Collaborative Governance: Theory and Lessons from Israel [1st ed.] 9783030458065, 9783030458072

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Collaborative Governance Theory and Lessons from Israel Edited by Neta Sher-Hadar Lihi Lahat Itzhak Galnoor

Collaborative Governance

Neta Sher-Hadar  •  Lihi Lahat Itzhak Galnoor Editors

Collaborative Governance Theory and Lessons from Israel

Editors Neta Sher-Hadar Mandel School for Educational Leadership Jerusalem, Israel

Lihi Lahat Administration & Public Policy Sapir Academic College Hof Ashkelon, Israel

Administration & Public Policy Sapir Academic College Hof Ashkelon, Israel

Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies Concordia University Montreal, QC, Canada

Itzhak Galnoor The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute Jerusalem, Israel Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel

ISBN 978-3-030-45806-5    ISBN 978-3-030-45807-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This collection of articles emerged from the work of a research group at the Yaakov Chazan Center for Social Justice and Democracy at The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, which investigated collaborative governance during 2015–2018. This book is the first to look at the mechanism of collaborative governance in the Israeli context. It is the third and last of a trilogy that was written at the Van Leer Institute on privatization, regulation, and collaborative governance.1 The trilogy examines the evolving role of the state as a result of far-reaching changes in democracy and public administration. This book continues the work of the previous volumes by proposing another approach for governments to consider, especially when privatization and regulation do not produce the desired outcomes in public policy. In its totality, the trilogy examines the changes in the state’s role and the status of its institutions, especially national and local administrations, and their repercussions for policy making in democratic countries. This book is the product of the ideas and discussions about collaborative governance among some twenty scholars in various disciplines such as sociology, political science, law and regulation, public management and policy. In addition, meetings were held with the managers and initiators of projects that are representative of the various types of collaborative governance, with the goal of understanding what is being done in the field and 1  The Privatization of Israel: The Withdrawal of State Responsibility (Editors: Amir PazFuchs, Ronen Mandelkern, Itzhak Galnoor, 2018. Palgrave Macmillan). Regulation in Israel: Values, Effectiveness, Methods (Editors: Eyal Tevet, Varda Shiffer and Itzhak Galnoor. 2020, Palgrave Macmillan).

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the possibilities implicit in these projects. The book, therefore, is an expression of the theoretical approaches to collaborative governance in its various forms, the practical results of actual implementations of collaborative governance, and the insights arrived at by the group. Most of the authors of the chapters in the book were partners in the group’s work, although, unfortunately, it was not possible to include contributions from all the partners. We thank the Center for Social Justice and Democracy in memory of Yaakov Chazan at The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in Jerusalem for its support of the research on collaborative governance. We wish to thank each and every one of the workshop’s participants who answered the call for papers in 2015, shared their studies, and participated in discussions on their content and on the concepts of collaborative governance. A special thank you to Nomika Zion for managing and leading the project from the beginning. We are also deeply grateful to Dr. Varda Shiffer for her important role in the process and her insightful comments on the various chapters. Special thanks to the authors of these chapters, not just for the quality of their work and their willingness to listen to our suggestions, but also for their contribution to the theoretical framework of the book and for helping develop the definition of collaborative governance presented here. The authors alone are solely responsible for the content of the chapters. However, the chapters were stimulated by our collaborative work and the definitions presented in the introductory chapter. We would also like to thank the editors of Palgrave Macmillan for their diligent work and guidance. We extend our thanks to all the participants in the conferences that dealt with our subject, especially the conference that was held at the Chazan Center on March 19, 2017, and at Sapir College on May 27–28, 2015. We want to express our deepest thanks to the Kibbutz Movement and the Havazelet Trust that helped found the Center for Social Justice and Democracy in memory of Yaakov Chazan and have continued to support its activities since then. We are also indebted to The Sam and Bella Sebba Charitable Trust for its ongoing collaboration with and support of the Center in its studies. Special thanks to the New Israel Fund for its support of the Center. Without all of this support, this book could not have been published. Dr. Lihi Lahat would like to thank the Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies at Concordia University Montréal for giving her the time to devote to the production of this book.

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We would also like to thank The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and its retired director, Professor Gabriel Motzkin, as well as its current director, Professor Shay Lavi. Lastly, we are deeply grateful to our diligent editor, Ms. Ronit Tapiero, for her invaluable work, and to Dr. Tal Kohavi, the manager of The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute’s publications, for their professionalism and dedication to making this book a reality. Jerusalem, Israel Hof Ashkelon, Israel 

Neta Sher-Hadar Lihi Lahat Itzhak Galnoor

Contents

1 Introduction: Collaborative Governance  1 Lihi Lahat, Neta Sher-Hadar, and Itzhak Galnoor

Section I On the Democratic Elements of Collaborative Governance  25 2 Participatory Democracy and Collaborative Governance: Do the Two Join Forces (Against the State)? 27 Gayil Talshir 3 Collaborative Governance in Light of Deliberative Democracy 53 Ronen Goffer 4 A Threefold Perspective: Conditions for Collaborative Governance 77 Lihi Lahat and Neta Sher-Hadar

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Section II  Collaborative Governance in Local Government 101 5 Local Collaborative Governance: Could It Bypass Outdated Legal Structures?103 Varda Shiffer 6 Local Collaborative Governance: Creating Workplaces for Women in Minority Societies in Southern Israel127 Rotem Bresler Gonen and Kassim Alsraiha 7 Example: A Local Collaborative Initiative in Kiryat Malachi151 Zion Regev and Neta Sher-Hadar

Section III  Regulation and Collaborative Governance 163 8 Collaborative Regulation: Collaborative Governance in Regulation165 Motti Talias 9 Reducing Aspects of Collaborative Governance in Standardization Processes in Israel191 Edna Harel-Fisher

Section IV The Place of Civil Society in Collaborative Governance Arrangements 215 10 Civil Society Organizations in Collaborative Governance: Cross-sector Partnerships as a Test Case217 Michal Almog-Bar

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11 The 5x2 Initiative for Expanding STEM Excellence in Israel: Collective Impact as a Model of Collaborative Governance241 Inbar Hurvitz and Michal Rom 12 Example: The Partnership for Regional Sustainability as a Collaborative Governance Arrangement267 Naomi Apel and Lihi Lahat 13 Conclusion: Collaborative Governance as an Arrangement for Shaping and Implementing Policy277 Neta Sher-Hadar, Lihi Lahat, and Itzhak Galnoor

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Michal Almog-Bar  is Associate Professor and the head of the Center for the Study of Civil Society and Philanthropy, the Paul Baerwald School of Social Work and Social Welfare, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her fields of research include organizational, managerial and employment aspects of nonprofit organizations; policy towards the nonprofit sector; gender in civil society; nonprofit advocacy and cross-sectorial partnerships. She serves as the area editor of civil society of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, one of the leading journals in this field. She has participated in several international comparative projects on nonprofit organizations and published several books and numerous articles in top leading journals in the fields of nonprofit studies and social policy. She has been involved in policy formation concerning civil society in Israel and took part in various national committees. Kassim  Alsraiha  is a faculty member at Mandel Center for Leadership in the Negev. He is a  doctoral candidate in the Department of Middle East Studies at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. His field of research is state and religion in the Middle East, with a focus on the Gulf States. Kassim holds a master’s degree from Tel-Aviv University, the Department of Middle Eastern and African History. In the framework of his master’s thesis, he studied the Arab-Bedouin population of the Negev, focusing on tribal law. Alsraiha has published articles and book chapters on the topics of religion and state, minorities and leadership. 

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Naomi Apel  was the director of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability. She has worked at Ramat Hanadiv Nature Park since 2003 in various positions and in the last 5  years has played a leading role in promoting the regional agenda towards a more sustainable management. She holds a BA in social studies and an MA in Technologies in Education from Haifa University. Itzhak Galnoor  is Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (emeritus) and senior fellow at The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. He served on the Executive Committee of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and edited its Advances in Political Science book series. He was head of the Civil Service Commission in Prime Minister Rabin’s government (1994–1996); member of the Israel Science Foundation’s Executive Committee; and on the Governing Board of Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In 2007–2008, he was the Deputy Chair of the Israeli Council of Higher Education. In 2015 he was awarded the Lifetime Achievement Prize by the Association of Israel Studies (AIS). His recent books in English include Public Management in Israel: Development, Structure, Functions and Reforms (2011); The Handbook of Israel’s Political System, (with Dana Blander), (2018). The Privatization of Israel: The Withdrawal of State Responsibility (with Amir Paz-Fuchs and Ronen Mandelkern), eds., Palgrave Macmillan (2018). Ronen Goffer  is a researcher and practitioner of participatory and deliberative democracy. He received his PhD in 2015 from the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His dissertation dealt with “An Institutional Normative Model of Hybrid Democracy: Integrating of Deliberative Democracy and the Representative Model”. His book Participation First: Participatory Democracy from Theory to Practice was published in 2008. He lectures at the Sapir Academic College. Dr. Goffer was a founder and director of the division for participatory democracy at the Haim Zippori Community Education Center, which developed and implemented methods of citizen participation in decision making. In 2011, he was the public participation adviser to the Trachtenberg Committee formed by the prime minister. Ronen Goffer is a graduate of the Mandel School for Educational Leadership. He holds an MSc (cum laude) in Physics and a BSc in Physics and Mathematics, both from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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Rotem  Bresler  Gonen  is a fellow researcher and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Management and Urban Politics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a faculty member at the Mandel center for leadership in the Negev, Israel. She completed her doctoral studies in 2005 at the London School of Economic and Political Science, researching political appointments in local government. Her research focuses on issues of administration and politics in local government, the connection between local and central government, and the challenges of local democracy. Bresler-­Gonen directs a program to train heads of local authorities at the Hebrew University’s Federmann School of Public Policy and Government in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior. For over a decade, she has served as an adviser to the Ministry of Interior and other ministries, as well as a consultant to local authorities on a variety of issues. Edna Harel-Fisher  is an attorney and is a research fellow in The Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem, Israel (since June 2017). Her current  research is based on profound understanding of Israeli Public and Administrative Law and on expertise in special fields as Arts and Culture Law and Higher Education Law. She worked for 25 years in various legal positions in the Israeli public service, including the Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Science, Culture and Sports. She also specialized in regulation affairs and economic law, served as a guiding figure for these subjects for almost a decade as head of the Department of Legal Counseling and Legislative Affairs (Economic Law), Attorney General’s Department, Ministry of Justice, Israel. Inbar  Hurvitz  is Deputy Executive Director at Sheatufim  – Strategies for Social Impact. Sheatufim is a nonprofit organization that leads and facilitates cross-sector collaboration using the Collective Impact framework as well as public participation methodologies in government ministries. Prior to joining Sheatufim, Inbar served as the Executive Director of the Tirat Carmel Community Foundation in Israel where she spearheaded innovative models of social entrepreneurship and local cross-sector collaboration. Inbar joined Sheatufim at 2013 and is leading Collective Impact as a key Strategy for social Impact. In that role she also served as the director of 5×2  – STEM Excellence Initiative since its inception up to 2018. Inbar holds an MA in Political Science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and an MPP from the UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy.

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Lihi Lahat  is a senior lecturer in the Department of Administration & Public Policy at Sapir Academic College and an affiliate associate professor, Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies, Concordia University, Montreal. She has a PhD from the Tel Aviv University, Israel. Dr. Lahat was the academic co-director (with Dr. Sher-Hadar) of the research group studying collaborative governance in the Chazan Center at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. Her papers have appeared in journals such as Policy Sciences, Social Policy & Administration, International Review of Administrative Sciences and Journal of Management and Governance. Her areas of research are policymakers’ perceptions of poverty, the regulation of personal social services, uses of time and policy, and collaborative governance. Dr. Lahat is a member of the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel and ran the “Outcome Oriented Management and Practice in Human Services Project” in the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Social Services (2013–2014). Zion Regev  is the head of the National Strategic Education Program in East Jerusalem. Previously he served as director of Corporate Social Responsibility at the  Gazit Globe real estate  company. Before that, he served as CEO of ISEF: The International Foundation for Education, in which gifted students from disadvantaged backgrounds receive scholarship grants and leadership training in an effort to narrow Israel’s socio-economic gap. Prior to that, Zion was head  of the Mae Boyar High School’s boarding school in Jerusalem. He holds a BA in education and MBA from the Hebrew University. Michal  Rom  is director of Research and Knowledge Development at Sheatufim – Strategies for Social Impact. Sheatufim is a nonprofit organization that leads and facilitates cross-sector collaboration using the Collective Impact framework as well as public participation methodologies in government ministries. Prior to joining Sheatufim, she worked as an adjunct lecturer and researcher in the Sociology Department and Gender Studies Program at Bar-Ilan University, as well as the Communications and Behavioral Sciences Departments at Sapir Academic College and Kinneret College in Israel. Her dissertation was the basis for a book she co-authored with Prof Orly Benjamin titled Feminism, Family and Identity in Israel: Women’s Marital Names, published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2011 She has a BA in Business Administration and Sociology from the Hebrew University of

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Jerusalem, an MBA from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, and a PhD in Gender Studies from Bar-Ilan University. Neta Sher-Hadar  is a lecturer in Public Administration and Public Policy. She has a PhD from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. She is in charge of policy studies at the Mandel School for Educational Leadership in Jerusalem and  is also a faculty member in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at the Sapir Academic College. She was the academic co-director (with Dr. Lihi Lahat) of the research group studying collaborative governance in the Chazan Center at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. Her research and teaching focus on issues of policy implementation, policy analysis, the interface between theory and practice in public policy, and public auditing. Varda  Shiffer  is a senior research fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. Her fields of research and  practice include education policy, education in  local authorities, educational leadership, privatization in education. Dr. Varda Shiffer worked at the Mandel Foundation-Israel between 1997 and 2012 and was the president of the foundation between 2010 and 2012. She is the founder of the Mandel Center for Leadership in the Negev and was its director (2004–2010). She served as chief scientist of the civil service commission (1995–1996). She also engaged in research and teaching at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Shiffer has a PhD in political science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her studies on civil society in Israel, on education policies, and on privatization have appeared in many books and journals. Her voluntary work includes membership in public committees and in social change organizations. At the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Dr. Shiffer directs the program for developing models of collaborative governance in local authorities. Motti Talias  holds a PhD in Public Policy from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He specializes in voluntary and private regulation in the area of consumerism. Several of his papers (in Hebrew and English) covering topics such as Kosher food voluntary regulation in Israel, comparative analysis of consumer voluntary regulation in Israel and the US, and private regulation of hotels in Israel and Europe have appeared in many publications. He has contributed a book chapter on voluntary regulation in Israel to the edited book Regulation in Israel: Values, Effectiveness, Methods (2019). His areas of interest expand also to governance and regulation, on

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which he published the article Global Governance Conceptualization and the Case of Hotel Classification. Dr. Talias teaches regulation  and public policy in the Open University of Israel. Gayil  Talshir  received her DPhil. from Oxford University where she wrote her dissertation on the political ideology of the Greens in Europe. She has established and led the center for Advanced Public Policy and the program for top civil servants in Public Policy as well as the President’s program for academic leadership. She explores the ideological scene as a dimension of the crisis of democracy. She recently led two research groups and published two books one  on higher education and democracy,  Lighthouse or Ivory Tower? and one on the changing paradigm of Israeli democracy, titled Governability against Democracy?. She works on a book on the ideological transformation and structural changes in the Netanyahu era.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

The economic and the political: the ideological axis of twentieth-century democracy 31 Fig. 2.2 The public sphere according to Habermas 33 Fig. 3.1 Representation and participation’s effects on democracy and governance70 Fig. 4.1 The threefold-layer perspective for exploring the possibility of implementing collaborative governance arrangements 82 Fig. 8.1 Voluntary regulation and collaborative regulation 184 Fig. 11.1 The five components of the collective impact model 245 Fig. 11.2 The 5X2 Initiative action model 256 Fig. 11.3 Changes in advanced level of STEM over time 257

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 8.1

Models of democracy The evolution of the paradigms of the state, the public, and the civil service Models of governance within the third paradigm Summary of the comparison of CG and DD Decision-making strategies and their implications for collaborative governance Summary: the developing discussion on CR in the regulatory literature

29 39 41 67 87 180

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Collaborative Governance Lihi Lahat, Neta Sher-Hadar, and Itzhak Galnoor

In the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in the concept of collaborative governance. Collaborative governance is an activity or strategy in the public domain that brings together stakeholders from various sectors to design and implement a policy or program. The L. Lahat (*) Administration & Public Policy, Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada The Chazan Center for Social Justice, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Research Group, 2015–2018), Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] N. Sher-Hadar Mandel School for Educational Leadership, Jerusalem, Israel Administration & Public Policy, Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel The Chazan Center for Social Justice, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Research Group, 2015–2018), Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] I. Galnoor The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem, Israel Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_1

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increasing interest in this mechanism derives from the potential benefits of including various actors to deal with the capacity and legitimacy problems of governance. Collaborative governance offers a different governance strategy from privatization and regulation, which have been utilized to respond to the challenges facing governments. Due to its potential, this book deals with collaborative governance on two levels. On the empirical level, it focuses on the strategies of collaborative governance implemented in the Israeli context. On the theoretical level, it focuses on the theoretical developments of the concept. Two main questions guided this book’s chapters: Do collaborative governance arrangements promote public values, and do these arrangements contribute to a more democratic process? To study these questions, our research group developed a modular definition of the concept of “collaborative governance” that will be discussed here. This introduction is composed of two parts. The first part will present a brief literature review of the concept of collaborative governance and a short description of the Israeli context. The second part of the chapter will present the definition developed by the research group and detail the parts of the book.

The Study of Collaborative Governance The concept of collaborative governance developed after four decades of gradual changes in public administration and public policy. These changes were part of reforms that began in the 1980s and were popular until the end of the 1990s. They were intended to make public administration more efficient. New public management reforms sought to adjust the Weberian bureaucratic mechanisms that were based on clear rules, hierarchal structures, the functional division of responsibility, and specialization to the needs of the late twentieth century by adopting management techniques from the business sector. As a result, the emphasis became managing state affairs so citizens would receive value for money, by, among other things, reducing the size of the public sector, privatization, relying on outsourcing, developing performance indicators, and viewing the public as “customers” of the public sector. Since the early 2000s, however, administrative reforms that emphasize democratic characteristics have been adopted (Cohen 2016; Dunleavy et al. 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Stoker 2006; Vigoda-Gadot 2009). These reforms seek to address

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some of the unintended consequences of the new public management reforms such as the fragmentation of government agencies. They respond to the need to strengthen the capacity of government due to privatization trends that weakened the knowledge and expertise of government institutions, as well as their ability to design and implement policy (Baker and Stoker 2013; Hajer 2003; Rhodes 1994, 2012). These models change the view of the public from “customers” to “citizens,” build and strengthen trust as a basic component of the activity within and between organizations, enhance cooperation between various actors, and highlight the importance of identifying and implementing public values. These trends in public policy also emphasize “governance” rather than “government.” Accordingly, public policy is formulated by discussions between networks composed of actors from different sectors that act together to create public policy (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Howlett 2014; Kekez et al. 2019; Lang 2019; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Salamon 2002; Stoker 2006; Vigoda-­ Gadot 2009). Therefore, this approach is composed of tools that emphasize coordination, discourse, and dialogue between different groups (Deleon 2006). These policy instruments, defined as “soft” tools, have become increasingly relevant, considering the changes occurring in the role of the state (Bevir 2012; Rhodes 1994, 2000, 2012). Instead of relying on a rigid hierarchy and markets as the mechanisms to govern society, there is a shift to modes of governance based on networks (Bevir 2012). Thus, these trends create the foundation for the growth of government strategies utilizing collaborative governance that includes diverse stakeholders to promote public policies and programs. The roots of collaborative governance are interdisciplinary in nature. As a result, there are various definitions of the term based on a variety of theories and disciplines such as political science, public administration, public policy, sociology, and economics (Emerson et al. 2012; Williams 2012). Moreover, different scholars refer to different points in time to describe its origins. Some see collaborative governance as a phenomenon of the last 20 years, while others point to its roots in the nineteenth century (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson and Gerlak 2014; McGuire 2006). One of the dominant definitions1 in the literature is that of Ansell and Gash (2008): “A governing arrangement where one or more public 1  For a review of cross-sector collaborations that refers to similar literature, see Bryson et al. (2015).

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agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decisionmaking process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (p. 544). In other words, it is a formal arrangement in which stakeholders communicate with one another in a deliberative and multilateral process. The stakeholders share responsibility for the policy outcomes because they are involved in the formal decision-making process within the forums of government agencies (Ansell and Gash 2008). This is an important point, even if responsibility is ultimately in the hands of the state, as in the case of regulation. Ansell (2012) lists six components of collaborative governance: (1) the initiative is that of a public agency; (2) it includes non-­government actors; (3) the participants are involved directly in the design of policy rather than serving only as advisors; (4) the forum is formally organized and meets collectively; (5) it aims to reach decisions by consensus even if a consensus is not achieved in the end; and (6) the focus of the collaboration is on public policy or the management of public programs. Differing from Ansell and Gash (2008), Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) present a broader definition of collaborative governance. In their definition the initiative for collaborative government may arise from non-governmental organizations. Therefore, the initiative might originate from the civil society, for example. It is considered collaborative governance because their goal is to promote public goals and they include government actors. Moreover, their definition also includes intergovernmental collaborative structures, meaning collaboration between different levels of government or between different government units. One of the important features of their definition is their addition that collaborative governance should be used only when public goals cannot be achieved in any other way (Emerson et al. 2012, p. 2). Therefore, an interesting question is whether collaborative governance is an additional strategy that government could embrace or whether there are situations in which it should not be implemented. Other scholars point to the strengthening trends of cooperation and normatively call for the inclusion of various stakeholders to strengthen the government’s capacity (Vigoda-Gadot 2004, 2009; Wanna 2008). One of the challenges regarding the concept of collaborative governance derives from the attempt to differentiate it from similar concepts. For example, Ansell and Gash (2008) distinguish between collaborative

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governance and corporatism, associational governance, policy networks,2 and public-private partnerships. They maintain that corporatism is more an expression of a partnership between leading organizations in the labor market and their interaction with government agencies. The concept of “associational governance” includes non-profit organizations, in contrast to collaborative governance, which can include citizens but does not necessarily include non-profit organizations. The concept of policy networks also involves structures of cooperation between stakeholders that include government agencies and actors from other sectors, although these can be informal. In contrast, collaborative governance refers more to a formal framework of cooperation. Public-private partnerships often describe a method for achieving coordination. However, they do not necessarily involve the creation of cooperation in the sense that collaborative governance does, which is consensus-oriented (Ansell and Gash 2008, pp. 547–548). Nevertheless, as mentioned, here again there is no agreement among researchers. Andonova (2010), for example, defines public-­ private partnerships as a type of collaborative governance between government and non-government actors. For her, the concept refers to the institutionalization of the hybrid authority that emerges in the international arena beyond the traditional forms of interaction between state actors and actors outside the state. It differs from types of interactions that were used in the past such as consulting, lobbying, or contracts (Andonova 2010, p. 26). One way to differentiate between collaborative governance and other concepts arises from the variation in the types of cooperation between the actors (Emerson and Gerlak 2014; Keast and Mandell 2014; O’Flynn 2008). At one end of the spectrum is cooperation, which is short term, informal in nature, voluntary, and the actors remain autonomous. In between is coordination, which denotes a firmer, more formal connection between the actors. At the other end of the spectrum is collaboration, which involves longer-term, more formal arrangements with a great deal of mutual dependence among the actors. Collaborative governance, therefore, reflects more intense collaboration that demands mutual dependence among the actors, the joint development of ideas, and the building of a synergy among the participants in order to find new solutions (Keast and Mandell 2014). Thus, while it is difficult to find one accepted definition 2  More examples of related terms include the whole-of government in Christensen and Lægreid (2006) and policy networks in Koppenjan and Klijn (2004).

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for the concept of collaborative governance, it is possible to point to a number of examples that can help clarify the concept. The literature provides examples of the implementation of collaborative governance and models that were developed to describe the modus operandi of these processes. Ansell (2012) refers to several examples, collaborative planning processes that involve different actors encouraging the creation of agreements that promote the process rather than raise objections, which has been typical of planning processes. Collaborative governance is implemented with regard to water and natural resources. Given that such resources cross boundaries and even national borders, the ability to create cooperation between watershed councils helps promote public values. Collaborative governance arrangements are also helpful in regulatory negotiations. Adopting this approach in the early stages of designing a law or regulation gives voice to the different points of view of stakeholders, leading to the creation of efficient mechanisms that have greater legitimacy and are more likely to be implemented. Aside from these examples, the literature presents models that describe the process within these mechanisms. Collaborative governance includes internal as well as external features. For example, Ansell and Gash (2008) claim that in collaborative processes it is necessary to distinguish between a number of components. The first are the pre-conditions on whose foundations the arrangement is built. Examples include the asymmetry in power relations, the various resources and information that the different stakeholders bring to the collaborative table, what kind of information is needed to promote the learning process, the incentives for participation, and the history of collaboration between the actors. Other important factors are the institutional context within which the formal arrangements are designed, and the leadership that drives the process and its ability to influence and promote an agreement among the stakeholders. Finally, it is important to pay attention to the outcomes of the process to determine whether they are optimal and have been implemented. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) describe collaborative governance regimes that are broader than one single arrangement. Collaborative governance regimes are defined as “public policy or service oriented, cross-organizational systems involving a range of autonomous organizations representing different interests and/or jurisdictions” (Emerson and Gerlak 2014, p. 769). According to them, these regimes include institutional arrangements, procedures, and behavioral norms that create a solid basis for collaboration. Collaborative governance regimes refer to the context in which the process takes place and identify the

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political, constitutional, socioeconomic, and environmental conditions that influence their methods of operation (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). Continuing this approach, and different from Ansell and Gash (2008), Emerson et al. (2012) focus on three main elements of collaborative governance arrangements: principled engagement, meaning the principles that lead the stakeholders to take part in the collaboration; shared motivation based on the mutual trust, understandings, legitimacy, and commitment of the stakeholders; and capacity for joint action. They emphasize the importance of a systemic perspective that leads to variation between collaborative governance regimes. Furthermore, they list various components that affect the results of collaborative governance in a circular manner, including the context of the system, the motives, the dynamics of cooperation, the outputs produced by the joint action, the outcomes, and the feedback and adaptation process, all of which create differences between different collaborative governance regimes. Despite the attention that has been paid to collaborative governance, it has also had its fair share of critiques, both as a phenomenon and as a theoretical concept. On the practical level, there is a fear that collaborative governance has become a trend, a “holy grail,” and that many use it as a solution to problems even when it is not appropriate (O’Flynn 2008, 2009). It is often the case that those who claim they are involved in collaborative governance are in fact engaging in coordination and cooperation processes, rather than collaborative governance arrangements, which are based on reciprocity, consensus, and formal discussions (O’Flynn 2009). Collaborative governance is based on cooperation and building agreements that require massive investments of time and human resources. Therefore, the process can be very expensive and even drain resources from other important projects. Moreover, it is not always easy to reach an agreement among the stakeholders. They might be biased toward their narrow interests or engage in “agency capture,” meaning promoting specific interests of some of the stakeholders rather than the broader public (Bhan 2014; Lubell 2004). For example, a study conducted about the health and social welfare services in Britain determined that collaboration increases access to services, reduces fragmentation and duplication in the supply of services, and leads to the development of integrative services. However, drawbacks were also found. For example, at times resources are channeled from supplying and improving services and from responding to

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citizens’ needs to the collaboration. Furthermore, the cooperation promotes results that seem important to the professionals but are not necessarily in line with the priorities or needs of the users (Rummery 2006). McIvor (2019) claims that there is a need to develop a critical theory of collaborative governance due to the pathologies that it might create. While the goal of these arrangements is to strengthen democratic foundations, the fact that they are developed in a “top-down” manner may limit public discussion in the Habermasian sense. They may also produce repetitive patterns of power, function as silencing mechanisms, and co-opt forces in the civil society that might otherwise lead to a radical change. Furthermore, collaborative governance arrangements might include the actors that the government wants to include and neglect others (McIvor 2019). Given these issues, Booher (2004) presents a number of important arguments regarding collaborative governance. First, it is an appropriate method for dealing with this era’s challenges, because it combines multiple actors, agreements, and forces to promote public goals. Furthermore, it can lead to better information for decision-making and implementation. Second, collaborative governance is not an appropriate method for every social problem. Its use is complex. Therefore, it is worthwhile only in cases where it is called for and necessary. Third, collaborative governance requires professional skills. Not every engagement called collaborative governance is indeed that. If that point is not understood, there might be repercussions, and it might have even been preferable to avoid its implementation in the first place. Fourth, the attitudes of senior officials in the organizations and of community leaders, and their willingness to create the conditions for collaborations or partnerships (such as through training), are of critical importance. Fifth, even if such processes are successful, it is still difficult to change the old ways of government (Booher 2004, pp. 43–45). McIvor (2019) emphasizes that training managers in initiating collaborative governance should include critical thinking regarding the rational roots of democracy, as well as the importance of independent discussion in the public sphere. The Israeli Context Israel was established in 1948 as a parliamentary democracy. In economic terms it is a developed state. Its GDP per capita is around $32,800,

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placing it just under the OECD average of $39,500 (OECD 2019). Israeli Jewish society is composed of different ethnic and cultural groups, largely based on countries of origin. About 20 percent of the Israeli population are Arabs, mostly Muslims (Israel CBS 2019). Prior to its establishment in 1948, Israel was ruled by the British, who had a strong impact on the historical roots of its public sector. After more than 30 years of incremental changes in the public sector, the management capacity of the civil service has declined considerably. Although Israel has not experienced a formal reform of the public sector, such as in other countries, public administration has been exposed to changes such as privatization, attempts at de-regulation, and the rise of a market management orientation and lately reform that focuses on human resource capacities (Cohen 2016; Galnoor 2011). Simultaneously, Israeli civic society has expanded and through outsourcing has taken over an increasing part of the delivery of public services (Paz-Fuchs et  al. 2018). These changes have led to initiatives involving various forms of collaborative governance, which, given Israel’s centralized policy style, is rather surprising. Israel’s public sector is not a natural candidate for collaborative governance. It is not only hierarchically centralistic but also reactive and dictative in its policy style, rather than anticipatory and consensual3 (Dror 1989, 2011; Galnoor 2011; Yair 2014). Therefore, Israel is unlike countries such as the Netherlands where collaborative governance is more natural (Bovens et al. 2002). The study of collaborative governance in Israel is quite limited.4 Therefore, the book seeks to explore these initiatives. Some of the features of Israeli society such as its multi-cultural nature correspond with the move to more heterogeneous societies that are appearing worldwide due to immigration trends. Thus, this book provides insights that should be relevant to those interested in Israel as well as other countries.

3  Partly because of its geopolitical and security challenges (Dror 1989, 2011; Galnoor 2011; Yair 2014). 4  Exceptions include, for example, Vigoda-Gadot (2004, 2009); Kerret and Menahem (2016). Some studies that explore collaboration in the Israeli context do not focus on the theoretical conceptualization of collaborative governance suggested in the current book.

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Collaborative Governance in This Book Collaborative Governance: Our Definition Due to the variety of definitions of collaborative governance, a more context-­oriented definition that could help explore the phenomenon in Israel was needed (Gerring and Barresi 2003). Therefore, one of the contributions of the research group was to formulate an agreed-upon definition of the concept of collaborative governance. The definition used in this book relies on previous definitions, particularly that of Ansell and Gash (2008). During the work of the research group, Professor Galnoor formulated a modular definition that is intended to provide a multi-level view of collaborative governance. The definition ranges from an advanced concept, which includes all of the components, to an intermediate concept that includes only some of them. Thus, the definition ranges from an ideal configuration to a minimal one (Gerring and Barresi 2003). Advanced collaborative governance includes all of the following components (most of them according to Ansell 2012): Predisposition . Aimed at achieving a public goal. 1 2. Activated when there is a chance of creating public value that cannot be achieved in another way.5 Features . A governance arrangement.6 3 4. One or more public agencies (the central government, a government ministry, a government company, a local authority) engage with or are willing to engage directly with non-state stakeholders. 5. The initiative can come from any of the participants.

 This sub-section is based on Emerson et al. (2012).  The emphasis on governance is meant to distinguish between collaborative governance and arrangements with a different main goal, such as the creation of public discourse or increased cooperation between various participants. 5 6

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The Policy Formulation and Decision-Making Process 6. Formal. 7. Collective. 8. Deliberative. 9. Aimed at building a consensus, strengthening trust between the participants, and the sharing of expertise and knowledge (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000; Getha-Taylor et  al. 2019; Huxham 2003; Innes and Booher 2010; Klijn et al. 2010; Leach et al. 2013; Leach and Sabatier 2005; Putnam 1993, 1995; Ran and Qi 2018). Implementation 0. Responsible for budget decisions. 1 11. Implements public policy or manages programs or assets. We claim that the predispositions (1 and 2 above) are necessary conditions for collaborative governance. The definition clearly states that a necessary condition is that the goal is publicly oriented and that the responsibility for the arrangement is that of a governmental entity. This point differs from broader definitions that view any initiative with multiple stakeholders as collaborative governance and do not clearly ascribe responsibility to the governmental actor. The second element includes both an empirical component and a normative component. With regard to the former, the objective is to define the concept of collaborative governance so that it connects to the world of practice. When the government initiates collaborative governance, it is usually a default from its perspective, because it recognizes that it provides the best chance of achieving a public goal that cannot be achieved in another way. This assumption is not necessarily the case for other participants in the collaborative governance arrangements. From the normative standpoint, the idea is that the collaborative governance arrangement is one of the many possible tools the government can implement and that the choice itself has a political meaning. Furthermore, in view of the challenges it presents, collaborative governance should be implemented in the absence of a more suitable option. The third and fourth elements relate to the central role of the public agency. Given that this is a collaborative arrangement, its goal is to implement policy in practice. Thus, it differs from many other worthwhile joint

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arrangements that have a different goal, such as creating public discourse, providing advice, ascertaining the opinions regarding a particular policy, or increasing cooperation and trust between the various participants. Moreover, the centrality of the public agency means that the final democratic responsibility remains with the public authority in these arrangements. The fifth element states that other participants such as social or business organizations can be initiators. However, collaborative governance, which includes the responsibility of a public authority, depends on the willingness of public representatives to engage with a variety of non-state stakeholders and to transform the formal and deliberative discourse to achieve the public goal. In other words, it is the public’s representatives who must transform an initiative in the social and civil domain into an arrangement of collaborative governance that includes public responsibility. The sixth to ninth elements relate to the components found in most definitions of collaborative governance. The idea that an arrangement be formally anchored is meant to create a certain level of institutionalization. The arrangement must be collective, inclusive, and deliberative in order to ensure its democratic nature and to achieve consensus, to whatever degree possible, among the partners. Therefore, it combines various voices that are relevant to the issue and that might not have taken part previously in policymaking processes or policy implementation or whose opinion was treated as advice only. The building of trust between participants is a critical component in the implementation of collaborative governance arrangements. The sharing of expertise and information is meant to strengthen learning processes and initiatives (Crosby et  al. 2017; Leach et  al. 2013; Leach and Sabatier 2005), which constitute one of the main reasons to use these arrangements. They also point to the need for collaborative governance to overcome the tendency of a public bureaucracy—and essentially any organization—to engage in secrecy and maintain a monopoly in their domain. The emphasis in our definition on the implementation process (the tenth and eleventh elements) is more central than most other definitions that include only collaboration, discourse, the inclusion of experts, and the influence on policy- and decision-making in collaborative governance. Nonetheless, we assume that it is the desire of all the participants that the collaboration not end with the design stage and that the true test consists of decisions regarding the budgeting for and the implementation and execution of the program or policy. In conclusion, we hope that the added value of the definition is that it is modular and makes it possible to map processes over a continuum. Accordingly, in most of the events presented in the book, as in the real

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world, only some of the components of the definition are evident. In the Israeli context, in many cases the initiative is in an early stage and is operating on the assumption or the hope that it will develop into collaborative governance that includes implementation at a later stage. Therefore, an additional advantage of the definition is that it can be used to examine a variety of initiatives, present their stages of development, and compare them to other relevant initiatives over time. Collaborative Governance: A Mechanism for the Realization of Public Values and/or Democratic Arrangements? In order to examine the relevance and contribution of collaborative governance arrangements, the contributors of the book were asked to refer to two main questions: Do collaborative governance arrangements help promote public values, and do they contribute to a more democratic process for the society in Israel? We wanted these questions to serve as reference points that would create a common thread between the chapters. We also raised these questions for another reason. One of the arguments today is that due to the reduction of trust in government, agencies in the public administration need to emphasize the public values they serve and the democratic foundations of their action. Hence, if collaborative governance arrangements contribute to these two issues, they might be a beneficial course of action. We will elaborate on the connection between collaborative governance and public values and democracy. Public values are a product of the collective, multidimensional, and politically mediated expression of citizens’ preferences, which is redefined in an ongoing process through social and political interaction (Bryson et al. 2014; Crosby et al. 2017; Moore 1995; Nabatchi 2012; O’Flynn 2008; Smith 2004; Sørensen and Torfing 2017; Stoker 2006). The goal of public administration organizations and the process of policy design and implementation are to promote public values. However, questions about what are the public values that the government needs to promote, and how to agree upon them and prioritize them, are not easy ones. In the past, the underlying assumption was that the government promotes public values. However, today there are more criticisms about the gap between the government and public preferences. Public protests around the world, including the Israeli demonstrations that took place in 2011, reflect the growing demand to better articulate and agree upon the public values that are promoted by the government (Bryson et  al. 2014; Nabatchi 2012;

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Stoker 2006). In this context Stoker (2006) calls for promoting a model of public value management. In this model, public managers focus on identifying and mapping the public values they aim to promote and on creating practical solutions for their implementation. According to Stoker, the managers in the public administration are those who steer public networks of actors that represent different interests, and their goal is to define public values in deliberative, participatory processes together. Thus, collaborative governance arrangements that include a formal, deliberative arrangement aimed at achieving consensus, particularly on specific issues that have a public goal, may promote public values. Therefore, the first question in this book is whether collaborative governance arrangements promote public values. Do these arrangements indeed create such a discourse, which engages stakeholders from the public and results in decisions and implementations that are more in tune with agreed-upon public values? The second question focuses on strengthening the democratic foundations of the state. In its essence, democracy expresses the will of the people. Therefore, cooperative arrangements such as collaborative governance arrangements that allow various groups in society to provide input are supposed to strengthen democracy (Bryson et  al. 2014; Crosby et  al. 2017; Nabatchi 2012; Sørensen and Torfing 2017; Talshir and Tsur 2013). However, collaborative governance as a governance arrangement represents a challenge to the classic role of the state and the traditional views of the role of its public administration. Thus, for example, there is concern that promoting collaborative governance arrangements that include only parts of the public might erode the accepted mechanism of representative democracy in favor of internal mechanisms, where it is unclear who they are representing. Furthermore, there is concern that collaborative governance arrangements will be responsive to the needs and interests of the stakeholders that participate in them at the expense of broader public interests, long-term planning, and more essential or coercive roles of the state that are less appealing (Rhodes and Wanna 2007, 2009). Finally, the democratic foundations of the state are bound up with the accountability of elected officials to the public. Democratic accountability focuses on the responsibility of public representatives to the citizens, and administrative accountability deals with the obligation of public employees to adhere to policies, based on laws, procedures, norms, and their expertise (Jantz et al. 2018). Both are important from the democratic standpoint. Formally, and in the narrowest sense of accountability, any arrangement that is adopted

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in collaborative governance arrangements is subject to the basic fact that elected officials and their representatives are responsible to the public. They have the obligation to justify every action and implementation (Behn 1998). In the broadest meaning, the concept of accountability has become synonymous with good governance, in which government institutions respond to the desires of citizens. Collaborative governance arrangements challenge the classic accountability of elected officials and public employees, because of the greater involvement of stakeholders from different sectors. Therefore, it is no longer clear who is accountable and for what. The demands for accountability from the government are not the same as the demands for accountability from the private sector, the third sector, and the fourth sector (social enterprises) that participate in these arrangements (Bovens 2006). Therefore, we asked the writers to examine the repercussions of collaborative governance for democratic processes. We also asked them to consider whether it is possible to implement collaborative governance in a manner that will promote public values successfully. The Structure of This Book The book has four sections. The first section deals with the democratic elements of collaborative governance. It establishes the theoretical basis for discussion based on descriptive approaches to democracy, participation, and public administration and examines the significance of collaborative governance arrangements in their light. Gayil Talshir asks whether democratic collaborative governance strengthens or weakens democracy. Does its theoretical proximity to participatory democracy empower it or in fact position them both as activities that weaken the state’s centrality? The chapter briefly presents models of democracy on the one hand and the anchoring of the civil service within democratic theory on the other. It also critically examines whether there is convergence between the theory of participatory democracy and the perspective of collaborative governance. The uniqueness of collaborative governance lies in its attempt to democratize the regime’s core, not just processes in civil society. However, it appears that collaborative governance will become a new paradigm only if it creates renewed public value for the civil service, the public, and the state. Doing so will require a centralized, professional ethos, with a sense of public service on the one hand and a commitment to acting in the public interest on the other. In

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addition, there must be a change in organizational culture to one of cooperation based on trust, a sense of duty, and the use of intra- and extraorganizational dialogue. These elements will promote the renewed contribution of collaborative governance to the legitimization of democracy. Ronen Goffer argues in his chapter that collaborative governance is part of the general cooperation trend, to which deliberative democracy also belongs. Common to both are the principles of cooperation, participation, transparency, accessibility, and discourse. This chapter compares them, as theories and practices, with the goal of improving and honing their practice. In addition, and in contrast to deliberative democracy, the democratic theory underlying collaborative governance is not sufficiently clear. Therefore, the second goal of the comparison is to clarify it. Although some researchers regard the theory of participatory and/or deliberative democracy as democratic theories that correspond to collaborative governance, Gofer shows that the model most resembling collaborative governance is the “regulated multi-cultural democracy” model. The model is based on formal, institutional regulation through mechanisms that involve stakeholders in the formation of policy- and decision-making, which themselves are characterized by relatively low levels of representation and judicial process, and lead to compromises that are characteristic of negotiating processes. Lihi Lahat and Neta Sher-Hadar conclude this section by exploring the question: Under what conditions is it beneficial for public administration organizations to promote collaborative governance arrangements and when is it not? To answer this question, they utilize a three-layer conceptual perspective. In the first layer, they refer to the values most suitable for these arrangements. In the second layer, they look at different situational decisions, and in the last layer, they examine the context within which these arrangements operate. They do not try to provide a guide for action but to contribute to the theoretical and practical development of collaborative arrangements. The second section deals with collaborative governance in local government in Israel. It presents the role and contribution of collaborative governance on the local level and the challenges in the attempts to implement them by presenting diverse examples of collaborative governance arrangements. Varda Shiffer highlights the fragility of the process of creating consensus in view of the gap between the legal and bureaucratic frameworks. She

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posits that the framework of collaborative governance, particularly the idea of consensus that underlies it, will make it possible to change the power balance between the central government and the local government. This goal will be accomplished through discussion rather than conflict between the levels of government and based on the ability to improve the trust between partners and the legitimization of outcomes. Her research documents that while collaborative governance arrangements indeed lead to the redistribution of power and empower the local government, it has limitations. Lack of supporting legislation as well as reliance on traditional hierarchal structures and bureaucratic processes weaken the stability of the consensuses achieved and increase the chances of conflict. Rotem Bresler Gonen and Kassim Alsraiha examine the role of collaborative governance on the local level and, in particular, its role in a minority society. The research focuses on efforts to promote women’s employment in the Arab-Bedouin society in the Negev by means of collaborative governance. These efforts illustrate that collaborative governance can overcome the complex challenges arising from a lack of trust in the government institutions. The local authority constitutes a mediating force and enables numerous entities to come together in the long term and promote local initiatives. Such initiatives would not have been possible without the connection created by the local authority between the various governmental and civil society entities. In this study, the researchers demonstrate how collaborative governance enables the local authority in a minority society to unite the various entities and promote public goals. At the end of this section, an example of collaborative governance will be presented, based on an interview with a stakeholder. Zion Regev and Neta Sher-Hadar present the case of collaborative governance in the town of Kiryat Malachi through the story of Zion Regev, who was the manager for corporate social responsibility in the Gazit Globe Company. The example shows how collaborative governance enabled changes in the education system in this city that could not have been promoted without it. The third section examines regulation and collaborative governance. The combination of actors in the regulatory process is supposed to help create agreements and implement laws and rules in practice. This section presents theoretical aspects that connect the concepts of regulation and collaborative governance. It also provides examples of these arrangements from Israel. Motti Talias explores the way in which the principles of collaborative governance are manifested in the development of regulatory thinking.

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Collaborative thinking is used in various policy domains. It is also used in the regulatory regime, which can be called collaborative regulation. The use of collaborative regulation has emerged against the background of continuing criticism of the traditional regulatory method of directives and control. The proposed change in direction includes cooperation between regulators and relevant stakeholders, and in that spirit, various models of collaborative regulation have developed. Notwithstanding the close connection between collaborative regulation and collaborative governance, they are discussed separately. The chapter examines the connection between the two: the common basis for their emergence and the developing presence of the component of collaboration in regulatory theory, including the place of collaborative regulation in the theory of voluntary regulation. Edna Harel-Fisher takes a different viewpoint in examining the tension between the collaborative governance approach and the world of governmental regulation. In a previous article, she explored the problems accompanying the institutional use of the approach in creating regulation. In this chapter, she looks at the field of standardization in Israel from the perspective of the collaborative governance approach. She explores the development in this field with reference to the principles of the regulatory domain, the situation in other countries, and international regulation. She claims that in this field in which the partnership and collaboration of stakeholders is fundamental, the government of Israel has changed course and tried to limit the characteristics of collaborative governance, as part of the effort to strengthen the globalization of the Israeli economy. Harel Fisher examines these changes and their potential implications in light of the processes and insights in other countries. The fourth section examines the place of civil society in collaborative governance arrangements. Civil society actors are central in collaborative governance arrangements. This section examines their part in these arrangements along with the challenges they face due to the different power relations in the collaborative governance arrangements. Michal Almog-Bar investigates cross-sector partnerships, which constitute a distinct form of collaborative governance and are of growing interest to governments, civil society organizations, foundations, philanthropists, and business organizations. These partnerships are regarded as one of the main ways of solving social problems and promoting innovative social projects, and as a necessary and desirable strategy for dealing with complex public challenges. The chapter critically examines the place and

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role of civil society organizations in cross-sector partnerships and the reciprocal relations that are emerging between these organizations and organizations in the government sector as part of the network of crosssector partnerships. The author accomplishes this goal by presenting and discussing the findings of research carried out in Israel in recent years on the activity of civil society organizations in cross-sector partnerships. Inbar Hurvitz and Michal Rom describe the 5X2 initiative in Israel that operates according to a collective impact model in order to promote scientific excellence in education, as a case study of collaborative governance. They present the story of the initiative’s creation and activity, which was the first to apply the collective impact approach in Israel. This approach defines the guidelines for systemic activity to solve complex social problems by means of a unique partnership between various stakeholders. The story of the initiative is described along a timeline and emphasizes the development of collaborative governance mechanisms and their characteristics within the context of the initiative’s activities. In addition, it details the process of creating relationships and trust between the actors in the three sectors, which constitute the basis for promoting collaborative governance mechanisms and their ability to operate successfully. This section will conclude with another example that illustrates collaborative governance. Naomi Apel and Lihi Lahat describe the case of a regional collaborative governance in the area of environmental protection. Ramat Hanadiv launched the initiative as a civil society organization. Through the story of Naomi Apel, the director of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability, the writers describe how the partnership promoted change by collaborating with different local authorities with different characteristics. Furthermore, the example reveals the challenges and difficulties that arose during the implementation process. The concluding chapter looks at the contribution of the book to the theory of collaborative governance. This chapter provides a theoretical and empirical summary of the various chapters in the book and suggests questions that remain open and are worthy of future discussion. Specifically, the chapter presents the implications of the discussions in the various chapters with respect to the main research questions: Do collaborative governance mechanisms promote public values, and can they contribute to democratic processes? In addition to the theoretical contribution, we hope that the answers to these questions will help policy-makers examine the advantages and disadvantages of collaborative governance arrangements and the appropriate conditions to their implementation.

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O’Flynn, J. (2009). The Cult of Collaboration in Public Policy. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 68(1), 112–116. Paz-Fuchs, A., Mandelkern, R., & Galnoor, I. (2018). The Privatization of Israel. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). Comparative Public Management Reform: An Introduction to the Key Debates. In C.  Pollitt & G.  Bouckaert (Eds.), Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis-New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State (pp.  1–30). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R.  D. (1995). Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 65–78. Ran, B., & Qi, H. (2018). The Entangled Twins: Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance. Administration and Society, 1–30. Rhodes, R. A. W. (1994). The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain. The Political Quarterly, 65(2), 138–151. Rhodes, R. A. W. (2000). New Labour’s Civil Service: Summing-up Joining-up. The Political Quarterly, 151(2), 151–166. Rhodes, R. A. W. (2012). Waves of Governance. In D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (pp. 33–48). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rhodes, R. A. W., & Wanna, J. (2007). The Limits to Public Value or Rescuing Responsible Government from the Platonic Guardians. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(4), 406–421. Rhodes, R. A. W., & Wanna, J. (2009). Bringing the Politics Back in: Public Value in Westminster Parliamentary Government. Public Administration, 87(2), 161–183. Rummery, K. (2006). Partnerships and Collaborative Governance in Welfare: The Citizenship Challenge. Social Policy and Society, 5(2), 293–303. Salamon, L. M. (2002). The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The Tools of Governance (pp. 18–47). New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, R. F. (2004). Focusing on Public Value: Something New and Something Old. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 63(4), 68–79. Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2017). Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks. The American Review of Public Administration, 47(7), 826–839. Stoker, G. (2006). Public Value Management: A New Narrative for Networked Governance? The American Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 41–57. Talshir, G., & Tsur, R. (2013, November). Democratic Governance: Inclusion and Sharing in Government Service. Article Presented at the Eli Hurwitz Conference for Economics and Society, Israel. (Hebrew).

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Vigoda-Gadot, E. (2004). Collaborative Public Administration. Some Lessons from the Israeli Experience. Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(6), 700–711. Vigoda-Gadot, E. (2009). Building Strong Nations. Farnham: Ashgate. Wanna, J. (2008). Collaborative Government: Meanings, Dimensions, Drivers and Outcomes. In J. O’Flynn & J. Wanna (Eds.), Collaborative Governance: A New Era of Public Policy in Australia? (pp. 3–12). ANUE Press. Williams, P. (2012). Collaboration in Public Policy and Practice: Perspectives on Boundary Spanners. Bristol: Policy Press. Yair, G. (2014). Israeli Existential Anxiety: Cultural Trauma and the Constitution of National Character. Social Identities, 20(4–5), 346–362.

SECTION I

On the Democratic Elements of Collaborative Governance

CHAPTER 2

Participatory Democracy and Collaborative Governance: Do the Two Join Forces (Against the State)? Gayil Talshir

Introduction Democratic collaborative governance presents itself as a new model, even a new paradigm. Its conceptual roots can be traced to two separate corpora: the first is new developments in democratic theory, especially in the context of the criticism of representative democracy. The second is the search for alternatives to the model of New Public Management (NPM), specifically the endeavor to reintroduce public value as a parameter in the civil service. This chapter briefly introduces three models of democracy, focusing on the incorporation of the civil service into democratic theory. It then critically examines whether participatory democratic theory converges with the idea of collaborative governance. Participatory democracy seeks to produce an involved citizenry and hence primarily targets civil society. The singularity of collaborative governance lies in its attempt to

G. Talshir (*) Department of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_2

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democratize the very core of government, well beyond the domain of civil society. And yet this objective begs the questions: Does democratic collaborative governance reinforce the importance of the state in advanced democracies, or does it rather further delegitimize democracy? Can the admission of nongovernmental entities into decision-making forums reinforce or jeopardize public trust in democracy? And under what conditions would it be possible to rehabilitate public trust in the state, government, and the civil service through collaborative governance?

Models of Democracy In order to map the critiques of representative democracy and its various suggested alternatives, it is useful to first briefly outline three main models of democracy. The first is Athenian direct democracy, which originated in the fifth century BC.  This model was founded on two main principles: every citizen enjoys full equality before the law (isonomia) and as such is equally entitled to speak before the assembly (isogoria). A political individual partaking in his city’s governing system realizes his political rights through active participation in the public assemblies held in the agora, where he enjoys equality before the law and, as a speaker, before the assembly members. In addition, a citizen can be chosen for public service positions via a random ballot and may vote on the election of position holders such as military strategoi and political parties. In contrast, the representative model of today’s established democracies has its roots in the social contract concept of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was later enacted as a form of government, following the American and French revolutions of 1776 and 1789, respectively. This model shifted toward representativeness, with citizens electing their government representatives. Every person is free and equal to every other fellow citizen, resulting in voting equality in democratic elections. The public representatives who win the most votes form the elected government, which shapes, legislates, and executes its policies. Every few years these policies are put to the test in new elections. The third model in democratic theory is the model of participatory democracy. The theoretical literature is saturated with analyses of deliberative democracy, reflexive democracy, grassroots democracy, discursive democracy, and so on. Common to all of these models is the idea that encouraging activism in civil society supports the electoral process—representative democracy’s central feature—with public deliberation, civic

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engagement, and the shaping of public discourse and democratic practices. Civil society discourse highlights plurality rather than electoral voting.1 This entails the politicization of identity—whether local, cultural, gender-based, or regional—resulting in a plurality of positions, expressions, and forms of engagement. The flaws of the representative model— its institutionalism, minimalism, and preoccupation with ascendance and governance—find their opposite, and thus, presumably, their redress, in what civil society has to offer. Political parties are still today the primary institution of representative democracy. However, a plurality of civic entities, organizations, and movements; beyond elections as an almost exclusive form of participation—diverse forms of political and social participation such as petitions, demonstrations, factions, memberships, local activism, and so on; rather than centralized government and agenda setting—efforts toward public engagement, voicing opinions, norms of discussion and deliberation, drafting position papers, and more. Normatively, then, civil society democracy complements and buttresses institutional rule but also poses a challenge and alternative to its accepted norms of conduct. Engagement, volunteerism, and the promotion of a diverse, layered, inclusive, activist, and enabling realm of activity is then meant to enhance public trust in democracy and salvage it from its legitimacy crisis. The different models are outlined in Table 2.1. Table 2.1  Models of democracy Democracy model

Time and place

Principles

Institutions

Direct democracy

Athens, fifth century BC

Isonomia Isogoria

Representative democracy

Nineteenth century onward, Europe and the West Theoretical literature, early twenty-first century

Equality Representativeness [freedom, separation of powers] Participation Engagement Volunteerism Decentralized decision-making

Citizens’ assembly in the agora, random ballots for public offices Elections, political parties, governments, autonomous courts

Participatory democracy

1

Civil society: social movements, NGOs

 Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1994) Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge: MIT.

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The Public Sphere: Between Democracy and Governance The reevaluation of the model of democracy in the twenty-first century can be traced to the legitimacy crisis of representative democracy, a crisis whose articulation was conceptualized by Habermas. As early as 1973, Habermas wrote of a systemic crisis due to global capitalism seeping into the political-administrative and social-cultural structure.2 In order to understand the change Habermas advocates, it is useful to recall the foundations of liberal democracy. At the heart of liberal democracy stands the autonomous individual. This autonomy is manifest in two domains: first, the identification of the individual’s own interest and his or her personal fulfillment in the private sphere. In political thought, certainly since Adam Smith, this domain is considered economic—the individual, as an actor in the free market, promotes his or her own interest. The second domain is public: in order for the individual to be autonomous, he or she must be able to affect state policy. Hence, the individual as a political actor has rights in the public domain, including freedom of speech and association and the political rights of election and participation. Within the second, public domain, the individual is involved in decisions that affect his or her life—whether indirectly, through elections, or directly through various channels of political engagement. The core image, then, of this idea of democracy consists of two partly overlapping domains: the economic and the public. The main ideological contest between right and left in modern democracies is also derived from this image. Right-wing ideologies seek to minimize this overlap—that is, the state’s intervention in economic affairs—while the left advocates state intervention that would enable an economic safety net, reduce social gaps, and overcome market failures, as outlined in Fig. 2.1. The representative model can be understood as the institutionalization of principles into a fabric of institutions enacting and enabling those principles. The principles of freedom and equality are translated into confidential, egalitarian, and universal elections for all. Democratic elections also create the sense—some would say the illusion—of forming the “will of the people.” The individual (as a private person or as part of a group) chooses between political parties offering different political and ideological packages, which then form the state’s ruling government according to the 2

 Jürgen Habermas, 1973, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon).

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Private sphere

Public sphere

Economics

Politics

Left

Right

State intervention in the economy To prevent structural poverty

Free market with limited state intervention

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Fig. 2.1  The economic and the political: the ideological axis of twentieth-­ century democracy

majority vote. Within a system of checks and balances, the three branches of government—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—create an intricate web that prevents the tyranny of the majority and allows for criticism and inspection. And yet, the close correlation between social cleavages and the party system, whereby politics in established democracies has long been conceived, is in crisis.3 Representative democracy, with political parties as its defining feature, is undergoing a legitimacy crisis with manifold manifestations. We witness a downturn in voter turnout and in party membership; the declining influence of the bigger parties; dwindling public trust in elected institutions and the civil service; an erosion of governing capabilities as well as the political system’s integration and aggregation capabilities; and diminishing consensus within the public. With rising

3

 Lipset and Rokken 1960, Social Cleavages, Party systems and Voters Alignment.

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voter volatility and plummeting public trust in democratic institutions, the data indeed point to a democratic crisis of trust.4 As a means of addressing the legitimacy crisis, Habermas’s vision adds a new dimension beyond the public sphere and the political and economic domains: civil society. After World War II, civil society became a driving force of public protest, social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy groups, and so on. For Habermas, as well as other thinkers, civil society augurs the revival of public trust in democracy in that it provides what Tocqueville termed “schools of democracy.” As such, it enables greater democratic engagement than the reductive form of participation permitted by elections. In this manner, this new understanding of the public sphere proposes a means of addressing the main criticisms leveled against representative democracy (Fig. 2.2). In this context, Habermas proposes civil society as a possible realm for the revival of meaningful civic activism and social engagement, which would then rehabilitate trust in the rules of the game through constitutional patriotism.5 The emphasis on civil society—as conceived in the model of participatory democracy and in Habermas’s political thought— creates a sphere for a democratic, participatory, deliberative, and activist public discourse that encourages democratic fulfillment in the form of civic engagement, but also enhances general trust in the rules of the game and in fundamental democratic norms and practices. The third model overcomes the deficits of representative democracy by offering the diversification, pluralization, and enhancement of democratic participation. For the most part, engagement within civil society affects the political establishment by enhancing the public’s trust in its institutions. It does not, however, necessarily contribute to decision- and policy-making processes, or institutional change.

4  Dalton, R. and M. Wattenberg, Eds. (2000). Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford, Oxford University Press; Crouch, C. PostDemocracy (2004) Cambridge: Polity; Dalton Russell, David Farrell and Ian McAllister (2011) Political Parties and Democratic Linkage How Parties Organize Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5  Jürgen Habermas (1998) Inclusion of the Other.

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Politics

Economy

Civil society

Fig. 2.2  The public sphere according to Habermas

The Civil Service and the State: Three Historical Paradigms The Habermasian construct addresses the constitutional framework and trust in the system. However, the cores of government—political parties and the civil service—are barely of concern to civil society theories. Rather, social activism often undermines public trust in formal institutions. While the scope of this chapter does not extend to the crisis of political parties, the transformation of the civil service—the executive branch of government policy—is crucial to the discussion on collaborative governance and democratic delegitimation. The civil service, the professional rank providing services, implementing policies, and mediating between elected officials and the people—that is, the sovereign—has become the backbone of the contract between state and citizen in the modern state. As such, it also ensures governmental continuity in a democracy, as opposed to the changing positions of elected politicians. This notion of the vital connection between the civil service and democracy peaked in the golden age of the welfare state in the second half of the twentieth century. But the current

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generation has lived through economic and political crises. Neoliberalism has succeeded the welfare state as the dominant ideology in the age of globalization. It introduced both economic theories and political practices. Nevertheless, global economic crises—most recently in 2008—initiated a wave of protests against citizens’ vulnerability to market forces and the state’s eroded capacity to protect them. What, then, are the main tenets of the relationship between the civil service and democracy? And what does collaborative governance bring to the table in the context of democratic theory in the twenty-first century?6 The vital connection between the state and the civil service was already articulated by G.W.F. Hegel, who saw bureaucracy as the “general class” representing universal altruism, that is, reflecting the concept of public interest and the march of spirit through history.7 Max Weber identified the state as having a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Indeed, twentieth-century realism came to see the state as the primary actor on the international stage.8 While the army and police were in charge of law and order, the state’s civilian branch, its defining characteristic, was the bureaucracy. Thus the army, the police, and state bureaucracy were the institutions most strongly associated with the state, along with their counterparts in the private sector, the factories that were at the heart of the industrial revolution, setting the stage for the growth engine of the modern world from the nineteenth century onward. They were all fashioned after the same design: they shared a hierarchical, pyramidical structure, where each elevation of rank brings with it an increase in professional experience, responsibility, prestige, income, and status. Bureaucracy symbolized public interest, elevated above private affairs, personal connections, and social status. Together with the judiciary, it was able to offer an unbiased concept of equality before the law that

6  I have presented an earlier version of the three paradigms idea in a paper for the Caesarea Conference on Public Service, which I coordinated together with Ron Tzur in 2014. For historical background, see also Itzhak Galnoor and Jennifer Oser, “Civil Service,” In The International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Vol 3, 2015, Oxford: Elsevier. pp. 695–700. 7  See Georg Friedrich Hegel, 2011, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Jerusalem: Shalem Center. 8  Max Weber, 1964, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New  York: The Free Press.

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manifested the contract between the state and its citizens.9 This idea of the civil service differentiates between the elected and the executive echelons: the former derives its legitimacy directly from the sovereign—the electorate—and therefore comes with a particular worldview, whose realization is then entrusted with the clerical, professional rank in public offices. The civil service, immune to bribery and political instability due to its permanence and professionalism, promotes the public interest while transcending the interests of any particular group, above all its own. The golden era of this understanding of the civil service came with the affluent society of the Western welfare state following the postwar economic miracle: the civil service spearheaded employment, welfare, health, the civic minimum, public education, pensions, social security, and other state mechanisms securing the civil, political, and social rights of the citizen.10 The welfare state’s status was eventually undermined by its own success. In the long run, higher life expectancy and lower birthrates led to a shortage of workers in the economy and to the accumulation of pension debt by aging generations who were projected to be supported by the workforce for many years after their retirement. Contributing to this process was the rise of a new dominant ideology that denounced the oversized, mediocre state apparatus for stifling all private initiative, creativity, diversity, and singularity while smothering the private sector. This led to devastating criticism of the civil service, bureaucracy, and state mechanisms, coupled with the demand to repeal the welfare state and to unshackle the private sector from the constraints of government policy.11 The New Public Management (NPM) approach arose as a neoliberal alternative. In the age of the global economy, neoliberalism announced itself as the leading recourse, introducing market principles into government: efficiency, competence, a consumer-based orientation, and an emphasis on customer service. At the same time, it dramatically downsized the civil service through privatization and outsourced a considerable portion of its responsibilities to executive agencies.12 NPM’s toolkit was 9  T.  H. Marshall, 1950, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10  Ibid. 11  Hall, P. (1993) Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain,” Comparative Politics, April, pp. 275–296. 12  Jos Raadschelders, Theo Toonen, Fritz van der Meer, 2007, The Civil Service in the 21st Century, London: Palgrave.

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­ anagerial: performance-based evaluations, incentives for excellence, m budgetary cuts, public administration reforms, and economic efficiency. This shift toward neoliberal economics, along with the crisis of trust in representative democracy, led to the decline of the civil service and to an ideology of privatization and minimalization of state mechanisms and “the bureaucracy.” These were now branded ineffective, outdated, and incapable of inspiring innovation and growth due to over-intervention in the free market. The legitimacy crisis, along with a distrust in and overall unflattering public image of democratic institutions—both elected and unelected, like the civil service—resulted in cutbacks to state apparatus. These were meant to make room for market forces to step in. The transition from an industrial society to a global economy introduced new limitations on governments’ capacity to determine economic policy. The economy was now subject to global developments as a result of the shift from heavy industry to a knowledge economy as the main growth engine, which now relied on computing, telecommunications, digitization, and hi-tech. These new enterprises were structured differently: they were flat, characterized by horizontal rather than vertical mobility, and dynamic, often decidedly disadvantaging experience and technological specialization. They favored instead the younger generation, which was constantly adapting to—and creating—new, fast-changing technologies and proving mobile, accessible, and innovative under conditions of extreme uncertainty. In the face of unprecedented developments in the production process, the rigidity, cumbersomeness, and outdatedness of the civil service came to be seen as obstacles to be removed. This was achieved by transferring important part of government functions to private hands, subject to governmental or private monitoring and regulation. The state’s main function then became goal setting, monitoring, regulating, and inspecting—without executing as such. Citizens were now service consumers, customers of the public service. Yet, much in the same way that the crisis of the welfare state galvanized the rise of the neoliberal paradigm as its alternative, global economic crises over the past decade have reintroduced the question of state intervention. This pertained in particular to citizens’ exposure to the fluctuations and failures of the global market. Moreover, structural reforms in the training, evaluation, and organization of the civil service had delivered mixed results, failing to instill a new organizational culture. In any event, the prestige, professionalism, and image of the civil service suffered.

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Far-reaching civil service reforms in all advanced democracies, in the spirit of NPM and in the name of efficiency, competence, and serviceability, bore little fruit and created new problems.13 Most of all, the consensus over the state’s constitutive role was eroding, undermining the legitimacy of the civil service as a professional agency that shapes policy with an eye to the public interest. The result is a lack of trust in both professional and elected government entities. And yet, did a third paradigm of public administration and public service emerge, beyond Weber’s classical approach and NPM? “New Public Management Is Dead  — Long Live Digital-Era Governance,” wrote Dunleavy et al. in 2005. “Is New Public Management Really Dead?” responded de Vries in 2010. For, in more ways than one, it was still very much alive.14 The debate over the paradigm shift and subsequent decline of NPM, 30 years after its ascent as the flagship of neoliberal economics, is now at the forefront of academic research among scholars of policy and public administration. In this age of a crisis of legitimacy, it places democratic governments before a pivotal crossroads: NPM was the product of the criticism of the welfare state, the overall conception of the state, and the emphasis on its role in representative democracy as the main institutional actor. It challenged all three, arguing that the state is by default less competent than the market in providing jobs and public services. Hence, it called to taper government functions, minimize bureaucracy, and introduce parameters of evaluation—efficiency, competence, serviceability—through privatization and outsourcing. It also incentivized public services that had long been considered, according to the previous paradigm, as self-evident state responsibilities. What new paradigm is superseding it today? Much as an administrative approach overemphasizing skill over value is too narrow, Dunleavy’s suggested alternative, digital governance, also stresses means at the expense of substance. How then is the state conceived in the twenty-first century? What is the public’s role within this conception? And what, thereby, is the desirable blueprint of the civil service—its objectives, functions, and methods? 13  Jos Raadschelders, Theo Toonen, Fritz van der Meer, 2007, The Civil Service in the 21st Century, London: Palgrave. 14  Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, Jane Tinkler (2005) “New Public Management Is Dead—Long Live Digital-Era Governance,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory16:467– ,494; Jouke de Vries (2010) “Is New Public Management Really Dead?” OECD Journal on Budgeting Volume 2010/1 pp. 1–5.

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The legitimacy crisis of democracy, along with the question of the state’s role in the age of globalization, poses a challenge to the reconceptualization of the civil service. Are the conditions indeed ripe for a new paradigm? Its cornerstones are governance, policy networks, and public engagement. Theoretically, the principal transition is from an institutional approach that features the government as the main actor to a new institutional approach. Not government, but governance; not a dominant player in the form of a centralized government, but a fabric of institutions—governmental, economic, social, both local and global—all doing their part; not top-down central policies prescribed by government, but policy networks involving different stakeholders and generating self-governance and collaborations between the public and private sectors and civil society.15 In face of the legitimacy crisis, the concept of governance offers greater public engagement, social activism, and social responsibility. It advocates an inclusive democracy that would allow affected citizens to partake in different levels of policy-making and implementation—and not only through elections as the lone, if pivotal, act of political participation.16 Thus, the key concepts emerging from the new paradigm—governance, policy networks, regulation, and participatory democracy—still lack an overarching, cohesive scheme. Consequently, they further widen the gap in the definition of a new public service paradigm in advanced democracies in the age of the global knowledge society. The result is a civil service following a collective and eclectic approach, with strong managerial tendencies and a commitment to privatization, outsourcing, and management efficiency. Lacking is an appropriate toolkit and a determination to develop a new model appropriate for a globalized, knowledge-based age. This version of the civil service is hence marked by a general disregard for the immense new challenges and future roles of public service in democratic states. It further fails to reconsider the role of the state, its responsibilities toward the public, and the concept of democracy with respect to the relationship between state and citizen. Table 2.2 outlines the main difference between the three paradigms.

15  Gerry Stoker, 1998 “Governance as Theory  – Five Propositions,” UNESCO 155, Oxford: Blackwell. 16  John Dryzek, 2010, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Oxford: OUP.

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Table 2.2  The evolution of the paradigms of the state, the public, and the civil service

Analytical approach Public interest The public The state Organizational structure Accountability Model of democracy

Modern state: bureaucracy

New Policy Management

Collaborative governance

Institutionalism

Neo-classicism

New institutionalism

Elected officials Voters Prescribing and executing Hierarchical, pyramidical Government

Personal interests Consumers Goal setting

Policy network dialogues Participating citizens Enabling

Executive agencies Policy networks and cross-sectoral partnerships Private sector and Multi-dimensional regulation Representative rule Law and order Deliberative democracy

Adapted from Mark Bevir, 2012, The New Governance and the Public Servant

Toward a Third Paradigm: Governance and What Else? What would the state look like according to the collaborative governance model? Is it a narrow concept that simply focuses on policy networks rather than on managerial skills? Does it merely improve governability, or does it also insist on a fundamentally new understanding of the state’s role in protecting its citizens and fostering their emergence as competent actors on the knowledge- and technology-based global stage? Does it have the capability to adequately address the legitimacy crisis, or only to face the limited challenge of designing public administration? And how does the third model, participatory democracy, correlate to the concept of collaborative governance? Do they complement each other by co-facilitating the neoliberal corrosion of the state by market forces, or by paving together a new pathway out of the legitimacy crisis? The governance paradigm can be embedded into three different models, each offering a different framework for answering these questions: monitory democracy, the enabling state, and democratic collaborative governance. Monitory Democracy  This model shifts the focus of democratic theory from an emphasis on decision-making bodies and the public—as the

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e­ lectorate that appraises government performance every four years—to a model entailing the engagement of civil society, the media, and citizens as constituting democratic criticism and discourse. It thus shifts the balance between institutions within democracy, as well as transforming their roles. In addition to expanding the functions of the citizenry and voluntary entities, this model transforms the civil service from an executive body to a monitoring entity. As such, it monitors policy-making and implementation within different executive agencies, whether via the state or via independent professional organizations. We have here, then, a model of a monitoring and monitored democracy.17 The government’s role becomes monitoring, regulating, and coordinating policy, while the role of civil society organizations and the media focuses on criticism, serving as democracy’s “watchdog.” The Enabling State  Adapted from Giddens’s The Third Way, this model renews the contract between citizen and state not by restoring the state’s role as provider of all services but by facilitating partnerships between the three sectors—public, private, and civic—and enabling the involvement of stakeholders. Encouraging social involvement in a multitude of areas, it seeks to “democratize democracy” and to expand the role of civil society. It does so by setting the foundation for community and state activities and by strengthening the rule of law, solidarity, and citizenship.18 Giddens, followed by New Labour British Prime Minister Tony Blair, stressed the role of civil society in promoting democratization, engaging the public, and involving communities in  local government. Similar to Habermas, the hope was that a democratic revival within the civil arena would enhance public trust in representative democracy and thus strengthen it. This model highlights the voluntarist aspects of public engagement and is based on the idea of liberal multiculturalism. Democratic Collaborative Governance  The third model centers on the legitimacy crisis and seeks to enhance public trust in democracy, not just 17  John Keane, 2009, Monitory democracy and media-saturated societies Griffith REVIEW Edition 24: Participation Society. 18  Anthony Giddens, 1996, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot.

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by improving public services but primarily by promoting civic engagement within the community, the region, and the state.19 Policy networks include citizens, not just stakeholders; public engagement is sought on a regular basis, not haphazardly or episodically; mechanisms of deliberative democracy—such as citizen committees, inclusion of residents in budgetary decision-­making, and deliberative polls—become an institutional element of government. Through public engagement, they reinforce civil culture, while rebuilding public trust through the idea of participatory democracy (Table 2.3). The model of monitory democracy is a minimal one. It mostly determines the rules of the game, providing a general framework whereby governance amounts to diverse channels of transparency, criticism, and monitoring. The enabling state model, on the other hand, offers engagement with stakeholders and greater accessibility to services and information for those seeking it. While the enabling state allows for public initiatives, it neither actively encourages civic engagement, nor introduces new forms of participation in decision- and policy-making processes. The third model, participatory democracy, is the most proactive, advocating citizens’ involvement in discourse, norm-setting, and public debate but also in policy networks and in decision-making processes. The three models are not mutually exclusive but rather offer different formulations of public engagement and public service. This chapter’s main recommendation is to see “democratic participatory governance” as the heuristic, normative horizon of the desired model of the state in the era of the knowledge Table 2.3  Models of governance within the third paradigm Concept of the state

Public

Public service

Monitory democracy Enabling state

Regulates and monitors Sets standards and norms

Critical discourse

Democratic collaborative governance

Determines the public interest together with the citizens

Sets up monitoring mechanisms Serviceability, shared ethos, engaging with stakeholders Public engagement through policy networks, accessibility, transparency

Voluntary participation of stakeholders Active involvement of citizens and organizations

19  Seyla Benhabib (2007) Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times Citizenship Studies, 11:1, 19–36.

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society. At the same time, it advocates developing the capacities of public service according to the enabling state model, while gradually expanding on them toward the realization of participatory democracy. In a neo-­ conservative era, which views the media, academia, and intellectual elites as “deep state” mechanisms, monitoring activities and criticism is crucial for fostering a democratic spirit. In order to facilitate a public service that is capable of bringing about such changes, enabling the establishment of policy communities, and serving as the primary catalyst in establishing cross-sectoral networks and platforms for public engagement, it is necessary to invest in different aspects of civic cooperation and involvement.

Collaborative Governance: A Combination of Participatory Democracy and Engagement Governance? The basic tenet of the collaborative governance approach is the aspiration to include nongovernmental stakeholders in decision-making processes through a consensual process of shared policy-making.20 While participatory democracy functions primarily through civil society, collaborative governance attempts to create a discursive environment and to enable citizens to gain access to the core of the governmental policy community. What role could collaborative governance play between the corpora of democratic theory and the reconceptualization of public administration beyond NPM? On one level, it seems there is indeed a convergence between the corpora. After all, participatory democracy seeks to promote the plurality, diversification, and inclusion of many different civil society actors, which is exactly what collaborative governance offers; policy networks allow for the involvement of diverse actors and underrepresented groups through debate and deliberation. Hence, we have here an interesting implementation of participatory democracy theory through collaborative governance. In fact, it can be argued that participatory democracy has left the state’s institutional backbone—elections, parties, governments, and so on— untouched. It seeks to foster a civic environment that actively employs democratic means in order to generate public trust in state institutions.  See the opening chapter of this volume.

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Most of the theoretical scholarship concentrates on the deficits of representative democracy: a lack of political engagement coupled with professionalist politics that excludes citizens from decision-making and from the institutional workings of parliamentary activity. Accordingly, civil society presents a civic alternative—social movements that enable activism, engagement, and representation and establish discursive communities, debate clubs, civil forums, civil juries, civic committees, social protest and advocacy organizations, and so on. And yet the dichotomy is preserved, with the political establishment continuing to make up institutional governance. Collaborative governance, in contrast, advocates something altogether different: it does not merely provide a participatory framework for the institutional core of government but aims to incorporate participatory processes into the very core of representative democracy: public policy and governmental decisions. Presumably, one of the flaws of the participatory model is that most civil initiatives do not, in fact, bring about policy change. Collaborative governance, on the other hand, injects the lifeblood of participation directly into the decision-making process. Policy networks that include non-institutional stakeholders become full partners in policy-making. Hence, collaborative governance goes beyond the democratization of civil society and the enhancement of public trust through “democratic education” in extra-institutional areas: it seeks to achieve a more inclusive institutional setting that would serve as an interface between institutional and informal stakeholders as part of a policy network. Evidently, collaborative governance focuses on opening up the institutional arena to participation. It is therefore more radical than the theory of participatory civil society and is no longer concerned merely with rehabilitating trust in the context of the legitimacy crisis. Rather, it focuses on practices of democratization within the act of policy-making. Hence, collaborative governance takes democratic theory one step further—from a representative democracy with a politically engaged civil society to a representative democracy that opens up the very heart of the establishment to multi-level participation.

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Participatory Democracy Within the Establishment: Collaborative Governance Under Democratic Criticism It seems that collaborative government synthesizes contemporary models, advancing them to the next level. Whereas the participatory democracy model relies on civil society to enrich, diversify, open up, and complement institutional democracy, collaborative governance attempts to incorporate these ideas into a new interface between the state (via the civil service), the public sector, and civil society. What Habermas tried to apply to formal democracy externally, through civil society, collaborative governance tries to incorporate into the heart of democracy’s decision-making establishment. Thus, Ansell and Gash’s definition implies decision- and policy-­ making processes in which government agencies engage with stakeholders and NGOs.21 Normatively, this notion is based on Bevir’s analysis, which argues for advanced policy networks that extricate the state from its omnipotent role as sole agenda setter, allowing for the inclusion of an array of new actors in the policy arena. Sørensen and Torfing argue that “deliberative theories” perceive the state as one of many competing and overlapping points of political identification, and they regard the establishment of linkages and bridges between political identities, narratives, and communities as an important democratic task that post-liberal theories of democracy must take into account.22 Dryzek would therefore see this development of policy networks as the democratization of the process of government.23 But does opening up the establishment to broad participation truly make for a better democracy? A worthier society? What are the immanent contradictions raised by this model, and is it indeed effective against the legitimacy crisis? First, public trust in representative democracy is founded upon the citizen’s choice between different political parties, with each offering its own ideology and policy package. How does collaborative governance enter this legitimacy equation? If a government was elected based on a certain 21  Ansell, C. & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Theory and Practice, 18, 543–571. 22  Eva Sva Ssen Jacob Torfing (2005) (2005) (2005) 5) 08). ‫ א‬Post-Liberal Democracy) 08). Administrative Theory & Praxis Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 225. 23  John Dryzek, 2010, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Oxford: OUP.

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agenda only to form its policy together with extra-institutional stakeholders upon its entry into office, it would either betray its original ideological position or profess no ideology to begin with. The deliberation process could thus lead to an outcome that does not conform, or is even diametrically opposed, to the party’s statements during the elections. In other words, collaborative governance entails an openness of the policy-making process that may clash with the election of a government based on a specific policy agenda. Second, there are different ways for determining who participates in the procedures of collaborative government and how. It can be through hearings, consulting, involvement in decision-making, or bearing responsibility for the policies—This in and of itself is of great importance. The latter option in particular poses a challenge to the elected government’s legitimacy: the worldview of collaborative governance advocates policy networks and a round table of stakeholders who together arrive at decisions, for which they then bear responsibility. But is it the elected government that is supposed to bear responsibility for policy-making? Whose performance will be judged by the public in the next elections? Third, reliance on policy networks can signify a lack of trust in decision-­ makers, elected officials, and the civil service. Indeed, the NPM narrative, which argues that state institutions and the civil service perform poorly in management and decision-making, may come to dominate in collaborative governance, as it would explain the need to turn to outsiders for help. Collaborative governance can be viewed as the privatization of decision-­ making processes. Even if de facto both governmental and nongovernmental entities are involved, policy-making becomes a joint project of the state and of interested parties, whether from the private sector or from civil society, who are not elected and cannot be held accountable. Fourth, inclusion in policy networks is offered to those who come with a pre-existing interest in the relevant policy area. Stakeholders are usually powerful market forces—financiers, commercial companies—but also civil society organizations that hold clear positions on specific policies. While general elections are meant to represent the public interest, those participating in collaborative governance are non-establishment entities that come with their own sets of interests. Those already with influence, access to the media, and clearly defined agendas now gain direct access to decision-­makers and become an integral part of policy-making in an area that directly pertains to their interests, economic or otherwise. This creates a cartel of political, economic, and other elites.

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Fifth, collaborative governance can, in effect, exacerbate inequality. As is well known, those participating in civil society deliberation efforts overwhelmingly belong to the educated middle class and are socio-­economically well placed.24 Therefore, the main advantage of general elections—their equality and ability to accommodate broader economic perspectives— effectively goes down the drain. Collaborative governance significantly empowers the already powerful—stakeholders and interested parties—and can thus undermine equality. Sixth, collaborative governance may include protest groups and underrepresented sections of society, thus voicing the concerns of those liable to be harmed by certain policies. But the question of representativeness here is crucial: when forming a policy regarding a certain ethnic minority— Ethiopians, for example—does one include the traditional leadership, such as kahens and other religious authorities, the radical leadership of protest organizers, or the charities providing assistance to Ethiopians? All of these exclude the voice of unorganized and unrepresented members of the community, such as women, or the overwhelming majority of the community that does not identify as religious, or may view the attempt of the self-­ appointed “leadership” differently when it seeks to set up an educational or patriarchal system for dictating cultural norms. Government policy should be legislated to reflect the public interest. Providing a platform for a diverse set of organized groups is important for the process of understanding the field, its different problems, and aspects. Determining policies together with organized entities, however, can undermine not only equality but also the public interest itself. Seventh, collaborative governance can significantly undercut the professional rank of experts and public service officials, who now come to occupy just another seat around the table. Collaborative governance can thus spawn populist policy-making processes that do not necessarily conform to the elected government’s core agenda and are skewered toward those whose prominence, means, or connections grant them entry. These actors have no public legitimacy, nor any of the political representation so central to democracy. The legitimacy crisis of democracy manifests itself in the decline of public trust in those mechanisms meant to ensure equality, representation, and the promotion of public interest. The dominant paradigm in the age of globalization—NPM—additionally weakens public trust in the  Merkel and Kneip 2018.

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professional rank of the civil service, those certified experts and professionals entrusted with decision- and policy-making. Collaborative governance can intensify this lack of trust among the public, further undermining the legitimacy of representative democracy. Finally, in terms of democratic theory, some authors have suggested that collaborative governance should be viewed as part of post-liberal democratic discourse: In contrast to the liberal theories of democracy, post-liberal theories do not necessarily perceive the undermining of the traditional institutional borderlines between nation states, between the public and the private sphere, and between the legislative input-side and the executive output-side of the political system as a threat to democracy. In fact, they tend to see the blurring of these borderlines as a prerequisite for the democratic regulation of governance processes.25

If this is the case, then post-liberal theories actually weaken the position of the state, the legitimation of representative democracy as well as the professionalism of the civil sector, reducing them to the flow of interconnected institutions and spheres, thus encroaching upon the normative foundations of equality and liberty at the heart of liberal democracy.

The State, Public Service, and the Public in Democracy As our discussion has shown thus far, collaborative governance can, on the one hand, be viewed as a radical approach democratizing the core of democratic rule by incorporating public engagement and involvement into the decision- and policy-making process. It can also be understood as chipping away at the legitimacy of elected government, the civil service, and the promotion of the broader public interest. By enhancing the participation of certain groups and organizations, it permits access to the decision-­ making process regardless of public support or adequate political representation. Because collaborative governance aims to construct a paradigm that goes beyond representative democracy in political theory, and beyond NPM in public administration, it is important to identify the dangers inherent to the blueprint it proposes. This does not mean that  Sørensen and Torfing 2005:227.

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collaborative governance will necessarily privatize policy-making, further empowering those who already have access to the political, economic, and media elites. It does mean that in determining the procedures of collaborative governance, it is necessary to form a clear conception of the state’s role, the mechanisms of representative democracy, and the civil service, so that collaborative governance will reinforce and uphold them rather than further aggravate the crisis of trust surrounding them. How could the state, the civil service, and the public be conceived within the collaborative governance model so as to reinforce the legitimacy of democracy? (a) Collaborative governance needs to create a public-oriented model of the state: the public interest and quality of service to the citizen will be at the core of this model, but they are not alone. Its other tenets must include building a dynamic, proactive, and creative civil service that can put processes in motion, plan for the long run, and provide professional policy planning and implementation in pursuit of the public interest. This puts the advancement of the state at the forefront. The public stands at the heart of collaborative governance; the concept of the state and its designation as a service provider are derived from an understanding of the contract between state and citizen. The citizen is autonomous in that he or she pursues his or her own fulfillment but can also partake in decision-­making, policy-making, and feedback—not just on election day but as part of a larger notion of civic engagement in public affairs. The citizen receives public services from the state but also the opportunity for meaningful social engagement. The public interest is at the center of decision- and policy-making processes in advanced democracies. While politics relies on representation of the public at large, as well as on the representation of identity-­ oriented or particularistic groups, the civil service enables the adaptation and integrative formulation of the public interest. It understands identity politics and the ideological party system and is also policy-driven and able to integrate the different voices within civil society and the political sphere of interests and decision-making. (b) The state is meant to provide facilities—physical, educational, economic, social, civil—in order to promote innovation, creativity, and civic solidarity and thus enable citizens’ self-fulfillment, personal development, and maximal autonomy. The state, represented by

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elected officials, sets goals, norms, standards, and an orientation for strategic planning in light of the public interest. Its role as a key player in the global knowledge society requires the state to qualify its citizens for future markets and to invest in skills, elevating civil capital by improving the quality of service and adapting it to a complex society. Finding creative solutions for separatist communities, developing civic strategies, and instilling trust in the rule of law, the civil service, and elected institutions are all crucial to the prosperity of the democratic state in a changing world. Hence, processes of governance must be led and managed by the state. This would allow voluntary endeavors, which almost inevitably strengthen the educated middle class, to weave less-privileged social strata into public engagement platforms and to articulate a shared public interest. (c) The civil service is the professional echelon involved in the strategic planning that determines long-, middle-, and short-term goals that are then translated into blueprints and budgets. One of the roles of the state apparatus is to provide universal social and public services. Another is to help manage regulation and shape policies that allot executive authority. At its core, however, the civil service establishes relevant policy networks for the planning and implementation of government policy that include experts, research bodies, and social and private organizations. As such, it generates public engagement and collaborative governance at relevant sites. In this respect, the civil service initiates, generates, and monitors the connection between different stakeholders participating in implementation: it is a hub around and within which services and policy implementation are administered.

Conclusion Collaborative governance draws on two traditions—democratic theory and public administration. In democratic theory, collaborative governance in fact challenges the participatory democracy model, which views activism within civil society as supporting, and enhancing trust in the institutional core of representative democracy. Collaborative governance, in contrast, proposes a radical democratic theory that democratizes the institutional core itself, infusing it with public engagement mechanisms that

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introduce new democratic practices beyond the theoretical framework. Within the oeuvre of public administration, collaborative governance tries to outstrip NPM, advocating for the reintroduction of public values as parameters in public administration. Through the establishment of policy networks, collaborative governance facilitates dialogue and broad discussion on policy matters among stakeholders. Yet collaborative governance also has its dangers—namely, the deepening privatization of policy-making processes and their resultant detachment from elected institutions and the over-involvement of powerful stakeholders in policy-making. The stipulation of an ongoing, open policy-­ making process in which stakeholders carry equal weight can particularly aggravate distrust in representative democracy by undercutting the pre-­ articulated agendas of elected representatives. Collaborative governance can be a successful paradigm only if it manages to generate new public value for the civil service, the state, and the public. How can the operating system of public service be transformed? How can it become a dynamic force that propels and manages complex planning initiatives and translates them into workable blueprints for policy implementation? And how can collaborative governance be leveraged to enhance public trust in representative democracy? The expertise of the civil service is in leading, consolidating, and implementing policy, while creating a common, transparent, and accessible knowledge base for public service that enables organizational development across different offices and entities, as well as a system-wide perspective and process for incorporating lessons learned. In order to achieve these goals, public service must instill a core ethic that is professional, service-oriented, and committed to the public interest. But it must also undergo a shift in organizational culture—from a compartmentalized system with many different sub-specializations to a trust-based, collaborative approach that fosters inter- and extra-­ organizational dialogue and instills a sense of mission throughout the different stages of the policy-making process. Civil servants do not necessarily have to be the sole experts in their fields, but they should be able to summon and establish diverse, research-based, and innovative policy networks that look to the future. This would allow them to not only provide high-­ quality service but also strategize and set up mechanisms for self-­ improvement, open criticism, and public engagement. The transparency and accessibility of knowledge, along with its original production, are central to building trust within and across different offices and sectors.

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Relevant sectors of the public should likewise be encouraged to participate in the utilization and processing of this knowledge. The rehabilitation of trust in public service can be achieved through its transformation from an executive body to a leader of policy-shaping processes together with the political echelon. This transformation, which would facilitate engagement with relevant, as well as underrepresented, voices and stakeholders, has the potential to reconceptualize democratic collaborative governance as an important tool in the preservation of democratic legitimacy in the twenty-first century.

References Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. Journal of Public Administration Theory and Practice, 18, 543–571. Benhabib, S. (2007). The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Published by: Princeton University Press. Cohen, J., & Arato, A. (1994). Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT. Crouch, C. (2004). Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Dalton, R., & Wattenberg, M. (Eds.). (2000). Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R., Farrell, D., & McAllister, I. (2011). Political Parties and Democratic Linkage How Parties Organize Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. de Vries, J. (2010). Is New Public Management Really Dead? OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2010/1, 1–5. Dryzek, J. (2010). Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance. Oxford: OUP. Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., & Tinkler, J. (2005). New Public Management Is Dead—Long Live Digital-Era Governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16, 467–494. Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and Freedom. Jerusalem: Shalem Center. Galnoor, I., & Oser, J. (2015). Civil Service. In The International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Vol. 3, 2nd ed., pp. 695–700). Oxford: Elsevier. Giddens, A. (1996). The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot. Habermas, J. (1973). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon. Habermas, J. (2010). Inclusion of the Other. Oxford: Polity Press. Hall, P. (1993). Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain. Comparative Politics, 25, 275–296. Hegel, G. F. (2011). Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Jerusalem: Shalem Center.

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Keane, J. (2009). Monitory democracy and media-saturated societies. Griffith REVIEW Edition 24: Participation Society. Lipset, M., & Rokken, S. (1960). Social Cleavages, Party systems and Voters Alignment (pp. 1–64). New York: Free Press. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Merkel W., & Kneip. S (Eds.). (2018). Democracy and Crisis. Challenges in Turbulent Times. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 373 S. Raadschelders, J., Toonen, T., & van der Meer, F. (2007). The Civil Service in the 21st Century. London: Palgrave. Rucht D. (2010). Civil Society Theory: Habermas. In Anheier H.K., Toepler S. (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of Civil Society. New York, NY: Springer. Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (September 2005). The Democratic Anchorage of Governance Networks Scandinavian Political Studies, 28 (3), 195–218. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2005.00129.x Stoker G. (1998). Governance as Theory  – Five Propositions. UNESCO 155. Oxford: Blackwell. Weber, M. (1964). The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: The Free Press.

CHAPTER 3

Collaborative Governance in Light of Deliberative Democracy Ronen Goffer

Collaborative governance is part of an ongoing trend that may be described as part of “the collaborative paradigm,” which is prominent both in research disciplines and in practice and can be attributed to the values of post-industrial societies that recognize the importance of participation and collaboration. These disciplines and practices all embrace participation, collaboration, transparency, accessibility, trust, and deliberation, both as values and practices. In this chapter, I will compare collaborative governance (CG) to deliberative democracy (DD), which is also considered part of the collaborative paradigm. This comparison has two main purposes. First, since CG and DD are often similar in their well-studied practice, the comparison has an academic value and can also assist policy-­makers to improve their practices. Secondly, assuming that the democratic-­theoretical foundation for DD is clear and well established, and due to that the base for CG democratic theory is not clear enough, exposing the differences between them can help establish the foundations for a democratic theory for CG.

R. Goffer (*) Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel DEMOS Participatory Processes, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_3

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CG is a relatively new governance theory and practice that perceives itself as a replacement for the adversarial or managerial modes of policy designing and implementation. Its main innovation is getting together stakeholders from the public, private, and civil sectors into collective forums of discussion to engage in a consensus-oriented deliberation, in the process of developing and implementing public policy (Ansell and Gash 2008). The practice of deliberative democracy also includes these types of processes, but with two main differences. First, it does not aim to incorporate stakeholders from the business sector; second, it focuses on including ordinary lay citizens that do not represent any specific vested interest, as opposed to stakeholders in CG processes. The practices of DD and CG are operating in the context of both governance and democratic theories. In this chapter, I will demonstrate the deficit that CG has in democratic theory on the one hand and the deficit that DD has in governance theory on the other. The democratic-­theoretical context of DD is clear: it considers itself a turning point in democratic theory, especially the representative one. However, it currently lacks comprehensive governance theory necessary to support its democratic theory and to provide systematical guidance for the processes of policy design and decision-making that it creates. CG, in contrast, was formulated within the framework of governance theory in the post-NPM era, which is defined by soft characters such as tri-sectoral partnership and trust building, and its disadvantage, in the current context, is its incompatibility with a democratic theory that is supposed to provide context to its governance theory. Even though some researchers point to the participatory-democratic theory and/or deliberative theory as the democratic theories that are compatible with CG, I will show that the model that is most compatible with CG is what I will describe as a multicultural regulated democracy. This model is defined by formal institutional regulation of the mechanisms of incorporating stakeholders into policy design and decision-making processes, which are characterized by relatively low representativeness, and by deliberation processes that usually end in compromise, as a typical result of negotiations. These results are sometimes weaker than (or even contradictory to) products of deliberative-democratic processes that are conducted by lay citizens with the intention to serve the public interest. This distinction might be valuable both to scholars in this field who would be interested in filling the deficit CG has in its democratic theory and to those who promote CG as an up-to-date preferred practice in public administration.

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The Theory of Deliberative Democracy Deliberative democracy is a movement in democratic theory that emerged in the early 1990s and is acknowledged as the deliberative turn in democratic theory (Cohen 1989; Fishkin 1991; Dryzek 1990, 2000; Miller 1992; Bohman and Rehg 1997; Elster 1998; Macedo 1999; Freeman 2000; Chambers 2003; Thompson 2008). Deliberative democracy, which was developed as a response to the legitimation crisis of representative democracy, concentrates on the active deliberative participation of lay citizens in policy design and decision-making. Deliberation is a mode of conversation between individuals that is based on the articulation of arguments, exchanging knowledge and information, mutual listening and internalization, a potential to change positions and preferences as a result of the discussion, and a possibility to reach some level of consensus that serves the common good. The standard brief definition of deliberation, in its political sense, is a process of discussing different arguments about political alternatives (Elster 1998). Several researchers point out other aspects of deliberation: Habermas (1996) emphasizes the necessity to avoid coercion, achieve political equality, and act rationally; Benhabib and Cornell (1987) and Young (1990) review the justifications of communication methods that include expressing emotions, narratives, and so on. If up until the emergence of deliberative democracy, the democratic theory had debated the ideas of participatory democracy based on acts of civic participation, then deliberative democracy drew the attention toward the deliberative processes in which the civic participation are made. This turn indicates a shift from a theory of representative democracy based on voting and aggregation of votes in order to form decisions to a theory based on talk, in which the exchange of arguments results in some level of consensus. In this manner, the deliberative theory claims to be more just and more democratic (Chambers 2003). The deliberative turn is facing the representative model of democracy. In the representative model, the government derives its legitimacy from the elections that represent the preferences of the public regarding the directions in which the society and the state are heading. Habermas (1973) was the first to articulate the nature of the legitimation crisis of contemporary democracies as a structural phenomenon that was partially a result of the deficit between the demands of the citizens and the state’s capability to answer to these demands. Following Habermas’s analysis of the legitimation crisis (ibid.), the research literature has defined its three

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fundamental elements: a crisis of participation, a crisis of trust in political institutions, and a crisis of party system (Norris 2011). The recognition of the crises and the demand for a more collaborative and less elitist democracy have all led to the development of alternative democratic models that shift the focus from the representative principle toward the participatory aspect. These models view civic participation in decision-making in matters of quality of life in the state, as an integral part of the democratic system. This view has laid the foundation for theories of participatory democracy, and DD is an up-to-date part of these theories (Zittel 2003). The shift to the participatory aspect is well established in the deliberative democracy theory but was not yet translated into a comprehensive governance theory that would be able to guide processes of public policy design. Therefore, and despite the turn in democratic theory, deliberative democracy is not yet able to fully replace the representative theory that has in its disposal democratic theory and also governance theory, which both provide tools for policy design and decision-making.

The Practice of Deliberative Democracy The deliberative turn in democratic theory has been followed by an increasing number of participatory deliberative projects that involve lay citizens in policy design, as part of a growing array of attempts for democratic innovations (Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Smith 2005). Deliberative initiatives for lay citizen participation started in the 1970s, usually under government auspices. Early examples are the “Planning Cells,” which were developed in the early 1970s in Germany, and the “Citizens’ Jury” in the United States, few years later. Since the late 1980s, Denmark has been developing practices that incorporate lay citizens into debates about science and technology issues and their effect over society (Joss and Bellucci 2002), such as Citizen-Based Consensus Conferences (Joss and Durant 1995) and Scenario Workshops (Andersen and Jaeger 1999). Deliberative Polls, which incorporate polling methods with deliberative principles using a random representative statistical sample, have been experimented in several countries since the early 1990s (Fishkin 2009). In the late 1990s, the concept of “21st-Century Town Meeting” increased the number of participants in the deliberative process to a few thousand citizens (Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2002). Project WWViews has been the first initiative to include citizens in policy design at the global level. In the first-ever global citizen conference held in 2009, thousands of

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lay citizens gathered simultaneously in 38 countries to develop a suitable global policy for global warming, in preparation for the climate change conference of the countries that took place two months later in Copenhagen (UNFCCC). Their policy recommendations were submitted to the conference. This action draws an important distinction between this project and its report, submitted by lay citizens, and the documents submitted by the “shadow conference” of the international civil organizations, which works alongside the international conference (Rask and Worthington 2012). This distinction, between the two documents, is important to this chapter. The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly The chapters of this book provide several examples of the CG practice. In order to compare it to DD, I will describe one case study of the DD practice in detail. The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, which took place in the Canadian province of British Columbia, is one of the most extensive experiments to apply DD practice. Not only was it an official statutory procedure conducted by the government of British Columbia, and was also confirmed in legislation by the provincial Parliament, but it also involved a prominent constitutional issue—an electoral reform. Changes in the electoral systems might have direct consequences for the careers of politicians and elected officials, and therefore the officials’ initiative to allow lay citizens more authority over this issue is remarkable and thought-provoking. The motivation to form a citizens’ assembly in British Columbia stemmed from the results of the elections of 1996 and since, which exhibited the malfunction of the provincial electoral system there. In the provincial elections of 2000, the Liberal Party of Canada won 77 out of 79 seats, with only 57.6% of the votes. The Green Party won 12.4% of the votes but did not receive a single seat in the Parliament (Blais et al. 2004). This problematic situation led the elected government to establish the citizens’ assembly, with the purpose of proposing an alternative voting system. The participants in the assembly were appointed by a near-random selection method, and their names were taken randomly from the provincial eligible voters’ list, representing the 79 electoral districts. In total, the assembly included 160 participants that represent the general population. Their mandate was to investigate and estimate the current voting system of British Columbia and to offer an alternative.

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The assembly gathered over the course of 18 weekends in three phases of learning, holding public hearings, deliberating, and reaching a consensus on a new mixed voting system. The new system was submitted to a referendum in British Columbia in 2005 and received 57% of the votes, but failed to pass the 60% support threshold required by law, and so the motion was defeated (Warren and Pearse 2008). In a second referendum held in 2009, the assembly’s proposition was defeated again by a majority of 60%. Nevertheless, these disappointing results did not hold back similar assemblies in Ontario and the Netherlands to take place in the following years.1 To our best knowledge, the Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia was the first in history to allow lay citizens to suggest fundamental changes in the state’s political institutions (ibid.).

Similarities Between CG and DD I will briefly explore the similarities between the practices of CG and DD and then explore their differences. Table  3.1 brings a summary of that comparison. The Object and Initiative of the Process Both kinds of processes were developed for similar objective: influencing policy design and decision-making in public issues. Ansell and Gash (2008) define collaborative governance as a “governing arrangement […] that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (p. 544), and Emerson et al. (2011) add to the definition of CG by claiming that it should be implemented if there is no other way to reach the policy goal. For DD, I will use the classic definition by Elster (1998) that embodies the same objective: a participatory democracy is a collaborative decision-making method done by the entirety of the participants or their representatives regarding a public matter that affects them, and in which the decisions are based on arguments made by participants committed to core values of rationality and integrity. Most processes are top-down projects that are initiated by the public administration or elected officials. This downstream tendency is present in

1  The same methodology was used successfully by the Irish Citizens’ Assembly of 2018 to successfully repeal the eighth amendment of the constitution regarding abortion.

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the DD practice of the Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia and is also noted by Ansell and Gash (2008) regarding CG processes. Status of the Process/Product Both types of practices are formal processes. However, they are only formal in allocating time and budget for the processes, and this formality does not usually apply to the status of their product. This distinction means that officially, decision-makers are not committed to the products of these processes that are usually little more than non-binding recommendations, even if the process itself was formal. None of this applies to the case of the Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia, which is unusual both for DD and CG processes, for the status of its product is statutorily established and therefore officially protected by government decisions and Parliament legislation (Blais et  al. 2004). Consequently, by these measures, the status of CG and DD products are usually informal. Nature of the Process: Deliberation Even though in comparison to CG, the DD scholarly literature mostly discusses the deliberative quality of the process as it is designed and executed, it is still possible to maintain that the reviews of both practices describe processes that are intrinsically deliberative. Elster (1998) and Fishkin (1997) sum up the definition of deliberation as a type of conversation that is characterized by (1) acquisition of knowledge, (2) balance between different perspectives, and (3) diversity of participants. Moreover, in deliberation, (4) participants have the opportunity to consider the various positions openly; (5) participants have the opportunity to make arguments and explore alternatives; and (6) participants have a high level of control over the agenda. Finally, (7) participants have the opportunity to change their preferences as a result of the discussion, and (8) the ultimate product accurately represents the debate and the positions of the participants (some level of consensus).

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Differences Between CG and DD Who Is Participating? Both practices engage participants from all three sectors, depending on the policy issues being discussed: third-sector civil organizations, lay citizens, business sector, experts/academia, administrative officials, and at times also elected officials. However, a review of several CG case studies reveals a strong tendency toward rigor participation of all three sectors, that is less typical of DD. A few examples of this tendency are the construction of a new cultural center in a Chicago city park, the management of Central Park in New York City, and the student loan programs in the United States, all described by Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011)—all of which involve collaboration with the business sector. The engagement of the business sector in these processes usually stems from the available resources it has in its disposal, from their duty of social responsibility, and from the blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private sectors (Stoker 1998). CG processes have an a priori notion of the identity of the potential participants in an effective collaborative process, and Donahue and Zeckhauser (ibid) even mention the business sector involvement as an essential element that defines CG processes. In contrast, DD processes do not usually include business sector representatives, and their participation depends on the matter at hand. However, the first citizen-based consensus conference that took place in Israel in order to discuss transportation policy incorporated representatives of transportation companies and business representatives of the Cross Israel Highway Company (Barnea and Melech 2000; Goffer and Goldman-Shaiman 2008). Similarly, a citizen conference in Denmark regarding genetically modified foods also included private companies that use modified food ingredients (Joss and Bellucci 2002), all of which are DD processes. Nevertheless, DD procedures usually separate between the central deliberative committee and the procedures designed for stakeholders from the business and third sectors. In the citizen conferences mentioned above, separate hearings were held to stakeholders and experts, and the main deliberative panel of lay citizens only received the products of their discussions. The Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia did not include representatives of the private sector at all and also held separate panels for experts (British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, 2004). Accordingly, these cases indicate that CG and DD processes both involve

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representatives of all sectors, but CG processes have a comparatively high tendency to engage the private sector. This variety in tendency can be explained by different purposes of participation and will be discussed later. Who Is in the Center of the Process? The tendency to incorporate the business sector is not the main difference between CG and DD processes. They differ mainly in the identity of the participants who accept central and integrative roles in the process. In classic decision-making processes, prior to the CG era, public administrators had taken the integrative role of policy design operations. Even if experts and stakeholders were consulted, the operation remained hierarchal, and the public administrators had the policy-making authority. CG is innovative in reassigning the integrative role of policy-making to a collaborative forum of multiple stakeholders and representatives from all sectors. In contrast, in DD processes, the central integrative role of policy design is given to lay citizens. The literature and practice of DD often address the selection methods of lay citizens for DD projects, and this involves issues of inclusion (Smith 2009), within a society that resolved the definition of its demos (Goodin 2007), as well as the question of presence, that defines the level of accessibility to participate in this or that political operation (Phillips 1995). With all this taken into consideration, Fishkin (2009) defines five possible mechanisms for recruiting citizens to a participatory operation: self-­ selection, non-representative sampling, random sampling (which is therefore statistically representative), prior appointment, and overall inclusion (as in a referendum). For example, participation in the Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia was based on random sampling, yet the other citizen conferences mentioned earlier had only self-selecting participants. These methods of participant selection in DD practices demonstrate another aspect that distinguishes it from CG. The context in which a DD process takes place is inherently democratic, and so are the selection methods, which, as mentioned above, address questions of representation and inclusion. In contrast, selecting participants to a typical CG operation is governance-oriented. Selection is usually made from the stakeholders that are within reach, most times as a part of policy/governance networks invested in the issue. The governance network usually represents the social power relations surrounding that matter. These power relations, as the literature of CG recognizes (Warner 2006), may allow accurate

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representation of the matter, but it is nevertheless prone to bias toward powerful actors in the network. Even the best effort to represent the policy/governance network in a CG process cannot surpass the boundaries of the existing network, and that brings into question the representativeness of the network, and even more so, of the participants that are only part of it. Using Different Types of Knowledge The identification of the various types of knowledge in DD and CG deliberative operations has few aspects. First, is the normative aspect that recognizes that policy-making or problem-solving requires as much knowledge and as many points of view as possible, and can only be achieved through a diverse group of people. This notion of the required knowledge matches the CG practice, which brings to the table different stakeholders that all have diverse knowledge about the policy, and Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011) even label information-sharing as one of the primary justifications and motivations for CG. Another aspect is the need of DD to justify the participation of non-expert citizens in DD processes that require professional knowledge. Glicken (1999) classifies knowledge elicited in deliberative processes into three main types: cognitive knowledge, which is technical knowledge based on scientific studies and factual arguments and is generated by experts; experiential knowledge, which is based on the personal experience of individuals that were affected by a particular policy and can be generated by any person with relevant experience; and value-based knowledge, which is moral or normative knowledge that is based on perceptions about what is “good” and valuable and can also be generated by any individual. A fourth type of knowledge, labeled deliberative knowledge (Benhabib 1996), is created in a diverse group when the participants use the educated discussion to re-evaluate their viewpoints and preferences, take into consideration the opinions of others, and sometimes even change their own positions accordingly. If so, the chance of creating deliberative knowledge increases in correlation with the diversity of the group. As seen above, CG and DD processes vary in respect to participant identity, particularly that of lay citizens. It is probable that the absence of lay citizens from most CG processes may lead to less diverse and less productive types of knowledge, especially value-based knowledge generated by lay citizens, which some researchers call “value experts” (Dienel and Renn 1995).

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The Legitimacy of Representation Methods in the Process (Who Is Included?) Civil forums such as the Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia pose a challenge for political representation theory (Brown 2006), and the DD literature widely discusses it. Representation theory is largely based on the preliminary work of Pitkin (1967), who defines representation as a meaningful action by the representatives for the benefit of the represented others, which in turn have the autonomy to authorize the representatives and hold them accountable to their choices. Civil forums, apart from the Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia, usually do not have the authority to make the decisions—and this poses a challenge regarding representation. The difficulty to guarantee accountability through the main institution of the representative democracy—the elections—only demonstrates how hard it is to justify accountability of lay citizens who are not publicly elected, such as those who participated in the assembly of British Columbia. For instance, a bill introduced to the American Congress only rarely passes the 50% threshold of the members of Congress, and it usually passes with only 30–40% (American National Election Studies 2007). This fact can explain the public’s approach to its lack of representation in Congress decisions and therefore legitimizes the search for other representation institutions besides those of the representative democracy, including DD institutions. On these grounds, Dalton (2004) argues that what contemporary democracies need is not better ability to represent diverse interests, but institutions designed to collect the various interests, take them into account and find a balance between them. Warren and Pearse (2008) considers the Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia as an example of this type of institution. In this way, DD demonstrates new ways to gather, represent, and balance diverse interests and even claims these methods to be more just (for further discussion, see Chap. 2 by Gayil Talshir). Even though representation is prominent in DD literature, it is rather absent from CG literature. Some of the fundamental CG researchers avoid dealing with representation at all (Emerson et al. 2011), and others only discuss it in the procedural context, without its democratic one (Ansell and Gash 2008; Bevir 2006). This omission is probably not unintentional; it is part of the aforementioned theoretical deficit in CG democratic theory, which will be discussed more later.

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What Are the Purposes of Participation and Its Justifications? So far, our discussion of the objective of the process has referred to its ultimate goal, which is influencing policy-making and implementation. However, in defining the purpose of participation in the CG or DD process, I am referring to the intent of the participating citizens or stakeholders and their reason for joining the process. Both CG and DD scholars would agree that the primary purpose of participating in policy and decision-making is to give voice to the desires and interests of the public. Vigoda-Gadot (2009) also declares this as the principal purpose of the current CG era, in contrast to the previous NPM trends that left the citizens passive and without influence over the design of public policy. This understanding of the purpose of participation is typical of the CG scholars, and it is compatible with the DD definition mentioned earlier, yet its justifications of CG are quite different from those of DD. The British Columbia case study illustrates the discussion of the justification of the purpose of participation according to DD.  Thompson (2008), relying on Rawls (1999), claims that the argument for giving lay citizens the authority to determine the voting system is embedded in the values of political freedom and equality. That is to say, if citizens are given the right to elect their representatives, they should also be given the right to choose the method for doing so. He claims this is a causal argument— the voting system itself affects the citizens’ actual voting practice, the outcomes of the election, and therefore the reality of civilian lives. My claim is that this argument should not be limited to the topic of the electoral system and should be extended further. Therefore, the logic Thompson uses has the power to justify giving citizens the right to affect decision-­ making in other areas as well. This kind of democratic justification is typical to DD. CG, however, provides different justifications to the purpose of participation, and most of them are concerned with increasing the efficacy of the governmental efforts. For example, Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011) describe four main motivations for CG processes: improving the productivity of governance processes, collecting stakeholders’ knowledge, increasing the perceived legitimacy of the public administration and the private sector, and pooling resources from the factors handling public issues. It is reasonable to determine that the justification reflected in these motivations is mainly occupied in increasing CG’s governance efficacy as a process and does not have democratic aspects as mentioned for DD.

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The Nature of Deliberation and Its Effect Over the Product Scholarly literature has declared the deliberative process as a principal element in both fields. Elster (1998) and Gambetta (1998), among others, distinguish between deliberation and negotiation between people of different vested interests. They claim that deliberation is a discussion of a single interest, that of the entire nation, and this separates it from conflict management or negotiation between various interests. In other words, in a negotiation, every party stays with its own interest, and the conversation might result in a compromise between those interests. However, in deliberation, the same agendas might still exist, but the participants have only one primary interest in mind, and that is determining what is best for the benefit of the group, community, society, or state. Stokes (1998) adds another aspect to the definition of deliberation, which is discussed by many other DD scholars and is considered to be significant: the possible change of position as a result of deliberative communication. This aspect corresponds with the understanding of deliberation as a process intended for the greater good; for only if the participants bear the public interest in mind, then they are able to change their views as a result of the deliberation and eventually reach a consensus that is for the sake of the greater good. These considerations, which determine the nature of the deliberation and its results, are affected by two types of variables: the quality of the process and the identity of the participants. In reference to the first, being strict to the guidelines of a proper deliberative process would affect the level of argumentation, the rationality of the conversation, the use of objective knowledge, and more. The second, the identity of the participants, has two main aspects: first, socio-demographic character of the participants (socio-economic status, age, education, etc.) may affect their ability to participate in the deliberative process in an effective way. The second aspect of the identity of the participants has a more significant effect over their behavior in the process and therefore also over its product: the participants’ inclination toward a specific interest that affects the debated policy. The distinction the scholars make between a deliberative process and negotiation of interests is made possible, first and foremost, by the distinction between stakeholders and non-interested participants. Lay citizens, as defined earlier, can engage in the discussion without a prior loyalty to any position. Stakeholders, however, are by definition in service of a particular interest that sets their limit for the discussion. These differentiations are the basis for distinguishing between a deliberative

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discussion done by impartial lay citizens and a discussion between stakeholders that only aspires to be deliberative, such as in CG, but is actually limited by various interests and therefore might turn into a negotiation that is settled by compromise. DD practice clearly acknowledges these distinctions. First, the integrative part of policy design is given to participants who are not stakeholders, and organizers of these operations create selection strategies that make use of these distinctions. Furthermore, DD practice usually allocates separate processes for separate stakeholders, in order to assist the primary process integrated by citizens. CG practice, however, constitutes a forum of stakeholders, usually from all three sectors. It is therefore possible to conclude, based on these assertions, that DD processes lead to a deliberative product that serves the public interest, surpassing other narrower interests, yet CG processes are limited to negotiating a compromise between the various interests of the participating stakeholders. The distinction between compromise processes that involve stakeholders and deliberation processes that involve lay citizens requires another point of view, which has consequences that are in certain terms even worse for CG.  The situation in which the positions of the participating stakeholders in CG processes are limited by the power of their interests assumes an “ideal” situation in which the stakeholders fairly represent the interests that brought them to the table. Stakeholders from the business sector have relatively clear agendas, and their representation is relatively simple. Trustworthy representation gets more complicated when discussing stakeholders that represent public and social interests. For instance, representatives of environmental organizations working on “green projects” usually rely on limited organizational capacities and cannot always make sure that their position is attuned to the public they are supposed to represent. Ansell and Gash (2008) mention the potential power imbalance between different interest groups, and they are understandably concerned that it may be subjected to manipulation by powerful actors. From a democratic perspective, however, power imbalance, which might occur, for example, due to the relative weakness of civil society organizations, diminishes their representativeness of the general public a priori. This description is also accurate to civic stakeholders who represent trade unions or other member organizations and even demonstrates the aforementioned argument. Piazza (2017) describes a negotiation between the Massachusetts Teachers Association, representing 70,000 teachers,

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and a national education advocacy group about a bill that would limit using seniority rights to protect teacher employment in the state. Both organizations held secret negotiations without informing their members and reached a compromise with the state to allow for the bill to pass while harming the rights of the teachers against their will, had they been asked. So, while CG processes are exposed to these kinds of harmful products in the representation level, DD processes have by definition the built-in mechanisms to avoid them. Table 3.1  Summary of the comparison of CG and DD

Typical initiative for the process Status of process/ product Objective of the process Nature of the process Who participates in the process? Who is in the center of the process? Types of knowledge

CG

DD

Top-down

Top-down

Informal

Informal

Influencing policy design

Influencing policy design

Deliberation Representatives of all sectors with inclination toward the private sector Stakeholders

Deliberation Representatives of all sectors, less inclined toward the private sector Lay citizens

Cognitive knowledge, experiential knowledge, value-based knowledge, deliberative knowledge Legitimacy of Limited to the sum of the representation methods stakeholders’ interests in the process (who is in?) What is the purpose of Efficient decision-making by the process and its the measures of the public justifications? administration Nature of the Compromise in terms of deliberation and its negotiation effect on the product Examples for methods Three-sector round tables, or typical projects collective impact

Cognitive knowledge, experiential knowledge, value-based knowledge Expanded representation that is compatible with up-to-date representation theories of the civic demos Reflective decision-making, responsive to the interest of the general public Consensus in terms of deliberation Citizens’ assemblies, citizen conferences

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Toward Making CG Compatible with a Democratic Model DD considers itself a turning point in democratic theory, especially the representative one. DD is not able to systematically guide the policy design and decision-making processes, in the way that representative democracy does. The British Columbia project specifically demonstrates the possibility to involve lay citizens in policy-making in a complicated issue, but it does not mean we can induce from it how the “deliberative state” which all its hypothetical processes will be derived from the deliberative-­ democratic theory will look like (Miller 1992; Smith 2009). This is a deficit in the governance theory underpinning the theory and practice of DD, and it stands out against the representative democracy theory and its ability, despite all its shortcomings and crises, to translate itself into institutions and governance processes that constitute our contemporary democracies. In these terms and for the time being, it is better to consider DD as a complement to the representative democracy model and not as its replacement. However, CG was developed in the framework of governance theory in the post-NPM era, and as many scholars have already noted, it is not fully compatible with a democratic theory. Bevir (2006) asserts that the contemporary system governance does not match the participatory-­democratic theory it is supposed to promote, and ultimately legitimizes keeping decision-­making in the hands of the dominant elites, while being selectively open only to groups and stakeholders that get favorable treatment. Sørensen and Torfing (2005, 2018) also refer to the deficit in CG theory, which according to them may be addressed by engaging democratically elected leadership in CG processes. Mair (2013) further claims that governance networks, which in our discussion represent the fundamental dynamics of CG, have led to a decline in the democratic forms of governance; by that, he means non-partisan organizations that grow and gain influence in the heart of the governance sphere. Ultimately, these scholars illustrate the deficit in suitable democratic theory for CG, yet they only mention the democratic theories that do correlate with CG in very broad terms. For instance, they mention participatory or deliberative democracy as a democratic theory that relates to CG, and Bevir (ibid) even mentions the radical democracy (a model that goes to even further regarding citizen engagement) as such. I will later argue that none of these democratic theories are compatible with CG.

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In order to determine which democratic theory is most compatible with CG, I will use the Fung and Wright’s (2003) attempt to design governance theory for DD.  Fung and Wright explore two dimensions that describe the governance situation in the context of inclusion and participation in policy design processes. The first dimension describes qualities of decision-making methods and moves between collaborative and adversarial processes, and the second describes a governance structure and moves between top-down and participatory bottom-up processes. This positioning allows them to distinguish their proposed model of empowered participatory governance from the others as a process that is both collaborative and participatory. On these grounds, I will present two dimensions that differ from those suggested by Fung and Wright (2003) but are still compatible with them. The first one is the extent of regulation of institutions and governance: how many policy design and decision-making processes that involve different actors are formal and officially regulated by relevant institutions. This dimension ranges from a high level of regulation, in which collaborative processes are conducted formally in governance settings and bodies, to a low level of regulation, in which the processes take place in a free market dynamic, with stakeholders and individuals influencing the policy design according to their power. The second dimension is the level of representativeness: to which extent the participants in the policy design processes represent the interests of the citizens and the general public, in the terms discussed so far (Fig. 3.1). The liberal democracies that are usually low in regulation levels for individuals and groups participation in institutions and governance are located in the first and fourth quadrants. This deficient regulation may lead to confrontational politics when several groups are fighting over access to state resources. The difference between these two approaches/ quadrants to governance depends on the very existence or non-existence of governance networks that are necessary for policy design while enabling group representation. While multicultural democracy enables or encourages actors, even unofficially, to enter public policy design through governance networks that supervise the policy design, the liberal democracy has a very thin governance mechanisms that do not encourage governance networks and leave the struggle for resource and value allocation to the competitive market dynamics. The democracies in the first and fourth quadrants both indicate low state involvement in social and economic

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Level of Regulation of Participation in Institutions and Governance Low

High

Level of representativeness in goverance processes

High Multi-cultural representative democracy: adversarial politics of groups regulation by governance networks

DD - Deliberative democracy: participatory politics of individuals and groups shared regulation by state and governance networks

1

2

Liberal democracy: confrontational politics of individuals and groups under market supervision

Multi-cultural regulated democracy: associational/neo-corporative democracy CG, participatory politics of groups and institutions shared supervision by state and governance networks

4

3

Low

Adapted by the author according to figure11.1 in Fung & Wright (2003), p.262

Fig. 3.1  Representation and participation’s effects on democracy and governance. (Adapted by the author according to Fig. 11.1 in Fung and Wright (2003), p. 262)

developments, but differ in the scope of the activity of policy and governance networks. The second and third quadrants are the participatory/consensual democracies (Lijphart 1999) that usually have high levels of regulation for individual and group participation in governance. This regulation leads to participatory politics that strives to base its policy design on consensus-­ oriented processes. The difference between these two approaches/quadrants to governance lies in the level of representativeness of groups and individuals in governance practices. While DD practices in the second quadrant emphasize the inclusion of lay citizens, which I consider to be of higher level of representativeness, the third quadrant represents

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collaborative processes with stakeholders from all sectors and therefore demonstrates a relatively low level of representativeness. The democracy reflected in the description of the third quadrant formally and institutionally regulates the participation of interested parties in its governance processes and therefore is supervised both by the state and governance networks. The countries closest to this description are Northern European countries such as Finland or Switzerland. The closest known model to this description in the third quadrant, where I claim CG is located as a governance concept, is similar to the associational democracy or neo-corporative democracy models. Ansell and Gash (2008) discuss this comparison but only as concepts of governance and not as democratic theories and argue that none of them describe CG well enough. In their view, neo-corporatism is a tri-sector dynamics including large organizations with a monopoly on representation (such as trade unions), while CG involves a much larger variety of organizations, most of which do not have formal power of representation. In the same way, Ansell and Gash reject the idea that the democratic model of associations is exemplary of CG, arguing that CG includes a wider variety of affiliations and not just formal associations. The differences that Ansell and Gash note between CG and these two approaches to democracy are not substantial in my view, especially if one takes into account more inclusive definitions of CG, such as that of Vigoda-Gadot’s (2009). Despite this distinction, it seems that the suitable democratic model for the CG governance theory is a formal regulation of accessibility and participation to governance and decision-making processes for multiple types of interest groups of various size and status. This positioning of governance regulation against representativeness facilitates in spotting the differences between democratic models and governance models in general, and DD and CG in particular. Of course, it is not possible to locate contemporary democracy in only one of these quadrants, as in most cases it is a complex model that partially correlates with at least two quadrants in this typology. If it were possible to maintain an ideal governance system entirely based on CG, it could also be described as an official institutional regulation of an existing situation in any state that encourages CG processes. Interest groups have always influenced public policy and public administration, and CG is innovative in its institutional and formal regulation of this influence, combined with greater transparency and trust. If we accept Ansell and Gash’s (2008) criticism that the models of associational and neo-corporative democracy do not

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apply well enough to CG, then the democratic model that does suit CG can be described as a multicultural regulated democracy. There may be contemporary democracies, such as the Northern European ones, which are wholly or partially compatible with this democratic model of CG, as described above. When considering democracies in which governance structures from the NPM age are in transition to post-NPM governance structures, such as Israel, the above distinctions can facilitate the execution of this transition in a way that is aware not only of the governance changes involved but also of the democratic ones.

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CHAPTER 4

A Threefold Perspective: Conditions for Collaborative Governance Lihi Lahat and Neta Sher-Hadar

Introduction After four decades of reforms, the question of how to improve public organizations still persists in most Western countries. There is an increased need to find new institutional arrangements that will improve the capacity—and legitimacy—of government organizations to serve the public interest. A major challenge today is how to incorporate multiple voices in public policy Note from the authors: A version of this chapter was published in the Journal of Management and Governance. Lahat, L., & Sher-Hadar, N. (2020). A threefold perspective: conditions for collaborative governance. Journal of Management and Governance, 24(1); 117–134, and it is published here with the publisher’s permission.

L. Lahat (*) Administration & Public Policy, Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada The Chazan Center for Social Justice, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Research Group, 2015–2018), Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_4

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processes. The desire to meet this challenge is reflected in the increased interest in the concept and practice of collaborative approaches to governance (Gray and Harrison 1999; Menahem and Stein 2013; Howlett 2014; Wu et al. 2015; Ansell et al. 2017; Halpin and Fraussen 2017). While some commentators claim that collaborative governance arrangements are becoming more common (Goodship et  al. 2004; Ansell and Gash 2008; Wanna 2008; Kekez et al. 2019), others maintain that many refer to collaboration when actually meaning different ways of working together (O’Flynn 2009). In addition, researchers argue that we know little about the outcomes of collaborative governance arrangements (Ansell 2012). Furthermore, we do know that they are not always beneficial (Rummery 2006; O’Flynn 2009). Therefore, if collaborative governance is not the answer to all problems, how do we decide when it is an appropriate choice? (Booher 2004; O’Flynn 2009). In this theoretical chapter, we suggest a conceptual framework that will hopefully contribute to answering this question. This interest in collaborative governance is part of the ongoing third wave of reforms that started from the beginning of this millennium, which some refer to as Post-New Public Management (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The need to better control and coordinate the fragmented structures of government organizations and balance the strong emphasis on market mechanisms has created a demand for a new vision for public administration. The Post-NPM period tried to answer these problems by suggesting that public organizations trust and involve citizens and stakeholders from within and outside the organizations. To accomplish these goals, this period has utilized various models such as New Public Governance, digital-era governance, and Public Value Management that emphasize trust, collaboration, networks, and holistic perspectives (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Stoker 2006; Vigoda-Gadot 2009; Osborne 2010; Lodge and Gill 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Van de Walle et al. 2016).

N. Sher-Hadar Mandel School for Educational Leadership, Jerusalem, Israel Administration & Public Policy, Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel The Chazan Center for Social Justice, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Research Group, 2015–2018), Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected]

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While collaborative governance arrangements may have advantages and can be part of the solution to the challenges that public administration and public policy face, they still have their weaknesses. Among them is the fact that these arrangements are cumbersome, costly, and difficult to manage and at times may be problematic from the democratic and accountability perspectives (Rummery 2006; O’Flynn 2008; Weible 2008). O’Flynn (2009) claims that many praise the notion of collaboration but few actually engage in it. This failure arises from the fact that it is similar to other ways of working together such as cooperation, meaning informal interactions of short duration, and coordination, which requires the strengthening of existing connections between actors in the system (Keast and Mandell 2014). Furthermore, collaborative attempts often fail because they result in problems such as creating compliance relationships rather than collaboration. Moreover, creating collaborative governance demands professional expertise. It needs leaders who understand the unique characteristics of these complex arrangements such as negotiation, serving as a catalyst and boundary spanning (Williams 2002; Huxham 2003; Ansell 2016). Indeed, not every action called collaborative governance truly reflects its essence. By definition, collaborative governance must include various actors. It also requires the expert guidance of managers who are not always present. Finally, it does not fit every social problem (Booher 2004). Furthermore, in reality the patterns of public administration action reflect not just the Post-NPM wave but also include a range of patterns that mirror the history and development of public administration organizations from the Weberian age to the New Public Management and Post-­ NPM periods. Thus, it contains different layers rather being than one holistic structure (Lodge and Gill 2011). While collaborative governance can be viewed as a strategy as well as governmental tool (Huxham et al. 2000; Ansell 2012; Kekez et al. 2019), in this chapter we focus more on the formulation stage of the policy process. We consider the question of under what conditions it might be more beneficial to use collaborative governance. Others embrace a point of view that is more implementation oriented and explore the context or the mechanisms or outcomes of collaborative governance (Fung 2006; Ansell 2012; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Bryson et al. 2017; Nabatchi et al. 2017). Furthermore, in our previous work, we dealt more explicitly with the relevance of collaborative governance to different kinds of co-­ production arrangements in public services (Lahat and Sher-Hadar 2019). In this chapter we explore and develop our previous work and ask the

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following question: under what conditions is it more beneficial to promote collaborative governance arrangements, at least initially, and when is it not? We utilize an ex ante view and present a three-layer conceptual perspective on the question. Using this approach, we suggest that the answer to this question is first, recognizing that some kinds of public values are more attainable than others via collaborative governance arrangements. Second, collaborative governance arrangements are more suitable in specific types of decisions than in others. Third, contextual factors related to the administrative culture may promote these arrangements, while in other administrative cultures it would be very hard, although not impossible, to implement them. We maintain that embracing the threefold perspective could enhance our understanding of the benefits of collaborative governance arrangements and the feasibility of implementing them. Furthermore, we claim that equally important is identifying the conditions under which collaborative governance arrangements are not beneficial.

Collaborative Governance: Frame of Reference Researchers trace the roots of the term “collaborative governance” to different points in time, from the beginning of the nineteenth century up to the last two decades (McGuire 2006; Ansell and Gash 2008; Wanna 2008; Emerson and Gerlak 2014). In general, collaborative governance includes an action or strategy in which different stakeholders work together to promote a policy process or decision-making based on consensus regarding public issues (Ansell and Gash 2008; Ansell 2012; Emerson et al. 2012). Several reasons have brought the notion of collaborative governance to center stage: the changing nature of the roles of government, globalization, the development of technology, and the increase in risk and in complex problems. These factors also highlight the need to be more responsive to citizens and reinforce their trust in democratic processes. Finally, they underscore the importance of the interdependence between policy design and implementation (Booher 2004; Vigoda-Gadot 2004; Wanna 2008; Williams 2012; Keast and Mandell 2014). For example, Ansell (2012) describes arrangements such as watershed councils and regulatory negotiation. Innes and Booher (2010) highlight the growing importance of collaboration in planning processes. Finally, Kekez, Howlett, and Ramesh (2019) describe the increasing relevance of collaboration, evident in the co-production and co-management of the delivery of public services.

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There are several ways to define collaborative governance. The broadest definitions emphasize the government’s tendency to collaborate with different sectors and actors and in different fields (Vigoda-Gadot 2004; Wanna 2008). There are more middle-range definitions as well (Emerson et  al. 2012). However, we utilize a narrower definition such as that of Ansell and Gash (2008): “A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-­making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage program or assets” (p. 544). The literature distinguishes between the concept of collaboration and similar concepts that reflect some kind of work with government officials. For example, researchers note that there is a continuum between cooperation, coordination, and collaboration (O’Flynn 2008, 2009; Emerson and Gerlak 2014; Keast and Mandell 2014). The differences in the three processes involve the actors taking part; their contribution to the process; the expectations from them in terms of time, resources, change, and so on; and the extent of the interdependence between them. In collaboration, the relationship is usually formal, long term, and reciprocal, enabling the process to influence policy design and promote innovation (Keast and Mandell 2014, pp. 12–13). There are case studies of collaborative governance arrangements in various fields including watersheds (Imperial 2005), environmental issues (Weible 2008), and social services (Gillett et al. 2016). While the study of collaborative governance and its implications and mechanisms is growing, the literature on the context and the conditions that influence the establishment of these arrangements is much more scarce (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Ansell et al. 2017; Voorberg et al. 2017). Using the three-layer perspective provides us with a diagnostic tool to explore when collaborative governance arrangements may be beneficial and when they are not. The three layers are nested in one another. The first begins with the value we want to promote. Then we consider the characteristics of the decision that must be made. Finally, we should be aware of the effect of the context on the possibility of implementing the collaborative governance arrangements. Figure  4.1 illustrates the three layers we will develop further in the next sections. Our three-layer approach is inspired by two theoretical perspectives: Ostrom’s (2011) institutional analysis and development framework (IAD)

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Policy style Administrative culture

the kind of enivornment

the kind of decision

Managerial/ es political valu

Kn orie owledg e nte orie d/value nted

the kind of value

Fig. 4.1  The threefold-layer perspective for exploring the possibility of implementing collaborative governance arrangements

and Sabatier’s1 (1998) advocacy coalition framework (ACF). Sabatier’s ACF is a holistic theory that aims to explain the policy process. The framework regards the policy process as occurring through interactions between different sub-systems. These interactions usually happen over a long period of time and among various coalitions in a specific policy field. Other elements including stable factors (e.g., the structure of the political system), exogenous factors (e.g., public opinion), and resource limitations (Sabatier 1998, Sabatier and Weible 2007) also affect the policy sub-system. Ostrom’s IAD is a framework for policy analysis in a multilevel institutional structure. The framework helps identify the interaction between actors and the outcomes of these interactions in specific “action situations.” Examples include exploring the costs and benefits of each actor and the information they possess (Ostrom 2011). While the IAD deals more with the conditions for collaboration, the ACF relates to the general notion of the creation of public policy and the 1  Part of the development of the conceptual work is based on the work of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith.

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role of different coalitions. Nevertheless, they both refer to three factors: values (individual values and core and policy values), the structure of the decision (action situation and policy sub-system), and the context (external variables, stable parameters, and external events). These three elements are nested one inside the other. Thus, values affect decisions, which are impacted by context. We maintain that considering these factors can help determine the likelihood of the success of collaborative governance arrangements.

The First Layer: Public Values In the first layer, we deal with the contribution of collaborative arrangements to the promotion of public values. At the heart of every policy is the idea of promoting public values (Molina 2015). Therefore, an initial consideration must be whether collaborative arrangements have an advantage in promoting certain public values. To answer this question, we must first explain what we mean by public values. When exploring that term, we note different definitions that try to capture the concept. An interesting distinction of Nabatchi (2017, p. 2) is between public value as added value and public values as a broad emotional and cognitive perception that guides behavior (p. 2). The first arises from Mark Moore’s (1995) notion of public value in his book Creating Public Value where he raises normative and practical questions about how public managers should promote actions that have real value for the public. He refers to values such as justice, fairness, and efficiency as being complicated, vague, and competing with one another. To help managers promote public value, Moore (1995, p. 22) suggests a strategic triangle: (1) identifying whether the action includes public value, (2) identifying the legitimation of the action in the political and legal context, and (3) identifying the administrative and practical feasibility of the action. The second perception of public values has moved from the individual managerial view of Moore’s writing (Moore 1995; Bozeman 2002) to a more general quest for identifying public values as a general outcome of the actions of public administration. For example, Stoker (2006, p. 42) explains: Public value is more than a summation of the individual preferences of the users or producers of public services. The judgment of what is public value is collectively built thorough deliberation involving elected and appointed

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government officials and key stakeholders. The achievement of public value in turn depends on actions chosen in a reflexive manner from a range of intervention options that rely extensively on building and maintaining networks of provision.

Stoker thus refers to a mutual deliberative creation that should guide the modus operandi of public sector organizations. The term “public value” is regarded as a more concrete term than “public interest” (Bozeman 2007; Plantinga 2010; Stone 2012). The interest in public value has inspired various writers (Kelly et  al. 2002; Smith 2004; Stoker 2006; Jorgenson and Bozeman 2002 in Bozeman 2007; O’Flynn 2008; Plantinga 2010; Shaw 2013; Hartley et al. 2015), while others have criticized these directions. Some of the criticism focuses on the fear of harming democratic principles. These critics maintain that the public administration’s involvement in decision-making might impede the democratic process especially in the hierarchical Westminster model that differentiates clearly between the administrative and the political levels (Rhodes and Wanna 2007, 2009). Another important criticism is that there are times when public employees must enforce less enjoyable actions on citizens such as collecting taxes and incarcerating prisoners, emphasizing the risk of embracing populist policies designed for short-term benefits. In their view, the idea of public value is meaningful only if the public values are the product of an ongoing dialogue between elected officials and managers in the context of tradition. As a result, the narrative reflects a dynamic process, not the decision of one person (Rhodes and Wanna 2007, p. 416). Alford and Hughes (2008, p. 134) claim that managers do not choose the values but should ensure that the premises upon which those values are founded reflect the will of the elected representatives and the citizens. Mauri and Muccio (2012) maintain that it is possible to distinguish between political and administrative decisions. Elected officials define the boundaries of permissible administrative operations, thereby mitigating concerns about harming democratic principles. If we refer to public values as the product of an ongoing collective, multi-dimensional, politically mediated process of defining citizens’ preferences based on social and political interactions (Moore 1995; Smith 2004; Stoker 2006; O’Flynn 2008), it seems that any action of public organizations would benefit from collaboration. Such joint ventures promote deliberation and consensus between different stakeholders. And

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indeed, different commentators express the growing demand for and implementation of these arrangements (Ansell 2012; Shaw 2013; Kekez et  al. 2019). However, if we consider the criticism mentioned above as well as evidence from different cases, collaborative governance may prove to be more complex than that and at times have negative outcomes (Lubell 2004; Weible 2008; Lubell et al. 2010; Klijn and Koppenjan 2014). In this case, the question as to when it is more suitable to engage in collaborative governance is crucial. In this first layer, we examine the inherent values within the specific issue. We claim that some issues have inherent values that are more suitable and relevant to explore in collaborative governance than others. In this context we utilize Nabatchi’s (2017, p. 5) typology of four categories of administrative and governance values that can help develop our claim: (1) political, such as liberty, participation, representation, political responsiveness, and equality; (2) legal, such as due process, individual rights, and equity; (3) organizational, such as administrative efficiency, specialization and expertise, authority of positions and merit, formalization, organizational loyalty, political neutrality, technocratic and functional rationality; and (4) market, such as cost saving, cost efficiency, productivity, flexibility, innovation, and customer services. From the public administration perspective, collaborative arrangements have institutional features that create more advantages for some values than for others. When engaging with core values that can be more accurately defined or legitimized by a group of people (stakeholders) who can contribute to their articulation, definition, knowledge, and legitimization, using collaborative arrangements can be worthwhile (Van Buuren 2009; Klijn and Koppenjan 2014; Lodge and Wegrich 2014; Sørensen and Torfing 2016). These values are usually reflected in political and organizational values. Political values are traditionally negotiated in public administration. Hence today, more than ever, due to the importance of different voices within the public policy arena, collaborative governance arrangements can serve as a platform for articulating them. In this context, for example, when deciding what the acceptable outcomes of different social services are, the definition should be discussed among different stakeholders. Is the outcome of participation in the labor force, then, just a question of having a job or should it lead to a better quality of life? The unique perspectives and knowledge that various actors can contribute to answering this question are valuable.

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However, we argue that in issues that revolve around values in the legal and market categories, using collaborative arrangements may be less beneficial. Our claim assumes that these values are based mainly on professional knowledge and expertise and that they involve a lower level of discretion. For example, trying to define market values such as cost saving, cost efficiency, productivity, and flexibility will not benefit much from deliberation. These values are mostly the outcome of professional expertise or epistemic knowledge. Similarly, cost-benefit analyses about purchasing medical equipment are based mainly on professional knowledge and calculations as well as past experience. By the same token, issues that include inherent values from the legal category will not benefit much from the unique features of collaborative governance arrangements, because they are based on years of professional legal interpretations and limitations. Therefore discretion, in comparison to organizational or political values, is of less value. To illustrate, when promoting a value such as due process for social service recipients or individual rights such as the right to protest, there are laws and regulations that define what it means to utilize these rights and processes. If there is room for interpretation, it is mostly in the hands of professionals such as lawyers. There is no need to create a collaborative mechanism unless the problem is lack of knowledge about how to use it. We will develop this aspect in the next layer. However, it is difficult to make definitive judgments about the appropriate situations for using collaborative arrangements. In real life they might be in-between situations. Examples include the emergence of new forms of collaborative plans such as local-level economic development (McGuire 2000) and collaborative arrangements that promote economic values.

The Second Layer: Situations Requiring Decisions We go back to our basic question: when it is more beneficial to use collaborative governance arrangements, and when might they create more complicated, expensive, and time-consuming discussions? (Booher 2004; Rummery 2006). Ansell (2012, p. 503) claims that collaborative governance can be another option in addition to managerial and adversarial strategies. The first is more expert oriented, and the second emphasizes the competitive aspects of democracies and the legal strategies of control and supervision (p. 503). The aim of collaborative efforts is to incorporate different voices into the administrative process and revitalize negotiations. Another answer to the question of when to use collaborative governance

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Table 4.1  Decision-making strategies and their implications for collaborative governance

Agreement on values

Disagreement on values

Agreement on facts

Disagreement on facts

Traditional government— traditional centralized government in which collaborative governance is not needed Value-oriented collaborative governance—stakeholders deliberate on values and priorities

Knowledge-oriented collaborative governance—stakeholders engage in learning and knowledge production Government in search of decisions—inspiration/risk-taking initiatives No place for collaborative governance

Source: Lahat and Sher Hadar (2019). With editors’ permission

arises from Emerson et al.’s (2012) observation that collaborative governance is worthwhile when there is no other option. A useful tool in answering our question is Thompson and Tuden’s (1959) typology of decision-making strategies in organizations (p. 197) based on Simon’s (1947) work. They distinguish between different types of decision strategies that we adapted to collaborative governance (Lahat and Sher-Hadar 2019). As Table 4.1 illustrates, these strategies reflect four situations of agreement or disagreement about the facts (e.g., what are the effects of global warming?) and value elements (e.g., the issue of abortion). When applying the matrix to administration and the division of labor (Dery 1996, 1997), we can look at the first type of decision as a classic government decision. In this situation there is agreement regarding the values at the heart of the policy and clear knowledge about how to implement it. These situations are quite common because they are technical in nature and have few value conflicts. Therefore, collaborative arrangements would not have any added value in these situations. The second type of decision is an experimental one. The problem here is insufficient knowledge. Learning is the best strategy for this situation. Knowledge no doubt is one of the most important and complicated ingredients of the policy process (Weiss 1979; Sabatier 1998; Van Buuren 2009; Ostrom 2011; Freeman and Sturdy 2014; Klijn and Koppenjan 2014). As mentioned, the decline in the power of and trust in expertise as well as the fragmentation of knowledge has created the need to build mutual arrangements of knowledge aggregation. In this situation there is no value disagreement among different parts of society regarding the importance of or

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the need to develop different policy actions, but there is not enough knowledge in the hands of government agencies on how to do it. For example, Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) explain that there is no disagreement about the desire to improve the higher education system in United States and the importance of doing so. The real question is how to do it. Therefore, the need to share knowledge from different stakeholders in this initiative seems the main incentive to engage in collaboration. In many respects, collaborative governance arrangements enable the creation of “embodied knowledge,” which Freeman and Sturdy (2014) define as “knowledge held by human actors and employed and expressed by them as they go about their activities in the world. It includes that sort of knowledge most often regarded as embodied, namely, so-called tacit knowledge” (pp. 8–9). Thus, it makes possible the creation of an “epistemological pluralism” that includes explicit and implicit knowledge on the individual and social levels (Spender 1996). In that respect, collaborative arrangements can create what Lindblom and Cohen (1979) refer to as “professional social inquiry” that integrates practitioners’ experience with social research. Therefore, in this case of knowledge-oriented collaborative governance where the need is to create knowledge, recruitment for these collaborative arrangements should be based on the information held by the various stakeholders. Furthermore, collaborative arrangements are a valuable tool for generating innovative ideas (Sørensen and Torfing 2016; Ansell et  al. 2017). The encounter between the different perspectives of the different stakeholders from different layers of different organizations with different interests and perspectives can undoubtedly be a fruitful basis for new and more innovative ideas for creating, promoting, and implementing public policies and public services (Sørensen and Torfing 2016). The third kind of decision is value related, reflected in disagreements about the values at the heart of the policy but not always on how to implement it. Using political tools such as negotiations will help in these situations. In fact, in these situations collaborative governance can help strengthen democratic principles (Sørensen and Torfing 2016; Ansell et  al. 2017). Reaching a decision on rural development exemplifies this type of decision. Does rural development mean investing in infrastructure, preserving the landscape and old buildings, or developing new public spaces? Does it mean providing new employment opportunities by

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opening new factories or investing in better transportation to work opportunities that are farther away? In these situations, there are fewer problems as to how to implement rural development, but there is disagreement on values: development versus conservation. The involvement of different stakeholders may help facilitate agreement and legitimation for the preferred values and policy alternatives, based on the consensus developed in these collaborative arrangements. On the other hand, in similar situations using another decision strategy, such as managerial decision-making that does not encourage consensus building, can make the implementation of the resulting policy problematic (Torfing et  al. 2017). Moreover, in this type of decision, collaborative governance has relative advantages over adversarial methods such as legal proceedings that can drag on for years until they are resolved, poisoning the relationships between different stakeholders in the same social surrounding. In the fourth type of decision, there is a lack of knowledge needed to determine the policy and disagreement about the policy’s core values. Hence, it is extremely difficult even to begin thinking about a decision, let alone implementing a policy. Such decisions include situations in which it is impossible to reach a consensus without worsening the situation. This difficulty arises either because there is insufficient knowledge in this field or because the controversies are so harsh that there is no way that different stakeholders can reach an agreement. Significantly, in this situation other forums that are less formal, even short-lived, may prove more beneficial. They can serve as informal forums that can build consensus and break gridlocks. Examples include forums for brainstorming or envisioning new directions, for crafting new ideas or visions, or networks to prepare the ground for future collaborations by engaging with rival sides to understand the issues that would be key in collaborative governance. According to our definition, collaborative governance is a formal tool with a more concrete target than “networks” that can work toward different targets or are not reciprocal in their essence. In situations like those described here, engaging in collaborative governance would result at best in policy deadlocks. In such cases, it might be better for the policy-maker to take a bold decision about a managerial strategy or engage with an adversary rather than getting involved in complex collaborative governance mechanisms.

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The Third Layer: The Policy Style and Administrative Culture The third layer refers to the macro conditions at the state level. Although they do not determine whether collaborative arrangements will evolve or not, they can shed light on their chances of developing and their likelihood of being implemented effectively. Awareness of these macro conditions can help policy-makers make more informed decisions about whether the environment in which they operate is conducive to the use of collaborative governance (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). Most studies on collaborative governance deal with its specific context and focus on its features and mechanisms. A question less considered is: what is the effect of national contexts on the potential emergence of collaborative governance arrangements? Some commentators, for example, Ansell, Sorenson, and Torfing (2017), refer to elements in the environment that may affect the feasibility of collaborative arrangements. Examples include the motivation of politicians to promote or impede the opportunity for collaboration. Other considerations include the corporatist or clientelist legacy of the country, its productivity at local or regional levels, the type of subject (civilian issues versus security issues), or the degree of ideological controversy (Ansell et al. 2017, pp. 480–481). In Collaborative Governance Regimes, Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) refer to the surrounding system’s context and drivers.2 The first includes conditions such as public resources or service conditions, legal policy frameworks, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of the relevant community, network characteristics such as the infrastructure for the collaborative efforts, the political dynamics and power relations at all levels, and the history of conflict among the different actors and organization involved in the specific surroundings (pp. 39–43). Although all of these elements can affect the implementation and realization of collaborative governance arrangements, they involve too many components to take into account when trying to calculate the benefits and challenges in creating collaborative arrangements. A more useful categorization emerges from the work of Voorberg et al. (2017).

2  The concept of drivers reflects the elements that affect the creation of collaborative governance, but we are focusing on the question of the conditions, so we will not elaborate on them here.

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Voorberg et al. (2017, p. 366) use a term similar to collaborative governance: co-creation. It emphasizes citizens’ involvement in the collaborative effort to create public services and includes the private, public, and NGO sectors in the collaboration. They claim that these arrangements have become “game changers” in the policy context in different countries. Comparing four cases studies from Britain, Estonia, Germany, and the Netherlands, Voorberg and colleagues focus on two dimensions. The first refers to the scale of incorporating different actors in policy processes. This scale ranges from countries that tend to consult different actors to those that have a more authoritative style. The second dimension relates to the legal style of the culture of governance. This scale ranges from countries more oriented to the law and its rules, for example, the “Rechtsstaat” style, to those that have a tradition of less involvement of the state, reflecting looser control by the state and a “public interest” culture of representation. The researchers conclude that the state’s tradition and governance culture are major factors in determining the likelihood of collaborative governance arrangements being more or less significant (p. 371). Using this approach to the exploration of administrative cultures in different countries, we utilize two points of view as we consider collaborative governance arrangements. The first arises from the term “policy styles” that reflects the political and cultural context and refers to it as “a more or less stable pattern of policy making that arises from the government’s approach to problem solving and the relationship between government and other actors in the policy process” (Richardson 1982, p. 13 in Bovens et al. 2002, p. 15). The connection between policy styles and policy instruments is an important one to explore (Howlett 1991) and can help explain changes in policy (Rittberger and Richardson 2003). In the early 1980s, Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan (1982) witnessed the rise of different actors in policy processes and raised the question of the possibility of and conditions for incorporating different actors in them. Based on Richardson’s heuristic typology, Bovens et al. (2002) identified the two dimensions that affect policy style. The first is the approach to problem solving, which can be anticipatory or reactive. The second refers to the relationship with actors from other sectors and involves the approach to policy design, which can be consensual or imposed. Thus, the Netherlands is an example of a consensual and anticipatory policy style, while Britain exemplifies an imposed and reactive policy style. It is reasonable to assume that countries characterized as consensual, with an anticipatory policy style, are better

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candidates for collaborative governance arrangements due to their history of relationships between various sectors as well as their tradition of devoting resources to policy problems and planning. The second point of view that may make collaborative governance feasible arises from the notion of administrative culture (Peters 2009). While it seems a more specific idea than policy styles, it is reasonable to assume that the institutional and historical features of public administration affect the inclination toward collaborative governance. Loughlin et al. (2011 in Hammerschmid et  al. 2016, pp.  260–261) describe four administrative traditions. The first is the Napoleonic tradition evident in countries like France and Italy that reflects a strong centralized state antagonistic to social actors. The second is the organicist tradition in Germany and the Netherlands, for example, that reflects a federal state with cooperation between state and social actors. The Anglo-Saxon tradition, evident in countries like Britain and the United States, has a mixed framework of the state and a pluralistic relationship with social actors. Finally, the Scandinavian tradition, in Denmark and Norway, for instance, combines the features of the organicist and the Anglo-Saxon states. It is interesting to note that the policy style perspective as well as the administrative culture perspective corresponds with Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 2006) typology of welfare regimes as liberal, conservative, or social democratic. Despite the different points of view when framing policy styles using administrative traditions or welfare regimes, and their limitations with regard to non-Western countries such as the changing features of the China’s administration reflecting a more collaborative manner due to recent market reforms (Rosenbloom and Gong 2013), they have common bases. These perspectives suggest that countries that have traditionally collaborated with social actors and have more pluralistic characteristics along with an anticipatory rather than a reactive style will be more comfortable with the idea of collaborative governance. Thus, countries such as the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and the United Kingdom are better candidates for this format than are France and Italy.

Conclusions In this chapter, we tried to embrace an ex ante perception, focused more on the formulation stage, by asking when it is worthwhile to embrace collaborative governance arrangements, and when it is not. We maintain that we can respond to this question using a three-layer perspective that

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considers the values being discussed, the nature of the decision, and the environment in which the collaborative arrangements take place. This approach is beneficial for several reasons. First, this triple-layer perspective enriches our understanding by considering the engagement in collaborative governance not only through its process but also by concentrating on the specific context in which decisions are made and implemented. Hence, instead of studying the mechanism itself, these three layers emphasize the components of the policy issue and the conditions under which the policy is designed and implemented. Second, while the three layers do not exclude one another, they are in many respects nested one inside the other. The first layer shows that some kinds of values, such as administrative or political values, can be articulated in a better way using collaborative mechanisms. However, there are others such as legal or market-­oriented values that benefit less from such an approach. The second layer can help guide policy-makers about when to use these arrangements, who ought to be invited to take part in them and what their expected achievements will be. As we suggested, two cells in the matrix are more beneficial for using collaborative governance due to the capacity and legitimacy that they promote. Furthermore, they suggest the elements to emphasize when recruiting stakeholders. Hence, when there is a need to generate consensus regarding different value preferences such as in the value-oriented collaborative governance cell, the emphasis should be on recruiting more varied stakeholders. When more diverse or new knowledge is needed, the emphasis should be on recruiting stakeholders who can bring different kinds of knowledge and interpretations to the collaborative effort. The third layer of policy styles and administrative tradition helps explain why collaborative governance seems more suited to some countries than to others. In countries in which embracing collaborative governance is not a natural choice, we must acknowledge the difficulties of implementing it and the resulting need to create a more supportive atmosphere. Examples include creating incentives for participation in collaborative mechanisms (Lubell 2004), being more patient in trying to promote this approach or finding other tools that can be utilized more easily. The arguments presented here suggest that collaborative governance arrangements can serve as an additional tool that policy-makers can use if they deem them useful. Therefore, the aim is to make policy-makers more aware about when the addition of collaborative governance is beneficial and when it might be disadvantageous.

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While we hope this theoretical perspective will help develop the practical and theoretical aspects of collaborative governance, it has its limitations. First, the dichotomies between different values and different situations that reflect the need for professional knowledge or are part of value disputes are not always so clear. Furthermore, the policy style and administrative culture are not always articulated and researched. Indeed, they might be in a transformation stage especially in non-Western countries. Future research that utilizes the three-layer conceptual perspective in diverse contexts may help enrich our suggestions presented here. Moreover, although the holistic macro framework has it benefits, further theoretical and empirical study of each of the different layers is needed to demonstrate the theoretical and practical relevance of collaborative governance arrangements.

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SECTION II

Collaborative Governance in Local Government

CHAPTER 5

Local Collaborative Governance: Could It Bypass Outdated Legal Structures? Varda Shiffer

This article addresses one aspect of collaborative governance, namely the consensus-building process and its fragility in light of the divergence between the legal and bureaucratic structures on the one hand and a more equal and “softer” system of collaborative governance on the other. A five-year action—research conducted at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute [VLJI]—proposed that a framework of collaborative governance, and in particular the concept of consensus-building that lies at its basis, could facilitate the division of responsibilities between central and local governments, in the sphere of local education. Furthermore, it suggested that this redistribution of roles and responsibilities could be achieved by means of rapprochement rather than by a power struggle between the relevant authorities. The consensus reached would generate trust among participants, which in our assessment would make it possible for a collaborative governance regime to focus on consolidating a policy on local education without resorting to controversial legislative processes. The research examined the development of collaborative governance arrangements for the management of education systems in

V. Shiffer (*) The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_5

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socio-economically disadvantaged local authorities. The aim of these arrangements was to support policy-making processes in the authority closest to the residents, thereby improving the locality’s education system. The laws and guidelines by which the education system in Israel operates allocate nearly absolute control to the central government, namely the Ministry of Education—while the local authority is assigned administrative and logistical responsibilities. This division of responsibilities does not enable the local authority to formulate educational policies corresponding to its needs. Powerful local authorities have long been active in the area of education, even on issues that are not part of their legal mandate, and they usually do so without the explicit consent of the Ministry, often accompanied by overt struggles for power. One of the outcomes of these unofficial processes is a loss of authority on the part of the Ministry, including its ability to oversee the implementation of educational curricula and to allocate resources. As a consequence there has been a troubling increase in socio-economic gaps among local authorities. The models of collaborative governance that developed in local authorities during the course of our research differ from the harmonious model proposed in the literature, according to which consensus if achieved produces a policy, which, when implemented, leads to the resolution of a specific (and defined) problem. Our research indicates that establishing arrangements for collaborative governance does indeed lead to a redistribution of roles and responsibilities in the local authorities examined. Yet the lack of supportive legislation and the central authority’s adherence to hierarchical structures and bureaucratic processes undermines the agreements reached and increases the likelihood of coercion. This article does not address additional hypotheses examined in the framework of the study; it highlights the processes by which agreements are reached, thereby laying the ground for collaborative governance, and their rapport with the legal system and bureaucratic structures that guide them.

Theoretical Background Collaborative Governance Ansell and Gash define collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal,

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consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (2008, 543). This definition has a number of elements that make it particularly suited to the formulation of a new system of governance in the field of education, such as assigning a particular role to public agencies and the engagement in a formal process of public policy-making. To this, one might add another layer, that is, a permanent arrangement as defined by Emerson and Nabatchi (2015). They introduced the term “collaborative governance regime”: “The particular mode of, or system for, public decision making in which cross-boundary collaboration [for example, across organizations, levels of government, or sectors—V.S.] represents the prevailing pattern of behavior and activity” (ibid., 721). The models of collaborative governance developed in the context of this study are not frameworks for isolated action intended to identify agreed-upon solutions to a specific, defined problem, but rather permanent arrangements for the formulation and implementation of a policy with the participation of stakeholders from various sectors. The basic premise, drawing on the literature on collaborative governance, is that the process of consensus-building would enhance trust among participants (Booher 2004) and solidify the social capital needed for collective action (Innes and Booher 1999). The benefit to the public that such an arrangement is expected to yield is the consolidation of an effective model of partnership among governing authorities and between them and other stakeholders, in a manner that would support the local authority and enable it to formulate and implement an optimal policy for its residents. The principle of subsidiarity adopted by the European Union, which grants preference to the authority nearest to the citizens, if it has the necessary capabilities (EU Fact Sheet), is one of the sources of inspiration for the model of local democracy with a balanced and effective division of responsibilities (Blank 2010), which can emerge from a collaborative governance arrangement. Consensus-Building: Among Whom? On What? The pursuit of consensus and the need to reach agreements are central elements of most definitions of collaborative governance (Emerson et al. 2012; Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Innes and Booher 1999, 2004 (on line)). As early as the 1980s, scholars were seeking ways of addressing the rifts created in the system of representative democracy as a result of far-reaching social changes (such as globalization,

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mass migration, and the communications revolution) that took place during the latter half of the twentieth century. These scholars (Putnam 2000, 1995; Dahrendorf 1997; Cohen and Rogers 1995; Putnam et al. 1993; Cohen and Arato 1992) viewed the activities of civil society as a means of building trust and social capital and as a foundation for participatory and deliberative democracy. The early 2000s saw the emergence of growing numbers of governance systems with the participation of governmental agents alongside representatives of civil society and the business sector in fora such as roundtables, designed to increase collaboration and build trust. Innes and Booher (1999, 2004) have addressed the growing need for consensus-building, as manifested in a variety of participatory processes between authorities and stakeholders. They argue that this is one social response (out of several) to changing social circumstances and the growing strength of social networking. The implementation of anything substantial or innovative requires developing flexible ties among many actors. Reaching agreements and seeking consensus therefore constitute an essential process in the new model of governance, which they define as follows: “an array of practices in which stakeholders, selected to represent different interests, come together for face-to-face, long-term dialogue to address a policy issue of common concern” (ibid. 1999, 412). In their definition of an integrative framework for collaborative governance, Emerson et  al. (2012) describe a collaborative governance regime as a logical process centered on three components: a dynamic process of creating a commitment in principle, shared motivation, and the capacity for joint action. These three components operate interactively and have an influence at various levels—outputs, outcomes, and impacts—which then generate action. Emerson et al. hold that joint action and its effects influence the system context that encompasses opportunities and constraints, which in turn affect and are affected by the collaborative governance regime and its outcomes (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015, 722–23; Emerson et al. 2012). In our study, the element of consensus-building is at the heart of the dynamic process of creating a commitment in principle (the first component). In our model this is a preliminary process, and it is only during the phase of shared motivation that agreement on policy and action takes place.

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The Gap Between the Legal Status and the Reality in Which Local Authorities Operate in Israel The inherent advantages of having the governing authority closest to the citizen formulate and implement policy have been explored in the legal and philosophical literature (Blank 2010), in the literature on public policy (Dery and Schwartz-Milner 1994), as well as the literature on local government (Ben-Elia 2007, 2012) in cities and elsewhere. Indeed, since the late 1980s, many countries have reformed their public services and decentralized or devolved powers to bodies closer to the citizens. With respect to the situation in Israel, Razin (2003) has observed that “...the gap that developed in Israel between the decentralization that has taken place in practice, and the centralized legal and bureaucratic foundation that failed to adapt itself to the new reality, is less prevalent elsewhere in the world. The Israeli system exhibits exceptional conservatism and, in particular, a blatant and ever-growing incongruity between the legal and institutional infrastructure, and patterns of municipal administration in practice” (ibid., 83). Local authorities1 operate in an environment of vagueness, rife with internal contradictions, and at times even hostility, particularly on the part of the central government (Blank and Rosen-Zvi 2009; Ben-Elia 2007; Dery and Schwartz-Milner 1994). Local authorities—whose heads have been directly elected since 1978, concurrently with local council elections—could potentially be viewed as governing authorities in every sense, constituting an intermediate layer between the citizen and the central government and genuine representatives of their residents. Yet the shift to direct elections of the heads of local authorities did not result in a corresponding change in the legislation relating to the various functions of the local authority. Moreover, there is no clear policy (or any policy) regarding the division of responsibilities between central and local governments that takes into consideration the rising status of the latter. Efforts to pass a new law on municipalities in 2007 did not come to fruition, while the draft law was subject to extensive criticism for preserving the status quo and 1  The term “local authorities” refers to cities, rural and sparsely inhabited regional councils, and local authorities with a few thousand residents. Israel has 255 local authorities (Central Bureau of Statistics 2017), which differ not only by size and social characteristics but also in terms of their ability to provide services. Some are able to provide high-quality services for their residents, and they are united in the Forum of 15. Other local authorities only provide state-funded services, which amount to basic services of low quality.

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overlooking the future potential of local authorities as part of a democratic system (Blank and Rosen-Zvi 2009; Ben-Elia 2007). Only some of the varied functions of local authorities have been defined, and these definitions are scattered across a wide range of laws and regulations. Article 7 (B) of the Law of Mandatory Education (1949) states that: “The maintenance of official educational institutions for the provision of free mandatory education ... to children and youths residing within the jurisdiction of a specific local education authority, is the joint responsibility of the state and that local education authority.” However, the same law later grants the minister of education the power of terminating or curtailing the “joint” nature of this responsibility. The minister may, for example, compel the local authority to establish semi-private schools (Article 10) and is also entitled to shift the responsibility for school registration to another entity if the authority has failed to meet its obligations. The State Education Law (1953)—the second constitutive law of Israel’s education system, which addresses the objectives of education, school curricula, and other issues at the heart of the education system— mentions local authorities in two instances. Once in the context of the obligation to register pupils, and the schools’ obligation to report to the local authority (Article 22) on their registration of pupils, and once in the context of authorizing the minister to order a merger of schools (Article 10 (A) and (B))—a context that highlights the hierarchical relations between the two governing authorities. Despite this outdated and rather fossilized legislative foundation, significant and substantive changes have taken place in the functioning of local authorities since the early 1990s (Beeri and Razin 2015; Ben-Elia 2007). Local authorities had to cope with challenges posed by large-scale immigration from the former Soviet Union, which increased the differences and gaps among authorities (Ben-Elia 2007; Blank and Rosen-Zvi 2009). One significant source of concern is the correlation between socio-­ economic status and educational achievements; this correlation is particularly strong in Israel. According to OECD data, Israel is one of the highest ranked among states that participate in OECD testing (OECD 2017; Schleicher 2014) in terms of gaps in educational achievements among distinct socio-economic classes. Access to higher education in Israel depends largely on a student’s place of birth (Blass and Shavit 2017; Swirski et  al. 2015) and the family’s socio-economic status. Occasional success stories about dramatic improvements in high school matriculation results in one locality or another are inevitably connected to the local

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authority’s initiative to invest in its education system. Until the early 2000s, these were mainly economically stable local authorities, and in most cases, the decision entailed a power struggle with the district representatives of the Ministry of Education. The local authorities’ involvement in their own education system improved educational achievements but also increased the gaps across local authorities and reinforced the correlation between educational achievements and socio-economic status (Blank 2004; Reingewertz and Steklov 2015). Following intensive activity on the part of the Federation of Local Authorities in Israel, in the 1990s local authorities appointed education department directors, and the new directors were required to have training and experience in the field of education (Local Authorities Law (Education Department Director) 2001). Thus for the past two decades, local authorities have been developing the infrastructures, including capabilities and resources, for a variety of educational services. According to Yair et al. (2009), “the situation in local authorities today allows them to take responsibility and exert authority in areas that in the past came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education—through the district or the inspectorate” (ibid., 3). In September 2016 the Ministry of Interior amended the guidelines on the role of directors of education departments in local authorities (Ministry of Interior, 2016), delegating to them new roles and responsibilities that were by law solely in control of the Ministry of Education. These guidelines are obligatory and appear to recognize changes that have taken place in local authorities’ involvement in their own education systems. Over the years, the government established a number of commissions to examine relations between the central and local governments. Some of those commissions directly addressed the education system2 and most recommended some form of decentralization of responsibilities to local authorities or to regional education authorities. The commissions’ various recommendations have not been implemented systematically even when adopted by the government. Some recommendations did have an impact on conduct and lead to changes, but these did not entail a planning process. According to Razin (2003), the absence of updated legislation 2   The Zanbar Commission, 1981; the Harmelech Commission, 1992; the Swary Commission, 1993; the Volansky Commission, 1993; and the Dovrat Commission, 2004. To these one may add numerous studies and policy papers (Yair et al. 2009, 2000; Yair 2004; Lavie and Tirosh 2003).

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regarding the status and role of local authorities stems from a lack of interest in local government reform on the part of politicians—and opposition on the part of the local authorities themselves (ibid., 83). The process of change in the status of local authorities, which occurred without planning and without a new legislative framework suited to the facts on the ground, created a distinct, overt culture of mistrust and of power struggles between the local and central authorities in the sphere of education. It also created a sense in the Ministry of Education that its authority was being undermined, particularly since the stronger local authorities used their power to challenge the status of the Ministry as the exclusive policy-maker in matters of education. The local authorities, for their part, felt that the Ministry was undercutting their own relations with their residents and preventing them from attending to their residents’ needs.

Methodology Since 2013 the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (VLJI) has been conducting an action research aimed at examining models of collaborative governance in socio-economically disadvantaged local authorities. An action research is a dynamic and evolving process that promotes stakeholder participation and fosters learning on the part of the researcher as well as the research subjects (Zelermeier 2016: Whyte 1991). Action researches are prevalent in research on social issues such as education, healthcare, and welfare. In our case the “action” included mapping the locality, conducting observations and interviews, and preparing an in-depth report in preparation of the collaborative governance process. We also engaged in leadership training and ongoing professional counseling. Our action research focused on creating local leadership and management infrastructures in the field of education to enable a redistribution of responsibilities among the ministry, local authorities, and civil society education stakeholders. Yin (1984) argues that for research focused on questions of “how and why” in relation to current events, the best suited methodology is that of a case study. The weakness of this methodology is that one cannot generalize and apply its conclusions and findings to other cases. Its advantage, however, is that similarities in the attributes of the model and differences in the characteristics of localities where the models are tested make it possible to draw conclusions about the unique aspects of each case, on the one hand, and to posit more general research hypotheses, on the other.

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The features of the cases make them what Yin terms “critical case studies” (ibid.). While still conducting a pilot study (2013–2015) in a small local authority with a population of 10,000 located in southern Israel, we began in 2014 a major action research project in three local authorities in the center of Israel. The collaborative governance model that was developed in one of those local authorities—Kafr Qasim—became the critical case study described here. Kafr Qasim is an Arab town with a population of 23,000 located in central Israel (in the Ministry of Education center district). It is ranked in cluster 3 of the socio-economic index (Central Bureau of Statistics 2016) and provides education services for about 9000 children. The action research was carried out from June 2014 through December 2017. The Research Hypothesis In light of the gap between the legal framework and the reality in which local authorities operate, the blurring of responsibilities, and the weakening standing of the Ministry of Education (the central government), we suggested that an arrangement based on collaborative governance, and in particular the creation of a solid base of consensus, can serve to circumvent the outdated legal framework. A successful process of consensus-building would: • change the culture of discourse among key stakeholders in the area of education in a manner that would enhance mutual trust; • change perspectives regarding the division of powers from the perception of a zero-sum game to a broader perspective encompassing all forms of power; and • would enable a redistribution of powers based on consensus rather than on power struggles.

Description of the Case Study Kafr Qasim, Phase I: Preliminary Consensus-Building Toward Collaborative Governance Insights from the pilot study indicated a need to pay special attention to the system context, to borrow the terminology of Emerson et al. (2012),

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and required us to divide the process in Kafr Qasim into two phases. During the first phase, consensus-building was not aimed at formulating a local education policy but rather at securing a commitment to the process itself and to the principles of the anticipated outcome, that is, to a redistribution of responsibilities and powers. The integrative framework described by Emerson et al. (ibid.) helped us understand the challenges that basic conditions posed to the transition toward collaborative governance. Only during the second phase, after achieving a commitment in principle and agreement on a framework for the process, were the institutions in which the dynamic process of formulating a collaborative policy established. The process included the three elements proposed in the conceptual framework of Emerson et  al. that lead to action: a commitment in principle, shared motivation, and the capacity for joint action (ibid.). After having been approached by the center district of the Ministry of Education, and before deciding on the locality in which the intervention was to take place, the VLJI researchers launched a lengthy process of coordinating expectations with the leadership of the district. Given the legal state of affairs, it was clear that the central authority was the party that would need to undergo the more difficult adjustment to expected new circumstances. The Ministry of Education district would have to relinquish some of its responsibilities, and it would therefore be necessary to devote time and special efforts to ensure that the district leadership and inspectorate fully understand the significance of the plan and its potential consequences. Researchers who have described cases of collaborative governance or other situations that require consensus (Cairns and Harris 2011; Booher 2004; Innes and Booher 1999) tend to provide a “thin” description of the consensus-building process as composed of a series of practices that take place during face-to-face encounters. In light of the pilot study, we considered it highly desirable to have the process include a number of elements. They incorporated learning and exploration of relevant theoretical materials, exposing decision-makers to similar processes elsewhere in the world and enhancing their openness to new ideas; presentations and collective review of texts that contain findings from studies on similar processes; and a detailed account and written reiteration of the plan and its objectives. We were hoping that investing in this preliminary process would ensure an understanding of the issues involved, followed by a well-informed commitment to its objectives.

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The preliminary process started in July 2014 with a paper3 submitted by the VLJI researchers to the center district leadership, to serve as a basis for discussions on aspects of the plan and its suitability for localities in the district. Among the objectives identified in the paper were 1) The development of an agreed-upon work plan for the [local] education department and for school principals and 2) Developing a tool for formulating a coherent, agreed-upon policy on the professional development of teachers with the participation of the local education leadership, the district, and local educational institutions. Following meetings and discussions during the course of the summer, the VLJI team presented the district leadership and the regional inspector with an updated proposal, which directly addressed the need for a revised division of roles between the district and the local authorities, by agreement. The document outlined a stage-by-stage process for the district level and for the local authority level. At the district level, the proposals included the initiation of a deliberative learning process regarding the varied and changing roles of the district and particularly of the inspectors. At the local authority level, the proposal included the establishment of a local education team led by the mayor, or the director of the local education system, including representatives of the education stakeholders in the locality and of the district. The team would collectively deliberate and reach agreements concerning its roles and objectives.4 The district leadership next decided, as part of its intent to place special emphasis on promoting progress in the district’s Arab local authorities, to find out whether the town of Kafr Qasim was interested and willing to take part in the proposed process. In October, a meeting with the mayor of Kafr Qasim and the leadership of its education system took place, where it was decided that Kafr Qasim would participate in the action research program. At this stage, it appeared that the center district leadership was well aware of the program’s objectives and its principles and was indeed committed to engaging in a collaborative effort with the local authority. Between November 2014 and March 2015, the action research project proceeded in two parallel directions: At the local authority level, the VLJI researchers conducted an in-depth mapping of the town’s education services, in relation to formal and 3  Varda Shiffer, A Proposal for “Mapping Teaching Infrastructures” in Local Authorities, 24 July 2014 (draft). 4  Record of understandings, 5 August 2014; minutes of the meeting of 2 October 2014.

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informal education. The mapping process included interviews with most education stakeholders, visits to schools, and an analysis of pupils’ educational achievements over time, as indicated by standardized tests taken during the past decade. A detailed report was prepared, which included specific recommendations. At the same time, the schools’ inspector (the District’s representative) invited the VLJI’s researchers to work with the school principals on leadership skills in the framework of their role as initiators of change in their schools and as educational leaders in the locality. During the 2014–2015 school year, staff from the VLJI met with school principals for over 50 cumulative hours, during which the idea of collaborative governance in the locality and its implications for school principals was widely discussed. On the level of the center district, the VLJI prepared a revised proposal, adapting the generic program to the needs of Kafr Qasim. The new proposal was more specific and clear about the creation of new leadership roles in the local authority and its responsibility for developing an education policy for the locality in a collaborative and trust-generating manner. It reflected a significant change in the status of the local authority, and both the local leadership and the district leadership agreed to proceed with the proposed plan.5 Another major task on the district level was an attempt to coordinate and integrate policies that were initiated at the Ministry of Education with the activities in Kafr Qasim. During the school year 2013–2014, the Ministry of Education initiated a policy to improve teaching and learning (“Significant Learning”). The center district chose to implement the policy in cooperation with an academic endeavor—the “Pedagogic Discourse Laboratory” (at the Ben Gurion University in the Negev). As the “Pedagogic Discourse” program entered the district’s schools in a gradual way, the VLJI researchers in Kafr Qasim took upon themselves to introduce the program to all the school principals and prepare them for it. At the same time, the Ministry of Education initiated another program, the “Self-Administered Schools” program6 aimed at establishing a connection between authority and responsibility at the school level. While shifting the responsibility for allocating some of the school’s resources to the ­principals, 5  Varda Shiffer, “A Proposal for Mapping Teaching Infrastructures” in Kafr Qasim, 24 October 2014 (draft). 6  Circular of the Director General of the Ministry of education, 2014–2015/1, constitutes a legally binding decree for those under the jurisdiction of that ministry.

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the local authorities were required to transfer resources to the schools and manage all budgets allocated to schools. The VLJI researchers assisted in integrating the program into the schools of Kafr Qasim and in linking it with the locality-wide process of collaborative governance. On April 30, 2015, 48 education stakeholders from Kafr Qasim with the leadership of the center district gathered at the VLJI to discuss the findings and recommendations of the mapping report and to launch a community-building process. In fact, this gathering marked a highpoint in the consolidation of preliminary agreements (for the collaborative governance process and its expected outcomes) and of building commitment and motivation to action. The group adopted the recommendations of the report after a substantive discussion that included proposals for specific points of emphasis. It further decided to establish a Local Education Team headed by the mayor. The district appointed the chief inspector for Arab schools to be its representative in the local education team. Phase II  he Local Education Team: A Collaborative Governance Forum T The local education team of Kafr Qasim comprises 19 members with relevant positions, as agreed at the stakeholders’ meeting in April 2015. They include senior municipal officials in the areas of education and welfare, school principals, leaders of nongovernmental organizations (such as preschool organizations and the municipal community and sports center), and civil society organizations. The team’s composition is cross-sectorial, and its members are qualified to formulate education policies for the locality and to support their implementation. The director of the education department chairs the team, and the mayor actively supports it and brings issues to its table. The team serves as a forum for collaborative governance for education policies and has been meeting regularly six times per year— now in its fourth year. Following recommendations included in the mapping report, members of the local education team held focus groups with the participation of community members in order to identify the areas in which residents were interested in developing informal enrichment and education programs. The focus groups’ findings indicated wide accord with respect to four areas: sports, science, promotion of languages (Arabic and English), and art. The team then decided to place special emphasis on early childhood.

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Team members, divided into sub-committees, prepared preliminary plans for three of the areas, which were discussed in the forum and adopted as policy recommendations. The mayor pledged to accept the team’s recommendations and to submit for its consideration and approval education policies that he wished to promote. Indeed, during the summer of 2016, the municipality acted upon many of the policy recommendations presented by the local education team. Science laboratories in schools were enlarged and enriched, and sport facilities were refurbished and made accessible for girls and women. These developments generated a sense of self-empowerment and trust among the members of the local education team. Alongside the sense of partnership that emerged while fostering change in the local education system, mutual trust among the members of the local education team increased. One of the clear indicators of growing trust among the local education team members (acting as a collaborative governance forum) was when a few months after the forum was created, the director of the National Program for At-Risk Children and Youth in Kafr Qasim asked to join it. The full cooperation of all team members made it possible to pool resources to initiate early childhood programs that cut across bureaucratic divisions between the education and welfare systems. This example illustrates not only cooperation but also the expanded range of activities of the forum as a whole. The collaborative governance forum in Kafr Qasim has become an institution in the locality, and its sessions attract interested members of the community. It has created a new sphere for policy-making with a redistribution of roles and responsibilities among actors and stakeholders within the locality. Discussions have become more formalized, yet open and frank, based on information and data, and officially recorded. While this internal process was evolving, the chief inspector of Arab schools, representing the center district in the forum, was gradually losing his status, and an invisible wall of mistrust had been erected between the center district and the local authority of Kafr Qasim.  he Center District Withdraws from Agreements T Barely a year after the establishment of the local education team in Kafr Qasim, as it became apparent that it was developing into an important forum of collaborative governance, and about 18 months after the VLJI researchers began working with school principals, the attitude of the center district leadership began to change. Some of the principals who

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participated in the leadership program were surprised to learn that the Ministry of Education selected their schools for an all-encompassing three-year intervention called “Marom.” It soon transpired that these schools were marked “red” (meaning that they failed to achieve required standards and were in need of special measures) according to the standardized tests that took place 18 months earlier. Recognizing that the VLJI researchers were already working with the schools and with the principals to improve teaching and learning, the district initially decided that the Marom program would not enter schools where the VLJI action research took place. However, the district was unable to act upon its own decision because, as was later related, the Marom program was initiated by the central office of the Ministry,7 and the selection of schools to participate in it was supposedly “objective,” namely according to achievements of pupils in tests. The district, therefore, could not interfere with the selection of schools. Furthermore, the program was accompanied by an elaborate structure of training and counseling involving the districts. It is possible that the top-down nature of the Marom initiative prevented any negotiations between the district and the local leadership, or in the case of Kafr Qasim, from raising it at the local education team. Some of the participating principals told the VLJI researchers that they felt that Marom was “a punishment,” and others wondered whether an imposed program such as Marom did not contradict the notion of school autonomy as embodied in the “self-administered” schools. The district officials when asked about these issues invoked the fact that it “came from above” and there was little they could do about it.8 In the summer of 2017, a crisis erupted when the local education department director was made aware of yet another program that had been proposed by the Ministry’s central office, which seemed to ignore the process that had already taken place in the town. The new program came with generous funding but also with particular requirements that threatened to undermine the town’s achievements. Faced with the demand of the town to continue with the collaborative governance forum and process and with its programs to improve teaching and learning, the Ministry withdrew their proposal. The crisis during the summer of 2017 marked a change in the stance of the director of the local education

7 8

 Ministry of education, October 2015.  Activities Report, Kafr Qasim and Qalansuwa, 26 June 2016 (draft).

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department and local education team—they have abandoned efforts to seek agreements and compromises with the ministry of education. By 2018, the center district withdrew almost entirely from its active participation in the local education team, though officially the inspectors of the local schools are still members of the team.

Discussion and Conclusions The case study reviewed here only partially supports the main hypothesis that an arrangement based on collaborative governance, and in particular the creation of a solid base of consensus, can serve to circumvent the outdated legal framework. The collaborative governance regime established in the field of education within the local authority did change the culture of discourse among key stakeholders and did enhance trust among them. It also changed perspectives regarding the division of powers, from a perception of a zero-­ sum game to a broader perspective; but these developments occurred only within the realm of the local authority. The members of the local education team—the mayor, educational leadership of the local authority, and the chief inspector (as long as he was part of it)—developed relations of respect and trust. The group became professional and empowered, possibly as a result of achieving some of their objectives. Within two years, the collaborative governance forum became an institution in the locality sought after by activists in the community who wished to join. However, these developments did not incorporate the leadership of the center district, a most important actor in the entire process. Despite the efforts made to secure a “commitment in principle” on the part of the center district of the Ministry of Education to the process and its outcomes, it disintegrated when the collaborative governance process progressed to the stages of shared motivation and of acquiring the capacity for joint action. Early in the process, the center district resorted to using a parallel track to the collaborative governance forum, through which it continued to operate according to traditional bureaucratic, top-down guidelines, as demonstrated in the example of the Marom program. The evidence documented during the course of the action research demonstrates that the actions of the district did not stem from a lack of understanding regarding the need for change, lack of awareness of the failings of the current system, or ill-will on the part of the Ministry or the district. The frequent references to hierarchy and superior authority to

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justify incoherent actions and policies, as we saw in the case of Marom and other programs, reflect the power and stability of the governmental bureaucratic structure. These hierarchies are salient in the relations between the central and district offices of the Ministry, rendering the district almost helpless in the face of policies and programs that obstruct its own intentions. In our case study, the district went along with programs, initiated by the central ministry, that undermined the collaborative processes that the district itself introduced. Initially the district was reluctant to comply, but within a very short time, it fully integrated these programs into its routines. The Many Faces of Bureaucratic Structure Max Weber’s classic discussion on bureaucracy suggests answers that are still relevant today to the questions raised by such a self-damaging behavior. “Work organized on a collegiate basis ... gives rise to friction, delay and compromise between conflicting interests and opinions, and so proceeds in a way which is less precise and less dependent on superiors, and hence is less unified and slower” (Weber 1978, 350). A bureaucratic system by its nature, or by virtue of its internal logic (Gillett et al. 2016), does not aspire to achieve teamwork, consensus, the dismantling of hierarchy, or the compromises needed to reach a consensus, and as such it poses one of the main challenges in any collaborative governance process (Booher 2004). In our action research, we sought to address this challenge by incorporating an element of learning in the consensus-building process. We presumed that an in-depth understanding of the causes of the system’s failings, with which everyone is familiar, and an awareness of other options, theories, and practical experience from around the world would increase willingness on the part of officials to change their conduct and try other approaches. However, this effort was blocked by an element of power inherent to traditional bureaucracy, namely that the bureaucratic organization knows what needs to be done. Public employees combine professional knowledge (they are appointed according to qualifications/ credentials and professional training) with authority derived from laws, decrees, and other orders of a compulsory nature. This powerful combination makes any learning process seem superfluous. The need for such learning does exist, as acknowledged at the senior administrative level, but it is not grounded in organizational procedure, not remunerated, and not part of the organizational culture.

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The local authority is also a bureaucratic structure, but it is more horizontal than the traditional government ministry. In contrast to a government bureaucracy, the local authority’s officeholders and elected officials are intimately familiar with the communities they serve, and its elected leaders are obligated to report directly to their constituencies. Elected officials are particularly sensitive to the wishes of their community members because their position depends on this community. A local authority has characteristics that conflict with its nature as a bureaucracy. Some of its senior officials report to government ministries or districts as well as to the head of the local authority (including the director of the education unit and the director of the welfare unit); this blurs the lines of hierarchy, of control, and of oversight. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior issues instructions regarding the roles of education department directors (Ministry of Interior 2016) in local authorities, thus interfering with the already blurred lines of control and accountability. These examples illustrate the fragility of bureaucracy in the local authority, where in contrast to standard practice in traditional bureaucracies, instructions are issued not by the person at the head of the bureaucracy but, rather, by external government departments. Additionally, appointments to professional positions in local authorities are not always based on qualifications or credentials. Although in the past decade most officials appointed in the field of education have been professionally qualified, there are nonetheless still strong clan, family, or political influences on professional appointments. While these factors contribute to the adaptability and flexibility of local authorities, they also increase the disquieting frequency of corruption and erode integrity among senior officials and local authorities (Ben-Elia 2012; 262). These dynamics have a negative impact on the central authority’s confidence in the local authority, which perhaps detracts from its willingness to participate in collaborative governance regimes. Nevertheless, the less rigid bureaucratic structure in local authorities has some advantages: in the cases we examined, the local authorities demonstrated an eagerness to learn and were willing, and indeed able, to adapt themselves to a changing reality and to improve the services they provide for their residents. The Culture of Power Struggle Prevails The problems inherent in the outdated legal framework and the lack of coherence between the laws and orders by which the Ministry of Education

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operates and the modes of operation of local authorities are widely recognized. Nevertheless, we found that the Ministry of Education relies on this legal framework, and particularly on bureaucratic orders and guidelines, as a basis for preserving power and as a tool in its struggles with local authorities. The central government’s adherence to traditional sources of authority poses another challenge to any consensus-based redistribution of roles and responsibilities. The critical case study in Kafr Qasim indicates that despite efforts by the central government to impose its plans through the use of a parallel track to the collaborative governance forum, there emerged a new arena for educational decision-making in a range of educational policy areas. Power had been redistributed. However, the process was not based on consensus but rather on the power gained by the local authority. The familiar phenomenon by which strong local authorities assert power now became possible for a socio-economically disadvantaged local authority such as Kafr Qasim by virtue of the leadership capacity and legitimacy that the collaborative governance regime promoted. An interesting outcome of the collaborative governance regime in Kafr Qasim has been its contribution to the development of local democratic processes supported by residents’ participation. This dynamic deserves further attention and study, although it already appears that the continuing practices of data collection and information gathering and discussions about the desirable educational policy have created expectations and, at the same time, granted legitimacy to the mayor’s decisions. In Kafr Qasim the mayor conveyed a commitment to implementing the recommendations of the local education team and to submitting any plans he formulated for the team’s approval. He indeed acted accordingly. This “local democracy in action,” which occurred in another of our research cases, may have contributed to the local authority’s growing sense of potency and to what could be defined as a reversal in its negotiating position with the Ministry of Education. Over the past two decades, strong local authorities have gained power in the sphere of education, but this has not generated the political will necessary for legislative reform. Changes in the power dynamics and division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Education and socio-­ economically disadvantaged local authorities is a new phenomenon, although it resembles patterns that are characteristic of strong local authorities—a redistribution of roles and responsibilities through power struggles rather than agreement. In the case analyzed here, we found that

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a successful local collaborative governance regime helped strengthen a disadvantaged local authority and supported it in a struggle for power with the central government. We did not find that consensus-building between governing authorities created the trust needed to enable the central government to adopt more egalitarian and “softer” practices in the face of the outdated legal framework. It emerged from our action research that collaborative governance between governing authorities that perceive themselves as part of a hierarchical structure, in which the central authority outranks the local authority, is impeded by an ingrained lack of willingness on the part of the central authority to relinquish its superior status. As a bureaucratic organization, the central authority views itself as defender of the rule of law, and in this sense, it adheres to an important and desirable principle. At the same time, the experience of strong local authorities in Israel and across the world points to the need for a more egalitarian and flexible relationship between the governing authorities in order to create better services. Our action research points to the advantages of a collaborative governance regime for the local authority—the authority located nearest to the citizen—as a means of improving the authority’s ability to formulate and implement policies suited to its residents. Our research did not confirm our hypothesis that a collaborative governance regime could transform a culture of power struggles into a culture of consensus-building.

References Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571. Beeri, I., & Razin, E. (Eds.). (2015). Local Democracy in Israel: Decentralization, Localism, Participation and Local Politics. Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, Hebrew University (Hebrew). Ben-Elia, N. (2007). A Lost Decade in Local Government. Policy Paper. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, Hebrew University (Hebrew). Ben-Elia, N. (2012). The Public Responsibility of Local Government. In R. Cohen-Almagor, O. Arbel-Ganz, & A. Kasher (Eds.), Public Responsibility in Israel (pp. 239–266). Jerusalem/Ra’anana: The Jerusalem Center for Ethics and Hakibbutz Hameuchad. (Hebrew). Blank, Y. (2004). Decentralized National Education: Local Government, Segregation and Inequality in the Education System. Tel Aviv University Law Review, 28, 347–416. (Hebrew).

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Blank, Y. (2010). Federalism, Subsidiarity and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel Governance. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 37, 509–558. Blank, Y., & Rosen-Zvi, I. (2009). The Cities Act: Present Without a Past, Reform Without a Future. Hukim Journal on Legislation, 1, 49–134. (Hebrew). Blass, N., & Shavit, Y. (2017). Israel’s Education System in Recent Years: An Overview. A Chapter from The State of the Nation Report 2017. Jerusalem: Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel (Hebrew). Booher, D. (2004 Winter). Collaborative Governance Practices and Democracy. National Civic Review, 93, 32. https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.69. Cairns, B., & Harris, M. E. (2011). Local Cross-Sector Partnerships: Tackling the Challenges Collaboratively. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 21(3), 311–324. Central Bureau of Statistics. (2016). Local Authorities in Israel, Kafr Qasim. http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications18/local_authorities16_1722/ pdf/154_0634.pdf Central Bureau of Statistics. (2017). Local Authorities 2015—Data File for Analysis (Updated 30 July 2017). http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/cw_usr_view_ SHTML?ID=357 (Hebrew). Cohen, J. L., & Arato, A. (1992). Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Cohen, J., & Rogers, J. (1995). Associations and Democracy: The Real Utopias Project (Vol. 1). London: Verso. Dahrendorf, R. (1997). After 1989—Morals, Revolution and Civil Society. New York: Macmillan Press. Dery, D., & Schwartz-Milner, B. (1994). Who Governs Local Government? Tel Aviv: Israel Democracy Institute, Hakibbutz Hameuchad (Hebrew). Emerson, K., & Nabatchi, T. (2015). Evaluating the Productivity of Collaborative Governance Regimes: A Performance Matrix. Public Performance & Management Review, 38(4), 717–747. https://doi.org/10.1080/1530957 6.2015.1031016. Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 22(1), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mur011. Gillett, A., Loader, K., Doherty, B., & Scott, J. M. (2016). A Multiorganizational Cross-Sectoral Collaboration: Empirical Evidence from an ‘Empty Homes’ Project. Public Money & Management, 36(1), 15–22. https://doi.org/10.108 0/09540962.2016.1103413. Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (1999). Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems. Journal of the American Planning Association, 65(4), 412–423. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944369908976071.

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Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2004). Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century. Planning Theory & Practice, 5(4), 419–436. https:// escholarship.org/uc/item/4gr9b2v5. Lavie, V., & Tirosh, R. (2003). Proposal for Reorganizing Public School Education in Israel Based on Decentralization and Zoning. Policy Paper No. 44. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute (Hebrew). Ministry of Education, Pedagogical Secretariat, Directorate of Self-Administering and Differentially Administered Schools. (2015, October). Differential Budgeting. (Hebrew). http://cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Units/ NihulAtzmi/medinyut/eqronot_hamedinyut/ Ministry of Interior, Administration for Local Government and Administration. (2016, September 18). Education Department Director, a Mandatory-Statutory Position. (Hebrew). OECD. Education at a Glance 2017 (OECD Indicators). http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/9617041e.pdf?expires=1519994182&id=id &accname=guest&checksum=8757563004101F80808FDEBED653E5A6 Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 65–78. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone. New York: Simon and Schuster. Putnam, R., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1993). Making Democracy Work— Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Razin, E. (2003). Local Government reform in Israel: Between Centralization and Decentralization, Between Traditionalism and Modernity. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, Hebrew University. 83 (Hebrew). Reingewertz, Y., & Steklov, O. (2015). Economic Aspects of Decentralizing Responsibilities and Fiscal Authorities to Local Governments in Israel. In I.  Beeri & E.  Razin (Eds.), Local Democracy in Israel: Decentralization, Localism, Participation and Local Politics (pp. 56–74). Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, Hebrew University, (Hebrew). Schleicher, A. (2014). Equity, Excellence and Inclusiveness in Education Policy Lessons from Around the World. OECD. https://doi.org/10.178 7/9789264214033-en. Swirski, S., Konor-Attias, E., & Zelingher, R. (2015). Israel: Social Report 2015 (pp. 22–31). Tel Aviv: Adva Center. (Hebrew). Weber, M. (1978). The Development of Bureaucracy and Its Relation to Law. In W. G. Runciman (Ed.), Selections in Translation (pp. 341–354). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whyte, W. F. (Ed.). (1991). Participatory Action Research (Sage Focus Editions) (Vol. 123). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Yair, G. (2004). Democracy and Education: Local Authorities Caught Between Parents and the Ministry of Education—Effects on Mayoral Elections. Megamot, 43(1), 217–241. (Hebrew).

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Yair, G., et  al. (2000). Servicing Professional Leadership: Outstanding Education Departments in the Local Authority. Jerusalem: Research institute for innovation in Education, Hebrew University. Yair, G., Shalev-Vigiser, Y., Schwat, S., & Biletsky, A. (2009). Professionalism and Democracy: Transformations and Needs in Education Departments of Local Government. Jerusalem: Research Institute for Innovation in Education, Hebrew University(Hebrew). Yin, R. K. (1984). Case Study Analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Zelermeier, M. (2016). Action Research on Education—History, Characteristics, Critiques. In T.  Ben-Yehoshua (Ed.), Traditions and Trends in Qualitative Research: Perceptions, Strategies, and Advanced Tools (p. 288). Ra’anana: Mofet Institute. (Hebrew).

CHAPTER 6

Local Collaborative Governance: Creating Workplaces for Women in Minority Societies in Southern Israel Rotem Bresler Gonen and Kassim Alsraiha

Introduction Collaborative governance (CG) brings together stakeholders of all sectors, public, private, and civic society, for the purpose of achieving consensus-­ oriented decision making (Ansell and Gash 2007). We explore the role of CG in the local arena, and more specifically, we demonstrate the role of CG in minority local authorities. As the closest tier of government to citizens, local government plays a crucial mediating role between citizens

R. Bresler Gonen (*) The Mandel Center for Leadership in the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel Federmann School of Public Policy and Government, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] K. Alsraiha The Mandel Center for Leadership in the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel Department of Middle East Studies, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheba, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_6

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and the state (Evans 2011; Durose et  al. 2009; Stoker 2011), which is especially important in the case of minorities (Khamaisi 2008, 2013). In this chapter, we demonstrate how local authorities in minority villages both collaborate with and combine stakeholders. Collaboration with the private and third sectors occurs in areas that exceed the basic tasks and responsibilities of local government. Local government initiates collaboration but is also requested to actively mediate between actors, combining political, economic, and social resources for the purpose of advancing desired programs. We found that without a mediation process conducted by local government, projects do not advance. Stakeholders, as well as central government, ask local government to mediate as their involvement minimizes the financial risks entailed in undertaking projects that include multiple organizations. Arab local authorities in Israel face multiple challenges, and they are especially severe in the Negev. Arab towns and cities suffer from poverty and high unemployment rates. Ranked low on the socioeconomic scale, municipalities cannot finance services with local taxes alone (Jabareen 2013, p. 10). Overall, the poor conditions under which Arab local authorities operate result from their residents’ socioeconomic status, lack of managerial skills, the mayors’ weak political power, and budget cuts made by central government (Ben Bassat et al. 2013; Abu Sharkia 2008; Coates 2004; Khamaisi 2013, p. 31; Brender 2003). It is well known that over the years, economic and social distress in Arab society in Israel led to a relationship of distrust with central government due to claims of budgetary discrimination (Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb 2008). This in turn contributed to an upsurge in civic society seeking to fulfill needs and services that were not met by government (Jamal 2017). Furthermore, deprived of budgetary support, local authorities began to collaborate with external organizations and bodies in hopes that they would take part in creating better services and facilitating projects. Thus, under these economic and social conditions, CG became a crucial mechanism that allows local authorities to meet residents’ demands. Israel’s Arab-Bedouin community comprises 250,000 citizens (in 2017) (Wiseblai 2017), the majority of whom live in the northern Negev. Bedouin society accounts for 25% of all citizens in the Negev and 13% of general Arab society in Israel (Abu-Saad 2010). There are strong disputes between Arab-Bedouin society and the state over ownership of lands (Abu-Saad 2010). Half the Bedouins in the Negev live in villages that are unofficial and unrecognized by the state. The other half live in authorized

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towns and cities (Rahat, Lakiya, Hura, Tel Sheva, Segev Shalom, Arara BaNegev, Kuseife), which were gradually established as part of an urbanization process of Bedouin society from 1968 to 1990. In the 1980s, many Bedouin local authorities in the Negev were poorly managed by Jewish Ministry of Interior representatives. Consequently, residents turned to the Israeli High Court of Justice and successfully overturned the Ministry of Interior’s policy in a way that allowed in 1988 for voters to elect, for the first time, mayors in the towns: Tel Sheva and Rahat. Elections in the remaining Bedouin towns followed in 2000 (Abu-­ Saad 2008). In this chapter, we explore how CG (collaborative governance) assisted the municipality of Hura with the implementation of programs that increased women’s employment in the southern Arab-Bedouin region. First, we lay out a short brief on the structural and political challenges in local government in Israel, and more particularly in the Arab society, that lead to the adaptation of local cooperation and collaboration mechanisms. We then move on to present cases of CG in three women’s employment ventures: establishment of a telephone call center in a local mosque; a local women catering enterprise, “Al Sanabel,” to provide school meals; and establishment of an ecological project, “Wadi Attir.”

Local Government Challenges and the Shift to Cooperative Mechanisms A major question is why in recent years local government in Israel and worldwide turned to cooperation and collaboration with external bodies. In this section we lay out a short overview to explain the shift to cooperative schemes as CG in local governments. In Israel, cooperation and cases of collaborative governance occurred as a natural transition that was meant to provide a response to numerous challenges faced by local authorities in recent decades (Limor and Avishay 2016a, b). Local government plays a major democratic role; it is supposed to be the closest tier of government to citizens and, as such, to understand and fulfill basic needs and demands (Brichta et al. 2010; Mill et al. 1991; Kisby 2010). However, some services were poorly supplied as most local authorities in Israel had to contend with financial, geographic, environmental, social, and cultural challenges (Ben Elia 2006; Bresler-Gonen 2010). Up to the early 2000s, most local authorities experienced economic hardship,

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which was especially severe in the Arab authorities and, unfortunately, still exists to these days (Ben Bassat et al. 2013, p. 16). In extreme cases of a local authority’s financial or political dysfunction, central government has blocked local representation by replacing mayors and council members with externally appointed committees (Ben Bassat and Dahan 2009; Ben Bassat et al. 2013). Furthermore, by the end of the 1990s, central government decided to dramatically reduce the financial “bailout” mechanism. This strict budgetary discipline, along with external committees and audit bodies, was a common occurrence in Arab local authorities (Kais 2013, p. 109; Alsraiha 2020). Financial difficulties stemmed from a weak central government financial safety net and budget cuts, alongside limited leverages for growth due to limited available land, commercial and industrial opportunities, and environmental damage (Razin 2003). Furthermore, local government in Israel faces social and cultural challenges since multicultural communities make diverse and often contradictory requests and demands (Young 1990; Bresler-Gonen 2016; Watson 2006; Yang and Callahan 2007). Financial hardship in recent decades led local authorities to seek external partners to assist in their numerous challenges and citizens’ demands (Valler et  al. 2000; Vigoda-Gadot 2003; Pratchett 2004). At the same time, local authorities also search for additional financial resources that will create independent leverages for the supply of services and attract high Social-Economic status families (Evans 2011). Leverages include building industrial and commercial centers, improving infrastructure, reducing environmental damage, investing in culture and leisure establishments, improving housing to suit financially strong families (Brannan et al. 2006). Globally, by the end of the 1990s, central governments encouraged local authorities to financially rely on businesses and entrepreneurs (Harvey 1989; Hall and Hubbard 1998), a policy that was considered antidemocratic (McGuirk et al. 1996; Gleeson and Low 2000; Sclar 2000). Such was the case in Israel; central government demanded extensive reduction in the employment of local men and women by shifting to contracting services. This demand was part of an overall New Public Management (NPM) reform adopted in western countries, Europe, the US, New Zealand, and Australia (Lane 2000; Denters and Rose 2005; John 2001, 2009). Nevertheless, the Israeli government did not adopt an extensive NPM reform, but gradually implemented major parts of it over the years (Ben-­ Elia 2006). In return, local authorities dramatically reduced the scope of

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their services, including social services, and the quality of contracted services declined (Ben-Elia 1996; Bresler-Gonen and Dowding 2009; Galnoor et  al. 2015). This in turn led to financially weak populations becoming dependent on external third sector foundations and organizations for the supply of services, while financially strong populations purchased services from private suppliers. This was the case in Europe, where NPM reform drew strong criticism, as services were cut and poorly delivered (Stoker 2011). Frequent operational and budgetary interventions by central government over the years led local authorities to make numerous attempts to reduce such interventions and have greater independence regarding decision making at the local level (Bresler-Gonen 2016). In the early 2000, the Ministry of Interior became more attentive to the request to relax monitoring systems and initiated “the stable authorities reform” which decentralized control over financial and organizational decision making in financially strong authorities (Sadan-Samet 2009). Collaborative Governance in Local Government While the 1990s are known for services being outsourced as a necessity, in the early twenty-first century, mayors openly expressed their trust in and support for market solutions for service provision: contracted-out services to business entrepreneurship, third sector, and civic society. Nevertheless, it is evident that in many circumstances market solutions can be inefficient and increase inequality (Galnoor et  al. 2015 Mosley and Sol 2005; Mandelkern and Sherman 2015). Unlike contracted-out services, CG offers mayors the opportunity to plan and implement policy while keeping services in-­house. Moreover, CG enables planning with external partners, leading to more freely and less dependence on central government (Ansell and Gash 2007; Lindsay et al. 2014; Osborne 2006, 2010; Osborne et al. 2013; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011. Orth and Cheng 2018). Our research team at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute adopted the following definition of collaborative governance: collaborative governance is meant for the purpose of achieving public objectives. This mechanism is most appropriate for local authorities wishing to facilitate change. They must therefore rely on external partners and central government—partners for policy-making and implementation purposes who come from various arenas: private entrepreneurs, third sector foundations and trusts, civic society members and groups. Either local government or external partners

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can be the first to initiate and engage in collaboration. CG relies on consensus building, knowledge sharing, and strong trust that develops in the collaboration process (for further discussion on CG, definition, and process, see introduction to this volume by Lahat, Sher-Hadar, and Galnoor). Keast and Mandell (2014) found that cooperation between central governmental actors and external organizations succeeded in the cases they examined due to the mediation of local government. The connection between actors is one of dependency. Local government needs third sector organizations and independent entrepreneurs to carry out substantial long-term programs. The external actors need to enlist local government for the purpose of connecting between actors in order to implement projects. Central government seeks to interact with a government body (i.e., local government), when investing in a project (Keast and Mandell 2014, pp. 12–13). Adopting CG in  local government provides new opportunities for advancing policy while posing new managerial and political challenges. Mainly, the potential effect of CG on the quality of local democracy and representation (Orth and Cheng 2018). It can also have managerial effects over senior executives’ work and decision making (Getha-Taylor and Morse 2013; Hilvert and Swindell 2013, p. 241). Under CG, local political representatives and senior executives need to learn how to bring together external bodies and groups and mediate long-term processes with central government representatives, entrepreneurs, interest groups, and civic society organizations (Getha-Taylor and Morse 2013; Clarke 2016). These new roles may change the character of local authorities from top-down leading, initiating, and educating to bottom-up regulating, mediating, and arbitrating (Orth and Cheng 2018; Eckerberg et al. 2015). In a survey conducted by O’Leary and Gerard (2013), local government managers were asked why they chose CG. They gave five main answers: it is implicitly mandated, it improves outcomes, it improves the problem-­ solving process, it builds relationships and credibility, and it is explicitly mandated (O’Leary and Gerard 2013).

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Collaborative Governance: The Case of Arab-­Bedouin Women Employment in the Negev In this chapter, we will shed some light on the structural changes that occur in decision making as a result of adopting CG for specific projects in  local government. We will present the implementation of CG in the Local Council of Hura, a southern local authority in Israel, and demonstrate the process and outcomes achieved with CG.  The cases include large-scale projects that increased awareness of the importance of working women joining the labor force under environmental and physical conditions that allow women to work freely outside the secure zone of their homeplace. Local CG is effective given the Arab citizens’ lack of trust in central government and the small scope of civic society organizations operating in Arab communities (Jamal 2017). Under these conditions, cooperation schemes and CG becomes the main instruments on which Arab local authorities can rely when adopting entrepreneurial projects. The Town of Hura Hura was established in 1989 as part of the establishment of seven Bedouin townships in the Negev.1 This was part of state efforts to shift Arab-­ Bedouin society in the Negev into permanent settlements. Hura received its formal municipal status in 1996. Most residents moved into permanent homes, and the town is divided into neighborhoods based on tribes or clans (hamula). Nevertheless, in Hura, the division between families is less rigid than in other Arab towns and cities. As a result, Hura has developed a sense of community.2 The transition from a rural way of life to an urban setting was very challenging for Arab-Bedouin society. Most Bedouin towns are ranked at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale, suffer from poor infrastructures and weak education systems, and struggle to find or create alternative means of income suited to urban living, not based on agriculture as in the past (Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb 2008). In 2012, the average annual salary in the Arab towns of the Negev was NIS 30,000 (approximately 1  The town received its name from Tel Hur, located east of the town. Dating back to the Byzantine period, it is a central and important town due to its strategic geographic location. Another explanation for its name is the type of soil in the area, locally known as hur. 2  From interviews with the town elders.

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US$12,000), extremely low in comparison to central Jewish cities in Israel. Central government data estimates that 61% of the Arab population in the Negev, and up to 80% of the population in the unrecognized villages, suffers from poverty. 3Poverty and unemployment can be attributed to many years of state neglect of infrastructures, transport, education, lack of commercial and industrial centers, and very poor local health systems, all of which led to a feeling of despair and inability to attract entrepreneurs to develop and create new opportunities (Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb 2008). Furthermore, managerial deficiencies exist due to a representation that is mainly built on family-clan connections, hamula. This includes electing and appointing to key executive roles in local authorities based on an agreed key of clan divisions in the town (Haik 2013; Brake 2010). Former Mayor of Hura Dr. Muhammad Al-Nabari claims that the Bedouin villages are considered “the periphery of the periphery,” leading to low incomes and difficulties in creating new jobs. The competition over workplaces in the Negev is intense, and Bedouins find it difficult to compete. In 2006, Al-Nabari decided that he should help the local residents with the employment situation and try to create suitable job opportunities, especially for women. He realized that first and foremost there was a need for a professional body to provide job training that includes overcoming job seekers’ cultural barriers. Before turning to collaborative governance, Al-Nabari recognized the need to create community forums for deliberation and consultation on various issues. He recruited local leaders, mainly religious ones, who would encourage women to work outside their homes and provide cultural legitimacy for them to do so. Thus, the Local Council of Hura formed consultation forums comprising men and women who are considered local leaders—local businessmen and entrepreneurs, religious leaders, women’s groups—in order to deliberate and form policies. Religious leaders addressed some of the issues raised in the forums during Friday prayers at the mosques.4 In the following cases, we demonstrate how various actors and organizations join forces in order to meet Hura’s challenges. It was clear from the beginning of Al-Nabari’s term in office that the Local Council of Hura was unable to advance reforms, especially in women’s employment, without assistance from various actors from central government, civic society,  http://www.themarker.com/career/women/1.1878792  From Wadi Attir pamphlets: A Desert Ecological Farm: A Sustainable Desert Community Model, 2010. 3 4

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and the third sector.5 Furthermore, it was clear that the current government job training and placement institutions had failed in the placement of Arab-Bedouin men and women (Gidron and Abbou 2014). It was thought that all the bodies and organizations need to cooperate in order to bring about substantial change. Furthermore, training must take place before creating more employment options.6 All the actors came to an understanding that creative thinking was needed, as well as openness to new techniques and methods.

Encouraging Socioeconomic Mobility by Means of Collaborative Governance: Women’s Employment The socioeconomic mobility of Israeli Arab society is low, especially of Arab women. Women were impacted financially and socially due to the move to urban settlement. In the past, women took a major part in managing the household, which was primarily based on agriculture. The shift to towns and cities seriously damaged their financial standing and social status (Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb 2008). In the past decade, Bedouin women’s employment rate is between 9% and 19%, of Arab women it is 34%, and the employment rate of Jewish women in Israel is 60% (Meir and Gekker 2011; Gidron and Abbou 2014). A study conducted in 2009 by the Brookdale Institute found that the major employment barriers for Arab women include insufficient education, internal social norms in Arab-Bedouin society against women’s employment, the perception of women as mothers raising children at home, and very few nurseries and kindergartens in the Bedouin towns (King et al. 2009). The study also found that the local labor market offers very few suitable workplaces for women (Gidron and Abbou 2014). For all these reasons, the Local Council of Hura decided to undertake the challenge of creating workplaces for women in Hura and nearby towns and villages and encouraging women to go out to work and even develop careers. We will present four projects that took place in Hura that changed the community’s perception in the region of the importance of work for women and created new and creative job opportunities for them.  From an interview with Dr. Al Nabari, June 2018.  From an interview with women employment manager and activist, Ms. Gadir Hani, October 2019. 5 6

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Project 1: Establishment of Maavarim Community Employment Center Maavarim was established in 2007 to meet the challenge of encouraging and training men and women to join the workforce in the community. At the time, central government provided such centers all over the country, but failed in its mission to reduce unemployment in Arab society and Jewish ultra-Orthodox society. This was especially true regarding ultra-­ Orthodox men and Bedouin women. Employment centers were established as part of the OECD recommendations, which targeted the unemployment problem in these two groups in the society. Existing government employment agencies failed to reduce women’s unemployment, first, because they were located outside the towns and villages, and women were unable to reach them. Furthermore, training was conducted in Hebrew, while most of the candidates spoke only Arabic. Most importantly, training did not include tools and practices that were needed to overcome cultural differences between communities and enable women to adapt to the labor market. Consequently, in 2007, the third sector organization JDC Israel, together with government ministries, youth centers, and the local authorities of Hura and Segev Shalom, decided to operate a pilot project and established a culturally appropriate employment agency called Maavarim. This was part of a larger national project of establishing community employment agencies in the towns and kibbutzim in Israel’s geosocial periphery in order to assist immigrants and residents to integrate into the labor market. The project’s uniqueness was the collaboration with the local community to create a local network of partners to the process: religious leaders, local unions, social and political leaders, local entrepreneurs. The aim was to train unemployed men and women and then accompany and guide them in their transition into a new workplace. The community network operated in ongoing forums that assisted Maavarim and the local authorities to match unemployed women and men with workplaces, to motivate and encourage the community to accept jobs. The forums included a community forum for religious leaders, an economic forum of local businessmen, and a women’s forum comprising academics and social leaders in the community. This community network model that was developed in Hura provides an excellent example of cooperation and collaboration between actors and shows how a community can work together with the local authority for

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the purpose of improving quality of life in the town. Over the years, the network formalized its status into professional consulting teams that met regularly and assisted the Local Council of Hura and Maavarim.7 For example, these forums helped establish Wadi Attir, a unique agricultural employment and learning center and farm.8 Following the success of the Maavarim pilot project, the Prime Minister’s Office, together with JDC Israel and Yad Hanadiv Foundation, decided to adopt the model that was developed in Hura and open additional community employment centers in the Negev. Later, the Arab nonprofit organization “Alfanar” opened additional employment centers around the country named Riyan Employment Centers. In 2018, twenty-­ one such centers operated in various towns, cities, and villages, assisting with employment for Arab and Arab-Bedouin society. The local authority played a crucial role in the process of planning and establishing the employment center in Hura. The Local Council of Hura mediated and built trust between all the actors, made the right connections, and generally enabled all the stakeholders to feel confident in the process. The local authority was considered the stable body that would ensure the project got off the ground and continued for a long time. Without the involvement of the local authority, it is almost certain that the project would not have been implemented. It seems that before approaching Hura, JDC Israel tried to interest other local authorities, who refused to take part in the project. It was only when JDC Israel approached Hura and obtained their agreement that the project commenced. Following the success of Riyan Employment Centers, other central government employment agencies changed their training programs to better suit Arab society by basing them on the Riyan format. As mentioned earlier, strengthening the mechanisms of employment schemes to fit the community, as in the case of Hura, provides a good example of CG.  The local authority was able to persuade government ministries, third sector bodies, and civic society to collaborate with it in order to face a crucial community challenge. CG occurred and continues today for the purpose of continually increasing the women’s employment in Hura.

7 8

 From an interview with Dr. Al Nabari, June 2018.  Ibid.

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Project 2: Bezeq Call Center in Hura Until 2010, women’s employment in telephone directory services occurred only in the ultra-Orthodox community of Modiin Illit. In 2010, youth center manager Irit Rimon Hayon and the managers of Maavarim approached the Local Council of Hura with a proposal to open a telephone directory service center in the town that would employ only women. Dr. Al-Nabari recognized that the proposed venture meets its vision and policy to increase women employment in the Negev area. By choosing collaboration, Al-Nabari faced three challenges: finding a suitable location for the center, training women to work in such a center, and overcoming the cultural resistance to allowing women to work in a call center. After an exhaustive search for a suitable location, a creative solution was proposed: the first floor of a local mosque. The choice of a mosque provided a few solutions: women could work in a safe place, a familiar and trusted environment, and close to home. Additionally, the local authority, Bezeq Telecommunications, and the Maavarim-Riyan Center joined forces to plan the training required for the women. Furthermore, the forum of religious leaders in Hura gave its support to open a call center in the mosque. It took two years to build the center. In May 2012, it was opened with a reception attended by government ministers and the local council. The Bezeq call center employs twenty-five women, five days a week. The women receive ongoing training in various fields of knowledge and skills, enabling them to become professional and advance to higher positions within the company or outside it. At the center’s opening reception, Dr. Al-Nabari said: With this historic achievement we have successfully developed, together with a big employer, a model suited to the community and culture, enabling employment of Bedouin women, and providing a real and equal opportunity, with consideration for cultural nuances. It is important to note that every true and exciting success has to be attended by strong support from the community that helps to assimilate substantial changes in the community. Therefore, what we have managed to do with Bezeq will help us to formulate additional models for the employment of Bedouin women in transparent systems supported by the community, in additional to circles of

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success with other entrepreneurs who have expressed their willingness to come to Hura to provide and receive services.9

As with the Maavarim project, the Bezeq project, too, demonstrates how actors joined forces to advance women’s employment policy. Local government, businesses, the third sector, and local leaders collaborating on a long-term project that could not advance without this collaboration and the continued support of all the actors. The connection between the actors led to the creative solution of opening a center in a mosque. At every stage of the project, the local authority conducted meetings that were meant to mediate between actors, build trust, and assure all that the project would continue in the long term. Project 3: Al Sanabel Catering Enterprise Al Sanabel—the Hura Women’s Catering Enterprise—was established as a not-for-profit social enterprise and provides meals to all the schools in Hura and the surrounding villages. To create Al Sanabel, the Local Council of Hura collaborated with the nonprofit foundation AJEEC-NISPED, other foundations, and the Ministry of Education. The idea of establishing a catering company was proposed by Amal Elsana Alh’jooj, Co-executive Director of the Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development at the AJEEC Center.10 Her initiative to establish a catering enterprise came in the wake of the National Food Security Law, legislated in 2004. The law stipulates that every low SES child in Israel will receive at least one hot meal per school day. In the Negev there are approximately 55,000 Arab-Bedouin children who are entitled to receive such a meal. In the years prior to the establishment of Al Sanabel, private contractors provided meals to the schools. However, for cultural reasons, children did not like the taste of the food supplied by the contractors, and most of it went to waste and was thrown away. In an interview with Amal Elsana Alh’jooj, she said she tried approaching a few mayors in order to interest them in a local catering project, but they declined:

 http://www02.bezeq.co.il/PressReleases_Old/Pages/2532012.aspx  The Negev Institute is an Arab-Jewish institution for social change. Established in 2000, its aim is to develop a sustainable community in transitional societies and to assist growth of equal, prosperous, and peaceful communities. 9

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First, I met with the Mayor of Lakiya. I explained that due to the new food security law, the government will pay for the meals. We have very high women’s unemployment, and we can train women to work in the catering enterprise. What is needed from the municipality is to allocate a site in Lakiya for the factory and to be a partner in the venture, because I cannot build this factory and run it on my own. (Gidron and Abbou 20.09.2014)

The Mayor of Lakiya rejected the idea, claiming there was no suitable place for the factory. When Amal Elsana Alh’jooj presented her idea in Arara BaNegev, she received a similar rejection. She then approached Hura. The mayor understood the opportunity for creating jobs for women and providing children with culturally appropriate meals and agreed to take part in the project. Al Sanabel opened its doors in Hura in 2008 with strong commitment from the local authority and under its supervision. The factory employs only single mothers, who are considered the weakest group in the town. Today, the catering enterprise operates as a highly professional business. In 2011, the factory reached production of 3200 meals per day and made a profit. In 2013, with the assistance of the Van Leer Foundation, the factory grew and reached production of 15,000 meals, with sales of US$3 million. It currently employs twenty-one women. It also practices affirmative action by choosing local Arab-Bedouin suppliers for its various needs.11 The government recently recognized the contribution of Al Sanabel and offered to expand the social business model to additional cities in Israel, such as the northern city of Migdal Haemek. It aims to supply 20% of the meals in Israel using the Hura local catering model (approximately 70,000 meals per day).12 The case of Al Sanabel demonstrates how CG facilitated a project that provides employment for women and improves operation of the education system and children’s welfare. The local authority’s involvement set the conditions for creating a stable social business instead of a simple profitable business for external contractors. The catering project demonstrates how government actors, both central and local, and local entrepreneurs collaborated in the long term for the good of the community. The Local Council of Hura wanted to implement the law stipulating a hot meal for 11  From an article on the women of Hura’s catering enterprise (“Al Hashulhan”), June 23, 2017. 12  From an interview with women employment manager and activist, Ms. Gadir Hani, October 2019.

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every child at school. It is important to note that the Ministry of Education was willing to cooperate with the project and purchase meals for the schools only because it trusted the local authority to deal with and assume responsibility for all the necessary legal arrangements, such as health permits, business permits, and so on. Project 4: Wadi Attir Sustainable Ecological District Farm In 2008, Wadi Attir was established as a result of collaboration between multiple actors that created and operated an environmental, ecological, and educational farm. A farm that raises sheep using sophisticated desert technologies, produces dairy products, grows desert plants and spices and medicinal herbs, and develops natural plant-based cosmetics. Wadi Attir is an ecological venture that demonstrates a CG arrangement between the Local Council of Hura, The Sustainability Laboratory, the Ministry of Agriculture, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, the Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development at AJEEC, and the Jewish National Fund. CG arrangement that began with a strong commitment of actors, each bringing a unique knowledge and expertise to the planning table. A collaboration that was based on a clear vision and strategic planning and is carried out successfully up to these days. The project began when researcher and entrepreneur Dr. Michael Ben Eli, founder of The Sustainability Laboratory in New  York, met with Mayor of Hura Dr. Muhammad Al-Nabari. They began planning a unique project that had never been tried anywhere else in the world and which posed unique challenges: to combine the long history, culture, and knowledge of Bedouin desert agriculture with new technology in order to create improved and up-to-date agriculture schemes and projects for the Bedouin community.Wadi Attir project manager Yunes Nabari explains: The project is a desert farm based on sustainable planning that combines community, environmental, technology, and economy aspects. This unique project of sustainable development in desert conditions should be implemented not only in the Negev, but also in every other desert region in the world. (17.09.2017)

The Wadi Attir mission statement states:

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Project Wadi Attir is a ground-breaking initiative of a Bedouin community in the Negev desert, establishing a model sustainable farm that leverages Bedouin traditional values, know-how and experience with The Sustainability Laboratory’s signature approach to development.

Wadi Attir provides work for women in all aspects of its operation: managing, teaching, making products, and so on.13 Wadi Attir is an ongoing CG project since all the actors depend on each other for its success.14 Furthermore, each actor possesses unique knowledge and abilities that the others lack: Dr. Bar Eli has the knowledge of sustainable ecologic technology, Ben-Gurion University has researchers with knowledge of the Negev desert, the Local Council of Hura, bridged between the project and central government for land, planning, and business permits. The mayor, the council, and citizens have the unique knowledge of Bedouin tradition and culture. Together something new and exciting occurred for the long term that needed, and still needs, the constant involvement of all the actors in thinking and planning.

Conclusion By adopting CG in integrating women into the labor market, local government assumes new roles that traditionally it did not in the past. These include entrepreneurial tasks to enable partnerships with external organizations in planning and implementing municipal reforms. CG also means mediating between internal and external bodies in the process of implementing reforms. Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh describe “collaborative dynamics” comprising three interactive components: principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action (Emerson et  al. 2012). In the cases presented in this chapter, we show how CG becomes a vital and important decision-making model that offers new channels for social change. Actors engage with a shared motivation, while each offers a complementing component that creates collaborative action (Emerson et al. 2012, p. 5). Local government operates under conditions that allow it to go beyond basic services, in a way that CG provides the infrastructures for meeting the challenges. CG eventually becomes essential and 13  From Wadi Attir pamphlets: A Desert Ecological Farm: A Sustainable Desert Community Model, 2010. 14  From an interview with Wadi Attir’s women project manager, Ms. Gadir Abu Hani, October 2019.

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crucial for local government success. With CG, multiple partners can participate for the purpose of improving the welfare of local communities. We examined four cases: Maavarim, a community-based employment training center; Al Sanabel, a catering enterprise for schools, run and operated by women; a Bezeq Telecom call center in a mosque; and Wadi Attir, a sustainable ecological farm. In all these cases, the Local Council of Hura chose to collaborate based on strong consensus with various state actors, third sectors, and private partners. It mainly provided the security and stability that all actors need when engaging in projects that entail certain risks. The local council undertook the role of constructing long-term forums that were meant to build trust between the actors, mediating the projects to the public, and seeking its support. All these ventures continued operating over the years and even grew and developed. It is important to note that all these projects are considered innovative not only in Arab-­ Bedouin society but in all groups of society in Israel. As Dr. Al-Nabari claimed: “Local government takes on a new role of integration and building trust between multiple bodies for the purpose of developing new projects in the town” (Mayor of Hura Dr. Al-Nabari, 17.09.17). However, there are some concerns with the shift to CG. A major concern is the effect on local democracy (Eckerberg et  al. 2015). To what extent can CG processes provide representation and a voice for diverse communities, especially in multicultural towns and cities? Will minority groups be included in the policy-making process of CG? Furthermore, CG might create strong temptations for local government to follow ventures that external bodies offer or even push for without prioritizing needs. As representation of minority groups is a genuine concern when considering CG, in our cases here however, we demonstrated that CG allowed the opposite: representation of the needs of women for employment, training, and professional education. Women which are often considered an underrepresented group in the Arab society. Another major concern is with the effect of CG on the representation and power of council members in  local authorities. The direct election system shifted power from council members to mayors and generally reduced the council’s power over policy (Bresler-Gonen 2010). The question is whether CG influences this power structure as well. For example, one of the major roles played by councillors is to scrutinize the administration; in CG processes, how would councillors oversee projects in which so many external actors are involved? It might be that CG might pose similar

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challenges to privatized and contracted-out services, since both are less regulated by audit bodies (Galnoor et al. 2015). In the cases of women employment in Hura, we found that councillors were mostly left out of the process and their ability to inspect the implementation of projects was minimized.15 Local government collaborates with various actors for the purpose of formulating and implementing policy. In the cases examined, we found that local government first and foremost integrated between potential partners, which created legitimation for complex processes involving multiple actors. All four cases demonstrate how CG positions the local authority as a pivotal actor who reduces risk for government ministries, third sector representatives, entrepreneurs, and businessmen. Local government is a statutory body that relies on a state budget and is subject to transparency, legislation, and formal acts and regulations. As such, all external bodies wishing to collaborate need the local authority as a safety net. This is especially true in Arab-Bedouin society where central government is reluctant to collaborate directly with third sector bodies and civic society and therefore views the local authority as a mediator and anchor. In our cases of women’s employment, we found that most actors seek long-term collaboration in planning and operating projects. They wish to take part in a stable interaction built on a long-term commitment. To this end, the local authority created long-term forums for planning and executing plans. The connection between actors in the forums facilitates continuation to new and innovative projects supported by the community’s trust. In sum, the cases we observed serve as examples of CG arrangements that provide an effective model for promoting long-term change in the local arena. The cases of women’s employment in the Arab-Bedouin towns of the Negev demonstrate how local government expands its responsibilities into unique, culturally appropriate, and essential services that were not provided before. Central government took part in CG in planning stages and by producing necessary state permits needed for the projects. However, central government acknowledged the fact that it struggles to meet the challenges in Arab society on its own. This acknowledgment can lead to more financial and institutional support, for the CG model, for bottom-up projects in the communities themselves. If so, central government will grant stronger support and legitimation for the implementation of CG.  From an interview with Dr. Al Nabari, June 2018.

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CHAPTER 7

Example: A Local Collaborative Initiative in Kiryat Malachi Zion Regev and Neta Sher-Hadar

Introduction Kiryat Malachi is a city in Israel’s Southern District. In 2016, the city had a population of 23,500: 55% under the age of 30 and over 20% new immigrants. The city was ranked in the economic-demographic cluster 4; approximately 40% of families in the city were under the care of the Welfare Division, and the city suffered from negative migration (data from Kiryat Malachi, Education City—Turning Challenges into Catalysts for Change). The collaborative initiative in Kiryat Malachi is a partnership of diverse actors, including the Kiryat Malachi local authority, the Joel Tauber

Z. Regev The Strategic National Program for Education in East Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel N. Sher-Hadar (*) Mandel School for Educational Leadership, Jerusalem, Israel Administration & Public Policy, Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel The Chazan Center for Social Justice, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Research Group, 2015–2018), Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_7

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Foundation, the Rashi Foundation, and the Gazit Globe real estate company. The following example is based on an interview with Mr. Zion Regev, then supervisor of corporate responsibility at Gazit Globe and its representative in the partnership, and relies on documents that he provided.

Background and Needs When the initiative began, Kiryat Malachi was facing numerous and diverse challenges: changes of local government, a municipal system that had been unsuccessful in effecting change, poor school achievement, young people leaving the city, and a poor local image. Over the years, various organizations tried to create positive change, particularly in education and welfare. A study conducted by the Rashi Foundation, the Joel Tauber Foundation, and Gazit Globe, in cooperation with government ministries, found that the individual activities underway were failing to create meaningful change due to the absence of overall strategic objectives and strategic thinking and recommended that cooperation between the active actors could secure greater impact (Local Social Mobility and Quantum Leap Administration in Kiryat Malachi). The mayor, who was involved in formulating these insights and was aware of the demographic changes in the city due to accelerated construction, joined the initiative and spearheaded the local model, which focused mainly on educational activities. The inspiration for the model was a similar initiative in the town of Yeruham.

The Collaborative Initiative The Social Mobility and Quantum Leap initiative was launched in mid-2016 with the goal of stimulating social and economic mobility and creating a substantial change in life in Kiryat Malachi (Local Social Mobility and Quantum Leap Administration in Kiryat Malachi). The initiative aimed to strengthen local infrastructures and provide every resident of the city, regardless of their background, with an equal opportunity for success and self-actualization, from birth through employment (Annual Activity Report). The initiative included five stages of work: 1. Establishing a local administration: A body was set up that includes representatives of all the stakeholders: residents, the local authority,

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government ministries, civil society organizations, the business community, and public representatives. The administration set the agenda and defined the joint objectives of the initiative. While it was chaired by the mayor, all of its members had equal status. Collecting and collating data: Data about the city was collected through surveys, interviews, measurement, and past reports. Defining joint objectives: Through a process of public involvement, the administration defined the key issues on which action should be taken. Building a work plan: A joint plan of action was developed for each field. Building mechanisms for joint measurement: Means of measurement were developed in order to create a transparent process for monitoring progress (Annual Activity Report).

The first stage was the establishment of a Local Administration that would formulate educational, social, and community policy consistent with the city’s vision. According to its proposed outline for activity, the Administration’s function was: A. To provide an overall view of the planning and thinking processes in the local education system. B. To create the infrastructure for synergy between the educational sphere and other spheres in the city. C. To define principles for the work of the city coordinator. D. To approve the work plan. E. To supervise and evaluate the progress of the project. F. To establish connections with stakeholders that could contribute to the success of the project. G. To provide additional resources for the project (Proposed Outline for the Activity of the Kiryat Malachi Local Project). The Administrative Forum included approximately 30 people and met once every four to six weeks. The Administration established a Steering Committee including the director-general of the municipality, the director of the Education Division, the local initiative coordinator (who runs the Forum and the work teams), and representatives of the founding foundations. The Steering Committee meets every two to three weeks. The representatives also maintain regular contact and provide regular reports on the activities.

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The operating mechanism was based on the “collective impact” model,1 a mechanism that was learned from representatives of the Collective Impact Initiative in Israel. This model for tri-sector cooperation is based on five basic principles: 1. Reaching consensus about a shared vision and mission (com mon agenda) 2. Defining objectives and criteria and undertaking joint measurement 3. Creating a coordinated network of activity by the partners 4. Ongoing communication between the partners 5. Maintaining an integrative organization responsible for managing the process (Proposed Outline for the Activity of the Kiryat Malachi Local Project). The partners chose a local initiative coordinator, who is employed by an external body rather than by the municipality. The coordinator manages the routine processes in the initiative: meetings, collecting and processing data, budget management, and so on. Of the various subjects that were defined as vital, it was decided to begin in the educational sphere. Within this, three key areas were selected: informal education, early childhood education, and excellence education (Annual Activity Report). Regev explains: “The real challenge is to change the mindset of local residents and to create optimistic, positive, constructive discourse that recognizes the potential and the possibilities without ignoring the challenges. There is a need for a citywide process to restore the residents’ faith and hope that it is possible to make Kiryat Malachi a good place to live in. A change in mindset can happen when meaningful action is implemented in the field, when public participation processes are facilitated, and when local leaders and managers of the public system create a terminology of hope and action” (Kiryat Malachi—Education City: Turning Challenges into Catalysts for Change).

1  ““Collective impact” is a model developed in the US as a methodology for promoting solutions to complex social problems. It is based on the assumption that in order to create meaningful social change, a large and diverse number of forces must be recruited from all three sectors for action that revolves around a joint definition of the task” (Local Social Mobility and Quantum Leap Administration in Kiryat Malachi, p. 4).

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The Affinity Between the Local Initiative and Collaborative Governance Goal  As noted, the initiative’s goal is a public one: to secure a significant improvement (“quantum leap”) in Kiryat Malachi. It aims to work with local institutions and relevant government ministries to strengthen the institutions, the leaders, and the municipal mechanisms and to influence public awareness in order to promote public values. Leadership  The partners all joined the initiative based on the assumption that no single body would be able to secure a significant improvement (quantum leap) on its own. They also all agreed that the initiative should be led by the mayor and the municipal leadership (the director-general, directors of the Education and Welfare Divisions, and their senior staff) and that any attempt to set an agenda for the city must be made with the agreement of the local authority and must involve its leadership. Mechanisms and Actors  The formal mechanism developed for the collaboration is a consensus-based process of deliberation. As noted, the initiative is led by Kiryat Malachi’s Local Social Mobility and Quantum Leap Administration. The partnership is managed by the Steering Committee, which manages the initiative and monitors its actions. The Steering Committee is made up of the director-general of the municipality and the founding foundations. The director of the municipality’s Education Division also participated in most of the Steering Committee meetings. The local coordinator is responsible for the local implementation of the initiative and for coordinating between the different bodies, working alongside the Education Division. It is hoped that this position will be integrated in the Strategic Planning Division, which is meant to be established in accordance with the municipal vision. Deliberation  Over the two years of the initiative in Kiryat Malachi to date, two thrusts have been emphasised: creating a vision and building a municipal infrastructure to realize that vision. The initiative does not seek to establish a permanent collaborative governance mechanism in the city;

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rather, it hopes to consolidate a sustainable professional infrastructure that will enable philanthropic bodies to move on to other initiatives elsewhere. Consensus building among the actors in the Administration was seen as an important component that should be advanced and maintained. In practice, however, a formal process that would promote agreement was not consolidated; rather, agreement was forged on the basis of dialogue and a desire to build trust between local residents, the municipal representatives, and others involved in the city. This trust facilitated deep discussions on a range of issues, including budgetary decisions. (For example, it was agreed that several positions would be funded from the Administration’s budget for a limited amount of time and would then be funded by the municipality.)

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Initiative The main advantage of the initiative is the results that it has achieved: rebuilding the city’s infrastructures, especially human infrastructures (e.g., placing professionals in positions that were unoccupied, building an information collection and management system, and formalizing work and reporting methods), and building trust between the various actors and between the actors and the residents. The local model is seen as the main tool that enables the desired quantum leap, and the assumption is that this goal could not be secured without partners. For example, as a result of the work of the initiative, a Municipal Strategic Planning Unit was created— not by coercion, but by fostering an understanding of the need for this type of information, gradually and through dialogue. Many of the decisions could have been made by smaller forums or behind closed doors, but establishing discourse as a municipal infrastructure is intended to strengthen the city in the long term. The main disadvantage of the initiative is the length of time it takes to achieve results. As noted, processes were quicker without shared participation, but it was more difficult—if not impossible—to integrate the processes into the infrastructure of the city. Another question concerns the sustainability of the process. Firstly, the initiative was never intended to be long term. The goal was to create an infrastructure that would enable the city to maintain a process of participation and strategic thinking on its own. Thus, the mechanism that was built and the process it included were a pragmatic tool designed to meet a need that could not be met by any

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other means, rather than a normative mechanism that would remain in place after the foundations reduced their involvement in the city. Secondly, the “collective impact” model that was used did not cast a special leadership role for the local authority; rather, it allows each actor in the partnership to lead. In practice, the actors who came together in the collaborative governance model determined that the mayor would lead the process.

Contribution of the Initiative to Promoting Public Values The initiative set long-term goals that will increase social mobility and bring about a quantum leap in Kiryat Malachi. As it worked toward these goals, the initiative advanced additional public values, such as the following. Trust  One of the main objectives of the members of the initiative is to build trust between the different actors and especially between the local residents and municipal institutions. Most of the initiative’s energy is devoted to promoting this value. According to Regev, “the main message of the initiative, which is also conveyed in practice, is that it isn’t another round table of people who come from the outside, bring money, and tell us what to do; rather, we are the professionals in the city, and the residents are full partners in the decision making.” As Regev sees it, this objective has been achieved. One proof of this is that despite personnel changes (e.g., the director of the Education Division, the representative of Gazit Globe, and the director of Early Childhood Education), the level of trust remains high and the work processes continue. Transparency  Throughout the process, an effort was made to enhance the transparency of all decisions and processes. Transparency increases trust but also added to the legitimacy of the institutions, particularly to the legitimacy of their decisions. Over the past two years, all information and data have been distributed to the members of the Administration regularly. A booklet describing the Administration’s work processes, decisions, and budgets was also printed and distributed to the residents of the city, and its key points were even disseminated on billboards. The process of issuing publications that share knowledge continues today.

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Professionalism  As part of the process of infrastructure building, an attempt was made to integrate leading professionals in positions best suited to them. This creates a public service that not only serves the residents better but also enhances their trust in its institutions and representatives. For example, the director of the Strategic Planning Unit, the director of Early Childhood Education, and more recently the director of Information Systems, all received their positions through this process. Integrating Israelis of Ethiopian Origin  One of the key issues in municipal development in Kiryat Malachi is the integration of the Ethiopian-Israeli community. The Administration is active in this field in various areas. The peak of its involvement to date was a trip to Ethiopia. Initiated by Gazit Globe, the trip was for influential, nonpolitical figures in the city, half of whom were from the Ethiopian community and half of whom were not. Participants in the trip included the director-general of the municipality, the directors of the Education and Welfare Divisions, the director of the Youth Unit, the director of Early Childhood Education, school principals, and social activists. The goal was for the participants to see the city’s Ethiopian-Israeli community as a catalyst for municipal change. As a result of the trip, changes can be seen in attitudes toward the Ethiopian community, both in the public sphere and in municipal institutions, although this process is still at an early stage. Achievements To date, after six years of philanthropic involvement of Gazit Globe, including three years using the model described here, a variety of achievements have been reported. These include a significant improvement in high school achievement; a doubling of the number of students participating in youth movements and organizations; a shift in support for early childhood education, reflected in the allocation of municipal resources; the establishment of a Youth Center, which was set up thanks to philanthropic organizations but now operates as a municipal body; and so on. Moreover, the most recent municipal budget allocated significant sums for the Administration’s objectives.

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Conclusions from the Collaborative Governance Case The introduction of collaborative governance mechanisms can lead to changes in the role of philanthropic bodies with regard to the setting and implementation of policy. The model in which a donor determines where funding will be spent, which used to be the accepted norm, has been replaced by collaborative discourse about broader needs. Among other things, it has been asserted that cooperation with other actors has led to communal and local thinking about the key public value that should be advanced and about the broader nature of the community. In this context, it has been argued that the use of collaborative governance mechanisms has shifted the role of philanthropy from that of an external body that arrives with an agenda and makes decisions on its own, to a body that has the status of an important partner in determining and implementing policy. Based on the partnership in Kiryat Malachi, six key variables can be identified that determine the success of the collaborative governance mechanism: Firstly, it is not possible to achieve the goal of the initiative without the involvement of the head of the local authority and local officials. It was agreed that the local authority should lead the process. Its representatives have a more central role than the representatives of other partners, and the other partners should accept that. At the same time, the head of the local authority must cooperate and must accept the vital role of the other partners. Secondly, the process must be managed by a director. One of the most important conclusions that emerged is that in order to maintain collaborative governance mechanisms over an extended period, there must be a coordinator or director who works to advance the process on a daily, substantial level (a backbone organization or director). Without a leading figure who is capable of recruiting participants and who understands cooperative ventures, it is difficult to maintain the mechanism. In both Yeruham and Kiryat Malachi, it was clear that the role of the local initiative coordinator is very important. Thirdly, the human factor was found to be extremely significant during the cooperative venture. It became clear that in addition to the formal mechanisms, there were many informal actions that supported the mechanism. In other words, partners must be committed to the value of

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cooperation, must be willing to forego personal credit and see the action as the product of a joint effort, and must be open to what the process beholds. Fourthly, the action must be accompanied by knowledge. (In this case, the initiative relied on a knowledge base provided by Dr. Varda Shiffer, who supervised the process that began in Yeruham.) This knowledge is necessary both for the working model and for the content of the activities. It helps to legitimize the process, thereby strengthening the bond between the actors. It was noted that constant collection and analysis of data are extremely important as a basis for decision making by the Administration, which is not necessarily comprised of professionals with prior knowledge. Fifthly, the process demands ongoing investment in building and maintaining trust. The process of building trust is connected to the partners’ behavior and includes the following key factors: transparent behavior; strengthening personal connections, including on the informal level; genuine and close attention to the local residents and to those who do the work; bringing oneself fully to the process; and knowing how to let go. Regev asserted that this may be the most significant part of the process. In Yeruham and in Kiryat Malachi, the partners sometimes had professional disagreements when the local authority wanted to allocate resources to urgent issues rather than to matters consistent with the joint objectives that had been defined. During these arguments, typical comments by the municipal leaders included: “At the end of the day, we are responsible, so if there is disagreement, we will make a decision even if we do not have a deep level of trust.” In Yeruham, when this type of crisis emerged, it was solved by means of a two-day meeting that included an overnight stay together. Without an agreed-upon solution and without trust, the partners could not have continued their cooperation. Lastly, in order to realize any kind of change, there is a need to establish sustainable infrastructures. All these variables combine to create legitimacy for policy and enable the partners to work together. In the area of personnel, for example, it was decided to establish a Strategic Planning Unit in the Kiryat Malachi municipality. In the first and second years of the initiative, this unit was funded in full by Gazit Globe; over a three-year period, however, funding was gradually transferred fully to the municipality. Alongside these insights, several questions remain unresolved: Firstly, to what extent are the developed infrastructures sustainable? In other words, will the local authority undertake to continue running the activities and will the partners be able to move on to their next task? (This

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question is particularly relevant in a situation in which there are local elections and it is possible that a new head of the local authority will be elected.) Secondly, to what extent does the success of the mechanism depend on the personal profile of those who establish it? For example, was the fact that one of the main partners once lived in the city a critical variable? If so, would the involvement of partners with a personal connection be necessary or advantageous when establishing similar mechanisms? Thirdly, how is it possible to reconcile the tension between the need to show meaningful changes (impact) to the foundations by creating short-­ term successes and the understanding that these are long-term processes that require investment in infrastructures? The final question is more general and relates to the essence of collaborative governance: Is it appropriate that philanthropic foundations influence policy making and implementation?

References Interview with Mr. Zion Regev. (2017, November). [in Hebrew]. Kiryat Malachi Municipality, Breakthrough Center, from the Reut, Maoz and Gazit Globe Group. Strategic Plan for a Quantum Leap [in Hebrew]. Local Social Mobility Administration in Kiryat Malachi. (2017, April). Annual Activity Report for Residents and Officials. (“Annual Activity Report”) [in Hebrew]. Available at: http://k-m.org.il/machlakot/report.pdf Local Social Mobility and Quantum Leap Administration in Kiryat Malachi [in Hebrew]. Proposed Outline for the Activity of the Kiryat Malachi Local Project. (2015, June 21). [in Hebrew]. Regev, Z. (2015, April 12). Kiryat Malachi—Education City: Turning Challenges into Catalysts for Change [in Hebrew].

SECTION III

Regulation and Collaborative Governance

CHAPTER 8

Collaborative Regulation: Collaborative Governance in Regulation Motti Talias

Introduction The discussion about the crisis of governance (e.g., Stoker 1998; Kjaer 2004; Rhodes 2007; Bevir 2012) revolves around the origin of the crisis, its manifestations, how trends in local and international policy and politics contribute to this crisis, and models to cope with the crisis. The governance concept isn’t new to the literature of government and policy. What is relatively new is the use of the concept. Traditionally it has been used to describe and evaluate the effectiveness of governmental systems and how governing is manifested in the use and management of public resources to provide public goods and services. Although the end purpose of the current use of the concept remains the same as in the past (Stoker 1998, 2004), the central focus of the concept has shifted from the state, its apparatuses, and actions to the operation of a whole complex of actors in the public sphere, including government and nongovernment actors (Bevir 2012; Salamon 2002). M. Talias (*) The Open University, Raanana, Israel Zofnat Institute for Organizational Consulting, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_8

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Alongside government agencies, this space is now populated also by business organizations, NGOs, citizen groups, and communities, in various configurations such as forums, groups, or networks. Furthermore, the space comprises not only local actors but also international and transnational actors. These players are using diverse strategies including policy appraisals, policy proposals, knowledge generation, public services provision, setting private norms, or enforcing public regulations by private means. In many cases, these actions are carried out independently from the state, and in some other cases, in cooperation with the state. A concise description of the change can be found in the literature in such expressions as “From government to Governance” (Rhodes 1996) or “Governance without Government” (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Peters and Pierre 1998). The governance crisis, and the terminology change from government to governance, is attributed to a series of factors. Some are directly related to the operation of the state, others to the institutional structure in which governance takes place today. This includes large-scale privatization, growing demand for new social services, complex public policy problems (e.g., climate change, immigration, and human trafficking), the expansion of civil society activity, globalization, the communication revolution, and the growing influence of multinational corporations, as well as independent international regulatory agencies, on local governments. Governance activity based on cooperation between government and nongovernment partners is called “collaborative governance” (CG). CG can be found in policy making and implementation in multiple areas, such as planning, education, and health. CG is also employed in regulation, which sets and enforces rules. The chapter is concerned with the presence of CG in regulation. The development of the regulatory field over the last few decades presents models which combine cooperation between government and nongovernmental agents, typically regulatees (Levi-Faur 2011; Drahos 2017). The models respond to the structural weaknesses in the traditional command and control model and aim to respond to the governance challenges in regulation. The models can be framed as “collaborative regulation” (CR). The CG literature covers CR only partly or in an anecdotal manner (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2007; Ansell 2012; Emerson et al. 2011; Amsler 2016). The overlap between the two is generally overlooked. By contrast, the regulation literature does review new regulatory models which include

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CG components. Yet, this is done without relating to the regulatory models as an expression of CG and without analyzing them in the overall context of the development of CG (e.g., van der Heijden 2017; Fiorino 2017; Emerson et al. 2017). The purpose of this chapter is to review the integration of the principles of CG in the newly developed approaches in regulation. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the way these principles are woven into the continuing criticism of the traditional regulatory system and the various conceptualizations toward reform. Since I wish to argue that CR is part of the evolving general regulatory stream called “voluntary regulation” (VR), this chapter presents also the characteristics of VR and the way CR is integrated in the overall models in this regulatory stream. The chapter is structured as follows. Part B presents the conceptualization of CG in regulation, as one direction to deal with the governance crisis, and the relations between CG and CR. Part C describes the gradual integration of collaboration in regulation in two stages: early and instrumental stage and the later stage in which collaboration is more essential and normative. Part D positions CR in a wider context and within the developing voluntary regulation stream. Part E summarizes and deals with general question regarding the sociopolitical feasibility of CR.

Regulatory Challenges in the Era of Governance Crisis Governance Crisis and Collaborative Governance The rise of the CG should be understood within the context of the governance crisis. The crisis is characterized by the decreasing ability of the state to govern in the face of rising policy demands, complex policy issues, and growing involvement of nongovernmental actors, local and international, in the policy arena. From the government standpoint, this new reality requires rethinking its operation in several dimensions: updated definition of where to intervene; how to intervene, whether directly or indirectly; and its relationships with the multiple new actors which participate in governance. The CG literature is mainly focused on the last dimension. According to Emerson et al. (2011), CG has theoretical anchors in a broad range of research fields: cooperation between governmental agencies and ranks of government, the theory of groups and its application to

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collective action problems, collective resource management and cooperation in competitive situations, and public administration and democracy. For that reason, they suggest regarding CG as a model encompassing multiple goals and varied partnerships, not only between government and nongovernment actors, in various structural configurations dealing with public issues. This chapter adopts the narrower approach to CG, that of Ansell and Gash (2008), which includes only cases where government is present and takes a significant role. This approach draws on participatory democracy (e.g., Renn et al. 1995). It is not limited to a specific policy area or management tool, but emphasizes the methods through which public issues are dealt with and the crucial role of public participation in these methods. The problem of governance, from this perspective, lies in insufficient public participation. But while one approach advances civic engagement (Putnam 2000), another stresses the need for direct involvement and influence of the public on policy, through various models of deliberative democracy (round tables, citizen panels or parliament, etc.). CG belongs to this latter approach, with two unique dimensions: (a) structurally, CG is based on simultaneous participation and partnership of citizen’s and government’s representatives; (b) the work is based on interaction, dialogue, mutual learning, and solution searching, and in some models even consensus decision making and joint execution. What makes CG attractive is the search for ways to overcome the governance crises and to lever the advantages that come with the crises. Hostility and distrust, reflected in the delegitimization of public policy, are seen as a result of the distance between citizens and decision makers. Following the New Public Management reforms, citizen-government relations became one of customer-supplier, which emphasize the quality of service but overlook the origin and substance of the policy in which the service is included (Vigoda 2002). The answer is then to increase public participation, which will not only improve awareness but also bolster the sense of ownership of public policy and its legitimacy by citizens. It is moreover argued that dialogue enables governments to cope with complex problems, by leveraging the public knowledge and at the same time overcoming and bridging disagreements (Booher 2004). These encounters allow also for the clarification of the scope and limits of government involvement and responsibility today, given the size and nature of the problems and the shortage of resources.

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CG serves as a model for many policy areas: local and/or regional vision delineating, common pool resource managements (e.g., watershed or land), education and health reforms, and regulatory tool development. The models are different in many aspects: level of activity (community, regional, or national); makeup of stakeholders from each sector; mode of collaboration; the nature of the outcomes the collaboration aspires to achieve, whether knowledge, decision, or also implementation. Despite the differences, all models are based on the same logic and principles. One of the areas in which CG is manifested, and is the object of this review, is regulation. Governance Crisis and Regulation The regulation literature has been dealing intensely, and for a long time, with the changes in the regulatory field (Baldwin et  al. 2010; Drahos 2017). This extensive and continuing discussion reflects a dramatic shift from the way regulation had traditionally been perceived: an act solely related to government agencies, based on authority (command and control approach) and only for public purposes. Researchers today agree that the regulatory space is now populated by many other players—local and international and from different sectors. These players act alone or in conjunction, in many regulatory strategies, toward a variety of goals, and with changing involvement along the regulatory cycle: rule setting, accreditation, enforcement, and sanctioning (Black 2001). Regulation is one of the means government applies to achieve its goals.1 Therefore it is natural to expect that the changes in the regulatory field will be part of the overall phenomenon of the governance crisis. The crisis is reflected in the regulatory field in two processes: (a) the expansion of regulatory activity and (b) the search for flexible models to cope with challenges facing the regulatory field in the current era. The changes in this field began with the intensifying demand to reduce government spending and to focus government work on policy making rather than direct service provision. At the same time, however, there is a 1  The literature on the changes in governance and its implications to the regulatory field deals with the local and international arena. This chapter discusses only the former. For general discussion on regulation in the international arena and the globalization of regulation, see Drahos and Braithwaite (2001), Mattli and Woods (2009), Abbott and Snidal (2009, 2013).

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contradictory demand to expand regulatory services, given the growing risks related to technology and scientific breakthroughs in areas such as genetic engineering, fertility, and communication. These demands are responsible, among other factors, to the shift of government from direct provision toward regulation and inspection, and the growing centrality of regulatory action in the overall government operation (Majone 1997; Levi-Faur 2005). These processes are in evidence as well in the growing number of regulatory agencies that have sprung up over the last few decades and the increase in power centered in the hand of regulators, a phenomenon often called “The Regulatory State.” Another challenge facing governments in the regulatory field is the necessity to apply effective regulation given the changing environment of governance. In general, the ability to set effective regulation depends on the information in the hands of the rule maker. In the absence of sufficient information about the nature of the problems requiring regulation, and given continuous change in the problems themselves, it becomes difficult to set and enforce regulation independently. It is also difficult to offer stable and steady regulation. Given the complexity of the problems, and in order to avoid rules rapidly becoming irrelevant and obsolete, what is required is regulatory flexibility. In other words, the ability to adapt and adjust regulation from time to time, taking into account different goals and regulatees. Finally, the demand for regulatory services creates heavy budgetary and management overload on the public system, so long as the system leans solely on its own resources. These challenges provided the infrastructure for the critics of the familiar regulatory system. The criticism combines positive and normative elements. Beginning in the 1980s, a series of publications have challenged the traditional regulatory system and have issued calls for reforms (Bardach and Kagan 1981; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Freeman 1997; Gunningham et al. 1998; Black 2001; Lobel 2004). The common ground of these criticisms is the growing gap between the traditional regulatory model and the changing environment in which it operates. The gap critically affects the ability of regulation to fulfill its purpose. The critics recommend a thorough reform in both the approach and the practice. The idea is to shape regulation in collaboration with the regulatees and to select regulatory strategies in accord with the majority of regulatees who tend to respect the rules and not with the minority who tend to disobey or evade. The underlying assumption of this approach is that disobedience is in most cases a result of either misunderstanding,

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mismatch between regulation and its goals, or inflexibility toward the different circumstances in which regulatees operate. Besides regulatory simplicity and guidance, flexible regulatory environments and the development of multiple regulatory methods (rules and sanctions) tailored to the willingness of regulatees to cooperate are needed.

The Evolution of Collaborative Regulation The literature review of the criticism about the traditional command and control regulation, and the attempts to combine collaborative features in new regulatory models, reveals two separate and consecutive periods. This section describes the two periods. The Early Period: Instrumental Collaboration The earliest reference to the governance crisis in the regulatory literature can be traced to the period between 1970 and the end of the 1990s. The underlying rationale of this approach may be found in the pioneering book of Bardach and Kagan (1982). The authors review extensively the structural flaws in the regulatory system, highlight its economic inefficiency and inability to achieve its goals from the regulatees’ standpoint, and emphasize the need for reform. In their opinion, the wish to cover every potential case created cumbersome and incomprehensible “rule monsters.” Uniform and detailed demands, designed to ensure equal treatment, and lack of knowledge of other means that can achieve the same purpose impose high and unnecessary costs on some businesses. This creates an atmosphere of frustration and anger toward the regulators and leads businesses to “cutting corners” behavior. Additionally, evaluating regulatory achievement via rate of compliance doesn’t cover in many cases the overall losses. In general, overlooking the ratio between costs and benefits of regulation at the macro level2 obscures the fact that very often the economic costs of regulation surpass its expected social welfare. The above analysis suggests, according to the authors, that a change is needed in both the substance of the regulation and in its enforcement by regulatory agencies. Yet, they admit that given the public atmosphere and 2  The full costs incurred by the regulatees and not only the regulator, including the rise in production costs and weakening competitiveness. Eventually, these have negative effect on the local economy.

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the political pressure for more intrusive regulation, the chance for such reform is minimal. For that reason, they encourage indirect regulation activity, such as self-regulation and mandatory requirement for transparency. If these actions demonstrate their contribution to regulatory enhancement, they may in the long run influence government regulatory approach and eventually reduce the negative outcomes of the traditional regulatory system. A systematic framework for this new regulatory approach can be found in the work of Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), published a decade later, in their model of “responsive regulation.” Embracing the criticism, and in order to bypass the controversy around more or less regulation, they suggest a regulatory strategy that acknowledges all the factors affecting regulation. Their model is designed as a pyramid of regulatory and matching enforcement tools. Depending on the level of risk and the urgency for response of the case at hand, the idea is to begin with soft tools at the bottom of the pyramid—such as (enforced) self-regulation—and to scale up, in accordance with the level of compliance, to more authoritative tools accompanied by economic or judicial sanctions. In other words, to start with persuasion and gradually to move to warning, economic sanctions, prosecution, temporary shutdown, temporary or permanent license revocation. The geometric shape of the pyramid, with a wide base and narrow vertex, indicates the expectation for a wider use of the soft tools and limited use of the authoritative tool, an approach called a “Benign Big Gun.” According to this approach, the stick (gun) is in the shadow and comes into play as a deterrence only when persuasion is being ignored. An additional and important component in this model is “Tripatism.” This responsive regulation model gives wide discretion to regulators and creates incentive for regulatory capture and for restrained treatment of regulatees. In order to prevent such behavior, the authors suggest to involve a third party, relevant public interest groups (PIGs), to serve as public inspectors in decision making. Since PIGs are expected to compete for a seat in such forums, the competition itself will prevent their capture. Gunningham et al. (1998) present a natural yet expanding continuation to Ayres and Braithwaite in their model of “smart regulation.” This model preserves the principle of responsiveness as a central and required component in the developing regulatory reality. Yet, it extends the number of the regulatory partners and regulatory tools and recognizes the existence of a regulatory field separate and independent of government. In

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fact, the enforcement pyramid becomes three-dimensional with three sides, one reserved for government and the others for the business and civil or third sectors. At the same time, the enforcement and sanctioning tools also expand to include information sharing and public disclosure, local private regulation, international standards, standards along the production and supply chain, declining applications for insurance and credit, and boycotting products or services. Effective regulation depends on the right combination of actors and tools. The models for change in the regulatory system, of both Bardach and Kagan (1982) and Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), emphasize the internal flaws of the system (bureaucracy, uniformity, inflexibility, and obsolete rules) and its inability to fulfill its purpose. At the center of the discussion stands the difficulty of the government to implement the regulation it has formulated, to enlist compliance, but the system of command and control remains given. Therefore, they suggest that the government experiments with new approaches and tools. Although Ayres and Braithwaite add also a component of collaboration between government and the other sectors (Tripatism) and claim that citizen participation is at the heart of the Republican ethos of democracy, it is hard to avoid the impression that this invitation is a result of constraint rather than choice, for several reasons: the entire book is concerned with the inability of government to enforce its regulation; the book’s thesis does not question the ability of government to shape regulation alone; the public is incorporated into the model by PIGs only to prevent regulatory capture; and its main contribution is not in developing better regulation but rather to serve as an effective guardian. Unlike the responsive regulation, the smart regulation model shifts the focus from solving the compliance problem to solving the regulation problem. It advocates creating regulation when it is needed and emphasizes that not all regulatory solution should come from government or from government alone. That is why it recommends the widening of the regulatory field, the inclusion of a growing number of actors, and the need to be aware of this changing environment. Yet, the model downplays the collaboration among the actors and stresses only their simultaneous presence in the regulatory field. In this model the state “uses” the conditions created by the new reality to improve its regulation activity, but not necessarily through collaboration, a critical ingredient in CG in general and CR in particular.

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The Late Period: Substantial and Normative Collaboration Parallel to the discussion in the regulatory literature about the flaws of the governmental regulatory system and the need for reform, and especially since the end of the 1990s, an emphasis on collaboration has emerged. Collaboration between government and nongovernment actors as a regulatory strategy has assumed an increasingly central role in the analysis of the traditional regulatory system. The first extensive text was presented to the Administrative Conference in the US by Philip Harter (1982). Harter suggested the “Regulatory Negotiation” (Reg-Neg) model as a cure for the malaise of the American regulatory system. According to Harter, this system grew from the A Procedure Act of 1964, which perceived public agencies as authoritative, neutral, and professional and accordingly provided them with wide discretion in decision making. That discretion was later curbed by judicial interference, due to public pressure. The agencies were required to allow stakeholders and the general public to submit or present in hearings their reservations (by a system of “Notice and Comment”) and were obliged to disclose all information and consideration behind their decisions. Yet, their discretion remained weighty and independent. While this model has several advantages, such as full control, clear responsibility, prevention of interference, and regulatory capture, it also has many weaknesses: it positions the regulators and the regulatees on opposite sides; encourages adverse relation; blocks dialogue and collaboration in the search for creative solutions; directs the parties to seek victory rather than understanding and compromise; turns the regulation making into a long, expensive, and cumbersome process; and creates difficulties in enforcing regulation. The final result is delegitimization of the regulation system. The way to cope with these flaws is to bring together all stakeholders and to formulate agreed policy based on negotiation (see also: Susskind and McMahon 1985; Fiorino 1995). This model has a number of complementary components: the issue is defined by the regulator; the regulator invites representatives of the stakeholders, but the forum can invite additional parties; internal working rules are shaped by the forum; all parties have equal status, and the group aspires to reach consensus; decisions are open for public comments and like any other regulatory initiative are subject to judicial review; and the parties have the right to withdraw from the negotiation at any stage of the process.

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A review of Harter’s model and its extended implementation across the US and Europe, especially in environmental policy (e.g., Fiorino and Kirtz 1985; Croci 2005; Durant et al. 2017),3 from CG perspective, reveals that the main concerns of this model are the tension and disagreement between regulators and regulatees and the subsequent erosion of quality of the regulatory products. Unlike the responsive and smart regulation models, this model strives to convene the stakeholders to work together and reach agreement, and not only to consider and work with different regulatory strategies. The goal according to this model is to reduce tension and to increase legitimacy. This is achieved by incorporating experience and knowledge and by creating mutual ownership of the solution. In the words of Harter: “A regulation that is developed by and has the support of the parties in interest would have a political legitimacy that regulations developed under any other process necessarily lack” (Harter 1982, p. 76). Harter’s approach to CG in regulation is focused on the regulation setting stage and not on the other stages. The parties remain in their traditional role as regulators or regulatees, and once a decision has been made, they all return to their place in the familiar order. This approach is different from the one suggested by later scholars, who see the process of regulation making as less dichotomous and linear and highlight collaboration also in the subsequent stages, in implementation and enforcement. Two such later publications which discuss the relations between regulation and CG are those of Freeman and Lobel. Freeman (1997) refers to the criticism of the regulatory system and the initiatives for reform from within the political system. In her view, these initiatives are insufficient. At the basis of their core—applying cost-benefit analysis, evaluating regulatory impact, and increasing judicial review—stands the wish to limit the regulator’s discretion and to enhance inspection and oversight. But, in her view, these and other ideas for reform cannot be expected to achieve substantial improvement, since they lack a comprehensive and inspiring vision for the required change. Instead, Freeman suggests adopting the CG model, a model already partly incorporated in the Reg-Neg and negotiation for licenses. Adopting this model fundamentally changes the attitude toward regulation, which in the US is based on the principle of interests’ representation and the pluralist theory behind it. The model also allows to 3  The practice of regulatory negotiation in the US turned into a law. First in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 and later in the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (Coglianese 1997).

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cope with two critical challenges facing the current regulatory system: efficiency and legitimacy. The current system sanctifies the division of labor between the regulator and the regulatee and focuses on the end of the process, after the regulator has defined the problem and formulated a solution, which is considered the final product. Direct stakeholders are invited to comment on this product, negotiation is conducted only with them, and the final result is an averaged compromise between demands, which is not necessarily the best solution. Unlike this approach, CG convenes all stakeholders as partners and regards the process itself as a joint effort to solve a problem by mutual responsibility. CG allows for the setting up of temporary solutions, which can be updated if and when conditions such as technology change. It also allows the option of considering flexible role and responsibility sharing, an approach more suitable to the decentralized regulatory scene today, which incorporates many actors and varied methodologies: multi-stakeholder processes are promising not solely because they bring techniques of alternative dispute resolution to public policy making and facilitate bargaining by groups that would otherwise litigate rules. Rather, they are promising because they are more likely than the traditional rule-­ making process to be sites at which regulatory problems are redefined, innovative solutions devised, and institutional relationships rethought in ways that are likely to increase both quality and legitimacy. (Freeman 1997, p. 7. Italic in the original)

The second publication is by Lobel (2004). While her review of the problems in the regulatory field is similar to Freeman’s, she discusses the problem in a wider context, that of the crises in the entire public administration system. This crisis is conceptualized as paradigmatic and requires a shift from the historic “New Deal” model to a “Renew Deal.” The New Deal model has ceased, gradually in the last decades and especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century, to provide a sufficiently sophisticated conceptual framework for the governance sphere and its challenges. With regard to the regulatory field, Lobel describes three stages in the regulatory developmental process: from legislation and economic regulation to particularistic regulation and finally to what she calls “reflexive regulation.” While the first stage regulates new areas and aspires to reduce risks, the second includes additional aspects such as fairness and equality.

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The injunction in the second stage to keep updating regulation in order to deal with particular and specific cases is what ultimately leads to a collapse of the regulation and requires a third stage in which a shift takes place from creating rules to a comprehensive restructuring of the regulatory domain. This involves new actors and new tools. Success in regulatory enterprise in the third stage (called “Regulation in Governance Model”) demands several components including innovation and entrepreneurship, flexibility and adaptation, the use of soft tools, and the participation of all stakeholders and at all stages of regulation. The regulatory approach presented by Freeman and Lobel can be called “collaborative regulation” (CR). Examples of CR are found in various models that have been developed in the environmental field. Gunningham includes all under the roof of collaborative environmental governance, with several common characteristics: “participatory dialogue and deliberation, devolved decision-making, flexibility rather than uniformity, inclusiveness, transparency, institutionalized consensus-building practices, and a shift from hierarchy to heterarchy” (Gunningham 2009, p. 146). Although the models represent different lines of thought, and may not have all the characteristics, they share the same mode of action. They are structured to face complex environmental problems, such as air, water, and land pollution coming simultaneously from large number of plants in a small geographical area. The models involve representatives from all sectors and from the local community. These collaborative groups study and delineate the problems and then shape solutions, which are sometimes experimental for the medium term before permanent policy is decided. Government’s role in these models changes from case to case. It may be direct, indirect, or not at all involved; it may take part as partner or just provide assistance in knowledge, information, budget, or other incentives; it may define required processes or results, but not interfere if these have not been achieved, or it may threaten to use its authority if the collaborative effort does not succeed and the required results are not forthcoming. The regulatory practice in the environmental field uses various models of CG, and the environmental regulatory literature is replete with theoretical discussions about these models as “the third wave of regulation” (e.g., Croci 2005; De Búrca 2010; Holley 2017), as well as in empirical research designed to assess their success (Gunningham 2009; van der Heijden 2017). These models are regarded as one of the central means to cope with the future challenges facing the environmental governance and the continuing striving to achieve sustainability:

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centralized regulation is ill-suited to many characteristics of a newer generation of environmental problems. Issues such as climate change, nanotechnology, and ecosystem protection simply are more dynamic, complex, and uncertain than most of their predecessors. Not only do strategies have to respond to information about changing conditions in and the relationships among the many aspects of such issues, but the social structures and decision processes for adapting strategies also should change. As a result, there has been an emphasis in the ENR [Environmental and Natural Resources] literature on adaptive co-management, which recognizes the systems aspects of problems and the need for learning and collaboration. (Fiorino 2017. pp. 320–321)

The Evolution of Collaborative Regulation: Summary The review of the changes suggested for reform in the regulatory literature, and their reference to CG, can be summarized as follows. There is a continuing criticism about the traditional regulatory system and its underlying approach. The criticism emphasizes the mismatch between that system and the current regulatory challenges, its inability to achieve its goals, and the erosion in its legitimacy. The criticism and the ideas for change can be divided into two periods: the early period from the end of the 1970s until the end of the 1990s and the later period from the end of the 1990s until today. In the first period, the mismatch is reflected in low levels of obedience and is attributed to inflexibility and overuse of authority. Erosion in legitimacy is mainly among regulatees and results from the gap between the regulation and the conditions under which regulatees operate, as well as regulatory overburden and high regulatory toll. The solution then points to more sophisticated regulation, more tailored to the inclinations of regulatees to comply, and recognizing other nongovernmental actors as potential regulators. The collaboration between government and nongovernmental actors, if and when it is suggested, is instrumental and is aimed at achieving higher level of compliance. Mismatch and low level of compliance are at the heart of the later period in the literature too. But now these difficulties are attributed more to the process of actually defining regulation than to the lack of flexibility and to the recognition of other regulatory actors (Harter 1982). Unilateral and authoritative regulatory processes engender adversarial relations between regulator and regulatee, loss of regulatees’ valuable knowledge, and a low level of compliance motivation. The erosion in regulators’

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legitimacy is referred also in this period to the regulatees (and not the general public), but unlike the former period, the idea now is to collaborate with the regulatees and, right from the beginning of the process, to utilize regulatory negotiation, compromises, and consensus decision making. But all this has to happen only after government has defined the regulatory problem. In the second part of this period that lasts until today, other models alongside Reg-Neg have been developing, and they present different approaches and solutions to the problem. The source of the incompatibility of traditional regulation from these models’ perspective comes from the complex nature of the problems and the growing number of players in the governance sphere. An additional challenge is the inability of the state to answer the increasing demand for regulatory services due to lack of knowledge, costs, and inefficiency. Legitimacy erosion is now relevant not only for regulatees but also for the general public as consumer or producer of regulation. At the core of the suggested solutions stands the element of collaboration, and the aim now is to reach wider purposes beyond compliance: precise problem definition and not only solution formulation; increasing involvement, ownership, and responsibility; enlarging the pool of resources to making and implementing regulation including funds, manpower, information, knowledge, and experience; and creating regulatory partnerships striving to achieve a better society. Table 8.1 summarizes the shift between the two periods and between the subsections in the more recent period. The development in terms of collaboration, as reflected in the shift between the two periods and particularly between the two subsections of the later period, matches the argument by some researchers over the last decade and a half about the need of the public administration to move from participation to collaboration in the era of Post-New Public Management reforms.4 This is a necessity, if the public administration wishes to remain relevant, to defend its legitimacy and to expand its capabilities and resources in order to overcome the challenges facing Western democracies (Wanna 2008). The collaboration at the beginning of the second period, as in the earlier one but more forcefully, is based on the 4  In that regard, it is interesting to see the overlap in timetables between the beginning of the second period and the emergence of the discussion about the NPM in the early 1990s, and between the second section of the second period and the critical discussion about the results of the NPM (post-NPM).

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Table 8.1  Summary: the developing discussion on CR in the regulatory literature Comparison dimension

Early period 1970s–1990s

Late period 2000–today Part A

Part B

The problem of regulation

Low compliance and lack of cooperation

Low compliance and lack of cooperation

The problem of legitimacy

Mismatch to regulatory environment; high costs to regulatees; low legitimacy among regulatees

Mismatch to regulatory environment (problems, actors) and inability of government to cope alone with regulatory problems Lack or insufficient regulatory solutions; low legitimacy among the public

Regulatory solution

Collaboration characteristics

Goals of collaboration

Focus of collaboration

Lack of communication and adversarial relations between regulators and regulatees; low legitimacy among regulatees Flexible/responsive Regulatory regulation and negotiation between enforcement, based regulator and on regulatees’ regulatees regarding motivation to comply; the regulatory acknowledging product collaborative players Participation by Partial collaboration; government government invites invitation; but all have equal government consults voice; aspiring to but decides alone consensus Instrumental, Instrumental, managerial, and managerial, and economic economic

Devising enforcement Developing strategies for better regulatory solutions compliance

Collaborative regulation involving all stakeholders at all stages of regulation making

Full collaboration; every side can invite the others, and all have equal voice; aspiring to consensus Substantial and democratic; collaboration in problem definition, shaping solution, and division of labor between government and nongovernment actors Problem definition, solution formation, and division of labor among all stakeholders (continued)

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Table 8.1 (continued) Comparison dimension

Early period 1970s–1990s

Late period 2000–today Part A

Part B

Parties in collaboration

Direct stakeholders (regulatees); PIGs as gradient from capture; invitation by government; government as central player

Direct and indirect stakeholder participation; invitation by government; government as central player

All relevant stakeholders; self-invitation; government not necessarily central player

managerial-economic theory of market. This theory sees citizens as customers and highlights the importance of responsiveness and satisfying their needs. In contrary, the current approach of collaboration originates from political-civic theory and as a way to strengthen democratic foundations (Vigoda 2002). The governance challenge is responsible to various developments in the policy field of regulation. One of them is the rise of regulatory stream called voluntary regulation (VR). This regulatory umbrella hosts a series of regulatory models that share many regulatory features. Collaborative regulation, as presented in this section, is part of this stream and the next section describes the link between the two.

Collaborative Regulation as Part of Voluntary Regulation Voluntary regulation (VR) is an overarching concept relating to various regulatory models that complement traditional public regulation, and CR is one of these models. VR has four core elements that differentiate it from the command and control regulation: standards and requirements above the law, voluntary participation, lack of criminal or other official sanctions, and informal incentives for compliance such as positive reputation and public praise (e.g., Haufler 2001; Webb 2004; Raynolds et al. 2006; Vogel 2008; Bartley 2007). VR regimes are mainly directed to the business sector, and they use techniques as certifications. These regimes operate at the international level, vis-à-vis multinational corporations, and locally toward local businesses. The flourishing of VR is also attributed to the governance

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crisis and the regulatory challenges in its wake and at the international level to the repercussions of globalization on the regulation of multinational corporations (Drahos and Braithwaite 2001; Vogel 2008). VR can be initiated by each of the three sectors (public, private, or third sector). When VR is classified by two dimensions—initiation and enforcement—three broad categories of models of VR emerge: (A) First-party regulation, initiated by public agencies, local or international, in collaboration with regulatees, with the public agencies responsible for enforcement, whether directly or indirectly. It includes such models as meta-regulation, enforced self-regulation, and co-regulation. (B) Second-party regulation, initiated by businesses for themselves or for a business subsector. It includes models such as self-regulation or private regulation. These models can either be operated singly or under the auspices of the state. Under public auspices, private or self-regulation is developed with the approval and assistance of the public regulator. (C) Third-party regulation, usually initiated and enforced by third sector organizations, directed toward businesses, in models such as civil regulation. The third sector sometimes applies VR toward itself in the self-regulation model. The relevant VR category for the discussion on CR is the one of first party, since it implies a direct interface between government and nongovernmental actors. Though governments in some countries (such as Australia or Canada) encourage and support VR (Webb 2001), it does not necessarily involve collaboration in shaping and enforcing regulation, as in some models within the first-party regulation. In the other two categories (second and third parties), either the business sector acts upon itself or there is cooperation between the business and the third sector. Yet, as we can see below, even the first-party category is not necessarily characterized by collaboration: sometimes the relationship is unilateral, or government may threaten to shift to the command approach if the voluntary approach does not receive compliance. First-party VR category includes a small number of models, which reflect different levels and styles of collaboration between the government and the business sector. One model is meta-regulation, and another is

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enforced self-regulation. In meta-regulation, regulatees agree to adopt standards above the requirements of the law, in response to public regulator’s demand. In that aspect, meta-regulation is different from self- and civil regulations which are independent initiatives. The regulator can implicitly threaten to intervene or suggest regulatory reliefs (Baldwin et al. 2010). In this model, government spots failure in certain business conduct, but wishes to avoid direct interference due to costs. In some cases, there are difficulties in defining the regulatory product (Gilad 2010) or in achieving political agreement (Talias 2016). If the regulator’s request is followed by an explicit warning to use formal regulation, in case the results will not be satisfying, it is called enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). The third model of first-party VR, particularly relevant to this chapter on CR, is co-regulation. This model aims to regulate business sector or subsector, based on collaboration between government regulator and business representatives, and often includes as well public representatives via third sector organizations or communities. One of the submodels in this version is Reg-Neg (or regulatory agreement) that was mentioned earlier. In the Reg-Neg model, the invitation is issued by government, and government is also in charge of implementation, but all three parties are present and involved, have equal status, and strive for consensus. Other models of co-regulation allow all parties to be conveners with only partial presence of the three parties and the involvement of all parties in the implementation stage. The co-regulation model, then, is the manifestation of CG in regulation or what I suggest to name “collaborative regulation.” Figure 8.1 summarizes all VR categories. While the two models of the first-party regulation (meta-regulation and enforced self-regulation) are based on the voluntary choice to adopt standards set by government with no direct involvement in shaping the regulation, the collaboration between the government and the other two sectors takes place only in the co-regulation model. Furthermore, only in this model is the general public recognized as stakeholder, entitled and invited to participate. In the other two models, either public participation is optional or cooperation is possible between the public regulator and the regulatees. VR therefore shares mutual ground with CG in several dimensions. First, the two phenomena grow out of the governance crisis and in response to its challenges. Second, in both there is nongovernmental

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Meta-Regulation Enforced SelfRegulation

First Party (Government)

Civil Regulation Self-Regulation

Third Party (NGOs)

Second Party (Business)

Private Regulation Self-regulation

Collaborative Regulation: Co-Regulation

Fig. 8.1  Voluntary regulation and collaborative regulation

involvement in governance activity, based on voluntary choice to participate. The proximity between the two is stronger in first-party VR that includes interface between government and nongovernment actors and in particular in the co-regulation model in which they have to work together and in some cases even make decisions together. In spite of the similarity between the two phenomena (VR and CG), they differ when viewed in a larger context. VR is first and foremost a reaction to insufficient public regulation in terms of regulatory tools and not in terms of regulatory processes. That is why VR is mainly concerned with providing complementary standards and less with enforcing by-laws. Its work is done either in spheres where national or supranational regulation does not exist (such as child labor or working conditions in third world countries) or in issues that governments refrain from being involved in such as the social and environmental responsibilities of businesses. That is, a large part of VR, as can be seen in Fig. 8.1, occurs independently with no relation or partnership with the state. It is important also to note that VR initiated by the state, including the models of co-regulation relevant to CG or CR, has a small share in the total VR activity (Abbott and Snidal

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2009).5 In any case, this is not the model with which VR is mostly identified but rather the initiative of the business and third sector—alone or in conjunction.

Summary This chapter discussed the interrelations between CG and regulation and the way the principles of CG are integrated in the developing approaches in the field of regulation. The chapter did not discuss the question of feasibility of CR, that is, what the chances are that CR will take a central place in the regulatory toolbox in a specific country and the necessary conditions for such a scenario. The feasibility of CR can be seen as part of a wider discussion about voluntary regulation approaches (Croci 2005). The literature on CR deals in fact with the auxiliary assisting conditions for its success (e.g., Perritt 1986; Fiorino 1995; Coglianese 1997; Freeman 1997; Harter 2000; Croci 2005; Wanna 2008). Yet, the discussion begins where choice has already been made to act according to this approach and focuses only on the act itself and the supporting conditions. Overall it is essentially a macro discussion that overlooks the social-political context supporting the growth and success of CR. The literature does discuss the operative condition for CR such as the nature of the problem, the makeup of the partners, and/or the required resources. Also emphasized is the need for supporting legal infrastructure, which gives public agencies the mandate to act in collaboration (Amsler 2016). There is also a discussion of the institutional conditions (such as property rights or incentive systems for regulators) and their impact on the motivation of regulators and regulatees to cooperate (Ebrahim 2004). But these and other conditions only partially influence the feasibility of CR, since they don’t guarantee that this venue will actually be taken. That explains why more fundamental conditions needed to be addressed. The question regarding the necessary preconditions for CR requires an empirical basis that is lacking today. What is needed is a database covering the use of this method in different countries (and even in different sectors) 5  Abbott and Snidal (2009) substantiate the argument in the international level. Although there aren’t equivalent figures in the local level about VR regimes, it is safe to assume that in this level the picture would not be different and might even be stronger. Since in the local level governments enjoy broad mandate (unlike international organizations), we may expect nongovernmental actors to find this avenue more natural.

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and an analysis of the correlation between these figures and local politicalsocial characteristics.6 In summary, the research needs to develop not only in mapping the attributes of CR and its conditions for success but also in evaluating the social-political context that supports its growth.

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6  Researchers do compare the use of VR between governments in Europe and the US and indicate a tendency to a lesser use of these methods in the US. This tendency is related to adversary tradition between state and business sectors, unlike the history of use in Corporatist and Neo-corporatist models in the continent. It is also claimed that when US government uses VR, it tends to use VR by the state—such as enforced self-regulation—unlike European states who also ally themselves with autonomous initiatives and grant them public recognition and support (Brouhle et al. 2005).

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Salamon, L. (Ed.). (2002). The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. London: Oxford University Press. Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as Theory: Five Propositions. International Social Science Journal, 50, 17–28. Susskind, L., & McMahon, G. (1985). The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking. Yale Journal of Regulation, 3, 133–165. Talias, M. (2016). Voluntary Hotel Regulation as a Political Compromise. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 56, 10–17. van der Heijden, J. (2017). Urban Sustainability and Resilience. In P.  Drahos (Ed.), Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications (pp. 725–740). Acton: ANU Press. Vigoda, E. (2002). From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance, Citizens, and the Next Generation of Public Administration. Public Administration Review, 62(5), 527–540. Vogel, D. (2008). Private Global Business Regulation. Review in Advance, 11, 261–282. Wanna, J. (2008). Collaborative Government: Meaning, Dimensions, Drivers and Outcomes. In J. O’Flynn & J. Wanna (Eds.), Collaborative Governance: A New Era in Public Policy in Australia (pp.  3–12). Canberra: The Australian University Press. Webb, K. (Ed.). (2004). Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation. Ottawa: Carleton Research Unit of Innovation, Science and Environment.

CHAPTER 9

Reducing Aspects of Collaborative Governance in Standardization Processes in Israel Edna Harel-Fisher

Introduction The field of standardization and the affinity between this field and issues of governance have been discussed in various articles and publications. Among other aspects, the discussion has touched on the impact of standardization on numerous areas of lives, as well as on governance contexts, given that standardization is used extensively by states and on the international level and that it influences and is influenced by multiple players and disciplines.1 1  See, for example, Russell 2005, pp.  247–260; Borraz 2007, pp.  57–84; Orviska et  al. 2013, pp. 36–59; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Rudder et al. 2016. The latter source includes standardization as part of “private governance”—the use of various bodies from the field of private law to determine various governance arrangements. In our opinion, this does not contradict the assertion that standardization maintains the collaborative governance model— the authors identify private bodies in the US as an integral part of governance in various fields

E. Harel-Fisher (*) The Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_9

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Collaborative governance brings together stakeholders from the private and public sectors in joint forums together with public administrative bodies in order to take consensus-driven decisions. It constitutes an alternative governance method to the adversarial and managerial methods (Ansell and Gash 2008, p. 544–545). The collaborative governance process depends on the presence of political players who affirm the importance of participation, maintain its principles, and do not prefer to advance alternative methods in order to realize their goals (Ansell and Gash 2008, pp. 552–553). I will argue that an arrangement based on the collaborative governance approach is vulnerable to changes in its conduct and public status when its outcomes are regarded as undesirable by players who have the power and capacity to exert political influence. This is true even when the management of an arrangement in accordance with the principles of collaborative governance offers clear advantages, as is the case in the field of standardization. The chapter starts by  detailing the principles of standardization and explains how standardization in Israel meets the characteristics of collaborative governance. The next parts detail aspects of the standardization process, focusing on cooperation between stakeholders and governance, aspects that provoked public criticism in Israel focusing on the collaborative governance dimensions of the process. The following parts describe the changes in the field of standardization in Israel and their significance in the context of collaborative governance. The chapter ends by examining these processes in reference to standardization processes in other countries, international standardization processes, and the aspects of collaborative governance these embody. This part also presents conclusions. This chapter relies on a central argument that standardization is fundamentally and inherently suited to the collaborative governance approach as it has been conceptualized. The characteristics of this approach, including those presented in Ansell and Gash (2008), may be used to examine the unique character of this field and the changes that have been introduced therein, thereby yielding insights. Over the past decade in Israel, the field of standardization in general and the Standards Institution in particular have been the focus of far-reaching changes accruing from the economic and competitive policies of the Israeli government (Lang

and advocate the expansion of the democratic aspects of their operations. It seems that this draws their model close to that of collaborative governance.

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2014).2 The examination shows that the changes introduced in Israel in the field of standardization, and particularly the restriction of the collaborative governance aspects in this field, are liable to impair its unique quality and its potential economic and social contribution. Accordingly, this field can serve as a case study for the action and arrangement of other fields that are inherently suited to the collaborative governance approach. The chapter will concentrate on arrangements relating to standardization activities—the development and determination of standards and changes thereto. What Is Standardization? The term standardization is used to refer to a wide range of arrangements, with an emphasis on technological and engineering means, and to the determination of indices, processes, and methods formulated by means of consensus between experts and stakeholders. Various definitions have been proposed for the term, some of which focus on the content of the arrangements, while others, including those set by standardization bodies, address the consensual formulation as a structured component.3 In Israel, the Standards Law defines a “standard” according to its content (Standards Law, sec. 6; Lang 2014, p. 97). However, the consensual component is also formalized in Standards Law through the designation of the Standards Institution of Israel as a consensual body enjoying exclusive authority to establish standards. Although our discussion might be relevant to other areas like the financial arena, I will focus on standardization relating to terminology, definitions, and production and work processes facilitating technical, technological, or industrial discourse between bodies involved in measurement, production, marketing, and so forth and in the establishment of a minimum threshold for quality, safety, or performances.

2  Amendments 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13 to the Standards Law, 5713-1953 (hereinafter “the Standards Law”), enacted between 2000 and 2018 https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/ Law01/232_001.htm; Government Presentation to the Knesset Committee during the deliberations on Amendment 12 to the Standards Law: http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/ committees/Economics/Pages/CommitteeMaterial.aspx?ItemID=2008682 3  http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/standardization.html; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standardization; https://www.iso.org/sites/ConsumersStandards/1_standards.html

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The standards give the consumer—commercial, industrial, or domestic—the possibility to purchase a product in the knowledge that it will meet requirements and conditions, without them being required to hold expertise in physics, chemistry, electronics, and so forth. Standardization allows consistency between different components and the specialization of industries in components and products that are integrated in larger systems. The quality or performance threshold for a product allows the customer and user to rely on concrete expectations. References to standardization in regulation or consumerism facilitate the protection of public interests and goods, including safety, environmental protection, and fair trade. Standardization may be based on purely technical or physical insights, constraints, or externalities, but it may also be driven by value-­ based constraints and public interests (Rudder et al. 2016, p. 4). Standards combine considerations relating to technical or professional arrangements with economic significance and ramifications as well as with national and international policy and governance factors (Russell 2006). Since it extends over numerous fields of life, standardization also raises institutional questions and issues in the sphere of governance. The Institutional Development of Standardization: The Status of Standardization Bodies Some researchers claim that the field of standardization has its origins in ancient times, when rulers used standards to consolidate control or to implement policy, as seen in the Indus Valley, Persia, Central Asia, and possibly also in Ancient Egypt, in the form of the standardized use of the waters of the River Nile in irrigation. In feudal and medieval Europe, diverse weights and measures were used by guilds and rulers in the absence of any political interest in cooperation and unification (Russell 2005, pp. 2–3; Spruyt 2001, p. 371). The field of standardization acquired its current format as the result of scientific, technological, industrial, and social processes such as the spread of higher education and the growth of the middle class in Europe. An example of this is the introduction of the meter in France in the late eighteenth century, following the French Revolution. France moved from a situation that entailed the presence of over 250,000 different weights and measures in different parts of the country to a rational and uniform system. As the scientist Condorcet noted, the new system enabled the optimum implementation of the principles of the revolution and human

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progress and could ensure the autonomy of citizens and free them from dependence on others for calculations relating to their interests. As such, it promoted the values of equality and liberty.4 The current format of standardization also derives from the industrial, engineering, and technological developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Russell 2005; Russell 2006). Standards reflected processes that helped crystallize confidence in the scientific and engineering tools developed through the scientific revolution, leading to precise measurement capabilities and a willingness to be guided by these tools. These tools were part of an infrastructure for the revolution in manufacturing processes based on standards, enhanced efficiency, compatability of product parts and the changing of demand and expertise of labour. This development was associated with the development of engineering and engineering ethics, which relates to such aspects as precision, consistency, safety, and reliability—all of which combine to create a moral responsibility. Many standardization mechanisms were developed in a bottom-up manner in response to needs raised in industry, manufacturing, and consumption and as the result of cooperation between engineers, industrialists, and consumers. Cooperation emerged as a guiding principle (Borraz 2007). From the end of the nineteenth century, standard institutes were established, sometimes as governmental entities, as in Germany and England. Attempts to establish a similar body in the US were halted following the financial crisis of 1929 (Russell 2005, pp. 2–3 and fn. 6–10). In other instances, standardization bodies developed through private, industrial, professional, or public initiatives. Some of these bodies later became governmental or public institutions, while in other cases the government relied on their work in formulating binding regulations (Rudder et  al. 2016; Perlman 2016, pp.  26–33). During the twentieth century, governments also recognized the benefits of these mechanisms in the context of the work of international bodies bringing together state institutions involved in standardization. The development of international trade was consistent with these trends. In 1985, the decisions of the European Union to promote economic integration and free trade established the “New Approach,” whereby voluntary standardization constituted a central component in a revised European system of regulation that was binding on EU member states (EU Council Resolution  of 7 May 1985  on a new approach to 4

 Russell 2005, p. 2, footnote 2 and the reference to Ken Alder.

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technical harmonization and standards [85/c136/01]). Voluntary standards essentially serve to corroborate propriety and conformity with the requirements of European legislation, despite their nonbinding nature. This approach led to a dramatic expansion in the operations and scope of work of the European standardization bodies and rendered their work binding in many respects (Orviska et al. 2013, pp. 37–38, 44–45). The Development of Standardization in Israel In accordance with the above description, standardization activities in Mandatory Palestine developed as a private and voluntary initiative through bodies such as the Tel Aviv Municipality, the Jewish Agency, the Society of Engineers and Architects, and the Association of Industrialists, and in cooperation with the Mandatory government. The company operated until 1953 as a private and voluntary entity. A few years after the establishment of the State of Israel, the government recognized the importance of the institution for the economy, consumerism, and trade. Accordingly, it decided to regulate its operations in law as a body integrated in the government’s actions in these fields.5 The Standards Law passed in 1953 formalizes the operations of the private company as a statutory body called the Standards Institution of Israel (hereafter SII) and establishes that this is the only body empowered to establish Israeli standards (section 6(a)) and that these voluntary standards are not legally binding. The law left the structure of the body to its members. The cooperation between the different bodies involved in founding the private company and in formulating standards served as a starting point, and the legislature permitted the body to continue operating in this manner.6 According to the original wording of the law, the SII was required to include in the rules for formulating standards provisions regarding the participation of state authorities and representatives of manufacturers and consumers interested in a specific standard (section 7). The primary authority granted to the government was to order that a particular voluntary Israeli standard constitute a binding provision. The law also granted some limited powers to the government, including the  SB 5713 No. 116, 29 Jan. 1953, p. 30; Proposed Law 5712 No. 103, p. 110.  Explanatory comments to the proposed law; Knesset Protocols, Session 60, 26 Feb. 1952, Session 171, 2 Jan. 1953, pp. 495, 499. 5 6

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approval of the SII’s constitution and the rules for formulating standards. Thus the voluntary and consensual standards developed by SII became a regulatory source for the government in appropriate fields (section 8(a)). Collaborative Governance in Standardization Proceedings in Israel The Israeli model was based on the granting of official status to a private company that had formulated voluntary standards and empowering the government to use the voluntary standards as binding provisions. The cooperation with stakeholders that formed a fundamental component in the formulation of the standards was consistent with collaborative governance before this approach was conceptualized. By law, the SII serves as the sole arena for formulating standards in Israel. The standards are developed through a process that consists of consensus among the stakeholders. Hence, as for collaborative governance, there is no alternative route available for establishing standards, and the stakeholders are incentivized to cooperate (Ansell and Gash 2008, pp. 549–553). The legal obligation to include representatives of consumers and users in the proceedings has developed over the years, and a restriction was imposed on the membership of economic sectors, so that no sector may exceed one-third of the members of committees.7 This arrangement constituted a progressive approach in terms of participation at the time, by comparison with the arrangements adopted by standardization bodies in Europe and the US, some of which did not ensure the genuine participation of all sectors or an adequate balance between them. It should be noted that this situation has since changed and European standardization institutes have expanded the scale of consumer and public participation in order to enhance the legitimacy of standardization and expand its binding use (Büthe and Mattli 2011, Chapter 9). In the US, as well, an approach has gained prevalence that mandates the participation of diverse stakeholders on the basis of consent, transparency, and fairness, in order to prevent any particular sector from dominating the preparation of the standard.8  Standards Rules (Formulation of Israeli Standards), 5751-1991.  ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National Standards, The American National Standards Institute, January 2016: https://share.ansi. 7 8

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Given the importance of voluntary standards that often have a de facto binding character (Borraz 2007), the proceedings for establishing voluntary standardization maintain governance in the Israeli model, since government representatives are involved in the standardization process even in the case of voluntary nonbinding standards. However, the Israeli standards law certainly mandates a clear form of collaborative governance in terms of its authority to attribute binding status to voluntary standards. It must be emphasized that the government is not empowered to amend a voluntary standard it has selected, but solely to declare that the standard (or part thereof) is binding. Since the SII serves as the sole arena for formulating the voluntary standard required as the basis for a government standard, through a proceeding that involves stakeholders and government professionals, this process is consistent with the principles of collaborative governance.

Cooperation Between Stakeholders and Governance I will now turn to a discussion of the broader context of standardization in Israel and around the world, focusing on approaches to standardization from the perspective of governance. I will begin with the subject of cooperation between stakeholders—a central issue both in standardization and in the collaborative governance approach. As described above, the fields of standardization developed through participatory discourse including professionals, experts, and stakeholders from diverse fields of knowledge, both private and public. Accordingly, the term standardization often inherently implies a component of consensus. This component developed bottom-up, not forced by governments, and with very little political interference. The participatory component is described by some commentators as “governance by participating stakeholders,” and others describe the standardization bodies as the fourth branch, alongside the traditional three branches, that consist the European Union as a regulatory state (Borraz 2007, pp. 60–63; Orviska et al. 2013, p. 53). It should be emphasized that consensus does not necessarily imply agreement among all those involved, but rather majority agreement and org/shared%20documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/ Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2016_ANSI_Essential_Requirements.pdf (section 1.2) (accessed March 9, 2018).

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the absence of substantive opposition. In central bodies such as ISO and CEN, the opposition is weighted according to the population of each country, while there are others, such as the telecommunications body ETSI, where the weighting includes consideration of the membership fee paid by the objecting party (Orviska et al. 2013, p. 44). The governance aspect accrues from the use made by governmental bodies of standardization for the purpose of formulating regulation or by granting it binding force, as well as from the ramifications of the use of standardization in the fields of distributive justice and the allocation of resources (Büthe and Mattli 2011, Chapter 8 and Conclusion). Büthe and Mattli point out that different states enhance the adoption of voluntary standards in response to pressure from domestic economic sectors following the expansion of international trade and investment agreements and growing opportunities for global trade and the movement of goods. It seems that the governance aspects occur in a broad sense not only in the Israeli model but also in the US and in Europe, where the models share the perception and the use of standardization based on voluntary-­ consensual pattern as a proceeding of governance (Borraz 2007; Orviska et al. 2013; Spruyt 2001).9 Cooperation Between Stakeholders in Standardization Proceedings: An Advantage That Entails a Disadvantage Standardization has helped drive innovation and development in the industry, technology, engineering, and consumerism in numerous fields. At the same time, however, these advantages can constitute a disadvantage and have been the subject of criticism. The inherent cooperation between stakeholders constitutes the weak point of the system. Cooperation between stakeholders representing different interests is liable to entail distortions in which the stakeholders have an interest, so that the resulting standards may not constitute an optimal response to the interests of all the stakeholders, and particularly the weaker ones among them, nor to the public interest (Shapiro 2001).

9  See “Standards in Regulations” on the website of ANSI: http://www.nist.gov/standardsgov/standards-in-regulations.cfm; US-EU High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, Report on the Use of Voluntary Standards in Support of Regulation in the United States, October 2009: http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/Voluntary_Standards_USRegs.pdf

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In Israel, too, standardization has been criticized for enabling problematic cooperation that may facilitate the thwarting of competition, advancement of business interests, and empowerment of already strong players at the expense of new initiatives, creativity, and small- and medium-sized businesses. This criticism, at least in Israel, seems to amplify the disadvantages of standardization, sometimes to the point that it may ignore its merits. As discussed below, acknowledging, addressing, and limiting the flaws of standardization are preferable to its wholesale rejection. In the absence of de jure standardization, de facto standardization may occur, such as the competitive domination of a particular technology requiring de facto compatibility from secondary and rival products. Standards developed through a de jure proceeding are preferable to such de facto standardization and offer advantages to the economy compared to refraining from using this tool (Borraz 2007; Orviska et  al.  2013; Russell 2005; Spruyt 2001). Given the growing strength and rapid development of technology, the need for standardization is also increasing as a fundamental layer in the industry, entrepreneurship, commerce, and consumerism (Borraz 2007; Orviska et  al.  2013). Against the backdrop of the global economy, the network of trade agreements, the interest in harmonizing markets, and the constant focus on technology as the foundation for global trade, even critics of standardization recognize the importance of standards as regulatory arrangements (whether in the form of “hard” or “soft” regulation). They note that such arrangements are likely to continue to expand, with a concomitant rise in the weight of the bodies responsible for setting standards (Orviska et al. 2013; Büthe and Mattli 2011). It might have been assumed that an independent expert would be preferable to a stakeholder and that governmental bodies are suited to serve as independent bodies, developing standards and technological specifications through experts acting on their behalf. In many instances, however, governments lack the relevant knowledge for this purpose, as of example on pre-regulatory stages in developing and innovative fields. Governmental bodies lack tools for responding to the changing needs of the market without impeding the development of such new fields. Hence, there appear to be no real alternative to standardization based on the participation of stakeholders and private bodies. However, steps should be taken to improve the standardization proceedings, mitigate their inherent disadvantages, and enhance their legitimacy. This can be achieved by strengthening the commitment to transparency and

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accountability, ensuring that all stakeholders are included, formalizing the commitment to general public interests, and other aspects relating to the actions of the governmental bodies. As Rudder et al. note (2016, pp. 2, 4): By accepting private governance as private, people lose control over much of what shapes their lives, their opportunities, health and welfare. At the same time, to interfere with private governance is to risk losing some of its contributions to providing the high–level expertise needed for intelligent policymaking today, responsiveness to technological change, networks that reduce the global governance gap, and alternative to the state […] to the degree that private groups are making public choices about values to pursue, they should be evaluated on the grounds of democratic legitimacy, including the organizations’ inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability in their governance roles, just as government should be.10

International Standardization and the Role of State Standardization Bodies International standardization is formulated by voluntary international and regional bodies. This standardization forms a foundation for global trade and for binding standards in various countries, including Israel. The international standardization bodies are voluntary, independent, and “private” bodies. In general, the members of these bodies are state standardization bodies that are also, in most cases, voluntary and nongovernmental, though many countries fund these bodies and rely on their status. The development of standards in international or regional standardization bodies, like ISO, is by committees that include experts and representatives of the members, generally state standardization bodies. Meanwhile, in each of the state standardization bodies, a professional standardization committee (“mirror committee”) will be established. The professional standardization committee will consolidate the position of the professional national body concerning the proposed standardization to be introduced by way of an international or regional standard (Orviska et al. 2013, p. 42). Again, an exception to this general format is ETSI, whose direct members are representatives of the industry and the consumers rather than state standardization bodies (Orviska et al. 2013, p. 43).  For a similar approach, see Axelrod 1981.

10

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When the European Union presented its “New Approach” policy in the year 1985, considerable weight was shifted to the regional, pan-­ European, standardization bodies, with the goal of accelerating unification and removing trade barriers. Compliance with the standards of these bodies was defined as prima facie compliance with the requirements of the European directives relating to product safety. The outcomes of these international bodies exerted a strong influence on public and distributive interests (Büthe and Mattli 2011, p. 220). These developments in the de jure and de facto status of standardization raised awareness of standardization activities and led to questions relating to aspects of governance, legitimacy, democracy, and legality. The limited status of the nation-states in the standardization bodies, in contrast to the power of regulation effectively introduced on the basis of standardization, sharpened the question of the identity of those who formulate standardization, demanded clarification of their guiding interests, and raised discussion of the ability of public representatives to ensure the public interest. Accordingly, the strong influence of international standardization in commerce and globalization highlights the interest of mega-corporations in ensuring that international standards are compatible with their products. Such compatibility allows these players to influence the expansion of markets, access to new markets, and easier penetration and consolidation in markets while also forcing local manufacturers and products to ensure their consistency with these products. Accordingly, representatives of mega-corporations are often found on standardization committees (Orviska et al. 2013, p. 43). A familiar argument suggests that standardization in international bodies is influenced by the overrepresentation of the economic and commercial interests of these mega-corporations and by their expertise and enormous financial resources—and that this may come at the expense of the public interest (Orviska et  al.  2013, pp.  40–42; Büthe and Mattli 2011, pp. 224–226). One focus of the discussion has been on the governance-related questions created by the status quo, including the question of the democratic legitimacy of regulation by private bodies (Abbott and Snidal 2001). International standardization similarly creates difficulties in the field of international governance, which is defined by Abbott and Snidal (2001, p. 346) as “the formal and informal bundles of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate the social practices of state and nonstate actors in international affairs.” The complex interests of the state and

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nonstate bodies involved, and the manner of operation of the international standardization bodies, raise concern that in the absence of intervention and attention, international standardization may fail to yield the optimum decisions, whether in economic terms or in the context of other interests of the public or of citizens of the states. Once again, the reason for such doubts is the collaborative character of the processes, the identity of the key stakeholders and powers on the international level, the status of transnational industries, and the status of countries and their governments in the field of standardization. To these we should add the question of the identification of the state interest within a global trade arena that also includes powerful nonstate players and stakeholders. In this context, emphasis has been placed on the differences between small and large states and the manner in which they are represented. Borraz (2007) suggests that some states, particularly larger ones, may exercise influence in international forums in favor of their own economic and other political interests. One of the conclusions of this discussion is that defective participation in the proceeding for formulating standards may impair the long-term interests of those players who are not represented in the proceeding (Abbott and Snidal 2001, pp. 352–354).11 Despite these doubts, only limited changes have been made to the operating methods of the standardization bodies so far. Instead it is conventionally accepted that their activities are vital and are achieved through the participation of experts and stakeholders. The approach that emerges from the literature is that it is important to preserve the valuable advantages of standardization processes, even if monitoring and improvements are required in order to reduce their inherent defects and disadvantages (Orviska et al. 2013, p. 55; Rudder et al. 2016, Introduction). In recent years, the European Union has offered to increase the governance of the member states over standardization and to strengthen the representation of the public interests of the member states and of general public interests during standardization proceedings. International standardization bodies are being urged to extend the participation of the stakeholders and to ensure the transparency and fairness of the standardization proceedings.12 There is an expectation that the standardization 11  For an analysis of economic inefficiencies and other distortions in international standardization proceedings, see Abbott and Snidal 1. 12  Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European Standardisation, Amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC

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bodies will act to increase the representation of public interests, including consumers and small- and medium-sized businesses (Mattli and Woods 2009, Chapter One). Alongside the recognition of the important role international standardization can play in strengthening the European economy and promoting economic growth, as well as in encouraging integration, competition, and innovation, there is also a recognition of the inherent duality of the standardization proceedings and the need for improvements (Bach and Newman 2007). The emphasis is on an attempt to prevent distortions and defects in the activities of the international standardization bodies in order to enhance their democratic legitimacy, reduce the risk that they will be taken hostage by narrow financial interests, promote transparency and accountability, and avoid the neglect of general public interests, including the environment, equality, and other interests that are not defined in growth terms, as well as specific interests of certain countries or types of countries (Büthe and Mattli 2011, pp. 220–225). Some commentators have identified the emergence of a new world order that is not necessarily grounded in democratic values (and certainly does not include the direct representation of consumers or citizens per se). In this world order, governance rests with new governors (Büthe and Mattli 2011). These arrangements are determined in international or regional forums and effectively bind the governments of different countries. International standardization bodies have acquired a quasi-­ transnational status, whereby states and private bodies use collaborative governance to create arrangements that de facto bind these states and are accepted by others. Expanding globalization and the growing need for international standardization in technological fields have created a situation whereby states have an interest in maintaining national bodies that can represent their interests in the international forums that develop standards. Reinforcing these state bodies and ensuring adherence to the rules of representation and to their presence in international forums promote the securing of the state’s interests in international standardization and in the fields of innovation, industry, and global trade, thereby promoting and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/ EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Official Journal of the European Union L 316/12 (14.11.12). See the EU legislation website: http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32012R1025

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national, economic, and public interests (Büthe and Mattli 2011, Chapters Eight and Nine). Growing awareness of public needs and of the need to include all the stakeholders has also recently been recognized as a function of the state standardization bodies that are members of the regional or international standardization bodies. The challenge this entails is considerable, since increasing participation and transparency are usually processes that extend the development time and contradict the interest of reducing the timeframe for standardization (Orviska et al. 2013, p. 55). Accordingly, key state standardization bodies, such as the BSI in the UK, AFNOR in France, or DIN in Germany, are active in the European standardization system and in the coordination of the standardization committees (Orviska et al. 2013, p. 51), thereby ensuring the optimum representation of the interests of their respective countries and the advancement of the industry, technology, and public interests. Changes in the Standardization Model in Israel over the Past Decade As a small economy in global terms, the Israeli economy requires a strong affinity to international standardization in order to promote its integration in international trade and benefit from the accruing advantages and competition. Since the 1980s, Israeli government policy has encouraged consistency between Israeli and international standardization. Since the turn of the century, there has been a growing demand to expose the economy to competition through imports and to adopt the principles of free trade and globalization in part on the grounds that this can help cut the cost of living (Lang 2014).13 These changes are consistent with the position of bodies in the Israeli economy whose status has strengthened over this same period, such as the Association of Chambers of Commerce,14 and the rising political strength of domestic players active in trade and imports. This has been mirrored by a decline in the strength of domestic manufacturers 13  Government Presentation to the Knesset Committee during the deliberations on Amendment 12 to the Standards Law: http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/ Economics/Pages/CommitteeMaterial.aspx?ItemID=2008682 14  By way of example, see HCJ 7428/01 Association of Chambers of Commerce v Minister of Industry and Trade.

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and industrialists. Israeli standardization activities have been subjected to criticism by the above-mentioned players and by those seeking to cut the cost of living, and in some instances this criticism has challenged the very legitimacy of the standardization system and highlighted instances when domestic Israeli standardization has prevented or restricted foreign imports. More specifically, it has been claimed that interested parties, particularly domestic industrialists and some key importers, have used standardization to advance domestic commercial interests or to curtail competition, so that standardization is directly responsible for the cost of living (Lang 2014).15 The disadvantage of the participation of the stakeholders has been depicted as the principal problem. The criticism has not sought to strengthen the domestic standardization capability in order to promote professional standardization that balances the different needs or moderates its impact through transparency and other processes. Rather, critics have shown an automatic preference for international standardization and have even raised doubts regarding the need for a domestic standardization body. According to this approach, the Israeli economy has no need for domestic standardization requirements, and it is sufficient that products meet foreign standardization. This approach also belittles the importance of clearly local requirements relating to consumer instructions or warnings in the Hebrew language.16 According to these positions, and with the support of an attitude that seeks to strengthen the “government’s governance,” amendments have been introduced to the Standards Law (five amendments have been adopted over the past decade). These amendments foster three key changes: strengthening the status of foreign standards and the narrowing of the authority of the SII to examine their suitability for conditions in Israel or to establish local standards; changes in the SII’s working method, the composition of the standardization committees, and the manner in which voluntary and binding standards are developed and formalized; and 15  See also the media reports of the State Comptroller and the position of government and public players, including the Minister of Economy and the Chairperson of the Knesset Reforms Committee: https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001219707; https:// www.israelhayom.co.il/article/521989; https://www.themarker.com/smb/1.2079684; https://www.themarker.com/news/macro/1.4552092 16   For example, see http://www.davar1.co.il/22658/; https://www.ynet.co.il/ articles/0,7340,L-5121968,00.html; http://www.mako.co.il/news-channel2/EconomyNewcast-q3_2017/Article-b4788c05e285e51004.htm?Partner=rss

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eliminating the SII’s monopoly over the inspection of the conformity of imported products to Israeli binding standards. The first two changes are the subject of this chapter, and their outcome is a reduction in the level of participation, the scope of impact of local expertise, and the ability to establish local arrangements with the participation of the various stakeholders, alongside a strengthening of the status of the government in proceedings for the development and establishment of voluntary and binding standards. Thus the delegitimization of a proceeding rooted in the collaborative governance approach has been formalized, its use has been reduced, and numerous restrictions have been placed on its implementation. The most significant amendment in this context is Amendment No. 12 to the Standards Law, adopted in 2016. This amendment changed the arrangements for the appointment of SII’s officials and the composition of its organs and imposed restrictions on the representation of industrial and commercial stakeholders in the standards developing committees. Special status was granted to the government representatives in those proceedings. At the same time, restrictions were imposed on the proceedings for developing standards; the subjugation of Israeli standardization to foreign standards was enhanced, so that deviation from them requires the approval of government players; and the authority of the ministers responsible for economic fields to use for regulation purposes domestic standards that are not the international ones was restricted. In 2018, another amendment was adopted further curtailing the SII as authority to develop standards planned to be binding ones, and further powers were granted to the government to prevent any deviation in the binding standards from international standardization.

The Meaning and Ramifications of the Changes for the Status of the Standards Institution of Israel Adoption of International Standardization While from as early as the 1980s the Standards Law instructed the SII to follow international standardization, its amended version goes further, mandating the sweeping adoption of standardization defined as international standardization. Moreover, the amended law notes that international standardization does not necessarily refer to standardization established by international bodies or applying globally: it is sufficient that

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the said standardization “pertains in developed countries with significant markets” or constitutes “other international documents similar in essence to international standardization current among developed countries with significant markets.”17 This has been accompanied, according to the new route, by the restriction of proceedings for examining the compatibility of international standardization for conditions in Israel. Accordingly, the main standards applying in the Israeli economy will be foreign ones, whether voluntary or binding, and, in general, these will be enacted without adaptation to the special needs of the Israeli public, local physical conditions, or other local suitability, such as consumer protection. Examples of such adaptation include the modification of water filters to suit the “hard” water in Israel18 and provisions for the adaptation of low-­ floor buses to the height of sidewalks in Israel.19 Thus, according to the European requirements rooted in the “New Approach,” states are not restricted in establishing domestic standardization but may not impose trade restrictions liable to impair the movement of goods. States can still select a specific standard appropriate for their conditions and impose requirements if these are justified, for example, in the case of scientific justification (Barak-Erez and Perez 2011, pp. 116–122, 139). In addition, states are not prevented from ensuring adaptation to the national language, to other standards applying in that state, and so forth. Reducing the Participation of Stakeholders in Standardization Proceedings Flexibility of action and the possibility for the stakeholders that are members of the SII to initiate or develop standardization now depend on constraints that are external to the collaborative process and on the authorities granted to the governmental players. These restrictions apply not only to stakeholders motivated by overtly commercial interests or to the use of standardization to curtail competition. The amendments have also reduced the SII’s ability to work proactively, respond to entrepreneurship and innovation, and act in a bottom-up manner as an institution holding expertise and professional status.  Section 7(B)(1) of the Standards Law.  http://www.sii.org.il/298-1002-he/SII.aspx?LastFolderId=288 19  See the report of the Knesset Research and Information Center on access to public transportation: https://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m04036.pdf 17 18

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These restrictions are liable to impair the SII’s ability to assist local bodies and domestic public interests and to meet the unique needs of local consumers. An example of this is the standard Hebrew keyboard defined by the SII.20 Undermining the professional status of the SII is also liable to impair the status and scope of its participation in international standardization bodies. By contrast, as described above, European countries are taking steps to strengthen the status of their national standardization bodies in the context of the development of international standards and to enhance the states’ governance in this arena. The SII and the government ostensibly recognize the importance of participation in the international standardization committees and are seeking to promote the involvement of Israeli industrialists in this process.21 However, in light of the changes that have been made and the weakening of the SII’s professional status, it is likely that the representation of Israel and its national interests will also be impaired in the medium and long term.22 It is unclear whether the decision makers examined the disadvantages that result from the restriction of aspects of collaborative governance and the impact this has on the state’s standardization capabilities from the perspective of the ability to influence the international standardization arena and in terms of the risk of heightened exposure to the disadvantages of international standardization. It is also unclear whether they took into account the long-term significance of maintaining a domestic standardization capability in the context of promoting Israeli industries on the global stage and advancing innovation of the Israeli economy within global integration. Standardization is of unquestioned importance in the fields of telecommunication, computers, the information revolution, and similar areas which the Israeli government determines will play a key role in the development of the national economy. With this in mind, has there been a discussion of the contribution that meaningful domestic standardization may make to advancing Israel’s economic interests through integration in

20  http://www.sii.org.il/44-14656-HE/SII.aspx; http://www.sii.org.il/44-3738-he/ SII.aspx?pos=244 21  https://portal.sii.org.il/heb/standardization/InternationalStandard/.aspx 22  Ms. Ziva Patir, former director-general of the SII, served in senior positions in the ISO— deputy president and chair of the technical executive; she also served as a board member in the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). These positions helped to enhance the senior status of the SII and of Israeli industry. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%96 %D7%99%D7%95%D7%94_%D7%A4%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%A8

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global innovation in these fields and through the creation of a sustainable economic infrastructure? The case of the Israeli innovative Netafim irrigation drippers illustrates the ability of a state, even one as small as Israel, to influence the formulation of standardization in an innovative field in a manner that ensures its own interests, including economic interests. On the other hand, international standardization is liable to harm Israeli manufacturing and mitigate against competition in its market if the state does not influence the development of standards. An example of this is the possible adoption of a US standard in the field of fire safety in ceramic protective canvases.23 It is doubtful whether it can be confirmed that attention was indeed given to the manner in which other countries have addressed the disadvantages of international standardization and adopted a different approach to standardization—one that responds to specific public and consumer interests (Barak-Erez and Perez 2011, p.  138). I believe that action to strengthen transparency and the balancing of the interests in the SII, while maintaining maximum professional flexibility and discretion, could have ensured the institution’s capabilities and strengths and encouraged its sustainable integration in international forums alongside other important standardization institutions. This would have advanced Israel’s long-term interests in various fields.

Conclusion: Collaborative Governance in Israel and the Field of Standardization The field of standardization in Israel, in other countries, and in international bodies exposes an inherent duality: it represents the benefit that accrues from the participation of stakeholders alongside the structural disadvantages that result from this participation, illustrating the defects that mar processes to formulate regulation with the participation of stakeholders. There is a constant need to examine the extent of representation of relevant players, their status in the processes, their access to information, 23  Netafim, http://www.icid.org/res_irri_.isie.html; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Drip_irrigation; Ceramic Protective Canvases, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article. aspx?did=1001200162 Regarding the importance of involvement in international standardization for technological entrepreneurs, see the comments by Avi Licht, former Deputy Attorney General, at the Calcalist conference in June 2018: https://www.calcalist.co.il/conference/ articles/0,7340,L-3740167,00.html

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and the transparency of the proceedings. These insights have been recognized over recent decades in various countries, including in the context of the international standardization bodies, alongside growing recognition of the importance of standardization for regulation. The field of standardization constitutes a model of collaborative governance. Although the field was formalized in Israel prior to the conceptualization of this approach, it represents a case study that can clarify our understanding of the model. Concerns regarding the suitability of the collaborative governance model for the establishment of regulation were discussed in an earlier article (Harel-Fisher 2016, p. 163). However, the field of standardization shows that collaborative governance may also constitute an optimal proceeding for the formulation of regulation and an example of an area where the participation of stakeholders optimizes the formulation of regulation, subject to an appropriate response to the disadvantages of such participation. The field of standardization around the world has sparked discussion of aspects relating to private and global regulation, governance, democratic legitimacy, and the impact of global corporations beyond the economic sphere. It is clear today that the impact of the international bodies involved in regulating various areas of life, whose activities include the participation of powerful nonstate stakeholders, is expanding and requires constant examination in order to protect state interests, equality, and general public interests. Collaborative governance emphasizes the commitment of all sides to the proceeding and agreement not to turn to alternative proceedings, as fundamental characteristics of collaboration between stakeholders. The standardization proceeding in Israel also entailed cooperation without the possibility for alternative proceedings, recognizing that a collaborative proceeding is required for standardization and constitutes a necessary imperative. Despite this, and despite the international approach supporting the participation of stakeholders in standardization, while reducing the accompanying disadvantages, these aspects have been restricted by means of an alternative proceeding established by the Israeli government and elements with political influence, some of which also have interests in the field of international commerce. The initiatives by which the legislation was amended illustrate the dependence of the collaborative governance proceeding on the commitment of all parties to this proceeding and show that parties may violate this commitment even if the collaborative governance model is required for the optimum advancement of the stakeholders’ overall long-term interests.

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The specific instance of the field of standardization enables us to offer an evaluation regarding the implementation and benefit of the collaborative governance model: identification of the conditions for ongoing public and political commitment and ongoing public legitimacy for collaborative governance proceedings; location of ways to ensure the stability of the collaborative governance arrangement; and, at least, an understanding of its conduct as a conditional arrangement, as long as the stakeholders who hold political power are interested in it or satisfied with its outcomes. As Spruyt (2001) notes, political players and considerations may prevent standardization even when it ensures a clear public interest. Political support for the use of collaborative governance is also not free of interests and may reflect regulatory captivity on the local or international level. The insights of collaborative governance also help us to understand the inherent disadvantages of global conduct of the kind and of its expanding to different fields, as the conclusions derived from the standardization field might be considered for other fields as well. Discussion of these issues may be informed by the insights drawn from the field of standardization regarding governance based on the participation of stakeholders; the status of stakeholders who lack political power; enhancing transparency in the proceedings; and protecting public and state interests. States that understand the nature, advantages, and disadvantages of these methods will be best placed to promote their own interests and their citizens. It is recommended that an effort be made to learn from the field of state and international standardization, voluntary and binding, and from Israel’s experience. Such learning can enrich the above-mentioned general insights and examine them prior to the use of the collaborative governance model in other spheres and particularly for the formulation of regulation.

References Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. (2001). International ‘Standards’ and International Governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(3), 345–370. https://doi. org/10.1080/13501760110056013. Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032. Axelrod, R. (1981). The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists. American Political Science Review, 75(2), 306–318. Bach, D., & Newman, A.  L. (2007). The European Regulatory State and the Global Public Policy: Micro-institutions, Macro-influence. Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 827–846.

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Barak-Erez, D., & Perez, O. (2011). Hamishpat haminhali beyisrael vehaetgar haglobali [Israeli Administrative Law and the Global Challenge]. Iyunei Mishpat [TAU Law Review], 34, 93–140. Borraz, O. (2007). Governing Standards: The Rise of Standardization Processes in France and in the EU. Governance, 20, 57–84. Büthe, T., & Mattli, W. (2011). The New Global Rulers: The privatization of Regulation in the World Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, ISBN 9780691144795 . Harel-Fisher, E. (2016). Haim titachen meshilut meshulevet bitchum haasdara beyisrael? [Is Collaborative Governance Possible in the Field of Regulation in Israel?]. Ma’asei Mishpat [Law and Social Change], 8, 163. Lang, A. (2014, November 11). The Committee to Enhance Competition and Remove Obstacles in the Field of Imports. Retrieved from: http://www.economy.gov.il/publications/publications/doclib/committeeconclusionsreport.pdf Mattli, W., & Woods, N. (Eds.). (2009). The Politics of Global Regulation. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/ j.ctt7rgmj. Orviska, M., Nemec, J., & Hudson, J. (2013). Standardization and the European Standards Organizations. Central European Journal of Public Policy, 7(2), 36–59. Perlman, N. (2016). Standardization and Inspection of Compatibility: Europe and  the US  – A Comparative Survey. Knesset Legal Office. Retrieved from: http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Info/LegalDepartmentSurveys/Survey 271116.doc Rudder, C., Fritschler, A. L., & Choi, Y. J. (2016). Public Policymaking by Private Organizations. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Russell, A. L. (2005). Standardization in History: A Review Essay with an Eye to the Future. In S.  Bolin (Ed.), The Standards Edge: Future Generations (pp. 247–260). Ann Arbor: Sheridan Press. [The copy cited was retreived from Russell’s site: arussell.org. pp. 1–17]. Russell, A.  L. (2006). Industrial Legislatures: The American System of Standardization. In IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission), International Standardization as a Strategic Tool: Commended Papers from the IEC Centenary Challenge 2006. IEC, Switzerland, ISBN 978-2-8318-8867-5, pp. 70–79. Shapiro, C. (2001). Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion? In R. Dreyfus, D. L. Zimmermann, & H. First (Eds.), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Spruyt, H. (2001). The Supply and Demand of Governance in Standard Setting: Insights from the Past. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(3), 371–391.

SECTION IV

The Place of Civil Society in Collaborative Governance Arrangements

CHAPTER 10

Civil Society Organizations in Collaborative Governance: Cross-sector Partnerships as a Test Case Michal Almog-Bar

Introduction Cross-sector partnerships, a distinct type of collaborative governance, have in recent years attracted increasing attention from governments, civil society organizations, foundations, philanthropists, and business organizations. Such partnerships are perceived as an essential and desirable strategy for coping with complex public challenges that include increased social needs, reduced resources for addressing those needs, and the growing complexity of various social problems and phenomena (Almog-Bar and Zychlinski 2010; Talias et al. 2010; Bryson et al. 2006). The literature offers various definitions of the term “cross-sector partnership.” Broadly speaking, however, it may be defined as an organizational framework (formal and/or informal), within which ongoing reciprocal relationships and exchanges between two or more sectors M. Almog-Bar (*) Center for the Study of Civil Society and Philanthropy, Paul Baerwald School of Social Work and Social Welfare, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_10

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(government, nonprofit sector, and the business sector) take place, with the aim of achieving a result with added value that is unobtainable through the activity of one sector alone (Babiak and Thibault 2009; Bryson et al. 2006; Gazley and Brudney 2007). Within the context of such cross-sector partnerships, the partners share resources, responsibilities and costs, as well as decision-making processes and execution, to achieve the added value that cannot be generated through the activity of one sector alone. The partners in such a relationship are supposed to maintain their primary identity, their autonomy, values and vision, but they work together towards a common goal. While some definitions of governance include various types of partnership arrangements, in this chapter I distinguish between collaborative governance, in which the status and accountability of the public agency is central, and one or more public agency (state, government ministry, government authority, local authority and the like) engage directly with nongovernmental parties (Ansell 2012; Lahat, Sher-Hadar, & Galnoor, introduction in this volume), and cross-sector partnerships, where the aim is to create a more equitable status for all partners. In collaborative governance, the public agency promotes activities aimed at advancing public goals or providing public services, and is usually the agent directing and holding power in the process. In cross-sector partnerships, in contrast, there is an emphasis on a less hierarchical and more equitable sharing of government authority, responsibilities and activities with the civil society organizations and the business sector. Such partnership aims to include the active participation of all organizations (governmental and nongovernmental) in setting policy and its implementation, together with joint responsibility for the outcomes of the partnership (Coston 1998). Cross-sector partnership, then, is distinguishable from other forms of collaboration, cooperation and participation, in that the Author’s Note: Some of the materials presented in this chapter are based on Almog-Bar, M. & Schmid, H. (2018). Cross-sector partnerships in human services: Insights and organizational dilemmas. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 47(4s), 119–138 and some of the findings are derived from research on cross-sector partnerships in Israel, funded by the Government-Civil Society Initiative, a partnership between seven government ministries and the JDC-Israel Institute for Leadership and Governance. The author wishes to thank her students, Roni Lior, Yael Hadas, Hadas Bar Siman Tov, Eitan Dunitz, Gilad Hadas, Uri Carmi, Alon Kuba, and Ortal Wasser, from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem who assisted in the collection of data.

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mechanisms for governance and decision-making are joint and actively involve partners from different sectors, and also aspire to be less hierarchical and more equitable in decision-making processes and implementation (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2018). The emergence of cross-sector partnerships on public issues and the growing interest of academic research in this subject are the result of significant social and economic transformations that have taken place in Western society over the last three decades. These processes have changed the relationship between the three sectors: the government, the business sector, and civil society, as well as the traditional division of labor between them. This change is described in the literature using the concept “new public governance,” which describes an alternative model for political and institutional organization based on governance composed of a network of partner institutions—governmental, social and economic—working together in policy networks that involve the various stakeholders and create collaborations between the public sector, business sector, and civil society. New public governance offers greater public participation, social activism, public responsibility, and participatory democracy, which involves the citizens concerned at different levels of policy-making and implementation (Osborne 2006; Talshir and Tsur 2013). Cross-sector partnerships are seen in this approach as a key tool for solving complex social challenges and addressing large-scale social problems. Cross-sector partnership is perceived as a tool that can better address the failures of each sector, allowing for flexibility, inclusion and better adaptation to changing situations, among other things, because of its ability to respond rapidly in comparison with cumbersome bureaucratic solutions provided by the public and government sectors (Bryson et al. 2006). The two types of reasons for choosing a cross-sector partnership as a tool for dealing with social challenges are first, the utilitarian, which focuses on the contribution of the partnership to the quality of services, their efficiency, their effectiveness, and their adaptation to the target audience—the state often uses these arguments to justify cross-sector partnerships; and, second, the normative, which justifies the selection of a cross-sector partnership as a form of action based on values such as equity, strengthening civil society, creating social capital, and the inclusion of the target population in policy-making processes (Gazley and Brudney 2007). This chapter seeks to critically examine the status and roles of civil society organizations in cross-sector partnerships that constitute systems of collaborative governance, as well as the emerging relationships between

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these organizations and governmental organizations within the framework of the cross-sector partnerships. It presents and discusses the findings of research conducted in Israel in recent years on the activities of civil society organizations in cross-sector partnerships. The chapter begins with a presentation of transformations in civil society over recent decades and of the changing context of government and civil society relations focused on the rise of the partnership paradigm. Then, it will present key issues regarding the activities of civil society organizations in cross-sector partnerships that have emerged in recent studies conducted by the author in Israel. Finally, it will discuss the status and roles of civil society organizations in cross-sector partnerships, the emerging relationships between these organizations and organizations from the governmental sector, and the implications of these arrangements for civil society organizations. Civil Society Over the past three decades, civil society1 has become an important arena in which organizations external to the state or the free market operate, provide social services and promote disadvantaged and marginalized populations (Lorentzen 2010). Civil society is perceived as an alternative public sphere in which various actors can collectively address issues of common interest, initiate new policy solutions, act to advance common goals, and influence public and state affairs (Cohen 1995; Edwards 2004). Participation in civil society is based on the concept of citizenship, whereby citizens of a democratic regime are entitled to rights such as freedom of association and freedom of expression, which enable them to act, organize, and be involved in various ways in shaping society and its institutions and in determining public policy. Therefore, civil society activity is also an expression of participatory democracy (Mutz 2006). Although civil society encompasses various forms of activity, formal organizations are a central and active part of it. These organizations, called “nonprofit organizations,” are formally organized, with a certain degree of institutionalization, stability, and continuity. They are institutionally differentiated from the public sector and are not officially subordinate to 1  Civil society is defined as follows: “civil society is the sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals, located between the family, the state and the market in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests” (Anheier 2004, p. 22).

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any units of government. These organizations do not distribute profits. If any profits do derive from an organization’s activity, they are re-invested in the organization towards achieving its goals. Such organizations have independent management mechanisms that are not controlled by the free market, and furthermore, they enjoy inputs from volunteerism and charitable donations (Salamon and Anheier 1997). From a legal standpoint, in Israel such organizations are incorporated as nonprofit organizations, public benefit companies, and philanthropic foundations. Civil society organizations play a diverse range of roles, including the provision of services, policy advocacy, civic and political engagement, promoting initiatives for social change, social entrepreneurship, and promotion of values and beliefs (Anheier 2004). The social mission of these organizations includes the advancing of social visions aimed at promoting justice, equality, and well-being of individuals, groups, and communities. Their work entails the active and significant involvement of volunteers, members, and clients, and a democratic and participatory organizational structure (Zychlinski 2010). Finally, civil society organizations are characterized by their ability to generate social capital, defined as networks of cooperation and trust between citizens (Putnam 2000). Israeli civil society is among the largest in the world in terms of the number of registered nonprofit organizations per number of residents, as well as in the scope of their economic activity. In 2016 there were 43,000 registered organizations in Israel, compared to 17,000 in the early 1990s. Over the past decade, some 1500–1700 new organizations have registered in Israel each year. However, only 20,000 organizations submitted their annual reports to the Corporations Authority in 2016 and are considered active. The share of civil society organizations in Israel’s gross domestic product and the rate of employment in civil society organizations are relatively high in international comparisons (Salamon et al. 2013). The Rise of the Partnership Paradigm: The Changing Context of the Government and Civil Society Relationship The growth and expansion of the activities of nonprofit organizations that gained momentum in civil society in most countries during the 1980s and 1990s has largely occurred within the context of the “New Public Management,” a school of thought which argued that shortcomings in public service operations could be overcome by introducing business-style management approaches and practices such as strategic planning,

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management by objectives, and incentive-based reward systems into the administration of the public sector, and favored outsourcing many government services to nongovernmental private and nonprofit organizations through contracts (Lane 2000). In light of critiques of the new public management approach, which emphasized the inapplicability and inefficiency of business practices in the implementation of public policy and the provision of public services (Flynn 2002; Rhodes 1997), a new approach, the “new public governance” emerged in the early 2000s. New Public Governance focuses upon interorganizational service networks and the role of government in orchestrating a wide range of third parties, stressing service effectiveness and outcomes that emerge as a result of interactions between public service organizations and their environments (Osborne 2010; Salamon and Toepler 2015). In contrast to the NPM approach, which emphasizes reliance on market mechanisms to assume functions formerly performed by governments, the NPG emphasizes the significant strengths that nonprofit organizations can bring to the delivery of public services (Salamon and Toepler 2015). In particular, nonprofit organizations are thought to have significant advantages over other types of providers of public services including unique knowledge deriving from close proximity to distinctive user groups, greater capacity for tailoring holistic services to client needs, flexibility, and ability to innovate; expertise in mobilizing volunteers and private charitable resources, and advantages for promoting important social values such as diversity, a sense of community, and civic activism; and capacities to democratize public services through co-production and user involvement (Bode and Brandsen 2014; Pestoff and Brandsen 2010). For these reasons, the NPG approach calls for extensive collaboration between the government and the nonprofit sector in the delivery of public services (Salamon and Toepler 2015). With the rise of the “new public governance” approach, there has been in recent years a growing understanding of nonprofit-government relations as partnerships, worldwide. Since the early 2000s the partnership approach has prevailed as a model for nonprofit-government relations in developed countries, linking government to nonprofit organizations in a wide assortment of fields (Bode and Brandsen 2014; Salamon and Toepler 2015). The partnership approach emphasizes the interdependence between the state and various social actors, including civil society organizations, and the emergence of extensive, diverse patterns of cooperation,

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collaboration, and coordination between them in the provision of services and in policy-making. In the inter-sectoral encounter that is part of crosssector partnerships, there is a high probability of conflict and/or competition between values and institutional logics that are derived from differences in the fundamental values that underlie the activity of each of the sectors (Bryson et al. 2006). Choosing partnership as a strategy for action exposes the partners to both advantages and disadvantages, risks and benefits. Some of the main advantages and benefits of cross-sector partnerships are: the ability to deal with common problems more effectively than their handling by a single sector, reducing environmental uncertainty (strategic and economic), reducing overlaps and duplications, potential for cost savings, better utilization and leveraging of resources, organizational learning, high quality service or final product, access to new skills or markets, strengthening the sense of community/social belonging, promotion of issues and processes that otherwise would not be expressed in the public sphere, and promotion of public responsibility and reducing the risk entailed in one body acting alone. The disadvantages and risks include: blurring of the boundaries between sectors, a reduction in their autonomy, the time and financial resources invested in the establishment and maintenance of the partnership, the costs of investment in oversight and maintenance mechanisms, the possible reduction in the public responsibility of the government, harm to quality of service, equality of service, and even to democracy itself since participants in shaping public policy include actors who did not receive a public mandate (Gazley and Brudney 2007; Person et al. 2009). Moreover, the power gaps between civil society organizations and government raise concerns that the involvement of civil society organizations in the design and provision of public services will lead to their over-dependence on the government, to changes in the unique role they play and the contributions they provide as part of civil society, and to the bureaucratization and over-­ specialization of civil organizations (Furneaux and Ryan 2014; Phillips and Rathgeb Smith 2014). In general, research from around the world shows that the main advantage of cross-sector partnerships for civil society organizations lies in access to financial resources, the expansion of their activity, and integration of new knowledge that contributes to the development and improvement of communications systems, management processes, and services (Alexander and Nank 2009; Simo and Bies 2007). However, civil society organizations

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that operated within the scope of cross-sector partnerships felt that they must operate in complex, multi-player environments that required a change in the way they acted vis-à-vis the environment (Gazley and Brudney 2007; Stone 2000). While the NPG approach and the partnership policies derived from it have gained prominence in many countries in recent years, the consequences of these policies are not clear yet. To date, there is only limited empirical evidence on the actual contribution of the nonprofit sector to public service delivery and to public governance (Pestoff and Brandsen 2010).

Key Issues in Cross-Sector Partnerships in Israel In order to examine the unique involvement of civil society organizations in collaborative governance arrangements, this section will present findings regarding the activities of civil society organizations in cross-sector partnerships, which have emerged from research in this area in Israel in recent years (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2018; Almog-Bar and Zychlinski 2010, 2014; Schmid and Almog-Bar, 2013, 2016a, b). In accordance with the definition of cross-sector partnership presented above, these studies examined cross-sector partnerships that were initiatives, projects, or programs with active participation of representatives of organizations from at least two sectors (government sector, civil society, and business sector). Partnerships were selected in which an active and long-term joint governance mechanism was identified with the active presence of representatives of organizations from different sectors, who are responsible for decision-making for the partnership and its management. The partnerships studied had operated for at least three years. The Establishment and Development of Cross-Sector Partnerships The findings reveal that in the cross-sector partnerships that have been studied in Israel, civil society organizations are the primary initiators of cross-sector partnerships. In contrast, government and business organizations were less prominently involved in initiating the establishment of cross-sector partnerships (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2018). The main motives driving civil society organizations to establish or join cross-sector partnerships are ideological, professional, and financial.

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Ideological motives: Cross-sector partnerships and inter-sectoral action are perceived by civil society organizations as a means of advancing and implementing broad social changes at the national level, such as creating diversity in the Israeli employment market or changing perceptions of people with disabilities in Arab society. Cross-sector partnerships are perceived as a unique tool that enables the enlistment and leveraging of the significant resources and forces that are fundamental to the enactment of large-scale social changes, as well as a means of crafting better quality services for their clients. Professional motives: These include improving coordination, working together, and reducing competition between organizations operating in similar fields, improving organizational reputation, increasing the visibility of organizations and enhancing their access to financing entities, as well as conserving time and resources, improving organizational capabilities through learning from other organizations, and generating public discourse on topics that may otherwise be lacking. Financial considerations: Younger organizations attached great importance to financial considerations, indicating the importance of partnerships as a tool for developing and pooling resources for young organizations that are generally less financially sound. Other prominent motives driving organizations to cooperate include the drive to gain access to centers of decision-making and distribution of resources and to leverage this for the purpose of raising resources. Cross-sector partnerships seem to be a particularly important source of resources for civil society organizations operating in an environment characterized by a lack of funding. It seems that cross-sector partnerships are a channel for increasing and securing government funding for the activities of civil society organizations. The findings reveal that the nongovernmental organizations consider the government to be a major player without whom it is not worthwhile promoting social projects. Cross-sector partnerships require financing for the operating costs of budget-intensive national level social projects, which civil society organizations usually cannot afford to finance on their own, hence the need to engage the government in these systems has increased. The findings have also revealed that it is necessary to partner with the government just so that it will not wriggle out of its social responsibility to promote welfare and social projects, and to forestall a situation in which civil society organizations and business organizations have to replace the government in its social functions. Furthermore, the government is seen by representatives of civil society organizations as helping in the

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enlistment of businesses to cross-sector partnerships, because it enables them to meet and establish close relations with government representatives thereby advancing their agendas. The studies reveal considerable differences in terms of organizational culture and work processes between the civil society partners and partners from other sectors. The government was perceived as a rigid and bureaucratic entity that focuses mainly on “routine,” and therefore less available to develop new initiatives. In order to deal with these gaps in organizational cultures and work processes, representatives of the three sectors agreed that clarifying and discussing as early as possible any differences and gaps in cultures, perceptions, and work processes is critical to building effective cross-sector partnerships and removing barriers to future collaborative work and maintaining it over time. Preliminary meetings of the leaders of the organizations, and workshops and conferences held prior to entering the partnership were found to contribute to creating trust between the partners and to achieving the partnership’s goals and outcomes. Socialization processes also affect the willingness of the partners to share information, resources, and organizational and professional abilities. The research reveals that the process of preparation and creating the will to enter into partnership relations is critical to their success and the achievement of the partnership’s goals. Considering the differences in perceptions, cultures, and work processes, civil society organizations have pointed out the importance of intermediaries in processes of building and maintaining partnerships between the government, civil society organizations, and business sector organizations. These intermediaries were usually veteran and influential civil society and philanthropic organizations that enjoyed good relations with the government and the business sector, and were perceived as reliable by government agencies based on previous cooperation experience, such as JDC-Israel and Sheatufim. Intermediary organizations played a significant role in creating the initial connections between civil society organizations and government agencies, in intervening and mediating when gaps and disagreements arose, and with funding and assisting in the establishment of mechanisms for managing and operating the partnership. The involvement of intermediary organizations was also perceived as helping position the joint project externally. In the case of one particular partnership, the nonprofit organizations involved stated that the involvement of the intermediary organization, a key civil society organization, was important in recruiting additional organizations for the project promoted

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by the partnership. This was because other civil society organizations view it as a source of resources and connections to the government. However, there is a limited number of Intermediary civil society organizations that mediate partnerships in Israel. Some of the civil society organizations that took part in cross-sector partnerships have raised questions about the central role played by a small number of intermediary organizations in Israeli partnerships. They argue that the close ties with government and the concentration of money, power, knowledge and experience in setting up and managing partnerships in the hands of just a few civil society organizations, make it nearly impossible to promote national level projects with the government without one of these organizations being involved in the partnership. This situation can create difficulties for smaller organizations seeking to promote partnerships at the local and national levels, who feel they must first connect with one of the intermediary organizations in order to create cross-sector partnerships. The Structure and Governance of Cross-Sector Partnerships Another significant issue that has emerged from research on cross-sector partnerships in Israel is the structure and legal status of the partnerships. In the absence of a clear formal legal mechanism in Israel to regulate the activity of cross-sector partnerships, it usually takes quite a while to find the appropriate legal structure and arrangements for the partnership, as well as to build the appropriate governance mechanism. Contracts: In some cases (e.g., the Guidestar Israel initiative) a contract was signed between civil society entities and the government as part of a “joint venture” (which requires exemption from a tender and co-­ financing). The advantage of this arrangement lies in the fact that a “joint venture” based on a clear contract between the government and civil society organizations allows for a clearer structuring of the governance mechanisms, the roles of the involved parties and of the joint work, and creates a more egalitarian relationship between the partners from the different sectors. However, such a legal arrangement is possible only when the civil society organizations are able to raise significant funds constituting at least 50% of the cost of the joint project, so as to match government funding. In many cases, civil society organizations are unable to do so. Outsourcing: In other cases, the partnership was set up as a contractual relationship between the government and civil society entities that provided services to it. Some of these outsourcing arrangements included the

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creation of joint governance mechanisms. The advantage of this arrangement stems from its formal nature, which regulates, to a certain extent, the financial relationship between the parties and ensures the project’s continuation for the duration of the contract. However, in the case of a partnership where government financing is regulated by a contractual arrangement in the form of outsourcing (a contract for the provision of services), the joint governance mechanism is necessary to compensate for the financial inequality and customer-service provider relationship. Informal arrangements: The third format through which partnerships were organized was carrying out joint activity by actors from different sectors under a “coalition,” “forum,” or “partnership” arrangement, without a clear, formal, and regulated contract between the partner organizations. Such arrangements offer the advantages of flexibility in decision-making and activity, but the parties also revealed an obvious lack of commitment to the joint activity. The lack of formal joint governance mechanisms and clear rules regarding division of labor among the partners involved hindered the activities of the partnership. Evidently, a clearer and more regulated legal structure of cross-sector partnerships in Israel would have facilitated and enhanced processes of partnership building and clarified the form of governance, division of labor, and relations between the partners. Governance Mechanisms and Managing the Partnership Research findings from Israel show that the creation of joint governance mechanisms in cross-sector partnerships based on power sharing and cooperation is quite complex. Although all the partnerships included steering committees with representatives of the three sectors, there were problems with the activities of the steering committees and there was a concern that they would transform from the partnerships’ strategy-setting and trail-blazing bodies into mere formalities. Civil society organizations often felt that the steering committees served primarily as forums for updates and exchanges of opinions in order to “rubber stamp” the activities carried out by the organizations constituting the core of the partnership, without substantive discussion that actually affected the conduct of the partnership. In some of the partnerships it emerged that there was fairly limited involvement of the various partners in the partnership’s governance vis-à-vis a limited core of active partners that functioned as the permanent decision-making body. This was explained by the high level of

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trust in the hired teams that actually manage the partnerships, together with a policy of granting autonomy to professionals. However, this situation raises questions about the actual functioning of the steering committees as the central decision-making body in a partnership. Furthermore, respondents in these studies pointed to difficulties arising from the unequal involvement of the partners in the steering committees. This kind of difficulty arose especially in partnerships where there was a relatively large number of partner organizations and in situations where the commitment of organizations to the partnership and its goals was problematic, as well as attempts by various organizations to advance their own agendas and programs. Respondents also pointed to the awkwardness and difficulty of governance mechanisms that include a large number of partners and indicated that it was easier to conduct partnerships in which a relatively small number of organizations are involved. It is argued that the broader the partnership is in terms of the number of organizations involved, the more difficult it is to focus, since it is necessary to answer to a wide range of interests and it is hard to promote a clear agenda. Ensuring that everyone’s interests will be addressed required considerable energy investment and comes at the expense of more focused activity. Difficulties also emerged in the functioning of partnership governance mechanisms over time, and in maintaining the role and participation of key partners. In many of the partnerships studied, there were no clear rules regarding the activities of the partnership’s governing bodies, and there was a lack of clarity regarding the division of labor and roles among the partners, as well as an absence of rules that define and regulate the nature of the partnership between the organizations. Such situations hindered the construction of joint programs and arrays. For example, in one partnership regulated through an outsourcing arrangement, the national steering committee was initially the center for decision-making and policy-making, starting with determining the budgetary model of the project, through identifying issues and targets for the work of the entities involved, and setting the rates charged for the activities. After the initial period, however, the national steering committee gradually became a body with no essential role in determining and shaping policy. Members of the steering committee meet only once a year, at a ceremonial gathering. Beyond that, there were only a few consultations with individual steering committee members (rather than all together), and only around specific issues where the organization that operates the partnership project believed that it is possible to use the “services” of the

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various government ministries involved. Thus, the main task of the national steering committee is to maintain the visibility of the project vis-à-vis the participating government ministries. As the project and the partnership stabilized, there were changes in the nature of authority and responsibility and their distribution among the participants. If, at the outset, the cross-­ sector committee representing all partner organizations was the entity that managed the project, as the partnership stabilized, its management in practice shifted into the hands of the civil society organizations and the professionals in the field. This situation was perceived as problematic by the government’s representatives, who felt that their voice was excluded from the partnership’s decision-making processes. Trust and Interpersonal Relationships as Key Components of Cross-Sector Partnerships One of the most crucial factors affecting the success of partnerships is building trust among partners (Alexander and Nank 2009). Studies of cross-sector partnerships in Israel similarly found that trust is a key factor in establishing, building, and operating partnerships. Research clearly shows that the greater the trust among the partners, the greater their openness and willingness to cooperate, and barriers are removed alongside the fear of exposure to the other organization, its staff, and its customary work processes. Trust has a positive impact on the partners’ willingness to share information, knowledge, and resources. Trust is the basis upon which the partnership rests, and when it is absent, the partnership is very difficult to maintain (Schmid and Almog-Bar 2016b). Trust between partners in Israeli cross-sector partnerships is revealed to be based primarily on familiarity and prior collaboration. Civil society organizations prefer to form partnerships with organizations and people with whom they have prior professional and personal experience, and whom they perceive as reliable. The prior acquaintance between the partners contributes to the creation of a common language, a common definition of the problem the partnership is addressing, and guidelines for its solution. A central factor seen to increase trust is the knowledge, professional reputation, and professional authority of the civil society organizations. The higher the professional status of a given organization, the easier it was for government officials to develop relations of trust with it. Moreover, the fact that civil society organizations are perceived as professional bodies

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that are usually devoid of political or economic interests and are committed to providing optimal services to their clients also encourages trust towards them. The high level of interpersonal trust between position holders in partnerships was a prominent finding of the research in Israel. Similarly, there was an emphasis on the personal dimension and the importance of interpersonal relationships and ties, or in other words, an emphasis on the personal characteristics of specific persons who were perceived as important in the development of a partnership. For example, one of the interviewees, a representative of a civil society organization, said that from his extensive experience in cross-sector partnerships, “everything ultimately succeeds or fails based on people” (Schmid and Almog-Bar 2016b). Good interpersonal relationships, and the commitment of the position holders to the project and to each other, were perceived as a central factor in helping establish trust and develop the partnership. It is clear that a significant part of a partnership’s trust-building processes involved the development of positive and friendly interpersonal relations between the representatives of the partnership organizations. Although trust-based interpersonal relationships are noted in the research literature as an important component of partnerships, it appears that, in Israel, the emphasis placed on specific individuals as key factors in a given partnership’s activity and success is far greater than in other countries (Gazley 2010). Nonetheless, the research also reveals that there are risks entailed in establishing partnerships based on personal relationships and ties. Changing jobs, lack of empathy based on differences between people, and difficulties in creating positive interpersonal relationships may harm partnerships over time. Power Relations Between Civil Society Organizations and the Government in Cross-Sector Partnerships Alongside high levels of interpersonal trust, striving for collaborative work, and the distribution of resources, knowledge and power, cross-sector partnerships in Israel are characterized by complex and delicate relations of power among the partner organizations (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2018; Almog-Bar and Zychlinski 2010, 2014; Schmid and Almog-Bar 2016b). Beyond the natural competition between organizations with different interests when they join together in a collaborative venture, research reveals complex relationships between civil society organizations and the government in cross-sector partnerships, especially in cases where the

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government is the primary provider of funding in the partnership and civil society organizations are the executing or operating agent of the public service. The very fact that the joint project is based on government funding is a significant source of power for the government. In such situations, the status of civil society organizations as partners is undermined, and it is not clear whether their status is one of partners or service providers to the government. In these cases, the relationship is one in which civil society organizations depend on the government for the continuation of the joint project, and their ability to function as independent professional organizations may be compromised. In addition, the government sometimes adopts an ambivalent attitude towards civil society organizations. To the government, the organizations are partners in everything related to the design of the service and the management of the project vis-à-vis the local government and the field. However, in all that relates to ownership of the project, the government views itself as the sovereign and the civil society organizations as service providers only. The fact that civil society organizations do not share the economic burden of the project encourages government partners to view them as “service providers” rather than equal partners. It should be noted that in some cases, government representatives expressed resentment that civil society organizations were accumulating much power in the partnerships by virtue of being the entity that operates the project or service. In their view, when a project’s management becomes the responsibility of civil society operators, the government’s dependence on them increases, they are less likely to make decisions in cooperation with government ministries, and consequently the government ministries’ ability to influence and their sense of being part of the partnership is compromised. Furthermore, among respondents from both civil society organizations and the government, the perception was that cross-sector activities were more suitable for well-established civil society organizations with considerable resources, patience, tolerance, the capability for long-term planning and vision, and familiarity and experience working with the government. Such organizations, it is argued, are able to stand up to the government, understand its constraints, and conduct negotiations with it based on an understanding of both its own and the government’s power and limitations. Partnerships naturally require time and patience, since they involve the creation of something new by several actors. The parties must have

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patience; they are required to learn a new language and to conduct themselves in a dynamic that is unfamiliar to them. This is especially true when working with government ministries; they are large-scale entities that the organizations usually have to adapt their discourse to. Therefore, partnerships with the government require much time and resources, and nonprofit organizations lacking economic resources and facing demands to show immediate results will find it difficult to allocate. These conditions highlight a lack of knowledge, financing, and mediation infrastructures that could aid and provide tools for civil society organizations interested in developing partnerships with the government and creating relationships that will endure over time. Outcomes of Cross-Sector Partnerships: An Added Value? The studies whose findings were presented in this chapter examined the perception of representatives of Israeli organizations from the three sectors who participated in cross-sector partnerships regarding their goals and the extent to which they were achieved. In general, despite the challenges involved in the operation and functioning of the partnerships studied, they reported a high level of achievement of the partnerships’ goals (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2018; Schmid and Almog-Bar 2013, 2016b). As seen by civil society organizations, cross-sector partnerships have the potential for significant broad social impact. The organizations viewed cross-sector partnerships as a means of promoting and implementing comprehensive social change at the national level and these were presented as a unique tool that enables the mobilization of new resources, as well as the pooling and leveraging of resources and forces at the significant scale that is a basic condition for enacting broad social change. Additionally, cross-­ sector partnerships were perceived by civil society partners and the government as a means of acquiring professional knowledge and new methods for work and management, improving customer service, improving customer status, promoting and developing services for excluded populations, strengthening organizations’ reputation, and changing partners’ attitudes towards new programs and initiatives, which helps to raise issues on the public agenda, create a new discourse and a common professional language between organizations from different sectors. The ability of cross-sector partnerships to strengthen and improve inter-sectoral work has also increased.

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Discussion Recent years have seen increasing use of cross-sector partnerships in the development of public services and the promotion of social programs, as part of the expansion and consolidation of the collaborative governance and new public governance approaches, which call for the engagement of variety of actors in public policy-making processes. Cross-sector partnerships are perceived as a necessary and desirable strategy for coping with complex public challenges, including growing social needs, the reduced resources for coping with them, and the increasing complexity of social problems (Almog-Bar and Zychlinski 2010). Such partnerships attract growing interest from governments, civil society organizations, and businesses. Professional literature as well as governments, donors and philanthropic foundations recommend, encourage, and sometimes even require civil society organizations to join cross-sector partnerships as a condition of support. This is how the “collaboration halo” emerged: a tendency spanning sectors and countries which views partnership as a positive, vital, means of realizing public policy (Prentice and Brudney 2016). The message implicit in this halo highlights the benefits and advantages of partnership and present it as an end in itself for organizations. On the one hand, evidence of the difficulties and challenges of creating and maintaining partnerships is increasing while there is little empirical testimony to the effectiveness of such partnership. On the other hand, researchers and professionals present partnerships as a panacea for a range of social ills, as well as a tool for promoting civil society organizations. Partnership is celebrated as an end in itself and not as a means to achieve other goals. These assumptions at the basis of the “collaboration halo” guide governments, and even more so civil society organizations that are required to establish and operate within partnerships. This is not necessarily because partnership is a good way to achieve their goals, but because partnership is perceived as an appropriate and desirable course of action at the present time, and because there is an ideological commitment to joint activity by the three sectors. Cross-sector partnerships are organizational arrangements in which representatives of two or more sectors conduct ongoing interactions and exchanges in order to jointly reach a result with added value that cannot be achieved through the actions of one sector alone. Cross-sector partnerships are distinct from other forms of collaborative governance in that they seek to expand beyond the practices of integration (or cooperation)

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through which the government engages or integrates nongovernmental actors in the design and delivery of public services (Ansell 2012), and develop initiatives with less hierarchical and more egalitarian governance mechanisms in which partners from various socio-economic sectors actively participate in the design of public services while sharing responsibility. Cross-sector partnerships thus present a different model in the sense that it does not grant the government an exclusive status in decision-­ making but seeks to create greater equality and collaboration between the government and nongovernmental actors in joint cross-sector projects. The nongovernmental actors are seen not only as efficient and cheaper service providers, but also as knowledgeable, capable, and potentially significant contributors to public services. They are perceived as partners in policy-making processes and not merely as elements that the government chooses to engage (Ansell 2012). In Israel, civil society organizations are usually the initiators and active force in the design and delivery of services in these partnerships, more than the government and organizations from the business sector. Therefore, cross-sector partnerships have become a central arena of activity in civil society. Research reveals that the conduct of these organizations within the partnerships is complex and requires significant investments of time, energy, organizational resources, and careful political conduct vis-à-­ vis other civil society organizations, and especially vis-à-vis the government and the business sector. Moreover, the desire for continuity and sustainability of partnerships requires ongoing investment of resources and joint maintenance of relations with the various elements involved in order to create and retain trust. These challenges raise the question of whether cross-sector partnership, which is usually presented as the most advanced model of relations government and civil society could be engaged in, is indeed the most effective and useful way of promoting initiatives and changes in public policy that governments and civil society organizations should pursue. It is quite possible that cross-sector partnership is not necessarily the best way to advance the goals of each sector (Person et  al. 2009) and therefore it is necessary to carefully examine whether it is worthwhile investing so much effort in establishing it. Several questions arise from the perspective of civil society organizations: What do cross-sector partnerships contribute to civil society and its organizations? Are the arrangements for cross-sectoral partnerships helping organizations in advancing their goals and expanding their potential for making an impact? Do they empower civil society as a free sphere of

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action that contributes to the expansion of public discourse and the development of alternative approaches to policy and services? Research from Israel demonstrates that cross-sector partnerships can help organizations develop new venues for action and new spheres of influence for social change. However, it seems that these possibilities are open to a relatively small number of organizations, usually organizations with considerable resources, intimacy, and prior acquaintance with the government. In contrast, the small and medium-sized organizations that make up the majority of organizations active in civil society find it difficult to join and operate within the framework of cross-sectoral partnerships. This is because they lack the acquaintance with the government, the knowledge, experience, and resources required to work in cross-sector partnerships. Thus, collaborative governance structures and cross-sector partnerships appear to be less accessible to most civil society organizations, particularly small and grass-root organizations, thereby limiting their potential contribution to the design of services and public policy. The lack of a clear legal structure to enable the building of cross-sector partnerships between the government and civil society organizations that cannot contribute at least 50% of the financing for a joint project, as well as the lack of adequate infrastructures of knowledge of about building and managing cross-sector partnerships, make it difficult for small and new organizations to enter the partnerships arena. It is worth asking further whether activity within the framework of cross-sector partnerships expresses and promotes democratic processes and promotes public values. Attempts have been made within the partnerships themselves to develop participatory, democratic decision-making processes. However, there were many challenges in managing these processes. In some cases, the steering committees, which constituted the central governing and decision-making body through which the partnership was supposed to be shaped, became a merely symbolic entity that did not express the voices of the various partners. Furthermore, even if there ostensibly are methods with the appearance of sharing, including information transfer, steering committees, and consultation, this does not necessarily mean the sharing of power and joint decision-making. Moreover, in partnerships based on an outsourcing arrangement between the government and civil society organizations with government funding, there are usually large power discrepancies that preserve the financer-supplier relationship between the government and civil society, which exist in any case in the context of the privatization policy of recent decades. These

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arrangements create a division of labor, where one party finances the service and the other provides it. However, it is difficult to see it as a partnership in a deeper sense; one in which power is shared along with responsibility and actual participation in decision-making. In addition, the fact that the partnership arrangements are accessible only to a small number of organizations that are endowed with money and connections also makes it difficult to see them as contributing to democratic processes. Finally, collaborative governance, democracy and civil society are ought to be understood within the specific political context and policy environment in which they take place. In Israel, the adoption of the “new public governance” approach and the emergence of collaborative governance has developed alongside a policy of tightening regulation and supervision of civil society in general, and a segregating and restrictive policy towards a specific group of organizations. It has taken place whilst weakening civil society organizations and marking some organizations as worthy of participation and voice, while other organizations are marked as undeserving of having voice in the governmental and public spheres. These policies pose difficulties in implementing democratic processes that include a variety of actors from civil society within collaborative governance arrangements. In conclusion, this chapter sought to examine the roles and activities of civil society organizations in collaborative governance systems such as cross-sector partnerships. Although definitions of collaborative governance emphasize values such as participation, partnership, deliberation, and strengthening trust, the research is yet unclear about the extent to which these values are expressed in real and significant terms in the relationships that develop in cross-sector partnerships with civil society. Although cross-sector partnerships have a potential for the development of innovative public services and the strengthening of deliberative and democratic processes while giving expression to civil society, there are many challenges and complexities in the development and operation of effective partnerships. These challenges are worthy of discussion in the emerging discourse on collaborative governance and its effects.

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Person, A., Strong, D., Furgeson, J., & Berk, J. (2009). Maximizing the Value of Philanthropic Efforts Through Planned Partnerships Between the U.S. Government and Private Foundations. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. Pestoff, V., & Brandsen, T. (2010). Public Governance and the Third Sector: Opportunities for Co-production and Innovation? In S. P. Osborne (Ed.), The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance (pp. 223–236). New York: Routledge. Phillips, S., & Rathgeb Smith, S. (2014). A Dawn of Convergence? Third Sector Policy Regimes in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ Cluster. Public Management Review, 16, 1141–1163. Prentice, C.  R., & Brudney, J.  L. (2016). Definitions Do Make a Difference: County Managers and Their Conceptions of Collaboration. Human Service Organizations: Management, Leadership & Governance, 40(3), 193–207. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rhodes, R. (1997). Understanding Governance. Buckingham: Open University Press. Salamon, L.  M., & Anheier, H.  K. (1997). Towards a Common Definition. In L. M. Salamon & H. K. Anheier (Eds.), Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-­ National Analysis (pp. 29–50). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Salamon, L., & Toepler, S. (2015). Government-Nonprofit Cooperation: Anomaly or Necessity? VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 26(6), 2155–2177. Salamon, L. M., Sokolowsk, W. S., Haddock, M. M., & Tice, H. S. (2013). The State of Global Civil Society and Volunteering. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies. Schmid, H., & Almog-Bar, M. (2013). Cross-Sector Partnerships: Research Findings, Conclusions and Implications for Practice. Jerusalem: Center for the Study of Civil Society and Philanthropy in Israel, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. (Hebrew). Schmid, H., & Almog-Bar, M. (2016a). Correlates of Cross-Sector Partnership in the Human Services: Implications for Policy and Practice. Human Service Organizations: Management, Leadership & Governance, 40, 238–252. Schmid, H., & Almog-Bar, M. (2016b). Cross-sector Partnerships in Israel: Inputs, Processes and Products. Jerusalem: Center for the Study of Civil Society and Philanthropy in Israel, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. (Hebrew). Simo, G., & Bies, A. L. (2007). The Role of Nonprofits in Disaster Response: An Expanded Model of Cross-Sector Collaboration. Public Administration Review, 67, 125–142. Stone, M.  M. (2000). Exploring the Effects of Collaborations on Member Organizations: Washington County’s Welfare-to-Work Partnership. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(1), 98–119.

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Talias, M., Hayman, A., Evron, T., & Shimoni, D. (2010). Promoting Cross-Sector Partnerships in the Local Field. Jerusalem: JDC Israel. (Hebrew). Talshir, G., & Tsur, R. (2013). Public Governance Recalculates Its Course. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute. (Hebrew). Zychlinski, E. (2010). Influence of Partial Privatization and Commercialization Processes on Characteristics of Third Sector Organizations in Israel. Social Security, 82, 79–111. (Hebrew).

CHAPTER 11

The 5x2 Initiative for Expanding STEM Excellence in Israel: Collective Impact as a Model of Collaborative Governance Inbar Hurvitz and Michal Rom

Introduction The story of the 5x2 Initiative begins with a discussion between two philanthropic foundations and a hi-tech company, all of which are significant, experienced players in the field of STEM1 education in Israel. The three players joined forces due to their shared sense that excellence in scientific and technological education had reached a low point that required raising of the issue on the public agenda. Despite various programs in the field, there had been no change on the national level: The number of students graduating high school with high proficiency in mathematics and science 1

 STEM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering and Math.

Author’s Note: The authors wish to thank Tamar Adelstein Zekbach for her contribution to this paper, and encourage readers to comment or ask for clarifications if needed via e-mail to [email protected] I. Hurvitz • M. Rom (*) Sheatufim Strategies for Social Change, Beit Yehoshua, Israel e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_11

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was continuing to fall; the shortage of suitably trained teachers was worsening; Israel’s performance on international tests remained poor; the gaps between socioeconomic groups had widened; and reports that forecast future economical, industrial, and social demands showed that Israel was on the verge of a crisis (Goldschmidt 2010; Manny-Ikan et  al. 2013, Manny-Ikan and Rosen 2013; Weissblai 2012, p. 213). The new approach called “Collective Impact” (Kania and Kramer 2011) drew the players’ attention. This approach attempts to address situations where social challenges persist over an extended period of time despite extensive resources and diverse programs. The approach defines operating principles for systemic initiatives based on a unique partnership between stakeholders from the various sectors — public, business, philanthropy and the third sector, — as the underlying assumption is that only joint action by all the sectors can solve complex social problems. In recent years, the collective impact approach has been implemented to great success in a wide range of initiatives in the US and around the world, while securing impressive outcomes.2 In April 2013, Sheatufim, a non-profit organization that specializes in leading and shaping processes for cross-sector discourse and action to promote social impact, was asked to examine whether a collective impact approach could be an appropriate way to try to create a change in Israel’s status quo with regards to excellence in STEM education. The Sheatufim team took up the challenge and, after a short but intensive period of learning and a feasibility study, concluded that it would be appropriate to launch a joint course of action. The 5x2 Initiative was launched in July 2013 and later became the first collective impact initiative in Israel (BenDavid 2017). Over the years that have passed since then, around 100 organizations from all three sectors have joined in the initiative. These include educational organizations from the third sector, teacher training colleges, science museums, research and academic institutions, hi-tech companies, the Israel Defense Force (IDF), and representatives of local authorities and the Ministry of Education. Since 2014, the 5x2 Initiative has operated through a unique strategic partnership with the senior management of the Ministry of Education. This led to the inauguration in the summer of 2  See, for example, Strive Together in education; Memphis Fast Forward and Greater Cincinnati foundation for strengthening and advancing the community; The Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) and Communities That Care Coalition in public health (Hanleybrown et al. 2012).

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2015 of the “Math First” Ministry’s National Program to Promote Excellence in Mathematics and Science. This article will describe the 5x2 Initiative as a case study in collaborative governance, presenting its development chronologically and according to the various components of its operations. The process of building relationships and trust between the different players—a key part of promoting collaborative governance mechanisms and enabling them to succeed—will be discussed in depth. Lastly, we will present the challenges facing the initiative, which are indicative of the challenges facing collaborative governance in Israel today.

Stage 1: Extra-Governmental Initiative (2013–2014) The Civic Society and the Business Sector Acknowledge the Need and the Value of Collaborative Action A sense of crisis about the state of education for STEM excellence in Israel began to arise in 2013; this came with an awareness of the long-term economic and social ramifications. Extensive data from the education system painted a clear and depressing picture, including a decline of ~30 percent in the number of students taking mathematics at the level of 5 study units3 between 2006 and 2013; a low proportion of students taking physics at 5 study units; a worsening shortage of outstanding teachers in these subjects; and poor achievements in twenty-first century skills as reflected in Israel’s ranking in the PISA international test.4 These problems were compounded by wide gaps between the center of the country and the peripheral areas, as well as between Jews and Arabs. The gaps had to do both with the number of high school students choosing to study science and mathematics and the achievements in international and national tests. The hi-tech industry faced a growing shortage of engineers, threatening its ability to maintain the growth trend over the coming years. Various

3  In Israeli high schools, subjects are studied at varying levels of difficulty, represented by the number of “study units” that students take in their matriculation examination. The highest study level is known as 5 units. 4  See: Picture of mathematics studies in Israel: Trends and findings from the education system, Report no. 1 (November 2016) and Report no. 2 (March 2017), National Authority for Evaluation and Measurement in Education, Ministry of Education (in Hebrew).

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statistics5 suggested an annual shortage of approximately 7000 engineers, particularly in the fields of computing, together with a growing shortage of engineering technicians in a range of fields. This reality led the Eddie and Jules Trump Family Foundation, which is active in promoting math and science quality teaching, the Rashi Foundation, which concentrates on advancing education and welfare issues in the geographical and social periphery of Israel, and Intel Israel6 to join forces to launch a strategic partnership on the national level. Compelled by a strong sense of urgency, these three organizations recognized that separate courses of action by the education system, business organizations active in the educational field, and third sector educational organizations had failed to secure change on the national level. There was also a growing recognition that the roots of the problem touched on a wide range of factors, including: Ministry of Education policies, school policies, awareness among teachers and communities, student motivation, the shortage of teachers and poor quality of teaching, and so forth. It seemed that long-term change would be possible only by way of partnership between a very wide range of players, with diverse experience and expertise that would agree on the reasons for the problem and concentrate on actions to secure a common goal. The collective impact model appeared to be an appropriate method to this end. This method, which brings together diverse stakeholders around defined and agreed-upon goals and objectives and which creates infrastructures for their joint and coordinated action, is based on theories of systemic change (Hanleybrown et  al. 2012). The advantage of this approach is that it offers a practical model for action enabling players from different sectors to join forces to create social impact in order to solve a complex social problem. The model is based on the combination of five components that are maintained simultaneously (see Fig. 11.1). It is intended to secure measurable outcomes and is committed to active learning and continual change. The model concentrates on creating effective 5  For example: The shortage of personnel in hi-tech: Recommendations of the interministerial team, National Economic Council, 2012 (in Hebrew); see also: Increasing the supply of trained personnel required for knowledge-intensive industry, Report of the Steering Committee in the Ministry of Economy, August 2014 (in Hebrew). 6  Intel Israel is a subsidiary of Intel Corporation. Established in 1974 it has become Israel’s largest privately-held employer and exporter with four development centers and two manufacturing-related facilities. The company employs about 10,000 people, in addition to indirectly supporting the employment of 30,000 workers in Israel.

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principles of action that ensure coordination between all the partners and that increase the chance that ideas emerging during their interactions will lead to the solution of the problem (Kania and Kramer 2011, 2013). The state of the science education field was studied in depth during a preliminary learning process, and previous attempts to advance the field were examined (see for example Manny-Ikan and Rosen 2013). The collective impact model and its implementation in the United States on issues relating to scientific-technological (STEM) education were also examined (Rom et al. 2012). At the same time, individual meetings were held with a range of stakeholders in the field. This work yielded three central conclusions: • A common sense of urgency: Different organizations shared the understanding that if the issue was not raised as a national priority, the ramifications for economic growth and for narrowing gaps would be severe. • Maturity to launch a joint initiative: Various organizations declared their willingness to expand existing cooperation in order to create a strategic partnership. Ministry of Education representatives also reported that the ministry was willing to open itself up to dialogue and joint action with representatives from the third sector and the business sector. It is important to note that at this time the Cross-­ Sector Round Table had begun to operate in the Ministry of Education,7 and it was evident that cross-sector action was on the ministry’s agenda.

Fig. 11.1  The five components of the collective impact model 7  The Cross-Sector Round Table in the Ministry of Education was established in 2013 and functioned as a platform for cross-sector discourse, bringing together representatives from the public, business, and third sectors. The round-table addressed a wide range of issues,

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• The need for increased involvement by the Ministry of Education: All the players discussed the vital need for the Ministry of Education representatives to be partners in launching the initiative. The precise characteristics of the partnership with the Ministry of Education were not defined at this stage, but it was clear that this partnership would have to be realized in order to secure change. Designing a Vision and a Common Goal for All Partners The feasibility study stage ended with an understanding of the potential to launch a strategic partnership based on the principles of the collective impact approach, and the first step was to draft a preliminary definition of the systemic problem and its key components. The first meeting of the initiative was attended by representatives from 60 organizations from all sectors, who came out of a sense of commitment, mobilization, and enthusiasm to lead a joint and strategic initiative for change. Four months were devoted to defining the vision, mission, and key objectives of the initiative within the framework of the common agenda—the first component in the collective impact approach. It was decided that the initiative would focus on two key target populations: teachers and students. Specific objectives were defined for each of these target populations, relating both to numerical scopes and to the type of skills needed in order to realize the vision. These definitions were the product of discussions held in the process of building consensus among all the stakeholders, and were formulated as follows: Vision of the 5X2 Initiative By 2025, Israel will be among the top fifteen countries in the world based on the quality of excellence in STEM education and will be in a position to leap forward as the second quarter of the twenty-first century begins. High school students from all sectors and strata of the population will exercise their right to study STEM at a high level, thus opening up opportunities for a life full of success, prosperity, and contribution. including: Regulating external programs in the education system; coordination between the ministry and civil society in routine times and during emergencies; encouraging an entrepreneurial culture in the education system; health promotion in the education system; and the transition of junior-high sections to self-management. Sheatufim serves as a body that assists in running the round table, parallel and separately to its work in the 5x2 Initiative. For more information: http://sheatufim.org.il/subject/cross-sector/education/

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Mission of the 5X2 Initiative We see our mission in promoting excellence in STEM education, as a driver of a broad educational culture of excellence. We are committed to achieving that, while striving to narrow the social gaps and to provide equal opportunities to every student in Israeli society. Task of the 5X2 Initiative Doubling the number of high-achieving students who display strong inquiry and analytical skills in math, physics, chemistry, and engineering tracks offered in Israeli high schools. In 10 years, at least 20 percent of all students in each year will cross the national and international standard test of excellence. At this stage of the process, the Ministry of Education, represented by teachers and professionals from the relevant subjects (mathematics, physics, and chemistry), did not seek to play a leading role. They allowed the discourse to progress despite a considerable measure of uncertainty as to how the partnership would develop. Establishing a Central Mechanism for Leading the Partnership A cross-sector steering committee was established in the first year to advance the initiative. The committee was defined as the policy-setting and decision-making body on the strategic level and included 18 members from the sectors participating in the initiative. The steering committee is the body that leads the partnerships in practical terms. The committee delineates the avenues of action based on the decisions taken in all the partnership and discourse frameworks that operate in the initiative. An example of this are decisions about delineating which subjects it will promote and focus on (mathematics, physics, chemistry, and computer science) and about the age range to be addressed by the initiative (junior and senior high school). These decisions were taken by the steering committee in light of the need to create focus and priorities for the joint action and based on the existing data. The processes of building consensus and making decisions on these issues entailed complex discussions that exposed differences of opinion and diverse worldviews among the different players. Some of the partners felt that the decision to concentrate the activities on post-elementary

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education might limit efforts to encourage interest in science and technology from an early age and to promote a broader awareness of science in arenas beyond that of the school setting. Despite the disagreements, the representatives on the steering committee and the organizations that participated in the first stage noted on its completion that they shared two basic assumptions: The first concerned the added value of the partners’ network as an arena that promotes a common language and common messages; enhances the presence of the unique expertise and assets of third sector and business organizations; and creates and enhances coordination, synchronization, and cooperation between the different bodies. On this foundation, a common awareness crystallized that the partners’ network is vital to securing the goal, and that it will not be possible to create systemic change without it. The second assumption concerned the role of the state, and the recognition that only with the clear leadership of the Ministry of Education, manifested in policy steps, would the initiative be able to advance the common goals and create systemic and long-term change.

Stage 2: The Ministry of Education Takes a Lead Position in the Joint Action (2014–2015) In November 2013, there was an opportunity to change certain aspects of the partnership with the Ministry of Education. The arrival of a new director-­general who had previously been responsible for managing the Cross-Sector Round Table in the ministry, led to an awareness of the value of open discourse with the third sector and business sector in advancing common goals. Senior management at the Ministry of Education also identified the opportunity created by the unique working cross-sector model introduced by the initiative across three key axes as described below. Targeting Shared Goals and Metrics Joint measurement and a data-driven approach form a central component in the collective impact approach. As it began to function, the initiative mapped the existing challenges and obstacles in the field to the advancement of excellence in mathematics and science. The results of the mapping highlighted the complex nature of the problem and identified trends in the different subjects. Based on a comparative international analysis, it was

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agreed that the target should be set to double the number of students so that 20 percent of the cohort would be studying STEM subjects at a level of excellence. The analysis of the data conveyed a message regarding the importance of focus and clarity along the way to solving the problem, as well as the need for coordinated management of the initiative and for measurement in order to evaluate the securing of the objectives. Cross-sectoral Shared Action The analysis of the complexity of the problem emphasized the added value of cross-sector cooperation and the opportunity to create a broad coalition of organizations committed to the goal and interested in cooperating with the ministry. The senior management of the Ministry of Education recognized that the initiative offers a new paradigm for joining forces with the third and business sectors and for mobilizing existing assets among diverse stakeholders, thereby enhancing the prospects for systemic change. The third sector organizations have acquired knowledge and expertise in grassroots activities with diverse target populations (students, teachers, and parents) and in diverse goals, such as strengthening the knowledge and skills of students in the periphery; encouraging girls to choose science subjects; reinforcing scientific capital; and exposure to the world of science. The business sector organizations brought a commitment to the joint vision due to the real need for high-quality graduates with diverse knowledge and twenty-first-century skill bases. The organizations recruited leaders of industry to joint action and leveraged their networks of community contacts in order to create a coordinated system for volunteering by engineers in schools around Israel. Given the relations between the Ministry of Education and the third sector and business organizations, which for years had been dominated by suspicion, criticism, and cynicism, an essential starting point was the process of developing trusting relations between the different players. However, the initiative’s clear perception of the central role of the Ministry of Education, as the responsible body, helped to develop these relations of trust and motivated the ministry to engage in joint action. The Backbone Organization The multiplicity and variety of stakeholders who took part in the initiative highlighted the importance and contribution of the backbone

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organization. Its function is to manage and lead the Initiative and to serve as the body that brings together the diverse stakeholders. It provides the professional platform for managing the contacts and discourse between the partners, promoting the building of trust and consensus. On the practical level, these functions are manifested in daily responsibility for planning, leading, and guiding the processes in order to optimize the decision making; collect information and support mutual learning and updating; and address conflicts, logistics, and administration. The fact that Sheatufim was not a player in the field of STEM education and that its expertise lies in shaping and managing cross-sector processes strengthened the trust it enjoyed, and therefore its mandate. All players had confidence in Sheatufim to lead the process from a professional and objective standpoint. Following these understandings, the Ministry of Education announced that it would be joining the leadership of the 5x2 Initiative. Senior representatives joined the steering committee, and the dialogue about advancing the joint objectives stepped up a gear. In May 2014 the Ministry of Education raised the subject of science excellence as a high priority, deciding to launch the Math First national program. The program concentrated on mathematics as the first stage in advancing the agenda of expanding STEM education, in light of the protracted fall in the number of students taking 5  units in mathematics. Alongside the sense of urgency, there was also a perception that as the “queen of the sciences,” mathematics would serve as a catalyst for mobilizing the system as a whole and could also create change in the other science subjects. The steering committee of the Initiative was required to decide whether to come on board with the priorities presented by the Ministry of Education and focus the actions of the Initiative as a whole on mathematics. Some of the educational organizations opposed the idea of concentrating on a single subject, due to their multidisciplinary STEM worldview. The business sector organizations opposed this direction due to their awareness of the critical importance of physics and technology for industrial needs. Nevertheless, a consensus emerged that it would be right to join the ministry in this focus, in the belief that it would manage to get the system and the partnership moving, so that it would then be possible to move on to advancing the additional objectives. The national program was inaugurated in the summer of 2014, in the form of an invitation to 100 schools around Israel that received earmarked budgets from the Ministry of Education in order to increase the number

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of hours for mathematics studies, as well as various activities intended to encourage students to choose to study 5 units in mathematics and to persevere with these studies. The total annual budget was NIS 15 million, and a special integrator was appointed to head the national program. Conscious, deliberate efforts were required in order to enlist the cooperation of the public sector and to persuade it to be a leading player in this process. Therefore, the ministry’s decision to take part in the joint leadership and to commit to the objectives defined in the Initiative, to prepare an infrastructure, and to allocate resources was one of the Initiative’s most significant achievements in its first year. It is worth highlighting that the partnership model between the ministry and the Initiative is a unique one, not formalized in a contract but taking the form of agreement on goals and objectives, and a decision to act together while sharing knowledge, data, and long-term planning. The national program for mathematics excellence, led by the Ministry of Education and cultivated in the strategic partnership with the 5x2 Initiative, contains the components that define the Initiative as a case study for collaborative governance. The joint operating model began with influence from extra-governmental bodies on the setting of government agenda and policies, through the Initiative’s work. Involvement by the philanthropic and business representatives, who initiated the formation of a broad cross-sector partnership, led to the recognition that there was a need to raise the issue of excellence in STEM education on the public agenda, and to launch a program dedicated to this purpose on the national level. All players realized early on in their joint efforts that systemic change led by the Ministry of Education was needed and, moreover, was crucial. This recognition served as a shared core value and was a condition for recruiting the ministry to action, for the sake of the Initiative’s success and to secure its objectives.

Stage 3: Common Action—Implementing the National Program for Excellence in Mathematics and Science (2015–2017) Major Moves Led by the Ministry of Education In May 2015, after the general election to the Knesset and as a new minister began to serve, the Ministry of Education announced that one of its

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central policy objectives would be to support the study of mathematics at the level of 5 study units. The ministry allocated NIS 75 million for launching the National Program for Excellence in Mathematics. As part of this process, the ministry acknowledged the great importance of cross-­ sector partnership and invited the steering committee of the 5x2 Initiative to serve as the public steering forum for the national program. Eventually, the national program drove several strategic courses of action along two main dimensions as described below.  olicy Decisions as a Core Activity of the Ministry of Education P The Ministry of Education launched several programs intended to increase students’ access to mathematics studies at the 5-unit level. These included adding 15,000 teaching hours to enable dividing up classes and enhanced studies; reducing the criteria for schools to open a 5-unit level track and as a result opening classes in high schools that had not previously provided mathematics studies at this level. Significant steps were also taken to create incentives for students, including providing a “safety net” for students who were unsuccessful in the matriculation examination at 5 study units and increasing the bonus given to high school students who secure 5 study units in admission to universities. Another important component was the 2016 publication of the local authorities’ educational statistics. For the first time, the main point of reference for gauging the quality of the local education system focused on the proportion of students receiving a matriculation certificate that included 5 units in mathematics. The publication of these statistics played a very important role in encouraging a policy of excellence, both due to its impact on public discourse on the national and local level and due to the importance of the statistics as a basis for formulating educational strategy in the local authorities. As part of its partnership with the Initiative, the ministry published the first report of its kind seeking to provide a comprehensive picture of mathematics studies based on a range of existing statistics. The report constituted an important step to creating a shared picture and was designed according to the Initiative’s “road map,” which defined the critical components for success in promoting excellence in mathematics and science.8 8  See: Picture of mathematics studies in Israel: Trends and findings from the education system, Report no. 1 (November 2016) and Report no. 2 (March 2017), National Authority for Evaluation and Measurement in Education, Ministry of Education (in Hebrew).

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All these actions were intended to create an infrastructure for long-­ term engagements by the Ministry of Education, school principals, and local authorities. They reflected the intention shared by the ministry’s senior management and the 5x2 Initiative to ensure that the process of change was systemic, comprehensive, and sustainable. S trategic Collaborations with Third Sector Organizations and the Coalition of Businesses in the 5x2 Initiative Alongside the policy changes, the Ministry of Education also launched strategic collaborations with the partner organizations in the 5x2 Initiative relating to three key issues wherein it had been determined that the external partners offered clear added value. Thus, for example, organizations with knowledge and expertise reinforced the ministry’s core activities with the target populations of students and teachers, while philanthropic funds provided complementary resources expanding the programs and strengthening infrastructures. The Ministry of Education allocated financial resources for the creation of new partnerships and for leveraging and expanding existing ones in accordance with these selected strategic directions: • Strengthening quality teaching: This key need was addressed through professional development for existing teachers and through creating channels for recruiting new teachers with appropriate education and skills. Associations, philanthropic funds, and universities took part in the main programs launched in this field: Expanding the certification of existing teachers to teach 5  units in mathematics; establishing teachers’ communities to promote pedagogic excellence; and extending the program for “teaching support,” which places volunteers in lessons on an ongoing basis. • Increasing access for students: The intention here was to enable students to study mathematics and science at a level of excellence even when the school did not have the adapted study tracks. In cooperation with the partner associations in the Initiative, technological solutions for online learning were extended, such as the “Virtual High School.” • Reinforcing students’ motivation to choose: Data analysis identified the 9th grade as the junction at which students decide on their future course. Accordingly, it was decided to focus on that age in working to enhance students’ perceptions of the STEM subjects in

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terms of relevance to their future, as they perceived it. Hi-tech organizations in the Initiative mobilized for action, hosting motivational visits for students to the companies’ offices and recruiting industry engineers and programmers to volunteer in schools. In cooperation with the Ministry of Education, a customized system of activities was established regulating the deployment of volunteering throughout the country, with an emphasis on the periphery areas and on Arabic-­ speaking schools. This work highlighted the added value of the “coalition of businesses” within the Initiative, and helped to define common messages regarding the importance of STEM studies as stages toward social mobility and integration in the workforce. The focused actions to create partnership between the Ministry of Education and third sector and business organizations, based on a joint examination of the central obstacles, thus led to enhanced coordination and an increase in the effectiveness of the common action to advance the objectives. Complementary Moves: The 5x2 Initiative’s Partner Network The Initiative’s theory of change argues that the complexity of the problem demands systemic changes, not only on the policy level but also in the manner in which third sector and business organizations operate. To this end, the 5x2 Initiative launched several complementary actions that helped to create a language, knowledge bases, and common messages. These served to strengthen the partners’ ability to be synchronized in their efforts, while helping to focus and prioritize those efforts, in effect complementing the work being done by the Ministry of Education. One example of this is that when the National Program was announced by the Ministry of Education in 2015, there was already a well-established infrastructure on the ground that was capable of applying and implementing the policy changes. While in other instances, a new educational policy may be declared while the grassroots population feels alienated and uninvolved—and are also unprepared to implement it—in this case, the policy was declared after the actual educational bodies were already on board with the policy’s agenda and were acting in its spirit. The bidirectional movement created between grassroots work and infrastructure and the processes of policy change that followed as a result, enabled the change to work powerfully and rapidly. This mutuality among all the players is the

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strongest manifestation of the nature of collaborative governance in the Initiative. As a general rule, in addition to the work of the steering committee, the Initiative’s network of partners operates through several cross-sector working mechanisms (see also Fig. 11.2): 1. Work groups promote key issues through processes of reflection and analysis, collecting information, and defining shared methods. The work groups are managed by the backbone organization and include content experts and relevant representatives from the range of organizations in the partners’ network. Over the years, work groups have been active on various issues such as: student motivation, retraining from hi-tech to teaching, science excellence in the periphery, and technological excellence. The outcomes of the groups’ work are diverse and are inculcated in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. 2. Every year, an annual meeting of the partners’ network is held, bringing together representatives from all the organizations that are members of the network. These meetings provide a platform for enhancing cooperation, learning, and the creation of common knowledge and language. 3. Ongoing online communication intended to strengthen the transparency and coordination between the different players.

Initial Results: Changing the National Graph (2016–2017) The central objective of the 5x2 Initiative—to double the number of students taking the matriculation examination in mathematics at the level of 5 study units—was secured in just four years. From the year 2014, the downward trend seen in the preceding years was reversed: from a low point of 8,869 students taking the examination in 2012 to 16,085  in 2017. The expectation is that the figure will continue to rise through 2019. Moreover, the reversal of the trend in mathematics influenced the number of students taking 5 units in physics and chemistry (see Fig. 11.3). Significant progress was also seen in the objectives of recruiting new teachers and improving the quality of teaching in these subjects.

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Fig. 11.2  The 5X2 Initiative action model

This reversal of the trend occurred in all streams of education in Israel, including in communities with a low socioeconomic profile. The programs that encouraged opening classes, allocating significant resources, and encouraging school policy to promote excellence appear to have led to the change. However, it was also apparent from the figures that the most significant increase was concentrated in communities with a high socioeconomic profile, and that the gaps between the different sectors were not reduced.9

The Next Stage: Looking Forward (2017–2020) A sense of success and satisfaction with the joint work arose upon seeing the figures that showed that the Initiative’s goal of doubling the number of students would likely be met. At the same time, questions were raised concerning the Initiative’s next steps. In September 2016, the steering committee held a strategic thinking process; at the end of this process, it was decided that in order to ensure that the trend would not be an isolated finding but would ensure sustainable change, the integrated actions by diverse players must continue in the context of their strategic partnerships with the Ministry of Education. The same process defined two strategic focuses for the Initiative’s work over the period 2017–2020: Expanding 9  CBS Publication dated 30 Jan. 2018: Trends in mathematics and science in the seniorhigh section 2006-2016 (in Hebrew). For statistics relating to changes in the other dimensions of science excellence in education, see http://www.trump.org.il/scoreboard

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Fig. 11.3  Changes in advanced level of STEM over time

the circle of excellence in the social and geographical periphery, and strengthening the knowledge, skills, and sense of capability among junior-­ high students. As noted, the impressive increase in the number of students taking 5 units in mathematics originated mainly from the center of the country, from the Jewish sector, and from socio-economically strong communities. The decision to focus on the periphery emphasized the key importance of action on the local level, and demanded deeper thought and attention to the roots of the gaps between the center and the periphery in the fields of science education. To this end, the Initiative, which in its first few years worked to promote the process on the national level, was required to strengthen the communication and cooperation with the local regional authorities. Accordingly, the Ministry of Education decided to expand the national program, using a specific invitation to local authorities in the periphery. The strategic planning process thus confirmed once again the value of cross-sector action in advancing common objectives. It also defined the relative advantages of the 5x2 Initiative: a broad perspective on the field and diverse target populations; management of a partners’ network that was open to any relevant organization interested in joining the partnership; management and building of the partnership, relations of trust, and joint leadership mechanisms with the Ministry of Education; and a platform for initiating systemic actions that integrate diverse third sector and

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business organizations in an effective and focused manner. The process also highlighted the Initiative’s role in providing a long-term perspective, encouraging change that extends beyond the limitations of specific governments’ or ministers’ terms in office; this type of sustainable change allows for continuity, the strengthening of infrastructures, and monitoring the long-term achievement of objectives.

The 5X2 Initiative from the Perspective of Collaborative Governance Collaborative governance has various layers: preliminary assumptions; the nature of the governance arrangements themselves; policy-setting and decision-making processes; and realization through the implementation of policies. The story of the 5x2 Initiative shows that layers of collaborative governance were manifested differently during the various stages of the joint initiative, as will be presented here. Preliminary Assumptions The goal of the collaborative governance in the 5x2 Initiative was to advance a public goal of expanding the circle of science excellence in education; the goal was intended as a response to the downward trend in the number of students choosing these subjects, and also as a step toward narrowing the gaps between Israel’s center and the periphery, and between the Jewish and Arab sectors. The decision to create mechanisms of collaborative governance was based on the understanding that this is the only way to generate change, i.e. to secure results and create public value. The complexity of the problem, with its many different dimensions, demanded joint action by players from all three sectors. In addition, the cross-sector partners’ network created public value and manifested the democratic values of a public voice, through civil society organizations active in the field of education. The Initiative set out with the preliminary assumption that the Ministry of Education is the body that should lead the partnership to promote systemic change by setting policy and defining priorities. In the first year, the action strategy of the cross-sector partnership, led by philanthropic, business, and third sector educational bodies, focused on creating dialogue, building trust, and recruiting the senior management of the Ministry of

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Education to lead the joint initiative. The cross-sector partnership was based on a worldview that emphasizes the state’s role and responsibility for public and educational matters; the shared and complementary methods were shaped accordingly. Collaborative Governance in Action The 5x2 Initiative was launched as a cross-sector partnership by extra-­ governmental bodies from the philanthropic and business sectors. After the Ministry of Education joined the Initiative as a leading partner, and certainly following the launch of the National Plan in 2015, a collaborative governance arrangement was effectively consolidated. In this arrangement, the 5x2 Initiative served as a central force, introducing and implementing processes that directly influence the Ministry of Education’s actions. In the second and third stages of the Initiative, collaborative governance arrangements were consolidated and shaped, while the Initiative’s common objectives and policy processes were determined through consultation and cooperation through discussions by the cross-sector steering committee. The Ministry of Education’s openness to the process and its recognition of the potential in the cross-sector initiative played a key role in facilitating the creation of common action mechanisms over time. Specifically, the Ministry of Education’s experience in the participatory processes led by the Cross-Sector Round Table led its senior management to recognize the value of building trust and common discourse with organizations from the third and business sectors. The 5x2 Initiative complemented these trends and exemplified the possibility of initiating and consolidating shared mechanisms around a diverse range of issues, in the belief that this would strengthen Israel’s education system and Israeli society as a whole. The effectiveness of the joint work depends on their being clarity regarding each player’s unique role and contribution—in this case, the role of the business and third sectors in supporting and complementing the core programs led by the Ministry of Education. This clarity was created in the 5x2 Initiative through gradual processes and through building consensus among organizations from the various sectors: the coalition of businesses, meetings of the Initiative’s third sector organizations, and the discussions of the cross-sector steering committee. Thus, the Ministry of Education promoted the core track of the National Program through policy decisions and budgetary allocations for

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increasing teaching hours, opening new classes, expanding teacher certification, and promoting incentives in academic institutions and among regional authorities. The business sector organizations gradually formulated the approach that, since the core educational issues are not their area of expertise, it is important that they focus their action in areas where they can add value: recruiting and mobilizing volunteers in a range of supportive activities; influencing students’ perceptions of their future; and reinforcing their sense of capability by presenting them with role models. The business sector also invested financial resources in the establishment of infrastructures in schools and in funding programs to reinforce mathematics and science studies. The third sector and philanthropic organizations, with ties in the grassroots arena and academia as well as extensive experience in cooperative ventures, contributed their strengths by promoting complementary solutions in the field of pedagogic innovation, creating virtual platforms, and strengthening the bond and continuum between formal and informal education. As a cross-sector initiative in collaborative governance, the 5x2 Initiative is based on the building of mutual trust between the different players. Due to the large number and diversity of participants, and the differing social beliefs underlying their activities, it was important to establish the understanding that there is no single solution to a problem, but rather that the solution requires the effective and coordinated combination of forces bringing multiple perspectives, different types of expertise, and diverse experience.10 Various work processes contributed to building trust: transparency and sharing of data; defining and dividing responsibilities among the different sectors; common discourse to understand systemic problems; and processes of forging consensus and joint decision making. Another important factor is a systemic perspective relating to the broader context, to systemic structures, and to each player’s unique contribution over time (Lahat and Sher-Hadar 2017, p. 6). The function of the backbone organization is to ensure that the joint action continues to take place on the basis of a systemic perspective that combines diverse viewpoints, and that the activities by the partners’ network are not subsumed by the government’s operations, thereby losing their civil and  For further insights about the various components of the model, see: Rom et al. 2015a.

10

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voluntary value. The commitment to the third sector organizations’ independence is grounded in the understanding that the organizations play an important function in the outcomes of collaborative governance and in advancing systemic solutions. In other words, without the collaborative governance mechanisms built in as part of the strategic partnership, it would not have been possible to secure the public goal of expanding the circle of science excellence and to advance the common socioeconomic vision. Policy Setting and Decision Making During the early stages of the policy-setting processes, when the Ministry of Education defined excellence in mathematics and science as a key priority, discussions were held and joint decisions made in the Initiative’s cross-­ sector steering committee based on the following principles: formal, collective (with diverse stakeholders), deliberative (participatory), and consensus-oriented. Once the National Program was launched, concrete decisions on the allocation of resources, setting criteria for the invitations, and other formal procedures were undertaken in consultation with the integrative mechanisms, but there was no joint decision making. However, the informal mechanisms led by the backbone organization continued to operate throughout the collaborative work processes, forging agreements and consensus. The mechanism of the Initiative is not incorporated as a formal legal entity, and all the partnerships, including those with the Ministry of Education, are maintained through voluntary mechanisms of the public steering forum, the steering committee, the work groups, and the plenum of the partners’ network. The public steering forum of the National Program does not operate by virtue of law and is not defined in a formal association, but rather is based on an informal commitment to partnership, based on an understanding of the added value, relations of trust, and common commitment to securing the objectives. These informal mechanisms have operated over a period of five years with a growing commitment on the part of the different partners to the outcomes and to joint action. Alongside the formal mechanisms, the third and business sector organizations continued to maintain independent activities in the field to promote the common goals. These activities are not necessarily supervised, monitored, or controlled in formal terms by the Ministry of Education. Alongside the National Program, led by the Ministry of Education,

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Sheatufim continues to serve as the backbone organization of the 5X2 Initiative that convenes and leads the informal joint work processes within the Initiative and promotes action, discourse, and joint learning by the broad cross-sector partners’ network. Implementation During the implementation and realization of the National Plan, the steering committee gradually became a consultative forum serving as a platform for reflection and for highlighting key issues and obstacles. The integrated mechanisms are not responsible for budgetary decisions and do not directly manage joint programs. This creates some challenges for the Initiative process as collaborative governance; it also raises the question of whether and how the governance arrangements might be strengthened in order to act effectively and manifest the different viewpoints during the implementation and realization stage as well.

Conclusion The 5x2 Initiative is a cross-sector partnership created by a network of partners from the social, business, and philanthropic sectors that joined forces with Israel’s Ministry of Education. This article presented the Initiative as a specific case of collaborative governance. The collective impact model adopted by the Initiative is based on principles of action drawn from the culture, political structures, and cross-sector relations of American society, which differ substantially from their Israeli counterparts. Those who conceived and developed the model do not conceptualize it as one of collaborative governance. However, we suggest that, in effect, collaborative governance mechanisms were created in the implementation of the model in Israel, in light of local perceptions about the sovereignty and the role of the state in processes of change on one end, and the cross-­ sector dialogue and trust that was created in the partners’ network and with the Ministry of Education, on the other end. All these factors largely explain the success of the Initiative. The relations of trust and the unique partnership developed between the senior management of the Ministry of Education and the representatives of organizations from the different sectors were key factors in promoting the National Plan and in securing the common objectives. The

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Initiative created a meaningful platform for open and participatory discussions that were conducted in a professional manner and were data driven and knowledge based. These discussions permitted different voices to be heard and allowed joint action to be advanced by diverse players. As things proceeded, it became clear that the collaborative governance mechanisms were extremely effective in the planning and policy-setting stages of the Initiative, in which joint decision making was facilitated. During implementation and inculcation, these mechanisms changed their function and became consultative bodies, while decision making was undertaken by the Ministry of Education. It now remains to be seen how the partners’ network and the cross-sector action will maintain the momentum and commitment of all the players and will continue to address the substantial challenges in the field. These challenges include the need to strengthen infrastructures and the long-term maintenance of the achievements gained in strengthening excellence in the periphery and among all groups in Israeli society.

References Ben-David, Y. (2017). The Story of the 5x2 Initiative: How Did the Public, Business, and Social-Educational Sectors Work Together to Promote Scientific-Technological Expertise in Education in Israel? Beit Yehoshua, Israel: Sheatufim Strategies for Social Impact (in Hebrew). Retrieved from http://wiki.sheatufim.org.il/%D7 %A1%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8_%D7%99%D7%95%D7%96%D7%9E %D7%AA_5%D7%A4%D7%992_%D7%9C%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95 %D7%9D_%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA_% D7%9E%D7%93%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%98%D7%9B%D7%A0%D 7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%AA_%D7%91%D7%97%D7%9 9%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%9A_%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D 7%90%D7%9C Goldschmidt, R. (2010). Education for Science and Technology. Jerusalem, Israel: Knesset Research and Information Center (in Hebrew). Retrieved from https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Info/MMM/Pages/document. aspx?docId=92C38D55-F7F7-E411-80C8-00155D010977&businessType=1 Hanleybrown, F., Kania, J., & Kramer, M. (2012). Channeling Change: Making Collective Impact Work. Stanford Social Innovation Review. Retrieved from:

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https://ssir.org/articles/entry/channeling_change_making_collective_ impact_work Kania, J., & Kramer, M. (2011). Collective impact. Stanford Social Innovation Review. Retrieved from: https://ssir.org/articles/entry/collective_impact# Kania, J., & Kramer, M. (2013). Embracing Emergence: How Collective Impact Addresses Complexity. Blog Entry. Stanford Social Innovation Review. Retrieved from: https://ssir.org/articles/entry/social_progress_through_collective_ impact Lahat, L., & Sher-Hadar, N. (2017). Collaborative Governance: A Review of the Literature (Draft for Discussion). Jerusalem, Israel: Hazan Center for Social Justice and Democracy, Van Leer Institute (in Hebrew). Retrieved from: https://www.academia.edu/37417915/%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%98_%D7%9 C%D7%99%D7%94%D7%99%D7%90_%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%A2_ %D7%A9%D7%A8-%D7%94%D7%93%D7%A8_2017._%D7%9E%D7%A9%D 7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%9C%D7% 91%D7%AA_%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%AA_%D7%A1%D7%A 4%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%98%D7%99%D7%95%D7%98%D7%94_% D7%9C%D7%93%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F_%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7 %A9%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D_%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7 %96_%D7%9C%D7%A6%D7%93%D7%A7_%D7%97%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%A A%D7%99_%D7%95%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%98%D 7%99%D7%94_%D7%A2_%D7%A9_%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A7%D7%91_%D7 %97%D7%96%D7%9F_%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9F_%D7%95 %D7%9F_%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%A8_%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95% D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D_%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%95 %D7%95%D7%9F_ Manny-Ikan, E., & Rosen, Y. (2013). Teaching Science in Israel: Trends, Challenges and Leverage for Change. Jerusalem: Henrietta Szold Institute (in Hebrew). Retrieved from: https://www.szold.org.il/wp-content/ uploads/2016/09/Maday-8.pdf Manny-Ikan, I., Rosen, D., Bashan, Z., & Tikochinski, T. (2012, 2013). Key Trends in the Integration of Laptop Computers in Studies in Elementary School – Our Sderot Project. Jerusalem: Henrietta Szold Institute, Research Report (in Hebrew). Retrieved from: https://www.szold.org.il/he/%D7%94%D7%A2 %D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%AA-%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%99%D7%A 7%D7%98-%D7%A9%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%A0%D7%95/ National Authority for Evaluation and Measurement in Education. (2016 November, March 2017). Picture of Mathematics Studies in Israel: Trends and Findings from the Education System. Reports no. 1 (November 2016) and Report no. 2 (March 2017). Jerusalem: Ministry of Education (in Hebrew).

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Retrieved from: http://cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Units/Rama/ HaarachatProjectim/Math_report.htm Rom, M., Hurvitz, I., & Tamir, O. (2012). Learning from the Experience of Others: On Collective Impact Initiatives to Promote STEM Education in the US. Beit Yehoshua: Sheatufim Strategies for Social Impact (in Hebrew). Retrieved from: http://wiki.sheatufim.org.il/w/upload/sheatufim/9/9d/%D7%9C%D7%9C %D7%9E%D7%95%D7%93_%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%99%D7 %95%D7%A0%D7%9D_%D7%A9%D7%9C_%D7%90%D7%97%D7%A8%D7% 99%D7%9D_%D7%A2%D7%9C_%D7%99%D7%95%D7%96%D7%9E%D7%9 5%D7%AA_Impact_Collective_%D7%9C%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95 %D7%9D_%D7%94%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%9A_%D7%94% D7%9E%D7%93%D7%A2%D7%99_%D7%95%D7%94%D7%98%D7%9B%D7 %A0%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99_%D7%91%D7%90%D7%A8 %D7%94%27%27%D7%91.pdf Rom, M., Hurvitz, I., & Yaacobi-Horowitz, M., (2015a). Four Insights on Process and Methodology: Following Implementation of Collective Impact in Israel. Beit Yehoshua: Sheatufim Strategies for Social Impact (in Hebrew). Retrieved from: http://wiki.sheatufim.org.il/w/upload/sheatufim/3/3e/ Collective_impact_insights.pdf Rom, M., Hurvitz, I., & Yaacobi-Horowitz, M., (2015b). Collective Impact 2015: Current Perspective on Theory and Practice. Beit Yehoshua: Sheatufim Strategies for Social Impact (in Hebrew). Retrieved from: http://wiki.sheatufim.org. il/w/upload/sheatufim/0/00/%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94 __%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%A7%D7%98%D7%99%D7%91_%D7%9 0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%A7%D7%98_%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%98_% D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%A0%D7%99_%D7%A2%D7%9C_%D7%94%D7 %AA%D7%99%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%94_%D7%95%D7%94 %D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A7%D7%98%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%94.pdf Weissblai, E. (2012). The Role of the Education System in Identifying and Locating Children at Risk. Jerusalem: Knesset Research and Information Center (in Hebrew). Retrieved from: https://www.fkn.org.il/webfiles/fck/ m03120.pdf

CHAPTER 12

Example: The Partnership for Regional Sustainability as a Collaborative Governance Arrangement Naomi Apel and Lihi Lahat

Introduction The Partnership for Regional Sustainability is a collaboration between Ramat Hanadiv Memorial Gardens and Nature Park and five local authorities, located in close proximity to one another: Zichron Yaacov, the Alona communities, Binyamina–Givat Ada, Jisr a-Zarqa, and Hof HaCarmel. The Partnership began as an initiative of Ramat Hanadiv, a public benefit company (PBC) under the terms of the Ramat Hanadiv Parks Law, 5718–1958. Ramat Hanadiv occupies a site of some 4500 dunams,

N. Apel (*) Ramat Hanadiv, Zikhron Ya’akov, Israel e-mail: [email protected] L. Lahat Administration & Public Policy, Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada The Chazan Center for Social Justice, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Research Group, 2015–2018), Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_12

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including gardens and a nature park, in proximity to Zichron Yaakov. The gardens serve as a memorial site for Baron Edmond de Rothschild and his wife Adelheid, who were reinterred there in 1954. Ramat Hanadiv is funded by Yad Hanadiv, a philanthropic foundation of the Rothschild family. The partnership focuses primarily on three areas: coexistence of nature, agriculture, and human activity; sustainable transport; and a sustainable regional economy. The following description is based on an interview with Ms. Naomi Apel, the former Director of the Partnership  for Regional Sustainability at the Ramat Hanadiv, as well as documents from the Partnership website.

Background and Needs In its search for ways to help move the region towards a more sustainable future, Ramat Hanadiv entered into a learning process. A range of models of activity from Israel and abroad were studied, and interviews were held with members of the local communities and stakeholders in order to understand the region’s challenges and needs. It became clear that to successfully promote the establishment of a geographical region managed in accordance with the principles of sustainability, the support of all key stakeholders in the region—for the idea, the strategic process, and the stages of implementation and activity—would have to be enlisted. The goal was to promote a region in which efforts in spheres such as nature preservation, agricultural managment, landscaping, and waste  were approached jointly, through the mutual commitment of the partners. Ramat Hanadiv recognized that creating a sustainable region, and not merely defining external objectives of sustainability, meant ensuring that all of the stakeholders accepted mutual responsibility. A “shared story” would be woven from narratives, one that favored a clear articulation of needs and acceptance of shared responsibility for taking action, over complaints, blame, and inertia. In other words, the positioning and stance of the partners involved in the process (the stakeholders) would have to change. For example, stakeholders who saw themselves as proprietary owners of a piece of land, might begin to see themselves as partners in a complex and participatory process; or critics of inaction would become active participants. Joint responsibility has various facets: some players are accountable to the public for the outcomes and actions, but their responsibility is also derived from their involvement in the process. People, authorities, and organizations become invested in the process, and this drives them to promote action in the region. Accordingly, it is important that they are all partners in the process.

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The Collaborative Initiative The idea to develop a regional partnership arose from the aspiration to bring greater attention to the issue of sustainability, which lies at the heart of Ramat Hanadiv’s activities. The vision of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability is to maintain a space for regional cooperation, and it is defined in the following words: To ensure that the region we live in will be one that enjoys lasting environmental, social, and economic resilience; that the communities in the region implement principles of sustainability in their lives and work constantly to improve the condition of their human, economic, and ecological environment; that the authorities work together and share a joint strategy for realizing the vision (website of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability). This is a goal that seeks to promote the broad public interest. It is in the public’s interest to change the way the region is managed and to inculcate principles of sustainability in planning, development, and implementation. The basic assumption of Ramat Hanadiv was that they could not do this alone. Nor did they believe it was possible to do this work only with the heads and officials of the local authorities. They came to the conclusion that the best way to reach the goal was by building a collaborative network of authorities (from action inside the “blue line”— the boundaries of each authority—to an approach that extends across boundaries); within the authorities (different stakeholders in the authority, such as heads of the authorities, officials, residents, business owners, farmers, educators); and between communities in the region (residents from the communities, of different cultures and socio-economic profiles). Accordingly, a special effort was made to create mechanisms that would incentivize the participants to cooperate and to broaden their perspectives. The transition to a more inclusive discussion that transcended personal interests would, they believed, facilitate development of a space conducive to creating a “common identity,” including those of the stakeholders themselves (a participant, e.g., is not just a business owner but also one who embodies a partner in regional economic development, a resident concerned about environmental aspects, etc.) and those of others (the needs of other groups, farmers, residents of other local authorities, etc.). Reconciling dual roles as private individuals and actors in a communal enterprise is central to being able to establish the core of a sustainable region, whose functions and responsibilities are not necessarily limited by its municipal boundaries and include other partners.

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Leadership  The concept of governance, in the sense of national or local government as the leading body, does not accurately reflect the Partnership. Some definitions in the literature regard collaborative governance as a governmental initiative, while others do not require that the initiative be governmental and argue that it may also come from other sectors. The definition formulated by the research group, and underlying most of the chapters in this book, focuses on the former (see introductory chapter: Lahat, Sher-Hadar, and Galnoor). At the outset, the question arose as to who would lead the Partnership, and this issue was examined by the various players, including the heads of the authorities. It was convenient to have a body such as Ramat Hanadiv—apolitical, neutral, and professional, and which enjoys a high level of trust, undertake leadership of the Partnership. This was not a simple decision for Ramat Hanadiv; they were entering an arena influenced by politics, conflicts, and special interests; this would require skills they did not possess; it would also require a willingness to forego control and management in favor of creating institutional frameworks for the consolidation of consensus. This would demand changes in how they operated. Mechanisms and Actor  Once the five local authorities in the geographic area encompassed by the initiative reached basic agreement, an inside team developed a strategy for managing the process. From the early stages it was agreed that no attempt would be made to control the decisions that were taken. No guidelines were established for specific issues; the only guiding principle was to include as many partners as possible through a meaningful and participatory process. The Partnership operates by means of a leading team—a broad forum of some 120 stakeholders that takes decisions regarding the agenda and actions. Additional forums include: three working teams that discussed issues of a sustainable economy, sustainable transport, and coexistence of nature, agriculture, and humans, respectively; a forum of heads of authorities; and additional thematic forums. The teams advanced their issues by laying out a vision for the future, joint goals, and modalities for securing the goals. They presented the broad areas of action to the Plenum (Partnership for Regional Sustainability, Annual Summary, 2016). Following approval by the Plenum, a covenant was signed by the heads of the authorities, including a summary of the various agreements. In

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addition, specific discussions are held with the heads of the authorities, particularly on issues relating to powers and resources, when it is appropriate to secure their agreement in advance. Over three years, dozens of discussions were held in the teams and forums, moderated by counselors with expertise in facilitation, and with the involvement of professional experts on specific issues as required. These discussions were consolidated into practical avenues of activity and a number of projects, at least some of which are already being implemented on the ground. Examples include regional educational programs, the promotion of the use of pesticides that are friendly to the environment and to humans among farmers and residents, transportation projects (such as a carpool parking lot at Binyamina train station specifically for passengers using cooperative transportation), a project for the eco-hydrological rehabilitation of Taninim stream, sustainable gardening in the local authorities, and others. The stakeholders who participate in the forums include a wide range of representatives, from groups of residents, parent committees, and local environmental organizations, to officials from the local authorities and district offices, heads of local authorities, farmers, business owners, experts, and others. All enjoy an equal voice at the discussion table. Whether the member is head of an authority or a farmers’ representative, their voice in the forum is considered meaningful and respected. Deliberation and Agreement  One of the key components of collaborative governance mechanisms is deliberation: discussion among participants characterized by mutuality, whereby knowledge and views move in both directions and there is a clear aspiration to secure consensual agreement whenever possible. In the case of the Partnership, the key question was how to manage the discussion. It was clear that there is a difference between the discourse of a body that wields control and has professional answers to questions raised before a broad forum of stakeholders. Questions to which the answers remain unknown, and the joint process of searching, are what matter and what create the added value of a complex perspective, alongside the development of trust between the partners. Forums for discussion were created to include numerous voices, and to choose together, through consensus, the questions, and responses. Much thought was devoted to how to lead respectful, broad, and consensual discourse. Particular emphasis was placed on attendance and the lack of a hierarchy. To set the agenda, 13 issues were selected by a forum of professional experts in order to ensure that the discussion would have a

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substantive basis. These issues were then brought before a plenum of approximately 100 participants divided among eight groups. Each group included diverse stakeholders, representing the range of local authorities. Through a process of deliberation and mutual persuasion, the participants at each table selected two issues. These were raised in the forum, and by collating the decisions of all the tables, three issues were chosen: (1) coexistence of nature, agriculture, and human activity: finding paths for dialogue and for all three to coexist, through understanding and mutual consideration, and not at the expense of one another; (2) sustainable transport: reducing the use of private vehicles and expanding the use of alternative means of transportation, including public transport, infrastructure for bicycles, and cooperative transport; (3) a sustainable regional economy—encouraging local businesses through community development, advancing connections between local authorities and local businesses, etc. (from the website of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability). On the whole, shared wisdom is appreciated, and every representative—whether of a committee of parents or farmers, or an official—enjoys equal status. The discussions did not always lead to consensus. Some disagreements could not be resolved. One of these concerned the construction of a road crossing the Hanadiv Valley: the heads of some of the local authorities opposed the plan, while others were in favor. The issue remained unresolved, despite the deliberative mechanisms. However, the mere fact that the issue was raised, the transparency, and the practice of “putting things on the table” played an important role in promoting joint discussion. More important than resolving the conflict was the process by which the participants internalized the process of holding better discussions that could lead to agreement. A significant part of this process is creating genuine commitment to the process and a willingness to listen to others and to reach unanticipated outcomes.

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Partnership The main advantage of the Partnership is the creation of common space for discussion and action that raises issues that were not previously advanced at the level of each individual local authority, but for which joint action can provide a convenient platform that in some cases can be relatively easily implemented. Budgetary issues sometimes appear to be less of an obstacle and more readily solved through joint action. Examples include

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preparation of a book of regional suppliers, which requires, above all, joint action and guidance, promoting a cooperative transportation project to the train station, and an initiative to promote integrated pest control in farming areas. This type of joint activity has a ripple effect that leads to further cooperation and discourse. Relations are formed between partners, and the discussions extend to additional issues, ultimately creating circles of impact that form the essence of sustainable partnership. On the other hand, there are several disadvantages. Agreement is sometimes hard to achieve, and when there are conflicts, these sometimes emerge more sharply. Since the tolerance for failure is low, it is not easy to mitigate these situations. Nevertheless, exposure of conflicts, even if they remain unresolved, has inherent value. It is important to understand that in the collaborative governance model discussion is irrelevant if the aim is merely to create legitimacy for a predetermined outcome. It is impossible to guarantee a particular outcome. The contribution of the Partnership is diminished when local authorities have preconceived notions about where they are heading. The work is complicated by the fact that the Partnership is not a decision-making body with powers. In this context, on certain issues there is a need to reach agreement and recruit the actors that have power in advance, since otherwise implementation will not be possible. In most cases it is possible to recruit them. Lastly, some of the actors may experience a disadvantage since, in a certain sense, they lose control and are dependent on the outcomes of the consensual and participatory processes, which take more time.

The Contribution of the Partnership to Promoting Public Values Several key values are manifest in the Partnership’s activity: Sustainability  Sustainability is a goal and a value in its own right. Creating a sustainable region demands a joint approach and joint action, and the collaborative governance model helps to realize these. Highlighting sustainability demands a reduction in the focus on personal identity, and replacing it with conceptualizations of shared identity. This creates a foundation for advancing the notion of a sustainable region as a value proposition.

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Narrowing Gaps  Another value promoted by the Partnership relates to the narrowing of gaps between the residents of the participating local authorities in the region. This is particularly relevant for Jisr a-Zarqa, where the starting point in terms of infrastructures and the lack of resources limits the ability to advance goals and plans. Mobilizing actors to action that advances the partners and narrowing gaps are values that the Partnership seeks to encourage. Trust Among Population Groups  The Partnership process enhances trust between the partners. This is true in the context of the issues that are discussed, but there is also a larger value: It creates a ripple or snowball effect in terms of deliberative capabilities based on the creation of trust. Public Participation  Yet another value that the Partnership advances is civil participation. Citizens and representatives share in the action and the responsibility for public activities—for their own benefit, but no less important for the benefit of the region as a whole. Economic Benefits Finally, the regional Partnership mechanisms allow more efficient exploitation of community resources for the general good. This is true both because of the economies of scale that is created by the development of joint infrastructures (e.g. in waste managment) and because of the ability to recruit common resources, create large circles of clients, and so on. The status of Ramat Hanadiv within this initiative is that of a body that convenes and facilitates the processes. However, if the Partnership itself is to be sustainable, Ramat Hanadiv cannot continue to lead it over the long term. A further participatory process intended to design an operating model for the future of the Partnership concluded that the most relevant model to adopt was the “regional clusters” approach developed by the Interior Ministry. This approach has already been implemented in regions around the country. Over the first few months of 2018, discussions began regarding the integration of the Partnership’s vision and management mechanisms in the framework of the Interior Ministry’s cluster activities. Starting in January 2020, Ramat Hanadiv no longer manages the initiative

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and the responsibility for managing the regional processes has been transferred to the regional cluster. The assumption was that once a strong infrastructure is in place for joint discourse, this may also be channeled in other directions that will maintain a sustainable region in the broadest sense of the term.

References Interview with Naomi Apel, Director of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability, (2018, January 23). Partnership for Regional Sustainability  – Annual Summary. (2016). Retrieved from the website of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability on 23 July 2018: /https://www.hashutfut.org Partnership for Regional Sustainability and Modus. (2016, May). Processes and involvements: On Partnership, Sustainability, and Regionality  – Perceptions of the Stakeholders on the Core Issues. Concluding Report. Retrieved from the website of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability on 23 July 2018: /https:// www.hashutfut.org Partnership for Regional Sustainability and Modus. Processes and Involvements. (2017). Regional Partnerships in Israel and Around the World: Structure, Mechanisms, and Operating Principles. Retrieved from the website of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability on 23 July 2018: / ­ https://www. hashutfut.org

CHAPTER 13

Conclusion: Collaborative Governance as an Arrangement for Shaping and Implementing Policy Neta Sher-Hadar, Lihi Lahat, and Itzhak Galnoor

This collection of articles discusses collaborative governance arrangements in the Israeli context, from both the theoretical and empirical perspective. These arrangements emerged against the background of changes in the functions of the state and the involvement of diverse actors in shaping

N. Sher-Hadar (*) Mandel School for Educational Leadership, Jerusalem, Israel Administration & Public Policy, Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel The Chazan Center for Social Justice, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Research Group, 2015–2018), Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] L. Lahat Administration & Public Policy, Sapir Academic College, Hof Ashkelon, Israel Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada The Chazan Center for Social Justice, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Research Group, 2015–2018), Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 N. Sher-Hadar et al. (eds.), Collaborative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45807-2_13

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and implementing policy. To a large extent, these arrangements are the product of the growing involvement of numerous actors in the public arena, the blurring of boundaries between different sectors, and the trend of privatization in many countries, including Israel. These arrangements, which originated in the late twentieth century, intensified in the early twenty-first century, influenced by multiculturalism, public participation, and the strengthening of civil society. These trends created the need to improve management, planning, and resource development capabilities, and subsequently inspired attempts by governmental bodies to seek new modalities for shaping and implementing public policy. One such modality was the reinforcement of regulatory mechanisms, based on the assumption that regulation would improve governance in an era of changes in the functions of the state. Other approaches, however, also emerged. This book examines one such arrangement that began during this period. Known as collaborative governance, this arrangement brings together stakeholders from different sectors in an institutionalized setting in order to shape and implement public policy. This type of cooperation is not a new phenomenon; representatives of different sectors, interest groups, and stakeholders have always made connections with institutions and representatives of government in order to advance various interests. What distinguishes these new arrangements is that the connection between the sectors and stakeholders is characterized by a different pattern of action. First, these arrangements are more formal. Second, they include a wider range of stakeholders than in the past. Third, these patterns of action seek to respond to the difficulties facing national and local government institutions in the current era, which have created far-reaching changes in governance capabilities. These new cooperative endeavors, based on the more formal collaborative governance approach, have gained new importance as a policy tool. A growing number of initiatives by local and central governments are consolidating connections between different stakeholders as a model for policy making. The increasing prominence of these trends on the practical level has been accompanied by greater research interest as well. The research I. Galnoor The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem, Israel Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected]

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literature highlights the new arrangements as a response to the features of the current age (Bryson et al. 2015; Lang 2019; Vigoda-Gadot 2009). These arrangements represent numerous voices in decision-­making processes and utilize a deliberative mechanism to express broad public interest. They are grounded in professional knowledge, leadership and forms of action that facilitate the expression of the broadest public possible. Nevertheless, some questions regarding the ramifications of modes of collaborative governance remain unresolved. In their current incarnation, do the processes of participation strengthen the function of the state and its responsibility to its citizens or are they liable to contribute to a further retreat in the capabilities of the state to govern and in its responsibility to its citizens? In this collection, we examine the nature and relevance of collaborative governance arrangements in Israel, while focusing on two central questions: (1) Do collaborative governance arrangements help promote public values? (2) Does collaborative governance reinforce democratic processes? These questions are the common thread that runs through the articles presented in the four sections of the book.

The Sections of the Book The first section of the book “On the Democratic Elements of Collaborative Governance” discusses the contribution made by collaborative governance arrangements to the democratic process and to public administration. The chapters suggest that these arrangements do not reflect a paradigm change, but rather offer a response to a need that emerged following administrative reforms and years of deficient representation in the democratic system and its institutions. In other words, although a key goal of the collaborative governance approach is to foster the expression of democratic participation, the authors in this section claim that in the current stage, and particularly in the Israeli context, the theoretical and practical sources of this approach do not necessarily indicate the strengthening of democratic foundations. Talshir’s chapter, “Participatory Democracy and Collaborative Governance: Do the Two Join Forces (Against the State)?” highlights the desire to increase participation through collaborative governance. However, she argues that the arrangement in its current format might actually weaken the state, and the increased number of players in collaborative governance may challenge the legitimate democratic bodies.

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Accordingly, there is a need to create a collaborative governance model that restructures the state’s role in these policy networks in a way that ensures that the democratic anchors are maintained during this process, without impairing the principle of democratic equality. Goffer’s chapter, “Collaborative Governance in Light of Deliberative Democracy,” compares the collaborative governance arrangement and deliberative democracy. The chapter argues that collaborative governance is not based on an independent democratic theory, but rather manifests multicultural democracy in an institutional form. In other words, while deliberative democracy has its foundation in democratic theories, collaborative governance is rooted in theories concerning the strengthening of governance. The democratic issue emerges as an ancillary question. Thus, in order to strengthen the components of a democracy, we must emphasize the importance of representation in these arrangements. To accomplish this goal, we must identify weaknesses in the patterns of representation, the power relations between the participants, and the responsibility of the various actors in these arrangements. Lahat and Sher-Hadar’s chapter, “A Threefold Perspective: Conditions for Collaborative Governance” indicates that the collaborative governance arrangement, as a form of action used by public administrative organizations, is not a replacement for existing arrangements. Rather, it adds a further layer to the current instruments. Under certain conditions, using it might be beneficial, whereas in others it provides no added value, and may even impede policy making. Collaborative governance may help shape policy under two conditions. First, it is helpful when policy makers require professional knowledge that they cannot acquire by themselves—for example, when the Ministry of Education needs to formulate clearer policy regarding the activities of NGOs in schools. The second condition is when policy makers require value-based consensus in order to reinforce the legitimacy of a policy. Furthermore, the utilization of collaborative governance arrangements can be more relevant for certain values such as organizational or political values and less relevant for others, such as market-­oriented values. Last, they argue that it would be easier to implement these arrangements in specific environments with an administrative culture or a policy style that tends to involve more actors in the formation of policy. Thus, collaborative governance may be adopted for normative reasons, meaning based on the belief that governments should make decisions using this arrangement, or for pragmatic reasons.

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The chapters in the second section “Collaborative Governance in Local Government” discuss collaborative governance arrangements in local government and their impact on local democracy. These chapters show that the well-known weaknesses in the status of local authorities, relative to the central government, are also reflected in the implementation of collaborative governance arrangements. In other words, while collaborative governance arrangements contribute to the strengthening of local capacities, they do not constitute a tool that has power in its own right. Moreover, collaborative governance does not solve the problem of the power relations between the central and local governments. Shiffer’s chapter, “Local Collaborative Governance: Could it Bypass Outdated Legal Structures?” suggests that collaborative governance has not substantially changed the relationship between the local and central governments. The principle of consensus, which is key to these arrangements, has not created real change in the power-based nature of the relations between these two governmental systems. Furthermore, collaborative governance arrangements may strengthen the power of weak local authorities, thereby leading to changes in the balance of power between the different strata of government. Therefore, despite the relative contribution that collaborative governance makes to resolving certain issues such as the creation of trust between players within local communities and the promotion of educational programs under the responsibility of the local authority, it does not in itself lead to substantive change in the problems of trust between the two levels of government. Bresler Gonen and Alsraiha’s chapter, “Local Collaborative Governance: Creating Workplaces for Women in Minority Societies in Southern Israel,” suggests that in a minority society collaborative governance can help local government expand the range of services it offers and improve its ability to implement policy. The reason for this outcome is that the partnership grants legitimacy to all of the groups involved in the process. The chapter shows that these processes helped make the local government a pivotal actor for other actors: for the central government, by granting legitimacy to the investment, and for civil society, by reinforcing the trust in them and with citizens. Thus, the collaborative governance arrangements implemented by the local authority helped build a bridge between a minority population and the institutions of the state. This outcome stands in contrast to the processes used previously for shaping and implementing policy, which were characterized by mistrust.

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The section ends with an example of the local collaborative initiative in the town of Kiryat Malachi based on the description of Zion Regev, who at that time was a supervisor for the corporate responsibility of the Gazit Globe Company and was one of the initiative’s leaders. The example underscores the important role of the human factor as well as the structure of the arrangements to the success of the process, especially to balancing political relations and promoting public values. The third section, “Regulation and Collaborative Governance” examines the collaborative governance arrangements implemented in the regulatory sector. Both chapters in this section offer insights regarding participation in regulatory processes in the post administrative reforms. Talias’s chapter, “Collaborative Regulation: Collaborative Governance in Regulation,” presents the concept of “collaborative regulation” and the possible development in the role of state regulation, including, as part of the process, voluntary regulation. Harel-Fisher’s chapter, “Reducing Aspects of Collaborative Governance in Standardization Processes in Israel” illustrates the dependence of collaborative governance proceedings on political support, especially from the government, which enables it to act contrary to the direction of collaborative governance and limit the effect of a joint process. The chapter highlights the significance of the state’s conduct in the national and global arenas in the context of standardization—an arena characterized by participatory proceedings involving other countries and organizations. Thus, by way of example, the chapter discusses the regulatory price paid for the reduction in the number of actors in the Israeli case. The chapters in the fourth  section “The Place of Civil Society in Collaborative Governance Arrangements” discuss collaborative governance arrangements from the perspective of civil society. Almog-Bar’s chapter “Civil Society Organizations in Collaborative Governance: Cross-­ Sector Partnerships as a Test Case” explores the role of civil society organizations within these arrangements and notes one of the key difficulties. Contrary to the ideal expectation of balanced partnership processes, she claims that in practice stratification emerges within civil society. Strong organizations gain prominence and significant power gaps are evident between governmental and social organizations, in a manner that disrupts the partnership processes. Hurvitz and Rom’s chapter, “The 5x2 Initiative for Expanding STEM Excellence in Israel: Collective Impact as a Model of Collaborative Governance,” presents a specific case of the adoption of collaborative governance, in a process designed on the basis of an action

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model developed in the United States. The chapter illustrates the delicate process of building trust in the field of science education in Israel, permitting flexibility in the division of functions between the partners. The authors note the changing role of the state in these arrangements. Thus, for example, the process revealed that the status of partner transformed the state into a leader in certain areas, particularly those consistent with the priorities of its leaders. The section ends with the example of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability in Ramat Hanadiv based on the description of Naomi Apel, the former  director of the partnership. The example demonstrates that despite the challenges, public values can be promoted, when a common interest is established. All of the chapters in the book illustrate the essence of collaborative governance as an institutional arrangement that offers a response, if only partial, to the challenges of capability and legitimacy in the current era. However, alongside the advantages offered by collaborative governance, questions remain regarding the ability of these arrangements to maintain public values and their significance for the democratic system. We will now examine these two questions in greater depth.

Collaborative Governance and Public Values In the Introduction, we discussed the role of public values in administrative work. Among other factors, we noted that, by definition, public values are formulated in various societies through a process of dialogue. Accordingly, they are constantly defined and redefined, and are not absolute. As we noted, public values are the product of the collective, multidimensional and politically mediated expression of citizens’ preferences. These values are constantly redefined through an ongoing process by means of social and political interactions (Moore 1995; O’Flynn 2008; Smith 2004; Stoker 2006). Accordingly, there would appear to be a structural correlation between collaborative governance arrangements and the basic definition of public values. Thus, for example, if there were an interest in promoting principles of inclusion in the educational system, a collaborative governance model would include the range of actors such as groups with disabilities and different ethnic groups reflecting the variance in the population. The fact that the collaborative governance arrangements include dialogue mechanisms that bring different stakeholders to the table to shape policy will inevitably lead to the promotion of public values and will at least create the possibility of broader democratic

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participation. However, the chapters in this book show that despite these potential benefits, various factors influence the ability of the arrangement to lead to a successful outcome. These factors include the need to strengthen the trust between the authorities, and between the authorities and the citizens, to enhance access to the public arena and to create greater equality in power relations. While the general literature pinpoints other similar factors (e.g., Ansell 2012; Ansell and Gash 2008; Bryson et  al. 2015; Emerson et al. 2012; Getha-Taylor et al. 2019, see also the literature in the introductory chapter in this volume), the subjects presented in the various chapters identify a number of factors that should be taken into account in the Israeli context when implementing these arrangements: 1. The reason for the collaboration: Collaborative governance arrangements demand complex processes in administrative and political terms. Accordingly, one of the main conclusions that emerged is that policy makers should promote collaborative governance arrangements when the use of other tools has failed to lead to the shaping or implementation of policy. In other words, as Emerson et  al. (2012) notes, the chance that collaborative governance will work well increases the more it is apparent to those involved that there is no other alternative. However, collaborative governance also includes inherent difficulties in implementation. Accordingly, before rushing to implement a collaborative governance arrangement, it is worth examining two issues. The first is the pragmatic question of whether simpler modalities or different policy tools such as public supply, subsidies, or regulation could resolve the issue, and whether the decision to choose a different policy tool might prove more effective in terms of the public interest. The second is the normative question of the contribution—in terms of democratic values—that will be made to society or to the community through the adoption of collaborative governance and whether utilizing this approach will help achieve a common goal. For example, can these arrangements provide knowledge and expertise that cannot be secured by other means, or can they contribute to the legitimacy of public action in a manner that cannot otherwise be achieved? 2. Power relations between the actors: Collaborative governance arrangements are one of the responses to the multiplicity of actors in the policy-making arena. It might be assumed that when utilizing this arrangement, a solution would be found to the pre-existing

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power relations. The chapters in this book show that these pre-­ existing power relations between the players exert a clear influence on the collaborative governance arrangements. In some cases, when central and local government institutions need the collaboration, they will be more open to the civil society, and these arrangements can contribute to governance. However, in other cases the central government or civil society organizations are unwilling to relinquish their power by entering the partnership. In these cases, the arrangement might not offer any advantage, primarily because it will not entail substantive collaborative governance. We saw this situation in the field of education in which collaborative governance arrangements were developed or initiated by local authorities or by civil society organizations. The actors from the central government or social organizations sought to preserve their power. In other words, the participatory framework did not necessarily change the pre-­ existing patterns of power. Accordingly, when structuring collaborative governance arrangements, it is important to consider how the different actors enter the partnership and the level of their trust in the mechanism. To what extent are they willing to relinquish power in return for the partnership? How important is the joint task to them as opposed to maintaining their own interests or power? All of these factors determine the fate of the partnership and influence the manner in which the formal arrangement itself is institutionalized. These factors also determine the significance of the process and its democratic ramifications, as well as the chances that it will make a substantive contribution. The genuine recruitment of all of the actors in a manner that creates trust can lead to meaningful results. Conversely, actors withdrawing from the process and returning to hierarchical patterns of action that ignore the agreements formulated through the collaborative governance arrangements may weaken the collaborative character and effectiveness of these arrangements in terms of governance. . Trust between the actors: Most of the chapters in this book, as 3 well as numerous studies in other countries, suggest that trust is a vital link in collaborative governance arrangements. Recognition by the partners of the need to build relationships of trust is a basic condition for association in a collaborative governance arrangement. Studies have found that these arrangements are sometimes based on existing trust, sometimes the arrangements themselves create and

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maintain trust between partners, and in some instances both patterns can be seen. Trust is based largely on expectations, on the level of vulnerability, and on a belief that the partner’s expectations will be met and that things it holds dear will not be damaged during the joint process (Klijn et al. 2010). It is difficult to gauge exactly how important trust is as a central component, because it is an abstract concept that is created gradually. Some degree of trust already exists when the stakeholders enter the partnership; another part is created during the process, influenced by external constraints. While evaluating whether trust is eroded or reinforced is difficult, there is agreement that trust is a very important element. The description in the previous chapters identifies two key variables that influence the consolidation of trust: the level of institutionalization of the collaborative governance as a formal arrangement, and recognition of the joint interest. We saw that the more permanent and organized the character of the action, and the more the partners adhere to it, the greater the level of trust and the observance of the rules. An additional side effect is the growing mutual recognition of the role of all of the actors and the place each one has in the arrangement. For example, the chapter by Inbar Hurvitz and Michal Rom emphasizes the importance of the structure and management of the meetings between the various stakeholders as the foundation for creating the trust that permits joint action. Naomi Apel and Lihi Lahat provide a second example in the chapter on the Partnership for Regional Sustainability. This example shows that the infrastructure of the meetings in itself, the forums developed on various levels, including regular arrangements and meetings, became a central factor in creating greater commitment and trust between the stakeholders. In general, the evidence seems to indicate that when actors entering into an arrangement recognize their joint interest and the reason why they joined the partnership, meaning what they can contribute to the arrangement and how it can benefit them, the level of trust and sharing between them increases. A joint interest can also lead to the strengthening of the joint action. . The missing or required policy components for success or fail4 ure: The various chapters lead to the conclusion that the collaborative governance arrangement may contribute more to promoting public values when: its participants need to create legitimacy for a policy; there is a need for additional, and usually specific, knowledge

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in order to make decisions; bureaucratic mechanisms are delaying decisions and their implementation; and there is a need to create legitimacy for governmental institutions among disadvantaged and excluded population groups. However, the chapters suggest that policy makers will avoid collaborative governance (or will discontinue an arrangement that has been established) when: they already had or have enough power to set policy and to control its implementation without partners; the partnership is expensive or complex for them; they have enough power to withdraw from the mechanism or the arrangement established is one for the sake of appearance and is not based on full mutuality, as required (i.e., it constitutes a channel for transferring information or creating legitimacy without mutual responsibility for the full process of shaping and implementing policy).

Democratic Aspects and the Question of Accountability in Collaborative Governance Collaborative governance arrangements enable the articulation of the value preferences, interests, and ambitions of diverse stakeholders. Therefore, they reflect a kind of democratic process (Sørensen and Torfing 2009). They serve as an alternative to the classic democratic structure (Booher 2004; Pierre 2009). In addition, they raise questions concerning representation and accountability. Are collaborative governance arrangements indeed democratic, and perhaps even more democratic, in the sense that they enhance the partners’ participation and create an opportunity for substantive equality? How do these arrangements influence the accountability of public officials and public representatives? Do they increase the state’s responsibility, or will they lead to the weakening of it? Is it possible to create democratic collaborative governance? The chapters of this book suggest that these issues are still a challenge for collaborative governance arrangements. Democracy is a political system in which the government is based on the rule of the people, sovereignty, and some level of self-governing. One of its basic principles is citizens’ participation in political decisions in various ways (Coppedge et al. 2011). The articles in the book suggest that collaborative governance arrangements in Israel indeed enhance the

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possibility for the participants to make their voices heard and to do so more equally than in the past. In other words, more diverse stakeholders are indeed present in these arrangements. Examples include collaborative arrangements in weak local authorities, the Partnership for Regional Sustainability, the 5x2 project, or various practical initiatives implemented in Bedouin society. In at least some cases, however, it is unclear whether the collaborative governance arrangements led to substantive changes in the existing power relations and to greater equality between the partners in the process. In other words, while collaborative governance can contribute to strengthening democratic processes (Sørensen and Torfing 2009), this does not mean that every gathering for such an arrangement automatically creates substantive equality. Thus, an examination of the contribution these arrangements make to the strengthening of democratic processes requires an analysis of the identity and status of the actors and of their power before this question can be answered. Three factors may encourage the reinforcement of the democratic approach in collaborative arrangements: 1. Reinforcing pluralism: Even though collaborative governance arrangements are not sufficiently grounded in conventional democratic theories, they are based on reinforcing the pluralistic dimension in policy design and implementation. However, if an actor who has more power (or authority) does not see the value and importance of pluralism in the process, or has no interest in relinquishing authority, the other actors must consider whether there is any point in participating in the partnership. 2. More involvement in the political process: In practice, collaborative governance arrangements manage political processes. In this sense, the deliberative process that forms an integral part of this practice provides an unusual glimpse into political processes. We can see that collaborative governance arrangements still adhere to the bureaucratic process, for example, in the distribution of resources, but they allow a greater degree of flexibility, such as in the budgetary process. In this sense, the process enables greater involvement of more actors in decisions regarding the allocation of social resources. 3. Strengthening the actors from the civil society: Collaborative governance arrangements may reflect the existing power relations in civil society and may not necessarily lead to a balance between the

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actors in the process. In some cases, powerful organizations prove more influential than others, thereby preserving the existing power relations rather than changing the patterns of action in civil society. In other cases, however, collaborative governance arrangements strengthen actors who have historically been regarded as weaker. To ensure a balance between actors from the civil society, the arrangement must guarantee that the partners in the process have sufficient information and ability to be heard in an equal manner. The issue of accountability in collaborative governance arrangements is also important. On one hand, the expectation is that a larger number of actors will be involved. On the other hand, the formal and legal responsibility of the state remains. The government is still responsible in the eyes of the citizens. Moreover, in the wake of the new reforms in public administration, the demand for accountability has become more acute. The question of whether collaborative governance arrangements, by their nature, reduce the government’s authority, power, and accountability to the public has not been fully clarified. Nevertheless, collaborative governance arrangements that impact broad sections of the public must be led by the empowered representatives of the state, because, ultimately the state will bear the responsibility. However, at least some of the examples presented in the book were initiated by actors from civil society or the business sector, which makes the accountability question even more important.

Collaborative Governance: An Epilogue and a Preface Cooperation between diverse actors inside and outside of government is not a new phenomenon. However, collaborative governance, as an arrangement, seeks to institutionalize the process of setting and implementing policy through a participatory, deliberative, consensual process in a manner that includes more stakeholders and is more formal and binding than in the past (Ansell 2012; Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson et  al. 2012). In this sense, collaborative governance is a policy tool that adds to the range of policy instruments to which government authorities have access in order to shape and implement public policy. As a practice, collaborative governance arrangements are becoming more widespread in the

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Israeli context as well. This book is the first to explore these arrangements from various perspectives in the Israeli context, where they appear to have given a voice to those who were not involved in policy processes in the past. The arrangements provided a way to deal with centralization and policy implementation failures in numerous fields. For example, collaborative governance efforts resulted in progress in areas where progress has been stymied. Examples include mathematics teaching, environmental issues, and the strengthening of weakened local authorities. They helped promote joint interests in a manner that leveraged the economies of scale, as in the case of the Partnership for Regional Sustainability. They expanded the range of solutions to a problem, as in the case of the 5x2 initiative. They encouraged the recruitment and pooling of resources, thereby enabling the implementation of policy, as in the  examples that refer to the field of education in the local authorities. Finally, they legitimized processes among groups such as the Bedouin who generally has less trust in the state institutions. However, the impact of the recognized flaws in Israeli public administration mechanisms such as the tendency toward centralization was also apparent. The examples from the Israeli experience reinforce the findings in the literature regarding the leading components of collaborative governance models. We saw that trust, leadership, the history of the power relations between the actors, operational mechanisms, and the context in which the collaborative governance arrangements are maintained are all important in understanding what happens within the collaborative governance processes. Based on the information in the book’s chapters, we can conclude that in order to create collaborative governance arrangements in Israel, it is important to establish trust, define common interests together, be aware of the tendency to preserve historical power relations, and ensure that those involved have a sincere desire and a mutual interest in finding other ways to act. At the same time, a flawed implementation of collaborative governance might strengthen the trends that these arrangements were meant to fix, and even weaken governability (Dahl and Soss 2014). The main theoretical contribution of the book is the modular definition it presents and its guiding questions. The modular definition, formulated on the basis of the discussions in the research group, helped guide the empirical cases. The definition shows that it is possible to identify different levels of implementation of these arrangements. The various chapters in the book underscored the wide range of possibilities within this modular definition, applied to Israel. The differences were semantic but showed

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how, as Gerring and Barresi (2003) maintain, the context determines the essence. In line with their argument, we proposed an ideal type of definition, one that includes various elements that might change based on the context. For example, variations in the level of formality, collectiveness, deliberative nature and the desire to build a consensus, strengthen the trust between the participants and share expertise and knowledge are reflected in articles six through nine. It seems that due to Israel’s governance and culture, once an arrangement has been established, the operation is more informal and determined locally. In other contexts, the modular definition might emphasize other features. This spectrum of possibilities allows it to fit different situations and benefit from its advantages. This perspective could help others examine the development of these arrangements and their changes over time. For example, exploring the future development of the 5x2 initiative could provide more information about changes in various aspects of the collaborative governance such as its formality and deliberation, as well as the allocation of budgets and responsibilities. The second contribution derives from the answer to the two questions that guided the chapters in this book: the ability of collaborative governance arrangements to promote public values and strengthen democratic processes. The reason the partners chose to collaborate, the pre-existing power relations between the stakeholders, the degree of trust between the actors, and the content of the relevant policy are all factors that affect the ability of collaborative governance arrangements to promote public values and democratic processes. There are several conditions under which such arrangements can prove more useful. First, there is no other way to promote public policy (as Emerson et  al. 2012 suggested). Second, the arrangements are based on a clear awareness of the accountability of the state institutions (the central and local government). Third, diverse stakeholders are represented, ensuring a better and more balanced representation of different voices in the process. Fourth, the arrangement includes an honest and open process for substantive deliberation about the modalities relevant to the issue at hand. The combination of the weaknesses of the state, the crisis in governance, the blurring of institutional boundaries and the changes in democracy creates a window of opportunity. Collaborative governance is not a governance arrangement that replaces existing tools. Rather, it is an addition to the existing instruments. Its strengths are more apparent in terms of its ability to cope with institutional challenges and strengthen the

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pragmatic capabilities of government bodies. Its weaknesses lie in the challenge to democracy. Expanding the participants is not in itself sufficient to create an essential change in public policy processes and their outcomes. The various perspectives presented in this book are important for determining when and how collaborative governance arrangements can make society better.

References Ansell, C. (2012). Collaborative Governance. In D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (pp. 499–511). New York: Oxford University Press. Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. Journal of Public Administration Theory and Practice, 18, 543–571. Booher, D.  E. (2004). Collaborative Governance Practices and Democracy. National Civic Review, 93(4), 32–46. Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2015). Designing and Implementing Cross-Sector Collaborations: Needed and Challenging. Public Administration Review, 75(5), 647–663. Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, S., Hicken, A., et al. (2011). Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach. Perspectives on Politics, 9(2), 247–267. Dahl, A., & Soss, J. (2014). Neoliberalism for the Common Good? Public Value Governance and the Downsizing of Democracy. Public Administration Review, 74(4), 496–504. Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 22(1), 1–29. Gerring, J., & Barresi, P. A. (2003). Putting Ordinary Language to Work: A Min-­ Max Strategy of Concept Formation in the Social Sciences. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15(2), 201–232. Getha-Taylor, H., Grayer, M. J., Kempf, R. J., & O’Leary, R. (2019). Collaborating in the Absence of Trust? What Collaborative Governance Theory and Practice Can Learn from the Literatures of Conflict Resolution, Psychology, and Law. The American Review of Public Administration, 49(1), 51–64. Klijn, E. H., Edelenbos, J., & Steijn, B. (2010). Trust in Governance Networks: Its Impacts on Outcomes. Administration and Society, 42(2), 193–221. Lang, A. (2019). Collaborative Governance in Health and Technology Policy: The Use and Effects of Procedural Policy Instruments. Administration and Society, 51(2), 272–298. Moore, M.  H. (1995). Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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O’Flynn, J. (2008). Elusive Appeal or Aspirational Ideal? The Rhetoric and Reality of the ‘Collaborative Turn’ in Public Policy. In J. O’Flynn & J. Wanna (Eds.), Collaborative Governance: A New Era of Public Policy in Australia (ch. 17). Canberra: Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Australian National University, E- Press. Pierre, J. (2009). Reinventing Governance, Reinventing Democracy? Policy & Politics, 37(4), 591–609. Smith, R. F. (2004). Focusing on Public Value: Something New and Something Old. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 63(4), 68–79. Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2009). Making Governance Networks Effective and Democratic Through Metagovernance. Public Administration, 87(2), 234–258. Stoker, G. (2006). Public Value Management: A New Narrative for Networked Governance? The American Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 41–57. Vigoda-Gadot, E. (2009). Building Strong Nations. Farnham: Ashgate.

Index1

A Accountability, 14, 15, 63, 79, 120, 201, 204, 218, 287–289, 291 Actors, 2–6, 8, 11, 14, 17–19, 30, 34, 37–39, 42, 44, 46, 62, 66, 69, 79, 81, 82, 85, 88, 90–92, 106, 116, 118, 128, 132, 134–137, 139–144, 151, 152, 155–157, 159, 160, 165–168, 173, 174, 176–178, 182, 184, 185n5, 202, 220, 222, 223, 228, 232, 234, 235, 237, 269, 273, 274, 277, 278, 280–286, 288–291 Administrative culture, 80, 90–92, 94, 280 Administrative reforms, 2, 279, 282 Agency, 3–5, 10–13, 35, 37, 40, 44, 81, 88, 104, 105, 136, 137, 166, 167, 169–171, 174, 182, 185, 218, 226

B Bureaucracy, 12, 34, 35, 37, 119, 120, 173 Business, 2, 12, 18, 54, 60, 61, 66, 106, 130, 131, 139–142, 153, 166, 171, 173, 181–185, 186n6, 200, 204, 217–219, 222, 224–226, 234, 235, 242–246, 245n7, 248–251, 253–254, 258–262, 269, 271, 272, 289 C Capacity, 2–4, 7, 9, 34, 36, 42, 66, 77, 93, 106, 112, 118, 121, 142, 192, 222, 281 Civic society, 9, 127, 128, 131–134, 137, 144, 243–246 Civil service, 9, 15, 27, 28, 31, 33–40, 44, 45, 47–50

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Collaborative regulation, 18, 165–186, 282 Collective impact model, 19, 154, 157, 244, 245, 262 Conditions, 7, 8, 11, 16, 19, 28, 36, 38, 77, 112, 128, 133, 140–142, 173, 176, 178, 184–186, 194, 206, 208, 212, 233, 234, 251, 269, 280, 285, 291 Consensus, 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 31, 37, 55, 58–60, 65, 80, 84, 89, 93, 103–106, 111, 112, 118, 119, 121, 132, 143, 154, 156, 168, 174, 179, 183, 193, 197, 198, 246, 247, 250, 259–261, 270–272, 280, 281, 291 Cooperation, 3–8, 10, 12, 16, 18, 42, 79, 81, 92, 114, 116, 129, 132, 133, 136, 152, 154, 159, 160, 166–168, 182, 183, 194–207, 211, 218, 221, 222, 226, 228, 232, 234, 245, 248, 249, 251, 253–255, 257, 259, 269, 273, 278, 289 Cross-sector partnership, 18, 19, 217–237, 251, 252, 258, 259, 262, 282 D Decision making, 4, 8, 11, 12, 16, 28, 39, 41–45, 47, 48, 54–56, 58, 61, 64, 68, 69, 71, 80, 81, 84, 87, 89, 104, 105, 121, 127, 131–133, 142, 157, 160, 168, 172, 174, 177, 179, 218, 219, 224, 225, 228–230, 235–237, 247, 250, 258, 260–263, 273 Deliberation, 28, 29, 45, 46, 53–55, 59, 65–68, 83, 84, 86, 134, 155–156, 177, 205n13, 237, 271–272, 291

E Education, 17, 19, 35, 65, 67, 88, 103–105, 108–118, 120, 121, 133–135, 140, 143, 152–154, 158, 166, 169, 194, 241–248, 246n7, 250–253, 256–260, 283, 285, 290 G Globalization, 18, 34, 38, 46, 80, 105, 166, 169n1, 182, 202, 204, 205 I Implementation, vi, 6, 8, 11–15, 19, 38, 40, 42, 48–50, 54, 64, 79, 80, 85, 89, 90, 104–106, 115, 129, 131, 133, 144, 155, 159, 161, 166, 169, 175, 183, 194, 207, 212, 218, 219, 222, 245, 258, 262, 263, 268, 269, 273, 281, 284, 287, 288, 290 K Knowledge, 3, 11, 36, 38, 41, 49–51, 55, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 85–89, 93, 94, 119, 132, 138, 141, 142, 157, 160, 166, 168, 169, 171, 175, 177–179, 194, 198, 200, 222, 223, 227, 230, 231, 233, 236, 249, 251, 253–255, 257, 263, 271, 279, 280, 284, 286, 291 L Leadership, 6, 46, 68, 110, 112–118, 121, 155, 157, 248, 250, 251, 257, 270, 279, 290

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Legislation, 17, 57, 59, 104, 107, 109, 144, 176, 196, 211 Legitimacy, 2, 6, 7, 29–32, 35–40, 43–48, 51, 55, 63, 77, 93, 121, 134, 157, 160, 168, 175, 176, 178, 179, 197, 200–202, 204, 206, 211, 212, 273, 280, 281, 283, 284, 286, 287 Liberal, 30, 40, 47, 69, 92 Local authorities/local government, 10, 16, 17, 19, 40, 103–105, 107–111, 113–116, 118, 120–122, 127–134, 136–144, 151, 152, 155, 157, 159–161, 166, 218, 232, 242, 252, 253, 257, 267, 269–274, 278, 281, 285, 288, 290, 291 M Managerial, 36, 38, 39, 54, 83, 86, 89, 128, 132, 134, 192 Minority, 17, 46, 127–144, 170, 281 Modular, 2, 10, 12, 290, 291 Multi-sector/cross-sector, 18, 19, 217–237, 242, 245, 245n7, 247–249, 251, 252, 255, 257–263 N Network, 3, 19, 42, 61, 62, 68–71, 78, 84, 89, 90, 136, 137, 154, 166, 200, 201, 219, 221, 222, 248, 249, 254–255, 257, 258, 260–263, 269 policy, 5, 38, 39, 41–45, 49, 50, 219, 280 New Public Management (NPM), 2, 3, 27, 35, 37, 42, 45–47, 50, 64, 72, 79, 130, 131, 168, 179n4, 221, 222 Non-profit organizations, 5, 242

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O Organization, 3–6, 8, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 29, 36, 40, 43, 45, 47, 49, 57, 60, 66–68, 71, 77–79, 84, 87, 88, 90, 105, 115, 119, 122, 128, 131–137, 142, 152–154, 158, 159, 166, 182, 183, 185n5, 201, 217–237, 242, 244–246, 248–251, 253–255, 257–262, 268, 271, 280, 282, 285, 289 P Participation, 6, 15, 16, 28–30, 32, 38, 41, 43, 44, 47, 53, 55, 56, 60–62, 64, 69–71, 85, 93, 105, 106, 110, 113, 115, 118, 121, 154, 156, 168, 173, 177, 179, 181, 183, 192, 196, 197, 200, 203, 205–212, 218–220, 224, 229, 237, 274, 278, 279, 282, 284, 287 Policy styles, 9, 90–94, 280 Power, 6, 8, 17, 18, 61, 64, 66, 69, 71, 87, 90, 103, 104, 107–112, 118–122, 128, 143, 170, 192, 196, 202, 203, 207, 212, 218, 223, 227, 228, 231–233, 236, 237, 271, 273, 280–282, 284–285, 287–291 Professionalism, vii, 35, 36, 47, 158 Public interest, 14, 15, 34, 35, 37, 45–50, 54, 65, 66, 77, 84, 91, 194, 199, 201–205, 209, 211, 212, 269, 279, 284 Public value, 2, 3, 6, 10, 13–15, 19, 27, 50, 80, 83–86, 155, 157–159, 236, 258, 273–275, 279, 282–287, 291

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R Reform, 2, 3, 9, 36, 37, 57, 77, 78, 92, 110, 121, 130, 131, 134, 142, 167–172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 279, 282, 289 Regime, 6, 7, 15, 18, 92, 103, 106, 118, 120–122, 181, 185n5, 220 Regulation, v, 2, 4, 6, 16–18, 36, 38, 47, 49, 54, 69–71, 86, 108, 144, 165–186, 194, 195, 199, 200, 202, 207, 210–212, 237, 278, 282, 284 Representation, 16, 43, 46–48, 61–63, 66, 67, 69–71, 85, 91, 130, 132, 134, 143, 175, 203–205, 207, 209, 210, 279, 280, 287, 291 Responsibilities, 2, 4, 11, 12, 14, 17, 34, 35, 37, 38, 45, 60, 103–105, 107–112, 114, 116, 121, 128, 141, 144, 152, 168, 174, 176, 179, 184, 195, 218, 219, 223, 225, 230, 232, 235, 237, 250, 259, 260, 268, 269, 274, 275, 279–282, 287, 289, 291

S Strategic, 49, 83, 133n1, 141, 152, 156, 221, 223, 242, 244–247, 251–254, 256, 257, 261, 268 T Third sector, 15, 60, 128, 131, 132, 135–137, 139, 143, 144, 173, 182, 183, 185, 242, 244, 245, 245n7, 248, 249, 253–254, 257–261 Transparency, 16, 41, 50, 53, 71, 144, 157, 172, 177, 197, 200, 201, 203–206, 210–212, 255, 260, 272 Trust, vi, 3, 7, 11–13, 16, 17, 19, 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 37, 40–51, 53, 54, 56, 71, 78, 80, 87, 103, 105, 106, 111, 116, 118, 122, 131–133, 137, 139, 143, 144, 156–158, 160, 221, 226, 229–231, 235, 237, 243, 249, 250, 257–262, 270, 271, 274, 281, 283–286, 290, 291