were to some extent reflecting the feelings of their parents - feelings of confusion, doubt, and uncenainty. Americans were losing the certitude that anti-Communism had given them, and the willingness to give things up for their country. The war, and the shock of the Tet offensive, precipitated this change, but its causes lay deeper, and lay largely within America itself. Living through the year 1968 was a harrowing experience for Americans. johnson's decision not to seek re-election was followed by the assassination of Manin Luther King, which sparked another round of racial riots in American cities, this time including Washington. Smoke from the looting fires could be seen hanging over the Capitol. Roben Kennedy announced that he would seek the Democratic nomination for the Presidency, and campaign against the war. He too was assassinated. Students, encouraged by their counterparts in Paris, once again besieged university administrations, and took over campuses. In August Brezhnev showed how little the Soviet Union had changed by sending troops into Czechoslovakia to get rid of the liberalising Dubcek. But in America attention was concentrated on Chicago, where the Democratic Pany was holding its Convention. Organised anti-war protests disrupted the proceedings in the hall: police and demonstrators clashed on the streets outside. The once respected liberal, Huben Humphrey, won the nomination, but he had not distanced himself far enough from johnson to satisfy the Left, and was vilified. When the election finally took place, he was beaten by Kennedy's old opponent, Richard Nixon. Ever since he went into Congress 1946, Nixon had taken a hard line on Communism. During the late 40s and early 50s, he was in the lead in using China, as well as Alger Hiss, to discredit the Democratic Administration. As Vice President under Eisenhower at the time of Dien Bien Phu, he was one of the first to suggest

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sending American troops to Vietnam. But Nixon had come to take a serious and sustained interest in international politics, and his private views did not always tally with his public posture. As early as August 1954 he said in the National Security Council that 'in the long run Soviet Russia and Communist China can and must be split apan' (Gaddis 1987, p . 182). In August 1967 FortignAJfairs published an article in which he said, 'Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations' (Kissinger 1979. p.164). The Cultural Revolution was then at its height: the British Embassy in Peking was sacked the same month. The war in Vietnam seemed to be going better, though casualties were mounting. Nixon did not link the two issues in his article, or in an interview he gave a year later. But in that he said, 'We must always seek opportunities to talk to the Chinese', and 'We must not only watch for changes. We must seek to make changes' (Kissinger 1979, p . 164). Then came the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which had a galvanic effect on Peking.

* * * Mao's relations with Moscow had never been easy. The high point was the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950. The Korean war made it necessary for both sides to keep up appearances: no public disagreement took place until it was over, and Stalin was dead. At the Soviet Patty Congress in 1956, Khrushchev denounced his predecessor, just after the Chinese representative, Chu Teh, had sung Stalin's praises. Still in 1957 the Soviet Union agreed to help China develop its nuclear technology. Some thousands of Russians were then working in China under their arrangements for economic and technological cooperation. But Khrushchev criticised the Great Leap Forward, and judged Mao a 'Romantic Deviationist'. He got angry when, without telling Moscow. the Chinese started shelling Quemoy and Matsu again in 1958, just as Khrushchev was working out a modus vivendi with Eisenhower. In the ensuing confrontation with the United States, China did not have the suppon of the Soviet Union. The Russians also refused to give China the atomic bomb that Mao thought it had been promised. Straight after his visit to America in 1959, Khrushchev flew to Peking and told Mao he was trying to exclude war as a means of settling disputes. The

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Chinese response was that they were not afraid of war. even if it was nuclear. Mao was quoted as saying that, if half the people in China were killed, there would still be three hundred million Chinese left alive . A few months later, Moscow announced that it was withdrawing 1390 Soviet experts from China. They left in September 1960, taking their plans and blueprints with them . Sino-Soviet cooperation had broken down, but many in the West went on talking about Communism as a monolith. For the next few years the Russians and the Chinese wrangled over what seemed to outsiders esoteric ideological questions. The Chinese moved funher to the Left, first in foreign policy, and then internally. China encouraged the more extreme revolutionaries in the Third World, and tried to take over the Non Aligned Movement. And in 1966 Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution . The spectacle of mass violence in China aroused atavistic fears among Russians, as well as hopes of scoring off Peking in dealings with the West. Soviet forces along the Chinese border were steadily built up, and armed with advanced weapons. some nuclear. The Chinese, preoccupied with their internecine strife, did not at first seem to take much notice, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia set alarm bells ringing in Peking. Mao seems finally to have realised that the Russians were capable of using force against another Communist country to prevent it straying too far from the Soviet line. The army was ordered to restore some son of order within China, as well as to defend its borders more vigilantly. Aggressive Chinese patrolling on the disputed islands in the Ussuri River, the nonhern boundary of Manchuria, led to armed clashes with Soviet border guards in March 1969, just after Nixon took office. The significance of the Sino-Soviet split was masked by the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Chinese, as well as by the antiCommunist rhetoric in the West. Under johnson. the United States continued to identify Vietnam with China: in 1966 Secretary of State Dean Rusk raised the spectre of half a billion Chinese overrunning Southeast Asia. But both Peking and Washington took care to avoid a direct confrontation over Vietnam. The Ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw were suspended for two years. but they resumed in 1969. The Chinese made strong protests about incursions by American aircraft into Chinese air space.

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without even threatening any specific action Then. m january 1970. at the 135th meeting. things changed . The Chmese representative suggested that talks might be held at a htgher level. The American Ambassador was already bnefed to say that the United States might be 'prepared to constder sendmg a representative to Peking'.

• • • By then Ametican troops were being withdrawn from Vietnam. Nixon's policy. as explained in a speech at Guam in july 1969. was not unlike that expounded by Acheson in january 1950. or the one followed by Dulles later. America's allies would be expected to defend themselves unless they were attacked by a nuclear power. This meant that the war was to be 'Vietnamtsed'. South Vietnamese forces were to be built up. and supponed wuh American air power. while American troops were withdrawn m stages. No time was lost putting the policy into effect : by the end of the year the number of Americans in South Vietnam had been reduced by about 100.000 . But Nixon was sensitive to conservative pressures and was as anxious as johnson not to be the first President to lose a war. The Pacification Programme was reVIved and strengthened. under the name Operation Phoenix. It did serious damage to the Communist infrastructure, and forced Hanoi to rely even more heavily on troops and cadres from the Nonh . Early in 1970 Nixon took a more risky step. He authorised the generals to do what they had long wanted to - attack the Communist bases on the Cambodian side of the border. on the ground as well as from the air. This unmistakeable extension of the war provoked another round of public protest in America . It culminated in an incident at Kent State College in Ohio in May 1970, when the National Guard was called in and four students were shot. Kissinger had already had several meetings in Paris with Le Due Tho, a member of the Nonh Vietnamese Politburo. The official talks initiated under johnson were still going on there as well: little progress was being made in either forum . Hanoi thought the Americans were weakening, and was not willing to make concessions. With Congressional elections looming up again, even conservative politicians were getting worried about the war. In

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October Nixon tried to meet their demands by proposing a 'standstill cease-fire' in South Vietnam. That would leave the Communists in control of much of the country. Hanoi rejected the proposal, insisting that the government in Saigon must be replaced by a coalition including the Communists. The North Vietnamese were preparing for a big offensive in 1972, by developing the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the point where it could take heavy vehicles. To prevent this, Nixon authorised an operation in southern Laos which was to be carried out by South Vietnamese troops early in 1971. It did not succeed: the South Vietnamese were badly defeated. And it provoked yet another round of protests in America. Veterans of the war now joined students and others: 200,000 marched on Washington late in April. Soon afterwards the anti-war movement got another fillip from the unauthorised publication of The Pentagon Papers, a collection of confidential documents originally compiled on McNamara's instructions, revealing some of the differences within the Johnson Administration. Kissinger was still talking to Le Due Tho, and still getting nowhere. Hanoi insisted that Thieu must go: Nixon remembered what happened after Diem, and refused to repeat Lodge's mistake. Thieu compounded the problem by outmanoeuvring his rivals and winning an election that was relatively fair. The withdrawal of American troops still went on: by the end of 1971 their number was down to about 100,000. The frustrations involved in negotiating with the North Vietnamese sharpened the interest of Nixon and Kissinger in developing relations with China. The American invasion of Cambodia had interrupted the process soon after it began in 1970, but not for long. According to Kissinger, 'the tempered Chinese and Soviet reactions to our military moves pointed once again to the possibilities of triangular diplomacy to help settle the war' (Kissinger 1979, p. 695). Channels of communication were established between Washington and Peking and through them Chou En-lai indicated at the end of 1970 that 'a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome to visit Peking' (ibid, p. 701). At about the same time, the Chinese told Edgar Snow that 'Nixon is getting out of Vietnam' (ibid, p. 703). When the ill-fated operation was launched in southern Laos, Nixon said publicly that 'this action is not directed against Communist China'. Chou

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responded, during a visit to Hanoi, by not cnnasmg Nixon personally. Moscow registered the point by denouncing the American 'diplomacy of smiles' towards China. In July 1971 Kissinger went to Peking, for the first of several visits, to prepare the way for the President himself to go in February 1972. Neither the Americans nor the Chinese made the change in their relations conditional on any action regarding Vietnam. Chinese aid to North Vietnam was actually increasing as Hanoi built up its forces in the South for the next offensive. But the Vietnamese were under no illusions. Mao had drawn a parallel between South Vietnam and Taiwan, which implied again that Hanoi should not expect to achieve its goal quickly . When Nixon promised, in the Shanghai Communique, to reduce the American military presence in Taiwan 'as tension in the area diminishes', the North Vietnamese assumed that a deal had been done at their expense. The offensive was launched anyway, at the end of March 1972. With only a few thousand American combat troops left in the country. the South Vietnamese army had to take the brunt of the Communist attacks. It did not collapse: with American air support, it inflicted heavy losses. But the offensive showed that the South Vietnamese were still critically dependent on American support. The day after it began, Nixon ordered massive bombing of North Vietnam. He was due to go to Moscow in May, to meet Brezhnev for the first time. Kissinger was afraid that the Russians would cancel the visit because of the bombing. Nixon stepped it up, and had the harbour of Haiphong mined. A Soviet ship was hit by an American bomb. But a Soviet Minister who was on a visit to Washington posed for photographs with the President. Nixon's trip to Moscow was not cancelled. Hanoi complained publicly that the leaders of the Communist world were putting their 'immediate and narrow interests' before their 'lofty internationalist duties', and resumed the talks with Kissinger. In October Le Due Tho put forward a new proposal for a cease-fire that left the two sides in the South where they were, while the Americans completed their withdrawal. Although it did not meet the American requirement for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South, Kissinger accepted the proposal. With the Presidential election coming up, Nixon did too. But

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Thieu balked. Despite American pressure, he denounced the draft treaty , and put forward numerous amendments. Nixon won the election by a landslide. He then assured Thieu that if the Nonh Vietnamese broke the agreement the United States would retaliate. He also instructed Kissinger to put forward Thieu's amendments. Le Due Tho suspended the Paris talks and went back to Hanoi for consultations. After giving Hanoi an ultimatum , Nixon ordered the heaviest bombing of the war, which went on over Christmas. The Nonh Vietnamese agreed to resume talks when the bombing stopped. Kissinger and Le Due Tho met again on 8 january, and reached agreement the following day. Thieu then gave in. The agreement that was signed on 2 7 january was little different from the October draft. Nixon said 'We have finally achieved peace with honour' (Kamow 1983, p. 654) . In March the last American troops left Vietnam. The cease-fire left the South Vietnamese Government with a million men under arms and in control of more than three quaners of the country. The Communists had suffered funher heavy losses during 1972, and needed time to rebuild their strength. Thieu decided to take the offensive, and ordered his forces to retake ground wherever they could. The Communists lay low. developing their logistical system for yet another offensive. This time both Peking and Moscow rejected Hanoi's requests for increased aid : Chou En-lai advised Pham Van Dong to 'relax for say five or ten years'. But Nonh Vietnam had big enough stocks to go ahead on its own. The Communist forces went over to the offensive late in 1973 and soon regained most of the ground they had lost. They were nearly ready for the kill. The collapse began in Washington. Revelations about the domestic scandal known as the Watergate affair had begun to come out soon after Nixon's second inauguration. In june 1973, his own lawyer accused him of covering up illegal activities. After a year of bitter public controversy. and growing popular indignation, Nixon was ordered by the Supreme Coun to hand over to a special prosecutor the tape recordings he had made of his own conversations. The House judiciary Committee then recommended that the President be impeached. On 9 August 1974. Nixon ~igned .

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The North Vietnamese seemed to hesitate at the last moment, but they finally launched their offensive in March 1975. Using conventional forces and conventional tactics. they concentrated initially on the northern pan of South Vietnam. Thieu decided to abandon it, and consolidate his position in the south - only to reverse his decision and order that Hue be held to the last. Hanoi ordered its field commander to liberate the whole country before the rains came in May. Some heavy fightinF, was required, but the target was achieved . Saigon fell on 29 April. The American Ambassador was lifted out by helicopter from the roof of his Embassy.

• • • Nixon and Kissinger deserve credit for extricating the United States from a position that had become politically untenable . They saw. earlier and more clearly than most others. that the widening split between China and the Soviet Union made it possible to play one off against the other. and to undermine the support of both for North Vietnam. They exploited the possibilities of triangular diplomacy skilfully, and to considerable effect. By doing so. they eventually got an agreement with Hanoi which allowed the United States to withdraw without a complete loss of face . They fought a brilliant rear-guard action. But they could not conceal the fact that America was withdrawing from a long-standing commitment, without achieving the objective it had set itself. Nor could they conceal the reason. Despite Kennedy's rhetoric, Americans were not willing to 'pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty'. American politicians, and officials, had underestimated the determination of the leaders in Hanoi, and their ability to mobilise the patriotism of the Vietnamese people. But the greater mistake made in Washington was to overestimate the ability of American leaders to evoke a long-term effort from the American people. The essential misjudgement was not about Vietnam but about America. The anti-Communism that grew up in the late 40s gave Americans a common sense of direction, and generated some willingness to make sacrifices. But the Cuba Missile

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crisis weakened the incentive, and altered the priorities. The civil rights movement also raised questions about American values. Social changes played their pan - not least the rise of feminism. Some politicians, like Roben Kennedy, seem to have felt the ground moving beneath their feet, and tried to move with it. Most responded more slowly: some never did. There was a widespread reluctance to acknowledge the central problem - that Americans were not, despite all the rhetoric, willing to pay the price for preventing the Communists from taking over South Vietnam. There were some compensations. During the 60s the United States poured resources into Southeast Asia, as it had in the 50s into Korea, japan, and Taiwan. Much was destroyed or wasted, panicularly in Vietnam. But at least some of the money spent in Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Philippines found its way into the hands of people who could make constructive use of it. The governments concerned did not all take full advantage of the opponunity: little was made of it in the Philippines because of Marcos's shon-sightedness, and his greed. In the 60s, Singapore was the only country in Southeast Asia that had the kind of leadership needed to achieve national cohesion and sustained growth. But Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as Thailand and even the Philippines benefited enough from American spending to give some hope of improving living conditions, and to weaken the attractions of Communism. Whether or not the American stand in Vietnam encouraged the Indonesian army to stand up to the Communists, and President Sukamo, after the abortive coup of 1965, it can scarcely have discouraged them. The American stand gave the countries of the area time to son out their hitheno deep differences, and in 1967 to form the Association of South East Asian Nations. ASEAN gradually became the main vehicle for regional cooperation in the area. So America achieved its wider objective, though not its narrower one. South Vietnam fell, and so did laos and Cambodia, but not the other Dominoes. The rest of Southeast Asia did not succumb to Communist aggression, or to subversion either. That could hardly have been the result if the United States had not applied its power so thoroughly to the problem for so long. But the Vietnam trauma was so deep, and so painful, that few Americans have been willing to claim credit for

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the success. The Vietnam war - the longest in American history - deserves to remembered, not just for what it did not achieve, for what it cost, or for what it revealed, but for the benefits it brought to Asia. Without the war, and the resources that America put into it, the fast growth of the 60s and 70s could not have come about. Sources Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics . Cole, Conflict in Indochina. Duncanson , Government and Revolution in Vietnam. Gaddis, The Long Peace. Halberstam , The Best and the Brightest. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina. Kamow, Vietnam: A History . Kissinger, The White House Years . Public Papers of the Presidents .

CHAPTER

7

The Anti-Soviet Coalition

Nixon and Kissinger had established a direct relationship with Mao and Chou , and had ended the 20-year confrontation between the United States and China. The Chinese leaders accepted the change because they were afraid of a Soviet attack on China and wanted American support. But the Americans also wanted better relations with the Russians: Nixon and Kissinger would not adopt the hard anti-Soviet line taken by the Chinese. Relations between Washington and Peking were not fully normalised until the SovietAmerican Detente had broken down. Reagan's concern for Taiwan interrupted their development, but his crusade against what he called 'the Evil Empire' brought the two countries into line, until Gorbachev came to power in Moscow. Trade and cultural relations between America and China grew rapidly in the mid-80s, when China was seen by some Americans to be 'going capitalist', but the new ties created new tensions. So did growing American concern about human rights. As the Soviet threat faded , these issues loomed larger, but American public attitudes towards China went on improving until 1989. The Tiananmen incident reversed the trend of the last twenty years, and opened another round of confrontation. It became clearer in retrospect that the American-Chinese partnership had been based on hostility to the Soviet Union: it was essentially an anti-Soviet coalition. During the 60s China had kept its distance from both the Superpowers: it was equally hostile to the Soviet Union and the

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United States. Mao clearly did not want to depend on any foreign power. But he defeated his own purpose by launching the Cultural Revolution . That convulsion aroused Russian fears. and hopes, and led to the build-up of Soviet forces along the Chinese border. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia made Mao realize that those forces might be used against him. and he needed American suppon to aven the danger. By pushing radicalism so far. Mao had made himself dependent on the United States . and lost his freedom of action, even in internal affairs. How did he come to make this mistake? To understand what happened later. it is necessary to look at the background to the Cultural Revolution, and try to work out why Mao deliberately plunged China into turmoil again . By reuniting China, by restoring order after decades of fighting and destruction, and by providing relatively honest and effective administration, the Communists got the economy going again, despite the Korean war . With some help from the Russians. mainly in economic planning, China began to move forward : the lot of the ordinary people began to improve , even if those who were better off suffered. But Mao was not satisfied : he wanted to move faster towards his goal of a socialist society And he believed that it was possible to do so, by mobilising the enthusiasm of 'the masses'. His first big effon was the Great Leap Forward. which he launched in 19 57 . The objectives were to bring all the peasants together in Communes, and use them to establish industry in the countryside, as well as to increase food production. If the goal was not entirely irrational, the methods Mao used certainly were . Targets were set arbitrarily, with little regard to feasibility. and success was claimed even when they were not achieved. The countryside was denuded of iron to feed the new furnaces, so that tools became as scarce as seed, and agricultural production fell sharply. By 1959 China was on the brink of famine. Unwilling to admit defeat , Mao called a conference at Lushan, in his home province of Hunan . There his fellow-Hunanese and old comrade-in-arms, Peng Teh-huai, then Minister of Defence, confronted him with the facts . Mao turned on him, deprived him of all power, and drove him eventually to his death. But he got the message: his senior lieutenant, Uu Shao-chi, was allowed to take over the running of the country. With the help ofTeng Hsiao-ping, Uu got it back on the rails fairly quickly, with the Patty in charge.

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Mao had lost face, and his wife, Chiang Ching, had reappea~d to fan his resentment, and his suspicions. He still believed that, to move towards a socialist society, it was necessary to mobilise the masses, and arouse their enthusiasm. He also believed in violent revolution, rather than peaceful evolution: he shared the view of Marx and Lenin that a bad old system could be broken only by force . Like others involved in the May 4 Movement of 1919, he saw Confucianism as the main obstacle to China's progress especially the deference to authority inherent in popular Confucianism, and the passivity that went with it. His aim was, it has been suggested, to get into the minds of ordinary Chinese the Western idea of Progress - to break through traditional fatalism and apathy, to make the peasants and workers realise that, by exening themselves and taking the initiative, they could improve the lot of their children, if not their own. This, Mao saw, requi~d a fundamental change of outlook - a Cultural Revolution. (The term came from the May 4 Movement.) The change had to begin with the intellectuals- those who had been brought up to believe that education conferred the right to rule, and immunity from manual labour. lt was no accident that the Cultural Revolution staned in the high schools, and that teachers we~ the first to be attacked. Under Uu Shao-chi, senior officials and their families enjoyed many privileges, which they did not always try to conceal. Elitism bred resentment, not least among the young who did not share the privileges. That resentment was the fuel Mao and Chiang Ching used to light the fire . Peng's successor as Minister of ~fence was Un Piao, the general who had beaten the Nationalists in Manchuria. and later commanded Chinese troops in the Korean war. lin learned from Peng's mistake, and stuck closely to Mao. He was cttdited with collecting the Chairman's Thoughts in what becamt known as The Uttle Red Book, and using the army to disseminate it all over the country. He evidently had ambitions, and no doubt played his pan in stirring up Mao's suspicions. The idea grew in the Chairman's mind that Uu and Teng we~ trying to subvert his policies and 'taking the capitalist road'. On Teng's case, later events showed that the suspicion was not entirdy unjustified.) To stop than, Mao ~t out to destroy the Party of which he himself was the leader. The mechanism he created for the purpose was the Cultural Revolution

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Group. which included the security chief. Kang Sheng. as well as several radicals from Shanghai. The moving spirit was Chaang Ching. She used the Group to extend her own power. and to persecute those she saw as enemies or nvals. rraany of them women. A lot were driven to suicide. Chou En-lai saw which way the wind was blowmg. and bent with it. While working with Liu and Tcng. until they were purged. he also took pan in the Cultural Rcvoluuon Group. and rraanaged to keep on side with Mao. Chou used his posmon to protect some victims of the Cultural Revolution , and persuade Mao to rein m the radicals when they went too far . The sacking ol the BritLSh Embassy in August 1967 rraay have helped him to convtce the Chairman . The army. which had been used to launch the Revolution. was now used to wind it down . though the pcrsecuuons went on. and order took time to restore . Czechoslovak1a strengthened Chou's hand . The army was ordered to stand up to the Russians. though its weapons were mferior to theus. Orders were obeyed. but Lin Piao was not pleased He seems to have kept some contacts with the Russians . and to have res1sted the rapprochement with America. No doubt he was also concerned at the growing power of Chou En-lai. After Kissinger's first VlSit to Peking. Lin allegedly planned a coup m which Mao was to be killed. The plot was discovered: Lin fled with his Wlfe and son, and they were all killed when their aircraft crashed m Mongolia. Chiang Ching was not implicated. but Chou's influence was further enhanced, largely at her expense. Although Mao was not well . he received Nixon as soon as the President arrived in Peking in February 1972, and he gave Chou authority to negotiate with Kissinger what became the Shanghai Communique . The twenty year confrontation between America and China was ended by two men who had done much to stan it. Each had been forced to seek a reconciliation - forced by the excesses to which his earlier policy had led. In Mao's case, it was the Cultural Revolution that made him do what he had set his face agaiTLSt. In Nixon's, it was the Vietnam war. When the euphoria of the moment wore off, they rraay have asked themselves whether it had been necessary to cause so much suffering to achieve the end result. Nixon's visit did not bring about an overnight change in China. The Cultural Revolution was already winding down, but it was not

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yet over. It took another year for Chou to get Teng back from exile , and begin using his acknowledged talents again . Teng rehabilitated a lot of other senior officials, but in doing so he gave Chiang Ching room for manoeuvre. By the end of 1973 she was able to launch a campaign against Western music , which was in effect a protest against the opening to the West that Teng wanted. (The first Western orchestras to visit China had been received with such enthusiasm that the leadership wondered where the opening would lead.) Mao was disappointed with the results of the Nixon visit. Apan from the Chinese seat at the United Nations, which the Americans had resisted giving to Peking, there was not much to show for the reversal of China's policy. Kissinger was now seeking Soviet cooperation in limiting strategic arms. He was not willing to take the tough anti-Soviet line followed by the Chinese, or to accept the political costs of making funher concessions to them on Taiwan. As the United States was not willing to give up diplomatic relations with Taipei, Peking was unwilling to normalise relations fully, or exchange diplomatic representation. Instead, the two governments agreed to set up liaison offices in each other's capitals, and sent senior people to head them. But the Chinese refused to give even David Bruce or George Bush full diplomatic status, or to let private American organisations station people in Peking. The development of the new relationship had got stuck, and the Chinese were not content to accept the half-way house. They began to talk about 'collusion' between the Superpowers, and to test the possibility of a reconciliation with Moscow. Chiang Ching tried to undermine Chou's position by launching another campaign, this time against an improbable pair, Un Piao and Confucius. Chou was clearly the real target: many expected to see him go the way of Uu Shao-chi, who had died in prison. But times had changed. The 'Pi Un, pi Kung' campaign revived factionalism and disorder in some places, but it was never allowed to go as far as the Cultural Revolution. Mao may not have trusted Chou completely, but he knew that Chou was the person who could deal with the Americans, and he was still too worried about the Russians to jeopardise the new relationship with the United States. Chou had already developed cancer, and died of it in january 1976, without losing the Premiership. Chou's death evoked a public demonstration in Tiananmen

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Square in April: thousands of people paid apparently spontaneous tributes to him, some of which were taken as criticisms of Mao. These incensed the Chairman and gave Chiang Ching her chance. Teng was once more deprived of all his posts, except his Pany membership. But Chiang Ching evidently did not have Mao's full confidence either. Instead of her, or one of her proteges, being given Chou's job, a relatively obscure member of the Politburo called Hua Kuo-feng was appointed Premier. He had a cenain feline strength which enabled him to hold on to the job longer than many expected. At the end of july, the Peking-Tientsin area suffered a severe eanhquake, in which at least quaner of a million people were killed . Soon afterwards, Mao himself died. Chiang Ching had lost her power base, and soon lost everything else. The older leaders of the army, who had been closely associated with Teng, took the initiative. Ostensibly on Hua's orders, Chiang Ching and her supporters were arrested, and deprived of all their offices. Teng, who had taken refuge in Canton, under the protection of the military commander, did not make his come-back immediately. In july 1977 he was reappointed as Vice-Premier and head of the Military Affairs Commission, but Hua remained Premier, and became Chairman of the Pany as well. He was a symbol of continuity and legitimacy which the rest of the leadership could hardly dispense with until Chiang Ching and her associates - now dubbed the Gang of Four - could be discredited and disposed of. They were eventually given a show trial in 1981, before being finally condemned. Chiang Ching committed suicide in prison, as so many of her victims had. Hua was eased out of the Chairmanship; Teng and his men took over. Teng's main objective was economic - to speed up China's development. The key to this, he saw, was technology, and Western technology was better than anything the Soviet Union had to offer. So it was essential to complete the process Chou had begun and fully normalise relations with the United States. Detente remained the obstacle. Although Nixon and Kissinger had both gone, the United States was still trying to get the Soviet Union to agree to limit strategic weapons. President Caner initially gave this priority over normalising relations with China. But his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wanted to take a tougher line with Moscow, and to 'play the China card'. As in the early days of the

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Cold War, the Russians helped the Hawks in Washington, this time by involving themselves in Angola and the Hom of Africa . The Soviet Union was also supporting Vietnam, which was increasingly at loggerheads with the Communist regime in Cambodia headed by Pol Pot. China strongly supported Pol Pot, and encouraged him to stand up to Vietnam. Vietnamese were driven out of Cambodia: Chinese began to flee from Vietnam. In july 1978 Teng told japanese journalists that China was sending ships to Haiphong to take the refugees out. Brzezinski had already been to Peking and softened the terms the United States had previously offered the Chinese for normalisation. The Carter Administration was now prepared to meet the essential Chinese requirements of breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan and revoking the 1955 security treaty, though it was not prepared to stop arms sales to Taiwan. In November, Vietnam entered into a military alliance with the Soviet Union . In December it was announced that the United States and China had agreed to establish full diplomatic relations on 1 january 1979. Before then, Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia. Teng went to America at the end of january, to celebrate normalisation. While he was in Washington, he said that China might have to 'teach Vietnam a lesson'. President Carter did not encourage the idea, but Teng must have seen that Americans had not forgiven the Vietnamese. Soon after he got home, Chinese forces invaded the northern pan of Vietnam. Despite their commitments in Cambodia, the Vietnamese drove them back across the border, with heavy losses. But Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia had confirmed its reputation as an aggressor, aided and abetted by an expansionist Soviet Union. Teng had used the issue skilfully to present China as America's partner in the struggle · against that expansionsim. One obstacle remained to be overcome - the United States Congress. Support for Taiwan had been strong there ever since the 4-0s: the China Lobby had done its job. Knowing this, Carter decided not to consult Congress during the negotiations leading to normalisation. Resentment at the slight strengthened opposition to the breaking of relations with Taiwan, and helped to pass the Taiwan Relations Act. It set up a system of unofficial representation, and assured Taiwan of continuing American protection, as well as arms supplies. Peking was displeased by this, as well as by Caner's

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attitude towards the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. The conclusion of trade and cultural agreements was held up for a while. But once again the Russians came to the rescue : at the end of 1979 Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. The United States reacted sharply, and took a stronger anti-Soviet line. To China it proposed a more extensive strategic relationship, including the sale of 'non-lethal' military equipment. The United States also worked with China to support the Cambodian resistance to the Vietnamese occupation, even though some of it was still led by Pol Pot. In the middle of 1980 a trade agreement was signed. The United States extended Most Favoured Nation treatment to China - a concession not granted to the Soviet Union - but it was subject to annual renewal. This was followed by a number of other agreements, on postal services, air services, shipping, and consular matters. All now seemed to be set fair for the rapid development of the relationship, until Jimmy Carter lost the election at the end of 1980, and Ronald Reagan became President of the United States. During the election campaign, Reagan had criticised Carter for his treatment of Taiwan. Talk of putting relations with Taipei on to an official basis was gradually toned down, and was not translated into action when the new Administration took office . Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, had worked with Kissinger in the Nixon Administration . He appreciated the geo-political importance of China, and wanted to build up the strategic side of the relationship with Peking. But the issue of arms sales to Taiwan got in the way. The Chinese Government wanted the United States at least to commit itself to ending them at some time in the future : this Reagan was not prepared to do . A compromise was eventually reached in 1982. The Chinese showed their dissatisfaction by emphasising China's independence of both the Superpowers, by criticising American policy towards the Third World, and by exploring again the possibilities for reconciliation with Moscow. Disillusionment on both sides of the Pacific was aggravated by economic factors . America and China were both going through recessions, which affected relations between them. After growing rapidly for four consecutive years (1978-1981) trade declined in 1982 and 1983. Unrealistic expectations were dashed, and a reaction was inevitable . But it did not last long. Reagan was pursuing his crusade against the 'Evil Empire' by increasing defence

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11 7

spendmg and reslStmg movement towards anns control. In Chma the process of economic reform was opening up prospects that were hard to resist . On returning to power, Teng at first moved cautiously on the economic front. The Gang of Four had gone , and the Cultural Revolution had left widespread disillusionment with MaolSm . but the older leaders were not yet ready for the sweeping changes Teng knew were needed . He brought in younger men who were more willing to experiment - notably Chao Tze-yang and Hu Yao-pang- and pushed them to the top of the Government and the Party . But, even when Hua had been eased out , Teng could not ignore the people who had supported him. and to whom he was closest . Many of them were military men , who had fought long and hard for the unity and independence of China. and for the ideals of Socialism. Teng had to carry them along with the refonns proposed by the younger leaders. One of his techniques was to let the provinces take the lead . Some of them had already been experimenting with changes in the system of agricultural production which gave farmers more freedom to sell their own produce. and more incentive to increase production. This approach was ratified by a Party Plenum at the end of 1978, just before the normalisation of relations wtth the United States At the same time. the prices paid by the State for grain were raised , while those of machinery and fertihsers were lo-wered. To protect urban workers. food subsid1es were raised proportionately. Their incomes rose less rapidly than those of farmers . but they too were given more freedom. and small-scale private enterprise was encouraged . Foreign investment was also encouraged. notably by setung up four Special EconomlC Zones m the south. close to Hong Kong. Macao, and Taiwan. Some of these measures had inflationary effects: they created a large trade defiat in 1979. and an even larger one in 1980. The problem was o~ome by cutting expenditure and promoung expons: by 1982 China had a trade surplus again . The new polices were beginning to pay off. Relations with the Umted States were also improving. The Chinese presumably reahsed that Reagan was not m fact gomg back on what Carter had done . and ..-.ras a staunch opponent of the Soviet Union. Early m 1984. Prerruer Chao Tu-yang went to

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America, and stressed that China wanted closer economic relations. Soon afterwards, President Reagan went to China. He acknowledged that there were great differences between the two countries, but argued that these should not stand in the way of closer relations. Impressed by what he saw of China's economic reforms, he said after leaving that it was not necessary to 'impose our form of government', and referred to 'so-called Communist China' (Harding 1992, p. 171). The American press went further, and drew the conclusion that China was 'going capitalist'. The widespread assumption was that economic reform would lead to political liberalisation, that capitalism and democracy would go together. The economic reforms accelerated China's growth, and the expansion of its trade . From 1983 to 1987 the annual growth of the gross national product averaged over ten per cent. After falling in 1982 and 1983, two-way trade with the United States rose rapidly: in the five years from 1983 to 1988 its value increased from $4.4 billion to $13.5 billion. In the same period, cumulative American investment in China grew from $18 million to $1500 million. In the process, the balance changed. Up to 1982 the United States had a substantial surplus nearly every year, and for another three years (1983-5) only marginal deficits. But from 1986 on the deficits became significant, and increased each year. In 1987 the issue was raised for the first time in bilateral negotiations. Under an agreement reached in 1983, China was exporting to America a growing volume of textiles, as well as electronic and other light industrial products. This aroused protectionist pressures, which were harder to resist when the United States had a heavy overall trade deficit. American exports were also growing, but not as fast as imports, and American businessman blamed Chinese protectionism. American investment, which increased sharply after Reagan's visit, declined in the next few years: again, Americans blamed the Chinese. The difficulties grew when China incurred an overall trade deficit again in 1986 and was forced to retrench sharply. The Chinese Government issued a new set of regulations intended to improve conditions for foreign businessmen, but they did not meet all the complaints. Another round of retrenchment in 1988 aggravated the problem, and increased the disillusionment. The economic relationship had grown rapidly, and had become significant to both countries, but

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it had created new tensions, which affected more people on each side. The renegotiation of the textile agreement in 1987 was a long and difficult process. Human rights were also becoming a source of tension. Even while the Cultural Revolution was going on, Nixon and Kissinger had not pressed this question with the Chinese. Nixon told Mao that what was important was not a nation's internal political philosophy, but its policy towards the rest of the world. The principle of non-interference in internal affairs was accepted by the Americans and enshrined in the Shanghai Communique. At that stage, there was no dissident movement in China like the one in the Soviet Union. But with Mao's death and the fall of the Gang of Four the situation began to change. One of the first things Teng did when he returned to power was to revive the universities, which had suffered severely from the Cultural Revolution. The examination system was reinstated, so that people were selected on intellectual rather than political merit. This move was welcomed by intellectuals, and it raised their hopes. In November 1978, just before the Patty Plenum and the normalisation of relations with the United States, thousands of posters were put up on what became known as Democracy Wall in Peking, and in other cities, demanding political reform. Teng may have condoned this movement in the beginning, when the targets seemed to be Mao and Hua. But before he went to America in january, a crack-down had begun, and in March one of the leading protestors, Wei Ching-sheng, was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Teng had already given the Chinese people more freedom than they had ever had under Mao. The machinery of control had been quietly dismantled, and people could talk without fear of retribution. The improvement was so obvious that even President Caner did not feel it necessary to press Teng on human rights. But there were limits to what Teng was prepared to do. The Cultural Revolution had demonstrated that in China civil order is fragile, and protest can easily lead to turmoil. The memory of students and other young people marching through Tiananmen Square in 1966 was enough to make those who had survived suspicious of any mass movement. By down-grading Maoism, and by decentralising the economy, Teng was inevitably weakening the authority of the leadership, and the legitimacy of the regime . This

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made it the more necessary, from Teng's point of view, to keep political control in the hands of the Party, now run by men he could trust. What Teng may not at first have realised was that progress breeds rising expectations. Intellectuals who had benefited from his regime were now its main critics. Among the most critical were those he had sent abroad for training. Like their predecessors in the 19th century, they were impressed by Western culture and values, as well as by Western technology. and they conveyed Western ideas back to China. By 1986, students were protesting again, and renewing the demand for political reform. Teng's protege, Hu Yao-pang, who was Secretary-General of the Party, was accused of encouraging them: he was forced to resign. as pan of another crack-down. But this time the protests attracted the attention of human rights activists in the United States. American concern had also been aroused by Chinese actions in Tibet, and by the coercive aspects of China's attempt to control the growth of its population. These questions were taken up in Congress, and the Administration came under pressure to take a stronger line with the Chin~ . When President-elect George Bush went to Peking early in 1989, Chao Tze-yang persuaded him that it would be counter-productiv e for the United States to support demands for democracy. because that would provide an excuse for 'reversing reform' . But human rights had already begun to rival Taiwan as the main problem in relations between the United States and China. The tensions created by trade and human rights might have been easier to contain if it had not been for the changes that were going on in the Soviet Union. China's fear had abated to some extent in the early 80s. just before his death in 1983, Brezhnev made a conciliatory speech, to which Teng responded during the dispute with the United States over arms sales to Taiwan. But that dispute was patched up, Brezhnev's immediate successors did not follow up on his gesture, and Teng reverted to his earlier antiSoviet attitude. Reagan stuck to his strong line, and accepted China as a partner, if not as an equal. Then, in 1985, Gorbachev came to power in Moscow, and set out to reduce the Soviet Union's military burdens. By withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan as well as Mongolia, and making Vietnam accept a settlement in Cambodia, he met the conditions the Chinese had

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laid down for reconciliation. But he also came to terms with the United States, on arms control as well as regional issues , and reduced American concern about the Soviet threat. This weakened the basis of the relationship Nixon had established between the United States and China. The change did not come about overnight. Many Americans found it hard to believe that Containment was finally achieving its objective and freeing them from the threat of Communism. But the process had begun, and was to go on. Americans felt less and less need for China's support, and less and less inclination to pay for it. The growing tensions between America and China were no longer constrained by common concern about Soviet expansionism. Americans felt freer to pursue their own interests, and to assert their own views. Gorbachev contributed directly to the break-down of the antiSoviet coalition by going to Peking in May 1989. His visit was intended to complete the reconciliation between the Soviet Union and China, and it attracted reporters from all over the world. When they reached Peking, they found that they had more than a summit meeting to report. Tiananmen Square was full of students and others who were demanding political reforms. The demands varied from eliminating corruption to introducing full democracy: there was no common programme, except political change. The demonstration had originally been planned to commemorate the 70th anniversary of May 4, 1919, but the death of Hu Yao-pang in April had provided a new focus . It was said that he had been forced to resign in 1987 because he was too lenient towards student protests. His death gave the movement a martyr, and an emotional launching pad. More and more people joined the demonstration: as during the Cultural Revolution, many journeyed to Peking for the purpose. They were supported and fed by local people: workers as well as intellectuals were involved, though not many farmers. (The proportion of peasants in the total population was declining, but was still about 75 per cent.) The leadership was divided on how to handle the problem. Chao Tze-yang, now Secretary-General of the Party, adopted a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude towards the students. The Premier, U Peng, took a hard line. Teng supported the hard line, and rounded up the military support required to carry it out. This involved overthrowing Chao, whom Teng had been grooming as his

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successor. Both Chao and l1 seem to havt bctn trymg to~ the demonstration to strengthen their own pos1t10ns Wlthin the leadership. This may have been one of the reasons why the leadership took so long to act. and then acted with dispropomonate force . Martial law was declared only on 20 May. after the demonstration had gone on for over a month. and the army d1d not move in force for another two weeks afttr that. Teng's earlier record hardly supports the vtew that he was determined to hang on to power at any cost He clearly beheved that more was at stake. He must have felt that. 1f the leadership d1d not act decisively. u would lose its authonty. and perhaps Its position. This could only lead to turmoil. and jeopardtse all that had been achieved smce 1976. But his reasofis went further . A few days after the demofistration was broken up on 4 june. he cla1med in a speech that the Government had put down a 'counterrevolutionary rebellion'. wh1ch was 'determined by the mtemauonal and domestic climate' . The obJective ol the rebelhon. Teng argued, was to 'establish a bourgeois republil: enurely dependent on the Wesl' (Harding 1992. p. 226) Whether or not this charge was justified. it seems to reflect Teng's underlymg concern . For him. what was at stake in Tiananmen Square was the stab1hty. the unity, and ultimately the independence of China. It was essential, and inevitable. that the opening to the West should conunue. The question was whether China would be strong enough to rnamtain its identity. or would succumb to 'globahsation'. Teng's reasons are one thing: his judgement is another. It seems clear that he underestimated the effects of his action in the outside world. He may not have realised how the changes that were going on in the Soviet Union were affecting American attitudes towards China. He is even less likely to have appreciated what impact modem communications would give the event in the United States. When the tanks rolled down Chang An Boulevard, and a protestor stood in front of one. the picture was seen all over the world. All the American media gave the story wide and lengthy coverage: for two months it took up more than a quarter of the television news programmes. When it was over, American public attitudes towards China had changed dramatically. In February 1989 three quarters of Americans polled had favourable impressions

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of China: by July only a third still did. The Tiananmen 'massacre' had reversed the trend of a decade. For the fourth time in a century, American attitudes had swung hard from one side to the other. The question was, how long the new phase would last. Sources Chang, Wild Swans . Evans, Drng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China. Harding, Fragile Relationship. Salisbury, "J1u Ntw Emperors. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung . Schram, ed .. Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed. Spence, "J1u Search For Modern China.

CHAPTER

8

Japan Challenges America Again

Devastation and defeat , with the humiliation and hardships they involved, turned the japanese against militarism, and the kind of regionalism that had gone with it. Their eyes moved again to the West, and particularly to America. Economic achievement presented itself as the only remaining way to catch up : the sort of effort that had gone into fighting the war was now devoted to rebuilding and developing the economy. The war in Korea provided the opportunity. It dramatised America's need for japan's support in containing Communism, and sharply increased the demand for japan's products. The economy began to grow fast , by exporting industrial products while restraining consumption at home. Dependence on America bred resentment, which led to riots in 1960, and the cancellation of a visit by President Eisenbower. But the Security Treaty was renewed, and came to be accepted as an essential part of the relationship with the United States. As japanese goods penetrated the American market, protectionist pressures rose. The return of Okinawa failed to secure japanese agreement to restrain textile exports, until President Nixon went to China, and then threatened to take unilateral action against japan. The japanese were harder hit by the Arab oil embargo. By exercising severe self-discipline they recovered quickly, and began to switch from heavy industries to those that were 'knowledge-intensive'. By the 80s japanese cars and computers were capturing American markets, and the United States' trade deficit with japan was growing.

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Public criticism of japan was growing too: by 1989 it was seen as a bigger threat than the Soviet Union . When the Peace Treaty restored japan's fonnal independence in 1952, economic recovery was just getting under way. The Dodge Mission had prepared the ground, by reducing infiation and increasing incentives, and the Korean War had stimulated demand, both internally and externally. Production was growing. though it did not reach prewar levels until 1955. Even when American aid was no longer required , japan continued to depend on the United States, for markets and for technology. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry - MITt - had the responsibility of ensuring that Japanese firms got access to the latest technology. In the early stages Americans were glad to help. not least by keeping the costs down . The United States also put pressure on its allies in Europe and the Pacific to open their markets to japan, after it acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1955. No less important a contribution was America's willingness to accept high tariffs and other protectionist practices as necessary for japan's recovery. But all this American help would not have achieved much without sustained effort by the Japanese themselves. Employers realised that their greatest asset was a highly educated and motivated work-force . and they learned to cherish it, through company unions and Life-time job security. The Government, and its well-developed bureaucracy, worked with the banks to ensure that capital was available for approved projects, and in the process gained a degree of control unusual in Western countries. This control was used to plan for growth. Individual japanese made their contributions by working hard. and saving hard too. The suffering caused by the war had not been forgotten: it provided much of the motiVation for the post-war recovery. Never Again seems to have been the lesson drawn b those who had been through ~ trauma of defeat, even as childrm. The were prepared to put up with a great deal to achieve security - especiall economic security. not readily acx:epted But continuing ckpendence n Ammca by all Japanese. Those n the Ldi of the political spttnum. whaher or not the ~'ere Marxists, w the United States as a militaristic. if not as an aggressive power, and they op~ tbr

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Security Treaty, as well as the large American military presence in japan People on the Right were not much more enthusiastic about it, but most saw the security relationship as a price that had to be paid for American economic help. The issue divided the japanese throughout the 50s, and had its effect on the actions of the japanese Government. Kishi Nobusuge, who became Prime Minister in 1956, had served in the war-time cabinet, and was no Leftist. But it was he who negotiated a new treaty to replace the one signed by Yoshida , with the Peace Treaty, in 1951. The new treaty met one of the main objections to the old one by providing that the japanese Government must be consulted before American bases in japan were used for operations elsewhere. But Kishi was still faced with strong opposition in the Diet. When he overcame it by calling a snap vote late at night, he was accused of trying to ram the treaty through by undermocratic means , and became the target of large public demonstrations Kishi was obliged to cancel the proposed visit by President Eisenhower, and to resign as Prime Minister. The rioting subsided, and the new treaty went into force. Kishi's successor, Ikeda Hayato , diverted attention from the security issue by introducing an 'income-doubling plan'. The recently united Liberal Democratic Party, to which both he and Kishi belonged , won the next election by a big majority. The economy was now growing at an average rate of 10 per cent a year. Textiles were being overtaken as exports by more sophisticated products like cameras , transistor radios, and motor cycles. j apan's image was changing japanese products could no longer be dismissed as cheap and shoddy, or as mere copies of Western prototypes. japanese brand-names were coming to signify quality as well as competitive prices . Incomes were rising, though not as fast as productivity: by the 60s the japanese were beginning to enjoy a modest prosperity. And the 1964 Olympic Games, which took place in Tokyo, showed that japan was beginning to be accepted again as a member of the international community. The country had come through its greatest crisis, without losing either its stability or the continuity of its institutions . Strengthened by the experience, it was ready to come out into the world again. But in 1965 the security issue was revived by the escalation of the war in Vietnam. japan profited economically, as it had from the war in Korea much of the aid given by the United States to

japan Challenges America Again

12 7

countries in South-east Asia was spent on japanese goods. But the conflict highlighted the continuing American occupation of Okinawa, and the fact that it was being used as a base for operations in Vietnam. Fear that the conflict there would lead to war with China sharpened the issue for the japanese. Kishi's brother, Sato Eisaku, was now Prime Minister. He used the experience of 1960 skilfully to persuade Washington to return Okinawa. In return Nixon tried to get Sato to restrain japanese textile exports to the United States, as he had allegedly promised during the election campaign. Whether or not Sato agreed is not clear, but he did not deliver, and Nixon felt he had been let down. Two years of complicated negotiations between Washington and Tokyo yielded no agreement on the issue. Then Kissinger went to Peking. The Japanese were shaken. Against their own inclinations, they had toed the American line on China, and yet they had not even been told in advance what was going on. Naturally suspicious, they wondered what the reasons were. They worried that, after its reconciliation with China, the United States might not need japan so much. This became known in japan as 'the Nixon Shock'. And it was not the only one. Soon afterwards, Nixon threatened to take unilateral action on textiles: then, and only then, agreement was reached- one of the first 'Voluntary Restraint Agreements'. About the same time, the convertibility of the dollar into gold was suspended, and the exchange value of the yen increased. In 1973 the United States Government suddenly stopped the export of soya beans, on which japan had come to rely. That revived japanese concern about food security, and strengthened support for the protection of agriculture. The succession of shocks brought it home to the japanese that their relationship with America was changing. japan's very success was affecting American attitudes, and raising the price it had to pay for American cooperation. japan was hard hit, in a different way, by the Arab oil embargo. Cheap oil from the Gulf had enabled the japanese to build up heavy industries along their coasts, catering largely to foreign markets. The sudden rise in the price of oil disrupted them, and the economy as a whole. For the first time in nearly 20 years, growth came to a halt. But the crisis was overcome, quite quickly, by the exercise of severe self-discipline; the japanese even turned adversity to advantage. To cope with the immediate problem,

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companies agreed to limit their use of 1mponed energy and raw materials, while workers accepted pay rcstramts . For the longer term , Government and business agreed. m a change of strategy. to shift the emphasis from industries usmg a lot of energy and labour. like chemicals, to those that uuhsed Japan 's mam asset a highly educated work-force . Th1s decision. wh1ch was taken by consensus. had far-reaching 1mplicauons It encouraged exploitation of the new and rapidly developmg computer technology . It also opened the way for the transfer of some of the older plants. and later whole industries. to countnes where labour was cheaper. ln this way, it contributed to the development of other As1an countnes, and to the emergence of an interdependent reg~onal economy. Harder hit by the oil shock than almost any other country . Japan was one of the first to recover: after falling shghtly m 1974. production began to grow agam. The rate was was not as h1gh as in the previous 20 years. but it levelled oH at 3 to 4 per cent . from what was now a much higher base . Once more . Japan had weathered a crisis, and this time on its own . wtth httle help from America. The oil crisis temporarily slowed the growth of Japanese expons. and brought a reprieve in trade frictions . But as Japan recovered. new problems arose . American consumers liked Japanese products, and bought more and more of them . Amencan producers lost market share , money and jobs, and sought protecuon. Problems arose over a series of products- television sets . office equipment, computers and semi-conductors, as well as steel. But cars became the crucial issue, because the automobile industry played such a key role in America's own economy. Detroit's complaints were taken up by Washington, and in 1981 the Japanese were forced to accept limitations on their expons. The Reagan Administration strongly believed in the free market, and strongly advocated free trade - or at least trade liberalisation. But, under pressure from American producers who were suffering from japanese competition, it made increasing use of Voluntary Restraint Agreements to limit access to the American market. The rhetoric was liberal: the practice was increasingly protectionist. The japanese responded realistically, and adapted to the situation. When the number of cars allowed into the United States was limited, car manufacturers raised their prices. The American

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trade deficit with japan continued to grow. By the mid-80s it had reached levels that alarmed Washington - though the trade imbalance was what enabled the japanese to buy American bonds and fund the yawning fiscal deficit. At the Plaza Hotel in New York in February 1985 the leading financial powers agreed on a realignment of currencies, which sharply increased the exchange value of the yen. This accelerated the change in japan's relations with its neighbours, by stimulating japanese investment in other countries. But japan's trade surplus with the United States went on growing. As it grew, Americans became more concerned, and tried to work out how the japanese did it. Interest in things japanese rose to new levels: more Americans were learning the japanese language and studying japanese culture, as well as investigating japanese business practices. One explanation after another was offered, and found wanting. Cheap Labour lost credibility as japanese incomes rose and began to rival those of Americans. Trade barriers were a more plausible reason: they were substantial, and effective. But, under American pressure, they were gradually reduced, until japan's tariffs were among the lowest in the world, and even some of the barriers to agricultural imports began to come down. The continuing trade imbalance was then blamed on unfair competition. Originally under MITI's guidance, but increasingly on their own initiative, japanese firms worked together to limit impons, and foreign investment in japan, so it was alleged. The charge was not without foundation. Cooperation among firms was stronger than in America, and it did tend to limit access to the japanese market. The question was whether this was the main explanation for the trade imbalance, or merely a subsidiary one. Americans were reluctant to face the fact that in many fields japanese industry had become more efficient than their ownthat the locus of comparative advantage had shifted, as it often does. One reason clearly was that japanese were better organised than Americans, and quicker to adapt to change. The organisation of]apanese business made it easier to take long-term views, because managers were responsible to bankers rather than to shareholders. Beyond that lay the japanese tendency to identify with a group family, firm or nation - and their willingness to make sacrifices for the common weal. The trade imbalance reflected the difference

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between two cultures - Asian familism and American individualism. Americans were even more reluctant to look for explanations in their own society. But when the United States Government began asking the Japanese Government to change long-standing and cherished domestic arrangements so as to encourage impons, the Japanese felt entitled to raise questions about the internal affairs of the United States. Why could the Federal Government not reduce its fiscal deficit? Why could Americans not save more and invest more? Why must they go on spending more than they earned? The Bush Administration's Strategic Impediments Initiative (SII) brought these questions to the surface. without doing much to answer them. The Administration accepted the need to reduce the fiscal deficit, but could not reach agreement with Congress on how the common objective was to be achieved . Interest rates were kept down, to avoid increasing unemployment: demand remained high , imports continued to flow in, and the trade imbalance did not go away. Criticism of Japan increased: 'japan Bashing' became a popular political tactic in America. In 1989 public opinion polls showed that Japan was seen as a greater threat than the Soviet Union. Books were published in the United States claiming that Japan was trying to dominate the world, and that its effort would lead to another Pacific war. These books were read at least as widely in Japan as in America, and they had their Japanese counterparts too. Perhaps the best-known was called The japan That Can Say No: it argued that Japan could and should now stand up to the United States and insist on equality. How much impact such outbursts had on public opinion in the two countries was hard to tell . They were probably more significant as expressions of popular feeling than for the influence they had on it. But they seemed to indicate that trade problems, and the political responses to them, were affecting wider public attitudes, on both sides, and introducing the element of nationalism. The outcome of the American elections in 1992 worried the Japanese. President Clinton came into office calling for sacrifices, and committed to reducing the fiscal deficit , but his main concern was 'jobs, jobs, jobs'. While he expressed support for trade

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hberalisation, some of the people he appointed to senior economic positions seemed willing to contemplate taking unilateral action to deal with the trade imbalance . This is what worried the Japanese most - the implicit threat of unilateral sanctions. They also disliked the idea of setting numerical targets for reducing the imbalance, which would require strong acuon by the Japanese Government. And they had misgivings about the Nonh American Free Trade Agreement, which Clinton took over from Bush . These concerns were set out clearly in a repon to the Foretgn Minister by a rugh-leveJ gTOup of businessmen and academics headed by Okawara Yoshio (Council 1992) . It suggested that , if the Umted States resorted to unilateral action , Japan might have to retahate . through the GATT. It also expressed opposiuon to any extension of NAFTA that discriminated among Asia-Pactfic nations. And 11 hinted that, if the United States moved towards 'the creauon of exclusionary prot.ectionist blocs', the nauons of the Asta-Pactfic ~on would have to consider some kind of regional agreement in response . Since the war, the Japanese had taken only hmned mterest m regionalism . The idea of a Greater East Asta Co-prosperity Sphere was closely associated with militarism : if it ever had much appeal in Japan , defeat discredited it. The economist Okita Saburo , who was Foreign Minister under Ohtra, took the lead in the 70s m developing the concept of a 'Pacific Community'. whtch gained some currency- despite , or because of. its vagueness. Others in Tokyo , including people in MITI , were more interested in the possibility of economic cooperation with Japan's closer neighbours . The Okita group favoured a broad-based regional arrangement that included the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The other group thought in terms of a narrower , pahaps tighter arrangement. Each had some influence on events. When Australia took the Initiative in proposing APEC as a vehicle for broad-based regional consultation in a spirit of multilateralism, it won Japan's cautious suppon. Then, after a visit to Japan, the Prime Minister of Malaysia proposed an East Asian Economic Group that excluded the United States and other non-Asian countries. That idea may have had its auractions for some Japanese companies involved in regional enterprises, but it did not get the support of the

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Government. The dominant view in Tokyo was that, although East Asia was increasingly important to Japan, Western markets were still essential, and anything like exclusive regionalism made no sense as long as they remained open. Facts and figures were produced to support each case . Asia's share of Japan's trade increased markedly during the 80s, and that of the United States declined. Japan was investing more in Asia too, though America still came first. But Europe also grew rapidly as a market, and as a field of investment. America still took a quarter of Japan's exports - Western countries as a group something like half. And the picture was not much different for the other Asian countries whose economies were linked with Japan's. All of them had achieved fast growth through exports, and saw themselves as global traders. To lose Western markets would mean a reduction in total trade, and total wealth. Some argued that Asian economies, including China's, were growing so fast that they would soon be able to absorb any exports not allowed into America or Europe. Others replied that, for the time being at least, there were not enough complementarities between Asian economies. But how long would this remain true? If China and its neighbours went on growing at current rates, would their economies not diversify and provide more scope for division of labour within the region7 Some thought this could happen so quickly that within a decade or two Asia would no longer be dependent on the American market. Most Japanese were sceptical of that argument, without totally dismissing the possibility. During 1992 the Tokyo stockmarket collapsed and the Japanese economy went into a downturn. After the revaluation of the yen in 1985, Japanese banks had invested heavily- if indirectly- in property and other domestic assets, as well as in the United States and elsewhere abroad. The resulting rise in asset prices eventually led to a collapse, and a tightening of credit. The Japanese system was just beginning to cope with that problem when the United States, in a renewed attempt to reduce the trade imbalance, forced another revaluation of the yen, to a record level. A dry summer aggravated the problem. The downturn steepened, and threatened to tum into a prolonged recession. For the first time since the Oil Shock, production stopped growing. At the same time the political system suffered a convulsion. A series of financial scandals had

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weakened the LDP and given rise to demands for reform, both within and outside the Pany. When in june 1993 Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi failed to get his reform plan accepted, he had to resign. The LDP lost its majority in the Diet, and- for the first time in 40 years - a non-LDP government was formed. As it included seven patties, of disparate views, its stability, and its durability, were from the outset uncenain. And it faced two serious problems in addition to reform - the recession and the trade imbalance . The new Prime Minister, Hosokawa Morihiro , recognised the need to reach agreement with the Clinton Administration on the trade issue, but strong opposition from both the Foreign Ministry and MITI made it impossible for him to accept the 'numerical targets' on which the Americans were insisting. The package of tax reforms he put forward under American pressure split his cabinet, and soon afterwards he resigned. Under his successor, Hata Tsutomu, the Socialists withdrew from the coalition, but their long-time leader, Murayama Tomiichi, formed a government with the suppon of his former opponents, the LDP. The Americans, having failed to achieve their goals by setting numerical targets or by fiscal stimulus, fell back on currency manipulation. The value of the yen was 'talked up' by about 20 per cent. japanese manufacturers now found it harder to compete, and moved production abroad even more rapidly. japan's overall trade surplus declined, but its surplus with the United States remained high in dollar terms. The japanese economy stagnated. At the same time, a severe eanhquake hit the city of Kobe , causing many deaths, and many more were caused by a series of poison gas bombs in underground trains in Tokyo. Public confidence was shaken. Some japanese at least seemed to be wondering whether concentration on economic growth still served their country's needs. All this strengthened the case of those who had been arguing for some time that 'The Sun Also Sets'. Their view was based on longer-term considerations- notably the aging of the japanese population and the changing attitudes of young japanese. But the political and economic crisis that began in 1993 made the question look more immediate. Was the japanese system still strong and resilient enough to meet the latest challenge, as it had met earlier ones? The strength of that system in the past had lain, not so much

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in the political leadership it threw up, but rather in the capacity of the japanese elite - bureaucrats, businessmen and academics to work out a consensus and carry the rest of the nation with them. Beyond that, the strength had come from the self-discipline of the japanese people, and their willingness to make sacrifices for their country. Times were clearly changing: the young were different from the old. How different only time would tell . One of japan's strengths was its education system. At least since Meiji times, heavy emphasis had been placed on education: by the 60s japan had one of the most highly educated work-forces in the world . It was panicularly good at training engineers. and produced them in larger numbers than Western countries. But japanese education was still influenced by the Confucian tradition of respect for the teacher and unquestioning acceptance of his views. japanese students were good at learning facts and passing examinations, but not necessarily as good at thinking for themselves. This worried some japanese. One of the key questions about japan's future was whether it could make the transition from adapting imponed technology to creating its own. Encouraging originality had never been the strong point of Confucianism. japanese were breaking new ground, especially in electronics and information technology, but some wondered whether they were yet capable of generating new technologies, and making themselves independent in this respect. At least until 1993, japan seemed to be challenging America again. In America, and in Europe , some suspected the japanese of trying to dominate the world economy, by acquiring monopolies of key technologies like advanced computer chips. The effectiveness of some new American weapons during the Gulf war was said to be due panly to their japanese components: this was a source of satisfaction to some in Tokyo. But underlying the satisfaction was a persistent sense of vulnerability. Economically powerful as they had become, the japanese still saw their country as small, densely populated, dependent on imported food as well as raw materials, and not widely liked or trusted, even in Asia. In the early 70s, Ohira had used the phrase 'Comprehensive Security' to define japan's objective. Though it had come a long way in 20 years, this still seemed more accurate than 'Economic Domination'. But there was the possibility that one thing could lead to another.

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Domination in any but the economic sense was an idea that still seemed to have little appeal to the japanese. The anti-military feeling arising from the defeat of 1945 remained strong: defence spending hardly exceeded one per cent of GNP. The economy had grown so fast that japan had a large military establishment, but there was strong resistance to any suggestion that it be used overseas. The Government had a struggle to get the Diet to agree to contribute even a small contingent to the United Nations operation in Cambodia, where japan's interests were clearly involved. japanese leaders preferred to think, or at least talk, in terms of 'Global Partnership' with the United States. Americans did so too - at least when they were talking to the japanese. Brzezinski argued publicly in 1988 that, if the United States wanted to retain global leadership, it would have to take japan into partnership. For the time being, it evidently suited the japanese to let America go on playing the role of world leader, and bearing most of the burdens involved. The situation bore some similarity to that which prevailed in the Atlantic world between the two world wars. Economic leadership was then passing from Britain to America, but the United States was not yet ready to take up the political responsibility. japan in the 90s was not isolationist, but it was not striving to match its economic strength with military power, or to assert leadership in international affairs. The japanese presumably saw no need to do so, as long as the American system continued to work to japan's advantage. The japanese were clearly determined- as they had always been- to maintain their national identity, and their independence. They appreciated the benefits they had derived from their close relationship with America, and were prepared to put up with the disadvantages, as long as the American market retiiained open. But the tensions of the 80s and 90s revealed growing doubts on this score. They also seemed to reflect a continuing resentment against the dependence involved- the subordination of japan to America in all but strictly economic matters. Again, there was a precedent. In the 20s japan benefited from the American system, and accepted it, but when that system broke down in 1929 resentment surfaced, and japan sought self-sufficiency through regionalism. Much had changed in the meantime, and history could hardly repeat itself. But the precedent served as a reminder

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that much depended on the continuing strength of the United States, and the openness of the American market. Sources Buckley, US-japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990. Council, japan-United States Economic Partntrship. Emmott, The Sun Also Sets: Why japan Will Not Be Numbtr One. lriye and Cohen, The United States and japan in the Postwar World. Okita, Approaching the 21st Century: japan's Role. Reischauer, japan: The Story of a Nation .

CHAPTER

9

Smaller Dragons Join In

Japan was no longer alone in presenting America with an economic challenge. During the 60s and 70s two other Asian countries, South Korea and Taiwan, and two virtual city-states, Hong Kong and Singapore, followed the path Japan had taken - the path of export-led growth- and made rapid progress. They did not all do it the same way- each took its own course- but the four had a good deal in common with one another, and with Japan. All were small, at least by comparison with China, and none was well endowed with natural resources. All were close to China, but separate from it, and distinct in character. Each felt that it was under threat: the sense of insecurity enabled strong leaders to evoke great efforts, and great sacrifices, from their peoples. And all enjoyed strong American support. At least untill970, they were seen as the front line in the struggle to contain Communism in Asia, and the United States helped them with ideas, money, and markets. Exporting manufactured products to America enabled them to achieve high rates of growth, and higher living standards for their peoples. It also made them dependent on the United States, and vulnerable to American protectionism. In the 80s growing trade deficits led the United States to press the Lesser Dragons, as they were sometimes called, to open up their markets to American exporters. All four were finding new opportunities in China, and getting more deeply involved there, but they still saw themselves more as competitors than as partners. American pressure was beginning to create a sense of common interest, while Japanese

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investment, and that of the Overseas Chinese was knitting their economies together. But regionalism had little attraction for the Lesser Dragons as long as the American market remained open.

South Korea The war of 1950-53 left South Korea devastated and impoverished. Syngman Rhee was still in power, with the slogan 'March North'. The United States entered into a security treaty with the Republic of Korea soon after the armistice, but the Senate made clear that it would come into effect only in the event of 'external armed attack' . Rhee insisted on keeping a large army: despite American aid, defence spending fuelled inflation and delayed economic recovery. Rhee's hostility to Japan prevented Japanese investment and restricted trade. In the absence of industrial development , population pressure kept agricultural productivity and living standards low. The economy stagnated. Student riots broke out in Seoul in 1960, after Rhee had rigged his re-election to the Presidency. He resigned, and went into exile again, leaving the country to be run by parliamentary leaders . Within a year they were pushed aside by a military junta, of which the effective leader was Park Chung Hee. As a young man, Park had been an officer in the Japanese army, and he was influenced by Japan's example of economic development. As soon as he had the power, he set out to develop the South Korean economy by producing manufactured goods for export, while restraining domestic demand. He also set about normalising relations with Japan: the peace treaty signed in 1965 brought the ROK $500 million in aid, as well as increased trade. Park's policy of industrialisation took advantage of the high level of education which had been achieved under the Japanese regime, and sustained with American help. He also seized the opportunities provided by the war in Vietnam. Two Korean divisions were sent to fight there, in return for American aid that amounted to $1 billion between 1965 and 1970. Korean construction firms, with low wage costs, won contracts in South Vietnam, and gained experience which stood them in good stead in the Middle East when the Arabs raised the price of oil in 1973. Using his power freely , Park set up machinery for planning and running the economy. In place of the state-owed enterprises left

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by the Japanese, he sponsored a series of big private companies called chaebols to carry out the planned industrialisation. Under the direction of the government, they concentrated on strategic industries like steel, ship-building, machinery, and petro-chemicals. Distrusting the Japanese, even after the normalisation of relations, the Koreans did not encourage direct foreign investment. The Government preferred to borrow abroad on its own account, and re-lend to the chaebols. The ROK went deeply into debt, but its growth rate rose by 1965 to double figures, and stayed at that level. Per capita income increased from $US82 in 1961 to $US1500 in 1979. Industrialisation provided employment in the cities, not only for refugees from the North, but also for the surplus population in the countryside. Land reform had been carried out during the American occupation in the late 40s: by 1950 many tenants had become owners of their own farms . But the war had interrupted ·the process and destroyed much rural capital. Once industrialisation was under way, Park set out to improve agricultural productivity and living conditions. He launched a Community Movement that encouraged local initiative and self-help. He also introduced a system of support prices, which raised rural incomes at the expense of urban consumers. The drift to the cities went on. The proportion of the population living in the countryside fell from 70 per cent in the 50s to 30 per cent in the late 70s. The success of Park's policies won wide popular support, and also created problems. Rising living standards generated rising expectations, and demands for political change. In the 1978 telections, the opposition polled more votes than the government, and the latter retained its majority in the legislature only by nominating a third of the members. One of the opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam, denounced Park's regime as 'dictatorial'. Student riots broke out again, and were put down by the army. Park's advisers were divided over the handling of the unrest. One of them, the head of the KCIA, remonstrated with President at a dinner, and shot him. Once again there vias a brief period of constitutional government: the civilian Prime Minister was elected President, and promised reform. But only six weeks after Park's assassination another ambitious military leader, Chun Doo Hwan, staged a coup against

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his superiors and took control of the government. Riots broke out once more, in Seoul and in Kwangju: they were put down with great severity. The opposition parties were dissolved, the constitutional President resigned, and Chun was elected to the post. Under him, South Korea rode out the world recession of the early 80s, and growth regained momentum. To show off his achievements, Park had arranged for the 1988 Olympic Games to be held in Seoul. The commitment exposed Chun to greater popular pressure. This time , when students took to the streets, with the support of their middle-class parents, Chun carried out an earlier promise and handed over to another general, Roh Tae Woo, who conceded the protesters' demands. Now the democratic forms of the ROK constitution were given substance. Opposition groups were allowed to compete openly with the government party, and unions were also permitted to function properly. Labour costs rose sharply, just as the United States was pressing South Korea to open up its market. But new opportunities were also opening up. The change in japan's industrial strategy after the revaluation of the yen encouraged a softening in the Korean attitude towards foreign investment, and gave a further boost to industrial development. The collapse of the Soviet Union widened the scope for Korean enterprise, not least in Central Asia. And the economic reforms in China created even greater opportunities there . Despite Peking's long association with Pyongyang, full diplomatic relations were established between the PRC and the ROK. Korean firms were already deeply involved, especially in Shantung: South Korea was seen by some Chinese as a counterweight to japan. South Korea had come a long way since the war ended in 1953, but Koreans did not feel secure. North Korea still kept its large army deployed in a threatening posture. Without the support of the Soviet Union, and with only equivocal support from China, it was facing serious economic problems, as well as a succession in the leadership. And Pyongyang was resisting pressure to comply with international safeguards on its nuclear plants. The North Koreans may have been raising the spectre of nuclear weapons to enhance their bargaining power with the United States; they did negotiate directly with the Americans an agreement that gave them large scale foreign aid. But the tactic carried high risks. The South

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had , perhaps for the first time, begun to look at the possibility of reunification in a realistic way. Germany's experience served as a warning that the costs involved could be hard to absorb. Seoul seemed to be coming to the conclusion that its own interest lay in leaving the North separate politically, though economically increasingly integrated with the South. The threatened development of nuclear weapons by the North would hardly encourage such a change of approach. It could only retard the emergence of a dynamic and powerful Korea, whether formally united or not. It could also retard the withdrawal of American forces from the South. It was still an open question whether the energy and determination of the Korean people would be turned to common goals, or would still be directed by Koreans against one another. Taiwan

When Chiang Kai-shek took refuge in Taiwan in 1949 , the island was impoverished and its people cowed. The Japanese had developed the economy, and the lot of the Taiwanese had improved under their rule. But when Japan was defeated and the Chinese Nationalists took control, they drained the island of resources to support their war effort against the Communists. In 194 7 the Taiwanese rebelled: they were put down with great severity, and many of their leaders were killed. Martial law was introduced, and it was maintained for the next 40 years. In Taiwan Chiang was even more dependent on the United States than he had been on the mainland. The reluctance of the Truman Administration to support him underlined the point. When Truman decided to take Taiwan under American protection after the outbreak of the war in Korea, the United States was in a position to exert great influence, and did so. American advisers helped the Nationalists to remedy what were recognised to be their greatest problems - inflation, corruption, and the lack of land reform. By 1953 the amount of land under owner cultivation had risen to nearly 80 per cent, and agricultural production was increasing. The power of the government was used to make sure that the benefits were shared. By setting the price of rice low, and that of fertiliser high, it skimmed the cream, and used it to begin industrialising. American commodity aid was directed to importsubstitution industries like textiles and flour-milling, which were

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protected from japanese and other competition. American influence restrained Chiang from attempting to return to the mainland, though continuing tension in the Strait maintained the sense of crisis. In this siege atmosphere the economy began to grow, but growth was limited by dependence on agriculture, and by 1960 the rate was slipping. The United States encouraged a change of approach by making it known that American aid would taper off during the 60s. Realising that it had to find new sources of foreign exchange, the government decided to promote private investment and exports. The currency was devalued, import duties were reduced, and credit was made available to exporters, while incentives were offered to foreign investors. In 1965 an Export Processing Zone was established at the port of Kaohsiung, in the south of the island. Under growing competition from Japan , American manufacturers were looking for ways to reduce their costs, and found that they could do so by using the cheap labour in Taiwan. (In 1972, according to the consultant Arthur D. Little, skilled labour in Taiwan earned $US72 a month, compared with $US102 in South Korea, $US122 in Hong Kong, and $US183 in Singapore.) Taiwan also benefited from the American war effort in Vietnam, through base construction, procurement, and leave facilities. American and japanese investors were required to purchase from local suppliers: small plants proliferated and prospered. As exports grew, America replaced japan as Taiwan's biggest market , with textiles as the main export, followed by electronics and wood products. The economy now picked up speed: the growth rate rose to nearly 10 per cent a year. This surge of growth was interrupted in the early 70s. Nixon's visit to Peking, which led to the recognition of the PRC by japan and many other countries, shook confidence. Then the Arab oil embargo raised the prices of Taiwan's imports and weakened markets for its exports. A healthy trade surplus turned into a deficit: in 1974 the growth rate fell to just over one per cent. The government intervened, by launching a series of development projects, in the fields of transport and communications, and also in that of heavy industry - steel, ship-building, and petrochemicals. After the second oil shock, it put more emphasis on 'knowledge-intensive' industries, such as computers. The growth

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rate recovered : it went into double figures for a few years, before settling at about 8 per cent. But a growing imbalance in trade led to pressure from the United States for the revaluation of Taiwan's currency. and for greater recognition of American patents and copyrights. Taiwan had begun to experience the disadvantages of dependence on one big market, but it was still inhibited from exploiting the most promising alternative, mainland China. The war between Nationalists and Communists had left a legacy of hostility and suspicion that outlived both Chiang and Mao . Peking's refusal to renounce the use of force for the liberation of Taiwan matched Taipeh's talk of returning to the mainland . Thanks largely to the United States, neither side translated its propaganda into military action , but the propaganda kept the feud alive. and made it harder for the two regimes to come to terms . When Teng returned to power in Peking, Taipeh took time to grasp that he was really trying to change the econom1c system and open China up, to Taiwan as well as to other countries. A Special Economic Zone was set up in Fukien province on the mainland to attract bus~ from Taiwan , and it eventually did so , but only gradually did Taipeh relax its restrictions on travel , trade . and investment. Business grew rapidly in any case , though most of it was still done through Hong Kong. The feud between Nationalists and Communists also retarded , but did not prevent, the liberalisation of the Taiwan regime . Rising living standards, together with exposure to American culture and politics, had by the mid-80s confronted Chiang's son and successor. Chiang Ching-kuo , with a choice between repression and reform . Despite his security background, Ching-kuo opted for reform . In 1984 he chose a Taiwanese , Lee Teng-hui , as his Vice-President . Soon afterwards, opposition panies were legalised and allowed to take pan in elections. In 1987 maniallaw was at last lifted. When Ching-kuo died in the following year, Lee succeeded him as President, and also as head of the Nationalist Pany. The opposition was divided between those who wanted democracy and those who sought independence for Taiwan, but the main party, the Democratic Peoples Pany, appealed primarily to the Taiwanese. In the first elections after the lifting of maniallaw, it won over a third of the popular vote, though polls indicated that the support for independence was not as great. Coming soon after Tiananmen ,

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this aroused concern in Peking. There was corresponding relief when the Nationalists won the elections in 1991 by a convincing majority. Communists and Nationalists seemed at last to be realising that they had a common interest in preserving the unity of China. And the growth of economic relations between Taiwan and the mainland was steadily strengthening that interest. Taiwan firms were now active even in remote pans of China like Sinkiang. Business made cooperation a practical necessity. In 1993 unofficial representatives of the two sides met openly for the first time, in Singapore, to reduce obstacles to business contacts. But as we shall see, growing pressure in Taiwan for recognition of the island's autonomy caused a crisis between the US and China in 1995, and raised serious questions about the prospects for further development of ties with the mainland. The more democratic Taiwan becomes, the more sympathy it gets in America , and the greater the danger of a clash with China . Hong Kong

Overshadowed by Shanghai at the end of the 19th century, Hong Kong regained importance after the japanese attack on that city in 193 7. but fell to them itself in 1941. After japan was defeated, British rule was reestablished, and refugees from the civil war in China began to pour in. Probably in order to get early British recognition of the PRC , and bring pressure on the United States to follow suit, the Communists did not attempt to take the colony in 1949. With the Portuguese enclave of Macao, it became the only pan of the mainland that was not under their control. But, after the outbreak of war in Korea, its contacts with the mainland were severely restricted: it was left in limbo. Refugees went on pouring in: the population of the colony rose from 600,000 in 194 5 to 1,800, 000 at the end of 194 7, and 2,200,000 by the end of 1950. The refugees came from many parts of China: they included a lot of businessmen from Shanghai who were looking for a new base. Some of them saw the cheap labour of their fellow-refugees as a valuable resource, and had some new textile-making machinery that was already on the way from Europe re-directed from Shanghai to Hong Kong so that they could take advantage of it. This was the beginning of the process of mdustrialisation.

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As a British colony, Hong Kong was administered by a Governor appointed from London. He was expected to make sure that the colony did not add to the burdens on the British Government's already strained resources. At first the main contribution the administration could make to development was to maintain law and order and to keep the pon free and open to all. Fires in the refugee slums in the early 50s forced it to take some responsibility for housing: later land reclamation was used to promote industrial development as well. The role of the government grew as its resources increased, but it continued to see its main function as providing stability and justice, and keeping taxes low. Its approach came closer to laissez faire than that of most governments at the time. As access to the mainland was restricted, manufacturers in Hong Kong had to look elsewhere for customers. Expon orientation was a necessity rather than a choice. Some of the first markets developed were in Southeast Asia: in 1956 Indonesia took the largest share of Hong Kong's exports. But the focus soon shifted to Britain and America. And as Hong Kong's exports to those countries rose, so did protectionist reactions. The colony was one of the first suppliers to come under quota restrictions in Britain, as well as in other countries. Other industries were now growing up - notably plastic toys and clothing. The economy began to grow faster, though living standards did not immediately follow. Hong Kong's location gave it some other opponunities. Although it was cut off from the mainland, the colony became a base for what was called China-watching- by Americans as well as by Commonwealth governments, and by the press. Its value was enhanced during the 60s by the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and by the Cultural Revolution in China. The turmoil caused by that movement spilled over into Hong Kong, and caused disturbances there in 1966-6 7, which highlighted the vulnerability of the colony. But fears of a Communist takeover were not fulfilled. Hong Kong had already become China's biggest foreign exchange earner, and this consideration evidently weighed with the more pragmatic leaders who were beginning to regain influence in Peking. During the Vietnam war Hong Kong was more frequently visited by American ships, and by American servicemen on leave. They enjoyed the shopping and other attractions, and spread the

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word that the colony was a good place to visit. Tourism took its place alongside manufacturing for export, and the local passion for gambling helped to add financial services as a source of income for the colony. Nixon's reversal of American policy towards China, and Mao's response to it, opened the way for a revival of Hong Kong's trade with the mainland. American and japanese investment in the colony increased in the early 70s, and expanded the foreign presence there . But it was only when Teng returned to power in Peking, and the process of economic change got under way, that Hong Kong began to derive substantial benefit. The establishment of Special Economic Zones in Kwangtung- one directly adjacent to Hong Kong - gave manufacturers there the opportunity to move plant across the border and take advantage of the cheap labour on the mainland side. The SEZs burgeoned, to the benefit of both sides. Before long, the two economies were becoming closely interwoven and interdependent. By the 90s the bulk of Hong Kong's manufacturing was being done across the border, though the colony remained the centre for management, financing, and export marketing. But confidence remained fragile . The lease for the New Territories, which had become an integral part of Hong Kong, was due to expire in 1997. During the 70s lawyers began to ask whether they could go on arranging mortgages on the traditional 15-year basis. Encouraged by the economic reforms in China, the Thatcher Government decided to grasp the nettle. In 1984 it concluded an agreement with Peking under which Hong Kong as a whole would revert to China in 1997, but it would retain 'a high degree of autonomy' so that it could keep its 'current social and economic system . . . unchanged for 50 years' Qoint Declaration para. 2, 5, 12). Some in Hong Kong were not completely reassured: those who could afford it began to establish the right to live in Western countries. The Tiananmen incident intensified the apprehension, and forced the British Government to make increased provision for emigration to Britain . Tiananmen also stimulated demands for democracy in Hong Kong, which a new Governor, Chris Patten, decided to try and meet. Despite his advanced age, Teng made a visit to South China early in 1992, and gave his blessing to the changes that were going

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on there, as well as in Shanghai. He must have seen how close the ties now were between Kwangtung and Hong Kong, and what a powerful influence the colony had on its hinterland. When Patten, without consulting Peking, proposed to widen the elective basis of the Legislative Council, the Chinese Government reacted sharply, and with I eng's full authority. It was made clear that China would not accept any constitutional changes made without its agreement. Patten then sought support from other governments. Early in 1993 he went to Washington, to lobby against the suspension of China's MFN status. While he was there, the United States Government reaffirmed its support for his proposals, as a step towards democracy in Hong Kong. Hong Kong had become one of the issues in relations between America and China, and one that was closely connected with the central questions of trade and human rights. In 40 years Hong Kong had transformed itself from a very poor place to one that was on the way to affluence. But its prosperity rested to a considerable extent on its ties with Kwangtung. It had become the centre of the most rapidly growing economy in the region, with a population comparable with those of Taiwan and South Korea. It had also become involved in the growing tensions between China and the United States, without much assurance of protection, economic or military.

Singapore Like Hong Kong, Singapore owed its existence to British imperialism. Founded in 1819 as a trading post, it had a strategic location and a harbour that could take big ship~. The British developed it as a free port, and an entrepot for trade with the Malayan peninsula and the archipelago that was to become Indonesia. Labour was imported, not so much from these areas as from various parts of southern China. Singapore became a predominantly Chinese community in an area peopled mainly by Malays. · The capture of Singapore by the japanese in 1942 symbolised the passing of the British empire in Asia. But after the war Britain needed the rubber and tin produced in Malaya, not least to earn scarce American dollars, and it reasserted its control. Some of the

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Chinese who had fought against the Japanese resisted the reimposition of British and Malay authority. The Communist insurgency that broke out in 1948 took eight years to put down, and a lot of troops - from Australia and New Zealand as well as from Britain itself. The Emergency also delayed the process of decolonisation, and radicahsed the anti-colonial movement in Singapore. When the British handed over to an elected government in 1959, the moderate socialist, Lee Kuan Yew, had a long struggle with the Communists. To prevent a Communist takeover, the Malayan leader, Tungku Abdul Rahman, proposed that Singapore become part of a new federation to be called Malaysia. But he would not agree to a common market, and he insisted on including the British territories in Borneo, to ensure that the Chinese did not become a majority of the population. Lee strongly supported the integration of Singapore with Malaysia, even though it provoked a military Confrontation with Indonesia . His party, based in Singapore, put up candidates for elections in Malaya in competition with Rahman's Alliance. Communal rioting broke out. Singapore was forced to leave the new federation, and become an independent state. Alienated from both its neighbours, the new state had few resources except its location, its harbour, and its people. But the people had been encouraged by their radical leaders to expect a lot from their government. Lee saw that to survive, and meet these expectations, the island would have to industrialise quickly, and that this could only be done with foreign capital. So he set out to attract private investment, particularly from America. To maintain popular support, Lee also committed himself, more deeply than other Asian leaders, to improving living conditions. His Government launched an ambitious programme of housing and road-building, which was financed by compulsory savings. This helped to get the cooperation of labour in the development of industry. Oil refining and ship building became the bases of the new economy, rather than the entrepot trade. When Singapore was cast out of Malaysia, Lee and his colleagues decided that it could not rely on other countries to protect it. The point was underlined by the decision of the British Government to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia. Singapore devoted a high

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proportion of its resources - over 10 per cent of GNP - to defence, and took advice on how to spend the money, mainly from Israel. Within a few years, Singapore built up substantial forces, and made itself a tough nut to crack. At the same time, Lee took advantage of Sukamo's fall to improve relations with Indonesia. When the Association of South East Asian Nations was formed in 1967, Singapore became a member, along with Malaysia and Indonesia. The American withdrawal from Vietnam enhanced ASEAN's importance: so did Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Singapore took a leading part in rallying international opposition to the Vietnamese occupation, and focussing attention on the threat of Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism. One benefit for Singapore was to balance the fear of China that was still strong in Indonesia, and allay its suspicions about Singapore. The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the anti-Soviet line of its force, but not before it had served its purpose. Singapore was now accepted as a leading member of ASEAN. The American effort to contain Communism in Asia had helped Singapore. Lee's own experience had ~de him robustly antiCommunist, and he expressed his views forcefully. During the Vietnam war, he gave the United States discreet but effective support, and built up a reputation as a reliable friend . American ships, and American firms, were welcome in Singapore, and found it congenial. Textile and electronics plants sprang up, with America as their main market. Industrial production rose, and so did living standards. Singapore had joined the fast-growth league. After the oil crises of the 70s, the Government decided to change its economic strategy. Wages were deliberately raised, to force firms to use higher technology and compete internationally. The economy suddenly contracted: GNP growth fell from 8.2 per cent in 1984 to -1.8 per cent in 1985. But, under close supervision by the Government, firms adjusted quickly, and by 1987 the growth rate was up to 8.8 per cent. Manufacturing, including electronics, now accounted for a third of all economic activity. But the more labour-intensive industries were moving out of Singapore itself, into adjacent parts of Malaysia and Indonesia. The idea of a 'Growth Triangle' was actively promoted by the Singapore

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Gov(mment, perhaps as a counterpan to Kwangtung. Both the former British entrepots. Singapore and Hong Kong, were showing their strength by widening the bases of their economies. For the time being. Indonesia and Malaysia seemed to share China's view that the economic benefits for them outweighed the political risks. Singapore's future clearly depended largely on relations with its immediate neighbours. Of this Singapore's leaders were acutely aware. but their actions did not always reflect the recognition. In international forums like the United Nations, Singapore allowed Itself to appear as the main spokesman of the ASEAN group. The continuing build-up of Singapore's forces, quiet though it was, could not but attract the attention of its neighbours, and risk provoking an arms race . And the pride of Singapore's people in their achievements highlighted the key role of the Overseas Chinese in the development of the whole region, at a time when their ties with China itself were being strengthened by business ventures. Close links with the United States added to the distinctiveness of Smgapore's position within its own area. if not to its vulnerability. Common Factors

The paths taken by South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Smgapore were not all the same. In some cases the government played a more active role in the economy than in others. The role of the United States vaned. as did that of Japan. Yet the four had much m common. The common factors that contributed to the achievement of fast economic growth can be summarised under hve headings - nationalism. Confucianism, strong leadership, economic pragmatism, and external assistance. The most permanent characteristic the Young Tigers, or l....esscr Dragons, have in common is geography. All of them are small, by comparison with China, and even japan, and none is well endowed with natural rtSOurces. They are all close to China, but separated from it. Tt~ir peoplts are different in experience and outlook, if not in origin and language. from those of the adjacent areas. Each has developed a sense of its own identity: except in the case of Hong Kong. this now amounts to nationalism. It has been stimulated ~nd sustaintd by a sense of m.sccurity - a feeling of being under threat. In mosl of the four cases. the actual threat has waned dunng tht years of econom1c expansion. but the earlier experience

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is remembered, and the memory is a present reality. It still gives force to the idea of nation-building, and helps to elicit the efforts, and the sacrifices, required to realise that objective. Next to geography in permanence is culture. Confucianism may not be the best word to describe what Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have all inherited from China: it is too precise a term, and implies more intellectual content than is usually present. The essence of the Chinese tradition is family loyalty and discipline, which was reinforced by the teachings of Confucius, rather than deduced from them. It requires respect for, and obedience to, the head of the family, and by extension the head of the state. Closely associated with that is respect for the teacher, and for education itself, as the vehicle of the tradition. But this tradition has not, on its own, generated economic dynamism. In the past, and to some extent still, the Confucian emphasis on stability, and the Confucian contempt for trade, have stultified economic growth. The economic power of family solidarity first emerged clearly in the Treaty Ports, and among the Overseas Chinese. Confucianism becomes dynamic in a capitalist environment. Acquisitiveness is not in itself a Confucian virtue: even a high rate of saving is not an inherent part of the tradition. They are responses to the insecurity, and the opportunities, arising from close contact with the West. Less permanent than culture, but deriving from it and enduring, are political systems. One thing South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have had in common is strong leadership. Democratic forms have been used, but, except in the case of Singapore, political power has not until recently been achieved through popular election. Nor has it always been exercised with scrupulous respect for the rights of the individual: heavy-handed repression has not been unla10wn. The leaders who launched their countries into fast growth used whatever means they found necessary. But each of them had a sense of direction, which was sustained for a long time. Most of them also had goals other than mere personal aggrandisement: the case of the Philippines under Marcos provides a contrast. Other leaders used their power to promote economic growth, and also to ensure that the benefits were in due course shared. Wealth is not evenly distributed in any of the four cases, but the range of incomes is not as wide as it is in

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other pans of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Living standards have risen, as well as production, and a substantial middle class has emerged, which now demands a say in the running of the country. One step funher down the scale of permanence is economic policy - though the four have all achieved more continuity than most other countries. There are differences in the content of policy: South Korea favours big firms and government financing, Taiwan relies on smaller enterprises financed by the extended family . But the common features are more important. One is longterm planning by the government for the economy as a whole, with sanctions to ensure compliance. Another is the use of private firms in competition with one another, rather than state-owned monopolies. A third is the use of state power to encourage new industries, and protect them from foreign competition. What the four have most in common is a high degree of pragmatism. In economic matters, none is as doctrinaire as Western governments have recently tended to be . Lowest on the scale of permanence is the external factor, and yet it has played a critical part in the transformation of East Asia. The flow of American resources initially stimulated by the Korean war provided the impetus for expon-led growth not only in japan, but also in South Korea , in Taiwan, and even in Hong Kong and Singapore. After the war in Vietnam the flow diminished, but the United States continued to play a vital pan in the process of industrialisation by providing a big and relatively open market. America also contributed many of the ideas that made fast growth possible, both through policy advice and through training. It is significant that there are now something like 150,000 Asians studying in America, and many of them return to their homelands in due course. But the key fact is that America takes a quarter of the exports of the fast-growth Asian economies. The openness of the American market has made it possible for them to transform themselves, and to give their peoples better lives than they have ever had before. But in the process they have become dependent on the United States, and vulnerable to any movement there towards increased protectionism. japan has also played an important part in the development of its neighbours, both as an exemplar and latterly as an investor. But

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it still does not provide many of them with a staple market: it sells other Asian countries more than it buys from them. Japanese investment has begun to knit their economies together, but it has yet to create a balanced regional economy. Panly for this reason, Japan is still not accepted as a leader. South Korea and Taiwan both see themselves as its rivals, rather than its partners, and are reluctant to enter into closer relations with Japan . Pressure from the United States to open up Asian markets is giving the countries concerned a common interest, but there is as yet not much sense of community. While the American market remains open , regionalism has little attraction for East Asia . Sources &ken. Korea Old and New . Haggard. Pathways from the Penphery . •joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong" long. Taiwan : China 's L.a.sr Frontier. Rees. A Short History of Modrm Korea . Regnier. Singapore: City-State in South-East Asia. Segal, The Fate of Hong Kong . Vogel, One Step Ahead in China . Vogel , The Four Little Dragons. Wade. Governing the Market.

CHAPTER

10

China against a Wall

The collapse of the Soviet Union completed the latest of th£ periodic swings in American attitudes towards China. Freed from the Soviet threat. Americans felt less need of Asian allies. The United States could now afford to pursue its own interests, political and economic. Americans could go back to using China for domestic political purposes. And China could not do much about it, because economically it had become dependent upon America. The collapse of the Soviet Union worried Chinese leaders too. They saw that China would now have to bear the brunt of the American crusade for human rights and democracy. They knew that, to keep up a high rate of growth, China had to have access to the American market and American technology. But they also knew that the United States needed China's expanding market. This reinforced their national pride, and encouraged them to stand up to American pressure, on economic issues as well as on Taiwan. The Tiananmen incident had aroused widespread public indignation in America, and reversed the growth of a more friendly attitude towards China. It also led to a demand for sanctions against China. This was voiced loudly by some of the Chinese who were in America studying: the cry was taken up by the media, and by American politicians, of both patties. President Bush felt obliged to respond. On 5 june 1989, he suspended military sales to, and military exchanges with China. After Teng had publicly endorsed the actions taken by the army in Tianamen Square, Bush announced a second set of sanctions, including the suspension of lending to

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China by international institutions, and of official exchanges at Cabinet level. The United States also encouraged its allies to follow suit: at the economic summit in Paris in july, even japan agreed to suspend economic aid to China. At the same time, the President warned against an 'emotional response' to events in Peking, on the ground that disproportionate sanctions might lead to a total break in relations, and cause further hardship to the Chinese people. Having tried unsuccessfully to speak to Teng by telephone, Bush sent two of his senior advisers, Lawrence Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft. to Peking, to convey to Chinese leaders American concern about the suppression of human rights in China, and the President's desire to prevent the collapse of Sino-American relations. Realising that this mission would look like a breach of the ban on high-level exchanges, Bush decided not to announce it publiclyan action which exposed him to charges of duplicity, and which was later used by his opponents to embarrass him. The sanctions imposed by the Administration did not satisfy public demands. At the end of june, Congress endorsed those already imposed, adding that they should not be lifted until the President could certify that China had 'made progress on a program of political reform', including the lifting of martial law and the release of political prisoners. If repression continued, the President was recommended to impose further sanctions, such as revoking the Most Favoured Nation status extended to China earlier. Congress also passed, by overwhelming majorities, a bill sponsored by Representative Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat from California, which gave Chinese students in the United States four years to apply for immigrant status. The President vetoed the bill, because it unduly limited his freedom of action in foreign affairs, but he issued an Executive Order with similar provisions. The Chinese did not retaliate against the United States. They did invite both Nixon and Kissinger to visit Peking again, and both went in the fall of 1989. On his return, Nixon reported to Congressional leaders that China was still essential 'to balance the power of japan and the Soviet Union in Asia' (Harding 1992, p . 25). He argued that it would be foolhardy for the United States to exclude itself from China's huge potential market, and run the risk of becoming an adversary rather than an ally of China in the next century. Not long afterwards, Scowcroft and Eagleburger

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went to Peking again, this time to tell the Chinese leaders that Bush needed some response from them. The President lifted or modified three of the sanctions that had been imposed on China earlier. The Chinese responded, by lifting martial law in Peking, by releasing some hundreds of the people who had been arrested, and by removing the heavy guard they had put around the American Embassy. But they did not release the dissident academic, Fang Uchih, who had been given refuge in the American Embassy. Fang became a symbol, at least to Americans, and his case acted as a rallying point for critics of the Administration's approach. The second Scowcroft-Eagleburger mission had been announced: the President was widely criticised for sending high-level emissaries to Peking, without even getting Fang released. Bush's discomfiture was increased by reports, usually from unidentified sources, that, contrary to what the Chinese had said publicly after the ScowcroftEagleburger visit, they were still selling arms in the Middle East. In january 1990, the Administration succeeded in defeating a move in Congress to overturn the President's veto of the Pelosi bill on Chinese students, but the margin was so narrow that the vote was in effect a rejection of the Bush policy on China. The Administration itself then picked up one of the ideas included in the Congressional resolution on sanctions, by hinting that the President had not yet decided whether to recommend the renewal of China's MFN status when the law required another decision by him. If MFN status were not renewed, American tariffs on Chinese goods would rise steeply, and halve China's exports to the United States. Peking responded to the threat. It encouraged japan's resistance to the idea of isolating China: the economic summit in Houston injuly 1990 agreed to a relaxation of sanctions. Fang U-chih was allowed to leave China, to go to Britain, and 300 more dissidents were released. The Chinese also bought from the United States $2 billion worth of Boeing aircraft. Bush considered these actions sufficient to justify his recommending the renewal of China's MFN status. Others did not. Human rights organisations published reports claiming that thousands of Chinese were still in prison and subject to torture. Another stream of reports accused China of selling missiles in the Middle East and continuing to supply anns to the Khmers Rouges in Cambodia. Some American experts on China came out against suspending China's MFN status,

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on the ground that it would lead to retaliation and give America's competitors the edge in the Chinese market. American business interests in Hong Kong also argued that suspension of MFN status would hun Hong Kong as much as China. These views did not at that stage prevail. Two bills were put forward by Democrats in the House of Representatives calling for suspension. When they came to the vote in October 1990, they were ovenaken by a simpler resolution which merely disapproved the renewal of MFN status. This was passed by a large majority, but one not large enough to survive a Presidential veto. The original bill was then adopted by the veto-proof majority of 384 to 30. But the Congressional session ended before the Senate had voted on the measure, and it lapsed, for the time being. The reprieve was panly due to the Gulf crisis. When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the United States took the issue to the United Nations Security Council. China was a permanent member of the Council, with the power of veto. In the early stages, China supponed all the resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion and imposing sanctions on it. By doing so, it won some credit in Washington. But in November, China abstained on the critical resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq. Bush, presumably recognising that China had not used its veto, received the Chinese Foreign Minister, but he was disappointed, especially when the Chinese criticised America's conduct of the war, and Bush's own idea of a New World Order. A senior Chinese leader, Po 1-po, was quoted as saying that this was an attempt to achieve world domination and to promote the 'peaceful evolution' of China from socialism to capitalism (Harding 1992, p. 274). Bush's subsequent request for financial help from japan and Germany demonstrated that the world was not yet 'uni-polar': The Chinese relaxed and concentrated on improving relations with their heighbours. Peking stopped criticising japan's defence policy and invited the new Emperor to visit China. It also took the first steps towards establishing relations with South Korea, while maintaining its long-standing ties with the Nonh. By the middle of 1991, it was becoming clear that China was holding to its course in economic policy. The process of economic reform resumed, though at a slower pace than in the late 80s. Political reform was still in abeyance, but more dissidents were

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released from time to time. At this stage, another stream of repons appeared claiming that China intended to sell missiles to Syria. It was also revealed, in Washington, that China was helping Algeria to build a nuclear reactor that was not subject to international safeguards. Meanwhile, the American trade deficit with China had grown. American sanctions had threatened China's ability to service its foreign debt, and forced it to cut back its impons. In March 1991 the United States Trade Representative reponed to Congress that the Chinese Government had raised tariffs, tightened impon controls, and increased expon incentives. China was also accused of using prison labour to produce goods exponed to America, and of shipping textiles to the United States through third countries, to get round American quotas. Another bill was put forward in Congress requiring the President to cenify, before renewing China's MFN status in 1992 , that Peking had released all the people arrested during the Tiananmen incident, stopped the expon of goods produced by prison labour, ended coercive abonions, and given assurances that China would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. This time a separate bill was introduced in the Senate. It set even stiffer conditions than the bill in the House. Some Chinese leaders argued against giving in to American pressure, but Teng decided that concessions had to be made. China undertook to stop the expon of goods produced by prison labour, and the illegal transhipment of textiles to the United States through third countries. It promised better protection of Americart patents and copyrights. Peking announced that the Algerian nuclear reactor was being placed under IAEA safeguards. And it agreed to join other permanent members of the UN Security Council in discussing limits on arms sales to the Middle East. Bush tried to use this Chinese response to head off the Congressional attack on China's MFN status. In a speech at Yale University at the end of May he announced that he was recommending that it be renewed, because isolating China would reduce the ability of the United States to promote peace and stability in Asia. There was another spate of repons about 'unfair' Chinese trade practices, violations of human rights, and arms sales to the Middle East. When the House bill came to the vote in july, it was adopted by 313 to 112. Bush then felt obliged to take a tougher line with the Chinese. A few

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days before the Senate was to vote on the bill, the President set out a new policy which included letting Taiwan accede to the GATT without the PRC. This helped the White House to round up enough votes in the Senate to sustain a Presidential veto if necessary. But it did not end the debate over China's MFN status, and Bush's policy towards China. A Presidential election was once again approaching. The Republicans had held the White House for 12 years continuously, and for 20 out of the last 24. Bush based his campaign for reelection on his record in foreign policy, and particularly on his handling of the Gulf crisis. China was one of the few foreign policy issues on which he was vulnerable, and it was the one on which his Democratic opponent fixed during the campaign. In accepting his party's nomination in july, Bill Clinton promised 'an America that will not coddle tyrants, from Baghdad to Beijing'. During the campaign he repeatedly criticised Bush for 'coddling China', though he added 'I do not want to isolate China'. Not quite consistently, he also said, 'It makes no sense to play the China card now, when our opponents have thrown in their hand' (Oberdorfer 1993, p. 5). Clinton won the election. To what extent Bush's defeat was influenced by his China policy is questionable. In 1992 he got the votes of only 30 per cent of the members of Congress on the China issue, but polls showed that more than half the American public supported the renewal of China's MFN status. Once Clinton was elected, he proceeded cautiously. For the first time, he acknowledged the benefits to the United States from trade with China - and he stopped talking about 'coddling'. Business groups - particularly those involved in trade with China - became more active in mobilising resistance to the suspension of MFN status. Even human rights activists began to emphasise that they were not seeking to stop trade with China. Democrats in Congress were more willing to compromise with a Democrat in the White House than they had been with his Republican predecessor. The new Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, who had served Reagan and Bush as Ambassador to China, put together a package that was acceptable to Congress. The President issued an Executive Order extending MFN status for one more year without conditions, but making it clear that, to get another extension in 1994, China

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would have to comply with the existing agreement on goods produced with prison labour, and 'substantially promote' freedom of emigration. In addition, China would need to show 'overall significant progress' on accounting for and releasing political prisoners, and granting access to such prisoners by human rights organisations, as well as protecting Tibet's cultural and religious heritage , and permitting foreign radio and television broadcasts to China. The point Clinton stressed in announcing his decision was that he wanted to support modernisation in China, 'and it's a great opportunity for America there' . Peking protested against the imposition of conditions: it warned that, if the United States persisted, it would hurt its own interests. Behind the change in Clinton's approach to China lay a change in the trade relationship. After Tiananmen American exports to China fell , while American imports from China went on rising. As a result , the American trade deficit increased . The problem was aggravated by the fact that both Hong Kong and Taiwan were transferring manufacturing plants to the Mainland, to take advantage of the cheap labour there, and to reduce their own trade surpluses with the United States. But, under American pressure, the Chinese set out to increase their imports from America. They bought aircraft, at a time when few others were doing so and Boeing was laying off staff in large numbers. China bought many other things from the United States, from telecommunications systems to cars. One result was to make American business more conscious of China's market potential - and of the competition from other suppliers, like japan . Another result was that American exports started growing again: without reducing the trade deficit significantly, they put it in a better light. Business groups lobbied hard for renewal of China's MFN status, both with Congress and with the Administration. Their influence was reflected in Clinton's decision in May 1994 to de-couple trade and human rights, and in the acceptance of that decision by Congress. But others were lobbying too. Human rights organisations worked openly, and did not try to avoid responsibility. The same thing could not be said of all those seeking to influence policy towards China. Each time a critical decision was coming up , there was a spate of reports about China's activities in the military field - alleged sales of missiles, nuclear technology, chemicals for

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weapons, and other anns, with the Middle East usually given as the destination. The reports seemed to be taken at face value: questions were seldom asked about their origins. But the timing suggested some. Why did they appear so often on the eve of policy decisions? What were the sources, and what authority did they have? And who would benefit from them? The last question in tum suggested at least part of an answer. At a time when defence spending was being cut hard, and defence industries were under severe pressure, some people involved could be expected to look round for a new Threat to replace that from the Soviet Union. Islamic Fundamentalism was an obvious candidate, but one that was losing credibility, especially after the Gulf war. China was more plausible- a Communist power, rejecting democracy and abusing human rights, increasing its defence spending and selling arms to anti-Western regimes, and still seen as a threat by some of its Asian neighbours. China offered a tempting target for anyone looking for a new Threat. The reports about its activities could not all be wrong, even if at least one was shown to lack any foundation . The Chinese clearly had some explaining to do, and were not very quick to see the need. But it was also clear that their actions were usually subject to a worst-case interpretation - they were presumed to be guilty until proved innocent. Underlying many of the reports, and the discussion they inspired, was the assumption that China is an expansionist power. When questioned, this assumption is often justified by reference to Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Both Tibet and Taiwan have long been internationally acknowledged to be parts of China: on this point there is no disagreement between Peking and Taipeh, or even Washington. Whatever the Chinese may do in those cases, it is hardly expansionism. Hong Kong is still a British· Colony, but Britain is committed to returning the whole territory to China in 1997. If China is guilty of expansionism in this case, it has been condoned by Britain and most other countries. The Spratly Islands are quoted as another case of Chinese expansionism. The PRC inherited this claim from its predecessors: the ROC occupied the largest island in the group soon after the Second World War, and has maintained its presence there ever since. Peking does not seem to have done much until other states -the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei- began putting

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forward claims of their own. What prompted them apparently was the belief that there were large deposits of oil under the South China Sea. Both China and Vietnam began letting exploration licences to foreign companies: in each case, one object seemed to be to involve the United States, for political reasons. The Chinese have always maintained that such disputes should be resolved by negotiations: more recently they have added 'in accordance with international law' . They seem to be moving in the direction of negotiating with ASEAN as a group , rather than with individual members of it, though this will become more difficult with Vietnam as a member. If the Chinese should fail to do so it will be taken as confirmation that their aims are expansionist. The clearest example of Chinese expansionism in recent times is Cambodia. At least since 1975 , the Chinese have tried to use that country to prevent Vietnam from dominating the old Indochina. They supported and encouraged Pol Pot when he was in power, and after the Vietnamese threw him out. In 1979 the Chinese army mounted a large-scale invasion of northern Vietnam, 'to teach the Vietnamese a lesson'. But China was not widely criticised for this in America at the time, or for long afterwards, because it was considered to be resisting Soviet expansionism. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the American attitude has changed, and China has been persuaded to reduce its support for the Khmers Rouges - though not to the point of a complete break. The Chinese have long since ceased to support insurgency in other parts of Southeast Asia, where their behaviour used to be seen as evidence of expansionism. Although China now has fruitful relations with all the ASEAN countries, there are still people in them who regard it as a threat, at least in the long term. The basis for this view is more domestic than international. The presence of millions of Chinese in Southeast Asia still causes concern, even though they make a major contribution to the current prosperity of the ASEAN countries, and are assimilating quite rapidly. China is not entirely innocent of expansionism, but what big country is? Looking back over the history of America's relations with Asia, one could hardly say that the United States was innocent either. Great powers have a tendency to assert themselves abroad, and to seek to influence other countries. Neither America nor China is an exception- let alone Japan. The critical question is

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not whether they are expansionist but whether they have the power, and the will, to expand. How strong is China? The high rate of economic growth it has achieved in recent years has encouraged the view that it is at least on the way to becoming a great power. Much publicity has been given to the assessment that, at present growth rates China will soon have one of the biggest economies in the world. This assessment does not take enough account of political factors . The stability of China can no longer be taken for granted, for three separate reasons. The present leadership cannot last much longer: the succession will be complicated by the fact that the regime has already lost much of its legitimacy, and now relies heavily on economic success. Economic decentralisation, which is essential for that success, is weakening the central authority, and affecting its ability to raise taxes, to the extent of jeopardising its control of at least some areas. And economic growth, together with increased freedom and the advent of television, has generated rising expectations, especially among the young, which are difficult to meet without disruption and disorder. For these reasons, the erosion of central authority is likely to go on, unless there is a complete reversal of the course followed since 1978, which would amount to another revolution. The unity of China could come under increasing strain, with provinces, and lesser entities, ignoring Peking, and getting into disputes with one another. There is no basis, either in history or in law, for the evolution of a federal system, or even a stable representative government. Any attempt to introduce such institutions quickly is likely to aggravate China's problems. Formal dissolution is not likely: most Chinese attach importance to the unity of their country, though that does not necessarily prevent them from acting independently at times, as Taiwan has shown. There is a serious risk that within a few years China will once again lapse into a congeries of economic and political entities, which compete with one another and sometimes link up with outside powers. Some of those who see this possibility say, Why not? Even within China, there are those who feel that Han culture, and particularly the characters which are its vehicle, represses and frustrates the popular cultures of the country, which are diverse and often have great vitality. This view seems to have been reflected

m the Chmcse televtSton work entitled Riva Eltgy, which appeared m the late 8 It emed to advocate the rejection of traditional Chmc~ culture m favour of an Opening to the West that amounted to 'globahsation'. This view may be widespread. at least in the coastal areas that are thriving on economic reform and foreign trade . Many people in Kwangtung. for example, must feel that they could do better if the province were on its own. or in some son of association Wlth Hong Kong. than it docs as pan of China, and to some extent still under the authority of Peking. Foreign busmessmen must also think that they could do better if they had to deal only with the provinces. and could forget about the central government . But what of the provinces that are not benefiting so much from the opening up of China? Could they be separated from the coastal area without creating great tensions? The answer to the question Why not 7 is that the cost of dtsmtegration would be very high . The cost would not be limited to reduced growth rates and lost opponunities for trade and mvestment . It would not even be limited to disorder and conflict, wtth all the suffenng they would cause among the Chinese people. Chma's netghbours are already so deeply involved in its economy that they could hardly escape being drawn into the fray . Neither could Amenca . which has a strong tendency to identify with what Americans ~e as the interests of the Chinese people. Although htStoncal precedents have to be used with caution , it is imponant not to overlook the point made m Chapter Three - that the war m the Pacific arose out of a disagreement between America and Japan over China . and that disagreement in tum arose out of the colla~ of the central authority in China. A strong China could become expansionist and cause problems for other countries. A weak and dlSunited China is almost cenain to become an object of compeution and to cause international tension. if not conflict. Chma lS under pressure to follow up iu economic refoTTTlS by gl"mg lts people more say in govertUnCTlt. Teng has resLSted pohtical change because he believes that it would weaken the central .iuthoriry and increase tht risk of disorder and disunity. But pnssure for pohllcal rdorm arises from his own baste strategy of opmmg Ouna to the West . Wc.e many of hlS predecessors. Teng has disc~red that Chmcse who go abroad to learn Western ttchnology oftm pac k up Western pobtia.l tdca.s as well Chma

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needs not only Western technology but also Western markets, so it cannot afford not to take account of Western ideas, even when it considers them dangerous . The saving grace, the Chinese have discovered, is that the West also needs China, because it is the most rapidly growing market in the world. This discovery has given the Chinese greater confidence in their dealings with Westerners. Nationalism has re-emerged, and is running high, particularly in the armed forces . Not surprisingly, it is directed primarily at the United States. Those seeking political support are at pains to show that they can stand up to the Americans and uphold China's interests. But this new nationalism proceeds at least partly from a realisation that China is still dependent on other countries - especially America. For the same reason, the Chinese are trying to improve their relations with their neighbours, and to play their part in the development of regional cooperation. One of their most significant actions had been to join the ASEAN Regional Forum, and try to reassure other participants about their policy on the South China Sea. Their main target seems to be japan. Both the Chinese and the japanese have presented the Emperor Akihito's visit to Peking soon after his accession as a symbol of the efforts they are making to overcome their past differences. They are apparently seeking to show that, despite long-standing grievances, they are not incapable of working together. Conscious as both are of their dependence on America, they seem to be trying to strengthen their bargaining positions, against the possibility of further pressure being put on them by the United States. The recent improvement in their relations has not so far shaken the Americans' assumption that China and japan will always be rivals, and that the United States holds the balance between them. There are two exceptions to the general improvement in China's relations with its neighbours. Governor Patten's attempt to democratise the Hong Kong legislature was seen as a departure from the spirit of the 1984 joint Declaration by Britain and China on the future of Hong Kong. The Chinese Government reacted strongly, making it clear that it would not accept changes to the constitution made without its consent. One reason was the closeness of the ties between Hong Kong and Kwangtung. The latter was already becoming difficult for Peking to handle: it did not want to

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aggravate the problem. What was at stake was not just the future of Hong Kong but the unity of China. When the United States gave Patten some support, Peking agreed to negotiations with the British, and made some concessions on economic questions. American pressure had its effect, but it did not deter Peking from announcing that the Legislative Council would be abolished in 1997. Given the extent of American business involvement in Hong Kong, and the American media presence, there is a risk that, when that time comes, Hong Kong may become an issue in relations between the United States and China. The other exception is Taiwan. Despite the breaking of fonnal relations with the United States and many other countries in the 70s, the island prospered during the 80s and early 90s. Trade with the Mainland grew rapidly, as well as Taiwan investment there. In june 1995, Taiwan's premier was quoted as saying that 'mainland China was likely to become Taiwan's largest trading partner, investment destination and source of foreign exchange surpluses by the year 2000'. But the extension of democracy had stimulated demands in Taiwan for recognition of its independence, and evoked greater sympathy in America. Under pressure from Congress, President Clinton allowed the President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, to visit the United States on a private basis. Peking saw this action as a breach of the understandings on which relations between the United States and China were founded, and reacted strongly. In addition to withdrawing their ambassador from Washington and suspending military contacts, the Chinese carried out a series of missile tests in the sea to the north of Taiwan. The Chinese press also made some strong personal attacks on Lee, although he himself was opposed to complete independence for Taiwan. Economic relations did not seem to be affected; their growing value to both parties held out hope that they might still provide a basis for limiting the damage . But the incident highlighted the fragility of the relationship, and its vulnerability to pressure for Taiwan's independence. Of all China's neighbours, Taiwan was still the one Peking found it hardest to come to terms with. That relationship was also the one that could most easily embroil China in another confrontation with the United States.

CHAPTER

11

The Asian Diaspora

The treatment of Asians in the United States has been discussed a good deal, but not much in the context of America's relations with the countries they came from. When it is, the point that is often made is that relations with the home country have influenced attitudes towards Asian immigrants in America. It is not always acknowledged that the converse is also true - reactions to Asians in the United States have influenced American views of the countries they came from . That is not surprising: until recently, most Americans have had direct contact with Asia mainly through Asians living in the United States. The latest example of the influence of such contacts was the American reaction to the Tiananmen incident; but that is only the most recent in a history that goes back to the middle of the 19th century. And that in tum is pan of the history of Asian migration, which goes back much funher. East Asia has long been a source of migration. The Americas were originally peopled from there, as was the South Pacific. The Chinese Empire was opposed to emigration: why should people who lived in the most civilised pan of the world want to leave? But official disapproval did not always prevent Chinese from going overseas. As early as the 1st century BC, trade with Southeast Asia was leading to the establishment of Chinese communities in that area. They thrived on the positive attitude taken by the Tang and Sung dynasties towards contacts with the outside world, and suffered from the Ming reaction against foreign influence. Cheng

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Ho's naval expeditions early in the Ming period may have helped them, but they soon lost whatever they had gained in protection and prestige. When the Ming Emperor stopped the expeditions, he also forbade Chinese to go overseas without licences. Peking was still willing to receive tribute from rulers enlightened enough to offer it, and to respond generously in kind; but the Emperor did not usually accept responsibility for those who entered into this tributary relationship. From Ming times at least, the Chinese in Southeast Asia were on their own, and had to fend for themselves. Theirs was more a folk migration than a planned colonisation. The Japanese Empire's attitude was not much different from the Chinese Empire's, at least until the end of the 19th century. Then Tokyo became concerned that Japanese who went to live overseas should not undermine the prestige of their own country, and asserted some authority over them for this reason. But, like Peking, Tokyo did not promote emigration, and generally disapproved of it. Contact with the West accelerated the movement of Chinese overseas . The first Europeans in East Asia were the Portuguese: they traded with China mainly around Macao, though they dealt with Chinese traders in Malacca and elsewhere in Southeast Asia as well. When the Spaniards established themselves in the Philippines in the middle of the 16th century, Chinese merchants went to Manila to sell silk and other Chinese products for silver from Mexico and Peru, and some settled there. Early in the 17th century, the Dutch supplanted the Portuguese . For a while, they, and the English, traded with the mainland from Formosa: their factories drew people from Fukien province on the mainland to the relatively empty island. But, after driving out the English, the Dutch found the spice trade more profitable, and concentrated their activities in the archipelago that is now Indonesia. Finding that they needed more labour than they could easily recruit around their base at Batavia in Java, they encouraged Chinese settlement, partly by supporting the sugar industry, which was already in Chinese hands. By the beginning of the 18th century, Chinese were living in various parts of Southeast Asia, in considerable numbers. They worked as traders and as artisans, as well as planters and farmers. Acting as intermediaries between the Dutch and the local peoples, they came to exercise a good deal of economic power. Their success encouraged others to follow them, especially

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when southern China was disrupted by resistance to the Manchu takeover in Peking. The flow of immigrants became too great for the Dutch colony's economy to absorb : unemployed Chinese banded together and threatened law and order. In 1740 Dutch attempts to deal with the problem led to a massacre: the people of Batavia turned against the Chinese and killed 10,000 of them. The Chinese in Central Java then rebelled, and were supported by the local ruler, who wanted to drive the Dutch out. But the Dutch won. They consolidated their hold on Java, and went back to using the Chinese as tax collectors. The war of American Independence, which cost Britain its American colonies, confirmed the supremacy of the British navy over the French, and opened the way for the extension of British sea-power to Southeast Asia, at the expense of the Dutch. In 1786 the British took possession of Penang, an island off the coast of Malaya, to use as an entrep6t. From the outset, the new outpost attracted Chinese, as did Singapore when it was founded in 1819. Singapore, Malacca and Penang were linked as the Straits Settlements: their economic success was due largely to their Chinese inhabitants, who came to be known as the Straits Chinese. They lived mainly by trading with the Dutch East Indies , but they provided the bases from which the British gradually extended their control over Malaya and the north coast of Borneo. The Chinese followed the British flag. They had long been involved in tin-mining: later they played an important part in the development of the rubber industry. And, as in the Dutch empire, they were active as traders and moneylenders. Perhaps the most lasting effect of the British Empire was that it helped to spread Chinese, and also Indians, not only through Southeast Asia, but all round · the world. The middle of the 19th century saw a sharp increase in Chinese migration. As we saw in Chapter One, the population of China more than doubled during the long period of peace provided by the Manchu Emperors in the 18th century. Food supplies expanded with the introduction of American plants - notably maize and sweet potatoes - but by 1800 the pressure on resources was again becoming intense, and the first in what was to be a long series of rebellions had broken out in the countryside. The abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1833 created a new demand for

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cheap labour, particularly in the West Indies, and led to the evolution of a system of indenturing that was not much different in effect from slavery. Then came the Opium War. Together with the Taiping Rebellion, it caused widespread disruption and impoverishment in southern China, which made many men desperate enough to leave their homes in the hope of earning money abroad. The opening up of the Treaty Ports also made it easier for foreigners to recruit Chinese for work overseas. In 1849 gold was discovered in California, which the United States had just acquired from Mexico. The news reached China quickly, and the Mountain of Gold became the goal of a new stream of Chinese migrants. They were nominally free, though they were often misled, ill-treated, and exploited by the businessmen - Chinese as well as American - who arranged their movement to California. Most of the Chinese who went to America - and later to Australia , New Zealand , and Canada, when gold was discovered there too - came from the countryside round Canton, which had suffered severely from the effects of the Opium War. Many of those who went to Southeast Asia came from there too , but many more came from the coastal parts of Fukien province, and spoke different dialects from the Cantonese. One thing the migrants had in common - whether they went on indentures or as 'free ' labour, whether they spoke Cantonese or Hokkien or Teochiu , nearly all went as single men, seeking to make money and then return to their homes in China . There were few women in this wave of migration, and few men who wanted to settle abroad. In present -day jargon, they were 'sojourners' rather than true migrants. The flow built up quickly. Between 1849 and 1870, over 100,000 Chinese entered the United States, nine tenths of them adult males . They were not the only people lured by the prospect of riches: in the year 1849 alone, something like 100,000 flooded into California. Yet labour was scarce: at first the Chinese were welcomed, and did well. According to the American representative in China, Dr Peter Parker, 'the favourable reports of those who have returned to China, having been fortunate at the gold mountain, seem to have imparted a new impetus to the tide of emigration' (Daniels 1988, p. 14). Although many went back to China, sooner

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or later, they became a significant element in the population of the new state. Between 1860 and 1880 Chinese represented more than 8 per cent of the total population: as most were men, the proportion of the work-force was much higher. In the early years, most of them worked as miners, but they were recruited for other jobs as well. The companies building the transcontinental Central Pacific Railroad employed up to 10,000 Chinese, especially on the more difficult and dangerous sections of the line. But when the line was completed in 1869 nearly all of them were laid off. By 1880, a fifth of the Chinese in California were working as miners, and another fifth as labourers: a seventh worked on the land , and similar proportions in manufacturing and domestic service. A tenth of them worked in laundries. Chinese labour was cheaper than any other, but the Chinese earned more than they could at home , and they kept coming. The biggest concentration was in San Francisco, where the Chinese population numbered over 25 ,000. They sought support and protection in associations based on their family names and their places of origin. Some of them fell under the influence of criminal organisations called 'tongs', which provided recreation in the forms of gambling, opium-smoking, and sex. It was among the tongs that Sun Yat-sen found his main support in America. The Chinese had not been in America long when they began to experience resentment and discrimination. As early as 1852, other miners in California - themselves immigrants, but white - were accusing the Chinese of reducing their wages. Mass meetings in mining districts passed resolutions protesting against 'unfair competition'. According to a historian of Asians in America, Throughout the mining districts of California, and eventually throughout the North American West, Chinese were subject to violence , expropriation, and murder' (Daniels 1988, p. 34). And popular feeling soon had its effect on politics. In 1852, when there were about 10,000 Chinese in the state, the Governor sent a message to the legislature insisting that 'measures must be adopted to check this tide of Asiatic immigration'. (Only a year before, his predecessor had called for increased Chinese immigration.) In 1855 the legislature passed 'An Act to discourage the Immigration to this state of persons who cannot become citizens thereof'. This

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was annulled by the state supreme court, but other acts were passed with the same purpose. Chinese immigration had become a major political issue, in California and beyond. In 1868 the United States Senate ratified the treaty with China negotiated by Anson Burlingame, which recognised 'the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free immigration and emigration of their citizens . . . from one country to another'. But in 1869 the railroad was completed and thousands of Chinese were thrown on to the labour market. Mass demonstrations demanded an end to Chinese immigration and abrogation of the Burlingame treaty. The Socialist leader Henry George took up the issue in New York, and denounced the 'Yellow Peril'. The question reached Congress in 1870, and by 1874 President Grant was lending his prestige to the anti-Chinese movement. A Congressional investigation in 1876 heard over a hundred witnesses, not one of whom was Chinese. The main allegations were that the Chinese lowered wages and degraded morals. The answer given to the first charge was that they worked hard and contributed to the development of the country. Employers welcomed cheap labour, and used it at times to break strikes. Neither they, nor the missionaries who tried to help the Chinese, could withstand the rising tide of popular hostility. The Democrats, who had espoused the issue in California, forced resolutions through the House of Representatives calling for modification of the Burlingame treaty, and the Republican administration felt obliged to respond. In 1880 the Chinese Government accepted a new treaty that gave the United States the right to limit the immigration of Chinese labourers, while allowing other Chinese to come and go freely. In 1882 Congress passed a bill that suspended the immigration of labourers for 20 years, and confirmed that Chinese were not eligible for American citizenship. President Chester Arthur thought 20 years was too long a period and vetoed the bill. But he signed a modified version of it that suspended immigration for ten years. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was renewed by the Geary Act of 1892, whiCh required all Chinese in the United States to have a certificate of residence. When this law was challenged in the courts, it was held -that the right to exclude aliens was an inherent attribute of sovereignty.

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Why did the Chinese incur so much hostility' The question is important, because this was the closest encounter so far between Americans and Asians, and it set a pattern for others - notably with the japanese. Why did Americans hate Chinese so violently' The main reason given at the time was that they worked for low wages: that was clearly part of the explanation. The other was that they degraded morals. This was based on the fact that most of them were single men, separated from their families , and they tended to resort to prostitutes, or to homosexuality, as well as to opium. How much effect their behaviour had on other people is not clear, though it is said that Chinese brothels were not patronised exclusively by Chinese. The underlying reason for the popular hostility towards the Chinese is that they were different. They looked different. They spoke a different language , which few Americans understood . They kept to themselves as much as they could, and did not try to become Americans. No matter how long they were abroad, they remained Chinese. Most wanted nothing more than to go home, and take some money to their families . Other immigrants went into the Melting Pot and eventually became Americans: for a long time, the Chinese did not. They were segregated by their own culture, as well as by the hostility of other groups. Even though most of them were single men, they did not adopt the individualism that was the hall-mark of an American. However long they were away from their homes , their lives continued to revolve around their families They worked hard, and endured much, not just for themselves but for those at home who relied on them. In this respect they were not completely different from other immigrants, but their family orientation lasted longer, and more severely limited their integration into American society. In seeking an explanation for the intense hostility towards the Chinese , it is necessary to look at the other side of the picturethe American one, as well as the Chinese. The people who lived in California in the second half of the 19th century had nearly all arrived there recently - some from other parts of the United States, many more or less directly from Europe. Some European immigrants seem to have clung to their own cultures like the Chin~se, but most wanted to identify with their new country. One way to assert their Americanness was to strike 'nativist' attitudes

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towards more obviously alien groups. The Chinese contribution to the Melting Pot in this period was to act as the common enemy of the white workers. Racism was thus intensified by large-scale immigration from Europe. It also drew heavily on European ideas -particularly Social Darwinism. One idea that had wide currency was that 'the Anglo-Saxons' were the fittest people to survive, but they had to resist threats from lesser races . Henry George argued that, unless Chinese immigration was checked, 'the youngest of the nations must ... meet the doom of Babylon, Nineveh and Rome' (Daniels 1988, p. 40). The Chinese Exclusion Acts had their effect. The number of Chinese in the United States seems to have peaked in the mid-80s: from 1890 at least it was declining. But at that stage japanese began to enter the continental United States in significant numbers. American sugar planters in Hawaii had been imponing japanese labour for some time: growing numbers of them now moved on to the West Coast of their own accord. Others went to America directly from japan. The numbers were not at first large: in 1900 there were still fewer than 25,000 japanese in the United States. The japanese Government took a close interest, out of concern for japan's slowly rising prestige: it did not encourage the movement. japanese immigrants came largely from the countryside, and many went to work on the land in California, but San Francisco, which was the main pon of entry, became the centre of the japanese community in America. It was there that violence broke out against them as early as 1890. The japanese were believed to be taking the place of the Chinese, and incurred the same hostility. It focussed on education. In 1893 the San Francisco Board of Education ordered all japanese children to attend the separate school it provided for the Chinese. Under pressure, the Board reversed its decision, and the issue died down for a while, but it revived in 1900, during a campaign for renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Act. The anti-japanese agitation was organised by leading members of the American Federation of Labour. All political panies now wanted to restrict immigration, but it was the Democrats who called for the extension of the ban on Chinese to all other Asians. The number of japanese entering the United States was rising: in 1907 it reached 30,000. By 1910 there were more japanese in the United States than Chinese- though in both cases the numbers

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were small compared with those for European immigrants. During the Russo-japanese War, a leading San Francisco newspaper launched a campaign against the japanese invasion'. The cry was taken up by other papers, and by the California legislature, which relayed it to Congress. japan's victories over the Russians intensified the hostility: they also gave the United States Government reason to intervene. President Roosevelt sought to defuse the issue. The San Francisco earthquake further stimulated anti-Japanese feeling, and the Board of Education once again ordered all japanese children to attend the Chinese school. Roosevelt dissociated himself from the action, though not without ambiguity. His statement was taken to mean that he favoured naturalisation, and it provoked an outcry on the Coast. The Board again reversed itself, but the Federal Government took action to check japanese immigration. At the end of 1907 a so-called Gentlemen's Agreement was negotiated with the Japanese Government under which the latter promised not to issue passports to japanese labourers to go to America. The United States, for its part, accepted that passports could be issued to the wives and children of japanese already living in America. The Gentlemen's Agreement was presented in California as tantamount to exclusion, but the actual result was different. japanese women came to America in significant numbers, and in due course iliey produced children. The number of japanese in the United States doubled in 20 years. Many of them worked on the land, and some prospered, mainly by specialised horticulture. Anti-japanese feeling did not decline. In the election of 1912, Woodrow Wilson associated himself with it, and won California by a narrow margin. Once in the White House he told the japanese Government he would try to prevent anti-japanese legislation, and 'he sent his Secretary of State to address the California legislature. It ignored his plea, and passed an Alien Land Act aimed at the japanese. They found ways of getting round it, and went on expanding their holdings. The Twenty One Demands made by the japanese of China in 1915 further stimulated anti-Japanese feeling. At the Paris peace conference, Wilson was obliged to oppose the racial equality clause that japan wanted to include in the treaty. Seeking to avoid ·revocation of the Gentlemen's Agreement, the japanese Government announced that it would no longer issue passports to

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'picture brides', but this did not stem the tide. No Japanese Exclusion Act was passed, but the Immigration Act of 1924 denied entry to anyone who was ineligible for citizenship. The courts had recently ruled that Japanese were ineligible, so they were effectively excluded, without being named. Again, the ban had its effect: the number of Japanese in the United States fell significantly during the late 20s and the 30s. But it did not fall as fast as the number of Chinese had done , because nearly half the Japanese were women, and the community was self-sustaining. Without much new immigration, the Japanese began to adjust to American ways. They concentrated on education, and did well. That did not save them from the growing popular hostility towards Japan. It was assumed that the first loyalty of all Japanese was to the Emperor, and that they were at least a potential Fifth Column in the United States. Even the Eastern journalist Walter Lippmann wrote that The Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of attack from within and without' . After Pearl Harbor, all the Japanese in California were rounded up by the Army and 'evacuated' , including those who were born in the United States and were American citizens. More than 100,000 of them spent the rest of the war in what President Franklin Roosevelt called 'concentration camps'. Some escaped by joining the United States Army, but they were not allowed to serve in the Pacific, because it was thought that their loyalty could not be relied upon in that context. The war had a different effect on the Chinese in America. During the 30s Americans had come to see China as the victim of Japanese aggression: Pearl Harbor confirmed the change in attitude by making China an ally of the United States. Chiang Kai-shek and his wife became American idols. 'All the world knows', said Roosevelt in 194 2, 'how well you have carried on that fight which is the fight of all mankind' (Daniels 1988, p. 189). Pearl Buck's husband organised a 'Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion' , which included Henry Luce , and had the support of Time and Life. In 194 3, Congress passed a bill repealing the Exclusion Acts, giving China a small immigration quota, and making Chinese eligible for naturalisation. A later act allowed the wives of Chinese Americans to enter the United States outside the China quota , and nearly 10,000 did so between 1945 and 1952. During the 40s , the

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numoo of Chintst in Am~ nca tncr~d . for the ftrst urn~ smce the 1870s. By 1950 It had reached 117 ,000- as agamst 140 .000 Japan~se . Chinese would not oumumber japancst unul the 1970s Exumal fa tors had learly mfluenced popular atutudes tow.ards tht Chinest and the japanest m America . Growmg con em about japanese aggression aga1nst hma intensJfted anu -Japanest feelmg. and weakened hostility to th~ Chinese . In both ~ the hosuht arose inntally from contacts Wlthin th~ Umt~d tales . and that hostihty also affect~d fore1gn policy . The mtemal and atemal as~cts w~ related : at least m the early tages . u was dtfftcult for th~ ordmary American to dlStin.gulSh between Chtna and the Chinese he knew, or betwe~n japan and the local Japanese Domestic ex~riences affected foreign rdauoru . and fore1gn relatioru influenced domestic attirudes. The connection between domestiC temtons and fore1gn pohcy ts even dearer in th~ case of Southeast Asia . In lndonesta . longstanding hostility to the Chinese was intens1f1ed by uka.m o' collaboration with Peking. After the killing of tx g~nerals by the Communists in 1965, the army condoned an outburst of popular violence that led to the death of over half a mtllion people- man of whom ~re Chinese . The army-led gov~mment broke relauons with Pdong, and did not re~blish them for quaner of a enrury. To most Indonesians, and man people in Malaysta as well . Chma was not so much a quesuon of foretgn poltcy as ne of domest1 pollllcs. ~lations with Peking ~re ondmoned b atmudes towards the Chinese in Southeast Asta . Why wert" the Chmese so hated? The quesuon ts t.ht same as m the case of America. but the arlSW'tr is not quue the me Ph cal dtflt>rmctS were less of a factor m uthasr Asla than they W'(fe in ~rica. and economi differences Wt"re m re impon:ant In Indonesia especial) the Chi~ had bem the nuddlemm betv.un the latter. thty the Europeans and the local peoples. In the t') ~re to ala~ ~nt adentified wath t.ht . I mal regt~ . Thar people . but tbt)• work as traders and moneyienders bmdited I also aroused resentment , espeaally as~~ became more prosperous than thar netghbours. Cultural dttf~ pla ~ thetr pan . as dtd local xenophobia. Although tht Olinese rmwned a small pulati n , they wert nll~Mrous enough to bt t:M min 1i ~ a threat untry. and t bt seen lamtb.ar throughout the

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traditional cultures. But the root of the problem was that the Chinese were more successful than others in coping with the demands of a changing world. They were hated mainly because of their success. In the early stages of the Cold War in Asia, the Overseas Chinese were widely believed to be at least a potential Fifth Column for Communist China . The charge was not entirely without foundation . The Chinese who had resisted the japanese occupation of Malaya went on to resist the reimposition of British and Malay rule. The Communist Party of Malaya was largely indigenous, but it looked to Peking for support, and probably got some. The Communist Party of Thailand was predominantly - though not exclusively - Chinese , and it helped to sustain a forelorn effort at insurgency in the Northeast. The Fifth Column charge provided a pretext for discrimination against the Chinese, and for financial extortion. From the 30s on, the military rulers of Thailand used repressive legislation to extract money from the Chinese, and a sort of symbiotic relationship developed between the generals and the towkays. Gradually, the Chinese lived down the suspicion, but not the resentment of their success. They went on working and making money, saving and investing, and taking advantage of the flow of American resources to Southeast Asia. They played an important part in the rapid development of the ASEAN economies from the 60s on. The fact that politics were still not open to them kept their energies channelled into business and , for the younger generation, education. In the case of Malaysia, discrimination in favour of Malays forced many young Chinese to seek education abroad, and perpetuated the division between the two communities. In Thailand the Chinese came to be more fully accepted, though they remained distinct. They played down their distinctiveness and regarded themselves as Thais of Chinese origin, but they were not fully accepted as such, especially by the poorer Thais flooding into Bangkok from the countryside during the industrialisation of the 70s and 80s. The children of Chinese businessmen were among those who most eagerly sought Western education, at home and abroad. In the process they picked up Western political ideas, and chafed at the domination of the government by the army. Students, and ex-students, played a prominent part in the demonstrations

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that led to the overthrow of the military leadership in 1992. The role of the Chinese was not highlighted at the time , but it is unlikely to have escaped the notice of the military. As in the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia, prosperity had eased communal tensions, without fully resolving them. By the 90s, Chinese people had settled in most countries round the Pacific, and in many other parts of the world. They had adopted many nationalities, and adapted to different ways of life, but most of them retained their identity, not least in their own eyes. They also kept in touch with family members and kinsfolk in distant places, sometimes across political barriers. And they tended to use these links for business purposes, including the transfer of money. As growth accelerated in Southeast Asia, many Chinese prospered, and some accumulated large resources, which they moved about the region to get the maximum returns. These resources did not come under any single jurisdiction or direction, but they tended to move through Hong Kong, and were sometimes controlled from there. Teng Hsiao-ping must have realised at an early stage that they were a potential asset to China: he encouraged Overseas Chinese to visit their family homes, and to invest in China. The changes that he introduced in the Chinese economy made such investment more profitable, and stimulated the flow. America helped too , though not intentionally. The economic sanctions imposed by the United States after Tiananmen gave the Overseas Chinese an opportunity that they were not slow to seize. It was then that they became the biggest source of foreign investment in China, after Hong Kong itself. Overseas Chinese were becoming more deeply involved in the Mainland economy than they had ever been before. Their links with China were getting stronger, even as they were emphasising their commitment 'to their new homelands. Talk of a 'Greater China', which included Hong Kong and Taiwan as well as the Mainland, contributed to the impression that pride in the achievements of the Chinese people was obscuring the resentment that they aroused, and increasing the vulnerability of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the diaspora was entering a new phase. Liberalisation of the American immigration laws in the 60s accelerated the growth of Asian communities in the United States. Filipinos, Indians, Koreans and Vietnamese came to join Chinese

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and japanese. both of which groups were themselves growing in numbers. By 1980 there were more than three million Asians living in the United States: in 1940 the total had been fewer than a quaner of a million . Natural increase was a significant factor, now that women could enter the country as well as men. But so was immigration. The Vietnam war created a sizeable new community in America, as the Korean war had a generation earlier. The Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1984 prompted more of the better off people in Hong Kong to look for places of refuge, in case things did not go well after 1997. Tiananmen sharply accelerated the movement. Not all of those seeking places of refuge actually used them . The objective in some cases was to acquire the option of emigration, while continuing to make money in Hong Kong for as long as possible . Sometimes wives and children were deployed to keep options open, especially where advantage could be taken of Western education. The United States was the preferred destination of most Asian migrants , and it received the largest numbers of them . But, as in earlier periods, Canada, Australia and New Zealand also took many Asian immigrants. Most of them were Chinese , whether they came proximately from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia , Vietnam, or the Mainland. The big difference between this wave of migrants and earlier ones was that fewer of those involved were poor. Many of them were financially better off than the people they came to live among, and not all of them took care to conceal the fact. The hostility shown by Black Americans to Koreans during the Los Angeles riots in 1992 was an extreme case, but it served as a reminder of the resentment that can be aroused, and the social tensions created, by a sudden surge in immigration when it is associated with economic disparities. Asians were not the only reason for the growing opposition to immigration in California, or even the main one, but they were one of the main groups that were likely to be affected by it - not least because they were the most rapidly growing section of the American population, and in some repects the most successful. How will the growth of Asian communities in America affect relations between the United States and the countries of East Asia? One answer was suggested by the sequel to Tiananmen: the Chinese studying in America then played a significant pan in arousing public indignation and stimulating demands for sanctions against

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China. This is consistent with the pattern long since established by European immigrants: as we have seen, the Poles in America played their part in the development of the Cold War. The effect may wear off as Asians are absorbed into American society, but the case of the Jews is a warning against assuming that this change will occur quickly. It would be surprising if Asians in America did not continue to take a close interest in their homelands, and react strongly to whatever crises occur there, especially when they involve groups to which those in America have belonged. Another round of student protest and repression in China would almost inevitably evoke a response from Chinese in America who were once students themselves. The ease of Harry Wu showed how Chinese Americans can add to the tensions between the two countries. The repercussions of any clash between China and Viemam over the Spratly Islands are more problematical: it seems unlikely that the Chinese in America would encourage the United States Government to support China, even to the extent it did in 1979. The Vietnamese are another question. Japanese Americans are now among the most fully assimilated of Asian groups, and perhaps the least disposed to involve themselves in disputes between their two countries. Koreans are different: they could seek a more active role. It is hard to see any Asian group in America doing much to moderate any serious clash between the United States and Asian countries: they are more likely to aggravate than to resolve problems. Another risk is that, by their conspicuous success in America, they will incur resentment and hostility that will carry over into relations with Asian countries. Attitudes towards Asians in America could once again come to colour Americans' view of Asia itself. Sources Daniels, Asian America: Chinese and japanese in the United States since 1850. Harrison, South-East Asia. Pan, Sons of the Yellow Emperor. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand . Wang, China and the Overseas Chinese.

CHAPTER

12

Regionalism in Asia

Is Asia on the way to becoming a trading bloc? The question is asked, sometimes anxiously, especially by those who are themselves involved in trading blocs. Some see it as inevitable that Asia will follow the course that was set by Europe and is now being explored by America. Others still hope to avoid a division of the world into three contending blocs , with the loss of opportunities for growth which that implies. Others again fear that the less competitive economies of Europe and North America may form a defensive alliance against the more competitive ones in Asia, and the EastWest struggle may be revived in a different form . What are the prospects? Which way are Asian countries heading? And what is most likely to determine their future course?

• • • During the last decade or so, regionalism has regained momentum in the West. After slowing down in the 70s, the European integration movement revived in the 80s, under the leadership of France and Germany. The Single European Act set the direction, and laid the legal foundation for a further round of integration, extending from the economic into the political field . All internal barriers to trade were to be removed by 1993 so as to create a Single European Market. This was to be followed by the introduction of a Single European Currency, after the creation of a European Union. These plans were not fully realized. The reunification of Gennany, and

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the reluctance of German tax-payers to meet the cost, led to heavy Government borrowing, which pushed up interest rates and the value of the D-mark. This severely disrupted the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and drove Britain out of it. Some Germans had second thoughts about a Single European Currency over which the Bundesbank would have less control than it had over the D-mark. Economic integration was proving as difficult to achieve as ever. Internal barriers to trade still existed, and the goal of a single currency was receding into the future . But Chancellor Kohl still saw European integration as the best way of preventing a revival of German nationalism and, at least under President Mitterand, France supported his efforts to hold the course. Europe was becoming more regionally-minded. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of eastern Europe generated a feeling that Europe was now so big, and potentially so strong, that it could become virtually self-sufficient, and would hardly need the rest of the world. This euphoria aggravated the difficulty of reaching agreement with the United States in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the GATT. Agreement was eventually reached, at a level rather lower than had earlier seemed possible. But in the process, the strength of protectionism had once again been demonstrated, on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in Asia. There was at least room for doubt as to whether the agreement would prove to be wide enough, or strong enough, to do what had originally been hoped - prevent the further growth of protectionism. Evidence was still coming in from all parts of the world that that phenomenon dies hard, drawing strength as it does from popular nationalism and sectional interests. Regionalism came to America later than to Europe. The United States showed little enthusiasm for the attempts made at economic integration in Latin America during the 60s and 70s. Nor did it support a regional approach to the debt problems of the 80s. The successful negotiation of a free trade arrangement with Canada changed the atmosphere , and made the Bush Administration receptive to pressure from Mexico for its inclusion in a wider arrangement. Political considerations played their part. Concern in the South-West about illegal immigration reinforced Bush's desire to support a Mexican President who was committed to free market reforms. Beyond that was the hope of getting access to a

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source of cheap labour that was not so readtly available to Amenca's competitors. When the Nonh Amcncan Free Trade Agreement was signed. it contained a domesuc content requirement htgh enough to give United tatcs firms a dtstmct advantage over Astan ones, panicularly in the producuon of cars m Mexico for the United States market. NAFT A was presented to Congress and the public as a step towards free trade . It dtd indeed reduce bamcrs to trade between the panic . but not between them and other countries. As in Europe . protecuomsm had come back 10 the gwsc of regionalism .

• • • In Asia regionalism was much slower to take on than u was m either Europe or Amenca. The tdea of regtonal cooperauon for economic development was put forward at an early stage , and given institutional form . Soon after World War 11 the Umted Nations set up an Econom1c CommiSSion for Asta and the far East, which held its first meeting 10 Shanghai m 1947. After the Chinese Communists came to power, ECAFE's headquaners were transferred to Bangkok. It did useful work, espeCially m surveying the economies of Asian countries and highlighting their problems, but it had little money to help put ideas into pracuce. The gap was partially filled by the Colombo Plan for Economic Development in South and South-east Asia, which was launched at a Commonwealth conference in 1950. The two organizations worked side by side, and initiated some regional projects, but their regular meetings did not engender any strong sense of regional solidarity, or spark off any movement for regional integration. The presence of former colonial powers may have been panly responsible. but divisions and rivalries within the region played a bigger pan. With the intensification of the Cold War in Asia, the United States stepped up its aid to non-Communist Asian countries, and channelled some of it through regional institutions. Even SEATO, though essentially a defence arrangement, was allowed to take on some economic activities. When it began to fail, the United States encouraged the non-Communist countries of the region to form another organization called AS PAC, ostensibly to promote economic and cultural cooperation. japan set up an arrangement of its own

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called MEDSEA, to promote and coordinate economic development. These effons had little more success than ECAFE or the Colombo Plan in promoting effective cooperation among the countries in the region. When the United States withdrew from Vietnam, SEATO and ASPAC disappeared. The only regional grouping that survived and went on growing was one that had been set up by some countries in Southeast Asia on their own initiative - the Association of South East Asian Nations. ASEAN's objective was to promote economic and social cooperation. Its main achievement in its early days was to damp down the divisions and conflicts which had hitherto wracked the area, and thus help to create the political stability required for economic growth. Early attempts at economic integration foundered on the parallelism of the economies concerned, but in 1992 the six agreed to set up an ASEAN Free Trade Area, which was to be introduced progressively over fifteen years. Later the timetable for some products was accelerated. During the 70s the idea of a wider regional arrangement attracted growing interest. Economists in japan and Australia had put forward suggestions for an organization modelled on the OECD which would include the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand along with the countries of East Asia . This idea won support, especially in business circles. It led to the formation of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) as a forum for discussions among businessmen. In 1980 a conference was held in Canberra to try and set up a similar arrangement at the level of governments. The initiative was frustrated by members of ASEAN . They attached much importance to that grouping, and did not want to see it overshadowed. As a compromise, a Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) was set up, to involve government officials as well as academics and businessmen. · The revival of the European integration movement, and its implications for the Uruguay Round, gave Australia an opportunity to raise again the question of inter-governmental cooperation on the wider basis. Some ASEAN members were still suspicious, but this time the Japanese Government lent its support, and the first meeting of ministers agreed to establish a new inter-governmental grouping called APEC- Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. This was a significant event: Asian and Pacific governments had not hithetto been able to get together on such a broad basis. But

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continuing resistance from ASEAN members still restticted the level of cooperation. APEC remained a forum for consultation, rather than a framework for regional integration. Even at that, it provoked reactions. In 1991. the Malaysian Ptime Minister called for an East Asian Economic Group which excluded the United States. Canada. Australia and New Zealand. The proposal won support only from Malaysia's immediate neighbours, Singapore and Indonesia, and it was strongly opposed by the United States. The ASEAN countties then agreed that the EAEG should be a caucus within APEC. directed by ASEAN ministers. On the initiative of President Clinton, the heads of government of Asian and Pacific countries met, for the first time ever, at Seattle towards the end of 1993. and decided to meet again at Bogor in Indonesia a year later. There they agreed on a policy of trade hberalisation . with the goal of free trade throughout the region by 2020 . They left open the question whether the benefits should be extended to non-members. When the third summit meeting took place at Osaka in November 1995. the Ametican idea of setting a timetable for reduction of trade barriers encountered some resistance . and Japan joined China. Taiwan and Korea in insisting on 'flexibility' for agricultural products. Unilateral plans for trade liberalisation were to be put forward by each government, in time for discussion at the next meeting, which was to be held in the Philippines in 1996. Japan as well as other Asian countries seemed to have accepted the broader and more open variety of regionalism favoured by the United States, in preference to the more exclusive one suggested by Malaysia . Asian governments had also gone some distance towards committing themselves to reducing their own trade barriers, in the hope that the American market would remain open to them. APEC seemed to hold the best prospect of avoiding funher clashes over trade questions between the United tates and East Asia.

• • • Why did regionalism not take on in Asia as it had in Europe. and was beginning to in Amaica? One reason was the equivocal attitude of Japan. Some Japanese. of whom perhaps the best known was Saburo O kita, had played an active pan in the

movement for widtr reg10nal cooperauon . but m the earhcr stages tMy did not seem to have the full suppon of t.herr own Government There was evtdently no onscnsus on the quesuon wtthm thr japanese estabhshmenl. Another reason . no doubt related to the first, was the conunumg suspaaon of Japan m the reg1on the japanese themselves realized that they had to tread very hghtl y 1.0 avoid arousmg latent hosuhty But the mam reason for the lack of enthustasm for regionahsm was dafferent . Most of the c.ountnes m East Asia that had achaeved fast growth had done so by concentrating on manu{actunng for expon . parucularly to thr United tales . Ln the process. they had becomr heavaly dependent on the American market . As long as that market remamcd open to them . they saw better prospects for themselves in mululatcral tradmg than in exclusive reg10nal cooperauon . Some regional integrauon was gomg on Governments hesatated . and sometimes equivocated. but busmess fmns were less mh1b1tcd . and more willing to take nsks japanese companies had long looked to Southeast Asaa, and Austraha. for suppbcs of raw materials . and they had mvested heavily m the explonauon of natural resources there . With the ~ m the pncr of oil . and later the appreciation of the yen . they became mtercsted m cheap labour as well. and began movmg manu~ctunng plants to other Asian countries. Thas led to some operung of the Japanese market to the products of thest' countnes. though not to the full extent of the devoluuon . Tht operauons of japanese farms were sull darccted from japan. m the mtercsts of the parent comparues . Therr mam markets were often m Amcnca or Europe. and the products ol o~rseas subs1daanes could be exponed duectly to those markets To the extent that reg10nal mtcgrauon was aclue~d . 11 'tA.'aS directed from japan. for japan's be.nefu . Other Asaan countnes maght benefu as well. but they had httlc say m the maraagement . Thear role m this kind of regtonal mtegrauon was more passave than they bkcd Another development making for regional mtegrauon . and one that was more broadly based. was the gro,.,mg role of the Ovc.rsas Chinese m the cconomae:s of the area Encouraged by Tat.peh . 1f I\Ol by Pekmg. Chmesc busmessmen bvmg abroad extmded thcu cross-border operauons to take advantage of nt'tA.' opportunllles After the operung up of the Mamland. thty became Its b1ggest souttt of mvesunmt after Hong Kong. Coopera.uon 'tA.'llh the

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Japanese was not unknown , where it was mutually advantageous, but suspicion persisted, and with it a strong sense of rivalry. Overseas Chinese cooperation was often presented as an alternative to cooperation with Japan, and subordination to Japanese interests. South Koreans played their own hand , for example in Vietnam, and added to the rivalries, as well as the integration. A more nebulous factor in regional integration, though not a negligible one, was the growth of a sense of Asian identity. Within the region itself, this had to contend with traditional divisions and rivalries, but they could be less inhibiting overseas, particularly in America. The flow of Asian students to the United States was important in this context. Asian students, identified as such in contradistinction to Americans , began to feel that they had something in common . Some took that feeling with them when they went back to their own countries. There it gathered strength from the emergence of a cosmopolitan middle class, largely Western-educated and oriented towards the United States. The new sense of Asian identity was as yet tentative , and rather fragile . It was not immune to the effects of traditional suspicions and hostilities. But it was becoming an element in the regional picture, and one making for integration. Yet divisions still ran deep, and rivalries remained intense. Japan was suspect throughout the region, not only for its attempt at military domination during World War II , but for what was regarded as its exploitation of its neighbours afterwards. In the case of Korea at least, suspicion of Japan amounted at times to hostility, though that no longer precluded cooperation for mutual benefit. In Southeast Asia the feeling was less intense, and perhaps declining, but it was not allowed to die. Some ASEAN Governments seemed determined to keep it alive, by reminding their peoples of the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the War. Even in Taiwan, where the Japanese had behaved better than the Nationalist Chinese who took over from them, resentment lingered on, and contributed to the sense of rivalry with Japan. In Mainland China, feeling about Japan still ran strong, even though that country was regarded as one of the main models for China's development. But China was suspect to others in the region, as well as Japan. Although Peking had long ceased to support armed insurgency in Southeast Asia, and had built up good relations with ASEAN

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Governments, China was still regarded as an inherently expansionist power, and a potential threat to the peace of its neighbours. The persistence of this attitude owed a good deal to the presence of the Overseas Chinese, and to their success in business. Growing pride in their achievements , understandable as it was , tended to exacerbate the envy and resentment of other groups. Lee Kew Yuan himself felt obliged to draw attention to the danger, and warn his fellow Chinese to be more careful. Lesser powers than China and Japan attracted less widespread hostility, but Korea at least aroused apprehensions among the Japanese, and Vietnam had yet to live down the reputation for aggressiveness it had acquired by its invasion of Cambodia. Prosperity was doing much to limit and alleviate the tensions within the Asian region, and to prevent them from causing further instability and conflict. But the tensions were deep-seated and intractable, and they were not likely to be resolved quickly.

* * * Experience in other parts of the world suggests that the development of effective regional cooperation requires a background and outlook that are , to a large extent, common to the countries involved. In Europe this is provided by Latin Christianity, with the culture and laws deriving from it. In East Asia Confucianism may serve the same purpose. The popular form of that code of conduct is shared by most people in the region, even if their beliefs and practices vary widely. The popular form consists essentially of filial piety, family solidarity, deference to authority, and respect for education. This set of attitudes provides a broad basis for regionalism, as well as for fast economic growth. But experience in other parts of the world also suggests that something more is needed to tum a common outlook into effective regional cooperation. In Europe it took the emergence of the Soviet Union as a threat to the West. In North America the stimulus was provided by industrial decline in the face of Asian competition, together with concern about illegal immigration. Even the combination of a common culture and a common threat does not always generate effective regionalism: the Arab states have both, but cooperation is limited to moments of crisis. In East Asia, the threat of Communism was never sufficient

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to bring the non-Communist countries together in any lasting combination. Part of the reason is that the United States preferred the hub-and-spokes system, which gave it full control. But the fear of Communism in Asia, great though it was, never entirely overrode the divisions within the region. Asian resistance to regionalism has proved to be very strong. If the fear of Communism could not overcome internal divisions, what else could? Is there anything that would worry them all enough to make them bury their differences and work effectively together? At present, there seems to only one possibility. Nearly all the countries of East Asia have come to depend on the United States, for their prosperity as well as their security. By the same token, they are vulnerable to any change in American policy military or economic. For the time being, with the American market more or less open, most of them want the United States to keep up its military presence in the Pacific and protect them from each other. But protectionist pressures in the United States have been worrying them ever since the 70s, and they have not been reassured by recent developments in American policy. The determination to reduce bilateral trade imbalances, and the willingness to use at least threats of unilateral action to achieve this objective, have revived and strengthened long-held fears in Asia - as they are evidently intended to do. Super 301 is aimed primarily at japan, but it can be used against other countries as well. The fear is reinforced by increased American emphasis on human rights and democracy, and a new willingness to use economic pressure to get Asian Governments to do what America wants them to . The linking of trade with human rights worries the governments directly concerned, like those of China and Indonesia. It also worries those that are not yet directly involved, but fear that they may soon be. Some see the United States using its economic power to advance its own objectives, without much regard to the stability and tranquillity of countries formerly regarded as its allies. There is even a suspicion that an idealistic programme is being used to cover a strategy that is essentially economic. These concerns were widespread enough to bring Asian countries together in an unusual way at the regional conference on human rights sponsored by the United Nations in Bangkok in April 1993. The Asian states produced an agreed statement on human rights which

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was markedly at variance with the views of Western members, and of non-governmental organizations seeking a more active approach. japan had some reservations, and got some changes made in the Asian statement, but it went along with the rest of Asia. The incident suggested that America and its friends could do for Asian countries something they had difficulty in doing for themselves overcoming their differences and forming an effective regional front. *

*

*

Asian governments are well aware of their dependence on the United States. They want to keep their access to the American market, as well as to American universities. As long as they do , they are likely to swallow their feelings and make the concessions necessary to prevent any serious disruption of their relations with the United States. The critical question - none the less critical for being hypothetical - is, What would Asian governments do if their access to the American market were significantly reduced? Such a reduction could come about in various ways. One would be a deliberate act of policy, involving unilateral trade sanctions, or, in the case of China, the suspension of Most Favoured Nation treatment. But this is only one of the possibilities. Over a longer period, Asian countries could find their access to the American market reduced by the working of the domestic content requirement in the NAFTA. Perhaps before then, they could be suffering from a downturn in the American economy, which would affect imports generally. The way in which the reduction in access came about would not be insignificant but it would be less important to Asian governments than the reduction itself. If they experienced a marked decline in their exports to the United States, they would be obliged to reconsider their options . One possibility they would be bound to explore more carefully than in the past is that of reducing their dependence on the American market by developing closer links with other Asian countries. Regional self-suffiency would hardly be a realistic objective for Asian countries at this stage. The rest of Asia now takes over a third of japan's total exports, and the proportion is growing. But compare the situation in Europe. The rest of Europe, including the

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EFTA countries as well as original twelve members of the European Union, takes nearly three quarters of Germany's total exports . The European economic system is much more regionalised than that of Asia, and even for Europe self-sufficiency is not a realistic goal. If Asian governments sought to reduce their dependence on the United States, they would still be impeded by the parallelism of Asian economies - the fact that they tend to produce the same kinds of goods for the same markets. As one Japanese official puts it , there are simply not enough complementarities to enable Asia itself to absorb any of its exports that America no longer wanted to buy. China at least , having only recently rejected a strategy of selfreliance and discovered the benefits , as well as the risks , of international trade , is unlikely to give them up lightly, as long as they exist. But the situation is not static. Fast growth, expecially in China, is widening the possibilities for intra-regional trade . If China remains united and peaceful , and fast growth continues , there should be increasing scope for division of labour within the region, and for further expansion of intra-regional trade. Lee Kuan Yew says that Asia's dependence on the West will last for another twenty years . That seems a realistic assessment . But the other side of the picture needs to be borne in mind too . With the growth of Asian markets , Western countries will come to depend more on them. The change will be incremental , and its effects will be cumulative. Unless American and European industries become more competitive, the balance of economic power is bound to go on moving in Asia's favour. The lop-sidedness of the present relationship is not likely to last indefinitely. American power was welcome in East Asia , from the 40s on , as a protection against Communism and as a promise of prosperity. Most Asian governments still want the United States to maintain a strong military presence in the western Pacific, though for somewhat different reasons . They see it as a guarantee against unduly assertive behaviour on the part of other Asian countries - a guarantee of continuing peace and security in the region. They also see the involvement of the United States as some assurance of continuing access to the American market. Asians are now using America for their own purposes, as the United States has long used them. There is at present a balance between the interests if the two . But that balance could be upset if one side became more assertive. The

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United States still has great power, in the economic as well as the military sense. Asians recognize the fact, and take it fully into account in their own policies. Power attracts, but it can also repel. If the United States were seen in Asia to be taking undue advantage of its position as the main market for Asian products, and at the same time reducing access to that market, it could in time come to be seen as a threat. And the emergence of a commonly perceived threat could catalyse the emerging regionalism, tranforming it into an effective political force . The outcome will depend partly on Asians themselves. Divisions among them are deep-seated and intractable: they could frustrate any attempt at regional cooperation, and enable outside powers to go on dominating Asia as they have for the past century of so . But China and japan at least have recently been making efforts to contain their differences so that they can work effectively together. The future of regionalism in Asia will depend to a large extent on whether they are successful. As Europe has shown, there can be no regional integration without close cooperation between the leading powers in the area. But the future of Asia depends also on the United States. The immediate question is whether the American market remains more or less open to Asian exporters, or succumbs increasingly to protectionist pressures. The answer to that depends on whether the American economy can regain a comparative advantage in critical fields . The biggest question, however, is whether Americans can learn to live within their means, and save enough to invest on the scale required to maintain America's primacy in the world economy.

CHAPTER

13

Whither America?

In the past half-century or so, the United States has done a great deal for East Asia. By supplying ideas, money and markets, it has played a critical pan in the transformation of that region from one of the poorest in the world to one of the most dynamic and prosperous. Freed from the threat of Soviet attack, the United States is now attempting something more . It is trying to give Asians the benefits of human rights and democracy. At the same time, it is trying to reduce its bilateral trade deficits with Asian countries by pressing them to open their markets. It hopes to achieve these goals peacefully. President Clinton says he wants an Asia-Pacific region that is 'united , not divided' (International Herald Tribune , 22 Nov 93). Yet he has put heavy pressure on a number of Asian governments, including both China and japan. He supports the liberalisation of international trade, and succeeded in bringing the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion. But he is using unilateral measures to force Asian countries to buy more from America. Are these policies calculated to bring about an AsiaPacific that is 'united, not divided'? Or are they more likely to bring the United States into confrontation with Asian countries, perhaps even into conflict? The United States is reassening its strength. A few years ago it looked as if America's power was beginning to decline. like other great powers in the past, the United States had devoted so much of its resources and energies to defence that it had weakened its own economy and was in danger of losing its leadership of the

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world economy. In the mid-90s, that danger seems to have receded. America's productivity, which has always been higher than that of Germany or japan, is now rising faster than theirs too. The American economy is growing at a rate of about three per cent a year. Unemployment has come down, as growth has created new jobs. Inflation is low; the Federal Reserve raised interest rates in time to prevent overheating. America's prosperity is highlighted by the stagnation of the japanese economy. In japan, productivity growth is lagging, unemployment is rising, and production is static or falling. The japanese Government has yet to take effective action to arrest the decline. The relative strength of the United States has begun to increase again. The Clinton Administration is trying to use that strength to advance America's objectives, and to strengthen its position still further. Clinton has stuck to the free trade approach he inherited from his predecessors. To reduce America's trade deficits with countries like japan and China, he has concentrated on getting them to open their markets, with no more than threats to limit their .access to the United States. He has argued that exports create jobs, and the results have supported him. But he has achieved these results in a period of economic expansion. What happens when there is a downturn in the American economy and unemployment rises again? In that context, how would the Administration meet demands for increased protection? There are already suggestions for a North Atlantic free trade area, which would not include Asian countries and seems to be aimed at least partly at them. In a colder economic climate, would the Clinton Administration go on supporting multilateral trade liberalisation through the World Trade Organisation, or would it turn to regional arrangements which were a thinly veiled form of protectionism? Would the United States continue to work for genuine free trade, or seek security in an association of the economically less competitive against their real competitors? Can America retain the leading position it now holds in the world economy? If present trends continue, in the United States and elsewhere, it may be able to do so. But that result is not yet certain: there is no inevitability about it. The main reason for the uncertainty is the continuing overall deficit in America's foreign trade. After declining in the late 80s, that deficit rose again in the

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early 90s, though not to the record level of the mid-80s. Americans were importing more than they exported . They were living beyond their earnings. to the extent of over $100 billion a year. While that situation lasted. the reduction of deficits with individual countries could have only limited effect - an effect more political than economic . President Clinton has attacked one of the sources of the problem, by getting Congressional agreement to a reduction in the fiscal deficit. The efforts he put into this were justified by the seriousness of the problem. but his success has been limited. The rate of growth had come down . but not the deficit itself. Defence spending is falling . and lightening one burden on the Federal budget. But there are demands for increased spending on crime prevention. education . and the re-training of the work-force . Clinton's proposals for increased taxation . modest though they were, ran into strong opposition in Congress and had to be modified . Economic growth increases revenue and reduces the deficit as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product, but it is far from clear that the underlying problem has been solved. In his Inaugural Address. Clinton called on Americans to make sacrifices. He seemed to be echoing what Kennedy had said in his Inaugural 30 years before- 'ask not what your country can do for you - ask what you can do for your country'. In fact , Kennedy cut taxes. while involving the United States more deeply in Vietnam. johnson greatly expanded that commitment, and would never allow Americans to be presented with a choice between Guns and Butter. His deficit financing of the war was largely responsible for the inflation that followed - the Great Inflation of the 70s. like johnson, Reagan increased defence spending, which had already begun to rise under Caner. Like Kennedy, Reagan also cut taxes. The deficit was not met this time by int1ation, but by borrowing. The United States borrowed back the money japan was earning from its trade surplus with America. For the first time in a century, the United States became a net debtor- the biggest in the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, America was left as the only Superpower - by far the strongest military power in the world . But to meet the cost of using that power in the Gulf War, it had to seek large-scale financial assistance from japan and Germany. ln the end, little of the cost was met by the American taxpayer.

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Few countries are homogeneous: America is less so than most. Perhaps one reason why the word 'nation' is so much used by Americans is that they are hardly a nation in the usual sense. Until now they have nearly all spoken English, but even that bond is fraying. Their backgrounds- ethnic, cultural, social and political -vary greatly. One of the few things they have in common is social mobility - a certain rootlessness . The differences have been growing since the liberalisation of the immigration laws in the 60s. The proportion of Asians and Hispanics in the population is increasing more rapidly than that of Blacks and Whites. While most of the newcomers quickly adopt American material values and compete vigorously with each other, as well as with older inhabitants, Asians and Hispanics generally have stronger family ties than either Whites or Blacks. The Asians at least show more social discipline , and a higher level of educational achievement. The Melting Pot is still at work, turning people of diverse origins into Americans. Television now accelerates the process by producing a common idiom, and a common set of attitudes, if not common values. That process still generates creativity and dynamism, and gives America a vitality some other countries lack. But it does not necessarily produce a strong sense of common purpose, or a willingness to make sacrifices for a common cause. For 40 years Communism, as embodied in the Soviet Union, gave Americans a common enemy, and a common cause. The unity of purpose it created was strong enough to enable the United States to take the strain of world leadership - to maintain a large military and naval presence in Asia as well as in Europe, and an effective nuclear deterrent too . Communism prevented America from retreating into isolation after the Second World War as it had after the First. By the mid-60s the fear of Communism was waning: it was no longer strong enough to sustain the cost of the war in Vietnam. But it continued to provide Americans with a common cause until the late 80s. Then Communism was finally seen to have failed . The Soviet Union collapsed, and no longer presented a credible military threat to the United States. Americans felt that they had won the Cold War: democracy and capitalism had triumphed. What cause was there left that could unite them? The Clinton Administration tried to find an answer. It put forward a strategy of Enlargement - enlarging the area in which

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democracy and human rights, as well as the free market, could flourish . This reflected the feelings of a large section of the American people- especially those with advanced education. But its appeal was not universal. The President's adviser on national security, Anthony Lake, acknowledged in September 1993 that 'Rallying Americans to bear the costs and burdens of international enlargement is . . . much more difficult today' (Address, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC). The President himself added ' . you're never going to have the American people looking outward again, except when they think their interests are affected and then they can clearly see it' (Press Conference , Washington DC, 15 Oct 93). The truth of these statements was fully borne out by the unwillingness of the American people to accept the cost of intervention in Somalia, and their reluctance to contemplate sending ground forces to Bosnia. Some Americans believe that the United States needs an enemy, if not to maintain its internal coherence at least to enable it to go on playing a leading role in international affairs. Whether this view is justified or not, there is a marked tendency to look for enemies . Islam, especially in its fundamentalist form , is often regarded as a threat, not only to Israel but to the West in general. At times of crisis, there is little recognition of the deep divisions that exist within Moslem countries, as well as between them, or of their common failure to develop strong, balanced economies. The re-emergence of Russian nationalism has revived doubts in America as to whether the old Soviet threat has completely disappeared. Serbia has recently become another candidate. The Serbs are considered to be mainly, if not solely, responsible for the strife that has followed the secession of Croatia and Bosnia from the former Yugoslavia , and therefore a threat to the peace of eastern Europe. And then there are the Asian candidates. In 1989 ,Japan was seen, according to some opinion polls, as a greater threat to the United States than the Soviet Union was. Latterly polls suggest that this perception is less widely shared, but it is still held by many Americans. If one were to judge from the public media, however, one would think that China was now seen as the main potential threat in Asia. Ever since the Tiananmen incident of 1989, the Chinese Government has been presented as repressive and expansionist - not reforming and outward-looking

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as it had been before that. Its concern for stability is generally considered to be merely self-serving rationalisation. Its attempts to make up for its heavy reduction in military spending during the 80s and to build up credible defences is taken as evidence of expansionist designs . The continued development of the Chinese nuclear deterrent is even seen as a potential threat to the United States. How widely these views are held is not clear. Some American observers say that, at the grass-roots level, there is still more concern about japanese competition than there is about Chinese abuse of human rights. What seems significant is that both the leading Asian countries are presented in terms that are usually negative, and their actions are subjected to the worst interpretations. Hostility is more often reflected in American comments than the goodwill that used to characterise the relationships. Americans have long had a sense of mission towards Asia, and particularly towards China . For nearly a century they were in the forefront of the Western campaign to convert the Chinese to Christianity. American missionaries had many successes, especially among the people who came in closest contact with the West. But the great majority of the Chinese people remained unmoved by missionary efforts: they stuck to their traditional culture and their syncretic beliefs. Now Americans are trying to promote human rights and democracy. Once again, many Chinese are responding - especially those most exposed to Western influences. To what extent their response reflects that of other Chinese is uncertain. The economic reforms initiated by Teng Hsiao-ping have liberated the acquisitive instinct and stimulated economic activity, even in remote parts of China . The idea of democracy is associated in the minds of many with material prosperity, and probably gains popularity from the linkage. One of the things that clearly worries the Chinese Government is that the views of dissident intellectuals have been gaining ground among industrial workers, and city dwellers generally. But it is not clear whether those views have widespread support in the countryside, where three quarters of the Chinese people still live. Their attitudes are conditioned by circumstances that are still harsh, and by long and bitter experience of civil strife . What they have usually wanted most is to be allowed to live their lives in peace. There is much talk, mainly in the West, of what is now called

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'globalisation', and its alleged inevitability. It is hard to deny that Western materialism has become widespread, not least in East Asia, and has been accompanied by some changes in social behaviour. But how far-reaching are these changes? Japan has been exposed to Western influence as much as any country in Asia: the post-War Occupation used to be considered a success, at least in converting the Japanese to Western ways. But it is now recognised that in business, as in other spheres, the Japanese still have their own ways of doing things. American individualism has made an impact, but it has not yet displaced the Japanese tendency to put the group first , be it family, firm or nation. Globalisation is a reality, but a superficial and deceptive one. If it amounts to more than what used to be called 'Coca-colonisation', it still means considerably less than the obliteration of cultural differences. Generalisations are risky, and seldom universally valid but they are unavoidable, and can be helpful. It seems relatively safe to say that Asians in general have more self-discipline than Americans or other Westerners. The clearest evidence is to be found in savings ratios. One thing most Asian countries have in common is a high rate of personal saving - usually much higher than those in Western countries. A long history of insecurity and suffering, and a close acquaintance with the vicissitudes of fortune, have given them an innate caution, and a willingness to postpone the gratification of their desires - to save their earnings and invest them in profitable ways. They seem to realise still that wealth is not created by consumption- that if a given resource is consumed, it cannot be invested for the future . Some Asians are inveterate gamblers- perhaps proportionately more than in the West. But most know how to live within their incomes, and avoid getting heavily into debt. This is something that people in the West seem to have forgotten. The tendency to live beyond one's means - to spend more than one earns - is widespread in the Western world, and nowhere more than in America . This is the fundamental weakness in the American economy. Americans have taught Asians a great deal. Access to American universities is much sought after, and is one of America's main contributions to Asian development. Latterly, under the spur of Asian competition, Americans have been trying to learn from Asia as well. Countless attempts have been made to discover the 'secret'

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of japan's economic success, so that it can be applied in America . Some of them have been useful , but not many have grasped the main point - self-discipline . If Americans recognised its importance, they would be in a better position to deal with their own long-term economic problems, and some of their social problems as well . Could they, even now, retrieve something from their Puritan heritage and learn again how to discipline themselves? This is the fundamental question, on which the future of America largely depends. But there are more immediate questions too. Will the fiscal deficit actually be reduced, and with it the demand for imports? Will American exports remain competitive with those of Asian countries? If not , can the trade deficit be eliminated without resort to unilateral measures , and ultimately increased protectionsim? Will the American market stay as open as it has been during the last few decades? Will the United States retain the power it has gained from the dependence of other countries on that market? Will Americans be willing to go on paying the price for world leadership? For the past two centuries and more the West has been trying to change Asia , and no Western power has tried as hard as the United States. Great changes have taken place, especially in the last half century. Since World War II , East Asia has been transformed into one of the most dynamic parts of the world economy, and one of those that enjoy most security. The United States has played a critical part in that transformation, and has received much less credit than its due . But Americans have not succeeded in remaking Asians in their own image. Most Asian cultures have proved too deep-rooted , and too resilient, for outsiders to refashion , or even to dominate. Asians have learned from the West, and used what they have learned, by adapting it to their own circumstances and requirements. They have gone on developing in their own ways, rather than following Western patterns. Now they are gathering strength. They still depend on the West, but increasingly the West also depends on them. The balance of strength is shifting. The question that is now arising is whether East Asian countries will continue to go their separate ways and accept the leadership of the United States, or whether they will come together to assert their independence. The answer will depend largely on whether the United States continues to be seen as a

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helpful partner, and whether its market stays open to East Asia'. Without a common threat to hold them together, America and East Asia are drifting towards on collision. It is not inevitable, but it can only be avoided if America accepts a more equal relationship with Asia - if Americans are willing to learn as well as to teach. The history of their relationship is not very reassuring: it is punctuated with wars. Does there have to be another one before they learn to treat each other as equals and live together in peace? APEC opens the way for them to benefit from each other's prosperity, and share it with the rest of the Pacific. Will that way be taken, that opportunity pursued? Much depends upon the answer.

POSTSCRIPT The Eye of the Viewer

What business has a New Zealander to write a book about America and Asia? What right has someone from such a small and remote place to judge the actions of the greatest power in the world, as well as its most populous and rapidly growing countries? What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba? The main answer is that he, and his country, have for nearly half a century been involved in various ways in the relationship between the Pacific Titans. That experience has shaped their views, and aroused their concerns. New Zealand has become part of the region that the United States, japan and China all belong to- the Asia-Pacific region. Yet New Zealanders retain a certain detachment: they are neither Americans nor Asians, and they are capable of making independent judgements. Here is a brief account of the way experience has formed the views of one New Zealander, and made him feel that it is worth writing a book about America and Asia . To me as a schoolboy in New Zealand, Franklin Roosevelt's death came as a shock. Under his leadership , America had rescued Britain and saved the world from Hitler's evil mania. The American Navy had saved New Zealand itself from the all-conqueringjapanese in 1942. Roosevelt had mobilised America's pride , as well as its resources, and used them to destroy the aggressors . But even as boy in New Zealand I knew that America had taken a long time to react to the threat, and Roosevelt had had to overcome strong resistance from within the United States. Isolationism had been defeated, but had it gone for good? Without Roosevelt, would it

204 Collision Course

return as soon as the war was over, and leave Britain, and New Zealand, as vulnerable as they were before? The fear was not realised. Stirred by Churchill and led by Truman, America saw a new threat emerging - the threat of Communism. It responded, more quickly this time, by pouring resources into Western Europe, and setting up an Atlantic alliance to 'contain' the Soviet Union. To some the danger now seemed to be that America would go too far and start a nuclear war. That danger loomed larger when the United States took a stand in Korea and found itself fighting Chinese Communists. Truman did not accept MacArthur's advice to use atomic bombs against Chinese cities , but the resulting frustration fuelled popular fear of Communism and made it look from a distance like hysteria. McCarthyism seemed to threaten freedom , not only in America but even as far away as New Zealand. America had shown its power during the war, and New Zealanders had not forgotten the lesson. When as a new graduate I was interviewed for the foreign service in 1952, I could summon up no enthusiasm for the defence treaty New Zealand and Australia had just signed with the United States, but I had to acknowledge that it was necessary for New Zealand's protection. Once in the service, I educated myself by writing a dissertation on the background to the new alliance. I also sought an opportunity to study in the United States, and get to know that country. You could not afford not to know, and try to understand, the country on which your own depended so heavily. Arriving at graduate school in Boston in September 1954, I quickly experienced the force of anti-Communism. During the preceding summer, I was told, everyone had been glued to the television screen watching the proceedings of the Senate committee hearing McCarthy's charges against the United States Army. Most of those I met were relieved by McCarthy's defeat. But, at a party in the dormitory on my first Saturday night, I found myself totally isolated in arguing for recognition of the Peoples Republic of China. Communism was evil: it threatened the whole of the Free World: to make concessions to any of its parts was to court disaster. No one questioned the dogma: it was the accepted basis for all discussions on foreign policy. Communism had apparently united Americans as they had seldom been united before the War.

The Eye of the Viewer

205

It had aroused their sense of mission, and given them a cause they would fight for, in the Pacific as well as in Europe. For the time being, Isolationism was in eclipse. After the French debacle in Indochina, John Foster Dulles formed another alliance, this time to contain Communism in Southeast Asia. As a member of the New Zealand delegation to SEATO, I spent many uncomfortable hours in Bangkok arguing how best to 'expose' Communist activities in that part of the world. Diverted to Saigon for a month to attend a Colombo Plan conference, I saw how the anti-Communist President Ngo Dinh Diem was being bolstered by American aid to stand up to pressure from North Vietnam. American actions seemed to show that the United States would do whatever was necessary to prevent the further spread of Communism. Early in 1961, while I was serving at the United Nations in New York, John Kennedy said in his inaugural address that America would do anything to uphold liberty, wherever it was threatened. And it still rang true. In Washington four years later, I watched the rapid build-up of American forces in South Vietnam, and the repeated bombing of the North. Since McCarthy, no American politician could afford to expose himself to the charge of being 'soft on Communism'. Lyndon Johnson was determined to save his 'Great Society' from the conservatives in Congress, and refused to present Americans with a choice between 'guns and butter'. America was so strong that it could afford to be generous both at home and abroad. But even within the United States Government there were voices questioning insistently whether the war could be won. The attack on the American embassy in Saigon during the Communists' Tet offensive of January 1968 dramatised the argument. Johnson stopped the build-up of forces in South Vietnam, and announced that he would not seek re-election to the Presidency. Mothers were asking why they should let their sons go and be killed in Vietnam. The war tore the Democratic party apart, and gave Richard Nixon the prize he had long sought. Nixon's speech at Guam in 1969 , as he began to extricate America from the quagmire by 'Vietnamising' the war, served notice on America's allies that they could not rely on the United States to protect them unless they were attacked by a nuclear power. America was not what it had seemed: our alliance with the

206 Colli sion Course

United States began to be questioned . But the President's visit to China in February 1972 at last opened the way for New Zealand and other countries to establish normal relations with the Peoples Rep ublic. Only two years after helping George Bush in his forelorn attempt to keep Taiwan in the United Nations , I found myself in Peking, as New Zealand's first ambassador to China . Talking to David Bruce and his colleagues in the American mission , as well as to Chou En-lai and other leaders, I felt there were grounds for hoping that Americans and Chinese were getting over the mutual hostility of the past 25 years. If the final collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 had some worrying implications , it still came as a relief not to have to choose between America and China. But life proved to be not so simple. To clinch Peking's new relationship with Washington , Deng Xiaoping stepped up the pressure China had been putting on Vietnam through Cambodia. The Vietnamese wanted relations with the United States too : they sent a minister round the region to seek support , and he came to We llington in june 1978 . When we tried to help bring about a reconciliation , we found some sympathy in the State Department. But President Carter took the advice of his Security Assistant in preference to that of his Secretary of State. and chose to 'play the China card' against the Soviet Union . Relations with Peking were normalised , but not relations with Hanoi . The United States did nothing to stop the Chinese from invading Vietnam, in retaliation for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The Communist threat was now seen to be coming mainly from the Soviet Union. and it was still the central concern of the United States. America and China seemed to be locked into a de facto alliance against the Soviet Union . Again life proved to be less simple. Returning to New York in the early 80s as ambassador to the United Nations , I saw Ronald Reagan overcome his preference for Taiwan and go to Peking, to learn that Mao had been desanctified and that Deng was, as Mao had said, 'taking the capitalist road'. The relationship between America and China still seemed safe. But I had to defend the right of a small democratic country, which had been a loyal ally even during the Vietnam war, to opt out of a strategy of nuclear deterrence . The 'Star Wars' initiative seemed to confirm that Reagan was trying to destroy the 'Evil Empire'. More clearly than ever, America's alliances were based on fear of the Soviet Union.

The Eye of the Viewer

207

Five years later, while I was serving as High Commissioner in London, I saw on television the violent dispersal of the student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, and the revulsion it caused in America. Almost overnight, the goodwill of the 70s and early 80s gave way to antagonism: American attitudes to China seemed to go through another of their periodic reversals . Gorbachev's presence in Peking during the Tiananmen crisis made a key point. The collapse of the Soviet empire had removed the threat that had kept America and China working together, despite their growing differences. It had freed the United States to pursue its own interests more vigorously, including its interest in promoting human rights , and its interest in promoting its own exports. But it had also removed the fear that had kept Americans united for forty years, and given them a common cause to fight for. Once the Soviet threat was gone, what cause was there left that Americans would be willing to make sacrifices for? The United States had done a great deal for Asia. Since I first went to Singapore as a junior diplomat in the mid-50s , East Asia had been transformed from one of the poorest and most turbulent parts of the world into one of the most prosperous, and one of the more peaceful. This change was brought about by Asian peoples themselves , with their strong tradition of family solidarity and discipline. But it could not have come about so quickly without the security, the ideas, the money, and the markets provided by the United States. To some extent, America had even imparted its own values - materialism was almost universal, and a desire for democracy was widespread in Asia. But even in Japan, where the post-war occupation had provided an unrivalled opportunity, the United States had not succeeded in remaking an Asian country in its own image. One of the complaints often heard in America in the 80s was that the japanese went on doing things their own way. Renewed efforts to make them change their way only gave rise to increased frustration and tension. For all the talk of 'globalisation', Asian cultures were proving to be deep-rooted and resilient, and distinctly different from those of Western countries. And some of the elements common to Asian cultures - notably a high propensity to save - were rapidly increasing their strength. After my retirement, I looked back at my own country struggling to escape from half a century of growing dependency, and wondered whether New Zealanders could summon up the self-discipline

208

Collision Course

required to keep control of their own destiny. The same question struck me when I came to look again at America. By the mid-90s New Zealand had answered in the affirmative. Americans had done little to prove that they still had the capacity to discipline themselves and live within their means . They tended to blame others - especially Asians - for America's economic problems, and tried to force them to buy more of America's products , whether competitive or not. They heavy pressure President Clinton put on Japan was driving it into closer relations with its neighbours especially China. America seemed to be doing for Asia what Asians had hitherto failed to do for themse lves - develop a sense of regional solidarity. The risk I saw was that , if the United States carried out some of its threats and began to limit Asian access to the American market, and especially if it did so in the name of human rights, it could find itself at odds , not just with one or two Asian countries but wi th a broad-based Asian coalition that carried great weight in the world . As a boy, I had lived through the war of 1939-1945 -the only war in which most Pacific countries have been involved. New Zealand played a limited part in the Pacific side of that war, because most of its soldiers we re fighting with the British and the Americans in the Mediterranean . To many New Zealanders , the Pacific war seemed to be essentially a struggle between America and japan - and one which America did not win quickly or easily. The wa r had arisen out of a conflict of aims between America and j apan over a weak and divided China. Looking back later on , the conclusion I drew was that peace in the Pacific depended on cooperation between America and japan, and that cooperation in tum depended on the maintenance of China's unity and stability. A breakdown in America's relationships with japan and China would imperil the tranquillity of all the countries in the Pacific region . By the 90s those relationships had come under severe stress , and their continuity could no longer be taken for granted. It was time, I felt, to draw attention to the risks involved in the policies being pursued by the Pacific powers.

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INDEX

Ache o n . Dean 70 . 71 . 75, 7 . l , 97 Afghani tan 11 6. 120 Akihi to. Emperor 165 Anglo-Japa nese Alhan e 18. 32 . D Anti- omintern Pact 43 . 45 Anti- Militansm (in Japan) 53, 54 , 125 . 126. 131, 134 APEC (Asta-Pactfic Economic Cooperation) 131 . 185-6 , 202 A EAN (Assoc iation of South- Ea t Asian Nations) 107. 149, 162 . 165, 178, 185- 186. 188 ASPAC (Asia Pacific Council) 184-5 Atomic Bomb (see also Nuclear Weapons) 51-2. 58 . 70 . 73 . 78 , 80 , 86 . 96 . 100. 204 Attlee . Clement 58. 78 Australia 26, 49 , 81-2 , 85 , 86, 148, 170, 180. 185. 186. 187 Azerbaijan 61

Boxer Rt~llion 17. 30. 31 . 34 Bradley , Omar 79 Britam (U nued Kingdom) 1.7 , 8. Opium Wan 9-11 . 13. 14, 17 . 18 . 19. 20. 21-2 . 23 . H . 27~. 29 , 30-1 , 33, 35 , 3S-9 , 42 , 45, 48 . 49 . and Cold War 5S-65 . 69 . 78 . 81 , 84. 85, 87. 90. and Hong Kong 144-7. and Singapore 147-8, 169. 170. 203 . 208 Bruce , David 113. 206 Brzezinski . Zbigniev 114-5. 135 Buck. Pearl 44 . 176 Buddhism 4 , 12. 9>-4 Burlingame. Anson 26. 172 Burma 48. 50. 81 Burma Road 46 Bush . George 11 3, 120, Tiananmen 154-9,183 Byrnes, james 61 , 73 .

Bandung (Afro-Asian) Conference 86, 88 Bangkok Conference on Human Rights 190 Berlin 63 , 64 , 70 Bevin, Ernest 59 , 61 Bismarck, Otto 26

Cairo Declaration 50-1, Conference 67 California 24. 32, 155, Chinese and Japanese immigrants 170-81 Cambodia 85, 90-1, 96, 102-3, 107, 115-6, 135, 156. 162, 189,

206

Index

Carter, jimmy Normalisation of relations with China 114-6, 119 , 196 Chang Hsueh-liang ('The Young Marshal') 4 1, 43 , 65 Chao Tse-yang (Zhao Ziyang) 11 7, 120 , and Tiananmen 121 Cheng Ho 4-5 , 168 Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) 111-4 Chiang Ching-kuo 69, 143 Chiang Kai-shek 39-40 , and japanese 41-3 , marries Soong Mei-ling 44 , 53, and Communists 65-9 , 81 , 86, in Taiwan 141-3, 176 Chien Lung Emperor 6--8 China Early contacts with Europe 1-12 , fall of Empire 16-20, early American contacts 22-6 , Open Door 29- 36 , Turmoil 37-47, civil war 65- 70 , Korean war 77--80, Offshore Islands 85- 7, Indochina 90- 92 , and Soviet Union 100-1 , Nixon 103-6, Anti-Soviet coalition 109-23 , Lesser Dragons 137- 53 , after Tiananmen 154-166, emigration 1 6 7--81 , regionalism 168-9 , 192 , American atttitudes 194- 202 Chinese Communist Party 39 , 65- 6, 110- 2, 114 Ching (Qing) Dynasty 6-7 , 16-7 , 18 Chou En-lai 85 , 86 , and Vietnam 9 1, and Nixon 103, lOS , 109, in Cultural Revolution 112-3 , 206 Christianity (see also Missionaries) 1, 2-4 , 10, 23 199 Chun Doo Hwan 140 Churchill, Winston 49, 58, Fulton speech 59 , 60 , 6 1, 8 1, 83, 87, 95 , 204 Civil War (in America) 25 Cleveland , Grover 27--8 Clinton, Bill On China 159, 160,

215

Taiwan visit 166 China and japan 194, 195,20 Communism (and AntiCommunism) Loyalty issue 61, Truman 62 , Taft 70 , McCarthy 71 , MacArthur 79 , 85 , Kennedy and Nixon 93 , 98, 99, monolith 10 1, 106, collapse 121 , 189- 90 , American unity 197 , force of 204-7 Confucianism 3, 4, 6, 111 , 150-1 , 189 Constitution (of japan) 52- 3 Containment Policy Proposed by Kennan 63, achieves purpose 121 Co-Prosperity Sphere, Greater East Asia 50, 131 Cuba Missile Crisis 98 , 106 Cultural Revolution 100, lau nched by Mao 111 , winding down 112-3 , causes disillusionment 117 , effect in Hong Kong 145 Cushing family Caleb 10, 24; john 24 Czechoslovakia 63 , Soviet invasion 99-1 0 1 Defensive Perimeter Speech 75, 82 Democracy 65 , 11 9 , Lesser Dragons 151 , 154, Hong Kong 165-6, Taiwan 166 , 194, Stategyof Enlargement 197--8, association with material prosperity 199 , 207 Dodge Mission Sf, 125 Diem, Ngo Dinh Elected President of South Vietnam 92, ove rthrown and killed 93-4 Dien Bien Phu Seige and crisis 845, 99 Domino Theory 84, 107 Dulles, john Foster japanese peace settlement 81-2, brinkmanship 83 , Manila Treaty 84-5, Offshore Islands 86-7

216

Index

EAEG (East Asian Economic Group) 131, 186 ECAFE (United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) 184 Eden, Anthony 87 Edication 74 , 134, 138, 151 , 174, 178 Eisenhower, Dwight Goes to Korea 80. 83 , rejects intervention in Indochina 84, Offshore Islands 86, 87, 99. visit to japan cancelled 124-6 Expansionism 63-4, 115, 121 , 149, 161-3 Fisca l Deficit 130, 196 France 8, 10, 11, 17, 18 , 46, 64, 82, Indochina 83-5 , 90-1 Franciscans 3-4 Fulton , Missouri Speech by Churchill 59- 60 Ge neva Conference on Indochina 83-5 , 91-2 George , Henry 172, 174 Ge rmany 17. 18, 19. 27, 28 , 29 , 30. 31 , 32 , 39 , Germany (cont'd) and japan 45-7 . 49 , 51 , and Cold War 57-60 , 64, 91, 141 , European regionalism 182-3, 192 , aid to US 196 Glo balisation 122 . 164, 199 , 200 , 207 Go rbachev , Mikhail 120, 121 . Tiananmen 207 Guam Speech 102 , 205 Gulf War 157, 159, 161 Hata Tsutumo 133 Hay , john Evolves Open Door policy 30-1 He rodotus 1 Hippisley. A.E. 30 Hirohito Emperor 52 Hiroshima 51 Hitler , Adolph 48. 203

Ho Chi Minh 90 , and China 91 , and US 92 , 98 Hong Kong Britain acquires 9, 29, 30 , late r development 144-7, and China 165-6 Hosokawa Morihiro 133 Hua Kuo-feng 114, 119 Hu Yao-pang 120-21 Hull , Cordell 46 , 58 , 60 Human Rights (in China) 119, 120, Congress presses for action 15560, Bangkok conference 190, and trade 208 Hung Hsiu-chuan (Taiping leader) 10, 23 Imperialism 48 , 147 Indochina 76--7 , 83-4, 90-1 , Chinese policy 162 Indonesia 4, 22 , 50 , 107, 145, and Singapore 14 7-9 , Chinese immigration 168-9, trea tment of Chinese 177. 179 Industrial Revolution 8 , 19 Isolationism After WW1 36, 45 , fea rs of after WW2 55-7 , Cold War prevents 63 , 71 , 203, 205 japan Early Western contacts 2-3 , Tokugawa isolation 8, Meiji Restoration 12-16, war with China 1895 16-19, US opens 24-5 , Scramble for China 29 , war with Russia 31 -2 , war in Europe 32-3, Washington naval conference 33-4 , migration to US 35, aggression against China 41-5 , Neutrality Treaty with Soviet Union 45 , war with US 46--52 , Occupation 52-5 , Chinese Communists 65-7 , Korea 73-5 japan (cont'd) Peace Treaty 80-2 , Vietnam 90, 107, development since 1952 124-35, Lesser Dragons 153, China 165,

Index

Japanese in America 174-6, 18 1, Asian regionalism 184- 93 , globalisation 200- 7, relations with US and China 208 Japan-bashing 130 Jesuit Order 2- 4 Johnson , Lyndon Role in Viemam war 95 , deficit financing 196, 205 Kennan , George 63 , 77 Kenned y, John 70, and Vietnam 93-4, Inaugural 106 , 205 Kennedy, Robert 106 Khrushchev , Ntktta 98 , 100 Ktm ll Sung 74-5 Ktm Young Sam 139 Kmg, Ernest 49 Ktsht obusuke 126 egonauons wnh KtSsmge r, Henry onh Vtet-namese 102-6 , deali ngs With Chi na 109-113 , and Japan 127 Know land , Wilham 84 Kubtlat Khan 2 Korea 16, 32 , war in 73-80, 107 , deve lopment smce 1953 137-4 1, 152 , Ko reans tn Amenca 179-80 , suspicion of Japan 188 Laos 85 , 87 , 91 , 93 , 96 , 103 , 107 Le Due Tho Negouates WJLh Ktssmger 102-5 Lee Kuan Yew Leads Smgapore 148-9 , warns Ove rseas Chmese 189 , Asia 's dependence on West 192 Lee Te ng-hu1 President of Tatwan 143, VlSiLS US 166 Lenin , V.I. 39 , 111 Liberal Democratic Party ( LOP) 126 , 132-3 Li Hung-chang 16 Li Peng 121 Lin Piao 69 , 112 Liu Shao-chi 110-113 Long March 40 , 4 2

217

Lodge , Henry Cabot 94 Lord , Winston 159 Loyalty 6 1-2 Luce , Henry 70 . l 76 MacArthur , Douglas In Phdlippines 51, Japan 52-4 . Korean war 7!-80 McCarthy, Joseph 71 . 80. 83. 85 . 204-5 McKinley . William 28-9 Me amara , Robert 93 . 97 Macartney, Lord 7 Malaysia (formerly Malaya) 81 . 85 . 92 , 107 . proposes EAE 131. and mgapore 147-9 . 169 , 177, 178 , 180, 186 Malenkov , Georgy 80 Manchu (Chmg) Dynasty 6-7 . l Oll , 16, 18, 34. consequences of fall 37 , 169 Manchuna Japan ftghts Russia for 17-8 , Japanese army takes ove r 41-2. clash vmh ov1et forces 45 . US tnslSLS on Japane e withdrawal 46, Sov1 t force s enter 51 , hme e NauonallSLS and Comm umsts fight fo r 67 Manifest Desuny 20, 24 Manila Treaty 85 , 87 Mao Tse-tung Long March 40-2 . extends ommunist control 657, proclaims PRC 70 , VJSILS Moscow 75 , calls SEATO 'paper uger' 87. relations wnh Moscow deteriorate I00- 1. launches Greai Leap 110 , initiates Cultural Revolution ill , receives Nixon 112 , dtes 114 , 117, 119 Marshall , George Launches Marshall Plan 62-3 , and China 68 , 78 , supports Truman against MacArthur 79 , 83 Martin , Joseph 61-2, 79

218

Index

Matsu Island 85- 6, IOO Matsuoka Yosuke 45 May Fourth Movement 39, Ill Meiji Restoration 14-5, 134 Menzies, Robert 86 Midway, Battle of 49 Migration 26 , 35, Asian Diaspora 167-8 1 Ming Dynasty 4- 5, 168 Missionaries 2-4, 10, American 23-5, role in US-China relations 44, 70 , French 90 , 199 MITI (Ministry of International Trade & Industry) 125 , 129, 133 Miyazawa Kiichi 132 Molotov, Vyacheslav 62-3 , 73 MFN (Most Favoured Nation) Principle 10, 24, 116, linked with human rights 155- 60 Murayama Tomiichi 133 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) 131 , 183-4, 191 Nagasaki 8, 13, 52 Nanking Massacre 4 3 Nanking, Treaty of 9, 24 Nationalism (patriotism) In MeUi Restoration 14, Compare j apan and China 19, Social Darwinism in US 27 , in China 38-9, 130, in Lesser Dragons 150, in China 165 Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) 37, 39, 43 , struggle with Communists 66-70 , in Taiwan 141-4 New Guinea 49 , 51 New Zealand 23, 26, 8 1-2, 85 , 86, 148 , 170, 180, 185, 186,203, 208 Ngo Dinh Diem see Diem Nien Rebellion 11 , 69 Nixon, Richard 84, 93, elected President 99 , and Vietnam 1026, relations with Mao 109- 13, 119, 121, threatens japan 127

and US policy on China 146, 155, Guam doctrine 205 Nomonhan, Battle of 45 Non-Aligned Movement 101 Nuclear Proliferation 158, 160-1 Nuclear weapons (see also Atomic Bomb) Eisenhower threatens 80 , Dulles says 'interchangeable' 86 , johnson rules out in Vietnam war 95 , Russians refuse to China 100, threatened development by North Korea 140-1 , Chinese 199 Occupation of japan 52- 5 Offshore Islands (Quemoy & Matsu) 85- 7, 100 Oil embargos By US on j apan 46, by Arab states 127-8 Okawara Yoshio 131 Okinawa 124, 127 Okita Saburo On regional cooperation 131 , 186 Open Door policy 30- 6 Opium wars 9-11 Overseas Chinese 4-5, 167-74, 17781, 187- 9 Pacific security system 81-7 Palmerston, Lord 9 Park Chung Hee 138-9 Parker, Peter 23 , 25 , 170 Patten, Chris 146-7, 165-6 Pearl Harbor 46, 48-9 Perry, Mattthew 13, 24- 5, 52 Phillippines 3, 6, 28, 31-2, 48, 50, 51, 75 , 82, 85 , 107, 151- 2, 161, 168, 179 Poland 60, 62 Polo, Marco (& Nicolo) 2 Population Of China 6, of japan 8, Korea 138 Hong Kong 144 Protectionism US condones in postwar japan 125, Americans

Index

demand against japan 127--8, j apanese reaction to US moves 131 , against Hong Kong 145 , 190 , 20 l , Clinton threatens Asians 194-5, 208 Pu Yi , Henry 38, 42 Quemoy lsland 85-6 , 100 Qing Dynasty see Ching Reagan , Ronald Elected President 11 6, goes to China 118 and 206 , strong line against Soviet Union 120, deficit financing 196 Regionalism 124 , 131-2, 153 , slow growt h in Asia compared with Europe 182- 93 Rhee , Syngman President of Republic of Korea 74-5 , resigns 138 Ricci , Mateo 3 Ridgway , Matthew 78- 9 Roosevelt , Franklin Slow growth of resistance to japan 44-5 , 46 , Pearl Harbor 48-9 , death 51 and 203, considers US interests world-wide 58, 67, 73, 90 Roosevelt , Theodore Orders attack on Spanish ships in Manila 28 , as President, arranges peace conference between japan and Russia 31-2, tries to de-fuse issue of j apanese immigration 175 Rusk, Dean l 0 l Russia (see also Soviet Union) 178, 30 , 31, 45 Sa to Eisaku 12 7 SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organisation) 85 , 87 , 184-5 , 205 Security Treaty between US and japan 124, 126 Self-Strengthening Movement ll -12 , 16

219

Shanghai 10 , 40 , 43, 69 , 112 , 144 , 184 Shanghai Communique 104 , 112 , 119 Shantung 17, 29, 39, 40-l Silk l, 4, 15 , 41 , 168 Singapore 48 , 107, development 147-50, 169 , 207 Sino-Soviet relations 75, 99 , 100 , 106 Smoot-Hawley Tariff 41 , 4 7 'Soft on Communism' 70-l , 93, 205 Solomon lslands 49 Soong family 44 , 66 Soviet Union Approach to China 39, aid to Chiang Kai-shek 43, Neutrality Pact with japan 45-6 , 51-3, development of Cold War 57- 65 , Korean war 73- 80 , 8 1, 90 , 96 , relations with Chinese Communists l 00-l , 104, 106 , 109 , 114-5 , 11 6, 120-121 , 149, 155 , 189, collapse removes basis for USChina coalition 20 7 Special Economic Zones (in China) 117 , 146 Spender, Percy 82 Spratly lslands 161-2, 181 Stalin, joseph Role in Cold War 58-60 , 64 , role in Korean war 73, 75 , death 80, 83 , 100 Steam (ships) 8-9, 13 , 19 Stimson, Henry Non-Recognition doctrine 4 2 , 60 Students 15 , in Gultural Revolution and Tiananmen 119-20 , in japan 134 , Asians in US 152 , Chinese in US 154-5 , 178, role in regional integration 188 Sun Yat-sen 18, suppon from Overseas Chinese 3 7-8 & l 71 , alliance with CCP 39, marriage to Soong Ching-ling 44 , death 40

220 Index Szechuan 66 Taft, Raben 70 Taft, Wlliam 32 Taiping Rebellion lO-ll, 170 Taiwan 15-17 , 51, 70, 75, protected by US 76, 80, 85, US security treaty with 86 , 94 , 107, 109, 113, Taiwan Relations Act 115, 116, development since 1949, 141-4, 159, 161, rising tension over 166 Tea 7, 17 Technology 4 , 5, 8, 16, Teng sees as key to development 114, MITI set up to acquire 125, 128, 134, 165 Teng Hsiao-ping (Deng Xiaoping) Rise to power 110- 5, 117, and political reform 119-22 , 14 7, 155 , 158, 164 Tet Offensive 96-7 , 205 Thailand 82 , 85 , 87, 107, 178 Thieu, Nguyen Van 103- 5 Thompson, Sir Raben 92 Tiananmen 70, Chou's death 113, Red Guards 119, 1989 demonstrations 121-2, effect in Hong Kong 146, and in US 154, 158, 160, 179, 180, 198, 207 Tibet 120, 160 , 161 Tojo , Hideki 50 Tokugawa Shogunate Founded by Ieyasu 3, 12 overthrown 13-4 Treaty pons 9, 10, 30, 38, role in Confucianism 151 , 170 Truman, Harry 57 , 59-60, 61, enunciates Doctrine 62, 64, 68, 70-1, 72, Korean war 75-80 , 81 , 82, 204 Twenty-One Demands 32-3, 175 Tzu Hsi (Cixi)Empress 16-18 United Nations Security Council Debates Azerbaijan 61, Korea

76, Offshore Islands 86, Iraq 157 United States of America 1, 8, 910, opensjapan 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, asserts self 21-36 , 37, 40 , 42 , supports China 44-6 origins of Pacific war 47-8 , course of war 48-52 , Occupation of japan 52- 5, Cold War 57-72 , Korea 73-88, Vietnam 89-1 07, antiSoviet coalition 108-23, relations with j apan since 1952 124-35, Lesser Dragons 137153, China 154- 66 Asian immigration 167-81 , Asian regionalism 182-193, prospects 194-202, personal experience 202-8 Versailles, Treaty of 39 Vietnam French debacle 84- 5, war 89-107, and China 115-7, Soviet pressure 120, Spratly Islands 161- 2, Vietnamese in US 180, personal experience 205-6 Wallace, Henry 59, 64 Wanghia, Treaty of 24 Warlordism 37-40 Washington Naval Conference 33-4 Webster, Daniel 24 Williams, S. Wells 25 Wilson, Woodrow 32- 3, 39, 58, 175 Wu, Harry 18 1 Xavier, Francis

3

'Yellow Peril' 26 , 172 Yen revaluation 129, 133, 187 Yoshida Shigeru 80 Yuan Shih-kai 18, 32-3 , 37 Zaibatsu

15, 54

Index

221

The Author Bryce Harland is an independent writer now living in London. A member of New Zealand's foreign service from 1953 to 1991 , he was his country's first ambassador to China, and he has continued to take an active interest in Asian affairs. Later he became Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. Until his retirement he served for five years as High Commissioner for New Zealand in London. Since then he has written two extended essays - "On Our Own: New Zealand in the Emerging Tripolar World" and "Asia: What Next?" - as well as a number of articles.