Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal: Evolving Geographies of Fear and Hope 9789814517935

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CLIMATE CHANGE -AND-

THE BAY OF BENGAL

The ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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CLIMATE CHANGE -AND-

THE BAY OF BENGAL

Evolving Geographies of Fear and Hope

SanJC!Y Chaturvedi and VijCfY Sakhuja

I5EA5

YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE

First published in Singapore in 2015 by ISEAS Publishing 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. © 2015 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Chaturvedi, Sanjay. Climate change and the Bay of Bengal : evolving geographies of fear and hope / Sanjay Chaturvedi and Vijay Sakhuja. 1. Climatic changes—Bengal, Bay of. 2. Bengal, Bay of—Strategic aspects. I. Sakhuja, Vijay. II. Title. QC903.2 B48C49 2015 ISBN 978-981-4459-58-7 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-4517-93-5 (e-book, PDF) Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

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CONTENTS Preface vii 1. Geopolitics in the Era of Climate Change: Rethinking Sovereignty, Security and Sustainability

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2. Mapping the Bay of Bengal in the Era of Climate Change

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3. Climate Change, Displacements and Imperatives of Human Security

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4. Strategic Responses to Non-traditional Security Threats: The Role of the Military

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5. Rescaling the ‘National’: Realities, Perceptions and Policies 137 6. Assessing Regional Responses: A Case for Reorientation

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7. Conclusion: Towards a Bay of Bengal Community

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Bibliography

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Index

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About the Authors

237

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preface We are living in an era of transitions and transformations where very different understandings of security and sovereignty are at work. The multifaceted challenge of multiscalar climate change forces us to rethink the issues of space, scale and power in ways perhaps hitherto unimagined. This is not to suggest that the old cartographies emerging out of state-centric imaginations of inside/outside and ‘national security’ have completely disappeared but to explore the extent to which they make sense in the era of climate change and scarcities. Taking the semi-enclosed ‘Bay of Bengal’ and its littorals as a case study we argue in this book that they don’t. For us the Bay of Bengal is also a valuable social science laboratory to establish and demonstrate that howsoever useful the ‘global’ metanarratives of climate change might be in their own right, a critical social science perspective compels us to rescale our attention and map out the complex spatial geographies of climate change. A useful way forward in the direction suggested above is to recall that even though climate change had not been factored into the deliberations and outcomes of UNCLOS III, the 1982 Convention makes the specific provision in its Article 123, to the effect that, States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization: (a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea; (b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific

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Preface research in the area; (d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.

Since we wholeheartedly agree with the contention that there is no such thing as a ‘view from nowhere’, we find it appropriate to outline at the outset some of the key assumptions on which our analysis in this book is based. First and foremost, we believe that the debate on climate change cannot and should not be divorced from the debate on sustainable development. We argue that climate change and sustainable development are inextricably linked and thus should be approached and analysed together in a holistic manner. By doing so, we are less likely to miss out the long-standing histories of natural disasters, ecological degradation and deeply entrenched ecological irrationalities in our societies. At the same time what we should be aiming at is to broaden the understanding and deepen the debate on climate change by analysing how the anticipated consequences of climate change travel backwards and beyond the causes related to ‘global warming’ and are anchored in the dominant models of economic growth and development. The second key assumption that guides our approach to analysis in this work is that the concept of sovereignty needs a radical reformulation in the context of climate change and ecological un-sustainability. A different geopolitics is at work beyond the limits of state sovereignty, which forces us to rethink the concept of boundaries (on land, sea and air) and in some cases even replace them by the concept of zones characterized by multilateral cooperation. It is forgotten sometimes that the Bay of Bengal is a semi-enclosed sea as defined under UNCLOS III, to which all the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal are signatories. By virtue of being signatories, the Bay of Bengal littoral states have certain obligations to meet. Article 122 of UNCLOS III stipulates that “For the purposes of this Convention, ‘enclosed or semi-enclosed sea’ means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.” We are curious to explore the extent to which the specific and unique regional specificities and circumstances of the Bay of Bengal have invited joint action, technical cooperation and other management mechanisms at the regional scale by the littoral states.

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A careful reading of various national perspectives on, and responses to, climate change mitigation and adaptations gives an impression that the scales that matter the most are either ‘global’ (a scale at which the dominant climate change metanarratives are currently framed, debated and discussed) or ‘national’ with strong tendencies to look inwards rather than transnationally. What are conspicuous therefore by their absence are regional consciousness and collective response strategies embedded in the physical-human-ecological geographies of the Bay of Bengal. For the purposes of this study we define geography as “literally, ‘earth-writing’ from the Greek geo (earth) and graphia (writing), the practice of making geographies (‘geo-graphing’) involves both writing about (conveying, expressing or representing) the world and also writing (marking, shaping or transforming) the world. The two fold in and out of one another in an ongoing and constantly changing series of situated practices, and even when attempts have been made to hold ‘geo-graphing’ still, to confine its objects and methods to a formal discipline, it has always escaped those enclosures.”1 Further, “the idea that there is some eternal metaphysical core to geography independent of circumstances will simply have to go”.2 In this vein we argue and illustrate in this book that the geographies of the ‘Bay of Bengal’, far from being fixed and rigid either in terms of physicality or our mental maps, are in fact ‘marked, shaped and transformed’ by the climate change. Correspondingly, what is needed now are innovative ways of ‘conveying, expressing and representing’ the semi-enclosed Bay of Bengal, from the perspectives of large marine ecosystem. At the same time, we uphold and argue that rather than presuming that there is an ‘eternal metaphysical core’ to the geography of the Bay of Bengal, we should be focusing more sharply on the centrality of those communities whose wellbeing and livelihoods depend on this large marine ecosystem. We begin this study with an analysis of the dominant metanarratives of multiscalar climate change, some of which are rather alarmist and fear inducing, and show how the ‘global’ scale is being privileged over other scales, especially the regional and the local. The current predominant framings of the Bay of Bengal appear no exception to the trends that tend to eclipse the reality of one of the largest marine ecosystems in the world being subjected to transformations and uncertainties associated with climate change. We further argue that

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there is a need to rethink the traditional state-centric understandings of sovereignty and security innovatively within the dynamic humanecological interface. The chapter to follow maps out in some details physical-human geographies of the Bay of Bengal, which in turn are approached and analysed as integral to large marine ecosystem. What we chiefly intend to show here is that climate change is likely to act as an impact multiplier in the region with a long-standing history of vulnerabilities to cyclones, tsunamis and storm surges. In Chapter 3, our key concern is with climate-induced displacements — both current and potential — and emerging ethical as well as geopolitical issues and contestations. The analysis here reveals the urgency of further research and reflection on the complex development-disaster-displacement interface around which the phenomena of ‘climate migrations’ are likely to unfold with implications for diverse and competing understandings of security. In the next chapter, it is argued that climate change will compel states and their defence-security establishments to rethink and reassess the roles and missions of their conventional armed forces. Confronted with common security challenges, the conventional understandings of the ‘adversary’ will have to be suitably modified in order to effectively address the transnational threats to human-environmental security. In Chapter 5 our key argument addresses the critical importance of rescaling ‘national’ responses to climate change in two major directions. It needs to be scaled up in order to develop regional perspectives and scaled down to community-centric levels to address local realities. The chapter to follow focuses on the ongoing regional cooperative engagements amongst the Bay of Bengal littorals and explores the extent to which these multilateral initiatives have factored in climate change and its various facets into their regional strategies. We present a future possibility where a new maritime regionalism — embedded in the specificities of the Bay of Bengal and harnessing the existing synergies of current regional approaches — takes a firm hold on both popular imaginations and official-state policies. Each of us owes combined and individual debts of gratitude. First and foremost, We would like to acknowledge our deeply felt gratitude and indebtedness to Ambassador K. Kesavapany, former Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Singapore, for his visionary guidance and kind support, with which this study has been

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conceptualized and completed. It has been an honour and a privilege for both of us to draw upon the formidable in-house expertise and outstanding wealth of library resources of ISEAS as Visiting Senior Research Fellows. We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to all the researchers, fellows and members of both the administration and library staff at ISEAS for their invaluable assistance and encouragement. Sanjay would like to thank Arun Grover, Vice Chancellor, Panjab University, Chandigarh, for his support and encouragement throughout the passage of this book writing. He would also like to thank all his colleagues and research scholars at the Department of Political Science, Panjab University. Vijay would like to equally extend his warm appreciation to a number of scholars who gave their valuable time to discuss climate change issues and senior retired Indian Navy officers who provided valuable inputs on maritime matters contained in the volume. Both of us would like to thank a truly amazing publication division and the editorial staff at ISEAS Publishing, especially Senior Editor Ms Rahilah Yusuf, for their patience and unstinted support to ensure successful fruition of the project.

Notes 1. D. Gregory, “Geography”. In The Dictionary of Human Geography (5th ed.), edited by D. Gregory, R. Johnston, G. Pratt, M. Watts and S. Whatmore. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). p. 287. 2. D. N. Livingstone, The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 28.

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1 Geopolitics in the Era of Climate Change Rethinking Sovereignty, Security and Sustainability Introduction The twenty-first century has been named by some as the ‘Climate Century’. 1 The findings of the four assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2 published so far and extensively cited the world over, offer ample evidence in support of anthropogenic global warming. The multifaceted and wideranging implications of climate change are likely to unfold in ways hitherto unimagined perhaps in the Indian Ocean;3 the Ocean of the Global South, with Bay of Bengal as its epicentre. In the meanwhile, the multiscalar challenge of climate change seems to have acquired an extraordinary complexity with each passing day, not only due to its transformational impacts already visible and felt in many parts of the world (e.g. the three poles: Antarctica,4 Arctic5 and the Himalayas6), but also because of an extraordinary range of representations and responses it has invoked from various quarters — governments, NGOs, international

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organizations, corporate sector, civil society and media.7 In some ways, climate change appears to have become a site marked by struggles between diverse philosophical and scientific positions on what should or should not qualify as knowledge. Perceived from a geoeconomic perspective, climate change has become the latest justification for commodification of the ‘global’ atmosphere where ownership rights are being auctioned and traded through market mechanisms.8 Framed in terms of the logic of the state and ‘national security’ climate change appears essentially a threat, which, for some strategic thinkers, surpasses even the danger posed by terrorism.9 And for others, it is an opportunity to rethink and replace the dominant paradigm of fossil fuel-driven development and “carboniferous capitalism”10 and initiate new networks and social movements.11 The trans-border nature of environment-climate change has posed a serious challenge to the underlying geographical assumptions, key principles and dominant imaginations/representations of what John Agnew has described as “modern geopolitical imagination”. 12 At the heart of this state-centric, security-obsessed vision of traditional geopolitics has been the relentless pursuit of primacy by dominant territorial states as containers of their respective societies. In the era of transformations and transitions, the visualization of geography as a fixed stage on which the struggle for power takes place in an ‘anarchical’ world is no longer tenable. Yet it is difficult to deny the persistent resistance of traditional geopolitics to new conceptualization of physical geography (both on land and at sea) as composed of delicately inter-locked ecosystems, which, in many cases (e.g. Bay of Bengal) transcend national boundaries and call for regional and sub-regional cooperation. We begin this chapter with the ‘big picture’ of climate change and environmental un-sustainability, taking most of the examples from the Indian Ocean region. We reflect briefly on how and why climate change has acquired the status of a metanarrative and argue that what makes the challenge of climate change so compelling and worrisome is that it is unfolding – in all its diversity and uncertainty – against the backdrop of longstanding history of ecological degradation. Yet another major argument then becomes that the old state-centric geopolitics looks hopelessly outdated in the era of climate change and scarcities and we need a new understanding of both ‘geography’ and ‘politics’.

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The chapter then turns to discuss the implications of environmentclimate change for the theory and practices of sovereignty with special reference to the Bay of Bengal as a semi-enclosed sea. What follows is a critical examination of ‘security’ implications of climate change and the argument that despite growing securitization13 of various climate change issues, the paradigm of human-ecological security is more suitable for the purposes of mitigating climate change and adapting to it.

Geopolitics and Climate Change: Scales, Space and Power Geopolitics is “literally a modern way of seeing the world that has profound consequences, not only for the world but also in terms of how we see the world in these terms, see our place within it.”14 According to John Agnew, it was during the course of European encounters with the “rest of the world” that the geographical moorings of “world politics” were visualized in terms of “global” scale. To quote Agnew, The onset of the capitalist world economy and the growth of the European territorial state gave rise to novel set of understandings about the partitioning of terrestrial space. The ‘layering’ of global space from the world scale downwards created a hierarchy of geographical scales through which political-economic reality was seen; in order of importance, the four were the global (the scale of the world as a whole), the international (the scale of the relations between states), the domestic/national (the scale of individual states) and the regional (the scale of the parts of the scale). Politics and problems were defined in terms of geographical scales (either domestic/national/ or international/ foreign) at which they were seen as operating within a global context. World politics worked from the global scale down. It was at this scale, therefore, that the term geopolitics was usually applied. Yet it rested on assumptions about the relative importance of various scales to life on the planet that were already in place. The global and national were privileged to the exclusion of the others.15

Agnew’s argument that “certain geopolitical understandings about geographical scale (representation) serve to underwrite specific ‘policies’ and ‘interventions’ (practices) that are then interpreted in terms of these understandings”16 is quite relevant in the context

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of climate change. One of us has argued elsewhere that ‘climate change’ is often framed as a ‘global challenge’ in both academic and popular discourses; a threat transcending national borders.17 The flows of humans, capital and carbon are perceived as indicators of a post-Westphalia world. The political space of climate change is thus imagined as deterritorialized and borderless. It is further approached and analysed by some in terms of ‘trans-national security threats’, based on the geopolitical premise that predicted climate change impacts are also likely to strengthen or help revive sub-state networks that have traditionally responded to environmental change and pressures via violence, crime, smuggling, banditry, trafficking, terrorism and other such activities.18 Despite the overwhelming natural-science evidence in favour of a deterritorializing nature of climate change, as described through various assessment reports of the IPCC, emerging geopolitical as well as geoeconomic discourses on climate change, some of which are subjected to a critical examination by us in chapter 5 of this book, tend to (re)territorialize a whole gamut of issues at play. In short, whereas transnational environmental problems (the old and the new) have posed a major challenge to modern geopolitical discourses and practices, it is useful to bear in mind that, “there is a geopolitics to how environmental problems are represented”.19 As pointed out by Simon Dalby, “the geography of specifying the environmental threat as somehow external obscures the fact that these threats might better be understood in terms of the unintended long-term and long-distance consequences of our own action.”20

“Global” Climate Change and its Consequences: Downscaling the Metanarrative? Jean-Francois Lyotard had announced in his seminal work titled The Postmodern condition: A Report on Knowledge (1992) the death of ‘metanarrative’ as a totalizing system of knowledge with claims of foundational truths with universal applicability. Greg McCarthy would disagree21 (and we agree with McCarthy) on the ground that what Lyotard had described as the key defining features of a metanarrative can be found in the dominant earth-system-science driven discourses

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of climate change. These three major characteristics are as follows. Among various competing discourses, one that is likely to qualify as metanarrative has a story/narrative to tell that can go beyond its own scientific/epistemic community and make it intelligible to both politicians/ policy-makers and the community at large. Secondly, it is crucial that the narrative itself becomes inextricably intertwined with the scientific knowledge that it draws on, so that scientific narrative not only gets legitimized through law-making agencies but also transforms itself through this process into a “truth claim without an author subject”.22 Finally, such intimate intertwining of science and politics tends to evoke a sense of powerful ‘global’ and globalizing moral justification, persuading communities (irrespective of their location on the face of the globe) to act in a particular (ethical manner) in the ‘best interests of humankind’. The most authoritative scientific basis to various climate change narratives has been provided by the IPCC, which was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to “assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation”.23 The mandate of the IPCC is to review the published scientific literature on climate change, in order to assess its costs, impacts and possible policy responses. It is also expected to provide expert advice and assessment on various scientific and technical issues for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). According to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (released in April 2007 and cited hereafter as IPCC AR4), “most of the observed increase in the global average temperature since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations. These results are based on more than 29,000 observational data series from the physical and biological systems, more than 89 per cent are said to be consistent with the direction of change expected as a response to warming.”24 It is in the executive summary of Chapter 6 entitled, “Coastal systems and low lying areas”25 that Working Group II of IPCC AR 4 talks about the following (reproduced verbatim) six important policy-

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relevant messages: “Coasts are experiencing the adverse consequences of the hazards related to climate and sea level (very high confidence)”; “Coasts will be exposed to increasing risks, including coastal erosion, over coming decades due to climate change and sea level rise (very high confidence)”; “The impact of climate change on coasts is exacerbated by increasing human-induced pressures (very high confidence)”; “Adaptation for the coasts of developing countries will be more challenging than for coasts of developed countries due to constraints on adaptive capacity (high confidence)”; “Adaptation costs for vulnerable coasts are much lesser than the costs of inaction (high confidence)”; “The unavoidability of sea level rise, even in the longer-term, frequent conflicts with present-day human development and trends (high confidence)”.26 The post AR4 survey of recent developments in climate change science, published recently, graphically outlines the global impacts of climate change.27 It is worth noting at the outset that over 100 countries are already in complete agreement over a 2°C limit for global-mean temperature rise (the so-called tipping point) in order to avert ‘dangerous’ climate change. According to AR4 estimation, for an approximately 2°C warming scenario, global-mean sea level rise, relative to 1980–99, could be in the range 0.18–0.38 m. Sea Level Rise (SLR) could go up to 0.26–0.59 m for an approximately 4°C world.28 More recent SLR research however suggests that “projections of SLR from AR4 may be underestimated and suggest a somewhat more likely higher central tendency of SLR with climate change than previously thought, but [worth noting in our view] they should not be treated as definitive as or more robust than the projections of the AR4.”29 Given the present-day protection levels, a 34 cm global SLR relative to present could result in an additional 63–102 million people falling victims to floods and an additional 5–20  per cent of coastal wetlands being lost. New work has attempted to further quantify the global-scale impact of SLR but differences in methodologies and spatial scales of analysis between studies mean that it is not possible to say whether they objectively present a change in the magnitude of impact relative to results presented in the AR4. According to some studies, for example, “around 56 million people and 1.86  per cent of coastal wetlands would be lost across 84 developing countries due to a 1 m SLR.”30

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Southeast Asia continues to figure prominently on the vulnerability map and according to certain estimates, depending upon emission scenarios, total coastal wetland area of the Coral Triangle (Indonesian, Malaysia, the Philippines, East Timor, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands) might vanish by 26–30  per cent in 2100 relative to 2010, due to rising sea levels. The anticipated adverse impacts of climate change on urban biodiversity, for example, the implications of “rising CO2 levels in cities, combined with a warmer climate and CO 2 fertilization”, 31 for urban biodiversity, urban vegetation and biodiversity management, are expected to be quite significant, especially for Singapore.32 Despite the fact that “generally, there has been little post-AR4 research on the global-scale impact of SLR”, some researchers have attempted to calculate the cost likely to be incurred due to global increases in SLR, with estimates of damages varying between US$400,000 million per year for a SLR of 0.71 m and around US$220,000 million per year (calculated only for the developing countries) for SLR of 1 m SLR.33 The challenge before the policy-makers, as far as climate change impacts on global ecosystems are concerned, becomes quite daunting in view of the fact that since the consequences of such transformation cannot be held prisoner to the national scale, a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, based on a static view of terrestrial or marine geographies, are likely to unravel. For example, due to a rise in sea temperature, warm-water species have begun moving towards the poles and colder-water species are fast retreating, “as fast as 15–50 km/decade”.34 Over 60 per cent of biodiversity is likely to be subjected to unprecedented species turnovers due to local extinctions in some regions and invasions in others.35 A decline of reef-building corals and the thousands of species which they support looks imminent at a large scale due to acidification and sea surface temperature rise. Yet another key issue area that continues to receive major attention and analysis in the post-IPCC AR4 period relates to water resources.36 The strategic importance of this indispensable resource is multiplied manifold in the light of the finding that, worldwide “drought disasteraffected area will increase with climate change from 15 per cent at present to 44 per cent by 2100, increasing rates of yield reduction for

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major crops by almost 90 per cent.”37 According to recent estimates, a temperature increase of 2.5°C will result in an extra 45–55 million people suffering from hunger by the year 2080. Whereas 3°C rise and 3–4°C rise are expected to result in an increase of 65–75 million people and 80–125 million, respectively in this category.38 Moreover climate change is expected to cause substantial damage to human health due to extreme weather phenomena, heat stress, vectorborne diseases (e.g. malaria and dengue) and poor air quality. It is to state the obvious perhaps that climate change damages key human interests. The IPCC AR4 had estimated that if there were no climate change then 3.5 billion people were at risk of dengue. But in case of approximately 2°C rise in world temperature, the health of 5–6 billion people would be at stake.39 Whereas more recent modelling studies seem to suggest that climate change could result in approximately 85,000–100,000 extra mortalities in Sub-Saharan Africa due to malaria and dengue in 2050.40 It is important to note that the preamble to the constitution of the World Health Organization defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” and its Ottawa Declaration of 1986 reinforced the positive view of health as “a resource for living”.41 According to WHO, despite the fact that measuring the health effects from climate change can at best be approximate, a WHO assessment, based on only a subset of the possible health impacts, concluded that the modest warming that has occurred since the 1970s was already causing over 140,000 excess deaths annually by the year 2004.42 It is important in our view to ensure that the focus remains on health rather than on disease. It has been argued that, “Excessive focus on threats can have profound consequences. By framing issues in terms of societal vulnerabilities, new terrains are opened up for state intervention, and ordinary people may be disempowered. New others may also be created, when the history of public health demonstrates that the well-being of societies is determined by how they treat those on their margins. Ideas of health, capabilities and resilience may lead to more positive and empowering paths.”43 The possibility can not entirely be ruled out that, containment of the diseases of the poor and developing countries of the south rather than genuine global

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transformation may become the dominant mode of the new geopolitics of the disease.44 One of the reasons we have devoted so much space and attention to the above cited review of post IPCC AR4 research on climate change science is to first and foremost highlight the fact that climate change is not an undifferentiated category. On the contrary, there is a complex spatial-geographical pattern to climate change all along the geographical scale, marked by considerable gaps in knowledge and high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability. As argued and illustrated later in this study, the Bay of Bengal is no exception to this deficit. It is important therefore to acknowledge that, “the uncertainties associated with projections across different climate models can be large (e.g. for precipitation)” and it is extremely important that “future impact assessments adequately address this source of uncertainty, where possible.”45 For example, “there are still several uncertainties in understanding the association between climate and natural or human systems; key uncertainties regarding the role of CO2 enrichment on crop productivity and Amazonia dieback, and understanding the varied response of calcifying organisms to ocean acidification.”46 The intellectual-epistemic space of climate change metanarrative, as drawn by the earth-climate-science, is alleged to be settled, consensual and beyond contention or polemic. And yet such claims to consensus have not gone unchallenged thus “attracting accusations both for being too radical on aspects of the science and for being too cautious in estimating risks”.47 Hulme would argue that: the notion that science “drives” consensus on policy and that better science will settle our differences ignores the roots of these differences in political, national, organizational, religious and intellectual culture. What is taken for granted among one group of people is “uncomfortable knowledge” that is hard for another to accept because of its implications for ideas and resource commitments that they hold dear.48

The first chairman of the IPCC, Bert Bolin, is reported to have said that the IPCC was designed in order to generate trust in the science and scientific research among nations.49 The IPCC aims at reaching a consensus view on the scientific aspects of global climate change, as this is perceived as necessary for arriving at policy decisions based on best available knowledge and expertise. The IPCC was founded in the hope

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that a wider participation of scientists along with government officials and bureaucrats would result in greater scientific consensus, which in turn would ensure a stable political outcome.50 The extent to which this hope has been realized remains debatable at best. As a hybrid agency comprising scientists and bureaucrats “it was to be governed by a bureau consisting of selected government representatives thus ensuring that the panel’s work was clearly seen to be serving the needs of government and policy. The panel was not to be a self-governing body of independent scientists.” In reality, however, “… this boundary between science and policy has proved a difficult one to maintain and to police.”51 This should not come as a surprise to social scientists; especially those aware of the intricacies of politics of knowledge and the dialectics of knowledge-power nexus. For the purposes of our study we find it useful to take note of the following pertinent questions raised by Reiner Grundmann:52 “What is the IPCC consensus? Who has been shaping the consensus? How important was it for public policy?” James Lovelock would say, “I know and respect the scientists of the IPCC and several of them are my personal friends but I was shocked to hear that they had reached a consensus on a matter of science; it is a good and useful word but it belongs to the world of politics and the courtroom, where reaching a consensus is a way of solving human differences. Scientists are concerned with probabilities, never with certainties or consensual agreement.”53 Whereas Grundmann would point out that, The IPCC likes to present itself as the international authoritative body pronouncing scientific expertise on the issue. However, some ‘‘contrarian’’ scientists and other critics think that the IPCC misrepresents the state of knowledge and exaggerates the size and urgency of the problem. While the skeptics accuse IPCC scientists of being environmentalists in disguise, others point to the processes of exclusion of specific social groups representing different knowledge claims.54 (emphasis given)

The IPCC “consensus” has led to different policy responses across countries55 and as illustrated in Chapter 5 of this book, the Bay of Bengal littorals appear no exception in this regard. In general, one reason behind such variation could be that in some countries complex and precarious domestic political agendas drive climate change policies. Behind such agendas one could also trace influences exerted by shifting alliances

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of interest groups, corporate interests and civil society assertions. Little doubt the IPCC sought from the governments the best available stateof-art scientific knowledge on various parameters of climate change. In some cases, the information that was furnished to the IPCC by certain governments was garnered from experts through the usual, well established and ‘reliable’ bureaucratic channels. The important role played by the media in some countries in shaping the tone and tenor of domestic debate and discourses on climate change issues as well as government policies was also significant.56 An additional point to be noted is that the science of climate change is still in the making and much more research is needed, especially in terms of indigenousnative knowledge systems and from a social-science perspective. The same appears to be true for the Bay of Bengal.

Rethinking Sovereignty: Growing Mismatch between the Ecological and Geopolitical Spaces Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk have described a “sovereignty discourse” as “a way of describing and thinking about the world in which nationstates are the principal actors, the principal centres of power and the principal objects of interest.”57 The sovereignty discourse58 partitions the world into physical-social domains with static physical boundaries that are “not only fixed and immutable in space, they are also fixed and immutable in time”.59 Since the legitimacy, authority and effectiveness of sovereignty discourse derives from the extent to which the theory appears to explain reality, all the three appear to be under threat in the context of ecological degradation and climate change. This is not to imply that sovereignty discourse ceases to matter but to argue that its explanatory and persuasive power is significantly eroded when, for example, the state damages the environment in ways that transcend its national boundaries. One striking example is that of the release of carbon from deforestation and the critical importance of the future of the Amazon forest for the rest of the world. On the one hand, the Amazon forest acts as a globally important carbon sink, on the other hand there is no denying the fact that by 1998, “the area of forest cleared in the

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Brazilian Amazon had reached some 549,000 square km, about the size of France out of a total area as large as Western Europe. In a few decades, Brazil has managed to deforest an area far greater than that lost over the preceding five centuries of European colonization”.60 Imagine a situation when the remaining Brazilian Amazon forests were to be lost. According to some estimates, the loss would amount to as much as 77GtC, which is 10 per cent higher than the 70GtC “that could be gained from the full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol together with a 1 per cent compounded reduction per year in the emissions of developed countries from fossil fuel burning between 2010 and 2100.”61 In comparison to various continental concerns and representations of climate change, such as those related to forests, mountain glaciers and rivers, the oceanic-maritime spaces appear to have received much less attention. Under Part IX of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) we find provisions dealing with a particular kind of “special maritime situations and features” — the “enclosed or semi-enclosed seas”. The inclusion in the UNCLOS of this part reflects the recognition by the drafters and negotiators of the special geographical situation of such seas as well as the relationship that can be envisaged between or among bordering States in managing activities and quality of the environment in such seas. Article 122 of the UNCLOS defines a ‘enclosed or semi-enclosed sea’ as follows: For the purposes of this Convention, “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.

Without doubt, the Bay of Bengal geographically fits this definition and is a semi-enclosed sea because it consists “entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states”. At its mouth between the Nicobar Islands and Sri Lanka, the bay is about 650 nautical miles wide.62 Similarly, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean Sea and according to some analysts even South China Sea,63 fall into this definition. Besides the legal geographies of obligation under UNCLOS III what further reinforces the semi-enclosed nature

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of the Bay of Bengal are the ecological-geographies of large marine ecosystem and one of the largest contiguous mangrove forests in the world the Sunderbans, as discussed in the chapter to follow. The geographical layout and the resource endowment of the Bay of Bengal, wide-ranging future implications of climate change (including human displacement) for human security and equity, emerging tensions among some of the littoral States of the Bay of Bengal over maritime boundaries, collectively reinforce the urgency of pursuing regional cooperation in the Bay of Bengal and further accentuate the importance of the provisions of Part IX of UNCLOS III. The question of how to approach the issues of Bay of Bengal, especially the issues of peace and development, deserves examination with a new view not simply from within the region but from the lessons learned from other similar regions, a theme to which we return in the concluding chapter of this work. In most cases, the geographical fact of being located in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea results in a situation where the bordering States compete with one another for marine space and resources. In some cases, tensions might arise due to claims of 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), continental shelf (especially areas of continental shelf beyond the EEZ) or even a full 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, without the occurrence of overlapping claims with neighbouring opposite or adjacent States. Discussed in some detail in Chapter 2 of this book, the emerging complex labyrinth of maritime claims and counter claims64 has the potential of turning the Bay of Bengal into what Sam Bateman65 would describe as ‘A New Sea of Trouble’. From a resources perspective, the bordering States share the same water body and the same marine resource base, both living and nonliving, for sustaining the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of fishing communities and sustainable development. Some analysts have argued that, “States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas can be said to be geographically disadvantaged States.”66 Disadvantaged or not, the States concerned (e.g. the littoral States of the Bay of Bengal) are confronted with certain ecological-geographical realities. The ‘limitation’ of being enclosed or semi-enclosed seas requires the bordering States to develop ‘intraregional’ mechanisms to reduce, mitigate or eliminate competition and conflicts.

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Ideally speaking therefore, States bordering an enclosed or semienclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under UNCLOS III. They collectively share the obligation directly or through an appropriate regional organization to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea in an ecologically sustainable manner. Be it the protection and preservation of the marine environment (a task made further cumbersome due to climate change) or production and sharing of information and knowledge (where appropriate through joint programmes of scientific research) the provisions of this article acquire critical importance in the Bay of Bengal and even beyond.67 Once we factor into these obligations demographic factors and socio-economic conditions of communities (e.g. the South Asia part of the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem has more than 20 million coastal poor living on less than US$2 per day),68 the concerns related to human security become paramount and pronounced. It is to this relatively neglected aspect of security spectrum that we turn next.

Rethinking Security: Human-Ecological Dimensions It is the poorest of the poor in the world — and this includes poor people in prosperous societies as well — who are going to be the worst victims of climate change–induced displacements and dislocations. Particularly vulnerable would be those who are on the socio-economic margins. The impoverished fishers of the Bay of Bengal, whose livelihoods depend directly on traditional small-scale fishing, fall in this category. As pointed out in the 2011 FAO study on South Asia sub-region of the Bay of Bengal, The number of fishers involved in the coastal/marine fishery was estimated at 3.2 million at the beginning of the decade. Neither the actual numbers of small scale fishers are known with adequate certainty, nor their operational areas within boundaries of resource systems in which they operate. This population is distributed predominantly along the Bangladesh and Indian coastlines, and to a lesser extent along Sri Lanka’s coastal area.69

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They are the ones who are lacking the most in terms of capacity and resource endowment and thus will find it increasingly hard to adapt to climate change. Considerations of equity, differential vulnerability within the Bay of Bengal, and differing adaptive capacity will remain paramount to these communities. No doubt the consequences of climate change-induced biophysical transformations will differ among members belonging to the same community in direct proportion to their adaptive capacities. Whereas some individuals or groups might perceive an opportunity with change, others may experience a loss, thereby changing community dynamics and complicating decisions about how to adapt.70 While grappling with the futuristic dimensions of the multiscalar climate change, it is important that we do not lose sight of the so-called ‘natural’ disasters that have struck the Bay of Bengal and its Indian Ocean environs in the past. On 26 December 2004, the earthquakeinduced tsunami disaster devastated the coastal regions and communities on the Indian Ocean rim. More than 300,000 people were killed and nearly 5 million displaced. Nearly 96  per cent of the total human loss and sufferings and about 12  per cent of the total economic damage recorded in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Myanmar, Maldives and Bangladesh were in the coastal zones. The then US Secretary of State Colin Powell was quick to compare the impact of Indian Ocean tsunami with a Hiroshima-sized nuclear explosion.71 We return to this issue in the next chapter. The concept of ‘environmental security’ has been meaningfully approached through diverse contexts, competing texts and contested readings. Before we turn to a critical examination of the nuanced nature of this concept we find it useful to be reminded of the fact that, The environment is sometimes seen (I believe oversimply) as the ‘state of nature’, including such measures as the extent of forest cover, the depth of groundwater tables, the number of living species and so on... This understanding is, however, deeply defective for two important reasons. First, the value of environment cannot be just a matter of what there is, but also consist of the opportunities it offers to people. The impact of environment on human lives must be among the principle considerations in assessing the value of the environment. … Secondly, the environment is not only a matter of passive preservation, but also one of active pursuit. Even though many human activities that accompany

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In our assessment, Amartya Sen is not denying “our sense of responsibility towards the future of other species”, for example, mangroves or tigers in the eco-region of Sundarbans, partitioned between India and Bangladesh. In his view since humans are much more powerful than other species, they owe some responsibility towards their wellbeing. One of the key points underlined by Sen is that “people do have needs, but they also have values and, in particular, cherish their ability to reason, appraise, choose, participate and act. … Seeing people (e.g. the Bay of Bengal coastal communities) only in terms of their needs may give us a rather meagre view of humanity”.73 Equally significant and compelling is his insistence that beyond grand narratives of socio-ecological justice (or for that matter ‘climate justice’) is the multitude of ecological injustices handed out to various marginalized communities over a long period of time. The former should not be allowed to eclipse the latter. Timothy Doyle,74 too would make a forceful plea in favour of “repopulating the environment” especially in the context of what he describes as a ‘majority world’.75 In his view, a narrow definition of the term ‘environment’ as well as eco-centric arguments that tend to privilege nature over communities are fundamentally flawed in the sense that they perceive the ‘environment’ as ‘somewhere out there’ and in the process alienate the inhabitants from their habitat. For nearly 400 million people inhabiting the catchment area of Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) in the Bay of Bengal as citizens of Sri Lanka, Maldives, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, the term environment has to be people-centric in order to be meaningful and relevant to them.76 One encounters different views on whether environmental security is compatible or in conflict with an exclusive focus on the security of the nation-state.77 Some analysts would locate environmental issues within the traditional, state-centric framework of ‘national’ security and argue that the military should be seen as a positive agent of environmental preservation because it can bring its organizational abilities to bear on environmental problems at the local scale.78 Whereas others would

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strongly disagree and argue that what is essentially a part of the problem cannot be a part of the solution.79 As shown in Chapter 4, the debate would continue but it will not be easy either to deny the close link between the concept of security and the nation-states and its armed forces, or to change the dominant state-centric spatiality of the concept of security. It may be possible however that the traditional roles and missions of the militaries are transformed to address new climate-induced non-traditional threats to security. Whereas those who believe that hegemonic discourses obsessed with ‘security’ often result in ‘militarized environment’ would forcefully plead that ‘environmental security’ should be meticulously approached and firmly relocated within the context of human security. Simon Dalby, for example, would argue that, The sheer scale of human activity in the last couple of centuries has changed the context within which humanity exists. The new Anthropocene era is now the appropriate framework to use to understand human security… the traditional focus on states as protectors is no longer an adequate geopolitical specification for what needs to be done; the formulations of human security make this inadequacy unavoidable, and the recognition that equity and impacts do not follow state boundaries reinforces the point, but these insights do not resolve the dilemmas that need urgent attention.80

The persisting firm grip of traditional geopolitics on both official and popular imaginations is proven by the fact that especially since the early 1970s, many environmental questions have been approached and understood as matters of largely ‘global’ scale. For example, ozone depletion, biodiversity loss and global climate change have been considered by many as matters demanding and deserving ‘global’ governance. It has been rightly pointed out that scale is neither given nor fixed, and is socially constructed, fluid and contingent. However, for the purposes of this study, several questions demand further critical reflection. What is the most appropriate regulatory scale (local, subnational, national and supranational) for mitigating climate change in the Bay of Bengal? What are the implications of various representational modes (including metanarrative)81 or discursive frames of scale for mitigating climate change and devising strategies for adaptation?

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The proponents of a critical geopolitics pinpoint new forms of power/knowledge that appear to be part and parcel of the twenty-first century environmental geopolitics.82 While duly acknowledging that nature exists as well as matters, they nevertheless insist that politics behind diverse framings and representations of nature need to be explored. In other words, they draw attention to politics behind the production of geographical knowledge of environmental crisis and climate change. Mike Hulme raises a series of questions that are of central importance to this book: What does climate mean to different people and to diverse cultures? Which of these meanings are threatened by climate change and which can co-evolve with a changing climate? What language is used to portray climate risks? Is climate change really a collective action problem? Who gains from driving forward ideas of global climate governance? And, in the end, what is our vision of the global future? Who speaks for the twenty-second century?83

Queries posed above shall remain partially answered in the absence of a critical engagement with the notion of ‘environmental justice’; which is fundamentally about incorporating environmental issues into the broader intellectual and institutional framework of human rights, democratic governance and accountability. 84 The discourse of environmental justice relates to the issue of equity, with special reference to vulnerable groups and communities including those in the Bay of Bengal region.

Conclusion The extent to which the obligations are likely to be met by the littoral States of the Bay of Bengal under UNCLOS III will be determined to a significant extent by the state of interplay between the modern geopolitical imagination (that continues to privilege the ‘global’ and the ‘national’ over other scales) and the imperatives of humanenvironmental security and social-ecological justice, which demand and deserve serious and systematic interventions both at the regional/ sub-regional (beyond the national) and local scales. As Arjun Appadurai85 puts it so aptly, if nations according to Benedict Anderson86

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are imagined communities, then what we need is a different set of imaginations to transcend national boundaries in order to meet the challenge of climate change largely within the paradigm of human security, which, if unaddressed, might challenge ‘national security’ through social unrest and popular protest. We return to this useful insight with reference to the notion of the Bay of Bengal Community in the concluding sections of this study. The list of non-traditional threats to comprehensive security is fast multiplying, and includes multi-scalar issues (in terms of causes or consequences or both) such as deforestation or desertification, loss of biological diversity both on land and at sea, global warming and ozone depletion, or threatened marine ecosystems, among several others. In a recent study on climate change and regional vulnerability to transnational security threats in Southeast Asia, Christopher Jasparro and Jonathan Taylor87 have discussed the possible impacts of climate change upon transnational and non-state threats including international organized crime, terrorism, illicit trafficking (in drugs, wildlife, humans, arms, etc.). They conclude by saying that, Over all climate change could increase potential vulnerability to various transnational security threats. Southeast Asian livelihood and social systems will be pressured, while state and civil society capacity will be strained. This will intensify existing vulnerabilities to non-state security threats and raise the overall level of vulnerability and risk to both human and state security. Predicted climate change impacts are also likely to strengthen or help revive sub-state networks that have traditionally responded to environmental challenge and pressure via violence, crime, smuggling, banditry, trafficking, terrorism and other such activities. This will contribute to the evolution, expansion and growth of “new” war fighting groups while raising overall vulnerability to non-state threats from local to global scales.

The Independent World Commission on the Oceans reminded us more than a decade ago that, “ocean ecosystems are often used in ways that are unsustainable, not only in environmental, but also in economic and social terms”.88 In most cases it is the poor who bear the brunt of unsustainability. An estimated 70 per cent of the world’s fish stocks are being exploited to such extent that they are beyond sustainable limits, but fishing generally continues unabated despite extensive regulatory

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arrangements for their management. “The oceans have also become the ultimate sink of discharges of waste of all sorts — carried by rivers and winds — from land-based sources, including coastal mega-cities. Other threats come from the transport of hazardous wastes, operational and accidental spillage of oil, discharge of radioactive materials at sea, nuclear testing and the transport of alien species in the ballast of ships.”89 In order to maximize human-ecological security for the Indian Ocean region in general and the Bay of Bengal in particular, what needs to be jettisoned at the very outset is “great void” construction and the perceived placelessness of the Indian Ocean. As Philip E. Steinberg (2001: 165) puts it so succinctly: The new intensity of the great void ideal of ocean-space (and indeed transportation space in general) is epitomized by the triumph of the container ship and automated, internodal container port. With containerization, movement by sea, rail and truck is constructed as one continuous flow. The aim is to annihilate any unique characteristics of the environment across which the containers move. The vehicle carrying the container is obscured, as are the commodities within the containers; trade is reduced to movement. Labour in the port and on the ship is hidden from view. There is no longer a popular image of a sailor, maritime worker or stevedore; work connections between port and city, formerly evident in the gritty, odorous maritime service area near the city centre, now are hidden within the sterile robotic gantry cranes of the remote container port. The imagination of maritime life is restricted to consumption sites glorifying mercantilist pasts, and these sites rarely contain any cues to assist the tourist in connecting historic memories with functioning ports. Of course, outside this image lies an empirically rich world of individuals whose everyday lives revolve around entirely different encounters with the ocean as a friction surface (e.g. refugees whose lives are dictated by the agonizingly slow movements of smugglers ships) and a space of nature (e.g. fishers whose lives revolve around knowledge of distinct fish-rich places within the ocean). However, the existence of individuals and their alternate constructions of the ocean as a space of representation are denied by the representations of ocean-space that emanate from postmodern capitalism’s dominant spatial practices.90

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Moving on to the next chapter we remain conscious of the fact that ‘mapping’ the Bay of Bengal implies and involves much more than simply mapping the physical-material-resource geographies. No doubt the physical geographies of the Bay of Bengal remain important, but they need to be filled in with the details of human-ecologicalcultural geographies in order to encounter the reductionism inherent in modern geopolitical imagination. Kanti Bajpai has persuasively argued that, The point of human security studies … is to describe a map of violence that goes well beyond the map created by the neo-realist/statist view of security. Evidence suggests that the map is much larger than the map of inter-state violence. With all its imperfections, a human security audit, done systematically and rigorously, will map a massive area of human experience that is presently unmapped (or mapped in bits and pieces). Its promise is not to get every contour absolutely right; it is rather, to start to fill it, however incompletely, what is presently a very blurry picture — a picture of a turbulent and complex world system, composed of a ramifying set of actors and linkages, as well as an emergent world society increasingly latticed by globalized norms and institutions.91

It is in the light of these insights that we turn to the vital task of mapping the Bay of Bengal in terms of human-environmental interface and interactions.

Notes   1. M. Glantz, Climate Affairs: A Primer (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003).   2. See IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], 1990. First Assessment Report  (AR1); IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], 1995. Second Assessment Report  (AR2); IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], 2001. Third Assessment Report  (AR3); IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], 2007. Fourth Assessment Report  (AR4). The texts of these reports can be found online at .   3. For an excellent set of papers dealing with climate change in the Indian Ocean Region, see the special issue of the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6 (2010) on: “Climate Change and the Indian Ocean Region”.

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  4. See J. Turner et al., eds, Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment (Cambridge: SCAR, 2009), Executive Summary at pp. xxvi–xxvii; S. Chaturvedi, “Antarctic ‘Climate Security’ Dilemma and the Future of Antarctic Governance”, in Antarctic Security in the 21st Century, edited by D. Rothwell, A. Hemmings and K. Scott (London: Routledge, 2012); C. Turner and Lachlan-cope Marshall et al., “Antarctic Climate Change During the Last 50 Years”, International Journal of Climatology 25 (2005): 279–94; J.R. Petit et al., “Climate and atmospheric history of the past 420 000 years from the Vostok ice core”, Antarctica Nature 399 (1999): 429–36; E.W. Wolff. “Understanding the past: Climate history from Antarctica”, Antarctic Science 17, no. 4 (2005): 487–95; Davor, “Emerging Law of the Sea Issues in the Antarctic Maritime Area: A Heritage for the New Century?”, Ocean Development & International Law 31, no. 1 (2000): 197–222; S.S. Jacobs, H.H. Hellmer and A. Jenkins, “Antarctic Ice Sheet Melting in the Southeast Pacific”, Geophys. Res. Lett. 23 (1996): 957–60; A. Shepherd and D.J. Wingham, “Antarctic glacier thinning, 1992-2003”, Scottish Geographical Journal 124, no. 2 (2008): 154–64.   5. See S. Chaturvedi, “De(securitizing) the Ice: Circumpolar Arctic in ‘Global’ Climate Change”, in Global and Regional Problems: Towards an Interdisciplinary Study, edited by P. Aalto, V. Harle and S. Moisio (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012); Arctic climate impact assessment, Impact of warming Arctic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Arctic climate impact assessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Arctic human development report, 2004 (accessed 21 August 2009); Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2009 (accessed 15 September 2009); R. Corell, “Challenges of Climate Change: An Arctic Perspective”, Ambio 35, no. 4 (2006): 148–52; B. Hugh, “Socialand economic aspects of climate change in arctic regions”, 2000, available at (accessed 15 July 2014); Derocher, Lunn and Stirling, “Polar Bears in a Warming Climate”, Integr. Comp. Biol. 44 (2004): 163–76; J.O. Kaplan, “Arctic climate change with a 2ºC global warming: Timing, climate patterns and vegetation change”, Climate Change 79, no. 213 (2006): 213–14; O.R. Young, “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the circumpolar north”, Polar Record 45, no. 232 (2009): 73–82.   6. See J. Xu et al., “The Melting Himalayas: Cascading Effects of Climate Change on Water, Biodiversity, and Livelihoods”, Conservation Biology 23 (2009): 520–30; K. Morton, “Climate Change and Security at the Third Pole”,

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  7.   8.

  9. 10.

11.

12. 13.

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Survival 53, no. 1 (2011): 121–32; V. Shiva and V.K. Bhatt, Climate change at the third pole: The impact of climate instability on Himalayan ecosystems and Himalayan communities (New Delhi: Navdanya Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, 2009). See M. Hulme, Why We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inactionand Opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). See G. Bridge, “The Economy of Nature: from Political Ecology to the Social Construction of Nature”, in The SAGE handbook of economic geography, edited by A. Leyshon, R. Lee and McDewell (New Delhi: Sage, 2011); N. Castree, “Commodifying what nature?”, Progress in Human Geography 27 (2003): 273–97; N. Castree, “Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 2: Theorising the Neoliberalisation of Nature”, Geography Compass 4 (2010): 1734–46; L. Lohmann, “Marketing and Making Carbon Dumps: Commodification, Calculation and Counterfactuals in Climate Change Mitigation”, Science as Culture 14, no. 3 (2005): 203–35. See S. Hawking, quoted in M. Henderson, “It’s five minutes to Armageddon, and Hawking tells the world to wake up”, The Times, 18 January 2007. For an interesting treatment of this concept, see M. Paterson, “Post-Hegemonic Climate Politics?”, British Journal of Politics & International Relations 11 (2009): 140–58; G. Bridge, “Resource geographies I: Making carbon economies, old and new”, Progress in Human Geography 5 (November 2010): 1–15; C. Bichsel et al., “Environmental Peacebuilding: Managing Natural Resource Conflicts in a Changing World”, Swisspeace Annual Conference, 2009; S. Dalby, “Global Geopolitics”, in The Sage handbook of political geography, edited by K.R. Cox, M. Low and J. Robinson, pp. 427–38 (London: Sage, 2008). See D.L. Levy and D. Egan, “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Political Strategy: Conflict and Accommodation in the Climate Change Negotiations”, Journal of Management Studies 40, no. 4 (2003): 403–29; E.M. Reid and M.W. Toffel, “Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate Disclosure of Climate Change Strategies”, Strategic Management Journal 30 (2009): 1157–78; A. Jamison, “Climate Change Knowledge and Social Movement Theory”, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1, no. 6 (2010): 811–23. J. Agnew, Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics (London and New York: Routledge: 1998), p. 494. The term “geopolitics” was coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 1899. For a detailed analysis, see O. Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in On Security, edited by R.D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); C. Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization

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14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal and Emancipation”, International Relations and Development 7 (2004): 388–413; T. Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”, European Journal of International Relations 11 (2005): 171–201; Hansen, cited in M. McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security”, European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–87; S. Holger, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and beyond”, European Journal of International Relations 13, no . 3 (2007): 357–83; M. Ibrahim, “The securitization of migration: A racial discourse”, International Migration 43, no. 5 (2005); M. McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security”; M.G. William, “Words Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 5 (2003): 511–31. S. Dalby. “Green Geopolitics”, in A Companion to Political Geography, edited by J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 442. J. Agnew, Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 3. Ibid. T. Doyle and S. Chaturvedi, “Climate Territories: A Global Soul for the Global South?”, Geopolitics 15, no. 3 (2010): 516–35. C. Jasparro and J. Taylor, “Climate Change and Transnational Security”, Geopolitics 13, no. 2 (2008): 232. N. Castree, “The Geopolitics of Nature”, in A Companion to Political Geography, edited by J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), p. 427. Dalby, “Green Geopolitics”, in A Companion to Political Geography, edited by Agnew, Mitchell and Toal, p. 445. G. McCarthy, “The Climate Change Metanarrative, State of Exception and China’s Modernization”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6, no. 2 (2010): 252–66. Ibid. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Summary for Policymakers: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Ibid. R.J. Nicholls et al., “Coastal systems and low-lying areas: Climate change, impacts, adaptation and vulnerability”, in Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by M.L. Parry et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), pp. 317–18.

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26. Ibid., pp. 317–18. The policy-oriented statements made by the IPCC, and marked by different levels of “confidence”, are backed up by facts and figures. Here are just a few citations from the executive summary. The number of those “exposed” to tropical cyclone hazards annually in different parts of the globe is about 120 million, out of which 250,000 people were killed between 1980 and 2000. We are told that, “The anticipated climaterelated changes include: an accelerated rise in sea level of up to 0.6 m or more by 2100; a further rise in sea surface temperatures by up to 3 degrees centigrade; and intensification of tropical and extra-tropical cyclones; larger extreme waves and storm surges; altered precipitation/run off; and ocean acidification. The phenomena will vary considerably at regional and local scales, but the impacts are virtually certain to be overwhelmingly negative”. Furthermore, “increased flooding and the degradation of freshwater, fisheries and other resources could impact hundreds of millions of people, and socio-economic costs on coasts will escalate as a result of climate change ... Populated deltas (especially Asian mega deltas), low lying coastal urban areas and atolls are key societal hotspots of coastal vulnerability, occurring where the stresses on natural systems coincide with low human adaptive capacity and high exposure. Regionally, South, Southeast and East Asia, Africa and small islands are most vulnerable ... Without adaptation, the high-end sea-level rise scenarios, combined with other climate changes (e.g. increased storm intensity), are as likely as not to render some islands and low lying areas unviable by 2100 ... Sea level rise has substantial inertia and will continue beyond 2100 for many centuries.” 27. See S.N. Gosling et al., “A Review of Recent Developments in Climate Change Science. Part II. The Global Scale Impacts of Climate Change”, Progress in Physical Geography 35, no. 4 (2011): 443–64. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., p. 445. 30. Ibid., pp. 445–46. 31. Ibid., p. 450. 32. Research on climate change and its impact on urban diversity is a key future research priority. 33. See Gosling et al., “A Review of Recent Developments in Climate Change Science”. Part II 34. Ibid., p. 449. 35. Ibid. 36. See K.D. Frederick, “Water Resources and Climate Change”, Climate Issues Brief, No. 3 (Washington: Resources for the Future: 1997), p. 452; Climate change is going to impact more than 1.4 billon people from Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Yangtze, and Yellow rivers. The upstream snow and ice

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26

37. 38.

39.

40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal reserves are likely to be affected by climate change, the extent of it is still unclear. See W.W. Immerzeel, “Climate Change Will Affect the Asian Water Towers”, Science 328 (2010): 1382; P.G. Gleick, “Climate Change, Exponential Curves, Water Resources, and Unprecedented Threats to Humanity”, Climatic Change 100 (2010): 125–29; L.G. Manning et al., “Using Probabilistic Climate Change Information from a Multimodel Ensemble for Water Resources Assessment”, Water Resources Research 45 (W11411), 2009. Frederick, “Water Resources and Climate Change”. B. Hare, “Relationship between increases in global mean temperature and impacts on ecosystems, food production, water and socio-economic systems”, in Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, edited by H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 177–87; S. Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global Climate Change”, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 15, no. 2 (2006): 255; W. Hare, “Assessment of Knowledge on Impacts of Climate Change”, Contribution to the Specification of Art. 2 of the UNFCCC, 2003. Avalilabe at (accessed 15 August 2011). U. Confalonieri et al., “Human health”, in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by M.L. Parry et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 391–431. A good deal of research is in progress on potential benefits of mitigation for health impacts. Studies have shown that transition to low-carbon fuels, lowering consumption of animal products, and using clean-burning cook stoves could reduce the burden of disease on national to regional scales. Others have shown that globally around 1 million heat-related deaths could be avoided by 2100 if CO2 levels are stabilized at 450 ppm relative to 650 ppm. See Gosling, “A Review of Recent Developments in Climate Change Science. Part II”. Cited in A. Ingram, “The New Geopolitics of Disease: Between Global Health and Global Security”, Geopolitics 10, no. 3 (2005): 522–45. See the media centre of WHO dealing with climate change and health at . Ibid. Ibid. See Gosling, “A Review of Recent Developments in Climate Change Science. Part II”, p. 456. Ibid.

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47. M. Hulme, Why we Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inactionand Opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 392. 48. Ibid., p. xxii. 49. R. Grundmann, “Climate change and knowledge politics”, Environmental Politics 16, no. 3 (2007): 414–32; N. Oreskes, “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change”, Science 306, no . 5702 (2004): 1686; R.S. Courtney, “Purpose and function of IPCC”, Nature  379, no. 109 (1996). 50. Ibid. 51. Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change, p. 96. 52. Grundmann, “Climate change and knowledge politics”, p. 415. 53. J. Lovelock, The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning (London: Penguin Books, 2003). 54. Grundmann, “Climate change and knowledge politics”, p. 416. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), p. 2. 58. J.L. Cohen, “Whose Sovereignty? Empire versus International Law”, Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 3 (2004): 1–24; K. Conca, “Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty Debate”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23 (1994): 701. A. Appadurai, “Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography”, in The Geography of Identity, edited by P. Yaeger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 59. Ibid. Camilleri and Falk. The End of Sovereignty?, p. 312. 60. P. Bunyard, “Climate and the Amazon”, in Surviving the Century: Facing Climate Chaos and Other Global Challenges, edited by Herbert Girardet (London: Earthscan, 2008), p. 80. 61. Ibid. 62. S. Bateman, “Bay of Bengal: A New Sea of Troubles”, RSIS Commentaries (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 21 May 2010), p. 2. 63. N.A. Hu, “Semi-Enclosed Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application of the 1982 UNCLOS Article 123 to the South China Sea”, Ocean Development and International Law 41 (2010): 281–341. 64. S. Kay, “Indian Ocean Maritime Claims”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6, no. 1 (2010): 113–28; C. Schofield, “Competing Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction in the Indian Ocean”, in Fisheries Exploitation in the Indian Ocean: Threats and Opportunities, edited by D. Rumley, S. Chaturvedi and V. Sakhuja (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 104–37.

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65. Bateman, “Bay of Bengal: A New Sea of Troubles”. 66. Ibid., p. 282. 67. Subparagraph (d) envisages the involvement of “extra-regional” States or “international organizations” in the cooperation with enclosed or semienclosed sea States. These extra-regional states may well be user states in the enclosed or semi-enclosed seas while the international organizations may well be those having regional or global competence in the affairs or the spheres as set out in Article 123(a), (b), or (c). 68. J.I. Samarakoon et al., “Review of Community-based Integrated Coastal Management: Best Practices and Lessons Learned in the Bay of Bengal, South Asia”, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2011, pp. 1–116. 69. Ibid. 70. K.L. O’Brien and R.M. Leichenko, “Winners and Losers in the Context of Global Change”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 93, no. 1 (2003): 89–103. 71. T. Huxley, “The Tsunami and Security: Asia 9/11”, Survival 47, no. 1 (2005): 123–32. 72. A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (New Delhi: Penguin, 2009), pp. 248–49. 73. Ibid., p. 250. 74. T. Doyle, Green Power: The Environmental Movement in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2000), p. 215. 75. T. Doyle, Environmental Movement in Majority and Minority World: A Global Perspective (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005). 76. M. Bavinck. and Salagarama, “Assessing the Governability of Capture Fisheries in the Bay of Bengal”, Journal of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies 7, no. 1 (2008): 1–10. For a detailed analysis of the state and status of fisheries in the Indian Ocean, see Rumley, Chaturvedi and Sakhuja, eds., Fisheries Exploitation in the Indian Ocean. 77. G. Porter, “Environmental Security as National Security Issue”, Current History 94, no. 592 (1995): 216. 78. K.H. Butts, “Why the Military is Good for the Environment”, in Green Security or Militarized Environment, edited by J. Kakonen (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1994), pp. 83–111. 79. M. Finger, “Global Environmental Degradation and the Military”, in Green Security or Militarized Environment, edited by Kakonen, p. 169. 80. S. Dalby, Security and Environmental Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 156. 81. G. McCarthy, “The Climate Change Metanarrative, State of Exception and China’s Modernization”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6, no. 2 (2010): 252–66.

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82. S. Dalby, “Green Geopolitics”, in A Companion to Political Geography, edited by J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). Also S. Dalby, “Anthropocene geopolitics: Globalisation, empire, environment and critique”, Geography Compass 1, no. 1 (2007): 103–18. 83. M. Hulme, “Geographical Work at the Boundaries of Climate Change”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33 (2008): 5–11. 84. See P.S. Wenz, Environmental Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988); A. Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Theories of Distributive Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 85. A. Appadurai, “Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography”, in The Geography of Identity, edited by P. Yaeger (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996). 86. G.R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 2006), p. 240. 87. C. Jasparro and J. Taylor, “Climate Change and Regional Vulnerability to Transnational Security Threats in Southeast Asia”, Geopolitics 13, no. 2 (2008): 232. 88. Independent World Commission on the Oceans, The Ocean, Our Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 89. Ibid. 90. P.E. Steinberg The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001). 91. K. Bajpai, “Beyond Comprehensive Security: Human Security”, in Comprehensive Security: Perspectives from India’s Regions, Seminar Proceedings (New Delhi: Policy Research Group, 2002), pp. 214–15.

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2 Mapping THE Bay of Bengal in the Era of Climate Change Introduction Geography is a critical determinant to understand the symptomatic impact of the ongoing climate change. The geographical profile of the region, its relative position on the earth, weather and environmental conditions that prevail in the geographical realm are the crucial indices to understand the impact of climate change on land, air and sea. This interrelationship among the indices of geography provides states greater understanding of the change and helps build capacities for adaptation and mitigation. Also the transnational nature of climate change necessitates that states correlate the geography, weather and environment of adjacent regions for developing the adaptation and mitigation strategies. At another level, climate-induced changes endow some states with an advantage and for others it could act as an adversity. For instance northern Russia is constrained by the harsh climatic conditions of the Arctic and is icebound resulting in partial access to the sea. But due to the climate-induced global warming and the shrinking of the Arctic ice cap, Russia may soon be in a favourable position to utilize the new sea routes as well as the living and non-living resources in the region

30

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adding to its economic prosperity. On the other hand, Bangladesh is among the worst affected by the multiplying effects of climate change and witnesses frequent and intense floods, cyclones, storm surges and may even lose some of its territory due to the rising sea levels. This will remain a significant factor in Bangladesh’s calculi of its economic and social development strategy.

Geographical Settings of the Bay of Bengal The Bay of Bengal is a horse shoe-shaped sea space which opens into the Indian Ocean in the south. Its waters wash the shores of the delta region of Bangladesh, east coast of India, western Indonesian archipelago, west coast of peninsular Malaysia, east coast of Myanmar peninsula, east coast of Sri Lanka and west coast of Thailand. In geographical terms, the Bay of Bengal region is the northern extended arm of the Indian Ocean and lies between longitudes 80 degree east and 100 degree east and latitudes 0 degree (Equator) and 22 degrees north. It is the biggest bay and stretches over nearly 2.2 million square kilometres. The average depth in the Bay of Bengal is 2,600 metres with a maximum depth of 5,258 metres.1 The Andaman and Nicobar group of islands lies in the middle of the Bay of Bengal and run in the north-south axis. These 572 islands are spread over an area of about 825,000 hectares and the coastline stretches 1,962 kilometres. The snowbound regions of the Himalayas and its glaciers such as the Gangotri and Yamunotri in Uttarakhand, India, Nubra, Biafo and Baltoro in the Karakoram region, Zemu in Sikkim and Khumbu glaciers in the Mount Everest region are the source of several large perennial river systems in South Asia which drain into the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.2 The Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet forms into the Brahmaputra in India, flows eastwards and then southwards west through the plains of Assam into the Bay of Bengal. The Ganga, which also has its origins in the Himalaya, is joined by a number of smaller rivers such as the Ramaganga, Gomati, Ghagra, Gandak and Kosi that also have their origins in the Himalayas in Nepal. The Surma-Meghna river system flows through Bangladesh. The confluence of the three rivers is also referred to as Ganga-BrahmaputraMeghna Basin and drains an area of 1,086,000 square kilometres. 3

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Likewise, the Ayeyarwady River with its origins in the Himalayas in Tibet flows eastwards and then south through Myanmar into the Andaman Sea. Importantly, the rains and the freshwater from the rivers determine the hydrographic and oceanographic characteristics of the Bay of Bengal. Further, the river systems also affect the sediment deposits and shape the underwater topography of the Bay of Bengal.

Weather and Cyclone Activity in THE Bay of Bengal The Bay of Bengal receives seasonal rains from the south-west monsoon from June to September and the north easterly monsoon gives rain during November to February. The region experiences tropical cyclones which are in the form of high wind speeds. These churn up the sea water in the form of giant waves that move with great intensity towards the shore and further inland causing flooding in the low-lying coastal areas.4 In a study titled ‘Climate change impacts and adaptation assessment in Bangladesh’, it has been noted that of the total 80 tropical storms that are formed globally, nearly 6.5 per cent form in the north Indian Ocean; the frequency of storms in the Bay of Bengal is five to six times higher than that in the Arabian Sea and therefore the Bay of Bengal share comes out to be about 5.5 per cent.5 The breakdown of the number of cyclones forming in the Bay of Bengal and hitting the littoral countries from 1877 to 1995 is shown in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 Cyclones in the Bay of Bengal and Littoral Countries Bangladesh

India

Myanmar

Sri Lanka

All Types

154

848

71

35

Depression Cyclonic Storm (CS) Severe Cyclonic Storm (SCS) CS + SCS Percentage of total Global CS and SCS

 68  43  43  86 0.93

539 197 112 309 3.34

24 23 24 47 0.51

15 12  8 20 0.22

Source: Anwar Ali, “Climate change impacts and adaptation assessment in Bangladesh”, Climate Research 12 (1999): 109–16.

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These storms and cyclones adversely affect the Bay of Bengal littoral countries, resulting in loss of life, damage to crops, salination of coastal areas and loss of infrastructure including housing, roads and fishing infrastructure. The study also notes that there is significant impact on human lives and of particular concern is the loss of life. It has been estimated that nearly 53 per cent of the recorded world deaths due to cyclones occurred in Bangladesh and about 23 per cent in India, totalling to 76 per cent, though both these countries experience only 4.27 per cent of the world storms. The trends in cyclones and storms in the Bay of Bengal continue and it has been noted that “if global warming causes any increase in cyclone activity, the situation in Bangladesh and India is likely to worsen”.6 Scientists, meteorologists, oceanographers and climate change experts have argued that there is ample evidence to suggest that global climate change has resulted in increased tropical cyclone activity. In the recent past, hurricanes, cyclonic storms, typhoons and storm surges (catastrophic feature of cyclones) have witnessed unprecedented increase in frequency and intensity. Besides, these phenomena would be more intense and erratic in the future. Based on the cyclonic data, it has been speculated that “any rise in sea surface temperature (SST) due to climate change is likely to be accompanied by an increase in cyclone frequency… It is almost certain that an increase in SST will be accompanied by a corresponding increase in cyclone intensity (wind speed).”7 A study conducted by the Ministry of Environment of the Government of India notes that “Storm surge has also become a major cause for concern in several coastal areas along the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. We have noticed that the intensity of cyclonic storms has increased though only 5-6 per cent of global tropical cyclones affect these two (Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea) areas. It’s also because of climate change.”8 Likewise, another study notes that in the Bay of Bengal the combination of climate change, SLR and natural hazards like flooding and cyclones impact severely and may result in “the complete disappearance of large proportions of the land area of some countries like the Maldives and Bangladesh. Changes in climate may also directly impact habitats, the resources that depend on them and the livelihoods of those who use those resources.”9

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As far as the Arabian Sea is concerned, cyclonic activity takes place during the months of May and June and during October and November the cyclones that form in the Bay of Bengal cross over to the Arabian Sea. Most of the storms or cyclones develop over the southeastern Arabian Sea and then follow a north westerly path towards the Arabian Peninsula.10 Thereafter, these begin to veer either northwest towards Gujarat in India and Pakistan or westwards in the direction of the Gulf of Aden. Between the period 1891 and 2006, there were 48 cyclones occurring in the Arabian Sea, out of which 24 were of severe intensity.11 According to the United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO), in 2007 the Arabian Sea recorded Cyclone Gonu, the first tropical cyclone ever to hit Oman and Iran.12

Legal Issues and Other Regimes in the Bay of Bengal There are provisions under Part XV of the 1982 UNCLOS for states to choose at least three legal means to settle their boundary delimitation disputes, i.e. the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS. The Bay of Bengal region has a few maritime boundary disputes among the littorals and these have so far been discussed under bilateral negotiation mechanisms and diplomatic channels. On occasions, there have been instances of sabre rattling among the contending states. The maritime boundary dispute involving Bangladesh and Myanmar has been referred to the ITLOS and it was hoped that a verdict would be delivered in early 2012.13 Bangladesh had objected to the India and Myanmar boundary settlement mechanism stating that the ‘starting point’ on how to mark the coastline to draw its marine boundary, with apparently overlapping claims of the three neighbouring countries itself was not clear because of the funnel-like coastline of the Bay and in 2009 it registered its objections with the United Nations.14 On December 23, 1986 the Treaty in Delimitation of Maritime Boundary between Myanmar and India in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea was completed and in 2010 India and Myanmar arrived at a consensus on forging strategic ‘informal’ alliance for settlement of various other maritime boundary disputes and issues with Bangladesh.15

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The Bay of Bengal is characterized as a Large Marine Ecosystem (cited hereafter as BOBLME) and is one of the 64 major marine ecosystems across the world. The BOBLME stretches over 3.3 million square kilometres and encompasses the coastal watersheds, islands, reefs, continental shelves and coastal and marine waters of India (east coast), Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand (west coast), Indonesia (Indonesian provinces of Aceh, Riau, and North and West Sumatra) and Malaysia (peninsular region) along with Maldives and their 400 million people rely on this region for their livelihoods and prosperity. In that context, the BOBLME has been established to manage the regional environment and its fisheries to improve the livelihood conditions of the people and ensure food security. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has initiated a Strategic Action Programme (SAP) aimed at enhancing ‘food security and reduce poverty for coastal communities in the BOB region, consistent and linked with a sustained resource base of good ecosystem quality’.16 The Project has five structured interlinked components: (a) Strategic Action Programme; (b) Coastal/Marine Natural Resources Management and Sustainable Use; (c) Improved Understanding and Predictability of the BOBLME Environment; (d) Maintenance of Ecosystem Health and Management of Pollution; and (e) Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation and Knowledge Management.

Communities and Livelihoods The Bay of Bengal is bordered by two highly populous countries, i.e. India and Bangladesh and “a quarter of the world’s population resides in the countries bordering the BOBLME” and “of the 400 million people living in the LME’s catchment area, many subsist at or below the poverty level.”17 It is natural that this population draws liberally from the Bay of Bengal its requirements for food security. A large number of the population is engaged in fishing that serves their livelihoods. According to some studies, fishing activity in the Bay of Bengal is on the decline and this can be partially attributed to the impacts of “increased fishing effort and habitat degradation” and is impacting on the “living standards, including food security, of some

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small-scale fishers.”18 The regional countries have developed cooperative mechanisms called the Bay of Bengal Inter-Governmental Organisation on coastal fisheries (BOBP-IGO), an agency under the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to address the problem of fisheries and environment in the region. Another economic activity in the Bay of Bengal is tourism. The region is known for excellent marine tourism destinations such as Phuket in Thailand, Langkawi in Malaysia, Andaman and Nicobar islands in India, Cox’s Bazar, the tourist capital of Bangladesh and the beautiful waterfronts in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. There are a number of attractions in these tourist destinations and the biological diversity is spectacular comprising coral reefs, mangroves, estuaries and fishbreeding areas, unique habitats and wild life. Interestingly, trans-bay tourist networks are being conceptualized. For instance, in 2005, the Port Blair Municipal Council in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Phuket Province of Thailand signed an agreement at Phuket to strengthen friendship. The agreement was signed to exchange experts in the fields of health, education, trade associations and also to make available experts on transportation and other developmental matters. Such networks have the potential to increase the number of tourists visiting Bay of Bengal tourist sites. There have been some initiatives in the Bay of Bengal to develop eco-tourism. Eco-tourism has been defined “as responsible travel to natural areas that conserves natural environments and sustains the well-being of the local people” or “an enlightening, participatory travel experience to natural and cultural environments… ensures the sustainable use of environmental resources, while producing viable economic opportunities for the host communities”. 19 Interestingly, there is also another perspective on eco-tourism that is “pro-poor (i.e. that generates net economic, social, cultural or environmental benefits to the poor), pro-nature (i.e. ensuring sustainable use of natural resources), participatory and involving a learning experience/cultural exchange for visitors and hosts.”20 In essence, eco-tourism should be able to generate enough economic dividends which should result in a number of livelihood opportunities including services for the upkeep of these tourist destinations. However, there could be a wide range of fallouts on the local environment that would emerge in the form mass displacements of people and also loss of traditional sources of

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livelihood. In that context, a judicious and friendly approach to the development of tourism could offer possibilities for an environmentally sustainable tourism industry which results in positive impacts on local communities. This also necessitates addressing the trans-boundary aspects of tourism, keeping in mind that there could be a number of impacts on the adjacent habitats. In the above context, Bangladesh has developed a sophisticated strategy for showcasing its tourism potential in an ecofriendly way and has put in place systems to prevent overexploitation of the fragile marine environment, the mangrove system, pristine beaches and rich marine life, as well as numerous varieties of trees, plants, birds and animals.21

Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Shipping in THE Bay of Bengal At another level, the Bay of Bengal has emerged as an important source of energy.22 A number of offshore oil and gas sites have been discovered off river basins such as the Krishna–Godavri delta off the Andhra coast, Mahanadi basin off the Orissa coast, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and east Sri Lankan coast. Experts believe that Bangladesh and Myanmar have huge offshore oil and gas reserves23 and a number of oil and gas companies from China, India, France and South Korea are engaged in exploration and production activity. The impact of these energy-related offshore activities merits careful analysis. It is quite evident that offshore exploration and shipping of oil and gas resources in and out of the Bay of Bengal will result in extensive development of maritime-based energy related infrastructure such as oil and gas storage tanks, underwater oil and gas pipelines and infrastructure for loading and discharging of energy products. The latter will also result in greater shipping activity. Oil and gas exploration and production combined with increased shipping has the potential for a number of maritime related incidents. These could emerge in the form of mishaps on oil rigs, oil spillages during exploration and also due to indiscriminate discharge by tankers including bilge cleaning, and ship-related accidents and collisions. It is important to keep in mind that offshore structures contain large quantities of highly inflammable materials which can cause fires that can have a devastating effect. In the past there have been several

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accidents onboard offshore oil drilling/production platforms. Some of these were due to human errors leading to collision between the oil rig and a vessel. Hurricanes and typhoons too have resulted in accidents onboard offshore platforms. Between 1982 and 2007, there were 67 reported incidents of oil spill in Indian waters. As far as the Bay of Bengal is concerned, in January 1993, the Indian Coast Guard undertook Operation Safai to control the oil spill resulting from a collision between two super tankers off the Straits of Malacca. The spill had spread over 8,000 square nautical miles and the slick was observed as close as 10 nautical miles from Nicobar Island. The spill was managed efficiently and a major environmental catastrophe was avoided. The Bay of Bengal is also home to the major international shipping lane that funnels in and out of the Straits of Malacca which witnesses traffic of over 70,000 vessels annually. There are two emerging strategic waterways in the Bay of Bengal, i.e. the Sethusamudram Canal Project (SSCP) between Southern India and Sri Lanka and the Isthmus of Kra in southern Thailand and these have been dubbed as Asia’s Panama Canal. The SSCP linking the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal can potentially reduce transit time by nearly three days. The Isthmus of Kra in southern Thailand will result in linking the Bay of Bengal to Gulf of Thailand which will reduce the time and cost of east-west shipping bypassing the Straits of Malacca. In case the SSPC and the Kra canal projects reach fruition, it can drastically alter the economic landscapes of the Bay of Bengal. However, from an environment perspective, these projects could have adversarial impact on the fragile ecosystem and on the flora and fauna in the Gulf of Mannar, and the adjacent sea areas of the Kra canal. The threat of sea pollution could have impact on the livelihood of coastal communities, whereas uncontrolled growth of infrastructure causing greater stress on the environment requires attention. The density of the traffic will also impact on the fishing grounds on either side of the canals.

Marine Pollution in THE Bay of Bengal Region from Land-Based Sources As noted earlier, a number of river systems which have origins in the mountains, plateaus and highlands drain into the Bay of Bengal.

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There are a number of industrial townships astride these rivers which discharge the industrial waste into them; besides, untreated domestic and human waste being drained therein due to lack of proper sewage systems.24 There is evidence of persistent organic pollutants (POPs), radioactive substances, heavy metals, hydrocarbons and litter in the Bay of Bengal.25 For instance, the Bay of Bengal countries do not have effective sewage treatment system and untreated waste is discharged into the rivers. About 90–95 per cent of domestic sewage in South Asian countries and all domestic sewage in Sumatra finds its way into the sea.26 Therefore, the coastal impacts from urban waste are enormous and water quality samples from coastal waters are dominated by sewage, industrial waste, oil and metals. Significantly, urban waste discharge, combined with the current and sea water ocean circulation patterns, emerges as a trans-boundary issue and has the potential for regional tensions.

Mangroves: Perspectives on and from the Sundarbans The Bay of Bengal region is characterized by moist tropical coastlands and major tropical rivers and their deltas are home to a number of mangrove ecosystems along the coast including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. For instance, there are several mangrove ecosystems along the east coast of India; (a) Cauvery river delta at Pichavaram in Tamilnadu, (b) Krishna river delta, (c) Godavari river delta, (d) Mahanadi river delta and (e) Ganga river delta in the Sundarbans formed by the Ganga and the Brahmaputra. Due to various reasons, both natural and manmade, India has lost 40 per cent of its mangrove area in the last century and 7,000 hectares from 1975 to 1981 and during 1987–97, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands lost 22,400 hectares of mangroves.27 The Sundarban delta, located at the confluence of Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers and spread over 80,000 square kilometres, is home to mangroves of which nearly 40 per cent are in India and the rest are in Bangladesh. The Indian Sundarban encompasses the area bound by the IchamatiRaimangal River in the east, the Hugli River in the west, the Bay of Bengal in the south, and the Dampier-1 Hodges line in the north.28 There are 54 deltaic islands in the Indian Sundarban that host human

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habitation, 63 of the 69 mangrove plant species in India are found in the delta and 1,434 recorded faunal species; in 1987, the Sundarban National Park located within the Tiger Reserve was declared a World Heritage Site.29 The Sundarbans also act as support system for the ecosystem by way of providing organic nutrients to estuarine and offshore fish populations and fisheries. Besides, Sundarbans also serves as a barricade against cyclones and storm surges thus providing protection to both human and other habitats against destruction and extinction. The Sundarbans in Bangladesh is home to the largest salt-tolerant mangrove forest covering 140,000 hectares spread across waterways, mudflats and small islands in the delta formation of three important rivers, i.e. Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers. The mangrove area was declared a reserve forest in 1875 and is known for three wildlife sanctuaries, i.e. Sundarbans West, East and South. These were established in 1977 under the Bangladesh Wildlife (Preservation) (Amendment) Act, 1974. The forests were declared a world heritage site in 1997 and are home to a variety of flora and fauna including vibrant marine life, 49 mammal species (Javan rhinoceros, water buffalo, swamp deer, gaur, hog deer, estuarine crocodile and pythons), over 200 bird species and the well known Bengal tiger. Besides being an ecological site, the mangrove area is also significant from the socioeconomic perspective given that nearly 600,000 people are dependent on it directly or indirectly for their livelihood. In 2011, the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) of Bangladesh approved a major project titled ‘Sundarbans Environmental and Livelihoods Security (SEALS)’ to rebuild and develop the habitat.30 Myanmar coast line extends more than 2,000 kilometres along the Bay of Bengal and is home to a number of small and medium river systems. The Mayu and Kaladan drain along the Rakhine Coast, Ayeyarwady, Sittaung and Thanlwin rivers form the Ayeyarwady Delta and the Ye, Dawai, Tanintharyi and Lenya rivers drain into the Tanintharyi Coast.31 These are home to a number of mangroves, coral reefs, sea-grass beds, evergreen forest and wetlands and serve a number of purposes such as environment protection, sanctuary for a variety of wild life, nursery area for numerous fish and crustacean species. They also provide a natural form of protection against the surf, supply wood and can also serve as carbon dioxide sink. Myanmar also has rich and healthy coral reefs and the Rakhine and Tanintharyi coastal areas are home to both

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hard and soft corals which provide a variety of food and habitats for marine plants, fish and other living organisms. The extent of mangroves in Thailand has declined to about 1,900 square kilometres as compared to 3,600 square kilometres estimated in 1961 by the Royal Forest department of Thailand. The mangroves along the Andaman coast of Thailand, spread over 181,374 hectares, are characterized by a rich biological diversity but have been shrinking in size due to a number of human-induced factors such as infrastructure development, human settlements, coastal aquaculture that had been in operation till the late 1990s, and the use of mangrove forest as landfills.32 The Andaman coast of Thailand is also rich in coral reefs which cover nearly 7,861 hectares and are much more developed around offshore islands. There are 14 Marine National Parks under the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) located at Surin, Similan, Phi Phi, Adang Rawi and Tarutao islands and three of these have been proposed to be listed as World Natural Heritage Sites. Habitat in the mangrove areas of the Bay of Bengal include the dugong, several species of dolphins and four species of endangered sea turtles such as the Leatherback turtle, Green turtle, Hawksbill turtle and the Olive Ridley turtle which are also found in India’s east coast in the Mahanadi basin. These turtles have been endangered due to a number of factors such as indiscriminate fishing practices and shrimp trawling nets. Likewise, the dugongs are sometimes trapped in fishing nets and also suffer due to the degradation of sea-grass meadows.

Impact of Climate Change in THE Bay of Bengal The Bay of Bengal region falls under the monsoon belt and experiences depressions, seasonal storm surges, cyclones and other natural disasters, such as the December 2004 tsunami which hit most of the countries of the Bay of Bengal in varying degrees. It is noted that in future the region will witness increased frequency of cyclones with changes in sea water temperature due to the global climate changes.33 Bangladesh and the Maldives are on the frontline of these changes and there are fears that sea-level rise will have adverse effects. For instance, it has been predicted that “seven percent of Bangladesh could permanently

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disappear, and a much larger area could be affected by associated phenomena such as storm surges capable of reaching as much as 160 kilometres or more inland, or two-fifths of the distance from the coast to the country’s northern border.”34 Similarly, a study has assessed that the Bay of Bengal is witnessing a sea level rise in varying measures; the east coast of India (Chennai, Vishakhapatnam, Paradip, Sagar, Gangra, Diamond Harbour (Kolkata), Bangladesh (Hiron Point, Cox’s Bazaar), Myanmar (Yangon) and Thailand (Ko Taphao Noi).35 The IPCC predicts that by 2050 nearly 17 per cent of Bangladesh territory will be lost to rising sea levels36 and according to Sugata Hazra, the head of oceanography at Kolkata’s Jadavpur University, “The rate of sea-level rise in this part of the northern Bay of Bengal is definitely attributable to climate change,’’ and nearly 15 per cent of the Indian Sundarbans region will be submerged by 2020. 37 However, the Bangladesh Water Development Board’s Coastal Study and Survey Department, which has been engaged in studies to measure the land accretion on the coast, has stated that the IPCC and other climate change scientists alarming observations were too general and observed that “For almost a decade we have heard experts saying Bangladesh will be under water, but so far our data has shown nothing like this.”38

Coastal Erosion The phenomena of coastal erosion and accretion are a continuing process but become invasive in the coastal areas due to various factors including changes in natural phenomenon such as weather, rains, floods, droughts, cyclones, waves and tides. Then there are anthropogenic actions and activities such as land reclamation, mining and dredging of sand and corals, uncontrolled human settlement along the shores and poorly managed coastal economic development. There are also livelihood issues such as aquaculture activities that impact on the mangroves and coastal vegetation. There are several examples of coastal erosion in the Bay of Bengal region due to both natural events and human activity. Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia have extensive low-lying areas just above the sea level that are experiencing coastal erosion. Malaysia has recorded that nearly 30 per cent of

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its coastline, bulk of which constitutes coastal mudflats fringed by mangroves, is undergoing erosion.39 In Thailand the coastal erosion during the past decade has been estimated to be approximately 1.3–1.7 metres/year along the southern Thailand coastline and 0.91 square kilometres/year for the Gulf coast and 0.25 square kilometres/year for the western coast. According to a study by the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services, “the shoreline across the country [India] is getting affected due to the sea-level rise. Erosion is going to take place and it will cause a major damage and human displacement in the coastal parts of the Bay of Bengal.”40 The Godavari Delta has experienced coastal erosion due to the dam across the Godavari River resulting in diminishing sediment supply to the coast. Besides, continued coastal land subsidence has resulted in erosion and habitat loss. In Sri Lanka, the coastal erosion in large parts is due to human settlement, fuel wood cutting and the clearing of coastal areas for intensive shrimp culture. Further, Mangrove forest cover has been steadily declining from 12,000 hectares in 1986 to 8,687 hectares in 1993 and to 6,000 hectares in 2000. The coastal erosion is so severe in Sri Lanka that the government has spent nearly US$30 million on breakwaters and other structures to combat it. In Bangladesh some parts of Chittagong coastal belt have undergone major coastal erosion and a number of vital areas including the export promotion zone, some naval establishments and port facilities, and a large industrial estate are in danger of being flooded if the present rate of erosion continues.41

Impact of Himalayan Glacier Melting on THE Bay of Bengal The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) sponsored study titled ‘Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone’ observed that while much of the international focus has been to reduce GHG and CO2 to combat climate change, it is important to understand the impact of pollutants such as black carbon and tropospheric ozone too.42 The report also notes that “Cutting black carbon levels in high mountain regions such as the Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau could slow the

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal

melting rates of glaciers – in part because soot deposits increase the absorption of sunlight and reduce the risk of the formation of glacial lakes and associated catastrophic outburst floods.” Further, “In the high valleys of the Himalayas, for example, black carbon levels can now be as high as in a mid-sized city.” There are fears that the “Increasing concentrations of particles like black carbon may also affect the timing and patterns of the Asian monsoon with important implications for human well-being because of changes in water supply and agricultural productivity, drought and flooding.” It is a well known fact that the Himalayas, referred to as the ‘The Roof of the World’ and also the ‘water tower of Asia’, are home to a number of large glaciers and permafrost other than those in the Arctic and Antarctica. Any climate-induced changes in the Himalayan mountain ranges can have severe impact on the Indian sub-continent as also on the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. These high altitude ranges serve as barriers and prevent icy winds from the Arctic region blowing southwards which helps keep the Indian sub-continent insulated, thus offering it a temperate climate. The mountain ranges also serve as a wall to deflect monsoon winds which helps these moisture laden winds to provide rain in the Terai region, making it both hospitable for human and suitable for farming and agriculture. However, these mountain ranges are highly sensitive to climate change and with the rising temperature, the Himalayan glaciers are shrinking and if the trends in warming continue, Tibetan Plateau glaciers are likely to reduce in size from 500,000 square kilometres (based on the 1995 baseline) to 100,000 square kilometres or less by 2035.43 According to the UNEP over 40 Himalayan glacial lakes were precariously on the verge of bursting because of the rapid ice melt of the glaciers caused by climate-induced warming.44 This will result in greater seasonal variation in river flow that will cause more floods and droughts. Also these lakes could experience Glacier Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF), which will impinge on the social structure and economic well-being of communities and damage infrastructure due to unseasonal melting causing flooding in the lower reaches and lower riparian states. If this were to happen, then nearly 1.5 billion people living around river basins in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central China, would be affected.

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The report ‘Climate Change as a Security Risk’ by the German Advisory Council on Climate Change identifies South Asia region as one of the hotspots.45 The underlying fear is that climate change induced sea level rise will threaten areas such as the densely populated Ganges delta. The region will also see significant changes in the monsoon rains that are so vital for agriculture. The melting of the glaciers in the Himalayan region will result in heavy rain events and intensification of tropical cyclones. Climate change is expected to act as some kind of a threat multiplier that would undermine peace and stability in a region perceived as among the most crisis-ridden in the world with relatively weak state institutions and intergovernmental capacities. The effects of climate change are already being felt in Nepal where the temperature has risen 0.6°C over the last decade.46 Similarly, in a study conducted by Xu Jianzhu, a researcher at the Center for Mountain Ecosystem Studies, it was noted that the air temperature of the Tibetan Plateau is increasing at the rate of 0.3°C every 10 years, drastically faster than the global average.47

Climate Change Impacts on THE Bay of Bengal Coastal Communities and Megapolises Human migration is an age-old phenomenon and people have traversed distances across lands and seas seeking better economic opportunities, escaping political uncertainties at home, seeking better livelihoods for environmental reasons and in recent times due to climate change induced insecurities. As far as the Bay of Bengal is concerned, Bangladesh and India are most vulnerable and likely to be worst affected in terms of human and asset exposure to climate change resulting from retreating shorelines, salination, acidification of soils and changes in the water table severely impacting on the social life of the people. The population density in Bangladesh is the highest in the world and is estimated to be over 1,000 residents per square kilometre. Importantly, nearly 85 per cent of the people live in coastal plains or inland flood plains and are exposed to climate change related phenomenon such as floods, storm surges and cyclones. Consequently, these conditions have resulted in migration, particularly to major cities such as Dhaka and Chittagong which lies along the waterfront48 and illegal migration to India.49 These trends prompted the Bangladesh’s Finance Minister, Abul

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Maal Abdul Muhith to state that nearly 20 million people in Bangladesh may flee the country by 2050.50 R.K. Pachauri, the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that the Bangladeshi migration should be taken seriously and “This is clearly a warning signal from Bangladesh and similar countries to the developed countries… If you had 30 or 40 million migrating to other parts of the world, that’s a sizable problem for which we have to prepare. And if it requires changes to immigration laws and facilitating people settling down and working in the developed countries, then I suppose this will require legislative action in the developed world,.”52 In fact, in 2007, R.K. Pachauri, had warned that “even during the most conservative scenario, sea level will be about 40 cm higher than today by the end of 21st century. It is projected to increase the annual number of people flooded in coastal population from 13 to 94 million (worldwide).”53 A Greenpeace report “Blue Alert: Climate Migrants in South Asia — Estimates and Solutions”, has observed that there will be visible impact of climate change. This report is discussed in greater details in subsequent chapters. The report notes that “Looking at India and Bangladesh alone, approximately 125 million migrants, comprising about 75 million from Bangladesh and remaining 50 million from densely populated coastal regions and other vulnerable parts of India, could be rendered homeless by the end of this century.”54 The report also notes that the bulk of the population lives in Low Elevation Coastal Zones (LECZ) that comprises region which is within 10 metres of sea level. In Bangladesh, the bulk of the population exposed to climate change is rural, whereas in India it is nearly equal (Table 2.2). Further, large coastal cities such as Dhaka in Bangladesh and Kolkata in India are at an average elevation of 2–10 metres above sea level. Table 2.2 Low Elevation Coastal Zones in Bangladesh and India

Bangladesh India

Area of LECZ Sq. Km

Population of LECZ

Urban Population of LECZ

54,461 81,805

65,524,048 63,188,208

15,428,688 31,515,286

Source: Sudhir Chela Rajan, “Blue Alert: Climate Migrants in South Asia – Estimates and Solutions”, Green Peace Report, p. 7.

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During an exercise conducted in December 2008 by the National Defence University, Washington, it was concluded that climate change induced events could result in thousands of Bangladeshi refugees entering India and this had the potential to result in social disruptions. It is plausible that several of them could take the sea route and head towards Indian shores, particularly the Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands as was witnessed in end-2008. A large number of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar reached the A&N coast after they had been set adrift in the sea by the Thai military.55 Such contingencies could occur more frequently in the future and would entail maritime operations in the humanitarian spectrum. The above reports clearly showcase the impact of climate change on the people and communities living along the shores. It will be useful to note that there will be simultaneous impact on the coastal infrastructure. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report ‘Ranking of the World’s Cities Most Exposed to Coastal Flooding Today and in the Future’ has estimated that the total value of coastal assets exposed to climate change would increase from US$3,000 billion in 2005 to US$35,000 billion by the 2070s, nearly ten times the current levels and rising to roughly 9 per cent of projected annual GDP in this period.56 The report further, notes that the top 10 cities of the world in terms of population exposure to climate change are Kolkata, Mumbai, Dhaka, Guangzhou, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Bangkok, Rangoon, Miami and Hai Phòng. Interestingly, except Miami, all other cities are located in Asia (Appendix A and B).

Tsunami and Cyclones in the Bay of Bengal The Bay of Bengal was adversely affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the devastation caused by it still looms large in the minds of people. The tsunami tidal waves hit the shores of Bay of Bengal littorals and Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand were affected in varying degrees, resulting in loss of life and infrastructure. While Indonesia and Sri Lanka were the hardest hit countries, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and India’s southeastern coast, Andaman and Nicobar Islands suffered

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extensive damage. The affected countries engaged in rescue and relief measures and later engaged in rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected communities and areas. Some of these countries needed external support which was generously offered by the donor countries and agencies. The local communities and non-government organizations were also at the forefront to assist the governments by providing relief materials and services. According to a study by Phil Cummins, senior scientist at Geoscience Australia, the Bay of Bengal is tsunami prone and “Millions of people along the coasts of Myanmar (Burma), Bangladesh and India may be at risk of suffering a catastrophic tsunami-generating earthquake.”57 Cummins has concluded that the millions of people living on the northern coast of the Bay of Bengal face the risk of giant, tsunami-triggering earthquakes. Relying on computer models, the study has suggested a worst case scenario that an earthquake of 8.8 on the Richter scale in Arakan — could generate a tsunami impacting the Chittagong coast, and the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta. Likewise, the report by C.P. Rajendran, senior scientist at the India-based Centre for Earth Science Studies has concurred with the above report and noted that “This report is important from a hazards perspective. We don’t have good data from the coasts of Andaman Islands, Bangladesh and Myanmar. It is high time scientists of the three countries got together to generate data on stress and strain measurements.”58 In the last 100 years, 508 cyclones of varying intensity have originated in the Bay of Bengal. Nearly 17 per cent of these hit Bangladesh, averaging a severe cyclone almost once every three years, leaving the country devastated and 53 per cent of these have claimed more than 5,000 lives.59 The cyclones that hit Bangladesh occur during April– May and September–December and can reach as far as 200 kilometres inland. A few of these also hit the east coast of India, and occasionally, divert towards Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In Bangladesh, human losses due to cyclones has been high (see Table 2.3) and this can be attributed to high population density (nearly 1,000 people/square kilometres) and also due to large number of people living in the delta region where there are ample natural resources which provide food and also employment opportunities. Significantly, these regions lie in the wake

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Mapping the Bay of Bengal in the Era of Climate Change table 2.3 Deaths (over 5,000 people) in Bangladesh Associated with Tropical Cyclones in the Bay of Bengal Year

Deaths

Year

Deaths

1584 1822 1876 1897 1912 1919 1941 1960

200,000  40,000 100,000 175,000  40,000  40,000   7,500   5,149

1961 1963 1965 1965 1970 1985 1988 1991

11,468 11,520 19,279 12,000 500,000 11,069 5,708 138,000

Source: Anwar Ali, “Climate change impacts and adaptation assessment in Bangladesh”, Climate Research 12 (1999): 109–16.

of cyclones and the local inhabitants bear much of the brunt with loss of life. Cyclone Sidr which struck the eastern part of the Sunderbans was no exception. It covered about 30 per cent of the area causing destruction to the fragile ecosystem and the Forest Department estimated that about 30,000 acres of forest resources were severely affected and another 80,000 acres were partially affected. It left behind a trail of destruction to the farms, trees, animals, habitation, mangroves, housing, transport, roads and telecommunications. Nearly 3,500 were declared dead, 1,000 people were reported missing and over 55,000 people sustained physical injuries. Also, the drinking water sources such as tube wells and ponds were contaminated by saline water. The proactive measures by the Government of Bangladesh such as early warning to the people and fishermen, shifting people from lowlying areas to shelters, search and rescue and relief preparations by the Bangladesh Armed Forces prevented a major calamity. The losses has been estimated to be nearly US$1.1 billion including environmental losses of BDT (Bangladesh Taka) 420 million. A number of international donors contributed in the post-Sidr rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts of the Bangladesh government. In India, the Bay of Bengal coast is more vulnerable to storms and these have hit the shores with immense intensity causing damage to

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal table 2.4 Deaths (over 5,000 people) in India Associated with Tropical Cyclones in the Bay of Bengal Year

Deaths

Year

Deaths

1737 1779 1833 1839 1854 1864

300,000  20,000  50,000  20,000  50,000  50,000

1895 1942 1971 1977 1989 1999

 5,000 40,000 10,000 10,000 20,000  8,960

Source: Anwar Ali, “Climate change impacts and adaptation assessment in Bangladesh”, Climate Research 12 (1999): 109–16.

infrastructure and loss of life (see Table 2.4). The following segments along the coast have been identified as highly prone to, and most vulnerable to, high surges: (a) North Orissa, and West Bengal coasts, (b) Andhra Pradesh coast between Ongole and Machilipatnam, and (c) Tamil Nadu coast, south of Nagapatnam.60 According to the data provided by the National Cyclone Risk Mitigation Project (NCRMP), during 1891–2000 nearly 308 cyclones (out of which 103 were severe) affected the East Coast. In 1999, Orissa was hit by two cyclones (17 October and 29–30 October) in quick succession and the latter came to be called as the Super Cyclone. The cyclone affected fourteen districts in the state and the devastation was very severe. Nearly 8,960 persons lost their lives, 450,000 cattle perished, about 2 million houses were damaged, about 90 million trees were uprooted and 1.8 million hectares of paddy and 33,000 hectares of non-paddy cultivated land was affected. Saline inundation left most of the drinking water sources polluted and dysfunctional; the recorded losses were estimated to be Rs.100 billion making it the worst cyclone related disaster in India.61 Unlike Bangladesh and India, Myanmar is less prone to cyclones. In the last sixty years, eleven severe tropical cyclones hit Myanmar and only two of which made landfall in the Delta region. In recent times, in 2006 Cyclone Mala (rated as category four) made landfall on the western cost of Myanmar, between Rakhine state and Ayeyarwady

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division.62 The damage caused by the cyclone was not so severe partly due to early warning messages and the evacuation of the people who were residing across the cyclone’s path. Cyclone Nargis was a severe cyclone of all time to hit Myanmar and was the first tropical cyclone to strike the country between 2 and 3 May 2008 on the west coast. The cyclone then changed direction towards the Ayeyarwady Delta and southern Yangon Division approximately 250 kilometres southwest of Yangon, leaving behind a trail of devastation, human deaths, damage to infrastructure, disruption of livelihoods and economic activities adversely affecting social environment. This was perhaps the worst natural disaster in Myanmar’s history. According to the data provided by the government of Myanmar, the official death toll stood at 84,537 with 53,836 people still missing and 19,359 injured. Nearly, 2.4 million people were severely affected by the cyclone and the number of those displaced by the cyclone may have been as high as 800,000.63 Further, the country suffered economic losses of about 2.7  per cent of the projected 2008 GDP and much of the damage was felt in the agriculture and fishing sectors.64 It was estimated that the Myanmar needed US$1 billion over the next three years for recovery and rehabilitation.

Losing and Gaining Territory It is true that the Bangladesh coast is experiencing erosion due to various factors including rising sea levels. For instance, Bhola Island which lies between the Meghna and Tetulia rivers in the north of Bay of Bengal reduced in size from 6,400 square kilometres in 1965 to half due to sea level rise.65 The island was home to 1.6 million people. In 2010, the Bangladesh parliament was informed that large areas along the costal belt including parts of the southern districts of Noakhali, Laxmipur, Barisal, Bhola, Pirojpur, Jhalokathi, Satkhira and Bagerhat may sink as the sea level will rise by 14 cm and 32 cm by 2030 and 2050, respectively due to climate change effects.66 Further, a study conducted by the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre has concluded that the sea level at Hiron point of the Bay of Bengal has increased by 4 mm in the last 22 years.

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While Bangladesh may take solace in the fact that a part of the Bhola Island is still capable of hosting habitation, the case of the flat muddy island (3.5 × 3.0 kilometres in size) referred to as South Talpatti by Bangladesh and New Moore Island by India and claimed by both the countries, has submerged.67 It is believed that the island was formed after a cyclone in the Bay of Bengal in 1970 and both countries had claimed it to be their territory. India had sent its ships to the island in support of its claims and its Border Security Forces planted an Indian flag on the island. Bangladesh claimed that its fishermen has been visiting the island and had been drying their nets on the island. There are some more islands which are on the verge of disappearing into the sea such as Ghoramara and Jambudweep Bulcheri, Bhangaduani and Dalhousie. Interestingly there are new reports which suggest that a new land formation is taking place in Noakhali in the Meghna river estuary that receives sediments from the Himalayan rivers such as the Ganges and Brahmaputra which bring down nearly one billion tons of silt and clay which is collected in the estuary.68 According to scientists at the Centre for Environment and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS) Bangladesh’s landmass has increased by 20 square kilometres (12.5 square miles) annually and over the next 50 years this could add up to over 1,000 square kilometres.69 The study also notes that the 8.5-magnitude 1950 Assam Earthquake increased the sediment flow which has resulted in an increase in the country’s land mass. This finding is based on a study of 32 years of satellite images. Further, the Head of Bangladesh Water Development Board’s Coastal Study and Survey Department has noted that “The land Bangladesh has lost so far has been caused by river erosion, which has always happened in this country. Natural accretion due to sedimentation and dams has more than compensated this loss…. If we build more dams using superior technology, we may be able to reclaim 4,000 to 5,000 square kilometres in the near future.” The study also notes that the primary reason for the erosion of 230 square kilometres at Bhola Island and 195 square kilometres of land from Sandwip and Hatiya islands was a result of the shifting flow of the Meghna channel.70 Interestingly, Bangladesh’s efforts (then as East Pakistan) to build dams date back to 1957 and 1964 when it built two dams in the Meghna estuary and reclaimed

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1,000 square kilometres. But the reclamation programme was halted due to lack of funding. 71 Further, in 2010, it was reported that Bangladesh had drawn plans to reclaim 600 square kilometres (230 square miles) of land from the sea over the next five years. The project chief was quoted as saying, “The project would cost only 1.20 billion taka (US$18 million). The dams will expedite sedimentations and manage the tidal system. They won’t allow loss of any sediments to the sea.” Apparently a study by the Dutch-funded Institute of Water Modelling (IWM) has concluded that the damming process would not result in collateral impact on other parts of the coastline or aggravate erosion of the Bhola island and the IWM principal researcher Jahirul Haq Khan stated that “We have done some water models of the project and found some 600 square kilometres of new land could be reclaimed without any side-effects.”

Conclusion The above discussion has attempted to map the Bay of Bengal and highlight the relevance and importance of geography, topography, rivers, deltas, rain patterns, people, livelihoods and institutional mechanisms established by the Bay of Bengal littorals to understand the impact of climate change in the region. It is evident that geography and climate change are closely linked to each other. Besides, these physical characteristics of the region are vital determinants in the region’s approach towards understanding and responding to the impacts of climate change. It is agreed that there is ample evidence to suggest that global climate change has resulted in increased tropical cyclone activity and these have adversely affected the Bay of Bengal littoral countries resulting in loss of life, damage to crops, salination of coastal areas and loss of infrastructure including housing, roads and fishing infrastructure. Also, region is replete with examples on coastal erosion due to both natural events and human activity. At another level, the climate-induced changing landscape of the Bay of Bengal can result in large displacements, and in some cases even migration. It is to a critical examination of this multifaceted issue area and its wide ranging socio-political and geopolitical implications that we turn next.

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal Appendix A Cities and Population Exposed to Coastal Flooding

Country

Urban Agglomeration

Exposed Assets Current ($ Billion)

Exposed Assets Future ($ Billion)

 1

USA

Miami

416.29

3,513.04

 2

China

Guangzhou

84.17

3,357.72

 3

Usa

New York-Newark

320.20

2,147.35

 4

India

Kolkata (Calcutta)

31.99

1,961.44

 5

China

Shanghai

72.86

1,771.17

 6

India

Mumbai

46.20

1,598.05

 7

China

Tianjin

29.62

1,231.48

 8

Japan

Tokyo

174.29

1,207.07

 9

China

Hong Kong

35.94

1,163.89

10

Thailand

Bangkok

38.72

1,117.54

11

China

Ningbo

9.26

1,073.93

12

Usa

New Orleans

233.69

1,013.45

13

Japan

Osaka-Kobe

215.62

968.96

14

Netherlands

Amsterdam

128.33

843.70

15

Netherlands

Rotterdam

114.89

825.68

16

Vietnam

Ho Chi Minh City

26.86

652.82

17

Japan

Nagoya

109.22

623.42

18

China

Qingdao

2.72

601.59

19

Usa

Virginia Beach

84.64

581.69

20

Egypt

Alexandria

28.46

563.28

Rank

Note: Top 20 cities ranked in terms of population exposed to coastal flooding in the 2070s (including both climate change and socio-economic change) and showing present-day exposure. Source: OECD, Paris, 2007.

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Appendix B Assets Exposed to Coastal Flooding

Rank

Country

Urban Agglomeration

Exposed Population Current

Exposed Population Future

1

India

Kolkata (Calcutta)

1,929,000

14,014,000

2

India

Mumbai (Bombay)

2,787,000

11,418,000

3

Bangladesh

Dhaka

844,000

11,135,000

4

China

Guangzhou

2,718,000

10,333,000

5

Vietnam

Ho Chi Minh City

1,931,000

 9,216,000

6

China

Shanghai

2,353,000

 5,451,000

7

Thailand

Bangkok

907,000

 5,138,000

8

Myanmar

Rangoon

510,000

 4,965,000

9

USA

Miami

2,003,000

 4,795,000

10

Vietnam

Hai Phòng

794,000

 4,711,000

11

Egypt

Alexandria

1,330,000

 4,375,000

12

China

Tianjin

956,000

 3,790,000

13

Bangladesh

Khulna

441,000

 3,641,000

14

China

Ningbo

299,000

 3,305,000

15

Nigeria

Lagos

357,000

 3,229,000

16

Côte D’ivoire

Abidjan

519,000

 3,110,000

17

USA

New York-Newark

1,540,000

 2,931,000

18

Bangladesh

Chittagong

255,000

 2,866,000

19

Japan

Tokyo

1,110,000

 2,521,000

20

Indonesia

Jakarta

513,000

 2,248,000

Note: Top 20 cities ranked in terms of assets exposed to coastal flooding in the 2070s (including both climate change and socioeconomic change) and showing present-day exposure. Source: OECD, Paris, 2007.

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal

Notes   1. H.M. Rahman, Legal regime of marine environment in the Bay of Bengal (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 2007), pp. 35–36. Also see “Water Facts”, available at (accessed 10 June 2014).  2. UNEP, “Recent trends in melting glaciers, tropospheric temperatures over the Himalayas and summer monsoon rainfall over India” (Kenya: Division of Early Warning and Assessment (DEWA), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2009).  3. “Ganga Basin”, “Ganga Flood Control Commission (GFCC), Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India”, available at ; Also see I. Faisal, “Managing Common Waters in the GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna Region: Looking Ahead”, SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 309–27; A.K. Biswas, “Management of Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna system: Way forward”, in Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, edited by O. Varis, C. Tortajada and A.K. Biswas (Berlin: Springer, 2008), pp. 143–64; P.K. Parua, “Flood Management In Ganga-BrahmaputraMeghna Basin: Some Aspects of Regional Co-Operation”, Water and Energy Abstracts 14, no. 4 (2004): 68–75.  4. S. Agrawala et al., “Development and Climate Change in Bangladesh: Focus on Coastal Flooding and the Sundarbans”, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003.   5. A. Ali, “Climate change impacts and adaptation assessment in Bangladesh”, Climate Research 12 (1999): 109–16.  6. Ibid.  7. Ibid.  8. S. Bhabani, “India Takes Major Project To Study Climate Change”, 2009, available at (accessed 2 October 2009).   9. P. Townsley, “Review of Coastal and Marine Livelihoods and Food Security in the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Region”, Report prepared for the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Programme (undated), p. vii. 10. “Hazards of Cyclones: Heavy Rainfall, Strong Winds and Storm Surges”, available at (accessed 26 October 2009). 11. “Coastal and Marine Risks in South Asia: Key Issues and Challenges”, available at (accessed 10 October 2009).

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12. “Global Land Temperatures for January and April Likely Warmest Ever Recorded – UN”, UN News Centre, (accessed 5 October 2009). 13. “ITLOS to solve Burma–Bangladesh Sea Dispute in 2012”, Mizzima News, 20 June 2011. 14. “Maritime Boundary Dispute with India, Myanmar”, Daily News Monitoring Service (Bangladesh), 14 June 2010. 15. Ibid. 16. “Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Sustainable Manage­ ment of the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BoBLME)”, available at (accessed 17 January 2011). 17. The Encyclopedia of Earth, “Bay of Bengal large marine ecosystem”, 2008, available at (accessed 4 June 2010). 18. Townsley, “Review of Coastal and Marine Livelihoods and Food Security in the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Region”. 19. N.M. Saville, Sustainable Ecotourism and eco-enterprise opportunities in the Gulf of Mannar, Tamil Nadu, India (Chennai: M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, 2002). 20. Ibid. 21. R. Afroze, “Ecotourism and Green Productivity in Bangladesh”, in Linking Green Productivity to Ecotourism: Experiences in the Asia–Pacific Region, by P. Hundloe (Tokyo: Asian Productivity Organization, 2002), pp. 37–44. 22. For an excellent energy scenario in the Bay of Bengal, see. Sudhir T. Devare, ed., A New Energy Frontier: The Bay of Bengal Region (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p. 205. 23. M. Lall, “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 3 (2006): 424–46. 24. D. Hassan, Protecting the Marine Environment from Land-Based Sources of Pollution: Towards Effective International Cooperation (Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 149–75. 25. D. Staples, “Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis of the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem”, Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Project Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2010, pp. 97–115. 26. Ibid. 27. T. Ravishankar et al., Atlas of Mangrove Wetlands of India (Chennai: M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, 2004).

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal

28. A.A. Danda and G. Sriskanthan, Indian Sundarbans Delta: A Vision (New Delhi: World Wide Fund for Nature-India, 2011), p. 4. 29. Ibid., p. 9. 30. “Tk 128cr project to develop ecosystems in Sundarbans”, The Independent, 15 January 2011. 31. P. Myint, “National Report of Myanmar on the Sustainable Management of The Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME)”, GCP/RAS/ 179/WBG, Department of Fisheries, Myanmar, undated, available at

(accessed 23 July 2014). 32. UNDP, “National Rapid Environmental Assessment Thailand”, 2005, avail­ able at (accessed 23 July 2014). 33. Agrawala et al., “Development and Climate Change in Bangladesh”; T. Stocker et al. “IPCC Workshop on Sea Level Rise and Ice Sheet Instabilities”, Workshop report, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 21–24 June 2010. 34. M. Ali, “Sustainable Management of the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME)”, FAO/GLOBAL Environment Facility Project Document, 2004, available at (accessed 5 January 2014). 35. A.S. Unnikrishnan and D. Shankar, “Are sea-level-rise trends along the coasts of the north Indian Ocean consistent with global estimates?”, Global Planet Change 57, no. 3–4 (2007): 301–307. 36. E.R. Bhuiyan, “Accelerating Land Accretion in Coastal Areas”, Financial Express (Dhaka), 29 January 2011. 37. M. Wade, “Rising sea level settles border dispute”, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 March 2011. 38. Bhuiyan, “Accelerating Land Accretion in Coastal Areas”. 39. G. Prasetya, “The role of coastal forests and trees in protecting against coastal erosion”, in Coastal protection in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami: What role for forests and trees?, edited by S. Braatz, S. Fortuna, J. Broadhead and R. Leslie, Proceedings of the Regional Technical Workshop, Khao Lak, Thailand, 28–31 August 2006. 40. “India Launching Major Project to Study Climate Change”, IANS, 7 September 2009. 41. National Encyclopedia Bangladesh, “Bangladesh: Sea Level Change”, 2006, available at (accessed 22 May 2011).

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42. United Nations Environment Programme, “Action to Curb ‘Soot’ and ‘Smog’ Pollution Could Help Limit Global Temperature Rise”, 2011, available at (accessed 22 July 2014). 43. Cited in “South Asia Environment Outlook”, United Nations Environment Programme, Kenya, p. 24. 44. Cited in “Climate Change: Nepalese Perspective”, available at (accessed 6 January 2014). 45. German Advisory Council on Global Change, “World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk”, WBGU, Berlin, Germany, 2007, available at (accessed 1 September 2014) 46. Cen fact sheet 2. “Climate Change a Nepalese Perspective”, 2003, available at (accessed 7 January 2011). 47. E.C. Lai, “Climate Change Impacts on China Environment: Biophysical Impacts”, China Environment Forum, 2009, available at (accessed 7 May 2014). 48. “Climate Change, Migration, and Population Growth”, Policy and Issue Brief, Population Action International, available at (accessed 5 January 2011); Ministry of Environment and Forests, “National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh”, 2005, available at (accessed 17 July 2014); M. Walsham, “Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh”, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Regional Office for South Asia, Bangladesh, 2010, available at (accessed 23 August 2014). 49. A. Panda, “Climate Induced Migration from Bangladesh to India: Issues and Challenges”, undated, available at (accessed 7 March 2014). 50. H. Grant, J. Randerson and J. Vidal, “UK should open borders to climate refugees, says Bangladeshi minister”, The Guardian, 4 December 2009, available at (accessed 26 July 2011). 52. Ibid.

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal

53. “Kolkata, Mumbai to Face Maximum Brunt of Climate Change”, Indian Health News, 11 April 2007. 54. S.C. Rajan, “Blue Alert: Climate Migrants in South Asia – Estimates and Solutions”, Green Peace Report 7, 2008. 55. “Beckoning of Fortune Traps Rohingyas”, The Daily Star (Bangladesh), 25 January 2009. 56. R.J. Nicholls et al., “Ranking of the World’s Cities Most Exposed to Coastal Flooding Today and in the Future”, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 4 (2007), available at (accessed 10 September 2011). 57. J. Roach,. “Bay of Bengal Faces Major Tsunami Threat, Study Says”, National Geographic News, 5 September 2007. 58. T.V. Padma, “Tsunami risk for Bay of Bengal”, 2007, available at (accessed 7 December 2014). 59. “Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh Damage, Loss, and Needs Assessment for Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction”, Report prepared by the Government of Bangladesh, April 2008. 60. Prof Anand S Arya, Anup Karanth and Ankush Agarwal, “Hazards, Disasters and Your Community”, available at (accessed 22 January 2011). 61. Government of Bangladesh, “Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh Damage, Loss, and Needs Assessment for Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction”, 2008, available at (accessed on 12 August 2014). 62. DREF Bulletin, “Myanmar: Cyclone Mala”, Final Report for DREF Bulletin no. MDRMM001, 2007, available at (accessed 12 January 2014). 63. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Post Nargis Joint assessment”, A Report Prepared by the Tripartite Core Group 1 (2008), available at (accessed 19 July 2011). 64. Ibid. 65. “Rising Sea Levels Erode Half Of Bangladesh’s Biggest Island: Study”, AFP (Bangladesh), 15 June 2005. 66. “Vast areas of costal belt may sink, JS told”, The Daily Star, 27 September 2010. 67. M. Wade, “Rising sea level settles border dispute”, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 March 2011.

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68. P. Roy, “Country Gets New Land”, Bangladesh Economic News, 22 April 2010. 69. “Bangladesh growing in size by 12.5 sq miles a year”, Bangladesh Economic News, 2 August 2008. 70. “Rising Sea Levels Erode Half of Bangladesh’s Biggest Island: Study”, AFP (Bangladesh), 15 June 2005. 71. “Bangladesh dams to reclaim 600 square kms of land”, AFP (Dhaka), 5 September 2010.

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3 Climate Change, Displacements and Imperatives of Human Security Introduction The complex, compelling and overlapping geographies of climate change ‘induced’ displacements in many parts of semi-enclosed Bay of Bengal are likely to challenge the traditional formulations of sovereignty and security, in ways hitherto unimagined, and make the boundary between ‘South’ and ‘Southeast Asia’ increasingly porous and blurred. These evolving geographies would reinforce the critical importance of regional cooperation not only as a matter of choice but necessity in this semi-enclosed sea. From the standpoint of human security and social justice here is a challenge that demands new imaginations of space and scale, and rigorous pursuit of transnational dialogues anchored in innovative regional frameworks of cooperation. Without harboring any intention of joining the ranks of climate change alarmists,1 our key argument in this chapter is that as the consequences of climate change unfold at an incremental pace,

62

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multi-causal displacements, both physical and vocational, with a longstanding history in various Bay of Bengal littorals, are likely to multiply in number and intensity. At the same time, the overlapping geographies of forced displacements will acquire considerable ethical-moral as well as geopolitical prominence throughout the Indian Ocean Region and beyond. We further argue that the problem in finding proactive responses to human displacements lies not only in the scale and magnitude of the problem (real and imagined) but also in the politics of finding proactive solutions based on ethical norms, human security considerations and new ecological economics of regional burden sharing.2 The dominant discourse of climate change tends to focus more on how humans (i.e. anthropogenic factors) affect the environment and much less attention has been paid to what ”environmental change means for individuals and communities who are faced with the interacting consequences of multiple global processes”.3 It has been rightly pointed out that, ”Ironically, the recent discourse on security and climate change emerging amid concerns about conflict and migration threatens to supplant discussions about ‘human’ security’.”4 As early as 1990, the First Assessment Report of the Intergovern­ mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had stated that it is on human mobility that the gravest effects of climate change are likely to be felt. The 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC further authoritatively established that anthropogenic climate change is accelerating and already has severe impacts on the environment and human lives.5 Also at risk are the atolls environments in the Maldives where people live and earn their livelihoods;6 the coastal plains of India where much economic activity is concentrated and the low-lying estuarine areas in India and Bangladesh where many of the poor coastal communities of the region, especially those engaged in small-scale fisheries, struggle to make a living.7 The chapter begins with a brief engagement with the ongoing multifaceted debate on human displacements with the intention of throwing some light on how this complex, historically contingent and geographically differentiated issue-area of human mobility and migrations (used by the poor and marginalized as adaptive strategies in many parts of the globe) is getting implicated in numerical estimates, imaginative geographies of fear and cartographic anxieties related to

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal

climate change.8 We turn next to focus on how human insecurities, currently experienced by communities precariously engaged in smallscale fishing in the Bay of Bengal, are likely to accelerate (and may even lead to displacements) due to climate change in the absence of adequate proactive policy planning and interventions at various levels. The section to follow shows how the livelihood security of the poorer communities located on the peripheries of national politics and economies are being eclipsed by the national and international narratives and framings of ‘climate migrations’ and ‘environmental refugees’. We focus on a number of case studies from around the Bay of Bengal in order to analyze how the ethical and the geopolitical considerations converge as well as diverge in a complex pattern in this part of Global South.

Mapping ‘Global’ Climate Change ‘Induced’ Displacements: Numbers, Drivers and Fears In the nascent debate on climate change induced displacements what strikes at the very outset is the sheer number of those, overwhelmingly from the Global South, who are said to be at maximum risk of losing their land, livelihoods and fundamental rights, including the right to live and work with dignity. According to International Organization for Migration (IOM),9 the most cited figures at present for those likely to be displaced by 2050 is 200 million. Whereas during mid-1990s the number of those who had been forced to abandon their land and homes as a result of serious ecological crises caused by pollution, land degradation, droughts and natural disasters was estimated to be around 25 million. It was during this time that highly problematic term ‘environmental refugee’ came into vogue and some analysts even went to the extent of proclaiming that the number of those belonging to this category were going to exceed all documented refugees from war-conflict zones and political persecution. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in their 2001 World Disasters Report repeated the figure of 25 million environmental refugees from various parts of the world. This figure was raised to 50 million environmental refugees by the United Nation’s University Institute for Environment and Human Security in a report released in 2005 with a sense of urgency. The

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figures jumped substantially in 2005 when Norman Myers of Oxford University wrote that, “When global warming takes hold, there could be as many as 200 million people overtaken by disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, by droughts of unprecedented severity and duration, and by sea-level rise and flooding.” 10 He continued: Preliminary estimates indicate the total [number] at risk of sea level rise in Bangladesh could be 26 million, in Egypt 12 million, in China 73 million, in India 20 million and elsewhere 21 million, making an aggregate total of 160 million, at the same time, at least 50 million could be at risk through increased droughts and other climate dislocations.11

Despite Norman’s disclaimer that best possible data at his disposal notwithstanding he could reach such figures only through some ‘heroic extrapolations,’12 this rather daunting figure has been accepted by both the IPCC13 and the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.14 In February 2008, the Deputy High Commissioner of Human Rights went on to predict that: By 2050 hundreds of millions more people may become permanently displaced due to rising sea levels, floods, droughts, famine and hurricanes. The melting or collapse of ice sheets alone threatens the home of 1 in every 20 people. Increased desertification and the alteration of ecosystems, by endangering communities’ livelihoods, are also likely to trigger large population displacements.15

For those living in and around South Asia, especially on the littorals of the Bay of Bengal, the findings of a recent Green Peace Study titled “Blue Alert”16 might sound most discomforting to say the least. This study shows that, If global temperatures rise by about 4-5°C in the course of the century, as they are projected under business-as-usual growth in greenhouse gas emissions, the South Asian region could face a wave of migrants displaced by the impacts of climate change, including sea level rise and droughts associated with shrinking water supplies and monsoon variability. In the three South Asian Countries sharing a coast line – Bangladesh, Pakistan and India – nearly 130 million currently live in what is known as the Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ), which comprises the coastal region that is less than 10 metres above average

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal sea level. About 125 million migrants, comprising about 75 million from Bangladesh and the remaining from densely populated coastal regions as well as other vulnerable parts of India could be rendered homeless by the end of the century.17

Leaving aside for the time being the numbers and the uncertainty seemingly associated with them, it may be useful to take note of the some of the key findings of a recent report titled “In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement,”18 authored largely from the vantage point of human security. In our view the report rightly points out that, “in order to make informed decisions, policy makers and development actors need a better understanding of the linkages between environmental change, displacement and migration.”19 It is important to acknowledge that economic and political factors are the major drivers of displacement and migration in a vast majority of cases and climate change is adding to their severity as an impact multiplier. Climate change is likely to accelerate the breakdown of ecosystem-dependent livelihoods, which in some cases have been devastated by natural hazards such as cyclones, floods and droughts, resulting in short-term migration. In those parts of the world where sufficient attention has not been paid to building climate-resilient livelihoods for the most vulnerable and marginalized communities, and where seasonal migrations are the most common coping mechanisms to deal with environmental change, climate change induced transformations such as glacier melt affecting major agricultural systems and sea level rise worsening saline intrusion, indentation, storm surges and other coastal hazards could lead to large scale displacements and migrations. For example, In the densely populated Ganges, Mekong and Nile River deltas, a sea level rise of 1 m could affect 23.5 million people and reduce the land currently under intensive agriculture by at least 1.5 million hectares. A sea level rise of 2 metres would impact an additional 10.8 million people and render at least 969 thousand more hectares of agricultural land unproductive.20

Once displaced, how far, and in which direction, will these millions go? The report concludes on the basis of its wide-ranging case studies that in the absence of necessary capacity and support, “many people won’t

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be able to flee far enough to adequately avoid the negative impacts of climate change”21 since “migrations require resources (including financial, social and political capital) that the most vulnerable populations, frequently don’t have.”22 Whereas the debate over ‘empirically sound figures’ will continue, generating more heat than light perhaps, especially in the absence of empirical studies at the local level, it is useful to be reminded, without downplaying the harmful side of climate change, that “it is not entirely inconceivable that there might be migration in order to take advantage of the effects of climate change”23 and climate change may provide both push and pull reasonings. Also, non-climatic drivers (i.e. demographic transformations, growing income gaps, domestic violence and government policies) behind displacement and mobility will continue to play an important role and need to be recognized as such. For example, in Indonesia, even after more than a decade, those who were first displaced by inter-communal violence opposing different ethnic or religious groups, or by separatist struggles between rebel groups and security forces, “tens of thousands of internally displaced people in many provinces of Indonesia are struggling to find durable solutions that would enable them to end their displacement”.24 At the same time, There is too often an uncritical acceptance of a direct causal link between environmental degradation and population displacement. Implicit in these writings is the belief that environmental degradation – as a possible cause of population displacement – can be separated from other social, economic or political causes. It must be recognized that the degradation of the environment is socially and spatially constructed; only through a structural understanding of the environment in the broader political and cultural context of a region or country can one begin to understand the “role” it plays as a factor in population movement.25

Whereas a good deal of evidence seems to suggest that a vast majority of the displaced will remain within their country of origin, the possibility of some being forced by a host of circumstances to cross international borders and thus face uncertain future and legal status remains. In some compelling extreme cases, especially the ‘sinking’ island states in the Indian Ocean Region and the South Pacific,26 cross-border relocation of

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal

displaced communities might be the one and only option left for the governments. The President of the Maldives, Mohamed Anni Nasheed, announced in 2008 the ‘Safer Islands Plan’, which contained provisions for internal resettlement from smaller, less populated islands to larger islands. While emphasising the need for better natural protection at home, reinforced by enhanced coastal defenses, the plan did mention the possibility of relocating the entire Maldives population to another country such as India or Iceland. Permanent Representative of the Maldives to the United Nations, H.E. Ahmed Khaleel was quick to admit that, “Migration and resettlement from smaller to larger islands has become an important prerequisite for development and for our survival.”27 For as many as 40 countries that are said to be facing ‘existential threat’ due to rising sea levels, mitigating climate change as well as adapting to it needs international cooperation and assistance. No doubt some of the small island states, like the government of Kiribati, are giving a serious thought to migrating the displaced to Australia and New Zealand, but they remain deeply conscious of the fact that what migration plans need first and foremost is a humanitarian consideration and recognition by other governments of the fact that relocation of the displaced falls under their international obligation to assist. The ways in which risk and uncertainty with deterritorialized threats could be manipulated and worst-case scenarios popularized can be associated with a well-documented ‘politics of fear’.28 As Furedi puts it so aptly: “The tendency to engage with uncertainty through the prism of fear and therefore anticipate destructive outcomes can be understood as a crisis of causality.”29 Given the huge uncertainty that appears to surround climate-induced displacements (multiplied many a time when visualized and categorized in terms of ‘climate migrations’ crossing national borders) it is not surprising perhaps that this geographically differentiated and uncertain phenomenon, both in terms of causality and consequences, is getting increasingly implicated in the geopolitics of fear at certain sites.30 As pointed out in the Australian context, both climate change believers and skeptics could use that fear as a strategy.31 It is equally important to bear in mind Dennis Rumley’s contention that “Indeed, certainty and uncertainty are by no means natural or universal concepts and what the West regards as uncertain is by no

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means an innocent representation.”32 Let us turn to just a few examples of a general nature in order to substantiate these points. Both Gwynne Dyer’s 2008 book titled Climate Wars and the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) report titled World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk (2008) provided further fillip to imaginative geographies popularized by Robert Kaplan in his widely cited 1994 essay titled The Coming Anarchy.33 According to the WBGU Report, the consequences of climate change will be farreaching for South Asia region as “glacial retreat in the Himalayas will jeopardize the water supply for millions of people, changes to the annual monsoon will affect agriculture, and sea-level rise and cyclones will threaten human settlements around the populous Bay of Bengal. These dynamics will increase the social crisis potential in a region which is already characterized by cross-border conflicts (India/Pakistan), unstable governments (Bangladesh/Pakistan) and Islamism.”34 Overall, says the report, “Climate-induced inter-state wars are unlikely to occur. However, climate change could well trigger national and international distributional conflicts and intensify problems already hard to manage such as state failure, the erosion of social order, and rising violence. In the worst affected regions, this could lead to the proliferation of destabilization processes with diffuse conflict structures. These dynamics threaten to overstretch the established global governance system, thus jeopardizing international stability and security.”35 According to Dyer, IPCC’s assumptions are rather conservative and in case we posit a global average temperature of 2.8 degrees Centigrade higher than 1990 (which according to him is well within the realm of possibility) then around 2045, in a world inhabited by 5.8 billion people, the following scenario is likely to unfold: Since the Final Collapse of the European Union in 2036, under the stress of mass migration from the southern to northern members, the reconfigured Northern Union (France, Benelux, Germany, Scandinavia, Poland and other old Habsburg domains in Central Europe) has succeeded in closing its borders to any further refugees from the faminestricken Mediterranean countries… Russia, the greatest beneficiary of climate change in terms of food production, is the undisputed great power of Asia. However, the reunification of China after the chaos of 2020s and 2030s poses a renewed threat to its Siberian borders, for even the much reduced Chinese population of eight hundred

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal million is unable to feed itself from the country’s increasingly arid farmland, which was devastated by the decline of rainfall over the north Chinese plain and the collapse of major river systems. Southern India is reemerging as a major regional power, but what used to be northern India, Pakistan and Bangladesh remain swept by famine and anarchy, due to collapse of the flow in the glacier-fed Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers and the increasingly frequent failure of the monsoon. Japan, like Britain, has withdrawn from its continent and is an island of relative prosperity bristling with nuclear weapons.36

We tend to agree with the contention of Benedikt Korf that, “climate wars narrative is flawed and dangerous. It is flawed, because it is based on misleading interpretation of the scientific environmental conflict literature. It is dangerous because it produced a regionalization, which maps out the Global South as hot spots (in a true sense) of violence and insecurity”.37 According to Korf, the future of humanity is being framed in terms of the imaginative geographies of climate wars as follows: “Climate wars are the wars of the future: in an increasingly warmer world, resources are likely to become scarcer, in particular in the already dry and hot zones of the earth. Scarcity of resources triggers struggles for survival and therefore, future wars will be fought by desperate populations in their struggle to survive – if they have not yet migrated to Europe.”38

Human Insecurities on the Margins: Geographies of vulnerability and Potential Climate Displacements in the Bay of Bengal In the light of the big picture outlined above (and the theoretical engagement attempted by us in the first chapter), our intention in this section is to zoom into the Bay of Bengal in order to capture the geographical specificities (physical, human, social-economic) of a semienclosed sea characterized by the presence of large marine eco-systems on which millions depend for their livelihoods. Beyond the imagined geographies of fear giving rise to highly alarmist scenarios of changing climate change related migrations, are the coastal localities where communities on the margins of their

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respective national political economies continue their struggles aimed at sustaining the lived-in-geographies of livelihoods in the wake of a number of transformations including environmental. For the purposes of this section we focus on the South Asian part of the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystems, drawing extensively from an excellent 2011 ‘Review of Community–based Integrated Coastal Management’39 supported by the FAO, where one finds, “…one of the largest concentrations of coastal poor [those living in terms of income poverty on less than US$2 per day, ranging from 40 per cent in Sri Lanka to about 80 per cent in India and Bangladesh)” numbering more than 20 million in the 1990s. It is important to critically reflect on what climate change has in store for those who remain comprehensively insecure on the margins of both national and international geopolitical economy while contributing to the food security of others. The livelihoods of these poor and marginalized communities, found predominantly along Bangladesh and Indian coastlines (and to a lesser extent along Sri Lankan coast) depend directly on traditional small-scale fishing. Out of nearly 50  per cent of the total population engaged in artisanal and small-scale coastal fishery activities, nearly 50 per cent happen to be women. In a serious state of deprivation in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, these women and their households are bearing the maximum burden in terms of rising insecurities related to falling income from fisheries, consequences (howsoever unintended) of modernization of fisheries, deepening poverty, food insecurities and displacements. Given the unsettling facts that “little evidence exists of smallscale fisheries being mainstreamed into national policy and national economy except in the case of Maldives”, 40 fishery statistics are unreliable by and large (with the sole exception mentioned above), the coastal fishery stocks are either overexploited or about to exceed the maximum sustainable levels (and yet reports by national agencies seem to suggest scope for capacity expansion in offshore waters!) and fast multiplying negative externalities of industry, agriculture and urbanization remain unaddressed within an ecosystem approach to fishery management, climate-related disasters and displacements seem to be in the making.41 The FAO study concludes with the following observations:

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal Many marginalized coastal/fisher communities are in chronic poverty trap which results in progressive increase in their level of deprivation (creeping normalcy). This requires recognition at the national level as a chronic disaster which may combine with acute coastal hazards (those to which a time and date can be given) resulting in catastrophes. The remote and dispersed nature of costal/fisher communities/ settlements which are inadequately serviced with infrastructure has obstructed movement into other occupations, i.e. poor access to education, health, alternative employment opportunities, etc. High levels of income poverty and lack of access to alternative means of income have caused displacement and transfer of responsibility for family health and nutrition to women heads of households… If fishery development is planned and implemented as it has occurred during the past five decades, i.e. without adequately understanding the complexity of the particular socio-ecological systems, undesirable unintended consequences will be inevitable with the severe socio-economic impacts being borne by the weakest actors in the sector.42

As and when displaced, with or without climate change (with the latter acting more as an accelerator and impact multiplier), in which direction and how far will these people go? We are much inclined to agree with those analysts who argue that even in the case of so-called sinking islands such as Maldives or Tuvalu or Kiribati, it is difficult to visualize a straightforward cause-effect syndrome, and in case of climate related movements more so.43 A vast majority of individuals, families and communities falling in the category discussed above, may not possess even the minimum necessary capacity, skills and resources to migrate even short distances. These geographies of immobility further seem to underline the preference of some observers for term ‘survival migration’, “which shifts attention away from particular causes of movement and towards a more comprehensive understanding of multiple stressors that may compel people to leave their homes”.44

Climate Change and The Sundarbans: Displacements, Migration and ‘Climate Refugees’ Covering less than 1 per cent of tropical forests globally speaking (which comes to around 0.4 per cent of the total global forest estate) mangrove

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forests “cover an area of only around 152,000 sq km in 123 tropical and sub-tropical forests worldwide”.45 Despite the well-known fact that they are not only extremely rich in biodiversity but also hold the key to the livelihood–food security of millions of people around the world through the production of numerous fishery and forest products, they are “disappearing three to five times faster than overall global forest losses. Some countries have lost more than 40 per cent of their mangrove area over a 25-year period and many remaining areas are in a degraded state.”46 Some of the major anthropogenic interventions that continue to destroy and degrade mangroves include rapid population growth and high population densities in coastal areas, over-extraction and deforestation, infilling, drainage and conversion for aquaculture or other resource, agriculture, urban and industrial runoff, oil spills and poorly managed dredging and coastal development.47 Termed as the ‘blue carbon sinks’, the mangrove forests serve as “highly effective global carbon stores and sinks” and in the context of climate change mitigation “they can also help build or maintain elevation in the face of rising seas.”48 Relatively undermined or neglected in many national climate change action plans, the mangroves as ‘blue carbon sinks’ are now strong contenders for market-industry driven clean development mechanism or carbon trading. The Sundarbans, hosting one of the largest continuous mangrove forests in the world, and shared between India and Bangladesh, are being increasingly perceived as well as reported in media as the ‘first climate hotspots’ in South Asia. Here is an outstanding example of an inhabited ecological region that is geopolitically partitioned and subjected to two different regulatory regimes. Designated as a UNESCO world heritage site, the Indian Sundarbans Delta (ISD), the western part of the delta of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin, is spread over about 9,630 square kilometres and is home to over four and a half million, largely rural, people.49 Nearly 60 per cent of India’s mangrove habitat is in the Sundarbans. The larger (eastern) part of the Sundarbans delta is in Bangladesh. As many as 54 deltaic islands (occupying a little over half of the area) are populated and the remaining space is covered by the mangrove vegetation. Extreme weather events, such as severe storms or cyclones, occurring at frequent intervals, have a long-standing history in the region. According to the IPCC fourth assessment report,

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal Mangroves may be affected by climate change-related increases in temperature and sea-level rise. Although the temperature effect on growth and species diversity is not known, sea-level rise may pose a serious threat to these ecosystems. In Bangladesh, for instance, there is a threat to species in the three distinct ecological zones that make up the Sunderbans – the largest continuous mangrove area in the world. If the saline water front moves further inland, Heritiera fomes (the dominant species in the landward freshwater zone) could be threatened. Species in the other two ecological zones (Excoecaria agallocha in the moderately saltwater zone and Ceriops decandra in the saltwater zone) also could suffer. These changes could result in economic impacts: Direct employment supported by the Sunderbans is estimated to be in the range of 500,000-600,000 people for at least half of the year …and a large number of these people --who are directly employed in the industries that use raw materials from the Sunderbans (e.g., woodcutting; collection of thatching materials, honey, beeswax, and shells; fishing) -- may lose their sources of income.50 (emphasis given)

Ecological insecurities, multiplied as well as magnified by climate change, as experienced by the vast majority of inhabitants on both sides of Sundarbans (especially those engaged in fishing and agriculture), are marked by a complex geographical-spatial pattern including (but not exhausted by) climate change induced seasonal variation, floods and droughts. According to the WWF India, A pronounced ecological change is evolving in this delta due to huge discharges of untreated domestic and industrial effluents carried by tributary rivers as well as the disposal of contaminated mud from harbour dredging and resulting from the rapid emergence of the Haldia Port Complex, a major oil disembarkment terminal in eastern India. The Sundarbans delta has become susceptible to chemical pollutants such as heavy metals, organochlorine pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, which may have changed the estuary’s geochemistry and affected the local coastal environment. As home to a significant portion of one of the world’s largest contiguous block of mangrove forests, the portion under natural vegetation in ISD holds a prominent global place and a part of it has been designated as UNESCO World Heritage site in 1987 in recognition of its high biodiversity as well as the occurrence of endangered and highly threatened species, including the only population of tigers found in a coastal mangrove habitat.51

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As pointed out above, the most prominent feature of the ISD is the mangrove ecosystem that dominates the landscape and defies the geopolitical boundaries between India and Bangladesh. Nearly 85 per cent of all mangrove habitats found in India lie in the ISD. At least seven of these mangrove species or species groups are at risk and demand immediate conservation measures. Both the direct human activities and natural environmental changes are responsible for the degradation of natural ecosystems in the ISD. As far as the impacts of climate change on other components of the natural environment are concerned, except for changes in the physical components, “there is insufficient knowledge to attribute changes directly to climate change”.52 While emphasizing that much more interdisciplinary research is the need of the hour, the WWF Report points out that, The pattern of governance in the ISD has so far struggled to keep up with the management and development challenges posed by this complex system. Given the disproportionately heavy impact that climate change is expected to have on this delta area, the need to improve adaptive management and develop more appropriate solutions for this unique system has become acutely urgent. Changes, in the face of climate change, are required in the broader context of physical limitations of a delta system, national development and human settlement management, biodiversity conservation, and transboundary cooperation. Putting the ISD in perspective and accounting for this broader context will be crucial if correct management decisions are to be made. If current policies and patterns of development continue, the ISD is likely to face steep and insurmountable challenges in coping with the pressures of predicted changes, particularly in the face of population growth and impacts of climate change. To date, the gravity of these challenges has not been publicly recognized. The ISD is in need of early, proactive and informed interventions by all actors involved in the management and development of this area, especially the state and national governments. The growing consensus among a vast body of scientists and experts from all over the world is that unless highly informed and sometimes bold changes in policy and governance are introduced, coping with the pressures of predicted changes will be nearly impossible. In view of the grave situation facing the ISD and the fact that without much needed change, this environmentally and economically important area is rapidly heading towards an uncertain future…53 (emphasis given)

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No doubt the Sundarbans are heading towards an uncertain future but with a rather complex geography in terms of scale, space and power. If Sundarbans occupy a peripheral position vis-à-vis national and provincial geographical-political mainstream (in other words vis-à-vis New Delhi and Kolkata) despite their growing visibility and centrality in the context of ‘global’ climate change, there are disempowered communities that continue to struggle on the margins of this periphery and experience extreme forms of vulnerability and livelihood insecurities. The widely cited findings of a study on the Sundarbans, carried out by Dr. Sugata Hazara, Director, School of Oceanographic Studies, Jadavpur University, revealed as early as 2006 that nearly two-thirds of Ghoramara Island had been permanently inundated due to sea level rise. And Lohachara Island, once inhabited by ten thousand people, and Supribhanga island (both located southwest of Ghoramara) had submerged. Those displaced from the Lohachara Island fled to an island called Sagar, which is said to be equally vulnerable, already having lost 7,500 acres of land to rising sea levels.54 The Ghoramara island (covering an area of around 4.8 square km, with a total shoreline length of 8.5 km) is located in the Hooghly river estuary (one of the largest estuaries of Ganges river), about 18.36 nautical miles away from the Haldia dock.55 Out of the cluster of small villages on this island56 the Kashimara Char, Lakshmi Narayanpur and Kashimara have been completely submerged. The key occupation of the communities in this area, which experiences a tropical warm and humid climate, is agriculture and fishing. Ghoramara is 6.5 m above mean sea level and subjected to “stronger flood tides for shorter duration”57 since “the Hooghly estuary experience semidiurnal tide with flood tide of short duration, 3 to 4 hours, and the ebb tide remains for 8–9 hours.”58 On the issue of morphological changes of the Ghoramara, a recent study points out that: The island is undergoing rigorous erosion and it has been calculated that the island has lost almost 50 per cent of its area over four decades due to severe erosion around all sides. The decrease of fresh water influx in the Hooghly River due to natural and anthropogenic causes is a major cause of the instability of the island system… Land use land cover map also shows a drastic reduction in the area of agriculture land and

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fisheries. Land use land cover calculations also showed that the island total area has been reduced from 9.09 square km to 4.8 square km.59 (emphasis given)

In 2001 the population of Ghoramara was about 5,000 but a number of factors, based on both fear and the hope to overcome that fear, have forced migration and relocation to other nearby islands such as Sagar, including severe erosion resulting in the degradation of local environment, loss of homeland and livelihood. Those who have been displaced from already submerged Lohachara and fast disappearing Ghoramara (experiencing rapid and vast erosion) have been called ‘environmental refugees’. As the poor communities lose their homes, land and fields and are exposed to multiple displacements, irrespective of which side of the Sundarbans they are (Indian or Bangladeshi), they would demand and deserve transboundary cooperation and complementarities at sub-regional and regional levels. Having said that, the key policy responses to the multifaceted and multiscalar plight of Sundarbans so far have been predominantly national rather than local and trans-national. Anamrita Anurag Danda (before he joined WWF and co-authored the above cited 2011 WWF report on Indian Sundarbans) had cautioned against privileging the national scale over the local scale in his doctoral thesis on the Sundarbans.60 The complexity of spatial-scalar matrix, within which the structural approach to ‘secure’ Sundarbans has been deployed by various government agencies, has been graphically captured by Danda in the following manner: The embankments are crucial for sustaining human habitation in the Sundarbans. Though the significance of embankments is local, the ownership is non-local in the sense that these are public property rather than common property and the onus of their maintenance rests on institutionalized collective action organization that is a level far too removed from the communities immediately affected due to breaches/ collapses in embankments.61

Danda while obviously mindful of the alienation caused by the physical and cognitive distance between the locality/communities (that have to bear the brunt of action or inaction) and the authorities, seems unable somehow to escape the dilemma inherent in a structural approach,

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however innovative it might appear in first instance.To quote Danda again Shifting a large population of over 1.76 million out of the eco-region does not appear feasible given that rural West Bengal already has a population density of 676 persons per square kilometre. Minimizing further degradation of the land mass is the only option to ensure that the population has the opportunity to develop with the rest of the country. Large-scale investments in concrete structures located further inland so that tides have the space to play is likely to allow more stability than currently possible. Given the magnitude of physical forces, the global phenomena of sea level rise, the level of investment required for erecting and securing the structures, and the significance of the eco-region, it might be more appropriate to transfer ownership of embankments and the responsibility of maintaining these even further by several levels to the national level or even beyond since the Protected Area is of global significance and has consequences for the World Heritage site. Moreover, it is not within the means of the State of West Bengal to make such large-scale investment.62 (emphasis given)

The ‘Delta Vision’ of the 2011 WWF Report talks about “enhanced protection for human economic activities together with restoration of mangrove forests, and encouragement of phased and systematic outmigration” and suggests a four-phase approach. Central to the vision, among various other suggestions, is the reconstitution of the Sundarban Biosphere Reserve as ‘Biosphere District’ in Phase I and in Phase IV, “the population below the green line starts to migrate to the newly developed areas”.63 What about the popular response to such a vision? The following excerpt from the concluding paragraph of the WWF Report sums it all: This Vision Scenario was discussed with at least 500 residents of the ISD at three different locations during consultative sessions in April-May 2010. Only about 5 percent of the participants thought emigration was possible. This may partly be due to the fact that current circumstances present few opportunities for positive emigration and the inhabitants of the region feel that current opportunities for change are limited. The experience of involuntarily displaced people in other parts of the country in terms of rehabilitation and resettlement may also be partly responsible for the current position on emigration that the people of ISD are taking.64

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The fear lying behind resistance expressed by an overwhelming majority of ISD residents to what they perceive as forced displacement is not ill-founded because, as succinctly pointed out by Oliver-Smith,65 The dispersal of family members that often occurs in displacement fragments not only a household, but erodes the social cohesion of a community as well, shredding those networks of relationships that form the basis of personal and social identity, setting people adrift, without those ties that anchor the self in the social world. The loss and destruction of important cultural sites, shrines, religious objects, the interruption of important sacred and secular events and rituals undermines the community’s sense of itself. The loss of personal relationships and the social context in which they were expressed and in which the individual was affirmed, may leave people bereft of a sense of meaning, a sense of purpose in life. In summary, removal from one’s place in the world can be a form of removal from life.

As the resident communities of geopolitically split Sundarbans struggle to adapt to multiples transitions, transformations and dislocations (without getting lost in the process), against the backdrop of various top-down structural, managerial and market-based solutions being vigorously pursued and indiscriminately imposed in some cases by the authorities concerned, the subaltern perspectives will continue to highlight the fact that in cases where the dominant spatiality of ‘social’ happens to be deeply hierarchical, climate change adaptation for these people appears difficult in the absence of empowerment (social-cultural, political and economic) at the grassroots.

Indonesia: ‘Development’, Displacement and Climate Change The 2009 World Bank report, entitled ‘Mainstreaming Climate Change for Sustainability’, highlights Indonesia’s major climate change challenges including more intense rainfall and a rise in sea level, and outlines implications for food security, water resources, health, farming life, and forest and marine biodiversity. It also points out that climate change will have major impacts on Indonesia’s economic growth as deforestation will decrease the country’s potential for development. The agricultural sector in Indonesia, and in turn poor communities dependent on this sector, are going to be seriously affected by climate change and the

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corresponding sea-level rise.66 As pointed out by Measey, “Indonesia has experienced an affluent amount of floods, mostly due to climate change. The poor population in Indonesia is going to be the hardest hit by climate disasters. The poor lack the assets and flexibility to handle the impacts that climate change have on productivity and the devastations caused by natural disasters and extreme weather conditions.” Due to the sea-level rise and corresponding increase in floods, communities that depend on agriculture and fisheries will be adversely affected. With climate change resulting in loss of arable lands due to the advancing of sea level, it is the poor people, “lacking the ability and the means to find other land in order to continue production” who would be the major losers.67 A recent case study by Freddy Pattiselanno and Agustina Arobaya of the Papuan Bird’s Head Peninsula (BHP),68 situated in the heart of the Coral Triangle (CT) in south eastern Indonesia (encompassing over 22.5 million hectares of sea and small islands in West Papua), shows that climate change impacts and implications can not be divorced from longstanding histories of environmental degradation, and in this case threats to marine biodiversity caused by economic growth obsessed models of development. On the global ecological map, the BHP is known as an “area with the richest diversity of reef, fish and coral species in the world. It is also considered the global epicenter of tropical shallow water marine biodiversity.”69 The authors of this study, in the course of mapping the biodiversity of the place, conducted between 2011 and 2012, Realized that BHP is not only rich in renewable natural resources but also in crude oil, gas and minerals such as gold, copper and nickel. We encountered the fact that Akram Resources — the Indonesian partner of Hillgrove Resources from Australia, a mining company, has been awarded an exploration license covering 99,230 hectares or 992.3 square kilometres (km) for a seven-year term within 40 km of the coast of Warmandi village, Abun district, in the BHP. Furthermore, Medco Energy, which has logged and planted since 2009, proposed 45,000 hectares for an oil palm plantation in Sidey district, Manokwari. Regrettably, we also realized that 571 km of the trans-West Papua road splits many pristine forests between Manokwari and Sorong. The expansion of roads not only leads to increasing forest loss at a rate of 50 soccer fields a minute but it also spews billions

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of tons of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere each year. Again, the pristine tropical rainforest in the BHP will soon be jeopardized and converted for the sake of development.70 (emphasis given)

The message emanating loud and clear from the above is that climate is not the only thing that is changing in the world, including the Bay of Bengal littorals. What are also changing rapidly are environmental, social and economic conditions. As reported by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), until March 2013, “West Papua was among eight provinces with the highest poverty rate (26.67 percent), second after neighboring Papua (31.13 per cent).”71 Furthermore, In addition to anthropogenic threats, coastal and marine areas in the BHP are also threatened by a combination of climate change impacts — increased frequency and severity of elevated sea surface temperature and extreme weather events, sea-level rise and ocean acidification. The combination of these threats will result in increased coastal erosion, inundation and displacement of wetlands and coastal lowlands in addition to increased flooding and storm damage as well as saltwater intrusion into freshwater sources. Given the reliance of local communities on coastal resources, including groundwater for consumption and crop irrigation, climate change impacts resulting from sea-level rise, heat stress and related coral leaching and mortality, may likely affect their future livelihoods and food security.72

According to Freddy Pattiselanno and Agustina Arobaya, joint efforts and partnerships among the central government and NGOs as well as local governments and stakeholders are needed in order to put into place effective and sustainable coastal and marine resource management. Establishing Marine Protected Areas (12 MPAs have been established in BHP so far) will no doubt help but “the empowerment of local governments and local communities to manage these resources is critical for future sustainability and food security in the BHP.”73 In the context of human-livelihood security, a critically important question relates to ensuring that marine protected areas are not established in the traditional fishing zones, and they “respect the participation of small fishers and fish farmers in fisheries management and promote inclusive growth”.74 According to the Southeast Asia Fish for Justice Organization (a network of non-governmental and fisherfolk organizations) it is vital to “develop the community-based approach as

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the alternative to CTI’s [Coral Triangle Initiative] ecosystem approach— one that is anchored on the participation of coastal communities in the crafting, planning and implementation of fisheries management actions, together with adaptation and mitigation measures to climate change.”75 In order to realize these objectives, SEAFish has made the following specific demands to ASEAN governments, which remain equally relevant for Bay of Bengal: “Respect traditional and customary rights of fisherfolk and coastal communities to their fishing grounds. Recognize the rights of fisherfolk and coastal communities to control and manage their fishing grounds; Take into account human activities such as overfishing and ecologically harmful investments in coastal and marine areas that result in resource degradation and worsen the impacts of climate change in coastal communities, as well as endangering their food security and physical security; Promote fisherfolk participation in building coastal community resilience to climate change and the adoption of local knowledge and capacities in efforts and measures toward this end; and regulate fisheries trade and enhance domestic markets toward food security and building community resilience.”76 It is to say the obvious perhaps that climate change impacts in their various forms (costal flooding and insecurities with regard to food, water and health), especially in the absence of such important interventions as mentioned above, will force the affected communities, especially the poor, to migrate in order to adapt, survive and arrest declining livelihood security. It is worth noting that in the case of Indonesia “there is a long history of responding to economic, social, or environmental adversity by moving on a temporary or permanent basis.”77 Moreover, nearly 6 million Indonesians, including low-skilled labor migrants, are working abroad, particularly in more advanced Asian economies and in the Middle East. There is a significant rural– urban movement within the country, both temporary and permanent, overwhelmingly in the direction of western Java. “However, with greater Jakarta expected to face multiple impacts of climate change in the years ahead, internal migration may shift to other urban areas less at risk, including on other islands in the archipelago nation”.78 Whether those forcibly displaced by overwhelming climate induced change will go beyond the Indonesian archipelagic islands, in the direction of ‘near abroad’ such as Australia, hopeful of more secure future, is difficult to predict. But what can be said with reasonable certainty is

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that such scenarios are causing fear and cartographic anxieties among some of the neighbors, especially Australia.

Myanmar: Opening Up and Leapfrogging For nearly three decades, Myanmar was shunned by the global community for its oppressive military regime, lack of transparency in governance and poor human rights record which invited economic and political sanctions. The ongoing political, economic and social transformation has invited international attention and there is a hope it would endeavour to protect itself against indiscriminate economic growth at the cost of the environment degradation while engaging in development to meet the critical requirements of the well-being of its peoples. In fact it is favourably positioned and has a unique opportunity to leapfrog the negative course of development unlike some other countries that have blindly and indiscriminately moved ahead in economic development. It is blessed with rich biodiversity and enormous amounts of natural resources and can be a model for a green development revolution. The Myanmar government is seized of the effects of climate change and its impact on Myanmar’s people and its economy but it is confronted with a number of challenges that have direct impact on Myanmar’s economic growth. Dr. Tun Lwin, the founder of Myanmar Climate Change Watch, a private nonprofit organisation that monitors climate change in the country and shares weather information with the public, has observed that “The new government is trying to solve poverty and civil war, but unfortunately climate change has never been well acknowledged by our decision-makers,”79 Further, “If it [climate change] continues, it will continue to have consequences in the coming years…That’s why we’re asking for more government support, because we can’t handle this issue alone.”80 A detailed study by a group of scientists on the possible implications of economic development and climatic change merits attention.81 It has suggested that Myanmar government should institute ecosystembased adaptation strategies and focus on strengthening the protected areas. The authors of the study note that “For many years, Myanmar’s isolation has served to protect the biodiversity which has disappeared

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from many other regions in Southeast Asia…Things are now changing rapidly for Myanmar, which will soon experience increasing economic growth and the myriad cascading effects of climate change on its forests and coastlines. The opportunity to protect the country’s natural heritage with a strategic and multi-faceted approach is now.”82 One of the authors of the study has observed: The threat of climate change implies the need to embrace ecosystembased strategies that will enable people to be resilient and allow species to survive. With sensible planning, the people of Myanmar can aim to protect the key ecological services that will provide an important buffer for the likely effects of climate change that are already occurring… Leaders of the Myanmar government have a chance to transform their country into a model for sustainable development…Saving Myanmar’s natural wonders for posterity will rely on filling knowledge gaps and correctly anticipating the responses of environment and people in a changing world.83

The study also urges that “Leaders of the Myanmar government have a chance to transform their country into a model for sustainable development,” and “Saving Myanmar’s natural wonders for posterity will rely on filling knowledge gaps and correctly anticipating the responses of environment and people in a changing world.”84 Myanmar has an agrarian economy and the country relies on exports of rice to keep its economy buoyant. The 2008 Cyclone Nargis destroyed 1.75 million hectares of rice farmland. Since the cyclone Myanmar has faced erratic weather patterns and this has affected rice agriculture. The Myanmar rice expert U Tun Win acknowledges the fact that the “Farmers in the delta have yet to recover from the cyclone,”85 and some of the farmers are in deep trouble due to insufficient financial support and loans will result in deep debts. Myanmar is ranked 12 out of the countries whose population is at risk due to sea level rise and has its fair share of natural hazards such as cyclone, flood, drought,  earthquake and tsunami. Besides, the country is also faced by communal violence. According to the 2012 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Report “Up to 140,000 people displaced by inter-communal violence in 2012 live in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Most of them belong to the minority Rohingya and other Muslim

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communities. They reportedly live in overcrowded camps affected by numerous waterborne diseases, around half of which are in low-lying coastal areas.”86 According to the United Nations, in 2012, nearly 13,000 people fled Myanmar to escape isolation and religious persecution. They have undertaken perilous voyages on board smugglers’ boats and many may have perished at sea. The UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, has observed that November is the sailing season for the smuggler boats to set sail for Thailand, Malaysia, India and others and the states “affected by such movements should adopt a comprehensive, harmonized approach that is underpinned by strengthened coordination and cooperation on search and rescue at sea, interceptions, disembarkation, assistance and identification of outcomes and solutions.”87

Sea Level Rise, Coastal Flooding and Human Security Imperatives in the Bay of Bengal Littorals While identifying coastal flooding as the “greatest risk induced by climate change in Southeast Asia, with around one-third of the population living in areas considered to be at risk”, the 2012 Asian Development Bank Report rightly emphasises that “the impact of climate change on these populations will be influenced not just by the nature and severity of the impact but also by the ability of those populations to bring resources to bear to adapt to that change.”88 In other words, mapping ‘the broader socioeconomic vulnerability of populations in the hot spots is therefore significant.’ In Thailand, leading climate change risks are associated with a shift in rainfall from north to south; more frequent extreme weather events; and rising sea levels that will influence closely settled coastal areas, especially in the Bangkok area.89 Furthermore, “One significant nonlinear change to migration patterns in Thailand could occur as a result of the risk of more flooding and sea-level rise in Bangkok. The core of the city is built around the Chao Phraya River and associated canals. The interaction of sea-level rise, storm surges, and riverine flood risk associated with climate change could lead to a significant displacement of people from the low-lying areas of Bangkok. This would lead to a fundamental change in the role of the city, both as a destination for internal Thai migrants and as a

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stopover point for international migrants, especially from neighboring countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. The floods that struck Thailand and part of greater Bangkok during the latter half of 2011 show the urgent need for adaptation.”90 According to some Thai experts, “the lives of about 700,000 people and 1.6 million buildings in Bangkok will be affected by floods caused by more rainfall and rising sea levels as a result of climate change in the next forty years.”91

Securitizing Climate Change, Displacements and ‘Environmental Refugees’ in the Bay of Bengal: Perspectives on and from Bangladesh The trend of growing ‘securitization’ of climate change and its various facets in general has been critically examined by a number of recent studies.92 Given the importance of changing energy-climate interface in the age of scarcity, real or constructed, (which is so important in the case of the Bay of Bengal) a number of observers have shown how issues related to access, demand and supply of energy flows are being securitized and militarized.93 Various ways in which certain state and non-state actors territorialize carbon flows and deploy geopolitics of fear by building alarmist future scenarios unleashed by climate change in the Global South have also been exposed and analysed.94 Our analysis in this chapter reveals that such securitizing trends are quite visible in the Bay of Bengal, especially with regard to Bangladesh. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) of Copenhagen School of International Relations have brought critical insights to bear on the traditional understandings of ‘security’ by introducing analytical levels other than that of nation-state and the military. Wæver has argued that what is being termed as ‘security’ is the perceived outcome of a ‘speech act’ that aims at taking politics ‘beyond the established rules of the game’.95 An uncritical acceptance of the assertion by the target audience that climate change induced displacements leading to migrations is a security threat enables an actor or actors to move an issue-area outside the sphere of ‘normal/low politics’ into the sphere of ‘security/high politics’. In most cases such a speech act is carefully

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designed and deployed in order to control a potentially ‘threatening development’ by discursively transforming it into an issue area where ‘emergency measures’ could be imposed and spaces for anticipated resistance could be erased or minimized. The extent to which the issue in question stands securitized or not depends on the target audience granting the securitising actor “a right to violate rules that otherwise would bind”96 for an issue area which previously was considered as falling outside the purview of security discourse. Policy implications of a securitization through speech act are quite significant in the sense that once its imaginative geographies are accepted as authoritative and legitimate, they are usually followed by new policy measures, shifting priorities or new initiatives and interventions (e.g. carbon taxes or insurance policies in the context of climate change related threats), establishment of new bureaucracies and/or the re-formulation of the old ones with new mandates. It is equally important to bear in mind that different outcomes of a securitizing act might follow, depending on the specific understanding of security that is being deployed by the securitizing actor or agency. It also appears to matter a good deal at the same time whether those ‘securitizing’ an issue argue in terms of wars, weapons and armies (i.e. ‘hard’ security) or in terms of ‘human security’, namely hunger, disease and refugees. Paul J. Smith97 has argued that, “the militarization of state response to migration partially reflects a paradigm shift in how international migration is being considered.” Earlier perceived as a social or labor issue, migration, especially large-scale and ‘disruptive’ is now perceived by many countries as a national security concern. A lopsided and sensational coverage by media has played a major role in ensuring that ‘disruptive’ migration receives far more attention than routine migration caused by various socio-economic discrimination and disruptions. In the overall process of immigration getting “transformed from a law enforcement ‘low politics’ issue into a ‘high politics’ matter with geopolitical implications”,98 the rhetoric and reality of climate related displacements are now playing a major role. In most of the literature on climate change and displacement, the reference to natural disasters is conspicuous by its absence. As Elizabeth Ferris99 points out so succinctly, a natural disaster is defined by the UN as, “the consequences of events triggered by natural hazards that

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overwhelm local response capacity and seriously affect the social and economic development of a region”. No less important is to ask how ‘natural’ are natural disasters. For example, in Nepal landslides are reportedly becoming more common, which may be the result of climate change and the melting of Himalayan glaciers. But it may also be due to deforestation. In a speech-act delivered at the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 26 September 2009, Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, talked about the implications of climate change for her country. It is worth noting that she not only makes a reference in this speech to millions of ‘climate migrants’ and ‘climate refugees’ but also emphasizes the need for an international legal regime. The tone and the tenor of her narrative of climate change, ably supported by natural science evidence, are visibly marked by the geopolitics of fear and cartographic anxieties: Climate change has for some time been adversely impacting our lowlying, deltaic, monsoonal country. Though Bangladesh’s contribution to climate change is negligible, it is one of its worst victims. Erratic floods, cyclones, droughts and earthquakes are interrupting our agriculture, and challenging our water resources, health, energy, urban planning, etc. Cyclones, battering the coastal areas, have particularly been taking countless lives, and sudden floods uprooting families in thousands, year around. River bank erosion, landslides, soil degradation and deforestation are causing millions of climate change refugees. They are already all over our thickly populated cities. What is alarming is that a metre rise in sea level would inundate 18 per cent of our landmass, directly impacting 11 per cent of our people. Scientific estimates indicate, of the billion people expected to be displaced worldwide by 2050 by climate change factors, one in every 45 people in the world, and one in every 7 people in Bangladesh, would be a victim. Rapid, unplanned urbanization, occupational dislocations, food, water and land insecurity are some of the consequences of climate change. The affected communities would not only lose their homes, they would also stand to lose their identity, nationality, and their very existence, and in some cases, their countries. In December this year, we would gather in Copenhagen for COP 15, and it is critical, therefore, the outcome of the conference reflects commitment for assured, adequate, and easily accessible funding for adaptation; and

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affordable, eco-friendly technology transfer to developing countries, particularly to LDCs; as much as specific commitments for deeper cuts in greenhouse emissions. Bangladesh would, of course, make a strong call for climate migrants at COP 15 to consider a new legal regime under the UNFCC Protocol ensuring social, cultural and economic rehabilitation of climate induced displaced migrants.100 (emphasis given)

In her message to ‘Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009’, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina expressed the resolve of her government to ‘free’ the people of her country from the ‘terror of climate’ and to ensure that “people are fully protected from its adverse impacts as promised in our manifesto”.101 However, as revealed by the following excerpt from the report, the government of Bangladesh appears to have accepted, rather uncritically, the category of ‘environmental refugees’ along with the geopolitical assumption that ‘more than 20 million’ displaced Bangladeshis will be migrating to other parts of the world: It has been estimated that there is the impending threat of displacement of more than 20 million people in the event of sea-level change and resulting increase in salinity coupled with impact of increase in cyclones and storm surges, in the near future. The settlement of these environmental refugees will pose a serious problem for the densely populated Bangladesh and migration must be considered as a valid option for the country. Preparations in the meantime will be made to convert this population into trained and useful citizens for any country.102 (emphasis given)

The quotation above raises a number of intriguing questions. Who are environmental refugees? Who among the millions of displaced Bangladeshis, ‘in the event of sea-level rise’, for example, would qualify to be ‘environmental refugees’ and why? How do we distinguish between ‘climate refugees’ and ‘environmental refugees’? 103 The official statements of Bangladesh, cited above, in conjunction with fast proliferating and widely shared assumption that mass transborder migration from Bangladesh towards India, Southeast Asia and even Europe will result in tensions and conflicts, have provided a fillip to imaginative geographies of climate wars in Southern Asia. Such cartographic anxieties have been typically expressed through statements of the following nature:

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal Sending migrants to other countries is an undeclared objective of Bangladesh. This policy was followed during pre-independence days by the Muslim League. After liberation, Mujibur Rahman wrote that Bangladesh would not be complete without the Northeast. Some writers have invoked the principle of Lebensraum [living space] to justify Bangladeshi migration to northeast India and other parts of the country. Some Indian analysts also believe that Bangladesh is following this as a state policy because ‘sending immigrants is the most effective way to colonize countries’ and it is also less offensive than sending military expeditions and much less expensive. The Bangladeshi government has opposed fencing of the border on many occasions. The ostensible reason is that no defense structure is allowed within 150 metres of the border and Dhaka has often portrayed fencing as an unfriendly gesture of India. The reality is that fencing of the border will create difficulty for Bangladesh to cross over to India.104

As B.S. Chimni puts it, an unambiguous definition of a ‘refugee’ in international law is of critical importance for “it can mean the difference between life and death for an individual seeking asylum”.105 According to the 1951 Protocol and Convention Related to the Status of Refugees106 subscribed to by more than 100 states, a refugee is one who, “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or; owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”107 It is to state the obvious, perhaps, that unless it is accepted by all concerned that ‘nature’ or ‘environment’ or ‘climate’ can be the persecutor, the term refugee, as subscribed to by the 1951 Convention, is not going to work for those supposedly or actually displaced by natural disasters or climate change.108 It is worth noting that even though the temporal and geographical restrictions imposed by the 1951 Convention on the definition of ‘refugee’, against the Cold War politicking, were removed by the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees, what remained by and large untouched was fear as the key defining principle along

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with its Eurocentric bias. According to Chimni “this meant that most third world refugees continued to remain de facto excluded, as their flight is frequently prompted by natural disaster, war or political and economic turmoil rather than by ‘persecution’, at least as that term is understood in the Western context.”109 It is equally noteworthy that regional instruments such as the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, besides incorporating region-specific attributes into their expanded definitions, went on to emphasize that the categorical understanding of a refugee should move away from a geopolitically dictated principle of ‘wellfounded fear’ of ‘persecution’ to address the plight of those fleeing civil unrest, war and violence, irrespective of whether or not they can prove a well-founded fear of persecution. No surprise, the UNHCR has categorically stated that, “the terms of ‘climate refugee’ and ‘environmental refugee’ should be avoided as they are inaccurate and misleading”.110 In a UNHCR-sponsored meeting of experts on ‘climate change and displacements’ held in February 2011 in Bellagio, Italy, the consensus appeared to be that global climate change will result in displacement but we need more research and a better understanding of the scale and impacts of displacements related to climate change.111 In the meanwhile there is no need to initiate a new agreement and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement reflect current international law on the subject and could apply to climate change induced displacements. One of the key messages that emanated out of this meeting was that since climate related displacements are likely to assume different forms at different sites, diverse responses would be required at various levels – i.e. national, sub-regional, regional and international levels. And in case of ‘external displacement’ due to ‘sudden-onset disasters’ the experts had the following to say: “Protection and assistance responses to externally displaced persons must be informed by fundamental principles of humanity, human dignity, human rights and international cooperation. Such responses need also to be guided by consent, empowerment, participation and partnership. They must equally take into account particular vulnerability and protection needs based on age, gender, disability and other forms of diversity. Climate change may further have particular impacts for indigenous peoples as well as nomadic and other mobile communities”.

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The following recommendation at the ‘regional’ level is particularly important in the context of the Bay of Bengal: In situations of large-scale disasters leading to mass external displacement it will be important to rely on burden – and responsibility – sharing arrangements, including through the development of comprehensive regional approaches. Responses to such events may require consideration and implementation of such arrangements as emergency humanitarian evacuation, temporary protection or third-country resettlement.112

Besides the legal ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding the term ‘environmental refugees’ there are some important moral and ethical considerations that have prompted the ambassadors of a number of small island countries of the Pacific to resist the concept.113 It has been rightly pointed out that, “critical to the very stability of the category ‘climate refugees’ is a set of assumptions about ‘future geographies’, where scenarios are described that entail sea-level rise, loss of low-lying Pacific island homelands and resulting mass population movements”.114 The resistance “highlights the fluidity of meanings surrounding climate change categories – and the perils of constructing political arguments based on discourse of victimhood”.115 The resistance has also been expressed through right-based reasoning: Now of course the issue of relocation and resettlement is very, very serious issue that we are continuing to investigate, but we do not want to leave our land. It is up to the leaders but I have the sense from the current discourse of discussions in my country that they want to stay on there and we do not want to be forced out simply because of lack of actions of those responsible. So if it appears that there is no responsibility to address the causes then of course there are issues that we are looking at seriously. I understand that the issue of litigation has been looked at. We are not going to go quietly. There are human rights issues; there are sovereign rights issues that need to be looked at carefully.116

More recently, climate change litigation, referred to above, has emerged as a major force to reckon with in transnational regulatory governance of greenhouse gases.117 In the absence of proactive and precautionary approach to climate change by the national governments, many state and non-state actors have been compelled to look beyond traditional

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international treaty mechanisms for solutions to anthropogenic climate change and resort to litigation and other legal actions at sub-national, national and transnational levels. As increasingly acknowledged by critical social science perspectives on climate change, beyond the alleged scientific ‘consensus’ on ‘facts’ related to climate change lies the realm of contentious politics revolving around value judgments, moral beliefs, and cultural understandings. The challenge of climate change forces us to revisit and rethink the classical notions of security and sovereignty and to acknowledge that a timely and effective response to climate change is morally required as well in the context of both inter-generational and intra-generational equity. The ‘legal space’ of climate change, according to some by all nations of the world acting as co-tenants, and one of the major challenges before public trust jurisprudence is how to protect this trust through judicial oversight. Is there a human right to security from climate change? Amy Sinden has forcefully argued that the ruling by the Federal High Court of Nigeria in November 2005, ordering Shell and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to “take immediate steps to stop the further flaring of gas”, upholds the contention of the Nigerian communities living close to flaring sites that this practice violates their fundamental right to life and dignity guaranteed under the Nigerian constitution.118 The example of a petition filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in December 2005 on behalf of Inuit in the United States and Canada reinforce the argument made by some scholars that a ‘human-rights’ centered analysis of climate change has profound implications for our understanding of the kind of action that should be taken, and who is obligated to pay for the cost of mitigation and adaptation. Osofsky would argue that Inuit petition raises profound ethical issues related to the legitimacy of behavior and responses of nation-state system and international institutions and individually oriented human rights approaches in the context of indigenous peoples’ perspectives on climate change.119 For Osofsky, the Inuit petition provides an important model for how dialogic spaces can be created for much needed conversations between the government agencies and the communities located on the margins, in the hope that conventional confrontational models of litigation competing for a ‘win’ in the United States will be replaced by a much more nuanced understanding of issues and values involved.120

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Some liberal thinkers are currently engaged in a debate largely focused around the very concept of environmental and climate refugees in the strict terms of international and domestic laws. One of the key questions here is this: Can (or for that matter should) the concept of refugee, traditionally used to provide security for those seeking migration on the basis on political or religious persecution, be extended to cover climate refugees? Some would argue that these rights, endorsed by the UN, would provide additional protection for those seeking to migrate across national borders, and being granted asylum accordingly by nation-states operating in liberal co-operative fashion. Such international cooperation, despite being highly desirable, may not be easily forthcoming due to the fact that categories such as ‘climate refugees’ are being increasingly perceived as serious threats to ‘national security’ and borders. In other words, intended or unintended, such fears and anxieties, are likely to be induced (and in turn used) by certain actors and agencies (both state and non-state) to securitize environmental issues and climate change.

Conclusion: Securitizing the Bay of Bengal into the ‘Bay of Fear’? As graphically shown by the boundary-defying tropical storm originating from the Indian Ocean, called Mahasen – that caused devastation in both Bangladesh and Myanmar and placed the State Disaster Management Authority and the National Disaster Response Force in India’s Northeast on high alert – on 15–16 May 2013, those who are already marginalized and displaced for various reasons (including sectarian violence) are the ones most vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change. Nearly 140,000 people, with a vast majority belonging to internally displaced Rohingya Muslim community, had been camping in most demanding conditions in the coastal state of Rakhine in Myanmar. Given the deficit of trust, calls issued by Myanmar authorities for massive evacuation were turned down by a vast majority of Rohingya community. Geopolitical considerations over the naming of the cyclone were also present. It was reported that, “The name Mahasen was given by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the World Meteorological Organization Typhoon Committee after King

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Mahasen who ruled Sri Lanka from 277 to 304 AD. But Sri Lanka has objected to the use of the Sinhala king’s name for a cyclone, saying King Mahasen had brought prosperity to the island and not destruction” (The Times of India, 17 May 2013). The abovementioned is one good example of geopolitics of fear. We have argued in this chapter that the geopolitics of fear, aiming at transforming climate-induced displacements and migrations into a ‘national security’ issue, in the absence of well-informed critique, could securitize Bay of Bengal and turn it into a Bay of Fear. Both national priorities and the prospects for regional cooperation are likely to be distorted in the process. We tend to agree with Matthew Sparke that, “Hope and Fear are huge swirling compulsions with enormous implications for lives and deaths of every living thing on the planet. False hopes and groundless fears can be of dreadful, deadly consequences. And yet justified fears when combined with sensible hopes can open up new possibilities and thereby help mobilize change for the better, including both better lives and a better world in which to live.”121 The multifaceted consequences of multiscalar climate change will unfold in the Bay of Bengal not in isolation from but in conjunction with several global/regional trends, such as population growth, migration patterns in general, urbanization as well as food, water and energy insecurities. In many parts of the Bay of Bengal littorals displacements caused by both development and natural/human made disasters continue to take place at regular intervals. The after-effects of the Indian Ocean tsunami can be visibly felt throughout the region even today. Looking ahead, there are a number of issues that would demand a serious and systematic attention of the Bay of Bengal littoral states and civil society actors in the context of climate change mitigation. One such issue relates to climate change-induced displacements and growing concerns, bordering anxieties, over ‘climate migrants’ and ‘climate refugees’ and raises a number of perplexing questions. Who is a refugee? Where should the category of ‘economic refugee’ end and the category of ‘climate refugee’ begin? What are the ethical, legal and geopolitical concerns and considerations that define the category termed ‘climate refugee’ and differentiate it from ‘climate migrant’? Our analysis has shown, on the one hand, that ‘security’ is an essentially contested concept,122 that remains open to relentless questioning: “who or what are the objects or referents of security; that

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provides security; and for whom is the security intended: individuals, groups, nations, states, regions, the world – or intangibles such as values?”123 Even though the concept of security is now being broadened considerably to address non-traditional, non-state transnational threats (e.g. human trafficking, piracy, terrorism, infectious disease) an extraordinary complexity is involved in accommodating displacements forced by climate change.124 On the other hand, the focus on growing insecurities of communities engaged in small-scale farming within the Large Marine Ecosystems in the Bay of Bengal, underlines the relevance of the emphasis placed by the UN Commission on Human Security on “…protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations…using processes that build on peoples strengths and aspirations…creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”125

Notes   1. See P. Schwartz, and D. Randall, “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security”, Office of Net Assessment, Washington, D.C., October 2003; CNA, “Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”, Center for Naval Analysis, Washington, D.C., 2006, available at (accessed 26 August 2014).    2. See WEDO, “Gender, Climate Change and Human Security Lessons from Bangladesh, Ghana and Senegal”, 2008, available at (accessed 15 January 2014); S.N. MacFarlane and Y.F. Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); A. Chenoy, “A Plea for Engendering Human Security”, International Studies 42 (2005): 167; E. Newman, “Human Security”, 2009, available at (accessed 24 August 2014); S.V. Menon, “Human security: Concept and practice”, 2007, available at (accessed 22 July 2014).   3. K. O’Brien, A.L. St. Clair and Kristoffersen, “The Framing of Climate Change: Why It Matters”, in Climate Change, Ethics and Human Security, edited by K. O’Brien, A.L. St. Clair and Kristoffersen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 13.

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  4. Ibid.   5. IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2007, Fourth Assessment Report (AR1).   6. Guardian, “Paradise almost lost: Maldives seek to buy a new homeland”, 10 November 2008, available at . Also see Ministry of Planning and National Development (Maldives), 2008, available at (accessed 20 August 2014); Analytical Report, “Population and Housing Census”, 2006, (accessed 22 August 2014).   7. See P. Townsley, “Review of Coastal and Marine livelihoods and Food Security in theBbay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Region”, Report Prepared for the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Programme, 2011, available at (accessed 21 August 2014).    8. For a discussion on how cartographic anxieties and fear of migration has marked climate change geopolitics in Australia, see Sanjay Chaturvedi and Timothy Doyle, “Geopolitics of Climate Change and Australia’s ‘Reengagement’ with Asia: Discourses of Fear and Cartographic Anxieties”, Australian Journal of Political Science 45, no.1 (2010): 95–115.   9. Oli Brown, “Migration and Climate Change”, International Organization for Migration 31 (2008), available at (accessed 25 August 2014).  10. N. Myers, “Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st century”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London: Biological sciences: Series B 357, no. 1420 (2002): 609–61.  11. Ibid.  12. B. Docherty and T. Giannini, “Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees”, Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 (2009).  13. IPCC 2007, Fourth Assessment Report (AR1).  14. Brown, “Migration and Climate Change”. According to International Organization for Migration (IOM), if such an estimation were proven as true, then by 2050 one in every forty-five persons in the world would have been displaced by climate change. This would also exceed the current global migrant population, which according to IOM stands at 192 million people, or 3 per cent pf the world population living outside their place of birth.

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 15. Docherty and Giannini, “Confronting a Rising Tide”, p. 352.  16. S.C. Rajan, “Blue Alert Climate Change in South Asia: Estimates and Solutions”, Greenpeace Report, 2008, available at (accessed 20 August 2011).  17. Ibid, p. 1.  18. K. Warner et al., “In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement”, 2009, available at (accessed 12 January 2010).  19. Ibid., p. iv.  20. Ibid.  21. Ibid.  22. Ibid.  23. Brown, “Migration and Climate Change”.  24. International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), “Indonesia: In search of durable solutions for all”, 2009, available at (accessed 2 September 2011).  25. S. Lonergan, “The role of environmental degradation in population displacement”, Environmental Change and Security Project Report 4 (Spring 1998): 8.   26. F. Gemenne and S. Shen, “Case study report on Tuvalu and New Zealand for the Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project”, 2009, available at (accessed 27 August 2011).  27. Lucy-Claire Saunders, “Paradise lost: When climate change leaves millions without a home”, 2008, available at (accessed 7 September 2011).  28. D.L. Althaide, Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2006); F. Furedi, Politics of Fear (London: Continuum Press, 2005); D. Gardner, Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008); B. Massumi, Politics of Everyday Fear (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); A.T. Thrall, American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11 (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2009).  29. F. Furedi, “Fear is key to irresponsibility”, The Weekend Australian, 9 October 2010, p. 7.  30. S. Chaturvedi and T. Doyle, “Geopolitics of fear and the emergence of ‘climate refugees’: Imaginative geographies of global warming and

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 31.  32.  33.   34.  35.   36.  37.  38.  39.

 40.  41.  42.  43.  44.  45.

 46.  47.  48.   49.  50.

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displacements in Bangladesh”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6, no. 2 (2010): 206–22. K. Suter, “The politics of climate change and the dismissal of Kevin Rudd”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6, no. 2 (2010): 267–73. D. Rumley, “Ideology, carbon emissions and climate change discourses in the Indian Ocean Region”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6, no. 2 (2010): 147. R.D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”, Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (1994): 44–76. German Advisory Council on Global Change, “World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk”, WBGU, Berlin, Germany, 2007. Ibid, p. 3. D. Dyer, Climate wars: The fight for survival as the world overheats (Canada: Random House, 2009). B. Korf, “The imaginative geographies of climate wars”, Procedia: Social and Behavioral Sciences 14 (2011): 35–39. Ibid., p. 38. J.J. Samarakoon, “Review of Community-based Integrated Coastal Management: Best Practices and Lessons Learned in the Bay of Bengal, South Asia”, Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011, available at (accessed 1 September 2014). Ibid., p. vii. Ibid. Ibid., p. 97. See Warner et al. “In Search of Shelter”. J. Mcadam, “Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer”, International Journal of Refugee Law 23 (2011), p. 14. See Van Lavieren et al., “Securing the Future of Mangroves”, A Policy Brief, UNU-INWEH, UNESCO MAB with ISME, ITTO, FAO, UNEP WCMC AND TNC, 2012, p. 3, available at . Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 3. The Indian Sundarbans Delta is bounded by the Ichamati-Raimangal River in the east, by the Hugli River in the west, by the Bay of Bengal in the south, and the Dampier-Hodges line drawn in 1829–30 in the north. See .

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 51. A.A. Danda et al., Indian Sundarbans Delta: A Vision (New Delhi: World Wide Fund for Nature-India, 2011), p. 7.  52. Ibid., p. 35.  53. Ibid., p. 31.  54. See S. Sengupta, “India’s River Delta Islands Washing Away”, New York Times, 10 April 2007; The Hindu (New Delhi), 24 March 2010.  55. J. Adarsa, S. Shamina and B. Arkoprova, “Morphological Change Study of Ghoramara Island, Eastern India Using Multi Temporal Satellite Data”, Research Journal of Recent Sciences 1, no. 10 (2012): 72–81.   56. The major villages on this island include Khasimara, Hathkola, Baghpara, Raipara, Mandirtala, Chunpuri Lakshmi Narayanpur and Khasimara Char.  57. Adarsa, Shamina and Arkoprova, (2012) “Morphological Change Study of Ghoramara Island”, p. 72.  58. Ibis.  59. Ibid., p. 81.  60. A.A. Danda, “Surviving in the Sundarbans: Threats and Responses: An analytical description of life in an Indian riparian commons”, PhD thesis, University of Twente (Netherlands), 2007.  61. Ibid., p. 148.  62. Ibid., p. 151.  63. Danda et al., Indian Sundarbans Delta, pp. 39–40.  64. Ibid., p. 40.  65. A. Oliver-Smith, “Sea Level Rise and Vulnerability of Coastal People: Responding to Local Challenges of Global Climate Change in the 21st Century”, Interdisciplinary Security Connections, No. 7, Publication Series of UNU-EHS, 2009, available at (accessed on 15 July 2013).  66. Asian Development Bank, The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review (Manila: Asian Development Bank, April 2009), available at (accessed 10 July 2013).  67. M. Measey, “Indonesia: A Vulnerable Country in the Face of Climate Change”, Global Majority E-Journal 1, no. 1 (2010): 31–45; available at (accessed 20 July 2014).   68. F. Pattiselanno and A. Arobaya, “A Global Centre of Marine Diversity in Peril”, Jakarta Post, 31 July 2013, available at (accessed 1 August 2013).

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 78.  79.

 80.  81.

 82.

 83.  84.  85.  86.

 87.

101

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. SeaFish Secretariat, “Regional Fisheries Network Urges ADB to be True to its Agenda of Better Governance and Inclusive Growth”, 2012, available at (accessed 10 August 2013). Ibid. Ibid. Asian Development Bank, “Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific”, Final Report 31 (2012), available at (accessed 10 August 2013). Ibid. “Burma’s Global Warming Activists Turn Up the Heat on Govt”, The Irrawaddy, available at (accessed on 1 January 2014). Ibid. Madhu Rao et al., “Biodiversity conservation in a changing climate: A review of threats and implications for conservation planning in Myanmar”, AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment”, available at (accessed 20 November 2014). “Myanmar at the crossroads: conservationists see opportunities and challenges in biodiversity hotspot”, available at (accessed 20 November 2013). Ibid. Ibid. Myat May Zin, “Climate change driving farmers deeper into debt”, Myanmar Times, 18 June 2013. “Cyclone in Myanmar Uproots Violence Displaced Rakhine State yet again”, available at (accessed 10 August 2013). “UNHCR fears sea tragedies as sailing season starts in Bay of Bengal”, available at (accessed 8 November 2013).

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 88. Asian Development Bank, “Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific”.  89. Ibid., p. 30.  90. Ibid., p. 31.  91. Ibid.  92. See M.T. Klare, “Global warming battlefi elds: How climate change threatens security”, Current History 106, no. 703 (2007): 355–61; J.W. Busby, “Climate Change and National Security an Agenda for Action”, CSR No. 32, Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, available at (accessed 10 August 2014); J. Podesta and P. Ogden, “The Security Implications of Climate Change”, Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2007–08): 115–38; H.G. Brauch, “Conceptualising the environmental dimension of human security in the UN”, International Social Science Journal 59, no. 1 (2008): 19–48; M. Brzoska, “Climate change as a driver of security policy”, Paper prepare for SGIR 2014, Stockholm, 9–11 September 2012; available at (accessed 5 September 2014); N. Detraz and M. Betsill, “Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts”, International Studies Perspectives 10, no. 3 (2009): 303–20; P.E. Wallace, “Climate Change, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Law Duties”, Wake Forest Law Review 41 (2009): 757–76; F. Renaud et al., “Control, adapt or flee: How to face environmental migration?”, InterSecTions series, No. 5 (Bonn: United Nations University, 2007); available at (accessed 6 September 2011); Chaturvedi and Doyle, “Geopolitics of Climate Change and Australia’s ‘Reengagement’ with Asia”.   93. See D. Rumley and S. Chaturvedi, “Towards an Indian Ocean Energy Community? Challenge Ahead”, in Energy Security and the Indian Ocean Region, edited by D. Rumley and S. Chaturvedi (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2005).  94. E. Lövbrand and J. Stripple, “The climate as political space: On the territorialization of the global carbon cycle”, Review of International Studies 32 (2006): 217–35: Chaturvedi and Doyle, “Geopolitics of Fear and the Emergence of ‘Climate Refugees’”; M. Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).   95. B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers, 1998), pp. 21–23.   96. O.Waever, “The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders”, in International Relations

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Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community, edited by Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 251.   97. P.J. Smith, “Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response”, Orbis (Fall 2007), p. 628.  98. Ibid.   99. Elizabeth Ferris, “Internal displacement, human rights, and development presentation”, Brookings Institution–University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2008, available at (accessed 29 August 2011). 100. United Nations, “Address by her Excellency Sheikh Hasina Hon’ble Prime Minister, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh”, New York, 26 September 2009, available at (accessed 15 November 2010). 101. Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy an Action Plan 2009 (Dhaka: Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2009), p. xi. 102. Ibid., p. 17. 103. T. Doyle and S. Chaturvedi, “Climate Refugees and Security: Conceptualizations, Categories, and Contestations”, in The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, edited by J. Dryzek, B. Richard Norgaard and D. Schlosberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 104. Anand Kumar, “Illegal Bangladeshi Migration to India: Impact on Internal Security”, Strategic Analysis 35 (2011): 108. 105. B.S. Chimni, International Refugee Law (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), p. 1. 106. J.C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 107. Quoted in Chimni, International Refugee Law, p. 2. 108. Renaud et al., “Control, adapt or flee: How to face environmental migration?”, p. 14. 109. Chimni, International Refugee Law, p. 7. 110. UNHCR, “Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement”, International Journal of Refugee Law 23, no. 3 (2011): 562. 111. Ibid., pp. 561–74. 112. Ibid., p. 567. 113. E.M. Karen and G. Chris, “‘We do not want to leave our land’: Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of ‘climate refugees’”, Geoforum 40, no. 3 (2009): 475–83. 114. Ibid. p. 476. 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid.

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117. W.C.G. Burns and H.M. Osofsky, eds., Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National and International Approaches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 118. A. Sinden, “An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case Against Gas Flaring in Nigeria”, in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National and International Approaches, edited by W.C.G. Burns and H.M. Osofsky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 173–92. 119. H.M. Osofsky, “The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights”, in Adjudicating Climate Change, edited by Burns and Osofsky, pp. 272–91. 120. Ibid. 121. M. Sparke, “Geopolitical Fears, Geoeconomic Hopes, and the Responsibilities of Geography”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 92, no. 7 (2007): 338. 122. S. Dalby, Security and Climate Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); H.G. Brauch, “Reconceptualizing Security: Global Environmental and Climate Change as new Security Dangers and Concerns”, Paper presented at the 49th ISA Annual Convention, San Francisco, 26–29 March 2008. 123. O. Richmond and J. Franks, “Human Security and the War on Terror”, in Human and Environment Security: An Agenda Change, edited by F. Dodds and T. Pippard (London: Earthscan, 2005), pp. 27–28. 124. L. Brock, “The Environment and Security: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues”, in Conflict and the Environment, edited by Gleditsch and Nils Petter (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), pp. 7–3. 125. Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003), p. 4.

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4 Strategic Responses to Non-Traditional Security Threats The Role of the Military Introduction The climate-security matrix and the likely security ramifications of the impacts of climate change and its adversarial impact on peace and security are now increasingly acknowledged by the international community. There is also a greater appreciation of climate-related security issue by social scientists, policy makers, academics and the general public. It is generally agreed that the negative effects of climate change can impact on the lives of people and that climate change can impact on peace and security.1 As observed in the earlier chapters, there are a range of consequences of climate change that impact on the state and its people which emerge in the form of widespread drought and famine, crop failures, food and water shortages. At another level, some regions may face extreme and unpredictable weather events, glacier melting, and severe snow storms, increased cyclonic and storm activity, sea level rise, unseasonal rains, and unprecedented floods. These climate-related

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natural phenomena might result in movement of people across borders as refugees escaping from natural, social and economic disruptions. As a result, there is bound to be increased competition for resources such as food, water, energy which has the potential to cause stress among societies. There is also an alarming belief that climate-induced wars can be expected in the coming decades. Even greenhouse gas emission has been termed as an ‘act of aggression’,2 clearly suggesting that climate change can be a potential threat to the stability and security of states. Interestingly, there is a constituency which believes that climate change “will fuel more conflict for decades” 3 and new academic assertions note that the international community must prepare for “enormous and specific, geopolitical, economic, and security consequences for all of us… the world of tomorrow looks chaotic and violent”.4 Further, climate change has also been termed as an ‘existential threat’;5 that if states fail to address climate change they would themselves become failed states. It has also been argued that “the security dimensions of climate change are only now beginning to sink into people’s heads… Up to now it has been a humanitarian issue.” 6 However, there is a constituency which believes that although climate change does impact on human security and “while securitization is an attractive option (given the extraordinary response it implies)”, it merits “a political and not a military solution”.7 This brings us to the issue of locating climate change in the ambit and discourse of security.

Climate Change: Non-Traditional or Traditional Security Issues? In the post Cold War period the concept of security has undergone major transformation: at one level, the state centric approach has partly given way to a transnational security perspective and at another level, individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged as important stakeholders and have acquired a crucial role in addressing core security issues. Though these entities have not undermined the primacy of states in national security matters, the emergence of non-traditional security threats alongside the traditional military threats implies that states must now increasingly

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face up to new challenges and devise new national security strategies in order to address a multitude of issues. It is important to examine some of the definitions of non-traditional security (NTS) threats. NTS threats are those issues that challenge the “survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise from nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime.”8 This definition has been further qualified to note that these threats are transnational in nature, defy unilateral solutions, demand comprehensive political, economic and social responses and humanitarian use of force. Another general definition notes that “non-traditional threats come in the form of terrorism, drug trafficking, serious communicable diseases, piracy, illegal immigration, environmental security, economic and financial security, and information security.”9 A synthesis of these two definitions suggests that there are a variety of non-traditional security threats and it is fair to argue that climate change and natural disasters are also non-traditional security threats and, further, these are transnational in nature. At this juncture it is pertinent to mention that the state is the primary actor that is in charge and responsible for protecting its citizens from those that may attempt to ‘harm’ them. Further, the source of the potential ‘harm’ can have its origin either inside the state or may have its genesis in another country. In fact ‘harm’ has no boundaries and can come from outside the boundaries of the state or within it. In that context, militaries are instruments available to states to address NTS, although they are not empowered to address ‘harms’ that have their origins in other states as it would tantamount to challenging the sovereignty of another state. It is argued that there is ample scope for the militaries to play a role in addressing NTS threats. In fact, militaries have been engaged in addressing NTS threats and challenges which are transnational in nature and have their origins in other states; some of their mission and roles have been tailored to address such issues. Several national security strategy documents underline the fact that climate change is a national security threat and military forces have a role to play. Several militaries have developed comprehensive strategies and built up capacities to respond to a number of such threats and challenges

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and deliver assistance to the affected states and their peoples. In fact, some states have enormous capacity to undertake multiple relief operations at various sites that are sometimes separated by thousands of miles. These militaries have constituted specialized units for such purposes, documented the list of items required for different disasters, established and practiced support supply chains, conceptualized communication networks, and established command and control systems. The militaries have even established standard operating procedures (SOP) for multilateral operations to address NTS threats and challenges. Some militaries are even engaged in addressing human security issues in the post-conflict environment. The UN too is engaged in transforming its capability to address issues of security, development and democratization, notably in fragile and post-conflict states in a comprehensive manner.

2007 UN Security Council Climate Change Debate The 2007 UN Security Council (UNSC) discussion is a good point to begin the debate on the impact of climate change on international security10 in which 55 national delegations had participated. While addressing the participants, Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General noted that: Environmental degradation has the potential to destabilize already conflict-prone regions, especially when compounded by inequitable access or politicization of access to scarce resources. I urge Member States to renew their efforts to agree on ways that allow all of us to live sustainably within the planet’s means… Projected changes in the earth’s climate are, thus, not only an environmental concern. They can also have serious social and economic implications, and – as the Council points up today – issues of energy and climate change can have implications for peace and security.

The Singapore delegate stated that: There was no point sitting around and complaining that the Security Council is encroaching into areas that should be dealt with by the General Assembly.   The Assembly should rise to the challenge and do something about that global issue. Hopefully, today’s debate would

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inspire the international community to take the next step of dealing with the issue in a broader setting involving the entire United Nations membership.

Meanwhile, the Bangladesh representative had observed that: …even though the development aspects of the phenomenon [climate change] had been extensively deliberated, the security implications of global warming had not merited consideration by intergovernmental bodies in the United Nations. The issue had been the subject of study outside the world body and, while the interrelation between climate, energy and security was still being examined, years of general consideration had proved that there was little doubt that the global climate was changing, relentlessly and inexorably, with perhaps dire consequences for the planet. …the report of the Intergovernmental Panel had stated that, unless very drastic measures were taken, humanity would face unprecedented challenges.

The British representative argued that: All members of the international community face a shared dilemma. To ensure well-being for a growing population with unfulfilled needs and rising expectations, we must grow our economies. Should we fail, we increase the risk of conflict and insecurity. To grow our economies we must continue to use more energy. Much of that energy will be in the form of fossil fuels. But if we use more fossil fuels without mitigating the resulting emissions, we will accelerate climate change, which itself presents risks to the very security we are trying to build.11

Interestingly, there were mixed reactions from the attendees; some members had raised doubts regarding the role of the Security Council to deal with the issue of climate change. This was so due to an understanding that the Security Council is primarily concerned with issues related to war, peace, genocide, terrorism and piracy. Further it has been argued that the likely security implications of climate change were speculative and that “The Security Council has a full docket of immediate threats to international peace and security that would benefit from more deliberation and action. Focusing on the speculative threats that may result from global warming distracts from these vital issues and undermines the seriousness and stature of the body by reducing it to a political theatre.”12

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Over the years, the UNSC has broadened its agenda and has also been engaged in debating human security issues focused on conflict and terrorism since 1999.13 Also, the Security Council resolution 1625 (2005) had addressed the root causes of armed conflict and political and social crises. On their part, delegations from small island states were particularly happy that the UNSC had taken up the issue.14 For instance, the Maldives delegate recalled that: Almost 20 years from that General Assembly (nearly twenty years ago) address, it was important to recall the efforts made by small countries like the Maldives to draw the world’s attention to the urgency of climate change and its consequences. For the people of the Maldives, dealing with climate change was already an everyday fact of life. Over the past two decades, the country had seen first-hand the real, practical reality of climate change and sea-level rise.   Today, over 60 per cent of its inhabited islands were facing varying degrees of coastal erosion, which was threatening the human settlements on them.

The UN attempt to engage in the climate-security matrix debate was a major milestone and on 3 June 2009, the United Nations General Assembly formally recognized the link between climate change and security and unanimously passed a resolution to step up efforts to deal with the security implications of climate change. The climate-security matrix debate is not yet over and states continue to present their perspectives on delinking security from climate change. For instance, at the debate in July 2011 to forge international consensus on climate change issues, the United Nations Security Council members were divided whether the issues of rising sea levels or competition over water resources fall under the purview of the UNSC.15 Although China was in support of the United Nations bodies (because they include all member states) particularly the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to address these issues, the Chinese representative argued that “Climate change may affect security but it is fundamentally a sustainable development issue,… The Security Council does not have the expertise in climate change and does not have the necessary means and resources”,16 reiterating its earlier stand that the UN and its various

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arms must concentrate on helping those affected due to the impact of the climate change. Likewise, the Indian position is that the UNSC does not possess the tools to deal with climate change like it handles and authorizes peacekeeping missions, use of force and sanctions. However, the UN General Assembly and the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are the right forums to debate and discuss issues related to climate change. The Indian delegate appeared to be quite critical of the UN and remarked that “We don’t have a problem discussing climate change,… As far as action, it has to be done in the UNFCCC”; further, “Some countries are trying to do a mandate creep”.17 Similar views were expressed by delegates from Brazil and South Africa. Notwithstanding that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has cautioned that “Extreme weather events continue to grow more frequent and intense in rich and poor countries alike, not only devastating lives, but also infrastructure, institutions and budgets – an unholy brew which can create dangerous security vacuums,” and sought international cooperation for “accelerated operationalization of all the agreements” made at Cancún and “move from a conceptual discussion to concrete delivery of ‘fast-start’ financing and agreement on sources of long-term financing”.18

A Brief Survey of Studies on Climate-Security Matrix A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for New American Security (CNAS) titled ‘The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change’ 19 developed three climate scenarios, i.e. (a) expected, (b) severe and (c) catastrophic. Among other issues, the three scenarios take into consideration the impact of rising sea levels in the low-lying coastal areas in Central America, South Asia and Southeast Asia resulting in massive migrations involving hundreds of millions of people both inside the country as also across national borders. It is noted in the report that these have

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the potential to cause social disruptions that can easily cause major security situations and generate regional tensions. However, the report also notes that But it is far from clear whether these anxieties will trigger a traditional national security response. It is conceivable that under certain scenarios a well-armed nation experiencing the ravages of environmental effects brought on by climate change might covet the more mild and fertile territory of another country and contemplate seizing that land by force. While this kind of scenario should not be ignored, there is a broader and more likely range of potential problems, including disease, uncontrolled migration, and crop failure, that are more likely to overwhelm the traditional instruments of national security (the military in particular) and other elements of state power and authority rather than cause them to be used in the manner described above.20

A paper titled ‘Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World’ presents worst-case scenarios and notes that “if uncontrolled, climate change will have security implications of similar magnitude to the World Wars, but which will last for centuries…. a failure to acknowledge and prepare for the worst case scenario is as dangerous in the case of climate change as it is for managing the risks of terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation.”21 Interestingly, the study argues that states can potentially use climate change as an excuse for harnessing clean energy and attempt to “acquire nuclear technology for military purposes” thus masking their attempts to develop nuclear weapons. At another level, environmental refugees and migrants can be “a source of national and international tensions” in Bangladesh, Nigeria and Egypt. The study also adopts an extreme view and attempts to link climate change with socio-cultural stresses emanating from radicalism. For instance, the study agues “Muslim countries will be among the hardest hit by climate change. If frustrated by inaction to slow climate change, radical environmental movements may spawn eco-terrorist groups in a parallel with the evolution of extreme left-wing movements in the 1970s. Failure to act effectively will undermine the legitimacy of the international system, reducing its effectiveness in tackling other security threats.” By way of conclusions, the study notes that security sector reform

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will be critical and states would have to make certain “bold and rapid transformation”.22 The Quadrennial Defence Review published by the US Department of Defence is quite clear on the linkage with climate change and security and among other things notes that “While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world. In addition, extreme weather events may lead to increased demands for defence support to civil authorities for humanitarian assistance or disaster response both within the United States and overseas.”23 It has also been argued that climate change will act like a national burden that will cause heightened environmental worries and thereby put pressure on states to manage their resources in a sustainable way. For instance, people in Southeast Asia will face water crisis by 2025 due to poor availability of freshwater. Perhaps what is more worrying is that the water shortages would impact on agriculture production and “the combination of temperature fluctuations and reduced agricultural productions has been linked to the frequency of warfare in Europe, China, and the rest of the Northern Hemisphere over the last millennium.”24 Further it has been observed that “climate change will act as a ‘threat multiplier’ that exacerbates existing intra- and inter-state conflicts and tensions, or create new ones in the future. The confluence of maritime piracy, illegal fishing, and choke-points vulnerabilities in Southeast Asia already complicate historical animosities and unresolved maritime disputes. These fault lines could be exacerbated as climate change further strains regional natural security.”25 Although this is a very alarming assessment, it still merits attention given that there will be competition among the people for the basic necessities of life such as food, water, health care, jobs, etc. and that will cause stress on the existing resources. As noted in earlier chapters and discussions, these centres could witness uncontrolled population growth as a result of mass movement of people seeking opportunities for a better quality of life. This chaos when combined with non-state entities, whose activities could range from armed robbery, underworld kidnapping, hijacking, mercenary operations, smuggling and sea piracy, would result in insurgents, belligerents, etc. is a matter of great concern.

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Role of Military in the Evolving ClimateSecurity Matrix The role of military in the evolving climate-security matrix is now an acknowledged fact. Several militaries have developed comprehensive strategies and capacities to respond to climate-security challenges and threats and have constituted specialized units for such purposes. In 2006, the US Centre for Naval Analysis constituted a Military Advisory Board (MAB) comprising US military officers to study the impact of climate change on national security. The study titled ‘National Security and Threat of Climate Change’ noted that “the stresses that climate change will put on our national security, will be different than any we’ve dealt with in the past…for one thing, unlike the challenges that we are used to dealing with, these will come upon us extremely slowly, but come they will, and they will be grinding and inexorable.”26 According to the executive director of the Military Advisory Board, “Climate change is a threat to national security and now is the time to take sensible action, to integrate it into national security frameworks, and to build the necessary capacity and resilience to address it responsibly in the future.”27 The report has stated that climate change posed a serious threat to the US national security and the consequences of climate change should be understood through the prism of national defence and integrated in the military strategies. Accordingly, the report urged the US Department of Defense to develop operational capability through new methodologies and innovative technologies to augment US power to address climate change related contingencies. The report also suggested that the US military must undertake a long-term assessment (30–40 years) of the impact of climate change on US military installations both at home and overseas particularly due to rising sea levels, extreme weather conditions, and other likely impacts on climate change on military infrastructure. The report also noted that climate change “can act as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world, and it presents significant national security challenges for the United States”.28 In that context partnerships with countries that do have the capability to manage the adversarial impacts of climate impacts would be necessary.

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It has been noted that there is a need to exercise caution in raising the threat level due to climate change and “if military spending and military assets are deployed towards environmental goals, it could be disastrous if the militarisation of this agenda leads to the escalation of conflict.”29 However, experts argue that military has an important role to play and possess inherent capabilities to respond to climate changerelated security issues. For instance, it has been stated that “there is a growing realization internationally that climate change is becoming a security issue in many parts of the world. Climate change is now listed as a major task in  NATO’s revised security strategy. … The military is one of the major assets [in the hands] of nation states and they have to be incorporated into national response mechanisms. If [states] have to deal with climate change, prevent international conflict or deal with situations where civil disorder occurs due to climate induced conditions, the military cannot be left out of this.”30 At another level, military also suffers from the impacts of climate change that emerge in the form of operations, training activities, its own equipment and the need to develop green infrastructure.31 Therefore, climate issues are not outside its purview and in that context, the militaries have drawn plans that seek environmental-friendly and green compatible ways of business that contribute to national and international climate change mitigation and adaptation policies and strategies. Also, the shipbuilding industry will have to design ships with minimum carbon footprint for “greater role adaptability for crew and hull for rapid response and deployments, and greater sea-keeping ability to cope with higher sea states and prolonged extreme weather operations.”32 At operational level, the challenges will emerge in the form of underwater operations due to changes in sea water temperature, currents, and salinity. Likewise the air forces have to address climate related issues including greater understanding of aerosol and gaseous concentration in the atmosphere that affect aviation activities and operations. The army too has witnessed the impact of climate change and has necessitated changes in operations, equipment logistics and infrastructure. Other initiatives include the adherence to the Montréal Protocol that seeks to protect the stratospheric ozone layer against ozone destroying substances (ODS) being used in air conditioning and firefighting systems of the military including the banking of Halon.

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An International Project ‘Climate Change and the Military: Copenhagen and Beyond’33 seeks to make a valuable contribution to global efforts to (a) Raise the issue of climate change and security higher on the agenda of international policy makers, environmental decision makers and military strategists worldwide; (b) Establish a continuing network of committed military officers (both retired and, when permitted, active duty) from around the world to promote an integrated approach to security and climate change; (c) Highlight the potential geopolitical and military consequences of climate change and the costs of these consequences; and (d) Foster increased interest in the role the military can play in humanity’s effort to surmount abrupt climate change. Coastal facilities in particular will be worst impacted due to rising sea levels encroaching into naval facilities, shipbuilding yards, and other coastal infrastructure like radar systems, gun and missile batteries and coastal watch stations.

Disaster Diplomacy Natural hazards arising on account of earthquakes, floods or drought are essentially seismic, hydrological or meteorological events. These catastrophes rather than being merely natural events have also been political occasions where states have generously provided material, human, and fiscal support to the country affected. Ironically, these events have also been on occasions seen as an opportunity by the powerful states to apply pressure on governments of the affected states if they fail to respond well, thus adding to the existing woes and anxiety. Further, earthquakes in particular have been responsible for change in regimes (Nicaragua 1972), accelerated political liberalisation (Armenia 1988) and opened communication channels (Greece and Turkey 1999). Natural disasters can happen at any place, in developed or in a developing country as was clear by hurricane Katrina that hit United States and the earthquake in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan. The natural disasters cause massive destruction to the lives and livelihoods of large population and hence, to the national economies. It is the developing countries that are impacted more severely by large-scale natural disasters due to absence of adequate risk control mechanisms. At the

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same time, disasters know no boundaries and are not bound by religion, culture, society or political systems. For instance, the US Government aid for earthquake victims was accepted by Tehran despite Washington having labelled Iran as a member of the ‘axis of evil’. US President George W. Bush said: “Human suffering knows no political boundaries.” And the Iranian leadership noted that aid had ‘no political character’. The US disaster aid to Iran is an example where political sensitivities are as fragile as in the case of India and Pakistan. In recent times, the US Navy has responded to three disasters, simultaneously, involving a tsunami, earthquakes and a severe storm in American Samoa, the Philippines and Indonesia in October 2009. In American Samoa that was hit by a tsunami triggered by an 8.0 magnitude earthquake, the US Air Force deployed five C-17 transport aircraft that offloaded search and rescue teams, food, supplies and vehicles. USS Ingraham with two helicopters for rescue and damage assessment missions was also sailed to the islands. Two amphibious ships, the USS Harpers Ferry and the USS Tortuga with marines on board to provide medical aid were deployed off Manila. Similarly, a C-130 military transport plane with aid supplies and USS Denver (with three heavy lift helicopters and some smaller helicopters) was dispatched towards Indonesia that had been hit by a 7.6-magnitude earthquake. There is no denying the fact that disaster diplomacy is an important tool of international relations to help cut through the icy chill of dealings among states, communities and people. Disaster diplomacy therefore needs to be developed to facilitate relief to affected peoples, open channels for communications, and overcome diplomatic hurdles and facilitating speedy operations by humanitarian agencies. However, it will be useful to keep in mind that disaster support for humanitarian purposes needs to be carefully done keeping in mind the sensitivities of the country that is the victim of a disaster.34 In that context, the post-tsunami strategic landscape presents a unique situation in Asia where external assistance was a welcome but was taken selectively and with some caution. As noted in the earlier chapters, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami waves lashed the shores of the Bay of Bengal littorals and Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand

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in varying degrees, resulting in loss of life and infrastructure. While Indonesia and Sri Lanka were the hardest hit countries, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and India’s southeastern coast, Andaman and Nicobar Islands suffered extensive damage. India announced that it could handle the post-tsunami situation all by itself and did not require external support. Likewise, Thailand announced that it could cope on its own but it did permit the US to operate from its territory to facilitate transport of relief materials and operations to Aceh. Indonesia accepted foreign troops when it became clear its own military could not deal with the devastation. But there had been an outpouring of opinion in Jakarta that Indonesia should not be surrendering its sovereignty to outsiders. It announced that all foreign troops assisting in the tsunami relief operation must leave the country before the end of March 2005 at the latest. Consequently, the US Marines, diverted from duty in Iraq, scaled back their plans to send hundreds of troops ashore to build roads and clear rubble. Also the US carrier group departed from the area. Likewise, the Myanmar government was not quite willing in allowing US and French warships and aircraft to provide disaster relief during Cyclone Nargis. Apparently, a senior UN program director remarked that the Myanmar regime made a mistake in classifying the event and thought that it was only a tropical storm and the army would distribute food and basic shelter equipment and material but were overwhelmed by the severity of the cyclone that left a deadly trail of devastation and destruction behind. Further, “The regime made some shocking mistakes early on, really horrible, when they blocked the aid. With all the international furore, they finally realized, ‘This is way, way too big for us.’ And after that, they did a lot. A huge national response occurred.”35

Maritime Forces As one of us has argued elsewhere, the attributes of flexibility and mobility of maritime forces makes them the most suitable platform for engaging in a variety of disaster assistance related activities. The forces can be mobilized and positioned without many of the constraints of geographic boundaries encountered by land and air forces. Also the

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sea allows for the deployment of maritime forces without significant political restrictions. Besides, the forces are exceptionally mobile. Most navies use a combination of both military and contracted ships for the purpose of sealift of bulk resources. Though these take longer time but are the most cost effective for initial relief materials and can be followed up by transporting sustainment logistics. Their own supplies makes them self sustaining and therefore can be deployed for extended periods of time with minimal external support. This self-sufficiency adds to their staying power thus managing crises over long periods, particularly in regions where external support is difficult to acquire. Further, the ship’s crew is a general source of handy and a highly motivated workforce that can be deployed for a number of tasks including guarding relief materials, general administration of relief supply chains, warehousing, driving relief transports, etc. Besides, the ship’s electrical and mechanical engineers, medical officers and other specialist crew are available for emergency repairs and medical attention. The naval ships can also serve as emergency power supply units which can be supplied ashore through cables and also for generating distilled water for drinking and medical use that can be supplied both by helicopters and bulk through specially designed flexible hoses. Although climate change has created new challenges for naval forces, it has opened opportunities for maritime multilateralism paving the way for growth in naval cooperation with other navies and addressing climate change induced conflict escalation in climate change hot spots. Such contingencies would be more frequently in occurrence in the future and the offer of assistance, as demonstrated during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, would emerge as the new template of multinational maritime operations in the climate change induced disaster spectrum. The US Quadrennial Defence Review Report, 2010 has observed that there will be “significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration.”36 The Report argues that climate change per se is not the source of conflict, but it can acts as a catalyst

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for ‘instability and conflict’. Besides, several states do not have the civilian capacities to respond to climate-induced calamities and this would necessitate militaries to take the responsibility and support humanitarian assistance or disaster response. At another level, the report highlights the US DoD efforts in establishing “environmental security cooperative initiatives with foreign militaries” aimed at capacity building, sharing best practices and developing response capacity. Above all, these are non-intrusive and add to building trust and confidence. Based on the Quadrennial Defence Review, 2010, the US Navy released a report titled ‘US Navy Climate Change Roadmap’ covering three phases till 2014 and spells out the navy’s approach and plan to address the impact of climate change on national security. The report highlights the implications of climate change on future naval strategy, policy and plans, operational readiness, training, investments in capability and infrastructure, strategic communications and outreach and environmental assessment and prediction.37 The focus of the US Navy would be to address a variety of issues including (a) Maritime Security, (b) Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response (HA/DR), (c) Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), (d) Maritime Domain Awareness, (e) Search and Rescue, and (f) Strategic Sealift and the Fleet Support conducted by Military Sealift Command Vessels. The report notes that the US Navy will be called upon to operate in ‘economically unstable regions’ that may witness increased instability. The report also notes that the US navy would consolidate on the “existing cooperative agreements with joint, interagency, international, scientific and academic, and non-governmental organization partners to consider climate change assessment, prediction, and adaptation” and also explore new partnerships to address climate change. While it is acknowledged that the navies / maritime forces will be at the forefront to respond to climate change related disasters, “a new kind of defence force is needed – one that is more flexible and capable of executing multiple missions simultaneously, from handling social unrest to providing disaster relief and anti-access operations. This entails an overhaul of their training, education, equipment, and orders of battle. Operationally, climate change will affect military readiness, especially the navy or maritime services.”38

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The expeditionary platforms of the navies serve as excellent staging positions for distributing relief supplies over-the-shore. The platform capability is also unique during times when airports and seaports are damaged and obstructed. In such conditions, these platforms serve as logistics bases to supply relief materials like food, water and shelter deep inside the hinterland thus connecting vital economic lifelines. Besides, these vessels can provide emergency electrical power and potable water by mooring in the vicinity of the disaster site. These ships can also serve as command platforms for disaster relief supply chains and overall coordination of operations. Specially designed ships serve as hospitals and can also host emergency medical relief facilities. At another level, merchant vessels could be augmented for rescue and relief operations. In that context, maritime forces would have to envision and adapt to new strategies that are focused for regional capacity building and response mechanisms.

Indian Ocean Tsunami and Cyclones Sidr and Nargis: Important Case Studies The Indian Ocean tsunami relief and rescue effort was perhaps one of the biggest disaster aid efforts in the world history. Several naval ships, aircraft, helicopters, marines, Air Force personnel, troops and paramilitary/police forces had congregated in the Indian Ocean, particularly around west Indonesia (Aceh) and Sri Lanka. These assets rushed food, water, and medical supplies to areas that were inaccessible and in desperate need for weeks. With crucial assets like helicopters, support ships, hospital ships and organizational skills, the US military had the largest presence in the area. This was followed by India, which deployed more than thirty ships that engaged in search and rescue, relief and reconstruction efforts including survey of harbours. Besides regional navies, other maritime forces present in the area included ships, aircraft and helicopters from Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Pakistan, RoK and UK but on a much smaller scale. As noted earlier, in 2007, Bangladesh was hit by Cyclone Sidr that killed 3,295 people and destroyed 2.2 million acres of croplands, livestock and 1.5 million homes.39 Besides, it impacted on the livelihood

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of thousands of people and their fishing gear including boats was lost. The Indian political leadership quickly announced emergency measures and the Indian Air Force was ordered to mobilize its helicopters and aircraft to prepare for disaster relief support operations.40 Likewise, the Indian Navy was put on standby and later ordered to transport relief materials from Vishakahaptnam to Chittagong through four amphibious ships. 41 The US Navy deployed USS Essex and USS Kearsarge with a complement of 20 helicopters and 3,500 marines and Army medical teams and US Air Force C-130 aircraft for emergency relief support, medical and emergency evacuation.42 Commenting on the US HADR response, the Director, FAO Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division remarked “Quick intervention to improve food availability and self-reliance in cyclone-devastated districts will reduce the need for protracted, and more costly, life-saving assistance,”43 Likewise, in 2009, Cyclone Aila rendered people homeless in Bangladesh and India. Perhaps the worst tragedy in the Bay of Bengal happened when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the cyclone left 78,000 people dead/missing and affected 2.4 million others. 44 However, the official statistics suggest that 140,000 people died. There was a critical need for emergency humanitarian assistance and the US, British and the French Navy ships were in the Bay of Bengal for relief operations. The US also engaged in air support operations and its C-130 aircraft undertook 185 aid flights with USAID/OFDA but foreign ships were refused ship-to-shore operations. 45 However, the Indian Navy was permitted and two Indian Naval ships, Rana and Kirpan, entered port to render assistance humanitarian and deliver supply relief materials under operation named Operation Sahayata.46 According to the Indian Navy, “Post-tsunami we have learnt more lessons in relief operations. Each of our ships carries one logistic brick (a pre-packed container of emergency supplies), which is sufficient to cater to 200 people for 30 days. The brick includes a community kitchen and packaged food to provide immediate relief and succor.”47 The Indian Navy’s disaster relief operations fit well into its foreign policy objectives and it has been noted that “Traditionally aid is a potent tool of diplomacy. With a number of natural disasters hitting

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the Indian Ocean Region, the Indian Navy has acquired a great edge… Moreover, engaging in capacity building and capability enhancing is the direct way of enhancing influence.”48

Regional Capacity to Respond to Climate Related Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) It is an acknowledged fact that militaries have been at the forefront in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations and have pressed into operations a variety of assets both human and materials, to respond to catastrophes. Further, the earlier discussion on the naval response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami including recent cyclone related incidents in the Bay of Bengal clearly showcases that climate induced HA/DR related missions will witness an increase and these may strain the existing military resources and national security missions. In that context, the role of the coast guard merits attention. In the past, states had entrusted their navies with constabulary functions at sea but some states decided to also build coast guards or marine police who were entrusted with a number of roles.49 As a national law enforcement agency, the coast guard plays a vital role in maintaining ‘good order ’ at sea, ocean governance and protecting the marine environment through patrolling and preventing illegal activities including marine pollution. Besides, the coast guards are also entrusted with the task of controlling marine pollution by deploying pollution protection equipment and containment gear.50 In the above contexts, coast guard vessels can augment disaster relief response. They are capable of hosting manned and unmanned aviation platforms such as helicopters and UAVs which offers them additional advantages to conduct search and rescue. In essence, humanitarian assistance operationalized through the maritime forces i.e navy and the coast guard is both symbolic as well as substantive and is the ‘soft power’ of the state projected through this military instrument. It is not surprising then that the US navy included humanitarian assistance as one of its core operational capabilities in the ‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’.51

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While some nations may have an inherently larger maritime and naval capacity than others to deal with the disasters internally and also across their border, others may require assistance. From the national security perspective, the strains will be higher on weaker nations who wish to focus their resources on national development. In such cases, a multilateral response both within the region and also from outside will have to be marshalled in to respond to the crisis. In the course of discussions at a meeting in April 2011 at Jakarta, the ASEAN defence ministers were unanimous in their view that the member states’ militaries must work together and respond in a coordinated manner to natural disasters.52 It was also agreed that it was necessary to develop common strategies and procedures to respond to earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons and floods. Admiral Agus Suhartono, Indonesia’s Chief of Defence Force noted that, “This will be developed into a Standard Operating Procedure. The SOP will be a guide for ASEAN countries in carrying out humanitarian assistance operations in one of the member states hit by disaster.” However, Lt. General Neo Kian Hong, Singapore’s Chief of Defence Force was cautious of over-response to natural disasters and opined that, “Even if we have made that arrangement, it will still be contingent upon the country which is receiving the help, because sometimes help can be too much. And when you have too much resources coming in and you have no ability to flow the resources, it can actually cause more trouble than help the situation.” It is quite evident that at the functional and operational level, response strategies need to be calibrated and monitored so that best value for the response was obtained and for that to materialize it is essential to have joint military exercise on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief among the militaries. Speaking at the Plenary Session of the 18th ASEAN Summit at Jakarta on 7 May 2011, H.E. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Kingdom of Thailand on ‘ASEAN Community-Building and Connectivity’ reiterated that it was critical for the ASEAN countries to “develop effective region-wide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) arrangements which build on networking between HADR centres in the region.”53 It was also suggested that ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre in Jakarta should be operationalized and be linked to the WFP Humanitarian Response Depot in Subang and the

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Utapao airport facilities in Thailand. The Thai Prime Minister also called for the “strengthening [of] the ASEAN Secretary-General’s role as humanitarian assistance coordinator and ASEAN’s development of effective civil-military partnerships based on cooperation with civil society organizations. In this connection, I commend ASEAN Defense Ministers for launching an effective partnership with CSOs in the area of disaster management.”

Illegal Migration by the Sea Route The impact of climate change on human migration has been discussed in the earlier chapters. It occurs due to a number of factors such as loss of irrigable land, poverty, drought, loss of economic opportunities and due to livelihood problems. A closer look at these issues leads one to conclude that climate induced migration is quite natural.54 Further, this migration, in most cases is illegal and takes place over land routes and the sea. This issue is important for the Bay of Bengal littorals given that there is good connectivity among the states and the sea is also a viable medium to move illegally. This phenomenon is likely to be more intense particularly from Bangladesh to India and it has been noted that “India will struggle to cope with a surge of displaced people from Bangladesh, in addition to those who will arrive from the small islands in the Bay of Bengal that are being slowly swallowed by the rising sea. Approximately four million people inhabit these islands, and many of them will have to be accommodated on the mainland eventually. Bangladeshi migrants will generate political tension as they traverse the region’s many contested borders and territories.”55 A large number of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka have been intercepted both in the Bay of Bengal and even distant destinations as far as Canada. For instance, in 2010 MV Sun Sea with over 200 Tamil migrants on board was intercepted, destined for Canada; earlier, in 2009, MV Ocean Lady was intercepted off Canada’s British Columbia coast with 76 Tamil asylum seekers from Sri Lanka.56 During an exercise conducted by the National Defence University, Washington in December 2008, it was concluded that climate change induced events could result in thousands of Bangladeshi refugees

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entering India and this had the potential to result in social chaos. The above conclusions are fast becoming a reality and it has been noted that The country [Bangladesh] is so small but densely populated that it will not be able to absorb these refugees. There will be a spill over migration, or an exodus of people walking towards India. And as you know, the Indians have built a fence around Bangladesh. They are in the process of electrifying the fence now. This is about the most severe division between states anywhere in the world. Indian border guards kill innocent Bangladeshis on a regular basis if they approach the fence… Given the current situation, wherever there is a flow of refugees trying to cross into India, tension and conflict will erupt.57

It is plausible that several of them could take the sea route and head towards Indian shores particularly the Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands as was witnessed in end 2008. A large number of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar reached the A&N coast after they had been set adrift in the sea by the Thai military.58

Bay of Bengal Navies and Climate-Induced Events, Incidents and Disasters At the operational level, the regional capacity to respond to climate change induced disasters is quite limited. It will be useful to identify and examine the naval force structure of the Bay of Bengal littorals. The Indian navy’s capacity to respond to HADR is quite substantive and has been showcased during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Since that event, the Indian navy has acquired a number of naval platforms that are tailored to respond to various HADR mission and roles. These include the INS Jalashwa, (ex USS Trenton); an LPD that can be classified as a floating island with extraordinary capabilities to host helicopters and VTOL aircraft. The vessel has space for housing troops, supplies and fuel. In times of emergency, the troop spaces can be converted to house stores. The overall capacity of the vessel is reported to be 2,000 tons of supplies and equipment excluding additional fuel cargo capacity. The indigenously built Magar class vessels (capable of hosting two helicopters and can land special marine commandos

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in enemy areas), Polnochny LSM from Poland, and Landing Craft Utility (LCU). INS Jalashwa and the Magar class vessels are capable of hosting helicopters and the latter can land relief material ashore. India also has the capacity to marshal container, bulk and tankers from trade to transport disaster aid, engineering equipment and fuel. The Indian Navy is contemplating to acquire four more Austin Class LPDs from the US. The acquisition of INS Jalashva by the Indian Navy and the future acquisition of Austin Class LPDs from the US are sure to bring about appreciable change in the HADR capability of the Indian Navy. As noted earlier, in 2007, Bangladesh was hit by Cyclone Sidr. The Bangladesh navy was deployed to carry aid to affected regions, clearance of the port, and search, rescue and rehabilitation missions. Again in 2009, Cyclone Aila hit the coast of Bangladesh and India and left thousands of people homeless due to high tidal waves which cracked river and flood-control embankments and dykes and many villages in Bangladesh were submerged. 59 The Bangladesh Navy dispatched a 33-member team to the cyclone-hit areas to conduct rescue operations. The navy also dispatched vessels to rescue fishing trawlers with 400 fishermen onboard which had been reported missing. Although the Bangladesh navy has responded to cyclone related events, these deployments have been limited given that it is a small navy and does not possess enough capability to respond to crisis. It is for this reason that the US navy ships were augmented to support the national relief work efforts. For the last two decades or so, the Sri Lankan navy’s force structure had been tailored to respond to the threat posed by the LTTE navy. Consequently, the Sri Lankan navy’s capability to respond to cyclones and tsunamis is limited yet it overcame these weaknesses during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The navy, supported by other foreign navies, assisted in wreckage clearance to facilitate movement of relief support vessels and unload supplies. They also helped the local fishermen to refurbish and repair their craft so that they could again go to the sea and resume their livelihoods. Likewise, the Sri Lankan army and the air force were mobilized to assist in national rescue and relief efforts. Interestingly, the Sri Lankan government announced its decision to dispatch a joint military relief team to Japan in the aftermath of the tsunami and earthquake in 2011.60

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The Myanmar navy is a small force with few large vessels. Yet it undertakes joint exercises with the more advanced Indian navy. It also participates in multilateral forums such as the MILAM hosted by the Indian Navy at its base in Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. It also undertakes search and rescue duties to help the Myanmar fishermen. For instance in April 2011, when a tropical storm hit the Gulf of Martaban nearly 600 fishermen were missing, the navy successfully rescued some 12,000 people safely to shore but many were feared dead.61 Thailand’s Defense Organizational Act 2008 under the Ministry of Defense gives clear mandate and responsibility for protecting and safeguarding national interests, developing the country for the national stability and solving problems that arise from disaster and assisting people at the time of disaster.62 Thailand military responded to the 2004 India Ocean tsunami that hit six southern provinces along the Andaman Sea from Ranong, Pangnga, Phuket, Krabi, Trang and Satul provinces. The Chief of Defence Forces, who is also the Chief of the MOD Public Disaster Relief Center, ordered the Armed Forces Development Command Public Disaster Relief Center to provide assistance to the affected victims as well as ordering the Armed Forces Medical Office to send medical team to cure the wounded in Phuket province. Chakri Nareubet, Thailand navy’s aircraft carrier played significant role during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Earlier, in 1989 after the southern coastal provinces of Chumporn and Prachuap Khiri Khan in the Gulf of Thailand were hit by a freak tropical storm Gay. In the aftermath of the typhoon over 500 people perished, 160,000 were left homeless, more than seven thousand square kilometres of farm land was destroyed, and the fishing community was totally devastated. The Thai navy was overwhelmed by the task of search and rescue and providing relief due to lack of resources particularly large platforms.

Shipping and Climate Change Till very recently it was believed that ship emissions are limited to the oceans and did not impact on land. However, in a 2007 study, shipping was found responsible for 60,000 premature deaths annually.63 The study points that the “annual deaths related to shipping emissions in

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Europe are estimated at 26,710, while the mortality rate is 19,870 in East Asia and 9,950 in South Asia. North America has approximately 5,000 premature deaths while the eastern coast of South America has 790 mortalities”.64 The maritime community was shocked to learn that shipping industry was responsible for carbon dioxide emissions of the order of nearly 1.2 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide annually and this figure could increase to 2 billion metric tons by 2015 if remedial measures were not instituted. Besides carbon dioxide, the shipping industry could emit 20 million tons of SOx and 37 million tons of NOx annually. The IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) report for the 58th session held from 6 to 10 October 2008 noted that “the CO2 emissions from international shipping amounts to 843 million tonnes, or 2.7 percent of global CO2 emissions, as compared to the 1.8 percent estimate in the 2000 IMO study”. It was noted that “in the absence of future regulations on CO2 emissions from ships, such emissions were predicted in the base scenarios to increase by a factor of 2.4 to 3.0 by 2050.”65 Further, if these adversarial trends continue, emissions by shipping could rise from 2.7 per cent of the world’s CO2 emissions (in 2009) to as much as 20 per cent by 2050.66 There is a consensus of opinion among the shipping industry that CO2 emitted per tonne of cargo transported one kilometre (tonne/km) can be reduced by about 15 to 20 per cent over thirteen years (2007 and 2020) through a host of proactive measures involving technological developments, efficient management of shipping and operational efficiency including newer and efficient ships through innovations in ship design.67 It is generally agreed that given the international nature of the shipping, it is possible to implement and enforce commonly accepted technical standards. However, operational measures are best left to the industry and ship owners. In October 2010, while speaking at the Seoul International Maritime Forum on ‘The strategy for climate change in the maritime sector’ Efthimios E. Mitropoulos Secretary-General, International Maritime Organization noted that “control of GHGs from shipping has been a complex and difficult task from both a conceptual and a technical perspective” and that it is possible to achieve fuel efficiency by adopting

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operational measures and reduce 20 per cent reduction of emissions He also announced that the IMO had stipulated technical measures to reduce shipping emissions by (a) Drafting of regulations for an energy efficiency design index, known as the EEDI, which would enable a minimum energy efficiency level for new cargo ship designs to be established; and (b) Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) to establish a mechanism by which a shipping company and/ or a ship can improve the energy efficiency of vessel operations – and this is meant to apply to existing vessels, too.68 The United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 16/CMP 6) in Cancún, Mexico, from 29 November to 10 December 2010 during their deliberations acknowledged the progress made by the IMO to limit or reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases from international shipping.

Naval Housekeeping and Infrastructure While the navies engage in operational missions related to climate change, the necessity for some introspection and housekeeping is critical. As noted earlier, the shipping industry is a significant contributor of greenhouse gases (GHG), the naval vessels, though very small in number when compared to global shipping fleet need to address the problem of climate change through proactive measures. The shipbuilding industries have begun to take measures to reduce emissions and address possible technological requirements associated with global climate change. The issues relate to identification of GHG emitting substance inventory on board ships, Ozone Depletion Substances (ODS) used on board ship’s refrigeration and firefighting systems and their phase out plans and also identifying Halon alternatives, and fuel-efficient machinery for propulsion.

ConcluSion Although the causes and effects of climate change are doubtful and uncertain, how they would unfold across different regions and overtime, is a matter of concern. The international community has accepted that there is an urgent need to address the impending impacts of the phenomena. Given that each region has its geographical, social, economic and political peculiarities, a regional approach to mitigation

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and adaptation needs to be adopted to address the issue in the larger economic interest of the region. In order to successfully manage the impacts of climate change, the militaries need to begin thinking about their future acquisition processes particularly in the context of ODS substances. Technological innovations are needed to produce energy-efficient machinery and reduce carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases emissions. Moreover, the navies should begin to prepare to counter the effects of climate changes on the infrastructure which in large proportion is along the coast. In the context of strategy and doctrine formulation, naval forces should prepare for contingencies related to HADR and also those arising from the adverse impacts of the climate change. Such contingencies would be more frequently in occurrence in the future and would entail maritime operations in the humanitarian spectrum. Maritime forces would have to adapt to new strategies that are focused on capacity building and response mechanisms. Reconfiguration of force structure would imply the need for expeditionary platforms whose focus would be on humanitarian missions. Given that the climate change science and modelling will improve in the future, it will be prudent that a risk management approach for addressing disasters should be adopted and contingency plans be drawn to respond to disasters. As a means of devising maritime strategy, it is important to integrate climate change consequences into the awareness programme for the maritime fraternity. A concerted awareness programme could begin with erecting billboards, awareness posters and circulation of information on the adverse impacts of climate change and what the maritime fraternity could do as part of community service.

Notes   1. J. Barnett, “Security and Climate Change”, Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 7, October 2001. Department of Defence, United States. 2010; “Quadrennial Defense Review”, available at (accessed 23 August 2014); CNA, “Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”, Center for Naval Analysis, Washington, D.C., 2006, available at (accessed 26 August 2014); C. Raleigh. and H. Urdal, “Climate change, environmental degradation

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  2.

  3.   4.   5   6.   7.   8.   9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal and armed conflict”, Political Geography 26 (2007): 674–94; J.W. Busby, “Who Cares about the Weather? Climate Change and U.S. National Security”, Paper presented at an International Workshop on Human Security and Climate Change, Oslo, 21–23 June 2005.; N. Pai, “Climate Change and National Security: Preparing India for New Conflict Scenarios”, The Indian National Interest, Policy Brief, No. 1, April 2008; S. Harrison, “Climate Change and Security”, The RUSI Journal 153, no. 3 (2008): 88–91. For instance, at the African Union debate in early 2007 President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda called greenhouse gas emissions an “act of aggression” by the developed world against the developing world and at the April 2007 Security Council debate the Namibian representative, Kaire Mbuende, called greenhouse gas emissions tantamount to “low intensity biological or chemical warfare”. For more details, see O. Brown and A. Crawford, “Climate change: A new threat to stability in West Africa? Evidence from Ghana and Burkina Faso”, African Security Review 17, no. 3 (2008): 39–57. Barack Obama, while collecting the Nobel Peace Prize stated that climate change result in more wars across the globe. For more details, see “Climate wars”, The Economist, 8 July 2010. Ibid. Ibid.; see also B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 21. “Bangladesh risks becoming failed state, retired general says”, Bangladesh Open Source Monitors, 5 February 2010. A. Ben Buckland, “Climate of War? Stopping the Securitisation of Global Climate Change”, International Peace Bureau, Geneva, June 2007. For a good definition of NTS, see “Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Issues in Asia”, RSIS, Singapore. For further details, see (accessed 20 March 2011). “Security Council Holds First-ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers”, Security Council 5663rd Meeting, Department of Public Information, United Nations. “Energy, Security and Climate”, Concept Paper issued by the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 5 April 2007. Brett D. Schaefer and Ben Lieberman, “Discussing Global Warming in the Security Council: Premature and a Distraction from More Pressing Crises”, Web Meno The Heritage Foundation 1425 (2007): 1–5. A. Roul, “Beyond Tradition: Securitization of Climate Change”, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, 2007.

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14. F. Sindico, “Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?”, Carbon and Climate Law Review 1 (2007): 26–31; T. Deen, “Legitimacy of Security Council Meeting Challenged”, Inter Press Service News Agency, 17 April 2007. 15. N. MacFarquhar, “UN: Climate Alarmists Isolated As Developing Nations Reject Security Hype”, New York Times, 20 July 2011. 16. Ibid. 17. “Climate change debate in UNSC welcome step: India”, The Hindu, 21 July 2011. 18. “Warning of climate change’s threat to global security, Ban urges concerted action”, UN News Centre, available at (accessed 30 July 2014). 19. K.M. Campell et al., “The age of consequences: The foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Center for New American Security, 2007. 20. Ibid. 21. N. Mabey, “Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World”, 2008, available at (accessed 30 March 2011). 22. Ibid. 23. United States, “Quadrennial Defense Review”, 2010, available at (accessed 23 August 2014). 24. “Climate change can strain Southeast Asia’s security”, Strait Times, 16 December 2010. 25. Ibid. 26. CNA, “Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. A. Litovsky, “Militarizing Climate Change”, Earth Security Initiative, 6 July 2011. 30. Ibid. 31. N.P. Shun, “The Environment: An Important and Increasingly Urgent Military Concern”, Pointers 34, no. 3 (2008), available at (accessed 15 January 2011). 32. P.K. Gautum, “Climate Change and the Military”, Journal of Defence Studies 3, no. 4 (2009): 37–48.

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33. “Climate Change and the Military: Copenhagen and Beyond”, available at (accessed 6 June 2014). 34. E.S. Yim et al., “Disaster Diplomacy: Current Controversies and Future Prospects”, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 24, no. 4 (2009): 291–93. 35. “Cyclone Nargis”, available at (accessed 6 January 2014). 36. United States, “Quadrennial Defense Review”. 37. Department of Navy, “U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap”, in Task Force Climate Change, Oceanographer of the Navy, 2010, available at (accessed 13 July 2014). 38. “Climate change can strain Southeast Asia’s security”, Strait Times, 16 December 2010. 39. “2.5 lakh buildings vulnerable to earthquake”, Daily Star, 13 December 2010. 40. “Cyclone Sidr spares Bengal, hits B’desh”, available at (accessed 13 March 2011]. 41. Bharat Rakshak, “Bangladesh Relief”, available at (accessed 13 March 2011). 42. “U.S. forces provide relief after Cyclone Sidr strikes Bangladesh”, available at (accessed 23 March 2011). 43. A. Ahmed, “U.S. Navy vessel arrives in Bangladesh for relief efforts”, 2007, available at (accessed 10 January 2010). 44. “Myanmar Tropical Cyclone Nargis”, available at (accessed 28 March 2011). 45. J. Belanger and R. Horsey, “Negotiating humanitarian access to cyclone -affected areas of Myanmar : A review”, 2008, available at (accessed 30 March 2011). 46. Indian Navy, “Humanitarian Activities and Disaster Relief”, 2008, available at (accessed 28 March 2011). 47. R. Sharma, “Indian Navy wins friends, expands influence in Indian Ocean region”, 2008, available at (accessed 29 March 2011). 48. Ibid. 49. For an excellent discussion on the role of coast guard, see Sam Bateman, “Multiple Uses, Maritime Law Enforcement and the Role of Coast Guards”, in The Safety of Sea lines of Communication in the Indian Ocean, edited by

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50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

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Dennis Rumley, Sanjay Chaurvedi and Mat Taib Yasin (Malaysia: MIMA, 2007), pp. 266–86. See also Sam Bateman, “Coast Guards: New Forces for Regional Order and Security”, Asia Pacific Issues, Analysis from the EastWest Center No. 65, January 2003. Prabhakaran Paleri, Coast Guard In The Maritime Security of India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004), pp. 48–49. C. Bedford, “The View From the West: Navies and Non-Traditional Security Threats”, Canadian Naval Review 6, no. 4 (2011): 37–38. Indonesia Bureau Chief Sujadi Siswo, “ASEAN defence chiefs meet in Jakarta”, 2011, available at (accessed 5 April 2011). “Intervention of H.E. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Kingdom of Thailand on ASEAN Community-Building and Connectivity” at the Plenary Session of the 18th ASEAN Summit, Jakarta, 7 May 2011, available at (accessed 7 June 2011); Ministry of Foreign Affair Kingdom of Thailand, “European Union takes note of Thailand’s constructive role in humanitarian assistance, disaster preparedness, and regional development”, 2011, available at (accessed 7 June 2011). P.J. Smith, “Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response”, Orbis 51, no. 4 (2007): 617–33. J. Podesta and P. Ogden, “The Security Implications of Climate Chang”, Washington Quarterly 3, no. 1 (2007–08): 115–38. G. Bandulahewa, “Tamil Migrant Ship M/V Sun Sea will arrive Canada by Aug 14 th ”, 2010, available at (accessed 7 January 2014). A. Litovsky, “Militarizing Climate Change”, Earth Security Imitative, 6 July 2011. “Beckoning of Fortune Traps Rohingyas”, Daily Star (Bangladesh), 25 January 2009. “11 die as Cyclone Aila lashes coast”, available at (accessed 22 January 2010). “Sri Lanka to send tri forces for rescue missions and US$1 million for Tsunami hit Japan”, Asian Tribune, 14 March 2011. S. Aung, “600 still missing off Burma coast”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 4 April 2011. “The military’s role in Disaster Relief”, available at (accessed 4 January 2011).

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63. “Pollution from Marine Vessels Linked to Heart and Lung Disease”, Science Daily, 12 November 2007. 64. Ibid. 65. Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), “Major progress on air pollution, ship recycling and ballast water management at IMO environment meeting”, IMO Briefing 48, no. 13 (2010). 66. Eirik Nyhus, “Climate Change Politics and Shipping: Decoding the Issues”, 2009, available at (accessed 11 March 2011). 67. International Chamber of Shipping, “Shipping, World Trade and the Reduction of and the Reduction of CO2 Emissions”, 2009, available at (accessed 2 October 2009). 68. International Maritime Orgenization, “The strategy for climate change in the maritime sector”, Seoul International Maritime Forum, 14 October 2010, available at (accessed 5 March 2011).

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5 Rescaling the ‘National’ Realities, Perceptions and Policies Introduction Our analysis in this book so far has raised a number of issues, geopolitical as well as ethical in nature — pertaining to scale, space and sustainability in the context of climate change. First and foremost is the multiscalar nature of climate change in terms of both ‘causes’ and ‘consequences’, which can be generalized only at the risk of oversimplification and reductionism. The very fact that there is complex spatial-geographical pattern to climate change, mapping geographical specificities (Chapter 2) of a particular space under consideration (e.g. the Bay of Bengal in this study) is of critical importance. We have also pointed out early on that despite the obligations invoked under Articles 122 and 123 of Part IX of UNCLOS III, there appears to be a good deal of mismatch between physical geographies, large marine ecosystem and the political geographies of the Bay of Bengal as a semienclosed sea. We have also argued in Chapter 1 that there is a compelling need to rethink the conventional notions of sovereignty in order to realize human security for a quarter of humanity that resides in the littoral regions of the Bay and depends on one of the largest marine ecosystems in the world for livelihood support and food security.

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Our key argument in this chapter is that the ‘national’ level perspectives and responses in climate change mitigation and adaptation need to be rescaled in two major senses. On the one hand, the national needs to be scaled up in order to develop sub-regional and regional understandings and implications of climate change. On the other hand, the littoral states of the semi-enclosed Bay of Bengal need to scale down their perspectives and policies in order to develop community-centric ocean governance models that remain grounded in specific localities and address local realities. Whereas the focus on scaling up enables us to look at some of the successful regional seas programs in other parts of the globe, imperatives of scaling down draw attention to the concepts of ocean governance and ocean management at the grassroot levels. We begin with some reflections on how the ‘regional’ scale has been approached and incorporated both by the regional seas program of UNEP and the concept of ‘semi-enclosed’ seas by the UNCLOS. The chapter then turns to a concise and selective engagement with various climate change national action plans in order to briefly examine the ways in which they approach the ‘space’ and ‘scale’ of climate change, within the larger framework of their preferred thrust areas. The analysis then turns to the case study of Sundarbans (the largest contiguous mangrove forest in the world, geopolitically split between India and Bangladesh), with a view to pinpoint the mismatch between ecological and geopolitical spaces at a sub-regional scale.

Revisiting Regional Seas Programs in the Context of Climate Change The ‘regional sea’ was conceived as an open space within which to approach ecosystem conservation and ensure that the development of coastal and island states would benefit from international cooperation.1 In principle, this space comprises both national and international waters and thereby offers an incentive for governmental and intergovernmental organizations to enter into partnerships and integrate their efforts in pursuing ecological objectives. In order to delimit the regional sea as a component of an action plan, the geographical allocation of the marine area and its physical features have been used as two major criteria.

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Theoretically speaking, the regional seas have been intended “as appropriate, enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, as well as marine and coastal areas of regions with well defined common problems”.2 In practice, semi-enclosed and enclosed seas would be regarded as regional seas if political conditions were conducive enough. In other words, one of the key underlying assumptions is that all the littoral states of the marine area were in agreement on environmentally sound political co-operation. As pointed out above, an ecosystem-based approach requires a Regional Seas Program to lay down clear guidelines for the continental margin (consisting of the continuation of the land into the sea and including the shelf, slope and rise), which is characterized by interlinked ecosystems of various kinds. The deep ocean, extending seawards from the rise, is not ‘empty space’. It consists of abyssal plains, ridges and other geological structures, characterized by a lesser variety of ecosystems, “all of which differ markedly from those representative of continental margin.”3 As far as the goals outlined under UNEP Regional Seas Program are concerned, two key characteristics stand out. The action plans conceived and implemented under the program revolved primarily around the principles of environmental protection. A few action plans also gave some attention to issues related to economic efficiency. Secondly, the understanding of environmental conservation was somewhat restricted and chiefly implied measures preventing or mitigating pollution. Consequently, whereas the abiotic components, and the physical and chemical processes of the ocean ecosystem received the major attention, relatively little attention was given to biological components. Despite such obvious reductionism this approach played a major role in encouraging ocean governance on a regional scale. Agenda 21 adopted by the Earth Summit (1992) further reinforce the importance of pursuing sustainable development objectives at a regional scale by taking the ecosystem in its entirety, “including both abiotic and biotic components, with the protection of its trophic webs as the core goal of environmentally sound planning”.4 Whereas Agenda 21 used the word ‘regional scale’ in a generic, undefined sense, “the concept of ‘regional sea’ adopted by UNEP has no precedent in oceanographic and geographical literature.”5 It was under UNCLOS III (1973–82) that the regional role of ocean governance was rejuvenated through an approach that acknowledges both oceanography and geography while focusing on enclosed and

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semi-enclosed seas. As pointed out in earlier chapters by us, Article 122 defines ‘enclosed or semi-enclosed sea’ as a basin or a sea “surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States”. It is useful to mention in passing that this concept is the one and only key legal reference point and no other concepts, including that of the regional seas, have been conceptualized and considered in legal terms.6 Despite growing evidence of climate change related implications, deepoceans are yet to be regarded as appropriate grounds for promoting cooperation at the regional scale. In our view it is not a question of whether, but when, deep-oceans would be placed under the purview of regional cooperation (including the semi-enclosed Bay of Bengal) as a result of climate change. The regional scale is also being referred to under Part XII (Protection and Preservation of Marine Environment), and Section 2 (Global and Regional Co-operation), where Article 197 calls upon states to cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features. It is useful to note that a concise definition of a ‘regional scale’ is missing under UNCLOS. May be it was seen as both unnecessary and inconvenient to restrict the notion of ‘regional’ to geographical theory of region, according to which only an ocean space that is cohesive both in terms of natural features and resource-uses would qualify as ‘ocean region’. The UNCLOS thus concluded that the regional scale could be referred to any kind of ocean area that is marked by interstate cooperation. In retrospect, what made the initiative by the UNEP to convene the Intergovernmental Meeting on the Protection of the Mediterranean in Barcelona (28 January to 4 February 1975) and launch the first action plan concerned with a regional sea so remarkable was the fact that, From that time onwards not only was an intermediate geographical scale interposed between the global and local ones, but also, in an expanding part of the world, two other consequences have arisen. On the one hand, the global approach to ocean environmental protection and resource use management have been designed considering that they had to gain effectiveness since their adoption

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and operation, and that they could be integrated with approaches at the regional level. On the other hand, local management was carried out being aware that it could have been framed in a wider geographical context concerned with the regional (multinational) scale and consisting in regional programs and plans.7

Once applied to large marine ecosystems that are embedded in the semi-enclosed seas such as the Bay of Bengal, and that too in the context of climate change, the regional scale assumes a significance of its own. It is with the following key question in mind that we turn to a brief assessment of various ‘national’ response to climate change on the part of the Bay of Bengal littoral states: Do we see any opening up of space for cooperation at the ‘regional’ and ‘local’ levels, with the ‘global’ and ‘national’ vying for greater attention and priority for multiscalar climate change mitigation and adaptation? If so, how can that space be further broadened and deepened? If not, what could possibly be done to create and sustain that space? As we try and seek an answer to the question raised above through the analysis that follows, we would like to flag and highlight the following facts related to the serious problem of land-based sources of pollution in the BOBLME region, which, in comparison to the overall profile of ecological irrationalities and environmental problems in region, is perhaps the tip of an iceberg. It is expected that current problems associated with land-based sources of pollution in the [BOBLME] region will continue to deteriorate unless radical measures can be introduced in a short period of time. The main forces operating to worsen the existing problems of pollution include increasing populations sizes, urbanization, coastal migration, development imperatives and improving lifestyles, shifts in industry, expanding tourism and intensifying methods of agriculture and aquaculture. The root causes of issues associated with land-based sources of pollution in the region include the expansion and increasing density of human populations, poor large-scale awareness, a low economic base for funding actions at all levels, insufficient scientific information and lack of technology. Many of these factors are amplified by inherent characteristics of at least some of the BOBLME countries, which have high rainfall, are low-lying, dissected by a large number of rivers and are subject to cyclones and floods. These characteristics ensure that pollutants are mobilized and transported large distances.8

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Besides confronting the compelling issue of land-based pollution, the Bay of Bengal littoral states and communities also need to prepare and respond to climate change induced threats in the form of accelerated coastal erosion, inundation of settlements and arable land with associated social and economic consequences. Sea-level rise, increasing sea surface temperatures and acidification of the oceans9 will further result in loss of mangrove forests and coral reefs and reduced fish stocks throughout this region.10 As pointed out in a recent study, “While sea-level rise receives the most attention, other impacts will create challenges along the world’s coasts. Rises in marine/coastal water surface temperatures will lead to the further bleaching and widespread mortality of coral reefs. Saltwater will displace or at least intrude coastal aquifers, and estuarine systems are likely to become more brackish — altering estuarine ecology with potentially severe impacts on fisheries and marine or coastal biodiversity and overall productivity.”11

The Bay of Bengal Littoral States: Perspectives and Policies on Climate Change Our key intention here is not to undertake an exhaustive survey of various national action plans of the Bay of Bengal littoral states on climate change but to briefly examine (a) their overall orientations in terms of scale and (b) predominant understandings and representations of climate change space. We also explore the extent to which the consciousness of the Bay of Bengal as a semi-enclosed sea figures in the ‘national’ approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation.

India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change: Common But Differentiated Responsibility It has become a truism that it is the poor and the marginalized that are going to be the worst victims of climate change and will be subjected to multiple exposures. Given that world’s largest number of poor, living on less than US$1 a day, and severely handicapped in terms of capacity, are to be found in India, they are the ones who are likely to be in the front-line of adverse climate change consequences. The Stern

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Committee was quite emphatic in pointing out that a marginal change in temperature could have a major impact on the Indian monsoon resulting in up to a 25 per cent decline in agricultural yield. Whereas according to recent Government of India study, up to 45 per cent of GDP variations in India over the past half-century were caused by fluctuations in rainfall. As much as 0.67 per cent GNP losses could accrue if temperatures were to rise from 2 to 3.5 degrees Celsius. Whereas 100 cm increase in sea level could cause 0.37 per cent GNP loss. Since one-fourth of the Indian economy is dependent on agriculture, any adverse consequence of climate change would seriously undermine India’s ability to meet its realization of millennium development goals, including poverty eradication. “India is faced with the challenge of sustaining its rapid economic growth while dealing with the global threat of climate change.”12 It is with an explicit acknowledgement of the ‘global’ scale that 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) underlined the Indian concern that, “Climate change may alter the distribution and quality of India’s natural resources and adverse­l y affect the livelihood of its people. With an econo­my closely tied to its natural resource base and cli­mate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, water and forestry, India may face a major threat because of the projected changes in climate.”13 The NAPCC underlines that, Recognizing that climate change is a global challenge, India will engage actively in multilateral negotiations in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in a positive, constructive and for­ward-looking manner. Our objective will be to establish an effective, cooperative and equitable global approach based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, enshrined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Such an approach must be based on a global vision inspired by Mahatma Gandhi’s wise dic­tum—The earth has enough resources to meet peo­ple’s needs, but will never have enough to satisfy people’s greed. Thus we must not only promote sus­tainable production processes, but equally, sustain­able lifestyles across the globe.14

A package of measures addressing both mitigation and adaptation, the NAPCC consists of the following eight missions: National Solar Mission; National Mission for Enhanced Energy efficiency; National Mission

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for Sustainable Habitat; National Water Mission; National Mission for Sustainable Himalayan Ecosystem; National Mission for a Green India; National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture; and National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change. Some analysts have argued that India’s official framing of climate change issues continues to oscillate between the ‘scientific’ imperatives of deterritorialized global understandings of climate change and reterritorialisation of climate space through geopolitical-geoeconomic reasoning.15 The development-centric thrust of India’s climate change geopolitical discourse, against the backdrop of what may be described as the ‘revolution of rising socio-economic expectations’, was easily discernible in the 2006 National Environmental Policy 16, which listed the following elements as central to India’s response to global warming: adherence to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; prioritization of the right to development; belief in equal per capita entitlements to all countries to global environmental resources; reliance on multilateral approaches; and participation in voluntary partnerships consistent with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). The argument put forward by India in international fora has been that action on climate change must be based on science and not treated as a ‘post-modernist religion’. However, the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, was quick to point out in his 2007 address to the Indian Science Congress that ‘the science of climate change is still nascent and somewhat uncertain’ and called upon the Indian scientists to further “engage in exploring the links between the greenhouse emissions and climate change”.17 It is often pointed out that India will become the third largest emitter by 2015 (together with the US, EU, China and Russia accounting for two-thirds of global greenhouse gases), and hence must demonstrate that it is a responsible international actor by committing to certain emission reduction targets. In response, the Indian official discourse runs as follows: India is under no ethical obligation to commit itself to legally binding mitigation targets for the obvious reasons that it has played a rather limited role in contributing to the problem thus far, and is faced with compelling developmental needs, especially of millions of poor and deprived. The former Indian minister for environment, Saifuddin Soz, is reported to have said at Kyoto, “Per

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capita basis is the most important criteria for deciding the rights to environmental space. This is a direct measure of human welfare. Since the atmosphere is the common heritage of humankind, equity has to be the fundamental basis for its management.”18 The address delivered by the Indian prime minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, on the release of India’s Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) on 30 June 2008, “graphically shows the tension between the global/ deterritorial and national/territorial logics deployed in response to the dilemma faced by a ‘Rising’ India with 300 million plus middle class; a class that symbolizes India’s status as a rising Asian power on the one hand, and, at the same time, can be held as most responsible/ accountable in terms of per capita emissions to the ‘global’ atmosphere”.19 According to Dr. Manmohan Singh, Climate Change is a global challenge. It can only be successfully overcome through a global, collaborative and cooperative effort. India is prepared to play its role as a responsible member of the international community and make its own contribution. We are already doing so in the multilateral negotiations taking place under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The outcome that we are looking for must be effective. It must be fair and equitable. Every citizen of this planet must have an equal share of the planetary atmospheric space.20

The low per capita emissions argument advanced by India, while defending the norm of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ in international climate diplomacy, somewhat loses its punch in the light of persisting, if not growing, gaps between the rich and the poor. A recent Greenpeace India study found that the carbon footprints of those in the top income bracket in India are 4.5 times that of the lowest.21 According to Praful Bidwai, “India’s stress on per capita emissions as the sole metric or criteria of equity and the only limit it will accept is problematic. In an extremely unequal and hierarchical society like ours, per capita emissions mean little”.22 Critics of NAPCC suggest that whereas there are some bold new ideas on paper, such as increasing the contribution of solar energy, what is missing are the details with regard to action and implementation. Yet another shortcoming is the failure of the NAPCC to articulate a vision regionally. While advocating a qualitative shift towards ecologically sustainable growth, the plan falls short of outlining a compelling vision

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of future development. For the purposes of the central argument in this paper, however, most conspicuous by its absence is the National Mission for India’s marine-coastal environments. The NAPCC no doubt makes a reference to ‘rise in sea level’ and confirms IPCC’s estimates of 1-2 mm per year global sea-level rise as consistent with research carried out by the Indian scientists for the North Indian Ocean.23 It also points out that ‘a mean Sea Level Rise of 15–38 cm is projected along India’s coast by the mid 21st century and of 46-59 cm by 2100… in addition, a projected increase in the intensity of tropical cyclones poses a threat to the heavily populated coastal zones in the country’. 24 It is in the context of disaster management responses to climate change that NAPCC explicitly acknowledges that, “The coastal areas are an important and critical region for India not only because of the vast 7500-km coastline but also because of the density of population and livelihoods dependent on coastal resources” and that “Coastal zones are particularly vulnerable and sensi­tive to such impacts of climate change as rise in the sea level, rise in the high-tide level, and cyclones and storms, which are projected to become more fre­quent and intense”. It is further said that, “the programme will focus on two elements, namely (1) coastal protection and (2) early warning systems. Priority areas on coastal zones include: Development of a regional ocean modeling sys­tem (the one and only reference to a ‘regional’ scale in the entire NAPCC document) especially in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea: High-resolution coupled ocean–atmosphere vari­ability studies in tropical oceans, in particular the Indian Ocean; Development of a high-resolution storm surge model for coastal regions; Development of salinity-tolerant crop cultivars; Community awareness on coastal disasters and necessary action; plantation and regeneration of mangroves; Timely forecasting, cyclone and flood warning sys­tems and; Enhanced plantation and regeneration of man­groves and coastal forests.”25 As far as adaptation strategies for the coastal regions are concerned, the NAPCC mentions that, In coastal regions, restrictions have been imposed in the area between 200m and 500m of the HTL (high tide line) while special restrictions have been imposed in the area up to 200m to protect the sensi­tive

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coastal ecosystems and prevent their exploita­tion. This, simultaneously, addresses the concerns of the coastal population and their livelihood. Some specific measures taken in this regard include con­struction of coastal protection infrastructure and cyclone shelters, as well as plantation of coastal forests and mangroves.26

While we agree with the contention that India’s climate action plan “has the potential, when the relevant Ministries produce concrete and realizable plans with targets and timetables tied to the energy and development policies of India, to set the country on a lowcarbon development pathway”27, a national action plan on India’s coastal zones with a regional perspective and emphasis is critically important. According to one study, Indian economy could easily lose approximately 2 trillion rupees due to a 1-meter rise in the sea level and its impact on fisheries, shipping, and the three main cities of Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata could be devastating and displace around 7.1 million people.28 This will also have adverse effects on agriculture due to flooding and the resultant loss low-lying arable land along the coast. Whereas the fisheries sector would also suffer, the worst hit would be the communities depending for their livelihood largely on small-scale traditional fishing.

Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2008: Development, Disasters and Displacements In the context of anticipated wide-ranging climate change-induced transformations as well as geopolitical framings of related vulnerabilities and threats very few countries on the entire globe could possibly compete with Bangladesh. The 2008 Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan provides a compelling account of how climate change, besides introducing new sets of vulnerabilities is going to act as a threat multiplier for millions of poor Bangladeshis. Climate change, we are told (reproduced verbatim as follows), “will exacerbate many of the current problems and natural hazards”; “result in increasingly frequent and severe tropical cyclones, with higher wind speeds and storm surges leading to more damage in the coastal region; heavier and more erratic rainfall in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna system,

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including Bangladesh, during the monsoon resulting in: higher river flows, causing over-topping and breaching of embankments and widespread flooding in rural and urban areas, river bank erosion resulting in loss of homes and agricultural land to the rivers; increased sedimentation in riverbeds leading to drainage congestion and water-logging; melting of the Himalayan glaciers, leading to higher river flows in the warmer months of the year, followed by lower river flows and increased saline intrusion after the glaciers have shrunk or disappeared; lower and more erratic rainfall, resulting in increasing droughts, especially in drier northern and western regions of the country; sea level rises leading to submergence of low-lying coastal areas and saline water intrusion up coastal rivers and into groundwater aquifers, reducing freshwater availability; damage to the Sundarbans mangrove forest, a World Heritage site with rich biodiversity; and drainage congestion inside coastal polders, which will adversely affect agriculture; warmer and more humid weather leading to increased prevalence of disease and disease vectors’.29 Alarmingly prone to severe tropical storm or cyclones, which develop over warm tropical oceans (with winds of 64 knots (74 miles/ hour or more) are the southern districts of Bangladesh. Bangladesh like so many other countries too has resorted to the structural approach in order to protect people from severe storms and tidal surges. With the Bay of Bengal having become more turbulent over the past few years, construction of cyclone shelters (more than 2,100 cyclone shelters have been built in the coastal districts) is one of six key mitigating measures adopted by Bangladesh along with embankments, afforestation, early warning systems, awareness building and communications. Whereas in the past it was largely during premonsoon and post-monsoon periods that rough seas were experienced, now it has becomes almost a year-round phenomena. The fishing practices and livelihoods of fishermen are in the front-line of these threats. Some of the worst flooding problems on the planet are to be found in Bangladesh. It is important to note that, “There are no estimates of the likely contribution to pollution of the Bay of Bengal caused by periodic events. The importance and relative contribution of floods in the region needs to be assessed, since inputs to the Bay of Bengal may cause ecosystem shock and account for damage

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that would not occur if inputs were only at a lower level and on a daily basis.”30

Indonesia’s National Action Plan Addressing Climate Change: Centrality and the Marginality of the Seas! According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Southeast Asia’ is both one of the most exposed regions to the impacts of climate change and the least prepared ones.31 So is ‘South Asia’, as our analysis has shown in chapter two. The critical development-environment interface assumes particular salience in view of the fact that approximately 2.2 billion subsistence farmers in Southeast Asia are already experiencing falling crop yields caused by floods, droughts, erratic rainfall and other climate change impacts.32 It has been argued by some analysts that Indonesia, despite its fairly obvious vulnerability to climate change, seems to be lacking in proactive, transnational-regional, approaches to mitigation and adaptation. The archipelagic state of Indonesia33 seems well aware of the fact that the impacts of climate change on the coastal ecosystems due to sea-level rise, change in surface temperature and water quality, and increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme events such as tropical storm and high waves are already visible and compelling. Indonesia is currently experiencing inundation of cultured fisheries area, loss of economic assets and infrastructure, increased erosion and damage to coastal biodiversity and small islands.34 The current and potential consequences of climate change for the marine habitats, ecosystems and coastal populations of Indonesia, within the broader rubric of human security, need to be assessed in relation to the fact that it has a very high coastal population. For example, nearly 65 per cent of the population of Java lives in the costal areas. Indonesia’s archipelagic character, as pointed out by Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, 35 carries important consequences not only for national identity and state building but also in terms of governance. The fragmented geography of Indonesian landmass into various islands poses special challenges in terms of communication and coordination. The intervening maritime spaces both separate and link these islands and “represent a major strategic, economic and cultural resource for

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Indonesia; they can not be ignored, yet governing the maritime zone poses enormous practical difficulties”.36 Indonesia is at a vital juncture in the management of its seas. Partly for historical reasons, partly thanks to its vigorous contributions to the framing of the Law of the Sea, Indonesia is recognized as possessing 5.8 million square kilometers of sea, and may soon come to possess more if its proposal for an extended continental shelf is accepted. With this vast area come substantial opportunities — the seabed will be one of the great resource frontiers of the twenty-first century and new opportunities for productively managing the ecology of marine areas are constantly emerging. Yet with this opportunity come responsibilities and threats. As a contributor to the international order, Indonesia will be obliged to exercise more direct authority over the seas under its control — protecting them from degradation and ensuring the safety of those who traverse them, while ensuring its own security and economic interests. Success in bringing effective governance to this vast realm will be crucial in Indonesia’s economic and social development.37

The challenge of ocean management and governance for Indonesia acquires further complexity due to climate change and in turn calls for new imaginations of scale and socio-political-legal innovations. Given their multifaceted dependence on fast multiplying uses of the sea, Indonesia and the Indonesians, simply cannot afford to be reactive in their approach. Here are just a few examples. Indonesia’s ‘internal’ as well as external connectivity depends to a significant extent on seas and Indonesian ports receive more than 75,000 dockings per year, loading more than 300 million tonnes of cargo every year. As many as 1,156 registered shipping companies, approximately 10,000 vessels, and about 14 million Indonesians travelling by sea every year for social and business purposes, further underlines the centrality of maritime spaces and flows to Indonesian life and identity. On the one hand, the resource-economic endowments of the sea (Indonesian waters include some of the world’s richest fishing grounds and Indonesia is the fourth largest producer of fish) include minerals (e.g. salt, sand and coral), oil and gas continue to provide a fillip to its steadily growing political economy. On the other hand, the sea is also a source of vulnerabilities and threats including flow of illegal immigrants

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(including from the Middle East), which have often caused tensions in Indonesia’s relations with Australia and Malaysia. In the keynote speech given on the occasion of releasing the ‘National Action Plan to Combat Climate Change’, in November 2007, the Indonesian President Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono while acknowledging that whereas seen from one important perspective climate change is a ‘global’ problem, was quick to underline the fact that geographical specificities of vulnerability on the part of developing countries must not be lost sight of, which in turn, demand multilateral cooperation. The Indonesian President said, we quote: In recent years, humans have faced a global threat that was never faced by earlier generations. Sea levels have started to rise and to threaten coastal areas and their inhabitants. In some places in Indonesia, this rise measures 8 mm per year. Our country consists of not less than 17,500 islands with a coastline of 81,000 km. The majority of our population lives on coastal area – around 65 per cent of the population of Java lives in coastal regions, for example. Indonesians are therefore vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Climate change has also changed the pattern of rainfall and evaporation with the potential to cause floods in some places and drought in others. This issue therefore threatens livelihoods in our country – both agriculture and fisheries. As a country that is vulnerable to their impacts, it is important for Indonesia to mitigate global warming and climate change. Indonesia would therefore reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the energy sector, and from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), while also increasing carbon sequestration. Indonesia recognizes that we cannot achieve this by ourselves. To avoid or slow climate change Indonesia calls on developed countries to fulfill their commitments to reduce GHG emissions. In this way, Indonesia is ready to work together bilaterally or multilaterally with other countries to tackle climate change. Efforts to control climate change cannot be separated from economic development and poverty alleviation. People that have met their economic needs will be better placed to protect the environment.38 (emphasis given by author)

Indonesia’s climate-environment challenge in the maritime-ecological realms, including the Bay of Bengal (which is yet to receive the attention it deserves), is likely to multiply as well as magnify by a number of

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factors. Before we do so, it is useful to appreciate that, “Governing the maritime realm has always posed distinct challenges to governments, different from those ruling the land”39, also by virtue of fact that the ocean being a different medium forces us to perceive, plan and act differently. Also, ‘the sea is multi-layered’ whereas governance regimes on land normally make a distinction between air column, surface and subsoil. Governance at sea, in contrast, must take account of air column, surface, water column, seabed and subsoil, each of them different realm.40 Consequently, such multidimensionality in terms of governance “means that most activities at sea require a higher level of technology and skill than do comparable activities on land”.41 Lack of access to and mastery over maritime technology, which may be partly due to lack of capital, on the part of Indonesia is said to have hampered Indonesian attempts to combat sea-borne criminal activities.42 It is to state the obvious perhaps that pursuit of regional cooperation in science and technology is not just a matter of choice but necessity. It is useful to note that Indonesia is currently participating in the ‘Arafura and Timor Seas Expert Forum’ (ATSEF), which aims at cooperation between Indonesia, Australia and Timor Leste for protection of the ecosystem and marine conservation in the Arafura and Timor Sea, under UNCLOS articles 122-123 dealing with cooperation in ‘semienclosed waters’.43 It is timely that Indonesia scales up its focus towards the Bay of Bengal in pursuit of similar cooperation. As one of the leading Indonesian experts on the law of the sea and maritime affairs, Hasjim Djalal puts it, “Currently, many concepts are being developed and discussed in various academic and government circles, specifically regarding management of the ocean based ecosystem and Large Marine Ecosystem principles that may transcend the maritime boundaries of a state. Indonesia and other coastal countries of the Indian Ocean need to be more proactive in these activities in order to protect their own interests as well as sustainability and the proper management of Indian Ocean resources and their ecosystems.”44

National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Sri Lanka: Crisis of Capacity and Coordination? While acknowledging at the outset that the effects of climate change could derail the development drive of Sri Lanka in the post-conflict

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phase, seriously undermine natural resource base on land and at sea, result in much enhanced frequency and intensity of natural hazards such as droughts and floods, and cause multiplication of vector-borne diseases at an alarming rate, Sri Lanka’s 2010 National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy stands out in terms of its emphatic focus on adaptation as well as a frank acceptance of major lacunae and handicaps: Climate change adaptation planning capacity [of Sri Lanka] is very limited and scattered…Technical capacity to effectively deal with climate change is lacking across key sector agencies as well. There is no focal point or unit responsible for ensuring climate resilience criteria are considered in national level planning initiatives… Climate change considerations are largely not included in planning processes across the economy. While knowledge of the concept of climate change seems widespread, awareness about what can and should be done to adapt is still very limited. Adequate guidelines and safeguards are lacking. The Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) guidelines, for example, do not specifically include any climate change considerations …Understanding of the economics of climate change in the Sri Lankan context is limited. There seems to be a great deal of ‘fatigue’ among stakeholders in talking about climate change. There is weariness on the limited scope for mitigation action. More focus needs to be placed on adaptation and action, and resource mobilization.45

According to a recent study “Sri Lanka’s mean temperature may increase by about 0.9-40°C, over the baseline (1961-1990), by the year 2100 with accompanying changes in the quantity and spatial distribution of rainfall”.46 Consequently we might witness an increase in the Maha (wet) season irrigation water requirement for paddy by 13-23 per cent by 2050 compared to that of 1961-1990. Whereas research on climate change implications for coconut yield suggests that production after 2040 may not be able to meet local consumption requirements, and a reduction in the monthly rainfall by 100 mm could result in loss of productivity by 30-80 kilograms of ‘made’ tea per hectare, seriously undermining the country’s exports.47 The adaptation strategy of Sri Lanka also underscores the need to scale down the metanarratives of climate change in order to mainstream climate change adaptation into to national planning and development through an integrated approach. It is further argued that

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climate resilience of Sri Lanka’s economy and its people can only be enhanced through an integrated approach based on “cross-cutting interventions that impact across multiple strategic thrusts and sectors in the economy. Given the scale and significance of potential impacts, climate change adaptation must be considered from the early stages of development planning through the implementation of major projects and programs. Sri Lanka’s society also needs to have more access to information on climate change related threats they may face, and what they can do at household or community levels to adapt and protect themselves.”48 Yet another important feature of the Sri Lankan approach to climate change adaptation is the emphasis placed on ‘addressing socio-economic concerns resulting from climate change impacts on biodiversity’, which is worth quoting in its entirety: Biodiversity based livelihoods and communities are bound to be adversely affected by climate change. Sea-level rise, for example, will impact fishery processes, livelihoods, and lifestyles of communities. Unplanned forest clearing in the dry zone has resulted in drastic change in food habits and migration routes of animals such as elephants, which in turn have increased human-animal conflicts. Adapting in such situations requires skill-building to adjust to changes in bio-resources, shifting to alternate means of livelihood, or sometimes relocating to safer places.49

National Adaptation Plan of Maldives: Towards the ‘Death of a Nation’! “As for my own country, the Maldives, a mean sea-level rise of 2 metres would suffice to virtually submerge the entire country of 1,190 small islands, most of which barely rise over 2 metres above mean sea level. That would be the death of a nation. With a mere 1 metre rise also, a storm surge would be catastrophic, and possibly fatal to the nation.” This is how the President of Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayyoom described the prospects and predicament of a small Indian Ocean island state, in the front-line of climate change, at the UN General Assembly in 1987.

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The 1989 Malé Small States Conference on sea-level rise, held from 14–18 November 1989, issued the Malé Declaration on Global Warming and sea-level rise (SLR), which recognized climate change and its effects as a common concern for mankind. The Declaration stressed the serious consequences of sea-level rise for low-lying coastal and island states and pinpointed the special responsibility of industrialized nations. The South Pacific Forum in July 1989 expressed concern over the effects of sea-level rise, and the Commonwealth Heads of Government declared their support for the efforts of coastal and inland states to protect themselves against sea-level rise in their 1989 Langkawi Declaration on Environment.50 The National Adaptation Plan of Maldives 51 identifies eight main sectors where the island state fears to encounter significant vulnerabilities brought by climate change: (i) Land, Beach and Human Settlements; (ii) Critical Infrastructure; (ii) Tourism; (iv) Fisheries; (v) Human Health; (vi) Water Resources; (vii) Agriculture and Food Security and (viii) Biodiversity. Given its small size (235 sq km of land area makes Maldives the sixth smallest sovereign state in the world), unconsolidated nature (1,190 coral islands out of which 375 islands covering 17 sq km are currently in use) and extremely low elevation (80 per cent of the land area is less than 1m above mean sea level), “Maldives is the most vulnerable country to the predicted impacts of sea-level rise”.52 Once the following facts are added to the Maldivian map of vulnerability and risk, reasons for growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty on the part of government and people of Maldives becomes quite understandable. 44 per cent of the settlement footprints of all islands are within 100 m of coastline, which translates to 47 per cent of all housing structures and 42 per cent of the population being within 100 m of coastline in year 2002. Majority of the islands (121 islands) have more than 50 per cent of their housing structures within 100 m of coastline compared to (77 islands) with less than 50 per cent. Over the last 6 years more than 90 islands (45 per cent of all islands) have been flooded at least once and 37 islands have been flooded regularly or at least once a year. The tsunami of 2004 flooded all but nine islands and required evacuation of 13 islands.53

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Maldives is also confronted with the serious problem of coastal erosion as almost 97 per cent of inhabited islands experienced coastal erosion in 2004, of which 64 per cent could be placed in the category of severe coastal erosion. Add to this the current vulnerability of Maldives to sea-level rise and storms, with wind gusts of 60 knots expected to return every nine years, “ocean-induced severe weather could prove catastrophic.”54 We may note in passing that total damages of the tsunami of 2004 were estimated to be US$470 million, (62 per cent of the GDP) out of which US$298 million were in the form of direct losses.55 Climate change could seriously affect the tourism-based political economy of Maldives with sea-level rise causing havoc with infrastructures, almost all of which are at the low elevation of 1.5 m above mean sea level. Highly vulnerable to sea level rise and associated storm conditions, the infrastructure of the two international airports is situated within 50 m of the coastline. And within 100 m of the coastline are more than 90 per cent of all resort infrastructure and 99 per cent of all tourist accommodation; 80 per cent of the powerhouses in inhabited islands and resort islands; 90 per cent of the waste disposal sites and more than 75 per cent of communications infrastructures.56 The Maldives coast is normally not affected by the tropical cyclones. But due to its isolated location, the long fetches in association with swells generated by storms, originating in the far south, have caused flooding. It is highly probable that the rising rate of sea level with high waves and flat topography have increased both the risk of flooding and the rate of erosion and alteration of beaches.57 The Constitution of the Maldives ratified in August 2008 for the first time “states protection of the environment as a fundamental right of the people. The conservation and preservation of the environment is a matter of survival for the Maldives. The unique environmental challenges it faces are deadly serious as they directly impact its people, economy and society.”58 According to the Strategic Action Plan, within the National Framework for Development (2009-2013), Government of Maldives, “the foremost principle of the environment policy of the Government is to view the natural environment as the key to socioeconomic development. Furthermore it is to ensure provision of the fundamental services provided by the environment; the right to access to safe drinking water, safe disposal of solid waste and access to electricity.”59 New challenges have appeared before Maldives as a result

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of unprecedented socio-economic change over the past years, including waste management. According to this plan, “Climate change threatens fundamental human rights, including the right to life.”60 The plan also acknowledges that Maldives is yet to become a member of IOTC which is the regional fisheries management body in the Indian Ocean, despite the well-known fact that due to their migratory nature, tuna stocks can be best managed regionally.61 This happens to be one of the very few references to the regional scale in the plan.

Myanmar and Climate Change: Energy, Environment and ‘Governance’ Myanmar, enriched by diverse ecosystems and biodiversity, has a long coastline covering almost the entire east coast of the Bay of Bengal. At the same time it has remained prone to heavy rainfall and floods at regular intervals during the mid-monsoon period (June to August), especially in areas traversed by rivers or large streams, Myanmar has been hit from time to time by cyclones, landslides, earthquakes, tsunami, fire and droughts. Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar in the first week of 2008 and nearly 140,000 people perished. Almost instant destruction of crops and other critical infrastructure such as shrimp farms, fishing ponds, nursery hatcheries and fishing boats followed and the livelihoods of additional one million Burmese were devastated and left an estimated 2.4 million people without adequate food.62 It was quite obvious that rising sea levels, stronger cyclones and ecosystem degradation mutually reinforce each other, and exacerbate the impact of seaward disasters. It has been pointed out that 90 per cent of deaths could directly be attributed to the storm surge, which was facilitated by the flat nature of the delta region, cleared of mangroves for agriculture. Cyclone Nargis flooded about 14,402 square kilometres in the Irrawaddy Delta; an area equal to one-third of Switzerland. According to FAO, about 2,000 square kilometres (about 16 per cent of the delta’s agricultural land) suffered severe salinity damage as a result of surge that pushed salt water inland up to 35 kilometres. According to one estimate nearly 83 per cent of mangroves in the Irrawaddy Delta had been destroyed between 1924 and 1999. There is broad agreement that climate change will exacerbate storm surge risk. A recent World Bank study states:

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“By far the most certain aspect of climate change that will influence surge characteristics is global-mean-sea-level rise … The overall conclusion is that the surge hazard will evolve significantly during the 21st century.”63 Given that the World Bank has ranked Myanmar as the world’s eighthmost vulnerable nation to sea-level rise in terms of ‘agricultural land impacted’, large-scale mangrove reforestation initiatives are needed as an important priority focus for protecting the coastline. The Government of Myanmar has been collaborating with the UN in the past to assess its environment performance (EPA). According to the 2009-2010 EPA report, the priority concerns of environment activities for Myanmar are: forest resource degradation; land degradation; water resource and quality status; threat to biodiversity, inadequate solid waste management; climate change; and impacts of mining industry on environment.64 In the world’s longest-standing space-based land monitoring archive of NASA, Myanmar has long been designated as a ‘deforestation hotspot.’65 According to a study of more than 750 Landsat satellite images of tsunami-impacted countries, Myanmar with an annual deforestation rate of ~1 per cent ranks as number one deforestation disaster in the world.66 The energy-climate interface assumes a great deal of complexity in the case of Myanmar and cannot be divorced from the nature of political system and the given asymmetries of power.67 Especially since the Yadana and Yetagun gas pipelines started flowing at the turn of the millennium, generating significant revenues, energy has been playing a key role in Myanmar’s economy and its foreign exchange earnings. There is no denying the fact that at the same time the way revenues are distributed throughout the economy at present they undermine equitable development and social justice. Since the large-scale devastation caused by the cyclone Nargis in 2008, civil society activism appears to have gained some momentum in Myanmar. According to some analysts, “Groups such as the humanitarian NGO Network Activities Group (NAG) emerged in the wake of Nargis as an offshoot from the NGO Myanmar Egress to provide humanitarian assistance particularly with the likely increase in climate induced disasters.”68 Despite the fact that Myanmar shares with the other Bay of Bengal littorals numerous threats and opportunities associated with climate change, Myanmar’s approach to climate change

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mitigation and adaptation remains relatively unknown in comparison to others. At the same time, Despite increased cooperation between some NGOs and the government on climate change concerns the structural impediments created by the dominance of the military throughout the country become evident in many climate change arenas. The impacts of a likely increase in the prevalence and severity of storm surges on the Myanmar coast are exacerbated by military battalions competing with local villagers for coastal resources, particularly the military owned and run shrimp farms that destroy the mangroves and coastal ecosystems and therefore removing the natural barriers for storm surges and tsunamis. In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis the ASEAN secretary-general blamed this extensive mangrove destruction for the enormous death toll in Myanmar and if such coastal inundation occurs on a regular basis it is likely to precipitate large-scale movements of ‘climate refugees’ escaping human and environmental insecurity.69

Myanmar is very much on the list of Asian countries that are likely to experience the principal health related impacts of climate change in the form of epidemics of malaria, dengue, and other vector-borne diseases. According to a Red Cross report, “Access to safe water and hygiene facilities in Myanmar is lacking for a large proportion of the population.”70 Illness and death are expected to increase from diarrheal diseases due to drought and flooding, and are also expected from increased amounts of cholera bacteria in coastal waters. An increase in the frequency and duration of severe heat waves and humid conditions during the summer is likely to increase the risk of mortality and morbidity.71

Thailand and Climate Change: Threats to Agriculture, Tourism and Trade Thailand, with 3,200 kilometers of coastline, has a population of 65 million people, a vast majority of whom live and work in rural, agricultural areas. As one of the largest exporters of rice in the world, Thailand, often called ‘the Rice Bowl of Asia, employs 49 per cent of the population in the agriculture sector, contributing 10 per cent of GDP. Tourism and fisheries also play important roles in the economy, providing 6 per cent of GDP and a livelihood to 10 per cent of the

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population. Climate change threatens all three important sectors of Thailand’s economy: agriculture, tourism, and trade. According to one estimate, one degree of warming will destroy the rice crops and a few centimeters of sea-level rise could submerge the capital city and devastate coastal tourism.  Thailand’s mitigation and adaptation efforts include a slow switch over to organic agriculture, a tsunami warning system along the Andaman Sea, the construction of a flood prevention wall around Bangkok, and an Action Plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The tsunami disaster in December 2004, which caused unprecedented devastation to Thailand, made the authorities realize that had more efficient disaster monitoring and mitigation system been in place, the resulting damage would have been much less. At the same time there is a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that unlike natural disasters (e.g. the tsunami) that are unpredictable and sudden in occurrence but quite traceable in terms of movement, scale and direction, “climate change is gradual, and its magnitude and areas of impacts are wider and varied across sectors and regions.” 72 Little surprise therefore preparing for climate change “covers more sectors and requires much more integrated approaches ranging from public awareness to adoption of adaptation technologies that are appropriate to local conditions and circumstances.”73 Thailand is reported to have taken steps towards enhancing the capacity of local communities “to integrate climate change into the community development process,”74 so that community resilience to environmental risks could be strengthened. What stands out in Thailand’s approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation is the emphasis placed on capacity enhancement and developing national and regional mechanisms for information sharing. In Thailand’s second national communication to UNFCC there is a frank acknowledgement of the following constraints in terms of lack of capacity and appeal for international cooperation. These areas are: research in systematic observation of climate variables to support GCOS, particularly ocean observation in Asia and the Pacific; enhancement of climate observation stations and networks; development of regional information exchange and communication; capacity building for short- and medium-term weather forecasts; capacity enhancement of meteorologists; development of a center of excellence for Asia and the

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Pacific and; capacity building for negotiators of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.”75 Having noted that, what appears to be conspicuous by its absence in the Thai climate change policy is any reference to either the Bay of Bengal or BIMSTEC. As far as land-based sources of pollution contributing directly to the BOBLME area by Thailand are concerned, they are limited to the southern peninsular part of the country, between Myanmar and Malaysia, which borders the Andaman Sea with about 740 km of coastline.76 In the past five decades or so, the provinces situated along the Andaman Sea coast have witnessed rapid development in agriculture, industry, tourism and other service sectors. “Little information is available on the status of most of the pollution sources in the country.”77 Thailand is particularly concerned about Bangkok, home to nearly 15 per cent of the country’s entire population, and at high risk of being flooded in the coming decades as a result of sea-level rise. Rising a little more than 2 meters above mean sea level at its highest point and therefore naturally prone to flooding, the low-lying Bangkok is reported to be sinking at a rate of about 10 cm per year as the heavy buildings continue to compress the swampy soil that forms its foundation. As reported by the UNEP, “Each year, parts of the city sink by 5-10 mm and by as much as 30 mm in outlying south- eastern and southwestern areas. This subsidence, when combined with a rising sea level could leave Bangkok under 50-100cm of water by 2025. Almost 55 per cent of the city would be affected by floods if sea level rose by 50 cm and 72 per cent would be affected if sea levels rose by 100 cm.”78 Since most of Bangkok’s water supply (91 per cent) comes from the Chao Phraya and Mae Klong rivers, if climate change were to adversely affect the flow of waters in the two rivers, the city’s future water supply could be seriously jeopardized. This crisis may be further exacerbated by the increasing demand for water due to warming from various sectors, especially households and industries. As Bangkok continues to grow over the next 10 years, the problems of water supply and contamination of both surface and ground waters may become more serious and compelling.79 A recent study, ranking the cities of the world most exposed to coastal flooding today and in the future, provides interesting insights into this vulnerability.80 The analysis indicates that by the 2070s almost

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all (90 per cent) of the total asset exposure of large port cities will be concentrated in only eight countries, one of which is Thailand. Thailand ranks sixth in terms of the severity of the projected effects. It is worth noting that among the remaining seven countries, four are the Bay of Bengal littorals, namely India (ranking second), Bangladesh (ranking third), and Myanmar (ranking eighth). The same study also assessed the impact on the population of countries exposed to coastal flooding. Almost 90 per cent of the exposure of people in the 2070s will be in 11 countries and Thailand will rank fifth in terms of the negative impacts projected. It is important to note that among the remaining ten, as many as three are the Bay of Bengal littorals; India (ranking third), Bangladesh (ranking eighth) and Indonesia (ranking tenth).81 The policy implications of this report are valuable not only for Thailand and Bangkok but also for the remaining littoral states of the Bay of Bengal, especially the ones mentioned above, since it highlights the critical importance of examining the implications of climate change for large-scale coastal cities; most of which happen to be the destination of internally displaced poor and marginalized communities in the BOB region. It is also important to note that, even if all cities are well protected against extreme events, large-scale city flooding may remain a frequent event at the global scale because so many cities are threatened and because protection is not fail-safe. For instance, assuming that flooding events are independent, there is a 74 per cent chance of having one or more of the 136 cities affected by a 100-year event every year, and a 99.9 per cent chance of having at least one city being affected by such an event over a 5-year period. Even considering 1000-year events, the probability of having one of the 136 cities affected is as large as 12 per cent over one year and 49 per cent over 5-year periods. So, at the global scale, 100-year and 1000-year events will affect individual port cities frequently. As a consequence, even assuming that protection levels will be high in the future, the large exposure in terms of population and assets is likely to translate into regular city-scale disasters at global scale. This makes it essential to consider both adaptation as well as what happens when adaptation and especially defenses fail. There is a need to consider warnings and disaster response, as well as recovery and reconstruction strategies, including foreign aid, in order to minimize as much as possible the long-term consequences of disasters.82

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One of the key messages that emerges quite clearly and compellingly from this report is that great challenges await coastal cities, including those situated on the semi-enclosed Bay of Bengal rim, with regard to “managing the significant growth in exposure that will come about from both human and environmental influences, including climate change.”83 The size and concentration of population and economic development in many of the Bay of Bengal’s largest port cities, combined with climate change, underline on the one hand the important two-way linkage between development and climate change and the necessity of more effective governance for climate change mitigation and adaptation at the city-scale. Effective adaptation strategies will require multilevel governance approaches as well regional cooperation to assist port cities to pro-actively manage current and future flood risk. The report further points out that “The large amount of future port city asset exposure on its own (as much as US$35,000 billion in the 2070s) argues for proactive adaptation which will require a much more focused effort across scales of governance (global–local and public-private) to advance adaptation measures to manage these risks in port cities.”84 Needless to say therefore, To effectively manage each of the key drivers of risk, adaptation strategies must encompass a range of policy options, including, as relevant, a combination of (1) upgraded protection, (2) managing subsidence (in susceptible cities), (3) land use planning, focusing new development away from the floodplain, (4) selective relocation away from existing city areas, and (5) flood warning and evacuation, particularly as an immediate response in poorer countries. Relocation seems unlikely for valuable city infrastructure, and a portfolio of the other approaches could act to manage and reduce risks to acceptable levels …All port cities require a combination of spatial planning and enhanced defences to manage the rising risk of sea-level rise and storm surge with climate change.85

Malaysian Responses to Climate Change: Internal-External Interface Malaysia’s 2009 National Policy on Climate Change emphasizes the need to “mainstreaming climate change response through wise resource use and enhanced environmental conservation, integration of these responses

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into new and existing national plans and programmes, and strengthening institutional capacity, with the collective goals of strengthening economic competitiveness, improving quality of life, strengthening development resilience in the face of the potential impacts of climate change, and reducing its negative impacts.”86 Some of the key principles flagged by the policy include, “development on a sustainable pathway, including conservation of the environment and natural resources and a low carbon economy.”87 It also emphasizes “coordinated implementation and effective participation of stakeholders, and reaffirms the centrality of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The policy identifies 43 key actions to be pursued with regard to 10 strategic thrust areas to facilitate the integration of climate change considerations into planning and implementation of development programmes and decision-making processes.”88 According to the Malaysian policy on climate change it is by addressing a mixture of internal and external factors that successful outcome of efforts at the ‘national’ scale can be ensured. Internally, government is expected to focus on transforming individual behaviour while promoting collaboration with other stakeholders like NGOs and the corporate sector to improve effective and efficient utilisation of energy, water and all natural resources in a sustainable manner. At the same time, institutional capacities should be further tapped and strengthened to achieve the necessary levels of synergies for realizing holistic and integrated strategies to adapt and mitigate. Externally, in order to realize green, cleaner, low carbon and climate resilient sustainable development, the need for a provision of adequate and timely access to technology and financial resources along with the enhancement of national capacities is emphasized. What is considered as equally important is the resolve on the part of developed countries to honor their international obligations to assist developing countries like Malaysia with regard to climate resilient and low carbon growth. There is an acknowledgement that “International cooperation is needed to ensure sufficient adaptation and avoid maladaptation in developing countries. At the same time, given that climate change recognises no boundaries, sufficiently strong targets and measures to curb GHG emissions domestically must be taken by developed countries”.89

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Malaysia launched its National Green Technology Policy in 2009 with the objective of promoting low-carbon technology in the pursuit of sustainable development. It identifies a number of thrust areas. The first strategic thrust, is to establish a green technology council for high-level coordination amongst ministries, agencies, the private sector and key stakeholders for effective implementation. The second strategic thrust is to provide a conducive environment for green technology development. This includes the introduction and implementation of innovative economic instruments, as well as the establishment of effective fiscal and financial mechanisms to support the growth of green industries. The third strategic thrust seeks to intensify human capital development by providing training and education programmes, and by introducing financial packages and incentives to students embarking on green technology-related subjects. The fourth strategic thrust is to intensify green technology research and innovation towards commercialization, with incentives to be announced in due course. The final thrust is strong promotion and public awareness especially as green technology, is a new area in the country. The government aspires to lead by example by adopting green technology in government facilities. It shall promote education and information dissemination to create buy-in from the public to support the ‘green economy’ and adopt ‘green practices’ as part of life.90

It is not that the Malaysian climate policy does not deploy the ‘regional’ scale. It does, but more in the sense of down-scaling the ‘national’ to capture regional variations within the territorial boundaries of Malaysia than engaging with the imperative of transnational cooperation. Malaysia’s concerns with the ‘Coastal and Marine Sector’ seem to revolve primarily around the following: Developing good local models on sea-level rise is constrained by lack of long-term tidal records. V&A for this sector requires inter-disciplinary inputs. Studies on coral bleaching due to the increase of sea surface temperature are needed. To date, insufficient studies have been done on the impact of decreasing salinity, increasing acidity as well as the impact of temperature changes on marine organisms.91

It is now widely acknowledged that integrated coastal management requires that decision-making should be based on the best of scientific research and information available. A wise use of coastal resources is difficult to realize in the absence of systematic knowledge and

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understanding; a need that becomes more compelling and important due to the complexity and uncertainties of climate change impacts.

Growing Mismatch between the Ecological and the Geopolitical spaces: Representing ‘Indian’ and the ‘Bangladeshi’ Sundarbans? The Sundarbans, hosting one of the largest continuous mangrove forests in the world, and shared between India and Bangladesh, are being increasingly perceived as well as reported in media as the ‘first climate hot spots’ in South Asia. Here is an outstanding example of an inhabited ecological region, which is geopolitically partitioned and subjected to two different regulatory regimes. Designated as a UNESCO world heritage site, the Indian Sundarbans Delta (ISD), the western part of the delta of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin is spread over about 9,630 square kilometers and is home to over four and a half million, largely rural, people.92 Nearly 60 per cent of India’s mangrove habitat is in the Sundarbans. Whereas the larger (eastern) part of the Sundarbans delta lies in Bangladesh. As many as 54 deltaic islands (occupying a little over half of the area) are populated with the remaining space covered by the mangrove vegetation. Extreme weather events, such as severe storms or cyclones, occurring at frequent intervals, have a long-standing history. According to the IPCC fourth assessment report, Mangroves may be affected by climate change-related increases in temperature and sea-level rise. Although the temperature effect on growth and species diversity is not known, sea-level rise may pose a serious threat to these ecosystems. In Bangladesh, for instance, there is a threat to species in the three distinct ecological zones that make up the Sunderbans — the largest continuous mangrove area in the world. If the saline waterfront moves further inland, Heritiera fomes (the dominant species in the landward freshwater zone) could be threatened. Species in the other two ecological zones (Excoecaria agallocha in the moderately saltwater zone and Ceriops decandra in the saltwater zone) also could suffer. These changes could result in economic impacts: Direct employment supported by the Sunderbans is estimated to be in the range of 500,000-600,000 people for at least half of the year …and a large

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number of these people – who are directly employed in the industries that use raw materials from the Sunderbans (e.g., woodcutting; collection of thatching materials, honey, beeswax, shells; and fishing) -- may lose their sources of income.93 (emphasis given)

Ecological insecurities, multiplied as well as magnified by climate change, as experienced by the vast majority of inhabitants on both sides of Sundarbans (especially those engaged in fishing and agriculture), are marked by a complex geographical-spatial pattern including (but not exhausted by) climate change induced seasonal variation, floods and droughts. According to the WWF India, A pronounced ecological change is evolving in this delta due to huge discharges of untreated domestic and industrial effluents carried by tributary rivers as well as the disposal of contaminated mud from harbour dredging and resulting from the rapid emergence of the Haldia Port Complex, a major oil disembarkment terminal in eastern India. The Sundarbans delta has become susceptible to chemical pollutants such as heavy metals, organochlorine pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons which may have changed the estuary’s geochemistry and affected the local coastal environment. As home to a significant portion of one of the world’s largest contiguous block of mangrove forests, the portion under natural vegetation in ISD holds a prominent global place and a part of it has been designated as UNESCO World Heritage site in 1987 in recognition of its high biodiversity as well as the occurrence of endangered and highly threatened species, including the only population of tigers found in a coastal mangrove habitat.94

As pointed out above, the most prominent feature of the ISD is the mangrove ecosystem that dominates the landscape and defies the geopolitical boundaries between India and Bangladesh. Nearly 85 per cent of all mangrove habitats found in India lie in the ISD. At least seven of these mangrove species or species groups are at risk and demand immediate conservation measures. Both the direct human activities and natural environmental changes are responsible for the degradation of natural ecosystems in the ISD. As far as the impacts of climate change on other components of the natural environment are concerned, except for changes in the physical components, “there is insufficient knowledge to attribute changes directly to climate change”.95 While emphasizing

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that much more interdisciplinary research is the need of the hour, the WWF Report points out that, The pattern of governance in the ISD has so far struggled to keep up with the management and development challenges posed by this complex system. Given the disproportionately heavy impact that climate change is expected to have on this delta area, the need to improve adaptive management and develop more appropriate solutions for this unique system has become acutely urgent. Changes, in the face of climate change, are required in the broader context of physical limitations of a delta system, national development and human settlement management, biodiversity conservation, and transboundary cooperation. Putting the ISD in perspective and accounting for this broader context will be crucial if correct management decisions are to be made. If current policies and patterns of development continue, the ISD is likely to face steep and insurmountable challenges in coping with the pressures of predicted changes, particularly in the face of population growth and impacts of climate change. To date, the gravity of these challenges has not been publicly recognized. The ISD is in need of early, proactive and informed interventions by all actors involved in the management and development of this area, especially the state and national governments. The growing consensus among a vast body of scientists and experts from all over the world is that unless highly informed and sometimes bold changes in policy and governance are introduced, coping with the pressures of predicted changes will be nearly impossible. In view of the grave situation facing the ISD and the fact that without much needed change, this environmentally and economically important area is rapidly heading towards an uncertain future…96 (emphasis given)

The widely cited findings of a study on the Sundarbans, carried out by Dr. Sugata Hazara, Director, School of Oceanographic Studies, Jadavpur University, revealed as early as 2006 that Lohachara Island (once inhabited by ten thousand people) had simply vanished and nearly two-thirds of Ghoramara Island had been permanently inundated due to sea level rise. Those displaced from the Lohachara Island fled to an island called Sagar, which is said to be equally vulnerable, already having lost 7,500 acres to rising sea levels.97 Ghoramara Island episode has been attributed by some to both natural and human disasters, including climate change induced sea-level rise. As the poor communities lose their homes, land and fields and are exposed to

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multiple displacements, irrespective of which side of the Sundarbans they are (Indian or Bangladeshi), they would demand and deserve transboundary cooperation and complementarities at sub-regional and regional levels. It is only through fostering connections across national, sectoral and regional scales, in which governments, NGOs and local communities have a major role to play, that nature-based adaptations for the Sundarbans can be realized. It has been rightly observed that, “Naturebased adaptations can help people and communities deal with climate change impacts by protecting mangroves, coral reefs, estuaries, seagrass beds, dune communities, and other systems on or near shorelines and the benefits they provide, such as protection from storms; mitigating floods; controlling erosion; providing water storage and groundwater recharge; and retaining nutrients, sediments, and pollutants.”98 What is so obvious both in the broader context of large marine ecosystems in the Bay of Bengal and the Sundarbans is that, “Functional ecosystems are also critical to natural resource–dependent livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. When coastal ecosystems are weakened and unhealthy, they are less resilient to the effects of climate change and variability and are less able to provide the goods and services that are important to human society in the face of climate change.”99

Conclusion Analysis in this chapter has shown that various ‘national’ responses to climate change by the Bay of Bengal littoral states remain overwhelmingly continent centric. And relatively speaking, much less attention appears to have been devoted to coastal-marine areas. Conspicuous by its absence in almost all the cases is the reference to and engagement with the Bay of Bengal as a semi-enclosed sea and the imperative of transnational, regional cooperation. Various deterritorial framings of the atmospheric space and climate change notwithstanding, international climate policy as well as national responses over the years has resulted in territorialisation of the carbon cycle.100 In the context of the complex and dynamic political geography of climate change, the processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, operating in conjunction, do not so much question sovereign spaces as they reproduce them. This appears to be more or

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less the case with the national responses of the Bay of Bengal littorals. This is not to deny the importance of the ‘national’ but to emphasize the critical importance of the ‘regional’ on the one hand, and ‘local’ on the other. A common problem shared by almost all the Bay of Bengal littorals appears to be the lack of data, or easy access to data in some cases, along with the need for local capacity to be continuously upgraded and having adequate financial resources and skills to undertake climate change related research. Yet another area of critical importance relates to access to affordable and robust green technology as key in implementing measures to deal with climate change as well as transition into a low carbon economy. The modern day ocean usage has grown manifold and the Bay of Bengal is not only an exception but it stands out in the entire Indian Ocean region in terms of fast multiplying uses of its ocean space; ranging from energy exploration to tourism to fishing. As pointed out in a recent seminal study on the Indian Ocean, In this new “ocean regime” of interdependence the centre of political gravity has unendingly shifted from land to oceans, but knowledge and understanding of the oceans is fragmented and specialised. The triad of factors in geopolitics: end of the Cold War, globalisation and governance standards; security: beyond individual states, empowerment of transnational actors, interdependence of security; development: trade, aid, security; maritime environment: new law of the sea, growing dependence on oceans, growth in sea denial capabilities; balance: growth, efficiency, sustainability; and Agenda 21: economic, social and environmental sustainable development, together provide an understanding of the need to look at issues from the ocean towards land rather than take a land-centric view of things.96

The metanarratives of climate change tend to privilege the discourse of ‘global’ governance and consciously or unconsciously tend to downplay the role that ocean governance can and should be playing at regional, national and local scales. It is useful to be reminded that with rising sea level and increased sea surface temperatures contributing to increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events, such as coastal storms, increased flooding and the degradation of freshwater, fisheries and other coastal resources could affect millions of poor and marginalized in the Bay of Bengal region and even displace a vast

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majority of them. With the exception of Bangladesh there appears to be relatively much less attention being paid in other national responses to the issue of climate-change induced displacement and its human security implications. The recent human-social-political disasters of December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Cyclone Sidr (Bangladesh, November 2007), and the Cyclone Nargis (Myanmar, May 2008) all demonstrate that calamities of such scale and intensity can simply overwhelm resources and disaster responses of the Bay of Bengal littoral sates. “Each coastal disaster provides tangible examples of the potential impacts that may unfold during the next century as a result of global warming and associated sea-level rise.”102 Duly considered or not by the climate change national policies and action plans, there are a number of regional initiatives with regard to the Bay of Bengal that have just begun to address the challenge of climate change. It is to the potential and promise of these that we turn in the next chapter.

Notes   1. A. Vallega, Sustainable Ocean Governance: A Geographical Perspective (London: Routledge, 2002).   2. Ibid.   3. Ibid.   4. Ibid.   5. Ibid.   6. Ibid.   7. A. Vallega, “The regional seas in the 21st century: An overview”, Ocean & Coastal Management 45 (2002): 925–26.   8. U.L. Kaly, “Review of Land-based sources of pollution to the coastal and marine environments in the BOBLME Region”, Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Theme report GCP/RAS/179/WBG.10 FAO-BOBLME Programme, 2004, available at (accessed 10 September 2014).   9. “Since 1750, an average decrease in pH of 0.1 units has been observed. It is projected that the pH of the world’s oceans could fall by up to a further 0.3–0.4 units by 2100, resulting in the lowest ocean pH levels in 20 million years.” See J. Tobey, et al., “Practicing Coastal Adaptation to Climate Change: Lessons from Integrated Coastal Management”, Coastal Management 38, no. 3 (2010): 321.

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10. Ibid., pp. 317–35. 11. Ibid,, p. 319. 12. Government of India, “National Action Plan on Climate Change”, Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, 2008, available at (accessed 31 July 2014). 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid, pp. 295–96. 15. T. Doyle and S. Chaturvedi, “Climate Territories: A Global Soul for the Global South?”, Geopolitics 15, no. 3 (2010): 516–35. 16. Ministry of Environment and Forestry, “National Environmental Policy”, 2006, available at (accessed 17 August 2014). 17. Government of India, “Prime minister’s address at the 94th Indian Science Congress”, 3 January 2007, available at (accessed 17 August 2014]. 18. L. Rajamani, “India and Climate Change: What India Wants, Needs, and Needs to Do”, India Review 8, no. 3 (2009): 340–74. 19. Doyle and Chaturvedi, “‘Climate Territories”, p. 526. 20. Government of India, “PM’s Speech on Release of Climate Change Action Plan”, 2008, available at (accessed 17 August 2014). (Note that under the Plan there are eight national missions on solar energy, enhanced energy efficiency, sustainable habitats, water, the Himalayan ecosystems, sustainable agriculture and strategic knowledge for climate change.) 21. G. Ananthapadmanabhan, K. Srinivas and V. Gopal, Hiding Behind the Poor (New Delhi: Greenpeace Report on Climate Injustice, 2007). 22. Cited in Rajamani, “India and Climate Change”, pp. 340–74. 23. Government of India, “National Action Plan on Climate Change”, Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, 2008, available at (accessed 31 July 2014]. 24. Ibid, p. 17. 25. Ministry of Environment and Forests, “India and Climate Change”, 2009, available at (accessed 23 August 2014). 26. Ibid, p. 18. 27. Rajamani, “India and Climate Change”, p. 365. 28. T.V. Paul, “Impact of Climatic Change on Indian Security: The Role of State Capacity”, in Climate Change and National Security: A Country-level Analysis, edited by Daniel Moran (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 73–84.

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29. Ministry of Environment and Forestry, “Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan” (Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2008), pp. xvi, 68. 30. Kaly, “Review of Land-based sources of pollution to the coastal and marine environments in the BOBLME Region”. 31. Asian Development Bank, “Climate Change Threatens Asia’s Food Prices, Energy Security, Population Balance”, News Release, 30 September 2009, available at , (accessed 30 July 2011). 32. Ibid. 33. The Republic of Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world, consisting of five major islands and about 30 smaller groups of islands, totalling some 17,500 islands. Most of the islands are vulnerable to earthquakes and high waves. 34. Republic of Indonesia, “National Action Plan Addressing Climate Change”, State Ministry of Environment, Jakarta, 2007, available at (accessed 3 September 2014). 35. R. Cribb and M. Ford, “Indonesia as an Archipelago: Managing Islands, Managing the Seas”, in Indonesia Beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State, edited by R. Cribb and M. Ford (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 1–27. 36. Ibid., p. 3. 37. Ibid. , p. 21. 38. Republic of Indonesia, “National Action Plan Addressing Climate Change”. 39. Cribb and Ford, “Indonesia as an Archipelago”, p. 13. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Republic of Indonesia, “National Action Plan Addressing Climate Change”. 44. H. Djalal, “The Strategic Values of the Indian Ocean to Indonesian Diplomacy, Law and Politics”, in The Security of the Sea Lanes of Communi­cation in the Indian Ocean Region, edited by D. Rumley, S. Chaturvedi and M.T. Yasin (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2007), p. 54. 45. Government of Sri Lanka, “National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Sri Lanka 2011 to 2016”, Colombo, 2010, p. 9, available at (accessed 13 August 2014).

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46. N. Eriyagama, “Impacts of Climate Change on Water Resources and Agriculture in Sri Lanka: Vulnerability Hot Spots and Options for Adaptation”, Water Matters 5, no. 7 (2010). 47. Ibid. 48. Government of Sri Lanka, “National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Sri Lanka 2011 to 2016”. 49. Ibid, p. 22. 50. United Nations, “The Langkawi Declaration on Environment, issued by the Commonwealth Heads of Government at Langkawi (Malaysia)”. Reprinted in UN Document A/44/673 and in American University Journal of International Law and Policy 5 (1989). 51. Ministry of Housing, Transport and Environment, “National Adaptation to Climate Change”, 2009, available at (accessed 3 August 2011). 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid., pp. 33–34. 54. Ibid., p. 34. 55. Ibid. 56. A. Shaig, “Population and Development Consolidation as a Strategy to Reduce Risk from Natural Disasters and Global Climate Change in Maldives”, unpublished MSc thesis, James Cook University, Townsville, 2006. 57. T.M.A. Khan et al., “Relative Sea Level Changes in Maldives and Vulnerability of Land Due to Abnormal Coastal Inundation”, Marine Geodesy 25, no. 1-2 (2002): 133–43. 58. A. Dhivehiraajje, “The Strategic Action Plan 2009–2013”, 2009, p. 390, available at (accessed 5 August 2014). 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid., p. 337. 62. ICE, “Cyclone Nargis, Climate and Conflict”, ICE Case Studies no. 249, July 2011, available at (accessed 18 September 2011). 63. M. Arnold, Natural Disaster Hot Spots Case Studies. Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Resource and Development / World Bank, 2008), p. 184. 64. UNDP, “The State of the Environment in Myanmar”, 2011, available at

(accessed 12 September 2014).

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65. World Vision, “Disaster Monitor Myanmar”, undated, available at (accessed 10 August 2014). 66. Ibid. 67. A. Simpson, “The environment-energy security nexus: Critical analysis of an energy ‘love triangle’ in Southeast Asia”, Third World Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2007): 539–54. 68. W. Sabandar, “Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A window for more meaningful development cooperation in Myanmar”, in Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections, edited by N. Cheesman, M. Skidmore and T. Wilson (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 2010). 69. A. Simpson, “Transnational energy projects in Myanmar (Burma): Climate change impacts and reflections on justice and security”, paper presented at the British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, University of Manchester, 2011, pp. 9–10. 70. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Report by Myanmar Red Cross Society”, 2011, available at (accessed 17 July 2014). 71. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation in Developing Countries”, 2007, available at (accessed 12 August 2014). 72. Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, Thailand’s Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Bangkok: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 2010), p. 90. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid, p. 100. 76. Kaly, “Review of Land-based sources of pollution to the coastal and marine environments in the BOBLME Region”. 77. Ibid. 78. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, “Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme _009 Bangkok Assessment Report on Climate Change _009”, BMA, GLF and UNEP, Bangkok, 2009, p. 90, available at (accessed 1 September 2014). 79. Ibid.

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  80. R.J. Nicholls et al., “Ranking of the World’s Cities most Exposed to Coastal Flooding Today and in the Future”, 2007, available at (accessed 1 September 2014).   81. Ibid.   82. Ibid., p. 9.   83. Ibid.   84. Ibid.   85. Ibid.   86. Malaysia, “Second National Communication to UNFCCC”, p. 100, available at (accessed 19 August 2014).   87. Ibid., pp. 100–101.   88. Ibid.   89. Ibid., p. 102.   90. Ibid.   91. Ibid., p. 88.   92. The Indian Sundarbans Delta is bounded by the Ichamati-Raimangal River in the east, by the Hugli River in the west, by the Bay of Bengal in the south, and the Dampier-Hodges line drawn in 1829–30 in the north.   93. IPCC, “Special Reports on Climate Change”, 2000, available at (accessed 29 July 2014).   94. A.A. Danda and G. Sriskanthan, Indian Sundarbans Delta: A Vision (New Delhi: World Wide Fund for Nature-India, 2011), p. 7.   95. Ibid., p. 35.   96. Ibid., p. 31.   97. See S. Sengupta, “India’s River Delta Islands Washing Away”, New York Times, 10 April 2007; The Hindu (New Delhi), 24 March 2010,   98. J. Tobey et al., “Practicing Coastal Adaptation to Climate Change: Lessons from Integrated Coastal Management”, Coastal Management 38, no. 3 (2010): 332.   99. Ibid. 100. E. Lovbrand and J. Stripple, “The Climate as a Political Space: On the Territorialization of the Global Carbon Cycle”, Review of International Studies 32 (2006): 217–35. 101. M. Gupta, The Indian Ocean Region: Maritime Regimes for Regional Cooperation (Springer, 2011). 102. Tobey et al., “Practicing Coastal Adaptation to Climate Change”, p. 332.

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6 Assessing Regional Responses A Case for Reorientation Introduction The trans-national and trans-boundary nature of the adversarial impacts of climate change has resulted in a common understanding among states that governance within their political boundaries and national spaces alone precludes comprehensive remedial measures. In fact, interstate governance and responses including those structured through multilateral organisations and institutions are critical. It is also agreed that cooperation to address climate change multilaterally generates opportunities to prepare for shared and trans-border adaptation processes and increases economic efficiencies to respond to the threats and challenges. This broad understanding has resulted in a consensus among policy makers and researchers to formulate and shape the responses collectively. There is also an understanding that common forums are essential to support the dissemination and implementation of effective response measures to climate change at various levels such as the state, provincial, and municipal levels so that these are synchronized and

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synergized across borders in a harmonized way. The importance of promoting cooperation at the international, regional and national levels has been acknowledged through a number of key multilateral frameworks and declarations by states. Yet there exist a number of challenges to cooperation in the form of governance which could be at the organizational, legal or policy formulation levels. Technical means would be needed to identify, assess, monitor and respond to impacts of climate change. Lack of knowledge, education, sophisticated management techniques and the absence of strategies for effective response and recovery are some of the stumbling blocks. Considering that regional cooperation is important, a number of international, regional and sub-regional grouping and organisations are closely associated with the Bay of Bengal region. These are the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Project, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and these organisations, institutions and groupings have established forums and networks to address the adversarial impact of climate change in the Bay of Bengal. These initiatives have resulted in regional and sub-regional programmes aimed at capacity building, technological cooperation, and development of strategies and methodologies for vulnerability assessments and mobilization of resources and sharing of information. However, the policies, processes and performances of the regional countries vary widely due to varying frameworks, national action plans and institutional structures. Although regional states acknowledge the impending consequences of climate change, these are viewed in isolation from the processes of regional planning and responses, risk and vulnerability assessments, knowledge and capacities of local people on coping with the climate change and risk management. We argue that integrated planning among the Bay of Bengal countries is virtually absent, and there is little intra-regional coordination within and between organizations. Also, the regional approaches to respond to climate change in the Bay of Bengal are mostly top down, which do not engage people at risk and the local, state and community organizations adequately.

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Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Project As noted in the previous chapters, the Bay of Bengal is a semienclosed sea and there is geographical contiguity among the littorals i.e. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand, which offers ambient conditions for regional cooperation. The BOBLME Project lays the foundations for a coordinated programme of action among the above stated countries. A number of international donor agencies such as Global Environment Facility (GEF), Norway, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the USA, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) support the BOBLME Project. The FAO is the executing agency and the estimated budget of the project is US$31 million. The project is for five years and it examines a number of issues including (a) overexploitation of living resources, (b) critical habitat degradation, (c) land-based sources of pollution, and (d) status of these critical habitats, post-tsunami, and their ability to support livelihoods in the future. The project also seeks to address regional institutional arrangements to facilitate a coordinated approach among the BOBLME countries to address these issues. The BOBLME countries have signed/adopted/ratified a number of international and regional conventions such as (a) Convention on Biological Diversity, (b) UN Fish Stock Agreement, (c) Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity, (d) UNEPs Regional Seas Agreements/Programme, (e) Declaration and Global Programme of Action on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, and Committee of Fisheries (COFI). It is important to note that the BOBLME Programme also addresses the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which aim to eradicate poverty and hunger, work towards an environmentally stable world, and endeavour to integrate the principle of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reversing the loss of environmental resources.1 Notwithstanding that there are several weaknesses in the programme such as “lack of regional institutional arrangements to facilitate a coordinated approach among the region’s countries” i.e. an institutional linkage between South Asia and Southeast Asian countries who are more closely networked with their respective regional institutions and

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thus attracted towards that regionalism i.e. the South Asian countries in the Bay of Bengal tend to look among themselves i.e. SAARC and the Southeast Asian states towards ASEAN. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Bay of Bengal region is confronted with “weak and/or inappropriate policies, strategies and legal measures that characterize much of the region; lack of alternative livelihoods; weak institutional capacity; insufficient budgetary commitments; and lack of community stakeholder consultation and empowerment.”2

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC) The Bay of Bengal countries have attempted to address the above weaknesses through the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC) comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The BIMSTEC is a multilateral forum and is well suited to address issues related to climate change in the Bay of Bengal in a comprehensive manner. The constants of geography, climate and the maritime contiguity among the Bay of Bengal littorals provide a sound basis for regional cooperation under the BIMSTEC. In fact, the grouping provides a natural link between South Asia and Southeast Asia that ties together nearly 1.3 billion people which corresponds to 21 per cent of the world population with a combined GDP of US$750 billion.3 There are significant human and economic indicators to encourage the regional countries to come closer and it is easy to identify a number of complementarities among the member states such as way of life, religion, language, culture among the states and their people. These contiguities are not a recent phenomenon; instead date back to the ancient times when the Bay of Bengal witnessed burgeoning trade, movement of people, cultures and religion. In the civilizational history of Asia, the Bay of Bengal region had made seminal contribution and played a significant part in the prosperity of China, India and Southeast Asia facilitating connectivity among these countries. A large amount of the intra-Asian trade came to be carried through the Bay of Bengal. Chinese ships sailed to Bengal and Indian-built ships also engaged in India–China trade. These trading systems showcase the fact

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that the Bay of Bengal was a highly busy region through which large number of ships had sailed since ancient times. Also, Fa Hsien on his return journey travelled by the sea route in A.D. 413-14 and visited Sumatra.4 This voyage encouraged other Chinese pilgrims to undertake similar voyages to India by the sea route through the Straits of Malacca and then into the Bay of Bengal. The Chinese monk I’sing visited Palembang enroute to India in A.D. 671 and 695 and traveled by the sea route through the Bay of Bengal.5 Later in the tenth century, great trading ships of Chola kings and Chinese fleets under Admiral Zhang Ho sailed through the Bay of Bengal conducting trade, projecting power, and establishing markets. Given this context, it has been observed that “BIMSTEC is the bridge between South and South-East Asia and nature and geography have bound the region by land and by water”.6 The member states of the BIMSTEC are driven by a common agenda and the focus is on a variety of issues. These are led by member countries on a voluntary basis and include (a) Trade & Investment, (b) Technology, (c) Energy, (d) Transport & Communication, (e) Tourism, (f) Fisheries, (g) Agriculture, (h) Cultural Cooperation, (i) Environment and Disaster Management, (j) Public Health, (k) People-to-People Contact, (l) Poverty Alleviation, (m) Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes, and (n) Climate change. At the 13th Session of the BIMSTEC Senior Officials’ Meeting it was recommended that issues relating to climate change be added to the priority areas of the BIMSTEC member countries and at the 11th BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting held in New Delhi in November 2008 the issue was included as a priority area. These initiates are significant and it is evident that regional countries acknowledge the fact that climate change, environment and disaster management are critical issues for the region and must be given higher priority in the organisation’s agenda. The joint statement at the 12th BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting convened in Nay Pyi Taw on 11 December 2009 is quite clear on the issue and it was stated that: We noted with deep concern the critical challenges that climate change poses for the world at large, and for our region in particular. Climate change threatens human security in areas as diverse as food, energy and livelihood security; it also poses existential challenges such as climate change induced large scale displacement. We welcomed the

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Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal inclusion of Climate Change as the 14th priority area of cooperation, as recommended by the 13th BIMSTEC SOM and endorsed by the 11th Ministerial Meeting held in New Delhi in November 2008. We accepted with appreciation the initiative by Bangladesh to be the lead country for Climate Change. We are confident that the inclusion of the new area of cooperation will contribute significantly to the joint efforts on the mitigation and adaptation to climate change in the BIMSTEC region.7

Similar sentiments were expressed in 2011 at the Plenary of the 13th BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting, and Preneet Kaur, the Indian Minister of State stated that the BIMSTEC countries are confronted with “common natural hazards which, more often than not, transcend geographical boundaries to affect many of us. Flood, cyclone, drought, earthquake and tsunami have become shared risks for all countries in the region. Hence we will be happy to support capacity building in this important area in our BIMSTEC partners. We are also taking steps to expedite establishment of BIMSTEC centre on Weather and Climate.” It was also noted “…I would also like to take this opportunity to announce that India would be conducting workshops on Seasonal Predictions and application to Society and on climate change and disasters.”8 In that context, at the end of the Ninth Ministerial Meeting of the BIMSTEC, the Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegation stated that: We welcomed and accepted India’s offer to be the lead country. We appreciated the progress under the sector including the decision to establish the BIMSTEC Centre for Weather and Climate and various training programmes and workshops in the area of remote sensing for environment and disaster management applications. The establishment of the BIMSTEC Centre for Weather and Climate would be an important milestone towards improving weather observation and prediction techniques, with the intent of reducing the loss of lives and property, caused by weather and climate related natural disasters in the BIMSTEC region. We advised our officials to finalize modalities for the Centre before the 2nd BIMSTEC Summit.9

The BIMSTEC centre on Weather and Climate has the potential to provide a reliable and early warning related to changes in weather, cyclones and storms in the Bay of Bengal. As far as environment and disaster management in the Bay of Bengal is concerned, the prospects

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of regional cooperation are indeed very important for a number of reasons. As noted earlier, the Bay of Bengal is a semi-enclosed sea and is one of the most disaster prone hot spots of the earth. It has, in the past, witnessed a variety of disasters such as earthquake, flood, cyclone, tsunami, drought, forest fire and this impacts on the growth of the regional countries. It has been estimated that the regional countries may have lost 2 to 20 per cent of GDP and 12 to 66 per cent of revenue in past disasters resulting in widespread poverty and has further aggravated the fragile eco-system of the region.10 The offshore exploration activities too have the potential to adversely impact on the marine ecosystem of the region. This issue gains further criticality in the light of the fact that in the Bay of Bengal there is no institutional mechanism among the littorals to respond to oil spills despite the region being declared as an LME system under the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Also needed is a sophisticated warning system to provide total domain awareness of offshore exploration activities and oil spills through a network of surveillance and monitoring. Further, the necessity for a timely and capable response strategy that is based on precise planning, preparedness, sufficient resources to respond, and well established and practiced consequence management arrangements are critical. This can be partly addressed through cooperative mechanism to respond to oil spill crisis and also through regional capacity building.

Bay of Bengal Inter-Governmental Organisation on coastal fisheries (BOBP-IGO) The Bay of Bengal Inter-Governmental Organisation on coastal fisheries (BOBP-IGO), an agency under the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a regional grouping to address the problem of fisheries. Its members include Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka and discussions with other countries in the Bay of Bengal region such as Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia to join the BOBP-IGO are in progress. The BOBP-IGO has a wide agenda which includes a number of programmes and activities that support sustainable development and management of coastal fisheries, fisheries management, training, and information exchange, and improving the quality of life and increasing

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the livelihood opportunities of small-scale fishers. The programme also seeks to assist the member states to evolve policies and legal frameworks that support sustainable development and management of the coastal fisheries. As part of capacity building the member states are urged to share technologies and techniques to assist in the development of small-scale fisheries. While that is an ambitious mandate, the BOBP-IGO‘s process of control and surveillance of fishery resources in the Bay of Bengal merits attention. The vision, mission and strategic plan of action (20102014) of the BOBP-IGO has urged the member states to develop their National Plans of Actions for Monitoring, Control and Surveillance which would be linked to the Regional Plan of Action that will address the issues of the management of trans-boundary species and specific management plans for major commercial species (such as the hilsa and shark fisheries). The BOBP-IGO also envisages capacity building for those states which are not equipped with technological know-how to undertake monitoring, control and surveillance. There is a widespread perception that the fisheries in the Bay of Bengal are on the decline.11 The decline has been attributed to ‘increased fishing effort and habitat degradation’ which could have direct impact on the ‘living standards, including food security’, particularly of the some small-scale fishermen. Further, mechanization, advances in fish processing and marketing networks have shifted the fish industrial base to larger fish landing centers which have had direct bearing on the livelihoods of small-scale fishermen who must now contend with lower value fish for local markets. Another trend in the Bay of Bengal is the attempt by coastal communities particularly in the delta areas along the east coast of India and the large brackish water lagoons to assert their traditional fishing rights in the face of growing competition for coastal resources. At another level, the fishing communities bear the brunt and onslaught of cyclones, high tides and storm surges and are victims of shocks from natural disasters. These emerge in the form of loss of human life and psychological stress, damage/destruction of fishing infrastructure, coastal erosion, salt water intrusion affecting coastal areas, salt water contamination of drinking water, water for agricultural production and destruction of crops and forest. These are particularly felt by the fishing and coastal communities along the

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east coast of India (Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal), Bangladesh and Myanmar. The cascading effect of these developments are felt beyond the traditional livelihood of the coastal communities and these coastal areas are graded as high risk for investments which may preclude investments in infrastructure development by private and public sectors.

SAARC Initiatives and the Bay of Bengal There are a number of regional institutions under the SAARC that address issues relating to climate change and its impacts on the South Asian countries. By virtue of geography, five SAARC nations (Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) are maritime states and Nepal, Afghanistan and Bhutan form the three land-locked countries of the grouping. Some of the SAARC maritime states such as Bangladesh, east coast of India and Sri Lanka are part of the Bay of Bengal regionalism. Notwithstanding that, the South Asian regional mechanisms have been engaged in developing cooperative mechanisms to address common issues of concern among themselves. Significantly, climate change was the theme of the 16th SAARC Summit held in Thimphu, Bhutan in April 2010 and the Heads of State or Government at the Summit reaffirmed their commitment to address this challenge. The South Asian Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) is an inter-governmental organization and is responsible for promoting and supporting protection, management and enhancement of the environment in the region.12 Since its establishment in 1982, the SACEP has initiated and implemented a number of projects and programmes related to environment education, environment legislation, biodiversity, air pollution, and the protection and management of the coastal environment. The Malé Declaration on control and prevention of air pollution and its likely trans-boundary effects for South Asia is a good example of intergovernmental regional cooperation to combat the transboundary air pollution. The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC) is a mechanism for co-operation and mutual assistance among countries to respond to a major oil pollution incident and encourages States to develop and maintain an adequate capability to deal with oil pollution emergencies. In that framework,

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SACEP and the IMO have established the South Asian Regional Oil Spill Contingency Plan.13 Under the plan, the regional countries have established mechanism for mutual assistance led by their competent national authorities to co-operate, co-ordinate and integrate their response to marine pollution incidents either affecting or likely to affect the territorial sea, coasts and related interests of one or more of these countries, or to incidents surpassing the available response capacity of each of these countries. The Regional Oil and Chemical Marine Pollution Contingency Plan for South Asia ran into difficulty in the early stages of its conceptualization. For instance, on 27 July 2003, Tasman Spirit, a single-hulled 87,580 dwt tanker carrying 67,000 tonnes of crude oil for the Pakistan Refinery ran aground off Karachi port on Manora Island. Initial attempts by the Karachi Port Trust, Port Qasim Authority and the Pakistani navy failed and ruptured tanks of the vessel started to leak.14 A few days later, the ship broke into two and the resulting oil spill constituted a major environmental disaster. Pakistan decided to obtain assistance from Tsavliris which was contracted as salvors under a Lloyds Open Form and the company directed a tug from Colombo and a cargo aircraft carrying 40 tonnes of salvage equipment from Rotterdam and the Tsavliris warehouse in Athens was dispatched to Karachi. Interestingly, Pakistan did not seek assistance from India despite the fact that the latter had national capability to deal effectively with a spill of more than 100 tonnes. In March 1995, the SAARC countries initiated the South Asian Seas Plan (SASP) which involves five countries i.e. Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Of these three are Bay of Bengal littorals too. Notwithstanding that these countries cooperate “to protect and manage the marine environment and related coastal ecosystems of the region in an environmentally sound and sustainable manner”. Their cooperation involves consultations and technical co-operation among the member states, management of marine environment, resources and working in a cooperative network for the mutual interest for the whole region. The agency is also responsible for (a) Integrated Coastal Zone Management, (b) Development and Implementation of National and Regional Oil Spill Contingency Planning, (c) Human Resources Development through Strengthening

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Regional Centres’ of Excellence, and (d) Protection of the Marine Environment from Land Based Sources of Marine Pollution. The SASP is also responsible for the conservation and integrated management of marine turtles in collaboration with IOSEA Marine Turtle Memorandum of Understanding. As noted earlier, the coastal zones of South Asia have been adversely impacted by climate change and the cyclonic activity has increased over the years. Further, the rising sea levels in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea have threatened the livelihood of people living in coastal and deltaic regions. In that context, the SAARC Coastal Zone Management Center (SCZMC) is a regional initiative and seeks to promote cooperation in planning, management and sustainable development of the coastal zones, including research, training and promotion of awareness in the region. Based on the charter, the Centre also engages in identifying regional organizations dealing with issues of coastal resources management and assists in networking amongst a number of stakeholders including ministries, coastal authorities, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, funding agencies and facilitates coordination and cooperation on ICZM issues. It also promotes human resource development and exchange of experiences, information, data and expertise in ICZM. In 2008, the SAARC countries decided to set up a SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC) to examine various dimensions of disaster risk reduction and management in South Asia. The primary goal of the SDMC is to develop sophisticated disaster management techniques, develop risk reduction strategies and empowering the community institutional mechanisms to strengthen emergency response systems. The SDMC is responsible for the implementation of the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change and has drawn a road map for responding to various disasters related emergencies. One of the priority areas of the SDMC involves integration of disaster risk reduction into climate change adaptation. The SDMC has also developed a project on South Asia Disaster Knowledge Network (SADKN) that connects a variety of government and non-governmental agencies for dissemination and use of knowledge on different aspects of disaster management in South Asia.

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ASEAN Initiatives and the Bay of Bengal The ASEAN states too are cognizant of the adversarial impacts of climate change and the policy makers in the region are conscious of the insurmountable challenges that these phenomena can pose to individual states whose effects will be felt far and wide in the region. An Asian Development Bank study titled ‘The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review’ suggests that Southeast Asia is vulnerable to climate change due to geographical, social and economic factors.15 The regional countries are endowed with long coast line (173,251 kilometres) and are highly dependent on the seas for their economic prosperity. The study highlights that the impact of global warming and climate change in Southeast Asia has been significant and the mean temperature in the region increased at 0.1–0.3°C per decade between 1951 and 2000 and is projected to rise 4.8°C on average by 2100 from the 1990 level. The region witnessed reduced rainfall during 1960–2000. Significantly, the sea levels in the region have risen by 1–3 millimetres annually and are projected to rise by 40 cm by 2100 from the 1990 level. Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam are expected to experience increasingly drier weather conditions in the next 2–3 decades, although this trend is likely to reverse by the middle of this century.16 Given that a large number of the people in the region are highly dependent on the seas,17 resulting in higher concentration of populations along the coast, who will be directly affected by the rise in sea levels, the study notes: Over the past few decades, the region has seen higher temperatures and a sharp rise in the frequency of extreme weather events including droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones. Without urgent action to address this pressing issue, the region will face a difficult future marked by declining freshwater and crop yields (affecting food security), increasing loss of forests and farmlands, rising sea levels threatening island dwellers and coastal communities, and a surge in infectious diseases such as dengue and malaria.18

The study warns that Southeast Asia produced 12 per cent of the global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at the turn of the century and its global share of GHG emissions could go higher if the regional countries did not take action to adapt to climate change.19

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In the context of the Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction, there are fears that “irrigated rice yields across Asia will fall 27 per cent by 2050, with irrigated wheat production down by a staggering 46 per cent unless climate change adaptation measures are taken”.20 This will result in higher costs for grain adding to food insecurity and could even “reduce the combined GDP of Indonesia, Philippines, Viet Nam, and Thailand by nearly 7 per cent annually by the end of this century, more than twice the global average”.21 In 2007, the ASEAN countries decided to further engage the Asia Pacific countries and dialogue partners. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) was expanded and the ADMM Plus 8 (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States) was established. The first ADMM Plus 8 meeting was held in Hanoi in October 2010 where the ADMMPlus member countries agreed to work together to develop practical cooperation in areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, military medicine, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping operations (PKO). Experts’ Working Groups have been established22 and the member states cooperate with each other through these groups to address regional security challenges and enhancing mutual trust and such interactions be held once every three years to start with. Perhaps what merits attention is that the Plus countries were urged to build capacity and provide resources when needed by the ASEAN countries to respond to HADR operations. The Plus countries could also support ASEAN states through information sharing, weather reports and early warning alerts of approaching disaster. At the Track II level, the ASEAN countries have established the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions, (NADI), which is a forum for think tanks and research institutions of the ASEAN countries to provide alternative policy options and offer new ideas and recommendations to the ASEAN defence arrangements such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting (ADSOM) and the ASEAN defense track. Given the sensitivities of security issues, NADI offers a platform for discussions on issues that cannot be debated at the Track I level. In that context, the forum offers, among other issues, opportunities for “exchange of views on national policies on HADR and their response capabilities to disasters and how ASEAN countries could

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assist each other in times of disasters including the role of their militaries”.23 The process involves workshops and seminars to enhance the skills and capabilities of the armed forces of the ASEAN countries in HADR.

Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-15 The Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-15 emerged as a result of the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe, Japan, where the ‘Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’ was adopted. The Conference was a significant opportunity for the international community to understand and promote a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and risks to hazards which could be natural and man-made. The conference urged states to “systematically integrate into policies, plans and programmes for sustainable development and poverty reduction, and supported through bilateral, regional and international cooperation, including partnerships.”24 In fact, it provided a sound basis for states to cooperate given that the impact and actions in one region can have an impact on risks in another, and vice versa. The Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-15 has identified a number of ‘Priorities for action 2005–2015’ and noted that there is a need to enhance international and regional cooperation and assistance in the field of disaster risk reduction. This could be achieved through capacity building by sharing knowledge, technology and expertise to improve the disaster resilience of developing countries, adhering to best business practices aimed at disaster risk reduction, awareness-raising initiatives and providing financial assistance to reduce existing risks and to avoid the generation of new risks. In that context, the ASEAN countries have conceptualized a sophisticated disaster management strategy and several policy declarations, agreements, and plan of actions, have been instituted. Significantly, the Declarations of ASEAN Concord I and II and on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters promote among ASEAN countries on assistance in disaster relief and response, knowledge sharing, and disaster management among the Member States including the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002, and the Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation,

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Reconstruction, and Prevention in the Aftermath of the tsunami of 26 December 2004.25 In 2003, the ASEAN countries established the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) which has matured into the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) which articulates the regional strategy on disaster management including establishing standard procedures on disaster management and emergency response. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), conceptualized in 2005, provides the multi-hazard legal and policy framework for regional cooperation on disaster management and also sets out the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations which facilitate the ASEAN member countries to put together critical resources and capacity for rapid disaster relief and emergency response.

Strengthening BIMSTEC: Integrating SAARC and ASEAN Initiatives Organizationally and institutionally, the Bay of Bengal littoral countries have focused their attention on the developments and initiatives within their established multilateral structures i.e. the ASEAN and SAARC. However, geographically, some of the states are also part of the Bay of Bengal and developments in the region impact on their growth and prosperity in a direct way. The Bay of Bengal lies at the cross section of the SAARC and ASEAN. In fact BIMSTEC is the logical forum to address Bay of Bengal regional issues. The BIMSTEC is a new initiative and can evolve into a potent multilateral forum for the Bay of Bengal by learning from the experiences of both ASEAN and SAARC. These organisations have amassed huge experience and established best practices to consolidate their interaction and develop several cooperative mechanisms. There is ample potential for regional cooperation on climate change and its impact on the region under the BIMSTEC since most of the countries in the region experience similar climate hazards. This forms the basis for a robust regional approach for developing strategies to respond to climate change in the form of mitigation and adaptation and these approaches are likely to be more cost-effective when compared

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to the national, sub-regional or trans-regional particularly when the Bay of Bengal littorals are part of two different multilateral institutions i.e. SAARC and ASEAN. It will be useful to keep in mind that the impact of climate change is not focussed to one geographic space, instead it transcends boundaries; therefore it is necessary to deal with it on trans-regional and trans-boundary basis i.e. integrating adjacent regional structures like the SAARC and ASEAN into the BIMSTEC. The BIMSTEC can begin by addressing climate related issues that have impact on the region through cost effective solutions at the national/ local level since knowledge gaps remain among the countries. This will help to fill existing gaps and could be the basis for more countryspecific and regional studies on climate change. It is a good tool to begin the research to better understand climate change challenges. The BIMSTEC can form groups and taskforces to understand and suggest to the regional countries on Bay of Bengal weather events, river basin management, knowledge about coastal and marine ecosystems, climate change related migration, droughts, floods, forest fires, surveillance, treatment and control of epidemics and vector-borne diseases such as the SARS, dengue and malaria. It will be also important to generate models that can predict these events to develop a common understanding of the problems and mitigation measures. It is generally agreed that regional cooperation is an effective way for pursuing some adaptation measures that can promote trade in green technologies, cooperation in building advanced energy production through renewable energy sources, promoting and transferring clean energy and technology and above all benchmarking of clean energy practices and performance among the regional counties. In the long run, these initiatives can be the basis for a regional emissions trading system making the region a model for others to understand and imbibe best energy practices. However, the above initiatives would need to be backed by policy coordination at national, sub-regional, regional and trans-regional levels. This is so because climate change is an issue that transcends people, communities, societies, governments, multilateral arrangements. This is a big challenge keeping in mind that intra and inter government agency policy coordination is a complex process involving a number of government, state and provincial level departments including environment, finance, social welfare, finance etc for planning and

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funding; this list can be very exhaustive keeping in mind that the regional states have different and varying governance structure and policy-making departments. Perhaps this is also an opportunity for the Bay of Bengal littorals to strengthen inter-governmental agencies for delivering governance to the people of the region and to strengthen the local capacity to address climate change. The above issues form the functional parts of the governance; however, the critical issues lie with the leadership at the highest level of government and the political will to share capacities with the weaker nations. This aspect gains salience and criticality given that the regional countries must be taken as important components of the regional approach to mitigate and adapt climate change induced adversarial impacts; otherwise the regional strategy may be ineffective and regional approach to addressing climate change may flounder. Besides, there are other stakeholders that are closely linked to the national plans to address climate change. These emerge in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work outside the framework of the governments of the region. These and other network of individuals and organizations are committed to supporting and promoting knowledge and education to societies and people. These initiatives are, in most cases, voluntary and have been powerful entities to shape public discourse and bring about greater understanding of the vulnerability of regions to climate change and thus urging the governments to understand and formulate strategies for mitigation and adaptation. These grouping and agencies have been actively engaged in Track II dialogues to promote an ‘alternative perspective’ and at times, states have used these forums to express national perspectives and views on difficult issues particularly in multilateral forums. The BIMSTEC is an appropriate forum where member states can ensure that climate change issues become a high priority issue on their national agendas. It can also serve as a useful platform for sharing national action plans, scientific research and information that can be further integrated into the regional action plans. A task force or a working group can be constituted to undertake integration of all national action plans and these can also be empowered to identify the existing gaps in the national action plans. For instance, the advantages of cooperation relating to assistance during natural disasters can be gleaned from the APEC’s natural disaster preparedness. Soon after

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the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, APEC established the Task Force for Emergency Preparedness (TFEP).26 This task force has been actively engaged in organizing workshops and studies across the region to share experiences and best practices in coping with emergency situations. The APEC is also engaged in developing web-based hazard mapping to better prepare the region for tropical storms, wildfires, tsunamis, and floods. Further, it is bringing together earthquake experts and identifying infrastructure professions to examine the regional shelter infrastructures such as school and other building so that these can be made more earthquakes resilient. These initiatives by the APEC are especially relevant to the BIMSTEC because nearly 53 per cent of the recorded world deaths due to cyclones occurred in Bangladesh and about 23 per cent in India totaling to 76 per cent though both these countries experience only 4.27 per cent of the world storms. As discussed earlier, if the trends in cyclones and storms in the Bay of Bengal continue and if global warming causes any increase in cyclone activity, the situation in Bangladesh and India is likely to further worsen.

Technological Solutions It is an acknowledged fact that it is quite difficult to keep large sea spaces such as the Bay of Bengal under constant surveillance. Besides, it is not operationally convenient for the countries to deploy aircraft and ships on 24x7 basis to monitor various activities at sea such as shipping, oil spill, dumping of hazardous waste, unlicensed fishing, illegal human trafficking, etc. It will be useful to mention that such round-theclock monitoring is an overwhelming responsibility particularly in the maritime domain that has its own peculiarities and complexities. The states have successfully deployed satellite-based surveillance systems to keep the seas safe. Besides, satellites provide communication facilities to ships to help them report accidents at sea and other untoward incidents including the requirements of search and rescue. Current international shipping regulations mandate all ships above 300 tons to carry the Automatic Identification System (AIS) which is a device fitted onboard a ship for monitoring its position, course and speed. An AIS fitted ship would transmit the above data continuously to stations ashore or at sea who should be able to identify and track

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the vessel. International regulations make it mandatory for all vessels (a) 300 grt and above engaged in international voyage, (b) cargo vessels above 500 grt not engaged in international voyage, and (c) all passenger ships, irrespective of size, are to be equipped with the AIS. It is possible to fuse satellite imagery with the AIS to obtain a more detailed picture of what ship movements at sea. Likewise, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), also called as remotely piloted aircraft, have emerged as valuable tools for maritime domain awareness and possess significant capabilities to monitor maritime activity and relay real or near-real time picture at sea to shore control stations. Satellites and UAVs are expensive equipment and may not fit into the budgetary allocations of several Bay of Bengal littorals. In our view, pooling in satellite capabilities can facilitate a common maritime domain awareness of the Bay of Bengal to be shared among the littorals. Given the satellite and technological capability of some of the Bay of Bengal littorals such as India, it is important to map the littorals for a common picture for an effective response mechanism and maximize competencies. Equally compelling is the need for a sophisticated data collection system to monitor changes in coastal areas of maritime activity (be it shipping or fishing), and the land holding along the coastal areas. The aim is to build necessary capabilities to monitor change for correct evaluation and timely response. The systems should be able to provide data integration tools that can seamlessly collate dissimilar datasets for a common operating picture. At another level, it is important to educate the coastal communities including fishermen on the impact of climate change and promoting the idea of them being important stakeholders in the adaptation strategies. Lectures, information pamphlets, documentaries and interaction with coastal communities on the impact of climate change can help to educate coastal communities on the impending impact of climate change to their livelihood.

Conclusion It is quite evident from the above discussions that a clear-cut regional initiative to address climate change in the BIMSTEC is absent and this has precluded a regional approach to responding to climate change from a regional perspective. Although there have been several initiatives by

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the SAARC and ASEAN countries, the Bay of Bengal countries have extended mutual cooperation and assistance to each other within their organisational and institutional frameworks on a bilateral basis. These supra-regional organisations have not developed as yet any institutional frame work with the BIMSTEC. It will be prudent to develop a Bay of Bengal databank which identifies marine ecosystem, marine sensitive areas, and develop a sophisticated communication network and perhaps a regional response centre to provide information to National/State/Local Authorities on the impending oil spill and the response options. This databank could be made accessible to all concerned parties through internet and through their respective national marine pollution response centers. In that context BIMSTEC is a viable multilateral arrangement for addressing the risks in offshore exploration activities in the Bay of Bengal. At another level, there are various constraints to the potential capabilities of the countries to respond quickly to climate change related disasters that can be attributed to their domestic political and economic constraints and it is critical to address this weakness given that it takes all the countries to cooperate and develop strategies to address common problems. There is also a need to expand the networks to involve multiple stakeholders to include media and the corporate sector to pool in their resources and emerge as responsible stakeholders to further strengthen and promote cooperation and to supplement the regional efforts.

Notes  1. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Sustainable Management of the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem”, 2008, available at (accessed 10 June 2014).  2. Ibid.  3. “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation: Background”, available at (accessed 23 August 2014).   4. Thomas Suarez, Early Mapping of Southeast Asia (Singapore: Periplus Edition (HK) Ltd., 1999).

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 5. K.N. Sastri, Cola Rajgan (Madras: University of Madras, 2000), p. 604; G. Coedes, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia (Hawaii: East West Centre Press, 1968), p. 403.   6. “BIMSTEC is the bridge between South and South-East Asia Dr. Manmohan Singh”, Asian Tribune, 13 November 2008.  7. “Joint Statement of the Twelfth BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting”, Nay Pyi Taw, 11 December 2009.   8. “Statement by MOS Smt. Preneet Kaur at the Plenary of the 13th BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting” on 22 January 2011, available at (accessed 30 January 2011).   9. “Ninth Bimstec ministerial meeting concludes”, Ministry of Eternal Affairs, Press Bureau of India, New Delhi. 10. Presentation entitled “BIMSTEC Workshop Regional Cooperation on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management, New Delhi, 30-31 October 2006”, available at (accessed 7 January 2010). 11. P. Townsley, “Review of Coastal and Marine Livelihoods and Food Security in the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Region”, Report prepared for the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Programme, undated, p. 21. 12. For more details, see the website of the South Asian Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP). 13. “Draft Regional Oil And Chemical Marine Pollution Contingency Plan For South Asia”, available at (accessed 20 January 2014). 14. “Tsavliris salves Tasman Spirit oil cargo”, available at (accessed 23 January 2010). 15. Asian Development Bank, The economics of climate change in Southeast Asia: A regional review, (Philippines: Renouf Pub Co Ltd, 2009), pp. vi–v. 16. Ibid., p. 32. 17. Ibid., p. 48. In 2005, the estimated population living within 100 km of the coast reached about 452 million people, equivalent to about 79 per cent of the total population. Most of these people depend on coastal and marine resources for their livelihoods. Coastal aquaculture has been the most important fishery activity in Southeast Asia with more than 30,000 households, in more than 64,000 ha, earning their livelihood from shrimp farming. 18. Ibid., p. vi.

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19. A. Phdungsilp, “Comparative Study of Energy and Carbon Emissions Development Pathways and Climate Policy in Southeast Asian Cities”, Fifth Urban Research Symposium, 2009, available at (accessed 19 August 2014). 20. “Asia needs both open and deep regionalism”, available at (accessed 6 June 2014). 21. Ibid. 22. Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening Defence Cooperation of ASEAN in the Global Community to Face New Challenges, Jakarta, 19 May 2011. 23. Ibid. 24. “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: I S D R International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters”, available at (accessed 5 January 2011). 25. “ASEAN and Disaster Management”, available at (accessed 6 January 2011). 26. Task Force on Emergency Preparedness Meeting, “Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Asia Pacific Region: 2009 to 2015 (TFEP 04/2008A)”, Lima, Peru, 15 August 2008, available at