Collective Responsibility 9042003111

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Collective Responsibility

VIBS Volume 50 Robert Ginsberg Executive Editor

G. John M. Abbarno Virginia Black H. G. Callaway Rem B. Edwards Rob Fisher Dane R. Gordon Hetaffiiyry Matti Hayry Richard T. Hull

Associate Editors

Daniel Statman

Joseph C. Kunkel Ruth M. Lucier Alan Milchman George David Miller Michael H. Mitias Samuel M. Natale Peter A. Redpath Alan Rosenberg Arleen Salles

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

Gregory F. Mellema

Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA 1997

Cover design by Chris Kok based on a photograph, ©1984 by Robert Ginsberg, of statuary by Gustav Vigeland in the Frogner Park, Oslo, Norway. @ The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of "ISO 9706: 1994, Infonnation and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for pennanence". ISBN: 90-420-0311-1 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA 1997 Printed in The Netherlands

To Adam

CONTENTS Editorial Foreword PETER FRENCH Acknowledgements

xiii

Chapters ONE Introduction TWO Collective Actions and the Actions of Individuals

15

TIIREE A Typology of Collective Actions

25

FOUR The Case Against Collective Responsibility

35

FIVE The Case for Collective Responsibility

47

SIX An Existentialist Perspective

59

SEVEN Moral Taint

71

EIGHT Avoiding Membership in Collectives

83

NINE Collective Responsibility, Obligation, and Blame

95

TEN Collectives and the Diluting of Responsibility

105

ELEVEN Collective Responsibility and the Responsibility of Corporations

119

TWELVE A Proposed Theory of Collective Responsibility

133

Bibliography

143

About the Author

145

Index

147

EDITORIAL FOREWORD by Peter French

I cannot think of a topic in the field of ethics that is more important and more in need of serious philosophical work than cpllective responsibility. Gregory F. Mellema has made a major contribution to that end. Over three decades ago I was a student of H.D. Lewis. Lewis had reintro­ duced philosophers to the problem of collective responsibility when he was roused to write on the subject by what he perceived to be the misguided slant of the public discussion in Britain in response to the fall of the Nazi regime and the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. The question of collective responsibility was then framed in the context of ascriptions of blame to the German people for the atrocities committed in Europe by the Nazis. Lewis believed, with a passion that is not especially common in philosophers, that if we were to take collective responsibility claims seriously, the very concept of individual and moral re­ sponsibility would be eroded. Indeed, it would be washed away by a flood of barbarous tribalism. His attack on the notion of collective responsibility was based on the intuition that no one can be held responsible for the actions of another person. He was fond of quoting a poem by Kipling that endorsed his intuition. He believed that if we held someone morally accountable for what another person did, everyone would ultimately become implicated in the do­ ings, right or wrong, of everyone else. It would cease to make much sense to morally praise or blame anyone and estimates of the moral worth of individual persons would be pointless. In short, on Lewis's account, collective responsi­ bility must destroy what is arguably the most central conception of Western ethics, the moral accountability of the individual. A number of days during the Nuremberg Tribunal's pretrial discussions were occupied with heated arguments among the representatives of the Allied powers about whether membership in Nazi criminal organizations, in and of itself, should constitute a sufficient reason to hold an individual member of an organization responsible for something for which the evidence could only pin­ point the organization. Should particular members of a group like the SS be held legally and morally liable for the activities of the SS in the absence of any proof that any of them specifically carried out the deeds in question? Lewis emphatically thought not. W hat Lewis was attempting to block was not the as­ cription of moral responsibility for a particular event to a number of people. He certainly allowed that a number of people might contribute to the occurrence of an event and that each should be held morally responsible for that event to the extent of his or her participation in bringing it about. What he disallowed was

X

Editorial Foreword

anyone being held responsible for an event solely on the basis of the fact that he or she belongs (or belonged) to a specific group or collective. We might talk about collective responsibility and collective guilt, but we cannot mean that the collectives are, in and of themselves, responsible and guilty, and we cannot mean that simply being a member of the collective makes one responsible for or guilty of that for which the collective is being charged. Still, Lewis did not have to be reminded, we quite commonly talk about groups of people, organizations, collections, institutions, corporations, and the like being responsible for events, and we do so in a manner that, in a number of _ cases, mimics ascriptions of moral responsibility to individuals. We not only are making causal claims about the events, we seem to be blaming, praising, and crediting the collectives themselves. I regularly insisted to Lewis that ordi­ nary language is in order when talking about collectives and he invariably chal­ lenged me to make sense of what he called "that deviant way of using the con­ cept of moral responsibility." That challenge, quite rightly, is the focus of the literature on coIIective responsibility subsequent to Lewis's work on the sub­ ject, and meeting it is the task undertaken by MeIIema in this book. I first took up Lewis's challenge a little over twenty-five years ago when I edited what proved to be the first philosophy text in applied ethics to explore the philosophical issues related to an event or issue that was dominating public discussion. The topic was collective responsibility with respect to the My Lai massacre that occurred during the Vietnam War. The book was a concerted at­ tempt by eight philosophers to deal with the concept of collective responsibil­ ity. Though working independently, the contributors produced essays that wove together into a rather thorough investigation of the entangled philosophical as­ pects of both the concept of collective responsibility and the massacre itself. Since the appearance of that book, interest in the issue of collective responsibil­ ity has become widespread and growing. Collective responsibility is much more widely discussed in the philosophical literature today than those of us who worked on that book could ever have imagined. The My Lai massacre has probably moved into ancient history for many readers. A great deal has happened in America and the world in the last twentyfive years. But collective responsibility remains a very important concept, argu­ ably the important concept, as we try to understand and deal with a spectrum of claims and ascriptions made by and about various groups in our society about justice, compensation, group guilt, etc., and as we wrestle with global social and environmental problems that could well determine the quality of human life for generations to come. Mellema refers to the My Lai massacre in his account of Lewis's attack on the notion of collective responsibility. While reading that part of the book I was reminded of the fact that Vietnam, among other things, caused a collective American loss of innocence. We had to come to grips with the fact that America lost a war without losing a battle. Americans have not felt the same about them-

Collective Responsibility

XI

selves since. My Lai was, perhaps, the dirtiest incident in a dirty war. The pic­ tures of the massacre and the accounts provided by the eye witnesses made us confront our own capacity to do evil, to see ourselves as villains. Red-blooded American boys could do this! Some tried to distance themselves from the event and the war. Others, in an odd way, embraced it, but blamed the Vietnamese, apparently for not being American. "It never happened and, besides which, they deserved it!" Who is responsible? Do we all share in the responsibility for My Lai? All? Not just those of us who were adult members of the society when it happened? Today's Americans as well? Including those who were not even born when Charlie Company entered the village of My Lai? Do we all bear the mark of shame for the massacre? Does it taint our culture, our history, the American people? Us? Not us? Not you and me? Them? Who? And how, if ever, can the blame, the shame, be expunged? When will the American people or the U.S. Army or the American government or Lt. Calley or you or me be free of the responsibility for what happened in that remote village in Vietnam? Crucially, of course, these are the characteristic questions of collective responsibility. My Lai could be any event for which a collectivity is held responsible or claims responsibility. It could be Dachau, Dresden, Hiroshima, Wounded Knee, Bophal, the explosions of Ford Pintos, Pan-Am 103, the Exxon Valdez, the pollution of the planet, world hunger, etc. It could be the killing of a doctor who performs abortions by an antiabortion protestor, the example with which Mellema intro­ duces the topic of this book. Has the philosophical community made some progress over the past three decades in understanding the concept of collective responsibility? Perhaps a little. Mellema carefully takes us through the major contributions to the litera­ ture of those that have made the attempt to rebut Lewis's position and those that have followed his lead. Mellema, quite correctly, sees the defenses of collective responsibility that David Cooper, Virginia Held, and I put forward primarily as attempts to capture what is typically meant in ordinary discourse when we talk about groups being responsible or being to blame for certain events. The reduc­ tionist program of individualists, who take ordinary speech on these matters to be, at best, a shorthand device for a string of ascriptions of individual responsi­ bility, many of us have argued, is difficult to fit with the facts. For example, reduction of an ascription of responsibility to the team for the loss of the game to a string of ascriptions of responsibility to the individual members of the team for the loss of the game, may be the furthest thing from the speaker's intentions. He or she does not mean that Left Tackle Jones is responsible for the loss of the game, or that Cornerback Smith is, or that Running Back Brown is. What seems to be meant is that the team did not play well enough as a team to win. Smith may have had a superb game and Brown was never better. But for ascriptions of responsibility to be sensible, there should be some identifiable feature or fea­ tures of the group in question in virtue of which it makes sense to treat it as a responsibility-bearing entity. The attempt to persuasively identify just such fea-

xii

Editorial Foreword

tures characterizes the works of most of those who have written about the con­ cept of collective responsibility since Lewis's challenge. Mellema provides us with a careful critical examination of the approaches that have dominated the scene. I am still haunted by Lewis's underlying worry: that any robust concep­ tion of collective responsibility will destroy the foundational individualism of our ethical attitudes. Should I be concerned if it does? Have I been too con­ cerned? Mellema does not seem to desert the fundamental individualism Lewis prized, but he, I think rightly, rejects the reductionist strategy for dealing with - ordinary ascriptions of collective responsibility. His focus on membership and qualifying acts makes, in his terms, "a crucial concession to the spirit of indi­ vidualism." He appears to be offering a sort of compromise. But appearances may be deceiving. Indeed, he breaks important new ground that demands the critical attention of anyone intent on understanding ascriptions of responsibil­ ity, anyone interested in ethics. Peter French Cole Chair in Ethics Director, The Ethics Center University of South Florida

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Portions of Chapter Ten are derived from my essay, "Shared Responsibility and Ethical Dilutionism," which appeared in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63 (1985), pp. 177-187. I wish to thank the editor of this journal for permission to include this material. I wish to thank members of the Calvin College Philosophy Department, including former member Scott Davison, for a great deal of helpful criticism. I have also received valuable responses to various portions of earlier drafts from Larry May, Robert Adams, Gregory Velazco y Trianosky, and, most of all, Peter French.

One INTRODUCTION One morning in March 1993, Dr. Davi_d Gunn died about two hours after being shot three times in the back by an antiabortion protester named Michael Griffin. Dr. Gunn regularly performed abortions at seven clinics in Florida, Georgia, and Ala­ bama, and was well-known to antiabortion groups. He was shot in the parking lot of an abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida as he was arriving for work. Following this incident was a great deal of talk about responsibility: the responsibility of Griffin for killing Dr. Gunn, the responsibility of abortion pro­ testers for the effects of their actions, and the responsibility of Dr. Gunn for taking the lives of unborn victims. But one claim about responsibility was sweep­ ing in breadth. In the wake of this incident, a reporter for National Public Radio claimed that all Americans are collectively responsible for not doing more to counteract the violence at abortion clinics. Not only were the people immedi­ ately involved in the incident responsible for what happened, and not only are antiabortion groups responsible for the harmful effects of their protests, but all Americans are collectively responsible for failing to do more to prevent these harmful effects. Claims such as this are common in the media and in ordinary conversation. We commonly hear people claim that various groups are collectively responsible for what has happened, and the groups claimed to be responsible are commonly vast in number. To hear someone say that all Americans are collectively responsible for some harmful situation such as the size of the national deficit or the failure to deal with the problem of homelessness is so commonplace as to attract little atten­ tion. The group consisting of every living person is sometimes claimed to be collec­ tively responsible for dealing with problems such as damage to the ozone layer, and claims of even this magnitide do not elicit much surprise on the part of those hear­ ing them. Such claims are common enough that they have lost whatever shock value they might have had at one time. In addition, claims of this type are seldom challenged. By all appearances people seem to believe that they are true. People are willing to grant that they are part of a vast collective responsible for this or that problem. When a reporter for National Public Radio claims that all Americans are collectively responsible for failing to deal with violence at abortion clinics, the average listener prob­ ably has little inclination to doubt this claim. And when someone claims that every living person is collectively responsible for dealing with the problem of damage to the ozone layer, the typical response is probably a failure to see any reason to doubt this claim.

2

Introduction

The equanimity with which these claims are received by most people is ironic. For twentieth-century Western culture is often characterized as thinking in indi­ vidualistic terms. People in contemporary Western culture think in terms of indi­ vidual rights, individual liberties, and, presumably, individual responsibilties. Ac­ cording to this characterization of contemporary Western culture, the individual bears moral responsibility for what he or she has done. Moral responsibility is a personal, individual matter, and we should never be expected to bear responsibility for the wrongdoings of another (unless we have agreed to do so voluntarily, as when we take responsibility for the actions of our child, our subordinate, or our senile parent). Moral responsibility is not something which can somehow spread sponta­ neously through a whole group of people; it is confined to each individual exactly in proportion to what the individual has done or failed to do. One of the ways in which contemporary Western culture is often con­ trasted with "primitive cultures" is in the manner in which moral responsibility is conceived. People in some primitive cultures supposedly think in terms of entire tribes bearing responsibility for the violation of mores or breaking of taboos by one member of the tribe. This collective way of thinking about moral responsibility is based upon the idea of the guilt of one individual being trans­ mitted to all members of a clan or tribe and is quite foreign to contemporary Western ways of thinking about moral responsibility. Also foreign to contem­ porary Western ways of thinking is the idea that responsibility can be elimi­ nated by destroying a symbolic object such as a voodoo doll. People sometimes argue that collective conceptions of moral responsibility are associated with primitive or even superstitious approaches to morality and have no place in contemporary Western approaches to morality. They credit Western morality that it has managed to overcome these supposedly primitive and superstitious notions by thinking of responsibility in strictly individualist terms. Given the highly individualistic conception of moral responsibility which supposedly characterizes contemporary Western culture, the fact that ascrip­ tions of collective responsibility are made as commonly as they are and chal­ lenged as little as they are is quite ironic. When people assert that all Americans are collectively responsible for not doing more to counteract violence at abor­ tion clinics, people do not react by charging that the correspondent for National Public Radio has regressed into primitive and superstitious ways of thinking about moral responsibility. Instead, they are more than willing either to accept claims such as this or to let them go unchallenged. But something is surprising about these reactions if ascriptions of collective responsibility are really associ­ ated with an older, primitive approach to morality which has been replaced by something quite different in present Western culture. Those who characterize the present age as extremely individualistic are frequently guilty of exaggeration and oversimplification, and people in Western cultures do not typically think of morality exclusively along individualistic lines. People of the present age think about morality quite differently than their primi-

Collective Responsibility

3

tive ancestors did, and one of the differences is surely that people of the present age do not think of guilt for one person's in:imoral act as automatically or inevi­ tably transmitted to others in the person's family or community. But one of the main themes of this book is that we can embrace the notion of collective re­ sponsibility without regressing into primitive or superstitious ways of const,ru­ ing moral responsibility. Thinking about collective responsibility in ways which are perfectly respectable from the standpoint of contemporary Western culture is possible, and this point will be made evident in the ensuing discussion. Some will disagree. Some philosophers, such as H.D. Lewis, find the whole idea of collective responsibility utterly repugnant and oppose all efforts to portray it as philosophically respectable. To Lewis's way of thinking it is, in all of its manifestations, something barbaric and out of place in the thinking of people in the twentieth century. Thus, some find an extreme individualist ap­ proach to their liking, and they will regard as utter nonsense claims typified by the correspondent for National Public �adio to the effect that vast groups of people can be collectively responsible for various problems in the world. However, much confusion over the term "collective responsibility" is pos­ sible, and we must distinguish two ways in which this term is employed. Sometimes what is meant by saying that several people are collectively responsible for a state of affairs is that each of these people is individually responsible for this same state of affairs. Suppose that several people throw paint at a public mural in an effort to deface it. Then, although each person contributes in different ways to the defacing of the mural, each comes to bear responsibility for this state of affairs. In this sense they can be said to share responsibility for the defacing of the mural. A different usage of the term "collective responsibility" assigns responsi­ bility to a single entity, the collective consisting of the various people who con­ stitute it. According to this usage, to say that several people are collectively responsible for a state of affairs is to say that responsibility is borne by the collective consisting of these people. Whether the people themselves are re­ sponsible as individuals for this state of affairs is a totally separate question; all that is asserted is that these people' belong to a collective which is itself the bearer of responsibility. The difference between these two ways of speaking about collective re­ sponsibility may initially seem extremely minor. However, this initial impres­ sion is misleading, as will become apparent in subsequent chapters. For ex­ ample, many philosophers hold the position that a collective can be responsible for a harm even though none of its members is responsible for this harm. A view of this sort is possible only if the two senses of "collectively responsible" are distinguishable from one another, and it illustrates that situations to which the second sense can be applied Ican be strikingly different from those of which the first sense holds true. The discussion in this book is mainly concerned with the second of these senses of collective responsibility, and to avoid confusion I will follow the lead of

4

Introduction

most writers on this topic in not employing the term at all to refer to the first of these senses. Instead I employ the term "shared responsibility" to refer to situations in which several individuals are responsible for the same state of affairs. In an earlier book I focussed upon the topic of shared responsibility (Mellema, 1988). In the present book, by contrast, I focus upon the topic of collective responsibility under­ stood as the view that a collective consisting of two or more moral agents can bear responsibility for what happens. For the remainder of this discussion I will speak of collective responsibility strictly in reference to this view. Several different positions regarding shared or collective responsibility are possible. The view held by H.D. Lewis is that neither is possible. Not only can responsibility not be borne by collectives, but it cannot even be shared by one or more individuals. A less extreme version of the individualist perspective affirms the contention of Lewis that collectives do not (or cannot) bear responsibility but also affirms that several moral agents can bear responsibility for the same state of affairs, such as the outcome produced by their various contributing actions. This view can be referred to as an individualistic approach because it holds that individual moral agents are the only bearers of responsibility, but it differs from Lewis's view in its acknowledgement that responsibility can be shared by two or more individuals. Steven Sverdlik is an important contemporary representative of this view, and in Chapter Four I examine his reasons for embracing this view. Those who believe that collective responsibility is possible make a dra­ matic departure from individualist views by asserting that responsibility can be borne by a non-human entity. This non-human entity, to be sure, is composed or comprised of human beings, but in and of itself it is non-human. A collective can be conceived either in terms of an aggregate of human beings or in terms of an abstract entity like a set (in which case it is not, however, exactly like a set, for unlike a set it can change membership over time). But regardless of whether a collective is conceived as an aggregate or as an abstract entity, it is itself a non-human entity. To those who are unfamiliar with discussions on this topic, the idea of a collective bearing responsibility may initially seem quite dubious or even ludicrous. But those who have written on groups and collectives have made a strong case for the idea that groups or collectives, over and above the people comprising them, can take actions of various sorts. And if such things as group or collective actions exist, granting that groups or collectives can take responsibility for the outcome of these group actions appears natural. This point will become clearer in subsequent chapters. Some proponents of collective moral responsibility argue that collectives can under some circumstances qualify as moral agents. While regarding collectives as agents to which group actions can be ascribed appears reasonable, I will not attempt to defend the claim that collectives can qualify as moral agents. Ascribing moral responsibility to an entity appears to require that the entity be an agent, but whether the agent must be a moral agent for moral responsibility to be ascribed to it is a matter of considerable controversy (especially if the collective contains as compo-

Collective Responsibility

5

nents agents which themselves qualify as moral agents). Thus, I regard as an estab­ lished dictum that collectives are capable of bearing moral responsibility only if they are agents, but whether they themselves should in addition be required to be moral agents is a matter for further speculation. Suppose that the possibility of collectives bearing responsibility is ac­ knowledged. Several views might then be taken concerning the relationship between the responsibility of the collective and the responsibility of its mem­ bers. First, a person might be enough of an individualist to insist that a collec­ tive bears responsibility for a state of,,affairs only if every member of the collec­ tive bears responsibility for the same state of affairs. On this view collective responsibility cannot exist where shared responsibility is not present; the re­ sponsibility of the collective can be said to distribute to the members compris­ ing it regardless of the accompanying circumstances. Second, a person might grant that colle.ctives can bear responsibility for a state of affairs even in situations where one or more of its members fail to bear responsibility for the same state of affairs. In these situations some members of the collective may play a dominant role and others a subordinate role in bring­ ing about a state of affairs. And while those who play a subordinate role may not do enough to warrant the ascription of responsibility for this state of affairs, they are indirectly tied to the responsibility by their membership in a collective which is responsible for this state of affairs. Alleged examples of these situa­ tions will appear in subsequent chapters. Third, a person can hold the position that collectives are capable of bear­ ing responsibility for a state of affairs in situations where none of its members are responsible for the same state of affairs. This view takes collective respon­ sibility to be a robust notion, and individualists find this position most disagree­ able. Yet it is a view which has many adherents, and it is a view which squares well with statements such as the one made by the correspondent for National Public Radio. For the correspondent's intention was not likely to judge that each American is personally responsible for failing to do more to counteract violence at abortion clinics. A much likelier interpretation is that Americans are not personally responsible but responsible as a collective. The last two views examined here allow for the possibility that a collective is responsible for a state of affairs for which at least some of its members are not personally responsible. These members, then, are judged to have a degree of in­ volvement in the events (by virtue of whose occurrence the collective incurs re­ sponsibility) mid-way between the degree of involvement possessed by those who are personally responsible and the degree of involvement possessed by those who are outside the collective. In other words, these members would have to be more involved to warrant the ascription of being personally responsible for the state of affairs, and they would have to be less involved to warrant the judgment that they are not to be considered members in the collective. Thus, three levels of involve­ ment can be distinguished. The lowest level allows an agent to escape all ties to the

6

Introduction

responsibility to the state of affairs in question, the middle level is associated with membership in the collective responsible for this state of affairs, and the highest level warrants (in addition to membership in the collective) the ascription of per­ sonal responsibility for the state of affairs. Recently the concept of moral taint has been introduced into discussions of collective responsibility. Roughly, the idea is that an agent can sometimes be tainted by the wrongdoing of others with whom the agent is significantly associated. One of the ideas which will be developed in this book is that if moral taint exists, then it can be regarded as corresponding to still another level of involvement in harm. Specifically, an agent who is tainted by the wrongdoing of another person through the agent's association with that person is involved in the events of the wrongdoing to a lesser extent than an agent who belongs to a collective which bears responsibil­ ity for this wrongdoing or its effects. This means that in and of itself the fact that an agent is tainted by evil is not sufficient to warrant the judgment that the agent is a member of a collective which is morally responsible for it. On the other hand, in an important sense the moral status of an agent tainted by the wrongdoing of others is unlike those who have no association at all with the person who engages in harmful or evil wrongdoing. Although the agent is free from all ties to the responsibility for this wrongdoing, the status of the person who is tainted by this wrongdoing is less than ideal from a moral point of view. As Anthony Appiah puts it, the agent's moral integrity is affected whenever moral taint takes place. This is not to say that the agent has done anything wrong or that the agent has a responsibility to sever connections with the person guilty of the wrongdoing. But the agent's moral status is altered nevertheless. The concept of moral taint has only recently come under serious scrutiny by moral philosophers, and some may be initially mystified by the idea that a person who is perfectly "innocent" can be tainted by the wrongdoing of someone else to whom the person just happens to bear some connection. Much more will be said in subsequent chapters, especially Chapter Seven, about moral taint and its relation­ ship with collective responsibility. Although giving a precise account of moral taint in terms of the accepted concepts and categories of contemporary moral philosophy is difficult, I believe it is a concept of significance which deserves greater recogni­ tion and further study by contemporary moralists. People can have responsibilities in a variety of ways. A person can have job-related responsibilities, responsibilities as a citizen to obey the law, respon­ sibilities which grow out of the roles of spouse or parent, responsibilities to friends (for example, to show up on time for a scheduled foursome of tennis), and even responsibilities in the context of games (the pitcher's responsibility to cover first base). This book is about moral responsibility. These other types of responsibility overlap considerably with moral responsibility. A person's re­ sponsibility to obey the laws of the land is typically a moral responsibility as well. And responsibilities concerning the raising of children are frequently moral responsibilities. But many of the other responsibilities which fall under these

Collective Responsibility

7

categories are not moral responsibilities, and consequently they fall outside the scope of the present discussion. Characterizing what it means for an individual to bear moral responsibility can be an enormously complex undertaking, and in the moral literature are many lengthy and detailed discussions and debates on the topic. Since this book deals with the group or collective dimension of moral responsibility, I shall not recount or comment upon these discussions and debates. Instead, I will rely upon an account proposed by Larry May which includes most of what is standardly considered to be the key components of moral responsibility (though, strictly speaking, it is not in­ tended to be a definition). Those who participate in the details of the debates on moral responsibility may find this account unsophisticated or simplistic, but for the purposes of serving a discussion of the group dimensions of moral responsibility I will, following May's example, regard it as suitable. May's characterization is as follows. A person is morally responsible for a given harm or character defect if the person's conduct played a significant causal role in that harm or defect, the person's conduct was blameworthy or it was morally faulty in some other way, and the aspect of the act that was faulty was also one of the aspects in virtue of which it was a cause of the harm (May, 1 992, p. 1 5). Here the conduct or act in question might consist in the person's omit­ ting to act, for often a person comes to bear moral responsibility for a harm by his or her not doing anything. Understood this way, the central components of the account are that harm results, it results because of a person's conduct, and this conduct is morally blameworthy or faulty. I will depart slightly from May by allowing that in some cases a person's contributing to harm may render the person responsible for the harm, even if the contribution is not strictly a causal contribution. My reasons for relaxing this requirement will be made clear in subsequent portions of the discussion, and others have likewise explained why in general relaxing this requirement is advantageous (Ellin, 1981, p. 21). This account of moral responsibility is for a state of affairs which actually occurs or obtains. One of the fundamental truths about moral responsibility is that an agent cannot be morally responsible for a state of affairs which never occurs, even if the agent believes that it does occur. Thus, an agent cannot be morally responsible for murdering someone who turns out to survive the mur­ der attempt; in such a case the agent is responsible only for attempted murder. In like manner, it is an accepted truth about moral responsibility, at least in Western traditions of morality, that an agent cannot bear moral responsibility for a state of affairs if it occurs prior to the attempt to bring it about. Thus, an agent cannot be morally responsible for murdering someone who, unbeknownst to the agent, is already dead. Nor, on this principle, can a person living today be morally responsible, or be part of a collective which is morally responsible, for the institution of slavery in previous centuries. Nevertheless, an agent can be morally responsible for bringing about a state of affairs which has not yet occurred. Moralists commonly distinguish

8

Introduction

between "retrospective" and "prospective" moral responsibility. Retrospective refers to responsibility for a state of affairs which has occurred in the past, and prospective refers to a state of affairs which has not yet occurred. May's ac­ count applies only to retrospective moral responsibility (note that it is framed in the past tense). Therefore, a separate account would be required to describe prospective moral responsibility. In my previous book I have discussed pro­ spective moral responsibility as it bears upon groups and group actions (Mellema, 1988, pp. 177- 192). However, the discussion of the present book will be limited to retrospective collective moral responsibility, and we can assume that May 's - account will be suitable for the purposes of this discussion. In a significant proportion of cases in which retrospective moral responsi­ bility is ascribed to an individual or a collective for a state of affairs, the state of affairs in question is something morally undesirable. And moralists who have developed accounts of collective responsibility have generally aimed at dealing with responsibility for morally undesirable states of affairs (I will frequently refer to these states of affairs simply as "harms"). But sometimes the state of affairs for which a person is judged morally responsible is something of a good or favorable nature, as when someone is judged responsible for rescuing a drown­ ing person. In this discussion let us bear in mind that these favorable ascriptions of moral responsibility exist, but virtually all of the examples presented in this book will be cases in which the states of affairs for which a person is judged morally responsible are of a morally undesirable nature. Having introduced some of the underlying concepts which will be exam­ ined in this discussion, I tum to a survey of the remaining chapters. Chapter Two deals with ways in which the actions of the persons comprising a group or collective can approximate or resemble the actions of an individual acting alone. For example, the actions of two people lifting a rock and throwing it through a window resemble the actions of an individual lifting a rock and throwing it through a window. Understanding how an individual comes to bear moral re­ sponsibility for these actions makes it easier to understand how the collective can bear moral responsibility for the actions of its members. I describe five characteristics of groups or collectives which increase the likelihood that the actions of its members will bear a strong resemblance to the actions of an indi­ vidual acting alone. These are: ( 1) unanimity of intent or purpose, (2) similarity of contribution, (3) physical and temporal proximity, (4) organization, and (5) cooperation. To the degree that a collective possesses these characteristics, the actions of its members resemble the actions of an individual acting alone, and to the degree that the actions of its members strongly resemble those of an· individual acting alone, ascriptions of moral responsibility to the collective for the outcome of its actions increase in plausibility. In Chapter Three I attempt to categorize or classify situations in which collectives are alleged to bear moral responsibility. The four main categories of this classification scheme are the following: ( 1) situations where the members

Collective Responsibility

9

of a group contribute causally to a harm, (2) situations where the members of a group risk a harm which subsequently occurs, (3) situations where the members of a group are in a position to prevent a harm from occurring, they deliberately refrain from doing so, and the harm subsequently occurs, and (4) situations where the members of a group refrain from preventing a harm whose occur­ rence is foreseen as probable, and the harm subsequently occurs. Each of these main categories is broken down into several sub-categories reflecting differ­ ences of involvement among the different members of the groups. An examina­ tion of the taxonomy helps reveal which types of situations are promising as candidates for ascriptions of collective responsibility, which are moderately promising, and which do not show promise at all. Chapters Four, Five, and Six constitute a survey of some main contribu­ tors to the literature on collective responsibility. Chapter Four deals with the approach of individualists H.D. Lewis and Steven Sverdlik. While Lewis re­ jects the possibility of both collective responsibility and shared responsibility, Sverdlik is willing to grant that several individuals can share responsibility for the common outcome of their actions. The basic presupposition employed by Lewis is that no one can ever be responsible, in the properly ethical sense, for the actions of another, and his conviction is that this principle is violated as soon as any concessions in the direction of acknowledging shared or collective responsibility are made. Sverdlik agrees with Lewis's presupposition that no one can be responsible for the actions of another, but he argues that an acknowledgement of shared responsibility does not violate it. Chapter Five begins with a challenge by H. Gomperz for contemporary philosophers to articulate a new type of approach to collective responsibility which avoids what are so often ridiculed by opponents of collective responsi­ bility as concepts which are primitive and barbaric. Several philosophers can be viewed as accepting this challenge, and the views of five of the most important are examined in this chapter. D.E. Cooper argues that, although the strategy of the individualist works in some cases of ascribing responsibility, in other cases ascriptions of responsi­ bility to co11ectives cannot be reduced to ascriptions of responsibility to indi­ viduals. Virginia Held argues that random co11ectives, such as passengers in a subway car or people walking down the street, are capable of bearing responsi­ bility for not preventing harms, or, in some cases, for not organizing themselves into units capable of preventing harms. Stanley Bates considers random collec­ tives on a larger scale, such as the audience at a cockfight and the people in­ volved in a lynch mob, and he affirms that the collective consisting of the first can be responsible for the occurrence of the cockfight and those of the second for the actions of the mob, even if the marginal contribution of some of its members is zero. Peter French distinguishes between different types of collec­ tivities, one of which, conglomerate collectivities, is capable of bearing respon­ sibility which does not distribute to its members. And Richard Swinburne de-

10

Introduction

velops the notion of community in such a way as to argue that all of us are members of various communities, that these communities can have moral re­ sponsibilities to share the burdens of various members, and that these responsi­ bilities do not always distribute to all members of the communities. Chapter Six deals with the work of Larry May, one of the most important and prolific writers on the topics of shared and collective responsibility. In his most recent book, May develops an account of shared and collective responsi­ bility inspired by the thought of existentialists such as Heidegger, Jaspers, and the later Sartre. He develops what he refers to as a social existentialist approach to moral responsibility and believes that this approach provides a much needed corrective to the dominant Western tradition of morality in the last two hundred years. Many of us who are "members of a highly self-indulgent age" will find that May's social existentialist philosophy places burdens upon us greater than those to which we are accustomed. Because setting the requirements of moral­ ity too high is not fashionable among British or American moralists, May an­ ticipates a great deal of reluctance among moral philosophers to take his social existentialist approach seriously. Nevertheless, May does an admirable job of defending his positions, and in this chapter I show that May's proposals are more promising than someone who has been taught to think about morality in traditional Western ways may initially suspect. Moral taint is the topic of Chapter Seven. The current revival of interest in this topic is largely due to the work of Anthony Appiah, and in this chapter I summarize and evaluate his contributions to understanding this rather difficult notion. I argue that making sense of moral taint can shed light on and promote a better understanding of collective responsibility. However, May is not altogether in agreement with the position taken by Appiah. As before, May looks for inspi­ ration to the social existentialists, and in this context he finds great insight in Jaspers's concept of metaphysical guilt. Similarities between this concept and the concept of moral taint can be found, but differences can be found as well. In this chapter I clarify these points of similarity and dissimilarity and suggest that, however the details of moral taint are spelled out, it is a key concept which deserves continued attention by moral philosophers. Much of the literature on collective responsibility deals with the manner in which individuals come to qualify for membership in collectives which bear responsibility for what happens. Chapter Eight deals with the opposite and more neglected question of how individuals come to avoid or remove themselves from membership in such collectives. By dissociating themselves from groups which bear moral responsibility for harms or from groups which are likely to bring about future harms, individuals can escape membership in the collective which is ultimately judged to bear moral responsibility for these harms. Often individuals have a moral duty to dissociate themselves in this manner, but one of my central contentions in this chapter is that individuals do not inevitably have moral duties to do so, given the costs or risks involved. I urge that in some

Collective Responsibility

11

cases dissociating ourselves in this manner qualifies as supererogatory. In other cases, I argue, dissociating ourselves in this manner is something less noble than supererogatory but stiII something which an agent ought to do in a sense of "ought" less strict than moral obligation. An agent ought to do something ac­ cording to this less strict sense of "ought" if it is not obligatory to perform but it is nevertheless moraIIy blameworthy to omit. Chapter Nine further explores some of the connections between moral re­ sponsibility, obligation, and blame. I argue that the debate between those who hold that coIIective responsibility invariably distributes to an the members of the conec­ tive and those who hold that it is non-distributive is closely tied to a debate about the nature of moral obligation. I believe that an awareness of this connection may well lead a person to a re-examination of whether collective responsibility distributes to an its members, and I urge that in the end this re-examination is likely to confer plausibility upon the view that collective responsibility does not always distribute to all of its members. In the second half of this chapter I develop an analogy be­ tween a series of acts by members of a collective and a series of acts by an indi­ vidual. Making use again of the concepts of obligation and blame, I urge that an awareness of this analogy has the potential for promoting a clearer understanding of collective responsibility. Here too I urge that this awareness confers some plausibil­ ity upon the view that the responsibility of a collective does not always distribute. In Chapter Ten I discuss the widespread assumption that as a coIIective responsible for a harm grows in size, the fact that a person is a member of it becomes less serious from a moral point of view. Thus, according to this as­ sumption, to be part of a collective of five which stands by while a preventable harm is occurring is a fairly serious matter, it is less serious if the size of the collective is increased to five hundred, less serious still if it is increased to five thousand, and so forth. While an outright refutation of this point of view is difficult, I defend a view according to which the seriousness of a person's moral involvement does not depend as such upon the size of the collective, and I at­ tempt to show that on a proper understanding of collective responsibility such a view is quite plausible. Elsewhere I have defended a version of this view as it pertains to shared responsibility. In the first section of this chapter I present a summary of my earlier argument in an effort to pave the way for a discussion of how such a view relates to collective responsibility. And in the latter half of the chapter I modify some of the earlier argumentation in an effort to make plau­ sible the idea that the size of the collective should not be thought to have any direct effect upon the moral status of its members. Chapter Eleven deals with the moral responsibility borne by corporations. Although some thinkers allege that corporations are not capable of bearing moral responsibility, people quite commonly ascribe responsibility to corporations. On the assumption that talking about the responsibility of corporations makes sense, I examine some of the connections between collective responsibility and corporate responsibility and look at ways in which collectives come to bear responsibility in a

12

Introduction

corporate setting. Among other things, this involves looking at the dynamics of decision-making in the corporate setting. I then argue that corporate responsibility is significantly more complex than collective responsibility and that reducing cor­ porate responsibility to the responsibility borne by the collective consisting of all the moral agents who make up the corporation is not possible. In the concluding chapter I draw together issues addressed in the preceding chapters, and I present an approach to collective moral responsibility which strikes a sensible balance between the views of a highly individualist nature and those which are so far to the other extreme that moral taint is in danger of being swal- lowed up by collective moral responsibility. The view I defend affirms that collec­ tive moral responsibility does not in general distribute to all of its members, and hence I stand in agreement with D.E. Cooper and others who believe that a reduc­ tionist strategy will not succeed. However, the view I defend affirms, in a spirit of individualism, that membership in a collective which bears moral responsibility depends to some extent upon what an individual actually does. Hence, collective moral responsibility is not like a virus that infects people who happen to come into contact with it. An agent must actually do something to warrant the judgment that the agent belongs to a collective which bears moral responsibility. The view I defend states that a moral agent is a member of a collective which bears moral responsibility for a state of affairs only if the agent performs a "qualifying act," an act which qualifies an agent for membership in the collec­ tive. Since a moral agent bears moral responsibility for having performed this qualifying act, in some sense collective moral responsibility can be said to dis­ tribute to the moral responsibility of its constitutive members. Each member of a collective morally responsible for a state of affairs is morally responsible ei­ ther for the same state of affairs or for a related state of affairs, where the related state of affairs is that of having performed the relevant qualifying act. That my view recognizes a distributing phenomenon of this type shows that it does not embody a robust collective responsibility. My view does not have as a consequence that when a collective bears moral responsibility for a state of affairs, each member of the collective bears moral responsibility for this very state of affairs. But on my view each member bears responsibility, if not for this very state of affairs, then for a closely related state of affairs. Precisely because each member bears moral responsibility for this closely related state of affairs, he or she comes to be a member of the col­ lective. A person who fails to bear such moral responsibility might still be tainted by the wrondoing in question, but this person cannot rightly be judged to be a member of the collective. By the same token, a person who is a potential mem­ ber of a collective can opt out of membership in the collective by declining to perform a qualifying act. By declining to perform a qualifying act, this person avoids being numbered among those bearing moral responsibility for a state of affairs closely related to that for which the collective bears moral responsibility. Those of an individualist persuasion will take issue with my belief that

Collective Responsibility

13

the moral responsibility of a collective does not distribute in the most straight­ forward sense. But the recognition that every member of a collective bearing moral responsibility for a state of affairs bears moral responsibility at least for a closely related state of affairs is a crucial concession to the spirit of individual­ ism. And this is a concession which defenders of robust theories of collective moral responsibility will regard unfavorably. In their minds, my theory under­ cuts much of what accounts of collective moral responsibility are designed to explain. In particular, I deny that mere circumstance can render an agent a mem­ ber of a collective which bears moral responsibility, and thereby I am denying what seems a fundamental feature of more robust theories. In what follows I hope to offer considerable clarification of these matters.

Two COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AND THE ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS Few thinkers would dispute the thesis that individual moral agents are the paradigm bearers of moral responsibility. If moral responsibility is borne by anything, it is borne by individual persons. Even the most ardent defenders of the view that collec­ tives are capable of bearing moral responsibility (at least in the Western traditions of morality) will readily agree that moral responsibility is first and foremost borne by individual moral agents. The concept of individual moral responsibility does not derive from the concept of collective moral responsibility. This is reflected in the way people form their beliefs about moral responsibility. They first come to under­ stand what it means for individuals to incur moral responsibility, and this subse­ quently helps them to understand what it means for collectives to incur moral re­ sponsibility. A major theme of this chapter is that collective moral responsibility can profitably be thought of as an extension of the concept of individual moral re­ sponsibility to situations in which several people act or fail to act. I will develop the thesis that situations in which several people come to bear collective re­ sponsibility as a result of their acting or failing to act can profitably be thought of as analogous to situations in which individuals bear moral responsibility as a result of their acting or failing to act. This thesis can be illustrated by the fol­ lowing simple example: two people together lift a rock, throw it through a win­ dow, and thereby come to bear moral responsibility for the broken window. This example is analogous to a case in which one person lifts a rock and throws the rock through the window and comes to bear sole responsibility for the bro­ ken window. To the extent that we understand how the individual person comes to bear moral responsibility for breaking the window, we can better understand how the collective consisting of the two people comes to bear moral responsi­ bility for breaking the window. I claim that alleged cases of collective moral responsibility increase in plausibility in proportion to the strength of the analogy with cases of individual moral responsibility. The strength of the analogy may even be a reason (beyond the fact that it is an analogy) that the claim of collective responsibility is so plausible; but all that I claim here is that the plausibility of ascribing collective moral responsibility increases in proportion to the strength of the analogy, and whether a causal connection exists is a question which need not be settled here. In and of itself a collective is one thing, not many things (and this is true regardless of whether a collective is taken to be an abstract entity). Hence, when a

16

Collective Actions and the Actions of Individuals

collective is claimed to bear moral responsibility for a state of affairs, the claim is that a single entity bears moral responsibility. This single entity is comprised of two or more entities, and what these entities do or fail to do determines whether the collective bears moral responsibility. But the collective is a single entity; hence, we can shed light on the process by which a collective comes to bear responsibility for what it does by taking note of the similarities between it and a single moral agent which comes to bear moral responsibility for what it does. I will examine a number of properties which characterize groups or col­ lectives of people and which render their action or inaction more analogous to - the action or inaction of individuals than if they were to lack these properties. These properties are unanimity of intent or purpose, similarity of contribution, physical proximity, organization, and cooperation. The basic idea is that the more of these properties characterize a group, the stronger the analogy with the case of individual action or inaction (and, in tum, the more plausible the claim that collective responsibility is present). Thus, for example, all of these proper­ ties characterize the group consisting of the persons throwing a rock through the window, or so let us suppose, and this makes saying that they are acting almost as if they were one person reasonable. But it would not be reasonable to say of a group lacking all or most of these properties that they are acting almost as if they were one person, and hence there would be no strong analogy be­ tween the group acting and an individual acting. The first property for consideration is unanimity of intent. The idea is straightforward: two or more people have unanimity of intent if what they in­ tend is the same. If the intent of two or more people is that a window be broken immediately, then what they intend is the same and unanimity of intent occurs. Because (barring cases of multiple personality) an agent always intends to do the same thing as himself or herself, situations where several people have unanimity of intent approximate in this regard situations in which a single indi­ vidual intends a state of affairs. However, matters are not as simple as they might appear when deciding whether unanimity of intent is present. For two people might intend the same outcome and disagree significantly on how to bring it about; similarly, two people might intend the same strategy but disagree significantly on what they intend this strategy to accomplish. Sometimes a hier­ archy of means and ends is operative in the decision to do something. To take a simple example, a person gets into the car to drive to the hardware store to purchase a part to fix a drain to placate a spouse. Similarly, two or more people might employ a hierarchy of means and ends to reach an ultimate desired end. They might agree on some aspects of the hierarchy but disagree on others. In such cases deciding whether unanimity of intent is present might be difficult. For the purposes of this discussion we may stipulate that unanimity of intent is taken to mean perfect unanimity of intent, where two or more agents can be said to have perfect unanimity of intent if and only if they agree on all of the levels of the means-end hierarchy. They agree on the end to be achieved, the

Collective Responsibility

17

strategy to achieve this end, the strategy to achieve the strategy to achieve this end, and so forth. This type of unanimity of intent ensures that collectives will most closely approximate individuals in the area of intentionality. This unanim­ ity is what is meant in the literature by saying that several people are acting with one mind, and I will employ this notion in discussing how collective moral responsibility can approximate individual moral responsibility. Thus, when a group of people brings about a state of affairs as the result of their having perfect unanimity of intent, we can more plausibly make a case for saying that they are collectively responsible for bringing it about than if they lack unanimity of intent. To take an extreme example, suppose that several people steal items from a warehouse and some participate only because they are or­ dered to do so at gunpoint. Saying that the entire group bears collective respon­ sibility for the theft of these items would be highly implausible. But if all of the people have perfect unanimity of intent, the situation would be more conducive to ascribing collective responsibility. This would even be true if those ordered to do so at gunpoint turned out to have perfect unanimity of intent with the others. Accordingly, one way in which people rebut the charge that they are part of a collective which bears moral responsibility is to point out that their intent in acting is quite different from that of the others in the collective. All of this is not to say that having unanimity of intent is a necessary condition of a collective 's bearing moral responsibility, for many other factors affect the plausibility of judging that a collective is responsible for what hap­ pens. Instead, when several people contribute causally to bringing about a state of affairs, then, other things being equal, their situation more closely approxi­ mates a single individual's bringing about a state of affairs if unanimity of in­ tent is operative. This, in tum, makes establishing the claim that they bear col­ lective moral responsibility for this state of affairs easier. The same result holds true in cases where people refrain from acting. Just as individuals refrain from acting as the result of having certain intentions, so groups of people refrain from acting as the result of the intentions of the various people. But when the people in a group refrain from acting, they do not neces­ sarily refrain from acting as the result of having the same intentions. Thus, just as unanimity of intent may or may not occur when several people embark upon a course of action, unanimity of intent may or may not occur when people re­ frain from acting. Suppose that four people observe that an abandoned building has just caught fire. All of them are aware of the importance of telephoning the fire department, and a public telephone just happens to be nearby. But for a variety of reasons none of them telephones the fire department. One of them refrains from acting because of the enjoyment of watching buildings burn, another re­ frains from acting because of a personal dislike for the owner of the building, another is a fugitive from justice and does not wish to risk being identified by authorities, and another with laryngitis refrains because it is painful to speak.

18

Collective Actions and the Actions of Individuals

Since no others observe that the building has caught fire, the fire department is not notified, and the building is a total loss. In this example the four people are in a position to prevent a significant harm from occurring, but they fail to do so. What they all have in common is their intending not to telephone the fire department, and the end result is that no one notifies the fire department. Although they all intend not to telephone the fire department, their reasons for not telephoning are quite different. That their intentions are quite different complicates the question of assigning collective responsibility. If, for example, all of them had refrained from telephoning the fire department because they enjoy watching buildings burn, then it would be less problematic to judge that they are collectively responsible for not notifying the authorities or for not preventing the total loss of a building. Their situation would then approximate a single witness who refrains from telephoning be­ cause of the enjoyment of watching buildings burn. But because their intentions differ so markedly, the question of assigning collective responsibility is quite complex and probably quite controversial. Another property of groups or collectives which allows for their behavior to approximate the behavior of an individual acting alone is similarity of contri­ bution. When two or more people contribute to an outcome by performing ac­ tions which are uniform in the sense of being similar, then their behavior can be thought of as approximating the behavior of an individual acting alone. Recall the example of the two people who together pick up a rock and throw it through a window. Each person contributes to the outcome by placing his or her hands under or around the rock, initiating a lifting motion, and then initiating a throwing motion. The motions of the two are not entirely the same; in many respects they differ in detail. But a great uniformity in what they are doing is apparent, and this is what makes possible the claim that a similarity of contribution exists in what they are doing. They are contributing in a uniform way to the final outcome of the window's being broken, and the uniform nature of their contribution makes what they are doing much like that of a single indi­ vidual who lifts a rock and throws it through a window. For this reason ascribing collective responsibility to the two people break­ ing the window is natural. Just as saying of one person throwing a rock through a window that he or she is responsible for breaking the window is natural, say­ ing of the two people that they are collectively responsible for breaking the window is natural. Again, ascriptions of collective responsibility are more natu­ ral and less problematic in cases where a strong resemblance exists between what a group does and what an individual does. In situations where several individuals refrain from acting, similarity of con­ tribution exists almost by default. Thus, the four people who elect not to report to the authorities that a building has caught fire fail to do something, and the failure of each one to do something is precisely like the failure of each other person to do something. Hence, they contribute to the group failure in exactly the same manner.

Collective Responsibility

19

Here too this case of group failure can be compared with a case in which a single individual refrains from reporting a fire, and this makes the collective consisting of the four individuals a stronger candidate for ascribing collective responsibility to it for its failure. As seen earlier, the situation is complicated greatly when the people who see the fire refrain from acting as the result of widely differing intentions. Then the similarity with the case of an individual refraining from acting is significantly weakened or diminished. But this does not change the fact that, in and of itself, similarity of contribution is a property of groups which facilitates drawing a strong analogy between their action or inaction and that of an individual. Again, the greater the degree of similarity between the actions of indi­ viduals, the greater are the chances of drawing a strong comparison between their actions and those of an individual. This discussion should not be taken to imply that the only way the actions of several individuals can qualify as comparable to those of a single individual is for similarity of contribution to be present. The contributions of several indi­ viduals may differ quite markedly but nevertheless form a pattern which also allows for the possibility of comparing the group action with the action of an individual. Situations of this type will be examined in what follows. The point here is that when similarity of contribution is present, drawing a strong com­ parisons between the actions of the group's members and the actions of an indi­ vidual is easier. A third property of groups which makes possible strong comparisons be­ tween the actions of its members and the actions of an individual is physical proximity. If several individuals are performing actions in close physical prox­ imity, then the likelihood that their actions will approximate the actions of an individual acting alone is greater than if they are not in close proximity. To put the point differently, an observer would not be as inclined to say of a group of people that they are acting almost as if they were one person if the people in question were scattered over a considerable distance. Suppose that after an earthquake the contents of an art collection are ex­ posed, and several porcelain vases of great value are removed by people who happen to be passing by. Each passerby takes a vase home and destroys it. All of the vases are destroyed, but they are destroyed by persons who are widely scat­ tered over a distance. Now consider a slightly different scenario. After picking up the porcelain vases, the passersby destroy them right at the location where they are found. As in the first scenario, each person destroys exactly one vase. But those destroy­ ing the vases are all in one place. Some might see little difference between these two scenarios. Whether some­ one destroys a vase ·at the point where it is found or whether the person destroys it only after first taking it home might appear to be of little significance. Nevertheless, I believe that a difference between these two scenarios can be seen in the matter of

20

Collective Actions and the Actions of Individuals

judging the actions of the passersby to be comparable or analogous to the actions of a single individual. While one person going from one location to another destroying one vase at a time is not impossible to imagine, comparing the breaking of the vases in the same location to the actions of a single individual is more natural. The physi­ cal proximity of those in the second scenario renders their actions more easily com­ parable to those of a single individual. More importantly, the passersby in the second scenario are a stronger can­ didate for ascriptions of collective responsibility for the destruction of the por­ celain vases than the passersby in the first scenario. In the first scenario saying _ that each passerby is individually responsible for destroying the vase he or she breaks is more natural. To say of these individuals that they are collectively responsible for the destruction of all of the vases is less intuitive than to say of the individuals in the second scenario that they are collectively responsible for the destruction of all the vases. Not everyone's intuitions are the same. Some will insist that ascribing collec­ tive responsibility in both scenarios makes sense, while others will insist that as­ cribing it in neither of the scenarios makes sense. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, some are highly reluctant to ascribe collective responsibility even in the situations which seem the most deserving candidates for it, while others are eager to ascribe it in situations which seem the most dubious candidates. This is not the place to attempt to resolve these differences of opinion. All that I am suggesting at present is that a group characterized by the physical proximity of its members is more likely to have its actions bear a significant resemblance with the actions of an individual acting alone. And furthermore, a group characterized by the physical proximity of its members is more likely to qualify as a plausible candidate for as­ criptions of collective responsibility than if it lacks physical proximity. (Perhaps a parallel case can be made for the claim that temporal proximity is a characteristic which renders a series of actions by different agents more similar to a single agent's acting alone. Thus, if those destroying vases do so within a short interval of time, their actions will more likely resemble an individual acting alone than if their ac­ tions are scattered over a broad interval of time.) A fourth characteristic of groups which makes possible a strong resemblance between the actions of its members and those of an individual acting alone is orga­ nization. Just as a principle of organization governs the actions of an individual acting alone (again, barring exceptional cases), so a principle of organization can govern the actions of the members of a group. Thus, a way in which the actions of these members can come to bear a strong resemblance to the actions of an indi­ vidual is for organization which coordinates their actions to be present. The example of the two people throwing a rock through the window is a simple illustration of how the actions of a group are coordinated as a result of organization. Little organization is required in such cases to guarantee that the actions of its members are properly coordinated. Sometimes organization is present in what a group sets out to do, but similarity of contribution is not present.

Collective Responsibility

21

A modification of the rock-throwing example can serve as a simple illustration. Suppose that two people set out to break all of the windows of a building with many windows. Because a fence encircles the building, the windows can be broken only by throwing objects such as rocks through them. They then adopt the following principle of organization: one of them gathers rocks, while the other throws them through the windows. This method of coordinating their ac­ tions serves them well, and in the end they are able to break all of the windows. In the literature much has been made about organized collectives and how the organization of a collective affects·its liability to bear collective responsibil­ ity. The consensus is that organization enhances a collective's chances of being a plausible candidate for ascriptions of collective responsibility. Although orga­ nization is not a necessary condition for a collective 's incurring moral responsi­ bility, those who have written on the topic agree that (if such a thing as collec­ tive responsibility exists at all) a collective is more likely to warrant the ascrip­ tion of collective responsibility if it is organized than if it is not. Like some of the group characteristics previously considered, organiza­ tion is a property which admits of degrees. A group or collective can be orga­ nized to a high degree or it can be organized to a modest or minimal degree. Presumably, the higher the degree of organization, the more closely the actions of its members will succeed in resembling the actions of an individual and, in tum, the more plausible a candidate the collective will tend to be for warranting the ascription of collective responsibility. Many other factors come into play which affect a collective 's fitness for being judged morally responsible for what happens. But the degree to which it has organization, especially the type of organization which allows the members of the collective to coordinate their actions, is an important factor. Organization can also play a role in situations of group inaction. Orga­ nized efforts of inaction, such as organized boycotts, are quite different from unorganized efforts of inaction, and the difference between the two can have an appreciable bearing on people's readiness to judge that those who fail to act form a collective which bears moral responsibility. Four people witnessing a fire may fail to report it, but for them to organize themselves into a club whose members agree not to report fires which they see is quite another thing. I be­ lieve that people will be more inclined to judge in the event that they organize themselves that the four are collectively responsible for not reporting it. The fifth and last group characteristic to be considered is cooperation. When the members of a group cooperate with each other in a group enterprise, their ac­ tions bear a stronger resemblance to the efforts of an individual moral agent than if they do not cooperate. Moreover, when cooperation among the members of a group is present, the group is likelier to be found collectively responsible for the end result of the members' actions than if they do not cooperate. Although cooperation and organization are closely related concepts and typically occur together\they do not always occur together. A group with a great

22

Collective Actions and the Actions of Individuals

deal of formal organization, such as the local chapter of a labor union, can suf­ fer from a lack of cooperation on the part of some members. Moreover, a group with little organization can be characterized by a great deal of cooperation, as when strangers pitch in to help at the scene of an emergency. Cooperation is also similar to unanimity of intent. When several people cooperate in a group effort, they typically have the same or similar intentions about what they are trying to do and the means they are employing in bringing it about. But this need not be the case. Several people may cooperate in setting up a large conference on AIDS awareness on a college campus, some with the intent of promoting AIDS awareness, and others with the intent of providing greater name recognition or of generating revenue for the college. Hence coop­ eration and unanimity of intent are not the same, for cooperation can be present where unanimity of intent is not. The relationship between cooperation and collective responsibility is cru­ cial. Like each of the other characteristics already considered, a group whose members cooperate with one another bears a greater resemblance to the efforts of an individual acting alone. Such a group is likelier to qualify for being judged collectively responsible for the outcome of the group endeavor than if coopera­ tion is absent or significantly reduced. Cooperation is one of the traits which helps give a group or collective its overall identity. One of the ways of identify­ ing a group is by the cooperation evinced by its members, and when these mem­ bers cooperate to bring about a state of affairs a person has greater reason for finding them collectively responsible for what they bring about than if they fail to cooperate. Again, some dismiss the whole idea of collective responsibility, and they will not be impressed by the presence of cooperation in a group any more than by any of the other characteristics considered already. But I believe that those · who accept the idea that collectives can bear moral responsibility will agree that a group whose members cooperate in bringing about a state of affairs is easier to be thought of as a unit and also a more plausible candidate for being judged collectively responsible for this state of affairs than if the members of the same group fail to cooperate. Cooperation can be present when members refrain from action, and in some cases cooperation may be necessary to ensure that all of the members refrain. For example, several people in a restaurant witness a diner at another table who is chok­ ing to death, and no one else is in the dining room. Some of them know the proper techniques for aiding choking victims, but one of them stands up and points out that the victim is a dangerous criminal who has just been released from the state peniten­ tiary on a legal technicality and no one should come to the victim's aid. They all nod or gesture a willingness to cooperate, and no one gets involved. This case is like the case of the four people in the previous section who organize themselves into a club, but here it can be supposed that no real organi­ zation is involved beyond that of indicating a willingness to cooperate. They

Collective Responsibility

23

are simply a random assortment of people sitting at different tables. Still, we could reasonably judge that in the event that the diner chokes to death the others who cooperate in noninvolvement are collectively responsible for not coming to the rescue. And even if one is not convinced that they are collectively respon­ sible for not coming to the victim's aid, we can admit that they are a more plausible candidate for being judged collectively responsible than if no coop­ eration had taken place. Thus, if each had simply known the choking diner was the criminal and decided on his or her own not to get involved, we would have less reason to think of them as forming a collective which is responsible for not coming to the aid of the criminal. I have discussed five characteristics of groups or collectives which help to render what they do as analogous or resemblant of what individuals do acting alone and which make them more plausible candidates for being judged collec­ tively responsible for what they do or fail to do. These are unanimity of intent, similarity of contribution, physical proximity, organization, and cooperation. One question which remains to be asked is whether this list is complete. Joel Feinberg claims, for example, that the solidarity of a group makes it a worthy or fitting candidate for the ascription of collective responsibility, a type of solidarity characterized by a community of interest, bonds of sentiment di­ rected toward common objects, or members united by goods or harms which are collective and indivisible (Feinberg, 1 968, p. 677). This claim strikes me as correct, but is solidarity a quality possessed by a group over and above the characteristics already discussed? I fail to s�e how a group can lack solidarity if unanimity of intent and similarity of contribution, together with proximity, or­ ganization, and cooperation are already present. If solidarity is something over and above these qualities, what that might be is hard to say. Perhaps a group could be characterized by all five of these qualities and still lack the feeling or sense of solidarity. We can conceive of a group as having solidarity but lacking the feeling or sense of solidarity, and surely we could argue that this is in itself a characteristic which makes the group a stronger candidate for ascriptions of co11ective responsibility. Here the concept of esprit de corps comes to mind. No doubt a group can be characterized by unanimity of intent and contribution, physical proximity, organization, and cooperation and lack esprit de corps, that special quality which gives the members of a group a vivid feeling of identification with the group, its members, and its activities. This point is relevant to the present discussion inasmuch as we can make a strong case for the claim that a group which genuinely has an esprit de corps is more fit to qualify for ascriptions of collective responsibility than otherwise. Although I am not certain that this claim is true, I am perfectly willing to admit that the five characteristics I have singled out for consideration in this chapter may not constitute an exhaustive list. Other characteristics may exist which also render the actions of a group more comparable or resemblant to those of an individual than otherwise. In corresponding fashion, characteristics

24

.

Collective A ctions and the A ctions of Individuals

other than those discussed here may exist which render a group a more fit or plausible candidate for ascriptions of collective responsibility than otherwise. My main concern in this chapter has been to illustrate a variety of characteris­ tics which have these capabilities when they are possessed by groups, and I have shown that thinking of the five characteristics discussed here as having these capabilities is reasonable. The basic idea is that in and of itself a collective is one thing, not many things. Hence if we wish to judge that a collective bears responsibility, we must think in terms of a single object as bearing responsibility. Because a collective consists of several individuals with different personalities, differing outlooks on life, and in differing circumstances, examining a situation in which they perform actions and coming away with a sense that they somehow form a unity, and as a unity ought to be judged responsible for what happens, is not always easy. This is one good reason why some thinkers have remained skeptical of the whole idea of collectives bearing responsibility. As will be seen in subse­ quent chapters, some insist that individuals are the only bearers of moral re­ sponsibility. Most who hold this view will go so far as to grant that individuals can share responsibility for the same state of affairs, but they will not grant that the collective itself can bear responsibility. But people almost instinctively attribute responsibility to collectives as well as to its individual members. Often judging that a collective is responsible for what happens seems unquestionably correct. This chapter helps explain why a group of people can sometimes appear so much to be acting as a unity, and it explains why to ascribe responsibility for what happens to the group or collec­ tive, as opposed to ascribing it to its individual members, sometimes seems so unquestionably correct. In the end, the correct thing to say about collective responsibility is that in some situations the actions of the collective strongly resemble the actions of an individual, and thinking of the collective as responsible for the outcome of its actions is natural and intuitive. In other instances ascriptions of collective re­ sponsibility are strained and unnatural because thinking of the responsibility for what happens as being borne by a single entity, as opposed to responsibility borne by a multiplicity of individuals for a multiplicity of separate actions, is difficult. Some philosophers refuse to acknowledge such a thing as collective responsibility even in the most intuitively compelling cases, just as others insist that collective responsibility is present in the least intuitively compelling cases. This chapter has explained what factors contribute to the plausibility of think­ ing that collectives can bear moral responsibility. The reasons why some hold views which go against the grain of what most people would find intuitively compelling will be made clearer in subsequent chapters.

Three A TYPOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONS Collectives are said to bear moral responsibility for what happens in many types of situations. In this chapter an attempt is Ihade to categorize these situations. The four main categories of the taxonomy are the following: (1) Situations where the mem­ bers of a group contribute causally to a harm, (2) Situations where the members of a group risk a harm which is foreseen as possible and which subsequently occurs, (3) Situations where the members of a group do not prevent a harm from occurring, and (4) Situations where the members of a group risk a harm which is foreseen as possible through their inaction and which subsequently occurs. Each broad category is broken down into four sub-categories: ( 1 ) Situa­ tions where each member of the group in question contributes causally to the harm or, in the case of omissions, each contributes to permitting the harm by refraining from action, (2) Situations where each member of the group attempts to contribute, but, though the outcome occurs, some members fail in their in­ tent, (3) Situations where some members contribute to the outcome, while oth­ ers offer some type of encouragement, and (4) Situations where some members contribute to the outcome, while others look on with silent approval. Most of the discussion will involve cases where members of the group act (or refrain from acting) with unanimity of intent or, as is sometimes described in the literature, with one mind. At the end of this chapter I briefly discuss situations where unanimity of intent is not present. I believe that most standard cases of collective responsibility can be ac­ commodated by the categories of this taxonomy. I do not claim, however, that all cases of collective responsibility can be accommodated by it. The sub-cat­ egories in particular do not exhaust the variety of ways in which those who do not contribute directly to the outcome nevertheless have an involvement so as to warrant inclusion in the collective responsible for the outcome. For this rea­ son, for example, some may wish the addition of a fifth sub-category to accom­ modate cases in which some members of the group come to be members of the collective by their role as silent but disapproving onlookers (as with many dis­ approving Germans during World War II who did not protest the atrocities com­ mitted by the Nazis). Naturally, others will object to the inclusion of such "con­ troversial cases" as these. Since it would be impossible to satisfy everyone with what is and what isn't included in the taxonomy, I shall simply claim that the taxonomy is a first attempt to help sort out the cases of collective responsibility, and in no way am I using it to promote a particular point of view or to advance a particular agenda.

26

A Typology of Collective Actions

The most basic and intuitive case of a group of people coming to bear collec­ tive responsibility for a harm occurs when each member of the group performs an action which contributes causally to the harm and where each member performs the action with the intent of helping to bring about the harm. For example, several thieves break into a bank vault with the intent of stealing its valuable contents, and they in fact steal its valuable contents. In this case the harm is produced by several people acting cooperatively. The thieves share the same objective, and by acting cooperatively they are able to achieve this objective. In some cases of this type the contribution of each member is a necessary condition for bringing about the harm. But this need not be the case, nor even believed to be the case by the participants, for a collective to be responsible for the harm. The thieves might be aware that the robbery can be carried out with fewer participants, but this would not alter our judgment concerning whether the collective is responsible for the harm. What matters is that all of them par­ ticipate with the intent of contributing to the robbery and that they in fact caus­ ally contribute to it. A second type of case in which ascribing collective responsibility is natural occurs when each member of a group performs an action intended to contribute causally to a harm and the harm is in fact caused by some, but not all, of these actions. In other words, each member attempts to contribute to the harm, some of the members are successful in their attempt to bring it about, and some of the mem­ bers fail in their attempt to contribute to it. For example, several thieves break into a vault to steal its valuable contents, and they do so, but some of the thieves carry out bags of what turns out to be worthless counterfeit currency. Here too the thieves may plausibly be said to constitute a collective which is responsible for the disappearance of the valuable contents. That some of the thieves actually carry bags of counterfeit currency does not exempt them from membership in the collective which bears responsibility for the harm. For they, of course, act in the belief that they are carrying bags of actual currency. As far as bearing collective responsibility is concerned, they are to be counted as mem­ bers as much as those who actually contribute to the disappearance of the vault's valuable contents. Third are cases in which several members of a group cooperatively cause a harm as the result of intending to do so, while others who desire the harm to occur support their efforts with encouragement. In cases of this type the group consists of certain people who· take action and others who provide encourage­ ment, and under certain circumstances we may reasonably judge that the entire group is collectively responsible for the harm. Suppose that as the thieves are breaking into the vault one of them accidentally becomes injured and incapable of carrying out any of the contents. Nevertheless, the injured thief offers words of encouragement to the others, and in the end the thieves are able to empty the vault of its valuable contents. Some might be unsure as to whether the injured thief deserves to be counted

Collective Responsibility

27

as a member of the collective responsible for the robbery. But the thief wills the same outcome as the others will and would have joined the others in carrying out bags of currency if not for receiving an unexpected injury. Moreover, the thief encourages the others. In more extreme cases the encouragement may come from an acknowledged leader of the group who is strongly suggesting to the others what they ought to do, and in these cases the person offering encourage­ ment clearly ought to be counted as a member of the collective. Cases of the fourth type are similar to the third, except that those not causally contributing to the outcome are more passive. These are cases in which several members of a group cooperatively cause harm as the result of intending to do so, while others who desire the outcome merely look on approvingly. The difference between these cases and the preceding cases is that these onlookers provide no encouragement to those actively involved in producing the harm. They are, however, approving onlookers, and they certainly do not do or say anything which conveys the impression that they disapprove of what the others are doing. Cases of this sort are very common. Frequently those who cause harm are in the company of others who can be described as approving onlookers. From those who look on with approval as others loot stores during a riot to genteel senior level managers who silently approve of the corrupt decisions of high level associates, these situations are all too familiar. Whether these tacit, approving onlookers should be counted as members of collectives responsible for the harms produced by others is often a matter of controversy and depends heavily upon the circumstances surrounding the situ­ ation. We would be hard pressed to argue that a person watching others carry items from a store during a riot is part of the collective responsible for the removal of these items, even if this person watches with an attitude of approval. But where senior level managers give tacit approval to the decisions of their associates, silence is often taken as assent and can function almost as forcefully as offering words of encouragement. Every case is different, and a great many factors must be taken into consideration. But at least sometimes the collective responsible for producing harm includes some who do nothing more than si­ lently approve. So far four types of cases have been examined, three of which involve persons who, although they desire the harm in question, do not causally con­ tribute to it. In one type of case they make an attempt to contribute to the harm which fails to be a causal contribution, in another type of case they offer en­ couragement, and in the final type of case they are nothing more than silent onlookers. Whether these people ought to be considered part of the collective responsible for the harm is most controversial in the silent onlooker case, less controversial in the case where they offer encouragement, and least controver­ sial in the other cases. Next I consider cases in which a number of people risk harm and where

28

A Typology of Collective Actions

the harm occurs as the result of their taking this risk. Suppose these people desire to bring about a good or desired outcome by pursuing a course of action but know a significant chance exists that their pursuing this course of action will cause harm to result. They are unanimous in their opinion that this course of action should nevertheless be pursued, and in the end the harm occurs as the result of their taking this action. As before, this general scenario can be broken down into four types of cases. First, I consider cases in which every member of a group desires to risk a particular harm to bring about a good result, each member contributes causally - to bringing about the good, and the risked harm occurs as a side-effect. For example, those on the city council know that ground water might be contami­ nated if they vote against a proposal requiring a local manufacturing firm to build a treatment center for its industrial wastes. Nevertheless, they vote down the proposal unanimously because they fear the city will collect fewer tax rev­ enues from the firm if it is required to build the treatment center. As a result, the ground water becomes contaminated within a fairly short time. Judging that the council members constitute a collective which bears moral responsibility for the contamination of the ground water is plausible. They know a significant likelihood exists that the contamination will occur if they vote against the proposal, and they nevertheless vote against the proposal. We might say that their decision is in reckless disregard of the community's safety, and for this reason they deserve to by judged collectively responsible for the contamination. Second, cases exist in which some, but not all, members of a group contribute causally to a good result in the knowledge that they are risking a harm (whose likelihood of occurrence is known by all of them to be significant). All are in favor of taking the risk, and all attempt to contribute causally to the good, but some fail in their attempt. Suppose the members of city council vote on the proposal described above by secret ballot. All of them intend to vote against the proposal, but one council member mistakenly marks the wrong box on the ballot. This council member's ballot is counted as a vote for the proposal; however, the overall vote defeats the proposal, and the ground water is subsequently contaminated. Arguing that the council members voting against the proposal are collec­ tively responsible for the contamination of the water and that the one council member casting a favorable vote is not a member of this collective is not rea­ sonable. This member 's intent is to vote the same as the others, this member is in favor of risking the contamination of the ground water, and the only sensible moral verdict is that, if the others belong to a collective which is responsible for the contamination, this council member should be counted as a member of this collective. In a court of law this council member may be found innocent of charges of having acted in reckless disregard of the community's safety, but from a moral perspective judging that this member is more innocent than any other council member would be a mistake. Third, in certain cases some members of a group contribute causally to a

Collective Responsibility

29

good result, knowing that they are risking a harm whose likelihood of occur­ rence is considerable, while other members offer encouragement. All of them endorse the idea of taking the risk, but not all of them actually contribute caus­ ally to it. In the end, as before, the risked harm occurs. Suppose now that the city council members are holding an informal ses­ sion prior to the meeting at which they are scheduled to vote concerning the proposal. Present at this session are several administrative aides, all of whom are in favor of taking the risk and all of whom recommend that council mem­ bers vote against the proposal. The council members listen with careful atten­ tion and a short time later vote unanimously to turn down the proposal. If we grant that the council members are collectively responsible for the contamination of the ground water, a strong case can be made that the adminis­ trative aides are to be counted as a part of the same collective. Part of their job description is to advise council members, and in this case they advise risking the contamination of the ground water. While they do not causally contribute to the outcome (which means that no council member votes against the proposal because of this advice), they support those that contribute causally to the out­ come with words of encouragement. Some might not be persuaded by this par­ ticular example, but I believe that cases exist in which the encouraging mem­ bers of the group clearly belong to the collective responsible for recklessness. A fourth type of case differs from these cases in that the non-contributing members offer only silent approval. That is, the members of a group are unani­ mously in favor of risking a harm whose likelihood of occurrence is considerable to bring about a good. To this end some members of the group, acting cooperatively, contribute causally to the good and inadvertently cause the harm to occur. Those who do not take action function as silent but approving onlookers. Can all of the members of the group reasonably be considered members of a collective which bears responsibility for the harm? This case is more con­ troversial than the preceding cases, because the silent onlookers have not taken any sort of action, not even offering words of encouragement, which many would take as necessary conditions for membership. But others would urge that their mere approving presence qualifies them for membership. Suppose that the city council members are meeting with their administrative aides. The aides are known by everyone at the meeting to favor taking the risk, but they remain silent when the council members voice their intention to vote against the recommendation (and thereby vote in favor of taking the risk). Is their silence any different than offering words of approval, and hence should they not be counted as members of the collective in question? Clearly, much room for controversy in these situ­ ations is possible. In this section the issue of collective moral responsibility in situations of group risk taking has been broken down into four types of cases. As in the previous section, three types of cases center around those who do not causally contribute to the inadvertent occurrence of the risked outcome. In some cases

30

A Typology of Collective Actions

failure to contribute causally results from inability to do so, in other cases ver­ bal encouragement substitutes for causal contribution, and in still other cases those who do not causally contribute are silent but approving onlookers. Whether these members of the group ought to be considered members of the collective bearing responsibility for the risked harm is least controversial in the first type of case and increasingly more controversial in the subsequent cases. All of the cases considered in this section can be described as cases of reckless disregard. The moral agents under consideration have an awareness that the risked harm is fairly likely to occur. They are aware that the likelihood - of its occurrence is significant, and yet they take the risk. Those who distinguish between the differing degrees of mens rea, or the de­ gree to which one has a guilty mind in deciding what actions to perform, point out that an important difference exists between acting recklessly and acting negligently. An agent acts recklessly when, among other things, the risked outcome is known to be fairly likely. But as the known likelihood of its occurrence diminishes to a small likelihood, saying that one is acting negligently becomes increasingly appropriate. In addition, those who act recklessly tend to be more attentive or heedful to the possibility of its occurrence than those who act negligently. Four more categories could be added to those already enumerated by consid­ ering cases in which an entire group of people is in favor of risking a harm whose likelihood of occurrence is fairly small in order to attain a desired good outcome. In the first group of cases everyone contributes causally to this outcome, in the second group of cases everyone attempts to do so but some do not succeed, in the third group of cases some offer encouragement, and in the fourth group of cases some are silent onlookers. The question then is whether the members of this group constitute a collective responsible for the harm, assuming it occurs. Here I will not engage in a detailed discussion of these cases. But I be­ lieve that whether collective responsibility exists in many cases of this type is controversial, even where each member of the group causally contributes to the outcome. For a good deal of what people do involves taking small risks of one sort or another, and often people have little choice but to take such risks. How­ ever, on some occasions collective negligence leads to collective responsibility, and when it does we can raise the same questions as those above concerning the status of those who do not contribute causally. I next consider cases in which collectives come to bear responsibility by their omitting to take action. Thus far all of the cases considered have involved situations in which harm has been caused by people acting in groups. By con­ trast, the cases considered in this section will involve situations in which people in groups have the opportunity to prevent harm from occurring. The central question, then, is whether and under which circumstances collectives can be held responsible for failing to prevent harm from occurring. (A related question is whether they can be judged responsible for the harm itself which is due to their inaction. Here I shall concentrate on the less difficult question of whether

Collective Responsibility

31

they can be judged responsible for failing to prevent the harm). First, in some cases all of the members of a group are aware that a harm will occur if they do nothing to prevent it and that they can prevent it by taking collective action, but they are unanimous in intending not to take action to prevent it. For example, two people are fighting in the parking lot behind a tavern. One person is losing so badly that it is obvious to the bystanders that this person will be critically injured or even killed if the fight is not broken up. The other fighter will gladly stop fighting if those watching indicate that they have seen enough. The bystanders, however, do not do so because they wish to see more fighting. Ascribing collective responsibility to the bystanders for not preventing harm to the person who is seriously injured is reasonable. They know that the fight will stop as soon as they indicate that they have seen enough, they know that they can prevent serious injury to the p�rson who is losing by indicating that they have seen enough, and yet they willfully refrain from doing so. This case is a paradigm instance of collective inaction which is morally deplorable. Of course, the person directly causing· injury to the other is behaving in a mor­ ally deplorable way, but this fact provides no reason to judge the omission of the collective consisting of the onlookers any less severely. In the preceding sections much of the discussion centered around the con­ cept of causally contributing to harm. Some might be inclined to apply the same concept to cases of omitting to prevent harm, but I believe that speaking of causal contributions in this context is stretching the concept too far. That a causal connection is present between an omission and a harm which could be pre­ vented is not at all clear. Instead, I shall speak of this connection simply as contributing. An omission does not contribute causally to a preventable harm, but an omission can in some cases contribute to a preventable harm. Thus, in the example of the onlookers watching the fight, they can in some sense be said to contribute to the severe injury of one of the fighters by their omitting to indicate that they have seen enough. Second, cases exist in which the members of a group know they are in a position to prevent a harm if they act cooperatively, their unanimous intent is not to prevent the harm, and some of the members fail in their intent to contribute to not preventing it. Imagine that the fighter in the previous example who is inflicting injury upon the other continues to look at the onlookers to see whether they are indicating that they have seen enough fighting. This fighter believes all of the on­ lookers are on one side of the parking lot, but this is not the case. Like the onlookers who are seen, however, those on the other side wish to see more fighting. Hence, even if the fighter were to look at them, nothing would be changed. Here we can say that some of the onlookers contribute to the outcome and others do not. Those the fighter does not see are not in a position to indicate whether or not they have seen enough. Nevertheless, their intent is the same as the other onlookers, and hence judging that the collective responsible for not preventing the harm includes only the onlookers whom the fighter sees is not reasonable. Failing to

32

A Typology of Collective Actions

contribute to the non-prevention of hann does not exempt a person from member­ ship in a collective responsible for its non-prevention. In a third type of case some members of a group are in a position to pre­ vent a harm through their cooperative action, and their intent is not to prevent it. Other members of the group are not in a position to prevent the harm, but, because they share with the others a desire not to see the harm prevented, they encourage those in a position to prevent the hann not to do so. Suppose that one person in a fight is losing badly and becoming severely injured; but this time the fight is between two children, and the fight can be - stopped only by actively intervening. Two or three of the adult onlookers could easily put a stop to the fight, but none of the adult onlookers wish to see the fight stopped. Several of the adult onlookers have physical disabilities which would prevent their intervening. But they too wish to see the fight continue, and they encourage the onlookers who are able-bodied not to intervene. In cases of this type some might be inclined to restrict membership of the collective responsible for not preventing hann to those who are actually ca­ pable of preventing it. Thus, some might feel that the adults with physical dis­ abilities are not members of the collective responsible for not breaking up the fight, for they are unable to break up the fight. However, a case can be made that their words of encouragement contribute to the non-intervention of the oth­ ers, and hence that they are no less a part of the collective than their able-bodied counterparts. Thus, we can plausibly say that encouraging others not to prevent a hann can under certain conditions render one part of the same collective re­ sponsible for not preventing it as those who really are in a position to prevent it. Fourth are cases like those just discussed, except that those who are not in a position to prevent the harm remain silent. Thus, in the example of the adult onlookers who refrain from breaking up the fight, suppose that the onlookers with physical disabilities simply remain silent. They are not in a position to break up the fight, they are in fact hopeful to see the fight continue, but they do not say anything to indicate their approval. Here people's intuitions about the status of these silent onlookers may vary a great deal. On the one hand, the onlookers with physical disabilities are not in a position to break up the fight, and they do not in any way contribute to the continuation of the fight. This would support the judgment that their moral status is quite different from the other onlookers. On the other hand, they could encourage the able-bodied onlookers to break it up, but, of course, they don't because they wish to see it continue. As will be evident in subsequent stages of the discussion, many would take this fact to be adequate reason for judging that these onlookers are to be considered members of the collective responsible for not breaking up the fight. Cases of this type are fairly common in human life, and much debate about those who simply stand by and watch others commit evil acts can be found in the literature. Several existentialist writers have been motivated to

Collective Responsibility

33

write on collective responsibility precisely because of the feeling that some­ thing was deeply wrong about the silence of the German people in reaction to the atrocities committed by the Nazis. These writers are convinced that silence such as this is grounds for judging that vast numbers of the German people form a collective responsible for not at least voicing their disapproval. (Their reasons for holding this position will be looked at in a later chapter). So far the consideration of cases in which groups have omitted to prevent harms from occurring has been confined to cases in which the members of these groups have intentionally omitted to prevent these harms from occurring. (This does not mean that their intent is that the harms occur, for one can intend not to prevent a harm without intending that the harm occur). However, groups are fre­ quently in a position to prevent harms from occurring and allow the harms to occur, though their intent is not to allow the harms to occur. This is precisely what happens when a group risks the occurrence of a harm whose occurrence is seen as possible. Earlier risk was discussed in cases where agents in groups decide to pur­ sue certain courses of action, and a distinction was introduced between the reck­ less taking of risks and the negligent taking of risks. Here too we can distin­ guish between cases in which groups neglect to prevent harms recklessly and negligently. And each of these cases can be broken down into cases where all members of the group contribute to the risk taking, where some of the members try unsuccessfully to contribute, where some encourage others who are in a position to contribute to do so, and where some who are not in a position to contribute are silent but approving onlookers. Although I will not attempt to discuss each of these categories, collective responsibility can be present in cases where groups, through their inaction, reck­ lessly risk the occurrence of harms. Thus, if those involved know that there is a significant likelihood that a harm will result if nothing is done to prevent it, and people who are in a position to do so refrain from doing so, then they can be collec­ tively responsible for not preventing it (assuming that it occurs). Moreover, depend­ ing upon the circumstances, the same can be true of those who unsuccessfully at­ tempt to contribute to the risk taking, those who encourage others to take the risks, and those who approvingly look on while others take risks. The main types of cases enumerated up to this point are the following. First, situations where the members of a group unanimously intend to contribute causally to a harm. Second, situations where the members of a group unanimously intend to risk a harm. Third, situations where the members of a group unanimously intend not to prevent the occurrence of a harm. And fourth, situations where members of a group risk a harm by their unanimously intending not to prevent it. What all of these situations have in common is unanimity of intent on the part of those in the group. These situations are sometimes described in the literature as a group of people having one mind, and having one mind is what some theorists believe makes possible speaking of groups and collectives as having the capability to act. But in real life people in groups do not always see things the same way, and

34

A Typology of Collective Actions

hence they do not always have unanimity of intent. Thus, situations exist in which some members of a group intend to contribute causally to a harm and others do not, and situations exist in which some members of a group, but not others, intend to pursue a course of action which risks the occurrence of a harm. Can collective responsibility exist in situations where there is no unanimity of intent on the part of those in the collective? Consider an example in which the members of a club approve a new policy not to admit members of certain racial minorities. Several members of the club are outspokenly racist, and they mount an aggressive campaign to have the policy approved by all of the club's members. When the time comes to take a formal vote the measure is approved overwhelm­ ingly, but the members of the club who vote in favor of it are not of one mind. Some vote in favor of it because their intent is to have a policy which will discriminate against minorities, but a few of the newer members vote in favor of it because they do not wish to be regarded by the elite and established members as naysayers or trouble-makers. They want to be known as cooperative team players. The question of deciding who belongs to the collective responsible for the new policy does not seem particularly hard: those who vote in favor of the new policy. Some members vote in favor of the new policy because they intend to discriminate against new members and others vote in favor of the new policy for other reasons, but seeing why any of them should not be judged members of the collective responsible for the new policy is difficult. Things would be dif­ ferent if some members vote in favor of the policy because they are threatened with bodily harm by those initiating the new policy. But assuming that everyone's vote is exercised freely, all are members of the collective responsible for the new policy in favor of which all vote affirmatively. This example shows that unanimity of intent is not a necessary condition for collective moral responsibility. Hence, the taxonomy developed in the pre­ ceding sections of this chapter needs to be expanded to include situations in which members of the relevant groups are not of one mind. Although the para­ digm cases of collective responsibility are perhaps those in which unanimity of intent is present, a taxonomy of cases which does justice to a real life situations must include mixed cases of the sort presented in the example of the club voting for a new policy. Naturally, many cases of the mixed variety exist in which the collective re­ sponsible for a harm fails to include all members of the group in question. Some­ times differences in what various members intend will end up allowing some to escape membership in the collective responsible for a harm. All of this is dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case. Drawing up a set of general guide­ lines for when differences in intent make a corresponding difference in assigning responsibility and when it does not is perhaps impossible. But clearly these mixed cases enter into the overall picture of collective responsibility.

Four THE CASE AGAINST COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY Probably no philosopher is better known as an opponent of collective responsibility than H.D. Lewis. His classic 1948 article, "Collective Responsibility," is a searing attack on the doctrine that collectives or groups of people can incur responsibility. He argues that responsibility can be incurred by individuals, but under no circum­ stances can it be incurred by groups of individuals. Responsibility, he says, belongs essentially to the individual. The position Lewis defends is based upon a principle which he regards as a certainty, the principle that no one can be responsible, in the properly ethical sense, for the conduct of another. Each of us is responsible for our own conduct, but never is one person morally responsible for the conduct of another. Lewis states that if he were asked to put forward an ethical principle of particular certainty, it would be this principle (Lewis, 1948, p. 3). No one is ever ethically responsible for the conduct of another. Lewis does not explain precisely how this principle serves as a basis for the contention that coilective responsibility cannot exist, but perhaps the basic idea is roughly this. If I am a member of a collective which is responsible for a harm, then presumably various of us in the collective have performed actions which in some sense lead to this harm. Suppose several of us are throwing stones at someone, and none of the stones thrown by me hits the victim. Then to say that I am a member of the collective responsible for the victim's injury suggests that I am somehow responsible for the throwing of stones by other persons. But Lewis believes that I do not bear responsibility for actions per­ formed by others, and on this basis he would judge that I am not a member of a coilective bearing responsibility for the victim's injury. Lewis does not assert that the doctrine that people cannot bear responsibility for the actions of others logically entails that collective responsibility cannot exist. But people some­ times argue that because a group is coilectively responsible for a harm, each member is thereby responsible for the series of events leading to the harm. And the strategy Lewis employs is to argue from the falsity of this conclusion to the falsity of the doctrine that there can be such a thing as collective responsibility. Lewis is frequently quoted as describing collective or group responsibil­ ity as a notion which is "barbarous." In his opinion the notion reflects attitudes common among primitive peoples. Among primitive peoples, Lewis observes, little heed was paid to the individual. What counted or mattered was the tribal or family unit, and their ethical awareness was tribal in its orientation. Clearly

36

The Case Against Collective Responsibility

an affinity can be found between this "ethic of the tribe" and the doctrine of collective responsibility. According to Lewis, taking note of this affinity should go a long way toward discrediting the notion of collective responsibility. With the realization that by embracing the idea of collective responsibility we are reverting back to primitive ways of thinking, we will presumably have good reason to resist embracing this idea. Critics, however, have challenged Lewis's characterization of these primitive ways of thinking (French, 1984, pp. 112ff.). Also bearing affinity with the idea of collective responsibility are some theological notions. Lewis singles out the belief in "universal sin" and "the collective guilt of man" (Lewis, 1948. p. 4). Those who believe that all people without exception are guilty for the fall into sin by Adam, the first man, are subscribing to a point of view closely allied with collective responsibility. Only with difficulty, says Lewis, can we uphold any kind of traditionalist theology without basing our belief on the idea that we can be implicated in one another's actions. Traditionalist theology, then, has much in common with a tribal or com­ munal ethical orientation. Lewis is advocating a type of ethical awareness far removed from tradi­ tionalist theology. Rather than emphasizing an ethical awareness based upon tribal or communal affiliations, Lewis is advocating an awareness which is based upon the principle that no one can ever be responsible for the actions of another. He admits that people often talk as though one person can be responsible for the conduct of another. Thus, the Prime Minister might announce that he is taking responsibility for the actions of his Chief of Staff. But no one can take moral responsibility for the actions of another. The Prime Minister can take responsibility for the actions of the Chief of Staff in a manner which has certain implications for how he will take leadership for addressing the problems caused by the other 's actions. But to take moral responsibility for the actions of the Chief of Staff is an impossibility, even for the Prime Minister. The situation would be different, Lewis says, if he encouraged the Chief of Staff to engage in some wrongful behavior. But then the Prime Minister would be morally respon­ sible for the outcome by virtue of his own wrongful encouragement. A person cannot ever be morally responsible for the actions of another. Sometimes the law encourages the idea that responsibility can be attached to groups or collectives. In some cases, Lewis notes, sanctions may be imposed upon an entire group without any account taken of the guilt or innocence of its individual members. For the sake of international order sanctions might even be imposed upon an entire nation. In such cases collective responsibility is ac­ cepted as a device for achieving practical ends. But this only serves to show the limitations of national or international systems of justice. Concluding from these cases that the innocent somehow share in the wickedness of the guilty would be foolish. Yet, according to Lewis, practices such as these are put forward in cer­ tain writings on ethics and jurisprudence as showing that conceptions of collec­ tive responsibility have ethical legitimacy. But even the most ardent defenders

Collective Responsibility

37

of collective responsibility must concede that these arguments are fallacious. Once again, moral responsibility belongs essentially to the individual. Lewis is aware that the term "individualism" has many unpleasant connota­ tions. For example, it is sometimes employed to describe the view that individuals have unlimited and inalienable rights, and sometimes it is used to describe the ten­ dency to overlook the dependence of the individual on his or her social environ­ ment. But individualism in these "reprehensible" senses, he says, need not have any connection to the type of ethical individualism which is presently under consid­ eration (Lewis, 1948, p. 17). To say th�t groups or collectives cannot bear moral responsibility is perfectly consistent with the view that an individual's rights are limited by the needs of the group or community or the view that individuals are dependent upon their social environments in many significant ways. Lewis is not endorsing individualism as articulated in views such as these. People have a tendency to revert back to thinking about moral responsibility in communal or tribal terms, and Lewis believes that this is sometimes evident in the way people describe joint undertakings. In a case of burglary there may be people involved in different aspects of the undertaking, and the temptation is to think of the undertaking as a crime for which all the participants are morally respon­ sible. But such an approach ignores the wide differences in the contributions of the different participants. The correct approach, Lewis says, is to think in terms of a multiplicity of crimes. The person who planned the undertaking, the person who provided inside information, the person who aided in the escape, and the person who received the stolen goods all are guilty of crimes. But they are all guilty of different crimes, and hopefully the law will treat them accordingly. To say that all of these individuals are morally responsible for the bur­ glary is to fall back into a tribal mentality in which the acts of individuals are seen as blending into a common course of action for which all involved are held collectively responsible. In a 1972 revision of his original article, Lewis dis­ cusses war crimes and finds this tribal frame of mind pervasive in the way people think about events such as the My Lai Massacre or the atrocities in concentra­ tion camps during World War II (Lewis, 1972, pp. 130ff.). Sliding from think­ ing about the individual responsibility of people such as Lt. Calley or Hitler to the notion of shared or collective responsibility of the American people or the German people is all too easy. Lewis believes that once we slide into this tribal way of thinking we are well on the way to the view that responsibility does not really exist. People begin to ask, for example, how such a thing could happen to such civilized people as the Germans. But this question makes use of the rheto­ ric of victimization rather than action, and a person who is victimized is scarcely a candidate for being a bearer of responsibility. Perhaps the crux of Lewis's case against collective responsibility is that it is one step removed from the view that moral responsibility is not real. Once a group is identified as collectively responsible for a harmful situation, we forget about the individual actions which lead to this situation. The responsibility be-

38

The Case Against Collective Responsibility

comes simply that of the group, regardless of who is in the group and regardless of whether the members of the group perform any actions contributing to the outcome. When the responsibility has been made sufficiently diffuse by con­ ceiving of it in these terms, it becomes easier to ignore. To say that as Ameri­ cans we are all collectively responsible for the atrocities in Vietnam is to as­ cribe a type of responsibility that is remarkably easy to shrug off or treat lightly. Lewis's intent is to protect the integrity of moral responsibility from what he sees as a dangerous erosion of its force as a moral concept, an erosion which results from embracing the notion of collective responsibility. To protect its integrity we must not let ourselves lose sight of the individual and what the individual has done to contribute to a harmful situation. Saying that the person who aided in the escape is partially responsible for the robbery is not enough. Instead, this person is solely responsible for exactly that, aiding in the escape. And each of us is morally responsible for exactly what we do or fail to do as individuals. We are each responsible for our own actions and never the actions of other individuals. Once we take that first step toward the tribal mentality by thinking of ourselves as sharing responsibility for the outcome of a joint ven­ ture, then we are on the way toward undermining the integrity of the concept of responsibility. For this reason we must resist the temptation to revert back to the tribal mentality. Once again, responsibility belongs essentially to the individual, and by now we know that what Lewis means by this dictum is that moral re­ sponsibility belongs exclusively to the individual. In the philosophical literature on shared and collective responsibility the views of Lewis are typically treated as extremist. Few seem willing to hold that responsi­ bility belongs essentially and exclusively with the individual. Vrrtually everyone who writes on the subject seems to agree that at least occasionally individuals can share responsibility for what has happened. In spite of the fact that we live in what Larry May calls an individualistic era, the views of Lewis are perhaps individualis­ tic to a degree beyond what most people find reasonable. Nevertheless, some philosophers agree with Lewis that the notion of collec­ tive responsibility is beset with problems and that some type of individualistic ap­ proach is necessary. Here I focus on a relatively recent contribution by Steven Sverdlik, whose work represents a more sophisticated defense of individualism. While Lewis seeks to promote individualism by taking aim at everything which represents the slightest deviation from it, Sverdlik proposes a theory which recog­ nizes what has been characterized in this discussion as shared responsibility. Examining the debates between the proponents and opponents of collec­ tive responsibility reveals plausible arguments on both sides of the issue. Sverdlik believes that by introducing the distinction between responsibility for states of affairs and responsibility for actions we are in a position to see what is reason­ able about both positions and to design a theory which avoids the most prob­ lematic features of both positions. In the end Sverdlik affirms that in one sense collective responsibility is possible, but not in what he calls the "most interest-

Collective Responsibility

39

ing sense" (Sverdlik, 1987, p. 61). Sverdlik characterizes collective responsibility as the notion that individuals within a group are responsible for an outcome which is produced collectively. He contrasts collective responsibility with corporate responsibility, which he character­ izes as the view that the group is distinct from its members and can itself incur responsibility. According to this usage, each member of a group which is collec­ tively responsible for a state of affairs bears responsibility for this state of affairs. When a group is collectively responsible for the outcome, according to Sverdlik, the responsibility for the entire outcome· is attributed to each member of the group. But where corporate responsibility is present the individual members of the group need not bear responsibility for the state of affairs in question. Sverdlik's use of these terms is different from others who have discussed these issues. The term "corporate responsibility" is often used by people to de­ scribe the type of responsibility that is borne by corporations, and frequently the term "collective responsibility" is used by people to describe what Sverdlik refers to as corporate responsibility. However, nothing of substance depends upon these differences in terminology, and for the purposes of discussing Sverdlik's work I proceed with the warning that he employs the term "collec­ tive responsibility" to describe what I refer to here as shared responsibility. Central to Sverdlik's project is his contention that we can distinguish be­ tween the responsibility a person has for his or her actions and the responsibil­ ity a person bears for the results of these actions. Since those who hold that shared responsibility is possible maintain that several people can simultaneously be responsible for the same outcome, those who hold that people can be respon­ sible only for their actions will reject the notion of shared responsibility. Sverdlik's position is not that people can bear responsibility only for their ac­ tions. However, he argues that bearing responsibility for actions is logically a more fundamental notion than bearing responsibility for results, and from this he goes on to argue that shared responsibility has a limited applicability. To show that responsibility for actions is the more fundamental idea, Sverdlik argues that the way in which people become responsible for outcomes is by per­ forming acts which contribute to the existence of the outcome (and he regards omis­ sions as actions of a certain sort). Thus, he says, a person can be said to be respon­ sible for an outcome only if the person is responsible for acting in a way which at least partially causes the outcome. Elsewhere I have challenged this step of the argument: situations exist in which a person's actions contribute to the outcome in a way which falls short of being a causal contribution and in which the person bears moral responsibility for the outcome (Mellema, 1988, p. 21). However, the point of the argument is to show that responsibility for outcomes is a derivative concept, and this conclusion can be established without insisting that the contribution of the ac­ tions to the outcome is a causal type of contribution. Hence this objection can be ignored for the purposes of the present discussion. Sverdlik believes �at the only way a person can come to bear responsibility

40

The Case Against Collective Responsibility

for an outcome is to bear responsibility for various actions he or she performs. But the reverse is not true. People often bear responsibility for actions in the absence of any corresponding outcome for which they are responsible. As examples he men­ tions dancing and having premarital sex, as well as cases in which people fail to bring about a certain outcome. We can be responsible for having danced, having had premarital sex, or having attempted to kill another person without any outcome or result occurring for which we incur responsibility. In short, bearing responsibility for an outcome depends upon bearing responsibility for various actions, but we can have responsibility for our actions apart from bearing responsibility for any results or outcomes brought about by these actions. Sverdlik next points out that more than one person can intend the same outcome, and hence that several people can perform actions directed to bring­ ing about the same result. When this happens each person is morally respon­ sible for the result as weII as for his or her actions. When several people push a car off a cliff, each is responsible for the destruction of the car. And by parity of reasoning the same is true of coIIective omission. Suppose three passersby no­ tice a person pinned under a heavy beam which they could move through their joint efforts. If they refuse to move the beam because each is intending the victim's death, then they share responsibility for the victim's death (assuming the victim in fact dies as a result of being pinned under the beam). Here we should note that each intends the result. If one member does not intend the result, the situation is changed significantly. If one of the persons pushing a car off a cliff has been ordered to cooperate at gunpoint, and would not otherwise cooperate, then this individual is not responsible for the destruc­ tion of the car, and the persons pushing the car do not aII share responsibility for its destruction. This point is crucial to Sverdlik's argument; it iIIustrates that the principles underlying shared responsibility are no different from those underlying ascriptions of responsibility to individuals. A group does not share responsi­ bility for an outcome if even one of its members is not responsible for the out­ come. Blaming a person for a result he or she did not intend to bring about is unfair, Sverdlik says, and this is true regardless of whether individual actions or joint actions are being considered. Sverdlik acknowledges that this last statement needs to be qualified, since we can incur responsibility for an outcome because we have acted recklessly or with negligence, and sometimes several agents can incur responsibility for an outcome because aII of them have acted recklessly or with negligence. Suppose that in the example of the three passersby who notice a victim pinned beneath a beam the three do not actuaIIy intend the victim's death. Instead, suppose that they continue walking in reckless disregard of the victim's dying. The three surely share responsibility for the victim's death, or at least for not preventing the victim's death. Each passerby is responsible for this state of affairs because each is acting recklessly, and hence they share responsibility for this state of affairs. But Sverdlik stresses that here too the principles underlying the coIIec-

Collective Responsibility

41

tive responsibility of the passersby are no different from those involved in ex­ plaining the responsibility incurred by each individually. To highlight this point Sverdlik imagines a further modification of the ex­ ample. Suppose that only two of the three passersby continue walking by in reckless disregard of the victims, while the third passerby is absorbed in reading a book or looking for a cab and does not see the victim pinned under the beam. In this scenario the three passersby do not share responsibility for not coming to the victim's aid, and the reason is that one of the three is not responsible for this state of affairs. According to Sverdlik, recklessness rests upon individualistic assumptions. A group does not share responsibility on the basis of reckless disregard if a member does not act in reckless disregard. Again, to see whether there is shared responsibility for a state of affairs, we need only look to see whether the individuals are each respon­ sible for it. A similar strategy shows that the same is true of negligence. Analyzing cases in which a group shares responsibility for an outcome because each of its members is negligent shows that nothing about their responsibility cannot be ex­ plained in terms of the responsibility of each of its members. Here too, Sverdlik contends, no factor is introduced in assessing moral responsibility that involves abandoning individualistic premises. To summarize, Sverdlik is willing to grant that shared responsibility is pos­ sible. In this respect he grants more than H.D. Lewis. But he maintains that indi­ viduals come to be responsible for a result by performing actions for which they are responsible which lead up to the result. In some cases these actions are omissions. Individuals become responsible for the outcome in several ways. These include contributing causally to the outcome, acting with the intent of bringing about the outcome, or acting recklessly or negligently with respect to the outcome. But in each of these ways Sverdlik finds no need to abandon individualistic premisses. Their responsibility is nothing over and above the responsibility incurred by the individual members of the group, and hence nothing can be learned about the re­ sponsibility of the group which cannot be learned from analyzing the manner in which each member comes to bear responsibility for the outcome. Another way to characterize Sverdlik's views is to say that if shared responsi­ bility for an outcome is present, then no member of the group exists who doesn't either contribute causally to it, act with the intent of bringing it about, or act reck­ lessly or negligently with respect to it. Sverdlik does not discuss cases in which different members come to bear responsibility for the outcome through a mixture of these avenues, but presumably the view he defends can acknowledge that here too shared responsibility for the outcome is possible. What his view does not tolerate is a case in which one or more members of a group which share responsibility for an outcome neither contribute causally to it, act with the intent of bringing it about, nor act recklessly or negligently with respect to it. Although he is willing to grant that a view of collective responsibility which acknowledges such cases is intelligible, Sverdlik believes it is false. No cases of this kind have convinced him that the boundaries of shared or group responsibility need to be extended any further than

42

The Case Against Collective Responsibility

his theory allows. In all cases of this kind judging that the group as a whole is responsible for the result would be unfair to the members who have not contributed to the outcome. Naturally, we could attempt to identify a sub-group which shares responsibility for the outcome. And for Sverdlik the members of this smaller group would have to be responsible for actions contributing to the result. But the larger group which includes persons not individually responsible for the outcome is no longer a suitable candidate for shared responsibility. The theory proposed by H.D. Lewis has been an easy target for those who defend the concept of collective responsibility. Only those with the most ex­ treme individualistic intuitions would deny that those pushing the car off the cliff, in some very real sense, share responsibility for the destruction of the car. To argue in this case that several crimes are being committed by several people, and not one crime being committed by several people, seems implausible. The same is true of many instances of group omission. The three passersby who refuse to help the victim pinned beneath the beam are each responsible for fail­ ing to prevent the victim's death. Lewis's approach does not allow one to iden­ tify one state of affairs for which all three are responsible. No doubt Lewis's position would seem much less controversial in a case where any one of the passersby could free the victim singlehandedly. But, in Sverdlik's example, de­ nying that the three are responsible for a common state of affairs is implausible. Sverdlik shares with Lewis some of the same individualistic intuitions about moral responsibility, but many of the counter-intuitive consequences of Lewis's approach are avoided. Although individual responsibility is the funda­ mental notion in Sverdlik's system, he recognizes shared responsibility in hu­ man life. In some situations different people are responsible for the same out­ come, and he designs a theory which makes sense of this idea without abandon­ ing what he calls his individualistic premises. As a result, criticizing Sverdlik's position is more difficult than criticiz­ ing the position of Lewis. Refuting Sverdlik's position requires identifying a situation in which a collective is responsible for an outcome while one of its members fails to be responsible for the same outcome. Sverdlik is convinced that no such situations exist, and identifying a clear counter-example to his theory is not as straightforward as his critics might initially suppose. This point can be illustrated by the following attempt to construct such a case. Suppose that instead of pushing a car off a cliff, several people are throw­ ing the pieces from someone's art collection over the cliff. We might claim that each person is responsible for the piece he or she threw but not for the pieces thrown by others and yet claim that the group is collectively responsible for the destruction of the art collection. Would this be a case in which a group is col­ lectively responsible for an outcome, the destruction of the entire art collection for which none of its members bears individual responsibility? Would this con� stitute a counter-example to Sverdlik's view? Sverdlik could reply that one of two things must be true: either the people

Collective Responsibility

43

are acting as a unity or they are not. Imagine that the people are acting with one mind to dispose of the art collection, and the members pitch in to accomplish the task as expediently as possible. Then the case is little different from pushing the car over the cliff: each is responsible for the outcome, and hence they share responsibility for the outcome. On the other hand, imagine that the people are not acting as a unity. Suppose that each person desires to destroy only one par­ ticular work of art and does so with the desire that the other works of art not be destroyed. The outcome is that all of the works are destroyed by different people, and they are all unhappy that the entire' collection is destroyed. Each wants only one piece destroyed. In this case saying that each person is responsible only for the destruction of one work of art is plausible. But saying that the people are collectively responsible for the destruction of the art collection is not plausible. The people are not acting as a collective; indeed, each one is unhappy with the involvement and causal contribution of the others. Each is responsible for the destruction of one work of art, and judging that each is a member of a collective responsible for destroying the entire lot would be unfair. Hence we have not yet constructed a case in which a collective, but not its members, bears moral re­ sponsibility for a state of affairs. Thus far Sverdlik's theory appears safe from refutation. However, de­ fenders of a more robust type of collective responsibility might point out that in cases of omission an individualist approach to collective responsibility will prove inadequate. For in many cases the failure of a group to take action may arguably render the group responsible for the resulting harm, even though no individual member of the group can reasonably be judged responsible for the harm. While Sverdlik's theory seems to yield the correct verdict in the case of the three pass­ ersby who allow the victim to die due to their reckless disregard, in other cases of group omission an individualist approach is not clearly satisfactory. Suppose that during an earthquake someone is trapped under a beam in a large auditorium while several hundred people seated in the auditorium look on in horror. Any one of the people could move the beam and free the victim, but no one goes to the trouble of doing so, at least not until several moments go by. Because of this inaction the victim suffers a far more serious injury than other­ wise. Had someone jumped to the rescue at once, the injury suffered would have been significantly less serious. Here we may reasonably claim that the collective is responsible for the result; the people seated in the auditorium are collectively responsible for sitting by and failing to free the victim and hence are responsible for the outcome. But are all of these people individually respon­ sible for the outcome? People who must climb over many others to get to an aisle will no doubt form expectations that those seated nearby the victim or nearby an aisle will be the prime candidates for taking action, and these expec­ tations seem reasonable. Hence these people, at least, do not bear individual responsibility; the most that can be said of them is that they are a part of a very large collective which bears responsibility for the outcome.

44

The Case Against Collective Responsibility

Nevertheless, a defender of the individualist approach will be less than con­ vinced by this example. Those who are not seated near an aisle might not bear responsibility for the outcome, but that would suggest to the individualist that these people are not a part of the collective which is responsible. The collective does not consist of everyone seated in the auditorium; as the example illustrates, significant differences exist among those in the auditorium as far as their proximity to the victim, the amount of trouble required to get to the victim, and so forth, and, to the individualist, thinking of the collective as a smaller sub-group of those seated is more logical. This sub-group will consist of those who are individually responsible. Those closest to the victim are those who should have acted and are consequently those most sensible to judge as morally responsible, presumably on the grounds of reckless disregard or negligence. Determining exactly which of the people are in­ cluded in this sub-group is difficult. But to the individualist the important point is that the collective responsible for the outcome consists of all and only those indi­ viduals who bear responsibility. Much more could be said about this example, such as responsibility for states of affairs other than the outcome. In cases of group omission people are frequently judged responsible for the failure to organize or cooperate with oth­ ers or alert others of impending dangers, even when they are not responsible for the result itself. Thus, we could argue that even those seated between the aisles and surrounded by others should have done something, such as exhort a person seated near the victim to offer help; instead, everyone looks on in stunned si­ lence for several moments, and no immediate help is offered. They may not bear responsibility for the victim's injury, but they are perhaps responsible for not having done anything. This point will come up in several subsequent points of the discussion. A person who fails to be responsible for a result can still be responsible for not doing something designed to make its occurrence less likely. The basic intuition underlying the individualist's program is that collec­ tive responsibility extends no further than individual responsibility. Where no individual responsibility is present, no collective responsibility is present. For both Lewis and Sverdlik this intuition is closely connected with a strong feeling that we cannot fairly judge someone responsible for what happens simply be­ cause of what others do or fail to do. Whichever people seated in the auditorium are responsible for the result are precisely the people collectively responsible for the result. And designing scenarios which serve as convincing counter-ex­ amples to this thesis is very difficult. Nevertheless, this thesis about collective responsibility is deeply dissatis­ fying to many. As many see it, reducing the concept of collective responsibility to something which is no more than a shared responsibility for the same state of affairs does not begin to do justice to the complexities of human life, human interrelationships, and the demands which morality places upon us with respect to these interrelationships. For a variety of reasons people come to be caught up in the net of collective responsibility, and these reasons are not always neatly

Collective Responsibility

45

reducible to the reasons that people come to bear responsibility as individuals. The view of many people is that the whole point of having a concept of collective responsibility is to be able to make ascriptions of responsibility which cannot be made with the limited resources of the individualist. According to this point of view, insisting that collective responsibility is nothing more than the shared responsibility of several persons leaves us with an impoverished view of the expectations or demands of morality as they apply to our dealings with others. While judging a person responsible for what another has done or failed to do is ordinarily unfair, Lewis is mistaken to think that this is what happens when a person is judged to belongs to a collective which is responsible for a state of affairs. To say that a person belongs to such a collective is not to hold him or her responsible for any state of affairs, but only to say that this person together with others bears a certain responsibi!ity for what has happened. In the next chapter I examine the views of those who support a more robust view of collective responsibility and inquire how they think a collective can bear responsibility for a result in' a way that one or more of its members does not bear responsibility for it. These include D.E. Cooper, Virginia Held, Stanley Bates, Peter French, and Richard Swinburne. Following that, I will dis­ cuss a still more robust view which is defended by Larry May in the tradition of existentialist writers.

Five

THE CASE FOR COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY In an article entitled, "Individual, Collective, and Social Responsibility," H. Gomperz discusses the notion of collective responsibility as it has been conceived during various periods of history (Gomperz, 1939, pp. 329 ff.). For the Old Testament Hebrews, he claims, it is illustrated in the conviction that people are responsible for the sins of their ancestors three or four generations removed and that whole nations must suffer for the conduct of their king. In the New Testament it is illustrated through such teachings as that all have sinned in Adam. And in the Middle Ages it is manifested in the practice of clan or tribal revenge. These practices and teachings are often ridiculed by contemporary thinkers as primitive, barbaric, or archaic, and many contemporary thinkers suggest that the notion of collective responsibility be discarded or, as Sverdlik has done, limited to a system based upon individualist premisses. But Gomperz warns against thinking about collective responsibility as the view we are left with when we revert back to primitive or barbaric ways of thinking about responsibility. The teachings of some religious traditions make us feel that collective responsibility is merely an archaic survival from past periods of history, he says, but that does not prove that collective responsibility should be considered unreasonable. The fact that cruel or barbaric practices are carried out as an expression of a culture's conception of responsibility as col­ lective in nature does not imply that collective responsibility is impossible or unreasonable. To some extent collective responsibility has to be recognized as a postulate of reason and of justice; those individualists who stress that people can be held responsible only for individual conduct are mistaken. Gomperz believes that instead of following the advice of the individualists, modem thinkers should reconsider the role of responsibility in group situations and determine to what extent it can legitimately be employed in our thinking about morality. Although Gomperz does not spell out how collective responsibility can be employed in our thinking about morality, his article seems to have inspired others to do so. In this chapter I show how some writers have attempted to articulate a de­ fense of collective responsibility which both rejects individualist assumptions and which takes seriously the advice of Gomperz with regard to avoiding problematic primitive or barbaric ideas. Considering their views is important in part because the view I develop in subsequent chapters is based upon a stance which forms a com­ mon theme in all of the writers considered here: that undistributed collective moral responsibility is possible. I begin by considering the views of D.E. Cooper.

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The Case for Collective Responsibility

Cooper's defense of collective responsibility starts with an argument against Methodological Individualism, the doctrine that statements about the responsibility of collectives are synonymous with, or at least can be deduced from, statements about the responsibility of individuals. Cooper grants that state­ ments about the responsibility of collectives may tum out to be deducible from statements about the individual members of the collective (and he is far from certain that this is the true). But even if this turns out to be true, he argues, no guarantee exists that statements about the responsibility of collectives can be deduced from statements about the responsibility of individuals. Thus, even if we can deduce the proposition that a collective is responsible from a detailed enough description of the behavior, attitudes, and dispositions of its members, we have not thereby shown that the proposition can be deduced from ascrip­ tions of responsibility to these members. Cooper acknowledges the practice of ascribing responsibility to collec­ tives over and above the practice of ascribing responsibility to individuals. No reason can be found to think that ascriptions of collective responsibility can be reduced to ascriptions of individual responsibilities. "It cannot be so reduced," he says, "just as the description of the stew as delicious cannot be reduced to descriptions of each ingredient as delicious" (Cooper, 1 968, p. 262). Cooper's view is that we can ascribe responsibility to a collective for what happens without implying that any of its members are responsible for it. His now famous example is of a tennis club which closes because over the course of time its membership has lost its esprit de corps, its natural convivial­ ity, and its communal feeling. The closure of the club is regrettable, but in no way do we attribute it to or blame it on the actions of its members, nor even on the negligence of its members. According to Cooper, the club is responsible for its own closure, and we cannot fairly judge that any of its individual members are responsible for the closure. As Cooper describes the example, none of them can do anything to prevent its occurrence. In a reply to Cooper's article, R.S. Downie takes issue with Cooper's conten­ tion that the tennis club example is one in which a collective bears moral responsi­ bility for a result for which none of its members bears individual responsibility. The tennis club may well be responsible for its lack of esprit de corps under the circum­ stances described by Cooper. Likewise, none of this responsibility might rightly be ascribed to any of the members of the tennis club. However, Downie emphasizes that lack of esprit de corps is not a moral fault. Thus, while the collective may be responsible for lacking it, the collective is not morally responsible for lacking it, and Cooper has failed to show that moral responsibility for a result can be borne by a collective but not by any of its members. Downie distinguishes causal responsibility from moral responsibility. Cooper's example shows that causal responsibility can be non-distributive. A collective can be causally responsible for a result, even though not all or none of its members is causally responsible for the result. But whether there can be

Collective Responsibility

49

cases of non-distributive moral responsibility is a much different question. This would be "exciting" if it were so, Downie says, but his belief is that it is not (Downie, 1969, p. 66). The moral responsibilities of a collective invariably stem from the moral decisions of individuals, and his view is that the moral responsi­ bilities of a collective are analyzable in terms of individual responsibilities. The manner in which the moral responsibilities of a collective are analyzable in terms of individual responsibilities is complex and requires us to look in detail at the roles played by the various members. But Downie concludes that Cooper's project can succeed only when limited'to a consideration of causal responsibil­ ity. As a thesis about moral responsibility, it is false. Perhaps the example of the tennis club lies outside the scope of what can reasonably be described as collective moral responsibility, for nothing of a moral nature is at stake in the survival of the club. But, in Cooper's defense, other examples are more persuasive as alleged instances of undistributed collective moral responsibility. Suppose the institution which closes performs services of a humanitarian nature, one without which many poor or destitute people would suffer harm. In such a case the collective responsibility is moral, and Downie's objection would arguably be circumvented. Clearly, the issue is open to further discussion. In what is perhaps the most frequently cited article on the topic of collec­ tive responsibility, "Can A Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Re­ sponsible?", Virginia Held argues that random groups of individuals can under certain circumstances come to bear moral responsibility (Held, 1970, pp. 471481 ). Because earlier writers had confined themselves to discussions of orga­ nized collectives with clearly identifiable members and carefully prescribed decision methods, Reid's thesis struck many as bold and provocative. To most people random, unorganized groups of people do not seem capable of bearing moral responsibility as genuine collectives. Nevertheless, in this article Held presents a persuasive argument to show otherwise. In her first example seven people are riding in a subway car. They are unacquainted with one another and seated separately from one another. All at once the second smallest passenger begins to strangle the smallest of the pas­ sengers. Although the other five passengers constitute an entirely random group of people, Held argues that they nevertheless have a moral responsibility to take action. Suppose they take no action and at the end of ten minutes the victim is dead. Then, according to Held, we would certainly hold the random collective responsible as a group for its failure to act. She does not claim that we would hold the group responsible for the victim's death, but we would hold the group responsible for having done nothing to prevent it. While the group has no prior organization or methods of procedure and thereby fails to qualify as an orga­ nized collective, we may reasonably expect the group to take action. Held defends this point by saying that what they should do is obvious to the other passengers. When the actions which should be performed to prevent harm is

50

The Case for Collective Responsibility

obvious to a group of reasonable people, then we can potentially hold them respon­ sible for not taking these particular actions. Whether the group is random or orga­ nized makes no difference. In this example the fact that the strangler should be subdued is obvious to the passengers, and the failure to take actions which would subdue the strangler renders the group responsible for not acting. Her second example involves five persons in a train compartment. One of them is a doctor who leaves the compartment. While he is gone another passen­ ger begins to have convulsions, lurches against a door to the outside, falls out of the door and is killed. W hen the doctor returns and is told what has happened, he admonishes the others for not having held the man down and administering a particular medicine from the satchel he left on his seat. In this case should we say the same as in the first case? Should we say that the three remaining passengers are collectively responsible for failing to act so as to prevent the man's death? Held answers in the negative. This case and the preceding case are significantly different. In the case of the passengers on the subway car what they ought to do is obvious to the passengers, but the same is not true in the present case. That a certain medicine is capable of bringing the convulsions under control is obvious to the doctor, and the doctor judges that this fact ought to be obvious to the others as well. However, Held believes that the judgment of the doctor is mistaken. The action called for is not obvious to the reasonable person, and this is the criterion Held claims ought to be applied to determine whether a random collective bears responsibility for not taking action. In this case it does not. Held's third and last example is the case, discussed by Sverdlik, of the three passersby who notice a man pinned beneath various beams of a collapsed house. In Held's version of this case the three cannot agree on a course of ac­ tion. Three beams must be moved, and moving any one requires the efforts of all three passersby. Each of the three insists upon moving a different beam. W hile they argue the victim bleeds to death. Applying Held's criterion, we might ask whether the action called for is obvious to the reasonable person. Held's position is that it is not; just as in the second scenario, no course of action is obvious to the reasonable person. Hence we cannot rightly judge that the three passersby are responsible for not having saved the man's life. To some this position might appear too lenient and allow them to escape responsibility too easily. However, Held goes on to say that although they are not responsible for failing to save the man's life, they are responsible for some­ thing else. They are responsible for not having adopted a decision method which would have allowed them to take action. Instead of each stubbornly insisting that the others follow a certain course of action, they should have cooperated with one another in deciding upon a common course of action. In other words, they should have transformed themselves into an organized collective. Thus, even if a random collective fails to prevent a great harm because what actions

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should be taken i s not obvious to the reasonable person, the group may bear responsibi lity for not organizing itself properly. Having now demonstrated that random collectives are capable of bearing responsibility, Held next states a principle about the responsibility of random col­ lectives. If a random collective is responsible for failing to act in a certain manner, then each member of the collective bears responsibility (although perhaps to vary­ ing degrees) for not having acted in this manner. The responsibility of a random collective distributes to all of its members, unlike an organized collective. When an organized collective bears responsibility for not having acted, one or more of its members may fail to bear responsibility for not having acted. Held does not explain why this principle is true, but perhaps the underly­ ing idea is that in a random group very little ground can be found for distin­ guishing among the members as to who does and who does not bear responsi­ bility. The passengers in a subway car or train compartment might be respon­ sible for failing to take action, but sufficient grounds do not exist for assigning individual responsibility to some but not others. Responsibility should either be assigned to all or to none (hopefully, Held would make allowances for people in the group who are unable to act or who are coerced to inaction by others). Held believes that responsibility should be assigned to all if the random collective is itself responsible. If the collective consisting of the passengers in the subway car is responsible for failing to overpower the strangler, then responsibility should be assigned to every member of the collective. If the responsibility of a random collective is distributive, as Held alleges, then analyzing this collective respon­ sibility with the tools provided by the individualist is possible. We need not go beyond what Sverdlik calls individualistic premisses. Nevertheless, Held believes an organized collective can bear responsibil­ ity in a way that some of its members do not individually bear responsibility, and here Held parts ways with the individualist. She does not present any ex­ amples of this phenomenon in the article under consideration, but in a later article, "Corporations, Persons, and Responsibility," she makes clear that cor­ porations are frequently responsible for what they have done or failed to do (Held, 1 986, pp. 1 6 1 - 1 8 1 ). And because persons within corporations can fail to bear individual responsibility for what corporations have done, Held's position goes beyond what the individualist will acknowledge. On her view a type of collective responsibility exists which is non-distributive. In a later chapter the responsibility borne by corporations will be examined in more detail. For now the point to be stressed is that they are organized collectives, not random collectives, and in the opinion of Held they are capable of bearing responsibility. Because they are organized collectives, the responsibility they bear is non-distributive. Individual members of the collective need not bear responsibil­ ity for the state of affairs for which the collective is responsible. Stanley Bates 's article, "The Responsibility of Random Collections," is a response to Held's article. He begins by agreeing that she has correctly diag-

52

The Case for Collective Responsibility

nosed the examples she presents. But Bates believes that the range of Held's examples is quite restricted, and he attempts to carry her inquiry a bit further. First, Bates believes that Held is mistaken to think that the moral respon­ sibility borne by a random collective is invariably distributive. He envisions a case in which ten people without access to a telephone are witnessing an attack on a woman by an armed criminal. One of the ten offers to attempt to save the woman if one or two others will accompany him. Everyone else refuses, and the attack on the woman is not prevented. Bates maintains that the random collective consisting of the ten is respon­ sible for not acting, but the man who attempts to organize a group to rescue the woman is not responsible for not acting. Hence Bates holds that this is an ex­ ample of non-distributive collective responsibility. He observes that we could save Held 's thesis by identifying the random collective as consisting of the other nine; we could then say that the responsibility of this smaller random collective is distributive. But such a move strikes Bates as "completely arbitrary and ad hoc" (Bates, 1971, p. 347). He then considers random collectives on a larger scale, such as the audi­ ence for a cockfight, the people involved in a lynch mob, and white Americans. Concerning the first two of these examples, Bates finds that Held 's thesis prob­ ably yields the correct conclusion. Each of the spectators at a cockfight prob­ ably bears responsibility for its occurrence (assuming they are there as onlook­ ers and not as protestors). And each person making up the lynch mob bears moral responsibility for the action of the mob, even those whose marginal con­ tribution is zero. A person who is intent on avoiding moral responsibility for the action of the mob cannot do so by claiming that his or her marginal contribution is zero. He or she could do so only by claiming (truthfully) that he or she is not actually part of the lynch mob but was there in some other capacity, such as newspaper reporter or police spy. The story is different with a random collective such as the class of all white Americans. Here ascriptions of collective responsibility do not distribute to all of the members. We might claim that white Americans are responsible for the horrible racial situation in this country, but we would be mistaken to hold that every white American bears responsibility for the horrible racial situation in this country. Bates does not, for example, feel that his infant white daughter is responsible for this situation. According to Bates, the responsibility for the horrible racial situation in this country is borne by, "mature, rational, white Americans who know what the racial situation is, and who either take actions to perpetuate it or worser. it, or who fail to take actions to alleviate it" (Bates, 1971, p. 348). A class of Ameri­ cans exists whose members are each morally responsible for this situation, and this group of white Americans is a smaller collective within the larger random collective of white Americans. The responsibilrty of the smaller group for the horrible racial situation in this country distributes to all of its members, but the

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53

responsibility of the larger group does not. In summary, Bates is in agreement with Held that random collectives can bear moral responsibility. He does not agree with Held's thesis that the responsibil­ ity of random collectives is invariably distributive. But since Held maintains that the responsibility of organized collectives is not always distributive, Held and Bates are in agreement that collectives can bear moral responsibility for states of affairs even when not all of their members bears responsibility for the same state of affairs (Bates also believes that when a collectiye bears moral responsibility for a state of affairs at least one of its members bears responsibility for the same state of affairs). Hence they are in agreement that the individualist program cannot capture all cases of collective responsibility, at least an individualist program which denies the possi­ bility of undistributed collective moral responsibility. Peter French has addressed the topic of collective responsibility in a num­ ber of writings. In his book, Collective and Corpor ate Responsibility, French distinguishes between types of collectives. One type he refers to as an "aggre­ gate collectivity" (French, 1 984, p. 5). An aggregate collectivity is merely a collection of people, and hence the collectivity changes identity any time a change in membership occurs. According to French, ascriptions of responsibility to aggregate collectivi­ ties always distribute to the members of these collectivities. When an aggregate collectivity bears responsibility for a result, then its members invariably bear responsibility for this same result. When the neighbors of Kitty Genovese watched from their windows while she was being assaulted and murdered, ev­ ery one of them came to bear responsibility for having done nothing to alert authorities. The aggregate collectivity of persons watching from their windows is responsible for not alerting the authorities precisely because each of its mem­ bers is responsible for not alerting the authorities. French notes that the principles of the methodological individualist are well suited to ascriptions of responsibility such as these. What is predicated of the group is nothing more than what is predicated of its members. Reductionist strategies are entirely successful when dealing with aggregate collectivities. But French goes on to say that the responsibility which is predicated of aggregate collectivities can never be moral responsibility. Membership in the moral community does not extend to entities of this type, and the reason is that they are not in and of themselves intentional agents. In no sense could the neigh­ bors of Kitty Genovese have acted intentionally as a group, and hence as a collective they cannot be morally responsible for not acting. On French's view a collective cannot bear moral responsibility unless it functions in and of itself as an intentional agent. Many random collectives are not aggregate collectivities. The people on the subway car in Held's first scenario are more than a simple aggregate collec­ tivity, for they can cooperate and act with one mind to subdue the strangler. For this reason we might hqld them morally responsible for failing to act in the

54

The Case for Collective Responsibility

event that they do nothing (although French is not committed to doing so). A significant difference exists between these passengers and the neighbors of Kitty Genovese, and French holds that these neighbors constitute a group which is incapable of bearing moral responsibility; they can, however, bear moral re­ sponsibility as individuals for their failure to act. Another example of an aggregate collectivity is the collectivity of white American racists. Like the neighbors of Kitty Genovese this collectivity is inca­ pable in and of itself of bearing moral responsibility. Its members can be mor­ ally responsible for their individual actions, but it cannot. A conglomerate collectivity is an organization whose identity is not al­ tered by losing old members or gaining new members. French 's examples in­ clude the Democratic Party, the Congress, the Rolling Green Country Club, the faculty of Yale University, and the Gulf Oil Corporation. Three primary charac­ teristics distinguish conglomerate collectivities from aggregate collectivities. First, they have decision procedures for choosing courses of concerted actions; second, they have enforced standards of conduct; third, members fill defined roles within the conglomerate, and the identity of the conglomerate is not af­ fected by changes in the persons filling these roles (French, 1 984, pp. 1 3- 1 4). A significant difference between aggregate and conglomerate collectivities is that statements ascribing responsibility to conglomerates are not reducible to state­ ments ascribing responsibility to its members. To say that the Rolling Green Coun­ try Club is responsible for racist practices is not to say that each of its members bears responsibility for these racist practices. Moreover, since conglomerate collec­ tivities can choose courses of concerted action, they are capable of bearing moral responsibility for what they do or fail to do. While aggregates fail the test of mem­ bership in the moral community, the same is not true of conglomerates. French cautions against confusing a conglomerate with the aggregate of · persons associated with it. To say that the Honeywell Corporation is to blame for Vietnam antipersonnel bombings is not to say that all Honeywell employees are to blame; nor is it to say that all Honeywell employees except those who behaved in a certain way are to blame. A fundamental reason for distinguishing conglomerates from aggregates is to get away from the idea that ascriptions of responsibility to the collective distribute to all of its members or all but those who act in a certain prescribed manner, such as registering disapproval for the course of action being taken. He also contends that the membership of a conglomerate is never defined by the causal contributions of persons toward a harmful result. Suppose that five senior officers of a corporation are responsible for initiating a course of action which pro­ duces a harmful result. We might be tempted to declare that the five officers consti­ tute a conglomerate which is responsible for the harm. But French resists this ap­ proach, unless the five have their own established decision procedures, enforced standards of conduct, and defined roles. Assuming they do not, they are not a genu­ ine conglomerate. And if they are nothing more than an aggregate, then they cannot

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on French's view bear collective moral responsibility. However, French does not state that conglomerates are the only type of col­ lective capable of bearing collective moral responsibility. He leaves open the possi­ bility that moral responsibility is borne by collectives less formally structured than conglomerates. Perhaps, then, the five officers, though they do not succeed in quali­ fying as a conglomerate, nevertheless bear collective moral responsibility. In a later chapter I argue that an approach along these lines is plausible. How far French is willing to go in granting collectives the capability of bearing moral responsibility is not clear. But what is important to emphasize is that, like Cooper, Held, and Bates, he acknowledges the possibility of collec­ tives bearing moral responsibility for a state of affairs for which one or more of its members do not bear responsibility. Non-distributive collective moral re­ sponsibility is for French a reality. When a collectivity is suitably organized with decision procedures, standards of conduct, and clearly defined roles, then the conditions are right for such responsibility to be present. Richard Swinburne's case for collective moral responsibility in his recent book, Responsibility and Atonement, is based upon the concept of community. This community, which Swinburne refers to as a nurturing community, has the duty to influence its members for good. From this basic duty flow many impli­ cations concerning the responsibility of these members. Swinburne begins by describing the responsibility of parents for their chil­ dren. Parents have a duty to "educate their children morally to have and pursue true values" (Swinburne, 1989, p. 90). Likewise, parents have a responsibility to influ­ ence the child's behavior. This does not mean that parents are responsible for every­ thing their children do, for they are not the only influences on the child. But if parents fail in their responsibility to influence their child's behavior, then they bear some responsibility for their child's resulting bad behavior. If, as a result of parents' bad example, lack of moral instruction, or lack of loving care, a child engages in thieving, then the parents bear some responsibility for this behavior. Already Swinburne has gone well beyond Lewis's dictum that a person can never be responsible for the actions of another. Swinburne's position is more than just that parents are responsible for the outcomes of their children's bad behavior. They bear some responsibility for the behavior itself. Many will agree with Swinburne's thesis that parents bear some responsi­ bility for their children's behavior. But he wishes to press this point much fur­ ther. In his view all members of the community have some obligation to each other. He provides two reasons in support of this claim. First, the mutual ben­ efits conferred upon all of us within the community create obligations among the members toward one another. Second, we are in debt to the "fathers" of the community, namely, our ancestors and benefactors, to care for those whom they would have desired us to care for. Presumably they would have desired us to care for the others within our community. Hence, we bear certain obligations toward the others in our community (Swinburne, 1989, p. 90).

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The Case for Collective Responsibility

Swinburne does not explain what all of these obligations are, but he does say that we have a responsibility to deter a fellow member from performing a particularly gross moral act on which he or she is intent. A husband ought to deter his wife from committing a crime he knows she is seriously contemplat­ ing. And a German living during the Nazi regime had a duty to protest against the practice of exterminating Jews. Since we have a responsibility to deter oth­ ers in this manner, we are presumably at least partly responsible for the result­ ing harm if we do not exercise this responsibility. If we are not able to influence the behavior of another, we are not guilty for what this other person has done. A man who is unable to dissuade his wife from committing a crime is not guilty for her crime. And a German who pro­ tested against the practice of exterminating Jews and was not able to influence the behavior of the Nazis bears no guilt. But for those countless others who were knowledgeable of these atrocities and raised no voice of protest the story is different. They are at least partly responsible for the atrocities. Even if a person bears no guilt at all for the result of another's harmful act, Swinburne holds that the person is still a part of the other's community and, as a part of this community, shares in the burden of the other's guilt. Sharing in another's guilt is impossible, but sharing in the burden of another's guilt is possible. And this is part of what belonging to a community means: to help other members of the community with their burdens. Here we have perhaps the clearest example of non-distributive collective moral responsibility in Swinburne's discussion: the responsibility of the com­ munity to help others with their burdens, and in particular to help others with their burden of guilt. Not every member of the community has a responsibility to help every other member of the community with their burdens. Instead, he says, our duty is especially directed to those who are closest to us and to whom we owe the most. If my wife commits a horrible crime, then my duty is to help her bear the burden of it. But presumably others in the community can be ex­ cused for not doing likewise, especially those who are not close to her. Making clear sense of Swinburne's account is complicated by his terminol­ ogy. What he describes in one place as a "duty" of the community or of various individuals in the community is later referred to as a "responsibility." The two con­ cepts seem to be used almost interchangeably by Swinburne. Moreover, his use of the term "community" is not made very precise, at least not in the book under consideration (Howard McGary also develops a theory of collective responsibility based upon the notion of community, and, while he offers a clear account of what it means to dissociate oneself from a community, his account of community suffers from a lack of clarity similar to that of Swinburne's account). What type of commu­ nity Swinburne has in mind when he speaks of people's belonging to a "nurturing" community is far from clear. And how the notion of guilt relates to moral responsi­ bility for what has happened is also far from clear. Nevertheless, the basic picture which emerges from Swinburne's discussion

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is relatively straightforward. First, we are all members of communities, and we all have moral responsibilities toward others in our community. Among other things, we have responsibilities to deter others from wrongdoing. And, more significantly, we have responsibilities to help others in our communities with their burdens. Thus, when a member of a community has a significant burden, then the community has a responsibility to share this burden and some individuals within the community have the responsibility to share this burden. In some cases all the members of the community might have this duty, but in typical cases the responsibility of the com­ munity does not distribute to all of its members. In this chapter I have surveyed the views of Cooper, Held, Bates, French, and Swinburne. Although large differences exist among these philosophers in their views on moral responsibility and the relationship between individual re­ sponsibility and collective responsibility, I have argued that in one important respect in they are in agreement. They all acknowledge instances in human life in which a collective bears moral responsibility for a state of affairs for which not all of its members bear responsibility. They hold, in other words, that a person can be a member of a collective which is responsible for something for which the person is not responsible. An individualist will wonder how a person can attain this status. The person is free of individual responsibility for what has happened, and yet the person is still considered part of a collective which is responsible for what has happened. If a place exists in the moral terrain which is occupied by such a person, it is one which will strike the individualist as mysterious or very counter-intuitive. Yet each of the philosophers surveyed in this chapter are proposing this idea. What these philosophers are proposing may appear bold and radical: an attempt to make ideas borrowed from a barbaric, primitive, and superstitious past philosophically respectful. More than half a century ago, Gomperz chal­ lenged philosophers to determine to what extent the concept of collective re­ sponsibility can be legitimately employed in our thinking about morality with­ out reverting to primitive or barbaric ways of thinking. An impressive number of philosophers have risen to the task, and what they are proposing is something that may appear radical. Nevertheless, in the next chapter I discuss and examine an approach which takes the idea of an undistributed collective moral responsibility further than these philosophers have done. It is an approach built upon a notion of collective responsibility more robust than the notion described in this chapter. Thus, while Sverdlik's concept of what he calls collective responsibility represents a minimalist approach, the approach described in this chapter can be classified as a moderate approach, and the approach described in the next chapter represents a rather full-bodied conception of collective responsibility.

Six

AN EXISTENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE In the introduction to his recent book, Sharing Responsibility, Larry May observes that existentialism is no longer in fashion. It is no longer numbered among the philosophical views which capture the public imagination. However, May is con­ vinced that those who think and write about moral responsibility, and collective responsibility in particular, cannot afford to ignore or neglect the contributions the existentialists have made in this area The concept of responsibility in twentieth century existentialist thought is shaped largely by the writings of philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Jas­ pers, and Hannah Arendt. These philosophers, who wrote in the years immediately following the Second World War, tried to come to terms with the widespread failure of their fellow citizens to prevent the horrible actions of the Nazis. They turned to existentialist thought in an effort to explain this profound failure, and they likewise appealed to the resources of existentialist thought to design a theory of responsibil­ ity that takes seriously society and the problems which afflict it. May distinguishes between two moral traditions which are both described as "existentialist." The first tradition emphasizes the self engaged in the task of constructing itself into a certain type of person. The second tradition sees the self as a social construct; the self is constructed by social experience or exist­ ence as well as by individual choosing. The second tradition, which May iden­ tifies with Heidegger, Jaspers, and the later Sartre, is what he wishes to revive and advocate. It is an approach which he refers to as "social existentialism." At the outset May admits that existentialist responsibility places a heavy burden on moral agents, and those of us who are "members of a highly self­ indulgent age" will be greatly tempted to ignore or flee from such responsibility (May, 1 992, p. 3). Setting the requirements of morality high is not fashionable among British or American moralists, and hence May anticipates a great deal of reluctance among philosophers to take seriously his attempts to revive and ad­ vocate social existentialism. Nevertheless, he is convinced that it is the most promising approach to thinking about moral responsibility in the context of groups, and in what follows I will summarize his defense of this approach. May observes that for the last two hundred years the Western tradition of moral philosophy has evaluated an agent's actions on the basis of what an agent wills. We appraise a person's behavior on the basis of the person's conscious deliberation. May wishes to challenge this notion. Inspired by the writings of existentialists, May wishes to broaden the scope of what can be morally ap­ praised to include certain attitudes which are not fully under the control of moral

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An Existentialist Perspective

agents. In particular, he urges that people can sometimes be held responsible for harms which result from holding these attitudes. On this point many will agree with May, for often we hold attitudes which, although they are not at present under our control, are the result of our past negligence. We allow ourselves to develop attitudes which are likely to lead to harm, and hence on certain occasions we could be responsible for harm result­ ing from such attitudes, even though they are not presently under our control. We should simply not have allowed such attitudes to develop in the first place. May draws a distinction between attitudes which are partly under our control and those which are fully under our control. He argues that even when an attitude is not fully under our control, we may bear responsibility for not changing it. More specifically, he argues that if a person could partially change an attitude that the person should change, then we can reasonably say that the person is responsible for having the attitude. Again, just because an attitude is not fully under our control does not mean we cannot bear responsibility for having it. And if harm results from our having such an attitude, we are partially responsible for the harm (though not as responsible as if we had actually intended the harm). His challenge to the Western tradition of moral philosophy becomes more pronounced when he begins to consider the role that attitudes play in group or joint efforts. Suppose that several people are acting so as to risk causing harm and that they are aware of this risk. Some of the people perform acts that tum out to cause harm, and some of the people perform acts which tum out not to cause harm. May argues that all of them share responsibility for the harm, those who caused it as well as those who did not. Just because some of the risk-takers tum out not to cause harm does not excuse them from sharing responsibility for the harmful result. His argument is simply that both have acted in "morally similar ways" (May, 1992, p. 45). No moral basis can be found for distinguish­ ing some of the risk-takers as responsible for the harmful result and others not. A similar argument can be made to show that when some have attitudes which they know can cause harm, then those whose attitudes do not cause harm still share responsibility for the harm caused by those who hold the same atti­ tudes. Allowing ourselves to have attitudes which we know can lead us to en­ gage in harmful behavior is much like taking a risk; we are aware of the possi­ bility that the undesired outcome may occur. Having such attitudes is not ex­ actly like taking a risk, for these attitudes are already ours. But May emphasizes that we should remove these attitudes which have the potential of causing harm. If we do not do so, and if we do not do anything to block ourselves from acting harmfully on the basis of these attitudes, then we share responsibility for the harmful result. Moreover, if we do not do so, then we even share responsibility for harms which result from the fact that others have such attitudes. And this point is the key to understanding how the social existentialists approach the subject of collective responsibility. Racism is a perfect illustration of this principle. People who hold racist

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attitudes are similar to those who take careless risks in contributing to creating a climate of attitudes in which harm is more likely to occur. When a community of persons holding racist attitudes exists, an atmosphere is created in which the members become risk-takers with respect to racial violence. And as these mem­ bers come to share in the production of a certain attitudinal climate, they are participating in "something like a joint venture that increases the likelihood of harm" (May, 1992, p. 47). Suppose that racial violence takes place in a community as the result of its attitudinal climate. Obviously, then, those who cause the harm directly bear moral responsibility for it. But what about those members of the community who are not among those causing the harm directly? May's answer is that they too are responsible for the racial violence. Assuming that they have made no efforts to change their racist attitudes, they come to share in the responsibility for this violence in two ways. First, they are contributing to a climate that influ­ ences others to cause harm. Because they themselves harbor racist attitudes, they help to create the attitudinal climate which ultimately gives rise to racial violence. Second, they are aware that racist attitudes have the potential for pro­ ducing racial violence. Like the risk-takers described above, those whose ac­ tions do not actually produce the harmful result still share responsibility for the harm caused by the actions of others who knowingly risk the harm. Some might object that the account May is defending disconnects the notion of agency from responsibility. If we grant that people with racist atti­ tudes incur responsibility for racial violence even when the violence is directly caused by a totally separate group of people in the community, are we not em­ bracing a notion of responsibility which leaves agency behind? May answers this question in the negative. First, people who have racist attitudes should make an attempt to remove them (assuming they are partially under their control). To the extent that they fail to do this, ascribing responsibility to them for what happens as a result of these attitudes makes sense. Second, May urges that if we think of the notion of agency in a more communal fashion, his account pre­ serves the connection between responsibility and agency. This last point deserves elaboration. Agency is usually envisioned in terms of an individual's motives or attitudes and the actions which the individual per­ forms as the result. But this picture of agency is limited to what a single person does or does not do; agency should not be conceived so "individualistically" (May, 1 992, p. 52). Just as a person's attitudes form a context within which the person behaves, so the collection of attitudes within a community forms a cli­ mate within which the behavior of its members occurs. A person's behavior is shaped both by his or her own attitudes and by the attitudinal climate of the community, and for this reason a proper account of agency should not ignore the communal dimension. He believes that the Western tradition of moral philosophy has been too narrowly focused upon the individual, and in particular with its conception of

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An Existentialist Perspective

agency. Once we begin to think of agency both in terms of the individual and the group, a close connection between agency and the account of responsibility defended by May will be evident. Those sharing racist attitudes in a particular community are, in an expanded sense of agency, participants in the racial vio­ lence ignited by these attitudes. Once this point has been established, we can reasonably conclude that they share responsibility for it. May follows up his discussion of racism with a discussion of moral insen­ sitivity. He argues at length that attitudes, like racism, which have the potential of harming others are closely related to the concept of insensitivity. Insensitiv­ ity is not itself an attitude on a par with these attitudes, but, like them, a person can be responsible for having it. It is something to be vigilantly guarded against. If we are aware of being insensitive we ought to counteract it. If we do not do so, then we are responsible for being insensitive. May does not state that this responsibility extends to foreseeable harms which could have been prevented if our insensitivity were not present, but presumably we can incur responsibility here as well. Just as we can be responsible for harms which are caused by hold­ ing certain attitudes, the same may sometimes happen with respect to insensi­ tivity. Again, we can be responsible for a part of ourselves that we do not cur­ rently have the ability to change. Two traditional ways of thinking about the relationship between groups or collectives and the individuals which they have as members can be distin­ guished. The first is individualism, which May characterizes as the view that people make moral decisions more or less independently of others and of the groups to which they belong. May cites current thinking about medical ethics as a good example of this view; dilemmas are almost always posed as questions about what a particular physician or health care worker ought to do. The second is collectivism, the view that groups are themselves entities that make decisions or initiate courses of action and that their activities are of more fundamental importance than those of individuals. On this view individuals are of interest only as they function as parts of groups. May rejects both of these traditional views. Individualism does not appre­ ciate the extent to which individuals are influenced in the values they hold or the decisions they make by the groups to which they belong. And collectivism errs by assuming that people are not strong enough to overcome the influences of the group. A great deal of group conformity occurs in human life, but sub­ stantial numbers of people are able to resist these strong influences. The ap­ proach favored by May recognizes that groups make a huge difference in the behavior of individuals belonging to them. That people act much differently in groups than on their own is a simple fact. However, the influence exerted by groups comes ultimately from its individual members. Values are held by indi­ viduals, and the group is not some type of super-entity which comes to have values independently of the values of its members. This approach is illustrated in two vastly different types of groups: corpo-

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rations and mobs. Corporations are highly structured groups with elaborate poli­ cies which are both role-defining and institution-defining. Mobs are groups with little or no organizational structure. May argues persuasively that what both corporations and mobs have in common is a very powerful influence over the behavior of its members. The policies of a corporation are designed to guide the behavior of its employees, and the result is frequently a transformation of their values. Those who participate in mobs become a part of a social identification that tends to structure their self-perceptions in certain ways; in his earlier book May describes this process in considerable detail (May, 1 987, pp. 58 ff.). The result is the same as with corporations in that individuals in mobs come to hold values quite different from those they would hold if they were not associated with the group. Social identification occurs in many ways, .often in ways that suppress or alter the identification people have outside of groups. An extreme example would be members of a lynch mob who literally hide their identity by wearing hoods or masks. A less extreme example would be members of a health care team who wear white coats or dresses. The uniforms are a reminder that those who wear them have a different set of priorities from those that do not. Values are significantly affected by identifying with the group; the uniform signifies this changed perspective. The transformation that our personal values undergo as the result of be­ longing to a group has two consequences for the way responsibility should be understood in group situations. First, since the members of the group influence one another in transforming their values, May concludes that in some sense all the members share in the attitudes and behavior of each member of the group. Second, a socialization process occurs within groups that frequently causes members of the group to be less sensitive to certain kinds of harm than if they were not associated with the group. To the extent that this diminished sensitiv­ ity contributes· to harm, thinking of the responsibility for this harm as being shared by the members of the group makes sense. May adds a note of caution regarding the degree to which members of a group bear responsibility. To say that the members of a group share responsibil­ ity is not to say that they each bear it to the same degree. The leaders of a group are typically those with the most direct input into the decision making, and the degree of responsibility borne by them will reflect the disproportionate influ­ ence they wield in bringing about harmful results. By contrast, most other mem­ bers of the group will typically have minimal influence on group decisions, and the degree to which they bear responsibility will be minimal. Just as moral agents sometimes bear moral responsibility for omitting to act, so people within groups often share responsibility for inaction. However, because of the dynamics of group interaction, ascriptions of responsibility to members of groups is much different than if they were not a part of the groups. May sets out to shed some light on this important difference. Groups make certain kinds of collective action possible. Within a group

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An Existentialist Perspective

some members participate in group action, while some members facilitate group action. Those who facilitate group action often do so by choosing not to block the action being taken by other members of the group. And by facilitating group action they come to share in the responsibility for the harm produced by the action, even though they are not among those who participate in the group ac­ tion. By contrast, an individual outside the group does not, other things being equal, bear responsibility for not blocking the action. Membership in a group brings certain benefits to its members, but membership in a group also makes one much more likely to bear responsibility for harms brought about by the group or even by a few members in the group acting in the name of the group. So far May's discussion has dealt mainly with the shared responsibility of a group, the responsibility that is distributed to each member of the group in varying amounts for what the group has done or failed to do. At this point May turns to the notion of collective responsibility. As he characterizes collective responsibility, it is always nondistributive. When a group is collectively respon­ sible for a harmful result, some of the members of the group might be individu­ ally responsible for the result, and none of the members might be individually responsible for it. But according to the terminology he employs, not all of the members are individually responsible for the result, for then shared responsibil­ ity, not collective responsibility is present. May draws a distinction between collective omission and collective inac­ tion. Collective omission takes place when a group collectively chooses not to act in a particular manner. Collective inaction takes place when the members of a putative group or collective do not actually choose to remain inactive but nevertheless fail to act in a particular manner as a group. If the members can act as a group, and they simply fail to do so without actually deciding not to act, then their inaction is collective inaction. Assigning responsibility is more difficult with collective inaction. When col­ lective omission takes place, the members are actually making a decision not to act, a decision which is open to moral appraisal. But suppose the members of a collec­ tive are in a position to prevent a harm from taking place and simply fail to do anything. Under what circumstances can they be judged morally responsible for their failure to prevent the harm? Part of the issue has to do with the failure to organize or to become structured enough to act, as Held and others have correctly observed. Much depends, as well, upon the time factor; whether a collective is responsible for inaction depends upon whether it could have organized itself into a mechanism of action in a short enough period of time to take an appropriate action. In addition, such factors as leadership, solidarity, and intersubjective communica­ tion are features of groups which make organization into a mechanism of action more likely. If a collective having these features still fails to organize itself into a mechanism of action to prevent a harmful result, it is a far likelier candidate for being judged responsible for the harmful result than if it lacks good leadership, solidarity, or intersubjective communication.

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After an extended discussion of these and other related issues, May arrives at the following criterion. A putative group of people engages in the kind of inaction that warrants collective responsibility if: (1) The members of the group fail to act to prevent a harm, the prevention of which would have required the coordinated ac­ tions of (some of) the members of the group; (2) The group could have plausibly developed a sufficient structure in time to allow the group to act collectively to prevent the harm; and (3) Judging that the members of the group should have acted to prevent the harm rather than doing anything else, such as preventing other harms which they also could have prevented, is reasonable. Conditions (1 )-(3) are sufficient for assigning collective responsibility to a putative group, but they do not constitute necessary conditions. Thus, May leaves open the possibility that other ways may exist for the group to incur collective responsibility. If conditions (1)-(3) are satisfied, we can conclude that the group in question incurs collective responsibility; but other ways for the group to incur collective responsibility are possible. May's criterion is intended to be provocative in two ways. First, he is intending to push to the limit our conceptions of agency and responsibility. People commonly think of agency in individualistic terms and think of respon­ sibility as set at a very modest level, and May is attempting to challenge these ways of thinking. Second, he is hoping to inspire people to see the potential for great social good when they envision solutions to social problems that lie in collective rather than individual approaches. Groups such as OXFAM have brought about tremendous good for the victims of famine worldwide. The key idea is people coming together to solve problems collectively, and sometimes only our collective inaction stands in the way of dealing with large social prob­ lems. In this way collective responsibility can be assigned to people such as ourselves for our inaction. May quotes Hannah Arendt as stating, "This taking upon ourselves the consequences for things we are entirely innocent of, is the price we pay for the fact that we live our lives not by ourselves but . . . [within] a human community" (May, 1992, p. xi). Many will object that the social existentialist account May is offering is too severe or unrealistic. Far too many harms are present in the world that people could prevent or alleviate by coming together in groups to think that we can realistically assign responsibility for their failure to do so. Condition (3) ap­ pears to require groups of people to spend all their time and energy trying to prevent the world's harms, leaving them little opportunity to pursue plans of a positive nature. We might visualize people spending their time and energy re­ acting to these harms, going from famine to famine, and being unable to do anything positive to end the conditions that give rise to these harms. May responds to this objection by pointing out that his criterion does not say which actions a group should undertake to prevent a particular harm, nor does it say which harms should be prevented. Thus, we cannot fairly object that his theory makes doing something about a particular harm, let alone doing some-

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An Existentialist Perspective

thing about a multiplicity of social harms across the face of the globe, the duty or obligation of a putative group. Instead, May is attempting to inspire people to look beyond their own lives and to think about what could be accomplished through joint action. And having expanded their consciousness, May's hope is that people will try to determine which harms are the ones to be addressed first. A group should ask which harms it is most responsible for preventing. Priority should be given to harms which the group itself has done something to bring about or about which it has raised expectations, such as implied promises to certain potential victims. Also important to consider are harms which the group is uniquely situated to prevent. Considerations of this type will make concentrating its efforts in a way that is effective possible and worrying about preventing all of the world's harms at once unnecessary. And even if a putative group turns out to bear responsibility for not pre­ venting harm, the conclusion that it or its members bear any type of guilt does not follow. If the members of a group fail to prevent a harm from occurring, then they are at most partial causes of the harm and are at most partially respon­ sible for its occurrence. But if a person is less than fully responsible for a cer­ tain result, then, on May's view, a moral assessment less accusatory than guilt is in order. In cases of collective inaction involving significant numbers of people who fail to act, the appropriate response is probably one of shame. If a harm could have been prevented had a group of people banded together and taken action, then we should not say that they are guilty for not taking action. But for them to feel shame would be appropriate. Shame, then, is what people should feel when the groups to which they belong fail to prevent harm that they ought to have prevented. And the same is true of people who fail to form groups which will enable them to prevent such harms when enough potential leadership is present for them to constitute them­ selves into an organized group relatively quickly. If they fail to organize them­ selves under these favorable circumstances, then, although they are not in any way guilty for the harm which results, they bear collective responsibility for the harm and can appropriately feel shame. All of this relates directly to the famous dictum that "ought implies can," the principle that we are not duty bound to do what we are incapable of doing. A person who contemplates societal problems such as hunger and racial inequal­ ity might conclude that dealing with these problems is so far beyond our abili­ ties that in no sense ought we to do anything to prevent them. Individuals are almost never capable of preventing these harms. But one of the lessons to be learned from the writings of the social existentialists is that we can do much to prevent harms if we act in groups. Often we can make a difference, and where we can make a difference and fail to take action collective responsibility, not just aggregate individual responsibility, is present. May concludes this section of his book with the following words:

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Great social tragedies are made more likely due to our attitudes and our fail­ ures to act collectively. Even seemingly minor matters, such as attitudes and inaction, can greatly increase the likelihood that groups and individuals will cause harm. If our communities are to become safer and more humane, people will need to feel an increased sense of shared responsibility for what their fellow community members do. (May, 1992, p. 124) Most people fail to feel a sense of responsibility for bringing about changes in the world around them. During the ;Nazi regime ordinary citizens stood by while atrocity after atrocity was perpetuated; the vast majority did not feel a sense of responsibility to protest or to try to organize with others to try to pre­ vent these atrocities. Sensing that something is deeply distressing about the reactions of these citizens, the social existentialist philosophy of Sartre, Jas­ pers, and Arendt is an attempt to change peoples 's thinking about responsibility. Until we begin to feel responsible for what others do, according to May, great social tragedies are made more likely. I now summarize May's social existentialist approach to moral responsi­ bility. Just as moral agents can incur responsibility for harms which their delib­ erate actions have produced, the same is true in many cases of harms which their attitudes have produced. Even if harms are produced by attitudes not fully within the control of a moral agent at a given time, the agent can still bear responsibility for the harm. If we are aware that we have attitudes which are likely to cause harm, we ought to take steps to remove or alter them. On a group level this principle holds true of all of its members. If an attitude such as racism is held by a11 the members of a group, then, given that they are aware that this attitude makes racial violence more likely to. occur, they share responsibility for the racial violence which is carried out by a few of its members. In an expanded sense of agency, all of the members are participants in this racial violence. And though it is not itself an attitude, insensitivity too is a trait moral agents ought to guard against. To the extent that the insensitivity of a group's members leads to harm, they share responsibility for it. Groups have a very powerful influence over the attitudes and behavior of their members. This is true of highly structured groups such as corporations, and it is likewise true of groups such as mobs with minimal structure. Our personal values undergo a transformation as the result of belonging to a group; the members influ­ ence and transform the values of one another. Along with this sharing of attitudes and values comes a sharing of responsibility for group actions. Belonging to groups also tends to make people insensitive to certain harms; these harms in particular are states of affairs for which the members share responsibility. Groups ate also at times responsible for inaction. If the members make a decision not to act, the inaction is a case of collective omission. More interest­ ing are cases in which people with the ability to form a group to prevent a harm from occurring fail to act. These are cases of collective inaction. In many in-

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An Existentialist Perspective

stances these putative groups can be judged collectively responsible for their inaction or even for the harms they fail to prevent. This does not mean that the members of these putative groups are guilty for their inaction or for these harms� feeling shame for their inaction is more appropriate. The positive point to be stressed is that the potential for great social good exists when people seek solu­ tions of a collective nature, since groups are far more likely than individuals to be able to prevent significant harms from occurring. May's account of responsi­ bility is intended to promote this outlook. May's discussion is lengthy, complex, and multi-faceted. Essentially, he is in agreement with Cooper, Held, Bates, French, and Swinburne that collectives can bear responsibility in a way that is non-distributive (with the stipulation that at least one member of the collective bear personal responsibility for the event in question). Ironically, the title of May's book indicates that it is about shared responsibility, the responsibility borne by groups which distributes to all of its members. May has much to say about shared responsibility. However, he also has much to say about collective responsibility, particularly responsibility for inaction. He finds non-dis­ tributive collective responsibility crucial for understanding how people can pro­ mote good and work to prevent harms in human society. May's theory of collective responsibility also differs from the views of the others in some important respects. First, he places a great deal more empha­ sis upon the problems of society such as racism and racial violence, and his views on responsibility are driven by concerns to deal with these problems. Second, his account of responsibility is accompanied by a proposal to expand the concept of agency from an individualistic focus to a more collective focus. His theory of responsibility is closely tied to an understanding of agency which differs from the mainstream Western tradition. Third, his account assigns responsibility when one or more persons hold atti­ tudes or possess traits such as insensitivity with the foreseen potential for causing harm, even when these attitudes or traits are not fully within their control at the time in question. This is a significant enlarging of the forbidden states of mind or mens rea that are standardly thought to warrant ascriptions of moral responsibility. Fourth, his account emphasizes the powerful influence which groups exert upon the atti­ tudes and values of its members and uses this as a basis for arguing that the respon­ sibility for group actions is frequently shared by all of its members, including those who are not directly involved in these actions. These differences are all inter-connected, of course, and they are all mani­ festations of May's social existentialist perspective. Since none of the writers examined previously is inspired by existentialist thought, large differences be­ tween their views on collective responsibility and the view defended by May are perhaps not surprising. Each of them seems to be operating from within the mainstream Western tradition of moral philosophy, at least as it bears on the issues under consideration. Still, we should not exaggerate the differences between May and the oth-

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ers. As already pointed out, they share an acknowledgement of non-distributive collective responsibility. Moreover, some of the earlier writers seem willing to think that these collectives can sometimes be large and diffuse. Held and French believe that a corporation or the employees of a corporation can function as a collective which is responsible for the harmful acts or practices of a corpora­ tion. Bates is willing to ascribe collective responsibility to mature, rational white Americans who know what the racial situation is, and who either take actions to perpetuate it or worsen it, or fail to take actions to alleviate it. And Swinburne ascribes it to those Germans during the Second World War who did not protest the extermination of the Jews. Moreover, Swinburne believes an entire commu­ nity is collectively responsible for sharing the burdens of its various members and for deterring its members from acts of wrongdoing. The difference between these views and the social existentialist approach, then, is not that these writers restrict ascriptions of collective responsibility to groups that are relatively small or tightly circumscribed (with the possible ex­ ception of Cooper). The difference is in the reasons they give for finding a group collectively responsible for a state of affairs. In addition, the assignment of responsibility to putative groups is strik­ ingly different. Held believes that strangers on a subway car or pedestrians walk­ ing past a collapsed building are responsible for organizing themselves into a group and taking action. But May appears to push this idea much further than Held. He offers OXFAM as an example of people coming together to form a group for the purpose of preventing harms qn a large scale (relief to those expe­ riencing famines, for example). Surely saying that three passersby are respon­ sible for not organizing themselves into a group to free the victim trapped under the collapsed building and saying that people are responsible for not organizing themselves into groups to prevent harms such as famines or racial violence are quite different. Most people will agree with the first of these claims, but I sus­ pect that most people will find the second far less plausible. David Copp argues that one of the problems with May 's view in situa­ tions of this second type is holding people responsible for not organizing them­ selves into groups when in fact they lack the prerequisites for concerted action (Copp, 1 991, p. 75). And Peter French finds May's view reasonable when ap­ plied to cases such as coordinating the rescue of a drowning child among those standing on a beach, but he finds cases of taking the initiative to deal with problems such as widespread famine to be quite different: . . . Michael Palin, ex-member of the "Monty Python" cast, journeyed around the world for the BBC. In Bombay he was beset by beggars. He refused their pleas on the grounds that whatever he might afford to give one or two would do little or no good with respect to the real problem. He obviously felt a bit uneasy about refusing the beggars, but he shouldn't have. Only a vast collec­ tive effort could hope to adequately respond to poverty and its attendant ills in Bombay and other Third World locations. But should Palin be held morally

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An Exis tentialist Perspective responsible for not organizing a collective that is able to make a significant dent in the problem? I suspect not. . . . it is not at all clear what group is to be organized. (French, 1992, pp. 83-84)

May can argue that no difference in principle exists between the two cases. Our responsibility is to aid the victims of starvation, just as our responsi­ bility is to aid those trapped under collapsed buildings. In both cases group action is needed, and hence people ought to take the initiative to form groups to make such action possible. To the extent that people should form these groups and do not, May's criterion judges them collectively responsible for their inac­ tion (though not guilty for their inaction). Why should we think that this conse­ quence is any less acceptable than in the case presented by Held? The most obvious difference between the two cases appears to be that in the case of the collapsed building the three passersby are in some sense uniquely situ­ ated to help the victim. The victim's survival does not depend upon their taking action; many more people may pass by in time to aid the victim. But they are the ones there now, they hear the victim calling for help, and any reasonable person in this situation knows that action is called for. In this case the action called for is a group action, and hence they should organize. Whether they like it or not, the onus is on them to act because they happen to be the ones passing by. Any reasonable person knows that many are dying of starvation every day, that this situation calls for group action, and that forming groups to take action is something that is in our power to undertake. But we are not uniquely situated to deal with this problem. The onus does not seem to be on us in the same way that it is on the passersby in Held's example. Perhaps the cases would be more similar if three passersby heard the cries of someone suffering from starvation. But in the forma­ tion of groups to deal with starvation in our community or in our part of the world, others are just as uniquely positioned to take action. The social existentialist will not be impressed by this line of argument. The social existentialist will see no difference in principle between these differ­ ent cases. And perhaps no difference exists. But even if the difference between these cases is only one of degree, we can still see the social existentialist posi­ tion as more radical. Some will assign responsibility to putative groups only when the degree to which these are uniquely situated or qualified to prevent a particular harm is quite high. Others will require a lesser degree of uniqueness in situation or qualification in order to assign responsibility to a putative group. And the social existentialist will presumably not require much uniqueness at all; as long as people are capable of organizing into groups, the extent to which they are in a position of uniqueness matters only slightly.

Seven

MORAL TAINT The concept of moral taint, a notion which is reasonably familiar to many people with little or no training in moral philosoP.hY, is the object of growing interest among philosophers. The basic idea is that in a variety of circumstances a person who engages in moral wrongdoing taints those with whom he or she is closely associ­ ated. Thus, a whole family comes to be tainted by the acts of a son who commits murder, an executive is tainted by the corrupt business practices of a close associate, and a surgical nurse is tainted by the medical malpractice of a physician whom he or she assists. In these cases people's reputations are damaged by the acts of others, but taint seems to imply something deeper as well. Roughly, it seems to imply that the evil of one person somehow rubs off on other persons close enough to be affected by its contagion. Sometimes taint is said to become operative even when the wrongdoing is carried out by persons only distantly associated with someone. For example, some might claim that all Americans are tainted by the dishonorable behavior of Richard Nixon while President of the United States or that all white Americans are tainted by the actions of Martin Luther King Jr. 's assassin. Claims of this nature are not at all uncommon in the media. Perhaps most sweeping of all, many believe that the sin of Adam, the first man, has succeeded in tainting the whole human race. Some of these ascriptions of taint are puzzling. In what sense are Ameri­ cans tainted by the dishonorable conduct of Richard Nixon? Is taint really a moral notion? Can a person's moral status be adversely affected by the wrong­ doing of others, including those only distantly associated with the person? While people commonly speak about the tainting of one person by another, few people have a clear understanding of what is meant by these statements. In this chapter I examine some attempts by moral philosophers to clarify the concept of taint. In addition, I relate it to some philosophical concepts which are better understood. Naturally, its relation to the concept of collective responsibility will be of particular interest in this chapter. While I do not pretend that we can make clear sense of everything that people say about taint, my hope is that this discussion will bring some initial clarification of the concept, show that thinking of it as a moral concept is plausible, and shed some light on its relation to collective respon­ sibility. A central theme of this book is that, however we understand moral taint, it is not the same thing as collective moral responsibility. Hence theories of collective moral responsibility which, either explicitly or implicitly, treat moral taint as a type of collective moral responsibility ought to be rejected. Anthony Appiah 's essay, "Racism and Moral Pollution," is not primarily

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Moral Taint

intended to explicate the concept of moral taint. It appears in a special issue of a journal on moral issues concerning divestment of stock in South African firms. In discussing this topic Appiah explicates the concept of taint and shows how it provides guidance in thinking about these issues. Paul Ricoeur 's treatment of moral stain covers some of the same ground as Appiah 's treatment of moral taint (Ricoeur, 1 967, pp. 8-9, 35-37). But because it is not as clearly spelled out, I shall take Appiah 's account as a point of departure. Appiah notes that in many primitive societies people were stigmatized for their unintended association with evil. For example, a person breaking a ritual taboo could expect just punishment at the hands of the gods. Moreover, such punishment was considered just even when the breaking of the taboo was purely unintentional. Indeed, in many societies, including Homeric Greek society, for whole families to suffer for the unintended wrongdoing of a family member was considered just. Some might be inclined to think of these beliefs in terms of suffering from a type of guilt by association. But Appiah prefers to think in terms of a kind of pollution which he calls taint. Although the centrality of this concept in moral thinking has long been absent in the Western tradition, Appiah finds that some of our moral language seems committed to a notion of taint. This, in fact, is the way many think about the divestment issue: that in holding shares of stock in South African firms we are associated with a wicked system and thus have "dirty hands" (Appiah, 1 99 1 , p. 225). Appiah argues that directness of connection to a wrongdoing has some­ thing to do with the "logic of taint" (Appiah, 1 99 1 , p. 232). This he illustrates in two examples involving merchants who sell knives. In the first e xample a mer­ chant overhears gang members outside instructing a member to buy a knife in order to kill a captured member of a rival gang. The merchant calls the police, but he must still decide whether to sell the youth a knife. If he refuses, he knows that the youth will simply walk down the street and buy a knife from another merchant whom he knows to be quite indifferent to the interests of others. In the second knife-seller example everything is the same as in the first example except that the store is owned and operated by two partners. One of the partners is downstairs carrying up a box of knives from the storeroom. He knows that the other partner will sell the youth a knife. The knives he is carrying up are relevantly identical, and he knows that the other partner will select one from the new box if they are brought up in time. If they aren't brought up in time, he knows the partner will sell one from the top shelf in the store. Each partner will profit the same no matter which knife is sold. The only question is whether the fatal weapon comes from the new box. No doubt many will be inclined to say that taint is present in the first example if the merchant sells the knife. The merchant does not take part in the stabbing, but the merchant knows that the knife he sells will be used to stab a member of a rival gang. Thus, even though the outcome will be the same if he refuses to sell a knife many non-utilitarians will argue that the taint is enough of a reason not to sell th;

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knife. Other things being equal, not selling the knife is better. In the second case the connection between the stabbing and the merchant carrying knives up from below is less direct. Some will argue that the merchant who delivers the new box in time to sell the fatal weapon is tainted by the stabbing. But Appiah believes that the involvement of this merchant is "less tainting" than the involvement of the merchant in the first example (Appiah, 1991, p. 233). If taint matters in the first case, it matters less in the second case. Again, this is because directness of connection to the moral wrongdoing affects the degree to which one is tainted by the wrongdoing. Regarding the question of divestrhent, Appiah thinks that this connection is extremely indirect. A very indirect connection exists between the evils of apartheid and a person's holding shares of stock in firms with business interests in South Africa (and an even less direct connection between the evils of apart­ heid and a person who is employed by an institution, such as a university, hold­ ing these shares). Appiah 's argument is complex but hinges largely on the issue of inevitability: just as the knife merchants know that the youth will acquire a knife regardless of their actions, shareholders know that apartheid will exist regardless of whether they divest. Hence, if tainting is present at all, the ex­ treme indirectness of connection renders it minimal. Appiah views taint as more closely related to the notion of evil as contagion or pollution than to the notion of guilt or wrongdoing. Thus, even if those who do not divest are tainted by the evils of apartheid, they might not in any way be guilty. Though they may be tainted by the evils of apartheid, they do not share in the guilt borne by those who actually practice it. If the practice of apartheid were something under the control of shareholders, the situation would be different and shareholders would be in a position to incur guilt or responsibility. But working to achieve di­ vestment will make no difference to the practice of apartheid; the only difference is that others will profit from holding the shares. But if taint is not directly tied to guilt or moral responsibility, why should we be concerned about it? Appiah 's answer seems to be that it is important for a sense of moral integrity. The knife merchant carrying a box of knives from the basement can choose whether to carry it up at once or to delay. If he carries it up at once, he knows that a knife from the box will become the murder weapon. And, although he does not share guilt or responsibility for the murder, his moral integrity is affected. Thus, he has a reason to delay carrying the box up; his life will be the better for the delay. But escaping guilt or responsibility is not part of the reason, for on Appiah 's view none needs escaping in cases such as this and the case of divestment, where only an indirect connection exists between the moral agent and the moral wrongdoing. Few would dispute Appiah 's claim that moral taint and moral guilt are dis­ tinct and that the former is possible without the latter. However, Karl Jaspers speaks of another type of guilt, metaphysical guilt. Jaspers does not offer a precise defini­ tion of this notion, and making clear sense out of everything he says about it is

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difficult. But May has done an admirable job of characterizing this notion, and, having done so, he concludes that it is a notion very closely connected with taint. Thus, while a vast difference exists between taint and moral guilt, taint and meta­ physical guilt are closely connected. In what follows I rely upon May's construal of Jaspers 's position, and I urge that what Jaspers says about metaphysical guilt can be taken as a contribution to our understanding of taint. May begins with the following quotation from The Question of German Guilt by Jaspers. There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co­ responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fail to do what­ ever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty. If I was present at the murder of others without risking my life to prevent it, I feel guilty in a way not ad­ equately conceivable either legally, politically, or morally. That I live after such a thing has happened weighs upon me as an indelible guilt (Jaspers, 1 96 1 , p. 36) In this striking passage, Jaspers speaks about a type of guilt which is neither legal, political, nor moral. It is a guilt which afflicts or comes over a person when he or she fails to prevent wrongs and injustices in the world. Even if a person must risk his or her life to prevent an injustice, the failure to do so weighs upon the person in the form of guilt. In fact, it weighs upon the person as a guilt which is indelible. In this passage, Jaspers also makes a startling statement about responsibility. He says that human beings are "co-responsible" for every wrong and injustice in the world. People are especially co-responsible for wrongs and injustices that are known to them, but to some extent they are co-responsible for all wrongs and injustices in the world. May states that Jaspers comes "dangerously close" in this passage to stating that each member of the human race shares responsibility for all of the world's harms. (May, 1992, p. 1 48) What May has in mind by the qualifying phrase "dan­ gerously close" is not clear (is it that co-responsibility is not the same as shared responsibility, or is it perhaps that some of the world's harms are not the result of human agency?). But this co-responsibility is due to a solidarity among all human beings, and hence it is not restricted to certain groups or collectives of human be­ ings. It is universal in scope. (Jedlicki, 1990, p. 62) The notion of metaphysical guilt is built upon two important ideas. First, a person can have metaphysical guilt only through being a member of a group or groups. Jaspers believes that people's identities are shaped partly through their group memberships. Who they are is determined in part by the nrious groups to which they belong, and th is is why judging that some people in a group are implicated by the actions of others in the group makes sense. The second important element of metaphysical guilt is that individuals make choices. In particular, individuals who are members of groups make choices regard­ ing the behavior of others in their groups. If others in our group are perpetuating

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harms, then we must make a choice whether to act to prevent the banns (or at least indicate disapproval of the harmful behavior), or do nothing. If we do nothing, then we fail to distance ourselves from these harms and we incur metaphysical guilt. The choice whether or not to distance ourselves from the harms which others in our group are perpetuating is also closely connected to our identity. In a sense we are choosing who to be when we make this choice. Thus, metaphysical guilt is not only based upon our actions, but it is also based upon choosing to be a particular kind of person. If I choose silence in the face of grave harms, then my choice of silence is at the same time the choice to be a certain kind of person. This is a crucial part of what enters into Jaspers 's conception of metaphysical guilt. Moral guilt is quite different. Situations exist in which people incur both moral and metaphysical guilt by choosing silence in the face of grave harms, but frequently we incur metaphysical guilt without incurring moral guilt. Jas­ pers speaks of cases in which the only way to prevent or speak out against certain harms is to risk our life. A person who chooses silence in these cases incurs metaphysical guilt. But Jaspers seems to indicate that in cases of this type moral guilt is not incurred. Metaphysical guilt and moral guilt are fre­ quently incurred jointly, but they are not always incurred jointly. From what has been said we can conclude that Jaspers envisions moral guilt as quite different from moral responsibility. Although moral guilt is not necessarily borne by people who choose silence in the face of harms, responsibility (or co­ responsibility) for every wrong or injustice in the world is shared by all of those who fail to speak out against these wrongs or injustices. Presumably, then, in many instances people's silence renders them responsible for harms brought about by others, even though they do not bear moral guilt for these harms. The extent to which responsibility is comparable to metaphysical guilt in Jaspers's thought is not clear, but it is definitely wider ranging than moral guilt. May believes that the moral concepts which come closest to metaphysical guilt are shame or taint. When a moral agent comes to bear metaphysical guilt as the result of the wrongdoing of others, the situation can be described as one in which the moral agent is tainted by the wrongdoing of others. Appiah denies that taint involves guilt, but moral guilt is what Appiah has in mind in making this denial. Metaphysical guilt, by contrast, seems to be borne in Jaspers 's scheme in the very sorts of cases where Appiah would postulate the appearance of taint. Metaphysical guilt in Jaspers's scheme is not, however, the same as Appiah 's notion of taint, for metaphysical guilt is also bound up with choosing one's identity. Our choice of whether to distance ourselves from the harmful acts of others is partly a choice of who we are. Thus, for Jaspers whether we come to bear metaphysical guilt is partly a matter of our relationship with other moral agents and partly a matter of what we have done in choosing our identity. Appiah 's notion of taint is characterized in terms of our relationship with other moral agents, and his account makes no mention of the relevance of choosing our identity. Presumably the choice of our identity can be relevant _on Appiah 's

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account; by choosing to be a certain kind of person the knife-seller will take actions, such as sending the youth to the other store, which may preclude being tainted. But its relevance is only incidental, whereas it appears to be an essential component of what for Jaspers enters into the concept of metaphysical guilt. May believes that the best way of understanding taint is to follow Jaspers 's lead. Appiah is correct to think that taint is the right concept to employ in cases where people react with silence to the harmful acts of others with whom they are associated. But May prefers as understanding of taint which also takes into account the question of who a person is. (May, 1 992, p. 1 50) Taint is best under­ stood as determined not only by what we do but also by who we choose to be. As Appiah envisions the example of the partner carrying a box of knives, the partner is tainted by the stabbing if and only if the knife used in the stabbing comes from this box. Suppose that the partner makes the choice to bring the box up at once but does not do so because the telephone begins to ring, and as a result the other partner sells the youth a knife from the top shelf behind the counter. Appiah 's view appears to be that the partner is untainted by the stabbing because the connection between the partner and the stabbing is severed (we could argue that another con­ nection exists due to the partner's profiting by the sale of the knife, but for the sake of argument assume that no other connection exists which taints the partner). May's point seems to be that more needs to be said. Although the partner's choice to bring the box up at once does not result in his actually doing so, he does make a choice. To some the choice might appear to be trivial , but those in the existentialist tradition have repeatedly urged that choices such as this are choices of who one is. The partner is choosing to be a certain kind of person, the kind of person willing to be connected with a stabbing. For this reason, follow­ ing Jaspers, May seems to suggest that the choice itself is enough to taint the partner. Regardless of whether he follows through on his choice, he is neverthe­ less tainted. (This is not to say that on May's view he is tainted by the choice no matter what; the partner could, after all, change his mind a few seconds later). The upshot of the discussion so far seems to be that Appiah 's notion of taint is very similar to Jaspers's notion of metaphysical guilt. With very few exceptions they apply to the same situations. Exceptions arise only because metaphysical guilt is borne by people who make choices of who to be, and taint presents itself only when these choices have an impact upon a person's relationship with the actions of others. May proposes to understand taint in a way which takes these choices seri­ ously. Making a choice is sufficient to be tainted by the wrongdoing of others. A second difference between Appiah's notion of taint and Jaspers's no­ tion of metaphysical guilt concerns responsibility. When a person is tainted by the wrongful acts of others, does this person bear responsibility for the resulting harms, or for not trying to prevent these harms? Appiah answers this question in the negative. Taint is a weaker notion than moral responsibility, just as it is a weaker notion than moral guilt. A person who fails to divest stock in firms doing business in South Africa might be tainted by the evils of apartheid, but on

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Appiah 's account this person cannot be judged morally responsible for the evils of apartheid, or judged to be a member of a collective which bears moral re­ sponsibility for apartheid. In this way taint marks out an area of the moral ter­ rain less serious than moral guilt or moral responsibility but more serious than total detachment or disengagement from the wrongdoing of others. Jaspers apparently sees things differently. He sees people as "co-respon­ sible" for the wrongs and injustices in the world. Not only do we bear meta­ physical guilt for many of the wrongs and injustices in the world, but we are co­ responsible for them. By "co-responsible" I take Jaspers to mean either that the perpetrators of these wrongs share responsibility with others of us or that we are all members of a collective which bears responsibility for these wrongs and injustices. Either way, Jaspers is in disagreement with Appiah. Jaspers believes that a significant difference exists between metaphysical guilt and moral guilt, but he also appears to believe that moral responsibility, in either its individual or collective variety, is as pervasive as metaphysical guilt. Unless a person does something to distance himself or herself from the wrongs and injustices of oth­ ers, the person is co-responsible for these wrongs and injustices. May is more sympathetic to the approach of Jaspers than to the approach of Appiah. He believes that moral responsibility is a part of the picture in situ­ ations where we are tainted by the actions of others. For we do not come to bear responsibility just through our actions. As was seen in the last chapter, we can be responsible for our attitudes or, in certain cases, our character traits. Thus, if we have an attitude of indifference toward the harms brought about by others, we can bear responsibility for having this attitude, even if we are not presently capable of changing the attitude. In this way, if a person fails to divest stock in firms doing business in South Africa partly because the person has an attitude of indifference toward the evils of apartheid, then on May's view the person bears responsibility for having this attitude. May is not saying that a person is responsible for the harms brought about by others. The person who is indifferent to the evils of apartheid does not come to bear responsibility for the evils of apartheid; the person is responsible only for having the attitude of indifference. Here, then, seems to be a significant difference between May and Jaspers. Jaspers believes that a person who bears metaphysical guilt for certain wrongs and injustices is also co-responsible for these wrongs and injustices, whereas May believes that metaphysical guilt does not, at least typically, bring with it responsibility for the wrongs and injustices of others: "As I construe it, metaphysical guilt only entails moral responsibility, if by 'moral responsibility' we mean responsibility for attitudes and character traits as well as for behavior." (May, 1 992, p. 1 50) Fundamental to Appiah 's notion of taint is the closeness of connection between a person and the wrongful acts of others, and he emphasizes that fre­ quently a person can influence or determine the degree of closeness. By direct­ ing the youth to the other store, the knife merchant becomes so distantly con-

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nected to the stabbing that he is no longer tainted by it. And by divesting stock in firms doing business in South Africa, we arguably remove the connecting link between ourselves and the evils of apartheid so that we are not tainted by it. May does not appear to dispute Appiah 's view that taint is tied up with the closeness of connection between a person and the wrongdoing of others. But, inspired by Jaspers 's discussion of metaphysical guilt, May wishes to suggest that Appiah 's account of taint is incomplete. It does not take into consideration the possibility of a person's being tainted as the result of making an authentic choice or having certain attitudes or character traits. Taint is determined not only by what we do but who we are. W hether we are tainted by the actions of others is not only determined by our actions, but it is also determined by our choices, attitudes, or even character traits. This extension of Appiah's account beyond the realm of overt acts to choices, attitudes, or character traits might initially appear insignificant. But here May finds an important connection between taint and responsibility. Making use of his argu­ ment that we bear responsibility for our attitudes and some of our character traits, May shows that persons tainted by the wrongdoing of others virtually always bear moral responsibility. They are not responsible for the outcome of this wrongdoing, as Jaspers seems to believe. Nor are they necessarily responsible for not trying to prevent these wrongs or for not speaking out against these wrongs. But they are responsible for choices, attitudes, or character traits which prevent them from dis­ tancing or dissociating themselves from the wrongdoing of others. We might draw ourselves away from close proximity to the wrongdoing of others by divesting our stock, declining to sell knives to someone we know will stab another, and so forth. But May believes more needs to be said. Be­ cause of our choices, attitudes, and character traits, we might, without even realizing it, continue to foster connections to these wrongs. W hen this happens we are not only tainted by the wrongdoing of others, but we bear the responsi­ bility for making the choices or having the attitudes or character traits which allow us to be tainted in this manner. Appiah connects taint with moral integ­ rity; our moral integrity is affected whenever we are tainted. On this point May appears to be in agreement. But for May taint is also intimately connected to responsibility, and here May's account departs significantly from that of Appiah. May does not speak of collective responsibility in this connection. A per­ son who is tainted as the result of choices, attitudes, or character traits bears individual responsibility for making these choices er having these attitudes or character traits. And if several people are tainted as the result of having a certain attitude, then each is responsible for having this attitude. Suppose that several people are tainted by the racial violence in their neighborhood because they have grown indifferent to it and to the harms produced by it. Then on May's view, each person is responsible for having an attitude of indifference. But so far collective responsibility has not entered the picture. On May 's view collective responsibility enters the picture when people

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should band together into groups to deal with these harms. If racial violence exists in one's neighborhood and people in the neighborhood know that they could prevent the harms it causes by taking action as a group, then that is what they ought to do. If they fail to organize themselves into a group capable of taking this action, then they bear collective responsibility for this failure. In many cases in which people are tainted by the wrongdoing of others, people can organize themselves into groups to prevent harm caused by this wrongdoing. If they fail to do so, then they are not only tainted by this wrong­ doing, but they are collectively responsible for not doing anything collectively to prevent it. At this point taint is linked with collective responsibility in the system constructed by May. People who are tainted by evil are frequently col­ lectively responsible for not forming groups to prevent it. Not everyone will believe that groups incur collective responsibility in the manner proposed by May. This feature of May's system is at odds with the Western tradition, and May is perfectly aware that persuading people that this is the correct way to think about what we should do to prevent harms caused by others will be difficult. I suspect most people will find Appiah's account of taint reasonable pre­ cisely because it does not make responsibility a consequence of taint. Accepting the idea that we can be tainted by the wrongdoing of others and accepting the idea that we bear responsibility as a result of what others have done are quite different. Jaspers goes the furthest in ascribing responsibility in these situations. We are, according to him, co-responsible for the wrongs and injustices of the world, or at least those that are known to us or which we have not attempted to prevent. On this view we are apparently co.:.responsible for the evils of apartheid, whether or not we divest our stock in firms which do business in South Africa Perhaps, then, co­ responsibility is even wider in its effects for Jaspers than metaphysical guilt. Most people will not find this view of responsibility plausible. May has at­ tempted to capture the key insights of social existentialism while presenting an account of responsibility less extravagant than that of Jaspers. The result is a view which assigns responsibility to people for making choices or having attitudes or character traits which prevent them from distancing or dissociating themselves from evil. Moreover, incurring collective responsibility for the failure to organize into groups is possible. I believe most people will see May's account as far more plau­ sible than that of Jaspers, and many may be persuaded to accept May's conclusions. Still, Appiah's view seems to come closest to capturing the intuitions of the Western tradition of moral philosophy. Some from this tradition will resist the notion of taint, a notion which strikes them as a vestige of ideas from primi­ tive or superstitious approaches to moral thinking. But for those who find the notion of taint useful in capturing certain of our moral intuitions Appiah's view will likely be appealing. A good recent illustration is Hudson's discussion of vegetarianism. (Hudson, 1993, pp. 10 1- 102) Appiah believes that when we are tainted by evil our moral integrity is adversely affected. People commonly feel this way about evil that is close at

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hand, even if it is not of their own making. The wrongful acts of one's spouse, sibling, or co-worker sometimes appear to strike at our own moral integrity in a way that goes far beyond embarrassment or damage to our reputation. We feel a type of moral involvement in these acts that is hard to explain with the catego­ ries and concepts of traditional moral philosophy. The notion of taint is de­ signed to provide at least part of the explanation for these feelings. Some will object that these feelings are irrational or have grown out of faulty teachings about the automatic transmission of guilt or other superstitious ideas. Others might object that we have these feelings only on occasions when someone very close to us commits a wrongdoing of extraordinary proportions and that our feelings about the effects on our moral integrity certainly do not extend to all of the cases that Appiah 's account would identify as taint. Appiah says almost nothing about feelings which are associated with taint. He claims that taint affects our moral integrity, but he says nothing which commits him to the view that people inevitably feel that their moral integrity is affected when they are tainted by the wrongdoing of others. People do sometimes have strong feelings that their moral integrity is affected by the wrongdoing of others, and this can be taken as conferring some legitimacy on Appiah 's theory. But Appiah 's theory is not dependent on the existence of these feelings. On the contrary, he believes that taint can occur when one has no realization or awareness of it. How does Appiah view the relationship between taint and collective re­ sponsibility? He does not offer any direct answer to this question, but on the basis of everything he says I will describe an answer which I believe captures the spirit of his views. Recall the example of the gang members who are carry­ ing out a resolve to stab a member of a rival gang. Suppose that the leader of this gang makes the decision to stab this member and then stabs the victim. The leader of the gang is the likeliest candidate for bearing moral responsibility for the victim's death. If anyone is responsible for the victim's death, it is the leader. Is anyone else morally responsible for the victim's death? Another prime candidate is the youth who buys a knife from a nearby store. To the extent that this youth is purchasing the knife with the intent that it will be used as a weapon of violence, responsibility can plausibly be assigned to him. No doubt he should be assigned a degree of responsibility less than that assigned to the leader of the gang, but he nevertheless bears responsibility for the victim's death. Whether responsibility should be assigned to other members of the gang will depend largely on their involvement. Some members of the gang will come to bear individual responsibility for the victim's death, but perhaps others will not. Suppose some members feel that the member of the rival gang should not be stabbed, but they do not wish to risk their good standing in the gang by registering any disapproval. They simply stand by and watch the events take place without an active involvement in these events. Those who acknowledge non-distributive collective responsibility will, I believe, find members such as these to be paradigm examples of people who do not bear individual responsi-

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bility for a result but who nevertheless belong to a collective which i s respon­ sible for this result. They strongly disapprove of stabbing the victim and do nothing to assist in it, and for this reason they are not strong candidates for bearing individual responsibility. But since these gang members acquiesce in the actions of the group through their strong desire not to jeopardize their good standing in the group, strong grounds exist for arguing that they are part of a collective responsible for the victim's death. Appiah may or may not agree that these gang members belong to such a collective. The point I emphasize is that �aint is of a lesser order of seriousness than collective responsibility. The gang members who acquiesce in the gang's actions are more seriously involved in the wrongdoing than those who are simply tainted by it. Some bear individual responsibility for a harm, some belong to a collective which bears responsibility for the harm, and finally some are simply tainted by the harm. We can think of these degrees of involvement as something like concentric circles around the harm, and taint can be thought of as affecting those who are in the circle beyond that of non-distributive collective responsibility. Taint is the lowest grade of moral involvement in evil, and the circle beyond taint will therefore embrace those with no moral involvement in evil at all. In the example of the gang members we can identify persons whose differing grades of involvement in the stabbing place them at differing points in this system of concentric circles. At the center is the leader of the gang, followed (but not nec­ essarily in a different circle) by gang members who willingly assist in one way or another, followed by gang members who merely view the proceedings, and so forth. If Appiah is right, then the merchant carrying the box of knives up the stairs (if he does so promptly) is in the circle corresponding to taint, and others will be placed in the outermost circle corresponding to total non-involvement. I believe that this is roughly how Appiah thinks of taint in its relationship with responsibility, and this is how I propose to think about taint. To be tainted by the wrongdoing of others is to have an involvement with the wrongdoing not serious enough to warrant membership in a collective, if one exists, which bears responsi­ bility for the effects of the wrongdoing (or for not preventing it or speaking out against it). Nor, as Appiah argues, is this involvement serious enough to warrant the judgment that a person bears moral guilt. Shame seems to be the appropriate re­ sponse to the fact that we are tainted by this wrongdoing, a shame for our own connection to the wrongdoing. Our sense of moral integrity is affected by taint, though we do not always feel that our moral integrity is affected, and shame is an appropriate response to this kind of assault on our moral integrity. Some might find it unfair that we can be tainted by the crimes of our parent or other family members to whom we have never actually chosen to be connected. When we are tainted by the actions of a spouse or a close friend, then we at least know that we have chosen this spouse or friend and that whatever adverse impact on our moral integrity takes place, in a sense it is partly deserved. But how can the taint which results from a parent's wrongdoing be deserved?

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This is an important and difficult question, and how it is answered will have a great deal to do with how reasonable a person finds the concept of taint. Some might feel that the fact that we are sometimes tainted by the wrongdoing of others who happen to be connected to us, often in totally fortuitous ways, is a cruel fact of life. In most cases we have done nothing to deserve being tainted, but that is pre­ cisely why taint is contrasted with responsibility. Perhaps being judged responsible for something over which we have no control (depending upon how the notion of control is unpacked) is not fair, but the same is not true of taint. The trouble with this line of argument is that it depicts taint as something over which people generally have little or no control. Often we have little or no control over the behavior of other people, and often we have little or no control over the degree to which we are connected to other people who engage in harm­ ful behavior. But we should not exaggerate our helplessness in the avoidance of being tainted by what others do. Just as we can prevent ourselves from incurring responsibility for a harm or from being a member of a collective responsible for a harm by taking certain actions, the same is true with taint. In Appiah 's various examples taint is avoided by declining to sell the youth a knife, by not carrying the box of knives upstairs right away, and by divesting shares of stock in certain companies. People are not powerless to dissociate themselves from those who do evil. Severing our association with a family member or close relative is more difficult. But even here we are not powerless. Some people will have nothing to do with a parent or sibling who engages in criminal or grossly immoral behav­ ior. As a result, they are presumably beyond the reach of taint, and their moral integrity need not be affected in any way by the actions of their family member. Here we might recall May's discussion of taint in connection with choices, attitudes, and character traits. Whether or not we are tainted by what others do is determined by who we are as well as by what we do. And if we can be tainted by who we choose to be, then we can avoid taint by who we choose to be. Suppose we choose to initiate a course of action which will dissociate us from the evil actions of another person, but circumstances arise which make this course of action impossible. We have then arguably made a choice to be a cer­ tain kind of person, one who will not be associated with the evil in question, even though we cannot follow through on this choice. In such a case we have presumably avoided the taint of this evil wholly on the strength of this choice. In general, therefore, we are not helpless in the matter of being tainted by the wrongdoing of others. Typically people come to be tainted by this wrongdo­ ing because they allow themselves to be tainted; they decline to take steps to remove themselves from connections to the wrongdoing of others. People's in­ tuitions may differ as to whether and when we are helpless to avoid being tainted by what others do. But I believe that if cases exist in which we are completely helpless in avoiding taint, these cases are relatively rare.

Eight AVOIDING MEMBERSHIP IN COLLECTIVES The previous chapter concluded with a discussion of avoiding taint. From a moral point of view, not being tainted by evil is better than being tainted by evil. Conse­ quently, removing ourselves from taint is' something morally good. Doing so has a positive moral status, other things being equal, whereas allowing ourselves to be tainted has a negative moral status. Similar remarks hold true of collective responsibility. From a moral point of view we are better off not being members of a collective responsible for harm, and hence removing ourselves from actual or potential membership in such a collective is something morally good. A positive moral status attaches to removing ourselves, other things being equal, whereas allowing ourselves to be members has a negative moral status. (The phrase "other things being equal" is necessary because our motives for removing ourselves may be evil). People do not normally wish to be tainted by the evildoing of others or to be members of a collective responsible for a harmful result. Thus, some incen­ tive always exists for removing ourselves from the possibility of taint or mem­ bership in a collective responsible for a harmful result. The trouble is, removing ourselves from the possibility of taint or membership in a collective is frequently difficult. Thus, all things considered, a moral agent might prefer the moral stigma that comes with taint or membership in a collective to the positive moral status that comes with being removed. The price of removal may be too high. Discussions of collective responsibility seldom address the issue of removing ourselves from actual or potential membership in collectives. With rare exceptions (McGary, 1 986, p. 163), emphasis is almost always on the opposite issue of how our behavior does or does not succeed in qualifying us for membership. In this chapter I discuss two ways in which moral agents can avoid membership in a collective which bears responsibility for a particular harm: by dissociating themselves from the collective and by causing the harm not to occur. I urge that the issue of avoiding membership in collectives is intimately connected to the concept of moral obliga­ tion, for one of the central issues in avoiding membership is whether we are morally required to do so. I argue that, although sometimes we are obliged to dissociate ourselves from a collective or to prevent a harm from occurring, we are not always obliged. In some cases our doing so qualifies as supererogatory, and in other cases our doing so qualifies as something we ought to do in a sense of "ought" less force­ ful than moral obligation. We remove ourselves from membership in a collective by doing what is nec­ essary to dissociate ourselves from a collective of which we are already members.

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And we remove ourselves from potential membership in a collective by doing what is necessary to prevint ourselves from be�o�ng �em�rs of the collective. In the following discussio, I concentrate upon situations m which our reasons for remov­ ing ourselves from actual or potential membership are, at least in part, to avoid being members of a collective which has or is expected to bear moral responsibility for a harm. Thus, we might terminate our membership in an association which has begun to embrace racially discriminatory policies, or we might decide not to seek membership in such an association in the first place. Not being a member of such collectives is better, other things being equal, and we might think that very little more needs to be said on the topic. However, a moment's reflection will reveal that in some types of situations removing our­ selves from membership is more important than in others. In some situations people are morally required to dissociate themselves from membership in a particular collective, and in other situations, or so I shall argue, they are not. An examination of the differences between these situations will help shed light upon the relation between individual moral agents and the collectives in which they come to be members. The discussion of this chapter illustrates that we can arrive at a better understanding of the concept of collective responsibility by taking note of the variety of ways in which the failure of moral agents to disso­ ciate themselves from collectives is open to moral appraisal. In many instances we have a moral duty or obligation (I shall use these terms interchangeably) to remove ourselves from membership in a collective or to refrain from becoming a member of a collective. Quite possibly we have a moral duty or obligation to terminate our membership in an association which has begun to embrace racially discriminatory policies. We have an even clearer obligation to dissociate ourselves from an association which has begun to per­ form secret acts of violence upon members of certain minorities. If we know that the association is engaged in this type of violence, we have an obligation to refrain from membership in it. Thus, our becoming a member of an association known to be engaged in this type of violence is morally forbidden. Perhaps in some situations a person ought to remain a member of a col­ lective engaged in harmful behavior and seek to work from within to change this behavior. But frequently bringing about change from within is not pos­ sible, and our moral obligation is to sever our connections with the collective. Moral obligation is standardly understood as the strictest or most stringent of the demands of morality, and among these demands are the demands to become dissociated from a collective. Few would deny that sometimes our moral obligation is to sever our con­ nections with a collective which is known to be responsible for a harm, but this is not always the case. In some situations we have no moral duty or obligation to dissociate ourselves from a collective, even in cases where no hope exists of bringing about change in the collective from within. In particular, situations exist in which withdrawing from a collective would be morally praiseworthy

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but not morally obligatory. Recall Appiah's example involving the members of a gang stabbing a member of a rival gang. Imagine that a member of the gang reacts to the stab­ bing as follows: "Being a member of this gang has been good in many ways, but what is about to happen is totally wrong. As much as I value membership in this gang, I cannot stand by and watch my fellow gang members stab a human being to death. If I stand by and watch this happen, then I am implicated in the stab­ bing. What I must do, therefore, is try to convince the others that they should not stab the rival gang member. If they 90 not listen, then I simply cannot main­ tain membership in this gang. Actually, all I must do is try to convince the oth­ ers not to proceed; doing so wil1 . .'�t guarantee my expulsion from the gang." For the sake of the discussion, assume that criminal prosecution is not an issue. Appiah's descnpuon of the example makes clear that the police will ar­ rive on the scene long after the gang members have left the scene of the crime. Imagine that the gang member in the preceding paragraph is motivated by moral reasons and not in any way by the avoidance of punishment. The gang member makes a large sacrifice by leaving the gang. Membership is something he values highly ;.' · "or him to say nothing and retain his membership in the gang is tempting. Givin0 ..J:' membership in the gang for moral reasons is not easy for him to do. As most people discover relatively early in life, doing what is morally right often requires making significant personal sacrifices. Because of the sacrifice he makes, his deciding to speak out against the stabbing can be described as morally praiseworthy. Deciding to do what is right when the cost is significant deserves moral praise. This decision is a paradigm of something which is deserving of moral praise. Thus, given that the gang member's decision will remove him from the collective which incurs moral responsibility, terminating membership in a collective responsible for harm is something which can be morally praiseworthy. Moving to the more difficult question of whether the gang member has a moral duty or obligation to remove himself from the collective bearing moral responsibility for the stabbing, intuitions may vary. He might seem to have a moral duty to do so because doing so is the right thing. He knows that a member of a rival gang will be stabbed and, although he knows that he can do nothing to prevent the stabbing, he must not allow himself to be a part of this horrible state of affairs. His duty is to inform the others that what they are doing is immoral. But some might argue that he doesn't have a duty to sever his connections with the gang. For him to do so would be praiseworthy, but given the enormous cost to him together with the fact that he can do nothing to change the outcome, he may not have a moral duty to remove himself from the gang. This point may be made more convincing with a slight revision of the example. Suppose that any member of the gang who questions the judgment of the leader or in any way attempts to renounce membership in the gang will be in danger of his life. The g�ng member under consideration knows that he will be 1

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stabbed alongside the rival gang member if he makes any protests or tries in any way to dissociate himself from the gang. . In this revised example, judging that the gang member has a moral obh­ gation to attempt to remove himself from the gang is not reasonable. He is allowing himself to be implicated in a grossly immoral act by remaining silent, and without question the morally superior course of conduct would be the he­ roic one of protesting. But when a person's very life is at stake, we would be hard pressed to judge that protesting is obligatory. Perhaps circumstances exist in which the sacrificing of a person's life for a good end is morally obligatory, but in the case under consideration this is dubious. Even if the gang member were able to save the rival gang member from being stabbed through his pro­ test, judging that his doing so is obligatory is far from clear. The position I defend is that we can remove ourselves from membership in a collective which is responsible for a harmful result in a way that is both morally praiseworthy and yet not morally obligatory. Stated another way. the position I am defending is that in many instances we need not have any duty or obligation to remove ourselves from a collective which is responsible for a harm­ ful result, even though doing so would be morally praiseworthy. If situations of this type are possible, they are cases in which removing ourselves from a col­ lective is beyond duty or beyond the call of duty. In these cases removing our­ selves would be morally praiseworthy and beyond what duty requires of us. The concept of supererogation is sometimes characterized in terms of going above and beyond the call of duty. When a person performs an act of superero­ gation, the person can be said to act in a way which goes beyond the require­ ments of duty. More precisely, an act of supererogation is one in which the performance of the act is commendable or praiseworthy and yet not obligatory. A person is not required by duty to perform an act of supererogation, and yet ' performing the act is praiseworthy. Performing an act of supererogation ex­ ceeds the requirements of duty. Acts of supererogation are not, however, the only type of acts which can be described as acts of going beyond the call of duty or obligation, for to qualify as an act of supererogation a further condition must be met. In addition to being an act whose performance is praiseworthy but not obligatory, acts of superero­ gation are standardly described as acts which are not blameworthy to omit. Not only do we not violate duty by omitting a potential act of supererogation, but our omission is not even morally blameworthy (Mellema, 1991 , pp. 17ff.). Thus, three conditions must be met for an act to qualify as an act of supererogation. First, its performance is not obligatory. Second, its perfonnance is morally praise­ worthy. Third, its omission is not morally blameworthy. Consider again the example in which the gang member knows that he will be stabbed to death if he protests the stabbing of the rival gang member or takes any steps to dissociate himself from the gang. As presented, I believe his pro­ testing qualifies as an act of supererogation. First, he has no duty or obligation

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to protest, given the sacrifice which is involved. Second, if he nevertheless does protest, �is doing so . would be praiseworthy. Third, we could not reasonably blame him for not domg so. Agam, not doing so is tantamount to preserving his life, and seeing how he could fairly be blamed for not putting his life in jeop­ ardy, especially when there is no opportunity to prevent harm to another, is exceptionally hard. At least two questions can be raised concerning the claim that the gang member 's protest qualifies as an act of supererogation. First, if his protest is known to result in his being stabbed, h?w can it qualify as praiseworthy? How can the sacrifice of a person's life be' praiseworthy when nothing good will come of it? The answer is that standing up for what is right is worthy of praise no matter what results are achieved. Standing up for what we believe is right is itself a good result. Either way, it is worthy of praise. The situation is compli­ cated when others are dependent upon us, but in the case under consideration we can assume that these complications do not arise. Second, do we not have an obligation as moral agents to do that which is morally praiseworthy and to refrain from what is morally blameworthy? And if this is true, how can the gang member have no moral obligation to protest? If his protesting really is morally praiseworthy, then isn't his protesting something he ought to do? This question is more difficult to answer, for it challenges whether acts of supererogation are ever possible. A fair number of philosophers and theolo­ gians are convinced that doing that what is IJlOrally praiseworthy or meritorious is always obligatory, and hence on their view we can never act in a way which goes beyond the demands of duty. No matter how praiseworthy our actions are, performing them is simply the fulfillment of duty or obligation. Elsewhere I have considered at length these anti-supererogationist senti­ ments and the various Kantian, utilitarian, and prescriptivist positions which lead philosophers to embrace them, as well as the views about God's demands upon his moral creatures which have shaped theologians' reasons for rejecting the possibility of supererogation (Mellema, 1991 , pp. 43ff.). Offering a decisive argument for the conclusion that acts of supererogation are possible is extremely difficult, as is convincing those of the opposite persuasion that they are mis­ taken in rejecting the possibility of supererogation. Hence, for the purposes of this discussion I will be content with a more modest claim: If acts of superero­ gation are possible, then the protest of the gang member is an act of supereroga­ tion. If going beyond the demands of duty or obligation is possible, then we can reasonably judge that the protest of the gang member is an instance of going beyond the demands of obligation. Nevertheless, the gang member is still a member of the gang, and hence he is a member of a collective which bears responsibility for the stabbing of the rival gang member. Unless he takes steps to dissociate himself from the group, he remains a member of this collective. Therefore, he appears to be in the posi-

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tion of having to choose whether to retain membership in a collective respon­ sible for the stabbing of the rival gang member or to perform an act of superero­ gation, an act which will almost certainly result in his own death. Some might argue that a person's liability for membership in a collective responsible for a harmful result is dissolved when the cost of leaving the collec­ tive is too high. But this member willingly joined the gang with the awareness, let us suppose, that the gang engages in acts of violence and that members of the gang dissociate themselves from membership from the gang only at great risk to their lives. Having known in advance that membership in the gang is of this nature, this member of the gang can plausibly be counted as a member of the collective which bears responsibility. However, this is not to say that the gang member bears individual responsibility for the stabbing of the rival gang mem­ ber. If he is genuinely opposed to the stabbing, this may count as strong grounds for arguing that he escapes individual responsibility for the stabbing. But unless he voices this opposition to the leadership of the gang, he has not clearly suc­ ceeded in dissociating himself from the collective responsible for the stabbing. To summarize, I have argued that one of the ways in which we can re­ move ourselves from membership in a collective responsible for a harm is to perform an act of supererogation. The performance of such an act is morally praiseworthy but not obligatory, and its omission is not morally blameworthy. Acts of supererogation are sometimes described as acts in which agents go be­ yond the requirements of duty, and hence the position I am advocating can be described by saying that removing ourselves from a collective responsible for a harm is sometimes beyond the call of duty. Thinking of the moral concepts of obligation and responsibility as related in this manner may seem peculiar. We might have expected that obligation will always direct us away from becoming morally responsibility for harms, but I have argued that this is not the case with regard to collective responsibility. Another way to guarantee that we are not members of a collective respon­ sible for a harm is to prevent the harm from occurring. A fundamental truth about moral responsibility is that no one can bear retrospective moral responsi­ bility for a state of affairs which never occurs. Thus, a person cannot bear moral responsibility for murdering a man who is still alive. Nor can we bear moral responsibility for a state of affairs which has occurred prior to our intentions or actions designed to bring it about. Bearing moral responsibility for murdering a man who is already dead is impossible, and this is true even if the man is be­ lieved by the would-be murderer to be alive. In the same way, a collective can­ not bear moral responsibility for a state of affairs which has not occurred or for a state of affairs which has occurred prior to any member's intending it or acting to bring it about. Sometimes people find themselves in a position to prevent another person from experiencing a harm, and sometimes the people who are in a position to prevent harm constitute a collective. I shall assume without argument that we

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sometimes have a moral obligation to step forward to prevent another from experiencing a harm, and this is true even in cases where others are likewise in a position to prevent it. The following is an example in which a person does not have a moral obligation to do so and in which the person's doing so arguably qualifies as supererogatory. Suppose that several people who happen to be pass­ ing through the lobby of a public building know that the only way an armed thief can be dissuaded from brutally beating and robbing an elderly woman i·s for someone to give him fifty dollars for a drug fix. Several of us in the lobby have, and are known by each other to h';lve, fifty dollars in our possession. Thus, each of us with fifty dollars is in a position to prevent harm to the woman. If none of us steps forward with fifty dollars and the woman is subse­ quently beaten and robbed, then we can reasonably judge that the collective consisting of those with fifty dollars is morally responsible for not preventing her assault. And if this is correct, then any member of the collective is in a position to prevent the entire collective from bearing responsibility for the woman's assault. Any one of us is capable of preventing a harm whose occur­ rence would render the entire collective responsible. Is preventing the harm from occurring morally obligatory for the members? As one of the people with fifty dollars in my possession, is my moral duty to step forward with fifty dollars? Some might answer this question in the affirmative on the grounds that if a person can prevent a fellow human being from being assaulted through the simple expedient of giving fifty dollars to the assaulter, then the person has a moral duty to do so. To tum our back upon such a human being would be an egregious violation of moral duty, other things being equal. But some might contend that other things are not equal. If I were the only person in the lobby with fifty dollars in my possession, then we could make a strong case for the claim that my moral duty is to give fifty dollars to the assaulter. But others are present who are known by myself and each other to be in a posi­ tion to prevent the assault from taking place, and this arguably changes the situation dramatically. For suppose that my moral duty is to give fifty dollars to the assaulter. Then the same is true of each of the other bystanders in a position to do the same. But supposing that each of us has this moral duty seems false. For if one of the other bystanders hands over fifty dollars to the thief, thereby allegedly fulfilling his or her duty to do so, judging that I fail in my duty to hand fifty dollars to the thief would be unreasonable. Perhaps the collective consisting of the bystanders in a position to act has a moral duty to hand over fifty dollars to the thief. Moreover, each bystander might have a moral duty to try to organize with the others into a group for the purpose of deciding how to deal with the problem at hand. But judging that each of us, or any of us, has a duty to hand fifty dollars to the thief is implausible. Hence my failure to perform this act does not constitute a failure to fulfil a moral obligation. Torbjom Tannsjo states much the same point as follows: "Even if it is true that you and I constitute a group of people who together ought to do

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something, it does not follow that each of us ought to 'do his share' . . . .To think otherwise is to commit a mistake in deontic logic." And regarding the possibil­ ity of collective wrongdoing in these situations he states, " . . . Sometimes . . . when each person is doing a permissible action, they are all, together, collec­ tively doing something wrong" (Tannsjo, 1989, pp. 223-224). Is my stepping forward with fifty dollars an act which is morally praise­ worthy? Some might feel that under the circumstances my stepping forward is something which in some sense I am expected to do. If so, then I am in no position to anticipate that such an action will tum out to merit praise. I am merely doing what any caring or reasonable person would do to save the woman from being assaulted. Nevertheless, this line of reasoning does not do justice to the communal di­ mension of the situation. As a group I and the other bystanders can be expected to hand fifty dollars to the thief. But can I be expected to do so? Suppose once again that another bystander performs this action. Could people reasonably express disap­ pointment in me for not being the one to step forward with fifty dollars? A family member or close friend may conceivably offer such a verdict. But even if we could reasonably expect a close friend or family member to have been the one to step forward, does this show that such an act could not qualify as morally praiseworthy or meritorious? Under the circumstances, handing over the fifty dollars might not be praiseworthy to a high degree. But it may be praise­ worthy to a modest or minimal degree. Holding that nothing is at all good or worthy of praise in what I did from a moral point of view would be unreason­ ably harsh. Although others could have done so, I am the one who steps forward on behalf of an elderly woman who is a perfect stranger to me. Surely my doing so warrants at least a modest or minimal degree of moral praise. So far I have argued that my stepping forward with fifty dollars is not morally obligatory but yet praiseworthy to at least a modest or minimal degree. To qualify as an act of supererogation a third condition must also obtain: the omission of the act is not morally blameworthy. If I omitted to step forward with fifty dollars, would the omission be morally blameworthy? First, those of us in a position to hand fifty dollars to the thief are morally blameworthy as a group if we all fail to act. Earlier I defended the claim that we form a collective which is responsible for failing to prevent the woman from being assaulted if we fail to act, and from this claim we can infer that we are blameworthy as a collective if we all fail to act. In the event that the woman is beaten and robbed, someone, the author of a newspaper editorial, for example, could appropriately blame us for not preventing the outcome. But whether I can be singled out as blameworthy for what happens can be determined only by looking at my particular circumstances. If I were a very wealthy individual, and if everyone gathered in the lobby knows that the loss of fifty dollars would be negligible for me and not for any­ one else, then my failure could justly be singled out as a blameworthy omission

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(and perhaps this is the case even if another steps forward with fifty dollars). But suppose instead that I am a person of very modest means and I neverthe]ess hand over fifty do11ars. Imagine that my doing so is a great financial sacrifice, and as a result I will have virtua1ly no money for groceries until my next pay­ check. Under such conditions the cJaim that for me not to act would be morally blameworthy is highly dubious, especially if I know that others of the bystand­ ers can easily afford the loss of fifty dollars. In such a scenario the failure of all of us to act may leave us morally blameworthy as a group, but my own omission could not fairly be judged to be a blameworthy omission. On the contrary, for me to step forward with fifty dollars under these circumstances would be praise­ worthy to more than just a modest or minimal degree. I have argued that an individual can prevent an entire collective from bearing responsibility for a harm by preventing the harm from occurring. Frequently indi­ viduals have a moral obligation to prevent such harms from occurring, but for one to act in this manner is not always obligatory. In particular, preventing these harms sometimes qualifies as supererogatory. Because collectives often incur moral re­ sponsibility as a result of the inaction of its members, the mora] status of those who step forward in an effort to prevent harms from occurring is important to assess. Many judge that for the members of a collective to act in this manner is always morally obligatory. For reasons already indicated, I believe this is an overly harsh verdict, and I believe that one who embraces this verdict will likely be led to em­ brace a distorted view of collective responsibility as well. A main theme of this chapter is that removing ourselves from a collective which is morally responsible for a harm is not always morally obligatory. So far we have concentrated upon supererogation as a type of human action which is non-obligatory. However, other types of actions are by definition non-obliga­ tory, and in this section I call attention to another category of human actions which has been the object of much attention in recent years. Taking account of these actions will promote a better understanding of ways in which individuals stand in relation to collectives which bear moral responsibility. Aurel Kolnai argues that, while forgiveness is not morally obligatory, moral agents frequently have what he calls a "quasi-obligation" to forgive oth­ ers. When people have a quasi-obligation to forgive, they are not morally obliged to forgive. Yet Kolnai emphasizes that whether or not they forgive is not a mat­ ter which is merely optional from a moral point of view (Kolnai, 1973, p. 105). Traditional deontic categories do not accommodate acts which, though they do not qualify as obligatory, are nevertheless morally sub-standard or blame­ worthy to omit. But philosophers have increasingly recognized this category of acts. In addition to Kolnai, these inc1ude Claudia Card, Neera Badhwar, and John Whelan. Here I explain some of the motivation for holding that such acts are possible, and my suggestion is that they shed further light on the moral status of those who prevent collectives from incurring responsibility for harms by preventing these harms from occurring.

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Kolnai and the others have been attracted to the idea of a moral "ought" which is less demanding than moral obligation in part because they feel that a strictly anti-supererogationist approach makes unreasonable demands. Some would say that we are violating duty by relaxing at the end of a hard day's work when we could be spending our evening hours promoting more good in the world, but they would be mistaken. In general, to hold that whatever is morally good or praiseworthy is inevitably obligatory is unreasonable. We must, however, avoid falling into the trap of regarding all non-obligatory actions which have positive moral status as merely optional. Marcia Baron employs the term "yuppie ethics" to describe such an approach to morality: "I have done 'my duty' . . . now my time, my choices, are all mine. . . . Any other attention to morality is, for me, strictly optional" (Baron, 1987, p. 249). A person may be tempted to assume that no moral expectations exist beyond the requirements of duty if the person regards going out of his or her way to benefit others as too troublesome. Thus, we may be tempted to conclude that we need do nothing beyond the bare fulfillment of moral duty. If we acknowledge good but non-obligatory acts, perhaps we run the risk of encouraging this attitude. Kant expresses a related concern. If we promote the idea that morally praiseworthy acts can fall outside the realm of moral duty, then perhaps we encourage feelings of pride or smug self-satisfaction among those who nevertheless perform such acts. Thus, we must likewise be aware that the attitude described by Baron may encourage viewing the performance of supereroga­ tory acts in a smug or self-righteous fashion. The approach of Kolnai might be appealing in the light of these concerns. Advocates of his approach avoid the unreasonable demands of an anti­ supererogationist position by acknowledging that acts can be both good or praise­ worthy to perform and permissible to omit. But this approach allows that omit­ ting a non-obligatory act which has a positive moral status is frequently bad or blameworthy. Thus, a person will find that his or her inaction is frequently open to criticism if he or she never goes beyond the minimum demands of duty. The moral life has expectations which go beyond the stark demands of duty. And if omitting praiseworthy acts is frequently blameworthy, we have less justification for indulging ourselves in smug self-satisfaction when we do perform them. Quasi-obligation might therefore appear to be an attractive basis upon which to construct a position which is neither too demanding nor too lenient. Kolnai believes that when someone who has offended a person subse­ quently has a change of heart, we have a quasi-obligation to forgive. We do not have a strict obligation to forgive the offender, but doing so is more than merely optional. Claudia Card argues that we ought sometimes to show mercy to an offender, even though we have no moral duty or obligation to do so (Card, 1972, p. 184). Card does not describe what we ought to do as quasi-obligation, but the idea is the same as described by Kolnai. Showing mercy is not always morally optional. We ought morally to do it, even though we have no moral duty or obligation to do it.

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Neera Badhwar finds this phenomenon in the context of friendship. By the very nature of friendship, we ought morally to do some things for the sake of a friend which we have no moral obligation to do. Friendship brings with it certain expectations upon moral agents, such as a willingness to make unpleas­ ant sacrifices for the sake of a friend, and Badhwar believes that these are things we ought to do (Badhwar, 1985, p. 126). Finally, John Whelan finds examples of these acts in many ordinary situ­ ations (Whelan, 1991, pp. 151-152): holding the door open for someone carry­ ing a large package when doing so is e.�sily within your power, deciding not to tell a true but embarrassing story you have heard twelfth hand about another person, and expressing gratitude toward another person who has gone out of his or her way to do a favor for you. Whelan argues that if a moral agent ought to do something but is not morally obligated to do it, then no one can rightly argue that the agent is required to do it. However, the agent can still be expected to do it and be subject to moral criticism for failing to do so. All of these writers agree that some moral expectations are not generated by duty or obligation. Though they are not morally obligatory, these acts are nevertheless morally blameworthy to omit. Kolnai calls them acts of quasi-obli­ gation. The others employ the "ought" locution to describe them: we ought (morally) to perform them, even though they are not obligatory. But they appear to agree that such acts are possible, despite the fact that traditional deontic cat­ egories do not acknowledge them. For present purposes let us assume that acts of quasi-obligation are pos­ sible. I now argue that they allow for the possibility of an important middle alternative to the approaches described in this chapter. No doubt some will main­ tain that I have a moral obligation to hand fifty dollars to the assaulter, and hence that I am morally required to do so. Others may hold that my handing fifty dollars to the assaulter is supererogatory; doing so is very commendable, but no blame whatever attaches to my failing to do so. However, some may be dissatisfied with both of these responses. The first response makes my handing over fifty dollars a moral requirement, and the second response makes my handing over fifty dollars purely optional. Suppose that the loss of fifty dollars is not particularly difficult or troublesome for me. Can we not picture my handing over the fifty dollars as something which I should do in a sense of "should" less stringent than moral duty or obligation? The notion of quasi-obligation offers the resources for those who are inclined to answer this question in the affirmative. If we judge that a member of the collec­ tive should act but is not morally required to do so, then we can employ quasi­ obligation to describe the moral status of this member (and presumably others of the members as well). If a person has a quasi-obligation to act in a particular way, then for the person to act in this way cannot be supererogatory. The failure to perform a quasi-obligatory act is morally blameworthy, but omitting a potential act of su-

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pererogation can never be blameworthy as such. What quasi-obligation and su­ pererogation have in common is that neither is morally obligatory, but they differ in the fact that acts of quasi-obligation are blameworthy to omit and acts of supererogation are not. Because an act of quasi-obligation is blameworthy to omit, such an act cannot be optional. Other things being equal, an agent can be expected to perform an act of quasi-obligation. Having the concept of quasi-obligation to describe the status of those who prevent a collective from bearing responsibility for a harm by removing the harm is helpful. Stepping forward to remove a harm for which a collective could be held responsible is frequently obligatory, even if others are likewise capable of removing it. On other occasions acting to remove such a harm is supereroga­ tory. But a middle alternative is also possible: acting to remove the harm is not morally required of us, and yet the failure to do so is something for which we can justly be blamed. From a moral point of view more urgency for us to act is present than in situations where our acting qualifies as supererogatory, but we are not required to act. Although Kolnai, Card, Badhwar, and Whelan do not specifically discuss situations in which individuals prevent collectives from bearing responsibility, the type of act they are describing is helpful in analyzing the status of those who are faced with the decision whether to take action in these situations. In some cases judging that these individuals are duty-bound to take action is unreason­ able, and yet for them to take action is more than just optional. If we follow the suggestion of these philosophers, we can describe the situation of these indi­ viduals as something mid-way between these alternatives. These individuals are not duty-bound to act, but for them to refrain is morally blameworthy. To summarize, an individual can prevent a harm from occurring and thereby prevent a collective from bearing responsibility for it in a variety of ways. Some­ times an individual has a moral obligation to do so, and hence the individual's preventing the harm from occurring is morally required. I have argued that pre­ venting a harm from occurring is not always morally obligatory. In some situa­ tions preventing the harm from occurring is supererogatory; doing so is praise­ worthy but not obligatory, and omitting to do so is morally blameworthy. Fi­ nally, if we take seriously the suggestion of Kolnai, Card, Badhwar, and Whelan, we can hold that preventing the harm from occurring is not obligatory but nev­ ertheless blameworthy to omit (and hence not supererogatory). In a sense we ought to prevent the harm from occurring, but our doing so is not a moral re­ quirement. In the next chapter I discuss some additional connections between these concepts and collective responsibility.

Nine

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY' OBLIGATION, AND BLAME In this chapter I explore more fully some of the connections between collective responsibility, obligation, and blame in the hope that considerable light can be shed on collective responsibility by examining these connections. In the first section I show that the controversy between those who believe that the responsibility borne by a collective invariably distributes to its various members and those who believe it does not is intimately tied to a somewhat different controversy regarding the nature of moral obligation. An awareness of thi� intimate tie may lead us to re-examine our convictions regarding whether the responsibility of collectives distributes to its mem­ bers, and my suggestion is that such an awareness will likely confer plausibility upon the view that in some situations the responsibility of a collective does not distribute to all of its members. Subsequently I describe an analogy between a series of potential acts by members of a collective and a series of potential acts by a single individual over an interval of time, an analogy having the notions of obligation and blame as essential components. My suggestion is that this analogy may promote a better understanding of collective responsibility, and here too I argue that, to the ex­ tent that it promotes a better understanding of collective responsibility, it like­ wise confers some plausibility upon the view that the responsibility of a collec­ tive does not always distribute to its members. Recall the type of situation described in the previous chapter. Several in­ dividuals are in a position to prevent a harm from occurring. If none does so, then the collective consisting of these individuals bears moral responsibility for not taking action. Assume from the outset that each individual knows that he or she can prevent the harm, each knows that other individuals are also capable of preventing the harm, and each knows that the entire group will bear responsibil­ ity for not acting in the event that no one does so. In typical situations of this type each individual ought, at a minimum, to try to organize with the others into a group for the purpose of deciding how to deal with the problem at hand. This might not hold true of cases in which the harm is insignificant, as when someone's hat is blown off by the wind. But where the harm is significant, each observer in a position to remedy the harm ought to demonstrate concern for its being remedied. The main question under consideration is whether any of the individuals in a position to prevent harm has a moral obligation to do so. In the previous chapter I argued that in the example of the people in a position to prevent an

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elderly woman from being beaten and robbed none of them has a moral obliga­ tion to hand over fifty dollars. For if one of them has an obligation to hand over fifty dollars, then each of them in a position to hand over fifty dollars has an obligation to do so. But, as I argued earlier, judging that all of them have an obligation to do so is quite counter-intuitive. Hence we can plausibly conclude that none of them has an obligation to hand over fifty dollars. Some may find this line of reasoning unpersuasive. Perhaps the claim that if one onlooker has a moral obligation to hand over fifty dollars then the same is true of all of the onlookers will seem acceptable. But some may see nothing counter­ intuitive in the claim that all of the onlookers have a moral obligation to hand over fifty dollars. Thus, on this view, if I am in a position to prevent the woman from being assaulted, then I have a moral obligation to hand over fifty dollars. Moreover, the same is true of everyone else with fifty dollars in his or her possession; each of them also has a moral obligation to hand over fifty dollars. In the previous chapter I argued that this position has the consequence that if someone actually does hand over fifty dollars, then the other onlookers could be charged with having failed to fulfil their duty. Since this is a charge which seems eminently harsh and unfair, I suggest that each onlooker does not have a moral obligation to hand over fifty dollars. However, defenders of this position can argue that this is not a consequence of their position if we build in the additional stipulation that people can be relieved of their duty to act as soon as someone else does so. According to this way of analyzing the situation, each of the onlookers has a duty to act. But as soon as one of them actually fulfils this duty, the others are automatically relieved of their duty. (This view was de­ fended by Nancy Snow in a paper presented at the meeting of the Central Divi­ sion of the American Philosophical Association, April 1993). In support of this stipulation a person could argue that no one has a duty to bring about a state of affairs which has already been brought about. Indeed, this is an instance of the dictum that "ought implies can"; to bring about such a state of affairs is impossible. Since no one can have a moral duty or obligation to do what is impossible, each of the other bystanders is relieved of his or her duty to do the same as soon as another bystander hands over fifty dollars. Only the first bystander to hand over fifty dollars brings about the state of affairs of saving the elderly woman from being assaulted. But even if each bystander's duty is relieved as soon as one bystander hands over fifty dollars, each of the non-paying bystanders has a moral obligation to act which goes unfulfilled on the view under consideration. Even if a person's duty to act is relieved by the fact that another has the same duty and fulfils it, that person is still in the position of having failed to fulfil a previously possessed duty. An alternative strategy which avoids this conclusion is to say that each person has an obligation to hand over fifty dollars because no others do so or will do so. Thus, if another person does or will hand over fifty dollars, the others haven't been relieved of an obligation to hand over fifty dollars; they never had

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this obligation in the first place. However, the problem with both strategies is that if none of the bystanders hands fifty dollars to the assaulter, then each of the bystanders has violated duty. In the event that the elderly woman is beaten and robbed, each of the bystanders on this view has failed to satisfy his or her moral duty to act. Thus, the question whether duties are relieved by the actions of another does not arise in the context of a situation where the harm is not prevented. Every bystander is judged to be guilty of violating moral duty. Let us relate these concerns to collective responsibility. Recall the debate between those who believe that a collec�ive is responsible for a harm only if the responsibility distributes to all members of the collective and those who believe that collective responsibility can fail to distribute to its members. I now argue that in the kind of case under consideration (each of several persons in a posi­ tion to prevent a harm from occurring) the position we take about the moral obligation of the members will have profound implications regarding whether or not the responsibility of the collective distributes to its members. In particu­ lar, if we hold that each of the members has a moral obligation to prevent the harm from occurring, then we are driven to embrace the position of the indi­ vidualist in the kinds of cases under consideration. If we hold that each member has the same obligation to prevent the harm from occurring, then we cannot maintain that the responsibility of the collective fails to distribute to its mem­ bers in the event that the harm is not prevented. My argument rests upon accepting the principle that if a moral agent has a moral obligation to bring about a certain state of affairs, then, if the agent fails to bring about the state of affairs, the agent bears moral responsibility for its not having occurred. If a person who is obliged to do a certain thing fails to do it, then the person bears moral responsibility for not having done it (assuming the agent has no good excuses for having violated this moral obligation). The prin­ ciple should be understood as applying only to all-things-considered moral du­ ties or obligations. If a person has a duty to do a certain thing which is overrid­ den by a contrary duty to refrain from doing it, then to say that the person is responsible for not doing it does not make sense. If a prima facie duty is over­ ridden by another duty, then it no longer falls within the scope of the principle. Having restricted this principle to all-things-considered duties, I believe it is reasonable. Spelling out the precise relationship between moral obligation and moral responsibility is notoriously difficult, but certainly they are related in such a way that the failure to fulfil one's obligation inevitably leads to moral responsibility for this failure. Of all the states of affairs which individuals come to be responsible for, failures of moral duty or obligation will be paradigm ex­ amples. Failing to do our duty is morally forbidden, and hence the principle asserts nothing more than that we are always responsible for doing the morally forbidden. If we are responsible for anything, we are responsible for morally forbidden actions or omissions. Consider again a situation in which several individuals are in _a position to

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prevent a harm from occurring, and recall the view that each of these individu­ als has a moral obligation to prevent it. Imagine that each of the individuals refrains from acting, and as a result the harm occurs. Now take any of the indi­ viduals. This individual refrains from acting to prevent the harm and hence violates duty. Applying the principle discussed in the preceding paragraph, we judge that this person is morally responsible for not having prevented the harm. If the individual has a duty to bring about this state of affairs and does not, then the individual is morally responsible for its not having occurred, that is, for not bringing it about that the harm not occur. By parity of reasoning, each of the other individuals is morally responsible for this state of affairs. If each has a moral obligation to prevent the harm from occurring, then, by as many applications of the principle as there are individuals, each of the individuals is responsible for this state of affairs. Each of the individuals is morally responsible for not having prevented the harm from occurring. And if this is true, then the responsibility borne by the collective consisting of these individuals distributes to the members of the collective. Each of the members of the collective bears individual moral responsibility for not preventing the harm. Thus, if we insist that each of several persons has a moral obligation to pre­ vent a harm from occurring, and the harm occurs because no one prevents it, we have no choice but to accept the consequence that the moral responsibility they bear for its occurrence distributes to all of them. This does not mean that non-distributive collective responsibility cannot exist, for we might hold that in other circumstances some individuals do not have a moral duty to act. But if we reject the possibility of doing what is morally good beyond duty, then we will invariably judge that it is our duty to do good in the form of preventing harm (assuming it is in our power), whether or not others are in a position to do the same. And by the argument just given, we will have no choice but to hold that the responsibility of the collective for the harm which they fail to prevent will distribute to all of its members. Crudely put, a person who rejects the possibility of good beyond what duty requires will not have the option of acknowledging (in the prevention of harm cases) that collectives can bear moral responsibility in any interesting sense. One philosopher who seems to be attempting to have things both ways is Herbert Morris. While defending a robust, non-distributive view of collective responsibility, he takes a stand regarding failure to act in group situations which is opposed to the spirit of supererogation. (Morris, 1976, pp. 132-134) Another perhaps more startling consequence of the view that no good beyond duty is possible is that we are in violation of moral duty by the very fact that we are part of a collective which bears responsibility. Suppose someone is a member of a collective which bears moral responsibility for a bad state of affairs. Then presum­ ably this person could have done something good or praiseworthy to have avoided being a member of this collective. But if something good or praiseworthy could have been done by this person, then on the view under consideration the person has or had a moral duty to do this. Hence the person is in violation of moral duty for

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belonging to the collective responsible for the state of affairs. To be a part of a collective which is morally responsible for a harm is morally forbidden. A person who is convinced that good beyond duty is impossible may be perfectly willing to accept these consequences. Such a person may have no regrets of missing out on the opportunity to embrace a non-distributive notion of collective responsibility. Plenty of moralists embrace an individualist ap­ proach to collective responsibility, and no reason exists why those who deny the possibility of good beyond duty should not be among them. Nevertheless, many who recognize no possibility of good beyond duty may be unaware of the consequences of this belief regarding collective respon­ sibility. Just as no reason exists why they should not prefer an individualist approach to collective responsibility, so no reason exists why they should not prefer a more robust view of collective responsibility. And to the extent that those of this persuasion do not wish to be forced into an affirmation of an indi­ vidualist position, they may wish to re-examine their commitment to recogniz­ ing no possibility of good beyond duty. A realization that the individualist position is what we are forced to em­ brace when we deny the possibility of good beyond duty may also lead some to find more plausibility in a more robust approach to colJective responsibility. Those who feel strongly that acts of supererogation or quasi-obligation are pos­ sible, for example, may find that a non-distributive view of collective responsi­ bility is more in the spirit of their convictions. Championing supererogation or quasi-obligation while at the same time embracing an individualist approach to collective responsibility is not inconsistent. But because supererogation and quasi-obligation are themselves more robust as approaches to the relationship between obligation, praise, and blame, a non-distributive approach to collective responsibility is somewhat fitting as an approach to collective responsibility suitable for those who acknowledge either supererogation or quasi-obligation. This point is perhaps most evident in the case of quasi-obligation. Recall that an act of quasi-obligation is an act which is not moralJy obligatory but nevertheless morally blameworthy to omit. Suppose that we hold that a moral agent can be a member of a collective responsible for a harm for which the agent is not individually responsible. The question then arises how the agent comes to be part of this collective without at the same time incurring individual responsibility for the harm in question, and here the concept of quasi-obligation has the resources for providing a plausible answer. A person who refrains from an act of quasi-obligation does not violate duty but is nevertheless morally blame­ worthy, and the status of such a person seems quite comparable to the status of the agent to whom the responsibility of the collective fails to distribute. Crudely put, just as an agent to whom the responsibility of the collective fails to distribute is bad enough to be part of the collective responsible for the harm but not bad enough to be individually responsible for it, so an agent who refrains from an act of quasi-obligation is bad enough to warrant blame but not bad enough to

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have violated duty. Thus, if people refrain from perfornring acts of quasi-obligation, a non-distributive approach to collective responsibility seems to provide a fitting context for evaluating their status with regard to moral responsibility. This does not prove that the individualist approach is in any way mistaken or an unfitting type of approach for those who embrace supererogation or quasi-obligation. But to the ex­ tent that one rejects the possibility of good beyond duty, I hope that an awareness of the issues discussed in this section will lead some to find that the non-distributive approach to collective responsibility is a plausible option. I next attempt to shed light upon non-distributive collective responsibility by describing an analogy between a series of potential acts by members of a collective and a series of potential acts by a single individual. Many find the notion of nondistributive collective responsibility puzzling or even mysterious, and I believe that this analogy may help bring clarity to this notion and even confer some plausibility upon it. I begin with two preliminary points. First, the analogy is not designed to shed light upon all instances of collective moral responsibility. It pertains to what John Ladd and others call the "blame" sense of responsibility, moral re­ sponsibility which is connected to a person's being blameworthy for a state of affairs (Ladd, 1986, p. 92). If a person can be morally responsible for a harmful state of affairs without being blameworthy for it, then such situations lie outside the scope of the present discussion. Second, the analogy rests upon the assumption that acts of supererogation are possible. Although we could construct a different analogy along the same lines without appealing to the notion of supererogation, such an analogy would be less illustrative. For this reason the following discussion is framed in terms of agents with opportunities to perform acts of supererogation. One puzzling question about collective responsibility is how moral agents come to be collectively responsible for something in a way which goes beyond the responsibility of the individual moral agents. Many find something puzzling about the status of a moral agent who is not morally responsible for a state of affairs and yet belongs to a collective which comes to bear moral responsibility for it. Such an agent does not strictly speaking bear responsibility, and yet the agent is not entirely free of all connections to this responsibility. What exactly is the moral status of this agent regarding the responsibility for this state of affairs? I believe much of the puzzlement with the notion of collective responsi­ bility is related to puzzlement over the moral status of these agents, and I be­ lieve that much of the skepticism about collective responsibility is related to a hesitation to acknowledge that agents can inhabit such an allegedly shadowy and mysterious region of the moral terrain. Thinking that we could explain away all of the puzzling aspects of this issue would be foolish, but I present an analogy which I believe can shed some light on the question how a collective can be morally blameworthy for a state of affairs for which none of its members is morally blameworthy. First, note that

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the concept of "blameworthy" can be predicated both of moral agents and, by extension, to states of affairs. Thus, if I fail to do something I ought to have done, we could say that I am blameworthy for having omitted to do it; but, in addition, we could sensibly speak of my omission as a blameworthy omission. I am blameworthy for having omitted the act, but the omission is a blameworthy omission by virtue of my being blameworthy in omitting it. In some cases we can know that an omission is blameworthy without knowing who is blamewor­ thy for omitting it, but, if an omission is blameworthy, some person or persons must be blameworthy for omitting it. , By definition a person can never be morally blameworthy for failing to perform an act of supererogation. The omission of a potential act of supereroga­ tion as such is never blameworthy. Nevertheless, as is often noted in the litera­ ture, a person can sometimes be justly blamed for repeated failures to perform a potential act of supererogation. Sometimes a person fails to take advantage of many repeated opportunities to perform an act of supererogation in such a way that the cumulative failure qualifies as morally blameworthy. When this hap­ pens the person is blameworthy for this cumulative failure; also, by extension, this is itself a blameworthy omission. This phenomenon has an analogue in situations where several moral agents are in a position to perform a potential act of supererogation. There will be nothing blameworthy in each individual's omission. But when none of the indi­ viduals performs the act in question, then an ascription of moral blame seems appropriate. What then could be the object _of such an ascription? Just as in the case of the single agent whose cumulative omission qualifies as a blameworthy omission, so this collective omission deserves to be judged a blameworthy omis­ sion. In the case of a single agent we can go on to say that the omission is judged blameworthy by virtue of the individual agent's being blameworthy for omitting to act, and here too we can say that the collective omission in the case of many agents can similarly be judged blameworthy by virtue of the collective 's being blameworthy in omitting it. An analogue exists, then, between a series of acts which an individual agent is in a position to perform and a series of acts which several agents are in a position to perform. And just as the repeated failure by the same person to perform a potential act of supererogation can warrant the ascription of moral blame, so the repeated failure by several persons to perform a potential act of supererogation can likewise warrant the ascription of moral blame. And just as in the former case ascribing blame to the agent omitting to act makes sense, so in the latter case ascribing blame to the collective consisting of these persons makes sense. Therefore, if refraining from an act of supererogation over the course of several opportunities to perform it can be blameworthy for the same individual, I am suggesting that for several individuals with opportunities to perform an act of supererogation to fail to perform it can be blameworthy. And if this is true, then a person can belong to a collective which is blameworthy for

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a state of affairs, even though the person is not blameworthy for the same state of affairs. However, the point of this argument is not to establish the truth of this claim. My intent is to show that collective blame, a notion many find to be very puzzling, has as an analogue a notion which is far less puzzling. Thus, my hope is that taking note of this parallel can help take some of the mystery out of non­ distributive collective responsibility. Putting these ideas in more concrete terms, imagine that every evening on the way home from work I pass a man who I know has had nothing to eat that day. Assume that on any given day my taking him into the restaurant across the street from where he is standing and buying him a nutritious meal would be an act of supererogation. Every day the thought crosses my mind that for me to perform this act would be very commendable, but each day I refrain from doing so. Part of my reason for refraining is that I know that many others will pass him on the way home from work, and the possibility that one of them will buy him a meal strikes me as highly likely. Moreover, I resolve that I will "take my tum" on some occasion in the near future. In spite of the fact that on any given day buying the man a meal would be an act of supererogation, my continued failure to do so could become morally blame­ worthy. We may have trouble assigning a precise number to the occasions of omit­ ting to buy him a meal after which my continued neglect crosses the threshold into the region of the blameworthy. But at some point I will have crossed it, and when that happens my (continued) omitting to buy him a meal is blameworthy. Now imagine a slightly different scenario. Each evening a large number of us leave the plant at the same time and pass this man. All of us know that he has had nothing to eat all day; and all of us know that after we pass him virtually no one else will be passing by. .People avoid this part of town at night, and because of a physical disability this man cannot easily go elsewhere. Suppose that we have never set up a formal procedure for deciding who should attend to his needs on any given day, but nevertheless someone in the crowd virtually always turns out to buy him a meal. Again we assume that on each occasion that someone buys him a meal the act qualifies as an act of supererogation. On some days no one takes the trouble to buy the man a meal, but neither I or any of my co-workers are blameworthy for the failure to buy the man a meal. By hypothesis buying him a meal is supererogatory, and omitting an act of supererogation can never be morally blameworthy as such. But we might nevertheless have the strong feeling that someone or something is to blame, and here the analogy may be helpful. In the first scenario my repeated failure to buy the man a meal is morally blameworthy in spite of the fact that each individual failure is not morally blame­ worthy. While each potential act of supererogation is not blameworthy to omit, the cumulative failure to perform one in a series of many potential acts of super­ erogation does qualify as blameworthy. And we might even employ the term "collective" to refer to the set consisting of the omissions of the acts in this

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series. The collective omission deserves blame, and this is because I deserve blame for this collective omission. Similarly, in the second scenario the individuals are not to blame for omit­ ting to buy a meal on a day when no one does so. To what, then, does this blame attach? The idea of a collective incurring blame or responsibility is one that many find puzzling or even mysterious. But my suggestion is that the analogy is helpful in showing that the notion of collective blame is c1osely tied in cases like these to the notion of collective omission. Just as my individual failures over the course of time in the first scenario can be thought of as a collective omission, so thinking here in terms of the collective consisting of the omitted acts by the various people can be helpful. Just as in the first scenario speaking of the collective failure to feed the man as deserving blame makes sense, the same is arguably true in the second scenario. The omitted acts considered as a collective or totality constitute a blameworthy omission, and hence we can make sense of the claim that the collective consisting of the persons omitting these acts is an entity which can be deserving of blame. Again, this is not an argument designed to show that the collective is in fact blameworthy. It is designed to show how we can make sense of the claim that the collective is blameworthy. To the extent that this analogy is helpful in understanding how a collective can bear responsibility for a state of affairs even when not all of its members bear responsibility for it, I believe that the possibility of non-distributive collective re­ sponsibility is rendered more plausible by an awareness of the analogy. Even if a person holds that collective responsibility typically distributes to its members, an awareness of this analogy will perhaps convince the person that responsibility can be non-distributive in certain instances. As long as the person acknowledges that the blame which attaches to an individua1 's omitting a series of potential acts can under certain circumstances fail to distribute to the acts in the series, holding that the blame which attaches to several individuals' omissions can fail to distribute is rea­ sonable. The reality of non-distributive blame in the realm of individua1 failures suggests that non-distributive blame is possible in the realm of collective failures. Nothing about the collective case differs from the individual case in a way which rules out the possibility of non-distributive blame. Many writers have promoted the idea that collective responsibility does not always distribute among its members. Typically they have promoted this idea by presenting what they take to be clear examples in which collectives bear responsi­ bility for a harm but one or more of its individual members do not. But these cases tend not to persuade those who do not already acknowledge the possibility of non­ distributive collective responsibility, and presenting examples designed to persuade the unpersuaded is not among the objectives I have set out to achieve. Making a convincing case for the possibility of non-distributive collective responsibility is difficult, in part because of its associations in people's minds with primitive or superstitious ways of thinking about the transmission of guilt. I have not attempted any!hing as grandiose as proving that non-distributive col-

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lective responsibility exists in a manner which will convince those who believe otherwise. Instead I have attempted the more modest objective of showing that the possibility of non-distributive collective responsibility is more reasonable than people commonly believe it to be, and in this chapter I showed this by pointing out some connections between collective responsibility and other deontic concepts such as obligation, blame, and supererogation. Something is unusual about the moral status of a person who finds him­ self or herself belonging to a collective responsible for a harm for which he or she is not individually responsible. We can be tempted to react with the same skepticism displayed by the individualist, to reason that either a person's action or inaction is bad enough to warrant the ascription of moral responsibility or the person's connections to the responsibility are non-existent. How can a person occupy the curious position of participating in a collective responsibility with­ out becoming responsible? This line of reasoning has some appeal. Thinking of responsibility in terms of an individualist outlook is tempting, and people can easily become convinced that all questions about moral responsibility can be shaped to fit into this neat and tidy picture. But philosophers such as Cooper, Held, Bates, French, Swinburne, and May have argued at length that this picture is not capable of doing justice to the complexities of the moral life. When we take a serious look at the complexity of group interactions and interpersonal relationships and when we begin to analyze the examples discussed by these writers, we gradually be­ gin to sense that questions about moral responsibility are not always simple enough to be reduced to a simple enumeration of who is responsible and who is not. The question of who contributed to a harm often reveals that many people contributed to the harm in a variety of ways ranging from direct to moderate to virtually not at all. For an individualist approach to succeed we must be pre- · pared to make many subtle discriminations. In the final chapter I present an approach to collective responsibility which affirms the possibility of non-distributive collective responsibility but which also affirms some of the basic intuitions of the individualist. Thus, while I be­ lieve that not all questions about moral responsibility can be resolved with the meager resources of the individualist, I am convinced that important lessons can be learned from the individualist's program. Taking these lessons to heart will be an important part of what I attempt to do in the approach to collective responsibility I present.

Ten

COLLECTIVES AND THE DILUTING OF RESPONSIBILITY People commonly claim that collectives,.which are vast in size are responsible for causing or failing to prevent harms. This book began with the example of a corre­ spondent for National Public Radio claiming that all Americans are collectively responsible for not doing more to counteract violence at abortion clinics. And hear­ ing claims to the effect that all of the world's living inhabitants are collectively responsible for problems such as violence and warfare in the Balkan nations is not unusual. What is surprising about these claims is not so much the vast size of the collectives to which moral responsibility is being ascribed or the frequency with which these claims are made, but the nonchalance or indifference of those who hear these claims. These claims, as sweeping in scope as they are, rarely seem to be challenged. By all appearances those hearing these claims accept them. People seem willing to believe that they are part of a vast collective responsible for some particular problem in the world. At least they do not appear to see any reason to doubt these claims or call them into question. If someone asserts that all Americans are collectively responsible for not doing more to counteract vio­ lence at abortion clinics, few seem inclined to call this claim into question. By contrast, people frequently call into question ascriptions of responsi­ bility to collectives which are small in size. When someone asserts that the three night nurses on duty at the time of a patient's death are collectively responsible for not keeping a close enough watch on the patient, the nurses will not be likely to receive this claim with nonchalance or indifference. They will be far likelier to challenge this allegation and attempt to persuade people that it is unfair, even if they knew that no possibility of legal sanctions exists. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon may be that when the collec­ tive judged to be responsible for a harm is small enough in size, the judgment comes closer to being a personal attack on those who are members of the collec­ tive. And to the extent that it comes closer to being a personal attack, we can expect that the members of the collective will be likelier to feel threatened by it and likelier to challenge it. When responsibility for a particular harm is ascribed to collectives which are vast in size, little likelihood exists that members of the collective will feel threatened or personally attacked. Consequently, people re­ ceive claims of this nature with nonchalance or indifference. In this chapter I examine what I take to be another part of the explanation for people's apparent willingness to accept claims that they are part of a vast

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collective responsible for a particular harm. This is the assumption that as a collective responsible for a harm grows in size, the fact that a person is a mem­ ber of it becomes less serious from a moral point of view. According to this assumption, the seriousness of our own moral involvement is diluted as the size of the collective is increased. Thus, to be part of a collective of five which stands by while someone is choking to death is a fairly serious matter, it is less serious if the size of the collective is increased to five hundred or five thousand, and so forth. I believe that this assumption is fairly widespread in the way ordinary people think about collective responsibility, and in this chapter I raise questions about this assumption. Elsewhere I have employed the term "ethical dilutionism" to describe a view according to which an individual's moral responsibility for a state of af­ fairs is diluted or lessened by virtue of other moral agents' sharing responsibil­ ity for it. Because ethical dilutionism is a view about those who share responsi­ bility, it is not the same as the view that as a collective grows in size the serious­ ness of the moral involvement of its members is diluted or diminished (at least if we assume that collective responsibility does not inevitably distribute to all of its members). But the views are similar enough to be regarded as driven by the same basic intuition, and for this reason I begin this chapter by reviewing my discussion of ethical dilutionism in the article, "Shared Responsibility and Ethical Dilutionism" (Mellema, 1985, pp. 177-187). Many people are attracted to the spirit of ethical dilutionism. A wide­ spread tendency exists among people in formal organizations, for example, to assume that the presence of others in the dynamics of decision making serves to shield them from the possibility of incurring a full measure of individual re­ sponsibility for the outcomes of group decisions. The more people who share the responsibility for the outcome of a group action, they often seem to sup­ pose, the more thinly this responsibility is spread among the participants. Although this idea may have some appeal, I have argued that it yields results which are clearly counter-intuitive. Suppose, for example, that two indi­ viduals each set out to assassinate a public figure who will be appearing at a large rally. Neither individual has any idea of the other's presence or intentions, and at a certain point in the rally two shots ring out simultaneously from oppo­ site ends of the crowd. The public figure is killed by two bullets, and an autopsy reveals that each bullet by itself would have been fatal. The ethical dilutionist would have us believe that the totally fortuitous presence of a second assassin automatically dilutes the degree to which the first assassin is responsible, and vice versa. But this verdict is mistaken. Each fires a shot with the clear intention of killing the public figure. Each wills the outcome, performs actions designed to bring it about, and the actions of each are in fact sufficient for bringing it about. The involvement of each assassin is independent of the other 's involvement, and the only plausible verdict is that each is as re­ sponsible as if the other had not been present.

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A striking feature about this example is the absence of cooperation among the participants. The two assassins are each responsible for the outcome, but they do not cooperate. Theirs is not a group endeavor. A dilutionist could sug­ gest, therefore, that ethical dilutionism is a theory which ought to be confined to cases in which responsibility for an outcome is shared by individuals who co­ operate with one another in bringing it about. But this stipulation is not enough to avoid instances in which ethical dilutionism leads to counter-intuitive consequences. Suppose that three girls resolve to throw rocks through the pi�ture window of an unpopular neighbor. They make the decision in committee fashion. Later they go out as a group, and each throws a rock through the window. According to the dilutionist, each of the girls is less responsible for the outcome than if she had been the only one to throw a rock through the window. But why should we think that this is so? Suppose Bonnie is one of the girls. She throws the rock with the clear intent of breaking the window. She wills the outcome, she performs actions she believes sufficient to bring it about, and these actions are sufficient to bring it about. Had she acted alone, performing the same actions with the same intent, the outcome would have been no different. The window would have been broken. The claim that the degree of Bonnie's responsibility for the broken window is reduced just because others are involved is counter-intuitive. A further restriction of ethical dih.itionism is needed. In the foregoing examples each of the participants performs actions which are sufficient to bring about the outcome, and in circumstances of this kind the dilutionist approach seems objectionable. If the presence of other participants has nothing to do with the occurrence of the outcome, no plausible basis exists for ascribing a reduc­ tion of responsibility. Suppose, therefore, that we be further restrict ethical dilutionism to cases in which the actions of those involved are not by them­ selves sufficient to bring about the outcome. The dilutionist has still not arrived at a fully satisfactory account. Sup­ pose that five people, of approximately equal strength, push someone's auto­ mobile into a lake where it is irretrievable. And suppose that any three of them could have produced the outcome. Then someone who affirms that a diluting of shared responsibility takes place ought to provide an account of the relationship between the degree of diluting which takes place and the fact that an outcome would have occurred if fewer participants had been present. To show a natural way in which such an account might be formulated, I appeal to the concept of a "threshold." In the example the threshold can be identified as the point at which three of the five people are pushing the car; three is the smallest number of people needed to bring about the threshold effect. Some slack must be taken up before enough people can trigger the threshold. (The situation might be described by a utilitarian in the following manner. The total utility realized in the automobile example is a function of many variables,

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one of which is the number of people x pushing the automobile. To maximize this utility, subject to certain linear constraints, we might construe the problem as a linear program. It will then turn out that x will be what linear programming theorists call a "slack variable" at certain ranges of values, and these values will be listed in the printout of any standard linear programming software.) And likewise some slack is present after the threshold has been crossed, for if people in excess of three push the car no additional consequence obtains. The trigger­ ing of the threshold takes place precisely when three people are pushing the car. Suppose we understand ethical dilutionism to affirm that, in cases where a threshold is present, the diluting phenomenon is operative only up to the point of the threshold. If Sam is one of those pushing the automobile, then Sam's responsibility is diluted by the fact that four others are involved. But, on the proposal under consideration, the degree of dilution is no different than if only two others were involved. No marginal diluting is present once the threshold has been crossed. A type of teamwork is necessary to bring about the outcome, but the dilution of Sam's responsibility is then limited by the amount of team­ work which is necessary for the threshold to be crossed. In summary, a number of restrictions must be placed upon ethical dilutionism if it is to avoid counter-intuitive consequences. Our responsibility for an outcome is diluted only when the responsibility is shared with other agents with whom we cooperate, our individual actions are not by themselves suffi­ cient to bring about the outcome, and the degree of dilution is limited by the point of the threshold if one exists. Having looked at ethical dilutionism and some increasingly satisfactory versions of it, I now turn to ethical anti-dilutionism. My purpose is not to offer decisive arguments to refute dilutionism. However, I aim to portray a version of anti-dilutionism, which I call "moderate anti-dilutionism," as an account of moral responsibility in group situations which is more plausible than ethical dilutionism or any of its refinements. According to moderate anti-dilutionism, our responsibility for what happens when we share moral responsibility with others is the same as if no one else were responsible for it. We are as responsible as if the actions we perform in contributing to the outcome bring it about in the absence of the other moral agents sharing re­ sponsibility for it. This does not mean that every moral agent sharing responsibility for an outcome incurs responsibility for it to the same degree. A person who plays a major role in bringing the outcome about may well incur a greater degree of responsibility for the outcome than if he or she plays a minor role in bringing it about. But the degree of a person's responsibility for the outcome is not affected by the sheer fact that others share responsibility for it. One way to picture the situation is to imagine a possible world, as similar as possible to the actual world in other respects, in which each of the other agents fails to qualify as an agent capable of bearing moral responsibility. Sup­ pose, for example, that in this possible world all of the others with whom a

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person is involved in bringing about a particular outcome are elaborate robots or androids. Thus, if a person is involved with others in a bank robbery, the degree of the person's responsibility for the bank robbery is no different than if each of the actions performed by the others who are involved were performed by elaborate robots. Since robots are not capable of bearing moral responsibil­ ity, the degree of the person's responsibility for the bank robbery is what it is independently of how many others participate. We could argue for a stricter version of anti-dilutionism according to which a participant in the bank robbery is as r�sponsible as if he or she had performed, as far as humanly possible, all of the roles of the others which led to the bank robbery. On this view a person who shares responsibility is always maximally responsible for the outcome, and each participant presumably incurs the same maximal degree of responsibility. But on the view I am proposing the degree to which we are responsible depends upon our own actions, including our mo­ tives, and the manner in which these actions play a role in the outcome. What other participants do or fail to do is irrelevant. Our decisions and actions are often influenced by those with whom we share responsibility. Suppose that someone serving on a committee votes affirmatively for a course of action because of being heavily influenced by others on the commit­ tee. Then this person's responsibility for the outcome is arguably diluted by the involvement of others with whom responsibility for the outcome is shared. Their pressure tactics play a significant role in the person's decision to vote affirmatively, and hence his or her responsibility is less than it would otherwise be. Situations of this sort appear to support the intuitions of the ethical dilutionist. Nevertheless, if a person's responsibility for the outcome is affected by the pressure tactics of others, then this fact is automatically taken into account by the moderate anti-dilutionist. An agent is as responsible for the outcome, according to the moderate anti-dilutionist, as if the agent had done what he or she did in the absence of other moral agents sharing responsibility for the outcome. Consider now what this voter does: voting affirmatively as the result of having been caused to do so through the influence of others. A complete description of the voter's actions includes a reference to this influence. Hence the voter is as responsible for the out­ come as if this action - voting affirmatively as a result of having been caused to do so through the influence of others - had brought about the outcome in the absence of any other moral agents sharing responsibility for it. If the influence of the others is a factor which affects the degree of responsibility, then this is a factor which is recognized by the moderate anti-dilutionist. Some might charge that an element of dilutionism is present in the moderate anti-dilutionist position after all. The pressure tactics of others can in a sense dilute the responsibility we might otherwise incur. But for the dilutionist the diluting phe­ nomenon occurs simply because others share responsibility for the outcome. Hence a denial of dilutionism is perfectly compatible with allowing for the possibility that our responsibility is affected by the pressure tactics of others.

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In the administering of penalties the anti-dilutionist might appear to allow for too little flexibility. In situations where the individuals in a group share responsibil­ ity for harm brought about to an innocent victim, the fairest and most convenient course of action is frequently to divide the responsibility to make amends among the members of the group. If three people share the responsibility for pushing someone's automobile into the lake, requiring them to share the costs of replacing the automobile would be reasonable; requiring each to pay the victim the full cost of replacement would not be reasonable. For the anti-dilutionist to divide the responsi­ bility to replace the automobile may seem to constitute an unwarranted diluting of each person's responsibility. Hence, the anti-dilutionist position does not apparently allow for the kind of flexibility in remedying the effects of wrongdoing which are generally regarded as most reasonable. But we may distinguish between shared responsibility for the occurrence of a state of affairs and shared responsibility to make amends to whomever is harmed by it. A person who is committed to the impossibility of distributing one of these is not committed to the impossibility of distributing the other. No inconsistency can be found in the view that, although dilutionism is mistaken, circumstances exist in which distributing the shared responsibility to make amends is appropriate. Whether or not a person accepts dilutionism is a matter which can be decided independently of the person's position concerning the practicalities of making restitution or the assignment of penalties. The extent to which someone is morally responsible need not dictate a particular manner of imposing sanctions. The temptation to confuse shared responsibility for the outcome of a group action with shared responsibility to make amends to whom­ ever is harmed by it might lead a person to suppose that dilutionism is a true theory. But if this is the reason for embracing dilutionism, it is one that is based upon fallacious reasoning. In the end I believe that an examination of the facts reveals that moderate anti-dilutionism is a more satisfactory theory than ethical dilutionism or any of its refinements. Moderate anti-dilutionism, in summary, is the view that if S is a moral agent who shares responsibility for outcome O with other moral agents, then the degree of S's responsibility for O is unaffected by the fact that it is shared with others. In particular, S's responsibility for O is unaffected by whether, relative to the others' involvement, S's involvement is major or minor. The de­ gree of S's responsibility is a function of S's actions, including S's intentions, and it would be no different than if, other things being equal, each of the others were replaced by robots. The degree of S's responsibility can, however, be af­ fected by the influence which others bring to bear on S, and this possibility is taken into account by the moderate anti-dilutionist. Finally, the moderate anti­ dilutionist also recognizes the fairest and most expedient course of action can sometimes be to divide the responsibility to make restitution among those who share responsibility for the outcome. This chapter began with the observation that people demonstrate a surprising

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willingness to believe claims that they are members of collectives which are vast in �ize and which bear moral responsibili� for harms. By contrast, when people are Judged to be members of a small collective bearing responsibility for a harm, they seem far likelier to challenge what is claimed. Part of the explanation for this phe­ nomenon is that claims of this sort come closer to being personal attacks on people, and for this reason people are likelier to feel threatened by these claims and have greater motivation to challenge them. But another part of the explanation, I believe, may be due to an underlying assumption about collective responsibility to the effect that as a collective responsible for a harm grows in size, the fact that one is a mem­ ber of it becomes less serious from a moral point of view. Thus, if a collective responsible for a harm is truly vast in size and we are judged to be a member of it, little is at stake as far as the seriousness of our own involvement is concerned. The parallel between this assumption, which I shall refer to as collective dilutionism, and ethical dilutionism is clear. While ethical dilutionism asserts that a person's individual responsibility for a harm diminishes as the number of those sharing responsibility for the harm increases, collective dilutionism stresses that a diminishing in the seriousness of one's moral involvement takes place as the collective responsible for the harm grows in size. Since the members of the collective need not bear individual responsibility for the harm, that which is diminished need not be a degree of moral responsibility. But nevertheless the assumption is that something is diminished and that we can accordingly rest assured that our moral status is improved as the size of the collective increases. Both views seem to regard moral responsibility as if it were like a pie which is divided according to the number of participants who are responsible for the harm in question, either individually or as members of a collective. The idea is that only so much moral responsibility is available to go around, and hence the portion of each participant diminishes in size as the number of par­ ticipants increases. In the case of ethical dilutionism the diminishing size of each portion corresponds to a diminishing share of moral responsibility incurred by each participants. And in the case of collective dilutionism the diminishing size of each portion corresponds to a diminishing of the moral seriousness of an agent's involvement, a notion which perhaps eludes characterization as precise as in the case of incurring degrees of responsibility. But the pie analogy seems appropriate to the spirit which underlies both. As the size of the group increases, each person's share of the pie diminishes in size. And as pieces of the pie dimin­ ishes in size due to the increasing number of participants, less reason for con­ cern over our moral status is necessary. Just as people commonly assume that in situations of shared responsibility the diluting phenomenon takes place, so I believe people in situations of collective responsibility assume that a similar type of diluting phenomenon takes place. When all Americans are claimed to be collectively responsible for failing to prevent a harm from occurring, a tendency exists among people to believe that such a claim has only the barest of implications regarding their own personal moral failures.

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Collectives and the Diluting of Responsibility

Thus, according to this way of thinking, since the collective consists of all Ameri­ cans, our own portion of the pie of responsibility is so small as to scarcely deserve attention. Because we are judged to be members of the collective, some implication of moral failure is present (that by virtue of which we fail to escape membership), but the presence of the diluting phenomenon renders our own personal moral fail­ ure insignificant to the point that we need not be concerned. For this reason, among others, people assume that ascriptions of responsibility to collectives which are vast in size have implications regarding the moral status of their members which are, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. As noted earlier, collective dilutionism is one reason why people show less inclination to challenge claims about the responsibilities of large collectives which include them than claims about the responsibilities of small collectives which in­ clude them. When we are members of a collective responsible for a harm and the collective is very small in size, the implications about our moral involvement can be considerable. The example of the three night nurses judged collectively responsible for not keeping a close enough watch on a patient who dies is a case in point. That they are collectively responsible appears to have significant implications regarding a moral failure on the part of each nurse, and examples such as this seem to confer plausibility upon a collective dilutionist outlook. Earlier I argued that, despite its initial appeal, ethical dilutionism is less plau­ sible than a version of anti-dilutionism called moderate anti-dilutionism. Here I urge that something similar is true of collective dilutionism. We may be tempted to think that, as a collective responsible for a harm increases in size, the degree of the moral failure of each member is diluted or diminished. But I believe that an exami­ nation of the issues reveals that this view is not as appealing as it might initially appear, a point hinted at by Jere Surber (Surber, 1 983, p. 85), and that a strong case can be made for an anti-dilutionist view of collective responsibility. The type of anti-dilutionist view I have in mind is the following. Suppose that a moral agent is a member of a collective responsible for a certain harm, and sup­ pose that this moral agent does not bear individual responsibility for this harm. Some will not believe that this is a possible situation; if so, no possibility of holding a dilutionist view of collective responsibility exists in the first place. Hence on the supposition that collective dilutionism is a view which needs to be criticized, we must suppose that non-distributive collective responsibility is possible. If a moral agent is a member of a collective responsible for a harm, a reason exists why this agent is a member of the collective, something the agent does or fails to do by virtue of which the agent is to be regarded as a member of it. Had the agent done otherwise, he or she would have escaped membership in the collective. Let us refer to the act by virtue of which the agent qualifies for member­ ship in the collective as the "qualifying act," with tht.o understanding that the qualifying act might be the omission of an act. By hypothesis the agent's perfor­ mance of the qualifying act is not serious enough to warrant the judgment that the agent is individually responsible for the harm, but it is serious enough to

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warrant the judgment that he or she is a member of the collective responsible for the harm. In addition, we may judge that some degree of moral blame at­ taches to the performance of the qualifying act. For if nothing is blameworthy in performing this act, and if this act is by definition the reason why the agent fails to escape membership in the collective responsible for the harm, judging that the agent should be judged a member of the collective does not make good sense. (Here I assume that the responsibility is for something morally undesir­ able. In cases where a collective is morally responsible for something morally favorable or desirable the account presynted here would have to be modified.) To see why this is true, imagine that a group of people on a street comer begin to throw rocks at the cars parked along the street and cause a great deal of damage to these cars. A man who happens to be walking down the street at the time the police arrive is apprehended along with the rock throwers and spends the night in jail with them. Suppose we claim that the group who spent the night in jail is collectively responsible for the damage to the cars and that the man walking down the street is to be regarded as a member of this collective because he was walking down the street at the time. The claim, then, is that the man's walking down the street is the qualifying act by virtue of which he is a member of the collective. But this claim makes sense only if we are able to explain something about his walking down the street which qualifies it as blameworthy. If in our judgment nothing is at all blameworthy in his walking down the street, then we will be puzzled as to how his walking down the street could rightly be judged as the sole reason for his being a member of the collective. Thus, something is morally blameworthy in the performance of a qualify­ ing act. And when we are members of a collective responsible for a harm (for which we are not individually responsible), the moral seriousness of our in­ volvement can be gauged according to the degree of blame which attaches to the performance of our qualifying act. To the degree that we are at fault for performing the qualifying act, our membership in the collective represents a moral failure. And this moral failure is an individual moral failure. No other member of the collective shares in this particular moral failure, because no other member of the collective performs the same qualifying act. Each other member performs a qualifying act, the performance of each member 's qualifying act is blameworthy, and a separate moral failure is represented in each member's be­ ing a member of the collective. Accordingly, the moral failure of some members can be of a greater magnitude, for the performance of one member's qualifying act can be more blameworthy than the performance of another's. Now collective dilutionism can be characterized with greater clarity. The proponent of collective dilutionism believes that as a collective responsible for a harm increases in size the seriousness of each member 's moral involvement is diluted or diminished. But if the seriousness of each member's moral involve­ ment is gauged according to the blame which attaches to the performance of his or her qualifying act, this view can be characterized in terms of a lessening of

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the blame attached to the qualifying act of each member as the membership increases in size. Thus, each member performs a qualifying act, and the perfor­ mance of this act is blameworthy to a degree which varies according to how many others are likewise performing qualifying acts. The anti-dilutionist perspective, by contrast, is that the degree to which the performance of each member's qualifying act is blameworthy is what it is regardless of how many others are performing qualifying acts. Whether ten oth­ ers or ten thousand others are performing qualifying acts does not affect the degree to which a particular member's qualifying act is blameworthy. We might feel less guilt if ten thousand others perform qualifying acts. But, according to the anti-dilutionist, this does not change the fact that we are blameworthy for having performed a qualifying act performed by no one else, and the degree of this blame is not affected by the number of others who are blameworthy for performing their qualifying acts. Others might pressure us to act in a particular way, and these pressure tactics might reduce the degree to which the performance of our qualifying act is blame­ worthy. But this is separate from the question of whether the sheer fact that others are involved has a diluting effect. If others have exerted pressure upon us to pursue a course of action, then the degree to which our qualifying act warrants blame auto­ matically takes into account the fact that others have exerted pressure on us. If the pressure they exert is severe enough, then presumably the blame attaching to what we do is reduced to zero and, on the account I am proposing, we have no member­ ship in the collective responsible for the harm in question. But the blame which attaches to the performance of our qualifying act is never reduced by the sheer fact that others are performing qualifying acts. When a person claims that all Americans are collectively responsible for not doing more to counteract violence at abortion clinics, then, on the assump­ tion that this collective responsibility is not taken to distribute to its members, we must understand it to mean that each American has done something which qualifies him or her for membership in this collective. The qualifying act con­ sists in omitting to counteract violence, and, if the claim is correct, each American's omission is a blameworthy omission. The anti-dilutionist claims that the degree of this blame is unaffected by the fact that hundreds of millions of others are likewise blameworthy for their omitting to counteract violence at abortion clinics. If we are to blame for doing nothing to counteract the violence, then the degree of this blame is what it is regardless of the sheer numbers of others who are similarly to blame for their inaction. Some might be inclined to say that, although people do not do enough to counteract violence at abortion clinics, nevertheless not every American is blame­ worthy for omitting to counteract violence at abortion clinics. Thus, the respon­ sibility of the collective does not translate into a measure of blame for each member's individual omission. That each American's individual omission war­ rants blame is dubious.

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This observation is plausible. For if we are members of a collective which bears responsibility for a harm, then, unless we are individually responsible for the harm, we are members of the collective by virtue of performing a qualifying act for whose performance we bear some degree of moral blame. In this case the qualifying act consists in refraining from doing something to counteract violence. If we are members of the collective in question, then we must bear blame for this qualifying act. Hence, if some Americans do not bear any blame for their individual omissions, what this shows is that not all Americans belong to a collective which is responsible for not doing more to counteract violence at abortion clinics. In other words; what ,.it shows is that the claim of the corre­ spondent for National Public Radio is mistaken. A deeper issue is at stake here. I argued that each member of a collective which is responsible for a harm performs a qualifying act and that each member's performance of this act is blameworthy. Some may feel that this picture of collective responsibility is mistaken and that whether we have membership in a collective which bears responsibility is not in general determined by what we have done or failed to do. Instead, some may feel that we can have membership in a collective as the result of our association with people or our geographical location. What matters is not always our individual contribution to a state of affairs. Often what matters is simply our circumstances relative to what has happened. On this way of understanding collective responsibility, a person comes to be a member of the collective responsible for not doing more to counteract violence at abortion clinics simply by being an American. Our failure to try to counteract vio­ lence at abortion clinics does not qualify us for membership in this collective. We simply live in a nation which has allowed such violence to take place. This circumstantial approach to thinking about collective responsibility, as I calI it, may account for some of the reason why claims about collective responsibility are not challenged more frequently. For if claims about collective responsibility are taken to reflect upon our circumstances and not upon our own moral failures, we are presumably less likely to feel threatened by or become defensive about these claims. No doubt this is exactly how some interpret claims about collective moral responsibility, and to the extent that we think about col­ lective responsibility in circumstantial terms we are likely to think of these claims as having little or no implications regarding the moral failures of the collective 's individual members. But the topic of discussion now begins to look as though it has shifted from collective responsibility to moral taint. When nothing more than mere cir­ cumstance draws us into the group connected to the occurrence of a harm, then this is the phenomenon described earlier as moral taint. We can be tainted by the evil actions of other people to whom we just happen to be connected in some way. Regardless of our own actions or failures to act, we can be tainted by the actions or failures of other moral agents. Whether or not we are tainted by what these other agents have done is entirely circumstantial, based on the connec-

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tions we happen to have with them. Talking about collective responsibility in circumstantial terms creates the possibility for much confusion by blurring the boundary between collective moral responsibility and moral taint. In primitive cultures no recognition of a distinc­ tion between collective responsibility and moral taint is typically present. But in the contemporary literature moralists have tried to make clearer sense of the notion of collective responsibility and have tried to distinguish it from other related concepts in a way that primitive cultures have been unable to do. Thus, an important part of the work of contemporary discussions of collective respon­ sibility has been to distinguish collective moral responsibility from concepts such as moral taint. I have urged that thinking about collective responsibility in circumstantial terms encourages the idea that no clear boundary exists between collective moral responsibility and moral taint. My recommendation is to keep them separate by insisting that when a collective bears moral responsibility for a harm, then each member of the collective either bears responsibility for the harm or does (or omits) something which qualifies him or her for membership. Some might object that my recommendation renders implausible many things people say about collective responsibility. For example, the claim about counteracting violence at abortion clinics can be true on the recommendation I have offered only if each American is to blame to some degree for not doing more to counteract violence at abortion clinics. But claiming that each Ameri­ can is to blame for this failure is dubious, and hence, given that the claim that all Americans are collectively responsible for this failure is not dubious, insisting that circumstantial factors alone cannot qualify moral agents for membership in collectives might be overly restrictive. Here I suggest that if the claim that each American is to blame for the failure to counteract violence at abortion clinics seems implausible, then think­ ing about the situation in terms of moral taint is perhaps better. Perhaps all Americans are tainted by the failure of elected government officials to take the lead in addressing the problem of violence at abortion clinic. By being an Ameri­ can a person is tainted by this failure, but the person is not thereby rendered blameworthy for any personal failure. Often people claim that all Americans or all of the world's males are col­ lectively responsible for some harm or other, and often these claims cannot plausibly be taken to mean that all Americans or all males are to blame for some individual moral failure. Often they are plausible only when interpreted along circumstantial lines. In such cases my recommendation is to re-interpret the claims as being about moral taint. So interpreted, individual moral failun;s are no longer in the picture. Some may be inclined to argue that a type of dilutionism is operative when people are tainted by the wrongdoing of others. I have advocated an anti­ dilutionist point of view regarding collective moral responsibility, but I have not addressed the question whether dilutionism is operative in the sphere of moral

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taint. For the present I regard this as an open question. If a person's taint can be diluted as the number of those tainted increases, then this would confirm the intuitions of those who both think about collective responsibility in circumstan­ tial terms and who believe that the seriousness of a person's moral involvement decreases as the size of the collective increases. The terminological question of whether the "collective responsibility" can rightly be used to include situations where membership is determined by nothing more than sheer circumstance could be debated at great length. Although I have advocated limiting the application of the �erm in the ways indicated earlier, others will be convinced that the wider usage is more appealing or advantageous. I do not claim to have arguments capable of convincing them otherwise, and attempting to convince them otherwise is not by any means the point of the present discussion. The point of the present discussion is to present an anti-dilutionist posi­ tion regarding collective responsibility as a viable and defensible point of view. I have attempted to do this by arguing that, when a collective bears responsibil­ ity for a harm, each member of the collective is a member by virtue of having done something or having failed to do something (the qualifying act) which warrants the ascription of moral blame. Thus, a reason can be found why each member is a member, a reason which relates to the member's actual involve­ ment in the course of events leading up to the harm. Once all of this is made clear, we will be hard pressed to see why the addition of new members to the collective should have any diluting effect upon the degree to which an agent is to blame for the performance of his or her qualifying act. The degree of blame for an agent's qualifying act is what it is independently of the size of the collec­ tive, and we will be hard pressed to see how a person would make any kind of compelling case for the presence of a diluting mechanism. If the scope of these collectives is widened to include those whose only relation to the harm is circumstantial, the situation may be different. If the only reason we attain membership in a collective is that we happen to be an Ameri­ can or a male, then we might conclude that the sheer size of the group of Ameri­ cans or males plays a role in rendering the seriousness of one's own involve­ ment to be nearly non-existent. Making a case for an anti-dilutionist perspective to cover situations of this nature would have to be quite different from the case I have made. Some might worry that the account I have presented is too lenient in that it allows us to enjoy the privileges of membership in a group while conveniently escaping membership in the sub-group which bears moral responsibility for harms which it inflicts. Suppose I am a member of a club which practices racial hatred, and I enjoy the privileges of membership in this club. One night certain members of the club inflict severe bodily harm on a member of a racial minor­ ity. On the account I have offered I apparently have no membership in the col­ lective responsible for this person's injury, and some will surely find such a verdict overly lenient.

1 18

Collectives and the Diluting of Responsibility

In response, on my account a qualifying act can consist in simply enjoy­ ing the privileges of membership in a group which is known to cause harms of a certain type. If I enjoy the privileges of belonging to a group committed to racial hatred and if I know that members routinely harm members of racial minorities, then this can be enough to qualify me for membership in the collec­ tive responsible for the harms in question. Thus, the qualifying act can consist in states such as states of enjoyment. Whether a person is acting simply by being in a state of enjoyment is perhaps open to debate, but nevertheless I wish to understand qualifying acts in such a way that being in a state of enjoyment can count as a qualifying act.

Eleven COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS Much attention in recent years has center�d around the question of whether or not a corporation can have or bear moral responsibility. People have frequently said, for example, that the Exxon Corporation bears moral responsibility, in addition to legal responsibility, for the disastrous oil spill which resulted from the wreck of its tanker, the Valdez. And while we might feel that the primary responsibility for this incident is borne by the officers directly involved, many people are convinced that, in addi­ tion, the Exxon Corporation itself bears moral responsibility for the oil spill. In this way corporations are said to be morally responsible for states of affairs which have occurred, a thesis which has been ably defended by philosophical ethicists (Goodpaster, 1983, pp. 1-22). People commonly allege that corporations can have a moral responsibil­ ity with regard to the future. Thus, corporations are commonly said to have a moral responsibility to produce safe products, to protect the interests of their shareholders, to maintain cordial relations with the community, to protect the environment, and so on. In other words, corporations have a prospective re­ sponsibility with respect to the future as w·en as a retrospective responsibility with respect to what has taken place in the past. Not everyone agrees that corporations can bear or incur moral responsibility. While corporations are legal entities which can be held legally responsible for what has happened and can have legal responsibilities with respect to the future, many maintain that corporations are not among the types of entities which are capable of bearing moral responsibility (Ladd, 1970, pp. 488-516; Velasquez, 1983, pp. 1-18). Among economists this view is generally expressed in terms of the contention that corporations can have no moral responsibility other than a responsibility to seek profit (Friedman, 1962, p. 13; McKie, 1974, p. 19). Typically those who reject the idea that corporations can bear moral responsibility hold the view that moral re­ sponsibility can only be borne by moral agents. According to this view, various officers of the Valdez are each individually responsible for the oil spill, but the Exxon Corporation itself cannot be held morally responsible. Here my purpose is neither to argue for nor against the thesis that corpora­ tions such as Exxon can bear moral responsibility. Instead, I urge that the debate between the opponents and proponents of the thesis that corporations can bear moral responsibility has tended to obscure an issue which is arguably as important, the issue of whether a select group of people within a corporation can bear collective responsibility for what happens as a result of corporate misconduct. Some cham-

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Collective Responsibility and the Responsibility of Corporations

pion the idea that entire corporations can bear moral responsibility, and others argue that only individuals can bear moral responsibility. But I argue that an important middle ground should be taken into account, that sometimes the more important question is whether a group of people within a corporation, who are not responsible as individuals, are nevertheless collectively responsible for what happens. Hence, even if corporations as such are not capable of bearing moral responsibility, never­ theless a group of people within a corporation can bear collective responsibility for a state of affairs, and the group can conceivably bear this collective responsibility even in situations where no individual members of the corporation bear responsibil­ ity for the same state of affairs. The second half of this chapter examines the thesis that corporations can bear moral responsibility but only if it is construed as responsibility borne by the collective consisting of all the moral agents making up the corporation. This is a thesis which has many appealing features, but I argue that it is overly sim­ plistic as a thesis about corporate responsibility. Exxon's moral responsibility for the oil spill is not a collective responsibility in which the collective consists of all of the people associated with the Exxon Corporation. The net effect of what I argue can be summarized as follows. If corporate responsibility exists, it cannot be reduced to the responsibility of a collective. In particular, it cannot be reduced to the responsibility of the collective consisting of the people making up the corporation. The responsibility for the harmful consequences of corporate decision making is, however, frequently borne by groups or committees within the corporation. And hence, even if we deny that corporations as such can bear moral responsibility, we can still acknowledge that the responsibility for these harmful consequences is not entirely borne by individual moral agents. Thus, an important middle ground can be found be­ tween the position that everyone within the corporation is collectively respon­ sible for what happens and the position that the only responsibility incurred is by various individuals in the corporation. Much time and effort have gone into the profoundly difficult question of of­ fering a satisfactory philosophical characterization of corporate responsibility. I will not undertake this task, a task whose significance has been exaggerated. Instead, by calling attention to the roles of committees in the dynamics of corporate decision making and by developing the idea that individuals within these committees can be collectively responsible for the harmful consequences of corporate conduct, I hope to illustrate that light can be shed on corporate responsibility even if we have not yet succeeded in producing a precise philosophical characterization of it. In the modem corporation much work is done by committees. Often these committees are known within the organization as task forces, executive cabi­ nets, administrative councils, or something else, but they are basically groups of people within the corporation assigned to a particular common task. Fre­ quently these groups have the authority to make important decisions on behalf of the corporation. At other times they function to recommend courses of action

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to administrative personnel within the corporation. Perhaps more than at any p revious time in history, the modem corporation relies upon committees to do its work. In recent years corporate boards of directors have even begun to do much of their work through committees of board members. Committees within corporations can bear responsibility for the outcomes of their decisions in two ways. First, every member of the committee may bear individual responsibility for what happens. When this happens the members of the committee can be said to share responsibility for what happens. Although the members might bear differing degr�es of responsibility for the same state of affairs, owing to differing contributions each makes to its occurrence, in this type of situation the group responsibility is nothing more than the shared re­ sponsibility of its component members. Second, a committee can come to bear responsibility for the outcome of its work in such a way that not all of its members bear individual responsibility for the outcome. Indeed, in some cases a committee can arguably come to bear responsibility for such an outcome even when none of its component members, or anyone else, for that matter, bears individual responsibility for the same out­ come. The committee as such is the bearer of responsibility for what happens, and in these cases the responsibility of the committee fails to distribute to all of its members. Consider a situation in which a committee within a large corporation is assigned the task of researching and evaluating the safety of a proposed new product. The committee learns of some research published by a consumer advo­ cacy organization which indicates safety problems with a similar product manu­ factured by a competing firm. The committee then wrestles with the question whether similar safety problems may be associated with the proposed new prod­ uct under consideration. As in many such situations, no one on the committee knows for certain. The members of the committee discuss the matter at great length over the period of several weeks. As time goes on, the members feel impatient with their lack of progress, weary of talking about the published re­ search, and increasingly they feel inc1ined to judge the research inconc1usive or irrelevant. Without explicitly realizing it, they almost begin looking for ways to discredit the published research. The consumer advocacy organization which publishes the research has long been a thorn in the flesh of the firm and indus­ try, and they suspect the organization's research is thoroughly biased. Gradually they realize that they are united in sentiment concerning the published research, and to no one's surprise the members finally reach the con­ clusion that no compelling reason can be found to think that the new product under consideration will have similar problems. This conclusion is communi­ cated to the appropriate officers of the firm. These officers are more than happy to learn of the outcome of the committee's deliberations, for considerable re­ sources have already been poured into the development of this product. Subse­ quently it is marketed with great success. Years later, however, people learn that

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the product is plagued by exactly the same problems as the competing product for exactly the reasons spelled out in the original published research. As a re­ sult, several users of the product sustain serious injuries. In this example we may reasonably judge that the committee bears some responsibility for the resulting injuries. The committee's task was to research the matter, and the committee chose to regard as irrelevant certain important, even crucial, published research concerning the competing product. The com­ mittee made what appears in retrospect as a morally irresponsible decision, and the end result is that several people suffer serious injuries. Judging that the com­ mittee is responsible for these injuries does not, however, settle the issue whether or to what extent the members of the committee bear moral responsibility on an individual basis for what happens. I address this issue by presenting several scenarios, each of which is based upon the original example. In the first scenario the members of the committee enter the situation desir­ ing, with varying degrees of intensity, that the product will be found acceptable. Early in their deliberations the members discover that this sentiment is shared by each member of the committee, and they gradually become aware that they are heading inevitably in the direction of finding the product acceptable. Nevertheless, they are all aware of the importance of going through the proper motions, and hence they make an effort to look at and discuss relevant data They examine the published research about their competitor's product in a manner which strikes them as fair and objective. But each member, without realizing it, looks for ways to discredit the reliability of the research and to raise doubts about the applicability of these find­ ings to their own product. They have almost an unspoken agreement that this pub­ lished research should not be allowed to spoil the plans of the firm to launch a new product. The members of the committee are united by their common sentiments, the atmosphere of their meetings is amiable and very much reflective of this unity of sentiment, and ultimately a unanimous desire to present a positive recommendation to management emerges. In scenario two the members of the committee are similar to the members in scenario one with a single exception. One member of the committee has sentiments very different from the other members. This member has no strong feelings about the importance of finding the product acceptable. His chief con­ cern is that the committee do its job in a manner which is thorough and respon­ sible. But soon he begins to sense that the other members are approaching the task differently. He discovers that the other members are desirous of discredit­ ing the published research in the hopes of presenting a final recommendation to approve the proposed new product, and this makes him very uncomfortable. As time goes on he finds that he is the only member who is viewing the published research as having a potentially serious bearing on the product under consideration, and he begins to discover that he is the only member whose re­ marks about this research reflect any concern and caution. Increasingly he feels unsure of what to do. He is not by nature outspoken or aggressive, and he does

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not wish to create a scene by means of a major confrontation. Feeling that he is u ?able to_ change th� momentum of _ the group singlehandedly, he gradually be­ gms to withdraw. Hts words of caution become more infrequent in the commit­ tee meetings .. In the final vote he abstains. I claim that the members of the committee share responsibility for the out­ come in the first scenario. Each bears some measure of individual responsibility for the outcome. But in the second scenario the moral involvement of one member in the committee's decision is clearly not on a par with that of the others. The other members act in a manner which render�, them individually responsible for the out­ come, but the same is not true of the reluctant member. Unlike the others he does not begin by desiring that the proposed new product will be approved, unlike the others he does not find ways to discredit the findings of the research, and unlike the others he does not vote affirmatively to approve the product. Some might object that this reluctant member could have done more to distance or dissociate himself from the rest of the committee. His vote of dis­ sent in committee deliberations could have been more forceful, he could have been more persistent in challenging their view rather than giving up so easily, and he could have cast a negative vote rather than abstaining. In many ways he could have done more to stand up for his convictions and resist caving in to what the others wanted. Judging that this member escapes moral responsibility for the outcome of the group decision might in this way be open to question. This objection raises a point of great importance concerning the moral status of people who participate in committees. People in committees commonly feel so much momentum for one course of action that they despair of taking any action to challenge it. They might hesitate to risk their reputation in the firm by taking an unpopular stand in a situation where little or no chance exists of chang­ ing the minds of other people. On the other hand, the morally superior course of action is almost always that of standing up for their convictions, no matter how unpopular in the eyes of our colleagues or co-workers. The reluctant committee member in scenario two caved in to the wishes of the other committee members perhaps too easily, and in this way we might feel that he is not totally discon­ nected from the moral responsibility for what happens in the end. The most sensible verdict concerning this case, I believe, is to judge that the other members of the committee are individually responsible for what happens and to judge, in addition, that the committee is collectively responsible for what hap­ pens. The reluctant committee member does not act in a manner which warrants the verdict that he bears individual responsibility for what happens, but under the cir­ cumstances the most plausible judgment is to view him as a member of a group which bears collective responsibility for what happens. Thus, while he escapes be­ ing found individually responsible for the outcome, he is not totally disconnected from the responsibility for the outcome. He does not escape membership in a group which bears moral responsibility for the outcome. In support of the view that he should be considered a member of this group,

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consider again the objection that the reluctant member could have done more to dissociate himself from the group. Had he done more to dissociate himself from the group, he would arguably have removed himself from all connections to the out­ come. Instead of belonging to a group collectively responsible for the outcome, the group would consist of the other committee members sharing responsibility for the outcome, and he would be detached from all connections to the responsibility. Unfortunately, the reluctant committee member does not act in this manner. He is content to let the committee embark upon a course of action without making much of an effort to prevent this action. Especially in the crucial interval of time leading up to the vote, he chooses silence. Although he could not have made much of a difference had he spoken up, this is hardly a reason for judging that he deserves to be cut loose from all ties to the responsibility borne by the collective. In the end he behaves as if he is perfectly willing to let the others arrive at a decision to approve the product, and he does not even vote against the decision. To dramatize and further develop these ideas a third scenario is instruc­ tive. This scenario is exactly like scenario two, except that an additional mem­ ber is present who resists the direction and momentum of the committee through­ out every phase of the discussion. The reluctant member of scenario two is still present, and he caves in to the majority point of view as before. But the addi­ tional member maintains steadfastly that the published research should be taken seriously, and she refuses to be taken in by the arguments and rationalizations of the other members. She is fully aware of the unpopular stand she is taking, but she judges the matter under consideration to be of sufficiently grave impor­ tance that she should not allow her own personal popularity or unpopularity to affect her decision. She never budges from her position, and in the end she registers the only negative vote. The product is approved as before, but the dis­ approving member does what she can to oppose the decision. Here we conclude that the committee as a whole does not bear collective responsibility for the outcome of their decision, for the disapproving member cannot reasonably be included in such a collective. She is successful in dissoci­ ating herself from the committee and from the decision they reach, and hence nothing ties her to the responsibility the committee bears. A group still bears collective responsibility, namely, the same group which bears collective re­ sponsibility in scenario two. This group is not the full committee, but neverthe­ less the group consisting of the members who vote affirmatively together with the reluctant member still qualify as a collective bearing responsibility for the outcome (and the subgroup consisting of the affirmative voters constitutes a group which shares responsibility for the outcome). Some important conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, the reluctant member in the preceding discussion is a paradigm example of one whose involve­ ment in the work of the committee occupies a position somewhere between those who zealously push forward toward a morally irresponsible decision, thereby incur­ ring an individual responsibility for the outcome, and those who zealously oppose

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such action, thereby taking on no responsibility at all. I have argued that the reluc­ tant member becomes a member of a collective which bears responsibility for the outcome, even though he cannot reasonably be judged individually responsible for the outcome. No doubt the behavior of the reluctant member is indicative of the behavior of many people in the modem corporation. If so, collective responsibility is probably a common phenomenon in corporate life. Second, the disapproving member in scenario three is a paradigm example of a person who successfully cuts all ties with the responsibility borne by the commit­ tee of which he or she is a member. A person who actively opposes the decision reached by the rest of the committee cannot justly be charged with responsibility for the committee's decision, even if what is at stake is nothing more than membership in a group which is co11ective1y responsible. This point might strike some as so obvious as not to be worth pointing out. But many are accustomed to casting the net of co11ective responsibility far and wide over those even remotely connected with a decision which leads to serious consequences (more on this point in the next sec­ tion), and raising a voice of caution concerning those who genuinely dissociate themselves from the committees is important. Third, even if we don't acknowledge that corporations as such can bear moral responsibility, we need not hold the view that moral responsibility can be borne only by individual moral agents. An important alternative exists which is almost invariably overlooked in discussions about corporate responsibility. We can acknowledge groups or committees within corporations as capable of bear­ ing responsibility over and above the responsibility borne by individual mem­ bers. Although this point seems to be presupposed in some of Peter French's published works, only seldom (Ozar, 1 979, p. 298) is it explicitly acknowl­ edged in the literature. To explain why this is a point of no small significance, I now look more intensively at the nature of corporate responsibility and how it differs from col­ lective responsibility. The most important difference between collective and corporate responsibility lies in the fact that a corporation is much more than a group or co11ective of people. Unlike a simple collective, a corporation is a complex entity which has assets, shareholders, a charter, employees, and so forth. A simple collective has none of these things. A club or association might have assets or employees, but a simple collective does not. In addition, a com­ mittee within a corporation might have direct control over various assets of the firm, and it might have the power to hire or dismiss employees. But, strictly speaking, the firm has the assets and the employees. (Some so-called commit­ tees, such as the Committee for Concerned Citizens, might have directors, as­ sets, and employees. But these are clearly not committees of the sort under consideration and hence lie outside the scope of the present discussion.) What this means is that when we ascribe moral responsibility to a corpo­ ration, we are ascribing moral responsibility to an entity which is more than just a group or collection of people. We are ascribing responsibility to an entity

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which has assets, shareholders, a charter, employees, and so forth. The fact that a corporation has assets causes some to find the ascription of responsibility to corporations appealing. For in situations where someone is injured as the result of a product defect, for example, allocating assets of the corporation in question as payment or restitution to those who have suffered injury can be convenient. Some philosophers see enormous problems or perplexities in assigning moral responsibility to an entity as complex as that of a corporation. For deeply embedded in the moral thought of the Western tradition since Aristotle is the idea that indi­ vidual persons are paradigm examples of entities with the capability of bearing moral responsibility, and, while a group or collective might be thought of as a some­ what natural extension of this concept, assigning it to something with as complex a structure as a corporation perhaps seems problematic, unnatural, or far-fetched. Sometimes we are urged to think of corporate responsibility more along the lines of collective responsibility by envisioning it as the responsibility borne by the people who "make up" the corporation. This might seem on the surface to be a rather natural way to think about corporate responsibility, but in the remainder of the chapter I argue that thinking about corporate responsibility in this manner is a serious mistake. The obvious advantage of this approach is to simplify talk about corporate responsibility by reducing it to a particular type of collective responsibility. We need not then worry about ascribing responsibility to an entity which is more than an aggregate of moral agents, and the whole enterprise of discussing corporate responsibility can be kept relatively straight­ forward. Nevertheless, I argue that the issue of corporate responsibility cannot be as simple as this picture suggests. The first thing to notice about this suggestion is the vagueness of the locu­ tion "make up" in the suggestion that corporate responsibility can be cashed out in terms of the responsibility borne by the people who make up the corporation. Thus, one problem is identifying these people who supposedly "make up" the corporation. In addition to the officers, managers, and other employees of the firm are its shareholders and directors, not to mention previous officers, manag­ ers, employees, shareholders, and directors. Of all these groups of people, who should be included? We might decide that shareholders should be excluded, because they have no direct involvement in the decisions of the corporation. But if this is the crite­ rion which determines which people make up the corporation, we should like­ wise exclude many employees, such as custodians, file clerks, groundskeepers, data entry personnel, and others who have no involvement in corporate decision making. In most cases corporate decisions which have morally significant con­ sequences are made by relatively few persons. And if this is what is meant by corporate responsibility, we are left with something little different from the kind of collective responsibility described earlier. The whole point of moving to the concept of collective responsibility, some might argue, is to get away from the idea that the only people to whom the

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responsibility attaches are people who in some way contribute to the state of affairs for which the corporation is judged morally responsible. Thus, in the case of Exxon, some of those who argue for the position that Exxon as a corpo­ ration bears moral responsibility for the oil spill resulting from the wreck of the Valdez are concerned to argue that in an some real sense all of the Exxon em­ ployees are tied to this responsibility. The vast majority of Exxon's employees did nothing which even remotely contributed to the wreck of the Valdez. But nevertheless, just by being an Exxon employee at the time, they are caught up in a vast net of responsibility. For that mf!Uer, some might wish to include former Exxon employees or even people who.have become Exxon employees since the disaster. As long as contributing to the oil spill is no longer the issue, how gen­ erously we extend the boundaries of the category of people who "make up" the Exxon corporation may not appear to matter. We can acknowledge some plausibility in this way of thinking. Feeling a genuine sense of shame or even guilt for what happened, regardless of his or her lack of involvement, would have been natural for an Exxon employee at the time of the disaster. People naturally identify with the corporation which em­ ploys them in a way which sometimes evokes feelings of pride and at other times feelings of guilt. Moreover, being criticized or blamed for what happens as a result of a corporate decision with which they had nothing to do is not uncommon for people who happen to be employed by a corporation receiving a great deal of negative publicity. From these observations about feelings of shame or guilt on the part of Exxon employees or about their being the object of criticism by others we can­ not conclude that they are in any way morally responsible for the oil spill. People sometimes feel shame or guilt or receive criticism for states of affairs for which by no stretch of the imagination do they bear moral responsibility. And, no mat­ ter how closely people come to identify with an organization, they do not auto­ matically incur moral responsibility for what happens as a result of the collec­ tive actions of its members. Identifying with a corporation is not a sufficient condition for being tied in any way to the responsibility for what happens. Nevertheless, many believe that all of a firm's employees come to participate in the responsibility for the consequences of corporate conduct. As a direct result of the fact that a person is employed by Exxon, according to this way of thinking, the person is somehow tied to the moral responsibility of the firm for the consequences of the oil spill. And the fact that an employee was not directly involved in the events leading to the wreck of the Valdez does not automatically disconnect him or her from the responsibility which falls upon the Exxon Corporation. The issue currently under consideration is whether what is said about the moral responsibility of a corporation can be reduced to statements about the collective responsibility of the people who make up the corporation. I began by suggesting that any attempt to achieve this reduction is plagued by the problem of defining who these people are who make up the corporation. But even if we

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succeed in arriving at an acceptable criterion for deciding who these people are, questions remain unanswered. One question is whether defining such a corpo­ rate-wide totality is even desirable. What is the sense of finding all of these people collectively responsible for what happens as the result of corporate ac­ tions such as oil spills? What is the sense of judging that all of the persons making up the corporation come to be members of a vast collective bearing responsibility for the ill effects of corporate conduct? Already I have argued against this approach, for some individuals in cor­ porations, typified by the disapproving member in scenario three, should not be judged to belong to such collectives. Her behavior clearly absolves her of all ties to the responsibility for the injuries suffered by users of the product the committee evaluates. Equating corporate responsibility with the collective re­ sponsibility of all the persons making up the corporation is a mistake. Judging that people serving on committees within a corporation come to bear collective responsibility for the ill effects of corporate conduct might make good sense, but extending the boundaries of these collectives to encompass all the people who make up the corporation does not make good sense. At the very least, people typified by the disapproving member of scenario three should be excluded. The issue of whether or not a corporation's moral responsibility distrib­ utes to the individuals involved has been much discussed. Patricia Werhane and Peter French are well known advocates of the position that it is in general non­ distributive, but others have attacked their position (Garrett, 1989, pp. 535-545). In defense of including all of a corporation's employees in this vast aggregate, a person could argue that feeling a sense of shame or guilt for the injuries result­ ing from the firm's decision to market the defective product would be quite natural, even in the case of the disapproving member. Even though she opposed the committee's decision and did everything reasonably within her power to dissociate herself from the efforts to approve the product, for her to feel shame or guilt for the harmful consequences of the committee's action would not be surprising. Regardless of her own actions, she is still a member of the commit­ tee and employee of the firm, and her feelings of identification with the corpo­ ration lead her to feel shame for what happened. In reply, we can agree that employees of corporations may have strong feelings of guilt or shame for the harmful consequences of decisions made by their firm, even when they themselves have done everything in their power to oppose such decisions. But is this a sufficiently weighty consideration for con­ cluding that they are to be numbered among the aggregate of those who bear corporate responsibility for such consequences? Seeing that they should is hard, just as hard as seeing that our feelings of shame for the ways in which our ancestors treated slaves several hundred years ago should be taken as a reason for concluding that we are somehow responsible for this treatment. Whatever we mean by moral responsibility, ascribing it to an agent who does his or her best to oppose a course of action, or to an agent who was not alive until several

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hundred years after an action has been taken by others, is not plausible. No doubt some will not hesitate to judge that we are morally responsible for the treatment of slaves by our ancestors several hundred years ago. But at this point the concept of moral responsibility appears have been stretched to such a point that it begins to lose much of its force and impact. We can perhaps see some attraction in thinking about moral responsibility in such a way that people with any type of affiliation with an organization such as a corporation come to be drawn into the net of responsibility. But a significant price is paid by envisioning moral responsibility in th�s �anner, namely, that judging that we should find ourselves within this net 'suddenly becomes a less serious moral charge. And if ascribing responsibility to an employee of a corporation for the consequences of a corporate act is on a par with ascribing responsibility to us for something our ancestors did hundreds of years ago, we have weakened the concept of responsibility considerably. The question of corporate responsibility is usually taken to be one of con­ siderable significance and gravity. The question whether the Exxon corporation should be regarded as morally responsible for the oil spill has been hotly de­ bated, and those who debate the issue see it as an issue of great urgency and significance. Viewed in this light, construing corporate responsibility as a type of collective responsibility which is stretched to the point of including all of the firm's employees, even those typified by the disapproving member of scenario three, is a mistake. For then we encourage the idea that what is at issue is some­ thing innocuous. I have argued that equating corporate responsibility with the collective re­ sponsibility of those who make up the corporation is problematic because it casts the net of responsibility too widely over those affiliated with the corporation. But this suggestion is likewise problematic for almost entirely the opposite problem: it fails to bring into the scope of moral responsibility certain non-human elements of the corporation, such as its assets, liabilities, charter, reputation, and so forth. Suppose that when we judge that the Exxon corporation is responsible for the effects of the oil spill we mean nothing more than that the people who make up Exxon are collectively responsible for what has happened. Then for these people to express sentiments of remorse or contrition, to pay personal fines for the costs of the cleanup, or possibly (in the case of those most directly involved) serve a prison sentence might make sense. But to allocate assets of the corporation toward the cleanup or toward the payment of fines to various local governments in the area adjacent to the oil spill does not make sense on this view. Moreover, if corporate responsibility can be reduced to collective responsibility in the manner suggested, then the damaging of the corporation's reputation by the fact that the corporation is held responsible for the effects of the oil spill is unjust. But judging that Exxon is morally responsible for the effects of the oil spill and then going on to insist that, for purposes of cleanup and paying fines, corporate assets are off limits would be wrong. And affirming that Exxon is

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morally responsible for these effects and going on to insist that the reputation of the firm should not in all fairness be damaged as a result would likewise be wrong. Again, corporate responsibility cannot be reduced to the collective re­ sponsibility of the vast aggregate of those who make up the corporation. If corporate responsibility is not to be regarded as the responsibility borne by this vast aggregate, how shall it be regarded? To attempt an answer to this question is well beyond the scope of the discussion, but in the concluding portion of this chapter I mention one intriguing suggestion put forward by Peter French. Accord­ ing to French, the most sensible way to approach this question is to begin with the position that the corporation should itself be regarded from a moral point of view as a person. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the corporation "'presents itself as a moral being" (MacIntyre, 1979, p. 124), but the view defended by French takes this posi­ tion one step further by identifying this moral being as a moral person. Thus, to say that the Exxon corporation bears responsibility for the oil spill is to say that a certain moral person is responsible, and this person is none other than the Exxon corpora­ tion. This is not a flesh and blood person. But the whole point of French's argument is that different types of moral persons exist, each of which has the capability of bearing moral responsibility. Some flesh and blood persons bear moral responsibil­ ity for the oil spill, but in addition the corporate moral person, Exxon, is responsible for the oil spill. In support of his contention that corporations are genuine moral persons, French has drawn up an impressive line of argument built upon calling attention to many important similarities between corporations and flesh and blood per­ sons. In recent years several writers have challenged French's contention, and an extensive literature has developed on the question whether a corporation can be considered as a person. My concern is not to take sides in the controversy over this question. But we might note the great advantage of French's approach is that we can acknowledge that corporations really do bear moral responsibil­ ity, while at the same time supporting the traditional notion that persons are first and foremost the bearers of moral responsibility. If corporations are moral per­ sons, we do not have the difficult task of explaining how an institution of such complexity can come to bear moral responsibility. My concern has been to argue that corporate responsibility cannot be re­ duced to the responsibility borne by a collective. And whether we take the posi­ tion that corporations are vastly different from persons or collections of persons or the position that corporations are themselves persons, corporate responsibil­ ity and collective responsibility are two different phenomena. Thus, we can deny that corporations can bear moral responsibility, we can affirm that they bear moral responsibility and that they do so in a way similar to the way that flesh and blood persons bear responsibility, or we can affirm that they bear responsibility in a way different from that of persons or collectives of persons. But the view that corporations bear responsibility in exactly the same way that collectives bear responsibility is not plausible.

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I have attacked two ways of thinking about the moral responsibility of corporations. One is that if we deny that corporations can bear moral responsi­ bility we are driven to the position that moral responsibility for the consequences of corporate misconduct must be borne entirely by individual moral agents within or associated with the corporation. By calling attention to the dynamics of deci­ sion making within committees, I hope to have made plausible the position that collectives within corporations can bear responsibility for the corporate mis­ conduct in ways which cannot in general be reduced to the responsibility borne by individuals within these committe�s. , Second, I have urged that collective responsibility borne by these collec­ tives within corporations should not be confused with the responsibility borne by the corporation itself. Seldom does everyone who makes up the corporation tum out to qualify for membership in such collectives. In addition, corporate responsibility involves resources over and beyond its human resources. W hat­ ever is meant by corporate responsibility, it is something considerably more complex than the responsibility of a collective.

Twelve A PROPOSED THEORY OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY In the preceding chapters collective moral responsibility has been examined in a variety of ways. Attention has been given to its points of resemblance to individual moral responsibility, the types of situations in which it is alleged to occur, how it is viewed by a number of prominent ethicists, its relationship to moral taint, ways in which it can be avoided, and how it functions in a corporate setting, to mention only some. The purpose of this chapter is to draw together some of these diverse themes and come away in the end with a picture of collective moral responsibility which is intuitively plausible, philosophically defensible, and at the same time does reason­ able justice to what ordinary people say about it. The challenge of H. Gomperz has remained in the background for most of the discussion. He speaks of modem thinkers ridiculing the notion of collec­ tive responsibility because of its association with primitive or barbaric ways of thinking, and he calls for an articulation of the notion of collective moral re­ sponsibility which is respectable to modem thinkers. If Gomperz's article has .encouraged the idea that not much can be learned from primitive notions of collective responsibility, or that these notions are silly or ridiculous, that would be unfortunate. But his challenge has served to stimulate interest in collective responsibility among some who may have otherwise dismissed it as unsuitable for dealing with contemporary moral concerns. Those who have written about collective responsibility have done a great deal to clarify it and to make it re­ spectable to the majority of modem thinkers. In the spirit of responding to the challenge of Gomperz, I now attempt to draw together some of the ideas which have been introduced in preceding chap­ ters and present an approach to thinking about collective moral responsibility which makes reasonably clear sense. Much is puzzling about collective moral responsibility, and I do not claim that the account presented here succeeds in resolving all that people find problematic and puzzling about collective moral responsibility. But to the degree that this work inspires others to continue in the work of resolving the puzzles and clarifying the issues, I believe that something worthwhile will have been gained. From the outset I have emphasized that an understanding of how collec­ tives come to bear moral responsibility requires a prior understanding of how individual moral agents come to bear moral responsibility. On the assumption that a clear account of individual moral responsibility can be given, I have con­ centrated on the task of explaining how this notion can be suitably broadened to

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deal with cases in which several individuals are connected with the occurrence of a state of affairs. The notion of individual moral responsibility is broadened m deal with these cases in two ways. First, sometimes several moral agents come to share responsibility for what has happened, in which case each bears individual moral responsibility for what has happened. Second, sometimes a collective consist­ ing of several moral agents comes to bear moral responsibility for what has happened. This book has concentrated on situations of the second type. Some philosophers, such as H.D. Lewis, deny the existence of both shared and collec­ tive moral responsibility. Others, such as Sverdlik, acknowledge shared moral responsibility but do not believe that collectives as such can bear moral respon­ sibility. But many others affirm that collectives can bear moral responsibility for a harm even though not all of its members bears moral responsibility for the same harm. The proposition that individuals can bear moral responsibility is far less controversial than the proposition that collectives can bear moral responsibility. Admittedly something is odd or even puzzling in the contention that a collec­ tive, which is in and of itself a non-human entity, is capable of bearing moral responsibility. However, I have urged that some of this oddity or puzzlement can be dispelled when we look at situations in which several agents acting to­ gether bring about a harmful result. If one person acting alone had brought about this harmful result singlehandedly, nothing would be puzzling in ascrib­ ing moral responsibility to this person. And if the several agents acting together can be thought of as a type of unit, ascribing moral responsibility to this unit is not altogether unnatural. Thus, we may think of collective responsibility as an extension of the idea that individuals bear responsibility by thinking of the ac­ tions of several agents as at least sometimes parallel to the actions an individual might have performed. I have developed this parallel by identifying situations in which the ac­ tions of several individuals resemble actions taken by an individual acting alone, and, to the degree that a resemblance exists, the potential for making a plausible case for collective responsibility is present. Some refuse to countenance collec­ tive moral responsibility even when a very strong resemblance is present, and others are eager to attribute collective moral responsibility where little or no resemblance is present. The approach I take falls somewhere between these two extremes. In the opinion of Sverdlik and others of an individualist persuasion (Ben­ jamin, 1976, pp. 93-106), no clear cases exist in which a collective can be said to bear moral responsibility for a state of affairs for which one or more of its members fails to bear moral responsibility. A strong resemblance between the actions of the group and those of an individual acting alone may indicate that shared responsibility is present. But to individualists like Sverdlik, no clear cases of collective moral responsibility can be found where the responsibility fails to

Collective Responsibility

1 35

distribute to all of its members. Whatever one wants to say about responsibility can ultimately be said about the responsibility born by various individual moral agents. Nevertheless. many moral philosophers believe otherwise. D.E. Cooper argues persuasively that. although we can sometimes reduce talk about the re­ sponsibility of a collective to talk about the responsibility of its individual mem­ bers. this is not always possible. Just as the description of the stew as delicious cannot be reduced to a description of each of its ingredients as delicious. the same is true about ascriptions of moral responsibility to collectives. Thus. the moral responsibility ascribed to colle'ctives will sometimes fail to distribute to its members. Virginia Held and Stanley Bates discuss the responsibility borne by ran­ dom collectives. W hile Held is inclined to believe that this responsibility in­ variably distributes to all of its members. Bates argues that in many cases it does not. From statements ascribing collective responsibility to the class of all white Americans we cannot plausibly conclude that each white American bears moral responsibility for the state of affairs in question. However. Held believes in addition that the collective moral responsibility of organized collectives does not in general distribute to members of these collectives. Peter French is perhaps the best-known advocate of undistributive collec­ tive moral responsibility. Conglomerate collectivities such as the Rolling Green Country Club can choose certain courses of concerted actions and hence are capable of bearing moral responsibility for what they have done. An example might be instituting various racist practices. But some members of the Rolling Green Country Club need not bear moral responsibility for these practices. Fi­ nally. Richard Swinburne argues that people are members of various communi­ ties. that these communities can have moral responsibilities. such as to help one of its members who has a significant burden. but that not every member of the community has an individual responsibility to help the member with a signifi­ cant burden. Summarizing the wide ranging and multi-faceted discussion of Larry May is more difficult. W hat is significant for present purposes is to affirm that May is in agreement with Cooper. Held. Bates. French. and Swinburne that the moral responsibility borne by a collective does not in general distribute to all of its members. More than any of the other writers. May emphasizes that responsibil­ ity in these situations is frequently borne by collectives as a result of omission or inaction (the former of which is deliberate and the latter not deliberate). His emphasis upon inaction is linked with a desire to promote the idea that groups are much more likely than individuals to be able to bring about social good or to prevent the occurrence of significant harms to society. This emphasis grows out of his commitment to a social existentialist view of moral responsibility. The combined weight of the various arguments provided by these writers for undistributive collective moral responsibility is impressive. After having

1 36

A Proposed Theory of Collective Responsibility

examined these arguments. the individualist appears to face a task of monu­ mental proportions in making the case that all legitimate ascriptions of moral responsibility can be reduced to ascriptions of moral responsibility to individu­ als. Although the combined weight of these writers• arguments is not enough to constitute an outright refutation of the individualist. it may well incline those making an unbiased inquiry to regard non-distributive collective moral respon­ sibility as a highly plausible and defensible option. And this is no small achieve­ ment when we consider the longstanding ridicule suffered at the hands of the attackers of primitive and barbaric conceptions of collective responsibility. Those who defend non-distributive collective moral responsibility must be careful to place limitations on what is regarded as genuine cases of collective moral responsibility, so as. among other things. not to invite renewed ridicule. (The same holds true of ascriptions of responsibility to individuals. An example of a claim with the potential for inviting ridicule might be Freud's contention that people are responsible for evil impulses that occur within their dreams.) If every prospective example of collective moral responsibility is indiscriminately welcomed with open arms. the prospects that collective moral responsibility will be regarded as a legitimate moral concept will be placed in jeopardy. Here moral taint can play a useful role. For if we allow that a moral agent can be tainted by the wrongdoing of others to whom the agent is connected, then a person can be connected to the wrongdoing in a way that need not in­ volve the transmission of guilt or the ascription of responsibility. Most people •s moral intuitions seem to support the idea that some type of effect exists. how­ ever inconsequential, that the wrongdoing of one person has upon another per­ son when a connection exists between the two persons. What is not clear is how we can characterize this effect in moral terms. for more than just the suffering of the second person's reputation appears to be at stake. This phenomenon has some type of moral dimension. In an effort to place it within a familiar moral category, describing it in terms of moral guilt or moral responsibility is tempt­ ing. I believe that this temptation accounts for many of the statements ordinary people make about collective responsibility. especially statements ascribing moral responsibility to collectives which are vast in size. But these ascriptions of col­ lective moral responsibility have the potential for encouraging either the idea that many such ascriptions are laughably extravagant, or else the idea that very little is really at stake if a person is judged to be a member of a collective which is said to bear moral responsibility. Much misunderstanding regarding collective moral responsibility can be eliminated once people acknowledge moral taint and see that much of what is judged to be collective moral responsibility is really moral taint. When some­ one else to whom we happen to be connected by the accident of circumstance engages in wrongdoing. then we can be tainted by this wrongdoing. But I have urged that if mere circumstance is the only connecting link between ourselves and this other person, then sufficient grounds do not exist for judging that we

Collective Responsibility

137

belong to a collective which bears moral responsibility for the effects of this wrongdoing. Thus, as I interpret Appiah's concept of moral taint, we can be tainted by the wrongdoing of another if our only connection to this other person is mere circumstance, but the same is not true of collective moral responsibility. Herein lies one of the most significant differences between the two concepts. Another, related difference between the two concepts concerns the ur­ gency of removing ourselves from a state of moral taint as opposed to the ur­ gency of removing ourselves from actual or potential membership in a collec­ tive which bears moral responsibility. Other things being equal, removal from a state of moral taint is less of a concei.n or priority than removal from member­ ship in a collective which bears responsibility. Because membership in the col­ lective involves more than mere circumstance, taking steps to dissociate our­ selves from a collective which bears moral responsibility for a harm can be a matter of considerable urgency. In many cases we have a moral duty or obligation to dissociate ourselves from such a collective. Often we are morally required to remove ourselves from association with those who have harmed or are planning to harm others. How­ ever, I have argued that we do not always have a moral requirement to pursue this course of action. On some occasions the costs of removing ourselves from membership in a collective are so high that to judge that we have an duty or obligation to do so would be unreasonable. On these occasions removing our­ selves from membership in a collective would be to go beyond the call of duty. Removal from membership in a collective gualifies as an act of supererogation when doing so is non-obligatory and morally praiseworthy and not doing so would not be morally blameworthy. And removal from membership in a collec­ tive is quasi-obligatory when doing so is non-obligatory and not doing so would be morally blameworthy. The account of collective moral responsibility which emerges from these observations is one which endorses certain emphases of the individualist and at the same time certain emphases of those who affirm the possibility of non­ distributive collective responsibility. On the one hand, the cumulative weight of the arguments of Cooper, Held, Bates, French, Swinburne, and May strongly incline a person to believe that on at least some occasions the responsibility borne by a collective does not distribute to all of its members. The program of the individualist may be able to account for a vast majority of cases in which a group of individuals bears responsibility for the outcome of their action or inac­ tion. But supposing that the individualist can account for every conceivable situation of this type seems doubtful, given the wide diversity of situations in which groups come to be responsible for what happens. No individualist has come close to demonstrating that such a strategy is successful or that the even­ tual success of such a strategy is even likely. The individualist can point out that no one has shown that a reductionist strategy is doomed to failure. No purported cases of non-distributive collective

138

A Proposed Theory of Collective Responsibility

responsibility will strike the individualist as a clear and convincing counter­ example to the eventual success of the reductionist strategy. Thus, I have n� t portrayed individualism as an option for which no hope of eventual success 1s possible. Instead, I have attempted to shed light on the controversy between the individualists and their opponents by pointing out some connections between collective responsibility and other deontic concepts such as obligation, blame, and supererogation. I have urged that an examination of these connections shows that the possibility of non-distributive collective responsibility is more reason­ able than it is frequently portrayed, especially by those who find collective re­ sponsibility untenable because of its connections with primitive or barbaric no­ tions about the transmission of guilt. Once we begin to analyze how the concept of collective moral responsibility stands in relation to other moral concepts which are widely recognized by modem moralists as legitimate, as has been done in Chapters Eight and Nine, we are better able to get a sense of its own legitimacy. I have emphasized how my approach to collective moral responsibility is in agreement with those who argue for the possibility of non-distributive collec­ tive responsibility; to the extent that an individualist approach is reductionistic, I believe that it is less plausible than acknowledging the possibility of non­ distributive collective responsibility. But, as Chapter Ten reveals, my approach can in a sense be described as individualist. For I contend that a moral agent can be a member of a collective which bears moral responsibility for a harm only when that agent does something or fails to do something which qualifies the agent for membership. By virtue of performing this qualifying act, as I have called it, the agent attains membership in the collective. The collective consists of moral agents who are there by reason of what they have done or failed to do; those who become members in such collectives are not like sardines in a can which have been packed together randomly. I believe that the failure to empha­ size this point on the part of those defending the concept of collective moral responsibility has contributed to the idea that collectives are often little more than arbitrary groupings. Once we acknowledge that a moral agent comes to be a member of a collective which bears moral responsibility for a harm by performing a qualify­ ing act, two points become evident. First, mere circumstance is not enough to qualify us for membership in a collective. We can be tainted through mere cir­ cumstance; when through mere circumstance we come to be connected to an­ other who brings about harm through his or her wrongful action, the possibility of moral taint is present. But being connected to harm in this manner is not enough to warrant the claim that we belong to a collective which bears respon:­ sibility for this harm. This claim can be warranted only by identifying a qualify­ ing act by the agent in question. The performance of the qualifying act is not sufficient to warrant the claim that the agent bears individual moral responsibil­ ity for the harm, but it does warrant the claim that the agent belongs to a collec­ tive which bears moral responsibility for the harm.

Collective Responsibility

1 39

Second, the degree to which we are blameworthy for performing a quali­ fying act is not directly affected by the fact that others are likewise blamewor­ thy for performing qualifying acts. In particular, the degree of blame attaching to the performance of a qualifying act is not directly affected by the number of others performing qualifying acts. This degree of blame is what it is regardless of how many others are performing qualifying acts. Hence, given the principle that we qualify for membership in a collective responsible for a harm only if we perform a qualifying act, the moral seriousness of our own involvement in a series of events leading to a harm for which a collective (to which we belong) is responsible does not depend upon the 'sheer number of others who belong to the same collective. In other words, no diluting of the seriousness of our moral involvement takes place as the size of the collective increases. As with shared moral responsibility, many assume that some type of diluting phenomenon oc­ curs with collective responsibility. But I have shown that this assumption is questionable. The picture of collective moral responsibility which emerges from this discussion somewhat resembles the approach of the individualist. It insists that each individual member of the collective which bears moral responsibility for a harm makes some type of contribution by virtue of which he or she attains membership in the collective. And this point is reminiscent of Sverdlik's con­ tention that no member of such a collective does not either contribute causally to the outcome, act with the intent of bringing it about, or act recklessly or negligently with respect to it. Sverdlik believes that the satisfaction of these qualifications warrants the claim that the moral agent bears individual responsi­ bility for the outcome. The same is not true of what is necessary for judging that one has performed a qualifying act, but I believe Sverdlik is correct that we must do something or fail to do something in order to be judged morally respon­ sible (what this something amounts to, of course, is itself an immense and con­ troversial topic). He argues that this is true on the level of ascribing shared moral responsibility to a group of individuals, and I have argued that something similar is true on the level of ascribing collective moral responsibility. Some might object that the whole point of articulating a concept of col­ lective responsibility is to emphasize the activity of a collective and to resist thinking of its members in terms of making individual contributions to a par­ ticular outcome. My approach might be thought to focus too much on the ac­ tions of the members of the collective and fall into the individualist trap of thinking of the collective's actions in terms of the actions of its members. On this objection, my approach fails to be suitably holistic and thereby undermines the whole point of having a concept of collective responsibility, as opposed to a concept of shared responsibility. In response, I concede that my approach is not holistic in the sense of ignoring the contributions of individual members of the collective in favor of emphasizing what the c?llective does or fails to do. The approach I have de-

140

A Proposed Theory of Collective Responsibility

scribed conceives of the collective's actions in terms of the actions of its mem­ bers; membership in the collective is itself determined by the actions of the individuals. If the whole point of having a concept of collective responsibility is to conceive of the collective's actions in some alternative manner, then my ap­ proach can rightly be judged to have missed the whole point. Nevertheless, we should see a significant difference between conceiving of the collective actions in terms of the actions of its members and conceiving of the collective's actions as reducible to the actions of its members, or conceiving of the responsibility of the collective in terms of the responsibility of its members. I have urged that the actions of individuals determine whether they are to be considered members of the collectives which bear moral responsibility for what happens. But nothing in this claim is reductionistic. Like D.E. Cooper, I believe that what a col­ lective does cannot in general be reduced to what its individual members do, and the approach I have taken opposes any impulse to show otherwise. The actions of individuals cannot be ignored when we talk about collec­ tive actions and collective responsibility. If the actions of its individual mem­ bers are regarded as counting for nothing in discussions about collective moral responsibility, then nothing prevents the inclusion in collectives of individuals who have done nothing to warrant inclusion. Nothing prevents the inclusion of individuals on the basis of sheer circumstance such as being an American, be­ ing male, and so forth. As we have seen, this is precisely the way that some people speak about collective moral responsibility. But, once again, this way of speaking makes us liable to confuse collective moral responsibility with moral taint. I have argued that the status of those who are tainted by the wrongdoing of others is not the same as the status of those who are members of collectives which bear moral responsibility. A key difference is that we must actually do something (including blameworthy inaction) if we are to be correctly judged a · member of a collective bearing moral responsibility. In the end we must acknowledge that individualists like Sverdlik are cor­ rect in emphasizing that what individual moral agents do is a determining factor in whether or not moral responsibility is borne. Collective moral responsibility is not like a virus that infects people who happen to come into contact with it. But collectivists are correct in emphasizing that collectives can bear moral re­ sponsibility independently of the moral responsibility borne by its members. Collective moral responsibility is more than just a collection of the individual instances of moral responsibility of its members. The view I have defended strikes a balance between the positions of those who see collective moral responsibility as reducible to these individual instances and those who see it as something like an invisible virus which strikes regardless of what a person has done to deserve it. This view is based upon the assumption that each extreme is motivated by insights which are worth pursuing and developing. The view presented here makes use of these insights and preserves what is valuable about them in a form which allows them to be compatible.

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Portions of this discussion have been technical and have at times involved lengthy examinations of complex ideas or subtle distinctions. The impression may have been created that collective responsibility is mainly a subject of schol­ arly speculation and that theories about collective moral responsibility have only incidental relevance for real people as they live their lives in the company of other people. But this impression is mistaken. Recall the existentialist philosophers whose writings on the topic of collective responsibility grew out of deep seated feelings about Germans living undet the Nazi regime. Surely they and many others who approach this topic treat it as one which has profound implications for how the lives and relationships of real people should be viewed. This discus­ sion began with a statement about the collective responsibility of all Americans to do more to counteract violence at abortion clinics. Statements of this nature are typically made as the expression of strong passions or sentiments. Rarely are they made for the purposes of disinterested scholarly discussion or analysis, and rarely are they made with only minimal concern for the effects these state­ ments will have upon others. Typically they are made for the purpose of deliver­ ing a strong message. People are sometimes mistaken about the statements they make ascribing collective moral responsibility, but these statements are nearly always regarded by them as having a direct bearing upon real life. The concept of responsibility plays a central role in morality, and moral philosophers have a reasonably good understanding of how individual moral agents come to bear moral responsibility for states of affairs. But much is puz­ zling about the dynamics of group or collective moral responsibility, and not just non-philosophers have been puzzled by it. It is one of the important areas of morality about which people who work in large organizations look to moral philosophers for guidance; unfortunately, it is an area of morality in which moral philosophers are still searching for answers to fairly basic questions. If this book has succeeded in making a small contribution to a better understanding of this area of morality, or if it has succeeded in inspiring others to take up the challenge of Gomperz to explain the concept of collective moral responsibility in a way that is suitable for modem morality, then it has served its purpose.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appiah, Anthony. "Racism and Moral Pollution" in Collective Responsibility, eds., Larry May and Stacey Hoffman. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1 99 1 , pp. 2 1 9-238. Badhwar, Neera. "Friendship, Justice, and Supererogation," American Philosophical Quarterly, 22 ( 1 985), pp. 123- 1 3 1 . Baron, Marcia. "Kantian Ethics and Supererogation," Journal ofPhilosophy, 8 4 (1987), pp. 237-262. Bates, Stanley. "The Responsibility of 'Random Collectives'," Ethics, 8 1 (1 97 1 ), pp. 343-349. Benjamin, Martin. "Can Moral Responsibility Be Collective and Nondistributive?," Social Theory and Practice, 4 ( 1 976), pp. 93- 1 06. Card, Claudia. "On Mercy," Philosophical Review, 81 ( 1 972), pp. 1 82-207. Cooper, D.E.. "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy, 43 ( 1 968), pp. 258-268. Copp, David. "Responsibility for Collective Inaction," Journal of Social Philosophy, 22 ( 199 1 ), 7 1-80. Downie, R.S .. "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy, 44 ( 1 969), pp. 66-69. Ellin, Joseph. "The Justice of Collective Responsibility," University ofDayton Review, 1 5 ( 1 98 1 ), pp. 1 7-27. Feinberg, Joel. "Collective Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy, 45 ( 1 968), pp. 674-688. French, Peter, Collective and Corporate Responsibility. New York: Columbia University Press, 1 984. ______ Responsibility Matters. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992. Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 962. Garrett, Jan. "Unredistributable Corporate Moral Responsibility," Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 8 ( 1 989), pp. 535-545. Gomperz, H .. "Individual, Collective, and Social Responsibility, Ethics, 49 ( 1939), pp. 329-342. Goodpaster, Kenneth. "The Concept of Corporate Responsibility," Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 2 ( 1 983), pp. 1 -22. Held, Virginia. "Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?," Journal ofPhilosophy, 47 ( 1970), pp. 47 1-48 1 . _____ "Corporations, Persons, and Responsibility," i n Shame, Responsibility, and the Corporation, ed., Hugh Curtler. New York: Haven Publications, 1 986, pp. 1 6 1 - 1 8 1 . Hudson, Hud. "Collective Responsibility and Moral Vegetarianism," Journal of Social Philosophy, 24 ( 1 993), pp. 89- 1 04. Jaspers, Karl, The Question ofGerman Guilt, trans., A.B. Ashton. New York: Capricorn Books, 1 96 1 . Jedlicki, Jerzy. "Heritage and Collective Responsibility" in The Political Responsibility

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Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 53-76. Kolnai, Aurel. "Forgiveness," Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 74 ( 1 973), pp. 9 1 - 1 06. Ladd, John. "Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations," The Monist, 54 ( 1 970), pp. 488-5 1 6. _____ "Persons and Responsibility: Ethical Concepts and Impertinent Analo­ gies" in Shame, Responsibility, and the Corporation, ed., Hugh Cuttler. New York: Haven Publications, 1986, pp. 79-97. Lewis, H.D .. "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy, 23 ( 1 948), pp. 3- 1 8. _____ "The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility," Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai, ed., Peter A. French. Cambridge, Mass: Schocken Publishing Co., 1 972, pp. 1 2 1 ff. MacIntyre, Alisdair. "Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: Are They Mutually Exclusive?," Ethics and the Problems ofthe Twenty-First Century, ed., K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1 979, pp. 1 22- 1 35 May, Larry, The Morality of Groups. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987. ----- Sharing Responsibility. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 992. McGary, Howard. "Morality and Collective Liability," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 20 ( 1 986), pp. 157-1 65. McKie, James. "Changing Views" in Social Responsibility and the Business Predica­ ment. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1 974. Mellema, Gregory. "Shared Responsibility and Ethical Dilutionism," Australasian Jour­ nal ofPhilosophy, 63 ( 1 985), pp. 177- 187. ----- Individuals, Groups, and Shared Moral Responsibility. New York: Peter Lang, 1988. ----� Beyond the Call of Duty. Albany: State University of New York Press, 199 1 . Ozar, David. "The Moral Responsibility of Corporations" in Ethical Issues in Business, eds., T. Donaldson and P. Werhane. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979, pp. 294-300. Ricoeur, Paul, The Symbolism ofEvil. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Surber, Jere. "Individual and Corporate Responsibility: Two Alternative Approaches," Business and Professional Ethics, 2 ( 1 983), pp. 67-9 1 . Sverdlik, Steven. "Collective Responsibility," Philosophical Studies, 5 1 ( 1 987), pp. 6 1 -76. Swinburne, Richard, Responsibility and Atonement. New York: Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989. Tannsjo, Torbjom. "The Morality of Collective Actions," The Philosophical Quarterly, 39 ( 1 989), pp. 22 1 -228. Velasquez, Manuel. "Why Corporations Are Not Responsible for Anything They Do," Business and Professional Ethics, 2 ( 1 983), pp. 1 - 18. Werhane, Patricia. "Corporate and Individual Moral Responsibility: A Reply to Jan Garrett," Journal of Business Ethics, 8 ( 1 989), pp. 82 1 -822. Whelan, John. "Famine and Charity," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 ( 1 99 1 ), pp. 1 49- 1 66.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Gregory Mellema is Professor of Philosophy at Calvin College, where. he has taught from 1 975 to 1976 and from 1 978 to the present. Mellema received his doctorate from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 1 974. He was an instructor at St. Olaf College from 1 974 to 1 975. He later earned a Masters Degree in Business Administration from the Univer­ sity of Michigan, a degree which qualified him to teach and write about busi­ ness ethics. He has frequently taught courses on this and related topics at Aquinas College as well as Calvin College. He is the author of two other books, Individuals, Groups, and Shared Moral Responsibility and Beyond the Call ofDuty, and of a booklet, The Bottom Line. He has contributed articles to four reference works, Magill's Reference in

Ethics, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Encyclopedia of Contemporary Ethical Issues, and Encyclopedia ofApplied Ethics. His articles have appeared in twenty different journals, including Ameri­ can Philosophical Quarterly, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Philosophia, and Analysis. Most of his recent articles deal with issues

in ethics, both theoretical and applied, but he has also published in the areas of philosophy of language, logic, and the philosophy of education. Gregory Mellema is married to Nancy Larson Mellema, and they have two children, Adam and Jenna.

INDEX

abstract objects, 4 act(ion)(s) by groups, 1 5 , 20, 60, 63-65, 67, 70, 107, 1 27 by individuals, 8, 13 coordinated, 65 contributing, 4 qualifying, 1 2, 1 1 2- 1 1 5, 1 1 8, 1 38- 1 40 with one mind, 1 7, 25, 33-34, 43 Adam, 36, 47, 7 1 agency, 6 1 , 65, 67 aggregate collectivities, 53-54 aggregate(s), 4, 54, 1 28 amends, making, 1 1 0 ancestors, 55 apartheid, 73, 77-79 Appiah, Anthony, 6, 10, 7 1 -73, 75-82, 85, 1 37 approval, moral, 25, 27, 29, 34 Arendt, Hannah, 59, 65-67 Aristotle, 1 26 assets, 1 25, 1 29 attitude(s), 60-63, 67-68, 77-79, 82 Badhwar, Neera, 9 1 -94 barbaric ideas, 35, 47, 57, 1 33, 1 38 Baron, Marcia, 92 Bates, Stanley, 9, 45, 5 1 -53, 55, 57, 68-69, 1 04, 1 35, 1 37 benefactor(s), 55 Benjamin, Martin, 1 34 blame(worthiness), 1 1 , 40, 86-89, 9 1 -95, 99- 1 03, 1 1 3- 1 1 7, 1 38- 1 39 Card, Claudia, 9 1 -94 care, 55 character traits, 77-79, 82 children, 55 citizenship, 6 coercion, 5 1 collective(s) conglomerate, 9, 54-55, 1 35 organized, 20, 50-5 1 , 95, 1 35 random, 9, 23, 49-53, L35

size of, 1 1 , l 05- 106, 1 1 0- 1 1 3, 1 36, 1 39 see also aggregate collectivities collectivism, 55 committee(s), 1 20- 1 25, 1 28 communal thinking, 36-37 community, 10, 55-57, 6 1 , 65, 69 conduct, standards of, 55 contagion, moral, 7 1 , 73 contribution, 7, 3 1 -34, 39, 42, 104, 108, 1 1 5, 1 27, 1 38 causal, 7-9, 25-3 1 , 33, 39, 42, 1 39 marginal, 9, 52 similarity of, 8, 1 6, I 8-20, 22-23 Cooper, D.E., 9, 12, 45-49, 55, 57, 68, 104, 1 35, 1 37, 1 40 cooperation, 8, 1 6 , 2 1 -23, 26, 29, 3 1 -33, 40, 44, 50, 107- 108 Copp, David, 69 co-responsibility, 74-77, 79 corporation(s), 1 1 , 39, 5 1 , 62-63, 67, 69, 1 1 9- 1 3 1 crime, 37 decision procedure(s), 49-50, 54-55, 63 demand(s), moral, 45, 92 deontic logic, 90-9 1 , 93 desert, 8 1 deterrence, 57, 69 dilutionism collective, 1 1 1 - 1 1 4, 1 1 7 ethical, I 06- 1 1 2 disapproval, 27 discrimination, 34 Downie, R.S., 48-49 dreams, 1 36 duty beyond, 86-88, 98- I 00, 1 37 moral, 10, 56, 66, 85, 9 1 -94 96-99, 1 38 prima facie, 97 see also obligation Ellin, Joseph, 7 employees, 1 25 - 1 27 encouragement, 25-30, 32 environment, 1 1 9

1 48

Index

esprit de corps, 23

evil, 7 1 -72, 79, 8 1 -84, 136 existentialists, 9, 32, 45, 59-70, 76, 1 41 social, 9- 10, 59, 65-68, 70, 79 famine(s), 65, 69 fault, 7, 48 Feinberg, Joel, 23 forbidden, morally, 84, 97-99 foreseeable harm(s), 62 forgiveness, 9 1 -92 Friedman, Milton, 1 1 9 French, Peter, 9, 36, 45, 53-55, 57, 68-70, 104, 1 25, 1 28- 130, 1 35, 1 37 Freud, Sigmund, 1 36 friendship, 93 games, 6 Garrett, Jan, 1 28 Germans, 25, 33, 37, 56, 69, 1 4 1 God, 87 Gomperz, H., 9, 47, 57, 1 33 Goodpaster, Kenneth, 1 1 9 group(s) actions, see actions, group conformity, 62 dissociating from, l 0, 57, 83-94 identity, 22-23, 63, 1 27 solidarity, 23, 64, 74 guilt, 66-68, 73-75, 8 1 , 1 27- 1 28, 136 by association, 72 collective, 36 indelible, 74 metaphysical, l 0, 73-77, 79 sharing the burden of, 56-57 transmission of, 3, 80, 1 03, 136, 1 38 Hebrews, 47 Heidegger, Martin, 9, 59 Held, Virginia, 9, 45, 49-55, 57, 64, 68-69, 104, 1 35, 1 37 heroism, 86 Hitler, Adolph, 37 Homeric society, 72 Hudson, Hud, 79 identity, choosing an, 75-76 inaction, collective, 64-68 individualism, 1 -2, 4, 9, 1 2, 36-39, 4147, 5 1 -53, 57, 62-63, 66, 68, 97- 100, 104, 135, 1 37- 1 40 methodological, 48, 53 innocence, moral, 6, 28, 36 insensitivity, moral, 62-63, 67-68 integrity, moral, 6, 36, 73, 80-82

intent, 1 6, 19, 1 39 failure in, 25-26 unanimity of, 8, 16-17, 22-23, 33-34 intentional agent(s), 53 intervention, 3 1 -32 Jaspers, Karl, 10, 59, 67, 73-79 Jedlicki, Jerzy, 74 Jews, extermination of, 56, 69 jurisprudence, 36 justice, 36 Kant, 92 Kantian ethics, 87 Kolnai, Aurel, 9 1 -94 Ladd, John, 100, 1 1 9 law, 6, 28 leadership, 64, 66 Lewis, H.D., 3-4, 8, 35-38, 41-42, 45, 55, 134 linear program(s), 108 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1 30 May, Larry, 7, 1 0, 38, 45, 59-70, 74-79, 82, 104, 1 35, 1 37 McGary, Howard, 56, 83 McKie, James, 1 19 media, news, 1 medical ethics, 62 mens rea, 30, 68 mercy, 92 methodological individualism, see individualism, methodological Middle Ages, 47 mob(s), 1 0, 63, 67 moral agent(s), 4 terrain, 57, l 00 Morris, Herbert, 98 motive(s), 6 1 , 109 Naz�. 25, 33, 56, 59, 67, 1 4 1 necessary condition(s), 26 negligence, 30, 33, 40-4 1 , 60, 1 39 New Testament, 47 obligation(s), 1 1 , 84- 1 00, 1 03, 1 37 see also duty offense, moral, 92 Old Testament, 47 omission(s), 17- 1 8, 2 1 -22, 25, 30-33, 42, 44, 86, 89, 93, 97, 101 1 03 , 1 1 2, 1 1 4, 1 3 5 collective, 40, 64, 1 0 1 - 103 see also inaction, collective

Collective Responsibility organization, 8, 1 6, 20-23, 49, 63, 64, 66, 79 degrees of, 2 1 formal, 106 see also collective(s), organized ought, 1 1 , 83, 92 impl ies can, 66, 96 Ozar, David, 1 25 parents, duties of, 55 participation, 26 penalties, 1 1 0 permissibility, 90, 92 pie analogy, 1 1 1 pollution, moral, 72-73 praiseworthiness, 84-92, 99 prescriptivism, 87 prevention, 25, 30-33, 75, 83, 89-9 1 , 94-95, 98 pride, 92, 1 27 primitive culture(s), 2, 9, 35-36, 47, 57, 72. 79, 1 03, 1 1 6, 1 33, 1 35, 1 38 promise(s), 66 qualifying actions, see actions, qualifying quasi-obligation, 9 1 -94, 99- 1 00, 1 37 racism, 60-62, 67-68 random collectives, see collective(s), random recklessness, 28-30, 33, 40-41 , I 39 reduction ism, 53 refraining, see omission(s) remorse, 1 29 reputation, 7 1 , 80, 1 29 responsibil ity causal, 48-49 corporate, 1 1 , 39, 1 20, 1 25- 1 29 degrees of, 50, 63, 1 08- 1 1 0, 1 2 1 distribution of, 10, 47-57, 64, 68, 80-8 1 , 95- 1 04, 1 36- 1 37 legal, 1 1 9 prospective, 8, I 1 9 retrospective, 8 , 88, 1 1 9 shared, 3-5, 23, 39-44, 60, 64, 67-68, 74, 77, 1 06- 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 - 1 22, 1 34, 1 38- 1 39 restitution, 1 1 0, 1 26 revenge, 47 Ricoeur, Paul, 72 rights, 37 risk, 9, 25, 27-30, 33, 60 robots, I 09- 1 1 0 roles, defined, 54-55

149

sanctions, 36, 1 1 0 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 10, 59, 67 self, 59 self-satisfaction, 92 sentiment(s), 23 sets, 4 shame, 66-68, 75, 8 1 , 1 27, 1 28 shareholders, 1 19, 1 25- 1 26 side-effect(s), 28 sin, universal, 36 slavery, 1 28- 1 29 Snow, Nancy, 96 social environment, 36-37 good, 65, 68, 1 35 identification, 63-64 society, 59 solidarity, see groups, solidarity of stain, moral, 72 see also, taint, moral stigma, 72, 83 supererogation, 1 1 , 83, 86-94, 98- 104, 1 37 superstition, 2-3, 57, 79, 1 03 Surber, Jere, 1 1 2 Sverdlik, Steven, 4, 9, 38-47, 50-5 1 , 57, 1 34, 1 40 Swinburne, Richard, 9, 45, 55-57, 68-69, 1 04, 1 35, 1 37 taboo(s), 2, 72 taint, moral, 5, 10, 1 2, 7 1 -83, 1 1 5- 1 1 7, 1 33, 1 36, 1 38- 1 40 Tannsjo, Torbjorn, 89-90 teamwork, 1 08 theology, 36, 87 threshold(s ), 1 07- 1 08 tribal unit(s), 35-38, 47 utilitarianism, 87 utility, 107 value(s), 55, 62-63, 67-68 Velasquez, Manuel, 1 1 9 victimization, 37 virtue(s), 7 voodoo, 2 Werhane, Patricia, 1 28 Whelan, John, 9 1 -94 will, 59 World War II, 25, 37, 59, 69

VI B S

The Value Inquiry Book Series is co-sponsored by: American Maritain Association American Society for Value Inquiry Association for Personalist Studies Association for Process Philosophy of Education Center for East European Dialogue and Development, Rochester Institute of Technology Centre for Cultural Research, Aarhus University College of Education and Allied Professions, Bowling Green State University Concerned Philosophers for Peace Conference of Philosophical Societies International Academy of Philosophy of the Principality of Liechtenstein International Society for Universalism International Society for Value Inquiry Natural Law Society Philosophical Society of Finland Philosophy Seminar, University of Mainz R.S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology Society for Iberian and Latin-American Thought Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust Yves R. Simon Institute.

Titles Published 1.

Noel Balzer, The Hunuin Being as a Logical Thinker.

2.

Archie J. Bahm, Axiology: The Science of Values.

3.

H. P. P. (Hennie) Lotter, Justice for an Unjust Society.

4. H. G. Callaway, Context for Meaning and Analysis: A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language. 5.

Benjamin S. Llamzon, A Hunuine Case for Moral Intuition.

6. James R. Watson. Between Auschwitz and Tradition : Postmodern Reflections on the Task of Thinking. A volume in Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 7. Robert S. Hartman, Freedom to Live: The Robert Hartman Story, edited by Arthur R. Ellis. A volume in Hartman Institute Axiology S tudies. 8.

Archie J. Bahm, Ethics: The Science of Oughtness.

9. George David Miller, An Idiosyncratic Ethics; Or, the Lauramachean Ethics. 10. Joseph P. DeMarco, A Coherence Theory in Ethics. 11. Frank G. Forrest, Valuemetrics: The Science of Personal and Professional Ethics. A volume in Hartman I nstitute Axio logy Studies. 12. William Gerber, The Meaning of Life: Insights of the World's Great Thinkers. 13. Richard T. Hull, Editor. A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry: Presidential Addresses of the American Society for Value Inquiry. A volume in Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies. 14. William Gerber, Nuggets of Wisdom from Great Jewish Thinkers: From Biblical Times to the Present.

1 5. Sidney Axinn, The Logic of Hope: Extensions of Kant' s View of R eligion. 1 6. Messay Kebede, Meaning and Development. 17. Amihud Gilead, The Platonic Odyssey: A Philosophical-Literary Inquiry into the Phaedo. 1 8. Necip Fikri Alican, Mill' s Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill' s Notorious Proof. A volume in Universal Justice. 19. Michael H. Mitias, Editor, Philosophy and Architecture. 20. Roger T. Simonds, Rational Individualism: The Perennial Philosophy of Legal Interpretation. A volume in Natural Law Studies. 2 1 . W illiam Pencak, The Conflict ofLaw and Justice in the Icelandic Sagas. 22. Samuel M. Natale and Brian M. Rothschild, Editors, Values, Work, Education : The Meanings of Work. 23. N. Georgopoulos and Michael Heim, Editors, Being Human in the Ultimate: Studies in the Thought of John M. Anderson. 24. Robert Wesson and Patricia A. Williams, Editors, Evolution and Human Values. 25. W im J. van der Steen, Facts, Values, and Methodology: A New Approach to Ethics. 26. Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, Religion and Morality. 27. Albert William Levi, The High Road of Humanity: The Seven Ethical Ages of Western Man, edited by Donald Phillip Verene and Molly Black Verene. 28. Samuel M. Natale and Brian M. Rothschild, Editors, Work Values: Education, Organization, and Religious Concerns. 29. Laurence F. Bove and Laura Duhan Kaplan, Editors, From the Eye of the Storm: Regional Conflicts and the Philosophy of Peace. A volume in Philosophy of Peace.

30. Robin Attfield, Value, Obligation, and Meta-Ethics. 31. William Gerber, The Deepest Questions You Can Ask About God: As Answered by the World's Great Thinkers. 32. Daniel Statman, Moral Dilemmas. 33. Rem B. Edwards, Editor, Formal Axiology and Its Critics. A volume in Hartman Institute Axiology Studies. 34. George David Miller and Conrad P. Pritscher, On Education and Values: In Praise of Pariahs and Nomads. A volume in Philoso p h y o f Education. 35. Paul S. Penner, Altruistic Behavior: An Inquiry into Motivation. 36. Corbin Fowler, Morality for Moderns. 37. Giambattista Vico, The Art of Rhetoric ([nstitutiones Oratoriae, 17111741), from the definitive Latin text and notes, Italian commentary and introduction by Giuliano Crifo, translated and edited by Giorgio A. Pinton and Arthur W. Shippee. A volume in Values in Italian Philosophy. 38. W. H. Werkmeister, Martin Heidegger on the Way, edited by Richard T. Hull. A volume in Werkmeister Studies. 39. Phillip Stambovsky, Myth and the Limits of Reason. 40. Samantha Brennan, Tracy Isaacs, and Michael Milde, Editors, A Question of Values: New Canadian Perspectives in Ethics and Political Philosophy. 41. Peter A. Redpath, Cartesian Nightmare: An Introduction to Transcendental Sophistry. A volume in Studies in the History of Western Philosophy. 42. Clark Butler, History as the Story of Freedom: Philosophy in Intercultural Context, with Responses by sixteen scholars. 43. Dennis Rohatyn, Philosophy History Sophistry. 44. Leon Shaskolsky Sheleff, Social Cohesion and Legal Coercion: A Critique of Weber, Durkheim, and Marx.

45. Alan Soble, Editor, Sex, Love, and Friendship: Studies of the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, 1977-1992. A volume in Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies. 46. Peter A. Redpath, Wisdom' s Odyssey: From Philosophy to Transcendental Sophistry. A volume in Studies in the History of Western Philosophy. 47. Albert A. Anderson, Universa,l Justice: A Dialectical Approach. A volume in Universal Justice. 48. Pio Colonnello, The Philosophy of Jose Gaos. Translated from Italian by Peter Cocozzella. Edited by Myra Moss. Introduction by Giovanni Gullace. A volume in Values in Italian· Philosophy. 49. Laura Duhan Kaplan and Laurence F. Bove, Editors, Philosophical Perspectives on Power and Domination: Theories and Practices. A volume in Philosophy of Peace. 50. Gregory F. Mellema, Collective Responsibility.

This book critically examines what philosophical proponents have said about collective responsibility, as well as making sense of what ordinary people say about responsibility when it is ascribed to groups of people. Collective responsibility is distinguished here from shared responsibility and moral taint. Parallels are examined between the actions of an individual and the actions of a group or collective. The final chapter, while arguing that collective responsibility is possible, also preserves central intuitions of the individualist . .

Gregory F. Mellema

The Value Inquiry Book Series (VIBS) is an international scholarly program that publishes philosophical books in all areas of value inquiry, including social and political thought, ethics, applied philosophy, feminism, personalism, religious values, values in education, medical and health values, values in science and technology, humanistic psychology, formal axiology, history of philosophy, post-communist thought, peace theory, law and society, and theory of culture.

I SBN

90-420-031

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