Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944–1946 9780231879903

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Cold War and Revolution

Cold War and Revolution Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946

Odd Ame Westad

Columbia University Press New York

Columbia University Press New York Oxford Copyright © 1993 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Westad, Odd A m e . Cold war and revolution : Soviet-American rivalry and the origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 4 6 / Odd A m e Westad. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-231-07984-2 (alk. paper) 1. China—History—Civil War, 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 9 . 2. China—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations— China. 4. China—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 5. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—China. I. Title. DS777.54W46 1993 951.04—dc20 92-21343 CIP

© Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are Smyth-sewn and printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Ingunn and Anders

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Note on Transliteration

xi

Introduction

1

1. Yalta and the Search for Stability

7

2. The Jiang-Stalin Pact and the Collapse of Great Power Cooperation

31

3. The Seventh Party Congress and the Origins of CCP Foreign Policy

57

4. The Race to Shenyang: Chinese Politics and the Soviet Occupation of the Northeast

77

5. Allies and Enemies: Mao, Jiang, and the U.S. Intervention in North China

99

6. The Origins of the Marshall Mission

118

7. The Soviet Withdrawal and the Coming of the Civil War

140

Conclusion: Revolt, Intervention, and Cold War

165

A Word on Chinese Archives and Materials

179

Notes

183

Selected Bibliography

223

Index

245

Maps on pages 6 and 98

Acknowledgments

This book would never have appeared in print had it not been for the generous help a large number of people offered me over almost a decade. Michael Hunt, my academic adviser at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has been the source of much practical guidance, intellectual inspiration, and friendship. His assistance made this project possible. Several friends and colleagues read drafts of the manuscript or of individual chapters in the latter stages of my work. Herewith my sincere thanks to Karl Campbell, Hsi-sheng Ch'i, Miles Fletcher, Tor Egil Ferland, Glenda Gilmore, Burton Kaufman, William Kirby, Karen Leatham, William Leuchtenburg, Steven Levine, Geir Lundestad, Olav Njolstad, Helge Pharo, William Stueck, Stein Tennesson, and Wyatt Wells—all of w h o m are of course completely without blame for the Book's many insufficiencies. I could not have collected the diverse source materials this study is built on without the help of individuals and institutions in many different countries. For their assistance and advice I a m particularly grateful to Chang Chao-jen, Ena Chao, Chen Li-wen, Chen Yung-fa, Lloyd

x

Acknowledgments

Eastman, Ha Fuyu, He Di, Nancy Hearst, Erwin Mueller, Niu Jun, Ren Donglai, Shao Xiaoyun, Sun Tung-hsun, Wang Zhigang, Wei Liangtsai, Wu Jie, Zhang Baijia, and Zhang Xianwen; and to the staffs of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the Harry S. Truman Library, the Harvard-Yenching Library of Harvard University, the Archives and the East Asian Collection at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, the Diplomatic and Military Reference Branches of the National Archives of the United States, the Norwegian Nobel Institute Library, the Number Two Historical Archives of China (Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan), the Republic of China Ministry of Justice's Bureau of Investigation (Fawubu diaochaju), and the Republic of China Ministry of Defense's Bureau of Historical Compilation and Translation Archives (Guofangbu shizhengbianyiju). A number of institutions have provided financial assistance for the project. My thanks to the American-Scandinavian Foundation, the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center. Much of the research for this book was done in the People's Republic of China during the spring of 1989—a unique and ultimately tragic period in the country's history. A special thanks goes to my students at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, who through their achievements during those dramatic months taught me a lot about China. Last, it was—as always—the love and encouragement of my wife, Ingunn Bjornson, which made the tribulations of writing this book worthwhile. The book is dedicated to her, and to our son, Anders, whose constant attempts to get his father's attention away from books and on to Real Life cats and dogs and chipmunks helped me to appreciate the privilege of discovery on three continents.

A Note on Transliteration and Terminology

Transliterations from Chinese are all in pinyin, except in the cases of those place-names where the official spelling in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1990 differs from this system ("Harbin, Qiqihar," etc.). Transliterations from Russian follow the Library of Congress system, without diacritics. All place-names in China are given in their 1990 PRC version, even if the oificial name has been changed since the mid-1940s. Provinces and cities are referred to with their 1990 borders, consistent with the maps. Zhonggong zhongyang [CCP center] is generally translated and referred to as "the CCP Central Committee," even if orders bearing this signature mostly came from the party Political Bureau, its Secretariat, or Mao Zedong. In a work dealing with three different countries and cultures some names and terms may cause confusion. "The Chinese government" is here used as synonomous with the GMD regime, and the "National Army" is that regime's armed forces. "The Red Army" is used only when referring to Soviet troops. Since pinyin is used without exception, Chinese personal names may appear in forms not familiar to some Western readers. Important names are listed below, with their nonpinyin equivalents in parentheses.

Gu Weijun (V. Wellington Koo) Hu Shize (Victor Hoo) Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kung) Song Ziwen (T.V. Song) Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) Wang Shijie (Wang Shih-ch'ieh) Xiong Shihui (Hsiung Shih-hui) Zhang Jia'ao (Chang Kia-ngau)

Cold War and Revolution

Introduction

This book deals with two main topics. One is the way political developments in China influenced the diplomatic and military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in East Asia at the end of World War II. The other is the effect Soviet-American rivalry had on the struggle for political power in China. Both topics raise a comprehensive set of broader issues, which all form part of the recent historiographical agenda. 1 Questions concerning great power control, "client" resilience, and the globalization of SovietAmerican confrontation all tie in to the first topic. The second topic brings up issues as the relative importance of foreign policy, the construction of foreign policy images, and the mobilization of domestic resources to influence great power behavior. All these issues are of historical as well as current concern. Between 1945 and the early 1980s American and European historians of foreign relations generally interpreted third world conflicts in terms of their Cold War content. Only a very few studies dealt primarily with the domestic origins of these conflicts, and fewer still took up the interactions between Great Powers and local politics. In addition to the ability to break with the dominant research agenda, these latter studies de-

2

Introduction

manded language training, area expertise, and access to foreign archives, all of which was in low supply well into the 1970s. As the Cold War started to recede as a historical epoch, more researchers had the inventiveness and the training to start dealing with the period as international history. During the last decade the source base for such studies has also slowly started to improve. The break-up of the patterns of alliance and conflict established in the late 1940s has brought home the urgency of attempting to interpret the Cold War not only as a Soviet-American confrontation, but also as a period of immense change in the international relations and in foreign policy perceptions of the "battlefield" areas—Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Focusing on the local aspects of the Great Power conflict also influences the periodization of the Cold War. It becomes easier to see its origins as a set of historical events, rather than as an unavoidable clash of ideologies. As the Cold War ended, it also became easier—at least for this writer—to discover a distinctively pre-Cold War era, where a rationale different from that of the last forty years drove the actions of both the Soviet Union and the United States. 2 China was the first of many Asian and African countries in the postwar period where Soviet-American rivalry influenced the course of domestic revolution. Focusing on the effects of American policy, US historians have generally concluded that Jiang Jieshi's corrupt and incompetent regime got Washington's backing because of American concerns with the rise of Communism and Soviet power. Because of its inherent weaknesses Jiang's party, the Guomindang (GMD), then failed to win the civil war against the Chinese Communists in spite of U.S. support. 3 But there is also another way of looking at the interaction between the Cold War and third world revolutions. I argue that in China the Soviet-American conflict weakened the regime by removing its ability to monopolize Great Power support. In spite of their clear view of GMD weaknesses, Mao Zedong and the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not believe that their party could win an armed conflict with the government as long as Jiang had the backing of both Washington and Moscow. Up to early 1946 Jiang gradually improved his domestic position by exploiting Great Power support and CCP fear of civil war. It was in mid-1946, when the Cold War prevented Jiang from retaining the backing of both powers, that he launched a civil war which his regime could not survive. A number of recent works on East Asian international relations in

Introduction

3

the 1940s have inspired this study. In his book on the final year of the American war against Japan, Marc Gallicchio concludes that the United States started to contain the Soviet Union in East Asia already in the summer of 1945.4 Russell Buhite, on the other hand, sees no evidence of a major postwar change in U.S. policy, and presents the American approach to East Asia after 1945 as tangled and undecided. 5 On the Chinese side, John Garver has reinterpreted GMD diplomacy up to 1945 by emphasizing Jiang's successes in dealing with the Great Powers. 6 In his perceptive study of CCP foreign relations, James Reardon-Anderson views Mao as pragmatic but aggressive, intent on overthrowing the GMD but careful in challenging the Americans.7 The Chinese historian Niu Jun sees a different CCP, where moderate policies and the need to avoid civil war are the focuses of Mao's thinking. 8 Besides informing my own conclusions, these recent studies convinced me that only an analysis that is multifocused and international can adequately explain postwar international relations in East Asia. This book therefore employs a four-cornered pattern of analysis, giving equal importance to explaining the perceptions and actions of each party—the CCP, the GMD, the United States, and the Soviet Union. By using such an approach, one may understand not only the complex interrelationship between the four, but also the troubled bilateral relationships between each of the parties. To create an international analysis, this study builds on recently available materials from both China and the United States. Archives and published materials from the Guomindang side have proved to be rich sources, as have the collections of CCP Central Committee documents and other documentation printed for limited circulation in the People's Republic of China. 9 These materials, together with sources now available in the United States, also form a new basis for the reevaluation of Soviet intentions and actions in East Asia.10 The first part of my study, chapters 1 and 2, deals with the relationship between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the GMD government from mid-1944 up to the end of the war against Japan. By focusing on the events leading up to the Yalta meeting (chapter 1) and the Moscow Sino-Soviet talks (chapter 2), I try to show how Roosevelt and Stalin arrived at their agreement to support the GMD regime, and how this agreement broke down over the following months. Chapter 2, in particular, analyzes why Jiang Jieshi himself welcomed the Yalta agreement, and why the GMD leader sought an alliance with the Soviet Union.

4

Introduction

Chapter 3 explains how Mao Zedong built his understanding of foreign affairs in 1944/45, and how the CCP—contrary to what Reardon-Anderson believes—came to emphasize moderation over revolutionary action during the last year of the war. It also describes h o w Mao's belief in Soviet-American cooperation influenced CCP policy, and how the chairman departed from this belief after Jiang's treaty with Stalin. The last four chapters shift the focus to the interaction between the four sides in China from August 1945 to May 1946, and show how the growing Soviet-American confrontation led to problems for both Chinese parties. Chapters 4 and 5 deal, respectively, with Moscow's and Washington's military interventions in China, and how the CCP and the Guomindang attempted to win foreign support. Chapter 6 shows h o w Jiang Jieshi for a short period was able to use his relations with both the Soviets and the Americans against the CCP, while Mao's party failed in its diplomatic and military strategy. The concluding chapter analyzes the American attempts to contain Soviet influence through mediation, Stalin's ineffective steps to save his alliance with the GMD, and Jiang's ultimate decision to seek a military solution to his conflict with the Communists. The complexity of the historical background for the situation in China in the mid-1940s strengthens the need for a multipolar approach. As Akira Iriye has observed, the Pacific war ended one international system in East Asia, and gave rise to a n e w . " Up to the late 1930s both the United States and the Soviet Union had avoided challenging the Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland. From 1939 on both powers had tried to contain Tokyo's ambitions, but while the Soviet attempt ended after the German attack, the United States and Japan fought a war which by mid-1944 seemed certain to lead to Japan's defeat. Both powers had since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 looked with sympathy on the Chinese resistance against Tokyo. But neither had provided much material support for the Chinese. Instead both Moscow and Washington had tried to use the Chinese armies as auxiliaries in their conflicts with Japan. Joseph Stalin had, unsuccessfully, pressured the CCP to attack the Japanese units which threatened Mongolia and the Soviet border. Franklin Roosevelt had, with as little success, attempted to get Jiang to use his best troops against the Japanese in Central China and along the coast. Instead of giving in to foreign pressure the CCP and GMD armies

Introduction

5

watched each other, and after 1941 did not engage the Japanese in any major battles. Both Mao and Jiang believed that the Americans would ultimately defeat Japan, and knew that the competition for power in postwar China depended on the strength of their armies. Both the size of the GMD forces, and the international recognition for his government, seemed to give Jiang the edge in this competition. But in 1944, unexpectedly, the Japanese started a new offensive. The offensive drove the remaining GMD troops out of the central provinces, weakened Jiang's position, and again attracted international attention to the war in China.

ONE

Yalta and the Search for Stability

As Louis Fischer has observed, "Yalta made less history than is generally believed." 1 This claim is particularly true for those agreements on East Asia that came out of the summit conference. They were all products of complex political calculations shaped during the preceding months, and only to a small extent influenced by the negotiations themselves. The basis for the Yalta agreements on East Asia was an attempt by both the Soviet and the American leaders to regulate the international system in the region at the end of the Second World War in a way that would satisfy the governments of both powers. Besides his concern with ending the Pacific war as quickly as possible. Franklin D. Roosevelt saw U.S. global interests best served by a continuation of the cooperation with the Soviet Union. He wanted to avoid a conflict over the last phase in the war against Japan or over postwar arrangements in China. Joseph Stalin wanted to widen his alliance with Washington to encompass the complete defeat of Japan, as well as American guarantees for any Soviet diplomatic or territorial gains in East Asia. Both Soviet and American East Asia policy up to the Crimean summit thus

8

Yalta and the Search for Stability

show a distinct pre-Cold War pattern that historians have often ignored.2 Events in China determined the form of the Great Power agreement. In the latter half of 1944 Jiang Jieshi's government was fighting for its survival against Japanese offensives, and the Chinese leader's best hope was that Japan's foreign enemies would rescue his regime. In particular, Jiang hoped that Washington would intervene in his strained relationship with Moscow, so that Stalin could be made to support the Chinese government rather than its domestic enemies. At Yalta Roosevelt and Stalin used the diplomatic legitimacy of Jiang's beleaguered regime in their attempt at stabilizing the relations between the Great Powers. As a result, Jiang got a Soviet-American guarantee against his rivals, Stalin got his deal on Japan, and the American president got the benefit of both decisions—Soviet entry into the war, and the prospects for future Soviet-American cooperation in East Asia. In the fall of 1944, when their armies were winning victory after victory in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders returned to an active policy on East Asia for the first time since 1941. The Soviets had succeeded in their overriding concern of avoiding a Japanese attack on Siberia through keeping a strict neutrality in the war between the Sino-Western allies and Japan. Now, with the situation in Europe dramatically changed, the Soviet political leadership faced the challenge of designing a policy that could achieve their two strategic objectives for postwar East Asia.3 The first of these objectives was to reduce the influence of Japan in any postwar settlement. Though Japan had suffered many defeats in its war against the Americans in the Pacific, Stalin could not be sure that the American leaders would not attempt a negotiated settlement with Tokyo that would leave Japan strong enough to challenge Soviet interests. Only Soviet participation in the war and in the writing of the terms of peace could ensure against Japan's revival.4 Stalin's second strategic objective was to avoid a Sino-American postwar alliance directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader did not like hearing Franklin Roosevelt's repeated argument that China should be recognized as a great power. Even if he knew that Jiang's China was very far from being a military power of the first or even the second order, Stalin suspected the Americans of being willing to supply the Chinese Nationalist government with enough military equipment and training to improve its fighting capacity signifi-

Yalta and the Search for Stability

9

cantly. Considering the history of strained relations between Jiang and Moscow and the many outstanding issues between them, the prospect of an American-backed China was not welcome to the Soviets. Neither was the possibility that the Sino-American friendship would pave the way for U.S. access to military bases all along the lengthy SovietChinese border. Such access would give the Americans an unparalleled advantage in any future conflict with the Soviet Union, and would limit Soviet ability to use force in support of its diplomacy in East Asia.5 The question for Stalin and his advisers was how to move toward their objectives while avoiding both a Japanese attack and a too heavy strain to their overall relations with the United States. By October 1944, the Soviet leaders had concluded that their interests would be best served by direct military intervention against Japan, and that victory in Europe would soon make available the manpower and equipment needed for such an intervention.6 There were three reasons why Stalin in October decided on military intervention against Japan in 1945. First, he wanted to secure further U.S. cooperation and supplies through continuing the Grand Alliance in the Pacific war. The strategic goods made available by the Americans were of vital importance both to the Soviet war effort and to the reconstruction of the Soviet economy after the war. Likewise, the alliance with the United States could prevent strong Western opposition to Soviet policies in Eastern Europe.7 Second, military intervention during 1945 would give the Soviet Union a formal say in any postwar decisions regarding East Asia, and help avoid a negotiated peace between Japan and the United States. Such a Japanese-American settlement would not only exclude the Soviets from East Asian affairs, but might also allow Japan to rebuild its strength and go after new objectives on the Asian mainland. Since the Teheran conference, Stalin had known that President Roosevelt wanted Soviet military assistance against Japan. He now thought that the promise of Soviet support later in the war would encourage the Americans to hold to their unconditional surrender policy. And even in case Roosevelt did decide on a negotiated peace, an early Soviet deployment of troops in eastern Siberia would still make it easier for Moscow to force concessions from the Japanese while Tokyo was at its weakest. Third, Stalin hoped to increase Soviet postwar influence by reclaiming at least parts of the former Russian privileges in northeast Asia. By first getting U.S. acceptance to these claims, he hoped to deny China the possibility for American support in resisting the Soviet demands. In

10

Yalta and the Search for Stability

this way, the Soviet leader would not only get the concessions he wanted, but could also hope to use the negotiations over what he termed "Soviet political demands" to drive a wedge between the United States and the Chinese Guomindang government. 8 Good timing was vital to the success of Soviet policy. Stalin still feared a two-front war in mid-1944, when the European conflict neared its final stage. He could not give the Japanese any reason to attack the Soviet Union before Germany had been defeated, even if reassuring Tokyo meant curtailing the preparations for war in the East. When Averell Harriman, the American ambassador to Moscow, brought up the Japanese war with Stalin in June, the Soviet leader vaguely hinted that he would be ready to enter the war some time after the defeat of Germany. As he had done since the Teheran conference, Stalin avoided making any firm commitments on East Asia to the Americans. By early October, when Harriman again made inquiries, Stalin had decided to offer the United States the prospects of full military cooperation in East Asia. One reason for this reversal was the successful Allied landing in France, which promised an early end to the war in Europe. In addition FDR had in late August pressed Stalin for a commitment through a personal message. The Soviet leader also expected a new Allied summit meeting to take place shortly, and wanted to demonstrate his willingness to extend military cooperation. Lastly, Stalin had just received the first direct indications from the Chinese government that it was willing to negotiate with Moscow. 9 The Chinese initiative gave the Soviet leader an opportunity to settle an old problem. Stalin had first become involved in Soviet-Chinese relations in 1927, when his disastrous advice to the Chinese Communist Party to pursue a united front with the Guomindang cost the CCP most of its members and almost cost Stalin his career. In 1937 Stalin again pressed the CCP to ally itself with Jiang in order to fight Japan, which by the late 1930s was threatening the Soviet Far East. Stalin went on to assist the Chinese government with military equipment for use against Japan up to 1941. In spite of his wartime conflicts with Chongqing over the Soviet military presence in Xinjiang and Mongolia, Stalin continued to believe that a postwar treaty with Jiang Jieshi would be both useful and obtainable. 10 During the meetings with Harriman in Moscow in mid-October 1944, Stalin stated his objectives and his problems with great clarity. He wanted a doubling of Soviet troop strength in the Far East before he

Yalta and the Search for Stability

1i

would take on the Japanese, Stalin said. Such a build-up could be achieved in two and a half to three months after the troops became available in Europe. However, this force build-up would require enormous amounts of food, fuel, and railroad equipment to be in place in the Soviet Far East before hostilities broke out. This stockpiling should start immediately, Stalin said, and he provided the Americans with a detailed list of supplies. Stalin's next point must have surprised Harriman and his military aide. General John R. Deane: the Soviet leader not only declared that joint U.S.-Soviet planning should begin at once, but he also offered the Americans air bases in Petropavlovsk, the Maritime Provinces, and on Kamchatka for use after the Soviets joined in the war. 11 The need to avoid war with Japan before the Soviet military preparations in the Far East were complete was a major concern for Stalin. He ordered the utmost secrecy both in the transfer of weapons and supplies to Eastern Siberia and the Maritime Provinces, and in the dealings with the American and the Chinese governments on the issue of Soviet entry into the war. The Soviet Union had barely survived the German surprise attack in 1941, and even if Japan in the fall of 1944 was weakened by the war in the Pacific, both Soviet and American experts believed it could still take the offensive against the Soviet Union. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) estimated in late November that Japanese forces, if they chose to attack that month, would be able to penetrate into Eastern Siberia and cut the vital Trans-Siberian Railway link, thereby isolating the Soviet Maritime Provinces. A Japanese attack would mean a long and hard campaign for the Soviet forces, and the need to divert equipment and troops from the massive battles then raging in Eastern Europe. 12 This scenario must have raised frightening perspectives for the Soviet leaders, and inspired a cautious East Asian policy.13 This same caution is also evident in Stalin's approach to military cooperation with the United States and China. He avoided all detailed planning of a common effort against Japan, even after Moscow opened talks with the Americans on the subject in October. The Kremlin also routinely turned down all requests for U.S. reconnaissance teams to visit the Soviet Far East, and Stalin expressed no wish for setting up a system of American military deliveries across the Pacific. On December 16 the Soviet Chief of Staff, General Aleksei Antonov, informed General Deane«that the Soviets had had to reconsider the building of U.S. air

12

Yalta and the Search for Stability

bases in the Maritime Provinces, which Stalin had agreed to in October. Their own forces, Antonov said, "will need all the air and naval bases" in this area.14 This "reconsideration" was inspired by the fear of provoking a Japanese attack—and not only by Soviet unwillingness to have foreign forces stationed on its territory. When Stalin had indicated his acceptance of such bases in October, the military situation in Europe had promised an early end to the war against Germany. In mid-December, when General Antonov repeatedly turned down the American requests for bases in the Far Eastern region, the German forces had undertaken what was to be their last great offensive, and made Soviet and U.S. estimates of when the European war would end much more pessimistic.15 True to his cautious policy, Stalin avoided bringing up the question of territorial concessions in the period between the Teheran conference and the preparations for the Yalta meeting. The Soviet leadership thought that U.S. interest in Soviet participation against Japan was influenced by the military situation in China. Therefore their chances of getting Washington's support for demands vis-à-vis China would improve as Jiang's position grew worse. They also knew that inflated Soviet demands would be rejected by the Western allies, and possibly reduce the American government's willingness to cooperate with Moscow not only in Asia, but also in Europe. As Stalin had anticipated, the military standing of the Chinese National Army at the end of 1944 was worse than it had ever been during the seven-year conflict. The Japanese forces had overrun government positions in Central China, and were threatening Chongqing, the Nationalist capital, and Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. Influential leaders in Jiang Jieshi's party, the Guomindang (GMD), were openly discussing the transfer of the seat of government to Kunming, in the remote southwestern province of Yunnan. The position of Jiang's forces became worse by the week in late 1944, and in early December the Joint Staff Planners of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had to discuss whether a further American military effort on the Chinese mainland was feasible if Jiang Jieshi's government should cease to exist, or was moved to Kunming.16 Knowing the desperate military situation in China, Stalin hoped that the Americans would tell their Chinese allies to accept the Soviet demands. The Soviet leaders decided in early December to take two important steps with regard to East Asia, both in preparation for the coming

Yalta and the Search for Stability

13

summit meeting. Sometime in the first week of the month they accepted Jiang's wish to send his foreign minister. Song Ziwen, to Moscow. Since early November, Stalin had indicated his interest in high level talks with the Chinese, and the time was now set for late February 1945. 17 In this way Stalin signaled to the American president his willingness to come to an agreement with the Chinese, and at the same time stressed the urgency of a Great Power understanding on the territorial issues in question. In the second week of December Stalin talked to U.S. Ambassador Harriman in the Kremlin about the Soviet territorial demands in East Asia. With the mixture of bravado and matter-of-factness typical of him, the Soviet leader presented his terms. Stalin, according to Harriman, "went into the next room and brought out a map. He said that the Kurile Islands and the lower Sakhalin should be returned to Russia. . . . He drew a line around the southern part of the Liaotung [Liaodong] Peninsula including Port Arthur [Liishun] and Dairen [Dalian] saying that the Russians wished to lease these ports and the surrounding area." Stalin went on to inform the American ambassador that the Soviet Union wanted to lease the lines of the Chinese-Eastern Railway running between the Soviet border and Dalian. "The only consideration not mentioned at Teheran," Stalin said, was "the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia—the maintenance of the Republic of Outer Mongolia as an independent identity [sic]." Harriman was not surprised by these demands. His only immediate reaction was to remind Stalin of FDR's preference that Dalian be a free port rather than Soviet leased territory. The Soviet leader must have been encouraged by the ambassador's response. 18 Some Soviet leaders seem to have recognized that there was a loose end in their planning. The political situation in China—which the Soviets had little influence on—would be crucial when the Red Army entered the Northeastern provinces. Moscow needed to avoid armed conflict between the Chinese Communists and Jiang's government, because the Soviets thought that such a conflict would make it less likely for Jiang to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union. Anatolii Pravdin, the head of the TASS bureau in Washington, told Walter Lippmann in the summer of 1944 that when Russia went to war against Japan "a very delicate situation would arise because the Chinese Communists would no doubt cooperate and Russia would have to be very careful to give no basis for the charge that she was aiming to bolshevize East Asia. The areas occupied by the Chinese Communists," Pravdin

14

Yalta and the Search for Stability

explained, "would then become the center of gravity," as Chongqing and the Guomindang were far from the fyattlefront.19 The ideal solution to China's political troubles, as seen from Moscow, was a political agreement between Jiang Jieshi's party, the Guomindang, and the CCP. Such an agreement would open up either for Communist participation in the government or at least for a government that the Communists could cooperate with. It would also reduce Jiang's fear of Soviet support for the CCP and therefore create new possibilities for an understanding between China and the Soviet Union. At the same time, Stalin went out of his way to downplay the ideological connections between the Soviet Communist Party and the CCP when talking to Westerners. In his conversation with Harriman on June 10 the Soviet leader used the often-quoted epithet "margarine communists" to describe the Chinese party. Still, Stalin insisted, they were real patriots, and should be used in the fight against Japan. 2 0 The Soviet leaders wanted Mao's party recognized as a fighting ally, but feared that Washington might view their ideological connection to the CCP as a reason to dispense with Soviet participation in the war. Some liberal Guomindang politicians were also preoccupied with the conflict between political ideology and practical interest in Sino-Soviet relations. Sun Ke, son of the party's founder. Sun Zhongshan, was the most prominent of the small minority of Guomindang leaders who had early come to believe that some cooperation with the Soviet Union was necessary. In the summer of 1944 Sun viewed CCP-GMD relations as the key to an understanding with Moscow, "because a Soviet attack in Manchuria or North China would require CCP cooperation, and therefore could create difficulties with the national government" if a coalition between the parties had not been worked out by then. 21 His point of view was not, however, shared by the most influential policymakers in Chongqing. In 1944 the Chinese government had been at war with Japan for more than seven years, and was on the battlefield no closer to a victory, or even anything remotely resembling a successful campaign, than it had been since the outbreak of war. As often noted, this lack of military success had three basic reasons: the corruption and inefficiency inherent in the Nationalist military organizations; the inability of the Nationalist army to cooperate with local resistance forces, including the Communist armies in North China; and, most significantly, the strategic superiority of the effective and well-equipped Japanese Imperial Army.

Yalta and the Search for Stability

15

By late fall 1944, the invaders not only controlled the Northeastern provinces, the coastal areas, and most significant centers in North and Central China, but in addition they now threatened the rich province of Sichuan, which had been the base for the GMD government for most of the war. 2 2 Jiang not only had to resist the Japanese enemy; the separatist and Communist challenges to his war-weakened regime were as dangerous and as immediate as the Japanese. Jiang had, since the 1920s, seen his main task as creating a strategy for the unification of China under his government. Up to the Japanese invasion in 1937 he had been remarkably successful, at least compared to the poor chances most Western observers gave his party at the outset of the Guomindang revolution. Not only had he forced most local warlords to accept the authority of the central government, but his troops had also isolated the CCP in the mountains in the North, after having chased the Communist forces all over Western China and significantly reduced their numbers. Equally important, the Guomindang had received international recognition for their regime. The war jeopardized all these achievements. 23 The strategy Jiang and his government had settled on in the late 1920s to achieve the unification of the country was to deprive rival Chinese parties of potential foreign support. The foundation for this imperative was part ideology, part figure-work. The Guomindang leaders, even if divided by different factions and regional loyalties, all believed that the GMD's military successes in the 1920s and 1930s gave the party's paramount leader the right to rule China. Jiang and his supporters had no doubt that this right was accepted by the people. It therefore followed that any Chinese party that tried to oppose Jiang's leadership was in all likelihood influenced by foreign powers. On the other hand, GMD leaders thought that they still enjoyed a vast military superiority over their domestic rivals—a superiority they could use to crush any party challenging them. Only active foreign support for one or more of the opposition groups could neutralize this GMD military advantage. 24 From Jiang's viewpoint in 1944 this strategy meant the necessity of the defeat of Japan by his government's allies, the United States and Great Britain. This defeat, Jiang thought, would lead to the fall of Wang Jingwei's Japanese-supported regime in Nanjing and, presumably, to the demise of the Manzhouguo empire set up by Tokyo after the invasion of China's Northeastern provinces in 1931. But there was also a need to prevent the CCP, local insurgents in Xinjiang, and the autono-

16

Yalta and the Search for Stability

mous regime in Outer Mongolia from receiving Soviet aid, and thereby threatening the Nationalist road to the unification of China. Likewise, Jiang had to prevent any possibility for the Americans finding an alternative government to support. Deeply aware of the hostility toward his authoritarian regime felt by some Americans serving in China, Jiang still concluded that Washington would withdraw its support only if his government collapsed militarily, or if the Americans agreed with the Soviet Union to create a new government.25 Even during the depths of his conflict with Japan, Jiang had been able to exploit the weakness of other powers to achieve results for himself. The Chinese government had—for the first time since the 1910s—taken control of most of the enormous northwestern province of Xinjiang, largely due to the inability of any local regime to get Moscow's support at that time of great duress for the Soviet state. Even if of limited practical value at the time, the Western allies' promise to give up their special treaty rights and concessions in China also constituted a victory for Jiang: the imperialist states had, it seemed, come to realize that it was only through his regime that they could build their future diplomatic and commercial relations with China. Finally, the victorious showdown with the Americans over Jiang's demand for the recall of General Joseph Stilwell, the U.S. commanding general in China, must have symbolized to the GMD leadership the absence of any alternative Chinese center of power acceptable to President Roosevelt.26 Jiang Jieshi's strategy—his use of the GMD's hold on the internationally recognized government in order to defeat his domestic enemies—could only survive the crisis of the last years of war on two conditions. The first was continued support by the American government. Jiang knew that he needed U.S. aid both to outlast the Japanese military onslaught, and to prevent any domestic challenges to his regime. Second, the GMD government had to preserve enough territory to retain the Great Powers' recognition. If Jiang's regime was able to hang on to its present status of recognition, any foreign power that wanted something from China would have to deal with Chongqing. The GMD leaders had learned from their opponents' use of foreign influence in the 1910s and early 1920s how significant this status could be. In 1944 the most likely patron for a serious domestic rival was the Soviet Union. Jiang disliked the Soviets for having supported the Communists in opposition to his regime during the CCP-GMD alliance in

Yalta and the Search for Stability

17

the mid-1920s and during the GMD attacks on the Communists from 1927. Even though Moscow had not provided material support for the CCP during the civil war in the early 1930s, the Guomindang leader believed that the Kremlin had a strong influence on the policy of the Chinese Communist Party, and that the party therefore was a likely recipient of Soviet aid in the future. Jiang also regarded the autonomous regimes that existed in Xinjiang and Mongolia as unviable without significant support from Moscow, and he suspected other regional parties, primarily in Manchuria, of hoping for ties across the northern border. On all these fronts Jiang saw a potential Soviet threat to Chinese territory, and worried over how to foil any attempts by political rivals or restive ethnic groups to win Moscow's support for their causes. 27 Even though most GMD leaders thought it likely that the Soviet Union would sooner or later enter the war in Asia, they were slow to adjust their policies to that expectation. It was not before the summer of 1944 that the Guomindang leadership started to move away from a policy of trying to put pressure on Moscow through domestic and international anti-Soviet propaganda. The persistence of this anti-Soviet policy can be explained in part by ideology. To Jiang and most GMD leaders the Soviet Union represented exactly the idea of class warfare and abrupt social change they had come to oppose in their own country. The northern neighbor was therefore an enemy of their regime's basic values and their search for political stability and social tranquility. This ideological animosity was strengthened by a general suspicion within the GMD, and indeed among a large group of educated Chinese, of long-standing Russian designs on Chinese territory. Finally, the inertia in foreign policy making within the Chongqing regime, created by factional infighting and the associated fear of controversy and attack for promoting any changes in foreign policy, contributed to the lack of new initiatives in Sino-Soviet relations. 28 Both American pressure and a reevaluation by Jiang Jieshi of how best to apply his diplomatic strategy contributed to a change in GMD Soviet policy in the fall of 1944. The Americans had for several months intensified their efforts to improve relations between their two allies. In a meeting on May I I , President Roosevelt told Chinese ambassador Wei Daoming that it was absolutely necessary for the Chongqing government to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. Without such an understanding, FDR said, the postwar stability of Asia and the world would be imperiled. The president also strongly indicated that

18

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the United States would be willing to assist in bringing China and the Soviet Union closer together. On June 1 Ambassador Fu Bingchang reported to Chongqing from Moscow that U.S. representatives there were pressing for China to mend relations with the Soviet Union, and that the United States apparently had cleared the way for sending a Chinese representative to hold talks with Stalin.29 Jiang decided that mid-1944 was an opportune moment to secure the active support of the Americans in dealing with Moscow. His initiative in suggesting Song Ziwen's visit to the Kremlin was followed by an appeal to U.S. Vice-President Henry Wallace for American support in negotiations with the Soviets. In light of the persisting attacks on the Soviet Union in the GMD press it is likely that Jiang hoped that Stalin would rebuff this first feeler, and that Chongqing afterwards could use the Soviet leader's rejection of talks as a means to elicit further U.S. support. 30 Nothing became of Jiang's June initiative. The Chinese leader could, with some justification, claim that he had been misled by the Americans. Acting for once on advice from the State Department, FDR turned down Jiang's appeal for immediate U.S. mediation between Chongqing and Moscow, conveyed through Wallace. Roosevelt told Jiang that Washington would not accept the role as intermediary if the GMD did not "achieve a working agreement with the Chinese Communists for effective prosecution of the war against Japan in north China." 31 The Chinese leader saw the American reply as a significant diplomatic setback, which did not warrant further direct overtures to Stalin.32 The June initiative did, however, signify a shift in the approach of the Chinese government. The openly anti-Soviet proclamations gradually abated, and the generalissimo held a series of meetings with representatives of the Soviet embassy. In these meetings Jiang tried to find out what he could expect to get from the Soviets as part of a settlement between the two governments, and was particularly interested in Soviet support in "solving the CCP problem." The Soviet chargé d'affaires had nothing to tell the generalissimo. The orders from Moscow obviously were to respond as little as possible to whatever the Chinese leader said.33 The Guomindang leadership now was caught up in a debate on how to deal with the Soviets, a debate that became more intense as the military situation deteriorated. Wang Shijie, a member of Jiang's cabinet, stressed in a memorandum to the generalissimo in mid-November the need to improve relations with Moscow, primarily in order to

Yalta and the Search for Stability

19

"solve" the CCP problem. But Wang's memo also shows how difficult it was politically for a GMD leader to suggest a concrete way of approaching the Soviets. The memo indicates that the debate in the fall of 1944 was a discussion not of options but of attitudes, with men like Wang and Song Ziwen, in favor of approaching the Soviets, debating conservatives who would not consider any opening to Moscow, whatever the circumstances. 34 A turning point in Jiang's own thinking seems to have come after his ambassador to London, Gu Weijun, in mid-October reported on a conversation with FDR's top military adviser. Admiral William D. Leahy. According to Gu, Leahy told him that the United States would not oppose the Soviet takeover of the northeastern port of Lushun if Moscow became part of a victorious alliance against Japan. Leahy also believed that the Soviet Union would under any circumstances join in the fighting in East Asia before long. 35 After reading Gu's dispatch, Jiang concluded that it was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union had started to consider the conditions for Soviet entry into the war, and that the Americans would expect China to agree to at least an arrangement over the ice-free port of Lushun. 3 6 Jiang was not at all dissatisfied that the negotiations over Soviet entry into the war now proceeded without direct Chinese participation. The development of the war had forced Washington to discuss the postwar settlement in East Asia with Stalin, and thereby act as an intermediary in Sino-Soviet relations. The GMD leader thought that this new American role would give his regime further leverage when negotiating a treaty with Moscow. 3 7 The Soviet demands that Jiang had been told about by U.S. representatives did not come as a shock to the Chinese leader. As early as January, after returning from Teheran, FDR had told Ambassador Wei that the United States supported internationalizing the Manchurian port of Dalian and guaranteeing access for the Soviet Union to the Manchurian railways. Even if the concrete arrangements Stalin wanted for Dalian and the railways were still unclear, and even if the Soviet leader had added the strategically important naval base of Lushun to the list of concessions, Jiang must have seen these conditions for getting an agreement with Moscow as relatively benign. In exchange he could expect to get the United States as a guarantor of a Sino-Soviet treaty, which would, Jiang hoped, exclude the possibility for Soviet support for rival Chinese regimes. The new American role was a welcome turn of events, considering the status of Jiang's war against Japan, and the

20

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tensions in Sino-American relations created by the Stilwell controversy. 38 The expected American initiatives were probably the main reason Jiang did not act on an invitation from Stalin to visit Moscow in early November. Now that he could expect the Americans to mediate, it would be far better to hold off going to see Stalin while Washington elicited the full Soviet demands. Jiang expected that he would learn from the Americans whether Moscow had added any new substantial demands. The situation in Europe also gave the Guomindang leaders hope that either the war there would end soon, or that Moscow and Washington would fall out over a European settlement. In either case, they thought, would Soviet participation in the war in East Asia be in doubt. In addition, the generalissimo might have concluded that it would be wise to put some time between a meeting in Moscow and the Stilwell crisis. If the Americans were to deal with Stalin on his behalf, it would be good to have them do so after the atmosphere between Chongqing and Washington had improved. 39 Franklin Roosevelt turned out to be a lot less cooperative and forgiving than Jiang hoped. In a meeting with Jiang's brother-in-law Kong Xiangxi on November 16, FDR lectured his visitor on the military disaster China faced if its forces did not unify and counterattack against the advancing Japanese units. According to Kong's report to Jiang, the president stated emphatically that the Soviet Union did not support the CCP, and that now was the time to get an arrangement with the Communists. The warning to Chongqing was clear: the Soviets have to come into the war, and you should get your own house in order beforehand. 4 0 Jiang interpreted the president's warning as a repetition of FDR's earlier condition: the Americans would intercede with the Soviets if the GMD started negotiations with the CCP at once. Jiang now needed to show the American president that he had understood Washington's conditions. The generalissimo therefore informed Roosevelt's representative Patrick Hurley in November 1944 that he was willing to negotiate with the Communists' headquarters in Yan'an. In light of this willingness to show at least outward compliance with the wishes of the Americans, some historians have been surprised that Guomindang diplomacy was not more active in communicating to Washington its desires with regards to the Soviets in the vital weeks before the Yalta summit. The explanation for this apparent lack of initiative is probably to be found in Jiang's belief that FDR would consult him if Soviet

Yalta and the Search for Stability

21

demands exceeded what the Chinese had been informed of already. In addition, the military situation in the war against Japan deteriorated to such an extent in the early weeks of December that Jiang might have believed that any pressure on the Americans might lead to a reduction in U.S. willingness to defend the GMD's precarious foothold in western China. 41 Even if Jiang had ruled out top level initiatives, Chinese officials did make attempts to influence and investigate American contacts with Moscow on the China issue in the weeks leading up to Yalta. On January 4 Zhang Jiasen, the leader of the Chinese Democratic Party, and his brother Zhang Jia'ao, who had a long association with Jiang Jieshi, met with Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew. The Zhang brothers stressed "the great anxiety in China that Russia might occupy and retain Manchuria." At the same time they emphasized that China would be quite willing to grant the Soviet Union transit rights through that region to Dalian or Liishun, and hoped that one of these cities could be declared an open port. 42 Two weeks later Shao Yulin, one of Jiang's trusted assistants, tried to get Grew to elaborate on U.S. plans for how to decide on the postwar order in East Asia. The undersecretary studiously avoided any concrete response. 43 By the time the Yalta Conference convened for its first meeting, the immediate military emergency in China had lessened somewhat. The Japanese had evacuated parts of the southern province of Guangxi, possibly as a result of a political deal between Chongqing and Tokyo. 44 Still, Jiang Jieshi knew that his military debacles would sharpen the conditions the Soviets presented as their price for entering the war against Japan in agreement with the United States and China. As Song Ziwen observed in late 1944, the GMD leadership felt that FDR had originally thought China would carry the main burden in liberating the mainland of East Asia, but that the experiences of the last year had shown the American president that the National Army was not capable of fulfilling this mission. It was this change in strategy that had made the Soviet entry necessary for the Americans, Song thought. 45 Song, educated at Harvard, read U.S. intentions with more accuracy than most Chinese observers. By late summer 1944, political and military leaders in Washington were exasperated over the setbacks in the war on the East Asian mainland, occurring as they did parallel to a series of U.S. victories in the Pacific and in Europe. American officials faulted Jiang's government for not resisting the Japanese with sufficient

22

Yalta and the Search for Stability

enthusiasm and efficiency to halt the invader's offensives, and American officers serving in China became increasingly critical of the corruption and factional infighting, which they saw as undercutting the Chinese war effort. The Chinese government did not fight the American kind of war, and as victory followed costly victory for the Americans in the Pacific, the president had to consider what options were available to defeat Japan in China, and what political effects each of these options might have. As shown by Richard Manser, there had been very little change in the basic formulation of FDR's China policy between the attack on Pearl Harbor and mid-1944. The president expected China's help in fighting the war, and hoped that U.S. training and supplies would make it possible for the Chinese National Army at some point to take the offensive against the Japanese. This cooperation during the war would also lay the foundation for China to be an ally of the United States after the war was over, controlling East Asia in cooperation with Washington much as Great Britain would do in western and central Europe, thereby removing the need for an American military presence. The lack of similarity between his own political ideals and those of the generalissimo seems to have bothered FDR little, if at all. 46 The constant Chinese attempts to make the Soviet Union look suspicious in the eyes of the Americans met with little understanding in Washington. Given the difficult position of the Chinese armies, most American officials failed to see why Chongqing seemed so intent on irritating Moscow. For instance, Jiang portrayed the ethnic uprising in Xinjiang, which started in the spring of 1944, as a Soviet-inspired and Soviet-aided attack on China. Both the U.S. embassy and the American consulate in the region regarded local issues and gross mismanagement by GMD administrators from outside the province as the real reasons for the rebellion, and found no evidence for Soviet complicity. The State Department supported these conclusions. 47 Roosevelt and his military advisers had early in the war told Moscow that they wished the Soviet Union to join in the struggle against Japan as soon as possible. The Americans knew, however, that Soviet entry was highly unlikely until well after the end of the war against Germany. The Soviet Union was not capable of fighting a two-front war, as Stalin had told the president at Teheran. FDR might therefore have expected that by the time a Soviet entry became possible the Chinese armies would have made significant gains in territory, as the Imperial Army had to shift its forces to counter the strong U.S. offensives in the Pacific.

Yalta and the Search for Stability

23

The result of the Chinese and Soviet offensives would be the certain defeat of Japan on the Asian mainland without the United States having to commit hundreds of thousands of its soldiers to fight the enemy on this front.4® By early fall 1944 these expectations had proved to be illusory. The Guomindang regime was not ready even to plan for an offensive against Japan. On the other hand, Stalin had yet to implement any kind of substantial military preparations for an attack in East Asia. If the American government was to insist on the total defeat of Japan, Roosevelt would now have either to plan for the use of U.S. forces in the China theater, or to find some way to get the Chinese armies moving and the Kremlin to start preparing for war. In late August the president tried to push Stalin for an initiative on East Asia, and got the most encouraging reply so far. On the China side, the president had since early summer tried to force Jiang to put General Stilwell in command of all Chinese forces in order to unify and invigorate their war effort. FDR now intensified the pressure on Jiang by sending Patrick Hurley and Donald Nelson as his personal representatives to China. Hurley and Nelson stopped over in Moscow in order to get Stalin's assurances that the Soviet Union supported Jiang's government and welcomed the U.S. initiatives. The Soviet leader complied on both points. On September 16, as the military situation in China deteriorated, FDR demanded that Jiang accept Stilwell as commander of the Chinese National Army. As Roosevelt was well aware, the position of an American general as head of Jiang's armies would increase U.S. influence not only over the way the war was fought, but also over Chinese foreign policy.49 On September 23 Jiang told the American president that he refused to accept Stilwell. Two weeks later the Chinese leader also turned down compromise solutions suggested by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Jiang's attitude convinced Roosevelt that the military situation in China was for the time being beyond repair. This belief had a significant influence on FDR's choice of long-term strategy in the area. On the same day Jiang communicated his final reply on the Stilwell issue, Winston Churchill reported to the president from Moscow that he had little doubt that Stalin would declare war on Japan as soon as Germany was beaten. Roosevelt made his decision. A couple of days later he told his secretary of war, Henry Stimson, that he had finally decided against landings in China. As "for fighting on the mainland of China, we must leave it to the Russians," Roosevelt told Stimson. 50

24

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Now FDR waited for Stalin's reaction. It was a breakthrough for the president's strategy when the Soviet leader later that week told the U.S. military attaché' General Deane, that joint planning for the war in East Asia should start immediately, and that he would select airfields in the Maritime provinces and the Petropavlovsk area for use by the U.S. Airforce after the Soviet Union attacked Japan. These assurances meant that not only did the Soviets commit themselves to enter the war, they also prepared to attack in coordination with U.S. war plans and in cooperation with U.S. forces. To Roosevelt the Soviet commitments had major political as well as military significance: Moscow had so far not allowed the U.S. or British airforce to use bases in the Soviet Union or in Soviet controlled areas in Europe. The president hoped for the alliance with the Soviet Union to continue into the postwar period, and saw Stalin's sudden willingness to cooperate militarily both as a promising sign of Soviet intentions and as a new tie between the two states that would in itself facilitate postwar collaboration. 51 Roosevelt now thought he had arrived at a strategy for winning the war against Japan. It was not the solution he had hoped for, but it did promise to take care of the problem. The Chinese difficulties remained, however. Some days after his reelection to a fourth term in office, FDR consulted his ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, on how to approach the China issue. Although the president had given up on any major Chinese military offensives, he still hoped that it would not be necessary to use Soviet troops against the Japanese outside Manchuria. As he said to Harriman in their discussion of Beijing, "If the Russians go in, will they ever go o u t ? " 5 2 The only way to develop a non-Soviet military force in northern China that could be used to e v i a the Japanese was to get a settlement between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, since the Communists had substantial forces in this area. Stalin also wanted such an agreement, Harriman reported. The Soviet leader wanted to use the Chinese Communist forces against the Japanese, something that would be difficult if they were not part of the National Army. Stalin, according to Harriman, would put pressure on the CCP to agree to almost any conditions Jiang would suggest. On the other hand, if there was no setdement, the Soviet Union might in the end support the Communist Party against the government, Harriman warned. 5 3 Harriman's report reminded the president that there was still a possibility for a political agreement between the GMD and the CCP, even if his hopes for a settlement through the shortcut of military unification

Yalta and the Search for Stability

25

had not worked out. The evidence suggests that Roosevelt sincerely wanted the Communists both to play a major part in the war in China and to join in a coalition government. He also remained unconvinced that the CCP was governed from Moscow. FDR kept referring to the CCP as the "so-called Communists," and might even have hoped that the "North China forces" could legitimize Chinese national interests in the areas into which the Soviet Red Army would soon move. On November 15, the president wrote to Evans Carlson, a young officer who had briefed FDR on his meetings with the Chinese Communist leaders, that he was "hoping and praying for a real working out of the situation with the so-called Communists." 5 4 FDR's envoy Patrick Hurley had gone to Yan'an on November 8 to work for such an agreement, and on his return to Chongqing three days later he triumphantly brought with him not only suggestions for how to solve the conflict, but also the prominent CCP leader Zhou Enlai in person to negotiate with Jiang. Roosevelt was unaware that Hurley's lack of intimacy with the complex game of Chinese politics had undermined his mediation efforts almost from the start, and the president mistakenly concluded that the political situation in China was improving. The embattled government in Chongqing might after all get the support of the CCP army, which Roosevelt's own secretary of state characterized as "virile and popular." 5 5 The remaining difficulty for the president was to decide on the "political demands," which Stalin had alerted him to at Teheran. FDR had preferred the Chinese and the Soviets to settle these matters between the two of them. Now time was running out. The Soviet leader had asked for a Great Power meeting to take place in late November, and even a postponement to early February had not left enough time to finish the CCP-GMD negotiations in Chongqing. Since Stalin had reasons not to hold talks with the Chinese before an agreement had been struck between the GMD and the CCP, and since Jiang clearly was unwilling to take any initiative of his own, FDR now had to get the Soviets to confirm their demands. In his November 10 conversation with Harriman, the president asked his ambassador to bring the Soviet demands up with Stalin as soon as possible. There was no reason to expect any great surprises, the ambassador said. Evidently, both the president and Harriman thought they knew the outline of Stalin's wishes. 56 In the meantime, the joint Soviet-American military planning—the news of which had so encouraged the president—developed very slowly.

26

Yalta and the Search for Stability

The Soviets kept the American planning group, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed on October 18, waiting in Washington for almost a month before processing their visas, and when the Americans finally arrived in Moscow the Soviet generals withheld all specific information about the Red Army's strategic planning. Two months after the JCS had appointed the U.S. group. General Antonov agreed to designate Soviet representatives in order for the combined planning group to start functioning. But again, in spite of several protests by General Deane, head of the American military mission, six weeks elapsed before the first combined meeting was held on January 26. At the meeting the Soviet planners argued that setting any concrete agenda for the group had to be postponed until after the Yalta Conference. 57 In spite of these delays, Roosevelt ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to push ahead with the plans to provide the Soviet Union with supplies and equipment for the war in East Asia, the operation known as "MILEPOST." The Joint Chiefs intended this operation to improve the logistics of the Soviet Far Eastern forces, and to stimulate the Soviets to begin the joint planning as early as possible. On November 1 the Joint Chiefs had accepted in principle all the requests Stalin had made to Harriman in October for petroleum products, railroad equipment, naval vessels, shipping, and aircraft. The JCS had warned, however, that even if the United States could deliver most of the goods in the first half of 1945, the military hardware would not become available until early summer. 5 8 In late November the Joint Chiefs changed their estimate of the prospects for Soviet entry into the war in East Asia. They now expected the Soviet Union to attack Japan three to four months after VE-Day. "Russia's interests in the Far East and in postwar world politics will undoubtedly force her entry into the war against Japan," the JCS concluded, although they warned that Moscow might decide to wait until the very last stage of the war. It would be desirable for the United States to get Soviet participation as soon as possible, particularly since the value of strategic bombing, and therefore the use of Far Eastern air bases, now had increased as a result of the postponement of the target date for the invasion of Japan until the fall of 194 5. 59 The president concurred. On November 18 he told Harriman that "the defeat of Japan without Russia would be extremely difficult and costly," and that the United States therefore should do everything possible to support Stalin's plans. 60 The intelligence services' advice carried the president in the same

Yalta and the Search for Stability

27

direction—toward an increasing emphasis on the Soviet role in East Asia. U.S. military intelligence estimated that Germany would be defeated "not before July 1," and that it would take four to six months from then for the Soviets to reorient their forces eastward. 61 The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reported on January 11 that the Soviet government had already decided to renounce the neutrality pact with Japan. On January 25 the same source reported that the Japanese ambassador in Moscow had told his government that if Stalin was not satisfied with the resolution of the European problems at Yalta, he would refuse to discuss East Asia. Finally, on February 7 the OSS reported that Japan would seek peace if Stalin decided to cooperate with the Americans. 62 In December the military situation in China hit rock bottom. As the U.S. Armed Forces worked out contingency plans for evacuating the China theater should Jiang's regime collapse, the American secretary of war noted in his diary, "If we can't get rid of Chiang Kai-shek, we can't get in touch with the only live body of military men there is in China at present, namely the Communists." 6 3 As the military crisis led Stimson to look for ways to cooperate with nongovernment military forces in China, so did it increase the president's need for a deal that would regulate outside interference in China after the war was over. In Washington, the events on the Chinese battlefronts in late 1944 led to an increased emphasis on the weaknesses of the Guomindang government and a fear that China might fragment further during the coming year. Roosevelt, in December, asked one of his aides to prepare a full record of his administration's support for China, obviously to prepare for the domestic criticism that might come if Jiang's government collapsed. 64 FDR, who had regarded the GMD government as a fighting ally, even if inefficient and corrupt, was now moving toward viewing the Jiang regime as a dangerous political vacuum of the kind found in Poland and other Eastern European states. As Lauchlin Currie, one of the president's close advisers, warned in a pre-Yalta memorandum to Roosevelt, "Russia and the United States might be maneuvered into taking sides on the issue," something which would both create international problems and wreck the prospect for a peaceful settlement of the GMDCCP conflict. Currie suggested that the president should reach an understanding with the Soviet Union on a "hands-off attitude," with neither of the foreign powers supplying the Chinese in a civil war. 65 Roosevelt agreed that to avoid future conflict over China he would need to have a general agreement with Moscow. With the survival of

28

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the Jiang regime now in doubt, he wanted a Great Power understanding over which kind of government China should have. The troubles in Europe over the postwar settlements for Romania, and especially for Poland, made it even more pressing to secure Soviet-American cooperation on East Asia. 66 Since Stalin had now informed the Americans about his demands, the upcoming Yalta Conference would have to deal both with Soviet participation in the war in East Asia and with China's relations with the Soviet Union. Roosevelt did not know whether Stalin would enter the war in cooperation with the United States and support the Americans in finding a solution to China's domestic problems. As Harry Hopkins noted some months later, one of FDR's main purposes at the Yalta Conference was to get a precise date and the full extent for Soviet participation against Japan. It was important for the United States to protect China's interests, Hopkins recalled, but it was even more important that the cooperation between the allies could break down "if the Far East was not settled." 6 7 Franklin Roosevelt left the United States on January 22 and, after a brief conference with Winston Churchill at Malta, arrived on the Crimean peninsula on February 3. Although the president's health had visibly declined over the last several months, there is no reason to believe that his illnesses played any significant part in the outcome of the conference. It was, however, a concern to his advisers, and made them more active and vigilant than during earlier summit meetings. Harry Hopkins, himself bedridden at Yalta, failed in getting FDR to hold further meetings with the British prime minister before seeing Stalin. Hopkins told Roosevelt's daughter, who accompanied the president, that it was FDR "who wanted this job. Now he must show that he is up to it." 6 8 FDR's policies at Yalta were, however, not dictated by his deteriorating health but by his overriding diplomatic concerns. The president's main objective at the summit was to bring the United States and the Soviet Union closer together on several international issues. As at Teheran, the president wanted Stalin to recognize that America did not have more common interests with Britain than it had with the Soviets. Throughout the conference FDR attempted to get Stalin to accept agreements, even on minor matters, which would link the Soviet Union to the United States in the coming years. On the more significant issues, such as that of a new government for Poland, the president engaged in hard bargaining but in the end always moved to close a deal with Stalin.

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29

The Soviets set the scene for the negotiations on East Asian questions. When the U.S. Chiefs of Staff tried to get military commitments from the Soviet general staff at their first meeting at Yalta on February 5, General Antonov made it clear that this would have to wait until after the heads of state had discussed the issue. Stalin wanted to discuss Europe first, then East Asia, and finally Soviet military commitments against Japan. As shown earlier, Stalin never considered calling off his war against Japan, whatever the settlement on Europe and East Asia had become at Yalta. The discussion on Europe must have convinced him, however, that the United States wanted to continue to cooperate with the Soviet Union, in spite of existing differences. When he met with Roosevelt on February 8, Stalin immediately withdrew his December reservations on American air bases in the Soviet Far East, and again agreed to their establishment. He also reaffirmed his support for joint strategic planning to take place in Moscow. 69 Then Stalin turned to his "political demands." Deciding to bargain, the U.S. president immediately agreed to Soviet acquisition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, but told Stalin that he wanted Dalian and Liishun "internationalized" rather than leased to the Soviet Union. The same should be the case with the Manchurian railway lines: They should be operated under joint Sino-Soviet management, not under a Soviet lease. When pressed by the president on the Soviet attitude toward the Chinese government, Stalin answered that he supported the "United Front" in China, and that he did not understand why the Communists and the Guomindang had stopped cooperating. 70 This meeting, in effect, ended the formal talks on East Asia at Yalta, and it must have left Stalin very uncertain as to how to proceed. He had asked the president before the end of their meeting if Roosevelt would accept signing a written agreement on East Asia before leaving Yalta, something FDR "thought could be done." With little time left before the president's scheduled departure, Stalin reiterated his demands in a written proposal. In this document, which with a few important changes became the final agreement on East Asia, Stalin took the surprising step of formally committing himself both to enter the war in cooperation with the United States and Great Britain two to three months after VE-Day, and to support Jiang Jieshi's government. His conditions were as outlined in the conversation with FDR. But after further U.S. pressure the next morning he substituted "internationalization" for "lease" of Dalian (but not for Lüshun), and agreed to joint management of the railroads. The American president accepted the

30

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deal, and overruled his ambassador in Moscow, Harriman, who believed that the president should ask the Soviets to make further changes. Roosevelt said that calling the Soviet interests in Manchuria "preeminent," and stating that Moscow's claims should be "unquestionably fulfilled" was all "just language." Nobody commented on the American obligation to get Jiang to agree to Stalin's demands on China, which now was part of the written text. Admiral Leahy, after seeing the agreement, told Harriman that "this makes the trip worthwhile." 71 It was the search for postwar stability in the relations between the Great Powers in East Asia that led Roosevelt and Stalin to sign the Yalta accords. Both leaders wanted an Asia in which regional issues could not challenge the positions won by each of the powers as a result of the war. The two had different methods of achieving these positions, but both still believed that it would be possible and desirable to get mutual recognition of each other's gains. Neither Roosevelt nor Stalin regarded the immediate objectives of the other as in conflict with his own short term aims, nor did the leaders of the two powers view the Chinese parties as extensions of each other's political systems. These accords were, in other words, products of a pre-Cold War period. The Yalta agreement should be seen as emerging from a three-way exchange between Moscow, Washington, and Chongqing, and as an element in a process that began several months before the conference. A driving force in this process was Jiang Jieshi's attempts to compensate for his military weakness by achieving foreign support for his regime. By doing this, Jiang tied the fate of his government to the international system that was coming into existence in early 1945, and of which the Yalta agreements were symbols. Considering the catastrophic military situation in China at the time, the Soviet-American deals resurrected Jiang as the most credible national leader, in opposition to the revolutionary forces competing with him for power.

TWO The Jiang-Stalin Pact and the Collapse of Great Power Cooperation

At Yalta Roosevelt and Stalin had sought to use Jiang Jieshi's China as a stabilizing buffer between a central and northeast Asian mainland dominated by the Soviet Union and a Pacific area dominated by the United States. This attempt at Great Power cooperation broke down after less than four months. Thus, the "Yalta system," as Akira Iriye has dubbed it, was at best a limited episode in the development of SovietAmerican relations in East Asia.1 The breakdown had many reasons. One was the inherent vagueness of the agreement itself. Both Stalin and Roosevelt, intent on compromise, accepted this vagueness, and hoped that they could develop greater detail later. But after FDR's death, the ambiguity of the treaty soon became a liability when a new U.S. administration sought to develop its own policy on East Asia. Another gravedigger for the "Yalta system" was the political and diplomatic developments in Europe in the spring of 1945. Washington, Moscow, and Chongqing read different meanings into these last weeks of the European war and the months that followed, but in the case of all three governments their perceptions of emerging Great Power relations on this continent strongly influenced their strategy in East Asia.

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Third, the leaders of the Guomindang regime recognized the opportunities created by FDR's death, and immediately began to reconstruct Sino-American diplomatic relations using the Yalta agreement and the U.S.-Soviet conflicts over Europe as their main tools. And last, the political pressure developed by those U.S. officials who believed that the Yalta agreements on East Asia were unsound and should be repudiated led to greater American support for Jiang in his negotiations with the Soviet Union. In effect this new American policy was a retreat from the Yalta premise that the United States would force Jiang to accept Soviet demands. This retreat signaled the replacement of the cooperation-oriented Yalta approach of the winter of 1944/45 with a much more conflict-oriented policy in the fall. The new framework— which could be termed the "Moscow approach" after the venue for the Sino-Soviet negotiations—set the stage for an intense rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in East Asia in the weeks before and after the Japanese surrender. 2 One of the many myths developed around the Yalta agreement is that Jiang Jieshi first was informed about the February Soviet-American deal four months later, when the Sino-Soviet negotiations were about to begin. 3 As John Garver has recently shown, Jiang was told about Yalta both by the Americans and by the Soviets only weeks after the summit ended. 4 Already on February 21 the Chinese ambassador in Moscow, Fu Bingchang, had guessed the general outline of the agreement based on hints from Soviet officials.5 On March 15, Ambassador Wei in Washington was briefed by President Roosevelt on the Yalta talks, and the president provided enough information for Wei to transmit a fairly full outline to Chongqing. 6 Jiang himself was convinced that Roosevelt and Stalin had struck a deal, which meant that the United States now was a participant in Sino-Soviet relations. Since such an intervention had been a part of Jiang's strategy for some time, the Chinese leader welcomed the Yalta agreement, although he of course hoped to avoid having to make too many concessions to the Soviets. Jiang's main worry was his poor relations with the White House. FDR's toughening attitude toward the military and political situation in China could easily poison diplomatic relations, and make Washington less inclined to support Chinese positions vis-à-vis the Soviets. The Great Powers could make new deals, Jiang feared, in which further concessions would be demanded from the Chinese government.

Jiang-Stalin Pact and Collapse of Cooperation 33 Jiang's dilemma was that he could not easily reconcile the American demands with his strategy for fighting the Chinese Communists. FDR wanted a Chinese coalition government and increased military effort against the Japanese. On the other hand, Jiang's whole strategy against the CCP depended on delegitimizing the Communist Party and keeping his own troops ready for a domestic military showdown. However, as Jiang noted in his diary in mid-February, "the international aspects are now gaining supremacy over the domestic," and thus it would be difficult to avoid some kind of settlement with the Communists. 7 His main foreign policy advisers pushed hard for a GMD-CCP agreement before Foreign Minister Song Ziwen had to leave for Moscow. At an informal meeting on February 6 between Song, Vice Foreign Minister Hu Shize, and Wang Shijie, now in charge of negotiating with the Communists, all thought an early accord with the CCP would help the government during the Moscow negotiations. 8 Jiang, however, kept emphasizing the connection between the development of Soviet-American relations and the future of Guomindang-CCP relations, implying that a breakdown in the Great Power alliance could still spare the GMD a forced marriage with Yan'an. 9 Then, suddenly, the gate to achieving broad American support seemed to open. In Warm Springs, on April 12, FDR died. Jiang Jieshi noted in his diary that the president had been a great leader for his country, "although he appeased Russia and protected the CCP." Now, Jiang wrote, "we must be even more careful when furthering Sino-Soviet relations." 10 Carefulness soon gave way to exhilaration. On April 16, Wei reported from Washington on the tougher attitude he expected the new president, Harry S. Truman, to take toward the Russians. After complaining about Roosevelt's opinions on communism in general and the Soviets in particular, Wei concluded that Truman was different, and that he was less likely to open direct talks with the Chinese Communists, as the Guomindang leaders feared Roosevelt had been in the process of doing. The main question, according to Wei, was whether the United States saw the connection between the Soviet Union and the CCP. In conclusion, Wei suggested that "we must, in the coming period, make every effort to coordinate [policy] with the United States[;] this should be done by accepting U.S. opinion on general matters, but strongly promoting our own demands on important questions." Wei urged the government to form a new strategy for dealing with the United States—and the Soviet Union—"when the situation became clearer." 11

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Wei kept his optimism after meeting with the new president the next day. Though conceding that Truman adopted a rather stern tone at their meeting, the Chinese ambassador attributed the president's language to the anti-GMD influence of certain officials and the press. Wei told Jiang that he still believed Truman would move away from FDR's "great power chauvinism." 1 2 Foreign Minister Song, reporting from the United Nations conference in San Francisco, also thought that the new president would create his own policy on foreign affairs, and that this policy would be better for China than FDR's. Referring to statements from both American and Soviet officials that the CCP was not "a real communist party," Song suggested that the Chongqing government could still benefit diplomatically from getting an agreement with Yan'an. 13 But after FDR's death Jiang was less willing than ever to give up anything to the Communists. In addition to his own fundamental reluctance to give any concessions to "rebels," Jiang—having just survived the greatest military crisis of the war—still had to keep right-wing rivals from challenging his authority in the Guomindang. Finally, the main reason for holding out was Jiang's hope that U.S. diplomatic support would be forthcoming in spite of his failure to work with the CCP. He also guessed that increased Great Power tensions could lead to the Soviets being more manageable at the upcoming Moscow negotiations. It would not be in Stalin's interest to throw away an improved relationship with China if the conflict over Europe intensified. 14 Had the Guomindang leaders known the details of the discussions that went on among senior officials in Washington in these first weeks after President Roosevelt's death, they would have had even more reason to feel elated. The U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman, who had been increasingly unhappy with FDR's Soviet policies, took the initiative to a series of meetings among high-level officials to form a foreign policy agenda for the new president. Among the proposals discussed was a new policy on East Asia, one that would strongly deemphasize cooperation with the Soviet Union in the war against Japan. Harry Truman, however, was not ready for any moves that the public would interpret as breaks with his predecessor's policies. On the contrary, he saw as his main task to demonstrate, domestically and internationally, that he was continuing on the track that the late president had laid down. Determined to continue a Soviet policy that he had neither understood nor endorsed, Truman accepted the State Department's proposal to send Roosevelt's trusted adviser Harry Hopkins

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to Moscow. Hopkins would reassure Stalin of the continuation of FDR's foreign policy while Truman himself frantically tried to figure out where the president's track really had been leading. 15 The Hopkins mission was the last consistent American attempt to influence the Soviet leadership toward greater cooperation. On the surface it seemed an extremely successful effort. In their discussion of East Asia, Hopkins asked for further Soviet guarantees on Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, and Stalin gave him all he asked for—and more. Not only did the Soviet leader restate his agreement to hand over power in Manchuria to Jiang's government but, if the Chinese signed a Sino-Soviet treaty, he would also consent to having GMD officials accompanying the Soviet divisions when the attack on Japanese positions began. Most important, Stalin gave Hopkins a date for the Soviet attack: mid-August 1945. 16 The talks with Hopkins gave Stalin the opportunity to use China to deflect attention from the emerging Great Power confrontation over eastern Europe. The United States had lodged diplomatic protests in February and March over Soviet behavior in Poland, but Stalin had not responded. However, the death of FDR—the American originator of U.S.-Soviet cooperation—had led Molotov to spend a night "wandering up and down the halls" of the American Moscow embassy "just like a wild m a n , " asking " w h o is this man Truman?" 1 7 China could n o w be both a point of convergence and a test case for the new administration's intentions, Stalin hoped. The Soviet leader believed that Washington was worried about a possible Soviet military domination of Manchuria and support of the Chinese antigovernment opposition. He interpreted the increase in U.S. military support for Jiang Jieshi as a way to preempt such a development, and as a sure sign of firm U.S. commitment to Jiang's regime. The Soviet leader therefore needed a treaty with Chongqing before his troops entered Manchuria if he was to avoid a conflict with Jiang and his American backers later on. Jiang Jieshi was finally officially informed of the Yalta agreement by Ambassador Hurley on J u n e 15. Contrary to what the ambassador thought he observed, Jiang's diary shows little emotional reaction. 18 For several weeks already the Chinese leader had held meetings with the new Soviet ambassador, Appolon Petrov, in preparation for the unavoidable negotiations with Stalin. Jiang had n o w started to worry in earnest about the domestic challenges he would meet at the end of the war against Japan. His nightmare was that the CCP would be able to link up to Soviet forces in Manchuria, and thereby gain strength in

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their contest with his government. Jiang wanted to find out from Petrov what kind of agreement the Soviets were interested in, and how much he would have to give Stalin to get a treaty that would leave the CCP isolated. 19 Jiang's thinking in these last weeks of June shifted back and forth between wanting to make use of prospective U.S. diplomatic support to pressure the Soviet ambassador, and the opposite—stressing Chinese independence of the United States to facilitate the discussions with Moscow. He could not decide whether U.S. support would come, and how badly Stalin wanted a treaty with China. After June 22, when Truman turned down Jiang's offer of U.S. access to the Lushun naval base, the generalissimo concluded that American support was not immediately forthcoming. 20 On the other hand, several of Jiang's advisers told him that the Soviets were seriously interested in a treaty with his government. A Military Affairs Committee report, discussing the probability of Soviet support for the CCP, pointed out that if Soviet forces were to enter Manchuria they would need to cooperate with a local adminstration. The Guomindang, controlling the legally recognized government, was the only source of authority for such administrations. Furthermore, the report stated, if Moscow wanted concessions in the Northeast, the only way to get these internationally recognized was through a treaty with the National Government. In other words, if the Guomindang needed something from Stalin, Stalin also needed something from the Guomindang. 21 When Chinese Foreign Minister Song Ziwen arrived at the Central Airport in Moscow on June 30, 1945, he must have felt that he was at the end of a long journey in more ways than one. The ups and downs in the relationship between the two regimes, both products of great revolutions, had been part of Song's political career for more than twenty years. As Sun Zhongshan's brother-in-law, he had watched the efforts Sun made in the early 1920s to create an alliance with the Soviet Union. After Sun's death, Song had assisted another brother-in-law, Jiang Jieshi, in breaking away from the compact with Moscow and the Chinese Communists, and in establishing a one-party dictatorship in China. Years later, as foreign minister in Jiang Jieshi's wartime government, Song had come to realize the necessity of a pact with the Soviets for the international and domestic security of the regime he repre-

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sented. It was in search of such a pact that Song Ziwen had come to Moscow. 2 2 Foreign Minister Song, Ambassador Fu Bingchang, and Vice Minister Hu Shize were received by Stalin and Molotov in the Kremlin on the evening of June 30. After initial pleasantries, into which Song cleverly inserted a statement about his close cooperation with the Americans, Stalin emphasized that the Soviet side was sure the two governments would arrive at an agreement. "In the past," Stalin said, "Russia wanted an alliance with Japan in order to break up China. Now, we want an alliance with China to curb J a p a n . " 2 3 The Chinese delegation came away convinced that Stalin genuinely wanted to sign an agreement—the question was at what price. 24 Two days later Stalin met with Song to start the negotiations. The Soviet leader first picked up a copy of the Yalta agreement and dropped it on the table in front of the Chinese delegation. "Are you familiar with this document?" Stalin asked. Song answered that the Americans had already communicated the contents to him at the same time that they had told the Chinese about Stalin's pledges to Hopkins. The Chinese foreign minister then immediately took up the question of Outer Mongolia and stressed, as Jiang had to Petrov, that his government did not want this issue included in the negotiations. Stalin, in response, underlined the strategic position of Mongolia and his firm belief that in the future Japan would rise again. "We must have legal right to defend ourselves in [the] territory of Outer Mongolia," Stalin said. He then added the Machiavellian argument that an independent Mongolian republic would reduce the danger for a nationalist rebellion in Outer and Inner Mongolia. Such a rebellion would be "to the detriment of China and us." In addition, Stalin said, he needed Chinese concessions because "if we attack Japan what will the people say? We finished four years of war and you start a new war. Japan does not touch you and you attack Japan. How shall I be able to justify [the] attack?" 2 5 Song, however, held firm on Mongolia, as he did when the discussion turned to Manchuria. After Stalin had suggested that the best thing to do would be to take the Sino-Russian treaty of 1898 and "make certain improvements on it," Song quickly returned to the text from Yalta and pointed to Dalian's status as a free port. Of course, Stalin said with a laugh, he wanted to be to the left, not to the right, of the tsarists. Still, throughout the first night of the talks, Stalin kept returning to the

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"rights" tsarist Russia had enjoyed in Manchuria. His demands were not very specific: he indicated a wish for joint administration of Dalian and Liishun, and Soviet ownership of the railways leading to these ports. On the other hand, the Soviet leader made sure not to make demands that might upset the Americans. He did not want the right to station troops along the railway, and he emphasized that the Red Army had not planned to "go to Peking." 2 6 Song's negotiation strategy for the first meeting was to deemphasize Manchurian questions in order to get Stalin to concede to the Chinese view of the Mongolian issue—that China would not object to Soviet troop presence and de facto control if Stalin would not raise the issue of formal independence. Stalin, on his side, would not yield an inch on Mongolia. Song's repeated arguments about Chinese public opinion, about setting bad precedents, and about the Soviets' recognition of the area as a part of China twenty years before all came to nothing. The negotiations ground to a halt. In spite of Stalin's insistence on a quick signing of the treaty. Song said he would have to consult Jiang on the issue of Mongolia. 27 Just before the meeting ended Song brought up the question of the Chinese Communist Party. They are "good patriots," Stalin said, but "As to [whether they are] communists [there is a] question mark." "China must have one government," he continued, "with predomination o f ' the Guomindang. Well aware of Song's wishes, the Soviet leader repeated his suggestion that Jiang could "send his representatives to our army to set up administration as our troops advance." As he had done during the conversations with Hopkins, Stalin again put the CCP bargaining chip on the table. 28 When the Chinese delegation met the next day to work on their strategy, all present hoped that Jiang n o w would concede some points in order to get the negotiations going. Hu Shize noted in his diary the importance of convincing Stalin of the Chinese bona fides. He feared that the Russian image of evasive Chinese would harm the potential for an agreement. There was little doubt among the negotiators that an agreement was necessary for the Chinese government. China was in the weaker position; it needed to give the Soviets a deal good enough to dissuade them from helping themselves to privileges on Chinese territory. 29 However, Hu's meetings with high-ranking Soviet leaders over the next couple of days left the vice-minister puzzled. Anastas Mikoyan, the commissar for foreign trade, strongly emphasized his hope for a

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39

Sino-Soviet agreement, but seemed completely unprepared to suggest any Soviet trade privileges. Hu's meeting with Marshal Klement Voroshilov left the same impression. The marshal went out of his way to stress how much he was "looking forward to fight together against Japan." The vice minister came away from these meetings with a strong impression that if the agreement was necessary for the Chinese, it was almost equally valuable for the Soviet leaders. 30 While waiting for Jiang to make up his mind on Mongolia, Song Ziwen held a series of meetings with Averell Harriman. These informal talks turned out to be crucial for the further development of the SinoSoviet negotiations. It is unlikely that Song expected much from the ambassador; the foreign minister's consultations in Washington before coming to Moscow revealed no U.S. support for the Chinese negotiators. After his meetings with Harriman on July 5 and 6 in Moscow, Song must have felt that this position was changing, and changing fast. On July 4 the new American secretary of state, James Byrnes, reiterated to Harriman the old U.S. position that it would be "unwise for this Government to attempt to act as interpreter . . . of the Yalta Agreement." Byrnes went on, however, to permit the ambassador to inform Song "that United States opinion is that de jure sovereignty of Outer Mongolia remains with China," even though Chongqing did not "de facto" exercise this sovereignty. 31 James Byrnes, who had received his political education in South Carolina courthouses, knew as much about the art of negotiation and compromise as he knew little about international affairs. The new secretary understood that the United States could use its influence on the Sino-Soviet negotiations to reward or punish Moscow in connection with the coming Great Power summit. 32 On July 6, after routinely repeating the warning against U.S. interposition, Byrnes told Harriman to make three new points to Song. "As a party to the Yalta Agreement," Byrnes said, the United States "would expect to be consulted before any agreement is concluded." Second, the United States could only accept "the right of equal access" to the port of Dalian. And third, the American government regarded Stalin's demand for Soviet ownership of the railway lines to the Liaodong peninsula as outside the Yalta agreement. 33 To Song Ziwen this message must have sounded like those bugles of the cavalry patrol in the Westerns he loved so much. If the United States was on the verge of intervening in the negotiations on the side of the Chinese government, he might not have to accept treaty terms he

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regarded as humiliating both to his country and to himself. By holding out, he could now hope to get a better deal than he had ever expected. Since the Soviets seemed surprisingly eager to sign an agreement. Song suddenly had more than his own negotiating skills to rely on. His reports to Chongqing indicated a new optimism, and the beginnings of a new strategy. The concessions that he earlier in the week had hoped Jiang would make had now become less important. 5 4 From his capital by the Yangzi River Jiang himself understood that the international scene was rapidly changing. The last Japanese offensives had ended in April, and Jiang concluded that Japan would soon ask for peace. The "Communist problem" now dominated the generalissimo's mind. He had to find a way to force the CCP to accept the authority of his government, either through military compulsion or through a negotiated agreement. Either way success depended on depriving the CCP of foreign support. Even if the Americans continued to aid the government after the war—something that, as Jiang noted, was in no way certain—it might not be enough to offset Soviet aid to the Communists. The more Jiang thought of the Moscow talks in these terms, the closer he got to the conclusion that it was both possible and necessary to strike a deal with Stalin. Song's first reports told him that Stalin would be willing to drop the CCP if the Soviets could get most of what they wanted through an agreement with the Chinese government. But could Jiang meet Stalin's price? 35 Jiang accepted Song's estimate that the success of the negotiations depended on a solution to the conflict over Outer Mongolia. The generalissimo's diary shows that the idea of giving up the territory was difficult to reconcile with his sense of mission in reuniting China. He took refuge in Sun Zhongshan's belief that the different nationalities had the right to decide their own form of government. In the end, Jiang observed, the question was not whether the idea of independence for the Mongols was "correct and just," but whether Russia had the right to demand it on behalf of "their" Mongols. 36 The leadership of the Guomindang met in the evening of July 5 to decide on Stalin's demands. The majority of those present opposed giving in on Mongolia, and Jiang told them that he would consider their opinion. But when the influential leader of a rightist GMD faction, Chen Lifu, who himself strongly opposed the concession, saw Jiang the next morning, the generalissimo had already decided against their advice. Jiang would sacrifice what he did not have to get what he badly needed. He told Song that he was willing to give up Outer Mongolia if

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the foreign minister could secure far-ranging guarantees on Manchuria. On July 7, Jiang narrowed his wishes down even more. In a telegram to Song he stated that these negotiations offered a way to solve the Communist problem once and for all. If Stalin would give up all support of the CCP, Jiang would permit Song to settle the Mongolian question in Moscow. 3 7 When Song met Stalin again around midnight on July 7, the Chinese negotiation strategy was in flux. Believing that American assistance was coming, and not yet having received Jiang's last telegram. Song had decided to try to hold out on Mongolia. He told the Soviets that independence was out of the question, but that China was willing to accept the presence of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia. He also stressed that he had American support for this proposal. Finally he told Stalin that no Chinese government could "recognize [Mongolian] independence and survive," and that the Yalta agreement supported his views. Stalin replied angrily, and correctly, that "It is our formula. They signed it. . . . We understood it as: China will recognize [Mongolian] independence." Song did not need to worry about the GMD regime's survival. "The other forces are Communists," Stalin said. "If China enters into an alliance with the Soviet Union nobody will overthrow the government." When Song still did not make any concessions, Stalin cut the meeting short. The negotiations seemed to have broken down. 3 8 The receipt of Jiang's last telegram, however, made it necessary for Song to continue his ordeal in the Kremlin. Song himself must have realized that a full break in the negotiations over the question of Mongolia was not in China's interest, at least not at this stage. On July 9, the Chinese foreign minister presented his government's new position to Stalin. Song quoted the part of Jiang's telegram referring to Chinese willingness to " m a k e the greatest sacrifice" to achieve Sino-Soviet cooperation. The "sacrifice" was Mongolian independence. In exchange Jiang hoped Stalin would agree to the Chinese proposals on Manchuria and to not aid the CCP. Jiang n o w suggested the joint use of Lüshun, and free-port status for Dalian. Both would come under Chinese administration. The railways "should belong to China," but were to be operated jointly with the Soviet Union. Jiang proposed a twenty-year duration for the agreement. 3 9 The new Chinese strategy put the Soviets in a difficult position. With the Berlin Great Power conference approaching, Stalin did not want to see the Americans use the Sino-Soviet negotiations to win concessions in Eastern Europe. To avoid such a situation he wanted an agreement

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with Song before leaving for Potsdam. Stalin therefore had to begin negotiating on the Manchurian issues, even if Jiang's position seemed to offer very litde to the Soviets. To push talks ahead Stalin now gave assurances on the CCP issue. "We do not support, and do not intend to support" the Chinese Communists, Stalin said. "As [far as] we are concerned, China has one government. If anyone else call [sic] themselves a government, that is a matter for China." 4 0 Stalin then got ready to make a deal. His immediate counterproposals were a thirty year treaty, Soviet administration in Lushun, and Soviet ownership of the railways. He also indicated that he was willing to delay his departure for the Berlin summit if that proved necessary to get the treaty signed. 41 When meeting with Song the next afternoon, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was in a hurry. His willingness to consider Chinese suggestions on a variety of important issues, somewhat contrary to his general diplomatic style, indicated that the Soviet leaders had decided to try to get agreement as soon as possible. Song, however, was not inclined to give in on any major points, and in some respects toughened his attitude. "Yalta is not sacred," he said when resisting Molotov's attempts to get agreement on the administration of the Manchurian railways. 42 At their meeting on July 11, Stalin showed his impatience with the successful Chinese strategy of resistance. "We can talk for two years and we shall reach nothing," he observed heatedly. He then tried to convince Song that China would gain nothing by delay, and that the Soviets were willing to make new concessions to get the treaty signed. Wryly observing that the United States did not want to land military forces in China, Stalin questioned any U.S. role in the negotiations. He did not hide his annoyance over Song's constant attempts to capitalize on American support for the Chinese positions. The new Soviet concessions were in no way major but, even so, indicated Stalin's urge to get the treaty in hand. Stalin now accepted Song's suggestions of strictly limiting Soviet movement of troops to Lushun and of only having Chinese armed guards on the railways. The Soviets also agreed to withdraw their invasion force from Manchuria within two to three months. Possible U.S. intervention in Sino-Soviet affairs at the upcoming conference now worried the Soviet leader more than ever, and his concessions were intended to mollify the Americans as much as the Chinese. He still hoped to meet Truman with the treaty in his pocket. " W e must settle before we leave for Berlin," Stalin said repeatedly. 43

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Song, however, had no intention of settling anything before the Potsdam conference. On July 12, Stalin gave up. The Soviet leader now went for the second best option, which was avoiding any public impression that the negotiations had broken down. Stalin was pleased when Song agreed to say in the official press release only that the talks "have to be postponed." The two sides decided to meet again after the Berlin conference. Before Song left, Stalin told him that the Soviets had found out that Jiang's left-wing GMD rival Sun Ke was communicating the content of the telegrams from Moscow to the Communists in Yan'an. This leak of information to the CCP was "very b a d " and had to stop, Stalin said. 44 It is hard to say whether Stalin attempted to avoid unnecessary problems in the relationship with the CCP, particularly now that the Moscow talks had ended inconclusively, or hoped to give an impression of commitment to new allies by betraying "friends." 4 5 Whatever his motives, the Guomindang delegation appreciated the information. 46 Song had already told Averell Harriman of his new strategy on Manchuria. According to the ambassador's report to Washington, Song was "anxious to leave the subject open in order to obtain your [Truman's] views. He hopes you will be able to get Stalin to accept the Chinese position at the fortcoming conference." 47 Truman, Song hoped, could become the GMD's new ally. Harry Truman had neither any background on nor any interest in China. Commenting on the China situation in 1943, Truman admitted "diplomacy has always been too much for me—especially diplomacy as it is practised by the great powers." 4 8 In spite of Harriman's attempts to question U.S. policy on cooperation with the Soviets in East Asia, the results of the Hopkins mission to Moscow had provided enough Soviet concessions to get the problem off the president's desk. Truman stuck to what he understood to be his predecessor's policy: To achieve both an alliance with Stalin against Japan, and a treaty between the Soviets and the Chinese before Stalin entered the war. Song had therefore got little encouragement from Truman when the two had met in June. The president had told Song that China would have to sign an agreement with Moscow, like it or not. Joseph Grew, among others, tried in the weeks before the Potsdam Conference to keep up the pressure on Truman to change FDR's policy. The acting secretary warned the president in late June that Moscow now was attempting to force the Chinese government to accept "as

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equals prominent Communists who formerly were either in active, fighting opposition to the central government or traitors." In addition, Grew indicated that the Communists in several countries, particularly China, were "so audacious" as to demand autonomy for their own armed forces. Grew believed that these developments were contrary to U.S. interests. 49 The War Department also warned Truman of Communist intentions. A comprehensive report on the Chinese Communist Party, which the president received from the War Department's Military Intelligence Division in early July, stated that the CCP was "sponsored and guided" by Moscow. It also claimed that the Soviets planned to use the CCP to create "Russian-dominated areas" in Manchuria and North China. Repeatedly drawing a parallel to Eastern Europe, the report warned against conceding a Soviet zone of operations in China. 50 On his way to Potsdam, the president spent hours discussing strategy with his advisers. "It is quite a different atmosphere from the other trips . . . . Considerably more businesslike," State Department Soviet expert Charles Bohlen wrote to his wife. 51 The official State Department briefing book was, however, too vague and general to offer much help to the president. Joseph Grew's advice was substantially blunter. The United States should accept the Sino-Soviet deal on Lüshun, Grew said, but the other territorial agreements "represent a reversion to a situation that was one of the most pernicious foci of imperialism . . . and is therefore disappointing from the point of view of American interests, policy and ideals." 52 The Sino-Soviet impasse on Manchuria provided a suitable outlet for the increasing suspicion of Stalin's motives held by a large group of American officials at Potsdam. The potency of the issue was connected to a prime U.S. foreign policy symbol: The "open door" in China. Already the day they arrived in Potsdam, Henry Stimson, who had served as President Hoover's secretary of state during the Manchurian crisis of 1931-1932, took Harriman's advice and warned Truman against letting the Soviets control Dalian. The acceptance of Soviet control, the secretary stated, would "constitute an abandonment of one of our longest established and most highly respected American policies." 53 Harriman was also torn between his wish to curb Soviet influence in Manchuria and his fear that Stalin might attack Japan and not cooperate with the United States. After shifting back and forth on the issue, his own memo concluded that "China has fulfilled [the] Yalta terms."

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The United States should confront the Soviets on Dalian, and demand a role for itself in any deal concerning the port. 54 Even after the many dire warnings to the president. East Asian affairs played a minor role in U.S. diplomacy at Potsdam. First of all, Stalin played his hand well in his meetings with Truman. Only some minutes after having shaken hands with the new president for the first time, Stalin was busy explaining his East Asian diplomacy. He told Truman that his troops would be ready to attack Japan by mid-August, but that he first needed an agreement with China. He stressed that the Soviet demands were within the limits set at Yalta, and that he both unequivocally recognized Manchuria as a part of China and renounced any intention of aiding the CCP. When Byrnes pressed Stalin on the question of military control outside Lüshun, the Soviet leader replied that Moscow had not demanded the right to station troops anywhere except around the naval base, and that Moscow had accepted Dalian as a free port. Stalin's last point caught the president's attention. Truman immediately proclaimed it to mean that the Soviets agreed to the American position on Manchuria. Since the president after this meeting obviously believed that he had both "clinched the 'open door' in Manchuria" and secured a fixed date by which the Soviets would enter the war, Truman felt that he did not have to deal directly with Song's troubles in Moscow. 5 5 The Sino-Soviet treaty "is practically made—in a better form than I expected," the president told his wife. 56 Despite his immense nai'veté in foreign affairs Truman was in many ways closer to FDR's outlook than most of his advisers were. Truman understood that Roosevelt had based his policy on cooperation with the Soviet Union, and the new president wanted to continue that cooperation. The new secretary of state, whose inexperience in diplomacy was rivaled only by Truman's, was attempting to bridge the president's wishes and the pressure for change among his main advisers. Byrnes hoped that the prolonged Sino-Soviet negotiations would keep Stalin from attacking Japan until Tokyo was convinced—by nuclear destruction—to surrender unconditionally. "This will save China," Byrnes felt. On July 23 the secretary had Truman send Jiang a telegram admonishing the generalissimo against giving in to Stalin — and demanding that the negotiations continue. 57 Even if Byrnes' strategy was built, at least in part, on the use of the atomic bomb against Japan to prevent the Soviets from entering the

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war, it is unlikely that this calculation was a major argument in the president's decision to use the bomb in early August. Recent research indicates that Truman would have used the bomb as soon as it was ready, regardless of the relationship with the Soviet Union. The rather naive plan of preempting the Soviet Manchurian offensive by raising Jiang Jieshi's hopes for U.S. diplomatic support best shows the inexperience of the main U.S. leaders at Potsdam. At the same time, however, this loose plan indicated that the Truman administration was moving toward confrontation with the Soviet Union in East Asia. 58 On the other side of the globe from Berlin, Jiang Jieshi received disquieting information from his military advisers. A detailed and wellinformed study of Soviet offensive plans in northeast Asia made for the government Military Affairs Committee reported that the Soviet Union wanted to occupy Manchuria and that it was fully capable of doing so at any time. The report expected only light Japanese resistance, which in no way could be compared to the fighting the Western allies would have to overcome to conquer the home islands. The massive buildup of Soviet troops in Mongolia, as well as along the Amur River, indicated that Stalin could also be preparing to seize areas in North China, such as Beijing and Tianjin. 59 To Jiang this report must have raised frightening prospects. A Soviet occupation not only of the northeast, but also of critical parts of North China, would place the balance of power between him and Mao Zedong in Stalin's hands. This realization was pushing the generalissimo further toward accommodation with the Soviets. When meeting the Soviet ambassador on July 19, Jiang emphasized that even if he had been reporting to Truman, China decided its own foreign policy. The point he tried to convey to Petrov was that only "if there is agreement on Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria can [the government] survive Outer Mongolian independence." Jiang implied that the demise of his regime would be disadvantageous to Moscow, based on what he had already agreed to in the Sino-Soviet talks. He also repeated that strong forces in China opposed an agreement with the Soviet Union under any circumstances. 60 The Guomindang regime faced a series of foreign and domestic challenges in the summer of 1945. The new national assembly was to convene in the fall, and Wang Shijie, who handled the preparations for the GMD leadership, noted the connection between the outcome of the Moscow talks and the regime's strength in the assembly. In addition,

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Jiang had to keep the party itself united behind his foreign policy. Most important, the GMD leaders sensed that the Second World War was ending, and that the race for control of territory between them and the Communists would intensify. 61 Jiang Jieshi spent much time in July 1945 reflecting on how international affairs would influence this race. He felt that the Soviet Union already regarded the United States as its enemy, and was certain that East Asia would go through a long period of Soviet-British-American rivalry after the war. In spite of his belief that U.S. isolationism with regard to China was no longer possible, Jiang was still uncertain whether the massive American support for his government would continue after Japan's defeat. The best policy, according to the generalissimo, was to avoid an alliance with any one of the Great Powers, and instead to turn their differences to China's advantage. In particular Jiang wanted to find a Soviet policy that could isolate the CCP and force the party to "conform" to GMD rule, preserve GMD unity, and "make the Soviet Union feel at ease in the Far East." 62 Song Ziwen's secret report on the Moscow talks to the GMD leadership on July 20 was not well received in Chongqing. The foreign minister had been away from China for a month, and when dealing with Manchuria Song emphasized economic issues, not the conflict with the CCP that had been on every GMD leader's mind over the last several weeks. The top level meeting of the party three days later must have included criticism of Song's approach and showed, according to Wang Shijie, the immense stress that "foreign and domestic issues" put on the party's unity. Jiang had been right when he told Petrov about the resistance in his party to ceding Outer Mongolia. Song Ziwen was an ideal lightning rod for these sentiments. Chen Lifu—who saw Song as "a foreigner who knew nothing about China"—and other opponents of the treaty tried to blame the foreign minister for the loss of Chinese territory. 63 The day after the meeting Song told Wang Shijie that he wanted to resign as foreign minister because it would be easier for a new minister to get agreement in Moscow. When Song informed Jiang Jieshi of his decision the next day, Jiang immediately agreed. The generalissimo called on Wang Shijie to replace Song. Jiang had several reasons for accepting his brother-in-law's resignation. It might give a new impetus to the Moscow talks while muting criticism of Jiang within the GMD. Accepting the resignation was also a way of sheltering Song Ziwen. Jiang resented Wang Shijie's "liberal" views on many domestic issues

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and considered him more expendable than Song. As Song told Patrick Hurley on July 29, "this proposed agreement with Soviet [sic] will be destructive politically to the man responsible for it." 6 4 But Jiang Jieshi needed his treaty. His main instruction to the new foreign minister was unequivocal: get agreement in Moscow. There was no real political conflict in the party over the issue of Outer Mongolia, Jiang told Wang. "Outer Mongolia has been outside our country for a long time," said the generalissimo, and was much less important than Manchuria. The task now was to save as much Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria as possible. 65 The ultimatum on Japan's surrender issued from Berlin did not change Jiang's Manchurian strategy. Both he and Wang asked themselves what the United States would do if Japan accepted the ultimatum. Were the Americans ready to land forces in Manchuria? To the GMD leaders this seemed highly unlikely. 66 The new Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow on August 5. Jiang had convinced Song Ziwen, who kept his position as chairman of the Executive Yuan, to accompany Wang to Moscow, and in reality resume his status as Chinese chief negotiator without having to put his name to an eventual treaty. The negotiating climate, however, had changed over the previous three weeks. Molotov told the Chinese at the airport that the end of their eight-year struggle was near, with Japan on the verge of collapse. Hu Shize, who had remained in the Soviet capital and had busied himself by reading its newspapers, noted that the increase in articles on Manchuria, and particularly on Liishun, indicated that the Soviet leadership had decided for war. He reported to Song and Wang that it was wrong to place too much hope on the Potsdam declaration; even if Japan capitulated the Soviets would "find another means of achieving what they want, under another pretext." 6 7 In addition to their difficulties with the Soviets, the Chinese now also had to handle the increasing intervention of the American ambassador. Song knew, based on his earlier experience in Moscow and on Truman's telegrams, that Harriman could not by now be kept out of the talks, even if the Chinese had wanted it. Song and Wang hoped to use American pressure on Moscow to get Jiang the best deal possible. But at the same time they feared that Washington, for reasons of its own, would oppose Jiang's new concessions to the Soviets. While continuing to cooperate with Harriman, Song in August did no longer inform the American ambassador of the details of the talks. 68

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Harriman, on his part, had continued the pressure on Washington to get instructions to intervene directly in the talks. On July 31 he reported to Bymes that Song would not give in on Manchuria, and that it would be contrary to U.S. interests if he did. He begged permission to tell Stalin, as soon as possible, that Dalian could neither be a Sovietcontrolled port nor in a Soviet military zone. If Stalin would not agree to these demands, Harriman suggested to formally propose the setup of an international commission to control the city. 69 On August 5, Bymes accepted Harriman's requests. The ambassador was instructed to tell the Soviet leaders that in the American view Song had already met the Yalta requirements, and that Stalin should not "press for further concessions." Moreover, Harriman should officially inform Stalin that no agreement "that might adversely affect our interests" should be concluded without consulting Washington. Finally, Stalin should be requested to sign a document pledging to respect the "open door" in Manchuria. Harriman, his prayers heard, immediately informed Song of the new U.S. position. 70 Song saw that time was running out. The first atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima. This was the moment, if there ever was to be one, to get the Americans to force Stalin's hand. On August 7 he informed Harriman that the ambassador had to ask for a meeting with Stalin the next day. 71 Song and his group met with the Soviet leaders that evening. As the Chinese entered the room, Stalin asked, "what news can you tell us?" Song stated the Chinese position on Lushun, and Stalin, obviously not surprised, would "think it over." The real difficulty was Dalian. Song insisted on the city being a free port with Chinese administration. Molotov countered by insisting on Soviet control. The "port installations and facilities were built by Russia and purchased by her," Molotov said. As he had done three weeks earlier. Song reminded the Soviets that the old treaty on Dalian had already expired. When Stalin complained that the Soviets had never been able to "make use of [the] port," Song acidly commented, "We can't help it. We do not insure against Japanese aggression." Stalin then returned to his old predictions that "Japan will surrender but will revive. . . . As to sovereignty of China we are going to fight and shed blood for it, what you never did." Soviet policy had changed since the 1920s, Stalin said. Moscow could not wage war against Japan then, but now it could. The question of Dalian remained unsolved. Hoping to remind the Chinese of their isolation, Stalin in conclusion commented

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that the Potsdam conference "was not bad," and that James Bymes was "a clever man. He played a big role." 7 2 That night Stalin gave the final orders for the attack on Japan. For over nine months, he had pressed for the preparations to be ready as soon as possible, and by now the Soviet line of attack along the Manchurian border was almost complete. The exact timing was decided by the intelligence reports Stalin had on the Japanese plans to surrender, and by the American threat of stopping him from extracting privileges from Jiang Jieshi. Stalin could obviously not allow Tokyo to capitulate to Washington before he got into the war, and after the bombing of Hiroshima the Soviets saw that Japan was giving up. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders could not know exactly what Harriman would present them with in the meeting scheduled for the next day. Based on the information they had from Jiang and Song, their best guess had to be that the ambassador would lay down certain American conditions for the treaty to be signed. Since such an action would force Stalin to either directly challenge the president, or accept some kind of American role in the treaty, he had to preempt the possibility of U.S. pressure by doing what Washington had urged him to do since 1941: Attack Japan. 7 3 Chinese and Americans alike had long realized that Stalin always had an ace up his sleeve—that he could, at any time, gain an advantage in the game by declaring war on Tokyo. The members of the Chinese delegation now asked themselves what objectives the Soviet offensive had and how soon the military operations would succeed. Wang Shijie expected that the greater part of Manchuria would be occupied "in a few days." Hu Shize observed that both Harriman and the Chinese negotiators had expected the Soviet attack to take place at the end of the month. "Now," Hu said, "there is nothing we can do." 7 4 As always when diplomacy is overtaken by military action, Harriman's long-sought meeting with Stalin turned out to be useless to both sides. The meeting contributed, however, to the intensification of mutual suspicion between the leaders of the two countries. Stalin went to great lengths in underlining that his demands had not been "a violation of Yalta" as he understood the Soviet-American agreement. As during the talks with Song, Stalin stressed to the American that he had not asked for Soviet troops to be stationed outside the Manchurian ports. The ambassador, however, was not pleased by Stalin's crude attempt to show that Soviet concessions in Manchuria were not in conflict with American interests. Harriman, going substantially further than his instructions, told the Soviet leader that "President Truman had accepted

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Soong's [Song's] general proposals." A visibly angry Stalin shot back that he was ready to agree to no Soviet troops in Dalian in peacetime and to sign a protocol stating his support for the "open door" in Manchuria. Before ending the meeting, Stalin told Harriman that he deplored the American position of accepting only the Chinese proposals, and not supporting any from the Soviet side.75 When the ambassador left the conference with Stalin, he closed the door on a period of Soviet-American relations in East Asia that had stretched through the Yalta Conference and up to August 1945. Now, the vague wordings of the Crimean agreement, and the semblance of cooperation that had accompanied them, had all been blown apart by the last months' events. The American diplomatic intervention against the Soviet position in China, and Stalin's subsequent decision not to coordinate his attack on Japan with Washington, led to a new period of intense rivalry between the two Great Powers—a rivalry that set the stage for the Cold War. When Molotov called the American ambassador back to the Kremlin later in the evening on August 8, it was to tell him that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan in about ten minutes time. 76 The Chinese delegation in Moscow was at a loss as to how to proceed in the negotiations. The U.S. ambassador gave contradictory advice. Lacking instructions from Washington, Harriman alternately stressed American opposition to Soviet control of Dalian and the obvious Chinese need for a signed treaty as soon as possible. When the Chinese met Stalin again, on August 10, it was rumored that Japan had already declared itself willing to surrender. The delegation had, on Wang Shijie's suggestion, decided on an almost desperate dual strategy for the meeting. On the one hand, they would stress China's willingness to continue the negotiations under the new conditions. On the other, they would not let the Soviets force them to make any important new concessions because of Stalin's military action. 77 Fearful of further American pressure, Stalin himself was still in a hurry to finish the negotiations. When meeting with the Chinese delegation in the evening of August 10 the Soviets told them that Japan wanted to capitulate. "Are we going to sign the treaties?" Stalin asked. While admitting that he was anxious to sign before the Japanese surrender, Song still did not suggest any new compromises. To his surprise, Stalin now made a number of minor concessions concerning the railways and the area to be included in the Soviet military zone. 78 After

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Wang Shijie made an eloquent and passionate plea for Chinese sovereignty over Dalian, Stalin reformulated the Soviet position. "We shall have no troops, no warships, no coastal artillery" in Dalian, the Soviet leader said, and China should be responsible for civilian administration in the city. On other points, Stalin said, Molotov and Song should "take [the] Chinese drafts and go point by point." 79 After having surprised the Chinese with these concessions, Stalin now raised a new issue. He asked Song and Wang to include in the treaty of friendship a statement saying that the Chinese central government would work for national unity and democratization in China. Stalin's motive might have been to make it easier for the CCP leadership to accept the deal, and thereby give the Soviets a fallback position if their relations with the GMD again turned sour. It would create political difficulties for the Soviets "if you continue to beat communists," Stalin told Song. When both Song and Wang objected in strong terms to this interference in Chinese domestic affairs, Stalin gave up. "O.K.," he said, "You see how many concessions we make. [The] Chinese communists will curse us." Stalin's concessions, however, still failed to buy him a treaty. This time the sticking point was the Mongolian state's frontiers. Wang Shijie, who guessed that Stalin was still eager to sign the treaty because of the Americans, used the confusion over internationally recognized borders in this area to threaten to further postpone the negotiations. Stalin said coldly: "It's now five o'clock in the Far East and our troops will continue [their] movement." 8 0 In spite of Stalin's thinly veiled threat both sides knew that they were ready to sign an agreement if only the question of Mongolia's borders was solved. In meetings with Molotov throughout the day of August 12, the Chinese proved willing to reach compromises on other minor issues, often with Song pushing Wang to shelve his opposition. Late in the evening, Wang received Jiang Jieshi's telegram stating his willingness to circumvent the border issue by use of a phrase like "existing boundaries." Song Ziwen and Jiang Jingguo told Wang that in their opinion time was running out, and that the Chinese had to sign immediately. 81 In the last negotiating session, which started at midnight, Stalin made further concessions both on w h o should control the railways and on Chinese influence in Dalian and Lüshun. 82 The negotiations had reached their conclusion. The Chinese were ready to sign. After a several hour delay, caused by an inexplicable attempt by the Soviets to

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add to the Russian text several minor points to their advantage, the treaties were signed at 3 a.m. August 15. 83 Molotov put his name to the treaty next to that of Wang Shijie, and Stalin left the hall, telling Hu Shize he needed some rest. He really left to instruct his generals that he was ready to receive the Japanese surrender. An hour later Stalin returned to offer champagne to the surprised Chinese, and to talk in a relaxed mood. The Second World War had just ended and Stalin had proved himself its great survivor. It is ironic and telling that he celebrated his victory together with a group of men with whom he had just entered into a new incongruous alliance. Now he talked about the reasons for the razor's edge survival of his regime. The Japanese, Stalin said, had chosen to attack the United States and not the Soviet Union for two reasons. The first was that Southeast Asia was infinitely richer than Siberia. Second, Hitler wanted to finish the Soviet Union by himself. The fiihrer never requested Japanese intervention in the East. "It was Hitler w h o did not want it," Stalin kept repeating. 84 The last days of negotiations, and the final agreement, left the American ambassador despondent. He had repeatedly attempted to influence the outcome of the talks, most recently on August 12 when he insisted to Molotov that a partial Soviet ownership of the Dalian port installations would be "adversely affecting American interests." His protests had had no effect. 85 Already on August 10 Harriman had urgently appealed to Washington for U.S. forces to occupy Dalian immediately. 86 The ambassador saw the "loss" of Manchuria as a major set-back for U.S. foreign policy. It further increased his fear that if the United States did not "reorient our whole attitude and our methods of dealing with the Soviet government," history would know "the period of the next generation as the Soviet Age." 8 7 Just six months after the Yalta Conference Harriman was already suggesting that the Americans use force to contain Soviet influence in China. President Truman too now saw a threat in the new Sino-Soviet tie that official U.S. policy had been promoting so eagerly only months before. When Truman met Song in Washington on August 18, the president pointed to the Soviet-American rivalry when he emphasized that although he welcomed the treaty, it was he, Truman, who had forced Stalin to treat China fairly. The United States was China's best friend, said the president. Truman then surprised Song by proclaiming

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himself "deeply concerned" about the CCP issue in the Sino-Soviet talks, and by stressing that the Soviets had yet to show their real intentions in dealing with the Chinese Communists. Song easily got the message in the president's not too subtle diplomacy: Do not trust the Soviets too much. For Song the president's warning in itself must have been worth his tribulations in Moscow, particularly when the president also promised further economic and military assistance to the Guomindang regime. 88 This development of U.S. attitudes was surely based on more than the Moscow talks themselves. To a large extent American officials projected European problems on the East Asian situation—already before Potsdam U.S. policymakers drew extensive parallels between Poland, Romania, and China. The Sino-Soviet talks took place at a time when U.S. concerns were shifting from the wars against Germany and Japan to the shape of the postwar world. Grew and Harriman now saw FDR's design for Soviet-American cooperation in East Asia as outdated. They viewed Soviet demands as aggressive and in conflict with American interests, and they believed that the CCP was an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. These perceptions were important stepping stones to the Cold War in East Asia. 89 Stalin never wanted to have his treaty with China damage his relations with the United States. The Soviet leader had, since FDR's death, tried to use the China issue to improve his relationship with Washington. His strategy during the negotiations was to avoid making demands that the Americans would consider as directed against their position in China. He would thus not ask to station Soviet troops in Manchuria or sponsor political concessions to the Chinese Communists. His other demands, Stalin thought, would not upset Truman because they would be accompanied by a treaty of alliance between himself and Jiang Jieshi. Since this treaty guaranteed the Chongqing regime against challenges from the CCP, Stalin believed it served the American purpose in China as well as his own. 9 0 Stalin's strategy had, however, changed as the talks progressed. At the outset of the negotiations Stalin viewed the Manchurian demands essentially as bargaining chips that he could cash in during Great Power controversies over Eastern Europe. However, as Jiang's cooperative attitude became clear, Stalin's plans shifted to a more permanent arrangement. The Soviet leader's desire for a gainful and stable relationship with the Guomindang was grounded in his conviction that the Chinese Communists—and other Communist parties in countries he

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perceived as dominated by the Western Great Powers—had no possibility of taking power. The Soviets felt that under the circumstances created by the end of the war, no Communist government could survive without the active support of the Red Army. As Ivo Banac has shown, this attitude was soon driven to the extreme, as when Stalin's Yugoslav supporters claimed that "isolated" struggles were mistakes, and that only the "unified forces of the international working class" could defeat imperialism. In other words, homemade revolution became counterrevolutionary. 91 Under circumstances like these, it is not surprising that the Soviet government tried not only to get privileges from Jiang Jieshi's regime, but also attempted to make cooperation with the Soviet Union appear to be in Chongqing's best interest. Even if Stalin accepted U.S. supremacy in China as unavoidable he would still try to secure his own positions and make sure that Sino-American cooperation did not turn anti-Soviet. As in earlier examples of Stalin diplomacy, however, his foreign policy style worked against his overall objectives. The ad hoc decisionmaking, the inconsistency in purpose, and the crudeness of Stalin's personal treatment of his counterparts were all counterproductive. To the historian—as to his contemporaries, Soviet and foreign—Stalin's foreign policy is not as much inexplicable in its parts as incoherent in its whole. Stalin's flexible negotiating strategy was influenced both by the close watch he kept over American attitudes to the talks, and by Jiang Jieshi's unexpected willingness to come to agreement with Moscow. As Jiang's attitude became clear Stalin's interest in signing an agreement increased even further, but so did his preoccupation with the detail of the treaty text. It was the Soviet leader's preoccupation with avoiding ambiguities that the Americans later could use to challenge his position in Manchuria that prolonged the talks in August. Even after the American defeat of Japan and Truman's threat to intervene directly in the negotiations had led to Soviet entry into the war, Stalin still had to make several concessions to Song in order to get the treaty signed. The constraints of military power were as evident in the case of the Soviet Union in 1945 as they were to become in United States East Asian policy during the following decades. The Chinese delegation had internal problems of its own. The emphasis on treaty formalities rather than on political content, particularly visible

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on the Mongolian issue, was not only based on diplomatic techniques, but also on the political system represented by the Guomindang state. As during the Qing empire, individual officials were expected to take the political responsibility for unpopular decisions, even if they acted on direct orders from the supreme leader. Song Ziwen was therefore reluctant to sign what he knew would be a much-disliked agreement with the Soviets, and his changing negotiating strategies and his attitude of secrecy toward the other members of the delegation were, at least in part, based on this reluctance. Jiang Jieshi—and not his Moscow emissaries—made the decision to strike a deal with Stalin. Fearful of the CCP, Jiang concluded the agreement with the Soviets out of political expediency. Already by the summer of 1945 Jiang's regime was caught in a balancing act where it attempted to use international support in order to counterweigh the Communists' advances in territorial and military strength. A pact with Stalin was the only way Jiang could make use of the potential for monopolizing foreign assistance that the Great Powers had given him through the Yalta accords. As the Hitler-Stalin pact six years earlier had been directed in part against revolutionary political change in Europe, so was the Jiang-Stalin pact intended to forestall revolutionary change in China. These leaders all shared the belief that leftist political movements were unable to gain power if not assisted by Moscow. In his Yan'an headquarters, Mao Zedong was asking himself if that assumption was right.

THREE

The Seventh Party Congress and the Origins of CCP Foreign Policy

When the delegates entered the dusty and cold assembly hall in Yan'an on April 23, 1945, for the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, they knew that their party had reached a level of political and military strength unprecedented in its twenty-four-year history. 1 This congress, which the CCP refers to as QiDa, was preceded by a 4 0 percent increase in membership, and a more than doubling of the size of the party's armies compared to a year before. 2 Geographically, CCP units had expanded further into areas behind the Japanese lines in North China, particularly in Hebei and Shandong provinces, and filled the political vacuum created by the Japanese rout of GMD forces in areas north and south of the Yangzi River. For a revolutionary movement that only a few years before had been reduced almost to extinction by the attacks of its Japanese and Guomindang enemies, the Seventh Congress celebrated the peak of a series of remarkable successes. 3 The congress also marks a watershed in CCP foreign affairs. Mao Zedong, the party's leader since the late 1930s, had up to 1944 placed little emphasis on foreign policy, or on efforts to achieve foreign support. However, the CCP's territorial expansions and the increasing American and Soviet attention to the war in China during 1944 led

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Mao to change his conclusions. By the spring of 1945 the chairman had decided that the Great Powers would have a decisive influence on future Chinese politics, and that his party now might get foreign aid. Mao therefore became increasingly preoccupied with developing his analysis of and his policy on foreign affairs in the period leading up to the April meeting. At the Seventh Congress—the first such gathering since 1928—Mao devoted many of his secret speeches to discussing Soviet and American influence on Chinese politics and the possible cooperation between the CCP and the Great Powers. His thinking on foreign policy was closely related to his desire to avoid a full-scale civil war in China. Mao n o w believed that the Soviet-American alliance would serve that end. The emergence of a CCP foreign policy in 1944-1945 came as a result of the party's domestic successes. The Communists had exploited the 1944 Japanese offensives against the Guomindang government to its advantage. Jiang's forces were unable to offer much military resistance to the Imperial Army, and the lack of cooperation that the GMD troops in retreat received from the local population symbolized the regime's political and administrative problems. The Communist armies could therefore benefit from penetrating the thin rear lines of the Japanese and thereby gain access to new areas. Once there they established themselves as symbols of national resistance to the invaders. 4 The second main reason for the growth in Communist strength was the centralization of party decisionmaking and the implementation of moderate reform policies in most CCP-held areas, both connected to the party rectification campaign that got underway in late 1942. Most historians have seen this campaign as a tool Mao Zedong used to weed out the last remaining resistance to his leadership from the associates of Wang Ming, many of w h o m had been educated in Moscow. Mao ordered leading CCP administrators and military commanders to be present in Yan'an for long periods of time, in several cases more than two years, to undergo rigorous investigation and political training. CCP cadre also carried out this campaign of "correcting the workstyle" (Zhengdun zuofeng or, abbreviated, Zheng feng) in the Communist-controlled base- and border-areas, often led by teams sent from Yan'an. Many local military commanders resented taking time from their dayto-day activities to study writings by Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Stalin. But the visits from Yan'an—often the first in many years—also gave the

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local cadre welcome opportunities to get direction on the policy for the immediate future. 5 In this the sixth and seventh year of the war of resistance against Japan, CCP cadre particularly wanted direction on how to carry out Yan'an's policy of a United Front with the Guomindang. Introduced at the beginning of the war, the United Front had proved to be an umbrella under which the civil war would continue, although in a more limited form. 6 Even though Mao in principle accepted the supremacy of the GMD government, he still insisted that the CCP had to retain its "independence and initiative," an attitude that squared badly with Jiang Jieshi's demand that the Communist armies had to be integrated into the National Army. From early 1941 on clashes between CCP units and government forces had become more frequent, but Yan'an still clung to the ideal of the United Front. Mao had found that the policies of unity were efficient weapons not only against the Japanese, but also against his domestic enemies. 7 Mao's thinking on the United Front was closely linked to the analysis of Chinese society that he propagated in his pamphlet "On New Democracy," originally issued in 1940. Here Mao had seen the Guomindang and the CCP as natural allies in serving the interests of the "awakened" bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. The interests of these classes, Mao said, were a capitalist, but government regulated industrial sector, and moderate land-reform. 8 The CCP would cooperate with the GMD, the representative of the bourgeois classes, to implement these policies during a period of "New Democracy." Mao insisted, however, that the political struggle within the United Front would continue in the period leading up to and during "New Democracy." According to the chairman, the party's tasks were to "expand and consolidate the left, help the central group to move forward and change its stand, and combat the tendency of capitulation from the right."9 This policy of unity and struggle benefited both Mao's tactical aim—an alliance with the Guomindang—and his strategic plans for a socialist revolution. Mao's analyses of international affairs tended to be almost mechanical reflections of his analyses of Chinese society. He had never been abroad, and up to 1944 his contacts with foreigners had been limited to Comintern representatives and incidental foreign visitors to Yan'an. Mao followed international events through reports specially prepared for him by the CCP news agency and by advisers like Zhou Enlai and

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Chen Boda, but his lack of understanding of international diplomacy prevented him from forming a consistent view of Great Power relations. However, the CCP leader never doubted his ability to construct his own comprehensive analysis of world events. 10 The origins of Communist foreign policy grew directly out of the analysis of Chinese society that accompanied the United Front. In Mao's understanding of world politics, the Soviet Union replaced the Communist party, and the imperialist powers, like the Guomindang, were divided in two groups: those who were allied with the Soviet Union, and those who opposed it. The same divisions could be found within the imperialist powers themselves, as a contradiction between "progressives" and "reactionaries." The U.S.-Soviet alliance therefore became meaningful to Mao as an international version of the United Front, where struggle and unity both were represented. 11 It was a problem for the Chinese Communists after 1941 that it was the United States and other imperialist powers—and not the Soviet Union—who were fighting their Japanese enemies. The CCP's contacts with the Americans developed slowly, both because of lack of official U.S. interest and the geographical remoteness of the main CCP-held areas, and because of a certain CCP wariness about the intentions of the Americans in China. Up to 1944 the main sources of contact in the base areas were through visiting American journalists, or chance encounters with U.S. military personnel. 12 Many local CCP units prided themselves of having rescued downed U.S. pilots behind the Japanese lines and thereby having contributed to the development of the international United Front. 13 In Chongqing, however, the cadre of the CCP Southern Bureau felt that most American representatives still wanted to hold the Communists at arm's length. During the height of the Zheng feng campaign, in early 1944, Mao and Zhou Enlai took the initiative to strengthen the party's international work. The party leadership had realized that one needed to bring more foreign visitors to Yan'an; the attempts at making contacts through Chongqing had not proved successful and, according to Zheng feng ideals, any sensitive issues had to be handled by the Center. Mao told the personnel in Chongqing to proceed carefully. Yan'an was worried that Chinese public opinion should suspect the party of setting up a separate state—or accuse the CCP of "betraying" the GMD government to foreigners. 14 Mao viewed the arrival of a U.S. military observer group, the socalled Dixie Mission, in Yan'an in the summer of 1944 as a major

Seventh Party Congress and CCP Foreign Policy 61 breakthrough in the party's efforts to attract military aid from the United States. The Americans were welcomed as heroes at the still fairly isolated Communist headquarters, and the CCP military commanders immediately started making plans for further cooperation. "This military cooperation will make subsequent cultural, political, and economic cooperation possible," Zhou Enlai wrote to one of his assistants. "With this channel established, future contacts will not be difficult. . . . The prospects for further cooperation are boundless." 1 5 The Communist press also heralded the arrival in early September of Patrick Hurley, the personal representative of President Roosevelt, as a sign of Washington's growing interest in the China theater. 16 This apparent breakthrough in CCP relations with the United States led the party's Central Committee to issue a general directive on foreign relations work, according to Chinese historian He Di the party's "first major foreign policy document." 1 7 In addition to streamlining the party routines for handling foreign contacts, the August 18 directive stated that FDR represented the "progressive forces" in the American government and that the CCP approved of the basic line in his China policy. This line the Central Committee identified as opposition to Japan, opposition to civil war, and support of democratic reforms. The Dixie Mission, the directive said, was a product of the CCP's successful application of the United Front policy on an international scale. As the United Front at home had strengthened the CCP, so would the international United Front contribute to the achievement of the party's war aims. 18 CCP policy with regard to the Soviet Union—the only long-standing foreign contact the party had—also started to change after 1941. From the early years of the party the leading Chinese Communists had been tending toward one of two main strategic vantage points in their view of international affairs. This difference in oudook, however, did not always run parallel to other dividing lines within the party. One vantage point, which could be termed "internationalist," had been shared by leaders as divergent on other issues as Wang Ming, the Chinese member of the Comintern Executive Committee, Bo Gu, the editor of Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily), and Zhou Enlai. To them, the Chinese revolution was a part of a global development where the international struggle between progressives and reactionaries would create the necessary preconditions for the CCP's political victory. 19 The other vantage point, which could be called "China- centered" and to which belonged (among others) Mao Zedong, Ren Bishi, and

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the "white area" strategist Liu Shaoqi, saw the Chinese revolution as first and foremost a product of the policies of the Chinese Communist Party. International support or opposition was important to this group, but the party's own policies were primary. 20 Those who held to the "China-centered" viewpoint were no less admiring of the Soviet Union, nor less interested in Soviet assistance, than the "internationalists." Mao and Liu were, however, primarily preoccupied with the effect international affairs had on China, and Soviet knowledge of this attitude made it more difficult for them to mobilize support in Moscow when confronting rivals who came from the opposite vantage point. 21 Mao had therefore not had Stalin's sympathy in his battle with Wang Ming for the leadership of the CCP in the mid-1930s. Wang, on the other hand, had tried to use his Comintern connections to defeat Mao, failed in getting the Soviets to intervene decisively, and lost his bid for party leadership. From 1937-38 Mao was in control of the party, and he soon got Moscow's blessing for the position. It is unlikely, however, that the struggle with Wang Ming had built much good will toward Mao among the Soviet leaders. 22 Mao's "China-centered" approach led to a series of political disagreements with Moscow in the early 1940s. When major fighting broke out between Guomindang troops and the Communist New Fourth Army in Anhui in early 1941, Mao Zedong asked the Soviets to halt their military supplies to the Chinese government. Stalin, determined to contain Japan through support of Jiang Jieshi, continued the weapons shipments, and demanded that the CCP not take any offensive action against the government. Another difference of opinion developed over the question of CCP strategy after the German attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviets wanted the Chinese Communist forces to attack the Japanese positions along the Mongolian border, but Mao, fearing military disaster, ignored the requests from Moscow. 23 There is no evidence of any significant Soviet material support for the CCP during the Chinese war against Japan. One Chinese historian describes the total amount of assistance as three to five planeloads of blankets and medicine. 24 Moscow did not allow Chinese Communist guerrillas to retreat into the Soviet Union, nor did they allow the party to organize among Chinese living on the Soviet side of the border. The Chinese armed groups, which had taken refuge in the Soviet Far East in the 1930s after the Japanese drove them out of Manchuria, were a particularly divisive issue. Instead of letting these troops establish, or in some cases reestablish, a relationship with the CCP, Stalin organized

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them as Red Army military units and inducted their leaders into the Soviet Communist Party. 25 Even though Mao had his differences with the Soviets in the early 1940s the charge by some historians that the chairman constructed the zheng feng campaign to combat Moscow's political and strategic viewpoints is not convincing. On the contrary, Mao's political dominance enabled him to take over some of the "internationalists' " preoccupation with foreign affairs, but basing it on how Soviet or other foreign aid could assist the CCP's political struggle in China. In addition, Mao intended the centralized organizational model that he propagated in the campaign to let Yan'an cooperate closely with domestic or foreign allies without endangering party unity. 26 The CCP leaders' feeling that the Soviet-American alliance would work to their advantage was stronger than ever in the fall of 1944. As a Yan'an spokesman put it in mid-September, the whole world situation went in the direction of cooperation against common enemies and to rebuild those countries destroyed by aggression. This global tendency would also influence the coming talks between the CCP and the Guomindang. Dong Biwu, temporarily responsible for liaison with Chongqing, stated in an internal report that "the international situation is extremely favorable for China." He expected the United States to put pressure on Jiang to reach an agreement with Yan'an in order to better resist Japan. The CCP should use the U.S. position to demand that Jiang leam politically and not just militarily from the United States, for instance on the question of an elected national assembly. Yan'an should also intensify the party's own efforts to cooperate with the Americans. 27 Zhou Enlai—an "internationalist" w h o had cooperated closely with Mao since the late 1930s—now worked within the party to promote the perspectives for American assistance. In a speech in one of the CCP base areas in early October, Zhou first listed the GMD armies that were used to blockade Communist areas rather than to fight the Japanese. He then asked angrily whether or not "all of them [are] equipped with American guns and artillery, even tanks?" Yes, Zhou said, the Americans were supplying the GMD. But his ire was directed against the Jiang regime, not against their U.S. suppliers. The GMD, Zhou said, was misusing American aid, and the Americans were discovering it. Based on talks with Hurley, he was hopeful that some of the future aid would go to the CCP instead of to Chongqing. 28 As part of its American policy, the CCP in November sought to have President Roosevelt's envoy, the erratic Patrick Hurley, mediate be-

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tween Yan'an and Chongqing. On Zhou Enlai's advice, Mao received Hurley in Yan'an and accepted the American ambassador's five-point plan for government reforms. When Hurley later in Chongqing—under pressure from the generalissimo—agreed to amend the plan, Mao was furious. "The approbation of the world will do us little good if we submit to being tied hand and foot by the generalissimo," Mao told the Americans in Yan'an. "We will yield no further," he shouted. 29 Mao's anger did not diminish when Hurley—claiming that the CCP leadership had tricked him into an intolerable position for a mediator— vetoed OSS and Army plans for military cooperation with Yan'an. Mao had been overjoyed at these plans, which had been discussed directly between Yan'an and the U.S. Army headquarters in China parallel with Hurley's abortive efforts at negotiating. After learning that Hurley had even purged the U.S. personnel supposing military cooperation with the CCP, the chairman complained to Zhou about American duplicity and Hurley's personal untrustworthiness. 30 In spite of their private misgivings, the CCP leaders took care not to publicly identify the United States with the Guomindang. Mao told the U.S. observer group that even "if the United States does not give us one rifle or one round of ammunition, we shall still be friends of the United States." During new negotiations in Chongqing in late January 1945, Zhou Enlai still hoped American pressure could eventually be brought to bear on Jiang Jieshi to form a coalition government. Zhou's wellknown attempt at getting an invitation for Mao to go to Washington was one of his initiatives for keeping up the momentum of U.S.-CCP contacts. 31 Zhou felt that some new CCP concessions, particularly on the question of unifying the army, would be powerful signals to the Americans that Yan'an was serious about getting an agreement with the government. Mao Zedong, however, said no. To him, the acceptance of any of the Guomindang demands for the CCP to give up control of its armies was both dangerous and unlikely to produce any positive steps from Jiang or Hurley. The political settlement had to come first, Mao insisted. 32 Mao elaborated on how the international situation influenced his views in a telegram to Zhou on February 3. The Yalta conference, Mao said, indicated an even closer alliance between the three allied Great Powers. In addition, "the Red Army is approaching Berlin, and the irresistible force of peoples and progressive parties in all countries is invigorated." The victory over Germany would probably mean an in-

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crease in Soviet participation in East Asian affairs. When the Soviets became more active, Mao predicted, "the Americans and Jiang will be eager to reach a political compromise with us." For Mao, there was therefore no need to rush into a disadvantageous agreement with the government. 33 The hope for Soviet support had always been an element in the strategic thinking of the CCP leaders. With the war in Europe ending, the prospects for such support in the near future soared. Like the government in Chongqing, Yan'an did not doubt that Stalin had decided to attack Japan after Germany's defeat. The questions in early 1945 was when the Soviets would attack, and what effects the expectation of Soviet entry would have on the Chinese political situation. In a telegram to the CCP chief negotiator in Chongqing, Wang Ruofei, the Central Committee stated that the party's negotiating strategy depended on an estimate of when the Soviet Union was likely to enter the war. 34 The hope for Soviet support did not crowd out the CCP's interest in developing the relations with the Americans. First of all, Mao in January 1945 still believed that the war against Japan could last as long as two years. In this period the United States would have a major influence on Chinese politics. Second, in spite of the "important disputes" that the CCP observed among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in the period after the Yalta conference, the Chinese Communist leaders concluded that the Great Powers would continue to cooperate long into the postwar period. 35 In early 1945 this belief in a lasting Great Power alliance was a fundamental part of Mao Zedong's perception of international relations and their effects on China. In a major speech at the party school in Yan'an on February 15, probably intended as a rehearsal of his arguments before the upcoming party congress, Mao argued that "the most important international question today" was "whether or not the alliance between the Great Powers is strong enough to complete the defeat of the enemy." He espoused the view that the alliance would hold throughout the war, and after the war ended. Mao's certainty was built on three premises. First of all, the "common m a n " in all countries demanded peace. Second, the Soviet Union was now "the main force" on the international scene. It had more troops in Europe than the Western Great Powers put together, and it would exert great influence on all major issues. Because a powerful Soviet Union favored peace, international conflicts would be unlikely. 36 The chairman saw the establishment of a second front in Europe as

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definite proof that the American government wanted to continue its alliance with the Soviet Union. Both the Americans and the Soviets realized that without the alliance there could be no victory in Europe or in the Pacific. Mao concluded that Roosevelt's reelection was in part due to a large American worker's movement that demanded a continued alliance with the Soviet Union against fascism. 37 In a circular to high-level party cadre in mid-March, the Central Committee drew on examples from Europe to guess what U.S. policy in China would be. The regimes created by the Allies in liberated Europe were democratic in nature, the Central Committee said, and these regimes would serve as models for post-liberation Asia and China. The United States realized that if the Soviet Union did not participate in solving the "Pacific questions," there would be absolutely no stable solution. If the "prestige" of the Communist Party was high enough, the United States would also certainly prevent Jiang from starting a civil war. 3 8 The "prestige" of the CCP meant primarily its perceived efficiency in fighting the Japanese and, by extension, the ability of its armed forces to occupy and hold territory in preparation for Allied landings. Looking at the war in the Pacific, and at the strategy the Allies had chosen in Europe, the CCP leadership expected U.S. forces to land soon somewhere along the China coast. "The landing of U.S. troops is inevitable," the Central Committee told its North China bureau in late February. The bureau should prepare to receive the Americans along the Hebei and Shandong coasts, or even in the Northeast. 39 Mao hoped that these landings would bring to an end the U.S. policy of exclusive military aid to the GMD, and open the possibilities for field cooperation between American and CCP units in the coastal areas. 40 As James Reardon-Anderson has shown, the CCP strategy of meeting the Americans at the coast turned out a failure. Mao had misread Washington's intentions, and did not know that the president in November had decided against China landings as part of the overall U.S. strategy. Moreover, Yan'an had difficulties getting local commanders to mobilize their forces for campaigns which, in the local military perspective, seemed both pointless and extremely hazardous. Typically, internal CCP pamphlets from February and March did not mention the potential link-up with the Americans at all. Instead, they emphasized that "only the strengthening of democratic power [i.e., more CCPcontrolled areas] can fulfill the purpose of organizing the coalition government." The party's forces would push on to the coast in order to

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liberate the people in this region from the Japanese, and demonstrate that the Communists could throw out the invaders, even if, as one pamphlet said, the party had no navy. 41 The Japanese and Guomindang resistance to the CCP advances led to heavy losses among Communist troops, even though the party did expand its control in some areas, particularly south of the Yangzi. In Fujian, for example, where the Communists had hoped to occupy several new districts, the local party leadership deplored the loss of men and equipment, and viewed the spring 1945 campaigns as outright failures. Ceng Jingbing, the head of the CCP Fujian Party Committee, hoped that developments in the international situation would make up for their losses. In early May he thought that the Soviet Union would likely enter the war against Japan soon. Ceng believed that the Soviet entry would be an advantage for the party, but it could also lead to an increase both in Japanese resistance and in the efforts of "international reactionary forces" to sabotage the CCP's position. To Ceng—a local commander in South China far from the areas of operation of the Red Army—the hope of a Soviet intervention can only have brought limited comfort. 42 The CCP leadership scrutinized U.S. China policy in the spring of 1945 in order to explain the American refusal to aid the Communist forces. Mao attempted to understand American policy in terms of a conflict between progressive and reactionary elements, and his analysis of the international situation indicated that the progressive elements were ascendant. It was therefore puzzling to him and to the other main CCP leaders that U.S. policy in China seemed to become increasingly anti-Communist. After the Americans halted the talks on military cooperation with the CCP in December, U.S. supplies to the Chinese government forces increased substantially, in spite of the standstill in CCP-GMD negotiations. Zhou Enlai returned from Chongqing in February convinced that Ambassador Hurley was behind these developments, and that the ambassador considered himself an enemy of the Chinese Communists. "What can one do with a country whose ambassador can pledge his word and put his signature to it and then repudiate his promises a few weeks later?" Zhou plaintively asked some of the Western residents in Yan'an. 4 3 Mao and Zhou expected that Hurley's return to the United States for consultations in March would show whether the ambassador's policies had the president's backing. Mao was discouraged over Hurley's press statement in Washington on April 2, where the ambassador bombasti-

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cally supported further aid to Jiang Jieshi and opposed any U.S. assistance to the CCP. Mao hoped, however, that the unofficial form of the statement meant that it was not cleared with the White House. FDR's sudden death on April 12—and the return of Hurley to new feuds with his embassy staff—increased Yan'an's uncertainty over where American policy was leading. 44 This uncertainty about American policies made it more important than ever for the CCP to grasp Soviet intentions. In the regions where CCP units were already fighting GMD forces, local commanders hoped that Soviet support for the Communists could weigh up American assistance to the GMD. In early May Ceng Jingbing feared that U.S. aid to China had changed into aid to the reactionary forces of the GMD government "because after the Soviet Union entered Berlin the struggles within the anti-fascist camp have intensified." 4 5 If American policy was moving toward the right, Yan'an concluded, it was all the more important for the party to get support from the Soviets when the Red Army entered China. A whole issue of a magazine distributed to CCP military units in late March was dedicated to information about the Red Army, explaining its strategies and equipment. The magazine also repeatedly told its readers about h o w the behavior and aims of the Soviet army differed from those of the former tsarist armies. Yan'an told its soldiers that this was a new army, a "red army," and that they should not regard the Soviets as foreigners but as the forces of all laboring people. 46 The leadership in Yan'an also discussed how they could use the new diplomatic power of the Soviet Union for their purposes. After the Soviet victories in Europe, and as the Red Army joined the winning alliance against Japan, Moscow would get a significant say in all future questions concerning China. The party leaders now asked themselves what role Moscow intended the CCP to play in Soviet China policy. Mao knew very well that Stalin wanted the CCP to ally with the GMD against Japan—a policy Mao accepted in principle, even if he felt that the Soviets sometimes wanted his party to go too far to achieve unity. But what if Jiang launched a full-scale attack on the CCP—with or without U.S. support? Could Stalin do anything to help? Mao Zedong addressed the delegates of the Seventh Congress already before the meeting was officially opened. For him, as for everybody else in the hall, the convening of this congress symbolized not only the CCP's external successes, but also the victory of Mao over his rivals

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within the party. Even though he as usual spoke in an informal tone, the chairman was well aware of the importance of his statements and structured his speech carefully. In brief remarks he summed up the twenty-four years of party history, showing how the "correct" line— his own—had in the end saved the party from a legacy of failures and pointed it to victory. Now, Mao said, that victory was within reach. The Communist Party had just taken over from the Guomindang as the new driving force in Chinese history. In this sense, Mao argued, 1945 was the culmination not only of the war of resistance against Japan, but of a hundred years of social and political development. 47 Some days later, in a report to a closed session of the congress, Mao spent most of his time analyzing the international situation. There was no question that the Soviet Union was on the CCP's side, the chairman said, but the party's relations with other governments was still one of "both unity and struggle." Less optimistic than two months earlier, Mao pointed to recent Allied support for the Right in the Greek civil war and warned that reactionary elements were powerful abroad. But he went on to emphasize that according to reports received in Yan'an the major powers were still intent on continuing the policy of alliance. The reactionaries were in a minority everywhere, Mao explained, but the party needed to be vigilant in dealing with foreigners. "Sometimes," Mao said, "they act toward leading cadre as if they were bringing gifts from heaven." Still, the potential for unity was there, particularly with regard to the United States. The late President Roosevelt could be compared to Sun Zhongshan as a harbinger of progressive developments—and the CCP should still hope to cooperate with the United States against Japan. 4 8 In his official political report to the congress, entitled "On Coalition Government," Mao was both vaguer and less cautious in his description of foreign affairs. In this document, which was intended as the main public statement of the meeting, Mao iterated his expectations for global peace after the end of the war and praised the Great Power alliance. The purposes of CCP foreign policy, the report said, was to defeat the Japanese and Chinese fascists, to avoid civil war, and to form a broad coalition government. The party welcomed all foreign aid that would contribute to these purposes. Mao demanded that the Guomindang government end its "hostile attitude" to the Soviet Union, and reminded Chongqing of Soviet support for China in 1924, when Moscow denounced all "unequal treaties," and in the beginning of the war against Japan, w h e n the Soviets assisted China with material support.

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While repeating his belief that there could be no solution to the Pacific conflict without Soviet participation, Mao also thanked the United States, in particular, for its help to China over the last four years. The praise for America was, however, followed by a warning. The CCP would not tolerate foreign interference "which went against the interests of the Chinese people." In conclusion Mao cited the positive precedent the United States had set for other colonial powers when it granted independence to the Philippines. He also quoted FDR, saying that "the world has already become smaller." As an example, Mao said, "the Chinese people feel that the American people, who before were thought of as living in a distant place, now have become a close neighbor." 4 9 Mao's awareness of American economic power strongly influenced his view of the U.S. role in China. Both in the opening speech and in the secret concluding report at the congress the chairman spoke at length about the position of the United States in the postwar world economy. Generally "capitalism is in decline," Mao said, "in continental Europe capitalism has fallen, in Japan capitalism has fallen, in Great Britain capitalism has fallen." Only "U.S. capitalism is still rising; its production during the world war went through . . . the greatest development in its history. . . . But does this mean that U.S. capitalism will live forever . . . so that there is no room for Marxism in the world?" Not so, Mao said. "The U.S. crisis will come very soon." But the chairman told his audience that as long as its economy was still strong the United States would play a significant role in China, both financially and politically.50 After Mao's speeches the congress got down to work. Three main tasks were on the agenda: to centralize party organization, to review past mistakes and formulate new policies, and to complete the victory of the chairman and his associates by inscribing Mao's thinking as part of the party's constitution. All of these tasks had profound influence on CCP foreign policy and the way it was conducted. Mao hoped to avoid confusion and delays in executing Yan'an's decisions when foreign forces joined the war in China. He could achieve this aim through strengthening party discipline, improving inner party lines of communication, and implementing a policy of referring all foreign affairs questions to Yan'an for decision." The main instrument for criticism of Mao's former rivals for power in the CCP was the "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions." This resolution—drafted by the chairman's young protégé Hu Qiaomu and

Seventh Party Congress and CCP Foreign Policy 71 passed at a Central Committee meeting just before the congress—was first and foremost a condemnation of the "left-wing" mistakes of Wang Ming and his followers during the 1930s. Many of the speeches at the congress dealt with this resolution. Zhou Enlai, for instance, who had been close to Wang in the mid-1930s, used almost all of his main speech to condemn the "left" line and praise Mao Zedong and "New Democracy." 52 Mao did not, however, intend the resolution as an implicit criticism of Wang's Comintern supporters. It rather stood as a warning against party leaders attempting to use "external connections" to further their views within the party. Mao and his advisers thought this lesson relevant to the party's immediate future. 53 On the issue of the domestic policies sanctioned at QiDa, Shum KuiKwong and others have recently argued convincingly that their theme was moderation, not revolutionary mobilization. As Shum points out, the "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions" links the ascendance of Mao Zedong to the development of the concept of "New Democracy." Under "New Democracy" the party's task was to "protect the well-to-do middle peasants, provide certain economic opportunities to the rich peasants, and also enable the ordinary landlords to survive." 54 The official political report at the Seventh Congress, dealt with "New Democracy" in the urban areas, and stressed that "a certain degree of capitalism . . . benefits the proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie, and the former perhaps more. . . . Indeed, we have too little capitalism." 55 These social and economic policies were also reflected on the Communists' moderate attitude toward the GMD government. Here political theory and practical politics walked hand-in-hand. Mao made his theoretical analysis of China's actual stage of development and his assessment of how to best move the country from feudalism to capitalism serve his political purposes. The chairman had long realized that no revolutionary policies could be implemented if the party wanted to join in a coalition government with the Guomindang. Mao wanted his party to join such a coalition—just as the Soviet Union participated in an alliance of Great Powers. The internal speeches of Mao and other CCP leaders at QiDa show that the achievement of a coalition—and not a Communist military victory—was seen as the correct tactical aim at this stage of the revolution, even if Mao, in particular, often was much less sanguine about the potential for realizing this aim when not speaking in public. 56 Last, the Seventh Congress inscribed "Mao Zedong Thought" into the party constitution as having theoretical significance on par with the

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works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Among Communist parties this was an unheard-of claim; it bore the message that not only was it possible for an individual party to set its own political aims—something many of the parties had been doing since 1941 anyhow—but also that each party could develop its o w n basic understanding of society without sanction from Moscow. Equally important was the basis for this claim, which was the successful resistance against Japan and the creation of the idea of "New Democracy." By turning his past achievements and present aims into doctrine for Communist Party tactics at this stage of national development, Mao took a giant step toward establishing himself in the eyes of party members and sympathizers as the supreme authority on Marxist theory. 57 The increased Chinese Communist independence from Moscow was a main element in the decisions of the Seventh Congress. Not only did the congress complete the political defeat of a group that had tried to use Stalin's authority to force their way to the top of the party, it also completed the buildup of a party structure and of a theoretical foundation initiated within the party itself. This political process, which culminated in QiDa, had begun in the party several years before as a result of the need for organizational and political flexibility in the face of Guomindang and Japanese onslaughts. Not being dependent on an authority outside of the party when making basic decisions was an essential part of this flexibility. Mao and his associates did not, however, intend to break away from Moscow's general political line for Communist parties in capitalist or colonial countries. On the contrary, the CCP tactic of demanding a coalition government was basically consistent with Stalin's recommendations to other Communist parties. Judging from the text of the published report from the CCP congress, it is even likely that the party leadership adjusted the language to closely resemble the Moscow line. The ironic point is that the Seventh Congress, which instituted processes that removed most of the potential for foreign influence within the CCP, should come at a time w h e n Mao had decided that Soviet support might be forthcoming after all, and when Stalin's tactical recommendations for once fitted the plans of the CCP leadership. 58 In May 1945 Soviet and American forces defeated Germany, but the victory only worsened the relationship between the two allies. While the CCP congress was still in session, American newspapers began discussing the possible disintegration of the alliance, and the Soviet

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press intensified its criticism of U.S. and British decisions. The mounting Great Power tension in Europe shocked the CCP leadership. If the alliance broke down, then Soviet influence in East Asia would decline dramatically and Stalin might not join in the war against Japan. A crisis in Soviet-American relations would also make Jiang Jieshi less inclined to seek a negotiated solution to the CCP-GMD conflict, and improve his chances for U.S. aid in fighting the Communists. Already during the last weeks of the congress Mao pointed to the problems in the Great Power alliance to explain Jiang's increased belligerence against the Communists. As the Seventh Congress ended, the chairman became increasingly preoccupied with creating a more flexible foreign policy— a policy that placed less emphasis on Great Power cooperation as a condition for CCP success. 59 In his concluding speech to a closed session of the congress on May 30, the chairman again opened by reaffirming his belief in the likelihood of future Great Power cooperation. Quoting Stalin, Mao said that "Europe is entering a period of peace" and added that peace was also coming to other areas of the world. This peace, Mao said, depended on Soviet power. "In today's international politics the Soviet Union has the initiative," the chairman proclaimed. "Great Britain, the United States, and China all are passive." Internationally, as domestically, two forces struggled with each other. On one side was the Soviet Union and the "peoples of the world," on the other side were the reactionaries, who even in the United States and in Great Britain were a small minority. Even if the Western allies were to repudiate the Yalta agreement, Mao said, such a repudiation would not mean that the reactionary groups had won and would engage the Soviet Union in a third world war. "Believe in the strength of the Soviet Union. Believe in the strength of the peoples of the world," Mao admonished his audience. 60 The chairman went on, however, to point to Moscow's military power as the sole reason for the Soviet Union having the international "initiative." If it were not for the battles won, Mao said, the Soviet Union would never have gained the advantagous position it held in the summer of 1945. Mao then quoted Lenin on how wars always furthered the cause of revolution, adding that such would also be the case in China. The message was clear: Peace after the war, in China and internationally, was most likely, but in order to create peace one needed strength, military strength. The CCP could not give up its forces to get an agreement with Jiang Jieshi. On the contrary, the party had to continue to expand its forces and increase its territory. 61

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Mao decided to prepare for the possibility of a breakdown in the Great Power alliance through a series of measures, all sanctioned at high-level meetings during the last weeks of the Seventh Congress. In June the Central Committee warned its chief representative in Chongqing, Wang Ruofei, that Jiang might start a civil war, and that the CCP had to show the United States that the American unilateral support of Jiang Jieshi increased the chances for such a conflict. The Communists had to appeal to U.S. and world opinion through strong protests against the American arming of Jiang for civil war. Simultaneously the Liberation Daily printed a series of articles strongly attacking the present American position. In its public statement on the eighth anniversary of the war against Japan on July 7, the CCP Central Committee issued a strong warning to the American and British governments to recognize the strength of the people's forces or face the prospect of all-out civil war. 6 2 The Central Committee in mid-June also decided to press forward with the establishment of a representative assembly for all the CCPcontrolled areas. The preparations for this conference had begun well before the Seventh Congress. By convening the meeting in June, Mao intended to warn Jiang and the Americans that the CCP was capable of creating an alternative government if there was no settlement of the GMD-CCP conflict. The Central Committee also ordered an early scheduling of the conference in order to show "at home and abroad [our] determination to keep the people's areas under the people's control." 6 3 Lastly, Mao started the preparations for a CCP penetration of Manchuria in anticipation of a Soviet attack. This "northeastern strategy" was a response to the increasingly difficult military position of the CCP outside its main base areas. Mao understood that allying with the Soviets against Japan in Manchuria, invited or not, would be a powerful countermeasure to the U.S.-GMD alliance that was developing in South and Central China. In June 1945 Mao and the CCP military leadership still believed that the war against Japan would go on for another year. The basic policies of the GMD and the United States would not become clear until after the war was over—and long after the Soviets declared war on Japan. The Northeast could therefore become both a refuge and a negotiating asset for the CCP. 64 Yan'an's lack of certain information on Soviet plans was a major problem to the party leaders. Like all revolutionary parties, the CCP had to convince its supporters in order to mobilize them. It therefore also had to explain to its commanders and cadre what presumptions its

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policies were built on. In the summer of 1945 the party leadership admitted even to mid-level cadres that "we do not know what the Soviet Union will do," nor how U.S.-Soviet relations would develop in the immediate future. However, Yan'an told the cadres that international affairs had become more significant for China, and that they should study developments in Europe as an indication of what could happen in East Asia. The Soviet Union was trying to keep the alliance intact through appeals to U.S. public opinion, the Central Committee explained. 65 In July the CCP leadership watched as the negotiations between Song and Stalin in Moscow developed in a direction that shocked and dismayed them. Stalin was probably right that somebody kept Yan'an fairly well informed about the Moscow talks. That the negotiations took place was no surprise to the CCP; already when Jiang had consulted Soviet representatives in late 1944, Yan'an had received reports that the generalissimo was troubled by China's low international status, and that he was preparing to strengthen his relations with Moscow. 66 In the summer of 1945, however, what came out of Jiang's attempts would be of much greater importance to the CCP than it would have been nine months before. The Communist Party leaders believed that now, when the Americans seemed solidly behind Chongqing, only the Soviet Union could force the GMD regime to revoke its plans for civil war. After Song's return to China, Mao found out that Chongqing was close to signing a broad agreement with the Soviet Union. The agreement seemed not to include any provisions for a settlement of the Chinese domestic conflict. Shaken, Mao concluded that this treaty could be Jiang's final move before ordering an all-out attack on the CCP-held areas. On July 22 he wrote to Wang Shoudao and Wang Zhen that "Song Ziwen negotiated for ten days in Moscow without reaching a solution. After the three-power meeting [Potsdam] Song will return to the Soviet Union, probably to decide the Sino-Soviet friendship and alliance squabble. . . . Jiang Jieshi is willing to do anything to oppose the Communists. The danger of civil war is more acute than ever before." "Be prepared for military action," Mao concluded. 67 The last three weeks before the collapse of Japan was for the CCP filled with preparations for a total military conflict with the government. Mao realized that his predictions had failed, and acting on his orders, local military units made themselves ready for fighting the National Army. In what might be described as the most decisive coincidence in the whole span of the GMD-CCP conflict, the CCP armies

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therefore found themselves ready to go on the offensive when Tokyo accepted defeat in the second week of August. On August 11 the Central Committee radioed all CCP local party headquarters that "the Soviet Union has entered the war, Japan has capitulated, and civil war is approaching." 6 8 In the year leading up to the Seventh Congress Mao Zedong had made strong efforts to offset the advantages the GMD government possessed through its international status. Basically these CCP efforts had concentrated on building a set of pragmatic alliances with different Chinese groups and with the Americans, all based on the premise that the U.S.Soviet alliance would continue for several years to come. Yan'an at first blamed the U.S. ambassador for the lack of success the party had in building its relationship with Washington in the winter of 1944-45. Up to May Yan'an was still convinced that the Americans would prevent Jiang from attacking the Communist bases, and therefore formed its political strategy on the existence of a long period of peace after the end of the war with Japan. In addition, Mao took heart in the belief that the increase in the military power of the Soviet Union would strengthen both the Great Power alliance and the possibilities for a coalition government in China. At QiDa this coalition strategy became the centerpiece of the party's domestic policies. But Mao himself did not dare to trust the analysis he had propagated to the congress. Events in Europe and the hardening attitude of Jiang Jieshi led the CCP leadership to conclude that the Communists had to increase their political pressure on the Americans and the GMD in order to avoid armed conflict. Getting nowhere with both Washington and Chongqing, Mao in July also realized that Stalin was willing to enter into a general alliance with Jiang. To Mao, the final round of the Moscow negotiations seemed to destroy the remaining fundaments of his own QiDa analysis. He threw the party into frantic preparations for civil war. 6 9

FOUR

The Race to Shenyang: Chinese Politics and the Soviet Occupation of the Northeast

When the first Soviet soldiers started crossing the Chinese-Mongolian frontier in the early morning of August 9, they knew little about what kind of resistance to expect from the Japanese forces. Field intelligence was scarce, and most of the attacking troops had only spent a few weeks in the Far East before the offensive began. Their deployment along the border had been completed two days earlier, and the invasion began less than two hours after the division commanders received the codeword molniia [lightning] from their headquarters. 1 Stalin and his generals had been making preparatory plans for an attack on Japan for over a year and had started moving troops from Europe to the Far East in mid-April, but by late July they had neither completed the military preparations nor taken a final decision on w h e n to attack. The planning seems to have assumed a target date in the latter half of August, which Stalin then moved forward by one to two weeks because of the American use of the atomic bomb and because of Washington's threat to intervene in the Sino-Soviet negotiations. After Marshal Vasilevski, commander of the Far Eastern Headquarters, got his orders from Stalin in the evening of August 7, the marshal had to push his resources to the limit to be ready on time. The Soviet forces

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did not even have a chance to use preparatory artillery and air attacks, the usual accompaniments to offensive action. 2 To Stalin's apparent surprise, the main offensive was over in less than a week. The 1.5 million Soviet troops, attacking on three different fronts, overwhelmed Japanese units that had neither the strength nor the will to resist. Stalin had the operation continue until Soviet forces controlled all strategic points in the Northeast. His decision meant that sporadic fighting continued up to late August, even though Tokyo was ready to surrender only days after the invasion began. The Soviet leader ignored American displeasure at this war without enemy; to him the military control of Manchuria was a necessary complement to the treaty Wang and Molotov had signed on August 14.5 In Yan'an, already in frenzied preparation for civil war, the news of the Soviet offensive heightened activity even further. This was the moment the CCP had long been waiting for; the Soviets were in the war and their offensive had opened the Northeastern provinces to party military and political activity. Later memoirs describe the electrifying effect the news of the Soviet attack had: everybody seemed to be in a hurry to leave Yan'an. On horseback, riding on camels, or on foot, people were streaming out of the town toward their base areas or toward the Northeast. 4 The apparent Soviet wish to sign an agreement with Jiang Jieshi had n o w become of less importance to the Communists. Yan'an did not see the Moscow negotiations as an obstacle to Mao's Northeastern strategy. The CCP leaders may have thought that the Soviet attack meant that Stalin had decided against an alliance with Jiang—what would be the use of such an alliance to Moscow after the Soviets had taken control of Manchuria? Under any circumstance, the ongoing Sino-Soviet diplomatic negotiations increased the need for the CCP to liaise directly with Moscow and to form working relations with the Soviet forces in the field. As Mao said in his telegram of congratulations to Stalin on August 9, "A hundred million people in China's liberated areas" were ready to cooperate with the Red Army. 5 The next morning the Central Committee gave brief instructions to all party organs to go on the offensive. The Soviet Union has attacked and the Japanese continue to resist, the Central Committee said. In this "historic m o m e n t " the party should "quickly expand the liberated areas" and "take over cities." Later that day and throughout the night of August 11, after Yan'an learned that Japan was capitulating, the CCP

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headquarters sent a series of military orders to units in different parts of the country. The orders detailed the party's plans for expansion by pointing to areas where CCP units should disarm and accept the surrender of Japanese and puppet troops. These areas included some of the populous districts in Central China and the urban centers in the north. But the most coveted prize was the Northeast. Yan'an ordered all units without vital tasks in Shanxi, Hebei, and Shandong provinces to start marching toward the Northeast immediately. 6 Local party cadres now learned that the end of the war against Japan had not alleviated the risk of civil war in China. In a circular Mao explained that "the GMD is energetically preparing to reoccupy our liberated areas and capture the fruits of the victory against Japan." The generalissimo was already moving his armies toward the CCP bases, and the government would also use Japanese and puppet troops in the attack. In case of an all-out attack, Mao ordered CCP units to concentrate and "give up spread-out guerrilla warfare." Some areas would have to be given up completely, particularly in South and Central China, but the party should compensate for these losses, the chairman said, by strengthening work in the cities.7 Mao was still caught between his QiDa predictions of cooperation and his observations over the last month, which told him to expect a GMD attack. "There is now a basis for talks," the circular said, and "Yan'an will temporarily soften its criticism of the Americans and the Guomindang" in order to promote negotiations. Local units should "continue to rescue U.S. personnel when in difficulties, be prepared to cooperate with the inland advance of U.S. forces where [this is] in the interest of both sides, [and] express friendliness toward the American people and the democratic faction in the U.S. government." Still, the circular warned, the danger of U.S. military intervention on the side of the GMD, which Mao had cautioned against last April, was not yet over, and the party had to be vigilant.8 "Vigilance" proved an unsatisfactory weapon against the challenges that foreign intervention posed to CCP strategy over the next few weeks. Jiang's government got almost immediate American backing for its order to all Japanese commanders outside Manchuria to lay down their arms only to representatives of the National Army. The Japanese, who now had every reason to cooperate with the governments they expected to be responsible for them as prisoners and evacuees, followed these orders to the letter. Since neither the National Army nor the Americans were present in the Japanese-held areas, the result was that

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the Imperial Army continued the war against the Communists much as before August 10. With a couple of exceptions, the CCP was therefore unable to take over any major city or center of communication during the weeks following the collapse of Japan. 9 Outmaneuvered by Jiang and his allies elsewhere, the Yan'an leadership focused their hopes on the Northeast. The signing of the SinoSoviet treaty, which Yan'an learned about on August 15, was therefore a dual disaster for the CCP. Not only did the treaty seem to preclude Soviet assistance in Manchuria, but Mao also saw it as the final indication that the Great Powers had freed Jiang's hands for civil war. As Zhou Enlai told Ivan Yeaton, the head of the U.S. observer mission in Yan'an, that afternoon, the CCP expected government forces to attack within days. Zhou appealed urgently to the Americans to stop aiding the Guomindang, or Washington would be responsible for the outbreak of civil war in China. 10 Though Zhou and the other Communist leaders blamed the Americans for Jiang's policies, the party also knew all too well that the Soviets shared the responsibility. Mao had told Moscow repeatedly that assistance to Jiang would lead to civil war. His warnings had gone unheeded. Now Stalin had signed a treaty pledging his assistance to the Guomindang government without even informing Yan'an. The CCP's relationship with Moscow had reached an all time low. 11 The day after Zhou made his appeal to Yeaton, messages started coming in from Moscow. In view of the dire straits the party was in, these telegrams contained both good and bad news for Yan'an. The Soviets indicated that there was, after all, an international understanding on the China issue. Moscow told Yan'an that the Americans, responding to Soviet pressure, would not let Jiang launch a civil war, and now instead supported the initiation of CCP-GMD negotiations in Chongqing. But at the same time the CCP learned that Stalin, in order to achieve these concessions, had had to guarantee that the Soviet forces that had invaded the Northeast would transfer the areas under their control solely to Jiang's government. Moscow also advised the CCP not to take any offensive military action that might upset the deal. 12 On getting the Soviet version of recent diplomatic events, Mao and the CCP leadership came around to welcome Stalin's initiatives, even though they continued to be unhappy with the political and military restraints the Soviets proposed. Still, compared with having to face the National Army and possibly the Americans in full-scale warfare, the

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Moscow solution seemed like an advantageous alternative. In a series of meetings of the Political Bureau, Mao defended the plan for negotiations with the GMD against some opposition, concluding that he himself should go to Chongqing to hold talks with Jiang Jieshi. "Peace can be obtained," the chairman said, because "the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain want peace, the people want peace, we want peace." n However, as in the negotiations the previous winter Mao was not willing to give up any of the CCP's military strength in order to reach a compromise with the GMD. When outlining the party's negotiating tactics at the Political Bureau meeting on August 23, Zhou Enlai, w h o in January had proposed such concessions, now supported Mao's position. Zhou said that the CCP needed both military strength and popular sympathy in order to obtain peace. "We are lighting for the initiative, to force Jiang to accept a compromise," Zhou said. "It is still necessary with one part talking and one part fighting."14 The talking began in Chongqing on August 29. Just after arrival, Mao explained to the CCP representatives in the capital—who had not yet been informed of the Soviet initiative—the "real" reasons for the Sino-Soviet treaty and the negotiations with Jiang. There were four reasons why the Soviet Union signed the treaty, Mao said. One was to strengthen the struggle against the Japanese fascists and the reactionary circles in the United States and Great Britain. Other reasons were to "avoid future anti-Soviet actions based on the border question," and to remove the general basis for anti-Soviet feelings. The fourth reason, Mao said, was to pave the way for "future Soviet help and assistance to the CCP. Although it is clear in the treaty that future Soviet assistance [is to go to] the National Government, [something which] appears to be unfavorable to the Communist Party, in fact in the future the Soviet Union will be even more active in supporting the CCP [and] in helping to found a democratic new China." Mao saw the very fact that GMD-CCP negotiations had started as proof that Stalin had pressed for such talks during the Moscow meetings. "I have come to Chongqing," the chairman said, "on the suggestion of the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union wishes that the GMD and the CCP [use this] opportunity to form a coalition [government]; such a government is not in full accordance with Soviet ideals, but good compared to the outbreak of a violent civil war." Mao had no doubt that the Soviets would facilitate the negotiations. So far, he said, he had no idea of what Ambassador Hurley might do. 15

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Mao's way of dealing with the Soviet intervention was to applaud privately and publicly those parts of Moscow's policy favorable to the CCP, while ignoring most of those that were harmful to the party. As long as the chairman thought that Stalin was able to deliver on the crucial issues of negotiations and U.S. nonintervention, Mao had no reason to risk any open criticism of the Soviets. In addition, Mao needed to allay the fears of CCP political and military units at the local level, where cadres viewed the Sino-Soviet treaty with surprise and suspicion. 16 The task of both explaining Soviet policy in positive terms and making clear when the party should ignore Moscow's wishes was particularly important on the issue of the Northeast. Mao, while limiting offensive action south of the Great Wall, had no intention of giving up the Northeastern strategy. As the negotiations in Chongqing opened, tens of thousands of CCP soldiers continued to march or sail for Manchuria. After their failure to expand south of the Wall, the Northeast was to serve both as an insurance policy and as negotiating trump for the Communists. 17 The Central Committee gave the background to Mao's strategy in a telegram to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei subbureau on August 29. "The Soviet Union accepted the restrictions in the Sino-Soviet treaty in order to safeguard peace in the Far East," the telegram said, "[and] must transfer the three Northeastern provinces to the Guomindang government and allow Guomindang army personnel to enter the Northeast. After our party and army entered the three Northeastern provinces, the Red Army could absolutely not agree [or] consult formally with us on our activities." 18 On the other hand, the Central Committee said, the Soviet army would show sympathy for and not interfere with those CCP activities that "do not directly affect the obligations of the Soviet Union's diplomatic treaties." Party units should therefore not ask the Red Army for permission or assistance when moving into the Northeast, and they should continue occupying strategic points as long as the Soviet commanders did not object. "But if the Red Army firmly opposes [us], we must give consideration to this," the Central Committee instructed. The GMD was not strong in the Northeast, and the Soviet troops were to remain for another three months. If the party acted correctly, it was in a good position to take control of the three provinces. 19 The first CCP forces that entered the Northeast did not have an easy time when they encountered Red Army units. Soviet officers told Zeng

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Kelin, who commanded some of these Chinese forces, that the Red Army had orders to disarm all "irregulars"—a category they took to include his men. "They took no notice of the quality of our army, but only feared that the GMD would say that they violated the Sino-Soviet treaty," Zeng complained. Language problems, as well as the contempt many Soviet officers showed toward the often nonuniformed and illequipped CCP units contributed to the general feeling of unease that Zeng and other CCP commanders had when meeting the Red Army for the first time. 20 Compared to the great efficiency with which the military offensive had been carried out, Soviet occupation policy in the Northeast during the first few weeks seems contradictory and aimless. In some instances the Red Army cooperated directly with Communist units, as in the takeover of the strategically important Shanhaiguan area. In other places the Soviet officers refused even to see the CCP commanders. Lack of planning, created in part by the rushed timetable for the attack, as well as the unexpected suddenness of the Japanese surrender, certainly contributed to this confusion. The appearance of battle trained "local partisans," w h o claimed to be Communists and who pledged full cooperation with the Red Army, presented the Soviet officers with some hard choices. 21 The further odyssey of Zeng Kelin's forces offers a telling example of the confusion in local Soviet policy in Manchuria during these first weeks of the Red Army occupation. After having occupied Shanhaiguan in cooperation with Soviet forces on August 29, Zeng's troops set out for Shenyang, the main city in Liaoning province, on trains they had taken over with the acquiescence of local Soviet commanders. When the CCP troops reached Shenyang on September 6, the Soviet commander in charge there at first refused them permission to enter the city. Only when Zeng tried to bluff his way through by insisting that Moscow had approved his mission, did the Red Army finally give in and allow his men to disembark. The CCP entry into Shenyang was a strange experience both to the soldiers and to the onlookers. On their way from the railway station the Communist troops at one point passed near a banner erected over one of the main streets stating that the mission of the Soviet armies was "to restore the three Northeastern provinces to the Guomindang Chinese Government." Armed mostly with Japanese weapons, the CCP soldiers wore civilian clothes with armbands saying—in Russian—"Eighth People's Revolutionary Army." On their caps they wore the blue and white

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insignia of the Guomindang. In spite of their ragtag appearance a U.S. intelligence agent described the CCP units as the best-disciplined Chinese troops he had ever seen. 22 Having arrived in Shenyang, the CCP cadre immediately set out to take over civil administration in the city, taking care to work closely with the Soviet authorities. On September 10, Zeng was ordered to appear at the Red Army headquarters. The Soviet officers first complained about the lack of insignia and even uniforms in CCP units. The Soviet commander. General Kovtun-Stankevich, then informed Zeng that Moscow in a reply to his inquiry had underlined that "the Soviet Union and the Chinese National Government have signed a treaty, stipulating that the National Government shall take over sovereignty in the Northeast." This, Moscow said, was an international question that could create problems with the United States and Great Britain if mishandled. "Return to your base area, and let us take care of this aspect," Kovtun-Stankevich told Zeng Kelin. 23 Zeng refused to obey Soviet orders without first consulting the party leadership. After another round of telegrams between Shenyang, Moscow, and the Soviet headquarters in Changchun, the Soviets decided to send a group of officers from Marshal Malinovskii's staff with Zeng to Yan'an to talk directly with the CCP leaders. Liu Shaoqi, in charge in Yan'an during the chairman's absence, gave his Soviet visitors a hearty welcome on September 14. This was, after all, the first time an official Soviet delegation had visited the CCP headquarters. But when the two sides sat down to talk after the initial pleasantries, their conversation must have been difficult. A Red Army colonel informed Liu that the Soviets would not insist that the CCP forces leave the Red Army occupied areas in the Northeast immediately, but party cadres would have to obey Soviet orders and agree to withdraw on Moscow's demand. To Yan'an, these demands doused hopes for direct assistance—but also provided some breathing space. Privately, Liu told Zeng that he had handled the Soviets well. 24 What led Stalin to give this concession to the CCP? It is obvious that the Chinese party was not among Stalin's favorites in the summer of 1945—not only had he just promised to aid the GMD against the Communists, but the CCP had also almost disappeared from Soviet propaganda. The party was neither included in listings in the Soviet press of successful foreign Communist parties, nor mentioned in the editorials celebrating the end of the war in Asia. Pravda did print the CCP Central Committee's statement at the beginning of the Chongqing

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talks—but then Moscow itself had taken the initiative to these negotiations. 25 Stalin still believed that he could control the policies of the Chinese Communists, and that their presence in Manchuria posed no immediate risk to his diplomacy. The CCP cadre in the Soviet occupied areas would follow Moscow's orders—and that included leaving these areas if Stalin so instructed. In the meantime, their presence could come in handy in case relations with the GMD soured or if Manchuria became part of general negotiations between the Great Powers. 26 Since Stalin now found his forces in undisputed military control of all of the Chinese Northeast, he hoped to use this area in bargaining with Truman and the British about a global postwar settlement. At the Soviet-CCP meeting in Yan'an, Liu Shaoqi talked the Soviet representatives into taking some high level CCP cadres with them in the plane back to Shenyang. Liu argued that their presence in the Northeast would simplify contacts between the Red Army and CCP units. Peng Zhen and Chen Yun, both from the thirteen member CCP Political Bureau, were selected to lead the buildup of the Central Committee's Northeast Bureau in Shenyang. They had one night to prepare in Yan'an before departure. Initially, their main task was "to coordinate our and Soviet actions," Peng told Zeng Kelin before landing in Shenyang. 27 The new CCP leadership in the Northeast faced a full range of urgent tasks. Besides attempting to improve relations with the Soviets, Peng and his assistants had to find ways to unify the different groups of Chinese Communists now operating in Manchuria. Of these only those who had just come in from the south were under Yan'an's direct command. Of the others, some had been in the Soviet Union for years and had returned as Red Army units, while other small groups, primarily in the cities, had survived the Japanese occupation as an underground and were now starting to operate openly. The Northeast AntiJapanese United Army, as the Chinese in Soviet uniform called themselves, and the underground party cells had only weak ties with the Yan'an leadership, and the political experience of their members— having little knowledge of both rectification and the Seventh Congress—was vastly different from that of CCP members from south of the Great Wall. 28 The Soviets seem to have facilitated the integration of the Chinese units in the Red Army with regular CCP forces during late September and early October. Stalin may have believed that this influx of Soviet

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trained officers and men into the CCP army would make it easier to control the Chinese party. As he had told Zhou Baozhong, the commander of the Chinese Red Army units, in a telegram on August 12, "the task of the Soviet Red Army is to liberate the Northeast, your task is to reconstruct the Northeast." Stalin expected Zhou and the other former exiles to show gratitude toward the Soviet Union when "reconstructing" the country and the party. 29 For Yan'an and its local representatives the integration of the Red Army units with their own forces was a mixed blessing. On the one hand the well equipped Red Army troops were welcome additions to the CCP armies, particularly since they brought with them large amounts of captured Japanese weapons. On the other hand, however, these troops were not trained in the principles of CCP military strategy or in the political subtleties of Mao Zedong Thought. Command integration as well as the efficiency of field operations therefore turned out to be a constant headache for the CCP Manchurian leadership during the ne>rt few months—complicated further by the occasional Soviet insistence that former Red Army officers still owed special allegiance to Moscow. 30 In the northeastern cities—Shenyang, Harbin, Changchun, Jilin, and Dalian—the CCP cadres and troops who entered in early and midSeptember developed an ambivalent relationship with Soviet occupation authorities. The party cadres, acting on instructions from Yan'an, tried to make themselves as useful as possible to the Soviets by taking responsibility for implementing Red Army orders as ad hoc municipal administrations. The Soviet commanders rewarded the CCP cadres by recognizing their local governments in most cities—as useful alternatives to either former collaborators or GMD sympathizers. In contrast to the latter, the Communists had recently come in from the outside, and had few roots in the Manchurian cities. It was therefore easier for them to execute Soviet orders, which often tended to be unpopular with the local population. 31 Nonetheless, the brutal behavior of Soviet troops toward civilians during the initial period of the occupation of the Manchurian cities created a major problem for CCP propaganda efforts in the Northeast. The party was caught in a quandary. While it needed to win local confidence and thereby expand its power base before the GMD could enter in force, it also needed to get as much practical support as possible from the Soviet commanders. It was not shared ideology alone that made the CCP propagate the gratitude of all Chinese toward the Soviet

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"liberators." The CCP cadres knew that they needed "Older Brother's" permission to stay on in the cities—and they believed that the extension of this permission depended on how valuable the party's services were to the Red Army. The Chinese Communists found the rapes, murders, and robberies committed by Soviet soldiers politically inexplicable. But they also knew that the more the occupying forces were disliked by the population, the more the Soviets would have to depend on the CCP to assist in managing local affairs. 32 The degree and success of practical cooperation between the CCP and the Soviets differed from one city to another. In Harbin, in the far north, relations developed relatively smoothly, with a CCP administration firmly in place by early October. In Shenyang a Communistdominated local administration took over in late September, but it was often ignored by the Soviet authorities in spite of the presence of the CCP Northeastern Bureau in the city. CCP cadres complained of little direct contact with the Soviet commanding officers, and Peng Zhen told one Red Army general in late September that he felt that the Soviet headquarters had shown "a cold and detached attitude" toward the Central Committee representatives ever since their arrival. The Soviet officers, on their side, regarded the CCP as "uninvited guests" in Shenyang, but conceded that they found it easier to cooperate with the Communists than with any other group. A Soviet officer told a U.S. intelligence agent that the Red Army had to find some local organization to work with, and that it was not the job of the Soviet Union to guard the interests of the distant Guomindang against the nearby CCP in a Chinese domestic conflict. 33 In Dalian the CCP-Soviet relationship was particularly complicated because of the special status assigned the city by the Stalin-Jiang agreement. In late August Soviet authorities informed the leading local Communists, who had just emerged from prison or from hiding, that the Red Army would not allow them to operate openly in the city. The Soviets preferred instead to cooperate with the remnants of the old proJapanese authorities. The Red Army also prohibited the CCP from moving its armed units around on the peninsula without permission, and at one time even suspected the party of stealing weapons from Soviet-held depots outside Dalian. The Communists responded by hiding their party membership from the Soviets, by again preparing for underground work, and by concentrating their forces in areas such as Huludao and Yingkou where they found the Soviet commanders less hostile. 34

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In mid-September Moscow told Yan'an that the Red Army would withdraw in late November, as stipulated in the Soviet agreement with Jiang. The CCP thus had less than three months to prepare for a possible confrontation with the Guomindang over control of the Northeast. To strengthen the CCP presence and Yan'an's control of the Communist armies, the Central Committee ordered the party units in East and Central China to intensify the transfer of forces to the Northeast in late September and early October. Large numbers of these troops were shipped from the northern coast of Shandong to ports in eastern Manchuria. J S By early October these redeployments faced a new threat. Regiments from the U.S. Marine Corps occupied a number of ports in Hebei and Shandong provinces, and American Navy ships started patrolling in and around the Bohai Gulf, threatening to block further CCP troop movements to the Northeast. Luo Ronghuan, the commander of the Eight Route Army forces in Shandong, was well aware of how explosive this situation was. When crossing the Bohai Straits with the first group of CCP troops, Luo's own ship was stopped by a foreign navy patrol boat. Luo told his men that "maybe [it is] a Soviet patrol, maybe an American. If it is Soviet, simple, but in case it is an American patrol everybody should keep quiet and not be flustered." 3 6 Luo and his men were relieved when they discovered that it was a Soviet and not an American ship that had detained them. But—in a first-class illustration of the situation in Manchuria in mid-fall—when Luo's troops were brought in to the Dalian/Liishun area, the Soviets refused to let them disembark. "We can not but fulfill our orders," the commanding Soviet officer told Luo. "For reasons [connected to] foreign affairs, please change course. . . . You may land at any port outside Liishun and Dalian." In spite of their protests, Luo and his Shandong forces were escorted out of the harbor by Soviet ships. After a rough passage they landed at Pikou further north on the Liaoning coast, this time prepared to disperse and go underground immediately if Soviet troops tried to force them out. 5 7 Luckily for Luo Ronghuan and the tens of thousands of CCP soldiers w h o followed him from Shandong to the Northeast in October 1945, most of the northeastern countryside was not occupied by Soviet forces. The CCP could therefore start to organize rural base areas without much interference from the Soviets, using the same political program that had proved successful south of the Wall during the war against Japan. Here too moderate land reform, cooperation with influential

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local groups and leaders, and political and general education served to expand Communist power. Already during the early fall of 1945 the party was able to establish its control in a number of areas, mostly in eastern and northern Manchuria. 3 8 Both the establishment of base areas and the expansion of the CCP armies benefited from the breakdown in social and political authority that followed the Japanese capitulation. Japan had controlled the Northeast for more than a decade, and had succeeded in constructing a system of collaboration that was both efficient and relatively stable. Now, with Japan gone, large units of the collaborationist "Manchurian Army" as well as local militias tried to keep their forces intact and protect their influence. After some hesitation, the CCP leadership sanctioned the incorporation of some of these forces—largely unreconstructed—into the Communist armies, on the condition that the officers and men would have to submit to political training in the future. 3 9 The CCP armed forces in Manchuria in the fall of 1945 were composed of elements that had little in common. They came from different regions, had different political attitudes, and were shaped by different military training. The establishment of a military headquarters with Lin Biao as commanding general in late October did strengthen the coordination of CCP forces, but other problems, like the lack of equipment, continued to create both strategic difficulties and internal strife. 40 The CCP had taken over substantial amounts of Japanese weapons and supplies in late August and early September, and improved its equipment further when the Chinese Red Army units joined its forces. From mid-September, however, most Soviet commanders strengthened their control of Japanese armories in and around their occupation zones, and refused the CCP permission to take over equipment from these warehouses. For Communist units arriving from the south, this sharpening of Soviet control posed a substantial problem. CCP logistic planners had believed that the Red Army would make weapons and supplies available to the party's troops in the Northeast, and the arriving CCP forces were therefore equipped only with light weapons. On discovering the Soviet-controlled armories closed, the arriving cadres blamed Zeng Kelin and other commanders already in Manchuria for insufficient intelligence. Zeng, on his side, defended himself by decrying a change in Soviet attitudes. 41 Yan'an could not prevent some of its cadres from voicing their criticism of Soviet attitudes. In a well-known example, one local leader told a party conference that "Soviet policy can not be understood." Nie

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Rongzhen, the powerful military commander of the CCP Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area, told a cadre meeting in Zhangjiakou in early October that "our Party policy would not be bound by the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and China." The party leadership, however, believed that criticism of Moscow was harmful not only in its own attempts to get assistance from the Soviets but also to party morale. Yan'an did its best to interpret Soviet behavior positively. Its efforts met with mixed results. 42 In some areas of the Northeast, such as the coal- and iron-mining towns north of Shenyang, the local reaction to the Red Army's looting and violence made it impossible for the CCP to associate itself with the Soviets. Here CCP cadres did criticize the lack of discipline in the Red Army. One cadre remarked that the foreign troops were so preoccupied with enriching themselves that they did not care what the CCP did politically anyhow. In other places the Soviet behavior led to organized local resistance, which again placed the CCP in a difficult position. 43 Much of the local resistance in the Northeast was directed against CCP domination as well as against the Soviets. The CCP cadres rarely had any roots in the local communities, and found that they often had to compete for power with other organizations, such as secret societies, religious groups, or the militias of local strongmen. Some cadres complained that the local population thought the CCP had no power because of the Sino-Soviet treaty. Some, but in no way all, of the resistance groups associated themselves with the GMD. The CCP tried to make up for its political weakness by inviting Soviet support, portraying their opposition as "anti-Soviet bandits." 4 4 In the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, which had also been invaded by Soviet and Outer Mongolian forces, the CCP faced the problem of ethnic separatism. In areas under their control, the Soviet and Mongolian commanders allowed local pro-independence groups, like the Mongolian Youth Organization, to recruit and gain influence. Local CCP cadres, already worried by the elimination of Chinese influence in Outer Mongolia, asked Yan'an how to react. "Our party must be timely and cautious in dealing with Inner Mongolian politics," the Central Committee responded in late October. The best way to deal with the Mongolian separatists was to understand that historically Japanese and GMD oppression had stimulated the demand for independence. CCP forces should avoid interfering with local customs and laws, even if this meant giving up land reform and attempts at organizing the peasants.

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Above all the party cadres should be careful not to openly oppose the new Outer Mongolia republic. 45 The CCP also had to explain Soviet behavior to the informed public outside the party. To important audiences, such as the leaders of China's non-Communist opposition, the party tried to dissociate itself as much as possible from Soviet actions in the Northeast. Wang Ruofei told officials of the Democratic League in Chongqing on September 4 that the Soviet Union alone was responsible for events in Manchuria, and that there was no special connection between Yan'an and Moscow. In public, however, the party defended the Sino-Soviet treaty and criticized those sympathizers who, due to "temporary bewilderment," had made incorrect statements about the treaty. One should not concentrate narrowly on national losses, or on the apparent Soviet support for the GMD, but realize that the Soviet Union favored peace and democracy, one article said. "Noninterference will lead to peace." 4 6 The party followed up this rather lame "explanation" by more aggressive attempts at convincing intellectual sympathizers later in the fall. An article in Xin dazhong [New Wave], a left-wing magazine, confessed that even some CCP members could not understand Soviet motives, and thought that any support of Jiang was wrong. But precisely because Jiang was reactionary, the article claimed, the Soviet Union ought to sign treaties with him and thereby prevent him from "selling our nation. Is it not better to bind him, so that he can not become anti-Soviet?" Anyhow, the anonymous writer stated, Moscow had only intended its support for the GMD government to help China win the war against Japan. This part of the treaty was not applicable to the postwar situation. Countering criticism of Soviet neglect of the CCP, the article defiantly stated that "we need no Soviet assistance." The public should protest U.S. participation in the fighting in North China, "and should never hope that Russia would copy their actions." 47 The Soviet military intervention in the Northeast in the fall of 1945 was a mixed blessing for the Communist Party. It did open up the region to CCP activity, and, in some areas, it did lead to at least limited cooperation between the CCP and Soviet forces. It also kept the National Army out of Manchuria, at least temporarily. For all these reasons, the CCP leaders welcomed the Red Army occupation. On the other hand, Soviet policies also created some grave difficulties for the Chinese Communists. The Sino-Soviet treaty made public the international isolation of the party, and gave rise to fears not only of a GMD

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attack but also of U.S. and Soviet support for the GMD in a civil war. The treaty and subsequent Soviet behavior in the Northeast also posed a public opinion problem for the party, especially in urban areas. Still, Yan'an had little choice but to continue its public support both for Soviet policies and for the treaty, and hope that the Red Army would continue to tolerate CCP organizations in its occupation zones. To Jiang Jieshi the sudden end to the war also presented both possibilities and dangers. As the Japanese empire collapsed, Jiang had secured the treaty with Moscow that could make the unification of China under his leadership the ultimate victory in this season of victories. Jiang had been fighting foreign and domestic threats to his regime for more than twenty years, but had never been closer to overcoming them. The loose end remaining in Jiang's diplomacy in mid-August was the American thread. The Chinese leader did not doubt that the Truman administration would continue to support his regime. But just how far was Washington willing to go in providing military and economic assistance? With the war ended and his treaty with Stalin signed, Jiang had decided the time was right to send Song Ziwen from Moscow to Washington to get specific promises for assistance. As it turned out, Jiang's timing was right, although not for the reasons he had thought. President Truman, sensitive to the growing competition with the Soviet Union for the friendship of the Chinese government, gave Song wide assurances of further American support, including military supplies and training. To Jiang Truman's attitude proved that postwar Soviet-American rivalry in China would be intense and that he could manipulate the suspicions between the Great Powers to his regime's advantage. 48 Contrary to what Mao thought, Jiang in mid-August felt that the Communists would have to come to terms with his government, and that he therefore could hold back on using military force. Stalin had informed Jiang after the Moscow negotiations that the Soviet Union had told the CCP to cooperate with the government, and Chongqing noted with satisfaction how Yan'an's public statements rapidly became more moderate during the week after the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty. On the eve of the Chongqing talks, Jiang believed that Mao almost certainly would sign a political agreement with the government, but that it could become difficult to force the different CCP military commanders to abide by the outcome of the negotiations. 49 The divisions that Jiang saw within the CCP reflected the situation

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within his own party. Already from the day Japan announced itself willing to surrender, some GMD officials had urged Jiang to strike at the CCP bases with the assistance of Japanese troops. The GMD right wing even worked out plans behind Jiang's back to attack the Communists in North China with the help of the Japanese. Only the generalissimo's insistence on negotiations hindered the outbreak of civil war during the weeks after the war against Japan ended. 50 Jiang had several reasons for preferring to bring Yan'an to submission through talks rather than through battles. China's international position would suffer if internal strife continued, making it more difficult to get U.S. economic aid. More important, such fighting might give generals and regional strongmen a degree of autonomy that Jiang was determined to avoid in postwar China. Talking with Yan'an would give Jiang time to prepare the takeover of the vast areas formerly held by the Japanese, and thereby make sure that the central government instituted its control from the very beginning. The slow movement of GMD troops after August 10 is striking compared to the explosion of activity directed from Yan'an. Jiang gambled that the presence of Japanese troops and the Soviet pressure for a negotiated settlement would deter Mao from launching a policy of military expansion. In a message to the Supreme Defense Council on August 29, Jiang ordered his generals not to rush forces to any part of China without adequate preparation, and to concentrate initially on liberating Shanghai and, in particular, Nanjing. 51 Jiang believed it vital to his plans to secure American logistical support before ordering any major movement of GMD troops to Central and North China. First of all, the Chinese government had almost no transport capacity of its own. Second, the use of U.S. military aircraft and navy ships would place the Americans squarely and publicly behind the Jiang regime, and therefore act as a further deterrent against any kind of armed domestic opposition. Already in his meeting with General Wedemeyer on August 11 Jiang pressed for such assistance, adding that the direct use of U.S. troops to temporarily occupy cities and communication centers in North China and along the coast would help prevent civil war. 52 Jiang seems to have taken it for granted that the almost immediate American willingness to transport GMD troops to the North would also include, in due time, transports to the Northeast. In combination with his deal with the Soviets, such assistance, Jiang believed, would guarantee a successful GMD takeover of Manchuria. The generalissimo

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therefore found no need to give the Northeast military priority in the weeks after the war ended. On the contrary, he warned his commanders that they should not allow the Communists to advance in the south while the government prepared its takeover of Manchuria, and instead reenter the Northeast methodically and over time. 53 In late August both Jiang and his main military advisers believed that the treaty with Stalin would hold. He Yingqin, the minister of war, told American friends that "the Sino-Russian Pact will be a great disappointment to the Communists." The foreign minister, Wang Shijie, noted in his diary that the treaty he had signed in Moscow had dramatically reduced the CCP's room for maneuver. With recent developments working to his advantage, Jiang instructed Wang before the minister left for the London Council of Foreign Minister's meeting in the first week of September not to let Sino-Soviet or GMD-CCP relations be placed on the agenda. 5 4 Soon, however, the generalissimo started doubting the motives of his Soviet partner. On September 6 he reminded himself in his diary that the Soviets had violated treaties before. Two days later, after learning about the joint CCP-Soviet takeover of Shanhaiguan, Jiang angrily noted that "Russia already sabotages the alliance." On September 12 he telegraphed to Song Ziwen in Washington that it was vital for the government to bring as many troops as possible to the Northeast that month. Song should make an urgent appeal to the Americans for transport. The next day Jiang suggested to Song that he should play up American worries that the Soviet Union was taking the place of Japan in Manchuria as a ploy to get Washington to land its own forces in China. 55 Meanwhile the government reoccupation of the provinces of Central China and the southern coast proceeded smoothly. Jiang and other Guomindang leaders had always admired the iron discipline of the Japanese army. Now—when the former occupiers delivered these rich provinces to the GMD without incident—Jiang understood that the remnants of the Imperial Army could be invaluable allies in the takeover of North China as well. Since Japanese and collaborationist troops in many cases had defended cities and towns for weeks on behalf of Chongqing, local surrenders often became less a change in regime than a merger of the old and the new. 5 6 Jiang's new mistrust of Stalin led Chongqing to speed up the process of forming a GMD administration for the Northeast. In mid-September the Northeast Headquarters of the Military Affairs Committee, led by

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General Xiong Shihui, started working in Chongqing. General Xiong, a native of Jiangsu province, was selected primarily to reward one of the GMD factions. Actual policymaking fell to his primary assistants, the economic adviser Zhang Jia'ao and Jiang Jingguo, the Foreign Ministry's representative. The younger Jiang, who had just returned from the Moscow negotiations, was still optimistic about the future of GMDSoviet relations. On the other hand, he told Song Ziwen, if relations with the Soviets were to break down the CCP was in a position to occupy the Northeast. 57 The Northeast Headquarters did not arrive in Changchun until October 13, more than a month after it was formed. In the meantime GMD-Soviet relations deteriorated further. Intelligence sources reported to Jiang that the Red Army had started cooperating with the CCP in several areas of the Northeast, and that Communist administrations were appearing in many towns and cities. The Foreign Ministry complained that it heard nothing from Moscow or from the Soviet ambassador concerning Manchuria. Then, on October 1, the day after U.S. Marines started landing on the North China coast. Ambassador Petrov informed Song Ziwen that the Soviet withdrawal would start immediately, and that the Red Army would be out of Manchuria before December 1. He also urged the Northeast Headquarters to come to Changchun to start talks on the arrangements concerning the withdrawal as soon as possible. 58 Sensing Soviet alarm over the sudden U.S. landings, Jiang decided to press Moscow for the right to land GMD troops in Dalian, the best port on the northeastern coast. In its request, the Foreign Ministry made it clear that the Chinese troops would be accompanied by U.S. personnel. After waiting in vain for an answer from Petrov, Jiang instructed Fu Bingchang to take the matter up with Stalin in Moscow. Stalin immediately said no. According to the Soviet interpretation of the August treaty, Dalian was not to be used as a military port. Moscow obviously was intent on blocking any Chinese armed parties from entering the former Russian concession. 59 When the members of the Northeast Headquarters finally arrived in Changchun they continued to press the Soviets for military access. At the first meeting with Marshal Malinovskii on October 16, General Xiong outlined plans to send in four GMD armies in early November, two by sea to Dalian and two through Shanhaiguan. Not commenting on Dalian, Malinovskii told the Chinese that he would not allow their main armies to enter any area before the Soviets had evacuated that

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area completely. He warned that the Red Army might not be able to help National Army advance troops enter eastern Manchuria, because the Soviets had few soldiers in that region. Finally, Malinovskii surprised his visitors by declaring that the Soviets regarded all Japanese owned or co-owned factories and other industrial installations in the Northeast as "war booty," the disposition of which was to be negotiated between the Soviet and the Chinese governments. 60 The Soviets continued to take a hard line in their talks with the GMD delegation. On October 21 their Changchun headquarters again flatly refused Chinese troops permission to land in Dalian. Later that same week Soviet military police searched the GMD party offices in Changchun and held some of the officials overnight. Malinovskii also turned down an urgent request from the Northeastern Headquarters to inspect the Soviet-held railway lines. 61 The events in the Northeast led to a policy debate in Chongqing in late October. Wang Shijie and Song Ziwen both had become disillusioned with the treaty they had negotiated, and recommended an official protest against Soviet behavior. However, in spite of suspicion of Stalin's motives, Jiang Jieshi convinced himself that he could still bring the Soviets to cooperate with the GMD. If he failed, his problems with the Communists would increase. After his meetings with Mao ended inconclusively on October 10, Jiang had decided to pass over negotiations in favor of using military pressure to force Communist acquiescence. He knew that he simply could not risk a break with Moscow while starting a military offensive against the CCP. Jiang thought that the deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations weakened Moscow in its Far Eastern policy. Stalin's inability to gain influence in Japan reduced the chance for Soviet intervention in Chinese politics, Jiang told his son. After a meeting with Petrov on October 25, where the ambassador complained at length about the potential "aggression" of American forces against the Northeast, Jiang was convinced that Moscow needed his cooperation as much as he needed Moscow's. Instead of a public protest, Jiang surprised his advisers by ordering all GMD branches in the Northeast to cease their activities immediately. After a new meeting with Malinovskii on the 29th, Jiang Jingguo reported to his father that in his opinion Soviet attitudes had started to change, and that the Soviets would cooperate in the GMD takeover of the Northeast. 62 A telegram from Stalin to Jiang Jieshi on November 1 seemed to support the optimism of the Jiang family. After receiving the telegram,

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the generalissimo told his son that Stalin wanted to cooperate because the Soviets were eager to keep what they already had got through the Moscow negotiations. The Soviets were in a tight spot diplomatically, both in China and in Europe, Jiang said, and were worried over their worsening relations with the United States. Jiang told General Xiong to inform Malinovskii that the more difficult entry into the Northeast proved to be for the National Army, the more Chongqing would have to depend on U.S. aid.6* The problem now for Jiang was to get the Americans to join in increasing the pressure on Moscow. In early November Jiang complained in his diary not only of "Russian plots" but even more about "the complexity and unwieldiness of American public opinion" and the inability of U.S. representatives in China to see "the weak points" of the Soviets and the CCP. Already the U.S. Navy had refused to land GMD forces in two CCP-held ports in eastern Manchuria. The GMD leader believed that the Soviets had deliberately handed the ports over to the Communists to prevent early landings by the National Army. Jiang saw "U.S. ambiguousness" on assistance for his forces in attacking the CCP in the Northeast as a sign that Washington might still wreck his plans by striking new agreements with the Soviets.64 Jiang Jieshi had by mid-November arrived at the point where the CCP leadership thought he had been three months earlier. He had taken a decision to launch a military offensive against the Communists, and the preparations for such an offensive were already well underway. Jiang also hoped his use of military force would put extra pressure on the Soviet Union to cooperate with the GMD during the Red Army's withdrawal from Manchuria. The Soviets feared the increasing U.S. power in Northeast Asia, Jiang thought, and would not allow its forces to be drawn into a conflict between the CCP and the U.S.-backed National Army. The generalissimo banked on the American military presence in North China to art as a veiled threat to the Red Army in the Northeast, even if he could not convince Washington to become a full partner in his new strategy. Again, Jiang's mastery of power politics made him look the winner of the game.

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Allies and Enemies: Mao, Jiang, and the U.S. Intervention in North China

The fall of 1945 was a time of decision in U.S. East Asian policy. Upset over Soviet policy in Europe, and over Stalin's unwillingness to accept the American position on Manchuria, the Truman administration acted to keep the Red Army out of Japan, and as far north on the Korean peninsula as possible.1 Washington also moved quickly to contain Soviet influence in China. But the American efforts there met with substantial problems. Its ally, the GMD government, believed less in confronting Moscow than in getting Soviet support to fight its enemy, the Chinese Communists. The CCP already occupied the strategic areas just south of Manchuria, and now resisted U.S. attempts to take over its positions. Finally, American policymakers soon encountered the limitations of U.S. military and logistic capabilities. As American commanders in China already realized in August 1945, the political will to influence events abroad and the practical leverage needed to effect one's wishes do not always square. The days following the Japanese surrender were chaotic for the American military staff in Chongqing. In late July General Albert Wedemeyer, commanding general of the American forces in China and chief of staff to Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi, had seen the threat of civil war as

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his main problem and had started making contingency plans to evacuate American personnel. On August 10, when radio reports announced the Japanese surrender, Wedemeyer suddenly faced the whole complex issue of U.S. involvement in postwar China. 2 Wedemeyer's first worry was that an administrative and social breakdown would take place in North and Central China if Chinese government forces were not brought in to disarm the Japanese and establish a new authority. Already on August 10 the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Wedemeyer the orders he had asked for and hoped for concerning the new task for his troops. "You will assist the Central Government in the rapid transport of Chinese Central Government forces to key areas in China." The Joint Chiefs also told Wedemeyer that "U.S. Pacific theater forces are preparing to secure control of key ports and communication points" in China as soon as possible. 3 As Marc Gallicchio has shown, the planning of this deployment had started well before the collapse of Japan and was, at least in part, connected to Washington's hopes of limiting Soviet influence in China after the war ended. In mid-July the War Department and General Marshall had started to realize that Japan might collapse before the Soviet Union attacked. The military leaders were worried that Moscow's demands on the Chinese government might give the Soviets a dominant strategic position in northeast Asia, and the War Department's Operations Division began working on plans to seize Dalian and Liishun as soon as possible. These plans also included the occupation of ports in North China. 4 The War Department had to delay its plans for landings on the China coast several times. First the Army and the Navy clashed over who should occupy the ports. Then General MacArthur postponed the operation because of lack of transport during the weeks after the Japanese surrender. Ambassador Harriman, who had been informed of the military plans, urged an immediate U.S. landing in Dalian, but to no avail. The naval commanders in the Pacific regarded Japan as a much more important target for immediate landings than the North China coast, and were not willing to divert transport from their primary aim. The China landings would have to be postponed. 5 After his first meetings with top American officials in Washington in late August, Song Ziwen was quite overwhelmed by their sympathetic response to his requests for aid. Since his visit two months earlier, the attitude in the American capital toward the Chinese government seemed

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to have gone through a complete change. Song knew from Harriman's last-minute efforts to influence the Moscow talks that the basis for the change was not satisfaction with the signing of a Sino-Soviet treaty, but rather the opposite—fear of a strong Soviet position in East Asia. As a seasoned diplomat. Song now set out to capitalize on the fears of American policymakers. 6 Song lobbied hard both for economic and military assistance. After having got a positive response to his requests for financial aid, both in the White House and among members of Congress, Song immediately started his appeals for military aid. Prodded by Jiang, the premier pushed his luck to the limit. He reminded President Truman that at Cairo FDR had promised to provide equipment for thirty Chinese divisions at once and for sixty more "at a later date." Song said that the Chinese government now would be happy to take over the matériel, which the United States already had in the Pacific and in India. In addition. Song asked for a permanent American military mission to China to assist with military training and to "organize her arsenals and her services of supply." 7 Requests like these, which only weeks before would have sent administration officials scrambling for cover, now received serious attention in Washington. Since there was, as usual, no written record of FDR's promise, the presidential advisers had to seek confirmation from the now-dying Harry Hopkins. Hopkins—a friend of Song Ziwen— remembered that Roosevelt had made "a flat promise" at Cairo to supply the enormous amounts of equipment that the Chinese envoy had mentioned. In his last meeting with Song, on September 14, a defensive Truman carefully avoided mentioning the sixty divisions, but promised the Chinese both a military mission and general military assistance. Song had got what he came for. 8 Less than a month after the war against Japan ended, Washington had made several important decisions that made the United States Jiang Jieshi's ally in his struggle with the CCP. Jiang had asked for U.S. landings and for assistance with troop transports; he got both. In addition, the Americans had promised him further military aid in form of arms supplies and training centers to be coordinated by a permanent U.S. military mission to China. Compared to the often strained relations between Washington and Chongqing over the previous four years, these decisions signaled a new American relationship with Jiang's government. The decisions to build a close postwar alliance with Chongqing all

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originated in the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the White House and the State Department as bystanders. Truman and Byrnes apparently both believed that the new American commitments to Jiang's government were merely steps toward realizing FDR's wartime hopes for a strong, pro-American China. This was how President Truman saw the situation when he briskly told Hurley and Wedemeyer on October 19 that "my policy is to support Chiang K. C. [Jiang Jieshi]." The difference between China before and after August 1945 was, however, that it was no longer the Japanese that Jiang wanted to arm against; it was the Chinese Communists. Assistance to Jiang therefore meant supporting the Guomindang in a civil conflict, something FDR had tried to avoid. 9 The American military leaders in Chongqing and Washington were not blind to this prospect. Wedemeyer, while calling for wide-ranging assistance to the GMD government, kept repeating to himself and others that the United States should not get involved in "fraternal strife" in China. The orders Wedemeyer received from the War Department also strongly underlined U.S. nonintervention in the GMD-CCP conflict. Privately, however, many military leaders in Washington had started already in mid-August to regard the CCP as an enemy. General Marshall told Wedemeyer on August 17 that one of the main reasons for a speedy evacuation of the Japanese forces was to prevent them from supplying arms to the CCP. 10 The American wish to build a postwar alliance with Chongqing was prompted by worry among many U.S. military leaders over Soviet intentions in East Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff read many of Stalin's actions in July and August as directed against American interests. The lack of any joint planning against Japan, Soviet demands during the Moscow negotiations, and the Red Army's conduct of the war in Manchuria all were pieces in an emerging picture of Soviet enmity toward the United States. The Soviets, the War Department believed, were as given to unilateral action in Asia as they had been in Europe. The Soviet continuation of its Manchurian offensive for weeks after Japan declared itself willing to surrender aroused particular anger and suspicion in Washington. The War Department's Operations Division thought that Stalin aimed at occupying areas outside the Northeast, and complained that the United States could do nothing about it. 11 As this fear of Soviet intentions developed in the last weeks of August, so did American willingness to support Jiang's military plans in almost every aspect. Wedemeyer worked out and started implement-

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ing a plan to transport five GMD armies by air and sea from Southwest China and South Asia to bases in North China. On recommendation from the U.S. military staff in Chongqing, Marshall sanctioned Jiang's policy of using Japanese troops "to maintain order" in North China. In spite of the temporary postponement of the landing of U.S. troops on the coast, the speed with which Washington had accepted Jiang's requests had given the generalissimo some crucial advantages over his domestic opponents. The Guomindang's ability to achieve foreign aid was again paying off. 12 Stalin, w h o could not know what disastrous results his Asian policy had had in Washington, called in Averell Harriman on August 29 to assure the ambassador that the Soviet Union still wanted to cooperate with the United States in China. Stalin said that the Red Army would not advance outside the area it now occupied, and would start withdrawing "shortly." He expected Jiang to send troops to Manchuria in the near future, and assured Harriman that the Red Army had found no Communist guerrilla units in the area. Stalin's main point was that both Washington and Moscow should promote a quick settlement to the CCP-GMD conflict. American intelligence confirmed Stalin's intentions. William Donovan, the head of the OSS, reported to Truman that the Soviet Union wanted a coalition in which the Chinese Communists would be formally well represented, but actually would have a relatively minor role. 13 Neither Stalin's assurances nor Donovan's memorandum had much effect on the debate in Washington over giving final approval for the landing of U.S. Marines on the coast of North China. Some State Department officials, most notably John Carter Vincent, did suggest canceling the landings because they would constitute a direct American intervention on behalf of the GMD at a time when China was on the verge of a civil war. Ultimately, in late September, General Wedemeyer and the War Department succeeded in persuading Byrnes that the landings were necessary in order to "strengthen the position of the National Government" against both domestic and foreign adversaries. Publicly Chinese and American officials explained the operation as an effort to speed u p the disarming and repatriation of Japanese troops still in China. The landings started on September 30. 14 The first U.S. military intervention overseas after the end of World War II involved more than 50,000 marines, supported by tanks, aircraft, and navy vessels. During the first week of October the American forces took control of strategic ports on the coast of Hebei and Shan-

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dong and occupied Tianjin and Beijing, the two main cities in North China. In all but one case the landings took place without incident, and the marines soon fanned out to take control of communication lines close to their areas of deployment. The Japanese commanders, w h o were still in control of most of the main population centers at the time of the landings, proved surprisingly cooperative, and often shared guard duties along the railway lines with American forces. Marine officers complained that they knew nothing about the length of the stay or even of the concrete tasks the U.S. Marines were supposed to carry out. Still, most officers believed that this was a short-term mission—a couple of months at m o s t . " The China in which the Marines arrived was in the midst of a military and political crisis. The Chongqing talks may have prevented civil war, but in no way did they put an end to the armed rivalry between the GMD and the CCP. In September units from the National Army started moving north by land, in the east toward the Communistheld areas in northern Henan, in the west toward one of the CCP Eighth Route Army's core zones in southeastern Shanxi. In most cases the CCP chose not to fight, still hoping that the talks would produce an acceptable compromise. At the same time Yan'an ordered the CCP forces in both areas to make large-scale preparations for a counterattack. 16 Yan'an regarded the rapid march of General Fu Zuoyi's forces in September through Shanxi toward the Great Wall and Inner Mongolia as the most threatening GMD troop movement. This operation could, if successful, cut off Yan'an and the main Communist bases in Shanxi from North China and the Northeast. Mao was not in doubt that here the CCP would have to fight, even if the Chongqing talks were still going on. His telegram to Nie Rongzhen—in charge of the Shanxi defensive operations—stated that "the more battles you win, the safer we are here and the more initiative we have in negotiations." Still, the CCP even here held back in its major counterattacks until after the Chongqing talks had ended. 17 The CCP also made some strategic advances outside the Northeast, even though prevented by Japanese power and its own caution from conquering any major cities. By taking over strategic points in North China, Yan'an aimed at preventing the National Army from attacking the CCP in Manchuria. In Hebei and Shandong provinces CCP units took control of ports and railway lines, and in the area between Beijing

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and Mongolia the party occupied the strategically important city of Zhangjiakou. 18 The news about the imminent landings of U.S. Marines along the North China coast took the CCP leadership by surprise. In late September Mao still believed that there was a secret understanding between the Americans and the Soviets about mutual nonintervention in China, and that Truman's unwillingness to risk a rupture with Moscow at this point would prevent him from stepping up aid to Jiang's government. Mao took the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel in South China, which had started in the first week of September, as evidence that the Americans would not intervene further. 19 Liu Shaoqi, supported by Mao, decided not to make a general protest against the American landings. The CCP limited its initial reaction to a warning to the U.S. Headquarters not to land troops in the CCP-held ports in northern Shandong without prior agreement with Yan'an. Such landings, the message from the CCP commander-in-chief Zhu De said, "would lead the people of China and abroad to suspect American interference in Chinese internal affairs." Likewise, when U.S. Navy ships anchored outside Tianjin harbor on September 30, the party limited its public reaction to a vaguely worded protest, saying that the United States should not decide who should control the city.20 In informing its field commands about the coming U.S. landings, the Central Committee's Military Committee emphasized that this new American intervention signified a new level of commitment to Jiang Jieshi's regime. The main aim of the American forces, according to the Military Committee, was to "prevent us from playing a role in the Northeast" by occupying the ports and railway junctions next to the main eastern route to Manchuria—the area where the Great Wall meets the sea around Shanhaiguan. Yan'an knew that when the GMD forces were to enter the Northeast, control of this route would be of crucial importance. Now the Americans seemed to be preparing to occupy the area on behalf of the Chongqing government. This meant, the Military Committee said, that the invasion of the Northeast was about to begin, and that the CCP had to reorient its military strategy to meet the threat. 21 Yan'an's immediate problem was how to handle the relationship between Marines and CCP units in areas where the U.S. troops had already landed. As noted, all of these areas were in or close to established zones of operation of Communist forces. The Central Commit-

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tee's Propaganda Department had already given general instructions on September 29. Hurley and Wedemeyer, it explained, were "very reactionary, [and] their policy is to connive with the Japanese and firmly support Jiang Jieshi against the Soviet Union and against the CCP. . . . But U.S. political circles and public opinion sympathize with us to a high degree." So far the CCP had failed to expose Hurley's and Wedemeyer's policies. For political reasons CCP members in the areas in question had to "try to be on good terms with, and not appear hostile" to U.S. intelligence and military personnel. "If U.S. personnel enter the liberated areas, [we must] show them that we are masters in our own country welcoming them. If the Americans open fire on us, commit illegal acts, or assist the GMD in suppressing the people, [you should] make reports so that we may alert international public opinion." 2 2 Of even more immediate importance was whether to ignore or oppose the additional landings of U.S. troops. The Central Committee realized that CCP forces could not actually beat back the Americans, but it still hoped to prevent U.S. landings in areas of vital interest to the party's military strategy. Mao believed that Washington would not give orders to attack any of the Chinese Communist positions if the relationship between U.S. and CCP units in most areas was correct and relaxed. In accordance with this hope, the Communists made no moves to challenge the foreign troops militarily, and only protested the U.S. takeover of Tianjin and Tanggu through press releases and leaflets. 23 The situation was different, however, in northern Shandong where the Marines also attempted to land in early October. This was an area where CCP units for many years had controlled the countryside, and where the party had taken over most towns immediately after the Japanese surrender. Since then the Communists had moved large numbers of troops into the region, hoping to ship them across the Bohai straits to the Northeast. The northern Shandong coast was a crucial link in the Northeastern strategy. From here CCP units could be shipped to positions in eastern Manchuria without interference by either the Guomindang or the Soviets. The port of Yantai was the most convenient point of embarkation. On October 6, after U.S. warships had appeared in Yantai harbor, the Central Committee ordered the local CCP units to resist the landing of American forces, by use of arms if necessary. "Only when [you are] not able to hinder or beat back their advance should you retreat. . . . Only if our army takes a strong attitude and international public opinion becomes greatly disturbed will the U.S. army back down." 2 4

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The Yantai crisis was defused by the local CCP leadership. In spite of the Central Committee's instructions, the commander in Yantai promised to open the city to the Americans if the U.S. forces did not interfere with the existing Communist administration and did not bring with them GMD troops. After having inspected the city the Americans withdrew, unwilling to risk a potentially explosive cohabitation with CCP forces in a town of seemingly minor importance. 25 Yan'an, in turn, took the incident as an indication that its prescription of equal amounts of stubbornness and cooperation could keep the Americans from intervening directly in the CCP-GMD conflict. The worst possible situation for the CCP was if the liberated areas were attacked by the Guomindang, the Americans, and Japanese and "puppet" troops at the same time. The party must try to exploit the contradictions between these groups, the Central Committee instructed on October 9. 26 In spite of the outcome of the Yantai incident, the CCP leadership especially warned the Shandong cadre against taking on the American forces. The Central Committee had not long ago criticized CCP base areas in this region for their excessive radicalism on issues of landreform and "popular justice." Now Liu Shaoqi warned the party's Central China Bureau that it should not allow a generally aggressive or confrontational military strategy in Shandong. He also warned the regional party leadership not to be overzealous in punishing local collaborators. 27 Yan'an was well aware of the long-standing antiforeign attitudes in Shandong. An unwelcome episode in late August may have been the background for Liu's worries. Captain John Birch, who had parachuted into western Shandong the week the war ended on a joint OSS-National Army mission to supply GMD guerrillas, had been killed in a confrontation with a CCP unit. It did not help much that both the OSS and the CCP investigation of the incident concluded that Captain Birch, for all practical purposes, had committed suicide by physically attacking an armed CCP officer at a checkpoint. Yan'an, realizing the anti-CCP propaganda potential of the episode, had decided to apologize and to prevent further clashes in the area. 28 After the U.S. occupation, the northern cities became the main stage for CCP attempts to influence American representatives and break the U.S.-GMD alliance. Tianjin offers a good example of the CCP strategy. By late August the forces of the CCP Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei military area had surrounded the city and were ready to attack, but—as with the other major cities—the Central Committee told its commanders to

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hold off, and ordered them instead to "consolidate their concealed strength inside the city." After the Americans arrived, the party intensified its policy of infiltration while secretly organizing guerrilla groups in the suburbs. Propaganda inside the city was particularly important, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Bureau said, "in order to eliminate the illusions about the United States among the masses." 2 9 In order to eliminate these illusions, the CCP first concentrated its propaganda work on condemning the large number of unpopular GMD orders and actions in areas controlled by U.S. forces. The party's leaflets attacked the clemency Jiang had shown former collaborators and the prominent posts he had given GMD leaders from outside the recovered provinces. The CCP's branches also made charges of corruption against local officials. While denouncing U.S. military intervention and American support for the government's supposedly antidemocratic and antipopular initiatives, the CCP avoided making open appeals to nationalist or antiforeign sentiments. The party feared that such propaganda would suggest a parallel between the U.S. and the Soviet occupied areas. In addition, the CCP did not want to close its opportunities for making direct appeals to the Americans to oppose Jiang's military actions against the Communists. 30 In several cities the CCP formed committees and fronts to work directly with American soldiers and officers. The appeals these groups made all had the same general content. Thanking the United States for its assistance to China during the war, they pointed out that "the people of China did almost all of the fighting during the past eight years, with the Japanese invader. Now the Victory should be ours." 3 1 A letter to American officers in Beijing quoted Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry while describing the corrupt behavior of GMD officials who "came by your planes." "The people are forced by the local authorities to welcome you," the letter continued. "As a matter of fact, they are already tired now. We do not mean tired of you, Americans. We welcome you heartily, as people of America, but not as American soldiers with weapons!" The authors of this letter, the "People's Society of Peiping [Beijing]," ended by pointing out that Beijing now was "surrendered [sic] by the People's troops, as the Kuomintang government call them 'rebellion.' You could see them in your planes or if you just go out of the city six or seven miles. And you are welcome to go. They have people of different nationalities including you Americans." 32 The CCP also had to explain the background for the U.S. intervention, and for the party's own restrained response, to nonparty political

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circles in urban areas. In a major analytical article in the official Xinhua ribao [New China Daily] the party stressed the military and economic power of the United States, and that its "reactionary forces" aimed at placing "the people of the whole world under the economic and political control of American monopolistic capitalists." The article then went through a long list of American policy statements, and found abundant evidence for the theory of an ongoing struggle between "reactionary" and "democratic" forces within the U.S. leadership. But "as a whole," the article said, "the trend in world politics is . . . toward a rational peace and absolutely not toward another war." 3 3 Meanwhile, the GMD-CCP negotiations in Chongqing made little progress. Ironically, both sides blamed the Americans for what they saw as their opponent's increasing intransigence. Jiang claimed that rumors of a change in U.S. policy toward his government led the CCP to stand firm. Mao, on his side, felt that the arrival of the U.S. Marines made the government less inclined to seek a negotiated solution. Feeling that the two sides initially had been moving toward a settlement, Mao was angry but not despondent when he left for Yan'an on October 10 after more than six weeks of negotiations without any concrete results. At a meeting of the Political Bureau the next day he still defended the need to hold further talks with Jiang. Some agreement in principle had been achieved, Mao said, but most importantly these talks had established an unprecedented "pattern of equality" between the two parties.34 Jiang Jieshi had considered the talks a failure since early September, when it became clear that Mao was not willing to open up the CCPheld areas to government administration until the GMD had agreed to a comprehensive political solution. The talks had reinforced Jiang's low personal opinion of Mao, and increased his anger at the CCP leader's policies. "If such a traitor cannot be punished, how can we expect the armed forces and the people to obey the government?" Jiang asked. A main reason why Jiang had suffered the talks was to demonstrate his reasonableness to the Americans and—in particular—to the Soviets.35 The GMD government did not wait for further talks before intensifying its military effort to gain control of North China and prepare to enter the Northeast. Some of the activities of the U.S. Marines formed part of this effort, particularly their guarding of communication lines in eastern Hebei. The result was confrontations and clashes between the American forces and CCP units ordered to sabotage roads and railway lines to prevent GMD troops from entering Manchuria. 36

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Developments in the Tangshan area suggest the tense situation throughout eastern Hebei. A U.S. Marine regiment occupied the town of Tangshan itself, while units of the CCP Eighth Route Army controlled the surrounding districts. On October 11, representatives of the CCP base area party committee sent a message to the U.S. commanding officer claiming that the Eighth Route Army controlled Tangshan, but that the Communist units were "willing to work together with you to destroy the puppet tyranny." The Americans did not respond. On discovering two days later that CCP troops had moved closer to the railway stations, the local Marine headquarters ordered overflights by U.S. military aircrafts to deter the Chinese from attacking. 37 When a representative of the regional Central Committee subbureau. Song Renqian, visited the American headquarters on October 17, the U.S. commanding officer ordered him to immediately cease movements of CCP troops and not to interfere with railroad traffic. Song, on his side, told the Americans that he expected the United States to remove the local puppet commander " w h o for fourteen years has tortured people." The meeting was inconclusive. 38 The next day a CCP unit ambushed a train carrying U.S. Marines near Tangshan. Seven CCP soldiers were killed and two marines wounded in the fighting. Although Yan'an almost immediately apologized for this incident, sporadic clashes continued throughout late October and early November. This series of incidents culminated on November 14, when local Communist troops attacked government workmen who had been rushed in to repair the strategic railway line between Tangshan and Qinwangdao. U.S. Marines guarding the repair train repelled the attack. The second-in-command of the U.S. Marine forces in North China, General DeWitt Peck, was aboard the train, and asked for an air attack against the village, which he took to be the CCP command center. U.S. aircraft reached the area some hours later, although their crews were under orders to carry out only simulated strafing of the village. 39 The day the Tangshan incident took place, the CCP's worst fears were realized only a few miles further east. The GMD forces, which the Americans had shipped and airlifted to eastern Hebei over the last two months, attacked CCP positions at Shanhaiguan. The battle for Manchuria had started. Up to the GMD attack in mid-November, the Central Committee had become increasingly concerned about the role of the American forces in Guomindang strategy. The Americans were taking the place of the Japanese in North China, Yan'an complained, and might join in a GMD

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assault on CCP positions. On the other hand, the Central Committee pointed out that civil war was not yet a fact, and that as long as the Americans "respect our rights and interests we [must] cooperate, but when the actions of the U.S. forces are against our rights and interests and support Chinese reactionaries, [we must] oppose t h e m . . . . When we cannot dissuade U.S. military personnel from assisting the GMD in entering the liberated areas, and they make their way by force, our troops shall act only in self-defense, take up defensive positions, and under no circumstance open fire first." In order to avoid war, the party had to reduce its number of enemies, the Central Committee said. 40 After Mao returned from Chongqing, he advised the party leadership that the CCP armies should counterattack against the advancing National Army units in Henan and Shaanxi. The Central Committee informed its bureaus that it was vital to the preservation of the party and the army that the CCP forces should succeed in stopping the National Army's offensive. In Henan, in the battle of Zhang River, local CCP forces under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping encircled three advancing National Army units; one corps commander went over to the CCP and the two others surrendered in early November. In northern Shaanxi the fighting dragged on, inconclusively, for several weeks. 41 Even if CCP leaders rightly viewed the battles fought in late October and early November as relatively successful for the party, they realized that the strategic advantage Jiang got through the American transport of National Army units to Hebei far offset any CCP victories further south. Yan'an's strategic dilemma was that it both needed to speed up the transfer of troops to the Northeast, and to keep sufficient forces immediately south of the Wall to delay a GMD attempt to enter Manchuria. In addition to these logistic difficulties, the party worried over how it could take a stand in Hebei without getting into direct conflict with the Americans. 42 When Yan'an learned of the U.S. assistance to the Guomindang forces before and during the battle of Shanhaiguan, most CCP leaders felt that the Americans had taken a major step toward openly supporting Jiang in a civil war. Several Chinese scholars have seen Shanhaiguan as a turning point, and claim that from then on Yan'an consistently regarded the Americans as irrevocably linked to Jiang's regime. The party leadership saw the battle as a major setback to both CCP military and diplomatic strategy. The events at Shanhaiguan led to a sense of crisis in Yan'an. It is impossible, however, to separate the Shanhaiguan crisis, and the CCP's relationship to the United States,

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from the parallel crisis that developed in the party's relations with Moscow. Events in both areas placed the party in a very difficult position from mid-November on. 43 After the warm embrace in August and September, the relations between Jiang and the Americans became somewhat more tempered in October. Although the United States stepped up its practical assistance to the GMD according to plan, many American commanders in China reacted against what they saw as corruption and mismanagement in the large areas they had helped the Guomindang to take over. A popular pun in North China in the fall of 1945 was to change the Chinese characters for "takeover" (jieshou) to the similar sounding characters for "plunder." In addition, some Americans found disturbing the apparent ease with which Jiang pardoned traitors and incorporated whole armies of the former "puppet" regime into the National Army. In Hebei, for instance, the former director of the "Pacification Department" of the local pro-Japanese administration became the commanding general of the GMD Hebei Advance Army, itself a former "puppet" unit. 44 The relations between the "liberated" population—particularly in urban areas—and the GMD administrators were often difficult. As Joseph Yick concludes, in a mere four months the GMD antagonized practically every social group in the recovered cities. Because of its close alliance with Jiang, the United States was often identified with the unpopular aspects of the takeover. Already many Chinese had started objecting to the presence of a foreign army now that the war was over. The GMD's handling of the liberated areas added to that criticism.45 Jiang had in early September asked for, and been granted, American assistance to transport troops directly to the Northeast, thereby circumventing the CCP forces in North China. The generalissimo had also asked the Soviets to allow the landing of GMD troops from American vessels in Dalian, the largest port in the Northeast. Because of the unclear terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty, Jiang wanted to establish some form of GMD authority in Dalian as soon as possible. He also chose Dalian because he believed that the Americans had an interest in keeping the city free from complete Soviet domination, and therefore would be willing to provide maximum support. The Soviet authorities in Manchuria had, however, refused permission to land in Dalian and Jiang had reluctantly agreed to land his forces in Yingkou and Huludao, two ports on the Bohai Gulf.46 When the American ships with GMD troops anchored outside Ying-

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kou, they found the CCP and not the Soviets in control of the towns. Told by the CCP commanders that they would resist any attempts to land, the commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet decided to abort the landings in the Northeast and instead to put the GMD troops ashore in northeastern Hebei. A landing in Yingkou, Admiral Kinkaid told Wedemeyer, "would violate our policy of nonparticipation in fratricidal war and subject us to rightful censure as actively participating in such a war."47 After fighting broke out south of the Wall in mid-October, General Wedemeyer himself worried that he might have to take the responsibility for committing U.S. forces against the Communists. Wedemeyer thought it unlikely that the Soviets would start an immediate push south from Manchuria. Hoping for more manpower and more flexible instructions from Washington, the general therefore decided to force the U.S. political leaders to choose between further intervention or full withdrawal. Referring to Washington's order not to get involved in Chinese "fraternal strife," Wedemeyer on November 5 recommended to the War Department that the United States refuse Jiang's urgent request to transport yet another GMD army to Hebei. He also appealed for Washington to either start withdrawing the U.S. Marines from North China, or significantly increase their strength. The general still hoped to help the GMD in its armed conflict with the Communists, but he wanted to do so under clear instructions from Washington. 48 Having visited the United States in early October, Wedemeyer was well aware of the mounting criticism in Washington against the American military involvement in China. Congressman Mike Mansfield, who had visited China several times and whose opinion the president valued, summed up much of this criticism when he told Truman that "the matter has now reached a stage where we may become involved no matter how hard we try to keep clear of the internal situation. If we become involved it would be bad for both China and the United States. It would violate our fundamental policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations and react against us around the world. It would cause trouble among American troops who are already discontented and it has alarmed some of our commanders who fear for the worst." 4 9 The liberal criticism of intervention, as presented by Mansfield, had started to worry both the president and his advisers. For the first time since the war ended, Truman himself felt the need to take an initiative on U.S. China policy. The president believed that the best way of

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countering the criticism was to issue a statement clarifying his administration's goals in China. Since Truman was not particularly clear about what his goals were, he prudently looked through his files before drafting a statement. 50 Truman found two reports on China of particular interest, judging from his drafting of the China statement. The first was a massive report from the War Department's Military Intelligence Division from July 1945, purporting to analyze "all material available" on the Chinese Communist movement. The War Department reported that the CCP armies had done little of the fighting against Japan, had sabotaged allied war efforts, and were still militarily weak. The report claimed that Moscow "sponsored and guided" the CCP, and that the Soviets planned to "create Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria, Korea, and probably North China." It concluded that a strong, stable, and undivided China was "essential" to American interests, and that such a state could not exist without the natural resources of Manchuria and North China. 51 The second of Truman's sources of inspiration was a report his friend Edwin Locke wrote in late August. Locke had been to China as a representative of FDR, and knew the Chinese situation well. Contradicting the War Department report, Locke strongly doubted that the Chinese government could win a civil war, but noted that Jiang would still fight the Communists at first opportunity if the United States did not put strong pressure on him not to do so. Locke believed that the Soviets did not want a civil war in China, and suggested that Washington—in consultation with Moscow—arrange peace negotiations and force Jiang and the Communists to make a settlement. 52 Truman constructed a statement on his China policy using points from both reports, but without making any clear choice between their differing conclusions. In the first rough draft of his statement in early November, Truman relied mostly on the War Department's opinions. The president stated that the Marines were in China for the sole purpose of helping with the evacuation of Japanese troops. He went on, however, to indicate that Jiang's government "fought side by side with us against our common enemy, [and] that we have reason to believe that the so-called Commies in China not only did not help us but on occasion helped the Japs." After discussing the statement with his closest White House staff, Truman asked Samuel Rosenman, his legal aide, to prepare a more complete draft, which was finished on November 9. Rosenman's draft was less aggressive than Truman's. It too stressed

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that the Marines were in China to help evacuate the Japanese and that Jiang's government had the support of the other Great Powers. It also concluded that Jiang was an old ally "while the forces now in opposition . . . contributed nothing to our war effort." Adding a reassurance missing in Truman's draft, Rosenman stated that there was "no danger of our troops becoming involved in civil strife in China unless they are attacked by Chinese troops, in which event we may expect the American troops to react with vigor and success." Rosenman deleted Truman's categorical statements that the Chinese government was to be given "every practicable assistance" in evacuating the Japanese, and that "the U.S. Forces in China will not support the Central Government of China in fratricidal war." Several White House aides, among them George Allen and Matt Connelly, still objected to the statement. Connelly commented that the remarks on the CCP were "not a factual statement; several officers have told me that the opposite is true." Because of the disagreement among his aides, Truman decided in the second week of November to put aside the idea of a public statement on China. 53 While the White House searched for a policy, the administration's top foreign policy officials debated the future of U.S. forces in China based on Wedemeyer's message. In a top-level meeting on November 6, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy pushed for further assistance to Jiang, including retaining the Marines and transporting more GMD troops north. McCloy said that Jiang wanted to increase his strength against the Communists, and not give the Soviets any excuse to remain in Manchuria. The assistant secretary told the secretaries of state, war, and the navy that he was still seriously worried about Soviet intentions in the Northeast, and thought that the Guomindang needed U.S. support to cope with the situation. Secretary of State Byrnes, however, seemed skeptical of increasing the aid to Jiang, and the meeting decided to get further advice from the Joint Chiefs before making a final decision. 54 In the late fall of 1945, James Byrnes still hoped to work out some kind of settlement that would reduce Soviet-American tension. The breakdown of the London Foreign Ministers' Conference in September had brought relations between the two powers to their lowest postwar level. Moscow and Washington were on a collision course not only in eastern Europe, but also in Iran and East Asia. Byrnes—who was once characterized as a man who would "lay out three hats in the morning, so that he can compromise on the one in the middle"—still believed

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that he could strike a bargain with Stalin. Byrnes hoped to trade U.S. concessions for Soviet cooperation, particularly in terms of troop withdrawals and limiting future intervention. In late October he suggested that Truman tell Stalin that the United States would start withdrawing its troops from China on November 15, if the Soviet leader would reciprocate. The president did not reply. 55 Ambassador Harriman, in Moscow, disagreed with Byrnes. In a private letter to his friend Dean Acheson, the new under-secretary of state, Harriman argued that the Soviet Union would exploit any domestic crisis in China, and that the United States therefore had to increase its assistance to Jiang. Such assistance had to include help getting the National Army into Manchuria, Harriman thought. He told Acheson that unless Jiang's army was ready to enter the Northeast, Stalin would not withdraw. Acheson, however, answered that "at a time when demobilization is amounting almost to disintegration, American policy must be based upon understanding and agreement rather than mere military force." 5 6 After receiving the secretaries' request for advice in mid-November, the Joint Chiefs immediately hit the ball back to the politicians' court, asking the State Department for its views. Byrnes then outlined his approach on November 19. As usual, the secretary of state suggested a compromise that included keeping the Marines in place, but declining to transport any more of Jiang's troops north. Byrnes wished that U.S. forces not be used directly against the Communists, but admitted that the American presence "will result in some collateral aid of prestige in favor of the National Government." 5 7 At a meeting the next day, the secretaries of war and the navy were more enthusiastic in their support for continued intervention. Secretary of War, Robert Patterson completely discarded Byrnes' fear of major U.S. casualties, and "thought that the 60,000 Marines who are there could walk from one end of China to the other without serious hindrance." Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal added that he would not like to see the United States withdraw "as a result of Russian pressure." The United States, the two secretaries agreed, already had "a considerable investment" in supporting Jiang, and ought to continue this support. 5 8 In a memorandum to Byrnes, the two secretaries strongly supported further U.S. military assistance to Jiang in his attempts to take over North China and the Northeast. A U.S. withdrawal from China now meant a retreat from major war objectives, the two stated. The battle of

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Shanhaiguan had shown that the CCP was militarily weak, and that the generalissimo would be able to overcome any Communist opposition if given adequate American support. On the other hand, the two secretaries said, if Manchuria and North China became a separate state, "then Russia will have achieved in the Far East approximately the objectives Japan initially set out to acquire." 5 9 Wedemeyer—a general with an acute sense for politics—now jumped on the interventionist bandwagon. Only a week earlier, after the Tangshan incident, he had urgently called for the withdrawal of the Marines. Now, in the last week of November, he enthusiastically supported the U.S. military presence in China. In a reply to questions from Marshall, Wedemeyer stated that not only were the Marines needed, but it might even be necessary to occupy more ports and cities in order to speed up the evacuation of the Japanese. Washington had decided for a longterm military involvement in China, Wedemeyer believed. 60 Forrestal's, Patterson's, and Wedemeyer's concern for the repatriation of Japanese soldiers was a cover for their overriding preoccupation with finding a way to prevent Soviet aggression in China. The War Department, in particular, viewed the CCP as an agent for Soviet policies, and assistance to Jiang as part of the general U.S. effort to bloc Soviet expansion. This thinking, typical of the Cold War, was the basis for U.S. actions in China in the fall of 1945. The president now had to decide whether American policy in China would be pursued with political or military means. Truman—who had been influenced by the War Department's general antipathy toward the CCP—was still less concerned over Soviet activities in China than were most of his ranking foreign policy advisers. Knowing that the direct commitment of American forces to Jiang's cause was unpopular at home, the president hesitated, hoping to find another way of easing his advisers' concern.

SIX The Origins of the Marshall Mission

Joseph Stalin's China policy in the fall of 1945 was as aimless and incoherent as his European policy. He had won a treaty that legitimated his territorial ambitions in Manchuria and brought the war in East Asia to a successful conclusion. But now Stalin could not decide how to proceed in his relations with the United States, the Chinese government, or with the CCP. Stalin was primarily concerned over the conflicts with the Americans. His alliance with Washington, stable and promising only six months ago, had disintegrated with the end of the war in Europe and in Asia. However much he had hoped to avoid postwar confrontation with the United States, Stalin could in the months after August 15 not make up his mind on how to achieve his aim. Faced with increasing U.S. suspicion of Soviet actions in China, Stalin straddled between applying pressure and offering concessions to rebuild his relations with the Americans. 1 In early September, the Soviet leader saw that not only was the United States ready to challenge the Soviet position in Manchuria, but it would also reject Soviet participation in the occupation of Japan. In addition, Stalin believed that the Americans were deliberately arming

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Jiang Jieshi for an attack on the Chinese Communists. During the summer, the Soviets had cautiously warned U.S. diplomats in Moscow that increased American military support of Jiang would lead to civil war in China. The Soviets argued that a dramatic change in U.S. China policy was now taking place. Stalin's attempts to tell Washington that increased military support of Jiang would harm Soviet-American relations were never made official, because of the treaty Moscow itself was about to sign with Chongqing. 2 In late August Stalin hoped to soften American attitudes by facilitating peace talks between the GMD and the CCP. The Soviet leader seems to have believed that if the Chinese Communists gave up their armed opposition to Jiang and accepted minor positions in his administration, then Washington would become more inclined to seek cooperation with the Soviet Union in East Asia. Stalin's appeals to Harriman in late August for a joint Soviet-American response to the peace talks went unheeded, and his belated attempts to show a minimum of cooperation with U.S. military missions to Manchuria did not do much to reduce American suspicions. 3 In the last week of September, during the London conference of foreign ministers, Stalin changed his tactics. Exasperated by British and American resistance to Moscow's political settlements in eastern Europe, the Soviet leader resorted to confrontation to force some concessions from the Western leaders. Stalin chose to abort the conference as a warning to Washington and London of how serious the crisis in Great Power relations had become. To end the crisis the Americans and the British would have to agree to at least some of the Soviet demands. 4 Soviet policy toward the Chinese government mirrored Stalin's overall foreign policy. In late August and early September the Soviets tried to extend the momentum from the Moscow talks by informing Jiang of their pressure on the CCP and by withdrawing their forces from all points outside the Northeast. The Red Army's cooperation with the Chinese Communists in some parts of Manchuria was based on local military considerations, a lack of orders from Moscow, and a certain sympathy for the CCP among Red Army officers—not on a plan to assist the Chinese Communist Party against the government. In late September, parallel to the London conference and the U.S. landings in China, this attitude started to change. The emergence of CCP-dominated administrations in all of the Soviet occupied cities was a signal that Moscow now wanted to put pressure on Chongqing—and on the Americans.

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The main problem for Stalin in China was that he had no clear idea of what to do with his Manchurian card. During the summer before the Soviet invasion, Soviet news media had emphasized the traditional Russian claim to control of the Chinese Northeast: one article stressed that everything in Dalian was built or planned by Russians, another writer talked about his sentiments when seeing "Russian soldiers' uniforms, bloodstained and bullet-riddled" in a Lüshun museum. Stalin stressed Russian claims in part to explain the additional sacrifice he imposed on the Soviet people by attacking Japan. But it also signified an increased emphasis on the Soviet Union as a Pacific power, for which the ports and railways in the Northeast were of major strategic importance. 5 The strategic theme became even clearer after the victory over Japan in August. An article in a major Soviet news magazine likened Manchuria to " a n immense wedge driven into our territory" that often had been used for attacking the Soviet Union. It concluded by proclaiming that " a n end must be put once and for all to a situation in which Manchuria may serve as a base and center of machinations against vitally important regions of our country." Both motivations, the sentimental and the strategic, seem to have played a role in Stalin's thinking both during the Sino-Soviet talks and in the early fall of 1945. 6 In addition to his strategic and historical motives, Stalin in mid-1945 became increasingly preoccupied with Manchuria's usefulness in postwar negotiations with London and Washington. By the time of the September London conference the current value of its possessions in China had become the pivot of Moscow's negotiation strategy, as Molotov used the conference to doggedly insist on global symmetry in political and military concessions. Molotov, and Stalin, put increasing emphasis on getting something in return for Soviet withdrawal, in spite of the provisions of the Sino-Soviet treaty. By doing so, Moscow contributed its part to the intense Soviet-American rivalry in China in midfall. 7 Stalin realized, however, that in spite of his present military control of Manchuria any attempt to keep troops in the area in violation of the Moscow treaty would lead to a direct conflict both with the Chinese government and with the United States. This meant that the Soviet forces would have to withdraw within three months, and that they would have to show an at least minimal cooperation with the National Army in the process. The heightened Soviet-American tension in early fall further increased the seriousness of any conflict over the Soviet

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position in the Northeast. The worsening of Great Power relations therefore increased the risks Stalin would have to take if he used Manchuria as a bargaining chip in a global postwar settlement with Britain and the United States. 8 The Soviet leaders believed that Washington landed U.S. forces in North China in early October as a response to the Red Army's presence in Manchuria. But again Stalin could not decide how to respond. His first reaction was to sanction a Manchurian policy that relied more heavily on the use of CCP support. In the last week of September the Red Army started accepting more Communist-dominated administrations. The Soviet headquarters also permitted its Chinese units to join the CCP armies in the Northeast. The day after the U.S. landings Stalin changed his tactics, and rushed to mollify Jiang. Moscow now informed Chongqing that the Soviet withdrawal was about to begin, and asked for immediate negotiations on the implementation of the evacuation. Stalin's new initiative contrasted sharply with the Soviet position at the London conference a few days earlier. There Molotov had refused—even in private—to talk with the Chinese foreign minister about the Northeast. 9 Soon after Foreign Minister Wang Shijie came back from London, Ambassador Petrov came to his office to raise Moscow's concerns about the presence of American troops in North China. Petrov warned the Chinese government against relying on American assistance in taking over the Northeast. On October 19, the Soviet embassy hinted that Soviet cooperation on the Manchurian issue might depend on U.S. withdrawal from Hebei and Shandong. The Soviets also showed their displeasure directly toward the GMD delegation in Changchun by refusing to make any practical preparations for Jiang's takeover of Manchuria. Malinovskii turned down all GMD requests to let the National Army enter areas of the Northeast before Soviet forces had withdrawn. 1 0 Then, in late October, Stalin again replaced confrontation with caution. His erratic foreign policy had contributed to a further decline in Great Power relations since the London conference. On China Stalin now decided to make concessions to the GMD. On October 29, Marshal Malinovskii told General Xiong that Moscow would allow Jiang to begin landing troops at ports on the Manchurian coast. On November 1, in a much-publicized operation, the Red Army prevented CCP units from taking control of the telephone and telegraph centers in Jilin city. The same day, the Soviets forbid the Communists to circulate their own

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currency in the Northeast. Jiang's representatives in Changchun sensed that the diplomatic climate was changing, particularly after Malinovskii, in a private meeting with General Xiong on November 5, underlined that he did not want CCP activities to damage the good relationship between the Soviet Union and the Guomindang government. 1 1 Jiang decided to up the ante. With the date set for Soviet withdrawal approaching, the generalissimo in early November ordered his Northeastern Headquarters to leave Changchun for the south. Jiang wanted to make it plain to everybody—and particularly to the Americans—that the Soviets were deliberately obstructing his takeover of the Northeast and creating a crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. 12 But international pressure against Moscow was only one side of Jiang's new policy on the Northeast. While making public his disagreements with the Soviets, Jiang started secret negotiations with the Soviet ambassador in Chongqing to find a way both to save the Sino-Soviet treaty and to take over Manchuria. His new plan was a bold follow-up of the Moscow negotiations. Jiang would now ask Stalin to join in a scheme to prevent a CCP takeover of the Northeast. If Moscow postponed the Soviet troop-withdrawal until National Army units were in place in the Soviet occupied areas, Jiang would open talks on important economic concessions in Manchuria. 1 3 The older and the younger Jiang were both well aware that the Soviets had started dismantling industrial equipment in Manchuria in early October, presumably for transport to the Soviet Union. Stalin had raised the issue of "war booty" with Song in Moscow, and Malinovskii had startled Jiang Jingguo in mid-October by declaring that the Soviets would regard all factories funded, in whole or in part, by the Japanese as "war booty." After the September stalemate on reparations in Europe, the Soviets seemed to speed up their attempts to empty Manchuria of everything that could be of value to Soviet reconstruction. The Soviet actions, taken without any consultation with Chongqing, had deepened the anger of many GMD officials over events in the Northeast. 14 Jiang and his son felt that there was a potential for replacing the often irrational looting of Manchuria's industries by some form of economic cooperation between the Soviets and the Chinese. Since economic questions had not been on the agenda in Moscow, Jiang Jieshi now thought he had found an area where he could, without diplomatic loss, offer some new concessions to Stalin. These economic

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concessions might, in turn, save the alliance between Moscow and Chongqing. 15 Jiang's decisions were built on his analyses of both the international situation and the situation in the Northeast. The generalissimo felt that the diplomatic conflict with the United States had reduced Stalin's ability to put pressure on the Chinese government. Moscow might therefore be interested in renewing its cooperation with Chongqing. Jiang saw no contradiction between condemning Stalin in Washington, and his own wish for better relations with Moscow. The more intense the Soviet-American conflict became, the greater the chances that Stalin would seek accommodation with the Guomindang. The generalissimo had also realized that the CCP was gaining strength in the Northeast, and that time was running out for Chongqing. With the Red Army about to withdraw, the GMD forces therefore had to hurry to enter Manchuria and build up their own military positions. Jiang needed American support to get his troops to the Northeast, and Soviet support while taking over the region. By camouflaging his own diplomatic initiatives, the generalissimo hoped to get both. Jiang's proposals gave Stalin the opportunity to reconcile, at least for the moment, the two approaches in his China policy. He could avoid withdrawing from Manchuria while U.S. forces still remained in North China—and he could send a positive signal to Washington through his cooperation with Chongqing. The Soviet leader accepted Jiang's suggestion for further economic talks without delay. On November 13, Ambassador Petrov informed Wang Shijie that the Chinese airforce could use the Changchun airport to bring in troops. Four days later the Soviets agreed to postpone their withdrawal by one month, and promised to assist the Guomindang in taking over the Northeastern cities. On November 19, the Soviet commander in Changchun called in the leaders of different organizations in the city—most of them Communists—and declared that from now on it was "not permissible to oppose the Nationalist [GMD] government." All anti-Guomindang posters should be torn down and replaced with posters supporting Jiang's government and "international cooperation." 1 6 The Jiang family's new Soviet initiative was opposed by the generalissimo's closest foreign policy advisers. Song Ziwen had for some time urged a tougher attitude toward the Soviets. It was he who had suggested to withdraw the Northeastern Headquarters and to protest in public Soviet behavior in Manchuria. Now both he and Wang Shijie

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warned Jiang not to make any economic concessions to Stalin before the National Army had moved into Manchuria. When questioned by members of the Supreme National Defense Council, the foreign minister admitted that the Soviets themselves had wanted to prolong their occupation of Manchuria. But in spite of expressing to the generalissimo his grave doubts about the wisdom of Jiang's new approach, Wang did his best to defend it both in the Council and in conversations with individual Guomindang leaders. 17 In Changchun the leading Soviet adviser on economic affairs, Mikhail I. Sladkovskii, wasted no time in getting the economic talks started. Already the day before the announcement of the agreement from Chongqing, Sladkovskii kept repeating to his Chinese counterpart, Zhang Jia'ao, that "politics and economics are closely related." In their first formal meeting on November 20, Sladkovskii suggested that all Japanese owned enterprises now should be jointly owned and operated by the Chinese and the Soviet side on a 5 0 - 5 0 basis. He hoped that Zhang would stay on in Changchun to continue the negotiations. When Zhang responded that he would do so unless "the environment" interfered, the Russian hinted that "the environment can be overcome by fruitful work." 1 8 In spite of Sladkovskii's threats, the turnaround in Soviet policy did not depend on any immediate concessions from Chongqing. On November 24 Petrov went as far as to apologize to Wang Shijie for Soviet behavior in Manchuria over the last months. Jiang Jieshi felt that Stalin now had realized his weakness in East Asia, and had finally made up his mind to come to a complete settlement with the Chinese government. After the victory at Shanhaiguan, Jiang believed that China was at a turning point in the republic's history. In his diary he compared the military advance into Manchuria with the start of his Northern expedition twenty years before, and envisaged his dream of a united China within secure borders soon becoming a reality. 19 It is not clear whether Jiang had informed the Soviets in advance of the National Army's attack at Shanhaiguan. Coming as it did during the talks in Chongqing, the operation was an obvious effort to put additional pressure on Moscow. The Soviet response was to state that the Red Army was now evacuating southern Manchuria, and that it had ordered all "irregular troops" (meaning the CCP) to withdraw from the vicinity of communication lines and cities in the area. "In the final analysis," Marshal Malinovskii said, "our aim is to assist the Chinese government establish its political power in the Northeast." 2 0

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The diplomatic events of November 1945 were a double disaster for the Chinese Communists. The GMD attack on Shanhaiguan was a much bigger operation than earlier government offensives, and proved to the CCP leadership that Jiang's general military assault on the CCP had started. The open support the U.S. forces in North China had provided to the National Army during the attack made the situation very grave both for the party's diplomatic strategy and for its military plans. The Central Committee viewed the U.S. involvement as the opening of a new stage of American intervention, and believed that Washington now had sanctioned direct support for the GMD during offensives against the CCP-held areas. The battle of Shanhaiguan went badly for the Communists. Outnumbered, outgunned, and almost without contact with their rear areas, the commanders of the CCP forces saw little chance of victory. The Central Committee, emphasizing both the symbolic and the strategic importance of Shanhaiguan, was not willing to give up the area, and ordered Lin Biao to move more forces into battle. On November 20, after both the town of Shanhaiguan and most of the corridor leading into the Northeast had fallen to the GMD, Yan'an still urged the Northeastern Bureau to counterattack and to prevent the National Army from entering Manchuria in the east. Two days later, however, Lin Biao informed the Northeastern Bureau and the Central Committee that his forces could neither recapture Shanhaiguan nor prevent the Guomindang units from marching north. 2 1 As the CCP forces were fighting at Shanhaiguan, the other side of the November disaster struck the party. On November 17 the Soviet commander in Shenyang informed Peng Zhen, the head of the CCP Northeastern Bureau, that the Communists would have to evacuate the city within a week. The Red Army would also no longer allow the CCP to station troops near the airfields and railroads in the area. When the CCP representatives protested, the Soviets told them they had no choice. "If you do not leave," the Soviet general said, "we will use tanks to drive you o u t . " 2 2 The Northeastern Bureau soon learned that the Red Army commanders had given similar messages to the CCP leadership in all the cities in the Northeast—in Harbin on November 17, in Changchun and Jilin two days later. Even Peng Zhen, w h o was generally described as being "as cold as a piece of machinery," despaired over the Soviet attitude. On returning from a meeting with the Red Army generals, he flew into a rage. Wu Xiuquan remembers him as shouting: "The army

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of one Communist Party using tanks to drive out the army of another Communist Party! Something like this has never happened before. Can this kind of action be acceptable?" 23 Peng still could not believe that Moscow had sanctioned Malinovskii's orders, and asked Yan'an to get directly in touch with Stalin. Liu Shaoqi, who by mid-November had taken over the full day-to-day leadership of the Central Committee from an ill Mao Zedong, told Peng that the United States and the Guomindang had put pressure on the Soviet Union, and that the pressure seemed to have worked. Some days later Liu put the situation squarely to the Northeastern Bureau: The Red Army's anti-CCP actions in Manchuria revealed Moscow's fear of the United States. The party could not expect assistance from the Soviet Union in the vital battles that had just started. Liu told Peng and Chen Yun that the CCP now had to rely on its own strength and on the support the party had gained in the Northeast over the past two months. 24 In all the Northeastern cities the new Soviet policy soon led to a veritable purge of Communists from positions of leadership. In Harbin, for instance, the Red Army commander forced the provincial governor, the mayor, and the chief of police to all resign on the same day. The CCP leadership still regarded open resistance to the Soviets as pointless. Yan'an ordered its cadres and military units to withdraw from the cities as soon as possible, and not openly oppose instructions from the Red Army. Being under attack by the GMD a few miles to the south, and with the Americans playing an increasingly active role in assisting Jiang's army, Liu and his comrades could not risk a conflict with the Soviets at the same time. 25 Despite the Central Committee's policy of subservience the CCP's relations with the Soviets became very tense in some areas. In Shenshan, in southern Liaoning, the Soviet commander and the CCP cadres quarreled over who should have the equipment stored in Japanese warehouses. Both units were withdrawing—the Chinese to the east and the Soviets to the north—and there were few friendly feelings between the two on departure. In Changchun, in spite of Soviet orders, the CCP units withdrew only twenty kilometers outside the city and left behind a large number of cadres to infiltrate and sabotage the new GMD administration. As in August, most local CCP units tried not to oppose the Red Army, but to circumvent it and its instructions. 26 In southern Liaoning, where National Army troops were now flooding in in large numbers after the victory at Shanhaiguan, the CCP strategy had depended on sabotaging the railways to slow the GMD

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advance. Now, when the battle with Jiang's army had started, the local Soviet commanders shocked the CCP units by giving them the choice between leaving the railway zones or being disarmed by the Red Army. The Soviets also put pressure on CCP commanders not to attempt to stop the National Army's advance. Even before getting instructions from Lin Biao, the CCP units had no alternative but to withdraw into the woods and mountains to the east. The external crisis also led to an internal political crisis in the CCP. The party had been overtaken by events to such an extent that even the political dominance of Mao Zedong within the central organs of leadership was substantially weakened in the late fall of 1945. Judging from memoirs and contemporary reports, little of the criticism was delivered openly—something which is not surprising considering the harsh measures taken against dissenters during the previous years. The dissatisfaction with the political line instead surfaced in general discussions on military and political strategy. 27 Mao seems to have been criticized from two different perspectives. Some military commanders believed that the chairman had been wrong when limiting military operations in the first two months after the defeat of Japan in order to pursue negotiations with Jiang Jieshi. Crucial time had been lost in North China, and, in the end, nothing had been gained through the talks. Liu Shaoqi sent a long message to several generals—among them Li Xiannian and Zheng Lisan—praising the correctness of Mao Zedong Thought on military affairs in order to counter such criticism. Sent on the day of Mao's return from Chongqing, Liu's message told the generals that Mao's works included "the most important writings on military affairs in world marxism." 2 8 The group that led the Chongqing talks—Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei in particular—were also dissatisfied with Mao's policies. In his report to the Central Committee in early December on the CCP-GMD talks, Zhou stated that agreement had indeed been possible, but that internal Guomindang politicking and the "armed incidents" had led to the breakdown of the negotiations. He recommended that the party from n o w on stress "political factors" in its dealings with the government. Contrary to the military commanders, Zhou felt that Mao's unwillingness to make concessions on military or strategic issues had been the major CCP mistake during the negotiations. 29 Mao Zedong withdrew from day-to-day leadership of the party sometime in November. His "period of rest" was both due to a need to recuperate from physical illness, and connected to a sense of political

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failure. As some fifteen years later, Mao also used his retreat to ponder new ways out of the pit into which the party had fallen. In early November he wrote to Zhou Enlai that "U.S. policy [is] well worth paying attention to, [and] ideas of friendship [are] worthwhile to consider." The problem was, according to Mao, that it was difficult for the CCP to make any concessions as long as it was under attack both by the Americans and by the GMD. Mao asked whether the CCP could, under such circumstances, trust guarantees given for the safety of its forces. 30 The events of late November laid bare to the CCP leadership not only the party's failure to achieve international support and recognition, but also the vital importance of foreign relations to the party's future strategy. Even if Mao may have contemplated a radically new approach to the United States before Shanhaiguan, the increasingly active role played by the U.S. Marines in GMD strategy in North China in early winter 1945 closed that alternative. Liu Shaoqi and other CCP leaders now believed that it would be impossible to break the alliance between Jiang and the Americans, and that if the party was to get any foreign support at all it had to improve its relations with the Soviet Union. The party leadership summed up this realization in its instructions. "The central question in today's world is the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, as reflected in China in the struggle between Jiang and the CCP," the Central Committee declared. "To conduct this struggle smoothly," the Northeastern Bureau explained on November 26, "the Soviet Union must first secure the initiative, and therefore our party and our army cadres must stop operating openly in the cities, and [our] organizations must speedily evacuate Red Army controlled areas. . . . [This is] a tactic to break up U.S.-Jiang diplomacy, so that it will be impossible for the United States to intervene on the side of Jiang in a civil war." 3 1 But the subservient role of the party in its alliance with the Soviet Union did not mean that the CCP should give up all of its own aims in Manchuria. "Our present task is to respect the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. . . and to fight for the big cities," the Northeastern Bureau concluded. It reminded its cadres that they could still "do everything that is not detrimental to Soviet diplomacy," like infiltration of police, administration, and public services in order to prepare for the withdrawal of the Red Army. 32 Chen Yun, member of the Political Bureau and head of the CCP's North Manchuria Subbureau, emphasized the hopes for a change in

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Soviet policy in a memorandum to party cadres a few days after the evacuation of Harbin. Chen hoped that if the CCP did not "give the Soviets too many difficulties in their dealings with the Guomindang" the local Soviet commanders would ultimately "help our party develop [its] strength in Manchuria." 3 3 But even if the party leadership had decided to accept Soviet orders in an almost desperate attempt to forge a future alliance with Moscow, Yan'an was still caught in the diplomatic morass of the present. The Central Committee keenly realized how complex the situation was. "Jiang's policy," it said in a message to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Bureau, "is to neutralize the Soviet Union while fighting the Communists. . . . The policy of the Soviet Union is . . . [to] make Jiang neutral during its period of struggle with the United States, to make sure that Jiang does not ally with the Americans." The CCP had to show Moscow that its conflict with Jiang "has nothing to do with the Soviet Union." On the other hand, the Central Committee said, the party had to "reduce its present difficulties with the United States." The success of the ongoing struggle with Jiang depended on keeping the Americans out of the military conflict. Yan'an instructed all CCP military units to avoid any incidents and to "reduce the possibility for U.S. provocations." 34 While the battle of Shanhaiguan was still being fought, the Central Committee also discussed h o w to employ the second most powerful weapon of the Communists: propaganda. The party had up to now only sparingly used nationalist sentiments in its general agitation against U.S. intervention, presumably for fear that the same arguments could be used with greater effect against any CCP-Soviet collaboration in Manchuria. Zhou Enlai, among others, felt that the CCP had to be more aggressive in terms of propaganda, and wanted to intensify the campaign against civil war by appealing to Chinese unity against American imperialist designs. On November 5 Mao told Zhou that he had asked a group of cadres to develop a large number of new materials for use in the campaign against U.S. intervention. Then, on November 17—the day Shanhaiguan fell—the Central Committee ordered the propaganda groups in North China and the Northeast to start proclaiming that the Guomindang was led by foreigners, and that the Communist Party was defending China against U.S. imperialism. When the party was in great danger, no weapon could be left unused. 3 5 North of the Great Wall the military situation went from bad to worse for the CCP. Huludao fell to the National Army on November 24,

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and the strategically important town of Jinxian fell the next day. Within a week Jiang's armies were less than a hundred miles south of Shenyang, and had taken control of all the ports on the eastern side of the Bohai Gulf. Several factors hindered the Communists' resistance. The Soviets pressured the CCP units to avoid making battle with the National Army, and refused to let the party use the railways to carry troops. The Communists, even in defensive operations, were therefore at a severe disadvantage compared to the mechanized units of the U n equipped GMD Seventh and Thirteenth armies. 36 On top of these logistic disadvantages, the CCP commanders also could not agree on what strategy to use in fighting the GMD onslaught. Yan'an's initial instructions had been to defend Shanhaiguan at all costs. When this proved impossible, Liu for more than two weeks left strategy to the commanders in the Northeast. Lin Biao, the commanding general of all CCP forces in Manchuria, believed that the party had to be ready to take over the cities when the Soviets withdrew, and was therefore unwilling to send more troops to peripheral, but defensible, base areas as advocated by North Manchurian leaders Chen Yun and Gao Gang. Lin's position was initially supported by Peng Zhen, but opposed by the military cadres in command of the units that had fought the National Army's advance, like Li Yunchang and Luo Ronghuan. 3 7 The debate over military strategy peaked at a meeting of CCP commanders held in Fuxin in mid-December. The discussion at the meeting was intense and complex. Li and Luo faulted Lin Biao for, among other mistakes, not committing enough forces to fight the National Army entering southern Manchuria. Lin was unwilling to take too many units away from the central and western areas for any purpose, hoping to use these forces to reenter the cities. According to Nie Rongzhen, Lin told his commanders: "I have made a policy decision and will not change it. If it is necessary to fight [in the south] . . ., you, Li Yunchang, go ahead!" The Fuxin conference broke up with mutual recriminations and without any strategic plan. On December 30, Fuxin fell to the GMD. 38 Lin's insistence on the correctness of his strategy damaged party unity, in particular since Yan'an already on November 28 had opposed his ideas. Liu Shaoqi had given instructions that emphasized both the strengthening of rural base areas, mostly in the north, and defensive action against the National Army advance in the western regions where the enemy had not yet entered Manchuria. Liu's reasons for selecting this strategy were as much political as military. By avoiding massive

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confrontation with the GMD in the Northeast, and concentrate on holding the line outside the areas from which the Red Army was withdrawing, Liu hoped first of all to placate the Soviets. The acting chairman said that the cities would have to be given up for now, and Peng Zhen, falling in line, told the Northeastern cadres that the CCP should not resist Jiang's army in areas controlled by the Soviets.39 Peng wrote his message first of all to assuage criticism of the Soviet Union in the party branches in the Northeast. He emphasized that the party leadership had decided that Soviet policy was not one of "unreasonable limitations" or "Rightist deviation," but part of the international diplomatic struggle against the United States and Jiang. The setbacks for the CCP were only temporary, Peng said, and their reasons should not be discussed openly because of the "international aspects" of the issue. Luo Ronghuan, one of the ablest and best-liked of the CCP commanders, joined Peng in an intense appeal for unity based on the Central Committee's decision. "In this situation," Luo said, "we must definitely stay united. If not . . . [we] might be driven into the sea." 4 0 As the military and diplomatic situation for the CCP deteriorated, Liu went out of his way to stress the political moderation of the party both in terms of its attitudes toward the government and in terms of policy in the CCP-held areas. From late November on internal party study materials emphasized "unity with the masses" and moderation on questions of land-ownership and finance. An outline for discussion in party units told the members that the party's policy is not to overthrow Jiang, but to convince him to institute reforms. The political message, given in quotes from Mao Zedong, was for a return to the line from the Seventh Congress. In the hope of party unity and new negotiations in Chongqing Liu Shaoqi pulled out Mao, the pragmatic politician from QiDa, to replace Mao, the failed negotiator, as chief party symbol. 41 As Liu struggled to propagate the new party line, he was eagerly looking for improvements in the international situation. The news that Ambassador Hurley had resigned and would be replaced as U.S. envoy by George Marshall reached Yan'an on November 28. To the CCP leaders the report that they were rid of Patrick Hurley was good news in a bleak period. When Harry Truman called General Marshall late in the afternoon on November 27, the president had not yet made up his mind about his new China policy. Hurley's resignation—and his charges to the press that U.S. foreign policy was directed by "imperialists" and "Commu-

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nists"—came as complete surprises to the president and required immediate attention. Truman was angry. He needed somebody to "top" Hurley on the China issue, and the president and his cabinet thought the general was the perfect choice. Marshall at once agreed to go to China as Truman's special envoy. The announcement that Marshall would replace Hurley took public attention away from the former ambassador's charges—and put the best man imaginable on the thomy task of dealing with China. As Matt Connelly later observed, "George C. Marshall in Mr. Truman's eyes could never do anything wrong." 4 2 Having found the "right" envoy, it now remained to find the "right" policy. Truman was well aware that public dissatisfaction with the U.S. troop presence in China was on the rise, and that a comprehensive new statement on the administration's China policy was much in demand. An Ohio congressman, William R. Thom, wrote Byrnes on November 23 that "my mail is filled with demands for an explanation of why we are keeping Marines in the parts of China where a civil war is in progress." Other congressmen had prompted Hurley's resignation by calling for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from China (although the ambassador's reading of these resolutions as Communist- and imperialist-inspired exemplified his somewhat unique worldview). 43 The main parts of the drafting of the new China policy took place in the War Department under Marshall's direction. The new envoy and his advisers were particularly concerned over Soviet policy in Manchuria, as they had been since early fall. The Marshall Mission would aim at strengthening the Chinese government—through a cease-fire and political negotiations between the different parties—and thereby make it easier for Chongqing to resist Soviet demands. "Manchuria should not be allowed to become like Mongolia," the War Department told Wedemeyer. Warning of Soviet intentions in China, the head of the War Department's Operations Division, General Hull, told Marshall that "there is grave doubt that the situation in Manchuria will await the outcome of Chinese internal negotiations." Hull felt that the United States should give full support to Jiang's efforts to occupy North China and the Northeast, even while negotiations were going on. 4 4 Marshall also sought advice from the commanding general of the China theater. General Wedemeyer candidly informed his former superior that the United States was moving GMD troops to Hebei to take part in offensives against the CCP. He also told the new envoy that his headquarters had not yet evacuated the remaining Japanese because the Chinese government needed them in its battles with the Commu-

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nists. Wedemeyer explained that the Japanese troops, among other tasks, supplemented American and GMD forces in guarding the strategic railways in North China. Marshall did not comment on Wedemeyer's telegram, nor did he question General Hull's analysis of the military situation. 45 Secretary of State Byrnes at first objected to making further military commitments a part of the new China policy. Byrnes felt that the transport of several U.S.-equipped GMD armies to the north "would prejudice the objectives of the military truce." The secretary argued that China needed domestic peace to gain control of Manchuria. Soon, however, the State Department gave in under pressure from the secretary of war and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On December 11 Byrnes agreed to War Department plans for shipping Jiang's armies to Manchuria and North China. General Marshall summed up U.S. policy in a meeting with Truman on December 14. Even if he could not get Jiang to agree to a political settlement, Marshall said, "it would still be necessary for the United States Government, through me, to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of China—through the Generalissimo." 46 The day after this meeting, Truman finally released his long-awaited statement on U.S. China policy. While primarily based on the preceding policy debate, the statement also echoed Edwin Locke's August report. Truman made clear that the Marines would remain in North China to disarm and evacuate Japanese troops, but also emphasized that it was the duty of the U.S. representatives in China to assist in creating "a unified, democratic, and peaceful nation." This, Truman said, could only be achieved through cessation of hostilities and a negotiated "broadening" of the government. On this last point, the president both proclaimed his full support for the National Government and criticized it for being based only on one party, while blaming the CCP for making political unity impossible through the creation of a separate army. In conclusion, Truman promised increased American economic and military assistance to China if the Chinese parties followed his prescription for "peace and unity." 4 7 The main thrust of Truman's statement was to make clear, domestically and internationally, that the United States government had both the will and the right to intervene in China. The message was not welcome in Moscow. On December 19, Pravda made its strongest criticism yet of U.S. policy in China, charging that the United States supported "Chinese reactionaries." The newspaper also condemned the

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U.S. military presence in North China, while unmistakably linking it to Soviet interests in Manchuria. "The Soviet Union," the article said, "borders on Manchuria, but North China is far from the United States." 46 Stalin's hope of linking the Soviet and the American military presence in China was also evident in the preparations for the meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain scheduled to take place in Moscow in late December. When Washington told the Soviets of its wish to place Manchuria on the agenda, Molotov immediately insisted on also including U.S. withdrawal from China and British withdrawal from Greece as topics for the meeting. At the first day of the conference the Soviet foreign minister tried to tip the balance further by suggesting that the three should discuss U.S. withdrawal, but not Manchuria, "since the Soviet government had a special agreement with the Chinese government on this." 49 James Byrnes hoped that the foreign ministers' meeting could rescue at least the semblance of Great Power cooperation. He believed China was a possible area for compromise. Byrnes therefore avoided pushing the Soviets on Manchuria, instead waiting for a Soviet initiative. As the secretary of state had hoped, Molotov soon presented a Soviet proposal, suggesting that both sides should withdraw their military forces from China by mid-January 1946.50 The Soviet foreign minister repeated his suggestion when meeting with the Americans on December 23. Byrnes refused to agree to the specifics of the Soviet proposal, but still wanted to keep the door open for further talks on China. Molotov, disappointed, threatened the Americans by saying that the Soviet Union would not like to leave Soviet troops "unnecessarily" in Manchuria—clearly implying that they might have to, if the United States did not withdraw from North China. "American forces in North China was a new development. . . that had not been contemplated when the Soviet government signed its agreement with China," Molotov said. Byrnes, angered by Soviet tactics, suggested that Molotov kept repeating this point "merely because he liked the sound of his [Byrnes'] voice. Molotov replied that he found Mr. Byrnes' voice very pleasant, but even more pleasant would be an agreement for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops." The meeting ended in a deadlock.51 Averell Harriman was not disappointed over the inconclusive BymesMolotov talks on China. During the meeting he had passed several notes to Byrnes stressing the need to involve Jiang Jieshi in any settlement. Harriman had feared for a repetition of the events at Yalta the

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year before, and disliked Byrnes' attempts to make a deal with the Soviets. The ambassador was also worried over the selection of General Marshall as special envoy to China. In Harriman's view the general was not sufficiently aware of the "Russian danger." 52 In spite of the tension of the Bymes-Molotov meeting on China, the final communiqué from the conference sounded like the Great Powers had reached some sort of agreement. Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, the communiqué said, were "in complete accord as to the desirability of the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practicable moment." The communiqué also stressed that the three were "in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife." 53 The communiqué was, in part, the result of Stalin's own intervention in the talks. Attempting to use the China issue to avoid breaking with the Americans, Stalin arranged a special meeting with Byrnes late in the evening on December 23. The Soviet leader told the secretary of state that "the Soviet government would have no objection if the United States wished to leave its troops [in China], but they would merely like to be told about it." Clearly singling out China as an area of special promise in Soviet-American relations, Stalin warned Byrnes that such "smaller countries" were "not always adverse to attempting to promote friction between large powers." Byrnes interpreted Stalin as saying that the Soviets would accept the U.S. presence in China if some kind of joint statement on the issue came out of the Moscow meeting. Believing that he had found a compromise on China, the secretary on Christmas Eve informed Truman that "we are in general accord as to Far Eastern issues." 54 The international developments in December had a profound impact on the political situation in China. For the Guomindang the period between Hurley's resignation and Truman's statement was filled with hope. The GMD forces were advancing in the Northeast, and the Soviets seemed willing to cooperate with Chongqing even against the CCP. Jiang was sorry to lose Hurley as U.S. ambassador, but Wei Daoming, Jiang's ambassador in Washington, told the generalissimo that no new policy should be expected from Marshall. Ambassador Wei had met with Truman early in the day on November 27, before the president learned about Hurley's resignation. Wei

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had asked for the meeting in order to get Truman's answer to a long message from Jiang on November 23. In his telegram the generalissimo had accused the Soviets of using the CCP to dominate Manchuria and North China, and had appealed for immediate U.S. assistance in transporting more GMD forces to the north. In his meeting with Wei, Truman promised further military and diplomatic assistance to the Chinese government—without making any specific commitments—and underlined his support for Hurley's views. In his report to Jiang, Wei took for granted that the president already knew about Hurley's resignation. The ambassador therefore interpreted Truman's praise for Hurley as a sign that U.S. China policy would not change." In Chongqing, Jiang Jieshi believed that Truman's appointment of Marshall precipitated a strong increase in American military and political involvement in China. Jiang based his view both on Wei Daoming's reports and on the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staffs plan for a permanent military advisory group to China, which leaked to the press on December 2. The generalissimo thought that the increased U.S. involvement would strengthen him in his conflict with the CCP. But he also feared that Marshall's arrival posed a danger to his diplomatic strategy in the Northeast. The Americans might want to place constraints on GMD diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—as they had threatened to do the previous August. The generalissimo, while making charges against the Soviets in Washington in order to get U.S. support, had continued his secret contacts with Moscow. He hoped for a more far-ranging settlement with Stalin before the Americans got too involved. 56 To get this settlement, Jiang wanted to send his son, Jiang Jingguo, to Moscow for direct talks with the Soviet leader. The generalissimo was particularly interested in finding out what Stalin's precise wishes were concerning economic cooperation in Manchuria. Jiang also believed that the scheduling of the talks would give his forces time to strike at the CCP in the Northeast without having to fear complications with Moscow. Wang Shijie presented the offer to Ambassador Petrov on December 7. The Soviets quickly gave the go-ahead for the younger Jiang to visit immediately after the Moscow foreign ministers's meeting ended. 57 In anticipation of his son's visit to the Kremlin, Jiang Jieshi did his utmost to smooth relations with the Soviets. He instructed his representatives in Manchuria to avoid raising the CCP problem with Malinovskii, and ordered the Foreign Ministry to avoid conflict with the Soviets on such other issues as Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang. Wang Shijie,

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who saw less and less to gain from trying to work with the Soviets, accepted Jiang's orders. Privately the foreign minister hoped that Marshall's mission would strengthen cooperation between the United States and Chinese government against the Soviet Union. In his diary he commented that the selection of the general as Truman's representative was certainly connected to increasing worries in the White House over Soviet intentions in the Northeast. 58 Other members of the Guomindang did not view Marshall's mission with such optimism. Chen Lifu, a leader of the GMD right wing, was having lunch with Jiang Jieshi when Wang brought the news of the appointment of Marshall. Chen immediately saw problems with the appointment. He told Wang and Jiang that they ought to inform the Americans that the CCP was an internal problem. Now that the Soviet Union had realized that they could not support the CCP, Jiang should not allow the Americans to save the Communists through negotiations. Marshall was too big, Chen said, "he could force a solution." 59 Hurley's resignation was good news to Yan'an, even if Liu and Zhou believed, as did the GMD, that the change in personnel did not signal any immediate change in U.S. policy. Just the departure of the hated Patrick Hurley gave reason to celebrate. Xinhua ribao, the Communist daily in Chongqing, hailed the resignation of Hurley and hoped that Washington would end the reactionary and misguided policy of which the ambassador had been a promoter and symbol. The first step of such a reorientation should be the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines who now stood "on the side of the antidemocratic and antipopular GMD troops [and the] puppet and Japanese troops. This is an insult to the American soldiers and people set up by Hurley and the reactionaries." 60 But for Yan'an the main diplomatic news of late November did not come from Washington, but from Moscow. In a remarkable replay of the events of late August, the Soviets suddenly signaled their renewed interest in the CCP. Starting on November 27—the very day Hurley resigned—Stalin sent a series of messages to Yan'an, in which he indicated that he still wanted to cooperate with the CCP in Manchuria. On December I the Central Committee informed its delegation in Chongqing that "the Soviet attitude is now becoming clear" and that Moscow wanted to negotiate and to develop relations with the CCP. Even more important, Stalin had told Yan'an that the Soviets had prevented the entry of U.S. forces into the Northeast. To Liu these messages must have indicated that the possibility for a Great Power compromise, which

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would at least keep the United States from intervening militarily, had still not completely disappeared. The policy of compliance with the Red Army's requests in Manchuria seemed to be paying off. 61 While Liu Shaoqi believed that Stalin's initiative had caused Hurley's resignation, it is more probable that the Soviet change in policy was based on the improved relationship Stalin now felt he had with the Guomindang. If Moscow now had avoided direct conflict with Jiang it could run the risk of renewed contacts with the CCP, at least on a low level. The Soviets had nothing to gain from giving the CCP the impression that the party was being thrown to the wolves by Moscow—at least as long as Soviet contacts with the CCP did not interfere with Stalin's diplomacy. The messages from Moscow led Liu Shaoqi to believe that the Soviets and the American "progressives" had defeated Hurley's policies, and that the Marshall Mission therefore might foreshadow an end to U.S. military support for Jiang. In its messages to regional military commanders in early December Yan'an stressed the need for a purely defensive strategy south of the Great Wall in order to promote the possibility for political talks with the government. The party leadership also decided to send Zhou Enlai back to Chongqing as head of the CCP delegation to the People's Consultative Conference, a clear indication that Yan'an was ready to negotiate. 62 The CCP leadership—eagerly looking for positive signs in the international arena—interpreted Truman's statement as a further improvement in U.S. policy. The Central Committee's public response to the statement was very favorable, and included the most friendly references to the United States in the Communist press for several months. The U.S. observer mission in Yan'an reported that "if Marshall uses the opportunity, the Communists will throw themselves in the lap of the U.S." 6 3 Internally the party's leaders concluded that "the United States has decided not to get directly involved in China's civil war." Yan'an said that this decision was a major step forward for the party, even if the CCP could never change the basic U.S. policy of support for Jiang. Seen in the context of Truman's statement, Marshall's arrival provided an excellent opportunity for new talks with the GMD. Yan'an ordered the party branches to intensify the work with contacting American officers and generally show personal friendship toward Americans in China. 64 In political terms the Guomindang paid a heavy price for its military victories in November and December 1945. Many Chinese, particularly

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intellectuals, concluded that the government and the Americans were responsible for starting a full-scale civil war. When added to existing complaints against government corruption and mismanagement, these sentiments led to large antigovemment rallies in several major cities. The Communists had been laying the organizational groundwork for some of these demonstrations, but in most cases the participation went far beyond CCP sympathizers. In Kunming, where the demonstrations started on November 25, large crowds of college and high school students demanding an end to the civil war were attacked by police and soldiers.65 The brutal treatment of the Kunming students fueled student unrest in other cities. Many of the student rallies blamed the United States for its intervention in China. In Kunming a student spokesman told reporters that the protesters knew well that "the bullets that flew last night were American." In Chengdu the demonstrations stopped outside the United States Information Service (USIS) building to shout slogans demanding U.S. withdrawal from China. The USIS report to Chongqing told of a "student who had aided the U.S. army as interpreter until the end of the war . . . [writing] on the building's wall the following three words in impressive block letters—'HANDS OFF CHINA!' " 6 6

SEVEN The Soviet Withdrawal and the Coming of the Civil War

When Jiang Jingguo entered the Kremlin halls for the first of his talks with Stalin, he already knew that he had been sent on a vague mission and could expect little but vagueness in return from his host. Jiang had come to Moscow on orders from his father, but had neither offers to make nor concessions to give to the Soviets. The older Jiang had designed the visit in part to reassure Moscow of his friendship, in part to get to know Stalin's exact price for cooperation in Manchuria. Jiang Jieshi was interested in making yet another deal with the Soviets, but this time he wanted Stalin to do the bidding. 1 Jiang Jingguo had a keener understanding of both Soviet diplomacy and the situation in the Northeast than had his father. The younger Jiang had spent parts of his youth in Moscow, married a Russian woman, and had closely watched the development of Stalin's foreign policy over the last decade. While on service in Manchuria he had noted that the Soviets were willing to work with the GMD, if the price was right. Jiang did not know whether his father was willing or able to pay the price for future Soviet cooperation, and had hoped for clearer instructions before going to Moscow. His Northeastern service had also

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convinced him of the growing power of the CCP in that area, and he realized that if the GMD was to strike a deal with the Soviets it had to act quickly. 2 As Jiang Jingguo had expected, Stalin proved unwilling to show his hand. Jiang's visit was therefore reduced to a sounding board for the Soviet leader's frustrations over American China policy. "You Chinese should be aware of this:" Stalin told Jiang, "the Americans think they can use China as an instrument to satisfy their own interests, (and] when they do not need you anymore you are certain to be sacrificed." In spite of the warning, Stalin repeated that he was not opposed to general Sino-American cooperation. Instead he lashed out at the presence of U.S. military forces in North China. The Soviet leader stated plainly that if Jiang Jieshi allowed the United States to station troops in China, then the Northeastern question would become "more complicated." 3 While Jiang Jingguo met with Stalin in Moscow, Ambassador Petrov in Chongqing informed the Chinese foreign minister that the Soviet Union had accepted Generalissimo Jiang's suggestion that the Red Army postpone its withdrawal to February 1. Listening to the Soviet ambassador, Wang Shijie was genuinely surprised. The foreign minister had never made such a proposal on his government's behalf, and angrily demanded to know who had. Petrov said that Jiang Jingguo and Zhang Jia'ao had presented the request in Changchun on the generalissimo's behalf, before the younger Jiang went to Moscow. 4 However upset Wang was over Jiang's secret diplomacy—secret even to the foreign minister of his own government—he realized that there was nothing he could do to change the situation. On December 31, Wang informed Petrov that his government accepted the Soviet proposal, taking care not to admit that the suggestion originally had come from the Chinese side. 5 Wang learned about the communiqué of the Moscow conference of foreign ministers just before he wrote his reply to Petrov. To Wang the text of the communiqué was "problematic." He feared that some of its points could give support to CCP demands. The foreign minister also worried that the Soviets and the Americans may have made a secret agreement at Moscow at his government's expense. 6 Even though the background of the Moscow conference differed markedly from Yalta, officials both in Chongqing and Washington feared for a repetition of the events of early 1945, when Stalin and Roosevelt had tried to find a China policy satisfactory for both great powers.

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The Communist Party interpreted the Moscow communiqué as being exactly the Great Power settlement that Wang feared and that Mao had proclaimed inevitable at the Seventh Congress. The communiqué confirmed Stalin's claims that he had succeeded in getting both political and military concessions from the Americans on China, and became yet another indication for Yan'an that its policy of close alliance with the Soviets was working. The party's public statement hailed the Moscow decisions, which it claimed "fit in with the urgent demands of the Chinese people." 7 Internally the Communist leaders were even more positive in their reaction to the three-power communiqué. The Central Committee told Zhou Enlai and the CCP Chongqing delegation that the Americans and the Soviets had agreed on a GMD-CCP cease-fire in Moscow. This agreement meant that the GMD would have to accept a truce in the fighting. Yan'an was still not certain what the Moscow decisions regarding a "broadening" of the government and U.S.-Soviet military withdrawal would mean in practice. The Central Committee told Zhou that the Great Powers had sent General Marshall to China to carry out their agreement, but Yan'an had as yet no indication of his full mandate. 8 In the weeks after the Soviets had thrown the Communist cadres out of the Northeastern cities, CCP morale had reached its lowest point in several years. By late December, however, the optimism of the party leadership had recovered substantially. First Soviet and then American policy had changed for the better. On the domestic side, Jiang Jieshi had, in spite of his military successes, alienated large groups of urban Chinese through his policies. Lastly, party unity seemed to have been largely restored through Mao Zedong's decisive intervention in the debate over military strategy in the Northeast. Mao's reappearance as the main policymaker within the CCP leadership came as a result of the Manchurian crisis. In spite of his many attempts, Liu Shaoqi had not been able to force the commanders in the Northeast to agree on a strategy. Liu lacked the combination of political and military prestige that was Mao's main strength in the party. By the time of the Fuxin conference, the leaders of the Central Committee must have realized that only the return of the chairman to the political leadership could force all the Northeastern commanders to submit to Yan'an's orders. 9 On December 28 Mao sent a telegram to the CCP commanders and the party's political leadership in the Northeast supporting Liu's views.

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The Communists should not concentrate their activities "in the big cities or along the main lines of communication," Mao said. Taking note of the dissatisfaction and dissent in the CCPs Northeastern branches, the chairman stressed the grave consequences of party disunity. Because of the "political conditions," the Central Committee had decided that the party now would build its Manchurian bases in the peripheral areas and not challenge the GMD's hold on the cities. Militarily, Mao said, the CCP's main task was still to resist the GMD offensive against the Communist base areas north and northwest of Beijing.10 The diplomatic events of late December further strengthened Mao's position in the party. As Mao had predicted, the Great Powers would not run the risk of an unstable East Asia as the result of a Chinese civil war. After the Moscow meeting, the party leadership thought it likely that the CCP could achieve a negotiated settlement with the GMD without having to give up the party's autonomy. The Soviet-American agreement would help the party achieve its political goals. The chairman now convinced himself and the other party leaders that the period he had foreseen at the Seventh Congress was finally at hand. 11 When he arrived in Chongqing on December 21 George Marshall had no idea of how the Chinese parties perceived his mission. Neither did he have any plan for how to achieve his mission's aims, which indeed in themselves were vague enough to fit almost any interpretation. The general had two concerns at the front of his mind. His commanderin-chief had asked him to make peace in China, and his colleagues in the War Department wanted the Soviets out of Manchuria as soon as possible. Marshall wanted to achieve both these aims, one at a time. 12 The general understood that a cease-fire had to be the immediate objective. He also realized that his best chance of achieving this aim would be if he could get the CCP-GMD negotiations going again before he made any formal requests to the parties. Already from his first meeting with Jiang, Marshall pressed for such negotiations to start. Marshall ignored the generalissimo's long explanations of how the Communists, in league with the Soviet Union, stood in the way of Chinese unity. "The American people does not wish to interfere in China's domestic affairs," Marshall said, but he added that he hoped Jiang would resume talks with the CCP as soon as possible.13 After seeing Marshall, Jiang was left with the impression that the general demanded that he take an initiative to get negotiations going.

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The GMD leader was reluctant to enter into new talks with the Communists, both because of his experiences from the failed negotiations the previous fall, and because of his present plans for military offensives. He realized, however, that it would be difficult for him to ignore Marshall's wishes. His government needed American diplomatic, military, and economic support. Jiang understood that Marshall's orders were to achieve negotiations, and he had to make sure that the prominent new U.S. envoy would not turn against his regime. 14 Second, Jiang realized that a new negotiating initiative would be good politics in China. While fuming over the anti-civil war protests held by "disobedient and uninformed" students in early December, Jiang knew that using his army against the Communists was not a popular measure, particularly not in those areas that had just been liberated from Japanese occupation. 15 Marshall's tactic worked. After meeting with the U.S. envoy, Jiang ordered his advisers to present a proposal for a truce to Zhou and the CCP group in Chongqing. The Communists presented their counterproposal on January 3. As could be expected, the GMD insisted on freely moving its troops through to North China and the Northeast during a truce, while the CCP demanded that all forces should remain where they were at the time of the cease-fire. 16 At this point Marshall—who had taken care not to intervene formally during the first CCP-GMD contacts—read his own draft to both Zhou and the GMD chief negotiator, General Zhang Zhun. The draft asked concessions from both parties, but the main concession would have to come from the CCP. Marshall asked Zhou to agree to the free movement of GMD troops with U.S. assistance into the Northeast. 17 Zhou readily agreed to most of Marshall's suggestions. On the question of the Northeast, however, the Communist chief delegate suggested that the area be left out of the formal agreement altogether. If not, Zhou said, the Soviet Union would also have to be consulted. But after several meetings between himself. General Zhang, and Marshall—now set up as formal negotiating group—Zhou Enlai came around to accept Marshall's recommendation on the Northeast. On January 8 Zhou agreed to add a memorandum to the cease-fire order, stating that the order "does not prejudice military movements of forces of the National Army into or within Manchuria that are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty." 18 When Zhou also proved willing to give the government the right to almost unrestricted movement of troops in South China, Marshall real-

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ized that agreement was at hand. He moved quickly to present the points the two sides had agreed on to Jiang, in form of a draft cease-fire order that had Marshall's own support. Jiang had little choice but to accept the outcome. The "Committee of Three"—Zhou, Zhang, and Marshall—put their signatures on the document on January 10. Jiang and Mao ordered their forces to comply with the cease-fire from midnight on January 1 3 . " In less than two weeks General Marshall had achieved one of his primary objectives in China. The cease-fire agreement was, understandably, an enormous personal boost for the general. Marshall now felt that he could handle the Chinese situation, and that he had proven wrong those who had told him that he had come on an impossible mission. Knowing next to nothing about Chinese politics, Marshall did not understand that the cease-fire agreement was as much a result of domestic forces as of his mediation tactics. His intervention had decided the timing of the agreement, but was not, by itself, enough to force further concessions from the two parties. 20 Marshall did realize, however, that he had to enforce the cease-fire if the agreement was to survive. Taking up one of Zhou's proposals, he had suggested that the Committee of Three set up a joint U.S.-GMDCCP Executive Headquarters in Beijing to report on any violations of the truce. This headquarters could in turn send lower-level "committees of three" to places where the truce was threatened by offensive action by either of the parties. The American involvement, Marshall hoped, might prove sufficient to enforce the truce. 21 The negotiations had succeeded with such speed that the Beijing Headquarters had to start working almost overnight. Marshall's assistant, Colonel Henry Byroade, commanded all available U.S. transport planes in China to get the CCP and GMD delegations to Beijing, and to fly in the equipment needed for the Headquarters. He took over the two main hotels in the city, and installed one Chinese delegation in each. The Executive Headquarters was operative the day after Jiang and Mao signed the cease-fire agreement. 22 Both Yan'an and the generalissimo were surprised by how quickly their negotiators had come to terms, and by the speed with which the Americans had set up the control mechanism. Even while agreeing to sign, Jiang had planned to take over several strategic towns in the Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan regions before the cease-fire became effective. In December the generalissimo had decided to divert some of his divisions from marching on Shenyang, which was already in GMD

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hands, and make use of weak CCP defenses to destroy their hold on these regions bordering on Manchuria. On January 7 he ordered Du Yuming, the commander of his northern forces, to intensify the attack on Rehe and Chahar. At the same time Fu Zuoyi's forces continued their attack from the west, and seized Jining, the CCP's key town in eastern Suiyuan, on the night the cease-fire went into effect.23 Yan'an also regarded the exact timing of the cease-fire as inconvenient, because Mao had decided to counterattack to regain the parts of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan already lost to the National Army. These were areas of Communist strength, and Mao wanted to show the party what the CCP armies could achieve if their strategy was united. While grudgingly accepting the cease-fire order, Nie Rongzhen, the CCP area commander, still asked for and got permission from Yan'an to recapture Jining. Nie rushed CCP units from all the three regions toward Jining on January 14.24 The Executive Headquarters' attempts to stop the fighting at Jining reveal the overall strengths and weaknesses of Marshall's approach. The Headquarters sent a "committee of three" to Zhangjiakou to meet with Nie. The CCP commander kept the committee in Zhangjiakou for thirty-six hours—until his forces had recaptured Jining on the morning of January 17. He then let the committee proceed to Jining, while telling the CCP officers there to get rid of the bodies and deny that any battle had taken place. Skirmishes of this sort continued all over North China, even while the cease-fire was generally observed by both sides.25 On the day the two parties signed the cease-fire order, the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) finally met in Chongqing. The conference, which included representatives of all political parties, was a product of the Mao-Jiang negotiations in October, and had as its mandate to discuss issues like the convening of a national assembly, a new constitution, and military reorganization. Jiang had never favored the idea of such a conference, and had so far prevented it from meeting. Now the generalissimo thought he would make political gains by consenting to public demands for the conference to convene. He still did not expect anything much to come of the meeting, and believed that he would be able to control a majority of the participants.26 This time the generalissimo was wrong. Spurred by the surprise of the cease-fire order, the PCC went on to pass a number of resolutions during January on all major issues of the GMD-CCP conflict. Zhou Enlai masterly gripped the initiative in the meetings, establishing a working relationship with the other non-GMD parties, and suggesting,

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in public, a wide range of popular reforms. For instance, his proposal for a common political program, presented on January 15, won broad public support. Its general endorsements of constitutional government and social justice became a central part of the program passed by the PCC. 27 The conference, in its final meeting on January 31, also called for the government to convene an elected national assembly on May 5, and for an immediate broadening of the government to include the Communists and other parties. This last resolution—by far the most important one passed by the PCC—set the ratio for government members to not more than 50 percent for the GMD, and the rest to be divided among the other parties. Events seemed to be moving faster than anyone could have predicted. 28 The CCP leadership were enthusiastic over the developments in Chongqing. However inconvenient the cease-fire agreement was militarily, Yan'an viewed it as a political victory, and expected it to last. The party press hailed the convening of the PCC on January 10 as the best news since the fall of Japan. Zhou's reports on the PCC deliberations gave grounds for even greater optimism. Yan'an had given its Chongqing delegations wide powers to negotiate, and Zhou's tactics seemed to be paying off. 29 Zhou Enlai returned to Yan'an for a crucial meeting of the party secretariat on January 27 and 28. The issue at the meeting was not whether the party should accept the resolutions coming out of the PCC—the leaders in Yan'an took such acceptance as a foregone conclusion. The purpose for the meeting between the five CCP top leaders— Mao, Liu, Zhou, Zhu De, and Ren Bishi—was rather how to interpret the apparent success of the negotiations, military and political. The meeting concluded, on Mao Zedong's advice, that the potential for agreement at the PCC showed that the political situation in China had changed dramatically since last fall, and that a peaceful solution to the CCP-GMD conflict now was within reach.*0 The Central Committee's message to all its regional bureaus on February 1 reflected this conclusion. The PCC agreement, the message said, "is a great victory for China's democratic revolution. From now on China has reached the new stage of peace, democracy, and reconstruction." The foundation for the new stage had been laid in Moscow, where the three powers had solved the international problems regarding China, and "made Marshall their representative." The Moscow settlement was in turn based on the strength of the CCP and the Soviet Union. There were still reactionaries both in China and in the United

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States who would fight this settlement, but the CCP could overcome its contradictions with these groups "step by step." "The most important form for struggle in the Chinese revolution from now on is not armed struggle, [but has] changed to non-armed parliamentary struggle[;] the domestic issues will be resolved through politics," the Central Committee told its bureaus. "All of the party's activities must be suited to this new stage." Yan'an went on to instruct each of its bureaus on its tasks during the new period, specifically warning against any "left-wing" aberations. 31 The most important of these instructions went to the Northeastern Bureau. At the Yan'an secretariat meeting Zhou Enlai had warned that neither Jiang nor Marshall had taken any real steps so far to bring about a solution in the Northeast. Mao knew that the GMD generals did not think highly of the CCP forces in Manchuria, and expected that Jiang would try to gain military control of the region before peace was fully established. He now informed the CCP leaders in the Northeast that the party needed to compromise with Chongqing. "If we adopt a policy of civil war toward the GMD, we [will] certainly return to failure," he told Lin Biao on January 26. 32 Mao interpreted the Moscow communiqué to mean that the Soviet Union would take an active part in finding a solution in the Northeast. "The Soviet Union," the chairman said, "can not assist us in a civil war in the Northeast, but may assist in creating a compromise between us and the GMD." It was inconceivable, Mao told Lin, that "the Soviet Union and the United States will tolerate a long period of civil war between the CCP and the GMD in the Northeast." 33 In his messages, Mao warned the CCP Northeastern commanders not to let the advancing GMD troops separate the CCP units from the Soviet and Mongolian armies. The chairman wanted the Communist forces to stay close to the retreating Red Army, so that the CCP units could establish themselves clandestinely in the areas from which the Soviets had just withdrawn. Mao also believed that the National Army would not attack the Communists close to the Red Army's evacuation routes for fear of a conflict with the Soviets. He told the CCP commanders to do their outmost to coordinate Communist policy in Manchuria with "Soviet foreign policy." 34 Even if it would take time for a Northeastern solution to appear, the CCP leadership felt confident in early February that the Guomindang would limit its armed rivalry with the Communists to that region alone. Mao believed that even inside Manchuria the National Army would not

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launch a general attack on the CCP, and that the Communists in the Northeast could carry out their political work clandestinely and behind the Soviet lines. This conclusion was a major reason why Mao and Liu Shaoqi could make their momentous proclamations of a new era of peace in China. In spite of later attempts by Mao to blame Liu for "right-opportunism" during this period, there is no doubt that inside the leadership it was Mao himself who most clearly visualized "a new democratic era" and led the campaign to prepare the party for new forms of political activity.35 The party did its best to propagate its view of events to domestic and international public opinion. Interviewed by Chinese and foreign press, Mao, Liu, and Zhou praised the generalissimo, Marshall, and the U.S. government for their efforts to create peace in China. In its instructions to the party branches on propaganda issues, the Central Committee underlined that Jiang was a temporary ally, and that the generalissimo now wanted to work within a democratic system. 36 In a particularly important interview, Liu sought out Koji Ariyoshi, one of the Chinese-speaking members of the U.S. Yan'an observer group, to explain party viewpoints directly to the American representatives. "Now that peace has been realized through the Political Consultative Conference," Liu told Ariyoshi, "China is on its way to democratization. We consider that the new stage for peaceful democratic reconstruction has already begun." The CCP would open up its areas to free political competition, and order its members to begin operating openly in the GMD-controlled cities. Liu had no illusions as to the costs of such openness; the GMD secret police would adopt "illegal means" and the struggle would be bloody. But, Liu emphasized, "there will be no civil war." Even when he later in the conversation hinted that "reversion to dark reaction is a possibility," Liu said that such a reversion would become less and less likely "after democracy has been carried out in China for a certain period." Therefore, "the main task [now] is drafting the constitution through which a parliamentary and cabinet system of government akin to that of the United States and Great Britain will be adopted." 3 7 In Chongqing, Zhou Enlai too was busy with constitutional issues. He felt, however, that a reorganization of the government itself had to be the most immediate objective. In early February Zhou spent much time discussing the makeup of the new government with the other non-GMD parties. Zhou had a list of CCP ministers ready, on which he himself figured as the future minister of agriculture and forestry. Both

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the CCP delegates and other politicians in Chongqing now waited in suspense for the government to follow up the PCC resolutions.38 Jiang Jieshi was faced with a series of difficult choices. He did not think much of the PCC meeting; in his diary he commented that only a few of the representatives had a "patriotic attitude" and a "sense of justice." He still had to accept the resolutions as they stood or face both a CCP propaganda victory and worsened relations with Marshall. Some right-wing GMD members—their positions strengthened by the military victories over the Communists—feared that Jiang might give up the leading role of the Guomindang in exchange for a strong national presidency. Chen Lifu and others warned the generalissimo that his acceptance of the PCC resolutions would lead to a crisis within the party.39 Their advice did not go unheeded. Already on February 4 Jiang asked the GMD delegates to the PCC to attempt to change some of the resolutions passed just four days earlier. The resolutions, Jiang said, conflicted with the essence of Sun Zhongshan's teachings. Then, on February 10, the generalissimo made his final decision. In a meeting of GMD leaders he distanced himself from the PCC resolutions, one by one. The idea of giving wide powers to a national assembly was unacceptable, Jiang said, because "most of the people are irresolute, uneducated, and inexperienced. Somebody might incite them to exercise the 'four popular powers' to their own selfish advantage." Jiang also told his audience that if he implemented the PCC decisions there would be a "revolution" within the Guomindang itself.40 Jiang still wanted the negotiations with the Communists to continue, since a public break would damage his foreign relations. Marshall had held out both a substantial American loan and increased military assistance as rewards if Jiang signed a political agreement. Jiang feared that disregarding the PCC resolutions completely would slow up—if not endanger—major new U.S. aid initiatives. It could also lead U.S. attention away from where the generalissimo now wanted it focused most of all—on Manchuria and the question of Soviet withdrawal. During January, Jiang had become less and less pleased with the new U.S. envoy. "Marshall does not understand the different conditions in our country," Jiang wrote in his diary. He also feared that the general, when pushing for a more comprehensive agreement between the GMD and the CCP, had been influenced by "elements in the U.S. embassy," whom Jiang felt had long been opposed to his regime. Jiang

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and his advisers also worried that Marshall, contrary to earlier expectations, seemed to take little interest in Soviet behavior. Wang Shijie noted with surprise that the general, instead of being active on SinoSoviet issues, used all his time on the mediation effort. 41 Jiang himself had been deeply disturbed by Jiang Jingguo's report after his return from Moscow. The generalissimo had expected Stalin to present his minimum demands for cooperating with the GMD—as the Soviet leader had done last summer—and thereby create a base for concluding the Sino-Soviet negotiations. When Jingguo reported that Stalin had had little to say besides demanding an American withdrawal from China, Jiang felt that the Soviets had decided not to negotiate and instead would use raw force and cooperation with the CCP to get what they wanted in Manchuria. In light of this analysis, the generalissimo could but conclude that Stalin's invitation for him to visit Moscow— presented to Jiang Jingguo during the last day of his visit—was a trap. "[When] Stalin received Jingguo during the Soviet visit his full purposes became clear; then I decided to politely decline the Soviet invitation," Jiang wrote in his diary. 42 Still it was difficult for the GMD government to openly confront the Soviets, even after Jiang learned from intelligence sources that the Red Army would not withdraw from the Northeast by February 1. Jiang's problem still was—as it had been since October—that the GMD military positions in Manchuria were not strong enough to prevent a CCP takeover of communication lines and important cities if the Soviets withdrew. As his private notes show, Jiang was torn between the fear of the Soviets violating the withdrawal agreement, and the fear that they would leave and let the Communists take over. 43 Gradually, over the first weeks in February, the generalissimo finally made the decision to push for immediate Soviet withdrawal—even if this meant a hard fight for control of the Northeast. Jiang now saw little to gain by a continuation of his diplomatic games with Moscow. The outcome of Jiang Jingguo's visit had convinced the generalissimo that it was impossible to work with Stalin in forming a Soviet-GMD understanding for the future of the Northeast. Jiang had also received a number of intelligence reports emphasizing increased cooperation between the Red Army and the Communists in northern Manchuria. 44 Second, Jiang wanted to force Marshall's hand on the question of the Northeast. Reports from Washington told him that the Truman administration was increasingly worried over Soviet intentions in Manchuria, and Jiang could not understand why Marshall seemed so unin-

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terested. The generalissimo could of course not know that Marshall's attitude was tailored to his negotiation tactics, and that the general's reports to Truman showed a strong awareness of China being "very vulnerable to low level Russian infiltration." 45 Finally, Jiang was influenced by mounting public pressure for the government to take a stronger stand against Soviet behavior in the Northeast. In early February the first Chinese and Western news reporters were allowed into Manchuria and dispatched stories of Soviet violence and plunder. To many Chinese, the period of Soviet occupation of the country's northeastern provinces seemed unending, in spite of what the government had told them in August. The publication of the secret Yalta agreements, also in early February, added to the public's suspicion of Soviet motives, as well as to a sense of national weakness. 46 The result of this new public awareness of the Northeastern question was a series of anti-Soviet rallies in Chongqing and in other cities in South China. Some of these demonstrations were undoubtedly organized by GMD right-wingers as a part of the struggle against the Chinese Communists. But, as had the anti-American rallies in December, the protests against Soviet policy on Manchuria got support far outside any organized group. At several universities the students went on strike in protest against Moscow's policy and the Yalta agreement, and most of the non-Communist press supported their action. Jiang was in no way immune to public pressure and, seeing his mail flooded by petitions and his ministers attacked in the press, he was confirmed in his resolve to confront the Soviets on Manchuria. The generalissimo was also aware that any conflict with the Soviet Union now could be used as a propaganda weapon against the CCP.47 On March 6 the Foreign Ministry launched its first formal protest against Soviet violation of the Sino-Soviet agreements, and demanded that the Red Army immediately evacuate the Northeast. 48 The protest meant that Jiang's diplomatic strategy over the last year had failed. Pressed by Stalin's demands for an American withdrawal, the GMD leader found that he could not get an agreement with Moscow without harming his relations with Washington. His hope now was that the GMD's alliance with the Americans would hold, even if he had to use force against the CCP. Two weeks before Jiang's break with the Soviets, the Committee of Three had agreed on a plan to integrate the armed forces of the CCP

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into the National Army. To observers this was an almost sensational agreement. Zhou Enlai had accepted a total evacuation of Communist forces from South China, and the integration of CCP units into the National Army in North China and in the Northeast on a basis of roughly one to six. The agreement also provided for a gradual dissolving of separate Communist units, for U.S. training and equipment for the National Army, and for the disarming of all forces not covered by the plan. 49 The military agreement was Marshall's greatest triumph in China. He had regarded such an agreement as the basis for all political accords, and had wisely seized the momentum created by the PCC and gone straight for a comprehensive deal on the size and distribution of military forces. In a way, Marshall's complete disregard for the historical roots of the situation he had jumped into in China helped him in pushing the two sides toward agreement. The general's penchant for discussing the technical sides of a draft text, and not leaving any time for political statements or mutual recriminations, forced the two sides to present concrete proposals and made it difficult for either side to find a pretext to delay the negotiations. Marshall had also created an atmosphere of good will that had advanced the talks. Zhou Enlai, who had regarded Patrick Hurley as totally inept, was one of many Communists who formed a high opinion of the new envoy's skill and integrity. Marshall reciprocated Zhou's high opinion of him. The mediator noted that Zhou's conduct in the negotiations led him to believe that a lasting agreement was within reach. In late February this belief led Marshall to push the generalissimo hard in order to get further agreements. 50 Marshall was increasingly concerned over the Soviet role in China. He told Truman that the U.S. aim in China had to be "unification at the fastest possible pace so as to eliminate her [China's] present vulnerability to Soviet undercover attack." "I also believe," Marshall continued, "that our Government must shortly do more for China in this matter than give advice." 51 To "do more" General Marshall wanted both increased U.S. material support for China, and U.S. assistance to Jiang's attempts to take over the Northeast. He was particularly eager for economic assistance, which he believed would help reduce tension in the country and preempt revolutionary politics. But he was also hopeful for a more active U.S. role in getting the Soviets out of Manchuria. The general planned to go to Washington in March to clear the ground for both these forms for support. Marshall knew, however, that civil war in the Northeast would make Jiang's efforts to take over the area

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infinitely more difficult, with or without U.S. support. He therefore had no difficulty with pushing for the extension of the truce agreement to also cover the Northeast. 52 Jiang Jieshi was of quite a contrary opinion. Extending the truce agreement to the Northeast, he felt, would leave large parts of the provinces in Communist hands, and hinder the movement of the National Army into areas the Soviets had evacuated. Jiang therefore vetoed sending truce teams to the Northeast. Instead he lobbied for U.S. diplomatic and military support in order to put pressure on the Soviets and force the CCP to accept government control of Manchuria. In early March he told Marshall that "the outcome of the Manchurian question now depended on the strength of the American stand toward Russia . . . any weakness would mean virtual emasculation of Manchuria as part of the Chinese nation." 5 3 Having folded his Soviet card, Jiang now felt that time was running out for him in the Northeast. He either got his divisions in place in central and northern Manchuria very soon, or the Red Army would hand over control of these areas to the CCP. The only way he by now could get more men and matériel to the Northeast quickly was through American assistance, and Jiang hoped that by showing his determination to regain control of Manchuria by force he could jolt Washington into action. 54 After the agreement on military reorganization, which he regretted that the GMD negotiators had accepted, Jiang had lost most of his faith in Marshall's support for his cause. The latter's requests for a cease-fire in the Northeast upset the generalissimo even more. "The CCP is a Soviet instrument, and special envoy Marshall intends to prop up CCP strength," Jiang commented in his diary. He also complained of not being kept informed by Marshall of Washington's real intentions. 55 The sporadic fighting in the Northeast had increased during late February, with the National Army taking the offensive against limited Communist resistance. The GMD forces had still not attacked any of the major CCP bases, but were closing in on several Communist strongholds in western Manchuria. Zhou Enlai repeatedly asked Marshall to put pressure on Jiang to end his offensives, but Marshall limited himself to informal suggestions to the generalissimo. 56 Marshall realized that the situation in the Northeast was getting more and more serious, and tried to find a temporary solution before leaving for Washington on March 13. After Marshall told Jiang that the fighting in Manchuria could harm his chances for increased U.S. eco-

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nomic assistance, the generalissimo accepted sending truce teams to the area, but only on the condition that the CCP agreed to the free movement of GMD forces all over the region. The negotiations remained deadlocked. 57 Zhou Enlai had been in no doubt that the generalissimo was planning to use force in Manchuria, but had also believed that Jiang's purpose was to improve his negotiating position—not to launch an allout attack on the CCP. Now, in early March, Zhou began to have second thoughts. Zhou Enlai had been among the most consistent supporters of negotiations with the GMD in the Central Committee over the past year, and had seen the PCC agreements as the high point of his political career. His beginning doubts of the possibility for a peaceful settlement of the Northeast question therefore indicated that CCP alarm over Jiang's actions was increasing fast. 58 Throughout February the CCP leadership had remained convinced that peace was within reach, and that the party had to prepare itself both for a restructuring of its armed forces and for new kinds of political competition. To what degree the party's leaders—and in particular Mao Zedong—were acting in good faith when they accepted the actual stipulations of the agreement on military unity remains one of the most debated topics in CCP historiography. No CCP military leader has wanted to be seen as having "left his sword and gun in the storehouse or set free his war-horse in the mountain," to quote Nie Rongzhen. In later periods accusations of neglecting the sword, gun, and war-horse in early 1946 have frequently been leveled against senior party leaders. 59 Available evidence indicates that Mao and the central leadership— including the military commanders—accepted the reduction in size of CCP forces as a prize they had to pay for a political agreement. They also gambled that party discipline would hold up even as Communist units were slowly integrated into the National Army, as had largely been the case during the CCP-GMD alliance twenty years before. Yan'an told the CCP commanders that demobilization had to start immediately, and that the party branches had to cease their open activities in those units slated for integration into the National Army. 60 These were exactly the concessions Mao had not been willing to give during the September 1945 negotiations. Mao's change of heart shows how convinced the chairman had become that his party would benefit from the PCC resolutions and from Marshall's mediation. Undoubtedly Yan'an was also preparing for worst-case scenarios by stockpiling weapons and equipment, and by giving secret orders to its commanders

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for all eventualities. Still, Mao himself pressed for compliance with the general instructions when individual commanders dragged their feet. 61 Mao still had not found a way to settle the Northeast question, and was uncertain of how to proceed. He still hoped that the Soviets would bring the GMD and the CCP together for negotiations on Manchuria, as Marshall had done for the rest of China. But Moscow had told him on February 22 that it would "absolutely not get involved" in CCP-GMD relations in the Northeast. For Mao the second best option was to let the U.S.-led truce teams enter the Northeast. But Marshall seemed unable to force Jiang to accept this proposal, and neither had the CCP yet got Moscow's approval for the plan. 62 The anti-Soviet demonstrations in February created further difficulties for the CCP, and threatened to overshadow the immense public relations victories scored by the party during the PCC session. Prominent liberal intellectuals, who had supported the party earlier, now publicly warned the CCP against cooperating with the Soviets in the Northeast. In some cases angry crowds—assisted by the GMD secret police—attacked the offices of the party or its newspapers. 63 Zhou, with his keen nose for public relations, immediately understood that the CCP had to state publicly that the party wanted a Soviet withdrawal from the Northeast as soon as possible. He had no problems with issuing such a declaration in Chongqing, but made sure to emphasize that it was the Chinese government which so far had obstructed the Soviet withdrawal. In Yan'an it took more time before the party leaders put together instructions on how to handle the issue. On February 25 they told the party branches to take the position that antiSoviet attitudes prevented a solution in the Northeast, and to praise the friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples and the August Sino-Soviet treaty. They ended their instructions by emphasizing that the party was not opposed to the entry of the National Army into the Northeast, only to the attacks on CCP personnel there. 64 In early March Mao became more and more worried that the CCP would have to face large-scale attacks in Manchuria, particularly after the Soviets informed Yan'an on March 15 that the full withdrawal of the Red Army was about to begin. He now had to decide on what strategy to use in the areas the Soviets would be leaving. Mao must have asked himself if the prospects for peace were bright enough for the CCP to voluntarily limit the movement of its troops into north and central Manchuria, and hope for a GMD-CCP settlement before the Soviet withdrawal was completed.

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The CCP leadership in the Northeast had already drawn up a comprehensive military plan built on a Communist takeover of the northern areas, and appealed to Yan'an for permission to implement it as soon as the Soviet withdrawal started. As Zhou's reports from Chongqing became increasingly pessimistic on the Northeast question, Mao hesitated, hoping that Marshall's mediation would yield results.65 Three events in mid-March led Mao to revise the party's overall strategy in favor of using force. First, Marshall abandoned the deadlocked negotiations and left for Washington. The removal of Marshall's personal influence on the CCP-GMD talks convinced the CCP leaders that a political solution to the Manchurian crisis was not in sight. Mao also concluded that the Americans were preparing to ship more GMD forces to the Northeast, even while the Chongqing talks were still going on. This information, which seems to have come from party intelligence sources in North China, convinced Mao that U.S. policy on the Northeast was hardening as a result of a new downturn in global SovietAmerican relations. 66 Lastly, the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Guomindang, which met in early March, showed the right-wing ascendant in the party. In reality, Jiang was an ally and even an inspirator to the GMD right-wing on many issues; for instance, the generalissimo's refusal to accept the PCC resolutions was well known among party leaders. Ironically, after having taken up many of Wang Shijie's and Song Siwen's recommendations of a tougher approach to Sino-Soviet relations, Jiang at the CEC meeting did little to shield his two advisers against criticism over their role in the making of the Sino-Soviet treaty. As a result the policy of making a political settlement with the CCP—a policy that had Wang and Song as two of its primary supporters—lost out at the meeting. 67 In the end the committee gave in to political expediency and passed the PCC resolutions—but Jiang and the GMD right-wing attached a number of conditions designed to make compromise with the Communists impossible. Under these amendments all members of the coalition government had to be approved by the GMD's Central Executive Committee, and the new National Assembly would almost certainly be under the GMD's total control. At a press conference on April 18, the day the CEC meeting closed, Zhou Enlai lambasted the generalissimo for allowing groups in his party to sabotage the PCC accords. Zhou then left for consultations in Yan'an, still without any agreement on sending truce teams to Manchuria. 68

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Marshall's departure, the increase in U.S. military aid to Jiang, and the outcome of the GMD meeting all left Mao with a feeling that his party was at a crossroads. If Yan'an gave up competing for immediate control of north and central Manchuria after the Soviet withdrawal, then the CCP would have no option but to pursue a purely political strategy whatever challenges it met from the GMD. But could the party decide to limit itself to political struggle in light of recent events? Mao hesitated. On March 16, Yan'an told its Chongqing delegation that Jiang had obviously entered an alliance with the GMD reactionaries, and that whatever happened, the CCP had to avoid public blame if a civil war broke out. But in a long, rambling message the next day, Mao told the CCP general commander for North China, Ye Jianying, that the party "should not fear a breakdown" in the negotiations, and neither should it "fear [fighting] a civil war." 6 9 The meetings that took place in Yan'an from March 20 to 25 were crucial for deciding CCP policy. The outcome was a partial reversal of previous decisions. The party leaders agreed that they would not unilaterally limit military activities in the Northeast, and that the CCP on the contrary should "use maximum strength to control the two cities of Changchun and Harbin." At the same time, Yan'an was worried that Marshall might withdraw his mediation, something which Zhou believed would bury all chances for a political solution. From Yan'an Zhou told his deputies in Chongqing that they should prepare to give in on something, preferrably in South China, to satisfy the American's wish for quick progress. 70 Unknown to Yan'an, Jiang Jieshi was making up his mind on the question of peace or war while the CCP leaders were meeting. Reports were coming in from the Northeast telling him that the situation was becoming increasingly critical, with the CCP in a far better position to take over Changchun and Harbin than the National Army. The Soviets had informed him on March 22 that the last Red Army units would leave Manchuria by the end of April, and intelligence reports confirmed Soviet intentions. Jiang had to act quickly if he was to depend on his armies in order to take over the Northeast. 71 It was the international and not the domestic reaction to the use of force that concerned Jiang the most when making his decision. Jiang did not believe in getting results from the Chongqing negotiations, and expected public opinion to be on his side when he tried to recover Manchuria. Internationally his hands had been freed to some extent by his break with Stalin, but Jiang felt that he was playing a risky game.

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He now needed to substitute American for Soviet support in his efforts to take over the Northeast and force the Communists to accept the supremacy of his government. 72 The information Jiang got in late March convinced him that American policy was shifting in his favor, and made it easier for him to decide to use force in the Northeast. Wei Daoming reported from Washington that the Truman administration now viewed its conflict with the Soviet Union as global, and that the United States could be expected to support the Chinese government in any conflict with the Soviets, whatever impression Marshall had given. On March 30, General Gillem, acting in Marshall's place while the latter was in Washington, told Jiang that the United States would transport the additional two GMD armies Jiang had asked for to Manchuria. The next day the GMD New First Army started attacking CCP-held areas around Siping in an effort to cut through to Changchun. 75 The battle of Siping was the first battle of the Chinese civil war. By fighting it, the CCP demonstrated its decision to prevent the GMD government from taking control of the Northeast, and the GMD showed its determination to crush Communist opposition in the region. However, both sides still hoped that it would be a civil war limited to one area alone. Jiang expected the Communists to submit to his government after seeing its military strength in the Northeast. Mao, on his side, hoped that new Great Power initiatives would force Jiang to accept the PCC resolutions. But at the moment both leaders were determined to use all available military force to achieve their objectives in the Northeast. 74 After several days of fighting the CCP was still in command of Siping, with its units blocking the National Army from moving on Changchun. Mao commended Lin Biao for his battle strategy and assured his Northeastern commander that the party was united on the need to use force. "If there is a wavering element in the party it is very small," Mao said. The chairman urged Lin to move on Changchun and Harbin immediately.75 The party leadership seems indeed to have been remarkably united behind the decision to use force in Manchuria. Zhou Enlai, who on two earlier occasions had objected to Mao's reliance on the army, now agreed with the chairman that it was impossible to avoid meeting Jiang's military challenge head on. Already on April 2 Zhou told Yan'an that the National Army must not be let through at Siping. Unlike Mao, Zhou believed that a military test in the Northeast might ultimately lead

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Jiang back to the negotiating table. But even Zhou's perspective included a long period of warfare in Manchuria. 76 In less than three months the CCP had gone from proclaiming the historical inevitability of a peace settlement to throwing itself wholesale into a civil war in the Northeast. The same leader had been at the helm in both periods. Mao Zedong had been as convinced about the coming of peace in January as he was about the primacy of armed struggle in April, when he told Lin Biao that "everything is decided by victory or defeat on the battlefield; do not put any hope on negotiations." 77 It is a testament to Mao's extraordinary skills of political persuasion that he was able to keep the party united and himself as its leader throughout this period. But the general acceptance within the party for this quick jumping from one theoretically based vision to its opposite also demonstrates the political immaturity of the CCP in the mid-1940s. Two times in less than a year the party had prepared itself for peace, and then had to fight a war it neither wanted nor was equipped for. In both cases Mao's analysis of the international situation had played a major role in guiding the party leadership to make wrong estimates and faulty policy. The political réévaluation that took place in Yan'an in late April showed that the party leadership had learned from its mistakes. While Lin's forces won victory after victory in the Northeast, Yan'an returned to the idea of protracted war developed during the anti-Japanese struggle. In his analysis of the situation and the political prospects for the party, Mao now put more emphasis on domestic developments, both political and social. In a series of programmatic resolutions, passed just after Harbin fell to Lin's troops on April 25, the Central Committee ordered a radicalization both of the land reform policy and the socialist propaganda in the cities. As it had done during the war against Japan, Yan'an now wanted to use its social message as a weapon in the civil war. 78 The party still believed that international relations played an important, but not necessarily decisive, role in determining the outcome of the war. The Central Committee's decisions on foreign affairs, transmitted to the bureaus on May 3 and 15, underlined that without a good relationship with the Soviet Union the present successes in the Northeast would not have been possible. The United States now openly supported Jiang in the civil war in the Northeast. "Our best hope," Yan'an said, "[is that] the Americans will not agree to civil war in the rest of China." If so, the CCP-held areas could develop economic rela-

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tions with the United States even while the party conducted a limited war with the GMD in the Northeast. Such trade would be of immense importance to the party, the Central Committee said. 79 The hope of avoiding a direct conflict with the Americans was the main reason why Mao wanted to keep the negotiations in Chongqing going, even after he had lost all hope for an immediate settlement. "Do not prepare to break with the GMD and the United States at the same time," Mao instructed Zhou. "Unless it [the United States] reverts to Hurley's policies [of] open support for the GMD dictatorship in an allout civil war, we should not break with it," Mao said. 80 Still, the major focus for CCP foreign relations in the spring of 1946 was the Soviet Union and the Red Army in Manchuria. Particularly after Jiang's open rupture with Moscow in February, relations between the Soviets and the CCP had become considerably closer. The CCP Northeastern leadership observed that the Red Army had stopped all threats of using force against the party, and instead provided small favors for the Communists, such as opening up communication lines and exchanging intelligence. This new Soviet attitude gave Yan'an reason to believe that the CCP could take over areas the Red Army had left without conflict with Moscow. 81 What led Stalin to change his policy on the CCP in the spring of 1946? Both global and local considerations played a role in Soviet China policy, which as a whole remained as inconsistent as it had been during the preceding fall. Stalin did not want a conflict with the United States over China, and realized that Washington's ability to influence Chinese politics was superior to his own. But his fear of the extension of American military power into China led him to take actions that destroyed his relationship with the Chinese government, and increased U.S. suspicion of Soviet motives in East Asia.82 Stalin welcomed the Marshall Mission, the text of the Moscow communiqué, and the prospect of a new coalition government in China. But his primary aim had now become the withdrawal of American forces. His diplomacy was one of pressure to achieve this aim. The CCP was one instrument available to him for putting such pressure on the GMD government and the Americans. In January Stalin ordered his envoys in China to "expand your communications with Chinese Communist representatives." 83 The Soviet leader believed that by letting his troops remain in Manchuria he could force Chongqing or Washington to arrange for a simul-

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taneous withdrawal of American and Soviet forces from China. He therefore ignored Jiang's attempt to ask for Moscow's total price—in economic terms—for withdrawing from the Northeast, and continued the occupation of northern and central Manchuria after February 1. As Pravda commented on February 27, the Soviet forces "will be able to withdraw before or not later than American forces leave China." 8 4 Stalin did not foresee the American reaction to his China policy, nor could he—after the improvement during the Moscow foreign ministers' meeting—foresee the sharp deterioration in overall Soviet-American relations in the early spring of 1946. Both developments led Moscow to decide in early March to withdraw from Manchuria unilaterally and without having any treaty on Sino-Soviet economic relations. 85 As Steven Levine points out, it was the Soviet withdrawal that signaled the start of the CCP's attempt to take over northern and central Manchuria. But Stalin had not foreseen or intended the CCP-GMD conflict over the areas the Red Army left to develop into a full-scale civil war. On the contrary, when Stalin made his decision in early March, the odds were that the GMD and the CCP would soon be parts of a coalition government. The Soviet leader must have felt that SinoSoviet relations under this new Chinese government would start out better if the Red Army had already withdrawn than if an evacuation was still pending. 86 From March 22, when Petrov informed Wang of the exact timetable for the Soviet withdrawal, to April 30, when the last Red Army unit crossed the border at Mudanjiang, official relations between the two governments remained ice-cold, but correct. Stalin was obviously unwilling to give any concessions to Jiang's regime, but also reluctant to give any cause for diplomatic incidents. The Red Army kept away from the fighting, and handed control of the cities over to Chongqing's representatives and the GMD military units. 87 It is damning evidence against Stalin's foreign policy skills that when he expected peace in China his own actions became the cause for war. In Changchun the National Army units, which had taken over from the Soviets, capitulated to the CCP on April 18, after days of fierce fighting. Harbin, which was evacuated by the Red Army on April 25, fell to Lin Biao's forces on April 28. Most GMD officials in these cities chose to accompany the Red Army across the border, ultimately to find their way home via Moscow and Vladivostok. 88 Harry Truman too expected peace in China in early 1946. He felt certain that General Marshall would "rehabilitate" the country, "and create a

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strong central government there." On January 11 he told his cabinet that "China [is] in good shape." Truman's secretary of state, just back from Moscow, echoed the president when predicting that Stalin "intends living up to his treaty with China and will not intentionally do anything to destroy our efforts for a united China." 8 9 But even if the president remained hopeful of the chances for a settlement of the GMD-CCP conflict, his suspicions mounted over Soviet policy on Manchuria. Truman had gradually become more distrustful of Stalin, and had disapproved of Byrnes' attempts to forge new agreements in Moscow. The president saw the Soviet decision to remain in Manchuria beyond the February 1 deadline as a prime example of the policy of expansionism that Winston Churchill pointed to in his "Iron Curtain" speech in early March. 90 Truman's military advisers fueled the president's suspicions. The Joint War Plans Committee told Truman already on January 8 that the U.S. Marines in North China prevented further Soviet expansion in that area. Military intelligence concluded some weeks later that the Soviet Union was preparing to include North China and Manchuria "in her concept of a security zone," and was using the CCP to achieve this aim. 91 During February and March Manchuria—together with Iran and the Balkans—topped the list of American complaints against Moscow's foreign policy. The publication of the Yalta agreement on East Asia and the news reports of massive Soviet plunder in Manchuria, both in midFebruary, contributed to the emerging hard-line consensus in the Truman administration. No leading official now wanted to be associated with Roosevelt's East Asia policy. James Byrnes, tainted by his association with Yalta and under fire for his earlier policy of compromise, launched a series of protests against the continued Soviet military presence in Manchuria. 92 In spite of the tougher political rhetoric, the Truman administration's basic approach to the Soviet role in China changed little during early 1946. The Marshall Mission had been designed to reduce Soviet influence in China, and up to the outbreak of the civil war the president continued to believe that a settlement of the GMD-CCP conflict would remove much of the potential for a "Soviet undercover attack." 9 3 Ironically, the Soviet withdrawal from China, and the outbreak of civil war in the Northeast, confirmed Washington's belief that the CCP was merely an instrument for Soviet policy. The U.S. Observer Group in Yan'an, recalled in mid-April, contended in its final report that "the Soviet Union is guiding the destinies of one of its strongest satellites, the Chinese Communist Party, as it has in the past and will in the

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future." The report, and the unexpected victories of the Communist armies in Manchuria, convinced the administration that the Soviets were assisting the CCP with equipment and advice. 94 Truman's willingness to support Jiang's regime militarily after midApril would have been far greater had it not been for Marshall blaming GMD stupidity for the breakdown in the negotiations. Jiang had "had a good chance to have peace in Manchuria but [he] did not utilize this chance," he told the GMD negotiators after his return on April 22. During his continued efforts to mediate a settlement in May and June, Marshall advised Washington against an increase in the already substantial U.S. material support for Jiang's regime. 95 General Marshall, who fully shared the administration's preoccupation with Soviet intentions, did not believe that Jiang Jieshi's government was an effective ally for the United States in its confrontation with Moscow. His messages to Truman, and the completion of the Soviet withdrawal, removed Jiang's regime as an immediate focus point for the global Cold War. But the rivalry that had developed between the two great powers over influence in China would continue throughout the three years of devastating civil war that the country now entered.

CONCLUSION Revolt, Intervention, and Cold War

George Marshall stayed on in China until January 1947, without ever getting any closer to mediating an agreement than he had been in the first two months of 1946. A proud and stubborn man, the general refused to recognize that he could not bring about a political settlement of the GMD-CCP conflict. From October 1946, when he finally saw the uselessness of further mediation, Marshall spent most of his time explaining to the American public why the United States would continue to support Jiang's regime even after the failure of the negotiations. 1 In the meantime the civil war intensified. On May 19, 1946, Siping fell to the National Army, and four days later the GMD took control of Changchun. Broken only by a brief truce in June, the war then gradually widened to North and Central China, as Mao sought to divert the GMD armies from their offensives in the Northeast. In mid-1947 Lin Biao counterattacked in Manchuria, and the military situation slowly improved for the CCP. Then, in a series of massive campaigns in the fall and winter of 1948, the Communists broke the back of the National Army. By early 1949, as the remnants of Jiang's armies fled south, the GMD regime began to prepare its last stand on Taiwan. 2

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W h e n M a o Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China from atop the Tian'anmen gate in Beijing o n October 1, 1949, both the chairman and his audience were in a w e of the victory the CCP forces had w o n . M a o and the other Communist leaders undoubtedly found the main source for their success in the support the party had built in the Chinese people over the last three decades. To Mao—and to most historians of the Chinese revolution—the most fundamental fact about the CCP's victory is that it was propelled by a popular rebellion against social injustice, misgovernment, and foreign domination. In this interpretation, Mao's presence on the Tian'anmen gate o n that cold October morning really meant that China, as a nation, had "stood u p . " 3 As a summation of the sources of CCP success and GMD failure in the three-year civil war, the "popular rebellion" thesis is certainly valid. But several other elements need to be counted in to construct a full interpretative framework for the Communist victory. As some recent contributions to CCP party history have pointed out, the CCP's ability to manipulate Chinese politics, at the central and at the local level, was crucial to its defeat of the Guomindang. 4 The historiography of the Chinese revolution has also neglected the role international relations played in the CCP's victory and in the GMD's defeat. This book has argued that foreign policy played a crucial role in the t w o parties' strategies at the end of World War II. Both the CCP and the GMD hoped that Great Power intervention would further their o w n political goals and thereby prevent civil war. Together with the Great Power conflicts, the jockeying for foreign support a m o n g the Chinese parties created a pattern of international alliances that would last for more than fifteen years. The emergence of the Cold War international system in China also caused the civil war in 1946. The failure of Jiang Jieshi's alliance with the Soviet Union led him to discard the potential for getting a negotiated settlement and, as a consequence, to attack the CCP. The steadfastness of U.S. military support for Jiang convinced M a o in early 1946 that the CCP could not rely o n Great Power intervention to prevent civil war. The CCP's domestic political successes and the improvement in its relations with Moscow enabled the party to resist Jiang's military challenge in 1946/47, and to defeat it two years later. Mao Zedong stood at the center of CCP decisionmaking during most of the time from 1944 to 1946. With the exception of the last two

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months of 1945, Mao personally reviewed all important messages and documents, particularly on foreign affairs. His unique prestige depended on his reputation as both a political and a military strategist. Of all the party leaders, it was only Mao who had as much influence with the commanders in the field as he had with the party Secretariat and Political Bureau. During the last years of the war against Japan, Mao had come to attach greater importance to international relations than he had during the preceding years. After his complete political victory over the Wang Ming group, the chairman had co-opted some of the emphasis on the international situation that had been typical of his former rivals. His close cooperation on United Front issues with Zhou Enlai, a prominent "internationalist," also brought foreign affairs more readily to the chairman's attention. And last, the increasing U.S. participation in the war in China convinced Mao that outside powers would remain active in Chinese politics after the war. Beginning in 1944, Mao strongly believed that the alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States would be the cornerstone for constructing an era of peace after the war, both in China and elsewhere. While he certainly viewed periods of international "struggle" as unavoidable—as they had been domestically in his alliance with Jiang— these episodes could not change the trend toward Great Power compromises on international issues. During the coming era the CCP would use the political strength it had built during the resistance war in order to gain power. In the process the party would benefit from the growing international influence of the Soviet Union. Mao's analyses of foreign affairs were schematic and shallow, put together without any understanding of the fluidity of diplomatic interaction or the thinking that motivated foreign leaders. His flawed interpretations stemmed not primarily from a lack of information on international developments, but rather from Mao's lack of understanding of how the Great Powers perceived their interests in East Asia. To him the international situation was a constant contest between progressive and reactionary forces, where status was determined by points won or lost to each side. Mao told his staff that this game was always very complex, and often played in secret. He therefore thought it impossible to judge from news reports or private conversations what agreements or conflicts really existed between the Great Powers. This "mystification" of international politics made Mao build his analyses on guesswork and castle-building, rather than on intelligence

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available in Yan'an. As a result, the chairman and the party leadership often misjudged the character of diplomatic events, and acted only on those reports that sustained their overall perceptions. Both in August and in December, Yan'an built its domestic strategy on Stalin's phantom "understandings" with the Americans. In February 1946 Marshall's assurances that Washington supported a coalition government contributed to Mao's conviction that peace was inevitable. CCP decisionmaking also suffered from the chairman's changing perceptions of the overall political situation in China. Mao's analyses could go from one position to its opposite in just a matter of days—as if he himself did not fully trust the perspectives he so convincingly laid out at meetings of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat. The flexibility of Mao's thinking—and his ability to convince others—was at times a blessing to the CCP, as when he mobilized the party's forces in the summer of 1945. At other times Mao's sudden reversals threatened the party with disaster, as in the fall of 1945, or in his great campaigns of the late 1950s and 1960s. During the 1940s, however, Mao was still able to learn from his mistakes. The failed negotiations in September-October 1945, and the severe diplomatic setbacks that followed, led Mao to conclude that the CCP could not gain power in China as long as Jiang Jieshi had the support of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Before the attack on Shanhaiguan he started thinking about which concessions the CCP needed to make to reduce its conflict with the United States. Mao was disappointed over Soviet policy, and put part of the blame for Jiang's willingness to start a civil war on Moscow. But the GMD attacks in North China in mid-November, which Yan'an felt would have been impossible without American advice and aid, convinced Mao and Liu that they could not break the alliance between Chongqing and Washington. Paradoxically, the Soviet actions most harmful to the CCP drove Yan'an to closer cooperation with Moscow. Stalin's late November orders to throw the party's cadres out of the Northeastern cities put an enormous strain on CCP-Soviet relations, and forced Liu Shaoqi and the temporary party leadership to decide whether to comply or to resist Soviet policy. Because the CCP was already under attack from the National Army—supported by the Americans—Liu had little choice but to comply, and hope that Yan'an's compliance would stop Stalin's drift toward the Guomindang.

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Moscow's messages of goodwill toward Yan'an in the winter of 1945/1946 led Liu, and in turn Mao, to conclude that the party's Soviet policy had paid off. The increase in CCP-Soviet contacts—and the parallel deterioration of the GMD's relations with Moscow—enabled Mao to fight Jiang's attempt to take over the Northeast by force. But Mao knew that Moscow's policy was reversible. If his party was to avoid future setbacks similar to those of late 1945, the CCP had to pay the price for Soviet friendship and avoid any policies, domestic or foreign, which Stalin "firmly opposed." The year 1946 marked the start of the CCP's Soviet period, which was to last up to the late 1950s. It is therefore not coincidental that many observers noted an increasing similarity between Yan'an's and Moscow's public statements from early 1946 on. Neither is there any contradiction between Mao's adjustment to Soviet policies and his support for Marshall's mediation efforts. The Soviets continued to support the idea of a coalition government well into 1947. The Soviet acceptance of the CCP's April 1946 takeover of the Manchurian cities was a watershed in CCP-Soviet relations. Mao took the lack of opposition on Stalin's part to the occupation of Changchun and Harbin as a sign that the alliance between Chongqing and Moscow had broken down. Although the Soviets did still not provide much material or political support for the CCP, the breakdown in GMD-Soviet relations made it possible for Mao to fight a war in the Northeast without challenging Stalin's foreign policy.5 Mao had believed that the political ideology shared by Yan'an and Moscow would lead the Soviets to work closely with his party after the Red Army entered the war. However, six months of contacts with Stalin's army convinced him that he could get Soviet cooperation only by making concessions in return. The ideological elements in the CCPSoviet relationship, on which so many Western historians have banked for their explanation of CCP behavior, receded in importance to Yan'an at the very moment when Moscow ceased being a distant ideal. To Mao Soviet policy in China in 1945 set the stage for a necessary but unequal and troubled alliance, built less on common ideology than on practical concessions.6 While attempting to get Soviet support, Mao continued to hope that the CCP could avoid a full break with the United States. The chairman viewed American policy as inconsistent and unpredictable as a result of struggles between reactionaries and progressives within the U.S. lead-

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ership. Even after the U.S. military intervention in October 1945, Mao ordered the CCP commanders to avoid clashes, in the hope that American policy would once again change for the better. 7 Mao interpreted the first months of Marshall's mediation as a sign that U.S. policy toward the CCP was becoming less hostile. But after the open American support for Jiang's attacks in eastern Hebei the previous fall he dared not conclude that the change in attitude was the result of the "progressives" gaining power in Washington. Instead the chairman read the Marshall Mission as the result of a Soviet-American compromise, in which Washington had given in to Moscow's demand for a peaceful solution in China. Mao had a keen understanding of U.S. military power, and had no interest in an armed conflict with American forces. When the stalemate in the Chongqing negotiations coincided with a further deterioration in Great Power relations in late spring 1946, Mao concluded that the Soviet-American compromise had broken down. Under these new circumstances, Mao was certain that the Americans would support Jiang's attempts to subdue the CCP by force. The purposes of the attacks on U.S. policy in the CCP press during the summer of 1946 were to warn Washington that the Communists would not give in to military pressure, and to give Moscow further signs of CCP loyalty. The propaganda campaign aimed at avoiding military conflict with the Americans, and limiting the war with the GMD. 8 The CCP leadership had neither wanted nor planned for civil war. Had it not been for Jiang's repudiation of the PCC accords and his military moves in Manchuria, Mao would probably not have agreed to Lin Biao's plan for taking over Changchun and Harbin. But as Jiang stepped up the military pressure, Lin's arguments gradually won Mao over. By mid-April Mao had lost all faith in negotiations, and viewed war as inevitable. Jiang Jieshi himself started the war that led to the political and military demise of his regime. Consistently opposed to giving any important concessions to the CCP, he insisted that the "rebels" would either have to submit or fight. The generalissimo's primary purpose was to unify China under his rule, and in the spring of 1946 he felt that military force was his best instrument to achieve this purpose. As his whole career testified to, Jiang was, however, more of a politician than a general. He did not wish for a full-scale war, and sought throughout 1945 to obtain Communist submission without hav-

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ing to fight. Although he believed his forces to be far stronger than those of the CCP, Jiang viewed some of the political and economic weaknesses of his regime with surprising clarity. He knew, for instance, that many regional leaders had, at best, a tenuous loyalty to Chongqing, and that corruption and waste had undermined his government's finances. In order not to exacerbate these problems, Jiang hoped to force the CCP to accept his authority without having to commit scarce resources to renewed warfare. Jiang's plan was to use Great Power support for his regime to make Yan'an realize the futility of further opposition. He pursued this strategy with vigor and cunning in 1944 and 1945, and achieved considerable results. Considering how weak the Japanese onslaughts had left his regime, Jiang's ability to mobilize U.S. and Soviet support was no mean feat. The Yalta agreement and the Moscow treaty embodied this international support for Jiang's regime. Contrary to later claims, Jiang himself not only viewed these arrangements favorably, but played a significant role in constructing them. Primarily due to American and Soviet support, by late 1945 Jiang was closer to unifying China than he had ever been before. Jiang's international strategy broke down when Stalin demanded that the GMD choose between Soviet cooperation and American military support. In early 1946, Jiang therefore believed that he had no alternative but to use military force against the CCP. To the GMD leader the Marshall mediation and the Chinese peace initiatives were but disturbing preludes to armed conflict. After the break between Chongqing and Moscow Jiang knew that he had to fight to gain control of the Northeast. Like Mao, Jiang was a latecomer to the Cold War. He saw no contradiction in cooperating both with the Soviets and with the Americans, and believed that he could—through skillful maneuvering—retain the support of both powers. He was strongly aware of the growing Soviet-American antagonism, but felt that such rivalry was to his regime's advantage, and that China should avoid joining any one power against the other. Up to early 1946 Jiang insisted—against the advice of the proAmerican GMD foreign policy elite—that cooperation with the Soviet Union was possible. The generalissimo would have continued his efforts to work with Moscow had Stalin given him any reason to hope for positive results. Jiang's view of the Soviet Union was that of an

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inimical but pragmatic power that wanted specific concessions and would not throw away its chances of getting them by ideologically inspired collaboration with the Chinese Communists. The Communists had nothing to offer Moscow, Jiang thought, and—in spite of their readiness to act as Soviet agents in China—were therefore of only limited interest to Stalin. Jiang viewed foreign policy as a game driven by pragmatic selfinterest. He believed that if he wanted foreign cooperation he would have to make specific concessions in return. Jiang thought he knew what Stalin wanted—territorial concessions similar to those the tsars had extracted from China in the past. The Americans were much harder to figure out. Jiang Jieshi never viewed China and the United States as natural allies. He was no admirer of the American political system, and came to feel a strong personal dislike for both Franklin Roosevelt and George Marshall because of their attempts to remold Chinese politics. Still, Jiang needed American support, and to get it he portrayed his regime to U.S. policymakers as indispensable to their postwar plans for East Asia, first as an ally against Japan, then as an ally against the Soviet Union. Though Jiang could not figure out what would buy American cooperation, he became increasingly convinced that Truman would continue to aid the GMD regime even during a civil war. Jiang's American policy in 1945 and 1946 remained largely successful. Aided first by Patrick Hurley's colossal ineptness as ambassador, and then by the War Department's anti-Soviet bias, Jiang received U.S. support even when he opposed American policy in China. The United States trained, equipped, and transported his military forces, provided intelligence, and guarded his lines of communication. In short, the GMD and the Americans were closer allies in peace than they had ever been during the war with Japan. Still, Jiang's foreign policy could not survive the onset of the Cold War. In spite of its rhetoric, the GMD was dependent on both American and Soviet support in order to develop its power and avoid civil war. When the Soviet link disappeared and the war came, foreign policy could no longer make up for the GMD's postwar political failures. Arbitrary rule, economic mismanagement, and a general unresponsiveness to the concerns of most Chinese became the undoing of the GMD regime in spite of the American assistance Jiang Jieshi continued to receive.

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Joseph Stalin had little interest in developments in China up to 1944. His main East Asian concern was Japan—an enemy that Stalin feared would attack the Soviet Far Eastern provinces. By late 1944, with Germany on the verge of defeat and Japan's power significantly reduced, Stalin's purpose changed from avoiding a Japanese attack to starting the preparations for his own military offensive against Tokyo. Aside from the total defeat of Japan, Stalin wanted to extend the Soviet-American alliance into East Asia. He also wanted to secure Soviet influence in Manchuria, but did not intend his Manchurian demands to damage relations with either Washington or Chongqing. On the contrary, Stalin seem to have believed that the Yalta agreement both secured further Soviet-American cooperation and provided a basis for a comprehensive Sino-Soviet settlement sanctioned by Roosevelt. Stalin's demands at the summer 1945 Moscow negotiations were basically moderate. In order to avoid conflict with the Americans, the Soviet leader wanted specific agreements with Chongqing before the Red Army attacked Japan. To get agreement Stalin had to compromise with Jiang on several issues. The final treaty was therefore not a Soviet diktat, but a deal in which both Moscow and the GMD regime had an interest.9 Stalin's inability to form a coherent postwar diplomatic strategy in East Asia destroyed his alliance with Jiang and contributed significantly to the coming of the Cold War. He first overreacted to American attempts to pressure him during the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow, and declined all military cooperation with the United States during his Manchurian offensive. Then the conflict over an economic and political settlement in Europe led Stalin to start treating his position in Manchuria as a card in further bargaining with Washington, and to ignore his deal with Jiang. Stalin viewed the landing of U.S. troops in North China as a direct challenge to the Soviet presence in Manchuria. In response, he tried to revive Soviet-GMD cooperation in the Northeast in order to avoid a Sino-American alliance directed against the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Stalin forced Jiang to break with Moscow by insisting on full American withdrawal from China as the price for Soviet friendship. Stalin never regarded the CCP as a serious contender for power in China. In a world dominated by imperialist states, he viewed any Communist victory not sustained by Red Army military power as by definition impossible. Since American, and not Soviet, forces were in

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place in all Chinese regions but one, Stalin believed that the CCP would be crushed if civil war broke out. Instead of challenging Jiang for power, he wanted the Chinese Communist Party to design its domestic political activities to support Soviet foreign policy. 10 Based on his experience with CCP policy during the war with Japan, Stalin was in no way certain that that the CCP would follow his advice. Consequently, the CCP was of no significance in Soviet diplomatic and military planning before August. 11 Stalin's ignoring of the CCP led to an initial lack of coordination of Red Army policy toward the Communists in Manchuria. By mid-September, however, Stalin concluded that he could use the CCP presence in the Northeast to increase the price Chongqing and Washington would have to pay for Soviet cooperation. In other words, the Soviet acceptance of CCP administrations in Manchuria signaled that Moscow expected further concessions from Jiang and Truman in order to honor the August agreements. When Stalin in November retreated as a result of pressure from Washington and Chongqing, the CCP again lost its role in Soviet foreign policy. The Red Army threw the Communist administrations out of the Northeastern cities, and Stalin advised Yan'an to seek compromise with Jiang. The Soviet leader may even have ordered the Red Army commanders to be as harsh as possible when dislodging the CCP units, so as to test the loyalty and "internationalism" of the Yan'an leadership. 12 Stalin interpreted Hurley's resignation and Truman's December 15 statement as signs that Washington was reducing its enmity toward the CCP. This perceived change in U.S. policy made it possible for Stalin to repair his links with Yan'an. The CCP had proved its loyalty to Moscow, and Stalin hoped that it would serve his purposes when it became a part of a coalition government. Stalin's decision to withdraw from the Northeast resulted from his break with Chongqing. After January 1946 it was clear to Stalin that Jiang would base his foreign policy on an alliance with the United States, and that Soviet promises of cooperation on the Manchurian issue could not prevent a U.S. military presence in China. A continued occupation of the Northeast was therefore meaningless; it would only increase American and Chinese suspicions of Soviet motives, and impede chances for better relations with the new government. A withdrawal would improve the political position of pro-Soviet groups in China, as

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well as strengthen the military bargaining power of the CCP by leaving the party in control of northern Manchuria. Compared to Stalin's achievements at the Yalta and Moscow negotiations, and the Soviet military success in August, Soviet postwar China policy was extraordinarily unsuccessful. Stalin not only lost his leverage with the Chinese government, but—through his inconsistent diplomatic maneuvers—also antagonized Washington and contributed to Truman's increasing support for Jiang Jieshi. 13 In addition to his inconsistency in purpose, Stalin's policy style also contributed to these failures. The Soviet leader seemed unable to delegate any foreign policy decisions, and as a result any issue that did not have his immediate attention—like relations with the CCP or the SinoSoviet economic talks—remained in limbo. In addition, Stalin's personal behavior—his rudeness and his threats—often defeated his immediate political aims. 14 Compared to Stalin's vacillation, the Truman administration was much more consistent in developing and carrying out its policy toward the Soviet Union in China. This policy was to limit Soviet political influence in China, and prevent a permanent Soviet military presence in Manchuria. Truman's own insufficiencies as a political leader—his precipitancy, his persuadability, his inexactness—should not obscure the relatively high degree of coherence in the basic formulation of his administration's foreign policy. Top officials in the State and War departments started already in the weeks after FDR's death to change Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Soviets in East Asia, and find ways to limit Soviet influence. Harriman, Grew, and the War Department planners viewed U.S. military and diplomatic support for Jiang's regime as the best way of containing the Soviet Union. Harriman's support for the Chinese positions during the Moscow negotiations in the summer of 1945 was the coup de grace for the Yalta agreement—a far better symbol of the change in U.S. foreign policy than Byrnes' pipe dreams of exploiting the atomic bomb for diplomatic purposes. 15 In the weeks after VJ-Day the American political support for Jiang developed into a substantial military commitment. The War Department instructed U.S. forces to assist the GMD takeover of North China and the coast, and brought in American troops to occupy the main cities on Jiang's behalf. By late November American military units were

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equipping, transporting, and reinforcing Jiang's armies in their battles with the Communists. The president played no important role in making these decisions. Truman was remarkably absent from the making of both the specific and the general parts of U.S. China policy, and his personal input was limited to a strong dislike for the Chinese Communists. In the fall of 1945, Truman was still a step behind most of his advisers as their alarm over Soviet aggressiveness rose. Typically, his appointment of Marshall was primarily a stopgap measure intended to quell domestic criticism, and not a diplomatic signal to Moscow or Chongqing. To the War Department officials who designed the basic policies of the Marshall Mission the new envoy's primary task was to limit Soviet influence in China. Marshall fully shared his colleagues apprehension over Soviet policy. The change in U.S. policy that he engineered—from full military support for the GMD to a mix of military assistance and pressure for reform—was designed to make Jiang a more effective and trustworthy Cold War ally. Marshall failed, because Jiang's primary concern was the survival of his regime, and not the conflict with the Soviet Union. As often pointed out, the U.S. decision to continue military aid to Jiang in spite of his resistance to reform also reduced Marshall's political leverage with the GMD government. The larger inconsistency in U.S. policy was, however, more significant to Chinese politics: it was the breakdown in Soviet-American relations that made it clear to Jiang that he could no longer rely on getting aid from both powers to defeat his enemies. This realization made him ignore U.S. mediation and embark on a military campaign that his regime was, in the end, too weak to sustain. This study has shown that the civil war in China (1946-1949) originated with the emergence of the Cold War. In terms of Cold War perceptions, however, the Chinese parties consistently lagged behind the Great Powers. Both Mao and Jiang continued to believe well into 1946 that an alliance with one power did not necessarily mean confrontation with the other. Their gradual conversion to Cold War dualism was in both cases the result of Great Power pressure: the United States and the Soviet Union both made their aid conditional on the recipient's enlistment in the Cold War. The Chinese parties regarded foreign assistance as vital to their cause, and they both tried to win international support through granting political or territorial concessions. Nationalism did play a role in CCP and

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GMD ideology, but did not prevent either of the parties from disregarding "national" interests when bargaining for foreign aid. 16 These attempts to attract foreign support in 1945/46 are similar to the strategies used by rulers and rebels during other periods in Chinese history when domestic power hung in the balance—the mid-seventeenth and late nineteenth century being good examples. 17 By mid-1946 the leaders of both Great Powers viewed the civil war in China as linked to the Soviet-American conflict of interest in Europe and in the Middle East. The perception characteristic of the Cold War— that of two Super Powers in global confrontation, each assisted by its clients—developed at roughly the same time in Moscow and in Washington. Over the year from mid-1945 on, the two powers gradually buried all chances for mutual cooperation, and turned their rivalry in China into one of many arenas for the global conflict. 18 The early globalization of the Soviet-American conflict is one of the most interesting conclusions to draw from recent research on the early Cold War. Although east-central Europe was the main focus of attention for both Washington and Moscow in the first postwar years, other areas—China, Korea, Iran, and Greece—became important perceptual testing-grounds for Soviet and American images of each others intentions and capabilities. In the ongoing rewriting of early Cold War history, younger historians have found the same basic elements in Soviet and American foreign policy toward other peripheral areas as those I have pointed to in the case of China: Soviet irresolution and American militancy. 19 As Bruce Cumings has pointed out, 1945—and not 1947 or later— was Washington's "initial situation." 20 The causes for global conflict, as American political leaders understood them, were all rooted in the year the Second World War ended. On the Soviet side, Stalin was unable to handle the necessary readjustment of his foreign policy from war to peace during that year. Instead of attempting to overcome American suspicions by working out a cautious and goal-oriented foreign policy, Stalin's off-and-on diplomacy—his sharp turns between aggressive and conciliatory measures—increased U.S. wariness and Soviet isolation. By mid-1946 Stalin and his aides believed that the world outside Europe had become the staging-ground for a massive U.S. offensive against the Soviet Union. 21 One of the main findings of this book is the importance of foreign policy to the revolutionary strategy of the Chinese Communist Party in the mid-1940s. This emphasis on the international dimensions of their

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revolutionary struggle may be found not only among movements in East Asia in the middle of this century, but also as a general aspect of the policies of third world revolutionary parties during the Cold War. Our new awareness of the role foreign policy played in the minds of revolutionary leaders—and among their adversaries—should precipitate new questions from historians concerning the effect of foreign affairs on domestic political conflicts.22 Seen against all the GMD's advantages in 1945—of which its international support seemed the most propitious—how could the CCP still win the civil war? The degree of popular support the Communists won in China is not by itself a sufficient explanation for their victory. In China, as later in other Asian and African countries, the Cold War facilitated a rebel victory by making it impossible for the government to monopolize foreign support. As Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam or Holden Roberto in Angola—or, for that matter, Afghanistan's hapless Babrak Karmal—Jiang Jieshi was unable to benefit from the broad international support available to many local regimes in the pre-Cold War period. 23 On the other hand, while anticolonial insurgents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had little hope of forming alliances with a foreign power, the bipolarity and the scope of the Cold War conflict opened the door for third world rebels to exploit the international great power system for their own purposes. By appealing to ideological solidarity, strategic advantage, or economic benefit, revolutionary movements in Southeast and South Central Asia, Southern Africa, and in the Middle East could hope to get both political encouragement and material support from a Great Power. These new possibilities for alliances dramatically improved the potential for rebellions to succeed and for new regimes to entrench themselves. 24 Up through the 1960s and 1970s Great Power intervention in third world domestic conflicts became not only the driving force in the Cold War, but also an agent of change in local struggles for political control. By focusing further on local aspects of the Soviet-American conflict, the developing international history of the Cold War will provide critical and timely insights into the influence and limitations of foreign power at times of revolutionary political change.

A Word on Chinese Archives and Materials

Much of the Chinese source material used for this book comes from archives newly opened to researchers or from publications not intended for open circulation. The Number Two Historical Archives of China (Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan) in Nanjing is the main depository for documents and manuscripts from the Republican period (1911-1949) in the People's Republic of China. 1 These archives hold a number of collections (quanzonghao, "general classification numbers") relevant to Chinese foreign relations, but only a few of these are now open for research. Most of the foreign relations materials at the Archives of the Party History Committee of the Chinese Guomindang's Central Committee (Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui) outside Taibei, Taiwan, are also closed to researchers. The Committee has, however, compiled a series of volumes of documents on modem Chinese history, Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubiatt [A Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials on the Republic of China], which includes documents on foreign relations from its own archives, from Jiang Jieshi's papers, and from several ministerial collec-

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tions. The documents are unedited, and both the scope and the depth of the series are impressive. The second most important archive for foreign relations history on Taiwan is the Ministry of Defense's Bureau of Translation and Compilation Archive (Guofangbu shizhengbianyiju) in central Taibei. This archive holds the papers of the Guomindang Military Affairs Committee (Junshi weiyuanhui) and the Supreme National Defense Council (Zuigao guofang weiyuanhui). Among the papers are a number of collections dealing with military aspects of foreign affairs and with Jiang Jieshi's meetings and orders as chairman of these committees. Jiang's role is also covered in the Zongtong Jiang gong dashi changbian chugao [A Draft Extensive Chronology of President Jiang], reportedly compiled by the Presidential Office (Zongtong jiguan) not long after Jiang's death. This compilation includes substantial excerpts from Jiang Jieshi's personal diary, as well as a wide selection of letters and reports received by Jiang. Several collections of private papers held by the archive of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Jindaishi yanjiusuo) at Nangang outside Taibei are of great interest to the student of Chinese foreign relations. Wang Shijie's papers and diary are among the collections held here. The archive also has a large collection of oral history interviews, published and unpublished, prepared by the staff of the institute. The best available archival holdings of documents and materials on the Chinese Communist Party are also on Taiwan. The Ministry of Justice's Bureau of Investigation (Fawubu diaochaju) in Xindian outside Taibei has a comprehensive and recently consolidated collection of CCP circulars, study materials, and leaflets covering the whole span of CCP history.2 Neither the Central Party Archives (Zhongyang dang'anguan) nor any of the military or diplomatic archives in Beijing are open for general research. 3 As is the case with the Guomindang, the Central Party Archives has recently published a selection of important documents, Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji [A Selection of CCP Central Committee Documents], which gives a broad overview of major debates and decisions in the Central Committee between 1921 and 1949. The Central Party Archives has also compiled a series of Central Committee documents on special areas of activities, as land-reform, mobilization of youth, and the United Front. The last series, Zhonggong zhongyang kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [A Selection

Chinese Archives and Materials 181 of Documents on the CCP Central Committee's National Anti-Japanese United Front] and Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhartxian wenjian xuanbian [A Selection of Documents on the CCP Central Committee's United Front During the Period of the Liberation War], contains a number of documents with relevance for the party's foreign relations. The regional and local levels of CCP activity are covered by the recent publication of several compilations of base area or border area documents. I have drawn heavily on these publications to document the encounters between the Chinese Communists and foreign forces in the Northeast and in North China. Access to most of the archives mentioned here requires special permission, and the CCP document-series listed are all "internal publications" (neibu faxing), i.e., they are published in limited numbers and for restricted circulation within the People's Republic.4

Notes

Introduction 1. For a recent historiographical overview of the debate, see Robert J. McMahon, "The Cold War in Asia," pp. 307-328. 2. As will be clear from chapter 1, I define "the Cold War period" as an epoque characterized by the global confrontation of two great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—each assisted by its clients. One of the studies that consistently emphasizes the difference between pre-Cold War and Cold War rationalities is John Lewis Gaddis' The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), written during the détente era (see, for instance, pp. 359-360). 3. See, for instance, Michael Schaller's conclusion in The U.S. Crusade in China. 19)8-1945, pp. 291-305. 4. Marc S. Gallicchio, The Cold War Begins in Asia. 5. Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954. 6. John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945. 7. James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers. 8. Niu Jun, Cong Hu'erli dao Maxie'er. 9. I was privileged in being able to exploit foreign affairs materials, only available in the People's Republic of China, during a period of exceptionally liberal policy of access to libraries and archives in that country—the spring of

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1989. For an overview of recently available published materials on the Chinese Communist Party, see Michael H. Hunt and Odd Ame Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs," pp. 258-272. 10. Instead of documenting foreign policy initiatives, and thereby interpreting them, so-to-say, from below, the lack of firsthand materials on Soviet foreign affairs still forces us to interpret from above, from the actions that can be perceived by outside observers. This approach is neither less logical, nor less theoritically defensible, than standard analytical interpretation. The synthetic quality of the approach, however, makes for clear limitations to its use. It is impossible, for instance, to trace individual (or group) positions and thereby to explain the genesis of particular initiatives. The approach is also obviously weaker in explaining the specific context of events. This is, however, not to say that it is necessarily weaker in overall explanation of foreign policy. The "synthetic approach" is, under equal circumstances, less attractive as a method, and presents more difficulties to the researcher. But if foreign policy by its nature is an international process, this approach will necessarily have to be used in order to make sense of those states that do not yet allow research into their inner policy process. A good discussion of a similar approach is in Peter J. Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944-1949, pp. 217-219. 11. Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia, pp. 98-99. 1. Yalta and the Search for

Stability

1. Louis Fischer, The Road to Yalta, p. 215. 2. A randomly chosen example is Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, ¡945-1954, pp. 5 - 8 . 3. For a comprehensive analysis of Soviet strategy in 1943-44, see William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy, pp. 58-88. 4. George Alexander Lensen, The Strange Neutrality, pp. 113-129; Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939, 2:1057-1062; Bohlen Post-Conference Memoranda, Appendix D, in FRUS: Potsdam, 2:1584-1585, 15871588; W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, pp. 350-351. American military intelligence estimated in early 1944 that the Soviet Union would need a year's preparation in order to fight successfully against the Japanese forces (Joint Intelligence Committee, 13 January 1944, 151/1, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives [hereafter RG 218, NA]). 5. Paul D. Mayle, Eureka Summit, p. 110; John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945. pp. 192-199. 6. For Soviet evaluations of the military situation in Europe, see John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, pp. 422-430. 7. George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia. 1941-1946. pp. 144-167. Since the Teheran conference FDR had tried to be seen by the Soviets as a compromiser between Stalin's and Churchill's positions on Eastern Europe (see minutes of

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185

Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, December 1, 1943, in FRUS: Teheran, pp. 594-595, and minutes of tripartite political meeting, December 1, 1943, ibid., pp. 6 0 2 603). 8. Stalin's Marxism told him that there were contradictions between the Guomindang and the foreign powers which could be made to serve Soviet security. His discussion of this in 1927, when he saw strong elements of "national capitalist interests" in the Guomindang, throws light on his thinking seventeen years later (Iosif Stalin, "O kitaie" [On China], Sochinertiia [Works] (Moscow: n.p., 1947), 9:331-362. See also Adam Ulam's Stalin: The Man and His Era, pp. 274-77. 9. Harriman to Roosevelt, June 11, 1944, FRUS: 1944, 4:965-67; Harriman to Roosevelt, October 15, 1944, in FRUS: Yalta, pp. 368-371; Harriman to Molotov, August 20, 1944, FRUS: 1944, 4:984; Fu Bingchang to Jiang Jieshi, June 1, 1944, Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, comp., Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian - dui Ri kangzhan shiqi, vol. 3, book 2, pp. 404-405. Hereafter Zhongyao shiliao. Gauss to Hull, July 31, 1944, 893.00/7-1344, Records of the Department of State (Central File), Record Group 59, National Archives. Hereafter RG 59, NA. 10. See C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 413-425; Xiang Qing, Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi shigao [A Draft History of the Relations Between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution] (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1988); and Yang Yinruo and Yang Kuisong, Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming [The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1988). For a brief summary of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Soviet Union in the 1930s, see Steven I. Levine, "Introduction," in Aleksandr Ya. Kalyagin, Along Alien Roads, translated and with an introduction by Steven I. Levine (New York: Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1983), pp. 1-13. 11. Harriman to Truman, October 15, 1944, FRUS: Yalta, pp. 368-369; Harriman to Truman, October 17, 1944, ibid., pp. 370-371; Deane to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 17, 1944, ibid., pp. 371-374. 12. "Russian Participation in the War Against Japan," November 23, 1944, p. 7, JCS 1176, RG 218, NA. 13. The U.S. Military Mission in Moscow realized that this worry played a major role in Soviet planning (Deane to U.S. Chiefs of Staff, January 22, 1945, JCS 1176, RG 218, NA). 14. "Specific action to be taken under revised policy with Russia," April 16, 1945, appendix "A" to enclosure "A," JCS 1313/1, RG 218, NA. 15. "Kamchatka Survey Party," February 4, 1945, Section III, JCS 1176/8, RG 218, NA; Deane to U.S. Chiefs of Staff, January 22, 1945, ibid.; "Intelligence appreciation," January 22, 1945, appendix "A," JPS 603, ibid. 16. Joint Staff Planners, 182d meeting, December 6, 1944, RG 218, NA.

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17. Hurley to Stettinius, December 24, 1944, 893.00/12-2444, RG 59, NA. 18. Haniman to Roosevelt, December 15, 1944, FRUS: Yalta, pp. 378-379. In his telegram to the president, Harriman worried not over the territorial concessions themselves, but over the Soviets stationing troops in Manchuria to protect the railways they wanted to control. 19. Memorandum of conversation, Lippmann-Grew, May 17, 1944, f. "Conversations, May 1944," MS 1687.3 v.6 (3), Joseph C. Grew Papers, HLHU. 20. Izvestiia, November 30, 1944; Harriman to Hull, June 22 1944, FRUS: 1944. 6:799; Harriman to Roosevelt, June 11, 1944, ibid., p. 97. 21. Gauss to Hull, July 27, 1944, 893.00/7-2744, RG 59, NA. 22. Hsi-cheng Ch'i, Nationalist China at War, pp. 77-81; Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction, pp. 138-146. 23. Ch'i, Nationalist China at War, pp. 227-233. 24. Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi], "Success in War and Revolution," in Chinese Ministry of Information, comp., The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-1945, 2:803-807. For an interesting discussion of GMD perceptions of national unity, see C. Martin Wilbur, "Military Seperatism and the Process of Reunification under the Nationalist Regime, 19221937," 1:203-263. 25. Entry for June 24, 1944, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang gong dashi changbian chugao [Preliminary Extensive Chronology of President Jiang] (Taibei: n.p., 1978), vol. 5, book 2, pp. 546-547. Hereafter Zongtong Jiang. 26. Andrew D.W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, pp. 157-163; Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, pp. 164-177; Liang Jingdong, Shidiweishijian, pp. 271-306. 27. Dong Yanping, oral history interview, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Jindaishi yanjiusuo [Academia Sinica, Institute of Modem History]. 28. Wei Daoming to Jiang Jieshi, April 30, 1944, Zhongyao ziliao, vol. 3, book 1, p. 170; Zhang Yufa and Shen Songqiao, interv., Dong Wenqi xiansheng fangwen jilu [Record of an interview with Mr. Dong Wenqi] (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo koushu lishi congshu, 12 [Academia Sinica Institute of Modem History Oral History Series, 12]; Taibei: n.p., 1986), pp. 59-61. 29. Wei Daoming to Jiang Jieshi, May 11, 1944, Zhongyao ziliao, vol. 3, book 1, pp. 173-174; Fu Bingchang to Jiang Jieshi, June 1, 1944, ibid., book 2, pp. 404-405. 30. Merrell to Hull, June 28, 1944, FRUS: 1944. 6:235. John Garver indicates that Jiang in mid-July ordered the press to stop attacking the Soviet Union (Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, p. 206). 31. Hull to Gauss, July 14, 1944, FRUS: 1944, 6:245. 32. Record of conversation, July 19, 1944, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 765-767. See also Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, pp. 204-205. 33. Memorandum of conversation, Jiang Jieshi-Soviet charge d'affaires, September 14, 1944, "Zhong Su waijiao wenti zhuanji" [Special compilation on questions concerning Sino-Soviet foreign relations], decimal file 062.23

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5000.3 (2), Ministry of Defense's Bureau of Historical Compilation and Translation, Taibei, Taiwan (hereafter BMH); memorandum of conversation, Jiang Jieshi-Soviet chargé d'affaires, October 12, 1944, ibid., decimal file 062.23 5000.3 (2), BMH. 34. Wang Shijie to Jiang Jieshi, November 13, 1944, Zhongyao ziliao, vol. 3, book 2, p. 538. 35. Gu Weijun to Jiang Jieshi, October 14, 1944, Zhongyao ziliao, vol. 3, book 2, p. 539. 36. Jiang Yongjing, "Song Ziwen Shidalin Zhong Su tiaoyue tanpan jishi," p. 79. 37. Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 629. 38. FRUS: Teheran, pp. 8 6 8 - 8 6 9 ; Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, pp. 2 0 8 209. 39. Jimi waijiaobu tongxun [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secret Bulletin], no. 8, (October 25, 1944), p. 1 - 2 , document folder 1 - 6 - 3 4 2 , Number Two (Republican Period) Archives of China, Nanjing, PRC. Hereafter Number Two Archives. 40. Kong Xiangxi to Jiang Jieshi, November 16, 1944; Zhongyao ziliao, vol. 3, book 2, pp. 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 . FDR followed up two days later in a message to Hurley: "I wish you would tell the Generalissimo from me in confidence that a working agreement between the Generalissimo and the North China forces will greatly expedite the objective of throwing the Japanese out of China from my view and also that of the Russians. I cannot tell you more at this time but he will have to take my word for it. You can emphasize the word 'Russians' to him." Roosevelt to Hurley, November 18, 1944, FRUS: 1944, 6:703. 41. Entry for December 2, 1944, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 6 4 5 - 6 4 6 ; entry for December 8, Victor Hoo (Hu Shize) Diary, Victor Hoo Papers, HIA, Stanford, Calif. Hereafter Hu Shize Diary. 42. M e m o r a n d u m of conversation, Zhang Jia'ao and Zhang Jiasen-Joseph Grew, January 4, 1945. Folder: "Grew, Joseph: Conversations, January 1 - 4 , 1945," Joseph Grew papers, MS 1687.3 v.6 (11), HLHU. 43. M e m o r a n d u m of conversation, Shao Yulin-Joseph Grew, January 27, 1945. Folder: "Grew: Conversations, January 27, 1945," Joseph Grew papers, MS 1687.3 v.6 (19), HLHU. 44. Richard Manser, "Roosevelt and China," pp. 2 5 2 - 2 5 6 . 45. Jiang, "Song Ziwen," p. 80. 46. Manser, "Roosevelt and China," pp. 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 . 47. "Political report for June 1944. U.S. Embassy, Chungking [Chongqing]," July 17, 1944, 893.00/7-1744, RG 59, NA; American consulate, Tihwa [Dihua] to Stettinius, December 10, 1944, 893.00/12-1044, ibid.; "Armed revolt Against Chinese rule in Sinkiang," memorandum. Department of State, Division of Chinese Affairs, November 30, 1944, 893.00/11-3044, ibid. 48. First plenary meeting, November 28, 1943, JCS minutes, FRUS: Teheran, pp. 4 9 9 - 5 0 0 . See also Manser, "Roosevelt and China," p. 127.

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49. "Logistic support of the USSR," June 9, 1944, JCS 901, RG 218, NA; Harriman to Molotov, August 20, 1944, FRUS: 1944. 4:984; Stalin to Roosevelt, August 22, 1944, ibid., p. 985; Harriman to Hull, September 5, 1944, FRUS:¡944, 6:255; Roosevelt to Jiang Jieshi, September 16, 1944, ibid., pp. 157-158. 50. Barbara W . Tuchman, Stil we 11 and the American Experience in China, ¡911-1945, pp. 629-642; Churchill to Roosevelt, October 11, 1944, FRUS: 1944, 4:1010-1011; entry for Friday, October 13, 1944, Henry L. Stimson diaries, Yale University Library. Hereafter Stimson Diaries. Stein Tennesson argues that FDR was still interested in the prospects for a U.S. landing in Indochina in late 1944. Tennesson, "The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945," pp. 202-212). 51. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp. 504-505. 52. Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 370. 53. Ibid., pp. 370-371. 54. Roosevelt to Carlson, November 15, 1944, President's Secretary's File (PSF), box 38. Folder: "China 1945." FDRL. 55. Stettinius to Roosevelt, January 4, 1945, PSF, Box 38. Folder: "China 1945," FDRL. This is Stettinius' attached comments to one of Hurley's reports from Chongqing. Congressman Michael Mansfield also reported to the president on January 3, after a visit to China, that GMD-CCP unity was "necessary to achieve U.S. objectives. Mansfield to Roosevelt, January 3, 1945, PSF, box 38. Folder: "China 1945," FDRL." 56. Harriman, Special Envoy, pp. 371. 57. "Combined U.S.-USSR Planning for MILEPOST," Section 1, February 4, 1945, JCS 1176/8, RG 218, NA; Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 383. 58. Joint Logistics Committee, "Summary of Supplies and Equipment for MILEPOST," February 4, 1945, JCS Info M e m o 360 (ARGONAUT), RG 218, NA. Limited deliveries across the Pacific of non-military goods started in early summer 1944, with the intention that some material be stockpiled in the Far East for use against Japan ("Logistic support of the USSR," June 9, 1944, JCS 901, RG 218, N A ) . 59. "Russian Participation in the War Against Japan," November 23, 1944, JCS 1176, RG 218, NA. 60. Joint Chiefs to Deane, January 18, 1945, appendix " A , " JCS 1176/5, RG 218, NA; Harriman, Special Envoy, pp. 371—372. 61. "Intelligence appreciation," January 22, 1945, JPS 603, appendix " A , " RG 218, NA. 62. Donovan to Roosevelt, January 11, 1945, PSF, box 170, FDRL; Donovan to Roosevelt, January 25, 1945, ibid.; OSS Memo for the President, February 7, 1945, ibid. It has later been discovered that this intelligence—provided by an official in the Vatican—was false (Washington Post. August 3, 1980). It is

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likely, but not certain, that the OSS kept the president informed of these intelligence reports while abroad. 63. Entry for Thursday, December 14, 1944, Stimson Diary. 64. Published as George Elsey, Roosevelt and China: The White House Story. 65. Currie to Roosevelt, "Re: Forthcoming conference," January 19, 1945, PSF, box 142. Folder: "Crimea Conference," FDRL. 66. For a discussion of FDRs views on Poland and East Central Europe in the period leading up to Yalta, see Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 464-466 and 469. 67. Notes on Yalta, October 19, 1945, Harry Hopkins Letters (mf), reel 20, FDRL. One of the papers in the president's briefing book at Yalta, compiled by the State Department, stated that the U.S. aim should be an agreement between the Soviet Union and China, on the basis of a unified Chinese military command. "Political and military situation in China in the event the USSR enters the war in the Far East," FRUS: Yalta, pp. 351—352. There is no evidence that the president ever read these documents. 68. Handwritten notes. Folder: "Yalta conference," box 58, Anna Roosevelt Halstead Papers, FDRL. For other discussions of the East Asian issues at the Yalta summit, see Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta, pp. 244-258 and Russell D. Buhite, Decisions at Yalta, pp. 85-104. 69. Minutes of first tripartite military meeting, February 5, noon, FRUS: Yalta, p. 593; minutes of Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, February 8, 1945, ibid., p. 766. It is possible that this apparent change of tactics was part of Stalin's negotiation behavior. If he expected resistance, he would often give as much as possible in the preceding discussions, for then to appear insulted and withdraw earlier concessions if rebuffed in his subsequent demands. 70. Minutes of Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, February 8, 1945, FRUS: Yalta, p. 768. 71. Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 399. 2. The Jiang-Stalin Pact and the Collapse of Great Power Cooperation 1. Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia. pp. 98-99. 2. Like Akira Iriye (The Cold War in Asia, p. 165), I distinguish between the concepts of "Great Power rivalry" and "Cold War conflict." The latter was a specific kind of bipolar conflict, characterized by the participants' perception of a global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, each assisted by its local clients. 3. See Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 251, as an example of how this myth influences one historian's interpretation. See also Peter M. Kuhfus, "Der Risken der Freundschaft," pp. 247-286. 4. John Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945, p. 209.

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5. Jiang Jieshi Diary, February 21, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 680.

6. Wei Daoming to Jiang Jieshi, March 15, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 686-687. 7. Jiang Jieshi Diary, February 18, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 678-679. 8. Entry for February 6, 1945, Victor Hoo [Hu Shize] Diary, box 2, Victor Hoo Papers, HIA. Hereafter Hu Shize Diary. 9. Entry for February 18, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 678-679. 10. Entry for April 13, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 696. 11. Wei Daoming to Jiang Jieshi, April 16, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 3, book 1, pp. 206-207. 12. Wei Daoming to Jiang Jieshi, April 17, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 3, book 1, pp. 207-208. 13. Song Ziwen to Jiang Jieshi, "Report from San Fransisco," April 17, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao. vol. 3, book 1, pp. 208-209. 14. Entry for April 30, 1945, Wang Shijie handwritten diary, archives, Jindaishi yanjiusuo [Institute of M o d e m History], Zhongyang kexueyuan [Academia Sinica], Nangang, Taiwan. Hereafter Wang Shijie Diary. 15. Minutes, Secretary's Staff Committee, April 20 and April 21, 1945. Folder: "April 1 7 - 2 4 , " box 178, Harriman Papers. 16. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 2:595-602. 17. John F. Melby, oral history interview (1986), p. 99. HSTL. 18. Entry for June 15, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 726-727. 19. Entries for June 12 and 24, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 724, 731. 20. Memorandum of conversation, Song Ziwen-Patrick Hurley, June 25, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 734. See also Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, p. 214. 21. Junshi weiyuanhui [Military Affairs Committee] to Jiang Jieshi, May 3, 1945, 062.23 5000.3 (1), "ZhongSu waijiao wenti zhuanji" [Special Compilation on Questions Concerning Sino-Soviet Relations], BMH. 22. For Song's background, see Howard Boorman, ed.. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 3:149-153. 23. " N o . I. Meeting Between Marshal Stalin and Dr. Soong [Song],'' June 30, 1945. Folder: "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1945-1946," box 2, Victor Hoo [Hu Shize] Papers, HIA. Hereafter Hu Papers. I have had access to two sets of minutes of the negotiations. Hu Shize's typewritten notes, in English, are kept with his papers at the Hoover Institution Archives. Parts of the official Chinese record is reproduced in Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 3, book 1, pp. 577-635. Hu's notes are considerably more detailed than the Zhongyao shiliao text, and it seems

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probable that the Foreign Ministry built the official Chinese record on these notes. The quotes in the text are from Hu's manuscript, if nothing else is noted. J o h n Garver's and Liang Jingdong's earlier analyses of the first part of the negotiations, based mainly on the official record, differ from mine by viewing the Soviet demands as more aggressive, and by placing less emphasis on US intervention. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, pp. 214—222, and Chin-tung Liang [Liang Jingdong], "The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945: The Inside Story," in Paul K. T. Sih, ed.. Nationalist China During the SinoJapanese War, 1937-1945. pp. 373-397. 24. Entry for July 1, 1945, Hu Shize diary. 25. "July 2, 1945, 8.00-10.30 p.m.," "Notes taken at Sino-Soviet Conferences Moscow, 1945." Folder: "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1945-1946," box 2, Hu Papers. Hereafter Hu Notes. 26. Ibid. 27. The status of Outer Mongolia was one of several ambiguities in the Yalta agreements. The Soviets regarded the "status q u o " mentioned in the agreements to imply recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic. FDR's team saw the phrase as meaning actual, but not official, Soviet control. Jiang took it to mean Soviet and American acceptance of formal Chinese suzerainty (zongzuquan) over all of Mongolia. See also Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, pp. 2 1 6 217. 28. Ibid. 29. Entry for July 3, 1945, Hu Shize Diary. Hu Shize enjoyed the advantage of being able to speak and read Russian fluently. Bom in the United States and educated in Paris, Hu had served as Chinese delegate to the League of Nations in the 1930s and as vice-minister since 1942. His handwritten diary, in French, is a fascinating record of Chinese diplomacy and public life before and after 1949. 30. Entry for July 5, 1945, Hu Shize diary. 31. Byrnes to Harriman, July 4, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7:914-915. 32. For a brief sketch of Byrnes' basic approach to foreign policy, see Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 1 0 9 - I I 1 . 33. Byrnes to Harriman, July 6, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7:9 1 6 - 9 1 7 . Song had told Harriman already on July 3 that " n o Chinese government can last if Outer Mongolia is ceded," and that Mongolian question therefore was "the greatest stumbling block" in the negotiations. "Conversation with Soong, July 3," handwritten notes. Folder: "July 1 - 1 6 , " box 180, Harriman Papers, LC. 34. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 8, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7 : 9 1 9 920; Song Ziwen to Jiang Jieshi, July 7, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 752-753. 35. Song Ziwen to Jiang Jieshi, July 2, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 745-746; entry for July 5, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, ibid., pp. 747; entry for July 6, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; see also entry for July 28, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 771.

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36. Entry for July 5, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 747. 37. Chen Lifu, oral history interview, f. "War and postwar," box 52, Chinese Oral History Collection, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York. Hereafter Chen Lifu interview. Entry for July 5, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; Jiang Jieshi to Song Ziwen, July 6. 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 7 4 7 748; Jiang Jieshi to Song Ziwen, July 7, 1945, ibid., pp. 7 5 3 - 7 5 4 . 38. "July 7, 1945, 11:00-11:45 p.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers. 39. "July 9, 1945, 9 : 0 0 - 1 0 : 4 0 p.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. "July 10, 1945, 2 : 0 0 - 4 : 0 0 p.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers. 43. "July 11, 1945, 9 : 0 0 - 1 1 : 3 0 p.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers. 44. "July 12, 1945, 12:00-12:45 a.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers. 45. For an interesting parallel—Stalin's betrayal of the German communists in 1939—see Anthony Read, The Deadly Embrace, pp. 2 4 8 - 2 5 5 . 46. Entry for July 18, Hu Shize Diary. Later, at the farewell dinner in the Kremlin, Stalin gave a toast to the unity of China under Jiang Jieshi. Looking at Jiang Jingguo, Stalin said that if the father could not succeed fully, his son would complete his work (ibid.). 47. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 13, 1945. Folder: "July 12-19," box 180, Harriman Papers, LC. 48. Truman to Lillie Knight, February 9, 1943., Folder: "Chinese Situation," box 51. Senate/Vice Presidential File. HSTL. Here quoted from Robert L. Messer, "Roosevelt, Truman, and China," p. 68. 49. Grew to Truman, "Possible resurrection of Communist International, resumption of extreme leftist activities, and possible effect on the United States," June 27, 1945. Folder: "Alphabetical File—C," box 36, White House Central File, HSTL. 50. "The Chinese Communist Movement," War Department, Military Intelligence Division, July 5, 1945. Folder 8, box 2, George Elsey Papers, HSTL. Hereafter Elsey Papers. The president was of course not aware that the report contradicted most available G-2 and OSS intelligence on the CCP's Soviet links. See "Chinese Communist Preparations for Civil Crisis in China," OSS study no. 32, July 27, 1945, Folder: "July 2 7 - 3 1 , " box 181, Harriman Papers, LC. 51. Charles Bohlen to Avis Bohlen, postmarked July 17, 1945. Folder: "Letters to wife," box 36, Charles E. Bohlen Papers, LC. 52. Grew to Byrnes, July 13, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, p. 870. 53. Memorandum, Stimson to President Truman, July 16, 1945, FRUS: ¡945, 7:943-944. See also entry for July 15, 1945, Stimson Diary. 54. Harriman to Truman, "Japan: Occupation and military government," July 15, 1945. Folder: "July 1 2 - 1 9 , " box 180, Harriman Papers, LC; Harriman to Truman, "Yalta agreement affecting China," July 18, 1945, ibid. 55. Entry for July 17, 1945, Stimson Diary. YUL.

2. Jiang-Stalin Pact and Collapse of Cooperation

193

56. Harry S. Truman to Bess Truman, July 18, 1945, Robert H. Ferrell. ed.. Dear Bess, p. 519. See also entry for July 17, 1945, Truman Diary, Robert Fen-ell, ed.. Off the Record, p. 53; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain, p. 114. 57. Entry for July 20 (1945), WB's book. Folder: 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Cooper Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C. Hereafter Byrnes Papers. 58. See J. Samuel Walker's overview of recent evidence, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," pp. 9 7 - 1 1 4 . 59. Military Affairs Committee to Jiang Jieshi, "Su E dui Ri gongshi zuozhan zhi yanjiu" [A Study of Soviet Plans for Offensive Battles Against Japan), July 14, 1945, Decimal File 546.4 4439.2, BMH. 60. Memorandum of conversation, Jiang Jieshi-Appollon Petrov, July 19, 1945, Zongtong Jiang. pp. 765-770. 61. Entry for July 14, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary. 62. Entry for July 28, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 771. 63. Entry for July 23, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; Chen Lifii interview. Folder: "War and Postwar." 64. Entries for July 24 and 25, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; Hurley to Byrnes, 29 July, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7:952-953. 65. Entry for July 25, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary. In connection with his last meeting with Ambassador Petrov before the resumption of the talks in Moscow, Jiang underlined both to his own advisers and to the ambassador how much he wanted the negotiations to succeed. 66. Entry for July 28, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 771; entry for July 26, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary. 67. Entries for July 27 and July 29, 1945, Hu Shize Diary. 68. The British informed Chongqing in early August that the Soviet Union in their opinion had "gone too far" already. Entry for August 8, 1945, Hu Shize Diary. 69. Harriman to Byrnes, July 31, 1945, FRUS; 1945, 7:953-954. 70. Byrnes to Harriman, August 5, 1948, FRUS: 1945, 7:955. 71. Song to Harriman, August 7, 1945 (handwritten note). Folder: "August 1 - 7 , " box 180, Harriman Papers, LC. 72. "August 7, 1945, 10:00-11:30 p.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers. 73. L. N. Vnotchenko, Pobeda na Dal'nem vostoke, p. 69. 74. Entry for August 8, 1945, Wang Shije Diary; entry for August 6, 1945, Hu Shize Diary. 75. Harriman to Truman, August 8, 1945, FRUS: ¡945, 7:533-535. 76. Harriman to Truman, August 9, 1945, FRUS: ¡945. 7:5 3 7 - 5 38. 77. Entry for August 9, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; handwritten note, August 11, 1945. Folder: "August 8 - 1 2 , " box 180, Harriman Papers, LC. 78. Stalin accepted a Chinese chairman of the board for both railways. He

194

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also dropped his demand for demilitarization of the small but strategic islands in the Bohai Gulf. 79. "August 10, 9:00-11:30 p.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers. 80. Ibid. 81. "August 12, 1945, 4.30 to 6.45 p.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers; Jiang Jieshi to Song Ziwen, August 12, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao. vol. 3, book 1, p. 647; entry for August 12, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; "13 August 1945, 12.00 a.m. to 1.30 a.m.," Hu Notes, Hu Papers. 82. Stalin accepted a Chinese majority on the boards of the railways, and Chinese ownership of the port facilities in Dalian. The Soviet leader also agreed to a compromise on the tricky issue of how to appoint the harbor master in Dalian: he now would be appointed by the (Soviet) manager of the railway by agreement with (the Chinese) Dalian mayor. In Liishun, the Chinese leader of the city's civilian administration would be appointed in agreement with the Soviet military commander. 83. When discovered by the Russian-speaking Hu Shize, Molotov explained this childish attempt to make extra gains as "a mistake." The episode indicates that the Soviets were not satisfied by far by the final agreement. Entry for August 27, 1945, Hu Shize Diary. 84. Entry for August 27, 1945, Hu Shize Diary. 85. Harriman to Bymes, August 13, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7:970-971. 86. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, August 10, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7:967. As Marc Gallicchio has shown, the War Department had to give up this plan to preempt Soviet control of the city because of the overwhelming logistical problems created by the Japanese surrender. Marc S. Gallicchio, The Cold War Begins in Asia, pp. 63. 87. Draft message for the President (marked "not sent"). Folder: "March 14-21" (1945), box 177, Harriman Papers, LC. 88. Song Ziwen to Jiang Jieshi, August 18, 1945, Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, comp., Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian. vol. 7, book 1, pp. 25—26. I have not found any record of this meeting in American archives. 89. Some American and British newspapers disagreed with this view of the treaty. See Christopher Thome, Allies of a Kind, p. 578. 90. Soviet inability to understand how serious, and how widespread, the American concerns about Soviet China policy were is reflected in a conversation his interpreter, Pavlov, had with a British diplomat in mid-August. China was Harriman's personal hang-up, Pavlov said, and went on to describe how the ambassador's "eyes glittered when the subject of China was mentioned." Memorandum, Davies to Kennan, August 18, 1945, box 181, Harriman Papers, LC. 91. Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, pp. 128-129.

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195

3. The Seventh Party Congress and the Origins of CCP Foreign Policy 1. For an explanation of the many postponements of the congress, see Li Yong, "Zhonggong QiDa tuichi zhaokai de qingkuang he yuanyin," pp. 60—61. 2. Lyman Van Slyke, 'The Chinese Communist Movement During the SinoJapanese War," in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds.. The Cambridge History of China, 13:708-709. QiDa is an abbreviation for Zhongguo Gongchandang diqice quanguo dahuiyi (Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party). 3. See Chen Yung-fa, Making Revolution, pp. 499-509; Liu Han et al„ Luo Ronghuan yuartshi, pp. 518-582; Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star, pp. 4 9 4 507. 4. For an overview of the debate on the growth of the CCP, see Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution," pp. 3—33. 5. For an inside report on Zheng feng in Yan'an, see Nie, Inside the Red Star, pp. 479-507. In some areas the campaign compounded problems instead of solving them. See David Mark Paulson, "War and Revolution in North China." 6. Both military expediency, nationalist ideals, and Comintern slogans seem to have inspired the CCP's willingness to form a United Front in the late 1930s. See John W. Garver, "The Origins of the Second United Front," pp. 29-59. 7. Chinese historians of the CCP have recently placed increased emphasis on the unfulfilled potential of the United Front. See Ju Zhifen, "JinChaJi kangRi genjudi shi yanjiu zongshu," pp. 33-41. 8. Mao Zedong, "Xin minzhuzhuyi lun" (On New Democracy], in Mao Zedong ji, 7:147-205. 9. Mao Tse-tung Selected Works, 2:61-70. 10. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan, 1898-1949, pp. 553-555. Hereafter Zhou Enlai zhuan. Xu Quanxing et al„ Yan 'an shiqi de Mao Zedong zhexue sixiang [Mao Zedong Philosophical Thought in the Yan'an Period] (Xian: Shaanxi renmin, 1988), pp. 338-374. 11. Wang Yi, "Kangzhan shiqi Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang chutan," pp. 31-35. 12. See Stephen R. MacKinnon and Oris Friesen, China Reporting, pp. 149150, 154-155. 13. Li Xiaoli, "Yingjiu Meiguo feixingyuan jishi," pp. 67-69. 14. Xie Shuangqiu, "1944 nian Zhongwai jizhetuan Yan'an xing," pp. 1 4 17. 15. Zhou Enlai to Wang Bingnan, quoted in Wang Bingnan, ZhongMei huitan jiunian huigu, p. 37. 16. Jiefang ribao [Liberation Daily], September 14, 1944. 17. He Di, "The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's Policy Toward the United States, 1944-1949," p. 33. 18. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu waijiao gongzuo de zhishi" [Instruc-

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tions from the Central Committee on Foreign Affairs Work], August 18, 1944, quoted in He Di, "The Evolution," pp. 33-34. 19. On Wang, see Shum Kui-Kwong, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power. pp. 156-158; on Zhou see Zhou Enlai zhuan, pp. 491-492. Shum concludes that Mao's victory over Wang also meant the defeat of the "internationalist" view of foreign affairs. My view is that Mao, often influenced by Zhou Enlai, not only took over some of the "internationalist" views of the connections between the world and the Chinese revolution, but also that these views persisted with the party and within Mao's own thinking for decades after liberation. See Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, pp. 237-238. 20. On Mao, see Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp. 42-47; on Liu, see Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi yu kangzhan jieshu hou zhengduo Dongbei de douzheng" pp. 124—126. 21. See Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, pp. 114-133; and John W. Garver, "The Origins of the Second United Front," pp. 29-59. 22. Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p. 138. 23. Yang Kuisong in Dangshiyanjiu (1987), no. 6, pp. 141-148. The Soviets had representatives in Yan'an throughout the war. Their most important task, besides filing reports to Moscow on the CCP, was to operate a radio to facilitate direct communication between Yan'an and the Soviet Union. The only source on the Soviet mission so far available is the diary (Osobyi Raion Kitaiia) of its leader, Petr Vladimirov, published in Moscow during the height of the SinoSoviet conflict. The published diary is unreliable, and I have preferred to use CCP documents for most of my treatment of Soviet-.CCP relations. 24. Hua Qingzhao, "Truman's China Policy as Viewed Through Chinese Eyes," p. 4. 25. Zhao Sufen, "Zhou Baozhong nianpu," pp. 239-250. 26. A good illustration can be found in several of Liu Shaoqi's writings from this period; see his "Liquidation of Menshevik Thought in the Party," in Boyd Compton, comp., Mao's China, pp. 255-268. 27. Dong Biwu report, September 24, 1944. Zhongyang tongzhanbu and Zhongyang dang'anguan, comps., Zhonggong zhongyang kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, 3:754-768; hereafter KangRi zhanxian. 28. Zhou Enlai, "Ruhe jiejue" [How to Reach a Settlement], October 10, 1944, Kangri zhanxian, pp. 769-780. 29. Barrett to Wedemeyer, December 10, 1944. Folder: "Radios—Eyes Alone—ct policy September 45-January 46," box 1542, Records of the United States Army, China Theater, RG 332, NA; hereafter CT, RG 332, NA. 30. McClure to Wedemeyer, December 18, 1945. Folder: "Radios—Eyes Alone, Dec. 23-Feb. 23, 1945," box 1538, CT, RG 332, NA; Zhou Enlai zhuan, pp. 580. See also Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945, pp. 195-206. 31. Barrett to Wedemeyer, December 10, 1944. Folder: "Radios—eyes alone— CT policy September 45-.Ianuary 46," box 1542, CT, RG 332, NA; Barbara

3. Seventh Party Congress and CCP Foreign Policy

197

Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington," pp. 44-64. See also Zhang Baijia, "Chinese Policies Toward the United States, 1937-1945," pp. 24-25. 32. Zhou Enlai, "Di Yu hou shengming" [Statement after Arrival in Chongqing], January 25, 1945, KangRi zhanxian, p. 788; Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, January 28, 1945, ibid., p. 789; Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 582. 33. Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, February 3, 1945, KangRi zhanxian, p. 790. 34. Central Committee to Wang Ruofei, February 25, 1945, KangRi zhanxian, p. 793. 35. Pan Zhongqun, "Du 'Dui Rikou de zuihou yizhan' ji youguan wenxian de zhaji," pp. 58-61; Central Committee to all Central Committee bureaus and sub-bureaus, March 15, 1945, KangRi zhanxian, pp. 802-804. 36. Mao Zedong, "Shiju ji qita wenti" [The Current Situation and Other Questions], February 15, 1945, originally in Ziliao xuanbian [Selection of Materials] (np: np, 1967), reprinted in Mao Zedong ji bujuan, 7:219-247, especially pp. 219-222. Hereafter Mao bujuan. 37. Ibid., p. 223. 38. Central Committee to all bureaus and sub-bureaus, March 15, 1945, KangRi zhanxian, pp. 802-804. 39. Central Committee to the North China Bureau, February 24, 1945, Zhongyang dang'anguan, comp., Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 13:27. Hereafter Zhongyang wenjian. 40. Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, February 3, 1945, KangRi zhanxian, p. 790. 41. James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers, pp. 87-91; untitled, undated document [Fujian Provincial Party Committee?], folder "Chinese Communist Documents," box 2463, CT, RG 332, NA. These documents seem to have been supplied to American military intelligence in mid-1945 by the National Army's Bureau of Investigation (diaochaju). One of the documents in the collection is an obvious GMD forgery. 42. Luo tongzhi [Comrade Luo, pseud.], "Zuijin liangge yue lai de gongzuo jiantao yu jinhou gongzuo wenti" [Self-Criticism of Work during the Last Two Months and Questions Concerning Work in the Immediate Future], in Fujian sheng dang'anguan and Zhongguo Fujian shengwei dangshi zhengweihui MinZheGan bangongshi, comps., MinZheGan dangshi wenxian ziliao xuanbian, pp. 251-252. Hereafter MinZheGan xuanbian. "Comrade Luo" is Ceng Jingbing, the head of the CCP Fujian provincial committee. 43. Hsiao-li Lindsay, typewritten memoir, p. 365, HIA, Stanford, Calif. Hsiao-li Lindsay (later Lady Lindsay) was the wife of Michael Lindsay, a British radio-operator who worked for the CCP. 44. Niu Jun, Cong He'erli dao Maxie'er, pp. 70-71. 45. MinZheGan xuanbian, 1:252. 46. Xinhua luntan [New China Tribune], vol. 1, no. 5 (March 16, 1945). 47. Mao Zedong, " 'QiDa' gongzuo fangzhen" [The Guiding Principles for the Work of the Seventh Congress], April 24, 1945, Mao bujuan, pp. 257-270. 48. Mao Zedong, "Zai Zhonggong diqici daibiao dahui shang de jianghua"

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[Speech at the CCP's Seventh Congress], originally in Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (np: np, 1967), reprinted in Mao bujuan, 7:279-283. Petr Vladimirov presents a summary of Mao's speech in his Osobyi raion kitaia ¡942-1945, pp. 424—437. Vladimirov's summary is a generally correct recount in the author's own words; it is interesting, however, that the Soviet correspondent omits most of those parts of the speech that dealt with foreign relations, and particularly some of Mao's most intense praise of the Soviet Union. For an English translation of this portion of Vladimirov's book, see "Mao Tse-tung's Oral Report to the Seventh Party Congress: Summary Notes," translated with an introduction by Steven I. Levine, Chinese Law and Government (Winter 1977/1978), 10(4):3-27. 49. Mao Zedong, Lun lianhe zhengfu [On Coalition Government], in Zhongguo Gongchandang diqici quanguo daibiao dahui wenxian [Documents from the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party] (n.p.: n.p., [June] 1945), pp. 4 - 8 , 73-79. Hereafter QiDa wenxian. There are several different versions of this report available. In the official Beijing edition of Mao Zedong xuanji, pp. 1029-1100, the foreign relations sections of the report are revised in order to remove most of the positive references to the United States. The text published in Mao Zedong ji, 9:183-275, is similar to the one I am using. 50. Mao Zedong, "Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang diqici quanguo daibiao dahui shang de zongjie baogao" [Final report of the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party], May 30, 1945, Mao bujuan, 8:27-29. 51. Xu Yan, "Jiefang zhanzheng shijian Mao Zedong de zhanlue sixiang de fazhanyanbian," pp. 1 - 7 . 52. "Zhou Enlai tongzhi yanshuo" [Comrade Zhou Enlai's Speech], QiDa wenxian, pp. 10—11. 53. For a good discussion of the origins and significance of this resolution, see Feng Hui, "Mao Zedong lingdao qicao 'Guanyu ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi' de jingguo," pp. 10-16. 54. Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p. 224. 55. Ibid., p. 228. 56. See Mao Zedong's oral report on April 24, cited above. John Garver and others believe that Mao's new emphasis on cooperation with the GMD was mainly an attempt to placate Stalin (Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, p. 261). 57. "Zhongguo Gongchandang dangzhang" [Chinese Communist Party Party Statutes], April 31, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:52-70; Jiefang ribao, May 15, 1945; Fan Ping, ed„ Zhongguo Gongchandang dangzhang yanjiu [Studies on Chinese Communist Party Party Statutes] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1987), pp. 29-43. 58. For an international comparison, see Trond Gilberg, "Introduction," in Trond Gilberg, ed.. Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties, pp. 1-28. Stalin gave similar advice to the Italian party. See Joan Barth Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 184-221. 59. Mao Zedong, "Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang diqici quanguo daibiao dahui shang de zongjie baogao" [Final Report of the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party], May 30, 1945, Mao bujuan, 8:25-28.

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60. Ibid., pp. 26. 28. 61. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 62. Central Committee to Wang Ruofei, June 17, 1945, KangRi zhanxian, 3:807-808; Jiefang Ribao, July 10 and July 12; Central Committee public statement, July 7, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:97-100. 63. Central Committee circular, June 19, 1945, KangRi zhanxian. 3:810813. 64. Xu Yan, " 'Rangkai dalu, zhanling liangxiang' shi jiefang quan Dongbei de bi you zhi lu," p. 37; Military Committee to Wang Zhen et al., June 15, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian. 13:89-90; Central Committee to Guangdong province party committee, June 16, 1945, ibid., p. 91. See also Nie, Inside the Red Star. p. 493. 65. JiLuYu gongshang dijiu fenju, "Shishi yanjiu tigang," June 1945, Fawubu Diaochaju (Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Investigation) Archives, Taibei, Taiwan. Hereafter BI. 66. Dong Biwu report, September 24, 1944, KangRi zhanxian, 3:765. 67. Mao Zedong to Wang Shoudao and Wang Zhen, July 22, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:107. 68. Wang Shoudao, Wang Shoudao huiyilu, pp. 382-383, 386. 69. James Reardon-Anderson, for instance, believes that the CCP at QiDa "decided to cut its ties to Chungking (Chongqing) and set out to seize power by the force of arms" (Yenan and the Great Powers, p. 84). The Seventh Congress prepared for peace, however—not for civil war. 4. The Race to Shenyang: Chinese Politics and the Soviet Occupation of the Northeast 1. David M. Glantz, August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, ¡945, pp. 16-17,48, 145. 2. David M. Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, p. xvii; A. Vasilevski, "Pobeda na dal'nem vostoke" [Victory in the Far East], Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal [Journal of Military History], August 1970, pp. 8 - 1 0 ; Glantz, August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat, p. 20. 3. M. V. Zakharov, ed.. Final: istoriko-memuarny ocherk, pp. 63-85. 4. Hsiao-li Lindsay, unpublished memoir, p. 385. HIA. 5. Mao Zedong to Stalin, August 9, 1945. Zhongyang wenjian, 13:114. 6. Central Committee to all bureaus and subbureaus, August 10, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:115; "Yan'an zongbu mingling diyihao-disihao" [Yan'an Headquarters Orders no. 1-4], Zhongyang wenjian, 13:116-119. These orders, issued in the name of Zhu De, seem to have been written by Mao. 7. Xiao Feng, "Zhandi riji jize," pp. 481-482, 484-485; Central Committee to all district party committees, August 11, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:123. 8. Central Committee to all district party committees, August 11, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:123. 9. The exceptions were Zhangjiakou, a strategic city north of Beijing, and a

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couple of cities in North and Central China close to established CCP base areas. Yao Fu et al., eds., Jiefang zhanzheng jishi, pp. 15-17. 10. Yeaton to Wedemeyer, August 15, 1945. Folder "Radios—Eyes Alone," box 1539, Records of the U.S. Army, China Theater, Record Group 332, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter CT, RG 332, NA. 11. See Liu Likai and Yang Kaibao, "Dierci shijie dazhan qijian Sulian de dui Hua zhengzhi." 12. Yeaton to Wedemeyer, August 15, 1945 (Report of conversation with Zhou Enlai), box 1539, CT, RG 332, NA; Mao Zedong, "Zai Chongqing dishibaji tuanjun banshichu de tanhua [Talk at the Office of the Eighteenth Group Army in Chongqing]," August 29, 1945, in Mao Zedong, Bujuan, 8:65-66; Central Committee to Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Sub-Bureau, August 29, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:138. 13. Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 591. 14. Ibid. 15. Mao Zedong, "Zai Chongqing dishibaji," pp. 65-66. For an overview of the first phase of the Chongqing negotiations, see Jung-chao Kuo, "Failure at Chungking [Chongqing]: Political Negotiations in Post-War China (Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1987), pp. 41-69. 16. For the reaction in one base area bordering the Northeast, see Chen Ping, "Cong jianchi 'wurenqu' dao jinjun Dongbei—tan JiReLiao de teshu zhanlüe diwei," pp. 53-54. 17. Li Yunchang, "JiReLiao budui tingjin Dongbei," 2:540-564. 18. Central Committee to Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei subbureau, August 29, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, p. 138. 19. Ibid. 20. Zeng Kelin, "Zeng Kelin tan jinjun Dongbei he Sibaolin jiang de youguan wenti," p. 6. 21. Several such troubled encounters between CCP units and the Red Army are described in Yang Conglie, "Bingfa Rikou, shichu Guandong—JiReLiao donglu budui jinjun Dongbei shi-mo," pp. 53-57. See also Zheng Xu, "Jieshou Chengde," 2:590-593. The confusion produced by the Red Army being unprepared to handle "political" issues also appeared in Korea; see Erik van Ree, "Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947," pp. 79-99, 224. 22. U.S. Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memo 924, November 19,1945, Folder: "Manchuria Folder 1," box 7. Edwin A. Locke Jr. Files, HSTL. 23. Zeng, Zeng Kelin tan, p. 7. 24. Wu Xuequan, Wangshi cangsang. pp. 155-156; Zeng Kelin tan, p. 8; Yang, Luo Ronghuan zai Dongbei, pp. 15-16; Niu, Cong He 'erli, p. 128—129. 25. N. Baltisky, "Patriotism," New Times, 1945, no. 1 (August); Pravda, August 31, 1945. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Sovetskie-kitaiskie otnosheniia, 1945-1980, claim that a secret meeting between Stalin and Liu Shaoqi took place in Moscow in early fall 1945.1 have found no evidence of such a meeting.

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26. Stalin tried to use the Greek Communist Party in a similar way in the early fall of 1945. See Peter Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 19441949, pp. 83-89. 27. Zeng, Zeng Kelin tan, p. 8. See also Ma Tao, "Liu Shaoqi tongzhi zai chuangjian Dongbei genjudi zhong de zhongda gongxian," pp. 15-18. 28. Zhang Yibo and Yuan Luyi, " 'Ba yiwu' qianhou de Dongbei kangRi lianjun," pp. 173-188; Leng Qing, "Dalian kangmeng fenhui zuzhi vvuzhuang huadong." 29. Zeng, "Zeng Kelin tan," p. 7; Yang, Luo Ronghuan zai Dongbei, p. 40; Chen, "Cong jianchi 'wurenqu'," pp. 56—57; Zhao Sufen, "Zhou Baozhong nianpu," p. 252. 30. Zhang and Yuan, " 'Ba yiwu' qianhou," pp. 184-185. 31. For developments in some of these areas, see Fu Limin, "Jiefang zhanzheng shiqi dang zai Shenyang de dixia gongzuo" [The Party's Underground Activities in Shenyang During the War of Liberation], Dangshi zong-heng [All About Party History] (1988), no. 8, pp. 28-32; Wang Shuqing, "Zhonggong Beiman liushi shengwei," pp. 205-216; "Jiefang chuqi de Shulan" [Shulan During Liberation], Jilin shi wenshi ziliao, 6:6-15; Xu Zhi, "Jieguan Jinzhou gaikuang," 2:585-589; Zheng Xu, "Jieshou Chengde," 2:590-93. See also materials on Dalian cited below. 32. Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang, pp. 163-164. 33. Wu, Wangshi cangsang, p. 159; U.S. Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memo 924, November 19, 1945. Folio: "Manchuria Folder 1," box 7. Edwin A. Locke Jr. Files, HSTL. For a chronology, see Ding Xiaochun et al., "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng dashi rizhi," pp. 8—26. 34. Leng, "Dalian kangmeng fenhui," pp. 405, 410, 412-413; Zhang Shoushan, "Dalian mingjie kangRi tongmeng fenhui de huadong," pp. 371, 377. 35. Li Yunchang, "JiReLiao budui tingjin Dongbei," pp. 540-564; Liu et al., Luo Ronghuan zhuan, pp. 604-617. 36. Yang, Luo Ronghuan zai Dongbei, pp. 31-32. 37. Ibid., pp. 33-34. 38. Peng Zhen, "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng de tou jiuge yue," pp. 3-10; Ma Tao, "Liu Shaoqi tongzhi zai chuangjian Dongbei genjudi zhong de zhongda gongxian," pp. 15—22. Steven Levine provides an in-depth analysis of the growth of the CCP base areas in the Northeast in his Anvil of Victory, pp. 8 7 121, 197-207. 39. "Jiang shang junwuzhuang qiyi" [The Revolt of the Inland Navy Forces], Harbin wenshi ziliao [Harbin Historical Accounts], no. 8, pp. 64—77. See also Levine, Anvil of Victory, pp. 102-103. 40. Central Committee to all bureaus and district party committees, September 21, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:149; Ding Xiaochun et al., "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng dashi rizhi," p. 13.

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in North China

41. Nie, Inside the Red Star, pp. 522-523; Li, "JiReLiao budui tingjin," pp. 540-549. 42. Hu Xikui, "Shiju bianhua he women de fangzhen" [Changes in the Present Situation and Our Plan], August 30, 1945, BI. Also quoted in Warren I. Cohen, "American Observers and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1945," p. 347, and in Reardon-Anderson, Yenan, p. 103); Nie, Inside the Red Star, pp. 515-516; Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau, October 19, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:176. 43. Yang Yichen, "Tieling zhongxin xianwei gongzuo suoyi," p. 27. 44. Levine, Anvil of Victory, pp. 66-67, 139-143; Wu Xiuquan, " Houfang de qianxian' xu" [Preface to "The Rear Front"], Dangshi ziliao zhengji tongxun (1986), no. 8, pp. 19-20. See also Heilongjiang dangshi ziliao, no. 7, which includes a series of memoirs dedicated to "anti-bandit struggles." 45. Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Central Committee Bureau to Central Committee, September 29, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:186; Central Committee to Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Central Committee Bureau, October 23, 1945, ibid., pp. 184-185. 46. Wang Ruofei, in conversation with Democratic League officials, September 4, 1945, quoted in Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 826; Huai Xiang (pseud.), "ZhongSu tongmeng tiaoyue zhansheng ji beijing jiji yiyi" [The Meaning and Background of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance], Qiinzhong [The Masses] (October 1, 1945), 10( 18):633-639; also quoted in Emily Yaung, "The Impact of the Yalta Agreement on China's Domestic Politics, 1945-1946," pp. 134-135. 47. Qun Yu (pseud.), "Zenyang renshi ZhongSu youhao tiaoyue" [How to Understand the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty], Xin Dazhang [New Wave] (October 31, 1945), no. 10, pp. 1 - 6 . The Qiinzhong and Xin Dazhang texts were first used by Emily Yaung in her important dissertation cited above (pp. 134137). My translation differs slightly from hers. 48. Song Ziwen to Jiang Jieshi, August 18, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 25-26; Jiang Jieshi to Song Ziwen, n.d., Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 834. 49. Foreign Ministry to Jiang Jieshi, August 30, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 26; entries for August 26 and 28, 1945; Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 813, 815. 50. Chen Lifu remembers meetings between himself and He Yingqin, chief of the National Army General Staff, in August 1945, on how the GMD forces, in cooperation with the Japanese, should move north and immediately encircle the CCP. Chen Lifu, oral history interview, no. 40, box 50. 51. Jiang to Supreme National Defence Council, August 29, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 2, p. 30. The takeover of Nanjing, the prewar capital of China, had a symbolic meaning to Jiang and to most other Chinese. 52. Wedemeyer to Marshall, August 11, 1945. Folder: "Radios—Eyes Alone," box 1539, CT, RG 332, NA.

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53. Jiang to Supreme National Defense Council, August 29, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 2, p. 30. 54. Notes dated August 26 [1945], Richard D. Weigle, "Imai comes to Ho," unpublished memoir-diary, box 1, Richard D. Weigle Papers, HIA. Colonel Weigle was serving with the U.S. Army China Combat Command under General Boatner; entries for August 27 and September 5, Wang Shijie Diary. 55. Entries for September 6 and 8, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, in Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 827 and 828; Jiang Jieshi to Song Ziwen, September 12 and 13, ibid., pp. 832 and 834. 56. See entry for November 3, 1945, John Melby Diary, Melby, The Mandate of Heaven, pp. 35-36. 57. Chang Kia-ngau (Zhang Jia'ao), Last Chance in Manchuria: The Diary of Chang Kia-ngau, p. 68. Hereafter Zhang Jia'ao Diary. Jiang Jingguo to Song Ziwen, September 11, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao. vol. 7, book 1, pp. 115-116. Documents describing the setup of the Northeast Headquarters and associated agencies are in Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 32—40. 58. Military Affairs Committee to Jiang Jieshi, September 12, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 5 (Diwu bian: Zhonggong huadong zhen xiang) [The True Face of CCP Activities]), book 4, p. 315; entry for September 20, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 837; Petrov to Song, October 1, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 116. 59. Foreign Ministry to Soviet Ambassador, October 1, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 117; Fu Bingchang to Foreign Ministry, October 6, 1945, and October 7, 1945, ibid., pp. 118 and 119. 60. Entry for October 17, 1945, Zhang Jia'ao Diary. 61. Entries for October 24 and 25, 1945, Zhang Jia'ao Diary. 62. Jiang Jieshi to Jiang Jingguo, November 1, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 869-870; memorandum of conversation, Wang Shijie-Petrov, October 25, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 125; Jiang Jieshi to all [GMD] party committees in the Northeast, October 26, 1945, ibid., p. 128; Jiang Jingguo to Jiang Jieshi, October 31, 1945, ibid., pp. 133-134. See also entry for October 30, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary. 63. Jiang Jieshi to Jiang Jingguo, November 2, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 137-138; the Stalin telegram might be the one which is printed in Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 870, (mistakenly) under the date November 14); Jiang Jieshi to Jiang Jingguo, November 1, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 869-870; Jiang Jieshi to Xiong Shehui, November 1, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 135. 64. Entry for November 9, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 879.

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5. Allies and Enemies: Mao, Jiang, and the U. S. in North China

Intervention

1. See Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, pp. 17-19, 5 7 61; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War. 1:130-131, 209-213. 2. Wedemeyer to commanding generals, August 2, 1945. Folder: "Eyes Alone," box 1539, CT, RG 332, NA. 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, August 10, 1945. Folder: "Japan—Surrender Folder 1," box 10, Naval Aide Files, HSTL. 4. Marc S. Gallicchio. The Cold War Begins in Asia. pp. 60-63. 5. Ibid., p. 63. 6. Jiang Yongjing, "Song Siwen Shidalin ZhongSu tiaoyue tanpan jishi," pp. 79-80. 7. Song Ziwen to Truman, August 30, 1945 (two letters), folder: "China— 8," box 2, George Elsey Papers, HSTL. Ren Donglai gives an excellent overview of the postwar GMD strategy to get U.S. economic assistance in his "Bupingdeng de tongmeng: Mei yuan yu ZhongMei waijiao yanjiu, 1937-1946" [Unequal Alliance: U.S. Aid and Sino-American Diplomatic Discussions, 1937— 1946] (2 vols.; Ph.D. dissertation, Nankai University, 1988), pp. 224-248. 8. "Memorandum for Commodore Vardaman," September 3, 1945. Folder: "China—8," box 2, George Elsey Papers, HSTL. The day after his meeting with the president Song sent a message to Hopkins asking for further support in providing China with military equipment. Song to Hopkins, September 15, 1945, reel 13, Letters of Harry Hopkins (mf), Harry Hopkins Papers, FDRL. 9. Entry for October 19, 1945. Folder: "President's appointment lists, September-December 1945," box 1, Eben Ayers Papers, HSTL. 10. Wedemeyer to Marshall, August 17, 1945. Folder: "Eyes Alone," box 1539, CT, RG 332, NA; Marshall to Wedemeyer, August 17, 1945, case 133, box 144, Decimal File, War Department's Operations Division (hereafter OPD), RG 165, NA. 11. Lincoln to MacArthur and Wedemeyer, August 17, 1945. Folder: "Japan—surrender—2," box 10, Naval Aide Files, HSTL. 12. Bissel to the Chief of Staff, August 26, 1945, case 171, box 143, Decimal File, OPD, RG 165, NA. 13. Harriman to Truman, August 29, 1945. Folder: "Japan—surrender (folder 3)," box 11, Naval Aide Files, HSTL; Donovan to Truman, September 5, 1945. Folder: "Office of Strategic Services—Donovan, William J.," Rose Conway File, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL. Donovan's information probably came from one of the OSS intelligence operations in Manchuria set up after the war ended. The largest of these initiatives, "Operation Cardinal," was based in Shenyang, and was intended both to assist in the release of U.S. prisoners of war, and to "establish [an] agent network to secure information on Russian and Chinese actions, [a] possible rebellion, and the development of secret political organi-

5. Mao, Jiang, and U.S. Intervention in North China

205

zations." Alongside the other OSS operations in North China and the Northeast, this network continued to supply Washington with massive, if not always accurate, information on Soviet and CCP intentions. Folder: "Operation Cardinal," box 7, entry 148, Records of the OSS, RG 226, NA. For OSS operations during the fall of 1945, see Davis to Wedemeyer, August 19, 1945. Folder: "Chungking [Chongqing]—Reg—op—1. Deputy SSO—Davis," box 4, ibid. 14. Vincent to Acheson, September 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7: 566- 567; Acheson to Vincent, September 28, 1945, ibid., p. 571. 15. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The United States Marines in North China, 1945-1949. pp. 1 - 5 . 16. Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star. p. 518; Military Committee to Rao [Shushi] et al., September 29, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:153. 17. Nie, Inside the Red Star. pp. 518, 526-528. 18. Zhonggong Shandong shengwei dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui, ed., Zhonggong Shandong dangshi dashiji, pp. 224-227, 232-234. 19. Central Committee to all bureaus, subbureaus, and party committees, September 26, 1945, Zhongyang tongzhanbu and Zhongyang dang'anguan, comps., Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, p. 14. Hereafter Jiefang zhanxian. The CCP leadership seem not to have taken seriously Wedemeyer's earlier hints about U.S. landings. 20. Ye Jianying to Ivan Yeaton, first sent September 27, 1945, repeated October 6, 1945. Folder: "China: General, 1938-45," box 1, John F. Melby Papers, HSTL; Xinhua press release, September 30, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:157. 21. Military Committee to Northeast Bureau, and to Nie [Rongzhen] et al., September 28, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:151; Military Committee to Rao [Shushi] et al., September 29, 1945, ibid., p. 153. 22. Central Committee Propaganda Department to all Central Committee bureaus and district party committees, September 29, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:155. 23. Central Committee to all bureaus and party committees, October 1, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 17; Xinhua press release, September 30, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:157. 24. Central Committee to Jiaodong District Party Committee, October 6, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:161. See also Huang Ronghai, "Kuai hai bei shang," pp. 509-515; Lin Mingqin, "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng zhong de Ronghuan tongzhi," pp. 473-478. 25. "Transcript of an interview with Lt. Gen. Keller E. Rockey, 1962," p. 19. Folder: "North China Marines—Draft Comments, Part 5," Historical Files, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Hereafter USMC-HC. ComGenChina to Marshall, October 8, 1845. Folder: "Messages—Eyes Only," box 1540, CT, RG 332, NA. Pang Shuozhi, "Fandui Meijun zai Yantai denglu de shengli" [The Victory When Opposing the American Forces Landing at

206

5. Mao, Jiang, and U. S. Intervention in North China

Yantai], Dangshi ziliao tongxun [Bulletin on Party History Materials] (1988), no. 6/7. pp. 6 8 - 6 9 . 26. Central Committee to all bureaus and district party committees, October 9, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:162. 27. Central Committee to Central China Bureau, October 4, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:159. The party leadership may also have been divided on how to deal with the American threat. 28. "Testimony of Tung Fu Kuan (Dong Fuguan]." Folder: "Death of Captain John Birch," box 16, entry 148, Records of the OSS, RG 226, NA. Dong, one of the National Army officers who accompanied Birch, testified that Birch insisted on entering this area in spite of ongoing fighting between CCP and GMD guerrillas. He quotes Birch as saying: "Nevermind, I want to see how the Communists treat Americans. I don't mind if they kill me for America will then stop the Communist movement with atomic weapons (ibid.)." Conclusion of CCP report on Birch's death from informant. See also Oliver J. Caldwell, A Secret War, pp. 1 8 2 - 1 8 4 . 29. Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Bureau instructions, n.d., quoted in Joseph Kong Sang Yick, "The Urban Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1 : 2 6 5 - 2 6 6 . 30. Zhao Jianguo, "Qingdao jiefang qianxi de shehui zhuangkuang yu minzhu yundong" [The Democratic Movement and the Social Situation in Qingdao on the Eve of Liberation], Shandong shizhi ziliao (1983), no. 1, pp. 4 8 - 5 3 . 31. Leaflet, n.d., box 1, Sutton Christian Papers, HIA. 32. People's Society of Peiping [Beijing], "Letter to American officers," n.d., box 1, Sutton Christian Papers, HIA. 33. Xinhua ribao [New China Daily], Chongqing ed., November 3, 1945. 34. Entry for September 20, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang gong dashi changbian chugao [Preliminary extensive chronology of President Jiang] (Taibei: n.p., 1978), vol. 5, book 2, p. 837. Hereafter Zongtong Jiang. Hurley to Byrnes, September 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7 : 5 6 5; Central Committee to all bureaus and party committees, October 1, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 17; Political Bureau meeting, October 11, 1945, quoted in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 602. 35. Entries for September 20 and 27, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, pp. 837, 838. 36. Shaw, The United States Marines in North China, 1945-1949, p. 5. 37. Entries for October 11 and 13, 1945. Folder: " 3 d bn, 7th reg—G-2 Journal, September 30-December 31, 1945—CHINA," USMC-HC. 38. 7th Regiment intelligence has his name as Soong Mian Cheh. Entry for October 17, 1945. Folder: "3d bn, 7th reg—G-2 Journal, September 3 0 - D e cember 31, 1 9 4 5 , " USMC-HC. Chinese sources show that the CCP representative was Song Renqian, a member of the Central Committee's Hebei-ShandongHenan Subbureau. Wang Jianying, ed., Zhongguo Congchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian, p. 491. 39. Entries for October 18, November 2, and November 14, 1945. Folder: "3d bn, 7th reg—G-2 Journal, Sept. 3 0 - D e c . 31, 1945—CHINA." DeWitt Peck,

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207

"Notes for Wednesday November 14th [1945]," quoted in Peck to Wade, September 3, 1961. Folder: "North China Marines, Draft Comments, Part 5," both at MCHC. 40. Central Committee to all bureaus and district party committees, October 29, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:187-188. 41. Yao Fu et al., eds., Jiefang zhanzheng jishi, pp. 4 4 - 5 6 . 42. Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau, October 19, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian. 13:176-177; Central Committee to all bureaus, October 20, 1945, ibid., pp. 182-183. 43. Jin Yunfang et al., "KangRi zhanzheng shengli hou zai Dongbei wenti shang san guo si fang de guanxi he douzheng," pp. 167-168, 170; Tang Kai, "Jiefang he baowei Shanhaiguan zhi zhan de zhongda yiyi," pp. 3 5 - 3 7 , 19. 44. Yick, "The Urban Strategy," 1:217-232. 45. Yick, "The Urban Strategy," 1:251; Louis E. Woods, oral history interview (1968), p. 322, MCHC. 46. Jiang Jieshi to Xiong Shehui and Zhang Jia'ao, quoted in entry for October 16, 1945, Zhang Jia'ao Diary. See also entry for October 21, 1945, ibid., p. 86. 47. Kinkaid to Wedemeyer, November 6, 1945. Folder: "Radios—Eyes Only," box 1534, CT, RG 332, NA. 48. Wedemeyer to Jiang Jieshi, November 5, 1945, FRUS: 1945. 7:603; Wedemeyer to Marshall, November 16, 1945, ibid., pp. 6 3 5 - 6 3 6 . 49. Mansfield to Truman, November 7, 1945, Official File 150 (1945-46), HSTL. 50. Entry for November 5, 1945, Eben Ayers diary, box 6, Eben Ayers Papers, HSTL. 51. War Department, Military Intelligence Division, "Chinese Communist Movement," July 1945. Folder: "Historical Reports—China—8," box 2, George Elsey Papers, HSTL. This is the so-called Peabody Report, which later gained prominence during the MacArthur Hearings in 1951. 52. Edwin A. Locke, " M e m o r a n d u m to the President. A proposal aimed at averting Civil War in China," August 20, 1945. Folder: "China—reports to the President," box 7, Edwin A. Locke Jr. Files, HSTL. Locke, a banker, had served President Roosevelt on several important economic advisory groups during the war, reporting—among other issues—on the situation in China. 53. Truman's first draft is in Robert H. Ferrell, ed.. Off the Record, p. 74. The president's subsequent draft and Judge Rosenman's draft, with attached handwritten comments, are in Folder: "China," box 1, Samuel I. Rosenman Papers, HSTL. Eben Ayers describes the discussion in his diary. Entry for November 5, 1945, Eben Ayers Diary, box 6, Eben Ayers Papers, HSTL. 54. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy," November 6, 1945, FRUS: ¡945, 7 : 6 0 6 - 6 0 7 . 55. Memorandum, Rosenman to Truman, October 30, 1945, box 2, Samuel I. Rosenman Papers, HSTL.

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Mission

56. Harriman to Acheson (personal and secret), October 12, 1945, box 183, Harriman Papers; Acheson to Harriman, November 9, 1945, box 184, Harriman Papers, LC. 57. Matthews to Byrnes, November 13, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7:619-621; Eisenhower to Wedemeyer, November 20 [19], 1945, ibid., pp. 6 4 4 - 6 4 5 . 58. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy," November 20, 1945, FRUS: ¡945, 7:646-647. 59. Memorandum, Patterson and Forrestal to Byrnes, November 24, 1945, case 336, section 1, box 141, Decimal File, OPD, RG 165, NA. 60. Eisenhower to Wedemeyer, November 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 7 : 6 4 4 645; Wedemeyer to Marshall, November 16, 1945, ibid., pp. 6 3 5 - 6 3 6 ; Wedemeyer to Marshall, November 25, 1945, ibid., pp. 669—670. 6. The Origins of the Marshall

Mission

1. For a similar view emphasizing Stalin's European policy, see William McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948, pp. 6 8 - 7 1 . 2. Memorandum of conversation, Davies-Vinogradov, July 2, 1945. Folder: "July 1 - 1 6 , " box 180, Harriman Papers, LC. 3. Commanding General, Services of Supply to Wedemeyer, September 1, 1945. Folder: "Japan—Surrender—4," box 11, Naval Aide Files, HSTL; Commander 7th Fleet to Wedemeyer, September 5, 1945, ibid. 4. For a perceptive analysis of the London foreign ministers' conference, see Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 122-132. 5. A. Subbotin, "In Dairen [Dalian]," The War and the Working Class (April 15, 1945), no. 8 pp. 2 6 - 2 7 ; M. Mitrofanov, "Shanghai-Manchuria," New Times (June 1, 1945), no. 1. 6. V. Avarin, "Manchuria as a Japanese Base of Attack on the Soviet Union," New Times (August 15, 1945), no. 6, p. 8. 7. See William Taubman's analysis of the London conference in Stalin's American Policy, pp. 116-121. 8. On Stalin and postwar Great Power negotiations, see Albert Resis, Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1946. 9. Petrov to Song, October 1, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 116; entry for September 29, Wang Shijie Diary. 10. Entries for October 9 and 19, Wang Shijie Diary; entry for October 17, Zhang Jia'ao Diary. 11. Entries for October 29 and November 1, 1945, Zhang Jia'ao Diary; Jiang Jingguo to Jiang Jieshi, October 31, 1945, in Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 133-134; Xiong Shihui to Jiang Jieshi, November 5, 1945, ibid., p. 141; Wang Yongcheng, "Dongbei jiefangqu de huobi faxing yu tongyi," pp. 4 5 - 4 8 . 12. Entry for November 8, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; entry for November 15, 1945, Zhang Jia'ao Diary. 13. Entries for November 12 and 13, 1945, Zhang Jia'ao Diary; entries for

6. The Origins of the Marshall

Mission

209

November 9, 13, and 18, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; memorandum of conversation, Wang-Petrov, November 13, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 145. The record of Wang's meeting with Petrov on November 13 is the only report available on these negotiations, but it is clear from Wang's and Zhang's diaries that this was only one of several contacts between Petrov and the Chinese Foreign Ministry in the period from November 9 to November 17. 14. For a survey of the extent of the damage inflicted by Soviet looting in the Northeast, see, for example. North-eastern Industrial Association and Rehabilitation Liaison Office for Japanese in Manchuria, "Navoc [sic] done to industries in Manchuria by Russian Occupation Army," February 1947 (in Chinese with English title), Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 268-312. 15. Entry for November 15, Zhang Jia'ao Diary. 16. Memorandum of conversation, Wang-Petrov, November 13, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 145; entries for November 17 and 19, 1945, Zhang Jia'ao Diary. 17. Entry for November 8, Wang Shijie Diary; entry for November 28, Zhang Jia'ao Diary; entry for November 27, Wang Shijie Diary. For Wang Shijie's own views, see his diary entry for November 19. 18. Entries for November 16 and 20, Zhang Jia'ao Diary. Sladkovskii's own survey of t h e period, Ocherki ekonomicheskikh

otnoshenii SSSR s Kitaem, has n o

account of his attempts to blackmail the Chinese in 1945. His autobiography, Znakomstvo s Kitaem i kitaitsami, presents the negotiations briefly as a Soviet attempt to assist the Chinese in rebuilding the Northeast (pp. 305-313). 19. Entry for November 24, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; entry for November 17, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 885. 20. Entry for December 5, 1945, Zhang Jia'ao Diary; Jiang Jingguo to Jiang Jieshi, December 5, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 897. 21. Li Yunchang, "Yi Shanhaiguan zhanyi," pp. 16-18; Central Committee to Lin Biao et al., November 15, 1945, quoted in Jin Yunfang et al., "KangRi zhanzheng shengli hou zai Dongbei wenti shang san guo si fang de guanxi he douzheng" p. 170; Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau, November 20, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 12:207; Lin Biao to Northeastern Bureau and Central Committee, November 22, 1945, quoted in Jin Yunfang et al., "KangRi zhanzheng shengli," p. 170. 22. W u , Wangshi cangsang, p. 162.

23. Zhong Ziyun, "Zhanliie houfang de Harbin" [The Strategic Rear Area of Harbin], in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui et al., comps., LiaoShen juezhan, 2:105; Zhang Qilong, "Chuangjian Dongman genjudi de huiyi" [Reminiscences on the Establishment of the East Manchuria Base Area], ibid., 2:118; Wu, Wangshi cangsang, p. 162. 24. Wu Xiuquan, "Dao Dongbei," 2:569. Central Committee [Liu Shaoqi] to Northeastern Bureau, November 19, 1945, paraphrased in Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi yu kangzhan jieshu hou zhengduo Dongbei de douzheng," p. 144; Central Committee [Liu Shaoqi] to Northeastern Bureau, November 23, 1945,

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paraphrased, ibid., p. 144. Zhu's article is based on extensive access to Liu Shaoqi's personal papers for this period but, like all researchers with access to the CCP Central Party Archives, he has not been allowed to quote directly from the documents. His citations are nevertheless very helpful to establish the chronology of intra-party contacts. 25. Zhong Ziyun, "Zhanliie houfang de Harbin," p. 105; Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau, November 28, Zhongyang wenjiart, 12:218-219. See also Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau and Lin Biao et al., November 28, 1945, LiaoShen juezhan, 1: 12-13. 26. Xiao Hua, "Zhanzheng zai Liaodong diqu" [Battles in the Liaodong Area], in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi. .., comps., LiaoShen juezhan. 1:235; He Jiannian, "Shenshan jiaofei j i " [Remembering the Suppression of Bandits in Shenshan], ibid., 2:45. 27. On political discipline in the CCP in the mid 1940s, see Fredrick Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, pp. 64-78. 28. Liu Shaoqi to Zheng Lisan and Li Xiannian, October 10, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 12:163-164. See also Nie, Inside the Red Star, pp. 5 1 6 517. 29. Zhou Enlai, "Guanyu GuoGong tanpan" [On the GMD-CCP talks], report to the Central Committee, December 5, 1945, quoted in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 607. See also the discussion of Zhou's differences with M a o during the September negotiations, ibid., p. 604. 30. Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei, November 7, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 28-29. 31. Central Committee to Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Central Committee Bureau, November 28, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 32; instructions from the Northeastern Bureau, November 26, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 12:208. 32. Instructions from the Northeastern Bureau, November 26, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 12:208, 210. 33. Chen Yun et al., memorandum, November 30, 1945, in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi. .., eds., LiaoShen juzhan, 1:14-15. 34. Central Committee to Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Central Committee Bureau, November 28, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 32. 35. Zhou Enlai to Central Committee, November 4, 1945, in "Zhongguo gongchandang guanyu wei heping jianguo er douzheng de ershiyifen wendian" [Twenty-one Chinese Communist Party Telegrams From the Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction], Dang de wenxian [Literature on the Party], 1988, no. 1, p. 47; Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, November 5, 1945, ibid., p. 48; Central Committee [Mao Zedong] to CCP delegates in Chongqing, November 5, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 24; Central Committee to Li Yunchang et al., November 17, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:201-203. 36. Yao, Jiefang zhanzheng, pp. 56-60. 37. Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau, November 20, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 12:207; Lin Biao to Central Committee and Northeastern Bu-

6. The Origins of the Marshall Mission

211

reau, November 22, 1945, quoted in Ding Xiaochun et al., "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng dashi rizhi" [A Calendar of Events during the War of Liberation in the Northeast], Dangshi ziliao zhengji tongxun [Bulletin on the Compilation of Party History Materials], 1985, no. 10, p. 15; Chen Yun et al., memorandum, November 30, 1945, in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi . .., eds., LiaoShen juzhan, 1:14—15; Wu, Wangshi cangsang, p. 162-163. Reconstructing internal CCP debates on particularly sensitive issues is still a difficult task. In this case, as in many others where Lin is a major figure, the post-Cultural Revolution materials contradict most of the accepted truth from the time when Lin was still Mao's heir apparent. Lin was then portrayed as the main proponent of building rural base areas against Liu Shaoqi's "mistaken" line of defending the cities. See Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, "Comrade Lin Piao [Lin Biao] During the War for the Liberation of the Northeast." The recently released documents cited above show that this version was, in almost every respect, a reversal of the actual positions taken, at least in the winter of 1945/46. 38. Li Yunchang, "Li Yunchang tongzhi huiyi Fuxin junshi huiyi qingkuang," p. 43; Nie, Inside the Red Star, pp. 523-524. 39. Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau, November 28, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:218-219; Northeastern Bureau to all ranking party committees and divisional commanders, November 29, 1945, ibid., 13:220. 40. Northeastern Bureau, p. 220, 222; Yang Guiqing, Luo Ronghuan zai Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng zhong, p. 48. 41. Zhonggong JinChaJi Zhongyangju xuanchuanbu, "Muqian de shiju, renwu he sixiang wenti de taolun tigang," December 1, 1945, BI. See also Zhu De's interviews with foreign reporters on November 28 in Zhongyang wenjian, 13:214-217. 42. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, pp. 149-152; Edwin A. Locke, oral history interview (1967), p. 79, HSTL; Matt Connelly, oral history interview (1967), p. 329, HSTL. 43. Thom to Byrnes, November 23, 1945, quoted in Kenneth S. Chem, Dilemma in China, p. 141. For a full discussion of the attitudes of members of Congress, see ibid., pp. 130—165. 44. Marshall to Leahy, November 30, 1945, The Complete Records of the Mission of General George C. Marshall to China. December 1945-January 1947 (microfilm; records held by the National Archives, Washington, D.C., in Lot No. 54 D 270), reel 1, p. 7 - 8 . Hereafter Marshall Mission Records. War Department to Wedemeyer, November 19, 1945. Folder: "Radios—Eyes Alone," box 1540, CT, RG 332, NA; Hull to Marshall, December 8, 1945, Marshall Mission Records, reel 1, p. 24. 45. Marshall to Wedemeyer, n.d.. Folder: "Radios—Eyes Alone," box 1540, CT, RG 332, NA; Wedemeyer to Marshall, December 2, 1945, ibid. 46. Byrnes to Marshall, December 8, 1945, Marshall Mission Records, reel 1, p. 18; "Notes on a meeting," December 11, 1945, ibid., p. 43; "Notes on a meeting with the President," December 14, 1945, ibid., p. 42.

212

6. The Origins of the Marshall

Mission

47. "Statement by the President, United States policy toward China," December 15, 1945, box 150, Official File, HSTL. 48. Pravda, December 19, 1945. 49. Molotov to Harriman, December 7, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 2:600; "United States' Delegation Minutes," December 16, 1945, ibid., p. 613. 50. " M e m o r a n d u m by the Soviet Delegation," December 21, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 2 : 7 1 9 - 7 2 0 . 51. "United States' Delegation Minutes," December 23, 1945, FRUS: ¡945, 2:749. 52. Handwritten notes, December 23, [1945]. Folder: "December 21-25," box 185, Harriman Papers, LC; Averell Harriman, oral history interview, p. 19, HSTL. 53. "Communiqué on the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers," December 28, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 2:821. 54. " M e m o r a n d u m of conversation," December 23, 1945, FRUS: 1945, 2:757; " m e m o r a n d u m of conversation," December 19, 1945, ibid., p. 686; Byrnes to Truman, December 24, 1945. Folder: "Russia-Moscow," box 187, PSF, HSTL. 55. Wei Daoming to Jiang Jieshi, November 27, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 156-157. 56. "Detailed Plan for a US Military Advisory Group to China," November 28, 1945, JCS 1330/15, Marshall Mission Records, reel 1, p. 249; "ABC News Report," December 2, 1945, ibid., p. 505; entry for December 6, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary. 57. Entries for December 4 and 6, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary; m e m o r a n d u m of conversation, Wang-Petrov, December 7, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 166. 58. Jiang Jieshi to Jiang Jia'ao and Jiang Jingguo, December 7, 1945, in Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 167; Jiang Jieshi to Wang Shijie, ibid., p. 157-158; Wang Shijie to Jiang Jieshi, December 12, 1945, ibid., p. 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 ; entry for November 29, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary. 59. Chen Lifu, oral history interview, 11-15. 60. Xinhua ribao [New China Daily] (Chongqing ed.), November 30, 1945. Jiefang ribao [Liberation Daily], the main CCP organ, called Hurley's resignation "a victory for the American people" (Yan'an ed., November 30, 1945). 61. Central Committee [Liu Shaoqi] to Northeastern Bureau, November 27, 1945, paraphrased in Zhu, "Liu Shaoqi yu kangzhan," p. 144; Central Committee to Dong Biwu and Wang Ruofei, December 1, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 33. 62. Central Committee's Secretariat to Dong Biwu and Wang Ruofei, December 9, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 34; Central Committee and Military Committee to the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Bureau et al., December 12, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:237-239. 63. Central Committee statement, December 17, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, p.

7. Soviet Withdrawal and Coming of Civil War

213

35-36; Yeaton to Wedemeyer, December 20, 1945. Folder: "Radios—Eyes alone—CT policy September 1945-January 1946," box 1542, CT, RG 332, NA. 64. Central Committee to all bureaus and all district party committees, December 19, 1945, Zhongyang wenjian, 12:247. 65. Yanjing xinwen [Yanjing News], December 13, 1945; McWilliams to Fairbank, December 14, 1945. Folder: "China general 1938-1945," box 1, John F. Melby Papers, HSTL; Pepper, Civil War in China, pp. 44-52. For the question of Communist influence in the student movement, see Pepper, Civil War in China, pp. 80-89, and Yick, "The Urban Strategy," pp. 269-271. 66. Fairbank to Biggerstaff, December 6, 1945. Folder: "China general 19381945," box 1, John F. Melby Papers, HSTL; McWilliams to Fairbank, December 14, 1945, ibid. 7. The Soviet Withdrawal

and the Coming of the Civil War

1. Jiang Jingguo, "Fang Su jiaoshe ji" [Record of Negotiations During a Visit to the Soviet Union], Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 112-113; entry for December 25, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 909. See also Jiang Jingguo, Fengyu zhong de ningjing, pp. 74-75. 2. Entry for November 3, 1945, Jiang Jingguo Diary, Zhongyao shiliao. vol. 7, book 1, pp. 100-101; Jiang Jingguo to Jiang Jieshi, December 5, 1945, ibid., pp. 158—159. For Jiang Jingguo's earlier stay in the Soviet Union, see Cai Xingsan, Jiang Jingguo yu Sulian. 3. Jiang Jingguo, "Fang Su jiaoshe ji" [Record of Negotiations During a Visit to the Soviet Union], Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 112-113. 4. Memorandum of conversation, Petrov-Wang, December 29,1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 170. 5. Wang to Petrov, December 31, 1945, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 171. 6. Entry for January 2, 1946, Wang Shijie Diary. 7. Central Committee public statement, December 30, 1945, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 38-39. 8. Central Committee to CCP Chongqing delegation, January 5, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 39. 9. Liu to Northeastern Bureau, December 20, 1945, Liu Shaoqi xuanji. 1:373— 376. The members of the Political Bureau after the Seventh Congress were Mao, Liu, Zhou, Zhu De, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun, Peng Dehui, Dong Biwu, Peng Zhen, Lin Boqu, Gao Gang, Kang Sheng, and Zhang Wentian. Of the members only Mao, Liu, Zhu, Ren, and Kang were in Yan'an for most of the period between June 1945 and June 1946. See Wang Jianying, ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian, p. 487. 10. Mao Zedong, "Jianli gonggu de Dongbei genjudi" [Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast], Mao Zedong xuanji, pp. 1177-1180. 11. Niu Jun, Cong Hu'erli dao Maxie'er: Meiguo tiaochu GuoGong maodun

214

7. Soviet Withdrawal and Coming of Civil War

shimo, pp. 204-206; Zhang Wenjin, "Zhou Enlai yu Maxie'er shihua, pp. 5 9 60. 12. Entry for December 29, 1945, John Melby Diary; John Melby, The Mandate of Heaven, pp. 72-73. Melby served in the U.S. embassy in China from November 1945 to the end of the civil war. 13. Memorandum of conversation, Jiang-Marshall, December 21, 1945, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 907. 14. Entry for December 30, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 910. 15. Entry for December 16, 1945, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 5, book 2, p. 903. 16. "The Government Three-Point Proposal Offered to the CCP," n.d., FRUS: 1946, 9:3; "Counterproposal of the Chinese Communist Party," January 3, 1946, ibid., p. 10. 17. Memorandum of conversation, Zhou-Marshall, January 3, 1946, ibid., p. 11-17. 18. Memorandum of conversation, Zhou-Marshall, January 5, 1945, ibid., pp. 20-25; "Memorandum by the Committee of Three," January 10, 1945, ibid., p. 126. 19. Memorandum of conversation, Jiang-Marshall, January 9, 1946, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, pp. 8 - 9 ; "Memorandum by the Committee of Three," FRUS: 1946, 9:125-126. 20. Marshall to Truman, January 10, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:129-131. 21. "Memorandum by the Committee of Three," n.d., ibid., pp. 127-128. 22. Henry Byroade, oral history interview (1988), p. 33. HSTL. 23. Zhou Enlai zhuan, pp. 612-614; Jiang Jieshi to Du Yuming, January 7, 1946, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 172. 24. Central Committee to Luo Ruiqing et al., January 3, 1946, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:259; Nie, Inside the Red Star, pp. 534-537. 25. Nie, Inside the Red Star, pp. 537-538; Byroade, oral history interview, p. 34. For other conflicts, see Gan Zhangdou, "Juntiaobu zhu Zaozhuang wo daibiao ou shijian jingguo," pp. 128-32. 26. Entry for January 22, 1946, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 13; Kuo, "Failure at Chungking," pp. 235-237. 27. Kuo, "Failure at Chungking," pp. 281-300; Zhou Enlai et al., "Heping jianguo gangling cao'an" [A Draft Program for Peace and Reconstruction], January 16, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 44-49. 28. "Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi wuxiang xieyi" [The Five Resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference], Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 58-70. 29. Xinhua ribao [New China Daily] (Chongqing ed.), January 10, 1946; Central Committee to Chongqing delegation, January 17, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 49. 30. Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 615.

7. Soviet Withdrawal and Coming of Civil War

215

31. Central Committee to all bureaus, district party committees, and column commanders, February 1, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 71. 32. Zhou Enlaizhuan, p. 615; Central Committee to Chongqing delegation, January 26, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 53; Central Committee to the Northeastern Bureau, Lin Biao, and Huang Kecheng, January 26, 1946, ibid., pp. 54—56. 33. Central Committee to Chongqing delegation, January 26, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 53; Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau, Lin Biao, and Huang Kecheng, January 26, 1946, ibid. According to my informants, these messages—and most other important correspondance with the Northeastern Bureau and its commanders in early 1946—were written by Mao Zedong. 34. Central Committee to Northeastern Bureau, Lin Biao, and Huang Kecheng, January 26, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 54-56. 35. Nie, Inside the Red Star, pp. 518-519; Zhang Qi, "Kangzhan shengli hou Zhongguo Gongchandang zhengqu minzhu zhengzhi de douzheng," pp. 2 0 4 208. See also Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, pp. 243-244. 36. Interview with Mao Zedong, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 78-82; Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 619; Central Committee to all bureaus, district party committees, and all column commanders, February 7, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 76-77. 37. Ariyoshi to Fairbank and Conners, February 3, 1946. Folder: "China— general—1946 (January-May)," box 1, John F. Melby Papers, HSTL. 38. Jiang Yuntian, Zhongguo jindaishi zhuanzhedian, pp. 49-51. Jiang was a delegate to the January 1946 PCC. 39. Entry for January 22, 1946, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 13; Chen Lifu, oral history interview. 40. Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, pp. 38, 40—43. 41. Entry for January 23, 1946, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 26; entry for December 30, 1945, Wang Shijie Diary. 42. Entry for January 14, 1946, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 26. The negotiations with Soviet officials over Sino-Soviet industrial cooperation in Manchuria had deadlocked in January, when Jiang had ordered his representatives not to make any further concessions. Jiang Jieshi to Zhang Jia'ao, January 7, 1946, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 412. 43. Du Yuming to Jiang Jieshi, January 30, 1946, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 172; entry for January 28, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 30. 44. A series of military intelligence reports dealing with Soviet-CCP relations in Manchuria from mid-January to early February are printed in Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 577-583. 45. Marshall to Truman, January 24, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:143. 46. See, e.g.. New York Times and Da gong bao (Chongqing ed.), both for February 14, 1946. 47. Emily Yaung, "The Impact of the Yalta Agreement on China's Domestic Politics, 1945-1946," pp. 169-191; Da gong bao, February 23, 1946. Song

216

7. Soviet Withdrawal and Coming of Civil War

Ziwen is attacked by name as responsible for the Sino-Soviet treaty in the proGMD Shishi xinbao [Current News], February 20, 1946. For petitions to Jiang Jieshi's office protesting the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, see folder 1(2)454, Number Two Archives. 48. Foreign Ministry to Soviet Embassy, March 6, 1946, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 187. 49. Minutes of meeting. Military Sub-Committee of Three, February 21, 1945, FRUS: 1946. 9:265-277. 50. Zhang Wenjin, "Zhou Enlai yu Maxie'er shihua," pp. 62-64. 51. Marshall to Truman, February 9, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:426-429. 52. Marshall to Truman, February 4, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:206-207. 53. "Memorandum of conversation," March 10, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:528529. 54. Entry for March 13, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, pp. 70-71. 55. Entries for February 26, March 1 and 3, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, pp. 58, 60, 62. 56. Yao Fu et al., eds., Jiefang zhanzheng jishi, pp. 90—94. Hereafter Jiefang zhanzheng. 57. Memorandum of conversation, Marshall-Jiang, March 10, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:528-529. 58. Zhou Enlai zhuan, pp. 622-623. 59. Nie, Inside the Red Star, p. 518. During the Cultural Revolution Mao and Lin Biao accused Liu Shaoqi for having had "illusions" of cooperation with the GMD in the spring of 1946. See Ma Tao, "Liu Shaoqi tongzhi zai chuangjian Dongbei genjudi zhong de zhongda gongxian," pp. 15-22; or, for Lin's and Mao's viewpoint, Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, "Comrade Lin Piao [Lin Biao] During the War for the Liberation of the Northeast," pp. 449-450. 60. Zhou Enlai zhuan. pp. 618—622; Yao, Jiefang zhanzheng jishi, pp. 85-95, Nie, Inside the Red Star, p. 519; Zhu De quoted in Gongjun fanMao jituan [AntiMao Groups in the Communist Army] (Taibei: Zhongguo dalu wenti yanjiusuo, 1969), p. 168. See also Central Committee to all bureaus and subbureaus, February 25, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 83-84. 61. Nie, Inside the Red Star, p. 519. 62. Central Committee to Lin Biao, Huang Kecheng, and Li Yunchang, February 22, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 77. 63. Xinmin bao, February 28, 1946; Da gong bao (Chongqing ed.), February 23, 1946. See also Yaung, "The Impact of the Yalta Agreement," pp. 191-192. 64. Smyth to Byrnes, February 23, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:440-441; Central Committee to all bureaus and subbureaus, February 25, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 83-84; Jiefang ribao, February 25, 1946. 65. Chen Yun to Northeastern Bureau, February 25, 1946, quoted in Ding Xiaochun et al., "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng dashi rizhi," p. 18. 66. Central Committee to CCP Chongqing delegation, March 16, 1946,

7. Soviet Withdrawal and Coming of Civil War

217

Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 86-87; Central Committee to Ye Jianying et al., March 18. 1946, ibid., pp. 88-89. 67. Kuo, "Failure at Chungking," pp. 337-338, 361. 68. Kuo, "Failure at Chungking," p. 338; Zhou Enlai press conference, March 18, 1946, quoted in Davis to Marshall, April 4, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:162—163. See also Zhou's comments in Xinhua ribao (Chongqing ed.), March 19, 1946. 69. Central Committee to Chongqing delegation, March 16, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 86-87; Central Committee to Ye Jianying et al., March 18, 1946, ibid., pp. 88-89. 70. Central Committee to the Northeastern Bureau and Lin Biao et al., March 24, 1946, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:356; Zhou Enlai to Dong Biwu and Wang Ruofei, March 22, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 90-91. See also Niu Jun, Cong He'erli, pp. 226—227, and Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers. pp. 155-157. 71. Entry for March 23, 1946, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 81; Dong Yanping to Jiang Jieshi, March 8, 1946, ibid., p. 66; Xiong Shihui to Jiang Jieshi, March 18, 1946, ibid., p. 77. Petrov to Wang, March 22, 1946, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, p. 189; Dong Yanping to Jiang, March 27, 1946, ibid., pp. 191—192. See also report for March 1946, Dongbei tingjinjun zongsilingbu chen zhong riji, 1946. 1-12. [Battle Diary of the General Headquarters of the Northeast Advance Army, January to December 1946], 540.9 5090, BMH. 72. Entry for March 23, 1946, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 81. 73. Wei Daoming to Jiang Jieshi, March 21, 1946, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 80; Gillem to Marshall, March 30, 1946, FRUS, 1946, vol. 9, p. 717. 74. Entry for April 19, 1946, Jiang Jieshi Diary, Zongtong Jiang, vol. 6, book 1, p. 112; Central Committee (Mao Zedong) to Zhou Enlai, April 20, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, p. 97. See also Mao Zedong to Chen Yi, April 11, 1946, ibid., pp. 95-96. 75. Mao Zedong to Lin Biao and Peng Zhen, April 6, 1946, quoted in Ding, "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng," p. 19. 76. Zhou Enlai to the Central Committee, April 2, 1946, quoted in Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 623. 77. Mao Zedong to Lin Biao and Peng Zhen, April 21, 1946, quoted in Ding, "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng," p. 20. 78. "Zhongyang guanyu tudi wenti zhishi" [Instructions From the Central Committee on the Land Question], May 4, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 99-104. See also "Dongbeiju dui muqian Dongbei gongzuo de zhishi" [Instructions from the Northeastern Bureau on Present Work in the Northeast], March 26, 1946, Zhongyang wenjian, 13:384-386; Levine, Anvil of Victory, pp. 203-207; and Pepper, The Chinese Civil War, pp. 246-248. 79. Central Committee to Shandong Bureau, May 3, 1946, Zhongyang wen-

218

Conclusion: Revolt, Intervention, and Cold War

jian, 13:396-397; Central Committee to all bureaus and to Zhou Enlai, May 15, 1946, Jiefang zhanxian. p. 104. See also Central Committee to CCP Chongqing delegation. May 28, 1946, ibid., pp. 105-106. 80. Central Committee (Mao Zedong) to Zhou Enlai, April 20, 1946. Jiefang zhanxian, p. 97. 81. Peng Zhen, "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng de tou jiu ge yue," pp. 3-10; Chen Yun to Northeastern Bureau, February 25, 1946, quoted in Ding, "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng," p. 25. 82. For an analysis emphasizing how U.S. leaders misunderstood Stalin's intentions, see Resis. Stalin, pp. 22—27. 83. Lozovsky to KonstantinofT, January 10, 1946. Folder: "Naval attache, Nanking [Nanjing], to Chief of Naval Operations, June 30, 1946," box 1535, CT, RG 332, NA. This is one of several telegrams from Moscow to the TASS Bureau in Shanghai on this day which were intercepted by U.S. Naval Intelligence. 84. Pravda, February 27, 1946. 85. On the stalemate in the Sino-Soviet economic negotiations, see entries for March 1 and March 5, 1946, Zhang Jia'ao Diary; on Great Power relations in Europe, see Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain, pp. 209-232. 86. Levine, Anvil of Victory, pp. 78-79. 87. Petrov to Wang Shijie, April 3 and 23, 1946, Zhongyao shiliao, vol. 7, book 1, pp. 193, 195-197; Dongbei tingjinjun zongsilingbu chen zhong riji, 1946. 1-12. [Battle Diary of the General Headquarters of the Northeast Advance Army, January to December 1946], report for April 1946, 540.9 5090, BMH. Jiang Jingguo claims that Stalin repeated his invitation to Jiang Jieshi to come to Moscow in May, but that Jiang again turned him down. Jiang Jingguo, Fengyu de ningjing, pp. 75-76. 88. Yao, Jiefang zhanzheng. pp. 105-107. 89. Truman to Byrnes, January 5, 1946 [unsent], Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 78. Entry for January 11, 1946. Folder: "Notes on Cabinet Meetings—White House File," box 1, Matthew Connelly Papers, HSTL. Byrnes to Marshall, January 4, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:18. 90. Entry for February 27, 1946, James Forrestal Diary, Walter Millis, ed.. The Forrestal Diaries, p. 141. For a fuller discussion of Truman's thinking on foreign policy in early spring 1946, see Harbutt, The Iron Curtain, pp. 183-208. 91. Joint War Plans Committee, 416/1 (Revised), "Military Position of the United States in the Light of Russian Policy," enclosure "B," p. 31; Joint Intelligence Committee, 341, "Aims and Sequence of Soviet Political and Military Moves," January 31, 1946, both RG 218, NA. 92. Byrnes to Kennan, March 5, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 8:1113-1114. 93. Shepley to Marshall, March 7, 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:511. 94. "Final Report of the Yenan [Yan'an] Observer Group," April 15, 1946, FRUS: 1946. 9:777-779. 95. "Minutes of Meeting," April 22, 1946, FRUS: 1946. 9:789; Marshall to Truman, May 6, 1946, ibid., pp. 815-818.

Conclusion: Revolt, Intervention, and Cold War Conclusion: Revolt, Intervention,

219

and the Cold War

1. Henry Byroade, oral history interview, p. 42, HSTL. 2. There is still no comprehensive history of the 1946-1949 civil war in English. Lionel Chassin gives an overview in his The Communist Conquest of China, while Suzanne Pepper focuses on the political developments in her Civil War in China. The military aspects of the civil war are presented from the victor's perspective in Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi. The GMD side is covered in Kanluan zhanshi. 3. Mao Zedong, "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongyang renmin zhengfu gongbao" [A Proclamation by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China], October 1, 1949, Jiefang zhanxian, pp. 281-282. 4. In English, see for instance Chen Yung-fa, Making Revolution, and Steven I. Levine, Anvil of Victory. For an overview of the literature in English, see Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution," in Hartford and Goldstein, eds.. Single Sparks. For the literature in Chinese, see Zhang Zhuhong, Zhongguo xiandai gemingshi shiliaoxue or, for some of the more recent works, Liu Yi, "Jiefang zhanzheng shiqi Huabei jiefangqu de tudi gaige yu nongcun zhengti," pp. 73-78. 5. Commerce between the Soviet Union and the CCP-held areas in the northeast became an important element in CCP strategy from late 1946, as did the training of CCP cadres in the Soviet schools. See "Dongbeiju guanyu sannian lai ZhongSu guanxi de zongjie" [The Northeast Bureau's Summary of Sino-Soviet Relations over the Past Three Years], June 11, 1949, quoted in Jin Yunfang et al. "KangRi zhanzheng shengli hou zai Dongbei wenti shang san guo si fang de guanxi he douzheng" [The Relationship and Struggle Between Three Countries and Four Sides on the Northeastern Question After the Victory in the Anti-Japanese War]. Zhongong dangshi ziliao [CCP Party History Materials], no. 28 (1988), p. 179. 6. For an opposite view, see Steven M. Goldstein, "Sino-American Relations, 1948-1950," pp. 119-142. 7. James Reardon-Anderson has also emphasized the caution Mao showed in his relations with the Americans in 1945 (Yenan, pp. 164-165). 8. New China News Agency Central Bureau to all offices, June 16, 1946, Xinhua she xinwen yanjiubu, comp., Xinhua she wenjian ziliao xuanbian, 19311956, 1:65-66; Jiefang ribao [Liberation Daily], June 1 and 5, 1946. 9. For the contrast to Stalin's way of dealing with East European nonCommunist regimes, see Vladimir V. Kusin's essay on Czechoslovakia in Martin McCauley, ed.. Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949, pp. 73-95. 10. For the parallel with Stalin's advice to Communists in western Europe, see Paolo Spriano, Stalin and the European Communists, pp. 270-281. The situation in Greece in 1945-1946 was in some respects similar to that in China, and Stalin's policy there was consistent with his actions in China. See Peter J. Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944-1949, pp. 4 8 - 6 5 and 99-101.

220

Conclusion: Revolt, Intervention, and Cold War

11. See also Wang Jianke, "Zhanhou Sidalin 'bu zhun geming' de yuanyin chutan," pp. 63-75. 12. Some Chinese observers believed that the Soviets acted brutally in order to test CCP reactions. See Wu, Wangshi cangsang, pp. 162-163. 13. My conclusion forms an interesting contrast to those of Vojtech Mastny (Russia's Road to the Cold War, especially pp. 308-310), who emphasizes Stalin's abilities as a diplomat in contrast to the incompetence of Western leaders. Mastny's conclusion is also generally followed by those who assign less blame to Stalin for starting the Cold War than what he does do. See for instance William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948, pp. 68-69. 14. William McCagg has another overall explanation for Soviet foreign policy indecision in 1945—1946. McCagg sees Stalin's emphasis on global stability as challenged by a younger and more "ideological" generation of party leaders, who believed in supporting revolutions abroad (Stalin Embattled, pp. 68-71, 159-161). Werner Hahn and Gavriel Ra'anan also underline factionalism as a decisive element in Soviet postwar foreign policymaking. The three disagree completely, however, on what specific positions the different factions took, or even who of the leaders belonged to what faction. Wemer G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics, pp. 19-25, and Gavriel D. Ra'anan, International Policy Formation in the USSR, pp. 35-42. 15. For accounts stressing Byrnes' and Truman's use of the U.S. nuclear advantages to pressure the Soviets in the summer of 1945, see Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy; Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed; and Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon. For an overview of the debate between these scholars and their critics, see J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," pp. 9 7 114. By arguing against the thesis that the U.S. administration used the bomb primarily for diplomatic purposes, Alperovitz's critics have sometimes obscured the more important point that U.S. policy became increasingly confrontational toward Soviet objectives during the summer of 1945. See for example Robert James Maddox, From War to Cold War. The most balanced analysis of U.S. policy the summer the war ended is in Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance. 16. For an analysis that stresses nationalist ideals as the main force behind both CCP and GMD diplomacy, see John Garver's Chinese-Soviet Relations, ¡93 7 ¡945, pp. 3 - 5 . Garver is right when pointing to nationalism as a driving force in both CCP and GMD ideology. He fails, however, to distinguish between reality and rhetoric in the foreign policy practice of the leaders of the two parties. 17. For the events surrounding the fall of the Ming dynasty, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 1:290-318. For an example from the late Qing period, see Richard Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins. See also Jürgen Osterhammel's discussion of the characteristics of Chinese foreign relations in China und die Weltgesellschaft, pp.

Conclusion: Revolt. Intervention, and Cold War

221

1-20. Jiang's earlier attempt at a foreign alliance is described in William Kirby, Germany and Republican China. 18. Akira Iriye argues that the international system in East Asia first entered its Cold War stage in 1948 (The Cold War in Asia. pp. 164-165). Marc Gallicchio, looking in depth at the perceptions of American policymakers, suggests a much earlier start to the Cold War conflict (The Cold War Begins, p. 177). I agree with Gallicchio that the main international actors in East Asia started envisaging the Cold War already in mid-1945. Using Iriye's international approach, I will argue, however, that the start of the Chinese civil war best marked the triumph of Cold War perceptions among Americans, Soviets, and Chinese. There seems to be no emerging scholarly consensus on the timing of the Cold War, even when considering the more well-studied cases in Europe. Looking at Italy, James Miller defends the "traditional" view that U.S. antiCommunist intervention began in earnest after the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine (March 1947). James Edward Miller, The United States and Italy, 19401950, pp. 223—234. Fraser Harbutt argues for a sudden breakthrough of Cold War thinking in the spring of 1946 (The Iron Curtain, p. 209). 19. For Korea, see Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:382-390, 428-444, and van Ree, "Socialism in One Zone," pp. 223-231; for Iran, see Mark Hamilton Lytle, The Orgins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953, pp. 138-152; for Greece, see Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, pp. 4 8 126. Stavrakis argues that Stalin's Greek policy was conceptually coherent, but extremely complex and difficult to exercise. Stalin's policy, Stavrakis claims, led to a series of diplomatic setbacks for the Soviet Union and to disaster for the Greek Communists. 20. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2:10-11. 21. See for instance Soviet ambassador to Washington Nikolai Novikov's "long telegram" to the Soviet foreign minister, September 27, 1946, translated in Diplomatic History (1991), 15(4):527-537. 22. For East Asia in the 1940s, see Tennesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945, pp. 411-417, and Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1:382-403, 436-437, 2:325-331. For a comparative view of the postwar period, see Odd Ame Westad, "Rethinking Revolutions," Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming. 23. On Vietnam, see George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986), pp. 93-121, and George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (2d ed.; New York: Knopf, 1986), pp. 90-95; on Angola, George Wright, U.S. Policy Toward Angola: The Kissinger Years, 1974-1976 (Leeds Southern African Studies no.2; Leeds: University of Leeds, 1990), pp. 3 - 1 3 ; on Afghanistan, Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, N.C.: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1983), pp. 221-237, and Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (2d ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 121 — 124.

222

A Note on Sources and Materials

24. This, of course, is not to claim that no "old regimes" exploited foreign aid successfully. As in Korea and in Greece, decisive intervention by a Great Power could ensure the regime's survival. A Note on Sources and

Materials

1. Shi Xuancen et al., chief eds., Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan jianming zhinart [A Brief Guide To the Second Historical Archives of China] (Beijing: Dang'an, 1987). 2. A guide to parts of this collection is Zhang Houde, 1949 nian yiqian Zhonggong jiqi waiwei kanwu yanjiu [Studies in the pre-1949 Publications of the CCP and Affiliated Organizations] (Gongdang wenti yanjiu, 10; Taibei: Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, 1986). In the bibliography those items which to my knowledge are available only at the Fawubu Diaochaju are marked "BI." 3. Some local and regional archives in the PRC have started to open up their collections of pre-1949 CCP materials. The journal Lishi dang'an [Historical Archives] provides sporadic surveys of such openings. 4. For a further discussion of the neibu-problem, see Hunt and Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party," pp. 260, 270-271. Internal circulation materials are marked neibu in the bibliography.

Selected Bibliography

Archives and Manuscript Collections BLCU. Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, New York Hsiung Shih-hui [Xiong Shihui] Papers V. Wellington K o o [Gu Weijun] Papers Li Tsung-jen [Li Zongin] Papers Fawubu Diaochaju [Ministry of Justice's Bureau of Investigation], Xindian, Taiwan FDRL. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Anna Roosevelt Halstead Papers Harry Hopkins Papers and Letters Henry Morgenthau Papers and Diary Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers Henry A. Wallace Papers Guofangbu shizhengbianyiju [Ministry of Defense's Bureau of Historical Compilation and Translation] 062.23 5000.3 ZhongSu waijiao wenti zhuanji [Special Compilation on Questions Concerning Sino-Soviet Relations]

224

Selected

Bibliography

540.9 5090 Dongbei tingjinjun zongsihngbu chert zhortg riji, 1946. 1-12. [Battle Diary of the General Headquarters of the Northeast Advance Army. January to December 1946] 546.4 4439.2 Su E dui Ri gongshi zuozhan zhi yanjiu [A Study of Soviet Plans For Offensive Battles Against Japan] HSTL. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri Dean Acheson Papers Eben A. Ayers Papers Matthew J. Connelly Notes and Papers Rose A. Conway Papers George M. Elsey Files and Papers Edwin A Locke Files and Papers John F. Melby Papers Naval Aide Files Samuel I. Rosenman Papers Harry S. Truman Papers White House Press Releases HIA. Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California David D. Barrett Papers Oliver J. Caldwell Papers Chang Kia-ngau [Zhang Jia'ao] Papers Chinese Subject Collection Sutton Christian Papers Lauchlin B. Currie Papers Victor Chi-tsai Hoo [Hu Shize] Papers John P. Lake Papers Hsiao-li Lindsay, Baroness Lindsay of Birker, Memoirs Wilbur J. Peterkin Papers T. V. Soong [Song Ziwen] Papers Richard D. Weigle Papers Ivan D. Yeaton Papers HLHU. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts Joseph C. Grew Papers LC. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. Charles Bohlen Papers Joseph E. Da vies Papers W. Averell Harriman Papers MCHC. Marine Corps Historical Center, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Records of 1st Marine Division, 3d Amphibious Corps

Selected Bibliography

225

NA. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State Record Group 107: Records of the Office of the Secretary of War Record Group 165: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs Record Group 218: Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Record Group 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services Record Group 332: Records of the United States Army RMCL. Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C. James F. Bymes Papers YUL. Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University Libraries, New Haven, Conn. Henry L. Stimson Diaries and Papers. Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan [Number Two Historical Archives of China], Nanjing, People's Republic of China Quanzonghao 1: Guomin zhengfu [Republican Government] Quanzonghao 18: Waijiaobu [Foreign Ministry] Quanzonghao 707: Junshi weiyuarthui yuanchang Dongbei xingying [Military Affairs Committee's Northeastern Headquarters] Quanzonghao 761: Junshi weiyuanhui [Military Affairs Committee] Quanzonghao 763: Junshi weiyuanhui waishiju [Military Affairs Committee's Foreign Affairs Bureau] Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui [Party History Committee of the Chinese Guomindang's Central Committee], Taibei, Taiwan Zongtong Jiang gong dashi changbian chugao [A Draft Extensive Chronology of President Jiang]. Vols. 5 {xia), 6 (shang). Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Jindaishi yanjiusuo [Institute of Modem History, Academia Sinica], Nangang, Taiwan Wang Shijie Diary Dong Yanping Papers

Oral History Interviews W. Walton Butterworth, HSTL Henry Byroade, HSTL Chen Li-fu [Chen Lifu], Chinese Oral History Collection, Columbia University O. Edmund Clubb, HSTL Matthew J. Connelly, HSTL Dong Yanping, Academia Sinica George M. Elsey, HSTL

226

Selected

Bibliography

W. Avereil Harriman, HSTL Wellington Koo [Gu Weijun], Chinese Oral History Collection, Columbia University Edwin A. Locke, HSTL John F. Melby, HSTL DeWitt Peck, MCHC John S. Service, HSTL Louis E. Woods, MCHC William A. Worton, MCHC

Journals and Newspapers (June 1, 1944-July 1, 1946) Da gong bao Izvestiia Jiefang ribao New Times New York Times Pravda Shishi ribao Shishi xinbao Voina i rabochi klass Xinhua luntan Xinhua ribao Published

Document Collections and Secondary

Sources

Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. Expanded and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1985. Banac, Ivo. With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. Barbey, Daniel E. MacArthur's Amphibious Navy. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1969. Beai, John Robinson. Marshall in China. New York: Doubleday, 1970. Beloff, Max. Soviet Policy in the Far East, ¡944-1951. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. Benson, Linda. The ¡li Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1990. Bohlen, Charles E., with the editorial assistance of Robert H. Phelps. Witness to History, ¡929-1969. New York: Norton, 1973. Boorman, Howard, ed. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. 3 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Borg, Dorothy and Waldo Heinrichs, eds. Uncertain Years: Sino-American Relations, 1947-1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Borisov, O. Sovetskii Soiuz i Man'chzhurskaia revoliutsionnaia baza, 1945-1949

Selected Bibliography

227

[The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base]. Moscow: Mysl, 1975. Borisov, O. B„ and B. T. Koloskov, Sovetskie-kitaiskie otnosheniia, 1945-1980 [Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1980]. Moscow: Mysl, 1980. Buhite, Russell D. Decisions at Yalta: An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1986. " 'Major Interests': American Policy Toward China, Taiwan, and Korea, 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 0 . " Pacific Historical Review (1978), no. 3, pp. 425-451. Patrick J. Hurley and American Relations with China. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973. Soviet-American Relations in Asia. 1945-1954. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981. Byrnes, James F. All in One Lifetime. New York: Harper, 1958. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper, 1947. Cai Xingsan. Jiang Jingguo yu Sulian [Jiang Jingguo and the Soviet Union]. Hong Kong: Era Books, 1976. Caldwell, Oliver J. A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944-1945. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1972. Cao Yanbo. "Gonggu dishi genjudi de Haerbin gong'an wuzhuang" [Consolidating the Police Force in the Harbin Base Area], Harbin wenshi ziliao [Harbin Historical Accounts], no. 8, 127-32. Neibu. Chang, Carsun. Third Force in China. New York: Bookman, 1952. Chassin, Lionel Max. The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War. Translated by Timothy Osato and Louis Gelas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Chen Boda. Wanjiu zuguo de weiji [Save the Motherland from its Crisis]. July 1946. BI. Chen Ping. "Cong jianchi 'wurenqu' dao jinjun Dongbei—tan JiReLiao de teshu zhanlue diwei" [From 'Dead Zone' to Intervention in the Northeast: On the Position of the Special Strategy in the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning area]. Unpublished paper. Jinian kangRi zhanzheng li sishi zhoumian zhuanwen [Papers On the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the War of Resistance against Japan]. 1985. Chen Yun. Chen Yun wenxuan, 1926-1949 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, 1 9 2 6 1949], Beijing: Renmin, 1984. Chen Yung-fa. Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China. 1937-1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Cheng Tien-fong. A History of Sino-Russian Relations. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Chem, Kenneth S. Dilemma in China: America's Policy Debate, 1945. Hamden: Archon Books, 1980. Ch'i, Hsi-sheng. Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-1945. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982. Chiang Ching-kuo [Jiang Jingguo]. "My Encounter with Stalin." In Dun Li,

228

Selected Bibliography

ed.. Modern China: From Mandarin to Commisar, pp. 296—307. New York: Scribners, 1978. Chinese Ministry of Information, comp. The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 1937-1945. 2 vols. New York: John Day, 1946. Chou Ch'ih-p'ing. "Comrade Lin Piao [Lin Biao] During the War for the Liberation of the Northeast." In China Problems Research Center, ed.. Selected Works of Lin Piao [Lin Biao], pp. 449-50. Hong Kong: Chih Luen Press, 1970. Clemens, Diane Shaver. Yalta. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. Cohen, Warren I. "American Observers and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1945." Pacific Historical Review (1966), 35:347-349. Compton, Boyd, comp. Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952. Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan: Japan against Russia. 1939. 2 vols. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985. Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. The Origins of the Korean War. Volume 2: The Roaring of the Cataract 19471950. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Dezhou diqu chuban bangongsuo. Lubei fenghuo [Fire-Storm Over Northern Shandong]. Shandong geming douzheng huiyilu congshu. Jinan: Shandong wenyi, 1985. Ding Xiaochun et al. Dongbei jiefang dashiji [A Chronicle of Events During the Liberation of the Northeast], Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1987. "Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng dashi rizhi" [A Calendar of Events During the War of Liberation in the Northeast]. Dangshi ziliao zhengji tongxun [Bulletin on the Collection of Party History Materials] (1985), no. 10, pp. 8 - 2 6 . Neibu. Ding Xuesong et al. "Huiyi Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng qijian Dongbeiju zhu bei Chaoxian banshichu" [Remembering the Northeast Bureau's Resident Office in North Korea during the War of Liberation in the Northeast]. Zhonggong dangshi ziliao [CCP Party History Materials], no. 17, pp. 197-210. Neibu. Ding Zhi and Wang Danbo. "Faku xian dang-zheng-junmin dui gu douzheng lishi huigu" [Looking Back on the History of Old Struggles of the Party, Government, and Army in Faku County]. In Zhonggong Tieling shiwei dangshi ziliao zhengji bangongshi, ed., Fenghuo qianyan [Forward Position in Flames of War], pp. 136-140. Shenyang: Liaoning daxue, 1988. Domes, Jürgen. Vertagte Revolution: Die Politik der Kuomintang in China. 19231937. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969.

Selected Bibliography

229

Dong Wcikang et at. Jiang Jingguo zai dalu [Jiang Jingguo on the Mainland]. Beijing: Zhigong jiaoyu, 1988. Neibu. Donovan, Robert J. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 19451948. New York: Norton, 1977. Dubinskii, A. M. "Osvoboditel'naiia missiia Sovetskogo Soiuza na Dal'nem Vostoke (1945)" [The Soviet Union's Liberating Mission in the Far East (1945)]. Voprosy Istorii (August 1965), pp. 4 9 - 6 1 . Eastman, Lloyd E. "Nationalist China During the Nanking Decade, 19271937." In John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., Cambridge History of China, vol. 13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution. 1937-1949. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984. Elsey, George. Roosevelt and China: The White House Story ("The President and U.S. Aid to China—1944"). Wilmington, Del.: M. Glazier, 1979. Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War Against Germany. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983. Fairbank, John K. and Albert Feuerwerker, eds.. The Cambridge History of China, vols. 12 and 13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Feng Hui. "Mao Zedong lingdao qicao 'Guanyu ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi' de jingguo" [Mao Zedong led the Process of Drafting the 'Resolution on Certain Historical Questions']. Wenxian he yanjiu [Documents and Studies] (1986), no. 2, pp. 10-16. Neibu. Ferrell, Robert H., ed. Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 19101959. New York: Norton, 1983. Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. New York: Penguin, 1982. Fischer, Louis. The Road to Yalta: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1941-1945. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. Forbes, Andrew D. W. Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Xinjiang, 1911-1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. FRUS. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944. vol. 4: The Far East. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965; vol. 6: China. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967. 1945. vol. 2: General Political and Economic Matters. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967; vol. 7: The Far East: China. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1969. 1946. vol. 8: The Far East.-Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971; vol. 9: The Far East: China. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972. Potsdam. The Conference at Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945. Washington, D C.: GPO, 1960. Teheran. The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961. Yalta. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. Waashington, D.C.: GPO, 1955.

230

Selected

Bibliography

Fu Hao. "Huiyi 'sanren xiaozu' zai Dezhou" [Remembering the 'Group of Three' in Dezhou]. Shandong dangshi ziliao (1987), no. 1, pp. 9 9 - 1 1 6 . Neibu. Fu Jize. "Juntiaobu dishiba zhixing xiaozu zai Bozhen" [The Military Mediation Headquarter's Eighteenth Executive Group in Bozhen], Shandong dangshi ziliao (1987), no. 1, pp. 117-27. Neibu. Fujian sheng dang'anguan and Zhongguo Fujian shengwei dangshi zhengweihui MinZheGan bangongshi, comps. MinZheGan dangshi wenxian ziliao xuanbian [A Selection of Documents and Materials on Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Party History). Vol. 1 (1938-1947 1.18.). Fuzhou: Fujian renmin, 1987. Neibu. Gallicchio, Marc S. The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Gan Zhangdou. "Juntiaobu zhu Zaozhuang wo daibiao ou shijian jingguo" [The Course of the Incident of Beating Our Delegates at the Military Mediation Headquarters at Zaozhuang], Shandong dangshi ziliao (1987), no. 1, pp. 128-32. Neibu. Garver, J o h n W. Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party," China Quarterly (March 1988), no. 113, pp. 2 9 - 5 9 . "The Soviet Union and the Xi'an Incident," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs (July 1991). no. 26, pp. 145-176. Geng Tian. "Huiyi Hulan jian zheng jiaofei douzheng" [Remembering the Political Struggle to Suppress Bandits at the Founding of Hulan], Heilongjiang wenshi ziliao [Heilongjiang Historical Accounts], no. 22, pp. 120-137. Neibu. Gilberg, Trond, ed. Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989. Glantz, David M. August Storm: The Soviet ¡945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria. Leavenworth Papers no. 7. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983. August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, ¡945. Leavenworth Papers no. 8. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983. Goldstein, Steven M. "Sino-American Relations, 1948-1950: Lost Chance or No Chance?" In Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade, pp. 119-142. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1989. Guan Dongguo et al. Du Yuming jiangjun [General Du Yuming], Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi, 1986. Guo Dequan. Kangzhan shiqi zhu E wuguan huiyi shilu [A True Record of Serving as Military Attaché to Russia During the War of Resistance]. Taibei: Guofangbu shizhengbianyiju, 1982. Hahn, Werner G. Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, ¡946-1953. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982.

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245

Zhu Yuanshi. "Liu Shaoqi yu kangzhan jieshu hou zhengduo Dongbei de douzheng" [Liu Shaoqi and the Struggle for Control of the Northeast After the End of the War of Resistance]. Jindaishi yattjiu [Studies in Modem History) (1988), no. 5, pp. 124-145. Zhuo Zhaoheng. " Tingzhan xieding' shi yiyue shiri qian dingde" [The Truce Agreement' Was Concluded on 10 January], Dangshi yanjiu [Party History Studies] (1982), no. 2, pp. 7 9 - 8 0 . Neibu.

Index

Acheson, Dean, 116 Air bases, Soviet, Allied use, 1 1 - 1 2 , 24, 29 Allen, George, 115 America, see United States American journalists, and CCP, 60 American politics, Mao's views, 66 American public opinion, Jiang's views, 97 Amur River, Soviet troop buildup, 46 Anhui battle, 62 Anti-Americanism, 139 Anticolonial insurgents, 178 Anti-foreign attitudes, Shandong, 107 Antigovemment rallies, 139 Anti-Soviet demonstrations, 152, 156 Anti-Soviet policy of GMD, 17 Antonov, Aleksei, 1 1 - 1 2 , 26; at Yalta, 29 Archives, 3, 1 7 9 - 8 1 Ariyoshi, Koji, 149

Anns for CCP forces, Soviets and, 89 Atomic bomb: and foreign policy, 4 5 46; and Soviet attack on Japan, 77 Banac, Ivo, 55 Behavior of Stalin, 175, 189w69 Beijing: establishment of People's Republic, 166; Headquarters, cease-fire enforcement, 145-46; U.S. occupation, 104 Birch, J o h n , 107, 206«28 Bo Gu, 61 Bohai Gulf: GMD troop landings, 112; Nationalist control, 130; U.S. and, 88 Bohlen, Charles, 44 Buhite, Russell, 3 Bureau of Translation and Compilation Archive (GMD), 180 Byrnes, James, 45, 115-16, 132, 163; and Moscow Foreign Ministers'

248

Index

Byrnes, James (continued) meeting. ¡34-35; and Sino-Soviet negotiations, 39, 49; and Soviet presence in Manchuria, 163; and Stalin, 135; Stalin's view of, 50; and U.S. landings in North China, 103, 133 Byroade, Henry, 145

Capitalism, Mao's views, 70, 71 Carlson, Evans, 25 CCP (Chinese Communist Party), 2, 4 5; and cease-fire, 146; and Chinese Red Army units, 86; foreign policy, 57-58, 60-76; historical archives, 180-81; and Hurley's resignation, 137-38; internal political crisis, 127; and Japanese invasion, 58; Jiang and, 35-36, 40-41, 47, 92-93; in Manchuria, 89, 99; Mao's leadership, 142-43, 166-70; military campaigns, 67; military strategy debate, 130-31; military units, 83-84; and Moscow communiqué, 142; political activity, 149; and Political Consultative Conference, 147; political immaturity, 160; rectification campaign, 58; Roosevelt and, 25; Seventh Congress, 57-58, 68-76, 199w69; situation, late 1945, 12526, 129-31; strategies, early 1946, 158; Truman and, 33, 176; and U.S. landings in North China, 105-7; U.S. War Department and, 44, 114; views of, 3, 4; see also CCP-GMD relations; Central Committee, CCP; Mao Zedong and civil war, 78-79, 159-60; victory, 165-66 and foreign relations, 111-12, 12829; American policy, 63-65; misjudgment of diplomatic events, 168; view of international relations, 13738 Soviet Union and, 13-14, 62-63, 80,

84-87, 121-22, 168-69; cooperation, 86-87, 137-38; Jiang's view of, 16-17; opposition, 125-27 Soviet Union viewed by, 65, 82, 91; attack on Japan, 78-79; policy in Manchuria, 89-92; withdrawal from Northeast, 156-57 Stalin and, 10, 54-55, 103, 119, 121, 161, 173-74; negotiations with GMD, 38, 42, 43, 52 U.S. and, 54, 102, 117, 163-64; armed clashes, 109-10; policy statement, 133 CCP-GMD relations, 15; Great Powers and, 18, 24-25 agreement: Jiang and, 33-34; Soviet idea, 14 conflict, 104-5, 113-14; Marshall and, 165; Stalin and, 103; U.S. nonintervention policy, 102; U.S. views, 113-17; see also Civil war negotiations, 63-65, 80-81, 109, 127, 143-44; Jiang and, 96; Marshall and, 143, 153, 157; Political Consultative Conference, 146-48; Stalin and, 119; U.S. and 20; Zhou Enlai and. 127, 155 Cease-fire agreement: extension of, 154; Marshall and, 143, 145; violations of, 146 Ceng Jingbing, 67, 68 Central China, GMD occupation, 94 Central Committee, CCP, xi; archives, 3, 180-81; foreign policy, 160-61; and local politics in Mongolia, 90— 91; and Moscow communiqué, 142; and National Army offensive, 111 ; and Northeast strategy, 82; political activities, 160; and Political Consultative Conference, 147-48; propaganda. 129; and Shanhaiguan battle, 125; and Soviet attack on Japan. 78-79; and Truman's policy statement, 138; and U.S. involvement in China, 105-7, 110-11, 125; view of Soviet actions, 126

Index Central Executive Committee, GMD, and PCC resolutions, 157 Centralization of CCP, 58; Mao and, 63; Seventh Congress and, 70 Central Party Archives, 180-81 Chahar, 146 Changchun, 125, 126; CCP forces in, 86, 169; GMD control, 165; Northeast Headquarters, GMD, 95; Soviet cooperation with GMD, 123-24 Chang Kia-ngau, see Zhang Jia'ao Chen Boda, 60 Chengdu, Japanese threat to, 12 Chen Lifu, 40, 47, 137, 150 Chen Yun, 85, 126, 128-29, 130 Chiang Ching-kuo, see Jiang Jingguo Chiang Kai-shek, see Jiang Jieshi China: as buffer between Great Powers, 31; and Great Power agreement, 8; historical strategies, 177; military situation, December, 1944, 27; political agreement, CCP-GMD, 2 4 - 2 5 , 3 3 34; political developments, influence on foreign affairs, 1; political situation, Mao's analyses, 168; postwar U.S. involvement, 100, 103-17; Soviet-American rivlary and, 2; see also CCP; Civil war, China; GMD Soviet Union and, 12-14, 46; influence on, U.S. and, 99-100; Stalin's concessions to Hopkins, 35; see also Sino-Soviet relations war with Japan, 14-15; Great Powers and, 4 - 5 ; Soviet Union and, 62 China-centered approach, of Chinese Communists, 6 1 - 6 2 China policy: Soviet Union, 118, 161; Jiang and, 123 U.S.: CCP and, 67-68; Truman and, 113-15; Truman administration, 131-33 Chinese archives, 179-81 Chinese civil war, see Civil war, China Chinese Communist Party, see CCP Chinese Communists: divisions among.

249

61-62; in Manchuria, 8 5 - 8 6 , 8 8 89; Red Army and, 119, 121; Stalin's views, 173-74; see also CCP Chinese-Eastern Railway, Soviet demands, 13 Chinese government, xi; Stalin and, 42 Chinese language, transliterations from, xi Chinese National Army: military situation, 1944, 12; and war with Japan, 22-23; see also GMD Chinese Nationalist Government, see GMD Chinese society, Mao's analysis, 59 Chongqing, 14; American military staff. 99-100; Japanese threat to, 12; see also CCP-GMD relations; GMD Churchill, Winston, 23, 28; "Iron Curtain" speech, 164 Civil war, China, 2, 78-80, 104-5, 113-14, 165; CCP and, 75-76; CCP leadership and, 170; Cold War and, 176, 2 2 I n 18; first battle, 159; Jiang Jieshi and, 97; progress of, late 1945, 129-30; right wing GMD and, 93; Stalin and, 103, 162 U.S. and, 102, 165; nonparticipation policy, 113; support for GMD, 74; views of, 113-17, 163-64 Coalition government, Chinese: Mao's view, 81; Seventh Party Congress and, 71, 72; Soviets and, 103, 169 Cold War, 183w2, 189w2; and Chinese civil war, 166, 176; Jiang and, 17172; perceptions of, 2, 3, 177; Stalin and, 173; start of, 221M18; and third world rebellions, 2, 178; and U.S. China policy, 117 Collaboration with Japanese in Manchuria, 89 "Committee of Three," CCP-GMD cease-fire agreement, 145, 152-53 Communication within CCP, Mao and, 70 Communist governments, Soviet Union and, 5 4 - 5 5

250

Index

Communist Party theories, Mao and, 71-72 Communists: local, Stalin's view, 1 7 3 74; U.S. views of, 44 Chinese: divisions among, 61—62; in Manchuria, 8 5 - 8 6 , 8 8 - 8 9 ; Red Army and, 119, 121; see also CCP Connelly, Matt, 115, 132 Constitution of CCP, Seventh Congress and, 70, 7 1 - 7 2 Cooperation with U.S., Stalin and, 9 12 "Correcting the workstyle," CCP campaign, 58 Corruption in GMD, 22, 112, 139, 172; Jiang and, 171; and war with Japan, 14 Cultural Revolution, 216n59 Cumings, Bruce, 177 Currie, Lauchlin, 27 Dalian (Dairen), 21, 194n81; CCP forces in, 86; CCP-Soviet occupation, 87; GMD and, 9 5 - 9 6 , 112; Sino-Soviet negotiations, 3 7 - 3 8 , 41, 49, 51, 52; Soviet demands, 13, 19, 120; U.S. and, 39, 4 4 - 4 5 , 49, 53, 100; Yalta agreement, 29 Deane, J o h n R„ I I , 24, 26 Democratic League, Chongqing, CCP and. 91 Deng Xiaoping, 111 Diplomacy: postwar, Stalin and, 173; Truman and, 43 Dixie Mission, and CCP, 6 0 - 6 1 Domestic policies. Seventh Party Congress and, 71 Domestic resources, mobilization of, 1 Domestic revolution, China, SovietAmerican rivalry and, 2 Dong Biwu, 63 Donovan, William, 103 Du Yuming, 146 East Asia: postwar, 3, 47; Yalta agreements, 7 - 8

East Asia policy: Soviet, 8 - 1 4 , 173-75 U.S., 3, 3 4 - 3 5 , 54, 9 9 - 1 0 2 , 175-76; Harriman and, 34; Truman administration, 1 7 5 - 7 6 Eastern Europe: FDR and, 184n7; Great Power confrontation, 35 Economic aid to China, Marshall and, 153 Economic concessions, Chinese, to Soviet Union, 122-24 Economic policies. Seventh Party Congress and, 71 Eighth Route Army, CCP, 110 Enforcement of cease-fire, 145, 146 Ethnic separatism. Inner Mongolia, 90 Europe: allied victory, 72; political developments, and Yalta system, 31 Factional infighting in GMD, 22 Financial aid, U.S., to GMD, 101 Fischer, Louis, 7 Foreign affairs: Chinese politics and, 1; GMD, historical archives, 180; Mao's analyses, 69, 167; Truman and, 45 Foreign assistance, Chinese leaders and, 176 Foreign ministers' meetings: London, 115-16, 119; Moscow, 134 Foreign policy, 1; and Chinese Communist revolution, 177-78; and Chinese strategies, 166; Jiang and, 97, 172; see also China policy; East Asia policy CCP, 57, 6 0 - 7 6 ; Mao and, 70, 73; after war's end, 79 Soviet, 119-21 ; interpretations of, 184wl0; Stalin and, 55, 121, 162, 175, 221 « 19; views of, 2 2 0 n l 4 U.S.: East Asia, 3, 3 4 - 3 5 , 54, 9 9 102, 175-76; Harriman and, 34; Mao's views, 169-70; "Moscow approach," 32; and Yalta agreement, 32 Foreign powers, and political change, 178

Index Foreign relations, see International relations Foreigners, Mao's view, 69 Forrestal, James, 116-17 Fu Bingchang, 18, 37, 95; and Yalta agreement, 32 Fujian, CCP campaign, 67 Fuxin, meeting of CCP commanders, 130 Fu Zuoyi, 104; and cease-fire, 46 Gallicchio, Marc, 3, 100 Gao Gang, 130 Garver, John, 3, 32 Geographical extent of CCP, 57 Germany, defeat of, 72 Gillem, Alvan C., Jr., 159 Globalization of Soviet-American conflirt, 1, 177 GMD (Guomindang), 2 - 5 , 15-16, 56; agreement with CCP, 14, 33-34; archives, 3, 179-80; challenges to, 46-47; Cold War and, 172; defeat of, 165-66; and Japanese invasion, 58; Mao's views, 69, 148-49; Marshall's views, 164, 165; and Political Consultative Conference, 150; right wing, 93, 157; Roosevelt and, 27; Seventh Party Congress and, 71 ; situation, late 1945, 135-36, 138-39; Stalin and, 8 - 9 , 12, 54-55; and surrender of Japanese troops, 79-80; see also CCP-GMD relations; Civil war, China negotiations with CCP, 63-65, 80-81, 109, 127, 143-44; Jiang and, 96; Marshall and, 143, 153, 157; Political Consultative Conference, 14648; Stalin and, 119; U.S. and 20; Zhou Enlai and, 127, 155 Soviet Union and, 14, 17-19; negotiations, 36-43, 47-48, 54-56; postwar relations, 95-96; support, 62, 99; territorial demands, 21; U.S. and, 17-21, 22; see also Sino-Soviet negotiations

251

U.S. and, 33-34, 112; CCP views, 74, 128; diplomatic relations, 32; military aid to, Stalin's view, 118-19; policy statement, 133; support, 17576 Great Power relations, 2, 31, 35, 7 2 73; CCP views, 65; Chinese civil war and, 177; Chinese leaders and, 166, 176; Jiang and, 171; Manchuria and, 121; Mao's ideas of, 60, 74, 143, 167, 170; Sino-Soviet negotiations and, 51; Stalin and, 119, 121; Yalta agreement, 7 - 8 Great Powers: and CCP-GMD agreement, 33; Jiang and, 2. 47; Mao and, 58 Grew, Joseph, 21, 43-44, 175; and East Asia policies, 54 Guerrilla groups, CCP, in Tianjin, 108 Guomindang, see GMD Gu Weijun, xiii, 19 Harbin, 125, 126; CCP and, 86, 87, 160, 162, 169 Harriman, Averell, 175; and aid to Jiang, 116; and Bymes-Molotov talks, 134-35; and foreign policy, 34, 43, 44-45, 54; and North China, 100; Pavlov's view, 194«90; and political agreement in China, 24—25; and Sino-Soviet negotiations, 39, 48-51, 53, 101; Song Ziwen and, 43; and Soviet territorial demands, 13, 25, 186n 18; Stalin and, 10-11, 14, 103, 119; and Yalta agreements, 30 Hebei province, 57, 104, 112; U.S. and, 88, 103, 110 He Di, 61 Henan province, 104; battle of Zhang River, 110 He Yingqin, 94 Historiography of Chinese revolution, 166 Hitler, Adolf, and Japanese attack on U.S., in Stalin's view, 53

252

Index

Hoo, Victor, see Hu Shize Hopkins. Harry, 28. 34-35. 43, 101 Hsiung Shih-hui, see Xiong Shihui Hull, John E., 132-33 Huludao, 87, 112; fall of. 129 Hu Qiaomu, 70-71 Hurley, Patrick, 20, 23, 35, 48; CCP and, 61, 67-68, 106; and CCP-GMD agreement, 25; and CCP-GMD negotiations, 63-64; Jiang and, 172; Zhou Enlai's view of, 153 resignation of, 131-32, 135-36; CCP and, 137-38; Stalin's view, 174 Hu Shize, xiii, 33, 37, 48, 53, 191n29; and negotiations with Soviets, 3 8 39; and Soviet entry into war with Japan, 50 Ideological elements in CCP-Soviet relationship, 17, 169 Independence of CCP, 72 Industrial equipment, Manchuria, as Soviet war booty, 122 Inefficiency of GMD, and war with Japan, 14 Infiltration policy, CCP, in Tianjin, 108 Initial situation of Cold War, 177 Inner Mongolia: CCP problems, 90-91; Sino-Soviet negotiations, 37; see also Mongolia Integration of armies, 152-53, 155-56 International affairs: CCP and, 75; Mao and, 59-60, 76; see also Foreign affairs International history. Cold War era, 2 Internationalist approach, of Chinese Communists, 61, 63; Mao and, 196«19 International relations, 2; and CCP victory, 166; CCP views, 126, 128-29, 137-38, 142, 160; East Asia, postwar, 3; Jiang and, 16; Mao's views, 65, 69, 73, 148, 167-68, see also Foreign policy International strategy of Jiang, 171

International United Front, CCP ideas, 60, 61 Iriye, Akira, 4, 31 Japan: Asian mainland war against, 22-23; China offensive, 5, 8, 12, 14-15, 21; expansion policy. Great Powers and, 4; defeat of, Jiang and, 15; and Manchuria, 89; occupation of, Soviet participation, 99, 118; Roosevelt's strategy, 23-25; Soviet Union and, 8, 9-12; Stalin and, 173; surrender of, 53; war against, Mao's views, 70, 74; see also Soviet Union, entry into war with Japan Japanese soldiers: GMD use against CCP, 103, 132-33; repatriation of, 117; and U.S. occupation of North China, 104 JCS, see Joint Chiefs of Staff Jiang Jieshi, xiii, 2, 4 - 5 , 15-16; alienation of urban Chinese, 142; American policy, 172; CCP and, 64, 149; and CCP-GMD negotiations, 109, 143-45; and cease-fire, 145-46, 154; and civil war, 93, 159, 170-71; and Cold War, 171-72, 176; and Communist armies, 59; FDR and, 187n40; and GMD right wing, 157; and Great Power agreement, 8; historical archives, 179-80; and invitation to visit Stalin, 20; Mao's view of, 75; Mao viewed by, 109; Marshall and, 143-45, 164; Northeast offensive, 154-55; and Political Consultative Conference, 146, 150; Song Ziwen and, 36; and Soviet territorial demands, 20-21; Stalin and, 10, 55, 62, 218«86; and Stilwell, 23; Truman and, 102; U.S. views of, 27; and Wang Shijie, 47-48; and Yalta agreement, 30, 32, 35 political maneuvers, 32-33, 35-36, 123, 135-37, 151-52, 166; with CCP, 40-41; Dalian, 112; deal with

Index Soviets, 140-41; international affairs, 47; in Northeast, 158-59; with United States, 18-21, 92 and Soviet Union, 13, 16-19, 22, 46, 96-97, 122-23, 124; negotiations with, 40, 56 U.S. aid to. 101, 102-3, 112, 175-76; CCP and, 74; Stalin and, 118-19; views of, 115-16 Jiang Jingguo, xiii, 95, 9 6 - 9 7 ; Moscow talks, 136, 140-41, 151; Stalin and, 192n46 Jilin city, 86, 125, 121 Jining, battle for, 146 Jinxian, fall of, 130 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.: and alliance with GMD, 102, and China, WWII, 12; and China policy, 133; estimate of Japanese strength, 11; and joint Soviet-American military planning, 26; and postwar involvement in China, 116; and Yalta agreement, 29 Joint strategic planning, Stalin and, 29 Joint War Plans Committee, 163 Journalists, American, and CCP, 60 Kamchatka, air base, 11 Kinkaid, Thomas C., 113 Kong Xiangxi, xiii, 20 Koo, V. Wellington, see Gu Weijun Kovtun-Stankevich, A. I., 84 Kung, H. H., see Kong Xiangxi Kunming, 12; antigovemment rallies, 139 Kurile Islands: Soviet demands, 13; Yalta agreement, 29 Leahy, William D., 19, 30 Leftist political movements, Moseew and, 56 Levine, Steven, 162 Liaodong (Liaotung) Peninsula, Soviet demands, 13 Liaoning province, CCP and, 8 3 - 8 4 , 126-27

253

Lin Biao, 89, 125, 148. 159, 211n37; and civil war, 165, 170; military strategy, 130; military victories, 160, 162

Lippmann, Walter, 13 Liu Bocheng, 62, 84, 105, 107, 111, 126, 147, 216w59; and criticisms of Mao, 127; international relations viewed by, 138; Mao and, 142, 149; and Soviet Union, 85, 168-69; strategy of, 130-31, view of GMD-U.S. relations, 128-29 Li Xiannian, 127 Li Yunchang, 130 Local populations, GMD and, 58, 112 Local resistance forces: GMD and, 14; in Northeast, 90 Locke, Edwin A., 114, 133, 207n52 London Foreign Ministers' Conference, 115-16; Jiang and, 94; Stalin and, 119 Looting by Red Army, 90, 96, 122, 163 Luo Ronghuan, 88, 130, 131 Liishun (Port Arthur), 21, 194«81; CCP and, 88; Sino-Soviet negotiations, 38, 4 1 - 4 2 , 49, 52; Soviet demands, 13, 120; U.S. and, 19, 4 4 45, 100; Yalta agreement, 29 MacArthur, Douglas, 100 McCIoy, John, 115 Malinovskii, Rodion, 9 5 - 9 6 , 97, 1 2 1 22, 124 Manchuria, 151; CCP and, 74, 128, 169; Chinese Communists in, 8 5 86, 8 8 - 8 9 ; civil war in, 159-60; Jiang and, 9 3 - 9 4 , 122; Stalin and, 78, 120-21, 161-62, 173; see also Northeast China Red Army occupation, 83, 8 6 - 8 7 , 102, 162; apology for behavior, 124; Harriman and, 186nl8; U.S. view, 163; withdrawal, 9 5 - 9 6 , 161-62 Soviet Union and, 35-36, 118, 169; GMD report on Soviet plans, 46; ne-

254

Index

Manchuria (continued) gotiations with GMD, 37-38. 47-49

41-42,

U.S. and, 4 4 - 4 5 , 118, 132, 133, 134; Harriman's view, 53; Marshall's view, 153-54; OSS intelligence operations, 2 0 4 - 5 « 1 3 Manser, Richard, 22 Mansfield, Michael, 113, 188«55 Manzhouguo empire, 15 M a o Zedong, 2 - 5 , 56, 61-62, 127-28, 196nl9; and civil war, 79, 159-60, 170; and Cold War, 176; establishment of People's Republic, 166; and foreign policy, 57-58, 60; and international relations, 65, 76; Jiang and, 96; Liu Shaoqi and, 131 ; and military unity agreement, 155-56; and M o s c o w communiqué, 148; N e w Democracy idea, 71; and Political Consultative Conference, 147-48; strategies, 158; and United Front policy, 59; and war with GMD, 104; and war with Japan, 65 and CCP, 58, 166-70; negotiations with GMD, 81, 109; party unity, 142-43; Seventh Congress, 6 8 - 7 6 and Soviet Union, 63, 82; attack on Japan, 78; treaty with GMD, 75, 80; withdrawal from Northeast, 156-57 and U.S., 64-65, 161; involvement in China, 166, 167; views of policy, 6 7 - 6 8 , 105, 106 Maps: China, 6; North China, 98 "Margarine communists," 14 Maritime Provinces, air bases, 11-12 Marshall, George C., 100, 131-32, 157, 158, 165, 176; and CCP-GMD negotiations, 143-45; and China policy, 132-33, 153-54; Harriman's v i e w of, 135; and Jiang, 136, 15052, 154, 164, 172; and Jiang's use of Japanese troops, 103; military agreement, 153; and Northeast situation, 154-55; and Soviets, 151-52;

Truman and, 162-63; Wang Shijie and, 137; and Zhou Enlai, 153 Marshall Mission, 132, 143-44, 163, 176; CCP views, 124; G M D views, 137; Jiang's view, 171; Liu Shaoqi's view, 138; Mao's view, 170; Stalin and, 161 Marxism: M a o and, 72; Stalin and, 185«8 Mikoian, Anastas, 3 8 - 3 9 MILEPOST, 26 Military bases on Soviet-Chinese border, U.S. access, 9 Military cooperation: Soviet-American, 11-12. 29; U.S.-CCP. 61 Military headquarters, CCP, in Manchuria, 89 Military personnel, U.S., CCP and, 6 0 61 Military situation: CCP, late 1945, 129-30; China, 1944, 27; GMD, and Soviet territorial demands, 21 Military strategy: CCP, debate over, 130-31; U.S., CCP views, 66 Military strength, CCP, 57 Military support, U.S., for GMD, 101, 175-76 Military unity agreement, CCP-GMD, 153; views of, 155-56 Mismanagement by GMD, 112, 139, 172; Jiang and, 171 Moderation, political, Liu Shaoqi and, 131 Molotov, Viacheslav M., 120; Byrnes and, 134-35; Harriman and, 53; negotiations with GMD, 37, 42, 49; and North China, 121; Sino-Soviet treaty, 53; and Truman, 35 Mongolia: Sino-Soviet negotiations, 37-38, 52; Soviet invasion, 77; Soviet troop buildup, 46 Mongolian Youth Organization, 90 Moscow communiqué, 135; Mao's interpretation, 148; Stalin and, 161; Wang Shijie and, 141-42

Index Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, 134-35 Moscow negotiations, 3 6 - 4 3 , 4 7 - 5 3 ; GMD and, 4 7 - 4 8 ; Harriman and, 53; Stalin and, 173 Moscow treaty, Jiang and, 171 Myths of Yalta agreement, 32 Names, Chinese, xi, xiii Nanjing, GMD and, 93 National Army, xi; defeat of, 165; troop movements, 104 Nationalism, Chinese, 1 7 6 - 7 7 , 220« 16, CCP and, 129 Negotiated peace, Japanese-American, Soviet Union and, 8, 9 Negotiating strategies of Stalin, 55 Negotiations, Marshall and, 153 Nelson, Donald, 23 "New Democracy," Mao's idea, 59, 7 1 - 7 2 , 149 Nie Rongzhen, 8 9 - 9 0 , 104, 130, 155; Jining battle, 146 Niu Jun, 3 Non-Communist opposition, CCP and, 91 Noninterference policy, U.S., 113 North China, map, 98 Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, 85 Northeast China: fighting in, 154; GMD and, 9 4 - 9 5 ; Jiang and, 9 3 - 9 4 , 158-59, U.S. War Department and, 100; see also Manchuria CCP strategy, 74, 7 8 - 8 0 , 8 5 - 8 6 , 88; infiltration, 8 8 - 8 9 ; Mao and, 82, 156 Red Army occupation, 90; CCP and, 9 1 - 9 2 ; withdrawal, 1 7 4 - 7 5 U.S. landings, 95, 1 0 3 - 4 ; Stalin's views, 173 Northeast Headquarters of the Military Affairs Committee, 9 4 - 9 5 Number Two Historical Archives of China, 179

25 5

Office of Strategic Services (OSS): intelligence operations in Manchuria, 2 0 4 - 5 « 13; and Soviet war with Japan, 27 Open door policy, U.S., 44; and SinoSoviet negotiations, 49, 51 Operation Cardinal, 2 0 4 - 5 n 13 Operation MILEPOST, 26 Origins of Cold War, 2 Outer Mongolia: Jiang and, 16, 46; Sino-Soviet negotiations, 37, 4 0 - 4 1 , 4 7 - 4 8 ; Soviet demands, 13; U.S. and, 39; Yalta agreement, 191«27 Pacific power, Soviet Union as, 120 Pacific war, 4; see also World War II Party discipline, Mao and, 70 Party History Committee (GMD), archives, 1 7 9 - 8 0 Party line. Communist, Mao and, 72 Party unity: CCP, 130-31, 1 4 2 - 4 3 ; GMD, 47 Patterson, Robert, 116-17 PCC, see Political Consultative Conference Peace, Mao's views, 73, 81, 160 Peck, DeWitt, 110 Peng Zhen, 85, 87, 125-26; and military strategy, 130, 131 People's Republic of China, 166; historical archives, 179 Periodization of Cold War, 2 Personal behavior of Stalin, 175 Personal names, Chinese, xi, xiii Pelropavlovsk air base, 11 Petrov, Appolon, 3 5 - 3 6 , 95, 96, 121, 123, 124, 136; Jiang and, 46; and Red Army troop withdrawal, 141 Place-names, transliterations, xi Policy formulation, Seventh Congress and, 70 Political Bureau, CCP, 213w9 Political change, revolutionary, foreign powers and, 178

256

Index

Political Consultative Conference (PCC), 1 4 6 - 4 8 ; GMD and, 157; Jiang and, 150 Political immaturity of CCP, 160 Political moderation, Liu Shaoqi and, 131 Political responsibility, in GMD, 56 Political situation: in China, Mao's analyses, 168; of GMD, late 1945, 138-39 Political struggle, within Chinese United Front, 59 Politics of Jiang Jieshi, 1 7 0 - 7 2 Popular rebellion, CCP victory and, 166 Popular support for CCP, 178 Port Arthur, see Lüshun Postwar diplomatic strategy, Stalin and, 173 Potsdam Conference, 44; Sino-Soviet negotiations and, 4 2 - 4 3 ; Stalin's view, 50; U.S. diplomacy, 45 Potsdam declaration, Hu Shize's view, 48 Pravda: and CCP, 8 4 - 8 5 ; and occupation of Manchuria, 162; and U.S. China policy, 1 3 3 - 3 4 Pravdin, Anatolii, 1 3 - 1 4 Pre-Cold War era, 2, 8 - 3 0 Prestige of CCP, 66 Propaganda, CCP, 1 0 8 - 9 , 129, 149, 170; Political Consultative Conference, 1 4 7 - 4 8 ; and U.S. landings in North China, 106 Public opinion, U.S., and involvement in China, 132 QiDa, 5 7 - 5 8 , 6 8 - 7 6 , 199w69 Railway lines, 96, 194«81; CCP attacks, 110; Sino-Soviet negotiations, 38, 4 1 - 4 2 , 52; Soviet demands, 13, 19, 186n 18; Soviet ownership, U.S. and, 39; Yalta agreement, 29 Reardon-Anderson, James, 3, 66

Rebellions, third world, Cold War and, 178 Rectification campaign, CCP, 58, 60 Red Army, xi; CCP magazine article, 68; Chinese units, 63, 8 5 - 8 6 , 89; Haniman and, 186« 18; U.S. and, 99; see also Soviet Union behavior, 8 6 - 8 7 , 9 0 - 9 1 , 152; apology for, 124 and CCP forces, 8 2 - 8 4 , 8 7 - 8 8 , 89, 121, 125-27, 174; cooperation, 119, 121, 161; opposition, 1 2 6 - 2 7 withdrawal, 88, 9 5 - 9 6 , 103, 1 2 0 - 2 2 , 124, 174-75; delay of, 123, 141; demands for, 152; Jiang and, 151; politics of, 156-57; Stalin and, 1 6 1 - 6 2 Reelection of FDR, Mao's views, 66 Reform policies, CCP, 58 Rehe, 146 Ren Bishi, 61, 147 Representative assembly, CCP, 74 Research materials, 3 Resistance, local, in Northeast, 90 "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions," Seventh Congress, CCP, 70-71 Revolution, Chinese, 166 Revolutionary movements, Cold War and, 178 Right-wing, GMD, 157 Roosevelt, Franklin D„ 4, 28, 33; and CCP, 25; CCP views of, 61; and East Asian war, 22; East Asia policy, 163; Eastern Europe policies, 184«7; health of, at Yalta Conference, 28; and Jiang, 187n40; Jiang's views of, 172; Mao's views of, 66, 69, 70; policies of, Truman and, 3 4 - 3 5 , 4 3 44, 45, 175; and Sino-Soviet relations, 17-18, 20; and Stalin, 10; strategy against Japan, 2 3 - 2 4 ; and Yalta agreement, 7 - 8 , 30 and China, 8, 22, 33, 102; knowledge of Yalta agreement, 32; military aid to, 101; participation in war, 2 2 - 2 3

Index and Soviet Union, 24; attack on Japan, 26-28; territorial demands in East Asia, 19.25, 29-30; Rosenman, Samuel, 114-15 Russian language, transliterations from, xi Sakhalin: Soviet demands, 13; Yalta agreement, 29 Seventh Congress, CCP, 57-58, 68-76, 199n69 Shaanxi province, 104, 111 Shandong province, 57, 88; CCP control, 104; U.S. landings, 103-4, 106-7 Shanghai, GMD and, 93 Shanhaiguan, 83, 94, 124-25; battle of, 111 Shao Yulin, 21 Shenshan, 126 Shenyang, CCP forces in, 83-87 Shum Kui-Kwong, 71 Sichuan province, 15 Sino-American relations, 19-20; after FDR's death, 32; Stalin and, 8, 173; Truman and, 33-34; wartime cooperation and, 22; see also GMD Sino-Soviet relations, 10; conflicts in, 14; U.S, and, 17-21, 22; Stalin's need for agreement, 35 negotiations, 36-43, 47-53; CCP and, 75; economic talks, 124; Harriman and, 53, 175; and Mongolian question, 191w33; Stalin and, 120, 173; U.S. and, 44, 77 treaty, 95; CCP and, 78, 80, 91-92; Jiang and, 94, 122; Mao and, 8 1 82; Soviet violation, 152 Siping: battle of, 159; fall of, 165 Sladkovskii, Mikhail I., 124 Social policies, Seventh Party Congress and, 71 Socialist revolution, Mao and, 59 Song, T. V., see Song Ziwen Song Renqian, 110

257

Song Ziwen, xiii, 13, 19, 21, 33, 95, 157; and Harriman, 39; Kremlin visit, 18; Mao's view, 75; report on Moscow talks, 47; resignation as foreign minister, 47—48; and Sino-Soviet negotiations, 36—43, 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 1 52; and Sino-Soviet treaty, 56; and Soviets, 96, 123-24; and Truman, 34, 43, 53-54; and U.S. aid to China, 94, 100-101; Washington trip, 92 Sources of research materials, 3 Southern China, GMD occupation, 94 Soviet aggression in China, prevention of, 117 Soviet-American relations, 116-17; CCP views, 126; and Chinese politics, 27-28, 73; cooperation, 35, 51; Jiang and, 9 6 - 9 7 , 176; postwar, 118-19; Roosevelt and, 24, 28; after Roosevelt's death, 32; Sino-Soviet treaty and, 54; Stalin and, 162; Yalta Conference, 29; Yalta system, 31 alliance: CCP and, 63, 75; Mao's ideas, 58, 60, 66; military planning, 24, 25-26; Roosevelt and, 7 - 8 ; Stalin and, 173 rivalry: in China, 1, 120-21; Jiang and, 92, 123 Soviet-British-American rivalry, Jiang and, 47 Soviet-Chinese relations, see Sino-Soviet relations Soviet military, and CCP forces, 8 2 - 8 4 , 89 Soviet policy, CCP explanations, 91 Soviet troops, see Red Army Soviet Union: and CCP, 6 1 - 6 2 , 65, 80, 84-87, 91, 128-29, 161, 168-69; and CCP-GMD negotiations, Mao's idea, 81-82; and CCP-GMD relations in Northeast, 156; China involvement, U.S. views, 163-64; and Chinese civil war, 130, 166; and Chinese Communists, 62; and Dal-

258

Index

Soviet Union (continued) ian, ¡12: East Asia actions. U.S. and. 102; GMD and. 8 - 9 . 14. 1 7 - 1 9 . 36, 80, 9 5 - 9 6 ; Harriman and, 44, 53; influence in China, U.S. and, 99, 100; and Japanese surrender, 53; Jiang and, 1 6 - 1 7 , 22. 47, 1 3 6 - 3 7 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 ; Mao's views, 65, 73; negotiations with GMD, 3 7 - 4 3 , 4 7 - 5 3 ; occupation of Northeast China, 83, 8 9 - 9 2 , 152; plans of, CCP and, 7 4 75; pre-Cold War era, 2; representatives in Yan'an, 196«23; role in China, Marshall and, 153; threat to China, 46; Truman and, 3 4 - 3 5 ; and Truman's China policy, 1 3 3 - 3 4 ; U.S. and, 169, 175; see also SovietAmerican relations; Stalin, Joseph China policy, 6 2 - 6 3 , 118, 119, 161; American concerns, 194«90; antiCCP, 1 2 6 - 2 7 entry into war with Japan, 9 - 1 2 , 35, 55, 173, 184«4; Bymes's view, 45; CCP views, 65, 67; invasion of Mongolia, 7 7 - 7 8 ; Jiang and, 19, 21; and negotiations with GMD, 5 0 - 5 3 ; Roosevelt's view, 24; U.S. and, 2 2 23, 2 6 - 2 7 ; Yalta agreement, 2 9 - 3 0 foreign policy, 184« 10, 220M 14; CCP views, 68; East Asia, 8 - 1 4 ; Stalin and, 221/119 territorial demands, 9 - 1 0 , 12, 13; GMD and, 47; Jiang and, 1 9 - 2 1 ; Roosevelt and, 25; Stalin and, 173; Yalta bargains, 2 9 withdrawal from North China, 88, 9 5 - 9 6 , 103, 1 2 0 - 2 2 , 124; demands for, 152; Jiang and, 151; politics of, 1 5 6 - 5 7 ; postponement, 123; Stalin and, 1 6 1 - 6 2 Stalin, Joseph, 4; and attack on Japan, 7 7 - 7 8 ; Byrnes and, 116, 135; and CCP, 14, 75, 8 4 - 8 6 , 92, 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 168; and CCP-GMD agreement, 24, 25; and China, 10, 28, 29, and Dal-

ian, 95; and Great Power relations, 121; and Harriman, 5 0 - 5 1 ; and Hopkins, 35; Jiang Jieshi and, 18, 9 6 - 9 7 , 151, 171; Jiang Jingguo and, 1 4 0 - 4 1 , 192«46; and Mao Zedong, 62; Marxism of, 185n8; and Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, 135; negotiating strategies, 55; negotiation behavior, 189«69; negotiations with GMD, 3 7 - 4 3 , 4 9 - 5 0 , 5 1 55; personal behavior, 175; Roosevelt and, 28; territorial demands in East Asia, 9 - 1 0 , 13; and Truman, 45, 163; and U.S., 35, 54, 1 1 8 - 1 9 , and war with Japan. 1 0 - 1 2 , 53; and Yalta agreement, 7 - 8 , 29, 30 foreign policy, 55, 1 1 9 - 2 1 , 175, 177, 221«19; China, 1 1 8 - 2 0 , 123, 1 6 1 62; East Asia, 8 - 1 4 , 103, 1 7 3 - 7 5 ; skills of, 162 State Department, U.S.: and China policy, 133; East Asia policies, 175; and involvement in China, 116 Stilwell, Joseph, 16, 23 Stimson, Henry, 23, 27, 44 Student unrest, 139, 152 Suiyuan, 146 Sun Ke, 14; and CCP, 4 3 Sun Yat-sen, see Sun Zongshan Sun Zhongshan, xiii, 14, 36, 4 0 Surrender of Japanese troops in China, 79-80 Synthetic approach to foreign policy, 184«10 Taiwan, archives, 1 7 9 - 8 0 Tanggu, U.S. occupation, CCP and, 106 Tangshan, U.S. occupation, 110 Territorial demands by Soviet Union, 9 - 1 0 , 12, 13; GMD and, 47; Jiang and, 1 9 - 2 1 ; Roosevelt and, 25; Stalin and, 173, Yalta bargains, 29 Third world conflicts, 1 - 2 ; Cold War and. 178 Thorn, William R„ 132

Index Tianjin, U.S. occupation, 104, 105; CCP and, 106, 1 0 7 - 8 Transliterations, xi Transportation of GMD troops, 93; U.S. and, 112 Truman, Harry S., 175; and atomic bomb, 46; and foreign policy, 3 4 35, 44. 176; and Jiang, 164, 172; and Sino-Soviet relations, 45, 5 3 54; Stalin and, 45, 54, 163 and China, 3 3 - 3 4 , 4 3 - 4 4 ; aid to, 92, 101, 102; expectations, 1 6 2 - 6 3 China policy, 1 1 3 - 1 5 , 117, 1 3 1 - 3 2 , 133, 136; CCP views, 138; Stalin's view, 174 Truman administration: China policy, 131-33; East Asia policies, 99, 1 7 5 76; and Soviet Union, 46, 159, 1 6 3 64 Unconditional surrender policy, U.S., Stalin and, 9 United Front policy, CCP and, 59, 61, 195«6 United States, 4, 2 1 - 2 3 ; CCP and, 6 0 61, 79, 111-12, 128, 138; and CCPGMD negotiations, Mao's idea, 63; Jiang and, 16, 3 2 - 3 3 , 47, 9 3 - 9 4 , 97, 154, 172; Mao's views of, 60, 70; pre-Cold War era, 2; and SinoSoviet relations, 1 7 - 2 1 , 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 8 51, 5 3 - 5 4 ; Stalin and, 54; and Xinjiang uprising, 22 China policy: CCP and, 6 7 - 6 8 , 1 6 0 61; Mao's view, 157; Truman administration, 1 3 1 - 3 3 ; Truman and, 113-15 foreign policy: East Asia, 3, 3 4 - 3 5 , 54, 9 9 - 1 0 2 , 1 7 5 - 7 6 ; Harriman and, 34; Mao's views, 1 6 9 - 7 0 ; "Moscow approach," 32; and Yalta agreement, 32 involvement in postwar China, 100; CCP and, 129; economic aid, Marshall and, 153; Mao's views, 1 6 6 -

259

68; military aid to GMD, 112, 166, 172; military intervention, 88, 95, 101, 1 0 3 - 1 7 , 121, 141; public opinion, 132; Stalin's views, 173 and Soviet Union, 102, 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 159, 220« 15; entry into war against Japan, 9, 78; policy in China, 194n90 United States-GMD alliance, CCP and, 74 United States historians, view of China,

2

Vasilevskii, Aleksandr M„ 77 Vincent, John Carter, 103 Violations of cease-fire agreement, 146 Voroshilov, Klement, 39 Wallace, Henry, Jiang and, 18 Wang Jingwei regime, 15 Wang Ming, 58, 61, 62; condemnation of, 71 Wang Ming group, Mao and, 167 Wang Ruofei, 65, 74, 91, 127 Wang Shih-ch'ieh, see Wang Shijie Wang Shijie, xiii, 1 8 - 1 9 , 33, 46, 4 7 48, 94, 121, 1 2 3 - 2 4 , 1 3 6 - 3 7 , 157; Jiang and, 4 7 - 4 8 ; and Marshall, 151 ; and Moscow communiqué, 141; negotiations with Soviet Union, 5 1 - 5 3 ; papers of, 180; and relations with Soviets, 96; and Soviet invasion of Manchuria, 50 Wang Shoudao, 7 i Wang Zhen, 75 War booty, Soviets and, 96, 122 War Department, U.S.: and alliance with GMD, 102; and CCP, 117; and China policy, 132, 133; and Communists, 44; East Asia policies, 1 7 5 76; and Jiang, 172; and North China, 100; report on CCP, 114; and Soviet occupation of China, 102 Weapons shipments, Soviet, to GMD, 62 Wedemeyer, Albert, 93, 1 0 2 - 3 , 117;

260

Index

Wedemeyer, Albert (cont.) CCP propaganda, 106; and Chinese civil war, 102, 113; and military situation in China, 132-33; and postwar China, 9 9 - 1 0 0 Wei Daoming, 17, 19; and Hurley's resignation, 135—36; reports on Truman administration, 159; and Truman, 33-34; and Yalta agreement, 32 Withdrawal of Red Army from North China, 103, 120-22, 124, 174-75; delay of, 123, 141; demands for, 152; Jiang and, 151; politics of, 156-57; Stalin and, 161-62 World politics, Mao's understanding, 60 World War II, 4; and Soviet entry into war against Japan, 10, 12 end of, 53; CCP and, 76; and Cold War, 177; Jiang Jieshi and, 9 2 - 9 3 ; Mao's views, 70, 74; and Sino-Soviet relations, 47 W u Xiuquan, 125 Xin dazhong ( N e w W a v e ) magazine, 91 Xinhua ribao ( N e w China Daily), 109; and Hurley's resignation, 137 Xinjiang province, 16; ethnic uprising, 22 Xiong Shihui, xiii, 95, 97, 121-22 Yalta agreements, 7 - 8 ; breakdown of, 31-32; Jiang and, 171; and Outer Mongolia, 191m27; publication of, 152, 163; and Sino-Soviet negotiations, 37, 41, 50; Stalin's view, 173; U.S. and, 39

Yalta Conference, 21, 2 9 - 3 0 ; FDR and, 28; Mao's views, 64; State Department aims, 189m67 Yan'an: CCP-Soviet talks, 84, 85; Seventh Congress of CCP, 5 7 - 5 8 ; see also CCP Yantai, 106-7 Yeaton, Ivan, 80 Ye Jianying, 158 Yick, Joseph, 112 Yingkou, 87, 112-13 Zeng Kelin, 8 2 - 8 4 , 85, 89 Zliang Jia'ao, xiii, 21, 95, 124 Zhangjiakou, CCP occupation, 105 Zhang Jiasen, 21 Zhang River, battle of, 110 Zhang Zhun, 144 Zheng feng campaign, 58, 60, 63 Zheng Lisan, 127 Zhonggong zhongyang, see Central Committee, CCP Zhou Baozhong, 86 Zhou Enlai, 25, 59, 61, 63, 128, 138, 147; and American policy in China, 67; and civil war, 80, 159-60; and Jiang, 157; M a o and, 167; and Marshall, 153; and Moscow communiqué, 142; and negotiations with GMD, 81, 127, 144; and Northeast offensive, 154, 155; and Political Consultative Conference, 146-47, 148; and propaganda, 129; and reorganization of government, 14950; Seventh Congress speech, 71; and Soviet withdrawal from Northeast, 156; and U.S., 61, 64 Zhu De, 105, 147