Coalition Behaviour in Modern Thai Politics 9789814377447

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

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Coalition Behaviour in Modern Thai Politics: A Thai Perspective

by

Somporn Sangchai

Occasional Paper No. 41 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Price:

S$4.00

Dr. Somporn Sangchai's "Coalition Behaviour in Modern Thai Politics: A Thai Perspective" is the forty-first p 11blication in the Institute's Occasional Papers series . Th is se~ies was inaugurated in 1970 and for the most part C'onsists of discussion and other papers presented at the Institute's Occasional and In-House seminars. Thailand has been undergoing major political changes over the last few years. These changes have significant implications not only for Thailand and its immediate neighbours but the region as a whole. Yet, the full complexity and significance of these and other similar changes are often little known or appreciated outside Thailand. In this light, the appearance of "Coalition Behaviour in Modern Thai Politics" is all the more timely and appropriate. Let's hope it will circulate widely. In the meantime, while wishing Dr. Somporn and his study all the best, it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Dr. Somporn and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute or its supporters . 29 April 1976

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Since M.R. Kukrit was appointed Prime Minister in March 1975, political pundits had predicted a short existence for his government . At the beginning, most observers predicted that the United Parties Cabinet would last at the most three later on, they stretched its life expectancy to six months; to a year. The United Parties Coalition exhibited several signs of possible collapse: internal conflicts, manoeuvres for cabinet posts, disagreements on many public and important issues, and so on. Ye t , the appearance of instability, even though it was continuous, could only rock slightly the United Parties Government. Many observers contributed the length of the exi stence of the United Parties Cabinet to M.R. Kukrit's versatility and shrewdness, as he appointed many ambitious politicians to the advisory or political posts and manoeuvred successfully among various factions within the coalition. His unpredictable and unorthodox behaviour and his verbal and writing dexterity had also kept his coalition partners at bay . For example, when the Agriculture and Co-operatives Minister, Dewitt Klinpratoom, was having a heated argument with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, General Pramarn Adireksarn, on the question of promotions and transfers of personnel in the Armed Forces, M.R. Kukrit claimed that he was ill and left the cabinet meeting ~ The argument terminated and the meeting was more or less adjourned. If one seriously studies the .condition of various Thai cabinets in the past, one can clearly see the "instability" factor in practically all cabinets, simply because most cabinets were composed of individuals representing various factions wi thin the same party. While one may acknowledge the fact that the United Parties Coalition was the reflection of the fact~ons within the previous United Thai People's Party, one may forget that even during the military regime factions and the "instability .. factor also prevailed. Under Marshal Pibulsongkram, there were Sarit Thanarat's and Phao Siyanond's factions; under Marshal Sarit, there were the factions of Sarit, Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapass Charusathien, Kris Sivara and others; and under Marshal Thanom, there were the factions of Prapass, Kris and Dawee Chullasap, Prase r t Rujirawong, and Sanga Kittikachorn and Sawaeng Saenanarong . Factional rivalries and politics under Pibulsongkram and under Thanom did contribute to the downfall of Pibu.lsongkram and Thanom. Consequently, the "instability" phenomenon has always been identified with each government, whether it is civilian or military.

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1t is dubious, therefore, to suggest that if the Thai people were politically more mature, the Thai political system would .be more stable " Since factionalization is the major aspect of Thai politics, one cannot really say with confidence that if the Thais would be more "mature" politicallyl the de.nocr.:itic government will accordingly be more Factional politics is the phenomena of Thai "stable". politics, which is a subsystem of the social system.l Consequently, one should investigate Thai political phenomena under the Thai social syst.em, 2 in order to obtain an understanding of Thai politics and to explain the unbelievable "stability" or the perpetual "instability" of the United Parties Government, without minimizing M.R. Kukrit's contributions to the duration of existence of the Coalition Government o

A Loosely Structured Coalition in the Loo:3ely Structured ~ety? John Emb1:ee has described Thai society as a loosely structured society, when it is compared to the Japanese.3 Other scholars tend to agree with Embree; some have even attempted to reason that the loose structure is the result of Thai individual1stic charactersi or that the Thais are generally very freedom-oriented - as suggested in the word "Thai" - and would not like to be bound to· any kind of formal organizations o4 The Thais normally rely only on

1 A good Parsonian thought is highly appropriate for a study of this type; perhaps one of the best examples of the relationship between politics and s oc..iety can be found in William C. Mitchell, The American Polity (New York: Free Press, 1962). 2

3

Prudhisan Jumbala, "Toward a Theory of Group Formation in Thai Society and Pressure Groups in Thailand After the October 1973 Uprising," in Asian Survey, XIV, 6 (June 1974): 530-545 is apparently the first attempt to study Thai politics through Thai social perspective. John Embree, "Thailand, a Loosely Structured Social System," American

Anthropologist, LII, 1950 . 4

The pros and cons of the loosely structured conc~pt has been discussed in Hans-Dieter Evers, ed., Loosely Struc·turcd .' Socn:az Sus-cern (New Haven: Yale Un1versity, Southeast As1an Studi es , 1969).

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primary groupings as units of society and cannot form any organization with some degree of permanency. Consequently, Thais lack organizational skills and/or cannot be organized for long-term projects or development, which require organizational structure.S The concepts of the loosely structured society and Thai individualism have been questioned by few Western and Thai In general, these tend to dismiss the categorization scholars. as somewhat dubious, since it is based primarily on Western organizational concepts . Thai society is organized on a very different oattern, which does not require an organizational structure.6 While Yatsushiro contends that Thai society is associational more than organizational,? others point to the tightly knit interpersonal and voluntary norms, hierarchical s ocial ·structure, and other social systems of friendship and extended family as rebuttals to the existing Thai societal models.8 In essence, they claim that Thai society is probably more tightly structured than the organizational structure, and that Thai society contains lower degrees of formality or higher degrees of informality than the o rganizational society , Of course, the society is not neatly arranged as in the organizational patterns, but it has functioned and served the Thai society for thousands of years . The superimposing or overlapping informal substructures, as in the following diagram, has bestowed the tightness on the Thai society, even much more than the organizational pattern . The Thais find the organizational pattern of society, which normally leads to the dissolution of familial closeness, not very useful to their agricultural society. However, the informal structured .society has been very beneficial and functional to the Thai society. But this should not be construed as an .argument for the indestructibility 5

Norman Jacobs, Moderni zation Without Development (New York: Prae gff ; 1971) suggests that p a trimoni alism prevents development of other systems.

6

Titaya Suvanajata, "Is Thai Social System Loosely Struc tured?" in Thai Journal of Development Administration~ 13, 4 (October 1973): 464-477 (in Thai).

7

Toshio Yatsushiro, "Northeast Thailand: Its Land, People and Culture, With Special Reference to Communist Insurgency and Planned Development Change," (Unpublished Manuscript, East-West Center, 1970), chap. III.

8

Titaya, loa. eit . , and J , A. Niels Mulder, "Origin, Development and Use of the Concept of 'Loosely Stru~ti.lre ·d~ in the Literature about Thailand: An Evaluation," in Evers, ed., op . ait.~ pp. 16-24.

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Di a gram I:

A Comparison .of Organizational and Informal Structured Societie s

Organizational Society

Informal Structured Society

or invulnerability of the Thai society; indeed, Thai society, e s pecially that of the urban sector, is changing very rapidly. But it will take a lengthy period of time for the Thais to drop their "loosely structured" mentality and adopt the organizational behaviour. Somewhat contradictory to the informal structure is the h i erarchical structure within the Thai society . While h ierarcpy requires a certain degree of inflexibility, the Yet, the i n formal .. structure bases itself on flexibility. Th ais have been able to combine these two aspects together. I nterpersonal relationship, extended family, close friendship system, and so on, have softened the hierarchical bureaucratic a n d administrative organizations .in Thailand which are re spectively the derivatives of ancient Indian beliefs and Simultaneously, hierarchical modern European concepts. c oncepts have also penetrated into the interpersonal pattern; on e .may be amazed to see two strangers address each other on ve ry intimate but hierarchical terms. For example, an old man is called uncle or maternal grandfather, an old woman is a d d r essed as .aunt or maternal grandmother, another man about on e ' s age ~ould be called either elder or younger brother, a woman about one's age would be addressed as either elder or

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y ounger sister, etc. Such intimate terms connote precisely the hierarchical position of each individual . Consequently, the hierarchical system is accepted when it is tempered by traditional Thai values of interpersonal relationship, extended family, close friend concepts, and informality. The love of freedom as a predominant character of the Thais should not be misconstrued as bases of Thai · individualistic character. "Thai" means free; but it i s the freedom from foreign oppression and sovereignty. It is the freedom of the whole Thai nation and the Thai way of life which may include the carefree and unabiding practices within the social boundary. Moral and cultural limitations can curtail degrees of "individualism". Consequently, "Thai" means free at a higher level, and the individualistic character of the Thais does not coincide with the "Thai" concept. Contemplating individualism itself, no Thai can advance the claim of individualism after considering social, moral and cultural obligations which are abundant in Thai society. With some understanding of Thai society, the "unstable" phenomena in the Thai political arena is not very unusual. Thai social mentality has been carried over to Thai political affairs. As stated previously, factional rivalry and its derivatives, coalition politics under the parliamentary system of government , exist at all t i mes in the modern Thai poli t .ical framework The "political instability, II as measured by Western yardsticks, may not be suitable for the development of parliamentary democracy, especially in the present international environment; but it should not be viewed as Thai immaturity or unreadiness for democratic politics. Perhaps, it is the maturity or the familiarity with "palatial" politics that gives rise to factional politics. The present political phenomena is democracy within the Thai context. n

The United Parties Coalition was a composition of 16 out of 22 parties in the House of Representatives . After the demise of the Democrat-Social Agrarian Coalition Government, the United Parties ascended in March 1975 to power under the leadership of M.R. Kukrit Pramoj . M. R. Kukrit was recruited by the United Parties Coalition, due to the fact that the United Parties needed the support from his party, the Social Action Party, and that the United Parties lacked a charismatic leader who was not closely associated with the former military regime. Despite his own role and the significance of his party in the coalition, the core of the United Parties was actually the Chart Thai Party, headed by General Pr amarn Adireksarn,

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Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister in the United Parties Government. The Social Justice, which had the largest number of M.Ps in the coalition, should have been the core of the coalition, but the defeat of its leader, Dewitt Klinpratoom, in the January 1975 General Election hampered its efforts in playing a major role in the coalition formation and policy-making. Consequently, only the Social Action and the Chart Thai parties wielded great influence within the coalition. The Social Justice, Social Nationalist and the "under ten" parties can occasionally influence the decision-making process, but, in general, they play second fiddle to the Social Action and the Chart Thai parties. If one takes note of the portfolios in the cabinet, one can clearly see that, in addition to the Premier's and the Deputy Premier's posts, the Social Action and the Chart Thai parties controlled traditionally important positions, for example, Defence, the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance. And the Deputy Minister's positions in these ministries were also in the hands of these two parties, with the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which had no Deputy Minister. Furthermore, the Social Action Party had received a number of cabinet seats beyond its proportional quota, which allocated one cabinet seat to five seats in the House of Representatives. Social Nationalist and the "under-ten" parties were underrepresented in the United Parties cabinet. And since there were four more possible positions in the cabinet - the Constitution allows up to 30 cabinet posts, in addition to the Prime Minister's position - manoeuvres among the hopeful candidates particularly in the "under-ten" and the Social Justice parties were Indeed, these seats became a source numerous and intensive. of problems for the United Parties Coalition one one hand, but on the other hand, they conveniently became a bargaining tool for the United Parties to keep their more recalcitrant One could easily assume from the above members at bay. information that the conflicts within the United Parties Coalition were not ideological - since members were mostly centrists or rightists - or policy oriented; most conflicts were on the personal or . individual levels. This does not imply that .there were no differences at all on policy Indeed, one could cite examples of differences matters. moderates and the hard-liners on various the between occasions; for instance, while the Prime Minister had suggested peaceful and diplomatic solutions for the ThaiLaotian border conflicts, the Deputy Premier declared that Thailand would fight to protect its independence and to

Tab l e I:

Membe r s of t he House of.

Par ty

Rep re s s n t a ti~ s,

Bangkok

1975

Total

Cent ral

No r th

Sout h

Northeas t

11

15 5 3 9 7 2 2 3

18 5 3

5

72

20 10

45 28 19 18 16 15 12 10 8 6 4 3 2

-· 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 3

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Demo crat Social Justice Chart . Thai Social Agrarian Social Action Social Nationalist Socialist New Force United Socialist Front Peaceful People's People's Justice Thai National Reconstruction Democracy Thai Earth People's Sovereignty People's Force Provincial Development Agriculturist Labour Free People's Economist

23

-

-

Total

26

64

2

-

1

-

-

-

15 10 5 3 7

-

2

-

5

-

2 1 1

-

1

-

1

-

-

3

-

1

4

2 1

5 6

2

11

-

7 10

1

1

1

-

-

1

-

6 2 2

2

1 1

2 2

-

-

-

1

1 1

52

35

92

269

1

-

1 1

'L 1 1

-....)

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Table II:

First Unite4 Parties Coalition Government

Parties and Names Social Action Party 1 M.R. Kukrit Pramoj 2 Boonchu Rojanasatien 3 Boontheng Thongswasdi 4 Yai Switachart 5 Admiral Kamol Sitakalin (nonelected) Chart Thai Party 6 Maj. Gen. Pramarn Adireksarn 7 8 9 10 ll

Maj. Gen. Chartchai Chunhawan Maj. Gen. Siri Siriyothin (nonelected) Col. Prakob Prayoonpokkaraj Wing Commander Thinakorn Bhankravi Dabchai Akkaraj

Social Justice Party 12 Dewitt Klinpratoom (nonelected)

Portfolios Prime Minister Minister of Finane~ Minister of the Interior Minister of Justice Deputy Minister of Defence Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Communications Deputy Minister of the Interior Deputy }unister of Finance Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives

18 Suwan Tanakanya 19 Sub. Lt. Boonyong Watanapong 20 Pol. Lt. Col. Boonlert Lertpricha

Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives Minister of Education Minister of Commerce Minister of Industry Minister of Public Health Minister of Bureau of State Universities Deputy Minister of Education Deputy Minister of Communications Deputy Minister of the Interior

Social Nationalist Party 21 Prasert Boonsom 12 Uthai Chunhachand

Deputy Minister of Education Deputy Minister of Public Health

13 Dr. Nibondh Sasidhorn 14 Thongyod Chittavera 15 Surin Thepkarnjana 16 Prachoom Rattanapian 17 Lt. Gen. Chan Angsuchote

Peaceful People's Party 23 Preeda Patanathabutr 24 Anant Chaisang

Thai Party 25 Anant Pakprapai

Minister-in-charge of the P .M' s Office Deputy Minister of Communications Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives

People's Force Party 26 Boonkoom Chandsrisuriyawong

Deputy Minister of Justice

People's Justice Party 27 Chaisiri Ruangkarnjanaseth (later appointment)

Deputy Minister of Commerce

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jealously guard its sovereignt.y, Such differences~ however" did not contribute to the confrontations or heated conflicts within the cabinet . From the point of v1ew of the informal structured society, the conflicts and differences within the cabinet could not be very ser1ous . They were bound together, first, by the fact that most of them were former members of tl'fe United Tha1 People's Party 1UTPP) . The UTPP under the leadership of Marshal Than om Kit t .ikachorn was divided 1nto at least four factions: Marshal Prapass Charusatien, General Kr1s S1vara and A1r~Marshal Dawee Chu.llasap, PoliceGeneral Pr asert. RUJ iravong, and MaJer Po.l.ice-Gener al Sa-nga Kittikachorn and General Sawaeng Saenanarong. The Social Nationalist, Social Just1.ce and Peaceful People us Parties are the followers of Prapass ~ Kr1s and Dawee, and Prasert respectively. Wh1le the Chart Thai members are the supporters of the late Marshals Pibulsongkram and Phin Chunhawan, the Social Action members come ma1nly from the UTPD-Prapass faction and the Democrat Party. Most members of the "unde.r ten" parties, however, are former members of the UTPP. The informal groupings w1th1n the formal str~cture can be easily understood 1n th1.s particular case , Yet, one layer of infot~al relatl.onship may not be sufficient for the analys1s. One may lock further into another layer of l.nformai relat1.onsh1p between 1mportan~ The bankersindividuals with1n the coalltlon industriallsts-busl.nessmen ax1s 1n the coall.tion is prevalent. Kukr1t, Boonchu, S1r1, and Pras1t Karnchanawat (leader of the Social Nat1onal1st. Party) are bankers; Pramarn, S1ri, Kukr1t, Prachoom, and Prakaipetch Ia leading member of the Social Act1on Party and Secretary-General of the Cabinet) are 1ndustr1al1sts; and Dewltt, Surin, Cha1siri, and many Un1.ted Partl.es members are b1g businessmen. Since the economic relationsh~p between bankers, l.ndustriaiists and businessmen 1.s commonly acKnowledged as the mainstream of "capitalism," the left 1sts labe.1led members of the United Parties Cabinet a.s turncoat band1ts, headed by three millionaires. Consequently. theiL p.rev1ous economic relationsh1pst especially the Bangkok Bank connection constitute another layer cf ~nformal struc~ure withl.n the United Parties Government Some critics like tG look at the 1ntormal rel.atlonships in the coalit1.on on the bases of inteLes~ on spec1f1c commodities, that is, sugar, rice, -r.1mber, land. r textile,

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ta nioca, cement, soft drinks, liquor, race-tract, etc. Others simply see coalitions in terms of individuals with military, civilian official, legal .or commercial backgrounds. Most experienced observers, however, investigated deeply into the interpersonal patterns of -relationship among cabinet members: extended family connections, old school ties, former student-teacher relationship, favour-reciprocat ion system, etc. These informal relationships among individuals in the coalition further cemented the structure of the United Parties Coalition. Political pundits might be distressed by the fact that intraparty factions were also varied in practically all parties: two in Social Action, three in Social Justice, two in Chart Thai, and four in the opposition Democrat Party, Yet such factions were known only within the party circles. Only the group led by Suchin Chaovisit - a Social Justice M.P . from Srisaket who is known notoriously as the "saltfish M P . " because of the distribution of salt-fish to potential voters in his campaigns for election - and Charoon Wattanakorn - a Social Justice M. P. from Rajburi was publicly known for i~s "divisive" activity among the United Parties Coalition . Most members of this group belong to the Social Justice Party, and a few from the Social Agrarian, National Reconstruction, Social Nationalist,and Free People's parties . While members of the group appeared somewhat to be political mavericks, they were also holding Suchin and Charoon, who both aspired to be Cabinet Minister, In the voting for the within the United Parties fr~work. Charoon at first and Suchin both 1975-76 Fiscal Budget, threatened to block the Budget, which w·olil1d have led to the collapse of the United Parties Government. But the group discussed the matter and outvoted the opponents of the Budget Bill; since the decision of the group was binding, the ,e ntire group voted for the Budget Bi 11. The "under-ten" parties also held their informal group Under the leaderships of Sa-ard Piyawan and meetings. (Mrs ) · 8Wlirat. Tehran , who are both wealthy and have business concerns, many politicians from the smaller parties ~nformally joined groups in order to obtain greater barga1ning powers. Their numbers were small, however, and they tended to leqn _toward, or to join, groups within bigger parties 1n the coalition, in the same manner as thos e wbo ioined the Suchin-Charoon Group in the Social Justice Party . Consequently, while they obtained greater bargining powers, they were also knitted into the coalition .

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M.R. Kukrit had successfully coped with the instability problem for almost one year.. In January 1976, while simultaneously facing a problem of a general labour strike in opp6sition to the government's announced plan to increase the minimum rice price, M. R. Kukrit was forced to reshuffle his coalition cabi~et . His delaying tactics in reshuffling the cabinet during 1975 had resulted in a possible defection of certain United Parties M.Ps to the opposition parties, which had decided to call for a vote of no-confidence on the United Parties Government and had preparatorily formed a leftist coalition cabinet to take over from the Kukrit Government , Kukrit, therefore, negotiated and brought into In the the coalition members of the Social Agrarian Party. Agrarian Social the of members four included process, he Party and one additional member of the Chart Thai Party in the cabinet, replaced a member of the Social Justice Party with its own member, replaced a member of the Thai Party with another, and dropped one Social Nationalist member frqm - the cabinet adding two new Social Nationalist members in it. This reshuffle brought the members of the cabinet up to the constitutionally maximum number of thirty. The reshuffle disappointed many ambitious politicians It also split the within the United Parties Coalition. Social Agrarian Party, whose leader, Sawet Piampongsarn, and a few men~ers refused to join the .Kukrit Cabinet . . Consequently, the liberal, socialist and the opposition parties gained support from members of the "under-ten;" the Social Agrarian, Social Justice, and, even, the Social Nationalist partieso The SQheduled debate on the no1 confidence issue certainly pointed to the defeat of the United Parties Coalition. M