Clintons War on Terror: Redefining US Security Strategy, 1993-2001 9781626377486

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Clinton’s War on Terror

Clinton’s War on Terror Redefining US Security Strategy, 1993–2001

James D. Boys

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2018 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB

„ 2018 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved ISBN: 978-1-62637-743-1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5 4 3 2 1

With love to the memories of my grandfather, David C. Jones, and his eldest daughter, my mother, Pauleen Jeanette

Terrorism is the enemy of our generation, and we must prevail. —President William Jefferson Clinton, George Washington University, August 5, 1996 Terror is not a new weapon. Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or example. But inevitably they fail, either because men are not afraid to die for a life worth living, or because the terrorists themselves came to realize that free men cannot be frightened by threats, and that aggression would meet its own response. —President John F. Kennedy, United Nations General Assembly, September 25, 1961

Contents

Acknowledgments 1

The Clinton Administration and Terrorism

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1

Part 1 The History, 1676–1992 2 3

Three Centuries of North American Political Violence, 1676–1976 Bipartisan Hesitancy, 1977–1992

Part 2 The Threats, 1993–2001 4 5 6 7

Trouble in the Heartland: Domestic Political Violence Rogue States: An Axis of Evil?

Cyberterrorism: Hack and Attack

Nemesis: Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda

Part 3 The Tools, 1993–2001 8 9

Eyes in the Skies: Drones

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147 171 197

A New Art Form: Rendition

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Part 4 Conclusion 10

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Reflections on Clinton’s Counterterrorism Strategy

List of Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book

235 251 253 267 283

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Acknowledgments

ing research arc that has defined my career to date. I am profoundly grateful to the team at Lynne Rienner Publishers for having the faith to get it to market. You would not be reading this book without the input of Caroline Wintersgill, my editor, with whom I also worked on my previous books, Clinton’s Grand Strategy and Hillary Rising. She has been a staunch supporter of my work and a vital element in getting my research to a global audience. This book was researched and drafted at various locations around the world: North Dakota; Brooklyn; Washington, DC; and London. The research had its genesis when I was named a visiting research fellow at the University of North Dakota’s Center for Human Rights and Genocide Studies in 2009. Over the course of 18 months, I made a series of visits to the university, drawing on its resources, presenting papers, delivering classes, and beginning the research that developed into this book. What started as an investigation into a “Perpetual War on Terror” gradually narrowed and focused, eventually becoming Clinton’s War on Terror. Many thanks to Robert O. Kelley, Gregory Gordon, and the director of the Chester Fritz Library, Wilbur Stolt. In London I remain indebted to the support I received from Richmond University, my academic home for the past decade, and in particular to my friends and partners in the pursuit of academic excellence: Michael Keating, Martin D. Brown, Eunice Goes, Chris Wylde, Dom Alessio, Alex Seago, Mark Horne, and Nastaran Norouzi Richards-Carpenter. Let me also thank the many students who have taken my classes over the years and who continue to provide motivation and encouragement, particularly Kalin Jordan, Stacy Tourtin, Patricia Schouker, Gigi Sopo, Kate Garcia, Mara Ortiz, Ludovica Musella, Sydnie Pennington, Camila Studart, and Henrik Friis de Magalhaes e Meneses. It is wonderful to see so many former students go on to achieve success in their chosen fields, and I wish all of them the very best. I am also most grateful for funding provided for this project by Richmond University’s

This book, my third on the Clinton era, is part of a continu-

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Research Committee and by the Gul Tokay Fund. Financial support from these sources enabled me to conduct research in Washington, DC, in March 2017, where I was ably assisted by Manuscript Reference Librarian Edith A. Sandler as I accessed Anthony Lake’s papers at the Library of Congress. My research has brought me into repeated contact with members of the Clinton administration, and I remain grateful for their insights and reflections. Thanks to Jef McAllister for sharing insight from his time covering the Clinton White House for Time. Thanks also to Joanne Paul at the University of Sussex for her continuing support and encouragement, as well as to Michelle Bentley at Royal Holloway, Brian Klaas at the LSE, John Bew at King’s College London, and Estelle Hitchon and Lisa Hodgson at the University of Brighton. I was honored to have been a visiting senior research fellow at King’s College London during the research stage of this project, and I remain grateful for the opportunity that was afforded me. I am grateful for the support that this project has received from the Salzburg Seminar American Studies Association (SAASA), in particular from Marty Gecek, Ron Clifton, and Cornelis “Kees” van Minnen. Thanks also to David B. Woolner of the Roosevelt Institute, Jeanne Zaino at Iona College, Robert E. Williams at Pepperdine University, and the University of Delaware’s dynamic duo, Michael “Awesome” O’Neal and his wife, Claire O’Neal, as well as their sons, Isaac and Jake. I am also extremely grateful for the friendship and support I have received over the years from Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University. My profound thanks to Sarah Fowler, who has accompanied this project every step of the way and who routinely offered insight and observations that greatly helped shape and improve the finished manuscript. Many thanks also to Michael L. Roberts, whose friendship, support, and encouragement, including our regular Friday lunches, were of immeasurable help throughout the various stages of the project. Thanks also to Kelly Young for reminding me that as one chapter ends, another begins. Thanks to my friends in the media, in particular the teams at Sky News, CNBC, Bloomberg Television, BBC, Al Jazeera English, LBC, Radio FM4, and Monocle 24, for continuing to draw on my insight into US politics. Thanks also to Kimberley Pearce at Bliss for keeping me looking as presentable as possible, a job that doubtless becomes harder and harder as time goes on. I’m extremely grateful to my growing number of Twitter followers and contacts on other social networking sites who have been so very supportive of my work and who help distribute it to a far wider audience than I could have ever imagined. Finally, thanks to the Wallflowers, Duran Duran, and Brian Fallon for providing the soundtrack to which this work was completed, fueled by copious amounts of chocolate biscuits and black coffee at my home office on Epsom Downs, watched over at all times by my wonderful blonde border collie, Rémy.

1 The Clinton Administration and Terrorism

with the administration of President George W. Bush as a result of the policies that were implemented following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The events of that day are routinely portrayed as the start of a new era in which the United States government, begrudgingly and belatedly, abandoned a previous naive stance adopted by the Clinton administration to enact a series of policies designed to quash international terrorism. These included the operations in Afghanistan, the global manhunt for Osama bin Laden, the covert missions around the globe, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the establishment of a prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, the use of “extraordinary rendition,” the establishment of secret sites to facilitate “enhanced interrogation techniques,” the deployment of drone technology, and the various bureaucratic moves made to ensure an efficient prosecution of a new kind of war: a perpetual War on Terror. According to this interpretation of events, President George W. Bush executed this war remorselessly before it was scaled back by his successor, Barack Obama, under whose leadership the United States finally located and killed Osama bin Laden. This narrative, however, is fundamentally flawed. Acts of political violence have shaped the course of history on the North American continent long before the establishment of the United States of America in 1776. From the dawn of the republic, not having been immune to the horrors associated with terrorism, Republicans and Democrats alike have been challenged to address the menace of political violence as various groups seeking political change perpetrated acts of terrorism. A study of US history reveals a contradictory pattern between declared intentions and actionable policies, between high-minded statements and pragmatic decisions, as politicians repeatedly struggled to confront the perpetrators of political violence. The result has been an unremitting series of violent incidents

War on Terror is an expression that became synonymous

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spanning more than 300 years in which assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, and acts of international and domestic terrorism have played a significant role in the political development of the United States. The attacks of September 11, 2001, focused the attention of the world on the threat posed by radical groups and radicalized individuals determined to wreak havoc in the name of their chosen ideology. The scale of the destruction and the coordinated nature of the attacks in Manhattan and Washington, DC, led many to question responsibility within the United States. It served George W. Bush, having been in office for only nine months, and his administration to highlight differences from his predecessor and to shift responsibility for the security lapses that had allowed the attacks to occur. This process of allocating culpability to the Clinton administration began in earnest as smoke still billowed over downtown Manhattan and across the Potomac River. Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson initially blamed the attacks on abortionists and homosexuals, but responsibility was quickly leveled against the Clinton administration, with allegations of budgetary cuts and codes of conduct imposed on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the 1990s having left the nation vulnerable.1 Rush Limbaugh urged that President Clinton “be held culpable for not doing enough when he was commander-in-chief,” while Republican congressman Dana Rohrabacher of California blamed Clinton for “letting the Taliban go, over and over again.”2 Sean Hannity noted that “had Clinton and Gore understood the importance of national security, it’s quite possible that 9/11 could have been avoided.”3 Such attacks, however, did not originate solely from Republicans. Democratic senator Bob Kerrey lamented that President Clinton had erred in his response to previous incidents and “should have treated them as an attack on the United States.”4 President Clinton’s former military aide, Robert Patterson, later accused the Clinton administration of “gross negligence and dereliction of duty to the safety of our country, which the president was sworn to defend.”5 Rather than failing to recognize the seriousness of the terrorist threat, however, the Clinton administration developed practices and policies specifically designed to prevent such attacks from affecting the United States and its global interests. From its first days in power, the Clinton White House confronted acts of political violence, including the bombing of the World Trade Center, the crashing of an aircraft into the White House, the killing of CIA employees, plans to bomb the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels in New York, the destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and attempts to launch coordinated strikes to coincide with the Millennium Eve celebrations. Internationally, American citizens and institutions were targeted in attacks on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and on the USS Cole in Yemen. Partly in response to such incidents, the Clinton administration initiated

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policies during its eight years in office that redefined the national counterterrorism strategy. Subsequently, several of these policies, including rendition, the deployment of drones, and efforts to address cybersecurity, became the target of criticism under the George W. Bush administration, but they all had been utilized to various degrees during the Clinton era. To date, the efforts of the Clinton administration to address the challenge posed by those willing to engage in acts of terrorism have been misunderstood, causing a false narrative to emerge in regard to its policies. US counterterrorism policy during the 1990s was designed for a specific political age—after the end of the Cold War, but before the attack on the homeland in September 2001. An appreciation of these policy initiatives is vital if the evolving counterterrorism strategy of the United States in the years prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, is to be correctly understood. This book, therefore, challenges the orthodox interpretation of the Clinton administration and its handling of counterterrorism to place its policies in their correct political and historical context. It does so to reveal the extent to which the Clinton administration was merely the latest in a long line to face the challenges posed by forces of political violence in the history of the United States. Focusing on declaratory policy, this work traces the development of US counterterrorism strategy between 1993 and 2001 and draws on official administration documents, many only recently declassified, as both a guide to analyze policy and a tool to consider emerging policies. The book draws extensively on primary material, including interviews with former administration officials, speeches, National Security Strategies, documentation from the National Security Council, Presidential Decision Directives, Presidential Review Documents, public and private papers from the Library of Congress, and recently declassified materials from the Clinton Presidential Library. These sources reveal the extent to which the president and his national security team were confronted by political violence from their first days in the White House. The book considers the incidents that set the stage for the Clinton presidency, the terrorist events that occurred during the administration’s time in office, and the policies that it enacted. It considers the individuals responsible for the development of policies, the government departments tasked with implementing them, the philosophical and political factors at work, and the manner in which counterterrorism strategy was deployed. Doing so ensures that this book explains the hitherto misunderstood approach toward acts of political violence that the Clinton administration adopted during the 1990s as it sought to define an appropriate response to what it saw as a growing challenge to US interests in the aftermath of the Cold War.6 The book opens by examining the bureaucratic challenges that attempt to address political violence face, the difficulties in defining terrorism, and the extent to which such activity has had a devastating impact on global

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affairs. It also proffers a definition of terrorism that is used to address the subject throughout the course of the text. The book then places the Clinton era in context by examining two distinct phases in US counterterrorism strategy. Chapter 2 reveals the extent to which acts of terror have influenced life on the North American continent for over 300 years, providing a chronology that reaches back to the dawn of the American experience to contextualize events that challenged the Clinton administration. Chapter 3 addresses President Clinton’s political inheritance by examining the counterterrorism strategies adopted by Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. An analysis of the policy reactions by these administrations after events such as the Iranian Revolution and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 reveals a bipartisan hesitancy in dealing with acts of terrorism in the years immediately prior to the start of the Clinton administration. The second part of the book addresses the terrorist threats that the Clinton administration faced and the manner in which it addressed them. Chapter 4 addresses the danger posed to the federal government by militias and cults determined to forge their own identities and ways of life, often in contravention of the US Constitution, laws, and regulations. The true extent of their menace was revealed in the destruction of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Chapter 5 discusses the Clinton administration’s efforts to address state sponsors of terrorism. It examines the dual containment strategy designed to quell the dangers emanating from Tehran and Baghdad and the decision to construct the rogue state concept to deal with a wider group of nations, including Cuba, North Korea, and Libya. Chapters 6 and 7 analyze what President Clinton referred to as “the dark side of this new age of global interdependence,” as cyberterrorists and nonstate actors emerged to threaten catastrophic damage to the United States and its citizens.7 Having considered the events that defined the Clinton administration’s War on Terror, the third part of the book turns to two controversial policy tools that were utilized by the White House during this era. Chapter 8 considers the development of drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), to detail how these craft were a natural progression from the U-2 and the SR71 high-altitude surveillance aircraft that were slipping in and out of official retirement. The chapter also considers the political and legal ramifications of drone technology and the extent to which the Clinton administration identified drones as a new platform of choice. After the discussion of technology in Clinton’s War on Terror, Chapter 9 focuses on the policy of rendition. The chapter considers the rationale for its development, the extent of its use, and its long-term impact as the Clinton administration implemented what it saw as “a new art form” to confront the forces of international terrorism. Finally, to complete an assessment of the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism strategy, the concluding chapter reflects on the policies to consider what was achieved and what failed. Chapter 10 discusses the extent to which Clinton’s

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counterterrorism policies can be considered a success and the impact of subsequent events on their continued relevance.

The Challenge of Political and Bureaucratic Resistance

Of all the challenges that hindered the Clinton administration’s ability to quell the rise of domestic and international political violence, few proved as daunting as those caused by bureaucratic tensions and policy differences among senior individuals and their respective departments. Although ostensibly working on the same team, the lack of imagination on the part of policymakers, bureaucratic turf wars, political machinations, electoral timescales, official secrecy, and partisan politics have historically ensured that US counterterrorism strategy routinely failed to receive a sustained, focused attention at the highest levels of government. Policymakers’ lack of imagination was a particular challenge that administrations faced when addressing terrorism in the pre-9/11 era, when the concept of a devastating attack on the homeland remained confined to the pages of Tom Clancy thrillers. So long as acts of political violence occurred overseas, or only in random circumstances at home, politicians were forgiven for dismissing their significance and for prioritizing issues that presented more immediate threats to the United States. Debate surrounding political priorities sustained another challenge: consistency. Campaign slogans calling for “change” all too often result in “change for change’s sake” by an incoming administration. Having run against the policies of its predecessor, the new team often feels inclined to reverse existing policy as a matter of principle, which results in a pattern of undulating policy in key areas. Counterterrorism strategy, and the priority it received, repeatedly fell victim to this cycle of behavior between 1977 and 1992. Politicians who adopted a hands-off approach risked accusations of lacking the requisite attention to detail, while those who became intimately involved with the subject risked the backlash that accompanied failed initiatives and flawed covert operations. With politicians locked into a fixed political schedule of national elections every two years, the US political calendar has proven to be a hindering influence on strategy makers. The constant need to plan, fund, and run for reelection has a detrimental impact on the ability to implement long-term initiatives, causing US counterterrorism strategy to become beholden to short-term domestic political constraints. Even when administrations have sought to bring the requisite attention to counterterrorism strategy, the structures of the US political system have often constrained their efforts. Executive branch departments, theoretically at the whim of the administration, have repeatedly resisted policy initiatives seen as detrimental to their departmental well-being. This has routinely

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resulted in political inertia as political in-fighting develops over competing bureaucratic interests. With institutional memories seemingly able to recall the slightest infraction, relations between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have historically been an impediment to the implementation of counterterrorism strategy. With agencies at odds with one another, it is not surprising that mistakes are made that result in congressional hearings. The Church Committee of 1975–1976 and the Tower Commission of 1987 demonstrate the impact that investigations can have on agencies and agents when the employees and senior officials at the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC) become the focus of intense scrutiny. Such hearings also demonstrate a dilemma in regard to the need for covert activity. With a free press, Freedom of Information requests, a politically motivated Congress, and suspicion of government motives, engaging in effective counterterrorism initiatives has become a thankless task. It is conducted under a necessary veil of secrecy in which failures are dynamic but successes are rarely revealed. The media, Congress, and political expediency have ensured that policymakers fear becoming scapegoats if operations fail to go as planned. As a result, balancing the responsibility to protect the lives and rights of the American people and the potential need to curtail those rights in an effort to safeguard lives and liberties has become a recurring dilemma for successive administrations. This tension has been at the heart of the decisionmaking process throughout the American experience and remains central to the debates surrounding US counterterrorism strategy. The threats posed by terrorism and acts of political violence have challenged politicians, policymakers, and security services for centuries. For as long as terrorists have inflicted their violence on society, policymakers have sought to define terrorism in their efforts to defeat it. To date, all attempts to establish an agreed-upon definition of terrorism have proved futile. Indeed, this task has proven so challenging that it has been likened to another elusive quest, that for the Holy Grail, in that “periodically, eager souls set out, full of purpose, energy, and self-confidence, to succeed where so many others before have tried and failed.”8 Much like beauty, perhaps, terrorism appears to be in the eye of the beholder: known when seen, yet impossible to define. A key task confronting the Clinton administration, therefore, was how to define terrorism. As Bruce Hoffman noted, terrorism has become a subject about which “most people have a vague idea or impression . . . but lack a more precise, concrete and truly explanatory definition.”9 In 1988, the editors of Political

The Challenge of Defining Terrorism

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Terrorism, who identified more than a hundred definitions of the word, noted the scale of the challenge facing those seeking to define the subject.10 The continued inability to define terrorism ensures that a degree of subjectivity remains a constant in any debate on the subject. As Martha Crenshaw noted, the term terrorism “was coined to describe the systemic inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population.”11 The challenge of defining terrorism creates problems for academics (who are required to teach an ill-defined concept), law enforcement agents (required to enforce illdefined legislation), politicians (required to justify conflicting and, at times, contradictory policies), and the general public (required to live with the risks posed by those who would use terrorism, regardless of how it is defined). In 1938, Antoine Sottile observed, “The intensification of terrorist activity in the past few years has made terrorism one of today’s most pressing problems.”12 Despite the passage of time since this remark, and the steady escalation of terrorist incidents, an agreed-upon definition of the term remains elusive. Political, cultural, social, and personal perspectives ensure that the old maxim “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” remains as relevant today as ever before, notwithstanding repeated efforts by scholars, politicians, and international organizations to find a universal definition.13 Within academia, a wide range of scholars have sought to define terrorism. In 1979, Ray S. Cline noted that “there is no consensus on [terrorism’s] meaning and consequences” and speculated correctly that “the historical and contemporary debate over the threat and use of ‘extra-legal’ force as well as over how society can and should deal with it will probably not soon be resolved.” Cline argued that this was, at least in part, because “so many contradictory national interests are perceived by different governments and substate groups.”14 Complexity, it appears, begets complexity, which begets a problematic lack of definition. In 1998, Harvey W. Kushner defined terrorism as “the use of force (or violence) committed by individuals or groups against governments or civilian populations to create fear in order to bring about political (or social) change.”15 As Arthur H. Garrison noted in 2004, however, terrorism “is not explained by the cause, because causes change.” Instead, it is defined “by the rationalization, logic, and perception of how to effect change.”16 This focus on the mode of terrorism is a perfectly acceptable academic pursuit, but it fails to assist in any meaningful attempt to arrive at a definition of the subject. Countless scholars have made repeated efforts to provide succinct (and not so succinct) definitions to create an academic framework within which to study and appraise the issue of terrorism. A major challenge is that the term terrorism is usually utilized as “a pejorative label, meant to condemn an opponent’s cause as illegitimate rather than describe behavior.”17 The sense that the term is loaded has not assisted the quest for an agreed-upon definition. Although parameters regarding the use of violence for political

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gain and attempts to intimidate a populace into forced acquiescence are widely accepted, disagreement continues over precise wording, which ensures that attempts to define terrorism are “as illusory as ever.”18 With the increased study of terrorism, and an increasing number of scholars eager to make their mark on the subject, the chances of arriving at a definition appear to diminish rather than improve. Nowhere is the need for an adequate definition of terrorism more urgently required than in international law, yet here again discrepancies abound. As Christian Walter observed, “Despite its prior exclusive use as a pejorative political term of stigmatization, ‘terrorism’ is increasingly used as a legal term and therefore should be accompanied by a discrete meaning.”19 Such meaning has thus far proven elusive in the international arena, which has sought to define terrorism since at least the 1931 Third Conference for the Unification of Penal Law at Brussels.20 Six years later, the League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism sought to address the issue, but with limited effect.21 The international failure to define terrorism is evident at the United Nations, which passed its first terrorism resolution in 1972.22 As Caleb M. Pilgrim noted, the UN’s response to terrorist attacks has been reactionary in nature, and it has proven unable to deliver on its stated policies.23 Such was the case with the 1979 UN Hostages Convention, designed to address a key aspect of political violence but which did little to reduce incidents of hostage taking. This reinforced a continuing stalemate, whereby the “law alone is insufficient; it must be buttressed with faithful enforcement and effective prevention strategies.”24 Although this predicament is not the sole preserve of counterterrorism, the challenge faced by the global community to address these issues in the current climate highlights the gulf between declared policy and its effective implementation. The failure of the UN to define and, therefore, address issues of terrorism is exacerbated by the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This has enabled Cold War antagonisms to routinely prevent the development of policies designed to address international outrages. In 1973, the USSR stated it had no objection to the adoption of measures under debate at the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, which would have imposed specific obligations on states to prevent terrorist acts.25 The Soviet representative, however, refused to accede to any broad interpretations of international terrorism that included national liberation movements because during the Cold War the Kremlin openly viewed terrorism as a method to destabilize Western governments.26 Cline lamented the fact that divisions among its member states prevented the United Nations from arriving at “any agreement on a definition of ‘terrorism,’ its root cause, or the appropriate steps necessary to be taken to cope with it.”27 During the 1990s, the United Nations continued to debate the issue of terrorism. Although the Cold War had ended, agreement on the issue

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remained elusive, in part because historic ties continued to stymie efforts to quell acts of terrorism around the world. In 1998, President Clinton dedicated his speech at the UN General Assembly to the subject of terrorism, an issue he had raised previously but to no avail. A year later the UN defined terrorism as any “act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”28 Terrorism, however, remained absent from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, partly because of a continuing inability to define the criminal components therein.29 In the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 obliging member states to fight terrorism.30 The resolution declared that “acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century,” but exactly what this meant remained subject to conjecture.31 Only four months later, in January 2002, a meeting of more than a hundred UN diplomats failed to arrive at a definition of terrorism, itself not without implications, because “without a definition the UN cannot pass a comprehensive treaty requiring all members to cooperate with each other on the fight against terrorism.” 32 In 2005, the UN secretarygeneral identified 21 global or regional treaties that related directly to terrorism, yet few made direct reference to terrorism, revealing the continuing inability of the international community to adequately address the issue of political violence. Notwithstanding the inability of the international community to define terrorism, it might be expected that the United States would have developed its own agreed-upon definition. Surprisingly, perhaps, this is not the case. The US government has at least three separate statutes and regulations on the subject, all of which define terrorism differently. The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” 33 The State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents.”34 Finally, laws that define federal crimes and criminal procedure define terrorism as “activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States” and which “appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.” 35 The same inability to

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define terrorism that has hampered international experts, therefore, has routinely hindered domestic US lawmakers. This is more than a semantic exercise, because “the lack of a social or legal definition creates problems. . . . American police and security agencies literally do not know what terrorism is . . . [and] agencies charged with countering domestic terrorism often have no idea what they are looking for.”36 Until 2001, the criminal prosecution of terrorists by the Department of Justice was “a critical, if not the dominant, method of counterterrorism.” In such circumstances, “the effectiveness and fairness of such an approach turns on whether there is a clear definition of terrorism in the applicable laws.”37 Uncertainty over the legal definition of terrorism, therefore, provides for the potential manipulation of the legal process, because loopholes and contradictions are exploited in an attempt to evade justice. Precisely what constitutes terrorism varies from individual to individual, from institution to institution, and from department to department, ensuring that definitions of the issue remain elusive.38 Terrorism herein is defined as a tactic employed to instill fear and uncertainty in a populace through the use of violence, or the threat of its implementation, in an effort to effect political change that would not be feasible using less direct methods. This use of politically motivated violence as a tactic to further a stated political goal has been employed by groups from the far left to the far right of the political spectrum. Likewise, it has been adopted by religiously motivated groups and individuals determined to implant their own brand of faith on an otherwise disinclined society. Terrorism can be domestic or foreign in both origin and implementation; as this book reveals, Americans and foreign nationals alike have been both the target and the purveyor of attacks on civilians and elected officials at home and abroad. The challenges that exist in defining terrorism are also present in efforts to decide who constitutes a terrorist. Madeleine Albright observed that the expression “is a loaded one, especially controversial when applied to those struggling on behalf of a nationalist cause.”39 Individuals engaged in terrorist activity in the United States have proven to be remarkably diverse in background, though not in age, with most between the ages of 18 and 30 years. They are from all social strata, including from relatively privileged pedigrees and educated backgrounds, from the extremes of the political spectrum, from black and white communities, and from various religious groups, including Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.40 Although various groups have espoused and engaged in political violence, all too often such acts have been committed by lone individuals, adrift from affiliation and society at large. As Christopher Hewitt noted, “It is, one suspects, this confusing and fragmented quality possessed by American terrorism that makes every terrorist incident seem de novo.”41 Walter Laqueur observed terrorists “are often closer to each other than they know or would like to admit to themselves or others.”42

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The same is true of those who seek to define the term, because semantic wordplay, coupled with political and academic pride, has stymied efforts to thwart the terrorist actions that have proven so difficult to quantify. Given that a central premise of terrorism is to terrorize, it is unsurprising that perpetrators of political violence have routinely targeted both the powerful and the general population in their efforts to effect political change. Few sectors of society have been spared the consequences of political violence because agitators have sought to maximize both the devastation and the political impact of their atrocities. Perpetrators have routinely demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to discriminate amongst targets, instead actively seeking to inflict maximum carnage on as wide a range of demographics as possible in the name of their particular ideology. Speaking to an audience gathered at the Windows on the World restaurant atop the World Trade Center in April 2000, Madeleine Albright noted that terrorism had “created a battlefield populated by civilians.”43 Politicians, corporate executives, union leaders, academics, students, schoolchildren, and sports figures have all been victims of political violence, ensuring that no one can feel secure, irrespective of their status or level of personal protection. One of the great dangers of terrorism is the threat it presents not only to the security of the individual but also to the security of the state. Terrorists’ random infliction of mayhem and carnage constitutes a direct challenge to the organizing principles of government and, so long as these individuals “remain free to engage in terrorism, the power of the state diminishes.”44 It is unsurprising, therefore, that governments of all political leanings are quick to clamp down on such activities regardless of their political motivations. Indeed, one of the unifying aspects of acts of political violence is the willingness of groups of all political persuasions to resort to such atrocities. As Laqueur noted, “There have been many selfappointed saviors of freedom and justice, impatient men, fanatics and madmen invoking the right of self-defense . . . using the sword not as the last refuge but as a panacea for all evils, real or imaginary.”45 The extent to which the United States has routinely been stalked by such “impatient men, fanatics and madmen,” often referred to as “lone wolves,” is a troubling facet of American life that stretches back throughout the history of the republic. The natural political order has been regularly upset by crazed, disturbed individuals whose actions are portrayed as being at odds with society and avowedly un-American. In the United States, 15 percent of all terrorist victims have been killed by unaffiliated individuals; this number is on the rise, with such individuals accounting for 26 percent of terrorist activity between 1978 and 1999.46 Commentators, politicians,

The Targets of Terrorism

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Clinton’s War on Terror

lawmakers, and the media have routinely disregarded such individuals, labeling their actions as “extraordinary” and removed from the American norm, as it has proven far easier to dismiss them as insane than to examine their motivations or political intent.47 Yet the history of the United States is littered with perpetrators of political violence who possess little apparent motive except for a need to vent their anger and frustration on society. From the assassinations of the Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King to those of other political leaders, acts of political violence are rarely explained as the result of conspiracies but rather as the behavior of disturbed, lonely young men eager to make their mark on history, even if it is the last thing they do. Such individuals are not unique to the United States. As Aristotle noted, “There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of gains and rewards however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant as an extraordinary action which will make them famous and honorable in the world; they wish to acquire not a kingdom, but a name.”48 A small number of organizations provide notable exceptions, including the Ku Klux Klan and the Weather Underground, but the lone individual has long been the most likely perpetrator of political violence in the United States. Recent examples include the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski; the Atlanta Olympic Park bomber, Eric Rudolph; and President Reagan’s would-be assassin, John Hinckley. Even debate surrounding the death of President Lincoln— perhaps the most consequential conspiracy in US history—centers on its leader, John Wilkes Booth. This focus on the individual, rather than on an organization, differentiates the United States from the rest of the world, where actions have traditionally been instigated by groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Great Britain, the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany, and the Basque separatist group ETA in Spain. Political violence on the European continent has uniformly been seen as the act of dedicated groups conspiring to overthrow leaders in an attempt to implement a specific philosophy, even if that was mere anarchy, with motivations ranging from the religious to the ideological and covering both extremes of the political spectrum.49 During a six-year period beginning in 1894, anarchists assassinated President Carnot of France, Empress Elizabeth of Austria, the prime minister of Spain, and King Umberto I of Italy. The 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria triggered the First World War, and political violence was central to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 that resulted in the murder of the czar and his family. In Great Britain, the IRA sought to assassinate British prime ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major in the 1980s and 1990s and killed both Lord Mountbatten and member of Parliament Airey Neave in 1979 and MP Ian Gow in 1990. Italian premier Aldo Moro was murdered in 1978, and Pope John Paul II was shot in 1981. In Sweden, Prime Minister Olof Palme

The Clinton Administration and Terrorism

13

was assassinated in 1986, followed by the murder of foreign minister Anna Lindh in 2003. Assassins claimed the lives of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, Rajiv and Indira Gandhi of India in 1991 and 1984, respectively, and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan in 2007. All too often, leaders have been struck down by groups dedicated to the promotion of an ideology or religion they felt to be endangered by the political status quo.50 In 1999, Laqueur observed that “terrorist movements are usually small; some very small indeed, and while historians and sociologists can sometimes account for mass movements, the movements of small particles in politics, as in physics, often defy any explanation.”51 As the history of the United States has demonstrated, small particles have played a vital and at times devastating role in the development of the nation. The Clinton administration took power at a time when the threat of terrorism did not warrant serious national attention. Despite this, the administration made a series of policy decisions designed to redefine national counterterrorism strategy. The end of the Cold War had unleashed tensions identified by the president in his 1993 inaugural address as “ancient hatreds and new plagues.”52 These included, but were not limited to, international terrorism and acts of political violence. In the eight years that followed Clinton’s inauguration, his administration was forced to address a series of challenges presented by those intent on inflicting harm on the United States. Domestically, the White House faced acts of political violence perpetrated by far-right-wing militia groups as well as by foreign nationals determined to wreak havoc on American soil. Internationally, the United States became the target of choice for a new breed of terrorist, motivated less by capital gain and more by religious fervor. In the years preceding September 11, 2001, the US government was engaged in a conflict with international terrorism that went unnoticed by the population and underreported by the media. The Clinton administration instigated the final US counterterrorism strategy before the attacks of 9/11. Since then, successive administrations, both Republican and Democratic, have waged a War on Terror. US armed forces have been deployed in multiple countries, most notably Iraq and Afghanistan, to reduce the threat to the United States from nation states and nonstate actors such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Although 9/11 is portrayed as a break from previous practices, many policies from the Clinton era were continued in this new era. As memories of 9/11 fade, as terrorist leaders are killed, and as new priorities emerge, the United States will doubtless revert to a pre-9/11 security standing. When that happens, the Clinton administration’s peacetime counterterrorism strategy will be a logical point of reference. It is, therefore, vital to appreciate its strategy, to understand what was implemented, where it succeeded, and where future administrations will need to make improvements.

14

Clinton’s War on Terror

Following 9/11, national security emerged as the preeminent concern of governments and was used to justify increased domestic surveillance, foreign military interventions, and new governing maxims. The Clinton administration’s tenure in office was retrospectively defined as a lost decade during which opportunities to confront a growing challenge to US interests were missed by a president more focused on remaining in power than exercising leadership. Political opponents disparaged the Clinton administration for failing to implement a cohesive response to terrorism, but this does not mean that the administration did not seek to define a coherent strategy. The Clinton administration may be criticized for its failings, but these need to be placed in a wider context if its intentions are to be understood. 1. Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, quoted in Joe Klein, “Closework: Why We Couldn’t See What Was Right in Front of Us,” New Yorker, October 1, 2001, 44–49. 2. Rush Limbaugh and Dana Rohrabacher, quoted in John F. Harris, “Conservatives Sound Refrain: It’s Clinton’s Fault,” Washington Post, October 7, 2001, A15. 3. Sean Hannity, Deliver Us from Evil: Defeating Terrorism, Despotism, and Liberalism (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 128. 4. Bob Kerrey, quoted in John F. Harris, “Conservatives Sound Refrain,” A15. 5. Robert B. Patterson Jr., Dereliction of Duty (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2003), 132. 6. For analysis of US foreign policy during this time, see James D. Boys, Clinton’s Grand Strategy: US Foreign Policy in a Post–Cold War World (London: Bloomsbury, 2015) and John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992–2000 (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009). 7. William J. Clinton, “The Struggle for the Soul of the 21st Century” (Richard Dimbleby Lecture, London, December 14, 2001). 8. Geoffrey Levitt, “Is ‘Terrorism’ Worth Defining?” Ohio Northern University Law Review 13 (1986): 97. 9. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 1. 10. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, eds., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988). 11. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 380. 12. Antoine Sottile, “Le Terrorisme International,” Recueil des Cours 65 (1938): 87–184. 13. Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 302. 14. Ray S. Cline, foreword to Control of Terrorism: International Documents, by Yonah Alexander, Marjorie Ann Browne, and Allan S. Nanes (New York: Crane, Russak, 1979), viii. 15. Harvey W. Kushner, Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1998), 10. 16. Arthur H. Garrison, “Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by Deed and Change Through Fear and Violence,” Criminal Justice Studies 17, no. 3 (September 2004): 263.

Notes

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15

17. Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (June 2000): 406. 18. H. A. Cooper, “Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited,” in Essential Readings in Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century, ed. Harvey W. Kushner (New York: Richard Altschuler and Associates, 2002), 14. 19. Christian Walter, “Defining Terrorism in National and International Law,” in Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security Versus Liberty? ed. Christian Walter, Silja Vöneky, Volker Röben, and Frank Schorkopf (Berlin: Springer, 2004), 23–43. 20. V. S. Mani, “International Terrorism—Is a Definition Possible?” Indian Journal of International Law 18 (1978): 206. 21. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Geneva: League of Nations, November 16, 1937). 22. General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII), UN GAOR, 27th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (XXVII) (December 18, 1972). 23. Caleb M. Pilgrim, “Terrorism in National and International Law,” Penn State International Law Review 8, no. 2 (winter 1990): 147–202. 24. Alberto R. Coll, “The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting 81 (January 1987): 297–307. 25. UN General Assembly, 27th Sess., A/C.6 1389, December 13, 1972. See Leon Romaniecki, “The Soviet Union and International Terrorism,” Soviet Studies 26, no. 3 (July 1974): 417. 26. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: Crane, Russak, 1984). 27. Cline, foreword, viii. 28. United Nations, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Article 2 (b), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 54/109 on December 9, 1999. 29. Richard J. Goldstone and Janine Simpson, “Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (Spring 2003): 13–26. 30. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Doc. S/RES /1373 (September 28, 2001). 31. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1377, Annex, UN Doc. S/RES /1377 (November 12, 2001). 32. Bruce Maxwell, ed., Terrorism: A Documentary History (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), xv–xvi. 33. Exec. Order No. 423-69, 28 C.F.R. 0.85 (1969). 34. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f (d) (2010). 35. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2009). 36. Jonathan R. White, Terrorism: An Introduction (Pacific Grove, CA: BrooksCole, 1991), 163. 37. Abraham Sofaer, “Playing Games with Terrorists,” New England Law Review 36, no. 4 (2002): 903. See also Ronald Sievert, “War of Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?” Notre Dame Law Review 78, no. 2 (2003): 307. 38. For more on the challenges involved in the evolving attempts to define terrorism, see Reuven Young, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation,” Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 29, no. 1 (2006): 23–105.

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Clinton’s War on Terror

39. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan, 2003), 377. 40. A 1990 study found that left-wing American terrorists were more likely to be college-educated than right-wing terrorists (68 percent compared to 19 percent). See Jeffrey S. Handler, “Socioeconomic Profile of an American Terrorist, 1960s and 1970s,” Terrorism 13, no. 3 (1990): 195–214. 41. Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al-Qaeda (London: Routledge, 2003), 13. 42. Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 5. 43. Albright, Madam Secretary, 377. 44. Yonah Alexander, Marjorie Ann Browne, and Allan S. Nanes, Control of Terrorism: International Documents (New York: Crane, Russak, 1979), xi. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, “Remarks,” Terrorism: An International Journal 1, no. 1 (November 1977): 384. 45. Laqueur, Terrorism, 4. 46. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 78. 47. For considerations of the psychological aspect of terrorism, see Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004); John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005); Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 3–42. 48. Aristotle, quoted in Walter Laqueur, ed., The Terrorism Reader (London: Wildwood House, 1979), 12. 49. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Non-Legal Violence and Terrorism in Western Industrial Societies: An Historical Analysis,” in Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld (London: Macmillan, 1982), 384–403. 50. For more on the use of assassination as a tool of political violence, see Michael Newton, Age of Assassins: A History of Conspiracy and Political Violence (London: Faber and Faber, 2012). 51. Laqueur, Terrorism, 80. 52. “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:1.

Part 1 The History, 1676–1992

2 Three Centuries of North American Political Violence, 1676–1976

history to have to address issues of terrorism and political violence. Despite efforts to create “a more perfect union,” the United States of America has been engaged in a struggle with forces of political violence for the duration of its existence. Long before terrorism became a threat to the United States, however, and before Europeans ever set foot on the North American continent, political violence motivated by religion, nationalism, and politics was used to strike fear into the populous and the powerful. As early as 380 BC, philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle considered the violent fate of tyrants in their respective texts Republic and Politics, and the assassination of Julius Cesar in 44 BC has repeatedly provided inspiration for playwrights and fanatics alike. The Zealot struggles in Palestine from AD 66 to 73 gave rise to the sicarii sect, a nationalist, anti-Roman group that attacked Jerusalem’s food and water supplies, destroyed temples, and used short sica swords to openly attack their opponents. A millennium later, in the eleventh century, the Assassins slaughtered their way from Persia to Syria, utilizing political violence in a cycle that was eventually ended by the Mongols following the murder of the Crusader King, Conrad of Montferrat, and repeated attempts on the life of Saladin. The Assassins realized that they were too few in number to face an enemy in open battle and instead engaged in a campaign of covert violence.1 Their successful implementation of this tactic ensured that their sect became synonymous with political murder. As with other religiously motivated groups, Assassins believed that “through the use of selective murders, almost always by dagger . . . they would be rewarded in the afterlife.”2 Religion also played an important role in the Thuggee cult, which worshiped the goddess Kali and utilized silk ties to indiscriminately strangle their victims across India and the Far East. Estimates suggest that at least 500,000 people fell victim to

The Clinton administration was certainly not the first in US

19

20

The History, 1676–1992

their slaughter between 1290 and the 1830s, establishing the Thuggee as the deadliest nonstate actor in the history of humankind.3 The root word terror (from the Latin terrere, “to frighten”) entered the lexicons of western European languages in the fourteenth century and was first used in English in 1528.4 It was the French Revolution, however, that ushered in the modern concept of “the terrorist,” a term Jacobins initially embraced to define their actions and policies.5 Between March 1793 and July 1794, the French aristocracy was decapitated in a cycle defined in the 1798 supplement to the Dictionnaire de l’Academie Francaise as systeme, regime de la terreaur, ensuring that after the ninth of Thermidor, “terrorist” became synonymous with political violence.6 The Age of Terror, centered around the systematic slaughter of the French elite on Place de la Concorde, occurred almost simultaneously with another uprising on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. While “thousands of those hellhounds called terrorist” were let loose on the French people, the uprisings in the British colonies of North America proved far less brutal in their handling of the elite, enabling the new nation’s rapid resumption of diplomatic ties with London. Both the United States of America and the modern concept of “terrorism,” therefore, emerged during a revolutionary era that saw the British expulsion from North America in 1776 and the removal of the French aristocracy in 1798.7 When a revolutionary effort succeeds in overthrowing a regime to establish a new system of government, its origins in the realm of political violence are quickly rebranded and its perpetrators portrayed as selfless freedom fighters. This was certainly the case in colonial North America, where violence directed at the British authorities was as much an example of domestic terrorism as any in history. Yet the War of Independence was not the first example of an uprising against the establishment in American colonies; the Bacon Rebellion shook the colonial authorities one hundred years beforehand. The 1670 Franchise Act, designed to restrict voting rights, as well as the Navigation Acts of 1660, 1663, and 1673 caused widespread discontent throughout the Virginia colony. Maritime navigation and intercolonial trade were also negatively affected by war with the Dutch. Colonial rights and esteem were further undermined when King Charles II ceded land and titles in Virginia to pay outstanding debts. The situation was compounded by deteriorating relations with Native American tribes. In 1674, defying orders not to attack the Susquehannock tribe, a group of farmers led by Nathaniel Bacon delivered what they felt was retribution for a series of incidents that had resulted in the deaths of colonists. Despite being branded a traitor by the governor, Bacon was initially forgiven, elected to office in Henrico County, Virginia, and granted a commission to

Political Violence in Colonial North America

Three Centuries of North American Political Violence, 1676–1976

21

march on other native tribes. Two years later, in June 1676, Bacon confronted the authorities, demanding more troops and “an act of indemnity in compensation for their proceedings.”8 His actions ensured that he was once again branded a traitor by Governor William Berkeley, which triggered a feud that divided the colony. Bacon accused the governor of “graft and corruption, of levying huge taxes for personal profit, and of condoning murder to preserve his illegal trading monopolies.” He called for the surrender of the governor’s aides and threatened to confiscate the property of any colonists who aided them, making no distinction between those he identified as the enemy and those who harbored them.9 Bacon attacked the governor’s forces at Jamestown, burned the town, and sacked Governor Berkeley’s plantation before dying suddenly of a short illness in October 1676. Twenty-three of Bacon’s compatriots were pardoned by royal decree but were hanged by Berkeley regardless. An inquiry into the situation concluded that higher taxes had played a significant role in the uprisings.10 Over a century before the Revolutionary War, therefore, British forces in North America faced an uprising led by disgruntled colonists, unhappy with issues of representation and taxation, in an event that provides an insight into the political tensions between London and the colonies. Prior to the War of Independence, very little united the colonists on the Eastern Seaboard of North America. There was rancor and insurrection, not only between the colonies, but also between competing communities within individual colonies. Fifteen years after Bacon’s failed uprising, political violence erupted in New York as the conflicting religious and national backgrounds of settlers reflected the tensions of the era. The religious divisions that caused many colonists to leave Europe proved inescapable, as uprisings occurred throughout the colonies in response to the invasion of England by William III and the ensuing uncertainty over the direction of the monarchy. When James II fled to France in 1688, the Dutch population of Long Island, Queens, and Westchester Counties, anticipating a return to Dutch rule under the protection of King William, overthrew local officials. Jacob Leisler asserted control over city officials and proclaimed William III to be king, but his efforts faltered because of his lack of support among the non-Dutch community and wealthier elites. This ensured his backing remained confined to “the lesser tradesmen and farmers in the vicinity of New York, a limitation which proved a crucial handicap.”11 A military entourage sent in advance of the arrival of the newly appointed governor, Colonel Henry Sloughter, encountered resistance from Leisler over demands that it be quartered in Fort James. The ensuing exchange of gunfire and resulting fatalities ensured that Leisler was branded a traitor. When Governor Sloughter finally arrived, Leisler continued to hold Fort James, ignoring orders to relinquish control of the facility, which led to his trial and eventual execution for treason on May 16, 1691. The uprisings led by

22

The History, 1676–1992

Bacon and Leisler had their origins in the lower classes, but neither conveyed the interest or gained the support of the established elite in North America. The Crown emerged unscathed from both uprisings but appeared incapable of learning from them or of implementing change to prevent their repeat one hundred years later, that time with far greater implications in both London and the American colonies.

The American Revolution as an Act of Political Violence

A hundred years after Nathaniel Bacon’s failed uprising, opposition to colonial rule continued to focus on issues of taxation. What started off peacefully developed into a full-blown revolution, with violence directed at the British authorities as an expression of frustration and resentment. In contrast to the radical nature of the French Revolution, the American experience did not feature the systematic bloodletting of the British elite, and there were no mass executions in central Boston to compare with the horror of the Place de la Concorde in Paris. This does not mean that the American Revolution was devoid of political violence, as increasing numbers of colonists protested the concept of “taxation without representation.” The Boston Massacre of March 5, 1770, was the most celebrated act of political violence in the colonial era. An assortment of citizens became embroiled in a clash with British Redcoats on State Street that left five colonists dead and several soldiers charged with murder. They were represented at their trial by future president John Adams, who referred to the protesting colonists as “a motley rabble of saucy boys, negroes, and molattoes, Irish teagues and outlandish jack tars.”12 Adams convinced the jury that the soldiers had been at risk from an unruly mob dedicated to inciting political violence. The troops were acquitted of murder, but the event was celebrated by those advocating the use of political violence against the British authorities in North America, including Samuel Adams and Paul Revere. John Adams subsequently referred to the event as the moment at which “the foundation of American independence was laid.”13 It was, however, five years before the outbreak of revolution, suggesting that the massacre’s direct influence on the course of history was rather more tenuous.14 Three years later, in 1773, the tea ship Dartmouth docked in Boston Harbor, precipitating the most prominent act of sabotage against the authority of the state: the Boston Tea Party. The vessel had 20 days to unload and pay duties, or forfeit the cargo under British law. On the day of the Dartmouth’s deadline to unload, between 30 and 130 men, many dressed in Mohawk costumes, boarded the ship and two other vessels and dumped 342 chests of tea, valued at $1.7 million in adjusted currency, into Boston Harbor. This act of political and economic violence prompted outrage through-

Three Centuries of North American Political Violence, 1676–1976

23

out the colonies and in London. Benjamin Franklin conceded that the tea should be paid for, but efforts to do so were rejected by the British government. The port of Boston was closed and the Coercive Acts (known in North America as the Intolerable Acts) were implemented to make an example of the resistance in Massachusetts. Although presented in hindsight as something of a caper initiated in reaction to the Tea Act of 1773, the incident was not a direct reaction to tax increases because the act reduced taxes on imported tea. Many merchants in the colonies were not averse to smuggling and opposed the act because it made legally imported tea cheaper, threatening their illicit livelihoods. These merchants played a key role in the protest along with tea importers not listed as consignees by the East India Company. Not all colonists were in favor of revolution and not all revolutionaries were in favor of political violence. Issues of geography, religion, and ethnicity contributed to regional variances in North America regarding the need for revolution and the manner in which it should be pursued. Often overlooked is the fact that “the shot heard round the world” was itself an act of political violence, aimed at the official forces of the Crown in an incident of insurrection and mutiny by the colonists, who were initially far from united in their cause. The start of the war on April 19, 1775, and the ensuing battles of Lexington and Concord quickly helped galvanize support across the 13 colonies. Failure to suppress the uprising was not an option for Great Britain, at that point the most powerful empire in the world. From the vantage point of London, the American revolutionaries were no more than a rabble, eager to benefit from the protection of the Crown and the benefits that this brought in terms of trade and opportunity but unwilling to pay for it in taxes. The leaders of the revolutionary movement were not seen as patriots in London but as traitors whose actions would have ensured their execution had their insurrection failed. Those who signed the Declaration of Independence, including John Hancock, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson, were in effect signing their own death warrants had the British prevailed. Likewise, Thomas Paine, whose pamphlet Common Sense was viewed as the intellectual manuscript behind the rationale for revolution, was regarded in London as an anarchist whose writings helped provoke political violence. The success of the revolution guaranteed that these perpetrators of political violence came to be celebrated as patriots rather than hanged as traitors, with a number eventually becoming president of the new nation. The American Revolution was an act of political violence designed to overthrow the British authorities, but the establishment of the United States of America as a free, independent nation did not quell unrest in North America.

Post-Revolutionary Political Violence

24

The History, 1676–1992

The Founding Fathers had no wish to create an American monarch to replace George III, but their efforts to avoid a strong, central authority resulted in a system of government whose weakness almost led to the disuniting of the newly established nation. The former colonies were initially governed by the Articles of Confederation, which combined the 13 former colonies into one nation but which lacked a central, unifying authority. There was no president and no system of federalism. Instead, power resided within the individual states, each having one vote in Congress irrespective of its size or population. No executive authority existed to enforce congressional law, regulate interstate commerce, or direct foreign affairs. Moreover, Congress could neither levy nor collect taxes. The flaws in the Articles of Confederation ensured that issues of finance and taxation continued to be problems both within and between the newly established states. Since each state printed its own currency and negotiated its own overseas trade deals, a sense of competition emerged that prevented the development of national unity and the establishment of a stable economy following the end of the War of Independence. Having rejected the protection of the Crown, creditors could no longer depend on the stability of the Bank of England, driving the demand for hard currency, which initiated a knock-on effect throughout the economy. As the need for currency filtered down through the economy, local businesses, traders, and farmers felt the impact most severely. This situation was worsened by the fact that many citizens were owed back pay for services rendered during the Revolution and were liable for new taxes levied by the states and by Congress, irrespective of their ability to pay. The nonpayment for military service, coupled with individual prosecution for nonpayment of taxes, prompted the first acts of political violence in the nascent nation, when Job Shattuck of Groton, Massachusetts, rallied citizens in an effort to prevent the collection of taxes in 1782. On February 3 in the following year, further acts of political violence were recorded in Uxbridge, Massachusetts, when a crowd reclaimed confiscated property and returned it to its previous owners. These actions were an affront to the authority of the state and were clamped down by the state governor, John Hancock. The decision to pursue back taxes and increase property duties to cover foreign debts continued under Hancock’s successor, James Bowdoin. This motivated a group known as the Regulators to gather in Northampton, Massachusetts, in August 1786 to prevent the county court from sitting in judgment on land seizures and mortgage foreclosures. When Governor Bowdoin ordered the county militia to intervene, they refused, citing sympathy with the protesters. On September 26, Daniel Shays and Luke Day attempted a similar move against the court system in Springfield, Massachusetts.15 Their efforts were anticipated by the local militia commander, causing a standoff between officials and Regulators that inspired similar protests in Taunton, Concord, and Great Barrington throughout Sep-

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tember and October 1786. Job Shattuck, who had instigated the uprising of 1782, was arrested, along with other protesters, further motivating citizens in Massachusetts to challenge “the tyrannical government” on the basis that “the seeds of war are now sown.”16 An armed struggle at the federal armory in Springfield, Massachusetts, was the climax to what became known as Shays’ Rebellion. Governor Bowdoin authorized his forces to appropriate the weapons to put down the protesters, which led to the collapse of the uprising by the summer of 1787. Despite the acts of treason and political violence committed against the state, the participants, including Daniel Shays, were pardoned and the death sentences imposed on the leaders were overturned on appeal. The authority of the government had been directly challenged, but not all of the Founding Fathers were concerned. Thomas Jefferson, then serving as ambassador to France, remarked that “a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing,” though his ambivalence was not matched by Samuel Adams, who proposed the state-wide suspension of habeas corpus and drafted the Riot Act to prevent unauthorized assembly.17 Shays’ Rebellion revealed the inherent weakness in the Articles of Confederation and has been credited with prompting a radical overhaul of the American political system that led to the drafting of the US Constitution. Calls for a stronger central government had been heard a year beforehand, however, and the first attempt to address this occurred in September 1786, concurrent with, not prompted by, the uprisings in Massachusetts. The political violence reinforced preexisting concerns and encouraged a second attempt to redraft the Articles of Confederation during the summer of 1787 in Philadelphia. Throughout the ensuing campaign to ratify the new constitution, Federalists made scant reference to Shays’ Rebellion, and some anti-Federalists even used the uprising to argue that the existing system of government was strong enough to withstand an assault without needing to be amended.18 Political violence, and the challenge it posed to the authority of the newly formed nation, contributed to the growing realization that the Articles of Confederation were insufficient to bind the country together. When the Constitution was voted on in 1788, it received widespread support from the merchant classes and from urban areas but was far less welcome in rural areas, which remained suspicious of continued centralization of power—a divide between urban and rural political sympathies that prevails in the twenty-first century. The weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation were a thing of the past by the time the next major act of political violence occurred in the United States: the Whiskey Rebellion. The event severely tested the powers of the

Political Violence Under a New Constitution

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The History, 1676–1992

new government and revealed its willingness to exert force in its own defense when faced with domestic terrorism. Although this uprising occurred in rural Pennsylvania, rather than in New England, it again centered on issues of taxation and the rights of the individual under the new system of government. In 1791, the administration of President George Washington introduced the Whiskey Act, a tax on domestically produced distilled products, including whiskey, in an effort to pay down the national debt. The legislation was also enacted, at least in part, to confirm “that the federal government had the authority and the will to collect such a levy.”19 By 1794, the physical intimidation of tax collectors threatened this legal assumption along with the government’s ability to collect the taxes. When US marshals attempted to serve writs for nonpayment to farmers and distillers in western Pennsylvania, an armed crowd attacked the home of tax inspector General John Neville. The administration sent a team to negotiate with the insurgents, and President Washington led a 13,000-man militia drawn from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland. All involved were cleared of wrongdoing, as it emerged that most distillers were impossible to tax, which led to the Whiskey Act’s repeal under President Jefferson. The uprising revealed the willingness of the federal government to suppress political violence and noncompliance with the law but also the challenges of collecting unpopular taxes from the rural community. Although 3,000 miles separated France from the United States, fears grew that advocates of reform would draw bloody inspiration from events in the Place de la Concorde and attempt a similar uprising in the United States. The response to the Whiskey Act revealed the extent to which the new government of the United States was susceptible to acts of political violence perpetrated by the American citizenry. In a pattern that has repeated throughout US history, the White House targeted foreign interests as it clamped down on extremism. Just as British interests were demonized in the lead-up to the Revolution, French interests were viewed with suspicion given their opposition to the Federalist cause in the United States. In 1798, President John Adams signed the Alien and Sedition Acts as the government sought to preempt attacks on its authority and suppress anarchy. These were a collection of four acts designed to curtail political violence through a variety of means: the Naturalization Act increased the residency requirement for US citizenship from 5 to 14 years, making it harder for immigrants to become naturalized; the Alien Friends Act granted the president the power to deport or detain noncitizens deemed to be dangerous; the Alien Enemies Act extended this power to address those from a hostile nation. Finally, uttering false statements critical of the federal government was outlawed under the Sedition Act. The Alien and Sedition Acts ensured that First Amendment rights were disregarded in the name of national security less than a decade after the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Although three of these acts

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were repealed by President Jefferson, the Alien Enemies Act continued to be utilized by US presidents to address perceived risks from political violence and is today enshrined in US law as 50 USC Sections 21–24. The new Constitution had been constructed, at least in part, to rectify the lack of a unifying entity at the heart of American political life. The establishment of the presidency ensured that Americans had a figurehead to lead the nation from the new capital city on the banks of the Potomac. The powers that the president wielded ensured that he became a figure not only for national unity but also for those looking to express their displeasure with the federal government. No other public office in the United States has been targeted so regularly by those determined to wreak havoc on the American body politic, which has resulted in the assassination of four presidents to date and serious attempts on the lives of many more. The first known incident of political violence directed at the president of the United States was on May 6, 1833, when Robert B. Randolph struck Andrew Jackson near Alexandria, Virginia. Randolph had been dismissed from the navy on the order of the president for embezzlement, ensuring that his assault was the forerunner of attacks by embittered workers whose careers had been terminated by the federal government. Eighteen months later, on January 30, 1835, came the first known attempt to assassinate a US president when Jackson again was the focus of political violence. As the president left the US Capitol building, Richard Lawrence twice attempted to shoot Jackson with separate firearms. Like Randolph before him, Lawrence blamed Jackson for the loss of his job. Miraculously, both of Lawrence’s weapons misfired, allowing President Jackson to escape the fate that later befell four of his successors. Violence against the American state on behalf of the lowly and the disenfranchised continued unabated under the new Constitution. The Dorr Rebellion of 1841–1842 was an attempt to overturn a regulation in Rhode Island dating back to 1663 that stipulated property amounting to $134 was required before a man could vote. The insurrection ended in May 1842, following the imposition of martial law, when Thomas Dorr’s men attempted to seize an arsenal in Providence only to be confronted by forces loyal to the state and its founding principles. Dorr was found guilty of treason and sentenced to hard labor for life, a ruling that was overturned shortly before his release from prison in 1845.20 Twelve years later, in May 1857, President Buchanan ordered 2,500 US federal troops to Utah, following reports that the Mormon community, led by Brigham Young, planned to secede from the Union. Shortly thereafter, in 1859, the United States witnessed another incident of domestic political violence aimed against the institutions of the state when abolitionist John Brown led his raid at Harpers Ferry

Pre–Civil War Political Violence

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in Virginia. Just as the move to establish a new constitution was attributed to Shays’ Rebellion, events at Harpers Ferry precipitated the greatest challenge possible to the authority of the state: civil war. Brown’s collection of 21 armed men, comprising 1 freed slave, 1 fugitive slave, 3 freed black men, and 16 white men, sought to take command of the 100,000 firearms held at the Harpers Ferry arsenal. The plan called for the arms to be distributed to slaves throughout Virginia to instigate a chain reaction of uprisings against slavery. The group planned to move southward into Tennessee and Alabama, freeing and arming slaves in a pattern of freedom and retribution designed to destroy slavery.21 Despite the obvious need for secrecy, upward of 80 people had prior knowledge of the impending raid, including Frederick Douglass, who warned Brown of the folly of such an act, insisting it would “array the whole country” against the abolitionist movement. Douglass warned Brown that he would “never get out alive.” The federal government was given advance warning of the raid by David J. Gue, who, along with two others, wrote to warn the secretary of war on August 20, 1859. Although the message named the ringleader and the precise location of the raid, it was dismissed on the basis that “a scheme of such wickedness and outrage could not be entertained by any citizen of the United States.”22 Brown’s uprising began on October 16, 1859, with the taking of hostages in Harpers Ferry. Telegraph wires were cut and passing trains paused, but not stopped, which enabled authorities in Washington to quickly learn of the assault. The armory was stormed, but the uprising that Brown anticipated among the slave community did not occur, since they had no idea the initiative had been commenced on their behalf. The lack of an uprising was a precursor of the rapidly deteriorating mission. By the following day, militiamen surrounded the armory, cutting off the insurgents’ escape route. In the ensuing standoff, the mayor and four local inhabitants were killed, along with Brown’s sons, Watson and Oliver. The local militia was joined by forces from Virginia and US Marines led by Colonel Robert E. Lee, who dispatched J. E. B. Stuart to negotiate Brown’s surrender. When this proved futile, the Marines stormed the facility and took John Brown with a saber blow to the back of his head.23 Colonel Lee later wrote that the raid at Harpers Ferry “was the attempt of a fanatic, of a madman” and that those black Americans in his party “gave him no voluntary assistance.” Brown was tried for treason and executed on December 2, 1859. On his final day, Brown wrote that he was “now quite certain that the crimes of this guilty land will never be purged away, but with Blood.”24 A young actor who came to embody much of the indignation that Brown had channeled against the federal government witnessed the execution. Within five years, the world learned the name of John Wilkes Booth when he perpetrated the first assassination of a chief executive of the United States.

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The initial incidents of political insurrection in the United States, Shays’ Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion, were intended “to hold government to the ideals that had been articulated in the Founding documents . . . of government accountability and government limitations.”25 Irrespective of any single deed, however, the greatest incident of political violence in the history of the United States occurred between April 12, 1861, and May 9, 1865, as the nation engaged in a civil war that saw casualties estimated at between 650,00 and 850,000, making it the costliest war in the nation’s history. In 1860, a political insurrection sought to secede from the Union and establish a new entity, the Confederate States of America, in a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the United States and its incoming president, Abraham Lincoln. The shots fired at Fort Sumter in 1861 were as explicit an act of political violence as those fired at Concord 85 years earlier. Both acts were a direct challenge to the established government and an attempt to use force to initiate political change against the wishes of the establishment. In terms of political violence, the four-year battle is unlikely to be surpassed. By the time it was over, 30 percent of all Southern males between the ages of 18 and 40 years and 10 percent of all Northern males between the ages of 20 and 45 years had been killed.26 Both sides of the conflict saw aggression on the part of their opponents; the South believed that its way of life was being undermined by political interference that threatened livelihoods and culture. Secessionists believed they had the right to leave the Union just as freely as they had elected to join it. The North viewed the secession by Southern states as an act of treason that jeopardized the existence of the nation. Both sides saw themselves as defending traditions, laws, and properties. The catastrophic death toll was a reminder of the price paid in blood for attempting to adhere to a set of principles in an age of mechanized war. At the climax of the war, the specter of assassination fell across the land as a conspiracy struck the leadership of the United States. Abraham Lincoln’s life had been threatened previously; in 1861 a plot was discovered to kill him in Baltimore before he arrived in Washington to begin his presidency. Fears for his life led to extra precautions being taken, which included him arriving in the US capital in disguise, for which he was mocked by opponents. A further attempt to kill the president was instigated in 1864. It has been suggested that “Lincoln’s reluctance to protect his own security at the end of the Civil War owed at least something to his memory of the ridicule to which he had been subjected four years earlier.”27 On the night of April 14, 1865, John Wilkes Booth shot and killed Lincoln at Ford’s Theatre in Washington during a performance of Our American Cousin. Lewis Powell and David Herold launched a simultaneous attack on Secretary of State William H. Seward, injuring him, but not fatally. An

National Insurrection

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attempt on the life of Vice President Andrew Johnson was also planned for that evening, but George Atzerodt failed to fulfill his part in the plot. This concerted effort to kill these top officials in a single evening was designed to deprive the North of leadership and provide hope to the ailing Confederacy in what constituted the greatest confirmed conspiracy in the history of the United States. Although Abraham Lincoln was only the first of four presidents to die at the hands of an assassin, all subsequent murders were explained as the acts of a deranged individual. Far from being the lonely outsider that came to define perpetrators of political violence in the United States, John Wilkes Booth was a noted actor and engaged to the daughter of John P. Hale, later the US ambassador to Spain. In the aftermath of the Civil War and prior to the eventual establishment of the FBI, the Treasury Department was the only federal agency with law enforcement powers. The department’s remit to protect the life of the president began following the discovery of a plot to kill Grover Cleveland in 1894 and was formalized in 1902 after the assassination of President William McKinley.28 Having managed to avoid a presidential assassination for the first 76 years of its existence, the United States suddenly fell prey to this form of political violence. Just 16 years after Lincoln’s death, President James Garfield was shot in Washington, DC, on July 2, 1881, after only three months in office. He eventually died on September 19, succumbing to an infection caused by attempts to heal his wounds. The assassin, Charles J. Guiteau, had written campaign speeches for Garfield but was diagnosed as being mentally challenged. Like Andrew Jackson’s assailant 46 years earlier, Guiteau claimed to have attacked the president as a result of a workplace disagreement—in this case, being rejected as US ambassador to France.29 President Garfield was not the only victim of political violence during the latter years of the nineteenth century, nor was he the last US politician of the era to succumb to an assassin. Five years after Garfield’s death, a group of anarchists bombed a labor rally in Chicago, killing seven police officers, while the ensuing exchange of gunfire resulted in a further four fatalities. On February 28, 1890, Charles Kincaid shot Congressman William Taulbee, who died several days later on March 11, following an attack outside the US Capitol building with clear parallels to the attempt on the life of President Jackson in 1835. Any expectations that the twentieth century might herald an era of peace and tranquility were quickly dashed, as the age began with a political murder that had profound implications for the direction of the United States and the world. On September 6, 1901, Leon Czolgosz assassinated President

Terrorizing the Twentieth Century

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McKinley in Buffalo, New York. Czolgosz, an American anarchist of PolishRussian descent, declared at his execution, “I killed the President because he was an enemy of the good people! I did it for the help of the good people, the working men of all countries!”30 The assassination elevated to the presidency Theodore Roosevelt, who became the youngest inhabitant of the office. He subsequently commenced the first international effort to eliminate terrorism, stating, “Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race, and all mankind should band together against the Anarchist. His crimes should be made a crime against the law of nations . . . declared by treaties among all civilized powers.”31 In the United States, Italy, Spain, and France, the anarchist movement of the era embraced the “propaganda by deed” concept espoused in the influential publication Freiheit, which was founded by Johann Most, considered “for many years the high priest of terrorism in America.”32 During this time, acts of political violence perpetrated by anarchists threatened the fabric of American society. The bomb was their weapon of choice: indiscriminate, easy to make, and difficult to defend against. Nowhere was off limits as domestic terrorism affected the entire continent. Anarchists assassinated the former governor of Idaho, Frank Steunenberg, in December 1905. They attacked the headquarters of the Los Angeles Times in 1910, killing 21; bombed a police station in Milwaukee in 1917, killing 10; and coordinated bombings in New York, Washington, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Boston, and Philadelphia on June 2, 1919, that killed 2. The presidency also remained an all-too-tempting target for instigators of political violence. Theodore Roosevelt not only ascended to the presidency as a direct result of political violence but also became the victim of an assassination attempt on October 14, 1912, when John Flammang Schrank shot and wounded him as he campaigned for another term in office. Of the nine presidents to occupy the White House during a 46-year period, from 1865 to 1901, three were lost to acts of political violence. Throughout the 1920s, the main source of domestic terrorism was not anarchists but organized crime syndicates. Reacting against the introduction of the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, organized crime constituted a direct threat to the power structure in the United States just as surely as any domestic terror organization did in its systematic violation of the law and willingness to resort to violence to achieve its ambitions. Not all incidents of political violence during the 1920s were committed by members of organized crime syndicates; random acts of political terror continued to be perpetrated in the United States in an indiscriminate fashion. On September 16, 1920, a horse-drawn carriage was detonated in the financial district of New York City, killing 38 and injuring hundreds more. Seven years later, on May 18, 1927, 46 people were killed when a bomb was detonated at a school in Bath, Michigan.

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Despite the brewing international crises that soon plunged the world into a second global conflict in the space of a generation, domestic political violence continued to plague the United States into the 1930s. Air travel became the target of terrorists for the first time on October 10, 1933, when a Boeing 247 was destroyed in flight over Indiana. This was followed by the hijacking of a plane after it departed Brooklyn and its eventual crash in the Free Irish State after a transatlantic flight, ensuring that the risk of hijacking became a feared possibility in the 1930s.33 Politicians remained a favored target for political violence, and an attempt was made on the life of President-Elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in Miami in 1933. An anarchist named Joseph Zangara sought to kill FDR but instead killed the mayor of Chicago by mistake. One of the most significant incidents of political terror occurred on September 8, 1935, when Senator Huey Long was shot and killed by Carl Weiss in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The assassination of Senator Long had repercussions three decades later when his son, Senator Russell Long, expressed his doubts about the veracity of the Warren Commission to New Orleans district attorney Jim Garrison, sparking the only criminal investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The eventual trial of Clay Shaw collapsed but provided the basis for Oliver Stone’s film JFK, which led to the passage of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act.34 The use of explosive devices—the calling card of the anarchists earlier in the century—continued into the 1940s. Two Americans were killed during an explosion at the World’s Fair in New York and more when a bomb was dropped from an aircraft over the United Nations building in New York City on July 22, 1948. Just as organized crime dominated incidents of domestic political violence in the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups presented a similar challenge to the authorities in the postwar years. The Klan had previously terrorized the Reconstruction era as a secret society dedicated to the lethal harassment of African Americans. During the interwar years, its racial position remained unchanged, but it also became embedded with the political elite in the Deep South, counting leading politicians among its membership.35 Its ability to draw on the support of local officials ensured it was able to influence politics at a national level, guaranteeing the institutionalizing of a policy, effective of apartheid, in the United States as late as the 1960s. As Hewitt noted, such activity fits a discernable pattern: “American terrorism has occurred in a series of waves, reflecting the waxing and waning of campaigns by different groups.”36 During this time period, one issue appeared to motivate acts of political violence above all others: the struggle for civil rights.

Political Violence During the Cold War

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The efforts on the part of the federal government to end a policy of segregation in the United States were met with violent opposition among sections of American society. Between 1954, when the Brown v. Board of Education ruling ordered the desegregation of public schooling, and 1970, 65 fatalities resulted from more than 580 recorded acts of political violence across southern states, particularly in Mississippi and Alabama. A variety of tactics, including beatings, shootings, and bombings, were utilized to intimidate American citizens and eliminate civil rights leaders. On June 12, 1963, Medgar Evers, a Mississippi field secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), was murdered. Three months later, the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, was bombed, killing 4 girls at Sunday school and injuring a further 23. In June 1964, 3 civil rights workers were kidnapped and murdered in Mississippi; on March 25, 1965, a civil rights protester was killed in Selma, Alabama, by the Ku Klux Klan. The targeting of the civil rights movement as an example of political violence was most clearly evidenced in the assassinations of Malcolm X in 1965 and of Martin Luther King in April 1968, events that led to further outbreaks of politically motivated violence in the form of riots and attacks on property. The efforts of such groups to instill terror, however, failed to have a substantive impact on the direction of policy, as the US government continued to espouse integration and civil rights following the election of Richard Nixon.37 In addition to civil rights, nationalism became a cause célèbre for political activists in an era defined by a growing movement toward decolonization. The United States had conquered Puerto Rico in 1898, but by 1946 the local legislature insisted upon the nationalist wishes of the Puerto Rican people, a move that was vetoed by President Harry S. Truman. The ensuing standoff ensured that Puerto Rico was neither a state nor an independent nation, a status that fueled nationalist sentiment and anti-American hostility. Having vetoed Puerto Rican independence, President Truman signed the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act on October 20, 1950, granting the status of “commonwealth.” Undeterred, Puerto Rican nationalists immediately declared independence and unleashed a stream of violence that included an attempt to assassinate Truman in Washington, DC, on November 1, 1950. The assault resulted in the death of one of the would-be assassins as well as the fatal shooting of White House policeman Leslie Coffelt. Four years later, Puerto Rican nationalists once more disrupted life in Washington, this time opening fire from the gallery of the House of Representatives, injuring five members of Congress. Fifteen years later, Puerto Rican nationalism again brought terrorism to the United States as the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) enacted a series of attacks against symbols of US capitalism, including banks and corporate headquarters. In all, 2 rocket attacks, 10 shootings, and more

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than 350 bombings were conducted in a cycle that lasted until the early 1980s.38 The Florida state director of the NAACP, Harry Moore, was assassinated along with his wife when his house was bombed on December 21, 1951. Radio City Music Hall in Manhattan was the target of a bombing in November 1954, followed by the bombing of the Paramount Theater in Brooklyn two years later. Attacks on aircraft continued, with a United Airlines DC-8 exploding over Colorado in November 1955 and a Cubana Airlines flight crashing in Cuba following its hijacking, which killed 17. The 1950s could not escape the threat of the suicide bomber; 6 were killed in an attack on an elementary school in Houston, Texas, in September 1959. Civil unrest and mounting dissatisfaction with overseas military engagements contributed to a sense that the United States was a nation under siege in the 1960s, an era replete with political violence, assassinations, and terrorism. The decade was only six days old when a National Airlines flight was destroyed over Boliva, North Carolina, killing 34. Airlines continued to be targeted, with hijackings and midair detonations occurring throughout the decade. Forty-four passengers were killed when a Continental flight was blown up over Missouri in 1962, and the same number died when the pilot of a Pacific Air Lines flight was shot, causing the plane to crash in San Ramon, California, in 1964. The Watts district of Los Angeles erupted in rioting in 1965 and 1966, leaving scores dead and causing more than $20 million in damage. By July 1967, politically motivated rioting spread to Newark, New Jersey, killing 26 and injuring more than 1,500, and to Detroit, where 43 were killed and 2,000 were injured. In addition to these focused efforts, random acts of political violence occurred, including the sniper shooting at the University of Texas in 1966 that killed 19 and wounded 31 as well as a 1967 suicide bombing in Las Vegas that killed 6 and wounded 12 others. On the right of the political spectrum, in 1961 Robert Boliver DePugh founded the Minutemen, an organization he named after the eighteenth-century defenders of US interests. Dedicated to defending the United States against a potential Soviet invasion, DePugh’s Minutemen “armed themselves [and prepared] to take back the country from the ‘subversives.’” They organized themselves in small cells and stockpiled weapons for an anticipated counterrevolution and published material on how to conduct a domestic guerilla war on US soil.39 The most notorious incidents of political violence in the era occurred on November 22, 1963, and June 4, 1968, when President John F. Kennedy and Senator Robert F. Kennedy were assassinated. These two acts, separated by less than five years, appeared to symbolize a nation out of control, at the whim of violent political forces that went undetected until they struck at the very heart of the American experience by killing its leadership and its potential future leadership in a blow to the American body politic. Addressing the UN General Assembly in 1961, President Kennedy had noted, “Ter-

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35

ror is not a new weapon. Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or example. But inevitably they fail, either because men are not afraid to die for a life worth living, or because the terrorists themselves came to realize that free men cannot be frightened by threats, and that aggression would meet its own response.”40 Not for the first time in US history, the murders were blamed on crazed individuals (Lee Harvey Oswald and Sirhan Sirhan, respectively), acting alone and categorically not as part of any wider conspiracy. Before his motives could be ascertained, Lee Harvey Oswald was himself shot and killed live on national television by Jack Ruby. Ruby was, perhaps unsurprisingly, identified as another lone individual, acting without direction or wider motivation. When Sirhan Sirhan was tried for the assassination of Senator Kennedy, his attorney opposed attempts to address political motives in the murder, despite his client’s repeated statements that he acted because of the senator’s support for Israel.41 In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Vietnam War, which Senator Kennedy had opposed during his brief presidential campaign of 1968, became a rallying point for disaffected Americans. Student-led resistance to the war mounted as the US role increased under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Campus-wide protests ranged from “petitions and rallies and teach-ins and electoral campaigns, to public fasting, draft resistance, and even, towards the end, rudimentary forms of insurrection.”42 The antiwar efforts had not initially utilized political violence, but that changed after 1968. An early sense of euphoria was felt following President Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection, and students “poured out of dormitories all across the nation in spontaneous demonstrations, congratulating themselves.”43 This quickly gave way to a “widespread belief that the opposition to the war had failed completely, that Johnson’s defeat of 1968 had been meaningless and empty, that Nixon was simply pursuing the war with equal determination by other means.”44 The ensuing violence grew “out of a sense of rage and deep frustration . . . at the continuing war in Vietnam” and found focus with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).45 The SDS was founded in 1962 and claimed more than 80,000 members by 1968.46 In 1969 the group splintered, leading to the foundation of the Weather Underground, a group vehemently opposed to the war in Vietnam and committed to the overthrow of the US government.47 The group referred to its rallies as “Days of Rage.” An antiwar rally in Grant Park, Chicago, on October 8, 1969, led to damage amounting to $250,000 to nearby properties and businesses.48 The Weathermen issued a declaration of war in July 1970 before attacking the US Capitol on March 1, 1971, the Pentagon on May 19, 1972, and the US Department of State on January 29, 1975.49 On all occasions, warnings were issued and the group targeted property, not individuals. The greatest loss of life they inflicted was on themselves: three of their

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members were killed building bombs in March 1970. The Weathermen claimed that they were both antiracist and anti-imperialist, and they shunned the label of “terrorist.”50 Writing in 2009, former Weatherman Bill Ayers insisted that terrorists “terrorize, they kill innocent civilians, while we organized and agitated. Terrorists destroy randomly, while our actions bore, we hoped, the precise stamp of a cut diamond. Terrorists intimidate, while we hope[d] to educate.”51 In the early 1970s, other radical groups adopted a pattern of political violence, such as the Jewish Defense League (JDL), which Meir Kahane formed in 1968 as a Brooklyn-based vigilante movement. In addition to nighttime patrols, the JDL campaigned against the Soviet policy toward Russian Jews and protested outside Arab embassies. As reported in New York Magazine, “Hundreds of Orthodox Jews, most of them from lower middle-class and middle-aged, signed up almost immediately for Kahane’s vigilante clubs.”52 Along with groups such as Jewish Armed Resistance, Save Our Israel Soil, and Thunder of Zion, the JDL bombed more than 110 locations, including Soviet and Arab embassies and Arab-American organizations in New York, killing five in the process.53 Although progress had been made in the area of civil rights, racial tensions continued to erupt into political violence during the 1960s and into the 1970s. In 1966, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, soon joined by Eldridge Cleaver, formed the Black Panthers in Berkeley, California. Initially established to provide protection in black neighborhoods, the Black Panthers became known for their violent tactics against police. A common chant heard at meetings was “The revolution has come, it’s time to pick up the gun. Off the Pigs.”54 The group claimed inspiration from a diverse range of revolutionary figures, including Chairman Mao, Malcolm X, Che Guevara, and Patrice Lumumba. Its manifesto, “The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense Ten Point Platform and Program,” included demands for the end of black conscription and the payment of reparations for slavery. By the end of the 1960s, the organization claimed a membership of nearly 10,000.55 Also hailing from Berkeley was the Symbionese Liberation Army, which robbed banks and committed murders before achieving notoriety totally disproportionate to its previous escapades by kidnapping and assimilating Patty Hearst in February 1974. Her participation in a bank robbery in San Francisco, captured on security cameras, provided a defining image of the era.56 The timing of the rise in black nationalist violence was politically significant, coming after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Race riots, looting, and domestic terrorism left almost 400 fatalities in their wake, confirming that the aspirations of the black community had not been met.57 A decade later, the Death Angels, a group of black racists, deliberately targeted white Americans in San Francisco, resulting in a temporary collapse in the city’s social scene.58

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Politicians continued to receive unwanted attention from those pursuing political violence. Alabama governor and presidential candidate George Wallace was shot and paralyzed in an assassination attempt in May 1972. Two years later, an attempt was made to hijack a plane in Baltimore and crash it into the White House to assassinate President Richard M. Nixon. The president was also the target of the Alphabet Bomber, who was eventually captured in August 1974, having exploded a device at Los Angeles Airport that killed 3. His move later inspired an attack at LaGuardia Airport in New York in 1975 that killed 11 and injured 75. Finally, two separate attempts were made on the life of President Gerald Ford in September 1975. Long before the attacks of September 11, 2001, “terrorist” had become an all-too-easy label to apply to any individual or group that refused to accept the status quo and challenged the American system with less-thanorthodox methods. A generation earlier, such individuals and their organizations had been labeled as “communists” by the FBI and its director, J. Edgar Hoover. By the 1970s, the same bureau and the same director branded groups such as the Black Panthers as terrorists, and efforts by the federal government to address the growing tide of domestic political unrest led to the establishment of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Initiated without congressional oversight, the program engaged in political sabotage and intimidation in attempts to “disrupt” and “neutralize” the activities of groups considered to be subversive.59 The CIA was also utilized in a domestic spying initiative under the auspices of Operation CHAOS, an action that not only violated constitutional rights but also was, as the director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms noted at the time, “not within the charter” of the CIA.60 Acts of political violence brought about the end of the colonial era in North America and helped shape the first two hundred years of US history. Although the era is officially defined by the towering figures of Abraham Lincoln, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedy, it was also distorted by their assassins, John Wilkes Booth, Leon Czolgosz, and Lee Harvey Oswald. Time and again, those who were unable to make their voices heard though peaceful means demonstrated a propensity for violence as and when they believed it was necessary to do so. The actions of the notorious serve to reinforce the fact that, although it may be politically convenient to consider threats to the United States as coming from abroad, the nation has always faced challenges from within its own borders that pose troubling questions for the country and its officeholders. The tension that existed between the need to thwart perpetrators of political violence and the requirement to defend and uphold constitutionally protected freedoms provided a continuing source of anxiety as the nation gathered to celebrate the bicentennial anniversary of its independence in the summer of 1976.61

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Notes

1. Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), 47. 2. Jeffrey D. Simon, quoted in Bruce Maxwell, ed., Terrorism: A Documentary History (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), xiv. 3. See Hiralal Gupta, “A Critical Study of the Thugs and Their Activities,” Journal of Indian History 38 (1959): 167–176; James L. Sleeman, Thug; or a Million Murders (London: S. Low and Marston, 1933). 4. Alex P. Schmid, “The Problems of Defining Terrorism,” in Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, ed. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 1997), 21–22. 5. The Jacobins initially used the term terrorist when speaking and writing about themselves in a positive sense; after the ninth of Thermidor, terrorist became a term of abuse with criminal implications. See Le Neologiste Francais, quoted in Francois-Alphonse Aulard, Paris pendant la reaction thermidorienne et sous le Directoire (Paris: Cerf, 1902), v, 490; Ferdinand Brunot, Histoire de la langue francaise des origins a 1990 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1905), ix, 871. 6. Terrorism, at the time, referred to the period in the French Revolution between March 1793 and July 1794 and was more or less a synonym for “reign of terror.” See Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 6. 7. For a consideration of terrorism, its origins and motivating factors, see Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006). 8. Richard Middleton, Colonial America: A History, 1607–1760 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 119. 9. Quoted in Warren M. Billings, ed., The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 1606–1689 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 277–279. 10. For more on Bacon’s uprising, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957); and Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Torchbearer of the Rebellion: The Story of Bacon’s Rebellion and Its Leader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1940). 11. Historians differ in their reasons for the rebellion. Thomas Archdeacon, in New York City, 1664–1710: Conquest and Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), stresses the threat posed to the Dutch community by the imposition of English culture. Robert C. Ritchie, in The Duke’s Province: A Study of New York Politics and Society, 1664–1691 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), emphasizes the frustration of the population in general and fears of a Catholic plot in particular. The view that the rebellion was a class struggle is argued by Jerome R. Reich in Leisler’s Rebellion: A Study of Democracy in New York, 1664–1720 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). 12. Quoted in David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 67. 13. Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), 301–302. 14. Neil Longley York, The Boston Massacre: A History with Documents (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 46–47. 15. See Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 16. David P. Szatmary, Shays’ Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 94–97.

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17. Jefferson, quoted in Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty! An American History (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 253. 18. For an insight into the impact of the rebellion on the drafting of the Constitution, see Robert Feer, “Shays’s Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation,” New England Quarterly 42, no. 3 (September 1969): 388–410. 19. Neil A. Hamilton, Rebels and Renegades: A Chronology of Social and Political Dissent in the United States (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2002), 61. 20. John B. Rae, “Democrats and the Dorr Rebellion,” New England Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1936): 476–483. 21. For more on the raid at Harpers Ferry, see Ron Field, Avenging Angel: John Brown’s Raid on Harpers Ferry 1859 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012); Tony Horwitz, Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid That Sparked the Civil War (New York: Henry Holt, 2011); and David S. Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights (New York: Vintage Books, 2006). 22. Stephen B. Oates, To Purge This Land with Blood: A Biography of John Brown (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 285. 23. Barry J. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty: The Changing Face of Patriots, Militias, and Political Violence on America (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 51. 24. Oates, To Purge This Land with Blood, 351. 25. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty, xi. 26. John Huddleston, Killing Ground: The Civil War and the Changing American Landscape (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 3. 27. Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 201–213. See also Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 15–16. 28. See Philip H. Melanson with Peter F. Stevens, The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency (New York: MJF Books, 2002). 29. Allan Peskin, Garfield (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1978), 587. For more on President Garfield’s lingering death, see Candice Millard, Destiny of the Republic: A Tale of Madness, Medicine and the Murder of a President (New York: Doubleday, 2011). 30. Isaac Cronin, ed., Confronting Fear: A History of Terrorism (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002), 31. 31. Roosevelt quoted by David C. Rapaport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 52. 32. Laqueur, Terrorism, 55. See also Ulrich Linse, “‘Propaganda by Deed’ and ‘Direct Action’: Two Concepts of Anarchist Violence,” in Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld (London: Macmillan, 1982), 201–229. 33. Alona E. Evans, “Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure,” American Journal of International Law 63, no. 4 (October 1969): 695–710. 34. Introduced by Senator John Glenn, the act was signed by President George H. W. Bush in 1992 to expedite the release of materials relating to the murder of President Kennedy. 35. Charles C. Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965). 36. Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda (London: Routledge, 2003), 16. 37. Reed Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 6–7.

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38. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 17. 39. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty, 71 See also Alan Barth, “Report on the ‘Rampageous Right’: Today’s Tensions Have Led to a Proliferation of ‘Conservative Extremists,’” New York Times, November 26, 1961, SM25. 40. “Address in New York City Before the General Assembly of the United Nations,” September 25, 1961, PPPJFK, 625–626. 41. James W. Clarke, American Assassins: The Darker Side of Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). 42. Thomas Powers, The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), xiii. 43. Melvin Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 158. 44. Powers, The War at Home, xix. 45. Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up? American Protest Against the War in Vietnam (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 314. 46. Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS: The Rise and Development of the Students for a Democratic Society (New York: Random House, 1973). See also Jack Newfield, A Prophetic Minority (New York: New American Library, 1966), 188. 47. For more on the Weather Underground, see Mark Rudd, Underground: My Life with SDS and the Weathermen (New York: William Morrow, 2010); Bill Ayers, Fugitive Days: Memoirs of an Antiwar Activist (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009). 48. See Dan Berger, Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2006); Ron Jacobs, The Way the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground (London: Verso Books, 1997); Cathy Wilkerson, Flying Close to the Sun: My Life and Times as a Weatherman (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007). 49. Jonah Raskin, ed., Weather Eye: Communiqués from the Weather Underground, May 1970–May 1974 (New York: Union Square Press, 1974). 50. Harold Jacobs, ed., Weathermen (Berkeley, CA: Ramparts Press, 1970), 135. 51. Ayers, Fugitive Days, 263. 52. Mel Ziegler, “The Jewish Defense League and Its Invisible Constituency,” New York Magazine, April 19, 1971, 30. 53. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 18. 54. David Farber, The Age of Great Dreams: America in the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 207. See also Earl Anthony, Spitting in the Wind: The True Story Behind the Legacy of the Black Panther Party (Santa Monica, CA: Roundtable Publishers, 1990). 55. Margo V. Perkins, Autobiography of Activism: Three Black Women of the Sixties (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2000), 5. For more on the Black Panther Party, see Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, eds., In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Curtis J. Austin, Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the Black Panther Party (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2006). 56. Patty Hearst was caught on September 18, 1975, and pardoned by President Carter after serving 21 months of a 7-year prison sentence. 57. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 17. 58. Clark Howard, Zebra: The True Account of the 179 Days of the Terror in San Francisco (New York: Richard Marek Publishers, 1979), 347. 59. Memo sent from FBI headquarters to all special agents in charge, August 25, 1967, quoted in Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book III: Supple-

Three Centuries of North American Political Violence, 1676–1976

41

mental Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (1976), 20. See also Frederick A. O. Schwarz Jr. and Aziz Z. Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New York: New Press, 2008). 60. Richard Helms, letter to Henry Kissinger, February 18, 1969, quoted in Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 67. 61. For more on political violence during this era, see Christopher Hewitt, Political Violence and Terrorism in Modern America: A Chronology (New York: Praeger, 2005); Joseph T. McCann, Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten (Boulder, CO: Sentient Publishers, 2006); J. Michael Martinez, Terrorist Attacks on American Soil from the Civil War Era to the Present (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012); Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz, Terrorism in America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Robert Kumamoto, The Historical Origins of Terrorism in America: 1644–1880 (New York: Routledge, 2014).

3 Bipartisan Hesitancy, 1977–1992

demonstrated an alleged indifference to acts of terrorism. Such forces, however, had long sought to undermine the authorities in the United States and plagued the administrations of Clinton’s three predecessors: Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. Between 1977 and 1992, political violence cost the United States alliances with foreign nations, members of the armed forces, and countless civilians, as well as resulted in the shooting of yet another president. Although political violence critically affected these administrations, US grand strategy between 1977 and 1992 focused on the danger posed by communism, not terrorism. As long as the Cold War continued, there was little to suggest that this would change, as both Democratic and Republican administrations sought to prevent the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. All other matters, including terrorism, were of secondary importance during this time, ensuring it remained a “blind spot” for policymakers and politicians alike.1 Despite the increasing tide of political violence during this period, neither Republican nor Democratic administrations proved capable of addressing the challenges it posed to the nation and its citizens, resulting in an era of bipartisan hesitancy.

A recurring critique of the Clinton administration is that it

The Carter administration came to Washington determined to address the excesses of the Nixon years and to place human rights at the heart of US foreign policy. Carter’s team included future Clinton administration officials Warren Christopher, Anthony Lake, Samuel Berger, and Madeleine Albright, all anxious to carve out a new direction for US grand strategy under a Democratic administration. 2 Instead of providing a fresh start, however, the Carter administration served as a 4-year Democratic hiatus

The Carter Administration, 1977–1981

43

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The History, 1676–1992

during a 24-year Republican grip on the White House that lasted from 1969 to 1993. Although it served only one term, the Carter administration’s efforts to confront terrorism reveal much about the approach to a form of political action that defined the coming decades. The political campaign season that brought Jimmy Carter to power coincided with festivities marking the nation’s bicentennial. This auspicious moment in history was tempered by the aftermath of Watergate, President Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon, Stagflation, and the continuing threat from domestic political violence. On July 27, 1976, Chester Plumber was shot and killed as he attempted to breach security at the White House. Two months later, a Trans World Airlines (TWA) jet was hijacked by Croatian terrorists, an explosion at Grand Central Station killed a New York City police officer, and a car bomb in Washington, DC, left two dead. Americans generally appeared undisturbed by such incidents, viewing them as events that may affect others, but not themselves, and certainly nothing to be concerned about. The advice provided by Winston Churchill’s wartime government in Great Britain appeared to suffice: keep calm and carry on. A classic example occurred in October 1977, nine months into President Carter’s term, when the New York Public Library was targeted by the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). As noted by Fred Shapiro in The New Yorker, the event failed to make the front page of the local New York papers, and people at the scene appeared “unruffled.” The reaction was best captured by a visitor from Idaho who insisted, “I’m not about to let a lousy little bombing stop me.”3 Across the country, random acts of political violence continued to occur, but they were contained within or between various factions, inflicting little damage on the general population. Notwithstanding these incidents, two distinct sources of political violence emerged within the United States as the Carter administration took office: Islamic terrorism and the Unabomber. On March 9, 1977, Islamic terrorists took 134 hostages in Washington, DC, before surrendering to authorities. Three years later, on July 22, 1980, Daoud Salahuddin assassinated Ali Akbar Tabatabaei in Bethesda, Maryland. The victim had been the leader of the Iranian Freedom Foundation and served as the press attaché at the Iranian embassy in Washington before the overthrow of the shah. With his murder, the political violence that had exploded on the streets of Tehran found its way to the Washington suburbs. The divisions between Islamic factions, in particular those involving the Nation of Islam, were not a threat to the American general public at this time but invoked “fear and grief through black Islamic communities across the US.”4 Even more prolific was the campaign of political violence waged by Ted Kaczynski. As a result of his focus on universities and airports, the Federal Bureau of Investigation quickly dubbed him as the UNABOMber (University and Airline Bomber). On May 25, 1978, Kaczynski’s home-

Bipartisan Hesitancy, 1977–1992

45

made device injured a police officer on the campus of Northwestern University, the first in a campaign of political violence that ended with his arrest in 1996. His wave of domestic political violence left three dead and dozens wounded as he sought to advance his views as espoused in a 35,000-word manifesto entitled Industrial Society and Its Future. The threat posed by hijackings continued into the Carter years as a series of nations led by Libya pledged to give sanctuary to hijackers of commercial aircraft. At a summit in Bonn in July 1978, the United States and its allies “worked up a commitment to cease all flights to and from a country that did not return hijacked planes or the hijackers to the country in which the crime was committed.”5 Soon thereafter, the practice ceased. President Carter also became the latest victim of an attempted assassination. In May 1979, Raymond Lee Harvey was arrested 10 minutes prior to Carter’s arrival at the Los Angeles Civic Center, having allegedly been part of a conspiracy, along with Mexican sharpshooters, to assassinate the president. No single incident was as detrimental to the Carter administration as the taking of American hostages from the US embassy in Tehran and their detainment for 444 days by forces of the Iranian Revolution. This incident, and the ensuing response from the White House, proved to be the undoing of Jimmy Carter and did much to undermine US influence in the Middle East. The administration’s failings in this area were total, encapsulating a calamitous deficit of political, diplomatic, and military will. As Madeleine Albright later recalled, every element within the administration “had different sources of information, different understandings of what was going on, and different ideas about what to do.” 6 Not only were US personnel captured but the embassy’s files were compromised in a violation of national security. The task of reviewing the extent of this security breach fell to the director of policy planning, Anthony Lake, who was later appointed national security adviser by President Bill Clinton. The Carter administration’s shortcomings were made evident not only by allowing the hostage crisis to arise and continue for so long but also by the eventual rescue effort that resulted in abject failure, compounding the sense of American hegemonic decline. The perception of a hesitant administration was exacerbated by the sense that decisions were being made on an ad hoc basis, at times by the president’s family members rather than by his political appointees. In a televised debate, President Carter revealed the input of his daughter Amy to his strategic thinking. At the outset of the Iranian hostage crisis, First Lady Rosalyn Carter convinced the president to end the US purchase of Iranian oil.7 The First Family were not the only unorthodox source of assistance for the Carter administration: on November 8, 1979, the New York Times reported that Republican congressman Paul Findley of Illinois had asked Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), itself considered

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The History, 1676–1992

a terrorist organization at the time, to intercede on behalf of the administration.8 Nine days later, the male African American contingent as well as the female American hostages were released.9 The rest festered in captivity until shortly after noon on January 20, 1981, released only after Jimmy Carter had left office and upon receipt of $8 billion in frozen Iranian assets, in what amounted to “the largest single transfer of funds in history.”10 Although the Iranian hostage crisis was a humiliation for the United States, a far more robust approach had been presented to the president for consideration by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who explored the possibility of mining Iranian ports and was an early advocate for a military operation to rescue the hostages. His advice was in stark contrast to that provided by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, while the director of Central Intelligence was deliberately excluded from his planning.11 As Brzezinski noted, the most strident advocate of a robust mission to rescue American citizens was a naturalized American citizen: “I wondered what this indicated about the current American elite and whether we were not seeing here symptoms of a deeper national problem.”12 President Carter, however, continued to adhere to the diplomatic approach espoused by Vance and the State Department. Only too late did Carter back Brzezinski and seek a military solution, and notably this occurred when Vance was on vacation in April 1980. Operation Eagle Claw, designed to penetrate Iranian airspace with helicopters operating from the USS Nimitz, was an aggressive attempt to regain the initiative. Gary Sick of the National Security Council counseled that a rescue operation constituted the only chance of securing the hostages “in the foreseeable future.” He argued that the policy of restraint had “won us a well-deserved understanding throughout the world, but it has run out. It is time for us to act. Now.”13 The attempt to free the hostages from the clutches of Ayatollah Khomeini resulted in a perfect failure. One helicopter was abandoned after it developed a mechanical fault; a second helicopter was forced to return to base; a third was then abandoned with a hydraulic fault, leaving an insufficient number of vehicles to rescue the hostages. Having aborted the mission, farce turned to tragedy when one of the remaining helicopters exploded as it was being refueled, killing eight American servicemen.14 When Vance resigned as secretary of state in protest, his deputy, Warren Christopher, was passed over for promotion in favor of Ed Muskie despite President Carter having referred to Christopher as “the best public servant I had ever known.”15 A rescue mission that had been launched, at least in part, to quell domestic political pressures on Carter’s presidency instead proved disastrous for the administration. The political violence that affected the Carter presidency in the form of the Iranian hostage crisis was compounded by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. Carter denounced the Soviet invasion, halted ratification of the agreement

Bipartisan Hesitancy, 1977–1992

47

resulting from the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), suspended the sale of technology to the Soviet Union, imposed a grain embargo, and called for the establishment of a rapid deployment force.16 Six months prior to the invasion, on July 3, 1979, President Carter had signed a Presidential Directive to provide assistance to the Afghan militia in what eventually developed into the largest covert war in history. The bureaucratic in-fighting between Vance and Brzezinski personalized a structural tug-of-war within the Carter administration between the State Department and the National Security Council over the formulation of US foreign policy. Having moved quickly to secure effective institutional control over the direction of US foreign policy, as outlined in Presidential Directive (PD) 2, dated January 20, 1977, Brzezinski initiated a series of reviews detailed in a Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM). Less than six months into office, Brzezinski drafted PRM 30 on June 2, 1977, to address issues of terrorism. In it, he requested that “the Special Coordination Committee review our policy and procedures for dealing with terrorist incidents” and report back by August 1, 1977. The remit was to consider “whether there should be an explicit policy for negotiating with terrorists . . . the level at which the policy should be set . . . [the] adequacy of current capabilities for dealing with a spectrum of terrorist threats [and to make] recommendations on collection and dissemination of intelligence on terrorist activities.” Furthermore, the memorandum called for a review of “current procedures for handling terrorist incidents, specifically . . . of lines of authority and jurisdiction for handling terrorist incidents.” It finally requested that it be determined “whether an interagency working group (like the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism/Working Group) should continue to exist,” and if so, “the level of secretariat support that is required.”17 This, however, failed to result in the drafting of a Presidential Directive on terrorism during the Carter administration. During what was to be its final year in office, the Carter administration sought to adopt policy positions to address the rapidly changing geopolitical environment. Its initial idealistic approach was replaced with far more realistic policies designed to address the shift in global activity by US adversaries. The Carter Doctrine, unveiled in the State of the Union address in January 1980, asserted US interests in the Persian Gulf, but it took a full year for these principles to appear in a final document, Presidential Directive 63, dated January 15, 1981, just five days before the end of the administration.18 As a result, Stanley Hoffman characterized Carter’s foreign policy as “the Hell of good intentions.” It suffered, he concluded, from “an almost total addiction to erratic tactics.”19 In addition, a variety of initiatives were launched that were seen to go badly wrong in the eyes of the electorate: the farming community in Iowa objected to the grain embargo on the Soviet Union; the decision to boycott the Moscow Olympics received a mixed

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The History, 1676–1992

reception; and Carter’s decision not to actively campaign for reelection while hostages were held in Iran proved to be a strategic electoral blunder.20 It appeared that Jimmy Carter had been “elected to redeem the country, not to govern it.”21 In September 1980, an NBC News/Associated Press poll revealed that only 23 percent of respondents believed Carter’s approach to foreign affairs was “excellent” or “good,” with 77 percent responding that he was doing a “fair” or “poor” job.22 Ultimately, Carter proved incapable of being what Roper defined as a “heroic president.”23 It is possible to conclude that the Carter presidency became a victim of state-sponsored terrorism following the Iranian government’s decision to release American hostages only after he left office. The Iranian hostage crisis, and the flawed effort to liberate the captured Americans, fatally undermined the Carter administration. Coming so soon after Watergate, the Vietnam War, and the Church Committee hearings into assassination efforts by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the inability of the United States to counter the dangers of political violence raised questions about America’s continuing role on the world stage, a situation few imagined a former movie actor would be capable of resolving. The Carter administration’s foreign policy proved to be an albatross for the Democratic Party and its future presidential candidates, who were forced to address its record in regard to Iran and Afghanistan. Not until a Democratic presidential candidate was prepared to publicly disavow the Carter years would the party again control the White House. For the next 12 years, the Democrats were effectively locked out of power, as the party itself became a casualty of Carter’s fall from grace, a decline exacerbated by the efforts of those who used political violence to achieve their aims. President Carter’s defeat ensured that he, along with Warren Christopher, Anthony Lake, Samuel Berger, and Madeleine Albright, were spectators as the more hardline policies they eventually embraced were implemented by successive Republican administrations. Political violence, in the form of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, inflicted a mortal wound on the Carter administration. Its inability to respond to such threats not only led to its defeat in the 1980 election but also ensured that Bill Clinton’s campaign and his subsequent administration did whatever it could to distance itself from memories of the Carter years when it took office in January 1993. In 1980 Governor Reagan, campaigning for the presidency, lambasted President Carter’s foreign policy for its “vacillation, appeasement, and aimlessness.”24 Offering a more robust approach, Reagan promised to “direct the resources of [his] administration against this scourge of civilization and

The Reagan Administration, 1981–1989

Bipartisan Hesitancy, 1977–1992

49

toward expansion of our cooperation with other nations combatting terrorism in its main forms.”25 Given Carter’s weakness in this area, it was an easy subject for Reagan to exploit. He pledged to punish terrorist activities and hinted at new policy initiatives in his inaugural address: “No arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. . . . Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and prey upon their neighbors.”26 Yet the Reagan administration proved to be contradictory on the subject of political violence, as strong words were undermined by inaction in response to deadly attacks on American interests. When nation states could be targeted, action was taken, but when attacks came from nonstate actors, the administration appeared ill equipped to respond. The Reagan administration arrived in the White House committed to developing a new approach to foreign affairs and pledging to adopt a robust engagement on the world stage. Secretary of State Al Haig insisted, “International terrorism will take the place of human rights . . . the greatest problem to me in the human-rights area today is the area of rampant international terrorism.”27 Haig held very particular views on the subject of terrorism, insisting that “the Soviet secret service played a key role in the international terrorist movement.” He was adamant that the USSR “financed, trained, and armed” terrorists “to carry out operations against Western interests and individuals, especially Americans and Israelis.” Pointedly, he noted that “nearly all terrorist organizations had some connection to the Palestinian Liberation Organization.”28 Also joining the Reagan administration were Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, United Nations (UN) ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and a host of advisers who eventually served future administrations, including Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas J. Feith, and Robert Oakley, who served as director of the State Department Office of Combatting Terrorism from 1984 to 1987. The Reagan administration was forced to respond to a wide range of terrorist incidents during its eight years in the White House. Shooting sprees claimed the lives of 13 Americans in Pennsylvania and a US sailor in Puerto Rico in May 1982, as well as 22 lives in an attack on a McDonalds in California in July 1984, 15 lives in an attack on a post office in Oklahoma in August 1986, and the lives of 6 schoolchildren in an attack on an elementary school in Stockton, California, in 1989, three days before Reagan left office. Politically motivated bombings killed Americans at John F. Kennedy International Airport in May 1981, in Manhattan and Brooklyn in December 1982, in Santa Anna, California, in October 1985, and in Wyoming in May 1986. In October 1985, terrorists hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise liner and killed an American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer. Explosions also terrorized, but failed to kill, in Pensacola, Florida, in December 1984; in Idaho, Arizona, and New York in 1986; in Atlantic

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The History, 1676–1992

City and Livermore, California, in 1987; and in New Jersey and Connecticut in 1988. Threats were made to contaminate the water supply to New York City in 1985 and to attack aircraft at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago in 1986. The Ku Klux Klan was responsible for a murder in Mobile, Alabama, in March 1981, and later that year, Kathy Boudin of the Weather Underground was finally arrested after killing three Americans in New York City. The Unabomber continued to terrorize the nation during the Reagan years, attacking Vanderbilt University in May 1982, the University of California two months later, and again in May 1985. His bombings inflicted injuries in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in November 1985 before resulting in his first fatality in Sacramento, California, on December 11. His final act during the Reagan era was to injure a computer store owner on February 20, 1987, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Reagan also became the latest president to be shot in an assassination attempt. As he left the Hilton Hotel in Washington, DC, on March 30, 1981, the president was struck by a bullet that ricocheted off his awaiting limousine. Reagan’s life was spared as the result of two factors: the action of Secret Service agents who placed themselves in the path of John Hinckley Jr.’s indiscriminate firing, and the decision to take the injured president directly to George Washington Hospital and not to the White House, as originally intended. The violence that affected the United States resonated around the world. In May 1981, Pope John Paul II was shot in Saint Peter’s Square. The Camp David Accords, perhaps the most discernable achievement of the Carter administration, became the target of political violence on October 6, 1981, when President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was murdered by members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The assassination changed history and derailed the US-led quest for reconciliation in the Middle East in a foreshadowing of events that claimed the life of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. In both cases, visionary leaders were replaced by those whose ascension to power was achieved under the shadow of assassination and who subsequently failed to exercise courageous leadership, doubtless fearing a similar fate. In 1982, President Reagan dispatched 1,400 US Marines to Lebanon to help stabilize the situation following an Israeli intervention. After their initial success in overseeing the withdrawal of the PLO, their mission was expanded to one of nation building in an attempt to prop up the government of Amin Gemayel, which left the marines exposed and their mission uncertain. The US embassy in Beirut was targeted by a terrorist truck bomb before the marine barracks was struck by Islamic Jihad on October 23, 1983, killing 241. By February 1984, the US presence in the region had ceased as the remaining forces were withdrawn. Colin Powell, who served as President Reagan’s national security adviser between 1987 and 1989, lamented that US Marines had been sent to Lebanon to provide a “presence.” He recognized that there were occasions when it was necessary to

Bipartisan Hesitancy, 1977–1992

51

risk American lives but argued that this was not one of them. “To provide a ‘presence’ or a ‘symbol,’” he concluded, “is not good enough.”29 All too often, symbolism appeared to be the extent of US action in the face of political violence. David Gergen, Reagan’s director of communications from 1981 to 1984, noted that when faced with the deaths of US Marines in Beirut, the president diverted attention by invading Grenada.30 A little over a year later, on June 14, 1985, TWA Flight 847 was hijacked en route from Athens to Rome by members of Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. The hijackers beat and killed passengers in an effort to secure a ransom of $10 million to $15 million and the release of 700 prisoners in Israel whose freedom Israeli defense secretary Yitzhak Rabin had already agreed to.31 For the second time in five years, a group of Americans was held captive in a high-profile, high-stakes situation that threatened to end in American bloodshed and political humiliation for the president. Although an international incident was unfolding that threatened his political standing, Reagan’s diary entries note that “his heart was broken,” not over the hijacking but over the enforced cancelation of a 10-day vacation at his California ranch.32 Later entries reveal that Reagan “would be riding at the ranch if it were not for the hostage crisis.”33 Such comments give pause for thought as to the priorities the president was attaching to the safety of American citizens and to his concept of national security. Speaking at the conclusion of the incident on June 30, Reagan declared, “The United States gives terrorists no rewards and no guarantees. We make no concessions; we make no deals.”34 The prisoners whose release was at the center of the hijacking were eventually freed by Israel throughout the summer of 1985, providing a precedent that was exploited four months later by members of the Palestinian Liberation Front who seized the Achille Lauro cruise ship. Despite these incidents of terrorist activity, President Reagan’s job approval rating jumped by five points to 67 percent during this time.35 The bureaucratic in-fighting that defined the Carter foreign policy team continued to affect the US government adversely during the Reagan years, preventing calls by Vice President George H. W. Bush to establish an intelligence clearinghouse. It also resulted in clashes between Secretary of State Haig and the vice president when Bush sought to chair the National Security Planning Group, designed to address developing crises. Haig’s maneuvering and general persona led to his replacement in 1982 by George Shultz. Unable adequately to address the challenge from nonstate actors, the White House turned its attention to more easily defined enemies. Shultz noted that state-sponsored terrorism had become “a weapon of unconventional warfare against the democracies of the West,” with a handful of states prepared to provide political and material support for terrorist organizations.36 In a July 8, 1985, speech at the American Bar Association, President Reagan identified Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Iran, and Nicaragua as

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The History, 1676–1992

ringleaders of “a new international version of Murder, Incorporated.” He mocked the leadership of these nations as “the strangest collection of misfits, Looney Tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich.”37 Of these states, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua received relatively little attention, but Libya and Iran quickly became central to the Reagan administration’s response to international terrorism. Throughout the Cold War, the challenges posed by the Soviet Union helped unify the United States in a common cause. By the mid-1980s, however, there was a need to refocus attention as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power and increasing popularity in the West. Accordingly, the focus shifted to the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, identified by the White House as a perpetrator of state-sponsored terrorism. Since the 1970s he had operated camps that trained and supported radical groups, including Basque Separatists from Spain, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Italian Red Brigades, the PLO, and Nicaraguan Sandinistas.38 US intelligence feared that Libyan terrorists planned to shoot down the presidential helicopter, Marine One, with a hand-held, heat-seeking missile and started deviating the aircraft’s flight plan as a result.39 On April 5, 1986, two US soldiers and a Turkish national were killed in a bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin by Libyan intelligence. A retaliatory strike, conducted under the auspices of Operation El Dorado Canyon, saw 18 US F-111 bombers based in the United Kingdom join A-6 aircraft flying from US carriers in the Mediterranean Sea attack sites in Benghazi and Tripoli. Addressing the American people, President Reagan defended the strikes as being consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, characterizing them as a “preemptive action” designed to “diminish [Gaddafi’s] capacity to export terror.”40 The strikes received support from the governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton, who noted that “anybody who thinks it is not a good idea needs to have an alternative, because in the end you can’t just continue to let state supported terrorism flourish.”41 In utilizing the military to combat a state sponsor of terrorism, the Reagan administration was acknowledging that it was easier to use the arsenal of the state to confront fellow states than it was to target terrorist networks and nonstate actors.42 The other state to feature prominently at this time was Iran. Having secured the presidency in part as a result of a hostage crisis, Reagan could not afford to campaign for reelection in 1984 under similar circumstances. Yet Americans continued to be held in the Middle East, casualties of the political violence that faced the United States and its citizens on a daily basis. These hostages were not being held by a state but by Hezbollah, a Lebanese-based organization allied with Iran and committed to ridding the region of American interests. In an effort to find favor with the hostage takers, and in clear violation of the Boland Amendment and the US Constitution, the Reagan administration channeled arms to the Iranians for use

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against a US ally—Iraq—in an attempt to expedite the release of American hostages. The White House then diverted the proceeds of the arms sale to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, having been prevented by Congress from funding the group. This event, the Iran-Contra scandal, undermined the credibility of the Reagan administration and its claims about not negotiating with terrorists. Each stage of the operation was illegal and the combination of these elements amounted to a violation of the administration’s declared intentions as well as American laws governing foreign policy and the raising of revenue. The deal with the Iranians ensured that the United States found itself arming both sides of the Iran-Iraq War for periods of the eight-year conflict. The Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department’s list of terrorist states, providing Saddam Hussein with access to data and material that would have otherwise been prohibited. The White House enabled Iraq to access what became known euphemistically as “dual use” technology as well as lines of credit to purchase arms from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, including the United States.43 This became problematic when Saddam Hussein utilized chemical weapons against his enemies, both foreign and domestic, and then received nothing more than an angry press release from the White House. Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater declared, “Everyone in the administration saw the same reports you saw last night. They were horrible, outrageous, disgusting, and should serve as a reminder to all countries of why chemical warfare should be banned.”44 Not for the last time, the White House response to the use of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East failed to live up to its rhetoric on the subject. As a former actor, Ronald Reagan was blessed with rhetorical skills that had proven formidable on the campaign trail and led to him being known to as “The Great Communicator.” His oratory skills were evident in regard to counterterrorism, even if his administration’s ability to provide substance to the rhetoric was doubted. In 1985, Reagan insisted that international terrorism was “a form of warfare” that, although “a difficult problem,” could be defeated and “by working together . . . against terrorism, the allies will win the war against this insidious disease.”45 Continuing the metaphor, Reagan observed that “the war which terrorists are waging is not only directed against the United States, it is a war against all of civilized society.” It was a battle “in which innocent civilians are intentional victims, and our servicemen have become specific targets.”46 The administration framed the issue in the language and context of the time but these continue to resonate in a post-9/11 era. Terrorism, Reagan insisted, was “the antithesis of democracy. Where democracy seeks to consult the common man on the governance of his nation, terrorism makes war on the common man, repudiating in bloody terms the concept of government by the people.”47 Terrorism, Reagan argued, was a fundamentally un-American concept.

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President Reagan compared terrorism to past challenges that had been overcome, including piracy. He insisted that the United States could not accept “repeated and vicious attacks against our nation and its citizens. Terrorists, and those who support them, must and will be held to account.” Reagan condemned those who sought to inflict harm upon his fellow Americans: “If we permit terrorism to succeed anywhere, it will spread like a cancer, eating away at civilized societies and sowing fear and chaos everywhere.”48 The president stressed that there was no room for compromise with such individuals, as “appeasement only invites renewed attack. Terrorists merit only swift, certain justice under the rule of law.”49 Such language reinforced the extent to which President Reagan actively sought to avoid comparisons with his predecessor. The media, however, pointedly repeated Reagan’s campaign attacks on Carter to highlight contradictions between stated and implemented policy. Most pertinent was a statement delivered in Reagan’s first month in office, when he declared, “Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be swift and effective retribution.”50 The reality was that the White House appeared uncertain as to how to respond to aggression from nonstate actors. When US Marines were killed in Beirut, the US response was “hypocritical and pathetic activism.”51 As Tom Brokaw noted on the NBC Nightly News, the Reagan administration was “long on talk and short on action when it [came] to international terrorism.”52 This proved to be the continuing pattern of behavior for the United States in the years to come, as Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed in the skies above Scotland in December 1988 just as the Reagan administration was drawing to a close. The Reagan Administration’s Bureaucratic Response to Terrorism Having taken office partly as a result of state-sponsored terrorism, the Reagan administration was inclined to utilize the bureaucratic tools at its disposal to address this challenge. The administration immediately renamed the National Security Council (NSC) reports: National Security Study Directives (NSSDs), designed to direct individual studies, replaced the Carter-era Presidential Review Memoranda (PRMs), and National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), designed to direct agreed-upon policy, replaced Carter’s Presidential Directives (PDs).53 Both reports were regularly utilized by the administration to address issues of counterterrorism, as were executive orders, signed by the president to direct actions by the federal government.54 President Reagan signed Executive Order 12333 on December 4, 1981, to ensure full cooperation with the CIA (headed by Reagan’s former campaign manager William Casey) in intelligence-gathering operations. The document insisted that all executive branch departments and agencies grant the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) “access to all information rele-

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vant to the national intelligence needs of the United States, and shall give due consideration to the requests from the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate support for Intelligence Community activities.” It reinforced President Gerald Ford’s directive regarding targeted killings, prohibiting any person “employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government” from conspiring in or engaging in assassinations.55 Vitally, the order directed that the DCI could request the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in collecting intelligence material in support of foreign intelligence requirements. This enabled the CIA, prohibited from operating domestically by its charter under the 1947 National Security Act, to draw on the surveillance-gathering facilities of the FBI, which was specifically mandated to operate domestically. This arrangement was confirmed the following month in NSDD 22.56 The Reagan administration took steps to make the National Security Council more responsive to crisis management and terrorist incidents. On January 12, 1982, NSDD 2 altered the national security architecture and established a series of interagency groups. The Senior Interagency Groups on Foreign Policy (SIG-FP), Defense Policy (SIG-DP), and Intelligence (SIG-I) were supplemented by regional and functional interagency groups to address a variety of geographical regions as well as policy sectors, including arms control and counterintelligence.57 The Reagan administration made extensive use of National Security Decision Directives to drive counterterrorism strategy. This process began in earnest at the start of Reagan’s second year in office and reflected the shift that had occurred within the administration. Initially intent on downgrading the status of the National Security Council, Reagan reappraised the situation and made a series of changes. William P. Clark replaced Richard Allen as national security adviser on January 4, 1982, and a month later prepared NSSD 1-82 for the president’s signature. The document called for the preparation of a National Security Decision Directive on the US National Security Strategy. The ensuing report, NSDD 32, was signed by Reagan on May 20, 1982, and focused on the threat posed by the USSR. It did, however, specifically seek to “increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorists, and subversive forces,” noting a series of challenges, “including terrorism . . . contribute[d] to the unstable international environment.”58 Although the danger of a nuclear exchange with the Kremlin remained the focus of US grand strategy, the potential use of political violence against US interests was highlighted in this NSDD. One month earlier, on April 10, 1982, the president had signed NSDD 30, designed to coordinate the federal response to acts of political violence. The directive sought to ensure the “successful management of terrorist incidents” through the implementation of “a rapid, effective response” that utilized “immediate access to institutional expertise” aided by “extensive prior

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planning.” Essentially, it addressed the response to terrorist incidents after they occurred rather than prevention to keep them from happening. The Reagan administration designated the State Department as the lead agency for investigating incidents that occurred outside the United States, and the Justice Department, working with the FBI, was tasked with investigating domestic incidents. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was designated as the lead agency for all hijackings. Notable in their absence was any reference to the military or the CIA. The directive also established the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) to provide the Special Situation Group (SSG) with “direct operational support, to ensure interagency coordination, and to provide advice and recommendations during an incident.”59 NSDD 30 was an early indication of the bureaucratic response to terrorism that emerged from the Reagan White House. NSDD 47 was signed on July 22, 1982, and outlined government policy in regard to emergency mobilization preparedness in the event of a “grave national emergency.” The document directed the nation’s law enforcement agencies to “maintain law and order in a variety of emergencies, particularly terrorist incidents.”60 Despite this reference, the focus of the directive was on the nuclear peril posed by the Soviet Union, with terrorism appearing low on the overall threat level. The challenge from the USSR was underscored on September 1, 1983, when Korean Airlines Flight 007, having strayed over Soviet airspace, was shot down, killing 269 passengers and crew, including Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia. Four days later, the president signed NSDD 102 in direct response to the incident and spoke to the nation from the Oval Office.61 Reagan called the incident “an act of barbarism born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations.”62 It was another reason why the Reagan administration viewed the Soviet Union as being “the focus of evil in the modern world.”63 Importantly, NSDD 102 restricted the US response to diplomatic and political endeavors, making no reference to any retaliatory military action. This was not to be the last 747 lost to an act of terror during the Reagan presidency, nor the last to elicit no military response. On April 3, 1984, President Reagan signed NSDD 138, which directly addressed efforts to combat terrorism. The document stated that the administration considered “the practice of terrorism by any person or group in any cause [to be] a threat to our national security” and vowed that the White House intended to “resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available.” The directive insisted that terrorist groups and states that actively supported the use of political violence would be targeted using “all available channels.” In language that refutes the belief that the preemption policy of the George W. Bush administration was a new development, the 1984 directive stressed: “Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to

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conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests.”64 This extensive report, designed to complement the provisions established in Executive Order 12333, was a two-phase initiative to address political violence. The first phase, to be implemented by December 31, 1984, was intended to “immediately reduce the threat to US citizens, interests, and property.” This included the preparation of four pieces of legislation to aid the US counterterrorism effort, which were sent to Congress on April 26, 1984. These were the Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, the Aircraft Sabotage Act, the Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts, and the Prohibition Against Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act. The Reagan administration directed that all lead agencies—State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, and the CIA—liaise to ensure the establishment of a coordinated, integrated policy to address challenges facing the United States. The responsibility for coordinating this plan was assigned to DCI Casey. The second phase, to commence on January 1, 1985, was designed to “improve capabilities, organizations, and management” in order to “further protect US interests, citizens, and facilities from acts of terrorism,” though the exact manner in which this was to occur was unclear at the time.65 The findings of NSDD 138 remained in place until being superseded by Presidential Decision Directive 62, signed by President Clinton. Reelected to a second term in November 1984, the Reagan administration pushed ahead with counterterrorism directives. In June 1985, six Americans were killed in a terrorist incident in El Salvador. In response, Reagan called for “reasoned responses to lawless actions” that must be “appropriate and proportionate.”66 The incident led to the drafting of NSDD 176, signed on July 9, 1985, which focused on supplying the government of El Salvador with military hardware “drawn from US stocks, diverted from assets intended for other countries, or purchased through accelerated procurement procedures.”67 This was only the first of three NSDDs to be signed in July 1985. On July 20, NSDD 179 addressed a task force on combatting terrorism, and NSDD 180 focused on a civil aviation antiterrorism program. Although the Reagan administration sought to undertake “action in concert with other nations,” it recognized the need to “be prepared to act unilaterally when necessary.”68 To that end, NSDD 179 established a government-wide task force under the directive of the vice president, who was appointed to review existing practices that had been established under Executive Order 12333 as well as NSDD 30 and NSDD 138. A spate of hijackings was the motivation for the final directive issued that July, which addressed the dangers posed to civil aviation. The directive ordered that “extraordinary security and protective measures” be implemented. These included the expansion of the Federal Air Marshal program to ensure coverage of the most

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high-risk locations, an international assessment of airport security, and enhanced airline security training. The danger from Libya was addressed in two NSDD reports in 1986. The first, NSDD 205, dated January 8, declared that the “policies and actions in support of international terrorism by the Government of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” The document sought to restrict Libya’s interaction with the world by imposing a series of punitive sanctions. It also announced an impending executive order to “terminate American economic activity in and related to Libya.”69 The directive confirmed the previous determination in NSDD 200 prohibiting Libyan naval vessels entry to US ports and imposed new travel and economic restrictions.70 This was followed eight months later by NSDD 234, which prioritized US objectives in regard to Libya as being to “dissuade” Gaddafi from utilizing terrorism, to enhance “the chances of a positive change in leadership,” and, finally, “to minimize the risk of Soviet gains.”71 In response to the increased threat to US interests, President Reagan signed NSDD 207 on January 20, 1986, addressing the National Program for Combatting Terrorism. Based on Vice President Bush’s task force, the directive insisted that US policy was “unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms.”72 The report stressed that the government would not negotiate with terrorists and would use all means at its disposal to stop and apprehend extremists. This directive confirmed earlier findings made in NSDD 30 granting the State Department power over international terrorism while the FBI took the lead on domestic incidents. At this time, room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building next to the White House was transformed into a high-tech crisis management center by Admiral John Poindexter, who was then serving as a military aide to the NSC. The room was designed, in part, to address cases of international terrorism. In the coming years, much of the technology was transferred to the extended Situation Room complex beneath the West Wing. The Counterterrorism Center (CTC) was also established at the CIA.73 As in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and 9/11, the instinctive response to traumatic incidents by the federal government was bureaucratic in nature. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration also utilized legislation to address terrorism. The 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorist Act widened the federal jurisdiction of the United States to “terrorist crimes, including hostage taking, homicide, conspiracy to commit homicide, or physical violence committed against a US national or interest occurring anywhere in the world.” These acts constituted what came to be viewed as “long-arm” legislation, empowering the FBI to investigate crimes beyond the territorial borders of the United States.74 The legislation enshrined the FBI as the lead

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investigative agency, a point reiterated in November 1987 by L. Paul Bremer III, the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism. Addressing the Committee on Foreign Relations in Tampa, Florida, Bremer argued that a key aspect of administration policy was “applying the rule of law to terrorists,” and he stressed that “terrorists are criminals.” He reiterated the view of the Reagan White House that “a major element of our strategy has been to delegitimize terrorists, to get society to see them for what they are—criminals—and to use democracy’s most potent tool, the rule of law, against them.” Bremer noted, however, that “given the persistence of terrorism over centuries, it is unreasonable to think we can eliminate it.” He insisted that aspirations had to be realistic and that the United States “must avoid the temptation of talking the total elimination of terrorism as our goal. We can no more eradicate terrorism than we can eradicate crime.”75 The Reagan White House became the first administration to be required to produce a National Security Strategy (NSS) in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The two reports issued by the Reagan administration under the auspices of the act addressed counterterrorism and political violence, but did so within the confines of a Cold War setting and in regard to state-led action. In both reports, dated January 1987 and 1988, the administration recognized the need to address terrorism as a major objective. Throughout the reports, the Reagan administration repeatedly made reference to its desire to address state sponsors of terrorism rather than the actual perpetrators of political violence. The primary focus of the administration’s counterterrorism strategy was the Soviet Union, which the White House accused of providing “arms and military training [to] international terrorist groups” in order to “exploit regional instabilities,” including “an aggressive and illegal war in Afghanistan.”76 The Reagan administration perpetuated the concept of a “terror network” that emanated from the Soviet Union, a view that was reflected in two influential articles published in the New York Times Magazine. Robert Moss’s “Terror: A Soviet Export” appeared in November 1980, and Claire Sterling’s “Terrorism: Tracing the International Network” was printed in March 1981. Both were indicative of the view that global terrorist activity was being controlled by the Kremlin. Sterling insisted that there was “massive proof that the Soviet Union and its surrogates, over the last decade, have provided the weapons, training and sanctuary for a worldwide terror network aimed at the destabilization of Western democratic society.”77 Her subsequent book, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism, was embraced by senior members of the Reagan administration, including the initial secretary of state, Al Haig.78 Although relations between Washington and Moscow improved dramatically during this time period, the Reagan administration insisted as late as 1987 that the Soviet Union continued to channel “massive amounts

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of arms, money, and advisory assistance” to terrorist groups around the world. It accused the Kremlin of supporting state sponsors of terrorism in Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria, and Libya to indirectly target the United States and its allies.79 The Reagan administration accused the USSR of having “established a massive political influence apparatus,” which included “the world’s largest propaganda machine, incorporating overt and clandestine activities in all types of media,” and the “funding and support” of terrorists.80 The administration was particularly concerned by the potential for the USSR to utilize terrorism to advance its long-stated ambition of global political supremacy over the United States. As a result, two global regions were of particular significance: the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East. The 1987 NSS noted that the “aggressive Marxist regimes” in Nicaragua and Cuba presented “an area of strategic opportunity for the Soviet Union.” The White House feared “continued instability and conflict in the region” as a result of the “support for guerrilla movements in other Latin nations and their ties to international terrorism.”81 The domino theory of the 1950s and 1960s was en vogue in the Reagan administration as it feared contagion in Central and South America via the mechanism of political violence. In the Middle East, the Reagan administration’s policy sought to “isolate and build international pressure against state sponsors of terrorism.” Primary among these nations were Libya and Iran. Having taken military action against Gaddafi’s regime, the administration highlighted a tangible response “designed to demonstrate the political, military, and economic costs of supporting terrorism.”82 The White House lamented Iran’s continued support for international terrorism that had caused the United States to provide naval protection to allied shipping in the region. This ultimately led to tragedy on July 3, 1988, when the USS Vincennes accidentally shot down Iran Air Flight 655, an Iranian civilian aircraft, killing all 290 on board. Despite these regional aspects, the Reagan administration repeatedly returned to the Soviet Union as it committed to “take steps to discourage Soviet and other state sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive forces to exploit instability.” When intervention was required, the Reagan administration insisted it would occur “in accordance with the principles of international and domestic law” and in partnership with allies “to assist one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency, terrorism, illicit narcotics traffic, and other characteristic forms of low intensity conflict.”83 Throughout its National Security Strategies, the Reagan administration was adamant that it had taken “significant steps to define and implement policies to counter international terrorism.” It recognized that lowintensity conflicts were likely to be “protracted struggles” and that, as such, “most of the instruments of power that we can bring to bear on them

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work indirectly and over a long period of time.”84 Economic sanctions, designed “to persuade the target country that its behavior is unacceptable,” were a primary instrument that the Reagan administration adopted in this struggle.85 The White House appreciated that the full use of the federal government was required to combat international terrorism, “particularly when state-supported,” because of its potential challenge to the security of the nation and its citizens.”86 The Reagan administration demonstrated a contradictory position on issues of terrorism and political violence. It issued harshly worded statements and dedicated many hours to NSC meetings on the subject, produced many NSDDs on related matters, and threatened retribution against perpetrators of such acts. Yet a consideration of events in Lebanon, Berlin, and Tehran demolishes any belief that the United States held a firm line against terrorism in the 1980s. On the contrary, the United States found itself unable to respond to an enemy it neither understood nor cared to confront head-on. Writing in 1987, Michael Mandelbaum captured a sense of the time and provided an indication of how much has changed in the intervening years: “There is no real consensus in favor of serious military reprisals against the agents and sponsors of terrorism that will kill others as well. No doubt this makes the United States a more attractive target than countries that are less reticent about shedding blood. It is perhaps the price to be paid for living in a nation whose citizens do not like to kill innocent people.”87 In the aftermath of 9/11, such a statement appears quaint and clearly belonging to a different time, a time when it was possible for the president of the United States to turn a blind eye to acts of political violence as they claimed the lives of American citizens.88 Many of the contradictions in the US position on counterterrorism can be traced back to Reagan. His “hands-off” management style and willingness to delegate responsibility to trusted subordinates ensured he was not fully engaged in the detail of policy, tacitly empowering his aides in a way that led to the establishment of fiefdoms and policies that, on occasion, challenged legality. Talking tough on terrorism, it appeared, was a great deal easier than acting tough, even for a former movie star. A change of tone came to the White House in January 1989 with George H. W. Bush, the most experienced foreign policy operative to hold the office. It was not surprising that international relations played a substantial role in his presidency.89 In his 1988 campaign book, Looking Forward, Bush explicitly referenced a notorious act of international terrorism: the murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. He noted that the incident led him to cast only the second American veto in United Nations

The Bush Administration, 1989–1993

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The History, 1676–1992

history, “against a Security Council resolution that condemned Israel for attacking Palestinian bases in Syria and Lebanon, but failed to condemn the Munich atrocity that led to the attack.”90 Despite the years of experience that George Bush brought to the presidency, he proved no more adroit at dealing with perpetrators of political violence than his predecessor. Bush may have sought a “kinder, gentler nation,” but he found that this did not translate into a more peaceful world, because a vast array of simmering hatreds emerged as the Cold War drew to a close.91 Domestic political violence continued unabated under the new administration. In March 1989, an attempt was made on the life of Sharon Lee Rogers, whose husband had been captain of the USS Vincennes. Rashad Khalifa was assassinated in Arizona in 1990 because of his interpretation of the Koran, and Jewish Defense League founder Meir Kahane was murdered by El Sayyid Abdulazziz Nosair in New York later that year. In 1991, Mustafa Shalabi was killed by members of an Islamic group, and in 1992 the wife of former senior officer in the Iranian shah’s secret police (SAVAK), Parivash Rafizadeh, was killed in New Jersey. Mass shootings continued to account for the highest loss of life at the hands of political extremists. Ten Americans were killed in a shooting at an office in Jacksonville, Florida, in 1990, 24 were killed in an attack in Texas in October 1991, and 4 were killed in a high school shooting in California in May 1992. A gas canister, sent in the mail, exploded at the office of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in Atlanta, Georgia, on August 21, 1989, and on December 18, 1989, Robert Robinson, a black civil rights lawyer, was killed when a device exploded in his mail in Savannah, Georgia. Bombings also killed a judge in Alabama in December 1989, and two members of Earth First were injured in May 1990 when their own bomb exploded before it could be used to terrorize others. Finally, in April 1992, federal forces held Randy Weaver and his family under seige at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. The ensuing shoot-out resulted in the death of US Marshall Bill Degan as well as Weaver’s wife and son. An investigation concluded that the federal authorities had used unconstitutional force, leading to hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information. It was an incident that came to have profound implications for the Clinton administration one year later. The Bush administration took office in the aftermath of a major act of international terrorism: Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed on December 21, 1988, as it headed to New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport, killing all 243 passengers, 16 crew members, and 11 people on the ground when the fuselage fell to earth in Lockerbie, Scotland. The event occurred at the worst possible moment for the federal bureaucracy, after the 1988 election but prior to George H. W. Bush’s inauguration, resulting in a lack of leadership or cohesion. Acting as both vice president and president-elect,

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Bush made it clear that the United States would “seek hard” and “punish severely” those responsible for the attack.92 As established by the Reagan administration in NSDD 30 and NSDD 207, the FBI was designated the lead investigative agency in the case, a decision that was not challenged by the incoming Bush administration. There was no rush to judgment with the incident, despite early efforts to blame Syria. Six months into the investigation, the FBI and the CIA focused on a potential Iranian involvement as a retaliation in revenge for the 1988 downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes. Declassified CIA material from the era reveals the agency’s belief that “Iran’s support for radical Palestinian groups, particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command . . . poses a serious threat to US and West European interests.”93 Throughout 1989, the possibility of Iranian involvement remained the investigators’ working theory until the discovery of a piece of circuit board at the crash site caused the focus to shift to potential Libyan involvement.94 Despite what was presented as solid physical evidence linking Libya to the destruction of the aircraft, the Bush administration refused to engage in military retaliation, choosing instead to support the imposition of UN sanctions and the pursuit of a legal case against two members of the Libyan intelligence service. The Bush administration concluded that a strategy of military retaliation was futile: “We thought that we weren’t likely to get anywhere with another bombing raid and that you couldn’t rule out that indeed the Pan Am 103 shoot-down was a consequence of the last bombing raid,” National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft recalled.95 The decision divided opinion, with speculation centering on why charges were brought against two individuals as private citizens rather than as operatives of the Libyan state. The decision to prosecute the crime through the courts, rather than via military action, created a precedent for the Clinton administration when it came to office in January 1993. George H. W. Bush moved quickly to place his own stamp on the national security architecture of the United States. His administration replaced the Reagan-era NSSDs with the National Security Review (NSR), and the previous NSDD papers were replaced with the National Security Directive (NSD). NSD 1, dated January 30, 1989, established the NSC structure that has remained largely intact ever since: a full National Security Council, a Principals Committee (NSC-PC), a Deputies Committee (NSC-DC), and a variety of NSC Policy Coordinating Committees (NSCPCCs) to oversee a series of geographical regions and issue-led aspects of national security, although terrorism was not included among these.96 Nine months later, this document was supplemented by a directive assigning responsibility for crisis management to the Deputies Committee. This directive continued to influence the decisionmaking process long after Bush left the White House and, on occasion, ensured that senior cabinet secretaries

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were not as fully briefed as necessary on developing issues. Most issues related to counterterrorism were addressed by the interagency Coordinating Sub-Group (CSG) on counterterrorism run by Ambassador David C. Miller. NSD 10, signed on May 7, 1989, established nine Policy Coordinating Committees, including one dedicated to counterterrorism designed to “assume the previous responsibilities of the inter-departmental group on terrorism and . . . lead the formulation of administration counterterrorism policy and implementation efforts.”97 During the administration’s first full month in power, NSR documents were issued requesting studies into the state of US relations with Panama (NSR 2), eastern Europe (NSR 4), western Europe (NSR 5), and the Persian Gulf (NSR 10). These reports centered on regions of the world where the potential for state-sponsored political violence was at its greatest: the European continent, where the US continued to face down the Soviet Union; the Middle East, where Iran and Iraq threated US interests; and Panama, where the Bush administration initiated Operation Just Cause to depose its leader, Manuel Noriega. Among the first National Security Directives issued by the Bush White House was NSD 3, addressing US policy toward Afghanistan. The document, which remains heavily redacted, noted that the United States should work to “encourage the establishment of a stable Afghan government” while preventing “the emergence of a new Afghan government that is pro-Soviet, pro-Iranian or messianic-Islamic.”98 Despite establishing these goals in the first month of the Bush presidency, the inability of the United States to deliver tangible results prior to the 1992 election had lasting repercussions for the administrations that followed. Using language that echoed President Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address, NSD 26, dated October 1989, insisted that “access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security.”99 In a document focused on US policy in the Persian Gulf, the Bush administration highlighted the challenges of dealing with Iran, with which normalized relations were sought but only following Tehran’s cessation of support for international terrorism. Although suspicions remained surrounding potential Iranian involvement in the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, the bombing was not mentioned in the document. US policy in the region was revisited once again in NSD 45, signed August 20, 1990, and in NSD 54, dated January 15, 1991, in which President Bush authorized the use of military action against Iraq in response to the political violence that had been perpetrated against Kuwait. Fears over potential retaliation by Iraqi forces led to the preparation of NSD 57, dated May 7, which focused on risks to US ports and flag-carrying vessels. The CIA believed that Saddam would “unleash a major terrorist campaign against Western—particularly US—interests. Multiple, simultaneous attacks are likely to occur in several geographic regions—possibly including the

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United States—in an effort to capture maximum publicity and sow widespread panic.”100 At this stage, the feasibility of simultaneous, coordinated attacks was believed to be indicative of the resources available only to national intelligence services and they were not associated with the actions of nonstate actors. Under President Bush, the National Security Council did not address issues of terrorism to the extent that it had under President Reagan. This reflected a decision not to emphasize the subject but also the degree to which the issue appeared to be on the decline. President Bush and his foreign policy team were focused on the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, negotiating nuclear reduction treaties, and paving the way for a peaceful transition from the Cold War to Bush’s self-defined New World Order.101 Terrorism, therefore, was not deemed to be a major topic of debate for the most senior members of the administration. The perceived decline in danger from perpetrators of political violence was such that discussions were held about the continuing need for the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) at the CIA, with suggestions emanating from the administration that the terrorist problem had been “solved.”102 The CTC remained, but the CIA’s penchant for secrecy ensured that it failed to develop into “the counterterrorism fusion center” that had been planned when it was first established. Bureaucratic challenges also ensured that regulations governing the domestic remit of the FBI prevented it from sharing vital information with the CIA, which was mandated to operate abroad. During the Bush presidency, therefore, the perceived risks from terrorism took a noticeable back seat to the broader international upheaval that accompanied the end of the Cold War. The three NSS documents issued by the Bush administration under the auspices of the Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed counterterrorism and political violence, but it did so within the confines of state-sponsored actions. The Bush White House prioritized “a stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions” and sought to “aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.”103 In its 1990 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration noted that its primary responsibility was to ensure “the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.” To do so, the administration committed to a series of pledges, including declaring its intent to “deal effectively with threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism.”104 Although East-West relations were improving, the White House recognized that “lower-order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States, its citizenry, and its interests in new ways.” Reduced international tensions between the superpowers

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did not mean an end to political violence but instead signified a new era of dangers to the United States. As the report noted, “It is not possible to prevent or deter conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum in the same way or to the same degree as at the higher. American forces therefore must be capable of dealing effectively with the full range of threats, including insurgency and terrorism.”105 The Bush administration appreciated that the “twin scourges of international terrorism and narcotics trafficking also pose very high-priority, but non-traditional, intelligence requirements.”106 This required a focus on unconventional warfare in which “Special Operations Forces have particular utility. . . . Units with unique capabilities in this environment will receive increased emphasis” to ensure that the nation was “better attuned to the needs of low-intensity conflict.”107 The 1990 NSS insisted that “the scourge of terrorism, and of states who sponsor it, likewise remains a threat.”108 To that end, the Bush administration committed to maintaining a naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, to preposition equipment throughout the region to confront state sponsors of terrorism. Despite the challenges posed by Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration argued that a New World Order was “still within reach, perhaps brought closer by the unprecedented international cooperation achieved in the Gulf crisis.”109 The conflict in Kuwait was decisive, but the report stressed that US counterterrorism strategy in the region exhibited “powerful continuity,” which involved “promoting stability and the security of our friends, maintaining a free flow of oil, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, discouraging destabilizing conventional arms sales,” and, vitally, “countering terrorism.”110 In a new geopolitical era, the Bush administration recognized “new tasks and new priorities,” while remaining aware of the “threats posed by narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and the proliferation of advanced weapons.”111 These challenges were far from theoretical, and the Bush administration noted the dangers of Iran and Libya, both of which were key suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 at the time the NSS was released in August 1991. By the time the Bush administration released its final NSS in January 1993, it had only days left in office, having been defeated in its bid for a second term by Governor Clinton. The document was more reflective and less prescriptive with regard to the fight against political violence and international terrorism. In language that was soon reflected in Bill Clinton’s first inaugural address, the 1993 NSS noted that the end of the Cold War “coincided with a virtual explosion of long-dormant ethnic and aggressive nationalistic tensions around the world, many of which have degenerated into international crises. Proliferation, terrorism, and the international drug trade still threaten stability.”112 At the end of a 12-year period during which George Bush had served as vice president and as president, his administra-

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tion’s final NSS confirmed a consistent philosophical approach to political violence: “Terrorism remains a potential threat to our national security—a threat we will oppose by all legal means available. . . . We will pay no ransoms nor agree to other conditions that could serve to encourage additional terrorism.” The 1993 NSS concluded that “states that practice or actively support terrorism will suffer international isolation and economic repercussions.” The language was notable for the lack of reference to any military repercussions. In language that was adopted by the Clinton administration, the report insisted that the United States “will reserve the right to act unilaterally, and will continue to work cooperatively with other nations to prevent and respond to terrorist acts.”113 As 12 years of Republican Party rule in the White House ended, the considered and temperate language it used to address political violence and international terrorism was soon adopted by the new Democratic president and thoroughly rejected by a new generation of Republican politicians in Washington, DC. The four years during which the Bush administration held office were a particular challenge to the president and his advisers, all of whom had been raised to face down the dangers of Soviet aggression. This threat was disappearing before their eyes, leaving questions as to the role of the United States on the world stage. As the Bush administration prepared to leave Washington, there was a sense of an era closing. The Bush presidency coincided with Francis Fukuyama’s prediction of the “End of History” and the belief that the great ideological battle of a generation had been waged and settled. Along with the broad sense of victory over communism came a quiet belief that the dangers from terrorism were now receding, as the end of the Cold War removed the financial and ideological backing that had been essential to terrorist organizations. Shortly after Bush left office, Robert Phillips of the University of Connecticut argued that international terrorism in the 1980s “was fundamentally fuelled by the Cold War,” adding that it was possible to “date the diminution of that terrorism with Gorbachev’s ascension to power.”114 The challenge that came from state sponsors of terrorism acting as “a big conduit of money and fake passports and putting the semtex in the diplomatic bags” appeared to be a thing of the past.115 The terror groups that had inflicted domestic mayhem a decade before, such as the Weathermen and the Black Panthers, had all but ceased to exist. Overseas, the Abu Nidal organization was collapsing, and the Palestine Liberation Organization was in secret negotiations to agree to a peace deal with Israel. As the CIA noted, “Regimes that sponsor or otherwise support terrorism have become less active or more discreet since 1986.” This, the agency noted, was “largely in response to Western counterterrorist measures and regional political developments.”116 Despite this, the Bush administration “continued to see America’s future wholly in terms of a global multilateralism that would be promoted

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and protected by American military might. For all of the president’s calls for a ‘new world order,’ it was the perpetuation of the older order of Pax Americana that remained his purpose.117 The world around them was changing, but Bush appointees remained stubborn in their Cold War resolve, fixated on state-centric threats and a preponderance of power philosophy. This focus on state actors and the perpetration of political violence between states, rather than on organizations or specific terrorists, had tangible implications, as perpetrators of attacks on the United States went unpunished. Understandably, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing repercussions in eastern Europe, coupled with the need to reunify Germany plus the Gulf War, dominated the administration’s foreign policy agenda and proved to be “all they could really find time for.”118 For President Bush and his foreign policy advisers, terrorism was a minor irritant and a distraction from the major geopolitical transactions that were occurring at the time. Yet, upon reflection, the administration’s time in office was bookended by two serious assaults on the prestige of the United States: the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988 as the administration prepared to enter office, and the bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, days after it left office. The attacks ensured that Paul Bremer’s words spoken five years earlier remained prescient: “Terrorism has by no means disappeared from the world scene. It is an ancient problem that will be with us for the foreseeable future as terrorists constantly revise and adapt their methods of attack.”119 Between January 1977 and January 1993, three administrations, headed by Republican and Democratic presidents, led the United States as it engaged with the forces of political violence. Their policies provided the direct inheritance for the Clinton administration and the foundation on which counterterrorism strategy for the remainder of the twentieth century was constructed. What most defined this era was continuity. All three presidents promised to address political violence and refused to compromise with terrorists, yet failed to find an adequate manner in which to deal with these challenges. During these years, Americans were routinely taken hostage, kidnapped, and tortured, the Marine barracks in Beirut was bombed, and Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed as it carried American citizens home for Christmas. In spite of these incidents, when Americans considered acts of terrorism, “they [were] usually referring to incidents far from American shores.” As a result, Americans tended to believe “that terrorism [was] not an internal problem for the United States.”120 The American public appeared unconcerned, and successive administrations appeared unprepared, lacking any tangible response to perpetrators of political violence. Events from this era reveal that the United States of America was under attack long before September

The Years of Bipartisan Timidity

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11, 2001, with little or no reaction from the media, or the population, and with an apparent lack of comprehension on the part of successive administrations as to how best to respond. As of January 20, 1993, the task of dealing with this fell to a man whose campaign focused almost exclusively on domestic economic reform and who appeared to be an unlikely leader of the post–Cold War era. 1. Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005). 2. During the Carter administration, Warren Christopher served as deputy secretary of state, Anthony Lake was director of policy planning at the State Department, and Samuel Berger served as Lake’s deputy. Madeleine Albright joined the staff of the National Security Council in March 1978 to develop congressional relations. 3. Fred C. Shapiro, “Blast,” New Yorker, October 24, 1977, 35–36. 4. “Religious Split Among Blacks,” US News & World Report 74, no. 83 (February 5, 1973). 5. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 206. 6. Madeleine Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty (London: Macmillan, 2006), 38. 7. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), 461. 8. Eric Pace, “PLO Aides Say Group Is in Iran, but US Official Expresses Doubt,” New York Times, November 8, 1979, A10. 9. Gary Sick, All Fall Down (New York: Random House, 1985), 264. 10. Steven Rattner, “Largest Private Financial Transfer in History,” New York Times, January 25, 1981, E3. 11. Stansfield Turner, Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors and Secret Intelligence (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 172–173. 12. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1983), 481. 13. Sick, All Fall Down, 290. 14. See David Patrick Houghton, US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 15. Carter, White House Diary, 423. 16. Glenn Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, Past, Present, Future, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 57. 17. PRM 30, “Terrorism,” June 2, 1977. 18. PD 63, “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” January 15, 1981. 19. Stanley Hoffman, “Requiem,” Foreign Policy 42 (Spring 1981): 3–26. 20. See Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 21. Peter Meyer, James Earl Carter: The Man and the Myth (Kansas City, MO: Shed Andrews & McMeel, 1978), 60. 22. “Opinion Roundup,” Public Opinion (December/January 1981): 27. 23. Jon Roper, The American Presidents: Heroic Leadership from Kennedy to Clinton (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).

Notes

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24. Ronald Reagan, “Draft of a Potential State of the Union Speech, March 13, 1980,” in Reagan, in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America, ed. Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York: Free Press, 2001), 472. 25. Reagan, quoted in Roland Evans and Robert Novak, The Reagan Revolution (New York: E. Dutton, 1981), 195. 26. “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1981, PPPRR, 3. 27. Alexander Haig, press conference, January 28, 1981. 28. Alexander Haig, Inner Circles: How America Changed the World (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 540. See also John-Thor Dahlburg, “Yeltsin Aide Says Terrorists Got Soviet Help,” Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1992. 29. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 291–292. 30. Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 326; George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human (New York: Little, Brown, 1999), 218; David Gergen, Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership, Nixon to Clinton (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 219–220. 31. Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 260. 32. Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 337. 33. Reagan, Reagan Diaries, 339. 34. “Remarks Announcing the Release of the Hostages from the Trans World Airlines Hijacking Incident,” June 30, 1985, PPPRR, 2:886. 35. Reeves, President Reagan, 264. See also Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 188–198. 36. George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 643. 37. “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association,” July 8, 1985, PPPRR, 2:894–900. 38. See Geoff Simons, Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003). 39. Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 291. 40. “Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strikes in Libya,” April 24, 1986, PPPRR, 1:469. 41. The Clinton Record, Libya, Excerpt from the Arkansas Gazette, April 16, 1986, Box 11, File 5, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 42. The extent to which the vilification of Libya permeated American society can be gauged by the fact that Libyan nationalists were the villains in the hit 1985 movie Back to the Future. The film made repeated references to the Reagan presidency and was later referenced by the president in his 1986 State of the Union. See “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,” February 4, 1986, PPPRR, 1:128. 43. See Alan Friedman, Spider’s Web: Bush, Saddam, Thatcher and the Decade of Deceit (London: Faber & Faber, 1993). 44. David Ottoway, “US Decries Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons,” Washington Post, March 24, 1988, A37. 45. “Written Responses to Questions Submitted by II Resto Del Carlino of Italy,” April 1, 1985, PPPRR, 1:373. 46. “Statement Announcing Action Against Terrorism,” June 20, 1985, PPPRR, 1:800. 47. “Letter to President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador on the Investigation of the Murder of United States Citizens in San Salvador,” August 29, 1985, PPPRR, 2:1019.

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48. “Remarks to Citizens in Chicago Heights, Illinois,” June 28, 1985, PPPRR, 1:833–834. 49. “Letter to President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador on the Investigation of the Murder of United States Citizens in San Salvador,” August 29, 1985, PPPRR, 2:1019. 50. “Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for the Freed American Hostages,” January 27, 1981, PPPRR, 42. 51. David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 233. 52. Reeves, President Reagan, 262. 53. As detailed in NSDD-1, February 15, 1981. 54. See William Inboden, “Grand Strategy and Petty Squabbles: The Paradox and Lessons of the Reagan NSC,” in The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft, ed. Hal Brands and Jeremi Suri (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 151–180. 55. Exec. Order No. 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” 3 C.F.R. 200 (December 4, 1981). 56. NSDD 22, “Designation of Intelligence Officials Authorized to Request FBI Collection of Foreign Intelligence,” January 29, 1982. 57. NSDD 2, “National Security Council Structure,” January 12, 1982. 58. NSDD 32, “US National Security Strategy,” May 20, 1982. 59. NSDD 30, “Managing Terrorist Incidents,” April 10, 1982, 2. 60. NSDD 47, “Emergency Mobilization Preparedness,” July 22, 1982. 61. NSDD 102, “US Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner,” September 5, 1983. 62. “Address to the Nation on the Soviet Attack on a Korean Civilian Airliner,” September 5, 1983, PPPRR, 2:1228. 63. “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida,” March 8, 1983, PPPRR, 1:363. 64. NSDD 138, “Combatting Terrorism,” April 3, 1984. 65. NSDD 138, “Combatting Terrorism,” April 3, 1984. The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking and the Aircraft Sabotage Act were both included in HJ Res. 648 and became law in October 1984. The Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts became law as part of the 1984 Act to Combat Terrorism. The Prohibition Against Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act was not passed. 66. “Statement Announcing Action Against Terrorism,” June 20, 1985, PPPRR, 1:800. 67. NSDD 176, “Combatting Terrorism in Central America,” July 9, 1985. 68. NSDD 179, “Task Force on Combatting Terrorism,” July 20, 1985. 69. NSDD 205, “Acting Against Libyan Support of International Terrorism,” January 8, 1986. 70. NSDD 200, “US Port Security Program,” December 4, 1985. 71. NSDD 234, “Libya Policy,” August 16, 1986. 72. NSDD 207, “The National Program for Combatting Terrorism,” January 20, 1986. 73. Naftali, Blind Spot, 181. 74. US Department of Justice, Terrorism in the United States 1998, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 15. 75. L. Paul Bremer III, “Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics” (speech at the Committee on Foreign Relations, Tampa, FL, November 4, 1987), reprinted in

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Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft, eds., Evolution of US Counterterrorism Policy, vol. 1 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 177–178. 76. The National Security Strategy of the United States 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1987), 6. 77. Claire Sterling, “Terrorism: Tracing the International Network,” New York Times Magazine, March 1981, 16–19, 24, 54–56, 58–60. 78. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1981). See also Edward S. Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan, The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape Our View of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989). 79. NSS87, 6. 80. NSS87, 7. 81. NSS87, 13–14. 82. NSS87, 17–18. 83. The National Security Strategy of the United States 1988 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1988), 34. 84. NSS87, 34. 85. NSS88, 12. 86. NSS88, 23. 87. Michael Mandelbaum, “The Luck of the President,” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 3 (1985): 403. 88. For more on the Reagan administration’s approach to counterterrorism, see Kiron K. Skinner, “The Beginning of a New US Grand Strategy: Policy on Terror During the Reagan Era,” in Reagan’s Legacy in a World Transformed, ed. Jeffrey L. Chidester and Paul Kengor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); David C. Wills, The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy During the Reagan Administration (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 89. George H. W. Bush was a member of Congress (1967–1971), a US ambassador to the United Nations (1971–1973), chairman of the Republican National Committee (1973–1974), chief of the US Liaison Office to China (1974–1975), director of Central Intelligence (1976–1977), and vice president of the United States (1981–1989). 90. George Bush with Victor Gold, Looking Forward (London: Boldey Head, 1988), 114. 91. George H. W. Bush, address accepting the presidential nomination (Republican National Convention, New Orleans, August 18, 1988). 92. Ruth Marcus and John Goshko, “Bush Vows to ‘Punish Severely’ Perpetrators of Pan Am Bombing,” Washington Post, December 30, 1988, A22. 93. Central Intelligence Agency, DI Terrorism Review, June 1, 1989. Quoted in Naftali, Blind Spot, 207. 94. Steve Emerson and Brian Duffy, “The High-Tech Terrorist,” New York Times, March 18, 1990. 95. John Lancaster, “Compromising Positions,” Washington Post Magazine, July 9, 2000, 10. 96. NSD 1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” January 30, 1989. 97. NSD 10, “Creation of New Policy Coordinating Committees,” May 7, 1989. 98. NSD 3, “US Policy Toward Afghanistan,” February 13, 1989. 99. NSD 26, “US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” October 2, 1989. 100. CIA Terrorism Review, January 10, 1991, quoted in Naftali, Blind Spot, 216. 101. For insight into the foreign policy priorities of the George Bush administration, see George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred

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A. Knopf, 1998); and James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995). 102. Naftali, Blind Spot, 226. 103. The National Security Strategy of the United States 1990 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, March 1990), 2–3. 104. NSS90, 2. 105. NSS90, 28. 106. NSS90, 29. 107. NSS90, 28. 108. NSS90, 6. 109. The National Security Strategy of the United States 1991 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, August 1991), 2. 110. NSS91, 10. 111. NSS91, 16. 112. The National Security Strategy of the United States 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1993), 13. 113. NSS93, 18. 114. Richard Lacayo, “Tower Terror,” Time, March 8, 1993. 115. J. F. O. McAllister (Time White House correspondent 1995–1997/Deputy Washington Bureau Chief 1997–1999), interview with author, July 26, 2017. 116. CIA Terrorism Review, October 6, 1988, quoted in Naftali, Blind Spot, 200. 117. Thomas J. McCormack, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 246. 118. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 119. Bremer, “Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics,” 181. 120. Jonathan R. White, Terrorism: An Introduction (Pacific Grove, CA: BrooksCole, 1991), 162–163.

Part 2 The Threats, 1993–2001

4 Trouble in the Heartland: Domestic Political Violence

administration to power was not dominated by discussion of foreign policy or counterterrorism strategies. Instead, the attention of the American electorate was on the state of the domestic economy, which benefited the Democratic Party candidate, Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas. He routinely referred to President George H. W. Bush as being a “foreign policy president” who had allowed the United States to slide into a recession, and he promised to “focus like a laser beam on the economy.”1 The Clinton campaign had a National Security Initiatives Working Group, which met for the first time on April 28, 1992, to “identify those important areas” on which Clinton may be attacked on foreign policy. These included nuclear weapons, Europe and the former Soviet Union, arms sales and proliferation, and force structure. Terrorism was not mentioned.2 Throughout 1992, Clinton’s campaign stressed three central aspects of a potential foreign policy. Echoing the broad outlines that Governor Clinton had presented in December 1991 at Georgetown University, these included reestablishing US economic leadership, fostering democracy abroad, and revamping the military to meet new security needs. These three aspects became the central tenets of the administration’s eventual grand strategy. Also stressed were the “new threats,” identified as being “disorder in former Soviet Union, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, unrest in Korean Peninsula, Middle East, terrorism, ethnic rivalries.” 3 Despite the hope that terrorism would decline in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Clinton campaign identified it as one of the challenges it may be forced to address if it won the election. In general, however, neither broad discussions of foreign policy nor specific considerations of counterterrorism strategy figured in the campaign. With financial and political support for terrorist organizations apparently

The political campaign season that brought the Clinton

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waning with the ending of the Cold War, and with sporadic incidents of violence occurring far away in the Middle East, the subject appeared to be of scant consequence to the US electorate, or to their potential elected officials. This made it so Americans went to the polls on November 3, 1992, with little understanding of the dangers the nation faced in the post–Cold War era. The political violence that accompanied the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, however, ensured that Bill Clinton was unable to focus entirely on domestic policy. Terrorism and acts of political violence were a constant challenge for the Clinton administration from its first day in office until its last. Although he had campaigned as a “New Democrat” to exorcise memories of previous Democratic presidents and candidates, Bill Clinton faced a dilemma when it came to staffing his administration. The leading candidates for the most senior positions had previously worked for Jimmy Carter, whose tenure in office the Clinton campaign had distanced itself from. As the new president unveiled his foreign policy advisers, therefore, there was a sense that this new team looked like a collection of “Carter administration retreads.”4 Clinton wanted a quiet, efficient secretary of state but discovered there was “a huge gap in age between those who would do it in the past and those who were not yet ready, but wanted to do it.”5 Senior members of Congress were reluctant to surrender their seats to serve a president with a slender mandate and a perceived ambivalence toward foreign policy. Many believed they could wield more power in congressional committees than in the cabinet. Clinton selected President Carter’s former deputy secretary of state, Warren Christopher, the most senior figure in the Democratic Party’s foreign policy establishment, who, at 67, was not too old to serve and had not served at the cabinet level before. Few were excited by him, however, or his view of the world. Madeleine Albright, appointed as ambassador to the United Nations, suggested that Christopher remained “a lawyer’s lawyer,” while others worried that he lacked imagination and innovation.6 Anthony Lake, who had been director of policy planning under Carter, was appointed national security adviser despite not having lobbied for the position or worked on the transition. He was delegated so much responsibility that he was viewed within the administration as “the president for foreign policy.”7 Lake’s former deputy, Samuel Berger, was named deputy national security adviser, bringing “a less academic and more political approach to the table.”8 Having been the first full-time foreign policy adviser hired by the Clinton campaign in 1992, Nancy Soderberg joined the White House as the third ranking official at the National Security Council (NSC). Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was named defense secretary, although his time in office was neither happy nor protracted. The same was true for Clinton’s appointment as director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

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Clinton intended to nominate the chair of the House Intelligence Committee, Dave McCurdy, but McCurdy refused to resign his seat in Congress to lead the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Clinton was, therefore, persuaded to name James Woolsey, who had been approached by the Clinton campaign, along with Jeane Kirkpatrick, in an effort to gain the support of neoconservatives who had rallied behind Reagan in the 1980s. Short-listed as a potential secretary of defense, Woolsey had no prior contact with the new president and was surprised to be named as DCI during the transition period. The incoming White House press secretary, Dee Dee Myers, was so unfamiliar with his career that she initially referred to him as “Admiral Woolsey” before being corrected moments before his unveiling to the media.9 As a sign of the relative unimportance attached to terrorism at the time, Woolsey only used the word once during his open session confirmation hearings.10 A vital decision was made to retain Richard Clarke, who had joined the NSC in the last months of the Bush administration and who was among the first to note the growing threat of international terrorism in the post–Cold War era. Known as a “bureaucratic ninja” who was “terrifying, brilliant, and irascible,” Clarke was the second youngest assistant secretary of state in US history.11 Personalities and politics ensured that “some of the most clever and experienced Democratic Party operatives found themselves shut out of the administration or marginalized.”12 These included Richard Holbrooke, who had contributed ideas during the 1992 campaign and whose credentials should have made him a natural candidate for a senior role at the State Department. His deteriorating relationship with Anthony Lake and reputation for being “a pain in the ass,” however, led to his initial appointment as ambassador to Germany.13 Michael Mandelbaum was also excluded, despite working on the campaign and having a rightful expectation of being appointed national security adviser. His thinking, however, was more realist than Wilsonian, placing him at odds with the majority of the incoming national security team.14 As he introduced his foreign policy team, President-Elect Clinton observed that “in a time of great change and challenges, the world is no longer a simple place with clear choices.” In the post–Cold War era, he noted, “We need bold thinking to advance our American values.”15 The foreign policy team had been assembled for their capability to do the job with as little fuss as possible. To many, however, the appointments represented poor choices to develop US policy in a time of rapid and unpredictable change. It was a team that was tested almost immediately, at home and abroad. In his 1993 inaugural address, President Bill Clinton observed that the end of the Cold War had resulted in an era that was “more free but less stable. Communism’s collapse [had] called forth old animosities and new dangers,” resulting in “a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom, but

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threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues.”16 Within days, CIA employees were murdered, and a month later, the World Trade Center was bombed. The terrorist threat that so many Americans perceived as being something that happened elsewhere to other people became a very real problem for the new Clinton administration. The American people, as well as the new team in the White House, discovered that political violence was not the sole domain of the Middle East and that they were no longer immune; they were now deliberate targets. The Clinton administration’s honeymoon from terrorism lasted 116 hours. At 7:50 a.m. on January 25, 1993, the start of the fifth full day of the Clinton presidency, Mir Aimal Kansi gunned down employees of the Central Intelligence Agency as they drove in to work. Two agency employees, Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett, were killed, and three more, Calvin Morgan, Stephen Williams, and Nick Starr, were seriously wounded as they prepared to turn into the CIA headquarters lot off Route 123 in Langley, Virginia. Though there was a recognition that CIA personnel and facilities may be targeted overseas, this assault on American officials on American soil came as a shock as it occurred outside one of the most secure buildings in the country.17 Although the shooting happened within 100 feet of a CIA security station, no attempt was made to apprehend the assailant at the scene; Kansi managed to fly to Pakistan the following day. He remained at large for four years until his capture on June 17, 1997. He was returned to the United States as part of the CIA’s rendition program, and he was tried, convicted, and eventually executed by lethal injection in Virginia.18 His ability to avoid detection for so long, however, indicated the challenges that Pakistan, and its fluctuating political loyalties, presented to the United States during the Clinton presidency. The memorial service to honor the victims of the shootings had a notable absentee: President Clinton. Rather than attending himself, the president sent the First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, a decision that sparked fury and resentment at the CIA.19 For a president with no previous connection with the intelligence community, or the foreign service, this was a missed opportunity to establish a personal bond, to empathize with the victims, and to grieve with their colleagues. Instead, the president’s decision not to attend was viewed as “an unforgivable slight” that led to the belief that President Clinton “couldn’t care less about the Agency or the intelligence community.”20 This sentiment was reinforced by President Clinton’s dealings with his choice of DCI, James Woolsey. In his two years in the administration, the two men met only twice. “I didn’t have a bad relationship with the president,” Woolsey said years later. “I just didn’t have one at

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all.”21 It was not only the president with whom Woolsey failed to develop a working relationship; his “pugnacious persona caused him in no time to achieve the considerable feat of alienating the Agency’s congressional overseers on a bipartisan basis.”22 Woolsey’s lack of access and President Clinton’s apparent indifference to intelligence issues led to the perception that the CIA was dealing with “a director who they knew had no clout and a president who they thought had no clue.”23 When Frank Eugene Cordor stole a Cessna aircraft and crashed it into the south wall of the White House on September 12, 1994, jokes spread that this had actually been a failed attempt by Woolsey to get a meeting with the president. Although the incident raised questions about potential aerial attacks on the Executive Mansion, Woolsey quickly saw the funny side, especially as it contained more than a degree of truth.24 Whatever humor existed in the situation, however, evaporated when plans to crash an aircraft into CIA headquarters were discovered as part of Operation Bojinka.25 Notwithstanding the lack of rapport between President Clinton and DCI Woolsey, the killing of CIA employees in January 1993 was a rude awakening for the administration in its first week in power. It was an incident with worrying repercussions and echoes that reverberated for years to come, a random act of political violence, perpetrated by a lone assailant, against an embodiment of the federal government, which provoked little apparent response. Such individuals dedicated to the enactment of political violence became known as lone wolves. The concept of the lone wolf was personified by the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski, who terrorized the United States from 1978 until his arrest on April 3, 1996. A prodigious talent with a PhD in mathematics, Kaczynski resigned his position at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1969 and moved to a remote area of Montana to live as a recluse. Nine years later, in 1978, he began a campaign of domestic terror, targeting universities and airports across the United States. The combination of targets baffled law enforcement officials, who could not decide whether they were searching for a troubled former academic or a disgruntled airline employee. Kaczynski’s activities suddenly halted in 1987, and he was not heard from for six years as he eluded the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and local law enforcement. During the first year of the Clinton administration, however, Kaczynski recommenced his campaign, targeting academics at Yale, the University of California, San Francisco, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1994, he was responsible for the death of public relations executive Thomas Mosser and, in 1995, for the death of California Forestry Association president Gilbert Brent Murray. Kaczynski promised to end his

The Threat from Lone Wolves

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campaign of violence if a major publication printed his 35,000-word manifesto. Hoping to draw him out, Attorney General Janet Reno authorized the Washington Post and the New York Times to print the material on September 19, 1995. He was arrested by the FBI on April 3, 1996, following information received from Kaczynski’s estranged brother, whose suspicions were confirmed by material included in the published document. Kaczynski pleaded guilty to all charges and was sentenced to eight life sentences without the possibility of parole.26 Kaczynski was eventually joined in prison by Eric Rudolph, who attacked the Olympic Games in Atlanta during July 1996, killing one person at the scene, causing the death of another, and injuring 11. Rudolph was an antiabortion activist who hoped to force the games to be canceled or else to be severely affected. He escaped the scene and eluded the FBI until his arrest in May 2003. His admission of responsibility cleared the name of Richard Jewell, a security guard who found the explosive device and evacuated the area only to be suspected of potential involvement. In the interim, Rudolph committed a string of bombings in Atlanta: at an abortion clinic in January 1997, at a bar the following month, and at another abortion clinic in January 1998, which claimed the life of a police officer and a security guard.27 In addition to his opposition to abortion rights, Rudolph was motivated by his hostility to gay rights, both issues of which he believed the Clinton administration advocated. As a young man, Rudolph had attended the “Church of Israel” in Missouri and had had contact with Aryan Nations. His actions and use of religious scripture in defense of his deeds caused Rudolph to become associated with religious extremism and the Army of God movement. Despite these affiliations, the FBI maintained that he acted alone. In all, more than 120 Americans were injured during Rudolph’s spate of domestic political violence.28 The lone wolf, however, was not the only perpetrator of domestic political violence during the Clinton presidency. One month after the shootings at the CIA, and only five weeks into Clinton’s presidency, came an act of terrorism in Manhattan that had long-lasting repercussions. Looming over the Manhattan skyline, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center provided tragic bookends for the Clinton presidency: the attempt to destroy them in 1993 occurred during Clinton’s first full month in power, and their eventual destruction in 2001 happened only months after he left the White House. Opened in April 1973, the Twin Towers were, for a time, the tallest buildings in the world and constituted almost 10 percent of all available office space in the financial district of Manhattan.29 Designed by gothic-modernist Minoru Yamasaki of Emery Roth & Sons, the towers were a reflection of American political and economic power at the end of the

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twentieth century. Their presence in film footage and photographs is a reminder of what was lost in a war on terror that began long before their obliteration in September 2001. At 12:17 p.m. on February 26, 1993, terrorists inspired by the Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel Rahman, known as the Blind Sheikh, detonated a 1,336pound urea nitrate bomb in the B-2 level parking lot beneath the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Detonated close to a structural retaining wall, the explosion ripped a 90-foot-wide hole through four floors of concrete in a deliberate effort to collapse the foundations and topple the building into the South Tower to cause a concertina of death and destruction. Although the detonation failed to collapse the buildings, it knocked out power to both towers that resulted in a telecommunications blackout in New York for several days.30 Six people were killed and more than a thousand suffered injuries either directly or in the evacuation process. When the attack occurred, the National Security Council was not equipped to handle domestic incidents. “Do you guys handle domestic crises too?” a White House Situation Room officer asked Richard Clarke because the NSC “had only ever concerned itself with foreign policy, defense, and intelligence issues.”31 What became apparent in the aftermath of the attack was the paucity of security at US airports. Two of the bombers had been allowed to enter the country without any travel documents and while carrying a manual on bomb making.32 Despite the importance of the target and the disruption caused in downtown Manhattan, the administration’s response to the bombing was muted for what was, at the time, the worst act of foreign terrorism in the history of the United States. There was no dedicated press briefing on the subject, no national address by the president, and Clinton’s on-the-record observations were in response to questions posed following White House events or appearances unrelated to the attack. President Clinton did make direct reference to the incident in his weekly radio address, recorded the day after the explosion, noting that “a number of innocent people lost their lives, hundreds were injured, and thousands were struck with fear in their hearts when an explosion rocked the World Trade Center.” The president noted the valiant work of the emergency services and informed the nation that he had liaised with New York’s governor Mario Cuomo and New York City mayor David Dinkins as well as the FBI director William Sessions. In keeping with the approach enacted by the Reagan administration, the FBI was the lead investigative agency and worked with the Treasury Department and the New York City Police and Fire Departments. Clinton was insistent that the authorities would do “everything in our power to keep [Americans] safe in their streets, their offices, and their homes. Feeling safe is an essential part of being secure, and that’s important to all of us.”33 Despite the extensive damage caused in Manhattan, the president quickly returned to the central

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message of his broadcast: economic security and the reaction to his first address to Congress on February 17. Asked directly on March 1 whether the explosion was a terrorist incident, President Clinton insisted that he wasn’t in a position to say, adding that the administration had “put the full, full resources, the Federal law enforcement agencies, all kinds of agencies, all kinds of access to information at the service of those who are working to figure out who did this and why and what the facts are.”34 Despite being in New Brunswick, New Jersey, the president did not cross the Hudson River to visit the scene of the incident in downtown Manhattan. Three days later, in an exchange with reporters in the Oval Office, President Clinton argued that the American people “should be very proud of the work done by the law enforcement agencies. . . . They worked without stopping until they made, I think, a very quick arrest.”35 Twenty minutes later, the president was again pressed on the nature of the attack and again focused on the role of law enforcement officials, stressing that “the American people should be very much reassured by the speed with which the law enforcement folks responded to this circumstance.”36 On March 5, the president spoke alongside New York mayor David Dinkins and insisted it was “very important not to rush the judgment here, not to reach ahead of the facts which are known to reach broad conclusions about who was behind this or what happened.”37 Intriguingly, in a wideranging interview for CBS News with Dan Rather, recorded three weeks later on March 24, neither the attack in New York nor terrorism in general was raised. Instead, the president was asked about his golf game and his thoughts on the upcoming Academy Awards.38 Neither the administration nor the media, it seemed, were interested in prioritizing the incident. Speaking alongside Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak on April 6, Clinton insisted that his administration was “determined to oppose the cowardly cruelty of terrorists wherever we can.” Clinton reiterated that he and Mubarak had “discussed ways of strengthening our cooperation in countering this and other forms of terrorism.”39 President Clinton conceded that the attack in Manhattan would lead to a policy review “to make sure we are doing everything we can to minimize the impact of terrorism in this country.”40 The FBI identified the bomb plotters when Mohammad Salahme sought the return of the deposit on the truck used in the attack at a Ryder rental office. Although several perpetrators, including the leader, Ramzi Yousef, fled the country, there was a sense that the various agencies had worked well together, made arrests, and eventually secured a conviction in the courts. The incident caused the FBI to establish TERRSTOP, a dedicated operation committed to preventing future acts of terrorism. Its most tangible result was to thwart a June 1993 plot by the Blind Sheikh to assassinate New York senator Alfonse D’Amato and the United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali and to blow up the UN headquarters building, Federal Plaza,

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along with the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels in New York.41 The successful discovery of the plot and ensuing trial resulted in Omar Abdel Rahman being sentenced to life in solitary confinement without the right to parole. He died in prison in February 2017. The Clinton administration’s reaction to the bombing and the decision to appoint the FBI as the lead investigative agency were in keeping with the prevailing orthodoxy and the continuation of a counterterrorism strategy dating back to the Reagan White House. President Clinton’s hesitancy to label the attack as an act of terrorism, or to visit the site, was predicated on a desire not to spark panic or to divert attention away from the administration’s new policy initiatives that were being unveiled, including the AmeriCorps program. The incident did not ignite, and the administration did not initiate, a national dialogue on the potential threat posed by international terrorism, a decision that received little criticism from the press or from political opponents at the time. Despite the attack, the prevailing sense in the counterterrorism community was that the greatest threat from terrorism remained state sponsors, not radical groups or lone wolves. The bombing, however, did cause officials to reevaluate their priorities and revealed to the American people that they were no longer immune to acts of terrorism. The World Trade Center bombing “shattered that complacency and raised concerns about the security of potential targets across the United States—and in Washington, DC, in particular—as no previous terrorist incident had done.”42 Notwithstanding the two attacks on high-profile targets in Virginia and New York, the greatest threat to American citizens during the Clinton administration came not from foreign nationals but from their fellow countrymen. On March 10, 1993, antiabortion activist Michael Griffin killed David Gunn; a year later, on March 1, 1994, Jewish students were targeted in a shooting on the Brooklyn Bridge by Rashid-Baz; on December 30, 1994, John Savi killed Shannon Lowney and Lee Ann Nichols in an attack on a family planning clinic; and on February 24, 1997, Ali Hassan Abu Kamal shot and killed tourists on the observation deck at the Empire State Building. In addition to targeted incidents of political violence, a major challenge for the Clinton administration was the threat posed by militias determined to protect their identity and way of life. The militia movements believed in the founding concept of limited government and saw it as their duty to enforce this maxim to enable the citizenry to fulfill the pursuit of happiness as prescribed by their hero, Thomas Jefferson. Almost two hundred years after his presidency, Jefferson’s assertion “for a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best security” presented severe challenges for the Clinton administration.43

A Siege Mentality: Ruby Ridge and Waco

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Jefferson’s twentieth-century acolytes believed it was their responsibility to ensure that “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.”44 The challenges posed by such sentiments became apparent during showdowns at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas. On both occasions, federal authorities exchanged gunfire with Americans, on American soil, to enforce American laws on American citizens, with catastrophic consequences in both the immediate and the short term. In August 1992, five months before the Clinton administration came to office, federal authorities engaged in a standoff with Randy and Vicki Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. The couple moved to the secluded region in 1983 to raise their children away from what they considered to be a “corrupted world.”45 A legal dispute with their neighbor escalated into a feud that led to Weaver being accused of threatening the life of the president, a felony under Title 18, Section 871, of the United States Code. Randy Weaver had attended meetings of Aryan Nations since 1986 and allegedly offered to sell sawed-off shotguns to an undercover agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). A series of bureaucratic errors resulted in the Weavers being targeted by the US Marshals Service, which initiated Operation Northern Exposure to monitor their movements and lay siege to their property. Reports that Randy Weaver fired on a TV helicopter during the siege prompted the FBI to draw up rules of engagement for the case that were later ruled “inconsistent with standard FBI policy” and “the most severe” that one agent had encountered in more than 300 hostage negotiations.46 The siege developed into a firefight during which 14-year-old Samuel Weaver was shot dead by federal authorities as he sought to retrieve the body of the family dog that had been killed by law enforcement officers. Deputy US Marshal Bill Degan was also killed in the cross-fire. On August 22, Randy Weaver was wounded by an FBI sniper, who subsequently shot and killed Vicki Weaver, an act the Department of Justice concluded did not “satisfy the constitutional standards for legal use of deadly force.”47 Randy Weaver surrendered on August 31, 1992, and was subsequently acquitted of all charges related to the siege. Faced with a $20 million wrongful death lawsuit, the government settled out of court, awarding Randy Weaver $100,000 and his three daughters $1 million each, but refused to admit any wrongdoing.48 Investigations deemed the authorities had used unconstitutional force and led to hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Information. The incident at Ruby Ridge proved to be a precursor for a far more devastating event at Waco, Texas.49 Two days after the bombing of the Word Trade Center, federal authorities were involved in a siege at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. The ATF believed an arsenal of more than 150 illegal weapons, including submachine guns, hand grenades, rocket launchers, automatic

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weapons, gas masks, assault rifles, and shotguns, as well as 8,000 rounds of ammunition, had been assembled on the site. On February 28, 1993, ATF agents attempted to arrest the group’s leader, David Koresh, an operation that resulted in the deaths of 4 of their team, the wounding of 16 others, and the deaths of 6 Branch Davidians. This began a 51-day standoff during which 60 members of the community managed to escape but left many others behind, including 25 children. In those weeks, efforts to end the siege became more pronounced; tanks were driven onto the compound and electrical power was cut. On the evening of Sunday, April 18, Attorney General Janet Reno informed the president that the operation was costing a million dollars a week and raised the possibility of child abuses and mass suicide. “When I talked to him that Sunday afternoon, I advised him, we discussed it,” Reno later related, “and we went ahead.”50 President Clinton left the matter in the hands of his attorney general and adhered to his planned schedule on the following day as the federal forces moved in with tanks and tear gas. White House communications director George Stephanopoulos was asked about the president’s involvement during his regular lunchtime television press briefing. “He is responsible,” Stephanopoulos insisted, but added, “the Attorney General and the FBI have operational control over this.”51 What Stephanopoulos did not know until he was advised live on air by Wolf Blitzer of CNN was that the compound was ablaze. “I had no idea what [Blitzer] was talking about,” Stephanopoulos recalled. “Then someone handed me a note, and I left the podium to find out what was going on.”52 When the fire started, the attorney general was returning from a speech in Baltimore, and the president was concluding a speech on his planned stimulus package at the Washington Hilton. Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell, the third ranking member of the Justice Department and an old friend of the Clintons, was following events in the White House Situation Room. The enormity of the event became apparent to the president only when he saw his associates watching the drama unfold on television. The raid and the ensuing inferno killed 87, including 17 children as well as the compound’s leader, David Koresh. The White House was hesitant in its response. In his memoirs, President Clinton recalled his need “to speak to the press to take responsibility for the fiasco” but that he had been talked out of it by Stephanopoulos.53 Clinton had been criticized for making far too many random public appearances in his first months in office, and his communications director wanted to make sure the facts were confirmed before the president addressed the nation. The president’s silence, however, proved to be a mistake, as the attorney general spoke to the American public, accepted responsibility for the raid, and offered to resign over its flawed execution. Reno “faced the cameras and even won public praises for soberly accepting responsibility.”

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President Clinton, meanwhile, “was portrayed in the press as trying to dodge.”54 The president eventually spoke to the nation the following day, insisting that he was the responsible officer of government, not Reno. He later wrote of his frustration at the debacle: “I had accepted advice that ran counter to my instincts. . . . I was furious at myself, first for agreeing to the raid against my better judgment, and then for delaying a public acknowledgment of responsibility for it.”55 For a president who presented himself as a Kennedyesque leader for the 1990s, the similarities with the Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961 were all too apparent, even to his young staff. As George Stephanopoulos lamented, “The first rule in a presidential crisis is to take responsibility fully and openly. Don’t duck. That’s the Bay of Pigs lesson that should have been burned in my bones.”56 On April 19, the White House released a short statement on the incident, expressing the president’s grief at the loss of life and explaining the decisionmaking process behind the end of the siege. “I told the Attorney General to do what she thought was right, and I stand by that decision,” the president insisted.57 The media’s indifference toward the attacks at the CIA and the World Trade Center disappeared, and the president faced a barrage of criticism for the manner in which the siege was handled. At a Rose Garden press conference on April 20, President Clinton took “full responsibility for the implementation” of the plan to terminate the siege, which had “ended in a horrible human tragedy.” He was adamant, however, that ultimate responsibility for the casualties lay with Koresh, whose “response to the demands for his surrender by Federal agents was to destroy himself and murder the children who were his captives, as well as all the other people who were there who did not survive.”58 Clinton reminded the country that the FBI had “done a lot of things right for this country over a long period of time” and that this was “the same FBI that found the people that bombed the World Trade Center in lickety-split, record time.” The president concluded the press conference on an ominous note, observing that “there is, unfortunately, a rise in this sort of fanaticism all across the world. And we may have to confront it again.”59 The siege at Waco continued to haunt the administration. Speaking two years later, the president defensively reminded viewers of 60 Minutes that the Branch Davidians had murdered federal law enforcement officials before the raid was initiated and that when the raid began, “it was the people who ran their cult compound at Waco who murdered their own children, not the Federal officials. They made the decision to destroy all those children that were there.”60 Particularly frustrating for the president was the fact that, when faced with a similar situation while governor of Arkansas, Clinton had “put a blockade around the camp, cut off food-stamp aid to the several families who were receiving it, and prevented anyone who left the premises to get supplies from going back. Eventually the holdouts gave in,

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and the suspects were apprehended with no loss of life.”61 Just as the Bay of Pigs invasion proved to be an embarrassing setback, as well as a vital learning process ahead of the Cuban Missile Crisis for the Kennedy administration, so the Waco siege helped the Clinton administration in its subsequent dealings with domestic political violence. Its first months in office, however, were a baptism by fire: the attack on the CIA in its first week in office, the bombing of the World Trade Center in its first month in office, and the Waco siege that ended in carnage. This cycle culminated in the deadliest attack to occur on American soil during the Clinton presidency: the Oklahoma City bombing.62

Devastation in the Heartland: The Oklahoma City Bombing

Exactly two years after the siege at Waco, on April 19, 1995, President Clinton hosted Turkish prime minister Tansu Ciller at the White House. During the course of the meeting, CNN broadcast news of a devastating explosion in the heartland of the United States. In a move that foreshadowed Andrew Card’s need to inform President George W. Bush of the attacks in Manhattan six years later, White House chief of staff Leon Panetta passed a hand-written note to President Clinton: “Half of the federal building in OK. City blown up—expect heavy casualties. Called Janet Reno—she has dispatched FBI.”63 The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was destroyed by a truck bomb that killed 168 people, injured 680, and caused more than $650 million in damage to 250 buildings across 16 city blocks. Despite the array of law enforcement agencies and intelligence apparatus at its disposal, the White House received word of the attack from CNN. As a result of the shooting at the CIA and the bombing of the World Trade Center, initial suspicion fell on Islamic terrorists. Writing in the New York Times, A. M. Rosenthal lamented, “Whatever we are doing to destroy Mideast terrorism, the chief terrorist threat against Americans, has not been working.”64 Georgie Anne Geyer observed that “while the bombing might possibly have been the handiwork of other groups (right-wing vigilantes, the Branch Davidians), the indisputable fact is that it has every single earmark of the Islamic car-bombers of the Middle East.”65 David McCurdy, a Democrat who spurned the opportunity to serve as DCI and who represented Oklahoma’s fourth congressional district until 1994, raised fears about Islamic fundamentalist activity in the region, noting their meetings and conventions where they had “incited people to violence and terrorist acts. They are connected with groups such as Hamas, which have been involved in terrorist activities.”66 Such fears were also prevalent within the administration. Morton Halperin, then working on the National Security

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Council, recalled, “People thought it was a foreign attack and came up with and tried to get authority from the congress in relation to foreign terrorist threats.”67 It became apparent within days, however, that the attack in Oklahoma had nothing to do with Islam and was an act of homegrown terrorism.68 Neither the date nor the location was a coincidence. April 19, 1995, marked the second anniversary of the Waco showdown with federal authorities and was the 220th anniversary of two key battles in the Revolutionary War at Lexington and Concord. The destroyed federal building housed the local offices of the FBI, the ATF, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), as well as the recruitment offices for the US armed services. As Mary Schmich noted, “The heartland is more than a place on the map. . . . What happened in Oklahoma City reminds us that the faith was a fantasy. A heartland out of the reach of madmen is as illusory as Oz.”69 This was an act of domestic political violence in the American heartland, carried out on American citizens, by American citizens acting as part of a militia, angry with their government, determined to wreak vengeance for the perceived sins of the past. Although the connection with the Waco tragedy was not immediately apparent, the Clinton administration’s reaction to the previous event had not been forgotten and helped guide the response to events in Oklahoma City. The president and his team had a far better understanding of their roles and learned from their past mistakes. Clinton, in particular, “better understood the expectations of the job and the role the presidency played in the national psychology in moments of shock or grief.”70 In consideration of the lessons learned from the mistakes made in April 1993, it was decided that the president, not the attorney general, would address the nation and that he had to be “firm, brief, and avoid speculation.”71 Speaking in the White House press briefing room, the president was resolute, in stark contrast to the response that accompanied the Waco disaster. Referring to the attack as “an act of cowardice,” Clinton insisted that “the United States will not tolerate it. And I will not allow the people of this country to be intimidated by evil cowards.” The president made it clear that he was in charge and laid out the steps he had taken in response to the attack, including the deployment of a crisis management team to the scene, the declaration of a state of emergency in Oklahoma, and moves to protect federal facilities. The president insisted that when the perpetrators were found, justice would be “swift, certain, and severe. These people are killers, and they must be treated like killers.”72 This was not an abstract tragedy for the president; a former member of his security detail, Alan Whicker, had only recently been appointed second in command of the Secret Service bureau in Oklahoma City and had perished in the blast. Unbeknownst to anyone at the White House, the perpetrator of the bombing was already in custody: Timothy McVeigh had been arrested

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within 90 minutes of the blast by an Oklahoma police officer for driving without a license plate and carrying a concealed weapon. Within days, McVeigh’s accomplice, Terry Nichols, was also in custody, and it became clear that this was an act of domestic political violence based on hatred of the federal government, with its origins in the militia movement in Michigan. Although it came as a relief to some that the attack had not been perpetrated by foreign nationals, as Nancy Soderberg noted, “It was perhaps more frightening to all its citizens that an act of such magnitude could occur on American soil and be carried out by one of their own.”73 The Oklahoma City bombing caused a sense of bewilderment at the White House, where “they just didn’t think that nice white boys could do this.”74 The militia movement had continued to feel alienated despite the conservative direction of the country during the Reagan and Bush years. “Instead of welcoming the conservative shift in the country [the extremists] tended to loathe it, for it drew members from their ranks towards more conventional center-right politics. It left them isolated on the fringe.”75 Its members believed that a cabal was not only promoting a tyrannical New World Order but that “it [was] close to victory, thus necessitating an immediate defense.”76 With the election of the Clinton administration, the militia movement feared the transformation of the United States into a truly multicultural nation in which English-speaking Caucasians would become the minority. McVeigh and Nichols, therefore, “perversely regarded themselves as avengers.”77 The Oklahoma City bombing proved to be a turning point for the Clinton administration. Only hours before the attack, the president was forced to explain why he was still relevant following the Republican takeover of Congress in the 1994 midterm elections. With the Oklahoma City attack, Bill Clinton found his presidential voice and role as “Mourner in Chief” following two years of political setbacks.78 The president’s Saturday radio address was televised, and an invited number of children whose parents worked for the federal government were seated on the Oval Office rug. The president and the First Lady then flew to Oklahoma City to console the families of the fallen. Four days after the crime, President Clinton addressed a crowd of 18,000 in Oklahoma City, giving a speech that transformed his presidency and focused his administration’s efforts on countering political violence. In the most effective speech of his presidency, Clinton told the audience, “You have lost too much, but you have not lost everything. And you have certainly not lost America, for we will stand with you for as many tomorrows as it takes.” President Clinton was adamant that decency must prevail. “When there is talk of hatred, let us stand up and talk

Clinton’s Presidential Role: Empathizer in Chief

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against it. When there is talk of violence, let us stand up and talk against it. In the face of death, let us honor life.”79 The president addressed the role of militias in an interview for 60 Minutes, warning that the events at Waco could never justify “the kind of outrageous behavior we’ve seen here at Oklahoma City or the kind of inflammatory rhetoric that we’re hearing all across this country today.” The issue of rhetoric was a concern for the Clinton White House, given the rise of conservative talk radio. The president called for rhetorical restraint “because of all the people in this country that might be on edge and might be capable of doing something like this horrible thing in Oklahoma City.” This had clear implications for constitutional rights, protected by the First Amendment, and accompanied a debate that had already begun regarding gun ownership and rights afforded under the Second Amendment. Clinton insisted that his administration did not seek to curtail rights but, taking issue with militia groups, warned, “They do not have the right to kill innocent Americans. They do not have the right to violate the law. And they do not have the right to take the position that if somebody comes to arrest them for violating the law, they’re perfectly justified in killing them.”80 Speaking in Minneapolis on April 24, the president promised to “arrest, convict, and punish the people who committed this terrible, terrible deed.” He insisted that it was “time we all stood up and spoke against that kind of reckless speech and behavior” and opposed “the purveyors of hatred and division.”81 A prime target of the president’s concern was former Watergateburglar-turned-radio-talk-show-host G. Gordon Liddy, who told listeners that he used images of the president and Hillary Clinton for target practice and advised on how best to shoot federal agents: “If they’re wearing flak jackets, don’t shoot them there, shoot them in the head,” he urged.82 Having been in the political ascendency for 18 months, the Republican Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, suddenly found himself on the defensive, reacting angrily when asked if his rhetoric had played a role in motivating the attack: “It is grotesque to suggest that anybody in this country who raises legitimate questions about the size and scope of the federal government has any implication in this.”83 As long as such questions were being asked, the implication of a causal relationship lingered. Despite concerns that the administration should not be seen to exploit the Oklahoma City bombing for political gain, there was an immediate surge in the president’s approval ratings, with the majority believing he had acted like a leader.84 In the aftermath of the bombing, an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll revealed 84 percent approval for Clinton’s handling of the attack as he prepared for a reelection campaign that only a year beforehand had appeared doomed.85 Dick Morris, the president’s campaign strategist, recognized that the attack presented the administration with three discernible benefits: “A. Temporary gain: boost in ratings. B. More permanent

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gain: Improvements in character/personality attributes—remedies weakness, incompetence, ineffectiveness found in recent poll. C. Permanent possible gains: sets up Extremist Issue vs. Republicans.”86 The president weaved the subject of terrorism into a series of speeches, but plans for a major address to the nation from the Oval Office on the issue were abandoned for fear of being accused of exploiting the tragedy.87 The president used a commencement address at Michigan State University on May 5 to remind his audience of the new era into which they were graduating. Noting the advantages that accompanied the end of the Cold War, the president lamented the “dark possibilities of our age,” which were evident in the Oklahoma City bombing. Drawing on the bombing of the World Trade Center, a gas attack on the Tokyo subway, and terrorist incidents in the Middle East, President Clinton reminded the graduates that the devastation in the American heartland was not an isolated incident. In what became a common theme of Bill Clinton’s presidency, he highlighted the positive developments that had accrued following the end of the Cold War but warned of the dangers that accompanied this new era. The threat from the Soviet Union had ended; however, the external challenge that this previously presented had also helped draw the United States together in unity against a common enemy. The lack of a unifying external threat proved a challenge for successive administrations, something that was mitigated, to an extent, by the threat posed by terrorism. President Clinton insisted that America “must respond to this threat in ways that preserve both our security and our freedoms.” Placing the struggle with political violence in the wider context of American history, President Clinton noted that the use of such action had always been wrong, whether motivated by politics of the Left or the Right. He lamented that “the Weathermen of the radical left who resorted to violence in the 1960s were wrong,” just as those “who came to the United States to bomb the World Trade Center were wrong.” The president concluded that “there is nothing patriotic about hating your country or pretending that you can love your country but despise your Government.”88 A year after the Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton spoke at the University of Central Oklahoma. He warned the gathered students that the world offered “more opportunities to succeed, if you have a good education, than any generation of Americans has ever known. But the same forces that offer you those opportunities to succeed offer people opportunities to commit terrorist acts.”89 Clinton asked the students to ponder an alternative version of events from a year before, in which three thousand people had been killed. Such a catastrophic loss of life, he noted, “can paralyze a country. It can take its heart out. It can take its confidence away. It can make young people believe they have no future.”90 To prevent such an act, he insisted, “we must be more vigilant, more active, more determined than ever before.”91 Although speaking of a thwarted effort to decimate

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Israel, his remarks were an ominous foreshadowing of the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center that would be used to throw doubt on his administration’s attention to the terrorist threat in the 1990s. Four months later, in a major address on terrorism at George Washington University, President Clinton identified the threat as being “an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders.” He presented the policies that had been pursued in the battle against terrorism, speaking not only as president but also as a candidate for reelection: “First, beyond our borders, by working more closely than ever with our friends and allies; second, here at home, by giving law enforcement the most powerful counterterrorism tools available; and third, in our airports and airplanes by increasing aviation security.”92 He was adamant that the struggle against the forces of terrorism was being waged successfully and highlighted the unheralded results that had been achieved, including the disruption of attacks on the United Nations, on the Holland Tunnel in New York, of Operation Bojinka, the conviction of the World Trade Center bombers, and the arrest of the Unabomber and the suspects in the Oklahoma City attack.93 The militia movement set its targets firmly on the federal government, which it viewed by the 1990s as being overbearing and at odds with constitutional restraints. President Clinton observed in his memoirs that, for such groups, the Waco siege “represented the ultimate exercise of arbitrary, abusive government power.” He lamented the rise in “anti-government paranoia” that led citizens to pervert “the historical skepticism of Americans toward government to a level of outright hatred.”94 During this time, any president would have incurred the ire of the militia movement, but Bill Clinton became “reviled, it was hard for [him] to know how to talk about that . . . to recognize that he was some kind of a lightning rod for all of them” as his politics and personality inspired visceral loathing in the extreme elements of the American community.95 Elected with 43 percent of the popular vote, Bill Clinton was never truly accepted in some parts of the American community as a result of allegations that hampered his 1992 election: draft dodging, pot smoking, and womanizing. As president, Bill Clinton was given the Secret Service code name “Eagle” and immediately became a focus for individuals seeking to make a name for themselves by murdering the nation’s chief executive. In October 1994, using a semiautomatic rifle, Francisco Martin Duran fired up to 30 rounds of ammunition at the White House from the sidewalk on Pennsylvania Avenue.96 In March 1995, Paul F. Walling was indicted on charges of threatening the life of President Clinton. In May 1995, Leland William Modjeski was wounded by Secret Service agents after he scaled

Targeting “Eagle” and “Evergreen”

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the White House perimeter and sprinted across the south lawn with a revolver.97 Three days later Andrew Meig Jopling was also apprehended for breaching White House security. The disdain that militias had for President Clinton was exceeded only by their loathing of First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, code-named “Evergreen.” Her efforts to guarantee health care for Americans became a specific target for those who feared the expansion of the federal government into aspects of their daily lives.98 Violent protests greeted the First Lady wherever she went as she sought to promote her legislative efforts, leading the Secret Service to insist she wear a bullet-proof vest on occasions.99 Such threats to the first couple did not only originate from extremist groups. On November 22, 1994, the 31st anniversary of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, Senator Jessie Helms of North Carolina insinuated that if Bill Clinton visited a military base in his state, his life might be in danger. “Mr. Clinton had better watch out if he comes down here,” Helms noted. “He better have a bodyguard.”100 These remarks appear to contravene federal laws against threatening the life of the American president, yet Senator Bob Dole declared Helms was fit to chair the Senate Foreign Relations Committee because the observations were made to a journalist when they were “joshing back and forth.”101 Such comments, however, did little to dissuade those who openly plotted political violence against the government or elected officials. The Clinton administration was cautious not to be accused of seeking to exploit the Oklahoma City bombing for its own political advantage. It could, however, draw upon the resources of the federal government to respond to acts of domestic political violence, ensuring a policy-driven response to the attack. It introduced physical barriers to protect key installations from attack, crafted legislation, prepared National Security Strategies, and drafted presidential directives. All were utilized in an attempt to address the mounting threat perpetrators of domestic political violence posed to the United States in the 1990s. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 27, 1995, Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick noted that the Oklahoma City bombing was “the latest in a disturbing trend of terrorist attacks, inside and outside the United States [which] have demonstrated the need to reassess the adequacy of the legal tools and resources available to combat terrorism.”102 A particular challenge lay in the fact that the counterterrorism bureaucracy was spread across various agencies, all of which competed for priority and funding. The devastation in Oklahoma City began a process of recalibrating the national security architecture to account for the new

The Clinton Administration’s Policy Response

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threats to the United States, as the NSC expanded its role to incorporate responsibility for domestic as well as international counterterrorism strategy. Room 302 of the Old Executive Office Building became the new home of the National Security Council’s Directorate of Transnational Threats (TRT), responsible for issues including crime, counternarcotics, critical infrastructure, homeland defense, and counterterrorism.103 Fear of another devastating truck bomb attack led to the permanent closure of Pennsylvania Avenue to traffic in front of the White House between 15th and 17th Streets, on the advice of the Secret Service, Treasury Department officials, and an independent panel of experts. As President Clinton explained, “It is necessary to protect the President and his family, the structure of the White House, the hundreds of people who work there, and the people who come and visit there, both on official business and as ordinary citizens.”104 This was not a universally welcomed decision and was criticized by local business leaders as well as security consultants. Writing seven years after the closure, the RAND Corporation lamented the “static, one-dimensional” approach to physical security that appeared to be “frozen in time.”105 Following the destruction in Oklahoma City, the Clinton administration urged Congress to pass antiterrorism measures. Having lost a Democratic majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 1994 midterm elections, the White House was forced to address not only the congressionally mandated checks and balances from the legislative branch but also a deep-rooted partisan loathing of the president that ensured any legislative victories were hard-fought. On May 3, 1995, the administration sent Congress the Antiterrorism Amendments Act, having previously submitted the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act on February 9, 1995. At the heart of the document were moves to provide federal agencies access to financial and credit reports in antiterrorism cases, the ability to track telephone traffic, and use of the national security letter process to obtain domestic credit records; it introduced a 10-year minimum sentence for transferring firearms or explosives with intent and “enhanced penalties for attacks against current and former Federal employees, and their families, when the crime is committed because of the employee’s official duties.”106 The Senate approved the bill in June 1995 by a wide margin of 91–8, but similar legislation languished in the House of Representatives, where Alan Kreczko, legal adviser to the National Security Council, feared the introduction of amendments would “effectively gut an already-weakened anti-terrorism bill.”107 In March 1996, the lower chamber approved a series of amendments proposed by Congressman Bob Barr (R-GA), including one to ban the use of wiretap evidence obtained without a warrant to prosecute terrorists. Other amendments removed key provisions, including the prohibition of transporting firearms for use in a felony and refusing authority to engage in multiple wiretaps in terrorist cases. The amendments caused the

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bill’s sponsor, Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to observe, “This is no longer a real anti-terrorism bill.” John Conyers Jr. (D-MI) agreed that the move “eviscerated the heart and soul of the anti-terrorism bill.”108 On August 3, 1995, Steven Simon and Alan Kreczko of the NSC prepared a memo for Anthony Lake regarding the status of the House Counterterrorism Bill. The memo noted “the political pressure to produce counterterrorism legislation.” It also expressed frustration with the Department of Justice’s “tendency to focus on procedural legal issues at the expense of the broader policy implications of the bill.”109 The ensuing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 allowed for the deportation of aliens suspected of having terrorist ties and the prosecution of those who raised funds for terrorist groups. This legislation provided assistance for the victims of terrorist acts but also curtailed habeas corpus rights as established in the Bill of Rights. It granted the authority to designate foreign terrorist organizations, outlawed the provision of material support to foreign terrorist organizations, and designated participation in certain international terrorism activities a federal crime.110 It also empowered the secretary of state with the ability to establish a list of “foreign terrorist organizations,” granting the government the power to determine the legality of political movements, which appeared to challenge First Amendment rights.111 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was also utilized to engage in over 5,000 operations during the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration initiated further changes to the way domestic counterterrorism incidents were investigated by the FBI. In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, a task force was established at the FBI to investigate right-wing groups and Islamic extremists. This involved extensive use of wiretaps, undercover operatives, and both physical and electronic surveillance techniques, all designed to provide an insight into future plans and operations.112 As rules governing such activities were relaxed, funding was increased and assets were recruited to address the threat from domestic political violence. By the end of the Clinton administration, the FBI had increased its investigation of domestic terrorism from about 100 cases to over 900.113 This was achieved as a result of a substantial increase in the counterterrorism budget. On September 9, 1996, the White House issued the president’s proposals for counterterrorism funding, detailing $1.097 billion in additional federal funds as part of an interagency review. This included $429.4 million on aviation security, law enforcement, and explosive detection, $436.9 million on improving facilities, $114 million on personnel hires at the FBI and ATF, and $116 million on “consequence management.”114 During the Clinton administration, counterterrorism funding increased to $9.6 billion, ensuring that, adjusted for inflation, approximately $70 billion of federal money was spent on counterterrorism between 1990 and

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2001.115 In addition, $2 billion was spent to upgrade security at federal buildings after the Oklahoma City bombing. However, undercover agents from the General Accounting Office successfully penetrated 19 buildings, including the Pentagon, CIA headquarters, and the Department of Justice building. The team also discovered that despite the capital outlay, security guards did not have proper security checks or firearms training, and one audit found “dozens of x-ray machines, closed-circuit televisions and magnetometers were delivered and still unpacked two years after purchase.”116 The money had been spent and resources allocated, but the threat of domestic terrorism was still not something that was taken seriously, even within the federal bureaucracy. The Clinton administration’s attempts to thwart domestic political violence involved an intricate balance between protecting civil liberties and maintaining national security. It did so by implementing ideas that originated from within both the executive branch and the legislative community on Capitol Hill. Concerns were raised, however, that a correct balance had not been achieved. Critics feared that the FBI had successfully exploited the evolving situation to claw back powers that had been surrendered in the wake of the COINTELPRO operations. As a White House official noted at the time, “If FBI infiltrators were put into every militia it would be back to the bad old days.” The government was not able to monitor a militia if it was obeying the law, but if it discovered that a group was collecting guns illegally and advocating violation of the laws, then it would be subject to the full scrutiny of the federal law enforcement authorities.117 The Clinton administration also addressed issues of domestic counterterrorism in its annual National Security Strategy (NSS), produced under the auspices of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The act had been an attempt by Congress to encourage the White House to formulate a coherent national security strategy that conveyed its “values, interests and objectives; its coherence in terms of relating means to ends; its integration in terms of the elements of power; and its time horizon.”118 The expectation was that requiring a written report would focus the attention of the White House and generate horizon-scanning perspectives with regard to foreign policy to assist in annual budget planning and resource allocation. Each report was expected to include the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that were vital to its national security; the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities necessary to deter aggression and to implement the strategy; the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of national power; and the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy.119 The Clinton administration’s national security strategy was based around three central pillars: maintaining national security, economic expan-

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sionism, and democratic promotion. Through seven reports in seven years, the Clinton-era NSS documents detail the development of events, strategy, and perception during the 1990s.120 Nowhere was this more apparent than in its approach to acts of political violence. As with the NSS documents from the previous Bush administration, the initial reports from the Clinton White House failed to emphasize either domestic or international terrorism. What was noted was the fact that terrorists had “the advantage of being able to take the initiative in the timing and choice of targets.”121 This was a challenge facing intelligence services around the world, and the Clinton administration recognized that the full force of the federal government was required to counter the threat the nation faced, both domestically and internationally. Accordingly, the 1994 NSS document tasked the FBI and CIA with working closely with the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense to integrate policies and procedures designed to “punish and deter terrorists.”122 The NSS documents reflected remarks in President Clinton’s 1993 inaugural address, stressing that transnational borders were effectively a thing of the past and that in the 1990s “we can find no security for America in isolationism nor prosperity in protectionism.”123 International boundaries and America’s geographical location, which had been seen to have protected the United States for so long, were now no longer sufficient for its long-term defense. The nation was now challenged by forces of political violence, organized as never before, which included drug trafficking, international crime, and terrorism. The NSS document recognized that the powers of the state that had previously been focused on overseas threats now needed to recognize the dangers that lurked within the United States. “These threats to our security have no respect for boundaries and it is clear that American security in the 21st Century will be determined by the success of our response to forces that operate within as well as beyond our borders.”124 Despite calls in some circles for a reduced international role for the United States in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Clinton administration argued that new threats to the nation demanded an enhanced global commitment. “Because problems that start beyond our borders can now much more easily become problems within them, American leadership and engagement in the world has never been more important.”125 Threats at home that originated overseas were a driving force behind the administration’s counterterrorism strategy from its first days in power. The priority afforded to terrorism and political violence was in the ascendency during the Clinton administration’s time in office, a fact reflected in the National Security Strategies of the second term. The 1998 report recognized that, domestically, the United States required “effective capabilities for thwarting and responding to terrorist acts, countering international crime and foreign intelligence collection, and protecting critical national infrastructures.”126 As it had throughout its time in office, the Clinton administration

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stressed the importance of interagency cooperation in this continuing struggle: “the threats and their consequences cross agency lines, requiring close cooperation among Federal agencies, state and local governments, the industries that own and operate critical national infrastructures, nongovernmental organizations and others in the private sector.”127 To that end, the administration sought to draw upon the full weight of the federal government to safeguard the nation and to overcome traditional interdepartmental rivalries that hindered the policymaking process in Washington. The administration was assisted in this effort by the presence of Morton Halperin, whose 1974 work on bureaucratic resistance remained essential reading into the twenty-first century.128 As a member of the NSC and then as director of policy planning, Halperin was a key asset in the administration’s efforts to overcome the intransigence that had handicapped previous efforts to create an effective executive branch. These efforts saw a concerted attempt to draw together the resources of the Departments of State, Justice, Defense, Treasury, Energy, and Transportation, the CIA, and other intelligence agencies, as well as the National Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to address the threats posed to the US homeland by terrorists and perpetrators of political violence. These agencies were required, in part, because of unprecedented concerns surrounding the potential use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on American soil. The Domestic Terrorism Program, designed to counter domestic threats, included plans for the deployment of military units to augment the National Guard in the event of a WMD incident. The likelihood of such an incident appeared to be escalating in the final years of the Clinton administration, as the threat from overseas grew and the White House sought to initiate “plans and prepare for a national response to medical emergencies arising from the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.”129 The concern that terrorists could acquire and utilize a WMD device on American soil was an indication of what was seen as a gathering storm on the horizon, one fueled by the use of sarin nerve agent on the Tokyo subway in March 1995. The Clinton administration’s NSS documents continued the bipartisan approach of addressing terrorism as a crime rather than as an act of war. The 1999 report stressed the administration’s International Crime Control Strategy as a vehicle for facing such challenges through improved relationships with foreign law enforcement agencies and enhanced US overseas law enforcement presence. The administration believed that this approach kept “crime away from American shores, enabling the arrest of many US fugitives and solving serious US crimes.” It planned to continue this approach in an effort to establish “networks of law enforcement professionals dedicated to preventing crime and bringing international criminals to justice.”130 The ulti-

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mate domestic ambition, as defined in the final NSS, was to “seek to stop terrorists before they act, and eliminate their support networks and financing.”131 The NSS documents of the Clinton era committed the United States to eliminating foreign terrorists and their support networks in the United States, destroying terrorist sanctuaries, and confronting state-sponsored terrorism using “diplomatic, law enforcement, economic, military and intelligence activities.”132 Domestically, the administration proposed legislation designed to provide law enforcement officials with the tools to combat terrorism, including “additional manpower and training, methods to mark and trace explosives, legal mobile wiretaps.”133 The majority of the NSS documentation focused on the threat from overseas, insisting that foreign terrorists would be prevented from entering the country and that “the full force of legal authorities” would be used to remove them if they did gain access. Similarly, the administration sought to prevent fund-raising within the United States in support of foreign terrorist activity.134 This appeared predicated on the threat from overseas and on foreign nationals seeking access to the United States to raise money to be used in incidents overseas. It became clear, however, that the most tangible threat to American lives during the Clinton administration came from Americans: the destruction left by the Unabomber, the attacks at the Atlanta Olympics, and the Oklahoma City bombing were all perpetuated by Americans, inflicted upon Americans, and conducted on American soil. The Clinton administration’s NSS documents presented an overview of US grand strategy of which counterterrorism was but one component. Far more detailed initiatives were provided in a series of presidential directives issued between 1993 and 2001. This series of documents was established in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 1, signed on the Clinton administration’s first day in office, January 20, 1993. The document abolished the Bushera series and replaced the National Security Review (NSR) series with the Presidential Review Directive (PRD), which was used to direct reviews and analysis of potential policy developments. The National Security Directive (NSD) series was replaced with Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), designed to convey national security policy decisions once President Clinton had agreed to them.135 The same day saw the release of PDD 2, which confirmed the continuation of the Bush-era structure at the National Security Council. This included the retention of the Principals Committee (NSC-PC), the Deputies Committee (NSC-DC), and a variety of Interagency Working Groups (NSC-IWGs). Vitally, for issues of counterterrorism, the Deputies Committee was assigned responsibility for day-to-day crisis management.136 In September 1994, President Clinton signed PDD 29, “Security Policy Coordination,” which sought to improve the “coordination, formulation, evaluation and oversight of security policy.” The directive recognized that the end of the Cold War had “dramatically changed the threats that defined the security policies and procedures for protecting [the] government’s

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information, facilities and people” and that though “some threats [had] been reduced, others . . . have increased.”137 The document also established the Security Policy Board to replace the National Advisory Board Group for Security Countermeasures. In May 1998, the Clinton administration drafted PDD 62, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas.” The document was an attempt to put in place a new series of initiatives designed to thwart potential attacks on the country by unidentified networks or individuals. The directive affirmed the administration’s “zero tolerance” approach to international terrorism and stressed its willingness to utilize both multilateral and bilateral initiatives to “eliminate sanctuaries, penalize states that sponsor terrorism, and assist friendly states victimized by terrorism.”138 PDD 62 explained the role to be played by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the FBI in dealing with a potential terrorist incident within the United States. The extent to which PDD 62 addressed the threat posed to the United States was an indication of the growing concern regarding the inevitability of an eventual penetration of the American homeland by those intent on delivering devastation, possibly involving a weapon of mass destruction. To that end, PDD 62 sought to ensure students entering the country from nations believed to sponsor terrorism were prevented “from acquiring WMD-related knowledge” while in the United States.139 The major modification that PDD 62 introduced was the establishment of a new office: the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The national coordinator would not direct the activities of the various agencies but would be responsible for chairing a variety of bureaucratic bodies from across the federal government, including the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), the Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness (WMDP) Consequences Management and Protection Group, and for ensuring coordination among these groups. The position was also designated as a full member of the Deputies and Principals Committees of the NSC when meeting to consider issues directly related to its remit. The wide-ranging responsibilities of this position were indicative of the scale of the challenge the United States faced in arranging for the bureaucratic coordination of counterterrorism strategy in the second term of the Clinton presidency, before the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. The National Security Council was also altered, with the addition of a Senior Director for Infrastructure Protection and a Senior Director for Counterterrorism, both of whom reported directly to the national security adviser. In addition to announcing the broad allocation of responsibilities in the event of an attack on the United States, PDD 62 also instigated the designation of National Special Security Events. These included future presidential inaugurations, national conventions, summit meetings, Olympic

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Games, and State of the Union addresses. All such events focused the nation’s leaders in one concentrated location, allowing for a potentially catastrophic blow against the United States. As part of the Clinton administration’s continuity of government initiative, such events would draw upon the expertise of the FBI, the Secret Service, and FEMA as well as “specialized units” from the Pentagon, the EPA, and the State Department.140 Given the political nature of these events, PDD 62 recognized the need to focus on the nation’s capital and initiated moves to ensure the ability to detect WMD materials “within or approaching Washington, DC.”141 The potential threat to the United States by a strike on the capital had been raised previously in the 1996 National Security Strategy Review, which initiated a policy of national security emergency preparedness. Such a plan was necessary in the event of an emergency “in order to ensure the survivability of our institutions and national infrastructure, protect lives and property and preserve our way of life.” 142 This initiative was continued in PDD 67, “Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Operations,” signed on October 21, 1998. Continuity of Operations (COOP) became an area of increasing concern in the second term of the Clinton administration as its principles recognized the need to ensure the continued function of the federal government in the event of a national emergency. Although this did not lead to the creation of a new agency within the executive branch, it was a precursor for the Homeland Security Department established in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Until then, the Clinton administration continued to build up resources, confirming “comprehensive, all-hazard emergency preparedness planning by all Federal departments and agencies continues to be a crucial national security requirement.”143

Terrorism in the Clinton Administration: A Crime or an Act of War?

Central to any understanding of the Clinton administration’s approach to political violence, and its ensuing counterterrorism strategy, is recognition of its determination that acts of terrorism were crimes to be investigated by law enforcement agencies, not acts of war to be punished by military intervention. Despite the criticism that this received following the attacks of September 2001, the Clinton administration’s policy was based on a continuation of the prevailing orthodoxy, established by the Reagan administration in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 30. Even when catastrophe struck during the Reagan and Bush years, the United States did not resort to major military operations against perpetrators of political violence; the State Department had jurisdiction over international terrorism, and the FBI was the lead investigative body on incidents of domestic terrorism.

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Despite much pontification, little action followed acts of political violence perpetrated in the years preceding the Clinton administration, except in instances when clear state intervention could be ascertained. In cases of political violence enacted by organizations, the response was muted at best. As Michael Mandelbaum observed, before September 2001 there was “no real consensus in favor of serious military reprisals against the agents and sponsors of terrorism.”144 Even when US national interests were targeted, such as the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, the George H. W. Bush administration responded with diplomacy, not military force, a decision that received little domestic political opposition. When asked directly on a suitable response following the Oklahoma City attack, President Clinton was frank in his assessment: “We have to arrest the people who did it. We have to put them on trial. We have to convict them. Then we have to punish them. I certainly believe that they should be executed.”145 This approach continued throughout the Clinton administration, with the White House insisting as late as the year 2000 that “whenever possible,” the United States would “use law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight against terrorism.”146 In language that reflected pre-9/11-era priorities, the Clinton administration noted the need to devote “the necessary resources for America’s strategy to combat terrorism, which integrates preventive and responsive measures and encompasses a graduated scale of enhanced law enforcement and intelligence gathering, vigorous diplomacy and, where needed, military action.”147 Despite retrospective criticism for a dependence on law enforcement to counter terrorist threats, the administration noted that there would be times when this was not sufficient, and that when national security was challenged it would take “extraordinary steps” to protect US citizens.148 In such circumstances, the White House reserved the right “to act in self-defense by striking at their bases and those who sponsor, assist, or actively support them.”149 It insisted, however, that “a coalition of nations [was] imperative to the international effort to contain and fight the terrorism that threatens American interests.”150 Such an approach was a continuation of prevailing bipartisan policy in a pre-9/11 era. Even after the attack in Oklahoma City, Americans continued to view terrorism as a problem for other people to worry about; they had a “realistic assessment” of the risks but felt that terrorism was “likely to happen— but to someone else.”151 So long as that remained the public perception, the pressure on the Clinton administration to prioritize the threat from terrorism remained all but nonexistent. Fears surrounding an “enemy within” have long been a concern for the United States. During the Clinton administration, such concerns were focused on militia movements and lone wolves. Incident appeared to beget incident, as one act of political violence inspired another, and government crackdowns on groups and individuals motivated reprisals, in a cycle of

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violence. The incidents at Ruby Ridge and Waco provided the militia movement with what they believed to incontrovertible evidence that the federal government sought to “destroy the freedoms and liberties of the American people regardless of the consequences.”152 The destruction the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City ensured that political violence was no longer an abstract concept for Americans to view from afar. The threat from homegrown groups was a double-edged sword for the Clinton administration: the challenge to its authority was a clear danger, yet it also presented an opportunity to push back against the growing tide of right-wing hate groups. Addressing these entities was a vital component in the administration’s successful campaign for reelection in 1996. The threat from domestic political violence, however, was only part of the challenge the Clinton administration faced. As David Kaplan and Mike Tharp noted a year into Clinton’s second term, “a serious terrorism threat also remains from international groups, particularly from the Middle East. Yet while international terrorists have repeatedly attacked American targets overseas, they have not struck in the United States since 1993.”153 Ensuring this remained the case became an increasing priority for the Clinton administration during its time in office. 1. Bill Clinton, quoted in Charles O. Jones, “Campaigning to Govern,” in The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals, ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Press, 1996), 23. 2. National Security Initiatives Working Group, minutes of first meeting, April 28, 1992, Box 11, File 7, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 3. Daniel A. Sharp, fax to Anthony Lake re: speakers’ notes defining potential Clinton administration foreign policy, October 20, 1992, Box 10, File 11, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 4. Warren Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime (New York: Scribner Books, 2001), 175. 5. Jordan, quoted in David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York: Random House, 2001), 172. 6. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan, 2003), 132. 7. Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisers and the Presidents They Served—from JFK to George W. Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 206. 8. Nancy Soderberg, The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 15. 9. Myers had either confused Woolsey with Admiral William Crowe, who was to be appointed US ambassador to the United Kingdom, or had misread Woolsey’s résumé, which included serving as undersecretary of the navy from 1977 to 1979. See Woolsey’s recollection in Russell L. Riley, Inside the Clinton White House: An Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 90–93.

Notes

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10. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 220. 11. Only Richard Holbrooke was younger. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 12. Joe Klein, The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 47. 13. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 14. Sidney Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars: An Insider’s Account of the White House Years (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 154. Information also confirmed in author’s conversation with Michael Mandelbaum, June 8, 2016. 15. Quoted in Simon Tisdall, “Clinton Team Draws on the Carter Years,” Guardian (Manchester), December 23, 1992, 8. 16. “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:1–2. 17. John Rizzo, Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis at the CIA (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2014), 139. 18. Patricia Davis and Maria Glod, “CIA Shooter Kansi, Harbinger of Terror, Set to Die Tonight,” Washington Post, November 14, 2002. 19. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 443. 20. Rizzo, Company Man, 139. 21. Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 440. 22. Rizzo, Company Man, 138. 23. Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 440. 24. The White House was being renovated in September 1994, so President Clinton was staying in Blair House, across Pennsylvania Avenue from the executive mansion. For more on threats to the White House, see Ronald J. Ostrow, “Location Makes White House Hard to Protect,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 1994. 25. For details of Operation Bojinka, see Chapter 7. 26. For more on the acts of terror committed by Ted Kaczynski, see Alston Chase, Harvard and the Unabomber: The Education of an American Terrorist (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003); Robert Graysmith, Unabomber: A Desire to Kill (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1997). 27. See Jo Thomas, “New Face of Terror Crimes: ‘Lone Wolf’ Weaned on Hate,” New York Times, August 16, 1999, A1; Roberto Suro, “Terrorism’s New Profile: The Lone Wolf,” Washington Post, July 22, 1998, A1. 28. For more on Eric Rudolph, see Marie Brenner, “American Nightmare: The Ballad of Richard Jewell,” Vanity Fair, February 1997, 100–107, 150–165; Maryanne Vollers, Lone Wolf: Eric Rudolph: Murder, Myth and the Pursuit of an American Outlaw (New York: HarperCollins, 2006); Henry Schuster with Charles Stone, Hunting Eric Rudolph (New York: Berkley Books, 2005). 29. One World Trade Center stood at 1,368 feet, and Two World Trade Center was 1,362 feet tall. They were surpassed in 1974 by the Sears Tower in Chicago, which stands at 1,450 ft. 30. Much of the telecommunications equipment that served Manhattan’s radio and television services were installed on top of the World Trade Center. 31. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (London: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 74. 32. Clarke, Against All Enemies, 77. 33. “The President’s Radio Address,” February 27, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:215. 34. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the Adult Learning Center in New Brunswick, New Jersey,” March 1, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:221.

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35. “Remarks on Receiving the Rotary International Award of Honor and an Exchange with Reporters,” March 4, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:236. 36. “Exchange with Reporters Following a Meeting with Tilden Middle School Students,” March 4, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:237. 37. “Remarks on Mayoral Support for the Economic Program and an Exchange with Reporters,” March 5, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:245. 38. See “Interview with Dan Rather of CBS News,” March 24, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:346–354. 39. “The President’s News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt,” April 6, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:406. 40. “The President’s News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt,” April 6, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:411. 41. Joseph P. Fried, “The Terror Conspiracy: The Overview; Sheik and 9 Followers Guilty of a Conspiracy of Terrorism,” New York Times, October 2, 1995, A1. 42. Bruce Hoffman and Peter Chalk, Security in the Nation’s Capital and the Closure of Pennsylvania Avenue: An Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 15. 43. Thomas Jefferson, “Eighth Annual Message to Congress,” November 8, 1808, reproduced in Thomas Jefferson: Thoughts on War and Revolution: Annotated Correspondence, ed. Brett F. Woods (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), 227. 44. Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith, Paris, November 15, 1787, reproduced in The Quotable Jefferson, ed. John Kaminski (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 119. 45. Barry J. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty: The Changing Face of Patriots, Militias, and Political Violence in America (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 139. 46. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty, 144. See also Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility, Ruby Ridge Task Force Report, June 10, 1994, Section IV: Specific Issues Investigated, F: “FBI’s Rules of Engagement” and “Operations” on August 21 and 22, 1992, 156–193, 200–208. 47. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty, 145. 48. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty, 146. See also Stephen Labaton, “Separatist Family Given $3.1 Million from Government,” New York Times, August 16, 1995. 49. For more on events at Ruby Ridge, see Jess Walter, Ruby Ridge: The Truth and Tragedy of the Randy Weaver Family (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002); Alan W. Bock, Ambush at Ruby Ridge (Irvine, CA: Dickens Press, 1995). 50. William J. Clinton, My Life (London: Hutchinson, 2004), 498; Nigel Hamilton, Bill Clinton: Mastering the Presidency (London: Century Books, 2007) 91. 51. John Brummett, Highwire: From the Backwoods to the Beltway—the Education of Bill Clinton (New York: Hyperion, 1994), 116. 52. George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human: A Political Education (London: Hutchinson, 1999), 142. 53. Clinton, My Life, 499. 54. John F. Harris, The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House (New York: Random House, 2005), 57. 55. Clinton, My Life, 499. 56. Stephanopoulos, All Too Human, 142. 57. “Statement on the Tragedy in Waco, Texas,” April 19, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:459. 58. “The President’s News Conference,” April 20, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:461. 59. “The President’s News Conference,” April 20, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:463. 60. “Interview on CBS’ 60 Minutes,” April 23, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:575. 61. Clinton, My Life, 498. 62. For more on the events at Waco, see Kenneth G. C. Newport, The Branch Davidians of Waco: The History and Beliefs of an Apocalyptic Sect (Oxford: Oxford

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University Press, 2006); Clifford L. Linedecker, Massacre at Waco, Texas: The Shocking Story of Cult Leader David Koresh and the Branch Davidians (New York: St. Martin’s Paperbacks, 1993); James R. Lewis, ed., From the Ashes: Making Sense of Waco (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994); Dick J. Reavis, The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Stuart A. Wright, ed., Armageddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives on the Branch Davidian Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Jayne Seminare Docherty, Learning Lessons from Waco: When the Parties Bring Their Gods to the Negotiation Table (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2001). 63. Harris, The Survivor, 179. 64. A. M. Rosenthal, “On My Mind; Ending Forgiveness,” New York Times, April 21, 1995. 65. Georgie Anne Geyer, “The ‘No Questions Asked’ Country for Terrorists,” Chicago Tribune, April 21, 1995. 66. Martin Fletcher and Tom Rhodes, “Up to 250 Missing in US Bombing,” Times (London), April 20, 1995. 67. Morton Halperin, interview with author, July 5, 2017. 68. For more on the threat posed by homegrown, right-wing militia in the United States, see George Michael, Confronting Right Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA (New York: Routledge, 2003); Chester L. Quarles, Christian Identity: The Aryan American Bloodline Religion (Jefferson, NC: McFarlane & Company, 2004). 69. Mary Schmich, “Oklahoma’s Terror Rips to the Heart of Faith in Normalcy,” Chicago Tribune, April 21, 1995. 70. Harris, The Survivor, 179. 71. Elizabeth Drew, Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 196. 72. “Remarks on the Bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,” April 19, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:552. 73. Soderberg, The Superpower Myth, 139. 74. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 75. Stephen Singular, Talked to Death: The Life and Murder of Alan Berg (New York: Beech Tree Books, 1987), 85. 76. Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (June 2000): 412. 77. Harris, The Survivor, 180. For more, see Brandon M. Sickney, All-American Monster: The Unauthorized Biography of Timothy McVeigh (Amherst, MA: Prometheus Books, 1996); and Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: Regan Books, 2001). 78. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 79. “Remarks at a Memorial Service for the Bombing Victims in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,” April 23, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:573. 80. “Interview on CBS’ 60 Minutes,” April 23, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:575–577. 81. “Remarks to the American Association of Community Colleges in Minneapolis, Minnesota,” April 24, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:580–581. 82. Liddy quoted in Howard Kurtz, “Gordon Liddy on Shooting from the Lip,” Washington Post, April 26, 1995, C1. 83. Drew, Showdown, 199. 84. Drew, Showdown, 200. 85. Harris, The Survivor, 179. 86. Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office: Winning the Presidency in the Nineties (New York: Random House, 1998), 419. 87. Drew, Showdown, 200.

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88. “Remarks at the Michigan State University Commencement Ceremony in East Lansing, Michigan,” May 5, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:643–645. 89. “Remarks at the University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, Oklahoma,” April 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 1:551. 90. “Remarks at the University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, Oklahoma,” April 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 1:552. 91. “Remarks at the University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, Oklahoma,” April 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 1:551. 92. “Remarks on international security issues at George Washington University,” August 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1257. 93. “Remarks on international security issues at George Washington University,” August 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1259. 94. Clinton, My Life, 651. 95. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 96. Robert L. Jackson, “Gunman Fires on White House: Shooting: President Is Not Harmed in Assault-Rifle Attack,” Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1994. 97. Paul Richter, “Intruder Shot, US Agent Wounded on White House Lawn,” Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1995. 98. See James D. Boys, Hillary Rising: The Politics, Persona and Policies of a New American Dynasty (London: Biteback Publishing, 2016). 99. Amy Goldstein, “How the Demise of Her Health-Care Plan Led to the Politician Clinton Is Today,” Washington Post, August 25, 2016. 100. Melissa Healy, “Helms Stirs Furor with Warning to President: Politics: Senator Says Clinton ‘Better Watch Out’ if He Visits N. Carolina Bases. He Later Admits to ‘Mistake,’” Los Angeles Times, November 23, 1994; Steven Greenhouse, “Helms Takes New Swipe at Clinton, Then Calls it Mistake,” New York Times, November 23, 1994, A19. 101. “Helms Can Still Chair Senate Panel, Dole Says,” Los Angeles Times, November 24, 1994. 102. Jamie Gorelick, statement before the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, concerning the Clinton administration Counterterrorism Initiative, April 27, 1995, Clinton Presidential Records, Domestic Policy Council, Jose Cerda, OA/ID No. 16955, Terrorism, Stack S, Row 98, Section 2, Shelf 6, Position 2, William J. Clinton Library, Little Rock, AK. 103. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, vii. 104. “Remarks at the White House Conference on Character Building for a Civil and Democratic Society,” May 20, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:722. The Oklahoma City attack had implications further afield and into the future. High-profile buildings, such as the US embassy in London and Freedom Tower in Manhattan, were designed to minimize the impact of a truck bomb, and government buildings across America were secured to vehicular traffic in an attempt to prevent a repetition of the events in Oklahoma City. 105. Hoffman and Chalk, Security in the Nation’s Capital, 3. 106. “Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Combat Terrorism,” May 3, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:633–634. 107. Alan Kreczko to Anthony Lake. Subject: Terrorism Bill, March 14, 1996, Clinton Presidential Records, Speechwriting, David Shipley, OA/Box No.: 12006: Terrorism Radio Attack, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AK. 108. Robert L. Jackson, “House Approves Amendment to Weaken Anti-Terrorism Bill,” Los Angeles Times, March 14, 1996. 109. Steven Simon and Alan Kreczko, memo to Anthony Lake re: NSC Views on the House Counterterrorism Bill, August 3, 1995, Clinton Presidential Records, National

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Security Council, Transnational Threats (Richard Clarke), O/A Box No. 3547. Terrorism; Money and Counter-terrorism Act [2], William J. Clinton Library, Little Rock, AK. 110. US Department of Justice, Terrorism in the United States 1998, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 15. 111. Andy Pearson, “The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Return to Guilt by Association,” William Mitchell Law Review 24, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 1185–1215. 112. Daniel Klaidman and Michael Isikoff, “The Fed’s Quiet War: Inside the Secret Strategy to Combat the Militia Threat,” Newsweek 128 (April 22, 1996): 47. 113. Carol W. Lewis, “The Terror That Failed: Public Opinion in the Aftermath of the Bombing in Oklahoma City,” Public Administration Review 60, no. 3 (2000): 201–210. 114. The White House Fact Sheet: The President’s Proposals for Counterterrorism Funding, September 9, 1996, Clinton Presidential Records, Domestic Policy Council, Jose Cerda, OA/ID No.: 16955, Terrorism-Admin [administration] Bill Sept [September] 96 [1996], Stack S, Row 98, Section 2, Shelf 6, Position 2, William J. Clinton Library, Little Rock, AK. 115. See Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda (London: Routledge, 2003), 115. 116. Neely Tucker and Petula Dvorak, “Lapses Plague Security at Federal Buildings,” Washington Post, September 28, 2001, A12. 117. Drew, Showdown, 198. 118. Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision, 2nd ed. (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 2. 119. 50 U.S.C. 404a. 120. For a detailed analysis of the evolution and implementation of US foreign policy during the 1990s, see James D. Boys, Clinton’s Grand Strategy: US Foreign Policy in a Post–Cold War World (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 121. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1994), 8. 122. NSS94, 9. 123. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1996), iv. 124. NSS96, i. 125. NSS96, 2. 126. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1998), 7. 127. NSS98, 8. 128. For a consideration of this problem, see Morton B. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974). 129. NSS98, 19. 130. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1999), 13. 131. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2000), 22. 132. NSS98, 15. 133. NSS96, 6. 134. NSS98, 15. 135. PDD 1, “Establishment of Presidential Review and Decision Series/NSC,” January 20, 1993.

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136. PDD 2, “Organization of the National Security Council,” January 20, 1993. 137. PDD 29, “Security Policy Coordination,” September 16, 1994. 138. PDD 62, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas,” May 22, 1998, 4. 139. PDD 62, 8. 140. PDD 62, 11. 141. PDD 62, 12. A large section of this part of the PDD remains redacted under Executive Order 13526. 142. NSS96, 26. 143. NSS96, 26. 144. Michael Mandelbaum, “The Luck of the President,” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 3 (1985): 403. 145. “Interview on CBS’ 60 Minutes,” April 23, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:575. 146. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2000), 23. 147. NSS2000, 23. 148. NSS98, 15. 149. NSS2000, 23. 150. NSS2000, 22. 151. Lewis, “The Terror That Failed,” 201–210. 152. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty, 147–148. 153. David E. Kaplan and Mike Tharp, “Terrorism Threats at Home,” US News & World Report, December 29, 1997–January 5, 1998, 23–27.

5 Rogue States: An Axis of Evil?

Clinton administration faced the challenge of dealing with violence overseas from state sponsors of terrorism and nation states that sought to advance a virulent anti-American agenda in the emerging geopolitical era. Eight years after President Ronald Reagan unveiled his list of outlaw “Looney Tunes” states, and eight years before George W. Bush unveiled the “Axis of Evil,” the Clinton administration identified Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya as “backlash states.” The administration sought to address these nations using a variety of methods, with Iran and Iraq being specifically targeted for a policy of dual containment. Over the course of eight years, the Clinton administration devolved the terminology from “backlash states” to “rogue states,” and finally to “states of concern.” Despite the evolving language and fluctuating patterns of behavior, the membership of this group remained consistent throughout the Clinton era, with the five nations identified as backlash states in 1993 remaining states of concern eight years later.

In addition to confronting domestic political violence, the

The United States of America arrived at a unipolar moment in 1992. Under the presidency of George H. W. Bush, Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait, General Manuel Noriega was removed from power in Panama, Germany was reunified, and the USSR was dismantled. These international successes should have ensured that the 1992 election focused on the establishment of President Bush’s New World Order, but with the end of the Cold War continued foreign intervention was not something the majority of Americans were looking to prioritize. Unnecessary involvement in the affairs of other countries was identified as one the biggest foreign policy problems facing the United States, as voters favored an era of “pragmatic

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internationalism” while the domestic economy was in the midst of a mild recession.1 The state of the nation’s finances were prioritized by the Democratic Party candidate, Governor Bill Clinton, and by H. Ross Perot, a Texan billionaire running as an Independent. Their combined efforts ensured that President Bush was unable to justify his bid for reelection on the basis of his foreign policy successes. When foreign policy was discussed, it focused on state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Cuba, and Libya. These states, and their propensity for political violence, were a continuing source of tension for existing officeholders as well as for those seeking the presidency of the United States. Iraq was a double-edged sword for both the Clinton and Bush campaigns. The White House was unable to focus on its military success in Kuwait without opening itself up to accusations of focusing on foreign affairs or concerns regarding Saddam Hussein’s continuing rule. Initially hesitant to attack President Bush on foreign policy, Clinton praised Bush for expelling Iraq from Kuwait but noted that “as soon as the war was over, he seemed so concerned with the stability of the area that he was willing to leave the Kurds to an awful fate.”2 As the campaign progressed, Governor Clinton grew more confident in his willingness to address foreign policy, including Iraq, ensuring that state sponsors of terror received limited but vital attention throughout the campaign. Clinton critiqued the president for siding “with the status quo rather than democratic change, with familiar tyrants rather than those who would overthrow them.”3 This was echoed by the authors of Marching in Place, who referred to President Bush as “a warrior for the status quo.”4 Speaking in Louisiana on October 27, 1992, Clinton scoffed at the state of affairs under the Bush administration: “There’s a lawsuit in Atlanta over Iraq-gate, over the deferral or the diversion of money that you paid for in your taxes to build up Saddam Hussein, and the CIA and the Justice Department under Bush are fighting about which one of them lied to the federal court to cover up this country’s actions.”5 Clinton argued that containing America’s foes in the Middle East was no longer sufficient; a way had to be found to change their behavior or their regimes. Governor Clinton’s previous stance on Iraq, however, hardly inspired confidence. When asked if he supported the Iraq War, Governor Clinton noted, “I guess I would have voted for the majority side if it was a close vote. But I agree with the arguments the minority made.”6 Such statements reinforced the view that he knew little, and cared less, about foreign policy, leading Pat Buchanan to observe that Clinton’s foreign policy experience consisted of having “had breakfast once at the International House of Pancakes.”7 It was, in part, to address such concerns that the Clinton campaign selected Senator Al Gore of Tennessee as the vice-presidential candidate. Unencumbered by personal scandal and with experience dealing with state

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sponsors of terrorism on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gore was an ideal selection both on the campaign and later in the White House. As one of only 10 Democrats in the Senate to vote in favor of the Gulf War, Gore attacked the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq, alleging that US loan guarantees and dual-use technology exports helped Saddam Hussein build up the war machine that American soldiers had fought in 1991.8 Gore was not alone in assisting Governor Clinton to attack President Bush over his dealings with the Iraqi dictator. Richard Holbrooke was providing the Clinton campaign with advice, including the suggestion that US involvement in Iraq was “a three-part event.” He suggested that Bush had “handled the middle part, Operation Desert Storm, right. But he was wrong on Operation Appease Saddam before the war—even when he was building nuclear weapons, threatening his neighbors and gassing his own people—and then, after the war, bent over backwards in Operation Preserve Saddam, to let his government stay in power.”9 Becoming embroiled in a battle of wits with Saddam was not a priority for the Clinton campaign, and the issue was raised just enough to remind voters of the intricate relationship that had initially bound the Reagan and Bush administrations with Baghdad. The continuing investigation of the Iran-Contra affair ensured that Iraq’s rival, Iran, also played a role in the 1992 election. On October 30, the weekend before the presidential election, Special Prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh produced a new indictment against former defense secretary Casper Weinberger based on evidence that indicated Bush knew of, and favored, the arms deal.10 On Election Day, Bill Clinton won just 43 percent of the votes cast but was elected having secured 370 Electoral College votes. Ross Perot’s presence on the ballot ensured that President Bush received only 37 percent support, the lowest percentage for an incumbent president seeking reelection since Herbert Hoover in 1932. In one of his final acts as president, Bush pardoned Casper Weinberger, closing off any further inquiries into the Iran-Contra deal. The third nation to attract attention during the 1992 campaign was Cuba. President Bush had signed the Cuban Democracy Act on October 23, restricting the flow of US dollars to Havana and placing limitations on international trade with Cuba. The act barred naval vessels from docking in the United States within 180 days of trading with Cuba and sought to prevent military assistance arriving from former Soviet republics. Democratic congressman Robert Torricelli of New Jersey insisted the bill was designed to “wreak havoc” on Cuba, which continued to frustrate the United States, as neither political party could overcome the challenges posed by the Castro regime without risking political repercussions in Florida, a state essential to any presidential aspirant.11 Finally, the continuing quest for justice for victims of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing ensured attention also focused on Libya. On January

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21, 1992, the United Nations (UN) unanimously adopted Resolution 731, calling for the extradition of two Libyans accused of the bombing, a request rejected by a Libyan judge on February 18, which triggered economic sanctions under UN Resolution 748. Having won the election, the Clinton transition team found itself with an opportunity to define the direction of US foreign policy and move beyond the containment strategy that had been in place, in one form or another, since the 1940s. Philosophical debate at the time centered on whether the world had arrived at the End of History or was about to engage in a Clash of Civilizations. Neither view was particularly popular with the new foreign policy team as they prepared to take office. They had all been in political exile during the Reagan/Bush era and returned to power determined to devise a new direction for the United States on the world stage, in particular in regard to Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and Libya. They quickly discovered, however, that their capacity to initiate new policies was constrained by deep-rooted political realities. Though the incoming Clinton administration had no wish to personalize the differences between the United States and Iraq, as many believed President Bush had done, it could not simply ignore the situation. “I am not obsessed with the man,” President-Elect Clinton told the New York Times. The incoming team planned to judge Saddam on his future behavior rather than on his previous activities. “I believe in deathbed conversions,” Clinton insisted. “If [Saddam] wants a different relationship with the United States and with the United Nations, all he has to do is change his behavior.”12 These remarks were widely interpreted as a weakening of American resolve and as indicative of a president-elect with no real foreign policy experience. The fierce reaction came not only from Republicans, to whom Saddam had become a bête noire, but also from members of Clinton’s own campaign team, who flew to Little Rock to initiate a damage-limitation exercise. Instead of standing by his statement, the president-elect made it clear that he had “no intention of normalizing relations” with the Iraqi leader and claimed to be “astonished” at the reaction to his earlier remarks.13 This Uturn on such a vital policy position did little to inspire confidence in the incoming administration. As the first Democratic president in 12 years, and the third youngest in US history, Bill Clinton could not risk appearing weak on the world stage, yet he had no intention of recklessly pursuing overseas engagements. Achieving an equilibrium between these positions proved to be a challenge throughout the Clinton administration. Without sufficient international provocation, however, the Clinton administration was initially content to continue Bush-era policies toward Iraq. The long-standing antagonism between Washington and Havana ensured that any breakthrough was unlikely under the leadership of Fidel Castro, although this reluctance had as much to do with domestic politi-

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cal considerations, given the significance of the Cuban vote in Florida.14 Also important was the role Cuba played in Bill Clinton’s defeat as governor of Arkansas in 1980 for, as Morton Halperin observed, “Clinton’s sensitivity to the issue was very much based on his feeling that he had lost his re-election because of the Cubans who had come to Arkansas.”15 Similarly, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s personification as the epitome of evil during the Reagan era and the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 ensured that Libya was identified as a state to be reckoned with by the incoming administration as it prepared to take office. Finally, Iran posed a very personal dilemma for the incoming foreign policy team of Christopher, Lake, Berger, and Albright, because the Iranian Revolution that had exiled the shah had also contributed to their own departure from the White House in January 1981, condemning them to political exile. In spite of this, it was recognized that “there was a fear of wandering into this area unprotected because of Iran-Contra and because it was still such a neuralgic political issue.” 16 In all cases, the options for the incoming Clinton administration appeared limited. It could seek to engage with long-standing foes, try to restrain their activities, or attempt to overpower them militarily. All three options presented challenges for an administration that had won office promising to focus on the domestic economy and not get unnecessarily involved in foreign interventions. Since the 1960s, the United States routinely played nation against nation in the Persian Gulf in an attempt to prevent the emergence of a regional superpower. This strategy played out against the backdrop of the Cold War, with the Soviets and the Americans maneuvering, each in an attempt to gain a foothold in the other’s sphere of influence while avoiding a nuclear confrontation. With the start of the Clinton presidency, several factors appeared to indicate a new era had arrived. Gone was the posturing with the Soviets, and the idea of Iraq serving as a counterweight to Iran was discredited: no longer would the enemy (Iraq) of America’s enemy (Iran) be America’s friend. The broader geopolitical situation was exacerbated by the Iraqi expulsion from Kuwait, the ensuing decimation of Saddam’s conventional forces, and the apparent destruction of his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. The collapse of the USSR and the humbling of Saddam left the United States as the dominant overseas power in the region. The direct military threat that Iraq posed was supplemented by the existential threat presented by Iran. The Iranian threat, however, was arguably far more complex, as its leadership had repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to use its agents of terror against the interests of the United States. Iranian cunning was contrasted with Iraqi belligerence, with a senior Kuwaiti official noting,

The Most Potent Threat: Iraq and Iran

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“It’s exactly because they’re so much more clever than Saddam that the Iranians pose the more serious long-term threat.”17 The two nations proved to be a formidable challenge to the United States during the Clinton administration, and the first military decision President Clinton faced was how to respond to an act of terror planned by the Iraqi government against US interests. In April 1993, the Clinton administration was presented with evidence that Iraqi intelligence had attempted to assassinate George Bush during a recent visit to Kuwait. Local authorities apprehended and charged 17 men in connection with the plot. Following their interrogation and examination of an explosive device by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an Iraqi attempt to murder the former president became clear.18 Several members of the National Security Council (NSC), including Martin Indyk, believed President Clinton “should retaliate against targets of importance to Saddam himself, such as presidential palaces, to drive home the point that if Saddam came after one of our presidents, the United States would consider itself free to come after him.”19 President Clinton was eventually guided by the advice of his senior military aide, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, to launch a volley of Tomahawk cruise missiles on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad. Timed to strike at 1:30 a.m. local time on June 26, 1993, this was deemed to be a “proportional response,” designed to inflict structural damage while limiting loss of life. Addressing the nation from the Oval Office, President Clinton declared that “the Iraqi attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans. We could not and have not let such action against our Nation go unanswered.” The president noted that this attempt was “particularly loathsome and cowardly.” Reaching back to the colonial era, Clinton noted that since the Revolutionary War, “America’s security has depended on the clarity of this message: Don’t tread on us.” Accordingly, Clinton insisted his response “was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in statesponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations.” President Clinton noted that Saddam had “demonstrated repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism or aggression if left unchecked. Our intent was to target Iraq’s capacity to support violence against the United States and other nations and to deter Saddam Hussein from supporting such outlaw behavior in the future.” Clinton’s specific reference to “terrorism” was a vital distinction to draw, as opposed to considering the Iraqi state’s behavior an act of war because of the nature of the target. The president insisted, “We will combat terrorism. We will deter aggression. We will protect our people.”20 The attacks were followed up by a presentation of evidence at the United Nations Security Council by Ambassador Albright,

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who had briefed the Iraqi delegation of the imminent attack only hours before.21 In choosing this course of action as his first ever use of force as president, Bill Clinton demonstrated his intention was to restrain Saddam, not to destroy him or his regime. The Clinton administration’s decision to instigate a cruise missile attack on Iraqi intelligence was the first such US retaliation since the airstrikes on Tripoli ordered by President Reagan seven years earlier. The attempt to deliver a proportional response, however, did not please everyone. CIA director James Woolsey was “enraged,” noting that despite the attempt to kill a former US president, President Clinton merely fired “a couple of dozen cruise missiles into an empty building in the middle of the night in Baghdad.” Woolsey observed that the missile strike was evidence of “retaliating quite effectively against Iraqi cleaning women and night watchmen, but not especially effectively against Saddam Hussein.”22 President Clinton, however, insisted that the United States had “damaged their major intelligence facility quite severely. . . . we made it absolutely clear that we will not tolerate acts of terrorism or other illegal and dangerous acts.”23 Saddam remained a thorn in the flesh of the Clinton administration, identified by Madeleine Albright as “the most persistent” of all “the headaches inherited.”24 The central challenge was to do whatever was necessary to protect the fragile moment that existed as the Clinton presidency began. In 1993, a lasting peace in the Middle East finally appeared to be a viable option, heralding Arab-Israeli peace, Israeli security, and unimpeded access to Persian Gulf oil. While many were working in the direction of peace, however, there were some who would stop at nothing to disrupt the process. Finding a policy solution to the challenges posed by Iraq and Iran was therefore a priority for the Clinton administration. That task became all the more critical on June 25, 1996, when a vehicle packed with explosives was detonated outside the Khobar Towers complex in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 US servicemen. The team sent to investigate by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered the results of the largest truck bomb it had ever encountered: a blast crater 85 feet across and 35 feet deep. As a base used to house US service personnel, the location was a relatively soft target. Suspicions quickly focused on the Iranian-backed Saudi Hezbollah, made up of the kingdom’s Shiite minority. US efforts to identify the perpetrators, however, were frustrated by the Saudi authorities, who failed to provide substantial evidence with which to prosecute any suspects in a US court of law. Despite the bombing occurring at the height of the presidential election of 1996, it failed to make a significant impact on the campaign of either President Clinton or his Republican challenger, Senator Bob Dole. In July 1996, Will Wechsler, director for transnational threats at the National Security Council, wrote a memo to Richard Clarke detailing

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concerns surrounding further attacks on US interests in Saudi Arabia. Although terrorism was unlikely to “ever prevent [the US] from fulfilling [its] military mission in the region,” Wechsler feared that “losses from a series of terrorist attacks will begin to be considered politically unacceptable.” Wechsler noted that if the United States was “still unable to determine culpability and order retaliation, political pressure will nonetheless sharply increase for the President to change policy and take ‘decisive’ action.” Wechsler warned that three unpalatable alternatives presented themselves in such a situation: “either withdrawing from Saudi Arabia (as Reagan did in Lebanon) or taking unconsidered military action (as Carter did in Iran).” However, “the least desirable reaction . . . would be for the President to appear to waffle.” What was required, he insisted, was a “commitment to a measured, consistent response.”25 In the aftermath of the attack in Saudi Arabia, a breakfast meeting was held to consider the wider implications of terrorist activity. Joining administration members were Brian Jenkins, a former senior expert on terrorism at the RAND Corporation; Jerrold Green, head of RAND’s Middle East program; Ambassador Robert Oakley; journalist Judith Miller; and Ambassadors Morris Busby, Richard Haass, and Gary Sick. On the agenda was a spate of terrorist incidents, including the sarin subway attack in Tokyo, the attack at Khobar Towers, the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in Israel, and the bombings in France and Great Britain. These attacks had been “carried out by an extremely diverse range of actors; an apocalyptic sect, radical political movements with or without the support of state sponsors, intelligence agencies of state sponsors, separatist movements, and criminal gangs that evolved from armed political factions.” It was noted that “there was no claim of responsibility for al Khobar, because the attackers’ only constituency was God and that he would know who was responsible.” At stake was a central question: “Are we moving into an era when terrorism is emerging as a strategic rather than a tactical threat?” The Clinton administration noted it had “never attributed a strategic significance to terrorism.” However, “Hamas attacks in Israel prior to the election did have a strategic impact. In the hypothetical case that the US were confronted by a rapid fire sequence of devastating bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia, the effect could have been strategic in scope.”26 Clearly, by 1996 the White House recognized the changing dynamics of international terrorism. The inability to identify the perpetrators of the Khobar Towers attack was a major blemish on the administration’s counterterrorism record. The suggestion of Iranian involvement raised the stakes of a potential war with Tehran at a time when a rapprochement was being attempted. Clashes over jurisdiction between the FBI and the Saudi authorities thwarted efforts to bring justice either at the time or at any point there-

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after. After the Clinton administration left office, the allocation of blame undulated between Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, with no adequate determination of responsibility or effort to bring those individuals to justice by any subsequent US administration. The Clinton administration’s attempt to formulate a coherent approach to the new geopolitical era became a serious philosophical dilemma as well as an in-house game of one-upmanship that Douglas Brinkley referred to as “the Kennan Sweepstakes.”27 With the end of the Cold War, individuals and departments sought to place their stamp on US foreign policy for the postcontainment era. Madeleine Albright’s contribution to this debate consisted of what she referred to as the “four food groups,” although she noted that this “was hardly a scientific way of looking at the globe,” since it “failed to take into account the rising influence of non-state actors.”28 Albright also advanced the concept of “assertive multilateralism” as a method of ensuring a continued US presence in international affairs, ostensibly through the mechanism of UN-backed operations. The abject failure of the UN in Somalia and Rwanda, however, caused her to alter her terminology.29 Before the Clinton administration’s grand strategy could be composed, the White House needed to address continuing challenges from nations that posed the greatest risk to US national security. Despite contemporary and retrospective criticism of a lack of focus on foreign policy, the Clinton White House moved quickly to establish strategy in this area during a high-level meeting of the National Security Council in February 1993, less than a month after taking office. Given the ongoing standoff with Iraq and long-standing tensions with Iran, focus settled on dealings with Baghdad and Tehran. Opinion differed within the executive branch agencies as to how best to address the threats posed by the two nations. Division occurred even within departments, with the civilian leadership at the Pentagon arguing for an increase in pressure on Saddam, and the uniformed command recommending a dialogue with Baghdad in order to end an open-ended military commitment. Colin Powell described Saddam as “a toothache,” a pain, but one the United States could live with.30 All were aware of the challenges posed by collapsing states and sought to avoid adding Iraq to the problems presented by events in the former Yugoslavia. Budgetary constraints were also a consideration since containing Saddam came at a price: the no-fly zones were patrolled by aircraft from US aircraft carriers stationed in the region, which was a drain on military resources at a time when the new administration was seeking to address the deficit and the state of the nation’s economy.31 The Clinton administration decided to advocate a policy of “aggressive containment,” covertly seeking an officer-led coup in Iraq, providing

Devising a State-Centric Strategy

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political support for the Iraqi National Congress (INC), and enforcing UN Security Council resolutions and restrictive sanctions. The same meeting resulted in a similar consensus in regard to Iran, identified as the “archetype of a hostile, rogue regime—the most important state sponsor of militant Islamic terrorism,” including Hezbollah and the Palestine Islamic Jihad.32 The options were limited as there were no existing UN sanctions in place to enforce, no US presence in the country since 1979, no base from which to launch covert activities, and no legitimate opposition groups. The dilemma in distinguishing between terrorism and freedom fighters was addressed at this point by President Clinton, who noted that “it may be in the eyes of the beholder. But from the point of view of the United States, there are clear definitions of terrorism, and one of them is the willful killing of innocent civilians who themselves are not in any way involved in military combat. That is what we seek to prevent.”33 The Clinton administration chose to retain a range of unilateral sanctions on Iran and lobbied allies to end Iranian trade in an attempt to destroy its economy, which was suffering from inflation running between 20 and 30 percent and comparable rates of unemployment. The policy recommendations of active containment for Iran and aggressive containment for Iraq were quickly adopted by President Clinton. By April 1993, barely 100 days into his administration, he briefed President Mubarak of Egypt on the new strategy toward the two states.34 Just as containment ceased to be the overarching US grand strategy toward its most implacable foe, the Soviet Union, a regional variant was initiated against two of its most stubborn opponents in the Middle East. The manner in which policy is announced, the individual chosen to deliver the policy announcement, and the timing of its unveiling all contribute to the manner in which it is received. Given President Clinton’s lack of foreign policy credentials and the significance of the subject matter, it might have been expected that Bill Clinton would have delivered the speech that disclosed the new policy toward Iran and Iraq. The president, however, was focused on domestic policy and was determined not to be drawn into a continuation of the hostilities with Iraq that had defined the previous administration. As written by Martin Indyk and his deputy, Bruce Riedel, the speech was intended to be delivered by Anthony Lake on May 18, 1993, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an organization Indyk had helped establish in 1985. However, when the day of the speech arrived, Lake was unavailable, as was his deputy, Samuel Berger. As a result, the speech was delivered by Martin Indyk, the British-born, Australian-raised, naturalized American who was serving as senior director of Near East and

From Active Containment to Dual Containment

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South Asian affairs at the National Security Council.35 This decision did little to draw attention to the policy or create an impression of its importance to the administration.36 Indyk explained that the policy was based on an approach Bill Clinton had advocated on the campaign trail: “a democracy-oriented foreign policy; a foreign policy that would promote the interests of American business abroad . . . to protect American interests in the Middle East and to counter the threats to those interests from radical regimes, be they secular or religious.” Indyk noted that, despite the geopolitical changes, US interests in the region remained unchanged, including “an abiding interest in the freeflow of Middle Eastern oil at reasonable prices.” The plan called for the containment of Iraq and Iran in the east, promotion of Arab-Israeli peace in the west, energetic efforts to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the promotion of democracy and prosperity across the Middle East. Indyk confirmed that the United States did not expect reconciliation with Baghdad and called for the establishment of a UN commission to investigate war crimes committed by Saddam’s regime, lambasted as “beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgment, irredeemable.” Indyk announced US support for the Iraqi National Congress as an alternative to Saddam’s regime and called on other nations to “accord the INC the recognition and support it deserves.” Indyk stressed the administration had no quarrel with the Iraqi people, merely with its leadership, and sought to work with the UN to enact Resolutions 706 and 712 to provide humanitarian assistance. Indyk conceded that containing Iran would be “more difficult though no less necessary,” as its intentions and capabilities were seen as “a dangerous combination for Western interests.” He identified Iran as “the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and assassination across the globe” that, via its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, was “doing its best to thwart [US] efforts to promote peace between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states.” Indyk insisted that it was in no one’s interests “to ease Iran’s economic situation so that it can pursue normal commercial relations on one level while threatening our common interests on another level.”37 By 1993, however, Iran had secured trade deals with China, Russia, and members of the European Union, thwarting the Clinton administration’s attempt to convince world powers that “the income supported Iranian terrorism and that Iran’s steadily worsening economy made it a bad investment.”38 Indyk stressed, however, that the Clinton administration was “not opposed to Islamic government” in Iran and noted its “excellent relations with a number of unspecified Islamic governments,” although these remained unspecified. Though the United States did not seek a confrontation with Iran, Indyk declared that it would not normalize relations “until and unless Iran’s policies change, across the board.” Until then, the Clinton administration would

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“work energetically to persuade our European and Japanese allies, as well as Russia and China, that it is not in their interests to assist Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or the conventional means to pose a regional threat.”39 Concerns existed over Iran’s conventional forces, with the US Defense Intelligence Agency reporting a $2 billion increase in Tehran’s military budget to include the purchase of Russian submarines and attempts to buy state-of-the-art battle tanks.40 Containing Iraq and Iran would prove costly; the strategy required an increased military presence in the Persian Gulf just as the administration was looking to reduce military expenditure. The Clinton administration had been advocating a fleet of 10 carriers worldwide, but the Congressional Research Service reported that keeping 1 carrier continuously on station near the Persian Gulf required a force of between 6 and 9 carriers to allow for rotation and refitting.41 The initial policy had been identified as one of “aggressive containment” for Iraq and “active containment” for Iran. Shortly before delivering the speech, however, Indyk discussed the initiative with Elaine Sciolino of the New York Times, who suggested that it sounded like a policy of “parallel containment.” Accordingly, Indyk announced that the policy would be known as “dual containment.”42 Because the policy announcement was not given by a senior member of the Clinton administration, the initial reaction was muted. The Washington Post addressed the speech five days later on May 23, and the New York Times reported the details on May 27, stressing that it had to “obtain a copy of the speech from the White House” on May 21, three days after the speech had been delivered. Finally, Newsweek addressed the speech and the new policy, but not until July 12. All focused on the concept of “dual containment” and the apparent similarity of policies to be adopted toward Iran and Iraq, despite the specific differences that defined the policy initiative. The inability to coordinate its unveiling ensured that the speech failed to convey the administration’s commitment to the policy while also managing to “combine critics who wanted Clinton to engage with Iran with those who wanted him to overthrow the regime in Iraq.” As a result, the policy “was denounced as a failure even before it had taken effect.”43 Indyk later conceded, “Although the speech emphasized the different approaches to Iraq and Iran, the use of the words dual containment created the false impression that the US would deal with both rogue regimes in the same way.”44 Indyk expressed surprise that he had “inadvertently . . . managed to brand Clinton’s policy,” but this belies the fact that the administration actively sought to define its approach to foreign policy during its first months in office in terms that would be easily digested by the American

Reaction and Implementation

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people.45 Indeed, one of the Clinton administration’s ultimate failings in foreign policy was its long-term inability to define policy that could be conveyed in a single word or slogan. Despite the debacle surrounding its unveiling, dual containment had its admirers. Paul Wolfowitz referred to the policy as one that “provided a muchneeded break with old notions of depending on a balance between [Iran and Iraq] to protect security in the gulf.”46 The New York Times noted that although dual containment was not a solution to the challenges in the Middle East, it was “a lot better than balancing one tyranny against another—the old recipe for strengthening both.”47 Writing in Foreign Policy, William Hyland conceded that dual containment had worked: “The administration has successfully confronted Saddam Hussein, while resisting any temptation to tilt toward Iran.”48 Reflecting on the policy in May 1994, the Boston Globe observed that the Clinton administration had propounded “a clear, forceful policy adapted to the transformations wrought by the implosion of the Soviet Union and by Saddam Hussein’s failure to annex Kuwait.”49 All praise, however, appeared tempered with criticism. Hyland questioned “how the same administration could be so effective in this obviously difficult region, while so inept in others”;50 Wolfowitz questioned the commitment to the policy at a senior level, a thinly veiled reference to the president that was not wide of the mark. Indyk also came under attack, denounced by Iraq’s foreign minister as “a Zionist who had taken control of US foreign policy.”51 Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser during the Persian Gulf War, observed that the Clinton administration “behaved as if the principal issues of the region . . . have no relation to each other and can be dealt with as if each was isolated from the others.”52 This observation appeared to be founded on the understanding that the Clinton White House failed to see the impact that Iranian-sponsored terrorism and Iraqi acts of political violence were having upon the peace process, something that Indyk stressed was at the heart of the administration’s overall strategy. The Clinton administration also sought to enforce UN sanctions on Iraq, a continuation of Bush-era policies, and to prevent the sale of nuclear materials to Iran in violation of internationally accepted nonproliferation accords. Scowcroft joined forces with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Richard Murphy to author a bipartisan critique of the policy for Foreign Affairs, arguing that dual containment was “more a slogan than a strategy” and that it lacked “strategic viability and carries a high financial and diplomatic cost.”53 Daniel Pipes, editor of the Middle East Quarterly, believed that the Iranian threat was being underestimated by the administration. “Even with persistent economic malaise and resulting popular discontent, there is no evidence of a credible threat to the regime’s staying power,” he noted. “They’d want to take control of Iraq, at least, if Saddam were gone, but they’d likely create a classic satrapy rather than move to an outright annexation.”54 Critics of

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dual containment stressed the size of Iran, its population of almost 60 million, and its leadership’s determination to be preeminent in the Gulf as reasons why a White House–sanctioned embargo would struggle to succeed. The greatest challenge to implementing the dual containment policy came from the international community, which was supportive of the policy outcomes but not its methods. For the policy to be effective, the Clinton administration needed to convince its allies to halt transactions with Iran and prevent Saddam from exporting Iraqi oil. At the time the policy was unveiled, Europe was beset by poor economic conditions, with average unemployment reaching 12 percent. Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria all traded freely and openly with Iraq and Iran, and France had only recently supplied Tehran with a shipment of Exocet missiles. At a time of economic contraction, and with exports accounting for a far higher percentage of economic output than in the United States, the request to close down two vital revenue streams met a hesitant reaction. To do so would mean “forgoing a market whose imports from Europe were over $10 billion and from Japan over $2.5 billion in 1992.”55 European leaders were not shy about stating their concerns. German chancellor Helmut Kohl highlighted the apparent hypocrisy in efforts to curtail European trade with Iran when the United States was a major purchaser of Iranian oil exports.56 The Clinton administration’s efforts were further undermined when the World Bank granted Iran a loan of $165 million to upgrade its electrical power system in March 1993.57 Despite these challenges, the dual containment policy remained in place into the second term of the Clinton administration. Secretary of Defense Cohen noted on April 28, 1997, that the policy was “the right one, and we are going to encourage our allies to support that one.”58 As the second term progressed, however, the policy evolved as a result of domestic and international pressures. On October 31, 1998, under increasing pressure from Republicans in Congress, the White House altered its policy to containment plus regime change. The move followed criticism of the policy that echoed earlier attacks on containment in the late 1940s. On both occasions, the policies appeared to be tantamount to an acceptance of the status quo and to an unwillingness to solve the continuing situation. Clinton’s second-term national security adviser, Sandy Berger, conceded that dual containment was “aesthetically displeasing, but strategically sufficient,” insisting correctly that forcing Saddam from power “would be emotionally gratifying, but the costs of it would be greater than our national interests.”59 Neither Iran nor Iraq emerged as a regional superpower during the implementation of the dual containment policy. Neither country made forays into foreign lands, despite a number of unsuccessful efforts by Saddam. The dual containment policy, reinforced by allied patrols of the no-fly zones, effectively kept Saddam “in his box” for the duration of the Clinton presidency.60

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The dual containment policy toward Iraq ultimately consisted of maintaining sanctions imposed by the United Nations in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. The administration did not embrace a concept of regime change in its first term because it understood that this would require the commitment of US ground forces in a conflict that had insufficient support in Congress, among the population, or within the administration itself. As a result, Iraq and its leaders remained an irritant but not a priority for the Clinton administration. Faced with a multilateral framework, Clinton had little or no room to maneuver.61 Its critical miscalculation was based on an anticipation of Saddam’s imminent removal from office. Containment of the Soviet Union had taken five decades to achieve, a time frame the Clinton administration did not wish to see replicated in the Persian Gulf. Its expectations of a five-year initiative proved to be optimistic at best, naive at worst. It enabled Saddam’s conventional forces to be rebuilt, which allowed him to reimpose his will over Shiite Muslim rebels in southern Iraq and the Kurdish rebels in the north. The allied solution to this during the 1990s was simplistic: “Drop a lot of iron, meaning there would be allied air strikes, but no commitment of ground troops.”62 The policy had a similar lack of impact in Iran, where dual containment did precious little to end support for Hezbollah and its cycle of terror in the Middle East. Dual containment was an appropriate policy for the Clinton administration to adopt as it sought to nurture the peace process in the Middle East and reduce the risk of political violence against US national interests while avoiding a direct confrontation with either Iran or Iraq, for which there was no political or public appetite. Dual containment did not provide a long-term solution to the challenge posed by Iraq and Iran, though throughout the Clinton presidency it proved effective at restricting both nations without strengthening either side, providing a viable balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Although the Clinton administration hoped to be able to deal with Iran and Iraq via its dual containment policy, it recognized that other states remained beyond its capacity to enact social and political reform. In an attempt to address these states en masse, the administration reached back to a concept first articulated in 1985, when Ronald Reagan grouped together a disparate band of nations with little in common except their determination to defy the United States. The repressive nature of the ruling bodies, as opposed to the ethnicity or creed of the population, best underscored the rationale for the grouping initially identified by the Clinton administration as “backlash” states: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya.63 With the exception of Nicaragua, this was the same collection of states that President Reagan had

Beyond Dual Containment

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identified in 1985, “ensuring that the list was short, manageable and enduring.”64 The Clinton administration’s policy response to these nations was unveiled in a series of high-profile speeches and articles by the senior members of the foreign policy team. On September 21, 1993, Anthony Lake gave the most important foreign policy statement of the entire Clinton era. At an engagement at Johns Hopkins University, Lake’s remarks set forth the administration’s view of the world and how it intended to shape it. The policy of “democratic enlargement” comprised strengthening the community of major market democracies, fostering new democracies and market economies, countering states that were hostile to democracy and markets, and promoting a humanitarian agenda. Lake was adamant that this was not a plan to “impose democracy on regimes that appear to be opting for liberalization” but rather an attempt to “help steer some of them down that path while providing penalties that raise the costs of repression and aggressive behavior.” The administration recognized that this might provoke a visceral reaction from a small group of nations that wished to challenge the expansion of democracy. It was this collection of countries that Lake identified as backlash states. Lake warned that such states “may engage in violence and lawlessness that threaten the United States and other democracies.” He argued that they constituted a “reactionary” approach to history and were “more likely to sponsor terrorism and traffic in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies” as well as to “suppress their own people, foment ethnic rivalries, and threaten their neighbors.” Lake called for these nations to be isolated, “diplomatically, militarily, economically, and technologically,” revealing that US policy toward these states would emphasize counterterrorism, export controls, and intelligence gathering. With the end of the Cold War, the threat from these nations was used, in part, to justify continued defense expenditure and dismiss calls for a peace dividend, as the United States had to be prepared to respond to acts of political violence to which these nations had historically resorted. Lake insisted that the United States “must always maintain the military power necessary to deter or, if necessary, defeat aggression by these regimes.” The tactics adopted by these nations were likely to be “diverse and unpredictable,” so the United States needed to ensure that its own forces were “ready, mobile, flexible, and smart.” Lake stressed that the United States was prepared to “strike back decisively and unilaterally” when necessary in response to acts of political violence. The White House was sensitive to charges that its policies targeted a specific religion, and Lake argued that the Clinton administration would “extend every expression of friendship to those of the Islamic faith who abide in peace and tolerance” but would likewise “provide every resistance to militants who distort Islamic doctrines and seek to expand their influence by force.” The Clinton admin-

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istration’s concept of democratic enlargement, and its blending of democracy and market forces, was presented as a peaceful remedy for the threat of political violence posed by backlash states. As Lake reiterated, “Market economies can thrive for a time without democracy. But both our instinct and recent history in Chile, South Korea, and elsewhere tell us they cannot do so forever.”65 Anthony Lake focused on the “aggressive and defiant” behavior of these states in a Foreign Affairs article entitled “Confronting Backlash States.” He stressed that their shared suppression of human rights, promotion of radical ideologies, and domination by cliques justified their grouping, although the piece focused on the specific threats from Iran and Iraq. Lake insisted that the administration’s decision to group these nations together did not mean that it failed to recognize that each nation was “unique in its history, culture and circumstances.”66 Dual containment, he stressed, did not mean “duplicate containment.” In Iraq, the Clinton administration was faced by “an aggressive, modernist, secular avarice,” whereas in Iran it was “challenged by a theocratic regime with a sense of cultural and political destiny and an abiding antagonism toward the United States.”67 Lake was adamant that the administration’s concern with Iran was not an example of a clash of civilizations. Instead, it was driven by Iranian support for political violence and its status as “the foremost sponsor of terrorism and assassination worldwide.”68 Lake noted that the lack of an international consensus made Iran difficult to deal with, since no broad sanctions had been imposed by the UN, and no moderating factions appeared available to support within the country. The “active coordination and consultations with friendly countries” that were essential for a successful, coordinated counterterrorism strategy in regard to Iran and Iraq eventually proved unsustainable, despite initial claims of having found “consensus among the European Union, Canada and Japan on those aspects of Iran’s actions that we find unacceptable.”69 The Clinton administration was forced to recognize that strong differences of opinion existed over how best to engage with Tehran, with some advocating a policy based on positive inducement rather than punitive sanctions. Lake believed that the Clinton administration had forged “a realistic and sustainable policy” that accounted for US interests in the Persian Gulf. This, he argued, was “not a crusade, but a genuine and responsible effort . . . to protect American strategic interests, stabilize the international system and enlarge the community of nations committed to democracy, free markets and peace.”70 Writing in the Washington Post later in 1994, Lake stressed that the need to contain the “reactionary” backlash states was a vital element of US policy in the Middle East. The defensive language of the article revealed the challenges involved in defining policy. Lake insisted that US involvement in the region was not “a struggle for mastery over the Middle East

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or a ‘clash of civilizations’ pitting Western values against Islamic and other religious traditions.” Instead, Lake noted, it was extremism in all its forms, driven by “political, economic and social alienation and exclusion,” that was now the enemy of the United States. When the “all too seductive language of fear and prejudice” was coupled with religion, it presented “a clear and discernable threat to US interests and the potential for peace in the Middle East.”71 Anthony Lake next addressed US counterterrorism strategy in remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations on September 12, 1994. He continued his theme from the Washington Post article to insist that the enemies of the new era were “extreme nationalists and tribalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states, and all those who would return newly freed societies to the intolerant ways of the past.” Lake recognized that the United States could not impose peace on nations engaged in civil strife but stressed the need to seek cooperation among international law enforcement agencies to thwart the threat of political violence. The Clinton administration, Lake insisted, was determined to fight “against those who would deny people their human rights, terrorists who threaten innocents, and pariah states that choose repression and extremism over openness and moderation.” Lake noted that nations seeking “to develop and traffic in the weapons of mass destruction, that support terrorism,” defying US policy, were a prime target for the White House. To address them, the administration committed to maintain the military in order to “deter aggression—and counter it when the need arises,” pursue the dual containment strategy, and seek a negotiated settlement with North Korea “to create a world where tolerance, freedom, and democracy prevail.”72 Between July and September 1994, however, official phraseology changed: the backlash states had become “rogue states.” Lake’s remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations were edited for an article in the New York Times. Revealing the overlap of policy that became a trademark of the Clinton administration, Lake referenced not only the rogue state concept but also dual containment. He argued that having two concurrent strategies was “not evidence of indecision: they are the hallmarks of determination, of a nation engaged in the long struggle for democracy and the freedom and tolerance it brings.”73 Although the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism strategy originated at the National Security Council, the State Department contributed to the evolving policies. Writing in Foreign Policy, Secretary of State Christopher referred to Iran and Iraq as the Middle East’s “most dangerous actors” that, along with Libya, continued to threaten US allies and interests. 74 His focus was reserved for Iran. The Clinton administration attributed to Iran support for Hezbollah in south Lebanon and Hamas on the West Bank, establishing terrorist training camps in Lebanon and Sudan, and assisting groups trying to overthrow the governments of

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Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia. Christopher claimed there was “overwhelming” evidence that Iran was “intent on projecting terror and extremism across the Middle East and beyond.”75 Christopher was adamant: “Our policy on terrorism is straightforward: We make no concessions to terrorists; we galvanize international pressure against states that sponsor them; and we bring terrorists to justice.”76 Championing administration policy, Christopher noted its success in finalizing the Agreed Framework with North Korea. The alternative had been “an uncontrolled North Korean nuclear-weapons program, rising tensions on the Korean peninsula, growing calls in some quarters for preemptive strikes, the risk of war, and with it countless American and Korean lives lost.”77 This, he ventured, was an example of “real dangers to American security and prosperity” posed by rogue states, a term that received three references in Christopher’s article, whereas no mention was made of “backlash states,” with the term having fallen out of favor.78 Not for the last time, clashes over phraseology, rather than the specifics of policy, caused tensions within the Clinton administration. By the start of the administration’s final year in office, the terminology changed again, as “rogue states” became “states of concern.” The director of policy planning, Morton Halperin, noted that the change of phraseology was deliberate: “I was trying to get us to use a vague and almost neutral term, like ‘States of Concern,’ rather than Rogue States, because I thought it wasn’t productive in trying to improve relations with those states.” Halperin believed that the previous terminology “suggested too great a difference between them and other states that had various kinds of problems and difficulties, and that we should really focus more on states that were transitioning to democracy that we could help . . . rather than focus on states that were going in the ‘wrong direction.’”79 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher conceded that the previous phraseology had “outlived its usefulness.”80 The rationale for the evolving language was the progress that the administration believed it had made with Libya, North Korea, and Iran. As it approached the end of its time in office, the Clinton administration could note the extradition of two Libyan intelligence officers to stand trial for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, the 1997 election of reformers in Iran, relative improvement in dealings with Tehran, and tentative steps toward a new era on the Korean peninsula. Changing the terminology appeared to be a way to signal an intent to build upon these developments. The administration’s critics remained unimpressed, viewing the move as an example of “Orwellian word games to rationalize a misguided policy of engaging odious regimes.”81 Republican senator Fred Dalton Thompson noted cynically, if not inaccurately, “if you can’t change the behavior, change what you call the behavior.”82

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In addition to the speeches and writings of the foreign policy team, the Clinton administration also addressed the threat of state-sponsored terrorism in its annual National Security Strategy (NSS). In its first report, published in July 1994, the Clinton administration noted that in the post–Cold War era, the transnational threat of terrorism presented security implications “for both present and long term American policy.”83 However, Morton Halperin, who authored the final draft of the initial NSS document, recalled that transnational threats were “not high on the agenda of people’s focus” at the time.84 As stated in the NSS documents, the Clinton administration’s policy for countering terrorists was “to make no concessions to terrorists, continue to pressure state sponsors of terrorism, fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists and help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism.”85 The Clinton administration adhered to this established bipartisan approach to counterterrorism, treating such acts as crimes to be addressed by law enforcement, diplomacy, and economic leverage. The NSS documents also reinforced the Clinton administration’s efforts to utilize a multilateral approach to address state-sponsored acts of terrorism whenever possible, and a concerted effort to improve international information sharing and law enforcement. This was reinforced in a speech to the Disabled American Veterans Convention in 1995, when the president pledged “to do whatever is necessary to give law enforcement the tools they need to find terrorists before they strike and to bring them swiftly to justice when they do.”86 One way this was achieved was through the utilization of international summits to address the threats from state-sponsored terrorism and to orchestrate closer cooperation to deny the ambitions of rogue states. An agreement to “work more closely in combating terrorism” was signed between Russia and the G-7 nations at a June 1995 summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Six months later, an agreement was reached “to cooperate more closely in detecting forged documents and strengthening border surveillance, to share information more fully and effectively and to work together in preventing the use by terrorists of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.”87 In June 1997, the G-7 and Russia “reaffirmed their determination to combat terrorism in all forms, their opposition to concessions to terrorist demands and their determination to deny hostage-takers any benefits from their acts.”88 The international collaboration that the Clinton administration emphasized was necessitated by the increase in transnational crime and acts of political violence. Bilateral and multilateral agreements were a key aspect of the Clinton administration’s efforts to address the challenges posed by state sponsors of terrorism. It was clear that, on some occasions, legal tools and multilateral action would not suffice. When these situations arose, the Clinton administration

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stressed its readiness to draw upon the full resources of the military, including “specialized units available to defeat such groups. From time to time, we might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them.”89 The Clinton administration was clear that it was willing to engage in “punitive attacks” to address rogue states and state sponsors of terrorism.90 The National Security Strategies from the era reveal a continuing focus on state-centric threats to the United States as it sought to “punish and deter terrorists.”91 If and when necessary, the Clinton administration pledged to commit US forces to address incidents of political violence directed against US interests around the world. In addition, it hinted darkly that the United States “may also choose to make additional statements to communicate the costs of aggression or coercion to an adversary, and in some cases may choose to employ US forces to underline the message and deter further adventurism.”92 The administration sought to use history as a guide in formulating its strategies to defeat state sponsors of terrorism. The 1995 NSS noted the failures of the post–World War I era, in contrast to the successful approach to international affairs adopted after the end of World War II. It was this approach that the Clinton administration sought to emulate in an attempt to defeat “terrorists who threaten innocents and pariah states who choose repression and extremism over openness and moderation.”93 The new geopolitical era brought great risks, including the threat of terrorism that transcended international borders. Globalization brought many benefits to Americans, but the White House was adamant that, despite advances toward a more peaceful future, rogue states presented “a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe.”94 These challenges were used to justify a continued global role for the United States as the Clinton administration sought to address the growing threat posed by political violence. The state-centric approach of designating state sponsors of terrorism as rogue states was evidenced in the Clinton-era NSS documents. Libya was identified as a “threat to regional stability and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States” owing to its repeated failure to refute international terrorism.95 The administration continued Bush-era policies toward Gaddafi’s regime, holding Tripoli accountable for the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 and Union de Transports Aériens (UTA) Flight 772. Iran was identified as the main state sponsor of terrorism in 1996 and as “a primary threat to peace in the Middle East and a major threat to innocent citizens everywhere.”96 The danger posed by Tehran was evidenced by its successful tests of an 800-hundred-mile-range (1,300 kilometers) Shahab-3 missile in July 1998, July 2000, and again in September 2000.97 The Clinton administration imposed an embargo against Iran to deprive Tehran of “the benefits of trade and investment with the United States.” The primary result of this embargo “was to further disrupt an Iranian economy already reeling

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from mismanagement, corruption and stagnant oil prices.” The administration secured backing from the G-7 in condemning Iran’s support for terrorism and a commitment from Russia not to sell Iran dual-use technologies.98 The Clinton administration approach of addressing nations in tandem, first unveiled in the dual containment strategy, was continued with the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, signed by the president on August 5, 1996. Designed to deny funding for international terrorism, the bill revealed the extent to which the administration was addressing terrorism on three fronts: “first, abroad, through closer cooperation with our allies; second, at home, by giving our law enforcement officials the most powerful counterterrorism tools available; and, third, by improving security in our airports and on our airplanes.”99 Speaking at George Washington University on the day the bill was signed, President Clinton insisted, “You cannot do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night. That is wrong. I hope and expect that before long our allies will come around to accepting this fundamental truth.”100 In addition to the annual NSS documents, the National Security Council drafted a number of Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) related to the threat posed by rogue states. Primary among these was PDD 24 on counterintelligence effectiveness, signed by President Clinton on May 3, 1994. The directive was drafted to “foster increased cooperation, coordination and accountability among all US counterintelligence agencies” and established a new national counterintelligence policy structure. The directive recognized that, although the end of the Cold War had reduced threats to US national security and ensured that democracy was being embraced as never before, threats to US interests remained. Primary among these was terrorism, so it was “critical that the US maintain a highly effective and coordinated counterintelligence capability.” The document referenced Executive Order 12333, signed by President Reagan, in regard to the status of the NSC but also instigated the establishment of a new Counterintelligence (CI) structure to improve government-wide coordination of policy and information. Central to this was the establishment of a National Counterintelligence Policy Board, designed to “consider, develop, and recommend . . . directives for US counterintelligence.” In addition, a National Counterintelligence Operations Board was established to “discuss and develop from an operational perspective matters to be considered or already under consideration by the Policy Board.”101 PDD 24 called for the establishment of a National Counterintelligence Center to be headed by a representative from the FBI, the CIA, and the Pentagon on a rotating, two-year basis. The center operated until President Clinton replaced it with the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive in January 2001. The establishment of the center, and all related activities, was derived

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from the findings of Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 44 on US counterintelligence effectives, dated April 30, 1994.102 Finally, the Clinton administration issued a number of executive orders in regard to Iran, all of which were predicated upon laws defined in the International Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and the United States Code.103 The first, Executive Order 12957, dated March 15, 1995, was titled “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources.” It noted that the actions and policies of Iran constituted “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States” and targeted the Iranian economy for direct sanctions. The order prohibited the involvement of US citizens or entities in the “overall supervision and management responsibility for the development of petroleum resources located in Iran” or any involvement in the “financing of the development of petroleum resources located in Iran.”104 This was followed two months later by Executive Order 12959, dated March 6, 1995, entitled, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran.” In addition to the original basis for the previous order, this document drew on presidential authority as prescribed in the 1985 International Security and Development Cooperation Act.105 It built on the initial order “to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” This order went beyond the initial focus on petroleum products to prohibit new investment by Americans into Iranian property; prohibit the exportation or reexportation to Iran of goods, technology, and technical data; and block the importation into the United States of goods or services of Iranian origin.106 Building on the previous two orders, EO 13059, dated August 19, 1997, sought to further restrict Tehran’s access to global trade by imposing restrictions on US commercial engagement. The order prohibited “the importation into the United States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran . . . the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly,” from the United States or by a US citizen “wherever located, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran.” It also prohibited sales to Iran via third parties or the onward shipment to Iran of goods originally exported from the United States.107 The drafting of such documentation in the face of threats posed by state sponsors of terrorism was just part of the battle.108 Having prepared policy, the Clinton administration was required to implement it, oftentimes in the face of ardent domestic and international opposition. The president was adamant, however, that terrorists needed to be punished and insisted that he would act alone if necessary to meet his constitutional obligation to protect the nation. As early as 1996, the president stated, “Even though we’re working more closely with our allies than ever and there is more agreement on what needs to be done than ever, we

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do not always agree. Where we don’t agree, the US cannot and will not refuse to do what we believe is right.”109 In its attempt to implement its initiatives to address the threats from rogue states, the Clinton administration discovered that it was not immune to domestic political pressure. The midterm elections of 1994 revealed the extent to which the Clinton administration was in total control of US foreign policy and the extent to which it, like all administrations, was reliant on congressional support. Republican attempts to introduce the National Security Revitalization Act in 1995 demonstrated the degree to which a resurgent legislative branch could coerce and influence the executive. The congressionally driven Helms-Burton Act of 1996 sought to penalize nations that continued to trade with Cuba, a move that was particularly disapproved of in Europe. Despite a clear rapprochement with former foes that retained a communist system of government, including China and Vietnam, no such moves were initiated in regard to Cuba, where President Clinton later conceded policy was “the product of the hardest-line people in Miami,” revealing the extent to which domestic lobbying affects US foreign policy.110 The Clinton administration’s rogue state strategy arguably had its greatest success in regard to Libya, as the White House successfully corralled an international consensus against Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. Its success in so doing, in stark contrast to the international ambivalence toward the dual containment policy, stemmed from the fact that Gaddafi had attacked US allies, including France and Great Britain, and supported groups hostile to their interests. Pan Am Flight 103 had taken off from London’s Heathrow Airport shortly before its destruction and fell on the Scottish town of Lockerbie, ensuring Great Britain’s jurisdictional interest in the case. In addition, Police Officer Yvonne Fletcher had been shot and killed in April 1984 by a weapon discharged from the Libyan embassy in London. The French had simmering tensions with Libya, which in the 1990s centered on their respective roles in Chad’s civil war, the destruction of UTA Flight 772, and the ensuing deaths of 54 French nationals in September 1989. President Clinton had addressed the situation during a press conference with Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak on April 6, 1993, insisting on the need to hold a “legitimate trial” for the Libyan intelligence officers suspected of involvement in the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103. The president insisted that this was a “huge barrier that overrides everything else right now,” which needed to be resolved “before any other issues with regard to Libya can be raised.” President Clinton observed that tougher sanctions were

Policy Implementation

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“inevitable” if a “real and legitimate trial” did not take place.111 In direct response to the Pan Am bombing, the Clinton administration sent the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection to the Senate for its consideration on June 29, 1993, in an attempt to force manufacturers of plastic explosive to include materials to assist in its detection by law enforcement agencies.112 Ahead of the G-7 and US-EU Summit in 1994, the NSC drafted a series of position papers for the president’s attention, including one related to Libyan and Iranian sponsorship of terrorism. It reminded the president that the administration wanted “G-7 support for increased pressure on Tripoli to comply with [United Nations Security Council] resolutions of the Pan Am-103 and UTA terrorist attacks” and “to persuade the G-7 to condition their economic ties with Iran on improved Iranian performance in terrorism and other areas.” The memo accused Libya of making “only easily reversible and cosmetic steps to reduce support for terrorism.” It recognized that despite US calls for a “world-wide embargo on imports of Libyan oil,” such a move “would threaten the viability of the French, Italian and Spanish economies.” The memo stated starkly, “We continue to regard Iran as currently the most active state sponsor of terrorism.”113 Speaking at a groundbreaking ceremony for a memorial to victims of the Pan Am bombing, President Clinton weaved the administration’s stance on terrorism into a wider narrative relating to the direction of history. Terrorists, he insisted, realized that history and “the rising tide of democracy seen everywhere in the world, is turning against them. And so with terrorism and any other means at their disposal, they lash back.”114 Speaking two years later at the opening of the memorial, the president insisted, “America is more determined than ever to stand against terrorism, to fight it, to bring terrorists to answer for their crimes.”115 The strategic approach toward Libya appeared to pay dividends. The Clinton administration secured UN backing to prevent civilian air traffic into and out of Libya, imposed a ban on the sale of oil-refining apparatus as well as munitions and firearms, and supported UN initiatives to resolve the legal standoff with Libya following the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103.116 By the end of the Clinton administration’s first term, Gaddafi ceased using political violence as a tool of state security as unemployment and inflation rose and the Libyan economy collapsed along with oil prices. Faced with increasing domestic pressure and global isolation, Gaddafi’s regime succumbed to international pressure during Clinton’s second term and began a dialogue to lift sanctions by delivering the Pan Am suspects to trial. It also ended its support for groups seeking to overthrow Western-friendly governments in Jordan and Egypt. In November 1999, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Ronald E. Neumann observed that the extradition of the Lockerbie suspects had “prompted questions about whether

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Libya has fundamentally changed” and highlighted the “positive steps” that the Gaddafi regime had taken, including the expulsion of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization. “As far as we can tell,” Neumann ventured, “the Libyan government’s actions are not window-dressing, but a serious, credible step to reduce its involvement with that terrorist organization.”117 The trial of the two Libyan intelligence officers finally began in May 2000, more than 11 years after the loss of the aircraft, and 8 months before Clinton left office. Conducted under unique circumstances, the trial occurred in the Netherlands, under Scottish law, with a Scottish judge. Despite this, Attorney General Janet Reno raised practical questions as to the logistics involved: “We will be accused of negotiating with terrorists. And what if the suspects are turned over and there is a mistrial, or an acquittal?”118 Libyan sanctions were suspended pending the outcome, which eventually saw Abdelbaset al-Megrahi found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison, while the second suspect, Lamin Khalifah Fhimah, was found not guilty and was released. The result, reached after the Clinton administration left office, was far from ideal but placed responsibility for the attack with the Libyan authorities, which conceded guilt and settled with the families of the victims. As Madeleine Albright observed, “Like many foreign policy outcomes, this one was far from fully satisfactory, but it did show that we could use the tools of diplomacy to achieve a measure of accountability and respect for the rule of law.”119 Despite this apparent success against a state sponsor of terrorism, the Clinton administration’s record in Iraq is far more ambiguous. In February 1982, the Reagan administration controversially removed the country from the State Department’s terrorist list. Ten years later, Tom Donilon drafted a memo for the Clinton presidential campaign, noting that, in March 1989, “at the very outset of the Bush administration, a top State Department official reported to Secretary [James] Baker that Iraq still allowed entry to terrorists including Abu Abbas—who directed the Achille Lauro hijacking and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer. Despite this information, Bush and Baker kept Iraq off the State Department terrorist list, allowing Saddam to procure dual-use technology.”120 Having inherited a policy designed to keep a weakened Saddam in power, the Clinton White House saw little to be gained from prioritizing the issue. Irrespective of subsequent statements to the contrary, this stance had the support of former defense secretary Dick Cheney, who noted that if the US invasion had attempted to topple Saddam, US forces would “probably still be in Iraq, responsible for the people and politics, owning the place like we now own Haiti.” Leaving Saddam in power was “messy,” he conceded, but removing him might be “worse.”121 The dual containment strategy and the classification of Iraq as a rogue state were initially sufficient as far as the Clinton administration was concerned. Repeated provocations from Baghdad, however, ensured that the

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administration’s policies in regard to Iraq were reactive. President Clinton’s first use of military power came in direct response to Saddam’s attempt to assassinate George Bush in 1993, and the White House launched Operation Vigilant Warrior the following year after Saddam stationed 80,000 troops on the Kuwaiti border, establishing a move/countermove pattern. The Clinton administration’s Iraq policies were ultimately predicated on hope of an internal revolution that would drive Saddam from power. Anthony Lake noted that the “frequent reports of coup attempts and unrest among the relatively privileged Iraqi elite . . . could lead to new conditions for the citizens of Iraq and new opportunities to build a more peaceful and normal relationship between Iraq and the outside world.”122 Accordingly, dissident groups such as the Iraqi National Congress received increased US support, although this remained limited, as not all were convinced by the viability of its leadership, which had much to gain with the removal of Saddam. Whatever hopes the Clinton administration had of an Iraqi uprising, however, were tempered by the historic parallels with Cuba and concerns that the INC was telling the White House what it wanted to hear. This doomed the INC to failure in its 1995 plan to overthrow Saddam, as the Clinton administration had no intention of being hoodwinked into a war in Iraq on the basis of flawed reports from an unreliable organization with an all-too-clear ulterior motive. Saddam, therefore, remained an irritant to the Clinton administration, but one never problematic enough to become an overriding concern, and no serious consideration was given to invading Iraq during the Clinton administration. Instead, the Clinton White House supported UN sanctions to initiate change in Iraq. Baghdad was permitted to sell a limited quantity of oil to purchase items not expressly prohibited by the United Nations, such as humanitarian requirements like medicine and food. This was rejected by Saddam, ensuring that Iraqis continued to suffer as the sanctions denied them the necessities of life, and the national infrastructure began to crumble. This suffering was promoted by Baghdad to weaken the resolve of the international community and prompt the removal of the sanctions, an effort that, on occasion, was aided by mistakes made by the Clinton administration. Asked on 60 Minutes if the sanctions regime had led to 500,000 Iraqi child fatalities, Secretary of State Albright replied, “I think that is a very hard choice, but the price, we think . . . is worth it.” It was, in her own words, a reply that was “a terrible mistake, hasty, clumsy and wrong.”123 The longer the Clinton administration remained in power, the greater the risk of “sanctions fatigue,” as nations grew weary of imposing trade limitations on Iraq, which owed debts and with whom deals could be struck. Russia and France in particular were keen to move beyond sanctions to an era of accommodation with Baghdad. Russian prime minister Yevgeny Primakov complained to Madeleine Albright, “Without sanctions, the Iraqis would sell oil and pay us; with sanctions they sell oil and use the sanctions

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as an excuse not to pay us.”124 When the Oil-for-Food Programme was eventually implemented, the Iraqi establishment was the first to benefit, with contracts awarded to Russian and French companies as reward for their nations’ patronage. Members of the United Nations were also found to be involved in secret payoffs, further undermining the credibility of the organization at a time when US commitment was already beginning to wane.125 Iraq’s rogue state status was confirmed by its continuing efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and its willingness to frustrate the efforts of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Following the end of the Gulf War, these agencies had gone a long way toward disarming Iraq without being part of an occupying military force. Saddam’s efforts to disturb the inspectors reached a climax on October 31, 1998, when he closed down the monitoring operation. By mid-December, it was clear that Iraq had no intention of complying with the UN requirement to allow full access for the weapons inspectors. As a result, Operation Desert Fox was launched, comprising 650 sorties and missile strikes over a 72-hour period, timed to conclude before the start of Ramadan. Once again, Iraqi military adventurism was met with US and allied airstrikes, forcing Saddam into a retrenched, but not severely diminished, position. One consequence of Saddam’s actions was the evolution of US strategy toward Baghdad. Despite having no intention of launching a military assault, in 1998 the Clinton administration dropped the dual containment strategy and instigated a policy of containment plus regime change, enforcing existing policies and sanctions and adopting of regime change as official policy. As Madeleine Albright noted, “None of this was dramatic, but it did succeed in limiting Saddam’s options, extending his isolation, and encouraging Iraqi opponents—whether outside or inside the country—to work together to loosen his hold on power.”126 The adoption of regime change, a policy synonymous with Clinton’s successor, ensured that, despite all attempts to demonstrate otherwise, a degree of continuity extended into the post-9/11 era. Eight years before President George W. Bush unveiled the Axis of Evil, and eight years after President Reagan announced his Looney Tunes, the Clinton administration prepared a similar list of states against which it would fight for “small victories, through persistence and pragmatism,” since such initiatives were “the hallmarks of determination, of a nation engaged in the long struggle for democracy and the freedom and tolerance it brings.”127 The collection of nations, be they backlash states, rogue states, or states of concern, was identified by Anthony Lake because of their status as state sponsors of terrorism and their unwillingness to embrace standard norms of international affairs. Speaking in 1995, President Clinton noted that terrorists “are often supported by states.” He insisted that “states

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that sponsor or permit terrorism . . . must face strong sanctions. We all have to say we cannot live with this; it is wrong. People must seek to resolve their differences by ways other than killing innocent civilians.”128 The attempt to group such nations together, however, failed to gain support with America’s allies, with whom the concept had no meaning in international law. The notion of anointing states as “good” or “bad” seemed out of place in an administration that prided itself on its intelligent approach to complex problems. It also raised questions as to why equally “bad” states such as Pakistan and Syria had been excluded. Overseas, it was argued that “Washington’s criteria for categorizing good and bad states would, if applied rigorously, significantly lengthen the list of the latter.”129 Even domestic allies were concerned. Carl Gershman of the National Endowment for Democracy wrote to Lake following the unveiling of the strategy, noting, “I think it is a mistake to deal with the Islamic world exclusively in the ‘backlash’ section of the speech and not also in the ‘democracy building’ section.”130 The grouping was an effort to exclude a series of nations from the administration’s broader grand strategy and to “mop up the little pieces of opposition . . . draw attention to them, and say we want to deal with them.”131 Yet it remained a state-based approach that failed to address the rise of nonstate actors. Anthony Lake incorporated an updated form of Immanuel Kant’s democratic peace concept into US grand strategy for the post–Cold War era, which may have been appropriate for dealing with other democratic nations but which provided little traction when dealing with failing states or nonstate actors. The backlash states concept was a deliberate attempt to address such nations. When buried deep within a broader policy speech dedicated to wider US grand strategy initiatives and unveiled by a media-shy national security adviser, the significance of the policy was lost on all but the most ardent purveyors of Washington politics. It did, however, reveal a remarkable continuity of counterterrorism strategy from the Reagan era through the administration of George W. Bush, as successive administrations sought to establish an enemies list against whom to rally support and focus domestic and international attention.

1. John E. Rielly, “The Public Mood at Mid-Decade,” Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995): 76, 81. 2. William J. Clinton, “A New Covenant for American Security” (speech at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, December 12, 1991), in Preface to the Presidency: Selected Speeches of Bill Clinton 1974–1992, ed. Stephen A. Smith (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1996), 113. 3. William J. Clinton, “Strategic Security in a Changing World” (speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, August 13, 1992), in Smith, Preface to the Presidency, 270.

Notes

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4. Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency of George Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 134–135. 5. William J. Clinton, “We Can Take Our Country Back” (speech at Girard Park Campaign Rally, Lafayette, LA, October 27, 1992), in Smith, Preface to the Presidency, 410. 6. Bill Clinton, quoted in Michael Kelly, “Clinton Defends Position on Iraq War,” New York Times, July 31, 1992, A13. 7. Patrick J. Buchanan, speech to the Republican National Convention, Houston, TX, August 17, 1992. 8. Bill Turque, Inventing Al Gore: A Biography (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 258. 9. Richard Holbrooke, memo to Sandy Berger, Tony Lake re: Should there be a separate debate on foreign policy? August 5, 1992, Box 11, File 2, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 10. Robert Pear, “The 1992 Campaign: Candidate’s Record; ’86 Weinberger Notes Contradict Bush Account on Iran Arms Deal,” New York Times, October 31, 1992. See also David Johnston, “Weinberger Faces 5 Counts in Iran-Contra Indictment,” New York Times, June 17, 1992. 11. Jane Franklin, “The Politics Behind Clinton’s Cuba Policy,” Baltimore Sun, August 30, 1994. 12. Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton Backs Raid but Muses About a New Start,” New York Times, January 14, 1993, A1. 13. Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton Affirms US Policy on Iraq,” New York Times, January 15, 1993, A1. 14. For more on US-Cuban relations at this time, see Soraya M. Castro Mariño, “U.S.-Cuban Relations During the Clinton Administration,” Latin American Perspectives 29, no. 4 (July 2002): 47–76. 15. Morton Halperin, interview with author, July 5, 2017. 16. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 17. Michael Kramer, “The Cost of Removing Saddam,” Time, October 24, 1994, 39. 18. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 444. 19. Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 150. 20. “Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters,” June 26, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:938. 21. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan, 2003), 273. 22. James Woolsey, “Remarks at Restoration Weekend,” Palm Beach, FL, November 16, 2002. Quoted in Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 444. 23. “The President’s News Conference with President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina,” June 29, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:955. 24. Albright, Madam Secretary, 272. 25. Will Wechsler, memo to Richard Clarke, re: Political Ramifications of a Third Bombing, July 1996, Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, TNT-Simon, OA/Box No. 2240, Khobar Towers [Saudi Arabia] [1], Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AK. 26. Steven Simon, memo to Daniel Benjamin, et al., re: Terror Bfst (5 pages), Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Emails, MSMail-Record (Sept 1994–Sept 1997) ([Khobar]), OA/Box No.: 590000, [09/01/1996–09/11/1996], Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AK.

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27. Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” Foreign Policy 106 (Spring 1997): 110–127. 28. Albright, Madam Secretary, 139–140. 29. James D. Boys, “A Lost Opportunity: The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (1991–93),” European Journal of American Studies 7, no. 1 (December 2012): 2–14. 30. Powell, quoted in Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 38. 31. Russell Watson with John Barry and Douglas Waller, “A New Kind of Containment,” Newsweek 122, no. 2 (July 12, 1993): 30. 32. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 39. 33. “Interview with the Arab News Media on the Middle East Peace Process,” September 13, 1993, PPPWJC, 2:1479–1480. 34. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 41. 35. Indyk served as US ambassador to Israel from April 1995–September 1997 and from January 2000–July 2001. 36. For more on dual containment, see Alex Edwards, “Dual Containment” Policy in the Persian Gulf: The USA, Iran, and Iraq, 1991–2000 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Thomas G. Mahnken, “Containment: Myth and Metaphor,” in The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft, ed. Hal Brands and Jeremi Suri (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016). 37. Martin Indyk, “Challenges to US Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities,” Soref Symposium (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 18–19, 1993), 1–8. 38. R. Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, “White House to Step Up Plans to Isolate Iran, Iraq; Administration to Try ‘Dual Containment,’” Washington Post, May 23, 1993, A26. 39. Indyk, “Challenges to US Interests in the Middle East,” 1–8. 40. Douglas Jehl, “US Seeks Ways to Isolate Iran; Describes Leaders as Dangerous,” New York Times, A1. 41. Watson with Barry and Waller, “A New Kind of Containment,” 30. 42. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 41. 43. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 42. 44. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 43. 45. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 42. 46. Paul D Wolfowitz, “Clinton’s First Year,” Foreign Affairs 73, no.1 (1994): 40. 47. A. M. Rosenthal, “On My Mind; Clinton, Iraq and Iran,” New York Times, June 22, 1993, A23. 48. William G. Hyland, “A Mediocre Record,” Foreign Policy 101 (Winter 1995–1996): 73. 49. “Containing Iraq and Iran,” editorial, Boston Globe, March 27, 1994, 74. 50. Hyland, “A Mediocre Record,” 73. 51. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 42. 52. Thomas W. Lippman, “Critics Want US to Re-Evaluate ‘Dual Containment’ Policy on Iran and Iraq,” Washington Post, December 7, 1997, A33. 53. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, “Differentiated Containment,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 3 (May–June, 1997): 20. 54. L. Bruce Laingen, “Perspective on Iran: A Nation Unlikely to Be ‘Contained,’” Los Angeles Times, July 9, 1993, B7. A satrapy is a province governed by a satrap, a provincial governor, derived from the time of the ancient Persian empire. 55. F. Gregory Gause III, “The Illogic of Dual Containment,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 61.

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56. “The President’s News Conference with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany,” February 9, 1995, PPPWJC, 1:187. 57. Jehl, “US Seeks Ways to Isolate Iran,” A1. 58. William S. Cohen, address to the Conference on Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Strategy, Georgia Center, Mahler Auditorium, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, April 28, 1997. 59. Frank Ahrens, “The Reluctant Warrior,” Washington Post, February 24, 1998, C1. 60. Henry Kissinger, Does American Need a Foreign Policy? Towards a Diplomacy for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 191. 61. James D. Boys, Clinton’s Grand Strategy: US Foreign Policy in a Post–Cold War World (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 61. 62. Watson with Barry and Waller, “A New Kind of Containment,” 30. 63. For more on the backlash state/rogue state concept, see Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000); Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995); and Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999). 64. Alex Miles, US Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 1. 65. Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement” (address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, September 21, 1993). Reprinted in US Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 39 (September 27, 1993). 66. Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March–April 1994): 46. 67. Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” 49. 68. Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” 52. 69. Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” 54. 70. Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” 55. 71. Anthony Lake, “The Middle East Moment; at the Heart of Our Policy: Extremism Is the Enemy,” Washington Post, July 24, 1994, C1. 72. Anthony Lake, “The Purpose of American Power” (address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, September 12, 1994), reprinted in US Department of State Dispatch 5, no. 38 (September 19, 1994). 73. Anthony Lake, “The Reach of Democracy; Tying Power to Diplomacy,” New York Times, September 23, 1994, A35. 74. Warren Christopher, “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity,” Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995): 21. 75. Christopher, “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity,” 22. 76. Christopher, “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity,” 26. 77. Christopher, “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity,” 24. 78. Christopher, “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity,” 26. 79. Morton Halperin, interview with author, July 5, 2017. 80. Richard Boucher, quoted in Barbara Slavin, “US Does Away with ‘Rogue State’ Tag. ‘Countries of Concern’ Is the New Term,” USA Today, June 20, 2000, 7A. 81. Robert S. Litwak, “What’s in a Name? The Changing Foreign Policy Lexicon,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 375. 82. Quoted in Miles Pomper, “Easing Up on ‘Rogue’ Cuba: New Label, New Policy,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, June 24, 2000, 1508. See also Wyn Bowen, “Rogues No More,” World Today 56, no. 8 (August/September 2000): 15.

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83. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1994), 1. 84. Morton Halperin, interview with author, July 5, 2017. 85. NSS94, 8. 86. “Remarks to the Disabled American Veterans Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana,” July 28, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1210. 87. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1996), 16. 88. A National Security Strategy for A New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1998), 16. 89. NSS94, 8. 90. NSS94, 7. 91. NSS94, 9. 92. NSS98, 15. 93. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1995), 2. 94. NSS96, i. 95. NSS98, 55. 96. NSS96, 16. 97. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2000), 59. 98. NSS96, 16. 99. “Remarks on Signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and an Exchange with Reporters,” August 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1254. 100. “Remarks on International Security Issues at George Washington University,” August 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1258. 101. PDD 24, “U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness,” May 3, 1994. 102. As of 2018, PRD 44, “US Counterintelligence Effectives,” April 30, 1994, remains classified. 103. Specifically, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of 3 U.S.C. 104. Exec. Order No. 12957, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources,” 60 Fed. Reg. 14615, no. 52 (March 17, 1995). 105. Specifically, section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9). 106. Exec. Order No. 12959, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran,” 60 Fed. Reg. 24757, no. 89 (May 9, 1995). 107. Exec. Order No. 13059, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran,” 62 Fed. Reg. 44531, no. 162 (August 21, 1997). 108. For more on the use of executive orders as a policy device, see Adam L. Warber, Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislation from the Oval Office (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 109. “Remarks on International Security Issues at George Washington University,” August 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1258. 110. Robert Nuccio, “Mr. Clinton Takes the Lead in Shaping US Policy on Cuba,” Miami Herald, February 1, 1998, 3L. 111. “The President’s News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt,” April 6, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:410. 112. “Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for Detection,” June 29, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:958.

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113. Anthony Lake, memo for the President, re: Your Trip to Germany, July 10–12, July 2, 1994. 114. “Remarks at the Ground-breaking Ceremony for the Pan Am Flight 103 Memorial in Arlington, Virginia,” December 21, 1993, PPPWJC, 2:2195. 115. “Remarks at the Dedication of the Pan American Flight 103 Memorial Cairn in Arlington, Virginia,” November 3, 1995, PPPWJC, 2:1717. 116. Martin Indyk, “The Iraq War Did Not Force Gaddafi’s Hand,” Financial Times, March 9, 2004. 117. Neumann, quoted in John Lancaster, “US Moves Toward Better Ties to Libya: Administration Cites Moderation by Gaddafi,” Washington Post, December 24, 1999, A9. 118. Albright, Madam Secretary, 329. 119. Albright, Madam Secretary, 331. 120. Tom Donilon, memo to Don Gross re: Fact sheet on Iraqgate, October 8, 1992, Box 11, File 3, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 121. Michael Kramer, “The Cost of Removing Saddam,” Time, October 24, 1994, 39. 122. Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” 52. 123. Albright, Madam Secretary, 275. 124. Albright, Madam Secretary, 275. 125. See Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, Second Interim Report, March 29, 2005. 126. Albright, Madam Secretary, 287. 127. Lake, “The Reach of Democracy,” A35. 128. “Remarks to the Disabled American Veterans Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana,” July 28, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1210. 129. Eric Rouleau, “America’s Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 59. 130. Carl Gershman to Anthony Lake, September 28, 1993, Box 19, File 6, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 131. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017.

6 Cyberterrorism: Hack and Attack

were transitioning from the preserve of the affluent to everyday items in people’s lives. The president acknowledged this development in his 1993 inaugural address, which he noted was being “broadcast instantaneously to billions around the world” thanks to “almost magical” technology.1 Bill Clinton clearly enjoyed being the first president of the Information Age, but with the obvious benefits came serious potential dangers to national security. His administration was forced to confront a form of politically motivated violence unlike any experienced before. No longer were the actions of terrorists confined to the streets of American cities or its transport systems; cyberspace and US critical infrastructure became the new targets of choice.

The Clinton administration came to power just as computers

Although the Clinton administration appreciated the threat posed by cyberterrorism, a challenge arose in defining its parameters.2 As addressed previously, debate surrounding definitions of terrorism had long frustrated politicians and academics alike, with little sign of an emerging consensus. A similar range of opinion emerged regarding the definition, parameters, and scope of threats to cybersecurity. The concept of cyberspace originated in the award-winning 1984 science fiction publication Neuromancer, written by William Gibson.3 Shortly thereafter, the concept of cyberterrorism was popularized by Barry C. Collin when he worked at the Institute for Security and Intelligence.4 The potential for rogue manipulation of computer systems that featured in science fiction novels and the 1999 movie The Matrix had been a subject of concern for the US government for several decades.5 As early as 1977, the Justice Department expressed apprehension over the

Defining Cyberterrorism

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fact that “the foci of communications, production and distribution are relatively small in number and highly vulnerable.”6 By the time the Clinton administration took office, the developing Internet and worry surrounding the susceptibility of critical infrastructure ensured that defining cyberterrorism preoccupied policymakers as well as academics. A particular challenge in defining cyberterrorism was the reliance that most definitions had on the concept of terrorism, which, as discussed previously, has no agreed-upon definition. Georgetown University’s Dorothy Denning advised Congress that cyberterrorism was “the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace,” which was “generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.” Denning insisted that to count as cyberterrorism, “an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear.” This could include “attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss” as well as “attacks against critical infrastructures . . . depending on their impact.”7 Further attempts to define cyberterrorism have been offered, each with a particular focus. In 1998, Mark Pollitt noted the importance of the perpetrator, insisting that cyberterrorism was “the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.” This definition sought to discern between actors and motives because, for cyberterrorism to have any specific meaning, lawmakers “must be able to differentiate it from other kinds of computer abuse such as computer crime, economic espionage, or information warfare.”8 A year later, Walter Laqueur concluded that the dawn of the Information Age had “made cyberterrorism possible [and that] the conjunction of technology and terrorism makes for an uncertain and frightening future.”9 As with the definition of terrorism, however, academic disagreement has blighted many studies and ensured continuing debate on the merits of cyberterrorism as a subfield of terrorism studies.10 Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald have argued that to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack must have offline or “real world” consequences that extend beyond damage to information technology or sensitive data.11 Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford raised the real-world implications of the issue, asserting that the expression cyberterrorism focuses unnecessarily on the modus operandi rather than on the cause or outcome of the crime. As they noted, “We do not use the term ‘ice pick terrorism’ to define bombings of icepick factories, nor would we use it to define terrorism carried out with ice picks.”12 Joshua Green went further, insisting there “is no such thing as cyberterrorism—no instance of

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anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. . . . Which is not to say that cybersecurity isn’t a serious problem—it’s just not one that involves terrorists.”13 Despite the philosophical deliberation surrounding the topic, the Clinton administration moved quickly to define cyberterrorism as one of a series of transnational threats to US national security, ensuring it received the full focus of the US federal government.14 The potential threat to the United States from computer-related crime had been speculated about for decades. Long before the general public had access to personal computers, computing machines had been networked together to communicate with one another. The US federal government was at the forefront of such developments, and by 1968 the National Security Agency (NSA) had established a network of more than a hundred computers spread across five acres of office space.15 Almost immediately, two issues arose: fear of network penetration and fear of potential threats to civil liberties. As early as 1966, the House of Representatives held hearings on the potential risks that networked machines posed for individual liberties and freedoms.16 Writing a year later, Bernard Peters, director of the NSA’s RYE system for handling simultaneous inputs from remote terminals, concluded that security could not be guaranteed “in an absolute sense in a multiprogramming system equipped with remote terminals, and that any introduction of sensitive data into the system should consider the likelihood of compromise.”17 In 1970, the RAND Corporation concluded that it was “unwise to incorporate classified or sensitive information in a system functioning in an open environment unless significant risk of accidental disclosure can be accepted.”18 As private computer ownership grew and the threats from hacking and debilitating viruses began to be appreciated, fears of a crippling attack on the US critical infrastructure captured the imagination of politicians and filmmakers. The computer hacker became a staple figure in popular fiction in the 1980s, most notably in WarGames, in which a high school student inadvertently hacks into the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) mainframe and triggers an impending nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.19 That fiction had its origins in an event that occurred in 1979, when an exercise scenario at NORAD was mistaken for an incoming Soviet missile and the incident reached the highest levels of the National Security Council.20 Even earlier, in October 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, an exercise tape was incorrectly fed into a computer, causing radar operators to believe the Soviet Union had launched a missile strike.21 By 1983, the Department of Defense was “increasingly concerned about [the] future security” of its networked computer systems, leading the

The Evolving Threat to Cybersecurity

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New York Times to conclude that “a volatile mix of technical and social trends . . . bodes ill for the future.”22 The combination of concerns regarding unauthorized access to government systems and the implications for civil liberties was addressed in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 145, “National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information System Security.” Signed by President Reagan on September 27, 1984, the directive conceded that US systems were “highly susceptible to interception, unauthorized electronic access, and related forms of technical exploitation” and that the technology needed to exploit them was “used extensively by foreign nations and can be employed, as well, by terrorist groups and criminal elements.”23 In a move that was immediately attacked as “an unprecedented and illadvised expansion of the military’s influence in [US] society,” NSDD 145 assigned the responsibility for network oversight to the National Security Agency.24 The ensuing battle between the White House and Congress resulted in passage of the 1987 Computer Security Act, which divided oversight of federal computer systems between the NSA, which would monitor networks with a national security designation, and the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), which would be responsible for all other systems. It was clear as early as the mid-1980s that “unfriendly governments and terrorist organizations [were] finding easy pickings” among the US networked computer systems.25 In Washington, the risk assessment shifted from the danger posed by state actors to the dangers posed by a new generation of threats, including the dangers of cyberterrorism. In 1990, the National Academy of Sciences warned that America’s increasing dependency on computers meant the nation was increasingly vulnerable “to the effects of poor design and insufficient quality control, to accident, and perhaps most alarmingly, to deliberate attack.”26 To address these concerns, the Bush administration issued National Security Directive (NSD) 42 on July 5, 1990. The directive, “National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems,” recognized the susceptibility of computer systems and telecommunications to “interception, unauthorized electronic access, and related forms of technical exploitation, as well as other dimensions of the foreign intelligence threat.” It concluded that a “comprehensive and coordinated approach” was required to establish the objectives, policies, and organizational structure required to protect national security systems.” The directive rescinded Reagan’s NSDD 145, established a mechanism for policy development and dissemination, and assigned responsibility for the implementation of the directive to the National Security Council Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs) for National Security Telecommunications. This group was tasked with developing policy recommendations and providing operating guidance to the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC), established by

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NSD 42, to consider technical matters and develop operating policies, procedures, guidelines, and instructions.27 The Bush administration considered the use of cyberwarfare against Iraq during the lead-up to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Referred to as “the First Information War,” consideration was given to penetrating Iraqi defenses with a team of Special Forces and cyber analysts who would attempt to cripple the antiaircraft missile systems and air defense radar installations ahead of US air sorties.28 General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of US forces, was skeptical of such “crazy ideas” raised by “snake-eaters” and viewed their suggestion as being “risky and unreliable.”29 Despite this, Operation Desert Storm was the start of a new era in combat, as computers and information technology provided the United States with a tactical and logistical advantage by feeding near real-time intelligence into forward-line assault vehicles. The use of this technology was not lost on other world powers. China, in particular, redrafted its war plans, which were previously based on overwhelming manpower, to focus upon what it referred to as wangluohua, or “networkization,” to address the “new battleground of computers.”30 With the end of the Cold War, policy analysts began to speculate on the potential threat to the United States from a cyberattack or an “electronic Pearl Harbor.”31 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt made an important distinction in their 1993 article, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” between “netwar” and “cyberwar.” The former involved a “societal-ideational” struggle across networks, and the latter was identified as a far more tactical threat to be waged by nation states.32 Debate over the scope and viability of an attack on US interests ranged widely; the authors of Computers at Risk, commissioned by the US National Academy of Sciences, concluded that a “modern thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun.” It was likely, therefore, that “tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb.”33 George Smith, however, directly refuted the suggestion in his article for Issues in Science and Technology entitled “An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely.”34 Uncertainty over the severity of the threat posed to cybersecurity caused David Gompert to ask in RAND Review, “How grave is the threat from cyberspace?” Was it possible, he asked, that an “information war [was] being oversold? We don’t know.”35 Concerns were also raised that the threat to cybersecurity was being manufactured to ensure continued funding for US surveillance agencies, deprived of their longtime adversary, the Soviet Union.36 The fundamental question remained as to where the threat originated. Did the principal threat come from criminals, rogue states, or terrorist organizations? Each had its own advocate in Washington. Even teenagers were identified in 1998 as being a “real threat environment” by the US assistant secretary of defense for acquisition and technology because of their perceived hacking abilities.37

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As the first administration seriously tasked with addressing this challenge, the Clinton White House was required to develop the infrastructure of what became the Internet as well as to devise responses to those who sought to exploit this technology for nefarious ends. The technology that the Clinton administration hoped could make life easier and more enjoyable for all Americans, therefore, also presented great opportunities to those who wished to wreak havoc on the world’s only remaining superpower. As computers moved from standalone units to nodes on an integrated network, the risks associated with attacks on the US critical infrastructure by individuals, groups, or foreign governments became all the more apparent. The potential risk was not only to sensitive data stored on computer systems but also to command-and-control functions that coordinated air traffic control and national defense systems. It quickly became apparent to the Clinton administration that there was a dark side to the new era of globalization that required the term cyberattack to be introduced into the presidential lexicon.38 The growth of the Internet became a defining aspect of the Clinton administration as ever-increasing numbers of people accessed the developing World Wide Web. The concept of computers working together in a series of connected networks was originally developed by a team working at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Such an environment was an ideal incubator to foster groundbreaking technology that initially appeared to have limited application. Until the 1990s, public knowledge of the Internet was extremely limited, although a number of politicians recognized the opportunities that could come from instantaneous communications with one another and, perhaps more importantly, with their constituents. Prominent among them was Senator Al Gore of Tennessee, an early and enthusiastic advocate of the opportunities inherent in high-speed telecommunications.39 Senator Gore could be described as the Internet’s political mentor, as he provided a platform for hearings on high-speed computing and communications from his position on Capitol Hill. Internet luminaries Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf acknowledged that Senator Gore “was the first elected official to grasp the potential of computer communications. . . . he sponsored hearings on how advanced technologies might be put to use in areas like coordinating the response of government agencies to natural disasters and other crises.”40 Gore first sought to enact legislation in October 1988, when he introduced the National High-Performance Computer Technology Act, designed to connect government, industry, and academic institutions. Speaking in 1989, Gore told a House Committee, “The creation of this nationwide network . . . will create an environment where work stations are common in the home and even small businesses.”41 Although his initial efforts to enact legislation did not come to fruition, Gore was later suc-

The Clinton Administration and the Internet

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cessful at steering the High-Performance Computing and Communication Act through the necessary stages of legislation before it was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush on December 9, 1991. Speaking at the signing ceremony of what was known as the Gore bill, President Bush announced that the legislation would help “unlock the secrets of DNA,” open up foreign markets to free trade, and hold a promise of cooperation among governments, academia, and industry.42 The bill created the National Research and Education Network, uniting experts in their efforts to develop computer networking, and led to the National Information Infrastructure, which Gore referred to as the Information Superhighway. The legislation required DARPA, which operated a computer network that was a forerunner to the Internet, to support research and development of advanced fiber-optic technology, switches, and protocols for an improved national computer system. Senator Gore wrote at the time, “Rather than holding back, the US should lead by building the information infrastructure, essential if all Americans are to gain access to this transforming technology.” He added, “High speed networks must be built that tie together millions of computers, providing capabilities that we cannot even imagine.”43 Gore appreciated the opportunities that this new technology offered, with its capacity to instantaneously send data around the world and the role the government could play in its development. Senator Gore’s influence became all the more persuasive six months later when he was chosen as Governor Clinton’s vice-presidential running mate. The Clinton-Gore campaign pledged to “create a door-to-door information network to link every home, business, lab, and library by the year 2015 [and] put public records, databases, libraries and educational materials on line for public use to expand access to information.”44 Once in office, the Clinton administration embraced the evolving technology, a decision viewed as being a “distinct statement about where the new administration stands on the matter of technology. . . . gone is the ambivalence or outright hostility toward government involvement in little beyond basic science.”45 The vice president’s role in this was vital. As President Clinton told a Silicon Valley audience in February 1993, Al Gore was “the only person ever to hold national office in America who knew what the gestalt of the gigabit is.”46 Internet usage exploded during the Clinton administration’s time in office. In December 1990, there were 313,000 computers on the Internet; by 1996, there were almost 10 million.47 Speaking shortly after leaving office, President Clinton reminded an audience in London that “in 1993, there were only fifty sites on the worldwide web. . . . When I left office, the number was three hundred and fifty million and rising.”48 On October 21, 1994, the Clinton administration launched the first White House website to provide access to governmental documents, press releases, and a virtual tour of the Executive Mansion. This was the most visible example of the

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developments occurring in the government sector during the 1990s that culminated in Executive Order 13011 in July 1996, which required executive branch agencies to “effectively use information technology to improve mission performance and service to the public.”49 The administration’s legacy in regard to the Internet was clouded by Vice President Gore on March 9, 1999. Interviewed by Wolf Blitzer on CNN and asked to distinguish himself from his rival, Bill Bradley, Gore noted, “During my service in the United States Congress, I took the initiative in creating the Internet.” The backlash to this statement, which was repeated as Gore claiming to have “invented” the Internet, led Internet pioneers Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf to write an open letter in his defense. They insisted that Gore was “the first political leader to recognize the importance of the Internet and to promote and support its development” and that “no other elected official, to our knowledge, has made a greater contribution [to the Internet] over a longer period of time.” Despite these efforts, the damage to Gore’s credibility was done; with that statement he had established a reputation for embellishment rather than initiative.50 The decision to include material related to cybersecurity in its annual National Security Strategy (NSS) revealed the Clinton administration’s understanding that the nation faced a “much wider range of threats and dangers” in the post–Cold War era.51 It was also a sign of the administration’s appreciation that previous classifications of national security needed to be redefined. It had already placed economic security at the heart of its strategy, along with democratic promotion and classic concepts of national defense. As early as 1995, the Clinton administration recognized that the “threat of intrusions to our military and commercial information systems [posed] a significant risk to national security and must be addressed.”52 As its time in office progressed, the administration recognized the need to utilize an “integrated approach to intensify the fight against all forms of terrorism: to capture terrorists, no matter where they hide; to work with other nations to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries overseas; to respond rapidly and effectively to protect Americans from terrorism at home and abroad.”53 Advances in technology transformed commerce, communications, and culture in the 1990s but also reinforced the view that the Clinton administration was governing “in a world where the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy [was] increasingly blurred.”54 Since 1998, the threat posed to cybersecurity was included in the annual National Security Strategy as a transnational threat, as attacks on the information infrastructure, “ranging from cyber-crime to a strategic information attack on the United States via the global information network, present a dangerous new threat

The Clinton Administration’s Cybersecurity Initiatives

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to [US] national security.”55 The White House warned that cyberattacks “could originate from terrorist or criminal groups as well as hostile states.”56 The administration recognized that “other governments and terrorist groups are creating sophisticated, well-organized capabilities to launch cyber-attacks against critical American information networks and the infrastructures that depend on them.”57 The Clinton administration also addressed cybersecurity and the developing terrorist threats to the national critical infrastructure in a series of presidential directives. After nearly three months in office, it focused on concerns surrounding the potential for terrorists to affect the Internet, still referred to as the Information Superhighway, in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 5. Signed on April 15, 1993, the document, entitled “Public Encryption Management,” discussed the need for encryption to secure communications and financial transactions as well as the concerns that such technology could “frustrate lawful government electronic surveillance.” This was a problem not only for domestic law enforcement but also for US foreign policy decisionmakers, because sophisticated encryption, when used abroad, could “be used to thwart foreign intelligence activities critical to [US] national interests.” Encryption technology, the administration acknowledged, required “new, innovative approaches” to ensure that privacy and civil liberties were not curtailed while the security services were enabled to defend the nation.58 The findings of PDD 5 were directly referenced in Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 27, signed the following day, April 16, 1993, and entitled “Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption.” It noted the urgent need to “accommodate the government’s interests in law enforcement, privacy, national security, productivity and competitiveness.”59 Signed by Anthony Lake, the directive initiated a study into how developments in encryption and telecommunications could affect intelligence gathering and law enforcement initiatives. The most comprehensive document on the issue of cyberterrorism to emerge from the National Security Council during the Clinton administration was PDD 63. Signed on May 22, 1998, the document, entitled “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” spanned 18 pages and was far longer than most directives. Issued midway through the administration’s second term, it acknowledged the extent to which the nation had become “reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems.” Although these systems had once been physically isolated to prevent external threats, the rapid development of the Internet ensured that these components had become networked and therefore were susceptible to illicit penetration. PDD 63 directly referenced the threat of cyberwarfare, noting that because of the overwhelming military superiority of the United States, adversaries may seek alternative forms of attack. Indeed, it was feared that “non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems may

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be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy.” It was not surprising that the Clinton White House, the first administration to place national economic security at the heart of its grand strategy, appreciated the potential dangers posed by an attack on the US economy via cyberspace. As an indication of the severity of the perceived threat, PDD 63 established the office of Senior Directorate for Infrastructure Protection on the National Security Council (NSC) staff in an effort to “eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.” The directive also established the office of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism, tasked with providing budgetary advice to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure; chairing the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG); and reporting to the Deputies Committee of the NSC.60 PDD 62, which was written concurrently, also referenced this position, which was initially held by Richard A. Clarke. In theory, this established that the full power of the federal government was available “to ensure that critical infrastructure protection is achieved and maintained.” In practice, however, Clarke’s frustrations with the document and the bureaucratic limitations of his role were revealed when he noted that the directive “made clear . . . that the czar could not direct anyone to do anything.”61 The Clinton administration also issued a series of executive orders related to cybersecurity that drew upon presidential authority detailed in existing statutes and the Constitution of the United States.62 The first, Executive Order 12864, dated September 15, 1993, established the United States Advisory Council on the National Information Infrastructure. Based on authority granted under the Constitution, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, the order restricted membership of the council to fewer than 25 members who were to be appointed by the secretary of commerce for an initial period of two years.63 The council’s remit was to advise the secretary on the development of the National Information Infrastructure, defined as “the integration of hardware, software, and skills that will make it easy and affordable to connect people with each other, with computers, and with a vast array of services and information resources.” Befitting the timing of the document, the words Internet and World Wide Web do not appear. At that stage, the concept of a “national information infrastructure” was still to be defined. The council was assigned the task of developing and evolving it and determining the role to be played by the private and public sectors. Although key economic questions regarding the potential for job creation, economic growth, and increased productivity were to be addressed, so too were the vital issues of “national security, emergency preparedness, system security

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and network protection implications.” Even before the Internet entered the public consciousness, the Clinton administration had begun to consider the risks associated with such an open computer network.64 A little less than a year later, on August 19, 1994, the president signed Executive Order 12924 to address the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979. The order noted that “the unrestricted access of foreign parties to US goods, technology, and technical data . . . constitute[s] an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”65 Although the order did not directly cite the Internet or telecommunications, it was subsequently referenced as the partial basis for Executive Order 13026, dated November 15, 1996, which directly addressed the administration of export controls on encryption products. Issued only days after the president’s reelection, the order was designed “to provide for appropriate controls on the export and foreign dissemination of encryption products [that] could harm national security and foreign policy interests even where comparable products are or appear to be available from sources outside the United States.”66 During its second term, as the Internet became part of everyday culture and the accompanying threats to national security became apparent, the Clinton administration issued two further related executive orders. The first, Executive Order 13035 on February 11, 1997, established the Advisory Committee on High-Performance Computing and Communications, Information Technology, and the Next Generation Internet. Drawn from a variety of sectors, including “research, education, and library communities, network providers, and representatives from critical industries,” the committee was tasked with assessing the “progress made in implementing the High-Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC) Program” and in “designing and implementing the Next Generation Internet initiative.” The initiative was, at least in part, designed to ascertain “whether the research and development undertaken pursuant to the HPCC Program is helping to maintain United States leadership in advanced computing and communications technologies and their applications.”67 If the aforementioned documents helped establish the basis for what became the Internet, Executive Order 13133, dated August 5, 1999, focused on the emerging threats that this technology posed. It established the new Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, chaired by Attorney General Janet Reno, which was to report on the viability of existing legislation to address the policing of the Internet. Though not specifically tasked with targeting terrorist groups, the working group was charged with reporting on “the extent to which existing Federal laws provide a sufficient basis for effective investigation and prosecution of unlawful conduct that involves the use of the Internet, such as the illegal sale of guns, explosives, controlled substances, and prescription drugs, as well as fraud and child pornography.”68

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Having devised policy for the nascent Internet, the Clinton administration was required to implement its plans to address violations by perpetrators of political violence who were intent on exploiting weaknesses in the developing infrastructure to wreak havoc on the United States. Much of the administration’s policy implementation in this area involved the use of the military, which had been steadily increasing its focus on cyber issues. In March 1993, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell issued a policy memo reflecting the administration’s objectives regarding information warfare, defined as the preparedness to “decapitate the enemy’s command structure from its body of combat forces.”69 On September 10, 1993, the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center was redesignated the Air Force Information Operations Center and drew together experts from the department’s Intelligence Command and Cryptology Support Center.70 Twelve months later, the Navy Information Warfare Activity facility opened at Fort Mead; in 1995, Army Land Information Warfare Activity commenced, and the first officers specifically trained in cyberwarfare graduated from the National Defense University. On June 11, 1993, the Clinton administration established the Joint Security Commission to report to the secretary of defense and the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on “the adequacy of protection within the contours of a security system that is simplified, more uniform, and more cost effective.” Delivered on February 28, 1994, the commission’s report noted the need to “develop a new security system that can meet the emerging challenges we face in the last years of this century and the first years of the next.”71 It stressed the need to ensure personnel security but focused heavily on the need for systems security. It concluded that information systems technology was evolving faster than information systems security technology and that “overcoming the resulting gap [would] require careful threat assessments, well-thought-out investment strategies, sufficient funding, and management attention.” If this did not occur, “the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of [US] classified and unclassified information assets” would be at risk.72 The report observed that, to date, the United States had “neither come to grips with the enormity of the problem nor devoted the resources necessary to understand fully, much less rise to, the challenge.”73 Among the commission’s recommendations were consolidating policy formulation under a joint Pentagon-Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) executive committee; developing a cost-effective information systems security investment strategy; and designating the National Security Agency as the executive agent for systems security research and development, covering classified and unclassified information.74 In response to the commission’s report, the various departments initiated their own responses. In 1995, the US Air Force released “Cornerstones

The Implementation of Cybersecurity Policy

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of Information Warfare,” which considered the potential of using computers to attack other computers. The Pentagon approached the RAND Corporation in an effort to understand the weaknesses that existed in the US systems. In a series of simulations conducted in the first half of 1995, it became clear that “the US homeland may no longer provide a sanctuary from outside attack.”75 On February 22, 1996, DCI John Deutch told the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the threat posed to cybersecurity was “difficult to measure,” and he noted that US intelligence had “identified a handful of countries that have instituted formal information warfare programs” and warned that “the threat to our information systems will grow in coming years as the enabling technologies to attack these systems proliferate and more countries and groups develop new strategies that incorporate such attacks.”76 Four months later, he advised the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the United States’ Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that international terrorist groups had “the capability to attack the information infrastructure of the United States, even if they use relatively simple means.”77 In May 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Department of Defense’s information systems were being attacked (or almost certainly probed) roughly 250,000 times a day.78 Such attempts to penetrate these sensitive systems constituted, “a multimillion dollar nuisance. . . . At worst, they are a serious threat to national security.” The GAO reported that attackers had previously “seized control of entire defense systems, many of which support critical functions, such as weapons research and development, logistics, and finance.” Clearly, “catastrophic damage” was inevitable if “foreign nationals or terrorists could use ‘information warfare’ techniques to disrupt military operations by harming command and control systems, the public switch network, and other systems or networks Defense relies on.”79 As the Clinton administration’s first term in office came to a close, it was clear that the executive branch agencies, the Pentagon, the CIA, and the GAO as well as the White House, recognized the duality involved in the developing Internet: the systems being established to make life easier, more streamlined, and enjoyable also threatened to expose the United States to a devastating assault upon its critical infrastructure. The destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City began a process in which a series of key aspects were drawn together to form the federal protection of critical infrastructure: cyberthreats, infrastructures, terrorism, asymmetric vulnerability, and the notion of “homeland security.”80 The devastation and political repercussions that followed “marked the beginning of the firm establishment of a cyber-terror concept that was closely linked to the critical infrastructure protection (CIP) debate on the national security agenda.”81 Two months after the bombing, President Clinton signed PDD 39, which established the interagency Critical

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Infrastructure Working Group (CIWG). Tasked with studying the vulnerabilities of US critical infrastructure to potential attack, the CIWG’s January 1996 report resulted in the eventual establishment of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). Headed by retired Air Force general Robert Marsh, the commission concluded that the resources needed to devastate the US critical infrastructure were “inexpensive, readily available, and easy to use.”82 The Clinton administration’s first term concluded with a government-wide recognition of the threat posed by cyberterrorism and a presidential commission in place to investigate the extent of the risk. Ominously, Russian president Boris Yeltsin noted at that time that it had become “necessary to devote more attention to the development of the entire complex of the means of information warfare.”83 Delivering its final report in October 1997, the PCCIP noted that the evolution in technology that Americans were enjoying was being manipulated by enemies of the state, ensuring that a “personal computer and a telephone connection to an Internet Service Provider anywhere in the world are enough to cause harm.”84 The report concluded that “the security, the economy, the way of life, and perhaps even the survival of the industrialized world were dependent on the triad of electrical power, communications, and computers.”85 Despite being launched in the wake of the attack in Oklahoma City, the report did not focus on right-wing groups, or international networks, but instead addressed the threat to the nation’s critical infrastructure from nation states and the need to create public-private partnerships to handle the situation. Following the release of the PCCIP’s report, President Clinton signed PDD 63 in May 1998, a report that was followed in January 2000 with the “National Plan for Information Systems Protection.”86 The directive adopted the recommendations and focus of the PCCIP report in its call for a partnership between government and private enterprise. At the heart of PDD 63 was the creation of four entities. The first was the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) based at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and tasked with serving as the “national critical infrastructure threat assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and response entity.” Linked to the rest of the federal government, the interagency NIPC was designed to provide “timely warnings of intentional threats, comprehensive analyses and law enforcement investigation and response.” In an attempt to overcome the bureaucratic resistance that existed between competing executive branch agencies, the administration ordered that all such agencies “cooperate with the NIPC and provide such assistance, information and advice that the NIPC may request, to the extent permitted by law.” 87 The 1998 document Terrorism in the United States, issued by the Department of Justice’s Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, insisted that the NIPC was “forging the

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analytical, information-sharing, investigative, and warning capabilities necessary to confront the terrorist threats of the twenty-first century.”88 Second, PDD 63 initiated the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), designed to oversee a relationship between the federal government and private enterprise in an attempt to secure the critical infrastructure. In a development that was viewed as the “securitization of cyberspace,” the federal government initiated efforts to further secure the US critical infrastructure architecture from threats posed by foreign nations as well as a growing list of nonstate actors. These moves required the acquiescence of private organizations, responsible for the day-to-day operations of such entities, to work with the federal government in the name of the national interest.89 In addition, the directive established the National Infrastructure Assurance Council in the hopes of creating nascent public-private partnerships in the area of infrastructure security, as well as the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, based at the Commerce Department. Speaking at the US Naval Academy in 1998, President Clinton explained that the Internet could aid the enemy in traditional terrorist functions, such as by enabling international travel and the location of information on bomb making. The potential dangers involved in cyberterrorism, however, did not stop with the strengthening of conventional terrorist methods. The president warned that new modes of attack were available to terrorists who used the Internet. He reasoned, “Hackers break into government and business computers. They can raid banks, run up credit card charges, extort money by threats to unleash computer viruses. If we fail to take strong action, the terrorists, criminals, and hostile regimes could invade and paralyze these vital systems, disrupting commerce, threatening health, [and] weakening our capacity to function in a crisis.”90 As the Clinton administration’s time in office progressed, the FBI, along with other agencies, developed its online surveillance capabilities and understanding of the cybercommunity. The more they learned, the more they sought greater powers to investigate, as email and online content became akin to previous debates over wiretapping and the opening of mail by the federal government.91 The administration had struggled to address this issue since the failure of its Clipper chip initiative in its first term, an effort to ensure that the National Security Agency could access US-based encrypted messaging without the need to gain a court order. Its eventual demise provoked a long-standing tension surrounding right-to-privacy issues as afforded by the First Amendment and concerns over the safeguarding of US national security. As the primary department tasked with ensuring the full and fair implementation of the law and the safeguarding of constitutional rights, it was appropriate that the Department of Justice be required to produce an annual report entitled Terrorism in the United States. Its 1998 report noted that the national infrastructure faced threats from terrorists and foreign governments

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eager to “degrade or destroy property and data, thereby denying crucial services to users of information systems.”92 Reflecting a growing recognition in the second term that threats were increasingly likely to come from nonstate actors as well as nation states, the report highlighted the threat posed by radical groups and individuals. Nations were increasingly incorporating cyberwarfare into their grand strategy initiatives, and such methods risked falling into the hands of terrorists, “with or without direct state involvement.”93 In an effort to ascertain the extent to which the US critical infrastructure was susceptible to external penetration, initiatives were launched during the second term of the Clinton administration. Although the full details remain classified, it is possible to conclude that the results proved the existence of inherent weakness in multiple systems as they came under sustained interrogation. The exercise Eligible Receiver 97 was conducted from June 9–13, 1997. Designed to stress test cybersecurity at the Pentagon, a group of National Security Agency (NSA) operatives successfully accessed supposedly secure networks using freely available software, and within a two-day period they were able to highlight severe deficiencies in local, state, and federal government systems, including the National Command Authority. The system-wide failings led to an immediate order for intrusion detection software across the Department of Defense—an acknowledgment that the operation “succeeded beyond its planner’s wildest dreams in elevating the awareness of threats to our computer systems.”94 Whatever problems Eligible Receiver 97 revealed, it was at least a controlled exercise run by federal authorities. In 1998 and 1999, the same systems came under attack once more, this time from outside sources. In 1998, a 19-year-old Israeli named Ehud Tenenbaum, along with two California teenagers, successfully accessed systems at the US Air Force, the US Navy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Pentagon. The subsequent government investigation, codenamed Solar Sunrise, revealed how porous the systems remained. This was confirmed the following year when the FBI investigation codenamed Moonlight Maze was launched into what appeared to be a coordinated, continuous penetration of US networks that lasted for more than two years and which stopped as suddenly as it started with no indication of who was responsible. At the time, Moonlight Maze was the most wide-ranging digital investigation ever launched, with up to 100 agents involved, and also drew on the assistance of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the United Kingdom.95 The concerns raised by the results of Eligible Receiver, as well as the findings of the PCCIP, contributed to the decision to launch the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) in October 1998. An interagency attempt to coordinate the growing number of federal agencies with responsibilities in the event of a terrorist incident, the NDPO was viewed as “an

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information clearinghouse” to facilitate assistance in times of national emergency. Importantly, the NDPO was not designed as another federal bureaucracy but instead was viewed as “a ‘one-stop shop’ for state and local responders seeking information regarding federal domestic preparedness assistance and as a forum for federal domestic preparedness programs to coordinate policy affecting those programs.” The NDPO was established neither as an operational entity nor to supplant the duties or responsibilities of those federal agencies tasked with combating terrorism.96 These initiatives—the NDPO, ISAC, NIPC, and the new role of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism— were all part of a growing consensus in the late 1990s that focused on the idea of defending the homeland.97 The concept had been raised in December 1998 by former Clinton administration members Ashton B. Carter and John M. Deutch who, along with Philip D. Zelikow, published “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tracking the New Danger” in Foreign Affairs. The bureaucratic basis for what eventually became the Department of Homeland Security was included in the Phase III report of the US Commission on National Security/21st Century, known as the Hart-Rudman Report. Instigated in 1998 at the direction of Defense Secretary William Cohen, the final report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, was released on January 31, 2001, 11 days after the Clinton administration left office. It reflected the Clinton administration’s long-standing view that, “in the new era, sharp distinctions between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ no longer apply.” The benefits that accrued from this were tempered by the understanding that a “combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the US homeland to catastrophic attack.” Less than eight months before the destruction of the World Trade Center, the Hart-Rudman Report warned that “a direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century.” Such an attack risked “not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine US global leadership.” To address this potential catastrophe, the report recommended the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA), “with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various US government activities involved in homeland security.”98 Prior to the attacks on New York and Washington, however, bureaucratic resistance to such warnings prevented their implementation. Resistance to reform was found not only in the federal government but also in private enterprise. The potential global cybersecurity crisis on Millennium Eve and the issues surrounding Y2K failed to manifest. Early in the year 2000, however, hackers targeted a series of high-profile online sites, leading to the first White House conference on cybersecurity. Neither side, however, wished to see the issue regulated, and the dynamics of the

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moment appeared to doom any chance for progress: the administration was running out of time, Congress was not inclined to legislate on the issue, and business leaders were wary of any developments that placed restrictions on trade or earnings. In January 2000, the White House released the National Plan for Information Systems Protection, which highlighted the severity of the threat posed by cyberterrorism. Written after PDD 63, the report acknowledged that any plan for cyber defense would need to “evolve and be updated” as vulnerabilities and threats emerged. It was, therefore, reactive in nature. This was the first such attempt to devise a way to safeguard cyberspace and was enacted as the administration prepared to leave office and experienced rapidly diminishing political capital. The document was forthright in its recognition that this was the beginning of a process that required collaboration and dialogue between the government and experts in the developing field. It took pains to stress that the response initiated must not come at the expense of civil liberties.99 As President Clinton observed at the report’s unveiling, it was “essential that we do not undermine liberty in the name of liberty.”100 The proposals included the creation of an Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, designed to bring together computer scientists and engineers to address the challenges posed by cyberterrorism. This and other such developments were to be paid for from a $91 million package, which formed part of $2 billion allocated to new security challenges in the Clinton administration’s 2001 budget. The resistance to governmental regulation continued after the Clinton administration left office on January 20, 2001. Richard Clarke, remaining in government until 2003, became the first Special Adviser to the President for Cyber Security and eventually devised the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in February 2003, which was based on concepts he had drawn up under the Clinton administration. The George W. Bush administration issued Executive Order 13231 on October 16, 2001, to address critical infrastructure protection in the Information Age but “left jobs vacant for long periods at several regulatory commissions and appointed commissioners who did not enforce the regulations that did exist.”101 When the Department of Homeland Security was established, cybersecurity experts from across the executive branch agencies were brought together under one entity, but this failed to raise the profile of the challenge faced. Four years later, the director of national intelligence Mike McConnell convinced President George W. Bush of the need to address the issue, which led to the creation of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), budgeted at $50 billion over five years, and the drafting of National Security Presidential Decision 54. The details of the initiative remained secret, a decision heavily criticized in May 2008 by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which noted, “It is difficult to conceive how the United States could promulgate a meaningful deterrence doctrine if every aspect of our capabilities and operational concepts is classified.”102

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The strategy was also attacked that year by Senator Barack Obama, who lamented the lethargy of the Bush administration in dealing with the issue. Speaking at Perdue University, Obama pledged to make the subject “a top federal priority” by naming a senior adviser on the issue, and he identified the US cyber system as “a strategic asset.”103 These plans were drawn up during the transition but were never fully implemented. Instead of an overhaul of US government strategy on cyberterrorism, the Obama administration tinkered with the existing Bush-era CNCI initiative. It was without a leader for the first 12 months and lacked authority to instigate regulation of any type. President Obama, echoing his Republican predecessor, insisted, “My administration will not dictate security standards for private companies.”104 On October 1, 2009, a general took charge of the new US Cyber Command, a military organization with the mission to use information technology and the Internet as a potential weapon. As he prepared to leave office, President Clinton listed cyberterrorism as one of the five key policy areas for the United States to address in the years ahead, along with the challenges posed by acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, regional conflicts, and future dealings with Russia and China.105 Just as Bill Clinton had presided over the rise of globalization, so too had his administration seen the rise of the dark side of globalization, manifested in the threats to the developing US critical infrastructure system, a network that simultaneously streamlined services that enhanced Americans’ lives while also providing an all-too-tempting target for those seeking to cripple the nation. As the Clinton administration drew to a close, it recognized that the ability to humble the United States no longer required geographical boundaries, natural resources, or mineral wealth. Nonstate actors and networks, using traditional and nontraditional methods of political violence, were the new plague. If they could humble the United States with a computer virus, they would do so. If not, other means would be found, including box cutters and hijacked civilian aircraft. 1. “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:1. 2. See Marsha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (June 2000): 405–420. 3. William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York: Ace Books, 1984). The novel contributed to the rise of the cyberpunk genre and was honored with the highest accolades in the field, becoming the first text to win the Philip K. Dick Award, the Hugo Award, and the Nebula Award. 4. Barry C. Collin, “The Future of Cyberterrorism” (paper presented at the 11th Annual International Symposium on Criminal Justice Issues, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1997). See also Barry C. Collin, “The Future of Cyberterrorism,” Crime and Justice International 13, no. 2 (1997): 15–18.

Notes

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5. The Matrix, directed by the Wachowski Brothers (Los Angeles: Village Roadshow Pictures, 1999). 6. Robert Kupperman, Facing Tomorrow’s Terrorist Incident Today (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1977), 1. 7. Cyberterrorism: Testimony Before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (May 23, 2000) (statement by Dorothy Denning, Professor of Computer Science at Georgetown University), http://www.stealth-iss.com/documents/pdf/CYBERTERRORISM .pdf. See also Dorothy Denning, “Cyberwarriors: Activists and Terrorists Turn to Cyberspace,” Harvard International Review 23, no. 2 (2001): 70–75. 8. Mark M. Pollitt, “Cyberterrorism: Fact or Fancy,” Computer Fraud & Security 2 (February 1998): 8–10. 9. Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 254. 10. Matthew G. Devost, Brian K. Houghton, and Neal Allen Pollard, “Information Terrorism: Political Violence in the Information Age,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 1 (1997): 72–83. 11. Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald, “What Is Cyberterrorism and Why Does it Matter? Findings from a Survey of Researchers,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 4 (2015): 657– 678. 12. Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford, “Cyberterrorism?” Computers & Security 21, no. 7 (2002): 645. 13. Joshua Green, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism,” Washington Monthly, November 2002, 8–13. 14. For more attempts to define cyberterrorism, see Gabriel Weimann, “Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 2 (2005): 129– 149; Jian Hua and Sanjay Bapna, “How Can We Deter Cyberterrorism?” Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective 21, no. 2 (2012): 102–114; Maura Conway, “Cyberterrorism: Hype and Reality,” in Information Warfare: Separating Hype from Reality, ed. Leigh Armistead (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 73–94. 15. Michael Warner, “Cybersecurity: A Pre-History,” Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 5 (October 2012): 783. 16. US House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, “The Computer and Invasion of Privacy,” 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 26–28, 1966). 17. Warner, “Cybersecurity: A Pre-History,” 783; Bernard Peters, “Security Considerations in a Multi-Programmed Computer System,” Proceedings, Spring Joint Computer Conference 30 (1967): 283–286. 18. Willis H. Ware, Security Controls for Computer Systems: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer Security, RAND Report R-609-1 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1979), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports /R609-1.html. 19. WarGames, directed by John Badham (Los Angeles: United Artists, 1983). The use of cyberterrorism and threats to cybersecurity were also explored in Golden Eye, directed by Martin Campbell (Los Angeles: United Artists, 1995), Live Free or Die Hard, directed by Len Wiseman (Los Angeles: Twentieth Century Fox, 2007), as well as the CBS series Whiz Kids (1983–1984). 20. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 114. President Reagan viewed WarGames at the White House and subsequently raised its central premise in meetings with members of Congress. See Lou Cannon, President Reagan: Role of a Lifetime (New York: PublicAffairs, 1991), 38.

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21. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 238–241. 22. William J. Broad, “Computer Security Worries Military Experts,” New York Times, September 25, 1982. 23. NSDD 145, “National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information System Security,” September 17, 1984. 24. Congressman Jack Brooks (D-TX), quoted in Donald Goldberg, “The National Guards,” OMNI Magazine, May 1987, 44–46. 25. Goldberg, “National Guards,” 44–46; Linda Greenhouse, “Computer Security Shift Is Approved by Senate,” New York Times, December 24, 1987. 26. National Research Council, Computers at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information Age (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1991), 7. 27. NSD 42, “National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems,” July 5, 1990. 28. Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association International Press, 1992). 29. Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 9. 30. Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 49. 31. Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare. Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security in the Electronic Age, 2nd ed. (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1996), 43. 32. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 141–165. 33. National Research Council, Computers at Risk, 7. 34. George Smith, “An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely,” Issues in Science and Technology 15, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 68–73. 35. David Gompert, “Keeping Information Warfare in Perspective,” RAND Research Review, 19 (Fall 1995). 36. John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, February 8, 1996, https://www.eff.org/cyberspace -independence. 37. Jacques Gansler quoted by W. Madsen, “Teens a Threat, Pentagon Says,” Wired News, June 2, 1998. 38. “Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland,” May 22, 1998, PPPWJC, 1:826. 39. For contemporary reporting on the development of the Internet and reference to Senator Gore’s role in introducing legislation, see John Markoff, “Creating a Giant Computer Highway,” New York Times, September 2, 1990. 40. Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf, “Al Gore and the Internet,” https://web .eecs.umich.edu/~fessler/misc/funny/gore,net.txt; Thomas C. Greene, “Net Builders Kahn, Cerf Recognise Al Gore,” Register (London), October 2, 2000, http://www .theregister.co.uk/2000/10/02/net_builders_kahn_cerf_recognise. 41. Bill Turque, Inventing Al Gore: A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 217. 42. “Remarks on Signing the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991,” December 9, 1991, PPPGB, 2:1579. 43. Al Gore, “Infrastructure for the Global Village,” Scientific American, September 1991, 150–152. 44. Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Putting People First: How We Can All Change America (New York: Times Books, 1992), 144.

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45. Gary Stix, “Gigabit Gestalt: Clinton and Gore Embrace an Activist Technology Policy,” Scientific American, May 1, 1993, 122–126. 46. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California,” February 22, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:174. 47. Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York: Basic Books, 1996). 48. Bill Clinton, “The Struggle for the Soul of the 21st Century” (BBC Richard Dimbleby Lecture, London, December 14, 2001). 49. Exec. Order No. 13011, “Federal Information Technology,” 61 Fed. Reg. 37658 (July 19, 1996). 50. See also Glenn Kessler, “A Cautionary Tale for Politicians: Al Gore and the ‘Invention’ of the Internet,” Washington Post, November 4, 2013; Paul Krugman, “Al Gore and the Internet,” New York Times, December 9, 2007; John Markoff, “The Team That Put the Net in Orbit,” New York Times, December 9, 2007. 51. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1994), 14. 52. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1995), 8. 53. “Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland,” May 22, 1998, PPPWJC, 1:827. 54. A National Security Strategy for A New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, May 1997), 1. 55. A National Security Strategy for A New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1998), 6. 56. A National Security Strategy for A New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1999), 2. 57. NSS99, 17. 58. PDD 5, “Public Encryption Management,” April 15, 1993. 59. PRD 27, “Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption,” April 16, 1993. 60. PRD 63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” May 22, 1998. 61. Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 108. 62. Specifically, the United States Constitution, the Federal Advisory Committee Act as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 2), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code. 63. Membership of the United States Advisory Council on the National Information Infrastructure was raised to 30 on December 30, 1993, by Exec. Order No. 12890 and to 37 half a year later on June 13, 1994, via Exec. Order No. 12921. The council concluded its work and its remit was revoked by Exec. Order No. 13062, dated October 2, 1997. The National Infrastructure Advisory Council was later constituted under President George W. Bush under Exec. Order No. 13231, dated October 16, 2001. 64. Exec. Order No. 12864 of September 15, 1993, “United States Advisory Council on the National Information Infrastructure,” 58 Fed. Reg. (September 17, 1993). 65. Exec. Order No. 12924 of August 19, 1994, “Continuation of Export Control Regulations,” 59 Fed. Reg. 43437 (August 23, 1994). 66. Exec. Order No. 13026 of November 15, 1996, “Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products,” 61 Fed. Reg. 58767–58768 (November 19, 1996). 67. Exec. Order No. 13035 of February 11, 1997, “Advisory Committee on High-Performance Computing and Communications, Information Technology, and the Next Generation Internet,” 62 Fed. Reg. 7131 (February 14, 1997). 68. Exec. Order No. 13133 of August 5, 1999, “Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet,” 64 Fed. Reg. 43895 (August 11, 1999). 69. Colin Powell, memorandum of Policy 30, “Command and Control Warfare,” March 8, 1993.

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70. This wing of the Air Force underwent several redesignations in the early twenty-first century before becoming the 688th Cyberspace Wing on September 13, 2013. 71. Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the Sectary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence (Washington, DC: Joint Security Commission, February 28, 1994), v. 72. Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security, vii. 73. Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security, 2. 74. Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security, 107–110. 75. Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), xi, xvii, 3, 9, 31; Warner, “Cybersecurity: A Pre-History,” 795. 76. John M. Deutch, “Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” February 22, 1996. 77. Foreign Information Warfare Activities Against the United States, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 104th Cong. (June 25, 1996) (statement of John Deutch, Director of U.S. Central Intelligence). 78. Warner, “Cybersecurity: A Pre-History,” 795. 79. US Congress, General Accounting Office, Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, Technical Report GAO /AIMD-96-84 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, May 22, 1996). 80. Myriam Dunn and Isabelle Wigert, The International CIIP Handbook 2004: An Inventory of Protection Policies in Fourteen Countries (Zurich, Switzerland: Center for Security Studies, 2004). See also Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2008), 10. 81. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Cyber-Terror—Looming Threat or Phantom Menace? The Framing of the US Cyber-Threat Debate,” Journal of Information Technology & Politics 4, no. 1 (2007): 19–20. 82. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, Final Report (Washington, DC: The White House, October 1997), 14. 83. James Adams, The Next World War: Computers Are the Weapons and the Front Line Is Everywhere (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 244. 84. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations, x. 85. Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics, 10. 86. Defending America’s Cyberspace. National Plan for Information Systems Protection Version 1.0: An Invitation to a Dialogue (Washington, DC: The White House, January 7, 2000). See also PDD 63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” May 22, 1998. 87. PDD 63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” May 22, 1998. For an assessment of the wider bureaucratic response, see Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997). 88. US Department of Justice, Terrorism in the United States 1998, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 18. 89. Ralf Bendrath, Johan Eriksson, and Giampiero Giacomello, “From ‘Cyberterrorism’ to ‘Cyberwar,’ Back and Forth: How the United States Securitized Cyberspace,” in International Relations and Security in the Digital Age, ed. Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007), 66; Ralf Bendrath,

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“The Cyberwar Debate: Perception and Politics in US Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Information and Security 7 (2001): 80–103. 90. “Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland,” May 22, 1998, PPPWJC, 1:827. 91. For more on the developing powers of the federal government, see M. Rotenberg, “Privacy and Secrecy After September 11,” in Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship Between IT and Security, ed. Robert Latham (New York: Free Press, 2003). 92. US Department of Justice, Terrorism in the United States 1998, 17. 93. US Department of Justice, Terrorism in the United States 1998, 17. 94. Pentagon spokesman Kenneth H. Bacon, quoted in Bill Gertz, “Eligible Receiver,” Washington Times, April 16, 1998. 95. GCHQ is the sister agency of the NSA in the United Kingdom. For more, see Thomas Rid, Rise of the Machines: A Cybernetic History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016). 96. See National Domestic Preparedness Office, Blueprint for the National Domestic Preparedness Office, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438600. 97. For more on the development of the Homeland Security concept, see David McElreath, Carl Jensen, Michael Wigginton, Daniel Doss, Robert Nations, and Jeff Van Slyke, Introduction to Homeland Security, 2nd ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2014); Dale Jones, Austen Givens, Rosemary O’Leary, David Van Slyke, and Soonhee Kim, eds., Public Administration: The Central Discipline in Homeland Security in the Future of Public Administration Around the World: The Minnowbrook Perspective (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy, Center for International Security and Cooperation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, October 1998), vol. 1, paper 6; Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998): 80–94. 98. US Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 2001), viii. 99. Defending America’s Cyberspace. 100. “Remarks on the National Plan for Information Systems Protection and an Exchange with Reporters,” January 7, 2000, PPPWJC, 1:14. 101. Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 113. 102. Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 114–115. 103. Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 116. 104. Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 118. 105. M. Lacey, “Clinton Gives a Final Foreign Policy Speech,” New York Times, December 9, 2000.

7 Nemesis: Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda network gained in subsequent years, they were neither perceived as a constant threat during the Clinton administration nor were they the only foreign terrorist organization to threaten the United States at the time. For much of the 1990s, the main threat from nonstate actors was believed to stem from the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah. Regardless of whether the danger came from state-sponsored groups or from Al-Qaeda, a common rationale for their animus toward the United States was American foreign policy in the Middle East in general and its continued support for Israel in particular. For most Americans, however, these groups and their actions were a distant menace and were not a focus of concern in their everyday lives. But these groups were a growing challenge; the Clinton administration recognized they posed an ever-increasing danger to the United States and its interests around the world. As the administration’s time in office progressed, it came to accept the orthodoxy that an attack was coming, it was just a question of where and when. Policies were implemented, bureaucracies altered, and dedicated positions created in an attempt to preempt what many feared was an inevitable assault on the US mainland. All too often this was done in the face of opposition from members of Congress and the armed forces, skeptical of the true nature of the threat and concerned that it was simply a diversionary tactic employed by an administration increasingly under siege.1

Despite the global notoriety that Osama bin Laden and his

The start of the Clinton administration coincided with a brief period of hope in the global community. Cold War tensions that had paralyzed international cooperation for decades were easing, reducing the possibility of a nuclear exchange and radically altering the state of global terrorism. With

The Growing Menace

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Moscow having previously funded terrorist organizations as a way to help undermine Western governments, the sudden withdrawal of patronage had a profound effect. Terror groups disintegrated or fell into irrelevancy; their leaders renounced violence, were killed in internal struggles, or were captured by authorities and imprisoned for long periods of time. Even in the Middle East, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) abandoned its use of violence and recognized Israel.2 Despite these developments, the danger from international terrorist organizations was far from over. Whereas groups had previously claimed a politically motivated ideology, entities increasingly emerged that claimed a new, religious motivation, often one inspired by an Islamic fundamentalist orthodoxy. Much of this stemmed from the establishment of an Islamic theocratic state in Iran following the 1979 revolution and the government support afforded to Hezbollah in Tehran. As early as 1993, Hezbollah plotted to murder National Security Adviser Anthony Lake using the resources of Sudanese intelligence. In 1995, Lake’s protection was increased, and he stayed in a series of safehouses until the threat passed; he finally returned home in early 1996.3 Notwithstanding the initial threats posed by Iranian-backed groups, the emerging danger of radical Islamic terrorism was evident from the very start of the Clinton administration; the attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in New York and the murder of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staff both were committed by radical Islamists. Two years later, the plans for Operation Bojinka were uncovered. This multifaceted scheme involved attempts to murder Pope John Paul II during his visit to the Philippines on January 15, 1995, destroy 11 US commercial airliners in-bound from Asia as they crossed the Pacific Ocean on January 21–22, 1995, and crash a hijacked aircraft into the headquarters of the CIA.4 These plans—remarkably similar to events that transpired six years later—were devised by Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, and were financed, in part, by a radical Saudi named Osama bin Laden.5 An attempt to assassinate President Bill Clinton during his visit to the Philippines in November 1994 was also uncovered and prevented. In 1996, the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s counterterrorism section, John O’Neil, declared that Islamic terrorists had “the capability and the support infrastructure in the United States to attack us here if they chose” and that they constituted the greatest threat to US national security.6 The prevailing view, however, as expressed by Philip C. Wilcox, the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, was that “while there are informal contacts among Islamists—especially abroad . . . there is little hard evidence of a coordinated international network or command and control apparatus among these groups.”7 By 1996, Afghanistan had become the focus of the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism efforts. Invaded by Soviet forces in 1979 in what President Jimmy Carter referred to as “the most serious threat to the peace

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since the Second World War,” the country was ravaged during the largest covert war in history.8 The vacuum created by the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 was exacerbated by a rapid withdrawal of political support by the Reagan administration, plunging the nation into anarchy, a situation warlords and perpetrators of political violence exploited. In 1996, the Taliban finally drew the competing powers together and initially appeared appreciative of the US role in ridding their country of Soviet domination. They also provided safe haven for Osama bin Laden, viewed during the first years of the Clinton administration “as a financier of terrorism, more than a leader of terrorism.”9 After being expelled from Saudi Arabia, he had moved from nation to nation, drawing to him a group of followers, including Ayman alZawahiri, in a network that became known as Al-Qaeda.10 Its grievances focused on the United States following the end of the Gulf War in 1991 and the agreement to permanently station US forces in the Middle East. In February 1998, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, under the auspices of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, issued a fatwa calling for the murder of Americans. This was predicated on the basis of the continuing US presence in Saudi Arabia and its holy places of Mecca and Medina, US sanctions against Iraq, and the continued US support for Israel. Despite the lack of apparent logic in issuing a decree seven years after the end of the Gulf War, it was suggested that “these complaints require no elaboration in the fatwa; they are immediately understood by the statement’s intended Muslim audience.”11 Although this may have been the first time members of the American public had heard of bin Laden, his name was known to policymakers and intelligence analysts in Washington and he was considered “a growing concern” owing to a series of high-profile incidents.12 As Nancy Soderberg later reflected, when the fatwa was issued, “the United States was in a war, but did not yet realize it.”13 White House meetings to address the threat bin Laden posed proved inconclusive. “At that point, the United States had no indictment of bin Laden and thus could not bring him to America for trial. No other country wanted custody of him. And there was nothing like a workable plan.”14 Six months later, on August 7, 1998, the eighth anniversary of the arrival of US troops in Saudi Arabia ahead of the Persian Gulf War, coordinated explosions devastated the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, killing 12 Americans and more than 200 others.15 On October 12, 2000, 17 American service personnel were killed aboard the USS Cole, which was docked in Yemen. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that “these outrages framed a new threat to world peace, a special kind of evil.”16 The Clinton administration, recognizing the need to utilize everything at its disposal to address the threat from terrorist networks, drew upon a number

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of policy tools, including speeches, National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), and executive orders. A series of high-profile addresses on the specific menace of terrorist networks was made during the eight years of the Clinton administration. During the first term, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake addressed these issues in a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Despite claims made by terrorist organizations, state sponsors of terror, and even distinguished academics, Lake insisted that the “fundamental divide” in the world did not run between civilizations or religions but “between oppression and responsive government, between isolation and openness, and between moderation and extremism.” Accordingly, the Clinton administration argued that the new foe of the United States was “oppression and extremism, whether in religious or secular guise,” and promised to “draw the line against those who seek to advance their agenda through terror, intolerance, or coercion.”17 Unlike other areas of foreign policy, the terrorist threat from nonstate actors was one that President Clinton appeared comfortable addressing personally rather than delegating to his national security team. The president sought to place the struggle with such groups in a broad, historical context, noting that although “fascism and communism are dead or discredited, the forces of hatred and intolerance live on.” The challenge in the 1990s was “ethnic violence, religious strife, terrorism,” which sought to “spread darkness over light, disintegration over integration, chaos over community.” President Clinton insisted his administration’s ambition was “to fight them, to defeat them, to support and sustain the powerful worldwide aspirations of democracy, dignity, and freedom.”18 Even though the threat from nonstate actors became particularly apparent in his second term, President Clinton made reference to the threat in July 1996 as he campaigned for reelection. Drawing on the events and policies of his first term, the president noted that the nation had seen “a record number of terrorists captured and convicted,” that his administration had “thwarted a number of planned terrorist attacks,” and that it would keep “the heat on terrorist organizations and those who would support them.”19 In 1997, President Clinton warned the UN General Assembly that terrorists along with organized criminals and drug traffickers formed an “unholy axis” that threatened the future of humanity.20 A year later, he dedicated his keynote address at the General Assembly to the subject of terrorism, which he identified as being “a clear and present danger to tolerant and open societies and innocent people everywhere.” He dismissed those who noted that “the number of deaths from terrorism is comparatively small, sometimes less than the number of people killed by lightning in a single year,” because political violence posed a direct challenge to the free and open era the Clinton administration was eager to advance. President Clinton insisted that rather

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than acceding to popular theories of the time, the United States rejected suggestions of “an inevitable clash between Western civilization and Western values and Islamic civilizations and values.” The president argued instead that the threats of the modern era represented “a clash between the forces of the past and the forces of the future, between those who tear down and those who build up, between hope and fear, chaos and community.”21 Clinton’s successor, President George W. Bush, was later criticized for the language he used in regard to the terrorist threat to the United States, in particular his assertion that he would take bin Laden “dead or alive.”22 However, the Clinton administration was not averse to using stark language to convey its message in this area. President Clinton presented the realities of combating terrorism as he addressed the nation in August 1998: “We must be prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must. America is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely because we are leaders; because we act to advance peace, democracy, and basic human values; because we’re the most open society on Earth; and because, as we have shown yet again, we take an uncompromising stand against terrorism.”23 As he declared in August 1996, terrorism was “the enemy of our generation.”24 In addition to speeches, the Clinton administration addressed the threats from terrorist networks in its annual National Security Strategy. The administration championed its multiagency approach as a way to “punish and deter terrorists,” highlighting the success in obtaining convictions on March 4, 1994, of four defendants in the bombing of the World Trade Center.25 The Clinton administration referred to the perpetrators of the attack in New York as a “more loosely organized group” than other “well-organized groups” that the United States had encountered previously.26 The White House noted that such networks had “the advantage of being able to take the initiative in the timing and choice of targets.”27 However, it was adamant that success was possible and reminded voters in the 1996 election season that in “the last three years, more terrorists have been arrested and extradited to the United States than during the totality of the previous three administrations.”28 The Clinton administration adhered to a long-standing principle of US grand strategy vis-à-vis terrorist organizations: “Our policy in countering international terrorists is to make no concessions to terrorists, continue to pressure state sponsors of terrorism, fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists and help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism.”29 It was a policy that was adhered to far more readily than many have been prepared to admit. While the Clinton administration planned to prevent the use of force against the United States, it accepted that such an eventuality must be prepared for, necessitating a policy of national security emergency preparedness to “ensure the survivability of our institutions and national infrastructure, protect lives and property and preserve our way of life.”30 Though a

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new governmental agency did not result, this was the first step in the direction of establishing the Department of Homeland Security. Accordingly, the Clinton administration continued to build up resources to ensure “comprehensive, all-hazard emergency preparedness planning by all federal departments and agencies.”31 By 1996, the White House could boast of its success in gathering “information on terrorist activities aimed at US persons or interests and [helping to] thwart such activities whether conducted by wellorganized groups or loose associations of disaffected individuals intent on striking at the United States.”32 The Clinton administration, an early proponent of globalization, conceded in 1996 that this process had a dark side, but insisted that Americans were “safer because [its] Counterterrorism strategy promoted closer cooperation with foreign governments and sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism, while increasing the resources for our own law enforcement agencies.”33 The White House recognized the threat that terrorist networks posed in a new era of open markets, open trade, and open borders, and it sought to target groups that “parasitically feed off and ultimately threaten, the open markets and open societies that we have worked so hard to advance.”34 As its first term ended, the Clinton administration could reflect on a series of initiatives designed to address the growing threat of overseas terrorist networks. Legislation had been sent to Congress to expand the range of options available to US law enforcement agencies in efforts to address political violence. This included legal mobile wiretaps and the ability to place identifying material in plastique. Efforts were also made to seize the assets of terrorist organizations. Notably absent in any National Security Strategies during the first term was reference to Osama bin Laden, which reinforces the idea that the threat he posed emerged in the second term. After the successful reelection campaign, NSS reports from 1997 onward revealed a far more aggressive tone in regard to counterterrorism strategy. Osama bin Laden was identified by name as the key nemesis to be addressed in the remaining years of the twentieth century. The 1998 NSS made the first explicit reference to bin Laden and the havoc he was wreaking on US global interests. The report noted the casualties from the August 7 attack on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the direct link to “the network of radical groups affiliated with Osama bin Laden,” who was identified as “perhaps the pre-eminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today.” The report noted that although “groups associated with bin Laden [came] from diverse places, [they shared] a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents.”35 As a result, they had made the United States their adversary “precisely because of what we stand for and what we stand against.”36 The Clinton administration recognized that these networks were “increasingly likely to attack U.S. terri-

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tory and the American people in unconventional ways.” In language that echoed the rhetoric that emerged under George W. Bush, the Clinton White House warned: Adversaries will be tempted to disrupt our critical infrastructures, impede continuity of government operations, use weapons of mass destruction against civilians in our cities, attack us when we gather at special events and prey on our citizens overseas. The United States must act to deter or prevent such attacks and, if attacks occur despite those efforts, must be prepared to limit the damage they cause and respond decisively against the perpetrators. We will spare no effort to bring attackers to justice, ever adhering to our policy toward terrorists that “You can run, but you cannot hide,” and where appropriate to defend ourselves by striking at terrorist bases and states that support terrorist acts.37

The Clinton administration prioritized a series of initiatives in the struggle against terrorist networks: to “eliminate terrorist sanctuaries; and counter state supported terrorism and subversion of moderate regimes through a comprehensive program of diplomatic, law enforcement, economic, military and intelligence activities.” In a passage that looms large in light of subsequent events, the 1998 report highlighted the effort to “improve aviation security at airports in the United States and worldwide, to ensure better security for all US transportation systems, and to improve protection for our personnel assigned overseas.”38 To do so, the Clinton administration continued the policy of ascribing the response to overseas terrorist incidents to the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) was “prepared to deploy on short notice to the scene of an incident” and was “tailored to the nature of the event” to “include personnel from the State Department, Defense Department, FBI, and other agencies as appropriate.” The administration also touted the existence of five Rapid Deployment Teams that were “ready to respond quickly to terrorist events anywhere in the world.”39 In its final NSS, the Clinton administration insisted that Afghanistan had become a “serious threat” to US interests as a result of the Taliban’s continued support of bin Laden. The administration as well as the UN Security Council had already imposed sanctions on Afghanistan for its ongoing defiance of the international community and its unwillingness to surrender bin Laden to justice.40 The administration committed the United States to enforce these sanctions “and look for other ways to pressure the Taliban to end its support for such groups.”41 The Clinton White House, however, was determined to remove any religious connotations from its counterterrorism strategy. Despite the nations targeted, and the religion of the main perpetrators of political violence, the Clinton administration repeatedly stressed that its policies were not aimed against Islam, which had become the fastest

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growing religion in the United States. The White House noted Islam’s “role as a source of inspiration, instruction and moral guidance for hundreds of millions of people around the world” and insisted that governmental policies were “directed at the actions of governments and terrorist groups, not peoples or faiths.”42 Ultimately, the Clinton White House argued that the standards it sought for all nations were “not merely Western, but universal.”43 Noticeably more robust than the first report in 1994, the 2000 NSS claimed that the administration had “mounted an aggressive response to terrorism,” a statement that came under close scrutiny nine months later.44 This was all part of a strategy that the administration could reflect upon as it neared the end of its time in office. It had doubled the number of FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism, doubled the FBI’s counterterrorism budget, and established the post of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism.45 Bureaucratically, despite congressional resistance, progress was being made in what the administration believed was an “aggressive response to terrorism.” It was a strategy that sought to utilize “enhanced law enforcement and intelligence efforts; vigorous diplomacy and economic sanctions; and, when necessary, military force.”46 The Clinton administration also addressed issues of international terrorist networks as part of the ongoing work at the National Security Council. On March 2, 1995, President Clinton signed PDD 35 to establish the Intelligence Priorities Interagency Working Group, a decision that represented an elevation in status for a danger that had previously received too little attention from too many administrations.47 This marked the Clinton administration as “the first to undertake a systematic anti-terrorist effort, in terms of resources and anti-terrorist activity.”48 The working group supplemented the work of the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and served as a forum for identifying issues that required specific attention from the intelligence community. As the White House press secretary Mike McCurry noted, “Terrorism remains a concern. . . . And how you structure the priorities of the intelligence community to reflect the new threats that are more urgent in the post–Cold War world is part of what this review and this directive are all about.”49 On June 21, 1995, the president signed the most important counterterrorism document to emerge from the Clinton White House: PDD 39. Dedicated solely to the US policy on counterterrorism, the paper announced that the administration intended “to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory.” The document presented the findings of the administration and the way in which it sought to “deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks” and to “identify groups or states

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that sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions.”50 The directive emphasized that it was the policy of the United States “not to make concessions to terrorists” and presented a series of policy stances to be implemented: reducing vulnerabilities, deterring terrorist acts, responding to terrorist incidents, and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction. Firstly, the Clinton administration committed to reducing US vulnerabilities both at home and abroad.51 The document allocated specific responsibilities to the heads of the executive branch agencies, including Justice, State, Defense, Transportation, Treasury, the FBI, and the CIA. The report confirmed the FBI’s position as lead investigative agency for domestic terrorist incidents and assigned specific duties to the agencies in accordance with their constitutional remits. The CIA in particular was tasked with conducting “an aggressive program of foreign intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and E.O. 12333.” Secondly, the administration sought to actively deter terrorism “through a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors.”52 PDD 39 called for the deployment of a range of policies to disrupt terrorist activities, including the use of public diplomacy, the placing of direct pressure on states that sponsor or harbor terrorists, the enhancement of counterterrorism capabilities, and the return of indicted terrorists from abroad to the United States. If the latter could not be done via extradition treaties, the Clinton administration was prepared to “induce” such flights “without the cooperation of the host government, consistent with the procedures outlined in NSD-77, which remain in effect.”53 Thirdly, the Clinton White House committed to “respond rapidly and decisively to terrorism directed against us wherever it occurs, to protect Americans, arrest or defeat the perpetrators, respond with all appropriate instruments against the sponsoring organizations and governments and provide recovery relief to victims, as permitted by law.”54 The administration continued to adhere to the bipartisan orthodoxy of treating terrorism as a crime to be investigated rather than an act of war to be retaliated against. The Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), overseen by the State Department, was established to address issues overseas, and the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), under the direction of the FBI, was empowered to coordinate the response to all domestic incidents. A host of other federal agencies were also allocated specific roles under PDD 39. The Federal Aviation Administration was allocated “exclusive responsibility” to coordinate the response to incidents of air piracy, although the Justice Department, along with the FBI, was tasked with ensuring the “efficient resolution of terrorist hijackings.”55 Although it was

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not the primary focus of the PDD, the CIA was ordered to “collect, analyze and disseminate all-source foreign intelligence on terrorist groups and activities abroad.”56 The directive required the CIA and FBI to work together and “achieve maximum cooperation regarding terrorism, as legally permissible.” The two were ordered to “share, where appropriate, terrorismrelated intelligence and law enforcement information expeditiously and efficiently.”57 The fact that this had to be spelled out so starkly was a clear indication of the problems that had long plagued relations between the two organizations and that continued to prove a challenge in the years ahead. The PDD called for the establishment of a Domestic Counterterrorism Center (DCTC) by the FBI to coordinate with a similar unit, the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), that already existed at the CIA. On August 8, 1995, transportation secretary Federico Peña advised the White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta that the Federal Aviation Administration would increase airport and airline security in accordance with PDD 39 and input from law enforcement and intelligence sources. Intriguingly, the transport secretary relayed the concerns of the Air Transport Association about “the potential impact on their industry if civil aviation alone is the focal point for increased security” and proposed that the White House publicly acknowledge that the measures were “part of an administration-wide effort in response to a general increase in the potential for anti-American terrorism.”58 In 1997, the Clinton administration publicized its efforts to improve aviation security at airports in the United States and worldwide to “ensure better security for all US transportation systems; and improve protection for our personnel assigned overseas.”59 Fourthly, PDD 39 insisted that the administration give “the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists” and viewed the acquisition of such materials by terrorist groups as being “unacceptable.” The directive insisted there was “no higher priority” than preventing such a situation from arising.60 The administration was directed to intensify its collection of intelligence on potential threats and to refine its response capabilities, rules of engagement, and procedures for retrieving, disabling, transporting, and disposing of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), drawing upon the expertise at the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) as necessary in times of crisis. Finally, the directive called for a series of recommendations addressing potential domestic vulnerabilities to be produced within 120 days and for annual readiness reports to be submitted to the national security adviser, who was to assume responsibility for the “ongoing review of implementation of this directive and for ensuring the functioning of the interagency counterterrorism system.”61 This review was a deliberate attempt to gain an appreciation of exactly what individual government departments were doing

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in regard to the counterterrorism strategy. As counterterrorism had never previously been afforded this level of importance, there was no way of knowing what gaps or overlaps existed in the federal bureaucracy. PDD 39, therefore, was a concerted effort to address this vulnerability and to centralize control over counterterrorism policy in the White House.62 In a memorandum for the president, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake conceded that interagency struggles had influenced the wording of PDD 39 as “the NSC had to reconcile a conflict between Treasury and the FBI over Treasury’s role in the NSC chaired group that coordinates US counterterrorism policy.” It was clear that the FBI director, Louis Freeh, believed that “Treasury’s presence would create confusion over responsibility for managing domestic terrorist incidents . . . because the CSG [Counterterrorism Security Group] coordinates sensitive operational matters that are beyond Treasury’s purview.” The PDD failed to grant the Treasury Department the membership it sought in the Counterterrorism Security Group but enabled it to be “present at CSG meetings whenever its expertise or jurisdiction are implicated.”63 At 11 pages, the directive was among the most comprehensive released by the Clinton White House in eight years. Nowhere, however, did it reference by name any specific nation or terrorist organization. In addition to the annual reports and directives that emanated from the Clinton White House, a series of executive orders were also released that addressed terrorist networks generally and bin Laden directly. These drew on presidential authority established in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and the United States Code.64 On January 23, 1995, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12947, “Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process.” The order specifically named a series of “terrorist organizations,” including Hamas and Hezbollah, which it accused of committing “grave acts of violence . . . that disrupt the Middle East peace process.” The White House declared that such acts “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States” and “declare[d] a national emergency to deal with that threat.”65 The order prohibited any transactions between these groups and US citizens or companies and any donations to them. In further keeping with standing operating principles, the FBI was designated as the lead investigative agency for any contraventions and was to work in conjuncture with the Department of the Treasury, signifying the importance that this order attached to stemming the flow of monetary support of terrorist organizations.66 On August 20, 1998, Executive Order 13099 was issued to build upon the initial order dated January 23, 1995. This amended the annex to the initial document so that it now directly referred to “terrorists” who threatened

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the peace rather than to “terrorist organizations,” and it added four names to the annex. The first was Osama bin Laden. Also on the list were Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, an eminent member of the Egyptian Islamic group Al-Gama’a Al’Islamiyya (GAI) who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and who was affiliated with bin Laden’s aide, Ayman al-Zawahiri, another name on the list. The final name was that of Abu Hafs al-Masri, a key deputy to bid Laden.67 The order also referred to an organization called the Islamic Army but noted it had many aliases, including the Islamic Salvation Foundation, the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, and the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites. It also had one other name: Al-Qaeda.68 Later in 1998, President Clinton issued a Memorandum of Notification in regard to bin Laden that directed the CIA to utilize assets in Afghanistan to engage bin Laden, primarily with the intention of capturing him. The memorandum was intended “to encourage the CIA to carry out an effective operation against bin Laden, not to burden the agency with constraints or doubts.” Vitally, however, the administration was hesitant to put on paper any order “that could be interpreted by Afghan agents as an unrestricted license to kill.” Despite a belief within the White House that the executive order prohibiting assassinations did not extend to bin Laden, it was understood that any such language would be vigorously opposed by the Justice Department.69 A little under a year later, on July 4, 1999, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13129, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban.” The order was issued in direct response to the Taliban’s continued willingness to allow “territory under its control in Afghanistan to be used as a safe haven and base of operations” for bin Laden and AlQaeda, which the White House accused of having “committed and threaten[ing] to continue to commit acts of violence against the United States and its nationals.” The order prohibited any transactions between US citizens and the Taliban, including the “exportation, re-exportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly . . . of any goods, software, technology (including technical data), or services to the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban or to the Taliban.”70 The order failed to reference any initiatives to replace the Taliban government, but the Clinton administration clearly sought to isolate it economically from the international community in a move reminiscent of its dual containment approach to Iran and Iraq. The Clinton administration also used international gatherings to garner support for an effective counterterrorism strategy. For example, the White House ensured international harmony on counterterrorism issues at the annual G-7 meetings. Following the 1995 G-7 meeting in Halifax, Nova Scotia, the seven nations and Russia agreed to coordinate plans to combat terrorism. Later that year, a meeting in Ottawa resulted in a P-9 commitment “to adopt all current counterterrorism treaties by the year 2000.” The Clin-

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ton administration believed that such initiatives were evidence of its success in “urging international cooperation in the fight against terrorism . . . in large measure due to a growth of international intelligence sharing and increased international law enforcement efforts.”71 At the 1996 G-7 Summit in Lyon, Iran’s continued support for terrorism and terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah was singled out for criticism. Commitment to international cooperation was confirmed a year later in Denver, when leaders reiterated their determination to combat terrorism.72 The director of policy planning at the State Department, James Steinberg, insisted that from 1995 onward, terrorism was the subject of a “rising curve of urgency and attention.”73 Having devised its policy approaches to international terrorist networks, the Clinton administration was duty-bound to respond to attacks on US interests and put its policies into practice. This took a variety of approaches: legal, structural, diplomatic, rhetorical, and, ultimately, military. The administration dispatched the largest ever overseas detachment of FBI agents as part of the investigative process following the attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The near-simultaneous nature of these attacks took the administration by surprise because they required a degree of coordination usually associated with state-sponsored acts of terrorism, which had been on the decline since the end of the Cold War. They also “brought home to the whole US government the size and the complexity of the problem” bin Laden posed, as the White House discovered it “had enemies who would punch us in places where we [didn’t] even know we had a vulnerability.”74 The administration’s ability to dispatch the FBI team was predicated on the concept of “extraterritorial jurisdiction,” a legal principle established in US legislation. The 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorist Act expanded the FBI’s jurisdiction to investigate terrorist incidents committed against US nationals to anywhere in the world. In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act built upon this legislation, outlawing the provision of material support to terrorist organizations.75 This legislation was further supplemented by the findings detailed in PDD 39. The work of more than 900 special agents of the FBI resulted in the apprehension of Mohammed Saddiq Odeh and Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali in Kenya within three weeks of the embassy attack and the subsequent arrest of Mamdouh Mahmud Salim in Germany one month later. All three were extradited to the United States before the end of the year and tried on charges related to the devastation caused to the US embassies and the ensuing loss of life. They were joined by Wadih El-Hage, a naturalized American, who was arrested for making false declarations to the FBI. The

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arrest of the four individuals eventually led to charges being made against Osama bin Laden and members of his network in the Southern District of New York on November 4, 1998. The Clinton administration was adamant that the rapid deployment of specialist agents to the scene of a terrorist incident, which built on policies put in place by the Reagan administration, was essential for any successful investigation. It was an approach that had already led to the trial and conviction of a series of high-profile terrorists during the Clinton administration’s tenure. Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman, Omar Mohammed Ali Rezaq, Mohammed Rashid, and Ramzi Yousef had all faced justice in the US court system, been treated as criminals, and were prosecuted accordingly. As the Clinton administration left office in January 2001, there was little to suggest that this bipartisan approach to apprehending terrorists would change radically in the years ahead. In January 1996, Anthony Lake and Richard Clarke tasked Michael Scheuer of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center with establishing a dedicated “virtual station” devoted to bin Laden. Named for Scheuer’s son, “Alec Station” focused exclusively on tracking bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Ultimately, Alec Station “thought it could find out whom bin Laden was funding and who, in turn, might be funding him; it was also hoped that the knowledge might open up new ways to disrupt terrorist operations.”76 The severity of the threat was not lost on the highest levels of the CIA, with Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet conceding in 1998, “We are at War.”77 He later noted that, despite subsequent claims to the contrary, “the Clinton administration understood fully the nature of the threat we were facing.”78 In addition to the FBI and the CIA, the National Security Council (NSC) was also actively involved in implementing the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism strategies. Of particular importance was Richard Clarke, who was among the first to note the growing threat of international terrorism in the post–Cold War era. Clarke was able to get away with what was referred to as “very abusive” behavior and language because of his rapport with President Clinton. This ensured that Clarke remained an influential figure in US counterterrorism throughout the administration, despite his willingness to highlight what he saw as being the shortcomings of several executive branch agencies.79 Initially, as head of the interagency CSG, Clarke was responsible for intense lobbying of his superiors, such as Anthony Lake, many of whom became converts to the cause of defeating the terrorist threat. 80 This continued into the second term, as Clarke focused on Lake’s replacement, Samuel Berger, and obtained greater government funding for the role.81 In 1998, Clarke was appointed National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, as detailed in PDD 62, and was granted a seat on the Principals Committee of the National Security Council. Never before had one individual

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been so accountable for US counterterrorism strategy. Although he had elevated the focus on counterterrorism at the NSC, hostilities still existed among the various executive branch agencies, many of which failed to take the threat seriously. His promotion provoked tensions within the administration; the Departments of Defense and Justice both vehemently opposed the establishment of a terrorism czar within the White House and sought to ensure that, unlike the national drug policy coordinator, Clarke would not have an independent budget or a dedicated staff. As Clarke noted in 1999, “There is a problem convincing people that there is a threat. There is disbelief and resistance. Most people don’t understand.”82 The Pentagon routinely sent low-level officers to meetings of the Counterterrorism Security Group before being ejected by Clarke. The lack of engagement by the Department of Defense caused Michael Sheehan, the State Department’s counterterrorism chief, to lament, “What’s it gonna take, Dick? . . . Does alQaeda have to attack the Pentagon to get their attention?”83 Despite frustrations with the lack of initiative shown by the Pentagon, the Clinton administration did engage in military operations against foreign terrorist organizations. The most tangible example of this was Operation Infinite Reach, launched in the aftermath of the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted, once the CIA briefed the White House that responsibility lay with bin Laden and his terrorist network, the United States “couldn’t sit around and wait until the terrorists struck again.”84 The Pentagon recommended a cruise missile strike on Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and the headquarters of the Taliban, although the latter option was overruled by the State Department. 85 The CIA briefed the president that soil samples taken from a Sudanese factory with ties to Al-Qaeda revealed traces of Oethyl methylphosphonothioic acid, or EMPTA, a byproduct of the process involved in creating the deadly nerve agent VX. Attorney General Janet Reno raised doubts as to whether the proposed strikes could be justified under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which addressed concepts of national self-defense, and she refused to participate in the final vote despite all other members of the NSC voting to approve the attack on the designated targets.86 On August 20, 1998, President Clinton authorized Operation Infinite Reach, consisting of 79 cruise missiles launched from US naval vessels in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea and aimed at terrorist training camps in Khost, in Afghanistan, and at a factory in Khartoum, Sudan. Striking the two sites in unison was a deliberate attempt to replicate the simultaneous attacks on the embassies that had necessitated the operation. The date and location

Targeting Bin Laden and the Taliban

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were specifically chosen to target a planned meeting of the Al-Qaeda leadership. Addressing the American public, President Clinton was at pains to stress that these efforts were not new and that the United States had “battled terrorism for many years” using the tools at its disposal. “Where possible, we’ve used law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight. The long arm of American law has reached out around the world and brought to trial those guilty of attacks in New York and Virginia and in the Pacific.”87 The missile strikes initially won popular support: Newsweek reported 73 percent in favor and a CBS/New York Times poll showed 70 percent approval.88 Paul Bremer observed that the strikes “dispel the impression of recent years that attacks on Americans—whether in Somalia, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan— remain unanswered. And they come as a welcome application of unilateral American force after years of dependence on desultory multilateralism.”89 The clear intent was to eradicate the Al-Qaeda leadership, and in this regard the operation must be considered a failure. Bin Laden was believed to have left the compound several hours prior to the attack, which had been timed to occur at night so as to avoid potential detection prior to impact. The strike certainly affected the viability of the camps and killed members of the network, but the main focus was missed. Madeleine Albright insisted that the attacks demonstrated that the United States “could hit the enemy on its home ground and that America could not be attacked with impunity.”90 Despite this optimistic appraisal, support for the joint strikes waned, as the Los Angeles Times reported that 40 percent of poll respondents believed that the military strikes were influenced by ongoing hearings into the president’s relationship with Monica Lewinsky.91 Such sentiment was fueled by political opponents, including senior members of Congress, eager to raise the specter of Wag the Dog, a film that had recently played in cinemas across the United States.92 Senator Dan Coats accused Clinton of “lies and deceit and manipulations and deceptions,” adding that the president’s record in office “raises into doubt everything he does and everything he says, and maybe even everything he doesn’t do and doesn’t say.”93 On the heels of the president’s public acknowledgment of an “inappropriate relationship” with Monica Lewinsky, public support for the operation continued to decline as US foreign policy became beholden to domestic political machinations. As Martha Crenshaw correctly observed, “American counterterrorism policy is not just a response to the threat of terrorism, whether at home or abroad, but a reflection of the domestic political process.”94 Subsequent attempts to strike bin Laden were planned; in 1999 a joint US-Pakistani effort to target him was canceled after the coup that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power. A strike on a motorcade transporting bin Laden was subsequently launched but failed to target the correct vehicle, enabling him to escape once more. The military operations and the president’s preparedness to target bin Laden with cruise missiles were at

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odds with the ambiguous language included in official documentation, revealing a twin-track approach. Officially, the strategy was to engage, capture, and eventually convict bin Laden; simultaneously, however, he was being targeted for termination with cruise missiles. As the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shelton noted in his memoir, preprogrammed, cruise missile–equipped submarines were stationed in the Persian Gulf for years, specifically waiting for word on bin Laden’s location.95 On two occasions the missiles were readied in anticipation of an imminent launch order, only for the missions to be aborted owing to insufficient evidence. As Sandy Berger noted in 2002, “The cruise missiles were not trying to capture him. They were not law enforcement techniques.”96 The team at the NSC’s Transnational Threats Directorate continued to draw up papers addressing the threat from Al-Qaeda. On November 12, 1999, Daniel Benjamin circulated a study paper ahead of a small group meeting scheduled for December 3 that discussed the continuing relationship between bin Laden and the Taliban regime. It noted initially that “logic supports the argument that the fading military challenge from the opposition Northern Alliance has made [bin Laden] less valuable to the [Taliban].” It recognized, however, that “other considerations, including his potential contribution to wider Islamic victories and the country’s reconstruction, will probably weigh more heavily.” The document again attempted to inject logic into the argument surrounding the Taliban and bin Laden, stating that as “leaders become more determined to gain international recognition and material aid for reconstruction, they are more likely to see bin Laden’s presence as a bargaining chip, along with their current encouragement of poppy cultivation.”97 Such thinking proved optimistic at best. Later in the month, the senior director for Near East Affairs at the NSC, Bruce Riedel, again addressed future options with the Taliban and bin Laden. In a memo for Sandy Berger, he described Afghanistan as “a cancer in Asia that exported ‘terror and drugs.’” He noted that the country had been “so ravaged by two decades of war that there is nothing worth bombing.” Riedel recommended launching a full diplomatic offensive to secure compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and to end the civil war. In an attachment, Riedel made direct reference to Al-Qaeda and bin Laden, asking “What is he up to? Where has he been? Is there any reality to the talk of his leaving Afghanistan? What role has [Al-Qaeda] played in Chechnya?” A second attachment stressed the need for cultural sensitivity, noting that the Security Council sanctions had been passed unanimously and were, therefore, “the will of the international community, not just the US—and that this effort is directed against [bin Laden] and not the Afghan people or Islam.”98 The need to portray this as being distinct from a clash of civilizations was revealed in an undated internal memo urging the administration to

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“Find a Muslim! This effort will get us to the real issue: ‘Terrorism’ vs. A perceived issue of religion. (Muslims against us and vice versa).” It is not clear what event this was relating to, but there was a clear recognition by the Clinton administration of the need to “find a prominent Muslim associate directly or indirectly [linked] with the US Gov.” so as to not make a religious issue out of the situation at a time that was at least months, if not years, prior to the attacks of September 2001.99 During the remainder of its time in office, the Clinton administration enacted various initiatives in an attempt to neutralize the threat posed by bin Laden, all of which involved overwhelming deadly force. B2 bombers were prepared to respond to an attack order; nuclear-powered submarines were placed on permanent standby in the Arabian Sea, awaiting orders to unleash their arsenal of cruise missiles on bin Laden’s location should it be conclusively determined; and the possibility of dispatching US Special Forces was also considered. In all instances, the actionable intelligence necessary to initiate a mission never materialized. It was a situation that Samuel Berger lamented: “We tried very hard to get bin Laden. . . . We attacked with cruise missiles and we just missed him. . . . We never had a clear shot after that.”100 The reaction to the August 1998 missile strikes had inadvertently raised the stakes for the Clinton administration as its time in office neared an end. A flawed operation would not only be used as a propaganda victory for bin Laden but would also raise doubts as to the competency of the administration, as Vice President Gore was seeking election in his own right. To supplement the legal and military response to the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the Clinton administration initiated a twin-track diplomatic effort aimed at the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. William Milam, the US ambassador to Pakistan, was authorized to conduct meetings with the Taliban leadership which would continue until the Clinton administration left office two years later. Instead of acquiescing or rejecting this overture, the Taliban prevaricated. In addition to this ambassadorial approach, former Green Beret Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Michael Sheehan was appointed State Department coordinator for counterterrorism. Along with Karl Inderfurth, assistant secretary of state for South Asia, Sheehan initiated a two-stage approach in an effort to convince the Taliban to provide access to bin Laden. It was made clear to the Taliban that the Clinton administration was prepared to use military force against locations in Afghanistan if actionable intelligence arose and that the Taliban would be considered jointly responsible for any attacks launched by bin Laden from its territory. In so doing, the Clinton White House anticipated two elements of George W. Bush’s approach: that of preemption, and that of holding host nations accountable for terrorist activity launched from within their borders. Sheehan and the US State Department also sought diplomatic support

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for their efforts from the only three nations that recognized the Taliban regime: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan. This was only partially successful. Saudi Arabia agreed to issue Afghans travel visas for nonreligious trips, reduced diplomatic relations with the Taliban, and, along with the United Arab Emirates, restricted commercial landing rights of Afghan air traffic. The situation with Pakistan was complicated by internal disputes that resulted in the October 1999 military coup and Pervez Musharraf’s rise to power, a move that complicated dealings between Washington and Islamabad for the remainder of the Clinton administration. Unilateral US sanctions imposed in July 1999 were supplemented three months later by those put in place by the United Nations. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright conceded, “This left the Taliban isolated, but it didn’t make them give up bin Laden.”101 The threat to the United States from overseas terrorist networks evolved during the Clinton administration’s time in office. Although the true scale of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda did not become apparent until the two African embassies were bombed simultaneously in 1998, the potential threat from nonstate actors was clear since the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the shooting of CIA employees. Once the menace from bin Laden and Al-Qaeda was understood, the Clinton administration adopted both diplomacy and military force in its efforts to counter the dangers that materialized in its second term. It launched cruise missile strikes on locations believed to be harboring bin Laden and brought sanctions on Afghanistan for hosting the Saudi exile. It was, however, unable to foster sufficient domestic or international political support for a vigorous prosecution of this effort. The Clinton administration recognized the danger of foreign terrorist networks, often in the face of criticism from political opponents in Congress who subsequently championed President George W. Bush’s War on Terror and criticized Clinton for concentrating too heavily on bin Laden. Despite the administration’s best efforts and the agencies at its disposal, political violence was perpetrated against the United States, ensuring that whatever measures had been implemented, “which were hardly insignificant, were by definition not enough.”102 At home as well as abroad, the Clinton administration was fighting a war against bin Laden’s nascent network that went unnoticed by most Americans and was routinely dismissed by lawmakers until it exploded above the streets of Manhattan in 2001. 1. For a consideration of the political context in which Clinton’s War on Terror was being played out, see Sidney Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars: An Insider’s Account of the White House Years (London: Penguin Books, 2003). 2. Peter R. Neumann, Old and New Terrorism: Late Modernity, Globalization and the Transformation of Political Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 2.

Notes

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3. Richard Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars: The Evolution of a Commander in Chief (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 289. 4. Operation Bojinka specifically targeted the main US carriers operating out of the Pacific Rim: 747 aircraft operated by United, Delta, and Northwest airlines flying out of Manila, Tokyo, Singapore, Bangkok, Taipei, and Seoul were all targeted. See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 21. 5. Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI— the Untold Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 259. See also George Tenet, At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 162. 6. Carl T. Rowan, The Coming Race War in America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996), 13. See also Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda (London: Routledge, 2003), 119. 7. Robin Wright, “Islam in the ’90s: A Study of Diversity: Despite Pervasive Stereotypes, Major Islamist Groups Differ Widely in Tactics and Tenets,” Los Angeles Times, February 7, 1995, A1. 8. “The State of the Union,” January 23, 1980, PPPJC, 1:196. 9. Anthony Lake, quoted in Russel L. Riley, Inside the Clinton White House: An Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 245. See also Nancy Soderberg, The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 143. 10. For more on the development of Al-Qaeda, see Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin, 2007). 11. Sohail Hashmi, “The Terrorist’s Zealotry Is Political, Not Religious,” Washington Post, September 30, 2001, B1. 12. Morton Halperin, interview with author, July 5, 2017. 13. Soderberg, Superpower Myth, 146. See also Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America (New York: Random House, 2001). 14. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 257. 15. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 29. 16. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan, 2003), 362. 17. Anthony Lake, “Building a New Middle East: Challenges for US Policy” (speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, May 17, 1994). 18. “Remarks at the University of Connecticut in Storrs,” October 15, 1995, PPPWJC, 2:1596. 19. “Remarks to the Disabled American Veterans Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana,” July 28, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1211. 20. “Remarks to the 52d Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 22, 1997, PPPWJC, 2:1206. 21. “Remarks to the 53d Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 21, 1998, PPPWJC, 2:1630–1632. 22. “Remarks to Employees in the Pentagon and an Exchange with Reporters in Arlington, Virginia,” September 17, 2001, PPPGWB, 2:1120. 23. “Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan,” August 20, 1998, PPPWJC, 2:1461. 24. “Remarks on International Security Issues at George Washington University,” August 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1257. 25. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1994), 9. 26. NSS94, 8.

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27. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1995), 10. 28. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1996), 16. 29. NSS95, 10. 30. NSS96, 31. 31. NSS96, 31. 32. NSS96, 24. 33. NSS96, 3. 34. NSS96, 26. 35. “Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan,” August 20, 1998, PPPWJC, 2:1460. 36. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1998), 16. 37. NSS98, 7. 38. NSS98, 15. 39. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1999), 14. 40. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2000), 60. 41. NSS2000, 61. 42. NSS99, 45. 43. NSS98, 54. 44. NSS2000, 22. 45. NSS2000, 23. 46. NSS2000, 22. 47. As of 2017, PDD 35 remains classified. The wording, therefore, has been reverse-engineered by drawing upon the public remarks of Mike McCurry and President Clinton. 48. Barton Gellman, “Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign,” Washington Post, December 20, 2001, A1. 49. Press Briefing by Mike McCurry, March 10, 1995. 50. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 1. 51. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 2. 52. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 3. 53. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 4; NSD 77 was signed by President George H. W. Bush and remains classified. 54. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 5. 55. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 8. 56. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 8–9. 57. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 9. 58. Federico Peña to the White House Chief of Staff, re: DOT Security, August 8, 1995, Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Trans-national Threats (Richard Clarke), OA/Box No.: 3547: Terrorism-FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] [1], William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AK. 59. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, May 1997), 10. 60. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 9. 61. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” 11. 62. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 230. 63. Memorandum for the President from Anthony Lake, “Presidential Decision Directive on US Counterterrorism Policy,” June 12, 1995.

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64. Specifically, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code. 65. Exec. Order No. 12947, “Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process,” 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (January 25, 1995). 66. The full list of “terrorist organizations” identified by the executive order is Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Hezbollah, Islamic Gama’at (IG), Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai, Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi faction (PIJ), Palestine Liberation Front—Abu Abbas faction (PLF–Abu Abbas), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP–GC). 67. All three were eventually killed by US forces. Bin Laden was killed on May 2, 2011, in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during Operation Neptune Spear; Rifa’i Ahmad Taha Musa was killed by a US drone strike on his location in Syria in April 2016; Abu Hafs al-Masri was killed by a US drone strike near Kabul, Afghanistan, in November 2001. 68. Exec. Order No. 13099, “Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process,” 63 Fed. Reg. 45167 (August 25, 1998). 69. Steve Coll, “Legal Disputes over Hunt Paralyzed Clinton’s Aides,” Washington Post, February 22, 2004, A17. 70. Exec. Order No. 13129, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban,” 64 Fed. Reg. 36759 (July 7, 1999). 71. NSS96, 16. 72. NSS98, 16. 73. Gellman, “Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign,” A1. 74. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 75. US Department of Justice, Terrorism in the United States 1998, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 15. 76. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 243. See also William Nestler, Hearts, Minds and Hydras: Fighting Terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, America and Beyond—Dilemmas and Lessons (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2012), 53. 77. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeiger, America Between the Wars (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 267. 78. George Tenet, At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 125. 79. Michael Dobbs, “An Obscure Chief in US War on Terror,” Washington Post, April 2, 2000, A1. 80. See Gellman, “Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign”; Robert Suro and Dana Priest, “Plan to Overhaul Anti-Terrorism Strategy Would Boost NSC’s Role,” Washington Post, March 24, 1988; Tim Weiner, “The Man Who Protects America from Terrorism,” New York Times, February 1, 1999. 81. Anthony Lake, Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them (Boston: Little, Brown, 2000), 56–57. Estimates from the Office of Management and Budget showed an increase in aggregate spending on terrorism from $5.7 billion in fiscal year 1996 to $11.1 billion in 2001. 82. Elizabeth Becker and Tim Weiner, “Homeland Security: New Office to Become a White House Agency,” New York Times, September 28, 2001. See also Coll, “Policy Disputes over Hunt Paralyzed Clinton’s Aides”; David Johnston and Thom Shanker, “Threats and Responses: Terrorist Bombing,” New York Times, October 1, 2002.

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83. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (London: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 224. 84. Albright, Madam Secretary, 364. 85. Hugh Shelton with Ronald Levinson and Malcom McConnell, Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 359. 86. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 260. 87. “Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan,” August 20, 1998, PPPWJC, 2:1461. 88. Kathy Kiely and Richard Sisk, “Prez Goes After Terror Asset,” New York Daily News, August 23, 1998, 3; Brian McGrory, “US Calls Terrorists’ Losses Significant,” Boston Globe, August 22, 1998, A1. 89. L. Paul Bremer III, “Fight Plan for a Dirty War,” Washington Post, August 24, 1999. 90. Albright, Madam Secretary, 368. 91. Mark Z. Barbak, “The Times Poll,” Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1998, A1. 92. Wag the Dog, directed by Barry Levinson (New York: Baltimore Pictures /TriBeCa Productions, 1997). 93. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 359. See also Todd Purdum, “US Fury on 2 Continents: Congress; Critics of Clinton Support Attacks,” New York Times, August 21, 1998, A1 94. Martha Crenshaw, “Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process,” in Essential Readings in Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century, ed. Harvey W. Kushner (New York: Richard Altschuler and Associates, 2002), 203. 95. Shelton with Levinson and McConnell, Without Hesitation, 342–343. 96. Berger, quoted in Coll, “Legal Disputes Over Hunt Paralyzed Clinton’s Aides,” A17. 97. Daniel Benjamin, memo to Beverly Roundtree (TNT) and Jack A. Robinson (TNT), Re: Taliban Discussion Paper, November 12, 1999, National Security Council and NSC Emails, “Declassified Documents Concerning Osama bin Ladin,” Clinton Digital Library, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36621. 98. Bruce Riedel, memo for Samuel R. Berger re: Taliban—Next Steps, November 30, 1999. 99. Terrorism, Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Transnational Threats (Richard Clarke), OA/Box No.: 3546: Terrorism [Folder 2] [6], William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AK. 100. Joe Klein, “Closework: Why We Couldn’t See What Was Right in Front of Us,” New Yorker, October 1, 2001. 101. Albright, Madam Secretary, 370. 102. Joe Conason, “Media Blame Game Requires a Mirror,” New York Observer, January 7, 2002, 5.

Part 3 The Tools, 1993–2001

8 Eyes in the Skies: Drones

tration was perceived as “gun shy” as it came to office in January 1993.1 As Democrats, they were members of a political party that had developed a reputation for weakness in military operations and, as individuals, many had earlier adopted a stance in opposition to military operations that affected their decisionmaking once in office. For many members of Clinton’s administration, the Vietnam syndrome was an influencing factor: they had witnessed hostility toward the war in Southeast Asia mount as the US body count steadily rose in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For an administration that sought to prioritize the domestic economy and provide healthcare reform, losing any political capital on foreign interventions, especially if the lives of American military personnel were placed in jeopardy, was to be avoided. The loss of American Special Forces in Somalia in 1993, only months into the administration’s first term in office, epitomized the Clinton administration’s anxieties about the potential costs involved in foreign excursions. The deaths in Mogadishu were exacerbated by the 1995 downing of Captain Scott F. O’Grady’s jet in Bosnia, events that became headline news and made for best-selling books and successful Hollywood films but jeopardized continuing public support for future overseas operations.2 The incidents also underscored the need for reliable, unmanned alternatives to existing modes of aerial reconnaissance. It stood to reason, therefore, that any initiatives that could reduce costs—both political and financial—while maintaining and, if possible, enhancing US capabilities would find favor in the Clinton White House. The political desire to remove the human element from aerial reconnaissance was accompanied by leaps in technology that made this idea viable during the Clinton administration. Few initiatives implemented during Clinton’s War on Terror, however, proved to be as subsequently controversial as

By the admission of its own members, the Clinton adminis-

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its deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones. From Bosnia to Afghanistan, the use of drones was a natural progression from the use of high-altitude surveillance aircraft such as the U-2 and the SR-71, both of which were aging projects by the 1990s that slipped in and out of official retirement. Drones, however, were an ideal solution for an administration that was skittish about the potential costs involved in overseas deployments but determined to stay engaged on the world stage. The team that surrounded Bill Clinton as he became president of the United States had been seared by their experiences with the Vietnam War, either as a result of their service or their efforts to avoid the draft. As the administration took office, many continued to be haunted by the conflict that had ravaged the nation and divided the Democratic Party. A “Vietnam syndrome” developed in the aftermath of the conflict that is believed to have stymied US foreign policy for a generation and led to a hesitancy to intervene militarily overseas for fear of a similar stalemate. In March 1991, President George H. W. Bush declared his belief that success in the Persian Gulf War ensured the Vietnam syndrome had been “kicked . . . once and for all.”3 The Clinton administration, however, recognized that victory in Kuwait had not resulted in George H. W. Bush being reelected to a second term. It also believed that public support for overseas deployments was, in part, dependent upon incurring minimal casualties. These two aspects of foreign affairs, both of which related to the seemingly fickle nature of public interest and support, were of great significance to the Clinton administration, which sought to focus on domestic policy and expend as little political capital as possible on international affairs. To the dismay of the Clinton White House, however, a combination of crises developed rapidly within its first year in office that highlighted the need to identify an unmanned alternative to current practices. The desperate plight of Somalia came to light in 1992 as the United States focused on the presidential campaigns of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. The United States finally addressed the humanitarian disaster on the Horn of Africa after the election and Clinton’s victory. The decision by the outgoing Bush administration to deploy 25,000 troops to relieve Somali suffering, under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 794, ensured that the Clinton administration came to power in the midst of Operation Restore Hope. Eager to transition out of the country as swiftly and painlessly as possible, the Clinton White House reduced the American contingent to just 3,000 logistical personnel and 1,100 rapid deployment troops by May 1993. When greeting returning service personnel at the White House, the new commander in chief hailed their mission as “the largest

The Clinton Administration and the Human Element

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humanitarian relief operation in history” and one that had “written an important new chapter in the international annals of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.”4 The withdrawal of US forces, however, merely encouraged Somali warlords to challenge the remaining UN peacekeepers, culminating in the death of 23 Pakistani troops on June 5, 1993. As political violence threatened the already ravaged country and undermined the UN operation, President Clinton acquiesced to one of the final recommendations of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell and the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council: to deploy US Special Forces to Somalia to prevent further losses to the UN detachment.5 This deployment drew US forces deeper into a land whose national interests were impossible to define as part of a United Nations operation that was far removed from the stated political ambitions of the new administration. Less than three months later, on October 3, 1993, two Black Hawk helicopters were lost as part of a Special Forces mission designed to apprehend warlord General Mohammed Aidid and his supporters. The battle that followed, with marooned US forces fighting their way out of Mogadishu, cost the lives of 18 Americans on the worst day of battlefield casualties in Clinton’s presidency. At the time of the incident, it was believed that the Black Hawk helicopters had been brought down by local Somali militia who were loyal to General Aidid. Subsequent reports, however, linked the assault to members of Osama bin Laden’s developing networks. In 1997, bin Laden claimed that he was particularly proud of his network’s efforts to drive the United States from Somalia and of its role in bringing down the helicopters. The eventual indictment against bin Laden that was drawn up in the United States made specific and repeated reference to these actions, difficult though they were to verify.6 The State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, Ambassador Philip Wilcox, noted, “We take [bin Laden] at his word.”7 The US attorney in Manhattan, Mary Jo White, insisted her department was “confident in the allegation.” Others, however, were less certain. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who had been the US envoy to Somalia, observed, “Nobody I’ve talked to, most of whom were in a good position to know, knows anything about that,” and he added, “We never heard anything about bin Laden.”8 Regardless of where responsibility lay, the destruction of the Black Hawks and the resultant deaths of US service personnel resonated throughout Capitol Hill, caused a reversal of an emerging grand strategy commitment to assertive multilateralism, and provoked the anger of President Clinton. The commander in chief understood that the deaths in Somalia would dominate the news and lead to a decline in support for overseas operations. This was reflected in a Time/CNN poll that indicated only 43 percent support for a continued US presence in Somalia following the incident, down from 79 percent in January 1993.9

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Two years later, the Clinton administration was again faced with the challenge of a downed US aircraft and its crew, this time behind enemy lines in Bosnia. On June 2, 1995, an F-16C piloted by Captain Scott F. O’Grady of the 555th Fighter Squadron, deployed as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation Deny Flight, was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. Serb forces quickly surrounded the wrecked aircraft and located the ejector seat that had saved O’Grady’s life. The US Air Force captain spent the following six days behind enemy lines, evading capture, before being rescued on June 8 by US Marines—cigars were smoked in celebration at the White House.10 O’Grady’s rescue was a success story, but one that could easily have ended very differently. Despite the ensuing revelry in Washington, it was clear that anything that could be done to keep US service personnel out of harm’s way while defending US overseas interests needed to be explored. Removing the human element from future operations appeared to be a logical option for all involved. The desire to reconnoiter an enemy position in an unobtrusive fashion while avoiding capture or detection is far from unique to the modern era. Long before the Wright brothers ushered in the age of the airplane on December 17, 1903, attempts were made to utilize vehicles of one form or another to gain a vantage over an enemy in an effort to better appreciate its logistical strengths and weaknesses. More than half a century earlier in 1849, the Austrian empire attacked Venice using explosives released from a series of balloons, which resulted in a six-month siege leading to the city’s eventual surrender. The concept of “ballooning” an enemy was developed two decades later in the United States when similar vessels were used by both sides in the Civil War to reconnoiter enemy positions. In 1863, the “Perely Aerial Bomber” was developed as a method to deliver an explosive device to the heart of the enemy utilizing a balloon and a timer. Not all advances, however, had such catastrophic intent; the first aerial photograph was taken in 1887 when Douglas Archibald successfully tethered a camera to a kite, ushering in the age of aerial surveillance. Despite its benign origins, this surveillance platform quickly found less peaceful use during the Spanish-American War of 1898, when the United States adopted the technology to engage in military espionage. Progress in deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles depended on the evolution of radio as much as on aircraft design—two technologies that had a rapid and symbiotic evolution in the latter years of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century. By the outbreak of WWI, the technologies had been successfully combined to create the first remote-controlled aircraft. Devised by Archibald Low of the Royal Flying Corps in Great

Dawn of the Drone

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Britain, the Rushton Proctor Aerial Target first flew on January 1, 1916, and was followed nine months later by the Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane, designed to act as an aerial torpedo. The modern use of the term drone to denote an unmanned aerial vehicle derives from the Queen Bee project of the 1930s. “Designed as an aerial target for anti-aircraft gunners training purposes rather than as a single-use guided weapon,” this radio-controlled aerial target was “a game changer” in the world of unmanned aircraft. It was capable of flying at over 100 miles an hour, with a range of over 250 miles, and became the first multiuse, unmanned vehicle.11 With the outbreak of World War II, unmanned aerial platforms beyond hot air balloons became mechanized and weaponized. Whereas the British made initial advances in drone technology, the German military leaped forward with the V-1, capable of carrying almost a ton of highly explosive material to a target up to 150 miles away and at a velocity of almost 500 miles per hour. In a 10-month period, from June 1944 to March 1945, 500 V-1 attacks were launched against Great Britain, although air defenses allowed less than 25 percent to reach their intended targets. Even so, V-1s were responsible for over 35,000 casualties and 1,000 fatalities.12 The V-1 brought fear to the cities of Great Britain and heralded not only a new era in unmanned warfare but also the start of the missile age, as the Cold War struggle between East and West drove both sides to develop even more deadly arsenals. Two highly embarrassing incidents in 1960 in the missile race with the Soviet Union quickly revealed the US military’s need to develop an unmanned platform. On May 1, Captain Francis Gary Powers was shot down as he flew his U-2 high above the Soviet Union on an aerial reconnaissance mission. Initially, the Eisenhower administration denied all knowledge of the operation and claimed that the Soviets had shot down a “weather balloon.” This strategy of denial backfired when Moscow revealed the aircraft’s metallic fuselage and placed Captain Powers on trial for espionage offenses. Exactly two months later, on July 1, a second US reconnaissance plane, a Boeing RB-47, was shot down close to the Soviet border. These incidents, occurring at the height of the Cold War, raised East-West tensions and contributed to the collapse of the Four Powers Summit in Paris that summer.13 The capture of Gary Powers reinforced concerns about using US personnel in high-risk reconnaissance missions. Two years later, on October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson became the sole American fatality of the Cuban Missile Crisis when his U-2 aircraft was shot down during a surveillance mission over the Caribbean island.14 The loss of a US serviceman at the height of the crisis risked a sharp escalation of tensions that would not have arisen had an unmanned vehicle been used. Further development on the Lightning Bug series enabled it to be utilized to reconnoiter areas of potential interest, including China, North Korea, and

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Southeast Asia. Vitally, UAVs completed more than 3,500 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions during the Vietnam War, though they were not used in actual combat operations owing to the difficulty in differentiating among camouflaged targets.15 The overwhelming need for the development of unmanned vehicles became apparent when the figures emerged on the loss rate of US manned vehicles in Vietnam: 5,086 of the 11,827 helicopters deployed to Vietnam by the US Army were destroyed, resulting in the deaths of 2,709 passengers and crew.16 The army lost a further 362 fixed-wing aircraft. The US Air Force lost 2,251 aircraft, the US Navy lost 859 aircraft, and the US Marine Corps lost 463. All told, more than 9,000 manned aircraft were lost during the Vietnam War, establishing the fact that “Vietnam was decisive to the development of drones as the perfect tools to perform dangerous missions without the risk of losing a pilot.”17 In the years following the Vietnam War, Israel played a major part in furthering the development of drone technology. The United States supplied Israel with drones for use in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and these were eventually modified and sold back to the United States. The first chance for the United States to deploy this technology, known as the Pioneer, came in the Persian Gulf War, where UAVs flew more than 300 missions.18 Evolving technology, increasing demands on US resources in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the political recognition that the public was unlikely to support high casualty rates in foreign conflicts ensured that drone technology was a logical tool for the Clinton administration to consider as it moved into the White House.

The Clinton Administration Enters the Drone Business

The Clinton administration came to office amid ongoing challenges involving active US overseas deployments. The Cold War had ended, but peace had not broken out as a result. Instead, a series of simmering tensions had exploded, all of which required attention from the White House. The time and political capital involved in these initiatives threatened to detract from the administration’s determination to address the issues it had campaigned on: healthcare reform and domestic infrastructure investment. The early loss of American lives in Somalia reinforced the belief that foreign deployments could only be detrimental to the administration’s longterm domestic aspirations and was a determining factor in deciding when and where to deploy US forces in the future. At at time of shrinking budgets, widespread calls for a “peace dividend,” doubts about the continued need for US foreign military engagement, and an objective to reduce attention paid to international affairs, UAVs provided an all-too-obvious appeal to the Clinton administration.

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Their potential was noted during the 1992 election campaign. A memo drafted for Nancy Soderberg stated, “A number of programs to develop and deploy short and medium UAVs should be given priority. Earlier designs proved their worth during Operation Desert Storm.”19 Once President Clinton was in office, the most immediate champion of UAVs was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James Woolsey. Recognized as a “smart guy,” his politics and priorities for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ensured that “he quickly just became a fish out of water.”20 Complaints mounted that Woolsey was too focused on developing new spy satellites and not focused enough on addressing the developing transnational threats of the post–Cold War era. It was also believed that he was more interested in offering “policy prescriptions” rather than raw data.21 During an era in which the future direction of the Central Intelligence Agency was being debated, Woolsey’s lack of rapport with the new president was a potential hinderance to the organization. Though not alone in his inability to develop a strong working relationship with the president, Woolsey was handicapped by Clinton’s apparent unwillingness to meet on a regular basis, as was de rigueur under previous administrations. Rather than receive his daily intelligence briefing from DCI Woolsey, President Clinton chose to be briefed by his national security adviser, Anthony Lake. Woolsey’s tenure at the CIA proved unhappy for all concerned. He resigned on December 28, 1994, and endorsed Republican senator Bob Dole for president in 1996 rather than his former boss, Bill Clinton. Woolsey’s indignities did not end when he departed the Clinton administration; he was incorrectly identified in the index to Clinton’s memoirs as “John Woolsey.”22 During his two years as DCI, however, Woolsey played a vital role in the establishment of a successful UAV/drone program. During the 1980s, competing groups had sought to develop unmanned surveillance vehicles for various government agencies, including the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite being ostensibly on the same side, the differing priorities and stylistic approaches of these government bureaucracies ensured that tension was never far from the surface and came to dominate the future debate surrounding the development, deployment, and control of the UAV/drone initiative. As the Clinton administration came to power in January 1993, the CIA began briefing Woolsey on existing plans and initiatives. With the White House looking to retask the agency for economic espionage in the post–Cold War era, it was natural for the bureaucracy to explain existing programs and developmental ideas ahead of any public policy announcements in an attempt to influence the decisionmaking process. As part of this process, Thomas Twetten, deputy director of operations (DDO), briefed Woolsey on the CIA’s drone initiative. In his time prior to appointment as DCI, Woolsey

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had traveled widely in a variety of remits, both public and private, and had encountered key personnel in the area of drone technology, including Abraham E. Karem, whose company, Leading Systems Incorporated, had developed a concept vehicle named Amber. An Iraqi-born engineer who grew up in Israel, Karem immigrated to the United States in 1977 and spent much of his career devising innovative UAV technology. Woolsey had met Karem in Israel and remembered him as being “an entrepreneurial engineering genius.”23 Motivated by the briefing from his DDO, Woolsey located Karem, who was working on his latest drone initiative in Los Angeles. Karem had initially devised a UAV named Albatross that was capable of remaining airborne for 56 hours and that weighed only 200 pounds even with its built-in camera. With funding provided by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the US Navy, the Albatross project developed into Project Amber in 1985. At that time, the UAV was seen as a way to monitor drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. By 1988, despite strides in global positioning system (GPS) technology and the apparent viability of the Amber project, both the army and the navy failed to purchase the system. Congress then consolidated UAV funding into a joint program, which canceled the initiative, leading to the bankruptcy of Karem’s company.24 Remarkably, Karem’s success came later from a less advanced system, the GNAT-750, developed out of the ashes of Leading Systems Incorporated after its assets were purchased by General Atomics in 1990. It was at General Atomics that Woolsey and Twetten discovered Karem. He and his new partners, the Blue brothers, had their UAVs for sale to interested foreign powers, including Turkey. The day Woolsey met with Karem, he placed an order, officially putting the Clinton administration in the drone business.25 At that time, the GNAT-750 required further development. A major consideration was the noise it generated. It sounded like “a lawnmower in the sky,” according to Twetten.26 Over the course of 1993, the craft was modified to improve the engine and the landing gear and to alter the nose configuration. Finally, it received a new name at the behest of the company’s president, Thomas J. Cassidy. The United States government took delivery of three vehicles and their ground control units at a cost of $31.7 million in the summer of 1994.27 The Predator, as it was rechristened, was now part of the Clinton administration’s arsenal in its global war on political violence. Having added a new tool to the federal arsenal, the Clinton administration was unable to avoid a battle over control of the new acquisition. The government had attempted to acquire drone technology throughout the 1980s. Now that the CIA had purchased the latest UAV, the agency’s competitors suddenly appreciated the leap it had made and the potential the technology offered.

Drones in the Federal Bureaucracy

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A bureaucratic clash emerged between the CIA, which possessed the vehicles, and the Air Force, which sought to operate the technology. Previous disagreements over which type of UAV to develop contributed to the tension: the Air Force initially was in favor of much faster vehicles, whereas the CIA sought a platform that included an aerial reconnaissance ability not provided by existing aircraft or satellite technology, which the Predator provided in real time. On July 12, 1993, Undersecretary of Defense John M. Deutch sent a memo to the assistant secretary of the navy for research, development, and acquisition regarding plans for a UAV designed to surpass the GNAT-750. Deutch laid out the challenges posed by the lack of a “continuous all-weather” surveillance platform that could provide “coverage of world wide targets.” “The Joint Staff has identified an urgent need for the capability of an Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system.” Deutch requested the Program Executive Office for the Cruise Missiles Project and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Joint “expeditiously contract for an endurance UAV.” The new vehicle would have a range of 500 miles, the ability to reconnoiter a target for 24 hours, fly up to 25,000 feet, and transmit imagery via satellite.28 On April 9, 1996, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry signed a memo entitled “Assignment of Service Lead for Operation of the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).” The document explicitly designated the US Air Force as “the lead Service for operating and maintaining the Predator UAV.” Perry concluded that the Predator had “proved its ability to provide a significant and urgently needed reconnaissance capability.” Despite his decision to designate the Air Force as the lead service, Perry was adamant that because of the Predator’s potential, “the continued participation of each Service must be maintained.”29 The army eventually took delivery of its version, the Hunter. “Meanwhile the Pentagon formed yet another new organization, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, to develop the GNAT, the Predator, a high-flying follow-up called Tier II Plus, and a secret, stealthy Lockheed-Boeing UAV.”30 The departmental debate was caused in part by bureaucratic pride but also by issues of funding. Clearly, the notion that the CIA planned to operate an aircraft independent of the air force was a point of contention at the Pentagon, as the potential for the Predator raised government-wide questions about mission parameters and how best to define this new technology: Was this an aircraft, a missile, or something altogether different? This debate intensified when it was suggested that weapons be added to the Predator, which raised even further questions about whether such a move would contravene the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that prohibited the development of any new long-range cruise missiles. The financing of the program also raised bureaucratic tensions and revealed the differing levels of budget allocation across the executive branch

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agencies at the end of the Cold War. The air force believed that the CIA wanted “to run everything and pay for nothing. They like to have sexy toys that do interesting things so they can claim credit . . . and of course, they don’t want to pay for it.”31 Tensions also existed over the speed of development. The CIA sought to deploy the Predator to gain valuable in-theater data on its viability and feared that the Pentagon preferred to conduct theoretical tests before unleashing the technology.32 Although budgetary battles continued to hamper interagency congeniality, in July 1995 the CIA finally agreed to allow US Air Force operatives from the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron based at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada to operate the Predator.33 Among the most serious challenges facing the incoming Clinton administration was the deteriorating situation in former Yugoslavia. Following his election defeat, President George H. W. Bush had been presented two options to end his presidency on a high note: a mission to deliver aid to Somalia, or an operation to end the civil war in the Balkans. He chose the former, ensuring that the breakup of Yugoslavia continued unabated through the winter of 1992 and into the spring of 1993. The political violence that tore Yugoslavia apart in the aftermath of the Cold War was enabled in part by an American desire to avoid unnecessary involvement and in part by a European desire to demonstrate the viability of the newly established European Union by blocking unwanted US participation. European political leaders balked at the idea of direct US intervention in what they saw as a problem they could fix. Luxembourg’s foreign minister Jacques Poos remarked that “this is the hour of Europe, not of America,” a view echoed by the president of the European Community, Jacques Delors, who insisted, “We do not interfere in American affairs; we trust America will not interfere in European affairs.”34 In the coming months, these statements revealed the extent of European impotence and were, in the words of UK defense secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind, “simply foolish.”35 Yet, in the midst of a presidential election, the United States was content to take the Europeans at their word. “They will screw it up,” Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger argued, “and this will teach them a lesson.”36 The United States did, however, establish a presence in the Balkans that winter when President Bush initiated several U-2 surveillance flights to collect information on Serb forces as they gathered strength. Political posturing notwithstanding, gaining vital look-down intelligence from the United States was not something military leaders in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were in a position to refuse. US detachment and European hubris ensured that the situation in Bosnia was allowed to deteriorate during the first years of the Clinton presidency with bloody consequences for all involved.

Deploying the Drones: Bosnia

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Despite a perceived ambivalence toward US foreign policy in general and Bosnia in particular, the new administration in Washington focused on the challenge in the Balkans to a greater extent than it did the developing crisis in Somalia. As is traditional for an incoming administration, the Clinton team sought to ascertain for itself the extent to which political violence was rampant in Bosnia, not to rely on the conclusions of the previous administration.37 What became apparent was that a “lack of good intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance was hampering US efforts to understand and, if possible, contain the civil wars” that had erupted in the former Yugoslavia.38 President Clinton continued and increased in number the U-2 flights that President Bush had initially approved. How the imagery was processed was also improved: it was “transmitted to a ground facility in Italy for processing, saving hours over the previous procedure that involved flying the film to the UK.”39 The GNAT-750s that DCI Woolsey had secured from General Atomics were also dispatched to the Balkans under codename Lofty View to supplement the U-2 flights and gain even greater insight into the savagery unfolding on the ground. Because of their range limitations, however, the GNATs were operated out of neighboring Albania from the Gjadër Air Base. A year later, the first Predator drones were deployed over Bosnia. Arriving in June 1994, the new UAVs provided the Clinton administration with a major advancement in surveillance technology. The range limitations of the GNAT-750 were overcome by installing a new Satellite Communications (SATCOM) link, which not only ended the “line-of-sight” era but also relieved the need to place operators in relative proximity to the drones. Perhaps the most important development was the lengthened endurance of the new UAV: it could remain airborne for almost 24 hours. This created a new capacity to observe acts of political violence and identify developing situations in real time. “The bad guys used to just wait for our fighter pilots to leave,” recalled Air Force Major General Ken Israel, who headed the Pentagon office in charge of unmanned military aircraft at the time. “They didn’t have that option anymore.” 40 As was noted, bureaucratic resistance hampered development, causing the UAV program to lag by at least six years: “Amber equaled the performance of the new Predator in tests six years ago—but was cancelled by the Pentagon’s UAV program office in 1990.”41 By 1995, the Predator was being operated out of the Taszár Air Base in Hungary, where it was a component in Operation Nomad Vigil and Operation Deliberate Force and contributed to the NATO mission against Serb aggression. “During the three-day campaign, CIA Predator drones were able to show Serb forces massing for a surprise counterattack, enabling the Croats to surprise it and turn it back.”42 This integration of UAVs into realtime operations provided invaluable data about the reliability of the vehicle,

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its strengths, weaknesses, and areas of focus for development. In less than two years, the UAV platform had evolved from requiring operators present in theater to being operated remotely via satellite communications; their durability had been extended and their reliability improved. A number were lost to enemy fire, others to inclement weather conditions that affected their operating systems. The live-fire environment also ensured that operators honed their skills in regard to “piloting” the Predator remotely. This was not a simple process; the delay in image relay from the Predator to its operator via a satellite also meant that the operator’s commands were delayed in reaching the vehicle, which exacerbated communication issues. The weight of the vehicle also ensured that it was susceptible to even moderate changes in wind direction and required extremely delicate handling by its remote operators. The successful integration of the Predator into the Bosnian theater of operations prompted a bureaucratic debate within the Clinton administration as to the future direction and intent of this technology. The Predator had demonstrated its capacity to provide a reliable, stable platform for intelligence gathering. It was capable of sourcing intelligence as well as confirming reported movements. To some, this was more than sufficient. However, at this stage the Predator was strictly a reconnaissance vehicle. The newly enlarged nose unit enclosed a movable camera and could also carry radar imaging and electronic intercept equipment.43 What it could not do was independently unleash weaponry of any kind. But this development was already being considered. Two options to integrate the Predator into armed attack procedures, known as the “kill chain,” were deliberated. The first concept was to incorporate the Predator into the overall surveillance package unveiled in the 1990s that was based on the new Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) platform. Constructed around a Boeing 707 airframe, JSTARS was designed to do for ground operations what the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) had done for air operations. Its strengths lay in its ability to track military vehicles in theater. Its weakness was its inability to focus on a single vehicle or individual for strict identification purposes. The potential for a Predator drone to transmit real-time imagery, “paint” a target with a laser beam, and direct a computer-guided weapon to its target was clear. Tests to link the Predator drone to submerged submarines began in earnest in 1995. By the time of the Kosovo War in 1999, the US Air Force had equipped Predators “with laser target finders and satellite links that would make drone-guided bombing operations possible for the first time, although no such attacks were actually carried out.”44 The second alternative was all the more robust: arm the Predator with an air-to-ground weapon that its remote operator–pilot could launch. In 1995, however, this was an unachievable option.

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The Predator remained a surveillance platform throughout the Clinton presidency, and though it was clear that the UAV program would evolve, the exact method by which it would deliver a deadly payload was disputed. The dimensions of the Predator constrained the array of armaments it could physically incorporate, and its range and distance from the base had implications on its ability to instigate a missile strike from a remote location. There was also the legal dimension to consider; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 precluded the United States from developing or implementing a long-range missile system of any kind. The State Department warned that weaponizing a UAV may place the Clinton administration in violation of its treaty obligations. The concept of arming the Predator was considered and developed but never operationalized until after January 20, 2001, when a new occupant resided in the White House.45 The Clinton administration deployed its UAV arsenal in Bosnia as part of a NATO-led mission to prevent further acts of ethnic cleansing and to mitigate a bloody civil war. The mission dominated the second half of the administration’s first term in office and helped establish President Clinton as a serious, engaged world leader, a status that had been in doubt beforehand. The security concerns of the second term, however, focused less on state-centric threats and more on the challenges posed by new, radicalized nonstate actors. The political violence that the Clinton administration believed required the most attention originated not in Europe or Africa but in Afghanistan, where the newly installed government, the Taliban, was known to be hosting the most tangible threat to US security interests: Osama bin Laden. Just as Fidel Castro had been a point of obsession for the United States in the 1960s and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in the 1980s, so bin Laden became in the final years of the Clinton administration, as proposals for his capture or elimination were drafted, discussed, and ultimately dismissed. Plans involved placing ultrasensitive cameras on a lofty fake television tower to search the Afghan countryside; using British Special Forces to apprehend bin Laden, following on their success in similar missions in Bosnia; embedding US Commando units in proximity to a known bin Laden residency in order to make a surgical strike when he arrived; and even shooting down bin Laden’s aircraft.46 The president, however, remained unsatisfied with the situation, and throughout his final year in office he challenged his counterterrorism group to generate new approaches to apprehending bin Laden. Fragments of data emerged as to the man’s potential whereabouts, but not enough information to justify an operational

Deploying the Drones: Afghanistan

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response in the form of a military insertion or airstrike. As had been apparent in the Balkans, traditional, high-altitude surveillance platforms such as the U-2 and satellites were simply not equipped to identify an individual target. Approaching its final months in office, the administration grew increasingly frustrated at the lack of success in apprehending bin Laden using traditional methods. President Clinton authorized the first experimental attempt to remote-pilot a Predator in Afghanistan. The UAV was to take off from Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan and fly over Afghanistan controlled from CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.47 Having deployed the Predator in Bosnia, the White House had some operational appreciation for how the UAV worked best, and it was clear that this was a platform that produced far better results during the day, as its night vision capacity lacked sufficient detail or resolution. The time difference between the United States and Afghanistan, however, required the Predator operators and officials aware of its mission to be at CIA headquarters in the middle of the night for the operations. Fifteen Predator flights were instigated, targeting specific areas where bin Laden was believed to be operating in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The hope was to capture a high-quality image of bin Laden and finally establish his precise whereabouts. Time and again, the focus of US surveillance returned to an area close to Kandahar International Airport known as Tarnak Farm. On September 7, 2000, a Predator drone revealed an individual believed to be Osama bin Laden at the Tarnak Farm complex. The location was identified as one of bin Laden’s facilities in 1998 when the CIA had initially devised an operation to apprehend the Al-Qaeda leader. The UAV imagery revealed a tall man dressed in white Arabic attire attended by a team of heavily armed bodyguards. “There was no way to be 100 percent certain that the man was bin Laden, but the evidence was very strong.” 48 Destroying the entire complex presented no challenge to the United States and was a task that could have been carried out with a cruise missile strike to avoid risks to American service personnel. The drone imagery made it all too clear, however, that whomever the tall, well-protected individual was, he was not alone at the facility: he had surrounded himself with women and children, a formidable human shield against the ultimate expression of the US armed forces. The fear of inflicting massive collateral damage weighed heavily on the White House, especially with an election pending less than two months later. The previous cruise missile attack on an alleged Al-Qaeda facility in Sudan had backfired, and with his vice president’s candidacy on the line, there was much for President Clinton to consider. As Jef McAllister later noted, in a pre-9/11 era, Bill Clinton “had to be a responsible leader of the free world and be measured and coherent and not kill too many civilians.” 49 A

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full-spread cruise missile strike could have decimated the facility along with the eminent individual at the center, whoever he may have been, but it would also have killed countless others in an act that may have amounted to a war crime. “It’s almost like he was daring me to kill them,” Clinton noted. “I do not care how precise your bombs and your weapons are, when you set them off, innocent people will die.”50 Preventing collateral damage proved to be as important to the White House as the central mission of targeting bin Laden, because “the Americans insisted on capturing the king without disturbing the pawns.”51 The White House screened the video imagery provided by the Predator, which convinced the administration of the importance of the UAV platform. It provided tantalizing but not totally convincing evidence of bin Laden’s presence at the Tarnak Farm facility. Even if his identity had been confirmed, doubts would have persisted about the course of action. A cruise missile strike on the facility was not feasible. The president favored a Special Forces raid, but the “strong and constant view” of the CIA and the Pentagon was that more time and intelligence were needed to guarantee the success of such an operation. But with only weeks remaining before its departure from office, the Clinton administration was out of time.52 The deployment of the Predator to Afghanistan was short lived, not because of political or military considerations but because of the climate. Though the UAV had succeeded in avoiding Taliban MiG fighter aircraft that scrambled at the Predator’s presence, the unmanned vehicle was susceptible to the extreme cold and high winds that characterized the Afghan winter.53 The Clinton administration halted the drone operation. By the time the weather improved in Afghanistan, Bill Clinton was no longer president and a new team, which had yet to appreciate the threats posed by terrorism or the benefits of UAV technology, was in place in the White House. For the Clinton administration, eager to implement new initiatives, determined to advance new technologies, and focused on minimizing the costs involved in overseas deployments, the development and utilization of UAV technology was a logical step. Although it was not the first administration to utilize unmanned drones, it was the first to actively incorporate them into the front line of US military deployments and to recognize their potential both as a reconnaissance platform and later as a delivery mechanism for deadly munitions. At a cost of $4.5 million, the Predator was a cost-effective option that reduced the threats to American pilots and helped reduce costs in an era of budgetary constraints. As Bruce Hoffman noted, however, the UAV program as initiated by the Clinton administration was “just a tactic . . . not a strategy.” No matter how effective the technology proved to be, it was only ever going to be able to frustrate its targets. Drones alone could “neither eliminate the network entirely, nor completely neutralize the threat that it poses.” 54

212

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1. Professor Charles A. Kupchan (director for European Affairs, National Security Council, 1993–1994; Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State, 1992), interview with author, January 24, 2014. 2. The events surrounding the deaths in Somalia were documented in Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down (London: Bantam Press, 1999), before being adapted into a film of the same name directed by Ridley Scott. The shooting down and subsequent rescue of Scott O’Grady in Bosnia was the subject of several documentaries and the basis for the 2001 film Behind Enemy Lines. 3. “Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council,” March 1, 1991, PPPGHWB, 1:197. 4. “Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning from Somalia,” May 5, 1993, PPPWJC, 1:565. 5. Michael R. Gordon with John H. Cushman Jr., “After Supporting Hunt for Aidid, US Is Blaming UN for Losses,” New York Times, October 18, 1993, A1. 6. USA v. Usama bin Laden, Indictment 98 Cr. 1023 (SDNY). 7. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001), 81. 8. Tim Weiner, “Missile Strikes Against bin Laden Won Him Esteem in Muslim Lands, US Officials Say,” New York Times, February 8, 1999, A13. 9. J. F. O. McAllister and James L. Graff, “When to Go, When to Stay,” Time 142, no. 14 (October 14, 993): 40. 10. Francis X. Clines, “Conflict in the Balkans: The Rescue; Downed US Pilot Rescued in Bosnia in Daring Raid,” New York Times, June 9, 1995. 11. For more on the early developments of this technology, see Ron Bartsch, James Coyne, and Katherine Gray, Drones in Society: Exploring the Strange New World of Unmanned Aircraft (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017), 20–25. 12. Steven Shaker and Alan Wise, War Without Men (New York: PergamonBrassey’s, 1988), 28. 13. Michael Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986). 14. See Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). 15. Michael Hastings, “The Rise of the Killer Drones: How America Goes to War in Secret,” Rolling Stone, April 16, 2012. For more on the development of drones during the Vietnam War era, see Ian G. R. Shaw, Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016). 16. Data compiled by Gary Roush for the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association. See Gary Roush, “Helicopter Losses During the Vietnam War,” updated February 3, 2018, https://www.vhpa.org/heliloss.pdf. 17. David Cenciotti, quoted in Hastings, “Rise of the Killer Drones.” 18. Hastings, “Rise of the Killer Drones.” 19. EG, draft memo to NS (Nancy Soderberg) et al., re: Investment Priorities or Restructured Military, August 11, 1992, Box 11, File 9, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 20. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 21. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 240. 22. William J. Clinton, My Life (London: Hutchinson, 2004), xli. 23. Richard Whittle, “The Man Who Invented the Predator,” Air & Space Magazine, April 2013.

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24. The history and development of Amber is detailed in Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 14, 1987; May 23, 1988; and June 20, 1988. See also Bill Sweetman, “Drones: Invented and Forgotten,” Popular Science 245, no. 3 (September 1994): 34. See also Peter Finn, “Rise of the Drone: From California Garage to Multi Billion-Dollar Defense Industry,” Washington Post, December 23, 2001. 25. Chris Woods, “The Story of America’s Very First Drone Strike,” The Atlantic, May 30, 2015. 26. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 522. 27. Whittle, “Man Who Invented the Predator.” 28. John Deutch, memo for Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition, “Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Program,” July 12, 1993, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle %20Document%201%20-%20Deutch%20Endurance%20UAV%20Memo%2012 %20July%201993.pdf. 29. William J. Perry, memo for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Secretaries of Defense, “Assignment of Service Lead for Operation of the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV),” April 9, 1996. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator -Whittle%20Document%202%20-%20Air%20Force%20assigned%20as%20Predator %20lead%20service%209%20April%201996.pdf. 30. Sweetman, “Drones: Invented and Forgotten,” 34. 31. Coll, Ghost Wars, 527. 32. Coll, Ghost Wars, 528. 33. Coll, Ghost Wars, 523. The air force announced that the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron would operate Predators in July 1995, Aerospace Daily, July 31, 1995. 34. Poos, quoted in John Dickie, Special No More: Anglo-American Relations, Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 248; Delores, quoted in Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 21. 35. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, interview with author, October 8, 2013. 36. Brendan Simms, Un-Finest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin, 2001), 54. 37. Such activity appears maddeningly frustrating but is all too often the case in bureaucratic politics of Washington, DC. In 2001, the incoming administration of George W. Bush instigated its own reassessment of US counterterrorism strategy rather than relying on the findings presented by Richard Clarke derived from his time in the Clinton White House. 38. Woods, “Story of America’s Very First Drone Strike.” 39. Richard Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars: The Evolution of a Commander in Chief (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 124. 40. Woods, “Story of America’s Very First Drone Strike.” 41. Sweetman, “Drones: Invented and Forgotten,” 34. 42. Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars, 148. 43. Coll, Ghost Wars, 523. 44. Coll, Ghost Wars, 524. See also John Robinson, “Submarine to Test Linkup with Predator UAV Later This Year,” Defense Daily, June 7, 1995, 345; Robert Holzer, “US Subs Gear for Broader Mission,” Defense News, June 12–18, 1995, 3. 45. See Barton Gellman, “A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution,” Washington Post, January 20, 2002, A1. On February 4, 2002, the first attempt to launch a Hellfire missile from a Predator resulted in the death of an innocent civilian mistaken for Osama bin Laden. The first confirmed death of a targeted individual by a US UAV

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came on November 4, 2002, when Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, who had engineered the attack on the USS Cole, was killed in Yemen. 46. Coll, Ghost Wars, 520. 47. Coll, Ghost Wars, 526. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 322–323. 48. Coll, Ghost Wars, 527. 49. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. 50. Coll, Ghost Wars, 529; Newsweek, April 8, 2002. Clinton made his comments in an interview with Jonathan Alter. “I don’t care . . . people will die” is from Clinton’s speech to the British Labour Party conference, October 3, 2002. 51. Coll, Ghost Wars, 529. 52. Barton Gellman, “Strategy’s Cautious Evolution,” A1. 53. The Predator struggled to make headway against high winds and could be blown off target. The extreme cold caused ice to form on the Predator’s wings, adversely affecting its aerodynamic properties and threatening to critically disable the vehicle. 54. Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” National Interest 107 (May/June 2010): 20–21.

9 A New Art Form: Rendition

national terrorism, the only practice to gain more notoriety than the development of drone technology has been the practice of rendition. The policy of apprehending individuals in a remote country and transporting them to the United States or to a third nation without an extradition order was widely condemned when enacted by President Clinton’s successor. Campaigners viewed rendition as in contravention to the very principles and freedoms that the United States claimed to be defending in its War on Terror. Unbeknownst to many, however, the policy of rendition did not begin under the George W. Bush administration. Many of its practices can be traced back to the Clinton administration, which institutionalized the procedure during the 1990s as it addressed the growing threat from radical terrorist organizations, particularly in the Middle East. When a covert government operation enters the public consciousness to the extent that it becomes the basis for a Hollywood movie starring Reese Witherspoon, it is perhaps expected that understandings will become blurred.1 Rendition has come to mean different things to different people; Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Michael V. Hayden defined it rather blandly as “taking a person to some other country.”2 This definition excludes the purpose of such activity, essentially equating it with tourism. His definition amounts to what Amnesty International referred to as a “benign characterization [designed to] conceal the truth about a system that puts the victim beyond the protection of the law, and sets the perpetrator above it.” Offering an alternative definition, Amnesty International describes rendition as “the transfer of individuals from one country to another, by means that bypass all judicial and administrative due process.”3 Rendition is an evolving concept. The 2004 definition was the “return of a fugitive from one state to the state where the fugitive is accused or was

Of all the tools that the United States uses to combat inter-

215

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convicted of a crime.”4 Five years later, extraordinary rendition was defined as the “transfer, without formal charges, trial, or court approval, of a person suspected of being a terrorist or supporter of a terrorist group to a foreign nation for imprisonment and interrogation on behalf of the transferring nation.”5 During the presidency of George W. Bush, extraordinary rendition was viewed alongside incidents of water-boarding and “enhanced interrogation” as evidence of an administration whose legitimacy was questionable, which saw the events of 9/11 as an “opportunity,” and which used extraordinary rendition in an attempt to outsource processes that would be legally problematic in the United States.6 Distinctions were lost, definitions blurred, and the conceptual philosophy behind the rendition program hijacked by political opponents of the Bush White House. They did not realize that many of the principles and practices they were lamenting had begun years before under the Clinton administration. The concept of “rendering” an individual to justice is unique neither to the United States nor to the modern era. The imprisonment of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte on Saint Helena, the removal of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina to stand trial in Israel, and the transportation of Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (aka Carlos the Jackal) from Sudan to France in 1994 all involved the extrajudicial rendering of an individual to justice against that person’s will.7 Within the United States, the rendition of suspects between states is enforced under Article 4, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Although this has traditionally been utilized to enable the return of suspects to stand trial in another state, it was also used to enforce the return of fugitive slaves during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Internationally, the United States has rendered individuals from overseas to stand trial in American courts since the nineteenth century, the legality of which was twice upheld by the US Supreme Court.8 The policy has historically been implemented in response to the challenges the United States faced in “apprehending suspects in foreign countries with which it had no bilateral extradition treaty, in which an extradition treaty was suspended due to a break in diplomatic relations, or in which there was virtually no law enforcement.” The legal justification for rendition and the “extension of American law enforcement powers to foreign states” were reinforced and sanctioned in two opinions drafted by Assistant Attorney General William Barr in 1989.9 The Supreme Court upheld the government’s power to prosecute people who were seized in these circumstances irrespective of the legality under international law in the 1992 case of United States v. Alvarez-Machain. At this stage, rendition amounted to an enhanced form of extradition, a policy that brought suspects to the United States to stand trial in an American court,

A History of Rendition

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where they received full legal protection. In December 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that the United States had utilized renditions for decades as a way “to transport terrorist suspects from the country where they were captured to their home country or to other countries where they can be questioned, held, or brought to justice.” She noted that the practice was “a vital tool in combating transnational terrorism” and that its utilization was “not unique to the United States, or to the current administration.”10 The practice was implemented several times in the late 1980s. The Reagan administration attempted to render the Palestinian hijackers of the Achille Lauro in October 1985, but the operation collapsed when authorities in Sicily refused to release the men and insisted that they stand trial in Italy. Two years later, Operation Goldenrod successfully ensnared Fawaz Yunis, who had led the team of hijackers who took control of Royal Jordanian Flight 402 at Beirut International Airport on June 11, 1985. Tempted on board a yacht off the Cypriot coast, Yunis was apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) when the vessel reached international waters and then he was flown to Washington, where he was sentenced to a 30-year prison term. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan also authorized a rendition operation to deal with the terrorist suspects responsible for the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut.11

The Clinton Administration’s Internal Debate on Rendition

The Clinton administration was not the first administration in US history to engage in rendition, but it was the first to utilize the practice in a structured and systematic manner. Initially raised as a possibility by Richard Clarke in 1993, the policy divided opinion in the Clinton White House along moral and legal lines. It was immediately recognized that, whatever benefits may accrue from the strategy, it also provoked a series of important questions pertaining to the rights of individuals under international law. White House counsel Lloyd Cutler advised the president that rendition violated international law and urged him to veto the plan. When asked his perspective, Vice President Al Gore adopted a more pragmatic view: “Of course it’s a violation of international law,” he exclaimed, “that’s why it’s a covert action. The guy was a terrorist. Go grab his ass.”12 Such statements go a long way to refute allegations of a less-than-robust approach to counterterrorism adopted by the Clinton administration. The need for such a program was summarized by Secretary of State Warren Christopher when he observed that “fanatics would plan attacks in one country, execute them in another, and flee to a third when the deed was done.”13 Rendition presented the United States with a seemingly simple solution to this complex legal problem.

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Despite the support that rendition received at the highest levels of the civilian government, the Clinton administration continued to face bureaucratic challenges from the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which claimed on various occasions to lack the resources to enact the program. In a series of incidents that revealed insubordination and systematic misdirection, members of the military and the CIA briefed reporters and members of Congress on how the administration was preventing them from apprehending war criminals and terrorists. As chairman of the Counterterrorism Security Group, Richard Clarke revealed, “The White House wanted action. The senior military did not and made it almost impossible for the president to overcome their objections. President Clinton approved every snatch that he was asked to review.”14 In part because of the covert nature of the policy, relatively little information regarding rendition was documented during the Clinton administration. Yet enough references to the policy were made in the administration’s final National Security Strategy (NSS), in classified Presidential Decision Directives, as well as in congressional testimony to enable an appreciation of the scope and focus of the initiative during the Clinton era. In December 2000, the Clinton administration’s final National Security Strategy acknowledged that since it had come to power in 1993, “a dozen terrorist fugitives [had] been apprehended overseas and rendered, formally or informally, to the United States to answer for their crimes.”15 Included among them were the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing and the shootings at CIA headquarters. Two years earlier, in September 1998, FBI director Louis J. Freeh discussed the administration’s rendition policy before the Senate Judiciary Committee. He revealed that in the decade prior to 1998, the United States had “successfully returned thirteen suspected international terrorists to stand trial in the United States for acts or planned acts of terrorism against US Citizens.” The majority of these renditions, Freeh noted, had been “accomplished with the cooperation of the foreign government in whose jurisdiction the terrorist suspect was located.” He explained that the rendition process was “governed by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-77, which sets explicit requirements for initiating this method for returning terrorists to stand trial in the United States.”16 This, however, was a misstatement because he was referring to a presidential directive issued by the George H. W. Bush White House, correctly referenced as National Security Directive (NSD) 77, a document that remains classified as of 2018. Rendition was also tackled in presidential directives issued by the Clinton administration. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, as addressed previously, was fundamental to the White House counterterrorism strategy.

The Clinton Administration’s Rendition Policy

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Signed by President Clinton on June 22, 1995, “US Policy on Counterterrorism” ordered the attorney general, the director of the CIA, and others to enact measures to reduce US vulnerabilities to terrorism. The Government Accounting Office and General Services Administration were also ordered to create structures that would aid in this process.17 Although the document ensured that the traditional focus remained on bringing terrorist suspects to the United States for trial, PDD 39 put in place the mechanism for covertly expelling suspected terrorists to nations with less stringent human rights policies than the United States, including Jordan, Syria, Morocco, and Egypt. PDD 39 was clear in its philosophy on this matter: “When terrorists wanted for violation of US law are at large overseas, their return for prosecution shall be a matter of the highest priority and shall be a continuing central issue in bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists them.” The directive insisted that legal methods of extradition were to be pursued, but that if such assistance was not forthcoming, the administration would “take appropriate measures to induce cooperation.” Lest there be no misunderstanding of the determination of the Clinton administration in this regard, the language was direct: “Return of suspects by force may be effected without the cooperation of the host government, consistent with the procedures outlined in NSD-77, which remain in effect.”18 As referenced by FBI Director Freeh, the rendition processes of the United States, as detailed in PDD 39, were explicitly designed to be enacted in conjunction with policies and practices established by the administration of President George H. W. Bush in its NSD 77 report, which remains classified. In May 1998, the Clinton administration issued PDD 62. The directive lauded the fact that the administration’s existing counterterrorism policies, as established, in part, in PDD 39, had “led to substantial success,” including “an increased rate of rendition, apprehensions and convictions of terrorists.” To build on the existing policies and ensure the continued protection of the American people, the directive established “an integrated program to increase our effectiveness in countering these threats and to prepare to manage the consequences of attacks against US citizens or infrastructure.” The document insisted that all such efforts would be “carried out in full compliance with applicable law and existing procedures governing the activities of the agencies involved.” The very first group of policy directives to be addressed in PDD 62 were those relating to the “apprehension, extradition, rendition and prosecution” of terrorists. The Clinton administration directed the Justice Department to coordinate with the State Department to pursue extradition and rendition initiatives, insisting that “foreign terrorists who violate US laws will be apprehended and tried, no matter where they hide and no matter how long it takes.” The directive specifically tasked the Justice Department with identifying “the highest priority pending foreign terrorist apprehensions” and

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the FBI, working with the CIA and the State Department, with “develop[ing] plans for their rendition.” The document outlined a multiagency approach and ordered the intelligence community to “maintain collection and capabilities to support apprehensions” while the Pentagon would “provide nonreimbursable transportation in support of renditions to the extent permitted by law.” Finally, the State Department was directed to ensure that the priority position to adopt vis-à-vis nations that harbored terrorists was “action against those that threaten or have attacked US interests and cooperation on apprehension, prosecution, extradition or rendition.” Using language that at times sounded more in keeping with that of the subsequent George W. Bush administration, PDD 62 stated unequivocally that foreign terrorists “who pose a credible threat to United States and its citizens will be subject to pre-emption and disruption abroad, consistent with US laws.” The CIA was tasked with leading this aspect of the policy initiative. The Clinton administration’s long-term aspiration, however, was of “zero tolerance for international terrorism,” an ambition that would “guide bilateral and multilateral efforts to eliminate sanctuaries, penalize states that sponsor terrorism, and assist friendly states victimized by terrorism.” At a diplomatic level, the State Department was assigned the lead agency role in efforts to “support forces to obtain the extradition or other rendition of indicted terrorists” on the understanding that “all programs and activities conducted abroad will be implemented in full compliance with existing Chief of Mission authorities.”19 From March 1993 until October 1999, the rendition process ensured a flow of high-profile terrorists to the United States to stand trial as the process became “a boom industry for the CIA.”20 The most prominent individual involved was Ramzi Yousef. Pakistani intelligence arrested Yousef in room 16 of the Su-Casa Guest House in Islamabad and handed him over to US authorities in February 1995.21 Having been manacled and blindfolded during the flight from Pakistan to the United States, he was subsequently tried in the Southern District Court of New York and jailed for life for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.22 New York City proved to be central to any appreciation of the US battle with terrorism in the late twentieth century: the Word Trade Center in Manhattan was attacked in the first days of the Clinton administration and destroyed shortly after the administration departed the White House, but it was also to New York that terrorists were often brought to face justice for their crimes. As General Hugh Shelton noted, the CIA used a specific judge in the city for rendition cases who would “make the initial ruling as to whether or not there was a valid case against that prisoner, how long he could be held, and whether or not he was going to be granted bail under law.”23 In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, rendition obtained a new dimension, but in the years prior to the attack the Clinton administration

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did not lapse in its efforts. In its 1996 NSS document, it noted that since coming to power in 1993 “more terrorists [had] been arrested and extradited to the United States than during the totality of the previous three administrations.”24 In 2002, the State Department’s publication Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 provided a list of individuals who had been brought to the United States from overseas between March 1993 and September 2001. (See Table 9.1.) It listed 10 as having been transported as a rendition process and another 4 who had been extradited. Of these, all but the final act of rendition occurred during the Clinton administration, as the process became, in the words of Samuel Berger, Clinton’s second-term national security adviser, “a new art form.”25

Table 9.1 Extraditions and Renditions to the United States (1993–2001) Date

Mar. 1993 Jul. 1993 Feb. 1995 Apr. 1995 Aug. 1995 Dec. 1995 Sep. 1996 Jun. 1997 Jun. 1998 Aug. 1998 Aug. 1998 Dec. 1998 Oct. 1999 Sep. 2001

Formata Individual

Regarding

RE

November 1985 Hijacking of EgyptAir 648 Nigeria

EX

Mahmoud Aby Halima February 1993 World Trade Center bomb

EX

Ramzi Ahmed Yousef

RE

EX

Mohammed Ali Rezaq Abdul Hakim Murad

January 1995 Far East bomb plot February 1993 World Trade Center bomb January 1995 Far East bomb plot

From

Not declared Pakistan

Philippines

Eyad Mohamoud Ismail Najim Wali Khan Amin Shah

February 1993 World Trade Center bomb

Jordan

RE

Mir Aimal Kansi

May 1986 Embassy attack in Jakarta

January 1993 CIA shooting

Not declared

Afghanistan

RE

Mohammed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali Mohammed Sadeek Odeh Mamdouh Mahmud Salim Khalfan Khamis Mohamed Zayd Hassan Abd al-Latif Masud al Safarini

August 1998 Embassy attack in Kenya

Kenya

RE

RE

RE

RE

EX RE

RE

Tsutomu Shirosaki

Mohammed Rashid

January 1995 Far East bomb plot

August 1982 Pan Am bombing

August 1998 Embassy attack in Kenya August 1998 East Africa bombings

August 1998 Embassy attack in Tanzania 1986 Hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73

Not declared

Not declared Kenya

Germany

South Africa

Not declared

Source: US Department of State, “Appendix D, Extraditions and Renditions of Terrorists to the United States 1993–2001,” in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (Washington, DC: US Department of State, May 2002), 131. Note: a. EX stands for Extradition, RE stands for Rendition.

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Extraordinary Rendition During the Clinton Administration

Rendition began as a pre-9/11 practice intended to facilitate the judicial process and bring wanted individuals to the United States to stand trial. As the 1990s progressed, and concerns regarding terrorism increased, the practice evolved to incorporate the transportation of individuals between other countries to face local justice, which was often severe. At this point, the “rendition to justice” policy began its transition to what became known as “extraordinary rendition.” As noted by Daniel Benjamin, terrorists “would be detained and, with logistical help from the United States, delivered to a third country for trial. These operations were kept secret so that the country in which the terrorist was found, or the one he was delivered to, or both, were protected from charges that they were acting as lackeys of the United States.”26 Michael Scheuer noted that the second phase of the Clinton administration’s rendition strategy “was begun in desperation” owing to the constraints placed upon the CIA by other departments in the executive branch of the federal government. The adherence to the rule of law as demanded by the Justice and State Departments meant that the CIA “were turning into voyeurs. We knew where these people were, but we couldn’t capture them because we had nowhere to take them.” With limited domestic legal options, the CIA and the Clinton administration “had to come up with a third party.”27 Scheuer noted that the initiative was not introduced in an effort to gain data but rather to “dismantle these terrorist cells overseas. We wanted to get suspects off the streets and grab their papers. The interrogation part wasn’t important.”28 Only after September 11, 2001, did the process evolve to incorporate the transportation of suspects to covert locations for detention and torture. During the Clinton administration, the rendition program was overseen by the White House and the CIA, which considered and researched every operation, ensuring that those who were “rendered” had previously been tried and convicted in absentia, often for treason or murder. This was a strategy pursued out of “expedience—not out of thinking it was the best policy.”29 It was during this stage in the evolution of the rendition program that Egypt became part of the process, as a reciprocal, mutually beneficial relationship began. Egypt was a key ally in the Middle East and the largest recipient of US foreign aid after Israel. Led by Hosni Mubarak, who had come to power following the assassination of his predecessor, President Anwar Sadat, the nation had a poor reputation in regard to human rights, and tales that emerge from its prisons make awkward reading for those who suggest that rendition became “extraordinary” only after the Clinton administration left the White House. Mubarak had been the intended target of political murder and was eager to bring those responsible for his predecessor’s murder to justice. Rendition, therefore, served both sides: “It served American purposes to get these people arrested, and Egyptian purposes to get these people back,

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where they could be interrogated.”30 This mutually convenient arrangement led to what is considered the first extraordinary rendition of the era—that of Talaat Fouad Qassem. As a key leader and spokesman of the Egyptian armed Islamist group Al-Gama’a Al’Islamiyya, he had been tried and sentenced to death in absentia for his role in the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981. He was picked up by Croatian police in Zagreb in September 1995 and questioned by American authorities aboard a ship in the Adriatic Sea before being turned over to Egyptian authorities.31 Three years later, in 1998, US intelligence officers guided Albanian authorities to five members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who were flown to Egypt, tortured, and executed. The US laws surrounding such practices stipulate that those individuals who are rendered are not subsequently tortured, but it was apparent from the start of the process in 1995 that Egypt would not comply with such legal niceties. Bob Baer, who worked for the CIA in the Middle East during the 1990s, insisted that the countries in the region had varying reputations: “If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear—never to see them again—you send them to Egypt.”32 The State Department noted just 14 rendition cases to the United States. George Tenet, however, has admitted that “there were over eighty renditions” during his tenure as DCI.33 There was no greater target for a potential rendition operation than Osama bin Laden. George Tenet later wrote of his hopes that bin Laden could have been rendered to justice, explaining that if a “tribe had been able to find [bin Laden] and spirit him away, they were going to literally roll him up in a rug, take him to the desert, and hide him away.” The CIA then planned to “exfiltrate” him to face justice in the United States.34 As Anthony Lake observed, however, “If you bring [bin Laden] here and don’t tell anybody, then you’ve got a constitutional problem, if we just hold him in the slammer and nobody ever knows. You can’t do that, really. Or, you could bring him here and put him on trial and since we don’t have the goods on him, we lose. That’s unattractive.”35 Notwithstanding the challenges involved, Tenet noted that more than 50 Al-Qaeda terrorists had been dealt with in this manner between 1996 and 2001 in an effort to “break the organization brick by brick.”36 Between 1993 and 2001, the government of the United States implemented a program of rendition, conducted by a Democratic president with the tacit agreement of America’s allies, against known perpetrators of extreme violence, which went underreported in the press, and which was all but ignored by the American public. Indeed, few people were paying attention as the Clinton administration quietly initiated its rendition program. Americans

Rendition: Reaction and Legacy

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were busy benefiting from the longest era of economic expansion in the history of the country, and the media and Congress were focusing on the president’s relationship with Monica Lewinsky. This lack of interest in international terrorism changed on September 11, 2001. No longer would presidential decisions in this area go unnoticed, and what began as a targeted policy, “aimed at a small, discrete set of suspects—people against whom there were outstanding foreign arrest warrants,” expanded to cover suspects wanted for interrogation rather than to face justice.37 During the Clinton administration, rendition evolved to resemble what came to be known as extraordinary rendition; however, the new policy only became official on September 17, 2001, when President George W. Bush authorized the CIA to kill, capture, or detain members of Al-Qaeda anywhere in the world. This presidential finding released the agency from its previous requirement to seek case-by-case approval for rendition practices.38 The shift in emphasis between the Clinton and Bush administrations, referred to as the “New Paradigm” by White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, was acknowledged by Cofer Black, who was then in charge of counterterrorism at the CIA. In a statement to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on September 26, 2002, he declared, “All you need to know is that there was a ‘before 9/11’ and there was an ‘after 9/11.’ After 9/11, the gloves came off.”39 Statements by Vice President Dick Cheney and DCI Tenet compounded the sense of a fundamental change in emphasis. Vice President Cheney stated that the government needed to “work through . . . the dark side,” and George Tenet told Congress, “It might be better sometimes for . . . suspects to remain in the hands of foreign authorities, who might be able to use more aggressive interrogation techniques.”40 During the George W. Bush administration, rendition was expanded to dispatch “individuals to countries not for the purpose of trial, but rather to gather intelligence about future wrongdoing through unlawful detentions and coercive interrogation.”41 Despite having been referenced as a policy tool in the Clinton administration’s final NSS document, rendition was not mentioned in either of the National Security Strategies issued by the George W. Bush administration. The statements from the Bush White House enhanced its reputation for toughness in a move designed to appeal to Republicans but that also helped inoculate the Clinton administration from the backlash that greeted public disclosure of the policy. The statements by Cheney and Tenet also undermined the repeated declarations of many, including President George W. Bush, who insisted that when the United States rendered individuals to other countries it received assurances that “they won’t be tortured” since “this country does not believe in torture.”42 This appears to be disingenuous considering that individuals were regularly rendered to Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, countries with less-than-stellar reputations for human rights. Nonetheless, the Bush administration insisted it never knowingly sent sus-

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pects to a place where they would be tortured.43 Perhaps the truth can be found in the statement of a federal court of appeals judge, who noted that US officials involved in rendition have not generally tortured the detainees themselves but instead “outsourced it.”44 The sense of frustration that prompted the Clinton administration’s expansion of the rendition program was also evident in its attempts to retask the federal government to address the gathering threat from terrorism as it encountered political opposition and bureaucratic resistance. The administration insisted that counterterrorism efforts required the “day-to-day coordination within the US Government and close cooperation with other governments and international organizations.” In its 1998 National Security Strategy, the administration noted improvements in such efforts among the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA, and other agencies.45 The Clinton White House made repeated requests for extra manpower and funding to increase the counterterrorism capabilities of these agencies, but its requests were denied by the pre-9/11-era Congress. As the Al-Qaeda threat intensified, President Clinton was under intense political pressure during the final years of his administration because of continuing investigations into his relationship with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky. The political burden that this created was compounded by the appearance in cinemas of Wag the Dog, a movie that depicted a US president launching a fictional war against Albania, whose threat to the US had been manufactured, to divert attention from an ensuing sex scandal. With most Americans unaware of the danger posed by Al-Qaeda or bin Laden at this stage, the film appeared far too close to the truth for comfort.46 The Clinton administration’s discomfort level demonstrated the linkage between foreign and domestic policy as the two collided in regard to counterterrorism strategy during the second term of the Clinton presidency. The Republican Party radically transformed during the 1990s, as it jettisoned its previous embrace of internationalism and multilateralism and adopted a skeptical view of overseas action in general and of the United Nations in particular. When George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, he did so under a mandate from the United Nations and with a multilateral force, an approach that was repeated in Somalia. Following the midterm elections of 1994, however, under the leadership of House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senator Bob Dole, the Republican Party became vehemently opposed to such operations and to the concept of operating under a UN mandate. This had a debilitating impact on the Clinton administration’s efforts to deal with terrorism, specifically its efforts to adopt a multilateral approach to the situation. All too often, this presented the White House

The Inability to Drive Policy

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with a choice between unilateral action or no action. Even when faced with the attacks on US interests overseas, “there were virtually no calls from congress or the media to take further action against al-Qaeda.” Instead, the Clinton administration “continuously explore[d] the possibility of doing just that, while pressing ahead on the diplomatic front.”47 In a move that revealed the congressional approach to counterterrorism at this time, President Clinton was advised on September 11, 2000, that Congress had slashed his funding requests for counterterrorism: the House cut $225 million (10 percent) and the Senate cut $664 million (29 percent) from a funding request that totaled $2.34 billion.48 The funding challenges were matched by bureaucratic in-fighting and an unwillingness to prioritize the terrorist threat at a departmental level. Having written on the challenges of instigating US foreign policy within the federal bureaucracy, Morton Halperin was well placed to observe the challenges of the Clinton administration. Working at the Pentagon, the National Security Council (NSC), and finally as director of policy planning at the State Department, Halperin noted that “bureaucracies look for problems that they’re good at dealing with, and there was no part of the US bureaucracy that was geared to dealing with bin Laden, and a threat that was both within the United States and abroad.”49 Within the executive branch agencies there was a sense of competition for resources and an apparent unwillingness to provide leadership on counterterrorism. No department wanted anyone else to address it, yet neither did they wish to be held responsible for failing to prevent an atrocity. Throughout the first term of the Clinton administration, the CIA proved to be a problematic agency, as a series of directors came and went. Only when George Tenet was appointed DCI in Clinton’s second term did a sense of calm and order return to the agency. When authorized to neutralize bin Laden, however, the agency prevaricated. Richard Clarke lamented that the CIA “didn’t want their own people killed. . . . they didn’t want to do it. . . . they could not stage a snatch operation.” Instead of carrying out administration policy directly, the CIA “basically paid a bunch of local Afghans, who went in and did nothing.”50 The long-standing tension between the CIA and the FBI over issues of jurisdiction continued during the Clinton administration, although funding in this area was not a problem. As Anthony Lake recalled, “It was the only time I can recall I ever heard bureaucrats saying, ‘Yes, we don’t need any more money.’” Yet the allocation of resources could have been improved, and in retrospect Lake conceded that the Clinton administration “should have spent more capital on reorganizing the government in ways to deal with [terrorism].”51 Speaking in 2017, Morton Halperin agreed that more could and should have been done: “We continued to do nothing about the split between the CIA, which is supposed to deal with these groups abroad, and the FBI, which is supposed to deal with them at home, which nobody’s dealing with the full range of threats and possibilities.”52

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The Clinton administration’s dealings with the Pentagon were not any easier. Daniel Benjamin of the NSC believed that the military was simply “unwilling to go out on a limb for Clinton” as a result of the events in the president’s first year in office that had become “woven into a perpetually troubled relationship between the White House and the military.”53 Neither side trusted the other: the military feared that civilian leadership wanted it to address a problem better dealt with via diplomacy, and the White House and the NSC feared that the military was constantly presenting reasons why operations were not feasible. As the administration drew to an end, President Clinton tasked the Pentagon “to develop some options for dropping commando forces into Afghanistan.” As he recalled in his memoirs, the president believed that if the United States “took out a couple” of AlQaeda’s training camps, “it would show them how serious we were.”54 Without directly refusing on order from the commander in chief, the military command proceeded to delineate the challenges that such an operation presented, including the lack of a staging area, the lack of reliable data as to bin Laden’s location, and the need for logistical support for any insurgency, all of which would cost time and money. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs openly mocked Samuel Berger’s “hair-brained scheme about how we could fly nine-hundred miles in a twohundred-mile helicopter and snatch a terrorist.” General Henry Shelton noted, “We’d basically have to tell him it wouldn’t work. It sounds great . . . but this won’t fly. These things crash after two-hundred miles without fuel.”55 When challenged to develop a more limited operation, the Pentagon warned that such a mission risked repeating the mistakes of Jimmy Carter’s tragic Operation Eagle Claw in 1980. As President Clinton lamented in his memoirs, “It was clear to me that the senior military didn’t want to do this, perhaps because of Somalia, perhaps because they would have to send in Special Forces without knowing for certain where bin Laden was, or whether we could get our troops back out safely.”56 As Morton Halperin concluded, “The Pentagon was skeptical about intervention, as it always is.”57 Finally, bureaucratic challenges arose in dealings with the Justice Department, which was reluctant to share sensitive information with fellow members of the Clinton administration. This was, in part, due to the nature of law enforcement but also due to laws that prohibited the revealing of grand jury information.58 This ensured that when US Attorney Mary Jo White filed a sealed indictment of bin Laden in June 1998, the national security adviser to the president of the United States was not informed.59 Faced with a growing array of challenges from perpetrators of political violence, the Clinton administration considered a range of pragmatic solutions. In its utilization of rendition, the administration sought to address the challenge of fighting an enemy that came from one country, struck unexpectedly in another country, and then retreated to a third nation, thereby

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escaping justice for its actions. The relative ease of international travel that enabled this was yet another example of what the Clinton administration recognized as being a downside to the age of globalization: the increase in travel and commerce that benefited US citizens and industries also enabled terrorists to travel quickly and often to escape justice. In utilizing rendition, the administration turned this on its head, making the ease of international travel a tool in its chest against international terrorists. The Clinton administration did not invent rendition, which had been practiced on numerous occasions previously. What it did was formalize the concept within a Presidential Decision Directive as a weapon in the national arsenal to be utilized against those who sought to evade justice. The political, ethical, and legal debate surrounding the practice that initially divided the Clinton administration eventually came to divide global opinion when the practice of rendition was expanded and revealed during the presidency of George W. Bush. The policy of rendition exposed the contradictions between the values the United States claimed to defend and the methods it utilized in the process. Rendition was “the day-to-day stuff” of counterterrorism strategy during the Clinton administration.60 In the end, however, “its over-use gave it a bad name.” What began as a “surgical application of American law in an unusually expansive sense of jurisdiction” became “torture airways.”61 During the 1990s, however, its practice was concealed from public scrutiny and considered by those in the know to be a “new art form” designed to destroy terrorist organizations “brick by brick.” 62 1. Rendition, directed by Gavin Hood (Los Angeles: New Line Cinema, 2007). 2. Michael V. Hayden, interview with Charlie Rose, October 24, 2007, quoted in Elaine Pasquini, “Activists Protest Torture Flights, Demand Jeppesen Stop Facilitating CIA Renditions,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 27, issue 3 (April 2008): 50–51. 3. Extraordinary Rendition in US Counter-terrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 17, 2007), serial no. 110-28 (statement submitted for the record by Amnesty International USA). 4. Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2004), 1322. 5. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 1409. 6. See David Weissbrodt and Amy Bergquist, “Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention,” Virginia Journal of International Law 46, no. 4 (2007): 585–650; Margaret Satterthwaite, “Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law,” George Washington Law Review 75, nos. 5–6 (August 2007): 1333–1420. 7. For a history of rendition, see Norman MacKenzie, “An Extraordinary Rendition,” History Today 60, no. 5 (May 2010): 38–40. For more on the Eichmann case, see Leila Nadya Sadat, “Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Ren-

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dition Under International Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 37, no. 2 (2006): 323– 324. 8. This occurred in the cases of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), and Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627 (1884). 9. Richard Downing, “The Domestic and International Legal Implications of the Abduction of Criminals from Foreign Soil,” Stanford Journal of International Law 26, no. 2 (1990): 573–575. 10. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks upon Her Departure for Europe, Andrews Air Force Base,” December 5, 2005, in Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft, Evolution of US Counterterrorism Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 2:449–442. 11. John K. Cooley, “Ending CIA Rendition of Terror Suspects,” Christian Science Monitor, 98, no. 158 (July 12, 2006): 9; Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (New York, Penguin Press, 2008). 12. Richard Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars: The Evolution of a Commander in Chief (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 291. 13. Loch K. Johnson, Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 231. 14. Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (London: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 145. 15. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2000), 23. 16. US Counterterrorism Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 106th Cong. (September 1998) (statement by Louis J. Freeh, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_hr/98090302_npo.html. 17. The Government Accounting Office was renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004. 18. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” June 21, 1995. 19. PDD 62, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas,” May 22, 1998. 20. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 251. 21. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 272–275. 22. Cooley, “Ending CIA Rendition of Terror Suspects,” 9. 23. Hugh Shelton, Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 277. 24. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1996), 16. 25. Samuel Berger, quoted in Gellman, “Broad Effort Launched after ’98 Attacks,” A1. Barton Gellman, “Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign,” Washington Post, December 20, 2001, p. A1. 26. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 251. 27. Scheuer, quoted in Jane Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s ‘Extraordinary Rendition’ Program,” New Yorker, February 14, 2005, 106–123. 28. Peter Bergen, “The Body Snatchers,” Mother Jones 33, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 58–61. 29. Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture,” 106–123. 30. Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture,” 106–123. 31. Anthony Shadid, “America Prepares the War on Terror,” Boston Globe, October 7, 2001; Kareem Fahim, “The Invisible Men,” Village Voice, April 6, 2004, 37.

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32. Stephen Grey, “America’s Gulag,” Newstatesman 17, no. 807 (May 17, 2004). 33. Counterterrorism Policy: Hearing Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (March 24, 2004) (statement by George Tenet, former Director of Central Intelligence Agency), https://9-11commission.gov/archive /hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-24.pdf. 34. George Tenet, At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 113. 35. Lake, quoted in Russell L. Riley, Inside the Clinton White House: An Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 246. 36. Tenet, quoted in Gellman, “Broad Effort Launched after ’98 Attacks,” A1. 37. Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture,” 106–123. 38. Dana Priest, “Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fights,” Washington Post, November 18, 2005; Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, “Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad,” New York Times, March 6, 2005. 39. Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture,” 106–123. 40. Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture,” 106–123; John Barry, Michael Hirsch, and Michael Isikoff, “The Roots of Torture,” Newsweek, May 24, 2004, 16. 41. Jules Lobel, “Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of Maher Arar,” Review of Litigation 28, no. 2 (Symposium 2008): 479–500. 42. “The President’s News Conference,” March 16, 2005, PPPGWB, 1:444–445. 43. Bergen, “Body Snatchers,” 58–61. 44. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 205 (2d Cir. 2008). See Lobel, “Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution,” 479–500. 45. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1998), 15–16. 46. Wag the Dog went into production long before the president’s “inappropriate relationship” with Monica Lewinsky became public knowledge and was released in December 1997, several weeks prior to the revelations concerning the relationship and almost a year prior to the missile strikes. The film was based on a novel published in the aftermath of the Gulf War; Larry Beinhart, American Hero (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993). 47. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan, 2003), 368. 48. Memorandum for the President from Samuel Berger, September 11, 2000, International Affairs Funding Issues, Clinton Presidential Records, Speechwriting, Heather Hurlburt, John Pollack OA/Box No.: 24510: [Berger National Security Reform] 9/27/00 [1], William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AK. 49. Morton Halperin, interview with author, July 5, 2017. 50. Richard Clarke, quoted in Jane Mayer, “The Search for Osama: Did the Government Let bin Laden’s Trail Go Cold?” New Yorker, August 4, 2003. 51. Lake, quoted in Riley, Inside the Clinton White House, 245. 52. Morton Halperin, interview with author, July 5, 2017. 53. During the 1992 campaign, Governor Clinton was accused of dodging the Vietnam draft, and a letter he had written as a student detailed his “loathing of the military.” As president-elect, he discussed ending the ban on homosexuals serving in the military. Clinton’s choice for defense secretary, Les Aspin, was also unpopular at the Pentagon. These issues clouded the relationship between the White House and the Pentagon during 1993 and continued to simmer for much of the Clinton presidency. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 319. 54. William J. Clinton, My Life (London: Hutchinson, 2004), 804. 55. Shelton, quoted in Riley, Inside the Clinton White House, 246. 56. Clinton, My Life, 804.

A New Art Form: Rendition 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

Morton Halperin, interview with author, July 5, 2017. See Rule 6E of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 239. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 252. J. F. O. McAllister, interview with author, July 26, 2017. Gellman, “Broad Effort Launched after ’98 Attacks,”

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10 Reflections on Clinton’s Counterterrorism Strategy

tion, the continued relevance of its counterterrorism strategy is debatable. In retrospect, the 1990s appear to have been an age between the ages: the decade between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the World Trade Center, presided over by an American president eager to focus on domestic affairs. The era witnessed a rising tide of political violence exacerbated by the end of the Cold War and enacted in the name of extreme nationalism and religious fanaticism. With the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the counterterrorism strategy of the United States moved into a new era as President George W. Bush instigated a War on Terror designed to thwart the ambitions of state sponsors of terrorism as well as nonstate actors such as Al-Qaeda. A heightened state of alert and the forward deployment of military forces continued throughout the remaining years of the Bush administration and dominated the foreign policy considerations of the Obama White House for eight years. US forces were eventually drawn down in Iraq but were increased in Afghanistan as the fight against Taliban forces continued and the search for Osama bin Laden narrowed until his eventual demise on May 2, 2011. His death did not lead to a cessation of hostilities, however; though the threat posed by Al-Qaeda diminished, it was replaced by a new and even more brutal force. The determination of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to establish a caliphate, and its regular displays of mass slaughter on the Internet, ensured it became the new focus of US counterterrorism strategy in the final years of the Obama presidency. As the Trump administration moves to conclude the fight against ISIS, a continued military deployment overseas may be coming to an end, enabling the return to a pre-9/11 counterterrorism strategy. As a result, it is appropriate to reflect upon the Clinton administration’s efforts

More than 15 years after the end of the Clinton administra-

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to instigate a counterterrorism strategy during the 1990s to appreciate what lessons can be learned. The Clinton administration arrived in office determined to focus on domestic policy but was confronted by terrorism from its first weeks in power. Within days came the shooting of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees, followed by the bombing of the World Trade Center. Weeks later came the siege at Waco, followed two years later by the devastation of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Before the end of its first term in office, the Clinton administration had to deal with the attack on the Olympic Games in Atlanta and a bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 American servicemen. The administration also faced a new form of politically motivated violence in the form of cyberterrorism, as computers moved from standalone units to part of integrated networks. Overseas, the White House faced threats from state sponsors of terrorism and the rise of nonstate actors and networks. It continued the Reagan-era practice of grouping nations and identified Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya as backlash states to be addressed with a variety of economic, political, diplomatic, and covert interventions, with Iran and Iraq specifically targeted with a policy of dual containment. As the administration entered its second term, nonstate actors emerged as a primary concern, with focus on Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network. Its attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and on the USS Cole, as well as its efforts to bring down airliners on the West Coast and decimate the infrastructure linking Manhattan with New Jersey, constituted what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called “a special kind of evil.”1 The Clinton administration quickly identified terrorism as one of a series of transnational threats to the United States following the end of the Cold War and drafted National Security Strategies, Presidential Decision Directives, speeches, and legislation in an attempt to address the challenges posed by perpetrators of political violence. What emerges from a consideration of this material is the recognition that the terrorist threat was disparate, evolving, and lacking in consistency. As the administration’s time in office progressed, the threat metamorphosed, causing an evolution in policy that was reflected in official documentation. A consideration of this material reveals the extent to which counterterrorism changed as a focus for the Clinton administration. The initial National Security Strategy of the United States during the Clinton era defined terrorism as a transnational issue that “present[ed] new challenges to US strategy” and that was to be addressed using an interagency, multilateral approach, when possible, but with independent action when necessary.2 By the end of its first term, the Clinton administration recognized that the threat from terrorism necessitated a policy of national security emergency preparedness “to ensure the survivability of our institutions

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and national infrastructure, protect lives and property and preserve our way of life.”3 During its second term, the Clinton administration increased the attention given to the terrorist threat and appointed Richard Clarke as National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and CounterTerrorism in May 1998. Its approach was to utilize “active diplomatic and military engagement, political pressure [and] economic sanctions” to address the threats. However, in language that reflected pre-9/11-era priorities, the administration noted the need to integrate “preventive and responsive measures” to supplement the work of “enhanced law enforcement and intelligence gathering, vigorous diplomacy and, where needed, military action.”4 Counterterrorism enforcement was to be a law enforcement issue, with the military drawn on only in the last resort and under extraordinary circumstances. The Clinton administration Presidential Decision Directives also reflect the evolution of US counterterrorism strategy. These documents were used to initiate “new, innovative approaches” to public encryption management (PDD 5), ensuring that privacy and civil liberties were not curtailed while enabling the security services to defend the nation.5 The National Counterintelligence Policy Board and the National Counterintelligence Operations Board were established, and the creation of a National Counterintelligence Center was advocated (PDD 24). The directives established the Security Policy Board to replace the National Advisory Board Group for Security Countermeasures (PDD 29) and the Intelligence Priorities Interagency Working Group to supplement the work of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PDD 35). They asserted administrative policy to “pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks”6 (PDD 39); established the roles of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in dealing with terrorist incidents within the United States; established the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and CounterTerrorism role; and designated high-profile public gatherings as National Special Security Events (PDD 62). The directives also established the Senior Directorate for Infrastructure Protection position on the National Security Council (NSC) and the office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism (PDD 63) to ensure the continued function of the federal government in the event of a national emergency (PDD 67). Although this did not lead to the creation of a new agency in the executive branch, it was a precursor to the Department of Homeland Security that was established in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. The Clinton administration’s executive orders also addressed counterterrorism and political violence, placing restrictions on the development of petroleum resources in Iran (EO 12957); preventing the importation into the United States of any goods or services of Iranian origin (EO 12959);

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and restricting Tehran’s capacity to trade globally by imposing restrictions on US commercial engagement (EO 13059). They also addressed the developing threat from cyberterrorism, establishing the United States Advisory Council on the National Information Infrastructure (EO 12864); the Advisory Committee on High-Performance Computing and Communications, Information Technology, and the Next Generation Internet (EO 130350); and a new Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet designed to address the policing of the Internet (EO 13133). The president and his national security team also dedicated high-profile speeches to the subject of counterterrorism. Speaking in May 1994, Anthony Lake insisted that in the post–Cold War world, the United States’ foe was “oppression and extremism, whether in religious or secular guise.”7 In 1995, President Clinton insisted that Americans were “safer because of the tough counterterrorism campaign [the administration had] been waging, including closer cooperation with foreign governments, sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism, and increasing the funding, the manpower, the training for our own law enforcement.”8 He suggested that the threat from terrorism highlighted his long-standing belief that “there is no difference between domestic and foreign policy” and that common threats produced a “common obligation to work together to combat terrorism.”9 The following year, speaking at George Washington University, the president conceded that the openness of the new era made the United States “more vulnerable to the forces of destruction that know no national boundaries.”10 Having bombed Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Sudan, President Clinton reminded the nation that the United States had “battled terrorism for many years.” He reminded the American people of the work that had been achieved in Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Haiti, and the Middle East and insisted that his administration had “worked for peace. But in this day, no campaign for peace can succeed without a determination to fight terrorism.”11 In September 1998, in a speech on the dangers of terrorism delivered to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton reminded his audience that “all nations must put the fight against terrorism at the top of [their] agenda,” as it was a “grave misconception” to view terrorism as an American problem. It was, instead, “a clear and present danger to tolerant and open societies and innocent people everywhere.”12 Finally, in January 1999, the president insisted that if the United States was “prepare[d] to defend against these emerging threats, we will show terrorists that assaults on America will accomplish nothing but their own downfall.”13 The Clinton administration retasked US grand strategy and the executive branch bureaucracy to address threats posed by terrorist activity. The IranLibya Sanctions Act increased economic pressure on state sponsors of terrorism; the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was signed in January 1998; and Iran’s support for terrorism was

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condemned at the 1996 Lyon Summit. The Intelligence Priorities Interagency Working Group was established, elevating the status of the danger posed by terrorism; President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in April 1996, and in January 1998 the United States signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Finally, the Clinton administration adopted two policy initiatives with far-reaching ramifications. Eager to avoid unnecessary casualties in foreign lands following the deaths of US service personnel in Somalia, the Clinton White House oversaw the development and utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles. Operating initially as a reconnaissance platform, UAVs were an ideal solution for an administration that was skittish about the costs involved in overseas deployments, yet determined to stay engaged on the world stage. As utilized, and then with further development and eventual weaponization by subsequent US administrations, the US drone program has become central to military engagement in the twenty-first century—an initiative that has its origins in the Clinton administration’s War on Terror. Finally, the Clinton administration utilized the policy of rendition as a way to apprehend those who evaded US justice. The Clinton administration also began the process of persuading allies to arrest terrorists and ship them to a third country without legal process, a concept that had previously been utilized on an ad hoc basis but that the Clinton White House initiated as an organized practice designed to facilitate the judicial process. Bruce Hoffman has noted that when President Clinton left office in January 2001, “he could claim credit for having done more than any other president to ensure that America is prepared to counter terrorist threats.” His administration doubled spending on counterterrorism and delivered key speeches to raise awareness on the subject, ensuring that “terrorism was elevated to the very top of the list of security threats that the United States will have to face in the 21st century.”14 This was reflected in initial polling. Gallup reported that President Clinton’s average approval rating for his last quarter in office was almost 61 percent, “the highest final quarter rating any president has received in the past half century.”15 This was a remarkable figure for a president who had failed to win a plurality of votes in 1992 and 1996 and who, two years into his second term, had become only the second chief executive of the United States to be impeached. Perhaps even more remarkable was the perception of President Clinton as a world leader. In 1994, Gallup reported that Clinton was viewed as a poor foreign policy leader.16 A year later, only 42 percent believed that his foreign policy was either “somewhat” or “very” unsuccessful.17 By 1998, however, Gallup’s survey ranked Clinton as “the best foreign policy president since World War II.”18 These assessments of the administration’s performance all occurred prior to September 11, 2001. Writing in the New York Times three days after the attacks, Ronald Steel declared, “This is the end; the end of an era, the

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era of our invincibility.”19 The following day, Frank Rich observed, “We live in a different America today than the day before Tuesday.” The country had lost its “illusion of impregnability.”20 Also lost that day was any fair assessment of the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism strategy. The attacks marked a new era in domestic and global politics, as the threat of political violence became all too apparent. The distinctiveness of the new era was reinforced by the policies of the Bush administration, which had taken office eight months earlier. The administration’s style, its political stance, and its forthright demeanor had already marked it in stark contrast to the former Clinton White House, but the attacks furthered the extent to which the past had suddenly become a foreign country. Once the Reverends Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson had finished assigning blame for the attacks on homosexuals and abortionists, blame was quickly focused on budgetary cuts and codes of conduct imposed on the CIA by the Clinton administration.21 Republican congressman Dana Rohrabacher blamed Clinton for “letting the Taliban go, over and over again,” and Rush Limbaugh urged that Bill Clinton “be held culpable for not doing enough when he was commander-in-chief.”22 Henry Kissinger accused the former administration of initiating “a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to specific crises.”23 Clinton’s former rival Democratic senator Bob Kerrey said that the former president had erred in his response to previous attacks and “should have treated them as an attack on the United States.”24 Christopher Hitchens lamented the fact that the administration had demonstrated “no big plans, no grand thoughts, no noble dreams.”25 Robert Patterson wrote, “From 1993 to 2001, Islamic terrorists attacked American targets ten separate times. . . . By failing to answer the threat as it should have, the Clinton administration was guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty to the safety of our country, which the president was sworn to defend.”26 Finally, Sean Hannity concluded, “Had Clinton and Gore understood the importance of national security, it’s quite possible that 9/11 could have been avoided.”27 Criticism of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy was not new. Raymond Seitz, the former US ambassador to Great Britain, previously accused the administration of “almost turn[ing] foreign policy into a vaudeville act”;28 opposition senators lamented a “feckless, photo-op foreign policy” from an administration that made “little or no effort to define a coherent plan for United States engagement in the world”;29 the editor of Foreign Affairs, William G. Hyland, suggested that Clinton’s foreign policy amounted to little more than one of “selective engagement.”30 John Lewis Gaddis lamented “the absence of any grand design,” believing that “there’s a kind of incrementalism and ad-hocism to things.”31 Finally, Owen Harris noted, “Clinton’s foreign policy is not an unmitigated disaster. It is not even a mitigated disaster. It is merely quite bad in certain ways that have limited conse-

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quences.”32 At the end of the administration’s time in office, a consensus had developed among its opponents that its foreign policy had been “indecisive, incoherent, contradictory, confused, lacking in vision and purpose.”33 Critics on both sides of the political spectrum blamed the Clinton administration for failing to take terrorism seriously and for slashing the CIA budget. The impact of this was quickly felt in opinion polls about the Clinton administration’s handling of counterterrorism. Two months after the attack, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll revealed a majority of respondents believed President Clinton had not done enough to neutralize Osama bin Laden. 34 What explains the perceived inability of the Clinton administration to appropriately respond to the gathering terrorist threat in its last years in office? Although policies and practices of the Clinton era proved to be the basis for much of the US counterterrorism strategy moving forward into the twenty-first century, several factors—including hubris, timing, and perception—stymie an appreciation of this fact and have hindered their total implementation. As long as the public and the bureaucracy perceived terrorism as a risk to other people in other places, other issues were given priority in a governmental system in which time, money, and attention were part of a zero-sum game. The potential for a cataclysmic attack on the United States was real and had been thwarted on several occasions during the Clinton era, but the nation’s sense of physical isolation from the perpetrators of political violence prevented the development of bipartisan unity against the threats that existed at the time. This was compounded by the timing of the threat. The danger terrorism posed to the United States was not a constant during the Clinton administration. The threat from Al-Qaeda, in particular, emerged in the second term and coincided with moves to impeach President Clinton. Although far too much emphasis has been placed on the scandals of the Clinton era, they directly affected both the implementation and the perception of the administration’s counterterrorism strategy, as the White House was accused of using the threat of political violence as a smokescreen during the president’s impeachment hearings. The concept at the heart of Wag the Dog— of a president launching a war to distract from a scandal—lingered in the minds of the public and entered the lexicon of political opponents, providing an easy shorthand with which to critique the former administration. The film was released in December 1997, shortly before the revelations regarding Monica Lewinsky emerged, and it was referenced repeatedly as President Clinton prepared to strike Al-Qaeda locations in Afghanistan and Sudan. The investigations and impeachment proceedings weakened the Clinton administration’s political position and prevented it from gaining bipartisan support to address the challenges posed by bin Laden’s network, a classic example of domestic politics influencing the administration’s ability to implement foreign strategy.

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Aside from the impeachment process, there is little to suggest that the Clinton administration would have expended political capital on a foreign intervention against either bin Laden or Saddam. “The villains were egregious, but the threat too distant, too uncertain.”35 Indeed, many who later supported the military buildup in the post-9/11 era only months previously were openly critical of the focus on bin Laden, suggesting the threat was overstated to give political cover to a weakened administration looking to stave off impeachment. Wag the Dog, therefore, appeared in the eyes of Clinton’s opponents to be a classic case of art imitating reality, ensuring that before it even left office the administration was regularly accused of playing politics with terrorism. Timing was also important in terms of the US political calendar. By 1998, time was running out for the Clinton administration. Bill Clinton was the first Democrat to serve two full terms since Franklin Delano Roosevelt, yet the political capital his administration had accrued by winning two successive elections had been all but exhausted. Any administration entering its final two years in office would have been politically drained, but the expenditure of political goodwill merely to remain in office during the impeachment process was particularly taxing for the Clinton White House. With its capacities diminished, it limped on to the end of its allotted time in office and survived calls for its premature demise but was able to achieve little in the process beyond mere survival. This was coupled with the election of 2000, in which Al Gore was seeking to become only the second sitting vice president to succeed his boss since Martin Van Buren in 1836.36 With relations already strained because of the impeachment process, the Clinton White House was eager not to hinder Gore’s chances, which ensured that potentially risky foreign policy initiatives were quietly placed to one side as the electoral process played out. There was, finally, a lasting impression that President Clinton was a poor messenger about potential dangers from overseas. From his first days as a presidential candidate in 1991, he had stressed the importance of domestic policy, and even though that had altered during his eight years in office, the belief that he failed to take foreign policy seriously haunted his administration. In January 1994, as the president prepared to deliver his State of the Union address, aides at the NSC debated the content and order of material to be addressed. Todd Stern, special assistant to the president and deputy staff secretary, noted to Robert Boorstin, special assistant to the president for policy coordination, that “sticking national security in the middle of the section on the economy strikes me as a big mistake.” Stern concluded, “When we recap the challenges facing us, we have to mention something foreign. Otherwise we’re just feeding the notion of the POTUS as a domestic President who defines his challenges strictly in domestic terms. . . . this would be a major error.”37 In the autumn of 1994, the administration sought once more to

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present its foreign policy initiatives in a series of coordinated speeches. As defined by Boorstin, these were designed to “set out US interests in clear terms for the American people, and to convince the media/foreign policy elite to take a fresh look at the President’s leadership and policies.”38 In February 1995, issues regarding the perception of the administration’s overall foreign policy were again addressed. Boorstin drafted a memo to the White House Communications group detailing plans for the initiatives to be addressed in the coming months. Central to the message was the assertion that “the President should launch initiatives on non-proliferation and anti-terrorism. These initiatives should carry us through 1995 and 1996.” The calculations for this were based on a consideration of the political realities: “The time is right. . . . Terrorism is always in the news, of course, but the World Trade Center trial brings a special focus.” The central message was direct: “Americans are more secure because President Clinton has kept his pledge to hunt down and prosecute terrorists, at home and abroad. Now he has launched a new, aggressive effort to stop terrorism.”39 The memos reveal that the White House believed its challenges lay not in the devising of policies but in their communication: “Neither those who make foreign policy nor those whose responsibility it is to articulate the policy are consistently doing so in a way that communicates strength, clarity and decisiveness. . . . Too much of that reporting and analysis takes places without an administration point of view. We are, therefore, constantly on the defensive.” There was a clear sense of a lack of interagency communication: “Too much happens at State and Defense without White House knowledge . . . the communicators of foreign policy are not well-armed with common material and not moving out in force.” 40 This internal debate and the continuing discussion regarding the presentation of policy highlighted a dilemma within the administration that went to the apex of power: Could the president of the United States be taken seriously in regard to matters of international relations? All too often, it was believed that he could not. The Clinton administration, however, exposed itself to accusations of double standards in this area. It routinely stressed that foreign terrorists would not be permitted to enter the United States and that the full force of legal authority would be used to prevent fund-raising to support foreign terrorist activity. Yet, Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams was granted a visa despite vehement protests from the British government and in apparent violation of administration policy. The definition of what constituted a terrorist also remained open to interpretation, as Yasser Arafat became the most regular visitor to the White House during the Clinton presidency regardless of the fact that he was previously branded a terrorist by the State Department. At the heart of post-9/11 criticism was the Clinton administration’s determination that terrorism should be investigated by law enforcement

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agencies and not treated as an act of war to be punished by military intervention. Robert Patterson lamented that President Clinton’s “military response to the terrorist threat was negligible” and that the problem within the administration was “a complete and total blindness to the proper use of the military. Terrorism was . . . addressed as a law enforcement issue.”41 Referencing the destruction of the Khobar Towers, the African embassies bombings, and the attack on the USS Cole, former senator Bob Kerrey criticized the decision to appoint the FBI as the lead investigative agency and concluded that, “to my mind, these were acts of war, not just lawenforcement issues.”42 This policy, however, had been established by the Reagan administration in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 30, which granted the State Department power over international terrorism and gave the FBI the lead on domestic terrorism incidents. In 1998, the director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, testified to the effectiveness of this approach, insisting that the Clinton administration’s “policy of treating terrorists as criminals and applying the rule of law against them” helped ensure that the United States was “one of the most visible and effective forces in identifying, locating, and apprehending terrorists on American soil and overseas.”43 Even when catastrophe struck during the Reagan and Bush years, the United States did not resort to major military operations against perpetrators of political violence. The Clinton administration’s decision to continue the bipartisan approach of pursuing criminal charges against perpetrators of political violence resulted in a series of convictions in 1998 alone: in January, Ramzi Yousef received a lengthy prison sentence for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and Operation Bojinka; Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim was sentenced to 240 years in prison for his part in the World Trade Center bombing. Their accomplices, Mahmud Abouhalima and Ibrahim Ahmad Suleiman, were imprisoned for 8 years and 10 months, respectively. Abdul Hakim Murad was sentenced to life plus 60 years in prison without parole for his role in Operation Bojinka. Finally, Terry Lynn Nichols was sentenced to life in prison for his role in the Oklahoma City bombing.44 Timothy McVeigh was executed in June 2001. As John Dumbrell concluded, “The notion that Clinton was a president who ignored the threat of international terrorism is absurd.”45 Before September 2001 there was “no real consensus in favor of serious military reprisals against the agents and sponsors of terrorism.”46 Even when US national interests were targeted, such as in the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, the United States responded with diplomacy, not military force, a decision that received little domestic political opposition. This approach continued throughout the Clinton administration, ensuring that as late as the year 2000 the White House insisted that “whenever possible,” the United States would “use law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight

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against terrorism.”47 This was a continuation of prevailing, bipartisan policy in a pre-9/11 era when terrorism was not regarded by American citizens as a serious threat to the United States. The nature and scope of the 9/11 attacks refocused initiatives on counterterrorism in a way that was unimaginable only months earlier. Prior to the attacks, neither the population, the administration, the legislative branch, nor the Pentagon had any appetite for a sudden and seemingly unprovoked attack on terrorist networks and state sponsors of terrorism. Robert Patterson has observed that the Clinton administration “never responded decisively, even when given the opportunity, as it was obliged to do, with its own ‘war on terrorism.’”48 At the time, however, no such opportunity presented itself. As Derek Chollet and James Goldgeiger acknowledged, there was “no broad strategic framework in which to fit a discussion about a sustained campaign against Afghanistan.”49 What support there was for an overseas military engagement came from Republicans looking to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Criticism that President Clinton “never began, much less finished, a war on terrorism, because he never thought in terms of prosecuting a military campaign against terrorism, and [that] he underestimated the rapidly evolving threat until it was too late” fails to take into account the fact that no more than 14 Americans died as a result of terrorism each year of the Clinton administration.50 As Andrew Bacevich noted, terrorism did pose a danger to Americans and their interests during Clinton’s time in office, “but then so, too, did lightning and food poisoning.”51 Even Al-Qaeda had killed fewer than 50 Americans prior to the attacks of 9/11, and the administration’s opponents routinely accused the White House of exaggerating the threat from bin Laden’s network, all of which contributed to an environment in which even the theoretical support for an overseas deployment was lacking. Americans had been the victims of political violence throughout the nation’s history, yet these incidents had not dominated political debate, nor did they rise to the level of national crisis. As Nancy Soderberg noted, “Before September 11, Americans felt safe, and as a consequence, were reluctant to take strong measures against terrorism or terrorists.”52 Even after the attack in Oklahoma City, Americans continued to view terrorism as a problem for other people to worry about; they had a “realistic assessment” of the risks but felt that terrorism was “likely to happen—but to someone else.”53 This was, in part, confirmed by the official numbers. The Patterns of Global Terrorism report, released by the US State Department, revealed that, in comparison with the previous decade, the average number of terrorist attacks dropped by 29 percent during the 1990s.54 During this time, the United States was the location of less than 1 percent of international terrorist activity with 15 attacks. By comparison, western Europe suffered 666 attacks; Latin America, 594; the Middle East, 299; Asia, 193; Eurasia, 131;

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and Africa, 130.55 In a pre-9/11 era, few were focused on the dangers of terrorism and politicians were not punished for failing to prioritize the issue. The American people appeared to accept the threat of terrorism as being one of the challenges they faced as citizens of a global colossus. So long as that remained the public perception, the pressure on the Clinton administration to prioritize the threat from terrorism remained all but nonexistent. As the United States considers its next steps in the continuing struggle against the forces of terrorism, it is apparent that there will eventually be a scaling back of overseas deployment and a return to a pre-9/11 state of readiness. Americans reaching voting age have no living memory of the attacks, bin Laden has been killed, Al-Qaeda scattered, and ISIS ostensibly defeated in Iraq. When the inevitable reduction in foreign operations is complete, the White House will require a new counterterrorism strategy. At that time, appreciating the Clinton-era policies as the last initiatives devised before the militarization of the US response to terrorism will be essential. The Clinton strategy built upon bipartisan principles and practices and utilized legislation, Presidential Decision Directives, and executive orders to construct an approach to protect American interests without enforcing a Pax Americana. Whatever international environment the United States finds itself in, it will not be a world without terrorism, as previous efforts to eradicate the world of hunger or drugs have yet to succeed, so, too, it is with terrorism. As Martha Crenshaw has noted, “Wars are waged against adversaries, not methods.”56 Whatever degree of success is achieved will be qualified by the realization that terrorism is a tactic used by political activists when diplomacy and negotiation have failed. As such, defeating that tactic is not a viable option. The frustration that gives rise to such outbursts will always find new focus in regions and causes yet to be identified. As Christopher Hewitt concluded, the history of terrorism reveals that “as society learns new ways to defend itself, the terrorists will invent new tactics.”57 The threats that the United States continues to face have their origins in the 1990s when the Cold War ended and untamed political violence erupted around the globe. The forces that were unleashed presented the Clinton administration with immediate challenges in Bosnia, Somalia, Russia, the Middle East, and at home, as militia groups openly challenged the authority of the federal government and critical infrastructure came under attack from cyberterrorists. In an age of increasing populism and nationalism, when cyberattacks have interfered with the election process in major Western states, it is clear that the policy initiatives of the Clinton era remain as relevant now as they were in the 1990s. The threats to critical infrastructure, to national security, and to the daily lives of American citizens were all identified during the 1990s, and the policies designed to ensure these challenges were met remain pertinent and available as the basis for new strategies moving forward.

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The United States has long been plagued by political violence, both at home and around the world. In the years immediately prior to the Clinton administration, 49 Americans were killed in an attack on the US embassy in Beirut, 241 lost their lives in the 1983 destruction of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, several soldiers were killed in the 1986 Berlin disco bombing, and 270 Americans died aboard Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. None of these incidents prompted calls for a massive retaliatory response against the forces of political violence. The attacks on September 11, 2001, changed the perception of political violence in the minds of politicians and the general public. Events that were unimaginable beforehand and the political response to them suddenly became accepted as the new norm in a new reality. During the Clinton administration’s time in office, the idea of a deadly series of coordinated terrorist attacks on the continental United States remained little more than a nightmare scenario, an unthinkable, abstract possibility devised by players of war games at the Pentagon. Likewise, the potential to launch an all-out global War on Terror, with ground troops dispatched to invade foreign lands, was neither sought nor politically feasible. The end of the Cold War destroyed any thoughts of unity in Washington, and the clarity of vision so crucial to successful foreign policy failed to crystallize as partisan divisions hindered the passage of even the most moderate legislation and cast political opponents in the roles of matinee villains with dark motives and immoral intent. The Clinton administration identified terrorism as a major post–Cold War threat and acted to improve the nation’s counterterrorism capabilities. However, weakened by continued political attacks and lapses in the president’s conduct, the administration could not get the CIA, the Pentagon, or the FBI to deal sufficiently with the threat. As identified by senior members of the Clinton administration, bureaucratic resistance to counterterrorism strategy was a major obstacle during its time in office, leading Anthony Lake to concede, “Bosnia was easier than changing the bureaucracy.”58 As president, Bill Clinton could have done more to address the threat from terrorism, and he has admitted as much. However, “it is difficult to locate another American President who was able to rouse a happy populace to sacrifice their lives in the service of an abstraction.”59 Before September 11, 2001, there was no public support for losing American lives to suppress terrorism, as massive, coordinated attacks on American soil remained a hypothetical danger. With the benefit of hindsight, more could and should have been done to address the emerging threat posed by Al-Qaeda. Yet, as Barry Posen has noted, “People talk now about Bill Clinton’s unwillingness to engage, to get down and dirty, and there is some validity to those arguments. But low-risk, long-distance assaults were all that the public, and the military, and many of our allies would tolerate.”60 During the Clinton administration, “dedicated men and women slowly [put] together pieces of

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a complex puzzle, a response that mustered US and global resources to meet a global threat, but—in retrospect—that underestimated the strength, patience, imagination, and determination of the enemy.”61 During the 1980s and 1990s, 871 Americans died in terrorist attacks at home and overseas, leading Paul R. Pillar of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center to observe that “fewer Americans die from it than drown in bathtubs.”62 It was also the case that Americans were far more likely to die at the hands of their fellow countrymen than any other nationality. Even after the 9/11 attack, the threat of terrorism in the United States must be placed in perspective: between 2001 and 2013, 3,000 Americans were killed by terrorists, whereas 406,000 were killed by guns during the same time period.63 It would, therefore, have required incredible political leadership on behalf of the Clinton administration to muster government agencies and political opponents into a global fight against terrorism, and harder still to persuade the American people and civil liberties groups that new powers were necessary to prevent catastrophe at a time when there was no discernable threat to the nation. Bill Clinton could not change these elements and neither could George W. Bush. Instead, it took a disaster of epic proportions to shock America into the reality of the threat it faced from perpetrators of political violence. 1. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan, 2003), 362. 2. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1994), 1. 3. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1996), 26. 4. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2000), 23. 5. PDD 5, “Public Encryption Management,” April 15, 1993. 6. PDD 39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism,” June 21, 1995. 7. Anthony Lake, “Building a New Middle East: Challenges for US Policy” (speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, May 17, 1994). 8. “Remarks at a Freedom House Breakfast,” October 6, 1995, PPPWJC, 2:1547. 9. “Remarks at a Freedom House Breakfast,” October 6, 1995, PPPWJC, 2:1548. 10. “Remarks on International Security Issues at George Washington University,” August 5, 1996, PPPWJC, 2:1255–1256. 11. “Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan,” August 20, 1998, PPPWJC, 2:1461. 12. “Remarks to the 53rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 21, 1998, PPPWJC, 2:1630. 13. “Remarks at the National Academy of Sciences,” January 22, 1999, PPPWJC, 1:87. 14. Bruce Hoffman and Peter Chalk, Security in the Nation’s Capital and the Closure of Pennsylvania Avenue: An Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 1.

Notes

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15. David W. Moore, “Clinton Leaves Office with Mixed Public Reaction,” Gallup Poll Releases, January 12, 2001, in Carol K. Winkler, In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post–World War II Era (Albany: State University of New York, 2006). 16. Robin Wright, “An Energetic Reformer, Clinton Changed World; Foreign Policy; His Willingness to Bridge Old and New Global Orders May Prove to Be Greatest Legacy,” Los Angeles Times, January 15, 2001, A1. 17. John E. Rielly, “The Public Mood at Mid-Decade,” Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995): 93. 18. Wright, “An Energetic Reformer, Clinton Changed World,” A1. 19. Ronald Steel, “The Weak at War with the Strong,” New York Times, September 14, 2001, A27. 20. Frank Rich, “The Day Before Yesterday,” New York Times, September 15, 2001, A23. 21. Falwell and Robertson quoted in Joe Klein, “Closework: Why We Couldn’t See What Was Right in Front of Us,” New Yorker, October 1, 2001, 44–49. 22. Quoted in John F. Harris, “Conservatives Sound Refrain: It’s Clinton’s Fault,” Washington Post, October 7, 2001, A15. 23. Henry Kissinger, quoted in “It’s the World, Stupid!” Economist 354, no. 8158 (February 19, 2000): 51–52. 24. Quoted in John F. Harris, “Conservatives Sound Refrain,” A15. 25. Christopher Hitchens, No One Left to Lie To: The Triangulation of William Jefferson Clinton (London: Verso, 1999), 80. 26. Robert B. Patterson Jr., Dereliction of Duty (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003), 132. 27. Sean Hannity, Deliver Us from Evil: Defeating Terrorism, Despotism, and Liberalism (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 128. 28. Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), 332. 29. John McCain, quoted in Jane Perlez, “For 8 Years, a Strained Relationship with the Military,” New York Times, December 28, 2000, A13. 30. William G. Hyland, Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 204. 31. John Lewis Gaddis, quoted in John F. Harris, “Despite ‘Lessons,’ Clinton Still Seen Lacking Strategy,” Washington Post, March 27, 1999, A15. 32. Owen Harris, quoted in “It’s the World, Stupid!” 51–52. 33. Emily O. Goldman and Larry Berman, “Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy,” in The Clinton Legacy, ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (New York: Chatham House, 2000), 226. 34. Susan Page, “Why Clinton Failed to Stop Bin Laden,” USA Today, November 12, 2001, 1A, 9A, 10A. 35. Joe Klein, The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 199–200. 36. The only other sitting vice president to do so was George H. W. Bush in 1988. 37. Todd Stern, memo to Robert Boorstin, re: SOTU Six, January 22, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting), O/A Box No. 419, SOYU 1994—Draft 6, William J. Clinton Library, Little Rock, AK. 38. Bob Boorstin to Anthony Lake; re: POTUS Speeches September–December, Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting), OA/Box No.: 420, 1994 Principals Schedules, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AK. 39. Bob Boorstin, memo to Communications Group, re: 1995 Communications Initiatives, February 17, 1995, William J. Clinton Library, Little Rock, AK.

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40. Tara Sonenshine and Tom Ross to Mark Gearan; re: Six-Month Public Affairs Strategy, June 10, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting), OA/Box No.: 420, NSC—Public Affairs Strategy, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AK. 41. Patterson, Dereliction of Duty, 141. 42. Klein, “Closework,” 44–49. 43. US Counterterrorism Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 106th Cong. (September 1998) (statement by Louis J. Freeh, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_hr/98090302_npo.html. 44. US Department of Justice, Terrorism in the United States 1998, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 2. 45. John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992–2000 (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 135. 46. Michael Mandelbaum, “The Luck of the President,” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 3 (1985): 137. 47. NSS2000, 23. 48. Patterson, Dereliction of Duty, 131. 49. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeiger, America Between the Wars (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 267. 50. Patterson, Dereliction of Duty, 142; US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, April 2001). 51. Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 119. See also Odds of Death Due to Injury, United States 1998 (Washington, DC: National Safety Council, 1998). 52. Nancy Soderberg, The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 134. 53. Carol W. Lewis, “The Terror that Failed: Pubic Opinion in the Aftermath of the Bombing in Oklahoma City,” Public Administration Review 60 (2000): 201–210. 54. Bacevich, American Empire, 118. An average of 537 per year for 1981– 1990; an average of 381 per year for 1991–2000; US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000. 55. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999 (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1999), 100–106. 56. Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism, Strategies and Grand Strategies,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 90. 57. Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda (London: Routledge, 2003), 132. 58. Mark Hosenball, “War on Terror: The Road to September 11,” Newsweek, October 1, 2001. 59. Klein, The Natural, 72. 60. Klein, “Closework,” 44–49. 61. Soderberg, Superpower Myth, 134. 62. Gellman, “Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign,” A1. Barton Gellman, ‘Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign,’ Washington Post, December 20, 2001, p. A1. 63. Mark Landler, Alter Egos: Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and the Twilight Struggle over American Power (London: W. H. Allen, 2016), 344.

Acronyms

DARPA NORAD NSA NSD

NSDD

NSR

NSSD

NSS87 NSS88 NSS90 NSS91 NSS93 NSS94

NSS95

NSS96

NSS97 NSS98 NSS99 NSS2000 NSSUS PD

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency North American Aerospace Defense Command National Security Agency National Security Directive (George H. W. Bush administration, 1989–1993) National Security Decision Directive (Reagan administration, 1981–1989) National Security Review (George H. W. Bush administration, 1989–1993) National Security Study Directive (Reagan administration, 1981–1989) The National Security Strategy of the United States, 1987 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 1988 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 1990 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 1993 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1994 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1997 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1998 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1999 A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, 2000 The National Security Strategy of the United States Presidential Directive (Carter administration, 1977–1981) 251

252

Acronyms

PDD

PPPGHWB PPPGWB PPPJC

PPPJFK PPPRR

PPPWJC

PRM PRD

Presidential Decision Directive (Clinton administration, 1993–2001) Public Papers of the President of the United States, George H. W. Bush Public Papers of the President of the United States, George W. Bush Public Papers of the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter Public Papers of the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy Public Papers of the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan Public Papers of the President of the United States, William J. Clinton Presidential Review Memorandum (Carter administration, 1977–1981) Presidential Review Directive (Clinton administration, 1993–2001)

Bibliography

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Documents/Speeches

253

254

Bibliography

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A wide range of Governor Clinton’s campaign speeches and statements are available at ftp://ftp.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir. A range of presidential materials are available at the Clinton Presidential Library: http://www.clintonlibrary.gov. National Security Strategy documents are available at the National Security Strategy Archive: http://nssarchive.us. Clinton-era Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives are being declassified on a rolling basis. They are available at https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us. Clinton-era State Department materials are available at the Electronic Resource Collections: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/index.html. Presidential Papers of US administrations can be accessed via the University of Michigan Digital Library: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus. The State Department Dispatch magazine for the Clinton years is available at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch.

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Index

Abbas, Abu, 138, 192 Abbottabad, 192 Abouhalima, Mahmud, 244 Abu Nidal Organization, 67, 138, 192 Academy Awards, 84 Achille Lauro, 49, 51, 138, 217 Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, 57, 71 Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts, 57, 71 Adams, Gerry, 243 Adams, John, 22–23, 26 Adams, Samuel, 22–23, 25 Adriatic Sea, 223 Afghanistan, 1, 13, 48, 64, 182, 187, 192, 209–211, 221, 235, 245; Al-Qaeda in, 182, 185, 187, 210, 238, 241; Clinton administration policy toward, 72, 177, 185, 188–189, 227, 241; drone use in, 198, 209–211; Soviet invasion of, 46, 48, 59, 172, Taliban role in, 177, 182, 188, 235 Age of Terror, 20 Aidid, Mohammed, 199 AIDS, 165 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 208 Aircraft Sabotage Act, 57, 71 Air Force, US, 158, 160, 162, 169, 200, 202, 205–208, 213 Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, 158

Air Force Information Operations Center, 158 Airport security, 58 Alabama, 28, 33, 37, 50, 62 Albania, 207, 223, 225 Albatross drone, 204 Albright, Madeleine, 10–11, 42, 45, 48, 78, 117–119, 121, 138–140, 173, 185–186, 189, 236; Assertive Multilateralism and, 121; as Secretary of State, 139, 173, 185, 189, 236; as US Ambassador to the United Nations, 78, 118; “Four Food Groups” concept, 121 Alec Station, 184 Alexandria, VA, 27 Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, 2, 89, 105, 159, 236 Algeria, 131 Alien and Sedition Act (1798), 26 Alien Enemies Act (1798), 26–27 Alien Friends Act (1798), 26 Al-Gama’a Al’Islamiyya (GAI), 182, 223 Allen, Richard, 55 Al-Masri, Abu Hafs, 182, 192 Al-Megrahi, Abdelbaset, 138 Al-Owhali, Mohamed Rashed Daoud, 183, 221 Al-Qaeda, 13, 121, 171–190, 210, 223–227, 235–236, 238, 241, 245–247 Alphabet Bomber, 37 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 173, 182

Page numbers in italic refer to notes.

267

268

Index

Amber drone, 204, 207, 213 American Bar Association, 51 American Revolution, 22-23 AmeriCorps, 85 Amnesty International, 215 Anarchist movement, 12, 23, 30–32 Anderson, Rudolph, 201 An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely (Smith), 151 Ann Arbor, MI, 50 Anti-Terrorism, 96–97, 243 Antiterrorism Amendments Act (1995), 96 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996), 97, 183, 239 Arabian Sea, 185, 188 Arab-Israeli peace, 119, 123 Arafat, Yasser, 45, 243 Aristotle, 12, 19 Arkansas, 52, 88 Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), 33, 44 Archibald, Douglas, 200 Army Land Information Warfare Activity, 158 Army of God, 82 Arquilla, John, 151 Articles of Confederation, 24–25 Aryan Nation, 82, 86 Asia, 172, 187–188, 197, 202, 245 Aspin, Les, 78, 230, 231 Assassination, US policy on, 9, 48, 55, 182 Assassins, 13, 19 Assertive Multilateralism, 121, 199 ATF. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Atlanta, 12, 62, 82, 101, 114, 236 Atlantic City, 49 Attorney General, 82, 87–88, 90, 138, 157, 185, 216, 219 Atzerodt, George, 30 Austria, 12, 126, 200 Austrian Empire, 200 AWACS. See Airborne Warning and Control System. Axis of Evil, 113, 140

Baader-Meinhof Gang, 12 Bacevich, Andrew, 245 Bacon, Nathaniel, 20–22; rebellion of, 20, 22, 38 Backlash States, 113, 127–131, 140–141, 236

Baer, Bob, 223 Baghdad, 4, 115, 118–119, 121, 123, 138–140 Baker, James A., 138 Baltimore, MD, 29, 37, 87 Barr, Bob, 96 Barr, William, 216 Basque separatists, 12, 52 Baton Rouge, LA, 32 Bay of Pigs invasion, 88–89 Beirut barracks bombing, 50–51, 54, 68, 217, 247 Beirut International Airport, 217 Benjamin, Daniel, 187, 222, 227, 231 Bennett, Lansing, 80 Berger, Samuel R. (“Sandy”), 78, 117, 122, 126, 184, 187–188, 221, 227; during Carter administration, 43, 48, 69 Berkeley, CA, 36, 81 Berkeley, William, 21 Berlin, 52, 61, 247 Berlin Wall, 235 Bethesda, MD, 44 Bhutto, Benazir, 13 Bill of Rights, 26, 97 Bin Laden, Osama, 171–189, 192, 199, 209–211, 213, 223, 225–227, 235–236, 241–242, 245–246; 1998 embassy bombings and, 176; 1998 fatwa and, 173; alleged involvement in Somalia, 199; death of, 1; Taliban support of, 173, 177, 182, 187–189, 209; targeted for drone strike, 209–211, 213; targeted for rendition, 223; US attacks on, 185–189, 209, 226–227 Birmingham, AL, 33 Black, Cofer, 224 Black Panther Party, 36–37, 67 Blind Sheikh. See Rahman, Omar Ahmed Abdel. Blitzer, Wolf, 87, 154 Blue brothers, 204 Boeing, 32, 201, 205, 208 Boland Amendment, 52 Bolshevik Revolution, 12 Booth, John Wilkes, 12, 28–30, 37 Bonn, 45 Boorstin, Robert, 242–243 Bosnia, 197–198, 200, 206–210, 212, 238, 246–247; drone use in, 206–210 Boston, MA, 22–23, 31

Index Boston Globe, 125 Boston Harbor, 22 Boston Massacre, 22 Boston Tea Party, 22 Boucher, Richard, 131 Boudin, Kathy, 50 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 84 Bowdoin, James, 24, 25 Branch Davidians, 87–89 Bradley, Bill, 154 Bremer, L. Paul, III, 59, 68, 186 Brinkley, Douglas, 121 Brokaw, Tom, 54 Brooklyn, 32, 34, 36, 49, 85 Brown, John, 27–28; uprising at Harpers Ferry, 27; execution of, 28 Brown v. Board of Education, 33 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 46–47, 125 Buchanan, James, 27 Buchanan, Patrick, 114 Buffalo, NY, 31 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), 86–87, 90, 97 Busby, Morris, 120 Bush, George H. W., 4, 39, 43, 51, 58, 61–68, 72, 77,114–116, 118, 139, 153, 198, 206–207, 225, 249; administration of, 62–67, 79, 91, 99, 101, 103–104, 113–115, 125, 133, 138, 150–151, 198, 218–219, 244; assassination plot against, 118, 139; as president, 61–68; as vice president, 51, 58; Bosnia and, 206; counterterrorism and, 4, 151; critiques of, 114; cyber warfare and, 151; drone use and, 206–207; Gulf war and, 114; Iran and, 63–64, 66; Iraq and, 64, 113, 151, 225; Looking Forward, 61; National Security Council and, 63–65, 101; New World Order concept and, 65, 113; 1992 campaign and, 77, 113–117; Pan Am 103 and, 62–63, 104; Saddam Hussein and, 66; Somalia and, 198; Vietnam Syndrome and, 198 Bush, George W., 1–2, 89, 113, 140–141, 175, 177, 188–189, 224, 235, 248; administration of, 2–3, 56, 164–165, 215–216, 220, 228 240; enhanced interrogation and, 216; rendition and, 215–216, 224, 228; September 11 attacks and, 216; War on Terror and, 1, 189, 235

269

California, 34, 36, 49–51, 62, 81, 162 California Forestry Association, 81 Camp David Accords (1979), 50 Capitol Hill, 98, 152, 199 Card, Andrew, 89 Carlos the Jackal. See Ilich Ramírez Sánchez. Carnot, President of France, 12 Carter, Ashton B., 163 Carter Doctrine, 47 Carter, Jimmy, 4, 40, 43; administration of, 43–48; assassination plot against, 45; boycott of Moscow Olympics, 47–48; Clinton-era appointees and, 43, 45–46, 48; Iran and, 48; Iran Hostage Crisis and, 45–46, 48; Operation Eagle Claw and, 227; Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 46–47, 172 Carter, Rosalyn, 45 Casey, William, 49, 54, 57 Cassidy, Thomas J., 204 Castro, Fidel, 115–116, 209 Catastrophic Terrorism: Tracking the New Danger (Carter, Deutch, Zelikow), 163 CBS News, 84 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2, 6, 54–57, 67, 98, 100, 114, 134, 158, 159, 179–180, 185, 218–226, 236, 240–241, 247–248; Alec Station and, 184; assassination program and, 48, 224; Bin Laden and, 182, 184–185, 210, 223; Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and, 58, 65, 180, 184; dealings with FBI, 6, 63, 65, 99, 179–180, 184, 220, 226; domestic operations and, 37, 65, 226; drone program and, 203–207, 210–211; Iraq and, 54, 118; murder of employees, January 25, 1993, 80–82, 88–89, 172, 189, 218, 236; Operation Bojinka and, 81, 172; Pan Am 103 inquiry and, 63; rendition and, 80, 220, 222–223; Tenet as DCI, 184, 226; Woolsey as DCI, 79, 81, 119, 203 Cerf, Vinton, 152, 154 Cesar, Julius, 19 Chad, 136 Charles II, 20 Chechnya, 187 Cheney, Dick, 138, 224

270

Index

Chicago, 30, 32, 35, 50, 106 Chile, 129 China, 72, 123–124, 136, 151, 165, 201 Civil War (US), 28–30, 200 Chollet, Derek, 245 Christopher, Warren, 43, 46, 48, 69, 78, 117, 130–131, 217 Church Committee, 6, 48 Churchill, Winston, 44 Church of Israel, 82 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency. CICG. See Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group. Ciller, Tansu, 89 Civil Rights Act (1964), 36 Clancy, Tom, 5 Clark, William P., 55 Clarke, Richard A., 119, 156, 164, 184–185, 213, 217–218, 226, 237 Clash of Civilizations (Huntington), 116 Cleveland, 31 Cleveland, Grover, 30 Cleaver, Eldridge, 36 Cline, Ray S., 7–8 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 80, 92, 95 Clinton Presidential Library, 3 Clinton, William Jefferson (Bill), 2, 4, 9, 52, 57, 66, 77–81, 8–85, 87–96, 99, 101, 104, 106, 114–119, 122–123, 127, 134, 136–140, 153, 159–161, 164–165, 174–175, 178, 181–182, 184–186, 191, 199, 203, 207, 209–210, 215, 218–219, 225–227, 238–239, 241–245; administration of, 2–6, 13–14, 19, 43, 62–63, 67–68, 77–78, 80–82, 85–86, 89–91, 95–105, 113, 116–140, 147–149, 152–165, 171–180, 182–185, 188–189, 197–198, 200, 202–204, 206–209, 211, 215–228, 235–248; appeal to neoconservatives, 79; appointments of, 43, 45, 78–80; as “Kennedyesque,” 88; as “Mourner in Chief,” 91–92; as president-elect, 79, 116, 230–231; avoidance of 1993 CIA memorial service, 80; campaign of 1992, 48, 77, 114–115, 123, 138; campaign speeches of, 77, 79; criticism of, 2, 14, 80, 85, 87–88, 94–96, 103–104, 114, 124–126, 131, 189, 240–245; “Eagle” code name, 94; economic focus of, 77, 84, 98, 101, 132, 154, 156, 177–178,

182, 203, 224, 236–238; embassy bombings and, 183; grand strategy of, 77, 98–101, 121–122, 133, 141, 156, 162, 175, 199, 238; impeachment of, 241–242; Inaugural Address, 1993, 13, 66, 79, 99, 147; Iran and, 113–127, 129–131, 133–135, 137, 172, 182–183, 236–238; Iraq and, 114–119, 121–130, 138–140, 173, 182, 236; Lewinsky scandal and, 186, 224–225, 230; Oklahoma City bombing and, 89–91, 93–94; relationship with Woolsey, 79–81, 119, 203; September 11 attacks and, 2, 13, 239–240, 243, 245, 247; Somalia and, 121, 186, 197–199, 202, 206–207, 212, 239, 246; USS Cole attack and, 2, 244; Vietnam War and, 198, 230; Waco siege and, 85–89; War on Terror and, 4, 197, 239, 245, 247 Clipper Chip, 161 CNCI. See Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. CNN, 87, 89, 154, 199, 241 Coats, Dan, 186 Coercive Acts, 23 Coffelt, Leslie, 33 Cohen, William, 126, 163 COINTELPRO, 37, 98 Cold War, 3, 8, 13, 43, 52, 59, 62, 65–68, 77–79, 93, 99, 101, 113, 117, 121, 128, 134, 151, 171, 183, 201–202, 206, 235–236, 246–247 Collin, Barry C., 147 Commerce Department, 161 Committee on Foreign Relations, 59 Common Sense (Paine), 23 Communism, 43, 67, 79, 174 Comprehensive Crime Control Act (1984), 58, 183 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), 164–165 Computers at Risk (US National Academy of Sciences), 151 Computer Security Act (1987), 150 Concord, MA, 23–24, 29, 90 Confronting Backlash States (Lake), 129 Congress, 6, 24, 33, 53, 57, 78–79, 84, 90–91, 96, 98, 126–127, 148, 150, 154, 164, 166, 171, 176, 186, 189, 204, 218, 224–226 Congressional Research Service, 124

Index Connecticut, 50 Conrad of Montferrat, 19 Constitution (US), 52, 86, 92, 94, 136, 156, 162, 168, 179, 216, 223 Containment, 116, 122, 127 Continuity of Government, 103, 177 Continuity of Operations (COOP), 103 Contra rebels, 53 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 137 Conyers, John, 97 COOP. See Continuity of Operations. Cordor, Frank, 81 Council on Foreign Relations, 130 Counterterrorism budget, 97, 178 Counterterrorism Center (CTC), 58, 65, 180, 184, 248 Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), 102, 181, 184 Counterterrorism strategy, 3–6, 8, 10, 13, 53–55, 57, 59, 61, 64–66, 68, 77, 85, 94–99, 101–103, 109, 120, 128–130, 132, 134, 141, 172, 176–182, 184–186, 199, 209, 213, 217–219, 224–226, 228, 235–241, 245–248 Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, 160 Crenshaw, Martha, 7, 186, 246 Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 161 Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), 102, 156 Critical Infrastructure Protection, 155–156, 159–160, 164 Crowe, William, 105 CSG. See Counterterrorism Security Group. CTC. See Counterterrorism Center. Cuba, 4, 34, 51–52, 60, 113–117, 127, 136, 139, 236 Cubana Airlines, 34 Cuban Democracy Act (1992), 115 Cuban Missile Crisis, 89, 149, 201 Cuomo, Mario, 83 Cutler, Lloyd, 217 Cyberspace, 147–148, 151, 156, 161, 164, 169 Cyberterrorism, 147–166, 236, 238 Cyberwar Is Coming! (Arquilla and Ronfeldt), 151 Czolgosz, Leon, 30–31

D’Amato, Alfonse, 84

271

Darling, Frank, 80 DARPA. See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Day, Luke, 24 DCI. See Director of Central Intelligence. DCTC. See Domestic Counterterrorism Center. Death Angels, 36 Degan, Bill, 62, 86 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 152–153, 204 Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, 205 Defense Department, 177. See also, The Pentagon. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 124 Delors, Jacques, 206 Democratic Party, 48, 77–79, 114, 198 Democratic Peace (Kant), 141 Denning, Dorothy, 148 Denver, CO, 183 Department of Energy, 100 Department of Health and Human Services, 100 Department of Homeland Security, 102–103, 163–164, 176, 238 Department of the Treasury, 30, 57, 83, 96, 100, 179, 181 Department of Transportation, 100, 179 Department of Veterans Affairs, 100 DePugh, Robert Boliver, 34 Deputies Committee of the National Security Council, 63, 101, 156, 199 DEST. See Domestic Emergency Support Team. Detroit, 34 Deutch, John M., 159, 163, 205 Dharan, Saudi Arabia, 119 DIA. See Defense Intelligence Agency. Dinkins, David, 83–84 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 37, 46, 49, 54–55, 78, 158, 184, 203, 215 Director of National Intelligence, 165 Director of Policy Planning, 45, 69, 78, 100, 131, 183, 226 Disabled American Veterans Convention (1995), 132 Dole, Robert, 95, 119, 203, 225 Domestic Counterterrorism Center (DCTC), 180 Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), 179

272

Index

Domestic Terrorism Program, 100 Donilon, Tom, 138 Dorr, Thomas, 27; rebellion of, 27 Douglass, Frederick, 28 Drones, 4, 192, 197–211, 215, 239. See also, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Dual Containment, 4, 113, 122, 124–127, 129, 130, 134, 136, 138, 140, 182, 236 Dual-Use Technology, 115, 134, 138 Dumbrell, John, 244 Duran, Francisco Martin, 94

Eagleburger, Lawrence, 206 Eastern Europe, 64, 68 East India Company, 23 Earth First, 62 Egypt, 50, 120, 122, 131, 137, 219, 222–224 Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 223, 50 Eichmann, Adolf, 216 Eisenhower administration, 201 Election, 1988, 61–62 Election, 1992, 198, 203, 206, 230, 239 Election, 1996, 105, 119, 157, 239 Election, 2000, 242 Electoral College, 115 El-Hage, Wadih, 183 Eligible Receiver, 97, 162 El Salvador, 57 Emery Roth & Sons, 82 Empire State Building, 85 End of History (Fukuyama), 67, 116 England, 21 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 100 EPA. See Environmental Protection Agency. ETA, 12 EU. See European Union. Europe, 12, 19–21, 63–64, 68, 77, 123–124, 126, 129, 136, 206, 209, 245 European Union (EU), 123, 129, 137, 206 Evers, Medgar, 33 Executive Mansion, 81, 106, 153. See also, White House. Executive orders, 54, 57–58, 134–135, 154, 156–157, 164, 174, 181–182, 192, 238, 246 Exocet missiles, 126 Extraordinary rendition, 1, 216, 222–224

FAA. See Federal Aviation Administration.

FALN. See Armed Forces of National Liberation. Falwell, Jerry, 2, 240 FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation. FDR. See Roosevelt, Franklin D. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 156 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 56 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 44, 55, 81, 119, 160–162, 172, 177–178, 181, 183, 217–219, 237, 244, 247; dealings with CIA, 6, 63, 65, 99, 179, 180, 184, 220, 226 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 100, 102–103, 237 Federalists, 25 Federal Plaza, NY, 85 Feith, Douglas J., 49 FEMA. See Federal Emergency Management Agency. Ferdinand, Archduke Franz, 12 FEST. See Foreign Emergency Support Team. Fhimah, Lamin Khalifah, 138 Findley, Paul, 45 First Amendment Rights, 26, 92, 97, 161 FISA. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Fitzwater, Marlin, 53 Fletcher, Yvonne, 136 Florida, 34, 49, 59, 62, 115, 117 Ford, Gerald, 37, 44, 55 Ford’s Theatre, 29 Foreign Affairs, 125, 129, 163, 240 Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), 177, 179 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 178, 237 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 97 Fort James, 21 Fort Mead, 158 Fort Sumter, 29 Founding Fathers, 24–25 Four Powers Summit (1960), 201 France, 12, 21, 25, 26, 30–31, 120, 126, 136, 139, 216 Franchise Act (1670), 20 Franklin, Benjamin, 23 Freeh, Loius J., 181, 218–219, 244 Freiheit, 31 French Revolution, 20, 22, 38 Fukuyama, Francis, 67

Index G-7, 132, 134, 137, 182–183 Gaddafi, Muammar, 52, 58, 60, 117, 133, 136–138, 209 Gaddis, John Lewis, 240 GAI. See Al-Gama’a Al’Islamiyya. Gallup, 239, 241 Gandhi, Indira, 13 Gandhi, Rajiv, 13 GAO. See General Accounting Office. Garfield, James, 30 Garrison, Arthur H., 7 Garrison, Jim, 32 GCHQ. See Government Communications Headquarters. Gemayel, Amin, 50 General Accounting Office (GAO), 98, 159 General Atomics, 204, 207 General Services Administration, 219 George III, 24 Georgetown University, 77, 148 George Washington University, 94, 134, 238 Gergen, David, 51 Germany, 12, 65, 68, 79, 113, 126, 183, 221 Gershman, Carl, 141 Geyer, Georgie Anne, 89 Gibson, William, 147 Gingrich, Newt, 92, 225 Gjadër Air Base, 207 Globalization, 133, 152, 165, 176, 228 GNAT-750 drone, 204–205, 207 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1986), 59, 65, 98 Goldgeiger, James, 245 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 52, 67 Gordon, Sarah, 148 Gore, Al, 2, 114–115, 152–154, 188, 217, 240, 242 Gorelick, Jamie, 95 Government Accounting Office, 219, 229 Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ),162, 170 Gow, Ian, 12 Grand Central Station, NY, 44 Grant Park, Chicago, 35 Great Barrington, 24 Great Britain, 12, 23, 44, 120, 126, 136, 201, 204 Green, Jerrold, 120 Green, Joshua, 148

273

Grenada, 51 Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites, 182 Guantanamo Bay, 1 Gue, David J., 28 Guevara, Che, 36 Guiteau, Charles J., 30

Haass, Richard, 120 Habeas corpus, 25, 97 Haig, Al, 49, 51, 59 Haiti, 138, 238 Hale, John P., 30 Halifax, Nova Scotia, 132, 182 Halperin, Morton, 89, 100, 117, 131–132, 226–227 Hamas, 89, 120, 123, 130, 181, 192 Hancock, John, 23–24 Hannity, Sean, 2, 240 Harpers Ferry, 27–28 Harris, Owen, 240 Hart-Rudman Report, 163 Harvey, Raymond Lee, 45 Havana, 115–116 Hayden, Michael V., 215 Hearst, Patty, 36, 40 Helms-Burton Act, 136 Helms, Jessie, 95 Helms, Richard, 37 Herold, David, 29 Hewitt, Christopher, 10, 32, 246 Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane, 201 Hezbollah, 51–52, 121–123, 127, 130, 171–172, 181, 183, 192 High Performance Computing and Communication Act (1991), 153 High-Performance Computing and Communications Program, 157 Hinckley, John, 12, 50 Hitchens, Christopher, 240 Hoffman, Bruce, 8, 211, 239 Hoffman, Stanley, 47 Holbrooke, Richard, 79, 106, 115 Holland Tunnel, 2, 85, 94 Hollywood, 197, 215 Hoover, Herbert, 115 Hoover, J. Edgar, 37 Horn of Africa, 198 House of Representatives, 33, 96, 149 Houston, TX, 34 Hubbell, Webster, 87 Hungary, 207

274

Index

Hunter drone, 205 Hussein, Saddam, 53, 64, 66, 114–119, 121, 123, 125–127, 138–140, 242, 245 Hyde, Henry, 97 Hyland, William G., 125, 240

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency. Idaho, 31, 44, 49, 62, 86 INC. See Iraqi National Congress. Inderfurth, Karl, 188 India, 13, 19 Indiana, 32 Indian Ocean, 66 Industrial Society and its Future (Kaczynski), 45 Indyk, Martin S., 118, 122–125, 143; critiqued as “Zionist,” 125 INF. See Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Information Age, 147–148, 164 Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), 161, 163 Information Superhighway, 153, 155 Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 164 Institute for Security and Intelligence, 147 Intelligence Priorities Interagency Working Group, 178, 237, 239 Interagency Working Group (NSC/IWG), 101, 178, 237, 239 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 209 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 140 International Crime Control Strategy, 100 International Criminal Court, 9 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 181 International House of Pancakes, 114 Internet, 148, 152–159, 161, 165, 235, 238 Internet Service Provider, 160 Intolerable Acts, 23. See also, Coercive Acts. Iowa, 47 IRA. See Irish Republican Army. Iran, 46, 48, 51–53, 60, 63–64, 66, 113–127, 129–135, 137, 172, 182–183, 236–238; Hostage Crisis, 45–46, 48; Revolution (1979), 4, 45, 48 Iran Air flight-655, 60, 63 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 134 Iran-Contra, 53, 115, 117

Iranian Freedom Foundation, 44 Iraq, 1, 13, 53, 64, 113, 114, 115, 116–119, 121–127, 129–130, 138–140, 151, 173, 182, 204, 235–236, 246 Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters, 118 Iraqi National Congress (INC), 122–123, 139 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 12, 52 ISAC. See Information Sharing and Analysis Center. ISIS. See Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Islam, 10, 90, 177–178, 187 Islamabad, 189, 220 Islamic Army, 182 Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, 182 Islamic Jihad, 50–51, 122, 192, 223 Islamic Salvation Foundation, 182 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 13, 235 Issues in Science and Technology, 151 Israel, 35, 49–51, 61–62, 67, 82, 94, 119–120, 123, 171–173, 202, 204, 216, 222 Israel, Ken, 207 Italian Red Brigades, 52 Italy, 12, 31, 207, 217

Jackson, Andrew, 27, 30 Jacksonville, FL, 62 Jacobins, 20, 38 Jamestown, 21 Japan, 124, 126, 129 JDL. See Jewish Defense League. Jefferson, Thomas, 23, 25–27, 85–86 Jenkins, Brian, 120 Jerusalem, 19 Jewel, Richard, 82 Jewish Armed Resistance, 36 Jewish Defense League (JDL), 36, 62 JFK, 32 John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act (1992), 32 John F. Kennedy International Airport, 49, 62 John Paul II, 12, 50, 172 Johns Hopkins University, 128 Johnson, Andrew, 30 Johnson, Lyndon B., 35 Joint Security Commission, 158 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTAR), 208

Index Jopling, Andrew Meig, 95 Jordan, 137, 219, 221, 223–224 JSTAR. See Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System. Justice Department, 56, 87, 114, 147, 179, 182, 219, 227

Kaczynski, Theodore (Ted), 12, 44, 81–82. See also Unabomber. Kahane, Meir, 36, 62 Kahn, Bob, 152, 154 Kansi, Mir Aimal, 80, 221 Kant, Immanuel, 141 Kaplan, David, 105 Karem, Abraham E., 204 Karshi-Khanabad Air Base, 210 Kennan Sweepstakes (Brinkley), 121 Kennedy, John F., 12, 32, 34, 37; administration of, 89 Kennedy, Robert F., 12, 34, 35 Kenya, 2, 173, 176, 183, 185, 221, 236 Kerrey, Bob, 2, 240, 244 Khartoum, 185 Khobar Towers bombing (1996), 2, 119–120, 244 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 46 Khost, 185 Kincaid, Charles, 30 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 12, 33 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 49, 79 Kissinger, Henry, 240 Klinghoffer, Leon, 49 Kohl, Helmut, 126 Korean Airlines flight 007, 56 Korean Peninsula, 77, 131 Koresh, David, 87–88 Kosovo War (1999), 208 Kreczko, Alan J., 96–97 Kremlin, 8, 55, 59–60 Ku Klux Klan, 12, 32, 33, 50 Kushner, Harvey, 7 Kuwait, 64, 66, 113–114, 117–118, 125, 139, 198

LaGuardia Airport, 37 Lake, Anthony, 43, 45, 48, 69, 78–79, 97, 117, 122, 128–130, 139–141, 155, 174, 181, 184, 203, 223, 226, 238, 247; assassination attempt of, 172; Backlash States concept of, 128, 140; Bosnia and, 247; “From Containment to Enlargement” speech

275

of, 128–129; relationship with Richard Holbrooke, 79 Langley, VA, 80, 210 Laqueur, Walter, 10–11, 13, 148 Las Vegas, 34 Lawrence, Richard, 27 Leading Systems Incorporated, 204 League of Nations, 8 Lebanon, 50, 61–62, 120, 130 Lee, Robert E., 28 Leisler, Jacob, 21–22, 38 Lewinsky, Monica, 186, 224–225, 230, 241 Lexington, 23, 90 Libya, 4, 45, 51–52, 58, 60, 63, 66, 70, 113–117, 127, 130–131, 133, 136–138, 236 Libya Sanctions Act, 134, 238 Liddy, G. Gordon, 92 Lightning Bug, 201 Limbaugh, Rush, 2, 240 Lincoln, Abraham, 12, 29–30, 37 Lincoln Tunnel, 2, 85 Lindh, Anna, 13 Little Rock, AK, 116 Livermore, 49 Lockerbie, Scotland, 62, 136–137 Lofty View, 207 London, 20–23 104, 136, 153 Lone Wolves, 11, 81-82, 85, 104 Long, Huey, 32 Long Island, NY, 21 Long, Russell, 32 Looking Forward (Bush), 61 Los Angeles, 34, 204 Los Angeles Civic Center, 45 Los Angeles International Airport, 37 Los Angeles Times, 31, 186 Louisiana, 32, 114 Low, Archibald, 200 Lumumba, Patrice, 36 Lyon Summit (1996), 183, 239

McAllister, J.F.O. (Jef), 210 McConnell, Mike, 165 McCurdy, Dave, 79, 89 McCurry, Mike, 178, 191 McKinley, William, 30–31, 37 McVeigh, Timothy, 90–91, 244 Major, John, 12 Malcolm X, 33, 36 Mandelbaum, Michael, 61, 79, 104

276

Index

Manhattan, 2, 34, 49, 82–84, 89, 106, 109, 189, 199, 220, 236 Mao Zedong, 36 Marching in Place (Duffy and Goodgame), 114 Marine One, 52 Marsh, Robert, 160 Maryland, 26, 44 Massachusetts, 23–25, 81 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 81 Matrix, The, 147 Mecca, 173 Medina, 173 Mediterranean Sea, 52, 66 Memorandum of Notification, 182 Michigan, 31, 50, 91 Michigan State University, 93 Middle East, 93, 105, 114, 119–120, 122–123, 125, 127, 129–131, 133, 171–173, 181, 215, 222–223, 238, 245–246 Middle East Quarterly, 125 Milam, William, 188 Millennium Eve terrorist plots, 2, 164 Miller, David C., 64 Miller, Judith, 120 Milwaukee, 31 Minneapolis, 92 Minutemen, 34 Missouri, 34, 82 Mobile, AL, 50 Modjeski, Leland William, 94 Mogadishu, 197, 199 Montana, 81 Moonlight Maze, 162 Moore, Harry, 34 Morgan, Calvin, 80 Mormon, 27 Moro, Aldo, 12 Morocco, 219, 224 Morris, Dick, 92 Moscow, 59, 172, 201 Moscow Olympics (1980), 47 Moss, Robert, 59 Mosser, Thomas, 81 Most, Johann, 31 Mountbatten, Lord, 12 Mubarak, Hosni, 84, 120, 122, 136, 222 Murad, Abdul Hakim, 221, 244 Murphy, Richard, 125 Murray, Gilbert Brent, 81 Musharraf, Pervez, 186, 189

Muskie, Ed, 46 Myers, Dee Dee, 79, 105

NAACP. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Najim, Eyad Mahmoud Ismail, 221, 244 Napoleon Bonaparte, 216 National Academy of Sciences, 150–151 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 33, 62 National Broadcasting Company (NBC), 48 NBC News, 54, 92 National Bureau of Standards (NBS), 150 National Command Authority, 162 National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and CounterTerrorism, 102, 156, 163, 178, 237 National Counterintelligence Center, 134, 237 National Counterintelligence Executive, 134 National Counterintelligence Policy Board, 134, 237 National Defense University, 158 National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), 162 National Emergencies Act, 135, 181 National Endowment for Democracy, 141 National Guard, 100 National High-Performance Computer Technology Act, 152 National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA), 163 National Information Infrastructure, 153, 156, 168, 238 National Infrastructure Assurance Council, 161 National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), 160 National Plan for Information Systems Protection, 160, 164 National Research and Education Network, 153 National Security Act (1947), 55, 179 National Security Agency (NSA), 149–150, 158, 161–162; RYE System, 149 National Security Council (NSC), 3, 6, 46–47, 54–55, 63, 65, 69, 78, 83, 96, 101–102, 118–119, 121, 123, 130, 134, 149, 155, 178, 184, 226;

Index Deputies Committee, 63, 101, 156, 199; Directorate of Transnational Threats (TRT), 96; Policy Coordinating Committee (NSC/PCC), 150; Principals Committee, 63, 101–102, 184; Senior Directorate for Infrastructure Protection, 156, 237 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), 54–58, 61, 63, 71, 103, 150, 244 National Security Directive (NSD), 63–64, 101, 150, 218 National Security Initiatives Working Group, 77 National Security Planning Group, 51 National Security Review (NSR), 63, 101 National Security Revitalization Act, 136 National Security Strategy (NSS), 59, 65, 98–101, 132–134, 154, 174; NSS 1987, 59–60; NSS 1988, 59; NSS 1990, 65–66; NSS 1991, 66; NSS 1993, 66–67; NSS 1994, 99, 132, 178; NSS 1995, 133, 154; NSS 1996, 221; NSS 1997, 176; NSS 1998, 176; NSS 2000, 101, 177–178, 224 National Security Study Directive (NSSD), 54 National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC), 150 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 164 Nation of Islam, 44 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Naturalization Act (1798), 26 Naval Academy, 161 Navigation Acts, 20 Navy Information Warfare Activity, 158 Neave, Airey, 12 Nellis Air Force Base, 206 Neoconservatives, 79 NEST. See Nuclear Emergency Search Team. Netherlands, 138 Nevada, 206 Neumann, Ronald E., 137–138 Neuromancer (Gibson), 147 Neville, John, 26 Newark, NJ, 34 New Brunswick, NJ, 84 New Democrat, 78

277

New England, 26 New Jersey, 26, 34, 50, 62, 84, 115, 236 Newsweek, 124, 186 Newton, Huey, 36 New World Order, 65–66, 68, 91, 113 New York City, 2, 21–22, 31–32, 36–37, 44, 49–50, 62, 83–85, 94, 163, 172, 175, 184, 186, 220 New York City Police Department, 83 New York City Fire Department, 83 New Yorker, 44 New York Magazine, 36 New York Public Library, 44 New York Times, 45, 59, 82, 89, 116, 124–125, 130, 186, 239 Nicaragua, 51–53, 60, 127 Nicholas, Lee Ann, 85 Nichols, Terry, 244 Nixon, Richard, 33, 35, 37, 43–44 No-Fly Zone (Iraq), 121, 126 NORAD. See North American Aerospace Defense Command. Noriega, Manuel, 64, 113 North America 1, 4, 19–23, 29, 37, 43 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 149 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 53, 165, 200, 206–207, 209 North Carolina, 34, 95 North Korea, 4, 51–52, 60, 113, 127, 130–131, 201, 236; Agreed Framework, 131 Northampton, MA, 24 Northern Alliance, 187 Northern Ireland, 238 Northwestern University, 45 Nosair, El Sayyid Abdulazziz, 62 Nova Scotia, 132, 182 NSA. See National Security Agency. NSC. See National Security Council. Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), 180

Oakley, Robert, 49, 120, 199 Obama, Barack, 1, 165, 235 Odeh, Mohammed Saddiq, 183, 221 Office of Management & Budget (OMB), 192 O’Hare International Airport, 50 O’Grady, Scott F., 197, 200, 212 Oklahoma City, 2, 4, 49, 89, 91–92, 94–95, 109, 160, 236, 244–245;

278

Index

bombing of the Federal Building, 2, 4, 89–93, 96–98, 101, 104–105, 159, 236, 244–245 Old Executive Office Building, 58, 96 Olympic Games; Munich (1972), 61; Atlanta (1996), 12, 82, 101, 236; Moscow (1980), 47 OMB. See Office of Management & Budget. Omnibus Counterterrorism Act (1995), 96 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorist Act (1986), 58, 183 O’Neil, John, 172 Operation Bojinka, 81, 94, 172, 190, 244 Operation CHAOS, 37 Operation Deliberate Force, 207 Operation Deny Flight, 200 Operation Desert Fox, 140 Operation Desert Storm, 115, 151, 203, 225 Operation Eagle Claw, 46, 227 Operation El Dorado Canyon, 52 Operation Goldenrod, 217 Operation Infinite Reach, 185 Operation Just Cause, 64 Operation Nomad Vigil, 207 Operation Northern Exposure, 86 Operation Restore Hope, 198 Operation Vigilant Warrior, 139 Oswald, Lee Harvey, 35, 37 Ottawa, 182 Our American Cousin, 29 Oval Office, 56, 84, 91, 93, 118

Pacific Air Lines, 34 Pacific Ocean, 172 Paine, Thomas, 23 Pakistan, 13, 80, 141, 186, 188–189, 192, 199, 220–221 Palestine, 19 Palestine Islamic Jihad, 122 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 45, 67, 172 Palestinian Liberation Front, 51 Palme, Olof, 12 Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) flight-103, 4, 54, 62–64, 66, 68, 104, 115, 117, 131, 133, 136–137, 244, 247 Panama, 64, 113 Panetta, Leon, 89, 180 Patterson, Robert, 2, 240, 244–245 Pax Americana, 68, 246

PCCIP. See President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. PD. See Presidential Directive. PDD. See Presidential Decision Directive. Peace dividend, 128, 202 Pearl Harbor, 58, 151 Peña, Fderico, 180 Pennsylvania, 26, 49 Pennsylvania Avenue, 94, 96, 106, Pentagon, 35, 98, 103, 121, 134, 158–159, 162, 185, 205–207, 211, 218, 220, 225–227, 230–231, 245, 247 Perdue University, 165 Perely Aerial Bomber, 200 Perle, Richard, 49 Perot, H. Ross, 114–115 Perry, William J., 205 Persia, 19 Persian Gulf, 47, 64, 66, 117, 119, 124, 127, 129, 187 Persian Gulf War (1991), 125, 151, 173, 198, 202; as first Information War, 151 Peters, Bernard, 149 Philadelphia, 25, 31 Philippines, 172, 221 Phillips, Robert, 67 Pilgrim, Caleb, 8 Pillar, Paul R., 248 Pioneer drone, 202 Pipes, Daniel, 125 Pittsburgh, 31 Place de la Concorde, Paris, 20, 22, 26 Plato, 19 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization. Plumber, Chester, 44 Political Terrorism, 6 Pollitt, Mark M., 148 Poos, Jacques, 206 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 63, 192 Posen, Barry, 247 Post–Cold War, 69, 78–79, 132, 141, 154, 178, 184, 203, 238, 247 Potomac River, 2, 27 Powell, Colin, 50, 118, 121, 158, 199 Powell, Lewis, 29 Powers, Francis Gary, 201 PRD. See Presidential Review Directive. Predator drone, 204–211, 214 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), 3, 57, 101–103, 111, 134, 155–156,

Index 159–161, 164, 174, 178–181, 183–184, 191, 218–220, 228, 236–237, 246 Presidential Directive (PD), 47, 54 Presidential Review Directive (PRD), 101, 135, 155 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), 160 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 178, 237 Primakov, Yevgeny, 139 Prohibition Against Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act, 57 Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act (1950), 33 Puerto Rico, 33, 49

Qassem, Talaat Fouad, 223 Queen Bee project, 201 Queens, NY, 21

Rabin, Yitzhak, 13, 50–51, 120 Radio City Music Hall, 34 Rafizadeh, Parivash, 62 Rahman, Omar Ahmed Abdel, 83, 85, 184 Ramadan, 140 Ramírez Sánchez, Ilich (Carlos the Jackal), 216 RAND Corporation, 96, 120, 149, 159 RAND Review, 151 Randolph, Robert B., 27 Rashid, Mohammed, 184, 221 Rather, Dan, 84 Reagan, Ronald, 4, 12, 43, 48–51, 65, 79, 113, 119–120, 127, 134, 150, 166, 217; administration of, 48–61, 63, 83, 85, 91, 103, 115–117, 138, 140–141, 173, 184, 217, 236, 244; counterterrorism strategies, 54–61, 134, 150; Iran and, 51–53, 60; Iraq and, 53; Terror Network concept and, 59–60 Reconstruction era, 32 Regime change, 126–127, 140 Regulators, The, 24 Rendition program, 3–4, 80, 215–228, 239 Reno, Janet, 82, 87–89, 138, 157, 185 Republican Party, 67, 225 Revere, Paul, 22 Rezaq, Omar Mohammed Ali, 184, 221 Rhode Island, 27

279

Rice, Condoleezza, 217 Rich, Frank, 240 Riedel, Bruce, 122, 187 Rifkind, Sir Malcolm, 206 Riot Act, 25 Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, 163 Robertson, Pat, 2, 240 Robinson, Robert, 62 Rogers, Sharon Lee, 62 Rogue states, 113, 130–134, 136, 140, 151 Rohrabacher, Dana, 2, 240 Rome, 51 Ronfeldt, David, 151 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (FDR), 32, 242 Roosevelt, Theodore, 31 Roper, Jon, 48 Rosenthal, A.M., 89 Royal Flying Corps, 200 Royal Jordanian flight 402, 217 Ruby, Jack, 35 Ruby Ridge, 62, 85, 86, 105 Rudolph, Eric, 12, 82 Rushton Proctor Aerial Target, 201 Russia, 123–124, 132, 134, 139–140, 160, 165, 182, 246 Rwanda, 121

Sacramento, CA, 50 Sadat, Anwar, 50, 222–223 Saladin, 19 Salahme, Muhammad, 84 Salahuddin, Daoud, 44 Salim, Mamdouh Mahmud, 183, 214 SALT II. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Salt Lake City, UT, 50 Sanchez, Illich Ramirez, 216 sanctions, 58, 61, 63, 116, 122, 125, 127, 129, 134–141, 173, 176–178, 187, 189 Sandinistas, 52 San Francisco, 36, 81 Santa Anna, CA, 49 Sarin attack (1995), 100, 120 Saudi Arabia, 2, 119–120, 173, 186, 189, 236 Saudi Hezbollah, 119 Save Our Israel Soil, 36 SAVAK, 62 Scheuer, Michael, 184, 222 Schmich, Mary, 90 Schrank, John Flammang, 31

280

Index

Secret Service, 50, 90, 94–96, 103 Schwarzkopf, Norman, 151 Sciolino, Elaine, 124 Scotland, 54, 62 Scowcroft, Brent, 63, 72, 125 SDS. See Students for a Democratic Society. Seale, Bobby, 36 Security Policy Board, 102, 237 Sedition Act (1798), 26 Seitz, Raymond, 240 Semtex, 67 Senate, US, 96, 115, 137, 226; Armed Services Committee, 115, 159, 164; Foreign Relations Committee, 95; Governmental Affairs Committee, 159; Intelligence Committee, 224; Judiciary Committee, 95, 218; Select Committee on Intelligence, 159 Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, 62, 86 Senior Interagency Group on Defense Policy (SIG-DP), 55 Senior Interagency Group on Foreign Policy (SIG-FP), 55 Senior Interagency Group on Intelligence (SIG-I), 55 September 11, 2001, attacks (9/11), 1–3, 5, 13–14, 37, 53, 58, 61, 103–104, 140, 210, 216, 220, 222, 224–226, 235, 237, 239–240, 242–243, 245–248 Sessions, William S., 83 Seward, William H., 29 Shahab-3 missile, 133 Shalabi, Mustafa, 62 Shattuck, Job, 24–25 Shaw, Clay, 32 Shays, Daniel, 24–25 Shays’ Rebellion, 25, 28–29 Sheehan, Michael, 185, 188 Shelton, Hugh, 187, 220, 227 Shultz, George, 51 Sick, Gary, 46, 120 Silicon Valley, 153 Simon, Steven, 97, 190, 231 Sinn Fein, 243 Sirhan, Sirhan, 35 60 Minutes, 92 Sloughter, Henry, 21 Soderberg, Nancy, 78, 91, 173, 203, 245 Solar Sunrise, 162 Somalia, 121, 186, 197–199, 202, 206–207, 212, 225, 227, 239, 246

Sottile, Antoine, 7 South America, 60 Southeast Asia, 197, 202 South Korea, 129 Soviet Union (USSR), 8, 47, 49, 52, 55–56, 59–60, 64–65, 68, 77, 93, 113, 117, 122, 125, 127, 149, 151, 201 Spain, 12, 30–31, 52 Spanish-American War (1898), 200 Special Adviser to the President for Cyber Security, 164 Special Situation Group (SSG), 56 Springfield, MA, 24–25 SR-71, 4, 198 SSG. See Special Situation Group. Starr, Nick, 80 State Department, 9, 46–47, 49, 53, 56, 58, 69, 79, 103, 130–131, 138, 172, 177, 179, 183, 185, 188, 199, 209, 219–223, 225–226, 243–245 State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 59, 172, 188, 199 State of the Union Address, 1980, 47, 64, 103 State of the Union Address, 1994, 242 States of concern, 113, 131, 140 Steel, Ronald, 239 Steinberg, James, 183 Stephanopoulos, George, 87–88 Stern, Todd, 242 Steunenberg, Frank, 31 St. Helena, 216 Stone, Oliver, 32 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 47 Stuart, J.E.B., 28 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 35 Sudan, 130, 185, 210, 216, 238, 241 Suleiman, Ibrahim Ahmad, 244 Susquehannock Tribe, 20 Symbionese Liberation Army, 36 Syria, 13,19, 60, 62–63, 141, 192, 219, 223, 235

Tabatabaei, Ali Akbar, 44 Taha, Rifa’i Ahmad, 182, 192 Taliban, 2, 173, 177, 182, 185-189, 209, 211, 235, 240 Tampa, FL, 59 Tanzania, 2, 173, 176, 183, 185, 221, 236 Tarnak Farm, 210–211

Index Taszár Air Base, 207 Taulbee, William, 30 Taunton, MA, 24 Tea Act (1773), 23 Tehran, 4, 44–45, 61, 64, 120–121, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 135, 172, 223 Tenenbaum, Ehud, 162 Tenet, George, 184, 223–224, 226 Tennessee, 28, 114, 152 Terror: A Soviet Export (Moss), 59 Terrorism in the United States (Department of Justice), 160–161 Terrorism: Tracing the International Network (Sterling), 59 Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), 56 Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (Sterling), 59 TERRSTOP, 84 Texas, 34, 62, 86 Tharp, Mike, 105 Thatcher, Margaret, 12 Third Reich, 52 Thompson, Fred Dalton, 131 Thuggee, 19–20 Thunder of Zion, 36 Time, 199 TIWG. See Terrorist Incident Working Group. Tokyo, 93, 100, 120, 190 Torricelli, Robert, 115 Tower Commission, 6 Treasury Department, 30, 83, 96, 181 Tripoli, 52, 119, 133, 137 Truman, Harry S., 33 Trump administration, 235 Tunisia, 131 Turkey, 204 Trans World Airline (TWA), 44, 51 TWA. See Trans World Airline. Twetten, Thomas, 203–204

U-2, 4, 198, 201, 206–207, 210 UAE. See United Arab Emirates. UAV. See Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Umberto, King of Italy, 12 Unabomber, (Ted Kaczynski), 12, 44, 50, 81, 94, 101 UNGA. See United Nations General Assembly. Union de Transports Aeriens (UTA) Flight-772, 33, 136

281

United Arab Emirates (UAE), 189 United Nations Building, NY, 32, 84–85 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 9, 34, 174, 238 United Nations Hostages Convention, 8 United Nations Secretary General, 84 United Nations Security Council, 118, 137, 187 United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), 140 United States Code, 86, 135, 156, 168, 181, 192 United States Cyber Command, 165 United States Marshals Service, 26, 86 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 216 University of California, 50 University of California, Berkley, 81 University of California, San Francisco, 81 University of Central Oklahoma, 93 University of Connecticut, 67 University of Texas, 34 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), 4, 198, 200–205, 207–211, 239. See also, drones. UNSCOM. See United Nations Special Commission. USA Today, 241 US Grand Strategy, 43, 56, 101, 122, 141, 175, 238 USS Cole, 2, 173, 214, 236, 244 USS Nimitz, 46 USSR. See Soviet Union. USS Vincennes, 60, 62–63 UTA. See Union de Transports Aeriens. Utah, 27, 50 Uxbridge, MA, 24 Uzbekistan, 210

V-1, 201 Vance, Cyrus, 46–47 Vanderbilt University, 50 Vietnam, 35, 136, 202 Vietnam Syndrome, 197–198 Vietnam War, 35, 48, 198, 202, 212, 231 Virginia, 20, 26–28, 80, 85, 186, 210 Volstead Act, 31 Voting Rights Act (1965), 36

Waco, 85–86, 88–90, 92, 94, 105, 236 Wag the Dog, 186, 225, 230, 241–242 Wallace, George, 37 Walling, Paul F., 94

282

Index

Wall Street Journal, 92 Walter, Christian, 8 Wargames, 149, 166 War of Independence (US), 20–21, 24, 90 War on Terror, 1, 4, 13, 83, 189, 197, 215, 235, 239, 245, 247 Washington, DC, 2, 28–31, 33, 43–44, 50, 59, 67, 85, 100, 103, 116, 141, 150–151, 163, 173, 189, 200, 207, 213, 217, 247 Washington, George, 26 Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 122, 174 Washington Post, 82, 124, 129–130 Watts Riots, 34 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 53, 66, 77, 100, 102–103, 117, 123, 128, 130, 140, 177, 179–180 Weathermen, The, 35–36, 67, 93 Weather Underground, 12, 35, 50 Weaver, Randy, 62, 86 Weaver, Samuel, 86 Weaver, Vicki, 86 Wechsler, Will, 119–120 Weinberger, Casper, 115 Weiss, Carl, 32 Westchester County, NY, 20 West Wing, 58 Whicker, Alan, 90 Whiskey Act, 26 Whiskey Rebellion, 25–26, 29 White House, 26, 31, 33, 37, 44–45, 48–54, 56, 58–61, 63–67, 78–83, 85, 87–92, 94–100, 104, 106, 114–115, 117, 120–121, 124–126, 128, 130, 133, 136, 138–139, 150, 152–153, 155–156, 159, 163–164, 166, 173, 175–183, 185, 188, 197–198, 200, 202–203, 209–211, 213, 216–218, 220, 222, 224–227, 230–231, 235–236, 239–246 White House Situation Room, 58, 83, 87

White, Mary Jo, 199, 227 Wilcox, Philip C., 172, 199 William III, 21 Williams, Stephen, 80 Windows on the World restaurant, 11 Witherspoon, Reese, 215 WMD. See Weapons of Mass Destruction. Wolfowitz, Paul, 49, 125 Woolsey, James, 79–81, 105, 119, 203, 204, 207 World Bank, 126 World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, 173, 182 World Trade Center, 2, 11, 68, 80, 82–85, 88–89, 93–94, 106, 163, 172, 175, 189, 218, 220–221, 235–236, 243–244; construction of, 82, 106; 1993 bombing of, 2, 68, 80, 82–85, 89, 93, 172, 175, 189, 218, 220–221, 236, 244; 2001 destruction of, 94, 163, 235 World War I, 12, 201, 133 World War II, 173, 133, 201 Wright brothers, 200 Wyoming, 49

Yale University, 81 Yamasaki, Minoru, 82 Yeltsin, Borris, 160 Yemen, 2, 173, 214 Yom Kippur War, 202 Young, Brigham, 27 Yousef, Ramzi, 84, 172, 184, 220–221, 244 Yugoslavia, 121, 206–207 Yunis, Fawaz, 217

Zagreb, 223 Zangara, Joseph, 32 Zealot, 19 Zelikow, Philip D., 163

About the Book

2001, President Bill Clinton's time in office was portrayed as one in which vital opportunities to confront growing threats to US security were missed. Firmly challenging this characterization, James D. Boys explores the longmisunderstood approach adopted by the Clinton administration as it sought to define an effective response to acts of political violence. Boys argues that only by understanding the efforts of Clinton and his team to address international terrorism can we make sense of the reasoning behind the actions of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, all of whom inherited, continued, and expanded on Clinton-era policies and practices. Drawing on official documents and interviews with key players, he reveals the evolution of counterterrorism strategy throughout the Clinton administration, as well as the ramifications that it has today.

In the aftermath of the catastrophic attacks of September 11,

James D. Boys is associate professor of international political studies at Richmond University, London.

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