Clans and Democratization: Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq [1 ed.] 9789004415485, 9789004415478

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Clans and Democratization: Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq

International Comparative Social Studies Editor-in-Chief Mehdi P. Amineh (Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam, and International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden University) Editorial Board Shahrough Akhavi (Columbia University) W.A. Arts (University College Utrecht) Sjoerd Beugelsdijk (Radboud University) Mark-Anthony Falzon (University of Malta) Harald Fuhr (University of Potsdam) Joyeeta Gupta (University of Amsterdam) Xiaoming Huang (Victoria University Wellington) Nilgün Önder (University of Regina) Gerhard Preyer (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main) Islam Qasem (Webster University, Leiden) Kurt W. Radtke (International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden University) Mahmoud Sadri (Texas Woman’s University) Jeremy Smith (University of Eastern Finland) Ngo Tak-Wing (Leiden University) L.A. Visano (York University)

volume 43

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/icss

Clans and Democratization: Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq By

Charlotte Hille With

Renée Gendron

leiden | boston

Cover illustration: A traditional Afghan fighter holds his child, while carrying a weapon. Does he turn his back on the conflict? The child is holding the weapon. This symbolizes the transition from conflict to peace that one wishes for the future and the child. Or will the child also follow the path to war? Source: Eastern Afghanistan, between Kabul and Jalalabad. Afghan refugees return to their home after Russian forces departed. © 1992 Philip Jones Griffiths / Magnum. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Name: Hille, Charlotte, author. | Brill Academic Publishers. Title: Clans and democratization : Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq / by Charlotte Hille. Other titles: International comparative social studies. Description: Boston : Brill, [2020] | Series: International comparative Social Studies, 1568-4474 ; volume 43 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019054164 (print) | LCCN 2019054165 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004415478 (Hardback : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9789004415485 (eBook) Subjects: LCSH: Tribes--Chechnia (Russia) | Tribes--Albania. | Tribes--Afghanistan. | Tribes--Iraq. | Conflict management--Chechnia (Russia) | Conflict management--Albania. | Conflict management--Afghanistan. | Conflict management--Iraq. | Democratization--Chechnia (Russia). | Democratization--Albania. | Democratization--Afghanistan. | Democratization--Iraq. Classification: LCC GN492.5 .H55 2020 (print) | LCC GN492.5 (ebook) | DDC 305.8--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019054164 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019054165

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1568-4474 ISBN 978-90-04-41547-8 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-41548-5 (e-book) Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

For Paul and Victor

∵

Contents Preface  ix Introduction  1

Part 1 Clans and the State 1 Clans  13 2

Statehood and the Clan  42

3

Warlords and the Clan Society  66 Co-written by Renée Gendron

4

Society and Democratisation  73 Co-written by Renée Gendron

Conclusion Part 1  99

Part 2 Casestudies 5

Clans in Chechnya  105

6

Clans in Albania  126

7

Clans in Afghanistan  149

8

Clans in Iraq  187



General Conclusion  224

viii

Contents

Appendix: Clans, Tribes and Their Locality in Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq  235 Bibliography  257 Index  282

Preface The ideas for this book came out of a course that I taught in 2003 on state building in theory and practice, at the department of Political Science of the University of Amsterdam. In discussions with students, it became clear that the path of democratisation of states with a clan structure provided more challenges than for states without a clan structure. My specialization in state building in the Caucasus, in combination with the recent political history and the international reality at the time, resulted in the selection of Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq as case studies to study clans and efforts at democratization. One of my former students and now Ph.D. student, Renée Gendron, has from the start cooperated on the project, finding literature and quotations. Chapters 3 and 4 have mainly been written by Renée. She contributed to the research for the other chapters as well. I have written the main body of this study, and have constructed the overall argument of the book. I would like to thank all of those who supported me during this project. A special thanks to Patricia Craig of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University, where I have been able to work on the book during a stay as a visiting scholar in 2007. Thanks to Samantha Barbee, who made it possible to stay in Washington while working on part of the book. I would like to thank René Kersten for his feedback on the chapter on Afghanistan, Hylke van der Wal and Ruben Paniry for feedback on the chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan, Eva Feldbrugge for her review of and suggestions about the tribal structures in the case studies, Margriet Goos for correcting earlier drafts of the manuscript, Elodie van Sytzama for the interesting discussions, and Viacheslav Chirikba for the valuable discussions on state formation in the Caucasus and the position of the clan. I am very grateful to Ruud Janssens for commenting on several drafts of the manuscript, and for his work on the footnotes and the bibliography. I am extremely grateful to Renée Gendron for our pleasant cooperation during this long journey and her contributions to this book. Renée would like to thank Martijn and Pierrette for their support during this project. A special thanks to my mother, for her continuous support. I dedicate this book to my brothers Paul and Victor Hille. A special thanks goes out to the anonymous referees of the manuscript for their valuable suggestions, which made it possible for me to improve this study. Jennifer Obdam, editor at Brill Publishers, merits special mention for her support during the process which led to this publication. I am grateful to the readers of this book for sharing our interest in state building, peace-making and peace-building.

Introduction The central question in this book is: How do clan societies and the state interact? This leads us to additional sub-questions, such as whether, and if so, how, state building processes are compatible with and involve clan societies. The assumption is that if state structures erode in a society with an underlying clan structure, the clan takes over vital responsibilities of the state, such as security of its members, the military, political and legal issues for its members, as well as the take-over of vital infrastructure in the area of the clan. When the state is reconstructed after a conflict or after a serious change in government, such as a transition from communism or a dictatorship to a democratic republic, the clan has to withdraw in order to allow the state structures to take over the responsibilities of a state. However, the clan will try to keep influence and may not have enough trust in the state structures yet. This may lead to conflicting aims. The central question in this book is: How do clan societies and the state interact? Subquestions are: − Are state building efforts and clan societies compatible? − What happens if clans co-opt state structures? − How is a state, based on the rule of law, built in a clan society? − How does one incorporate a clan in a state with weak institutions? − How does a clan society relate to democracy? − How do we deal with the prejudice that clan societies are backwards? Though much has been written on post-conflict reconstruction and transition processes, and clans are mentioned in these works, there are very few books that specifically deal with the political aspects of state building processes in clan based societies.1 This interdisciplinary research combines research on clan societies and the state from the perspectives of political science, international law, sociology and anthropology. In the sociological and anthropological analysis, the clan as a social structure is researched. From a political point of 1 Christian Ghasarian, Introduction à l’Etude de la Parenté (Manchecourt: Editions du Seuil,1996), Claude Lévy-Strauss, The elementary structures of Kinship (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1969), Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective (Harmondsworth: Penguin Anthropological Library, 1967). Kathleen Collins is an exception with her book Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) on the political role of clans in Central Asia.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_002

2

Introduction

view, the analysis is concentrated on how states with a clan society function, and to what degree clans form a threat to state building and international stability. From an international legal point of view, the question is whether and how international law, which can be regarded as Eurocentric, influences the debate on legal order and democracy. In this book a reflection on the reality and the problems that occur in clan-based societies is provided. It is this combination that makes the book unique. If one investigates clan-based societies, it turns out that many of these societies can be found in weak and failed states. The international community interferes to stop the situation from deteriorating, and starts a policy of state building, thereby introducing or reinforcing democracy and the rule of law. There is a potential clash between a traditional clan society and a Western modern state building process. The literature on military intervention and state building focuses on Western concepts and 20th century developments in international law, especially in the field of human rights. The literature is often top-down, and does not (sufficiently) take into account the aspects of a clan society that may be beneficial to state building. The scholarly debate concentrates on aspects such as strengthening the security sector, fighting corruption, introducing transparent and accountable institutions on a central, regional and local level. The restoration of a fair justice system, where everyone has access to a judge, who is impartial, is an important aspect that is part of the process, just as transitional justice. In the anthropological debate, the clan is central, but not so much the relation between the clan and the state. One may ask why these clan-based societies are all in weak and failing states. Is this a coincidence or is there a link between clan societies and weak states? Do clans create weak and failed states? The clan society is often very old, dating back before the Muslim or Christian religions until the republics under investigation were introduced. Therefore, they are deeply embedded in the structure of society. Specific aspects found in a clan society are the importance given to family ties, honour and a division in responsibilities for men and women. Most clan societies (though not all) have a patriarchal structure. Most of the research on clans and clan-societies has been done in the field of cultural anthropology and sociology. Distinguished anthropologists like Claude Lévy-Strauss, Robin Fox and Christian Ghasarian have written on kinship and clan lineage. This book however aims to investigate clans and clan society from a political science perspective, with reference to international law, and is in this sense unique. Kathleen Collins in Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia offers empirical insights into clan-based societies from a political science p ­ erspective.

Introduction

3

This research builds on Collins’ work by suggesting that clans are important partners in building and reinforcing state structures. In addition, this book examines John Rawls’ notions of “political justice” and “fairness” in relation to clans and state building. International legal aspects relevant for clan societies and other states alike are the right to self-determination, human rights, humanitarian law, transitional justice, and theories concerning state building such as the rule of law. The political aspects that are important when writing about the clan and the state are again state building, reform of the security sector, and policies concerning elections and a strong rule of law. In this book an analysis of state building and democratisation in states with a clan structure, where an outsider, be it a state, a group of states or an international intergovernmental organisation, interferes is given. When clan societies form part of a state, and especially if that state is weak, the question is how other states and international organisations that intervene strengthen the state. To what extent, if at all, do the societal structures remain in place? To what extent is the clan structure used, and what aspects of the clan structure find their way into the design of the state? In this book the suggestion is to use the clan structure in the state building process. This will make the state building project more acceptable for the population. The weakness of a state may be due to a transition caused by an internal conflict. This results in a changing position of the clan in society and in politics. These changes result in a modification of the activities that the clan undertakes, a modification of the position of the clan in society and the state, and therefore, often a clash between the state and the clan, when it comes to distributing political goods to the population. When states weaken, this may threaten regional security, due to internal and cross-border criminality, such as trafficking of drugs, weapons and people. This, in turn, may ultimately result in outside intervention by the international community, be it through support in negotiations, or, as an ultimate remedy, as a UN or nato intervention force, aimed at strengthening the state and restoring national and regional security. In casu an intervention by the national army during the Russian intervention in Chechnya takes place, a conflict prevention mission by the osce in Albania is deployed, a combined peace enforcing and peace building mission in Afghanistan and a peace enforcing mission in Iraq are undertaken. Intervention may also take place by non-state actors, such as international non-governmental organisations (ngos) specialised in conflict transformation or human rights or ngos specialised in faith-based conflict resolution. In the cases analysed in this book the intervening forces were the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Italy in Albania before the First World War

4

Introduction

and nato after 1991, the UN and nato in Afghanistan, and the UN and nato in Iraq. For many involved in military intervention, state building and post-conflict reconstruction, the history and position of the clan in society needs to be known and understood in order to meaningfully and respectfully support strengthening the state. In order to answer the central question in this book several assumptions are presented. The first assumption is: when the state becomes weak, the clan takes over responsibilities that are supposed to be in the domain of the state. A second assumption is: clan-based societies are less developed than nonclan-based societies. A third assumption is: clan societies can be democratised, since the clans together form a decentralised structure in the state, where the power of the clans is vested in specific territories. A fourth assumption is: when the state gets stronger, the clan has to withdraw from some political fields, and this creates friction between the state and the clan. In both peaceful and post-conflict societies, the goals of state building remain the same: strengthen the rule of law, develop transparent and accountable institutions and provide basic public services. These requirements are designed by Western theorists, and are applied to states worldwide. To some degree, one might ask whether this is a clash of civilisation, the imposing of Western democratic values, or the merging of clan values and Western democratic values. It is the latter vision that is preferred in this book. While democratising clan societies, certain problems arise. The clan society has specific habits to support clan members, and this results in a closed society, whereas the Western style of democracy is an open society. Clientelism and corruption do occur in clan societies. This is inherent to the clan, but is not wanted in a merit-based democracy. In this book it is argued that the approach taken by national governments and international actors in engaging clans and tribes in state building practices will determine the success or failure of state building efforts. State building can be analysed from two perspectives: top-down and bottom-up. In a top-down approach to state building, the priority is placed on drafting a national constitution, realising national security and creating judicial institutions. In a bottom-up approach, the citizen is the first actor that is taken into account. The needs of the citizens in his or her environment are the starting point of the state building project. It means that each municipal or local government is responsible for ensuring the delivery of basic public goods and services. The interactions between local organisations (grass root

Introduction

5

o­ rganisations) and local rule create a framework from which national legal instruments and security services can benefit when drafting legislation and developing policies. Both approaches are needed for successful state building, particularly in clan-based societies, since this will improve the changes that guarantee that clans will be included in the state building project. In the first section of this book, the legal framework of modern sovereign nation-states as well as the obligations and responsibilities of nation-states towards their populations under international law is provided. Which aspects are characteristic of clan societies, and how do these pertain to state building theories? In order to test the hypotheses with the theoretical debate on state building and transition processes towards democratisation in a clan society, the following topics are discussed: In Chapter 1 an introduction is given into the definitions of clans, and how these cultures refer to the open society of a democracy. The hypotheses are introduced, such as whether a clan society is equal to a backward society, and whether a clan society and a democracy are opposed. How does the clan society pertain to the rule of law? Is state building possible in clan-based societies? In Chapter 2 the groundwork for the analysis is laid, by describing the criteria concerning state building and democratisation. Sovereignty and aspects of self-determination are discussed. Definitions of failed and weak states are analysed and the question is raised how transition processes can be monitored or supported in such a way as to give way to a stable state. This legal framework is regarded as Eurocentric by some, and will be tested in the case studies. This chapter also describes the aspects that are important in post-conflict reconstruction, which are applicable to the four case studies at hand. Chapter 3 discusses the position of warlords. Given that clans have their power base in specific areas, and that clans have their own defence structures interwoven in the clan structure, situations may arise where it is not clear whether the person in charge in an area is a warlord or a clan leader. Their relation to the population is, or at least can be, very different. This is a situation where security is not sufficiently guaranteed by the state, since the state does not have a monopoly over violence. Chapter 4 analyses society and democratisation. Once security has been guaranteed, the population has to restore trust in their fellow citizens, especially if these have a different identity or have been the enemy. The population needs to regain trust in the government and in the state. Trust is necessary for the government in order to move forward with post-conflict reconstruction and transitional justice. Members of a clan have trust in their fellow clan members, but sometimes lack trust in other clans, for example if there is a blood

6

Introduction

feud. This also plays a role in the post-conflict reconstruction process, which mostly aims at introducing a stable democracy and rule of law. Reform of the security sector aims to strengthen transparency and accountability of the state towards its citizens. This chapter elucidates how clans are involved in the state building process and how clan society deals with human rights and the economy. Having analysed several aspects that are important in the relation between the clan and the state, it is time to investigate the state building project and the role that the clan plays in it in four case studies: Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq. The second section of the book analyses the different ways in which social organizations, in casu clan-societies, impact state building efforts. Neglecting the clans and their influence on state building can slow down reforms and state building measures. The case studies have been selected because they are all examples of states where the clan is still visible in society. Furthermore, they are all in transition from non-democratic governance to some form of democratic governance. In all of these case studies there has been some form of outside intervention by either (inter)governmental or non-state actors, or both. Lastly, the case studies have nearly all (with the exception of Iraq and to some extent Albania) been part of the Russian sphere of influence during the twentieth century. The case studies of Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan, and Iraq were selected because they represent clan-based societies. Chechnya and Albania are both in transition from a communist government to some form of a republican democracy. Chechnya experienced two wars of secession from the Russian Federation. Albania was faced with internal struggle and the inaccessibility of territory inhabited by clans. Iraq and Afghanistan were selected as case studies because both countries were invaded by an external force that subsequently engaged in state building. Afghanistan was a collapsed state under the rule of the Taliban when the United States and other nato countries invaded. Iraq was invaded by the United States and its allies in order to destroy presumed weapons of mass destruction (wmd). The Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was removed from power and a state building process under the aegis of the invading powers started. In Chechnya, the case study in Chapter 5, the clan is still clearly visible. The history of the republic and the organisation of the clan in Chechnya is discussed. The clan and the republic have been interlinked in several ways during the past centuries. This chapter gives a description of the structure of the clan society and the power base of the different clans. The 19th century and especially the Murid wars united the clans against the Russian Empire, which was seen as a common enemy. Only in 1859 were the Murid wars over for Chechnya.

Introduction

7

For the first time during this war, a wish for uniting with neighbouring north Caucasian peoples emerged in order to remain out of the Russian Empire. This aim to cooperate with neighbouring peoples was also a clear sign of the wish for freedom that is typical for the Chechen clan society. Experiments with state building took place in the period after the fall of the Russian Czar and the coming to power of the Communists, between 1918 and 1921. Again, the Chechens were proactive in their wish to unite in some form of cooperation with neighbouring north Caucasian peoples. Eventually they were incorporated in the Soviet Union. Clan society has always been strong, and if knowledge of the clan society diminished during the Soviet period (1918–1991), the clan had nevertheless co-opted the communist system. Clan justice was even allowed during the 1970s, since clan law was observed better than positive law. After the fall of communism, the knowledge of the clan returned, and, according to some, was reinvented. When the Soviet Union fell, the Chechen president tried to secede from the Russian Federation in order to form an independent state. Chechnya became a mono-ethnic republic in the Russian Federation. Nationalism replaced the communist ideology, and the clan history was highlighted to underline this nationalism. The choice of presidents and the political relationship with the opposition in Chechnya can be understood in terms of clan politics. During the initial years after the fall of communism and the two Russian-Chechen wars (1994– 1996 and 1999–2000) the clans gained local and regional power but also national power. Favouring clan members was a common policy by former president Dzhokhar Dudayev, just as the use of violence against presidents who got involved in blood feuds was. This happened with former president Akhmad Kadyrov and former president Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, who are said to have been murdered because of blood feuds. This chapter provides an analysis on how clan law and positive law interact from the 20th century onwards, and what role clan allegiance has during elections and in national politics. During the period that the state weakened, in the 1990s, warlords emerged. To what extent were they warlords, and to what extent were they clan leaders? Striking is that at the beginning of the second millennium some 80% of votes could be retraced to clan affiliation. This means that the clan has a serious role in the politics and nation building of Chechnya. The state building process, as in the other cases in this book, has not been completed. However, we can come to a conclusion on how the state and the clan interact in the state building at hand. Chapter 6 discusses the history of Albania and the role that the clan plays in society. Albania is largely mono-ethnic, and clan society is centred in the north of the country. The difference between Albanians from the north and from the south is that the north has long been inaccessible to outsiders, which means

8

Introduction

that the Albanians in the north were dependent on their clan society. The clan system provided for law, law enforcement and politics. This chapter describes how Albanian clans are organized, and what the role of clan society is. What is the relation between the clan and religion? In this chapter we also look at the role that clans play in national politics, and how, or whether, national politics involve clans in the state building process. Albania also has a communist past, and ideology that was replaced by nationalism after the fall of communism in 1991. After 1991 clan politics was still visible, and the patriarchal society gave few rights to women. The state went through a period of weakness, where the clans in the north of the country were left to follow their clan politics as they had done before. In this chapter questions are addressed such as: how does traditional clan law influence the legal system? What role did the international community play in intervening with the state building process, and to what extent did the intervening actor take the clan society in Albania into account in their intervention planning? The fact that blood feuds still existed (just like in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya) meant that young men from families that were involved in blood feuds could not participate fully in the social and economic life. For Albania the state building challenge has been to include the north in the state building project and disclose this part of the state. Chapter 7 addresses the role of the clan in Afghan politics. The clan society in Afghanistan is strong. An analysis is given which peoples in Afghanistan have a clan society, and how this fit in with the state building process that the state has known through history, with special emphasis on the rule of the British in the 19th century, and the period of internal violence that began in the 1970s. During the 19th century, Afghanistan was never fully ruled by British colonisers. They left part of the activities that are typical for a state, like tax collection and law enforcement, to the Afghans. In the 20th century Afghanistan has been undermined by a civil struggle since the 1970s. Outside interference by the Russians and the Taliban has influenced the state. This was the legacy when the US intervened in 2001 to remove the Taliban government and search for Osama Bin Laden. After the intervention in 2001 a multi-national intervention force has been restoring law and order in Afghanistan, while jihadists joined the Taliban and Al Qaeda to fight the foreign invaders. This means that in Afghanistan, intergovernmental organisations have interfered in order to issue state building projects, and that non-state actors like Al Qaeda and the Taliban aim at very different state building projects. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state. The Pashtun organise themselves along clan lines. However, given the fact that the Pashtun have been in power over the past 300 years it is

Introduction

9

interesting to investigate how the state building projects are influenced by traditional aspects of clan society. Questions in this chapter include: how do the other peoples in Afghanistan deal with traditional law, religion and the formal legal system, how is clan society shaped, and what has 40 years of conflict done to the clan society? Outside forces, including both intergovernmental and non-state actors, try to introduce a state system that deems them to be good. What is the relationship between the Taliban and the clans? To what extent does the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or nato take into account that there is a traditional society with clan structures, and how do we differentiate between warlords and clans? To what extent does the production of opium and corruption hamper the state building process and what role does the clan play in this? Chapter 8 investigates the relation between the state and the clan in Iraq. The population in Iraq is multi-ethnic. Not all peoples have a traditional clan society. The state of Iraq was created after the First World War, and its policy was influenced by neighbouring Arab states in the mid-20th century, when the role of religion and nationalism started to dominate politics in the region. The structure of clans and the hierarchy between clans and tribes is analysed. Here, as in the case study on Afghanistan, some clans have long been in power. The policy of the Baath party, which was in power since the 1960s, was to eradicate clan society in the state between 1968 and 1979. Nationalism was one of the policy goals under the Baath party to unite the population. Only after 1980, with the start of the Iran-Iraq war, did Saddam Hussein change this policy and began using a tactic of divide and rule among the clans in Iraq to gain their support. He used this support to strengthen adherence to the Iraqi state. After the fall of Saddam Hussein and the military intervention by the coalition of the willing in 2003, new entities with a political agenda for Iraq emerged. In the first place there was an international intervention force of the UN, and simultaneously the influence of non-state actors, like Al Qaeda in Iraq (aqi), the Sadr brigades, and, most recently, the Islamic State (IS), which aimed to change the state building plan. This shows that the relation between state and clan is still adamant, given that these groups also rely on clans for military support or for their support in search for security in the country. Religion plays a role in the politics of Iraq, especially in the relations between Sunni and Shia. The Sunni have been in power during the reign of the Baath party, and part of the frustration for the Sunni is linked to religious ­differences with others, loss of power and clan affiliation. Some Sunni clan members who lost power after the fall of Saddam Hussein joined terrorist organisations, aimed at overthrowing the power of the government. With the

10

Introduction

I­slamic State (IS) we have another non-state actor that draws support from Sunni clans that feel politically deprived. Questions that are addressed in this chapter are: to what extent do clans play a role in the political system and in elections? To what extent has the international intervention force taken into account the clan structure in Iraq? What is the relation between the traditional clan law and the positive national law? This book concludes with a comparison between the four case studies. The assumptions based on theory and practice of state building in clan-based societies are tested. The aim of this book is to give some insight into the relation between the clan and the state for policy makers, the military who intervene in clan-based societies, and for scholars who want to know more about the role of clans and the state from a political point of view. Although it is argued in this book that blueprints concerning state building are practical when supporting a state in the process of democratisation, one has to realise that a blueprint for dealing with state building projects in clan societies will not work, since every society has its own peculiarities. Clan-based societies differ from n ­ on-clan-based societies. This book may not give an ultimate answer to all questions concerning the relation between the state and the clan in state building projects, but it aims to clarify how state building projects work in some clan-based societies. Both the terms “clan” and “tribe” are used in this book. In Western political discourse, the two terms often carry negative connotations , therefore, they are used in a neutral fashion.

Part 1 Clans and the State

∵

Chapter 1

Clans “Countries like Iraq and Afghanistan may take on the trappings of modern, Western nation-states, with parliaments, justice departments and other governmental agencies, researchers say. But politics are still driven by the customs and institutions of nomadism, in which political disputes were settled at the level of family, clan and tribe”. ilan greenberg1

In this book the clan is defined from an interdisciplinary perspective. The relation between the clan and the state can be interpreted differently depending on whether one looks at it from a political, legal, sociological or anthropological perspective. This book investigates the relation between the clan and the state. Aspects typical for a clan society are honour, blood revenge, traditions and religion. We investigate how these aspects of a clan society are incorporated into the modern nation-state. The literature differentiates between open and closed societies, where open societies are associated with Western democracies, while closed societies are typical for clan societies, where one is born into a specific family and clan. Can these two systems coexist in a state, or is there a clash between the two organizing principles? Several hypotheses on the relation between the clan society and the state are presented in this chapter. These hypotheses will be tested in the cases in the second part of this book. Questions that will be raised include: are clans and democracy compatible? Do we need to co-opt clans in state institutions? How do clans relate to the rule of law? How can clans be incorporated in weak state structures? Are clans and democracy opposed? Are clans similar to backwardness? The quest for the relation between clans and the state is completed with the question: how do clan societies and the state interact?2 In this book the terminology “clan” and “tribe” is not used in an Orientalist fashion, but as neutral terms denoting specific social structures. I am aware that there are negative connotations associated with the terms “clan” and “tribe”. I do not share these, but use the terms in a neutral way. 1 Ilan Greenberg. “In much of Asia and Africa, nomadic traditions permeate modern societies”, New York Times, August 8 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/08/world/asia/08ihtkazakh.1.7033162.html?_r=1, (accessed July 26 2019). 2 Parts of this chapter has been published previously in Charlotte Hille, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus (Leiden, Brill, 2010). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_003

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Chapter 1

As theory is discussed and examples are provided in Part 1, this will broaden the scope of clan-based societies beyond the case studies discussed in this book to include, but are not limited to, Somalia, the Hopi (an indigenous population in North America that is concentrated around Arizona), clans in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. The examples are selected because Somalia has a very strong clan tradition, Azerbaijan forms part of the Caucasus, just like Chechnya, Tajikistan has a long history of clan politics and also forms part of Eurasia, and finally, the Hopi are mentioned in the analysis of the clan. 1

Tribes, Clans and Kinship

Clans are composed of extended families. Several clans may share a common lineage and form a tribe. Sociologist Max Weber considered clan politics as a “historically common form of social organisation in the nomadic and semi nomadic regions of Eurasia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa”.3 Weber assumed that clan societies would disappear as society modernised and opened up to other influences. The clan ties were regarded by Weber to be networks based on the rational calculations of individuals made within a collectivist cultural and institutional context.4 Anthropologist Claude Lévy Strauss changed thinking about kinship. Before Lévi-Strauss, marriage had been discussed as recruitment to kinship groups. The group renewed itself by the children that were born from legitimate marriages. Lévi-Strauss argued that the real differences between kinship systems lay in the different ways in which they moved women around the system in marriage.5 He described patrilineal and matrilineal systems, and how in these pure systems rules concerning marriage and kinship were organised. LéviStrauss presents the idea of dual organisations, which are systems in which the members of the community, whether it be a tribe or a village, are divided into two parts which maintain complex r­ elationships varying from open hostility to close intimacy, and with which various forms of rivalry and co-operation are usually associated.6 3 Max Weber quoted in Katheen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 16. 4 Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 16–17. 5 Robin Fox. Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967), 23. 6 Claude Lévi-Strauss. The elementary structures of Kinship (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1969), 69.

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Lévi-Strauss remarks that many dual organisations in society are characterised as archaic and at a primitive level of culture.7 Many sociologists regarded the lineage (family) and the clan as different. Whereas in the lineage, people knew the origins of both lines, from the father’s side and from the mother’s side, in a clan, the history of either the paternal or the maternal line is dominant.8 The anthropologist Christian Ghasarian states that lineage lines can be traced. The members are living in a certain area, there are common rules on the position of women, who often call the other women in the lineage sisters, the members have a common leader, an own traditional law system, their own traditional religious beliefs, where all members know what their rights and duties are. Upon marriage, the woman leaves the lineage of her father’s family, and enters the lineage of her husband’s family. According to Ghasarian, the members of a clan, however, only remember their mythic forefather, and are loosely connected. They are not bound to a specific area. The clan comprises several lineages. Clan members do however feel connected and have a sense of solidarity.9 Robin Fox, an anthropologist, states that clans are groups that claim a common ancestor, “even if they cannot demonstrate exactly how this descent came about”.10 Clans are in general ­endogamous, where lineages are exogamous. Clans do not have a leader (a “chief”), in contrast to lineages, which do have a leader.11 Fox defines a clan as “Higher order units often consisting of several lineages in which common descent is assumed but cannot necessarily be demonstrated”. The name clan originates from the Gaelic clan, meaning offspring or descendants.12 Concerning unilinear descent groups, Fox mentions that while lineages may be property owning bodies, the clans provide an organisation for mutual aid, defence, ceremony and vengeance. The clan may control the property, and the heads of lineage form the group that is responsible for everyday governance. Within the clan, some lineages can become more influential and powerful, which may create a kind of nobility.13

7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Claude Lévi-Strauss. The elementary structures of Kinship, 70. Claude Lévi-Strauss. The elementary structures of Kinship, 103. Christian Ghasarian. Introduction à l’Etude de la Parenté (Manchecourt: Editions du Seuil, 1996), 83–85. Robin Fox. Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective, 90. Christian Ghasarian. Introduction à l’Etude de la Parenté, 87. Robin Fox. Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective, 41. Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective, 49. Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective, 97.

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One can differentiate between patrilinear kinship groups and matrilineal kinship groups. In matrilineal kinship groups the house to which the woman originates is important, and is often harbouring a totem, like in the example of the Hopi, described by Robin Fox. Women are in charge of religious life.14 The house has a special importance, and the men after marriage move to the village and to the house of the woman. She is in some cultures allowed to have several lovers, meant to guarantee the security of women and the home. Men are responsible for security, and often are away to fight. At such a moment, other men provide security and guarantee offspring. Within this society, there is a special relationship between the brother of the woman and her children.15 Amjad Jaimoukha, a specialist on Chechnya, describes how some of these aspects are still visible in Chechen society, although this society nowadays is firmly patrilinear.16 In a patrilinear society, the women move after marriage from the family they were born into, and the clan they were born into, to the family and the clan of their husband.17 This system is visible in all cases analysed in this book. The rights of women in this society are, seen from a Western perspective, lacking in important aspects. The women are responsible for the honour of the family, which means that honour crimes against them are not prosecuted sufficiently, that violence against women is not sufficiently addressed, and that women do not have equal rights in inheritance and equal access to work. This has led us to address the position of women in society in the cases analysed in this book. The analysis of Ghasarian and Fox may partly be contrary to what was found in clan societies that were researched. The clan in the case studies in this book has a common forefather, the members know who belong to the clan and the members are able to tell you the names of their clan family for generations back, they do have an area where they originate from and where they have their power base, and they do have clan elders, who have a political, military and judicial role within the clan, and represent the clan in conflicts between clans. It is therefore interesting to investigate why there seems to be a difference between the anthropological research and the political science research on clans and the state, since we see a combination of lineage and the clan. This certainly merits more research. In the literature on clans, sometimes the term “tribe” is (also) found. Though clan and tribe are not necessarily interchangeable, as we saw above, for some 14 15 16 17

Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective, 88–89. Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective, 37–44 and 88–89. Amjad Jaimoukha, Chechens: A Handbook (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 83–84. Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage, An Anthropological Perspective, pp.h 45–49.

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social scientists they are. Therefore, when the term “tribe” is used, it will be explained how this relates to the term “clan”. Thomas Franck, an international lawyer, discussed the similarities between “nation” and “tribe”. He postulated that both have a common ancestry and culture. Both “nation” and “tribe” have a glorified past, which unites and fortifies the bonds between individuals. Franck argued that a multi-ethnic state does not tend to emphasize a common past. Rather, multi-ethnic states tend to focus on a positive future, which is an improvement of the present.18 2

Clans, Society and Blood Feud, Honour

Little research has been conducted on the political role of clans in state building and transition.19 Anthropologists have done the most research on clans. Here we are interested in the political role of clans. Kathleen Collins, a specialist in clan politics, described clan politics as: Clan politics creates an informal regime, an arrangement of power and rules in which clans are the dominant social actors and political players; they transform the political system. Clan networks, not formal institutions and elected officials, hold and exercise real power. Clan politics has a corrosive effect on the formal regime, especially on democratic ­institutions; it further erodes the durability of both democratic and ­authoritarian institutions over time, as fragile, personalistic regimes cling to power.20 Collins defines clans as informal identity organisations based upon kinship.21 She recognises two principles that mark clan relations and identity:

18 19

20 21

Thomas M. Franck. “Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice”, The American Journal of International Law 90 (1996), 362–363. Joel Migdal. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 50, Marina Ottaway, “Think Again: Nation Building”, Global Policy Forum, Sept./Oct. 2002 at https://www.globalpolicy. org/component/content/article/172/29947.html, (accessed July 26 2019) and International Commentary, vol. ix, no. 34, (December 2013) special issue Somalia: Clan and State Politics at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/_COMMENTARY_ SOMALIA_ISSUE_DEC_2013.pdf (accessed July 26 2019). Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 3. Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 24.

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Kinship is the core foundation of clan relations and identity, and a network is the organizing principle of this unit. The clan is thus an informal organization built on an extensive network of kin and fictive, or perceived and imagined, kinship relations.22 Demian Vaisman, an Uzbek scholar, explained how the clan is both defined by kinship based on birth and family relationships, and fictive kinship based on local or regional networks, and business: The core clan consists of blood relatives of the family of the clan head, who occupy important positions. The core is extended by marriage connections. Clans usually strengthen their positions through family connections among several regional elite groupings. This cements the clan’s power and helps to extend it.23 Ekaterina Sokirianskaya, who works extensively on the North Caucasus, and in particular on Chechnya, used the definitions of the Russian ethnologist Vyacheslav Arutiunov and the Chechen traditionalist Khoz Ahmed Nukhaev: State building and policy-making in Ingushetia and Chechnya are shaped by the interaction of primordial patterns of social integration, primarily teips (clans) with the formal state-institutions and The Chechen people consist of tribal communities, regardless of whether this community has its classical completion, measured by origin from one forefather in the seventh generation or exists in a shortened variant till cousins and second cousins. This is the real social basis of our society, and the problem is in placing the social framework, i.e. institutional organization on this platform. And such a platform can be only the teip ­system, which would integrate kin – tribal relations and teip – tukhum units, and through them create a united social body.24

22 23 24

Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 24–25. D. Vaisman. “Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan”, in Y. Ro’i, Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (London, Frank Cass, 1995), 112. Ekaterina Sokirianskaya. “Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 4 (2005), 454.

19

Clans

From these definitions one can conclude that what unites social scientists in their definitions of clans is that clans are informal networks based on kinship, which may operate as political players. A commonly perceived risk is that clans may have a corrosive impact on state institutions. Clan societies have a very rigid concept of honour, which forms a core principle of their identity. Regardless of the ethnic composition or religious belief of the clan, honour is something that cuts across all clans. Most societies that have a clan structure, though not all, have a patriarchal culture.25 Honour can include that a man keeps his word, that he is a good worker and loyal to the tribal elder. In dealing with others, particularly men, a man must be honest and reliable. A perceived slight against the integrity of a person’s honour may lead to a blood feud. Blood feuds can rapidly escalate to prolonged violent conflict between two or more clans. For a Chechen male being honourable means keeping his word, providing sufficient material goods and support for his family, being a good friend, being fearless in the face of battle or danger and demonstrating exceptional hospitality.26 In parts of Pakistan, males must follow a behavioural code: the Pashtunwali. According to GlobalSecurity, the Pashtunwali requires bravery in an “all-or-nothing manner”. Every man must competently and fearlessly defend himself. In addition, every woman must be sexually pure and chaste. The sexual good repute of a man’s female relatives is vital to his personal honour.27 Other clan-based societies have their specific definitions of honour. However, in general they tend to highly value independence, self-reliance, hospitality, keeping one’s word and bravery. 3

Open and Closed Societies, the Position of Clan in Society

Clan-based societies are regarded as “closed societies”. Closed societies are based on family ties and honour.28 The society is patriarchal and marriages are often arranged. Violations of honour will result in a blood feud of (the clan of) the aggressor with the whole clan to which the family belongs. The strong clan network can also result in acts of clientelism, where clan members give other 25 26 27 28

The Tuareg are a people with a clan structure that is matriarchal. Emil Souleimanov. “Chechen Society”, Prague Watchdog May 25 2003, http://www.watch dog.cz/?show=000000-000015-000006-000006&lang=1,(accessed October 5 2010). Global Security. “Pashtunwali/Pashtunwaali”, Globalsecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity. org/military/world/pakistan/pashtunwali.htm, (accessed October 6 2010). Miloslav Bednáŕ. “Open Society and the European Union”, in Zuzana Parusniková, Robert S. Cohen (Eds.). Rethinking Popper (Springer, 2009), 237.

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members of the clan jobs, and reserve political positions for fellow clansmen. This system is seen in the economic field as well. While clan societies can protect their members in times when the state does not provide safety or minimal subsistence, there are also negative aspects of the clan structure. As a result of the patriarchal system, violations of human rights of women are not easily remedied in the courts, and it is more difficult for women to admit that they have been victim of human rights violations which are specifically aimed at women, such as domestic violence, sexual abuse, rape, or forced marriage. Collins found that intra-clan cohesiveness and survival goes further than the economic dependency of clan members upon each other (and the dependency on the elite of the clan). The norms of the clan, the identity and structure, also play an important role in cementing the clan.29 Albanian politics are an example of a society with a clan affiliation. Both clan and political activities are kept secret and quiet, away from the public sphere unless it is in the direct interest of the clan to publicly express their position or version of events.30 In the case of Albanian families (shpi), clans (fis) and political movements are closely-knit. Only when they feel safe, they will tell an outsider their side of the clan story.31 Clan allegiances have a direct impact on voting behaviours of Albanians. Clan allegiance also has an impact on whether or not an Albanian voter is likely to support a particular policy.32 Clans create allegiance in several ways. They can be related through kinship, culture, religion or language. This influences voting behaviour towards clan members. Another aspect that was found is that clan members are driven in their voting behaviour by the policies that favour the clan. There are many ways to engage tribes and clans in state building. This will be elaborated in the case studies in Part 2 of this book. The philanthropist George Soros defined open societies as economical and democratic; he conceived of them as more open to change and therefore more 29 30

31

32

Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 31. Pavlos-Ioannis Koktsidis and Casper Ten Dam. “A Success Story? Analysing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans”, East European Quarterly Summer (2008), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph& AN=34131165&site=ehost-live&scope=site, (accessed August 27 2010). Pavlos-Ioannis Koktsidis and Casper Ten Dam. “A Success Story? Analysing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans”, East European Quarterly Summer (2008), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph& AN=34131165&site=ehost-live&scope=site, (accessed August 27 2010). Klarita Gërxhani and Arthur Scram. “Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a  Clan Culture”, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/75439/1/749827890.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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prone to transparency and improvement, culminating in a globalised world. This is in contrast to those preferring archaic-styled closed societies. The idea of an “open society” is based on Karl Popper’s analysis of society. According to Popper, an “open society” is a society in which the leaders can be overthrown without a bloody coup. In a “closed society”, according to Popper, a bloody coup is required to change the leadership.33 The assumption is that when the state gets stronger, it is able to uphold the monopoly on violence and generate income through taxes. The rule of law ­prevails and administrative organs get stronger. In many cases it also means cutting back on corruption. The result will be that the state moves from a closed society to an open society. Francis Fukuyama described this as the transition to liberal democracy in his book Trust, The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity.34 Here, accountability is an important aspect of political and administrative life.35 The question remaining is whether it is possible to create the rule of law, incorporate clan members in efforts to democratise and strengthen the state.36 The transition period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in many places, prompted the strengthening of the clan to fill in the power vacuum and to ensure survival. The strengthening of clan networks increased control, protection and sharing of resources between clans and specific networks.37 In the Caucasus there was renewed activity of clan politics in Chechnya, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In Azerbaijan President Gaidar Aliev, who was president of Azerbaijan from 1969–1982 and from 1993–2003, relied on the Aliev clan, and provided his clan with considerable influence in the energy sector.38 According to the Georgian political scientist Tamara Dragadze, Georgian social organisation had been comprised of clans and extensive family networks, both prior to and 33

34 35 36 37 38

Samer Y. Saab. “‘Ideas’ in Development from George Soros: Power and Influence through Philanthropy?”, paper presented at John Hopkins University, November 2005, http:// mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1878/1/MPRA_paper_1878.pdf, (accessed October 5 2010). Karl Popper. The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume Two (New York: Routledge, 1945), 24. Francis Fukuyama, Trust, The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1995). Francis Fukuyama, “Fukuyama Says Ideas On Liberal Democracy “Misunderstood””, RFE/ RL, 14 October 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1072031.html, (accessed July 26, 2019). Michael Ignatieff describes this in his book Empire Lite, Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan (London: Vintage Publishers, 2003). Charles Fairbanks. “Weak States and Private Armies”, in M. Beissinger, C. Young (eds.), Beyond State Crisis, Post Colonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), 129–160. Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 305.

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during the Soviet Union. The Georgian military had traditionally been composed of the rural clans of central Georgia. The policy of Georgian president Zviad Gamsachurdia to disrupt local clan and patronage networks has been influential in the opposition to Gamsachurdia, making visible the sometimes conflictual relationship between clan and state.39 4

Clans and the State

State building projects are intended to guarantee security to the citizen and the state, by creating durable, transparent vertical institutions. In this process, indigenous governance systems are often overlooked. This book will focus on how clan-based societies impact, both positively and negatively, the state building process. The political power of the clan should not be underestimated, as Maria Sultan, a defence specialist, stated: A tribe inherently contains many of the functions of power of the state – it has tribal customs that function as laws; mechanisms of dispute resolution that act as judiciary organs; and in most cases, mechanisms of assigning executive authority in times of need, that is, normally, in times of an external threat.40 The former Soviet borders in Central Asia were arbitrarily drawn. Many ethnic groups were divided into two or more administrative units. In addition, some peoples in the Soviet Union were forcibly displaced during the Second World War, and tried to migrate back after the death of Stalin in 1956. Some of these people held a clan structure, just as did some peoples in Central Asia. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, clan identities and loyalties became more important than any allegiance to a nation-state.41 Although the states of Central Asia experienced different degrees of success with economic and political reforms, all of the former Soviet Central Asian states have a basis of clan politics and patronage networks.42 Clans still play an important role in the identity of the 39 40 41

42

Tamara Dragadze quoted in Collins, 307. Maria Sultan. “The Quest for Peace in Chechnya: the relevance of Pakistan’s Tribal Areas Experience”, Central Asian Survey December 22 No. 4 (2003), 443. Abraham Cohen. “Are Central Asia’s Weak States Getting Weaker?”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute February 12 2003, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/ item/7800-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2003-2-12-art-7800.html, (accessed July 26 2019). See Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006).

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Kyrgyz population in Kyrgyzstan. Although there is a fairly strong national sentiment in Kyrgyzstan, tribal and clan allegiances are more important to individuals than nationalism. Despite efforts by the Soviets, who in their imperialist politics tried to stamp out the clans, clan patronage networks became entrenched in bureaucracy. In the post-Soviet world, the entrenched clan networks further weakened the state by challenging the rule of law, as we will see in the cases further on in this book. Also, the clans directed state resources away from the broader public towards their patronage networks (their clan and allied clans).43 Clans are usually seen in a socio-anthropological sense. However, they are important current political and social actors. Successful state building must apply “thin law”.44 Thin law requires the acceptance and internalisation of processes, institutions and mechanisms by the population. The safeguarding of the rule of law and the application of justice has to be in accordance with local customs and methods of local socio-cultural organisation. If the clans are ignored, they can have a very negative impact on any state building procedure. As will be discussed in greater detail, clan structures do have a negative impact on certain aspects of state building, for example in the area of human rights. With the active, constructive participation of clans in the state building process, negotiations between customary laws and practices and state law and its mechanisms can be undertaken to find a mutually agreeable solution. Usually, clans have their power base in specific parts of the country. Each clan-based society sees a division between smaller, bigger, older, younger and politically important and less important clans. In Iraq, there is no “typical clan”. Clans on the Arabian Peninsula share a non-hierarchical and egalitarian organisational style. Each specific clan has its leadership style, which may be nomadic or semi-nomadic, as well as its own distinct internal politics.45 To draw on other examples of clan-based societies, in Somalia, clans do not have a centralised structure. Instead, Somali clans are organised according to clan-families, clans, sub-clans, primary lineages, and 43

44 45

Saltanat Berdikeeva. “National Identity in Kyrgyzstan: The Case of Clan Politics”, presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities’ 11th Annual World Convention entitled “Nationalism in an Age of Globalization”, Columbia University, New York, March 23 – 25 (2006), https://aytmatov.org/metinler/national_identity_of_kyrgyzstan_-_the_case _of_clan_politics.pdfBerd (accessed July 26 2019). Giovanni Bassu. “Law overruled: strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict states”, Global Governance Jan-March (2008), https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800689, (accessed July 26 2019). Michael Eisenstadt. “Iraq: tribal engagement lessons learned”, Military Review (SeptemberOctober 2007), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a499906.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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dia-paying groups. The dia-paying groups are the most important group of the Somali clan system. They are formed by alliances between lineages within a clan. The dia-paying group is responsible for paying blood money and mutual assistance, particularly in the area of defence and assistance to clan members.46 5

Co-opting Clans into State Institutions

The co-optation of clan members into the institutions of the state has been mentioned earlier. Leaving specific state functions to the clan and their traditions was a method used in the Afghan-Pakistani border area by the British in the 19th century.47 This was the only way the British could get the area under control. Co-optation was also a tactic used in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, who appointed his clan members to important posts, thereby also strengthening his own position. After 73 years of Communism many of the clan structures in the Soviet Union had weakened, but since in many republics communism was replaced overnight by nationalism, the re-invention of the clan was a perfect way to mobilise the population against the former regime. The reintroduction of the clan structure took place in Chechnya under former Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev, but also in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Clans function as a solid base of society. They have existed for a very long time and cannot easily be removed. In several states where the clan is still prominent, we see that there are several legal systems existing in parallel to each other, such as the national formal law and traditional clan law or adat law. Conflict resolution mechanisms from the informal or traditional system can be mixed with principles from the formal law to strengthen institutions. Clans can be brought into compliance with the state in two ways, i.e. force the clans into administrative compliance or co-opt the clans. The Caucasus specialist Svante Cornell argued: There are two basic ways for a state to exercise control over predominantly tribal areas: either to break down the tribal structures and integrate the population into the social structures of the state, or to co-opt 46 47

Jama Mohamed. “Kinship and contract in Somali politics”, Africa Spring (2007), https:// www.jstor.org/stable/40026707, (accessed July 26 2019). Maria Sultan, “The Quest for Peace in Chechnya, The Relevance of Pakistan’s Tribal Areas Experience”, 437–357.

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tribal leaders and use them as instruments of power in the tribal areas. Most states facing this dilemma have employed a mixture of these two strategies, often playing tribal leaders against one another.48 The first method is through intentional policies of weakening the clan through targeting its members by deportations and massacres. These actions can reduce the clans’ numbers and cause its extinction. In the case of the North ­Caucasus, the Russians in the 19th century consolidated their administrative control through the use of force and deportation. This did not make them ­popular among the Circassians, a West-Caucasian people with a clan-based society. The majority of the Circassians fled the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the 1860s. More than 1.5 million Circassians either fled to the Ottoman Empire or were murdered. According to the 1897 census in the Russian Empire, only 217,000 Circassians had remained in the Russian Empire.49 Similar processes were the deportation of the Chechens to Central Asia and Siberia during the Second World War. A second method is to co-opt the clan, to engage in a mutually beneficial power-sharing contract in which the clan remains in control of internally regulating the relationships between its members on its territory and determining in which economic activities it will engage. The state remains responsible for distributing funds for infrastructure, such as education and health, foreign policy and the military. In Yemen clans are being co-opted in the central politics, with the aim of severing their traditional support base.50 In Jordan the Hashemite monarchy has co-opted the clans. Clan-law was officially administered until 1976, and in practice is still administered. A nephew of the King has been Advisor of Tribal Affairs. This means that he consulted with and represented the clans.51 The approach of co-opting the clan, as we see from these two examples in different states, is not necessarily one of assimilation but rather one of m ­ utually 48 49 50 51

Svante Cornell, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics”, Orbis Winter 45 No. 1 (2001), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387(00)00056-9, (accessed July 26 2019). Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. “Circassia”, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, March 25 2008, https://unpo.org/members/20855, (accessed July 26 2019). Sarah Phillips. “What Comes Next in Yemen?: Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building”, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Number 107 (March 2010), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribes1.pdf (accessed July 30 2019), 7. Egbert Harmsen. Islam, Civil Society and Social Work Muslim Voluntary Welfare Associations in Jordan Between Patronage and Empowerment (Hoofddorp: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 93.

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beneficial co-existence. Clan structures have historically been very difficult to assimilate into societies that do not know a clan structure. There is a high degree of solidarity among clan members as well as a significant degree of strife or feuding to increase a member’s relative social position within the clan. The term assimilation entails that the clan structures are no longer present, that they forfeit in the new social construct. Another development is that the society rapidly modernised and urbanised and clan members became dispersed throughout a large geographic area and for various reasons were unable to maintain their kinship relationships and practice their traditions. Helen Chapin Metz, a specialist on the Middle East, described the situation in Iraq in 1932, when significant land reforms and other modernization processes were taking hold: The accelerated pace of modernization and growth of a highly nationalistic intelligentsia, of a bureaucracy, and of a powerful military, all favoured the cities. Thus, while the economic position of the shaykhs had improved significantly, their role in tribal society and their status in ­relation to the rapidly emerging urban elite had seriously eroded.52 The sociologist Rodolpho Stavenhagen argued this in relation to Kurdistan: Conflicts between tribes, sometimes over land and resources, tend to turn into long-standing feuds in which vengeance or vendettas take precedence over other forms of conflict resolution. Nation states have tried, with variable success, to break the system of tribal vendettas and impose the national legal framework for administration of justice in the Kurdish areas.53 Co-opting clans means that the state and the clans have entered a social or political contract where their respective structures are left intact. An example of co-optation can be given from Palestinian territories under Arafat. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Palestinian leaders opted for a hierarchical model of governance. Military and political efforts in the Palestinian territories were centralised and had a clear chain of command. This structure was challenging to manage, as it was easy to disrupt and neutralise. When Arafat became ­president of the Palestinian National Authority, he changed the structure of 52 53

Helen Chapin Metz, “Iraq: A Country Study”, in Iraq: Issues, Historical Background, Bibliography ed. Leon M. Jeffries (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc, 2003), 150. Rodolfo Stavenhagen. Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State (Houndmills Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), 68.

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various organisations, including the armed services in such a way that they would report directly to him. This eliminated several steps or gatekeepers and made the chain of command harder to compromise. Arafat had managed to control most of the Palestinian Authority’s cash flow and appeals for budgets had to be directly brought to him. The civilian organisations that received money from the Palestinian National Authority were based on clan alliances. In return, the clan-based group would provide political support to Arafat. Some of these groups also created their own militias or allied themselves with various Palestinian security services. When Arafat died this left many organisations with no formal ties to the Palestinian Authority and thus they began to look for a new source of funding.54 It left many institutions with a dearth of institutional capabilities; to fundraise independently of government support, to petition and lobby government as an entity and not a specific person and to cooperate with other institutions for strategic and non-tactical purposes.55 The intent of Arafat was to be able to maintain relative order within Palestinian society. In having so much direct control over the allocation of resources, Arafat was able to maintain a broad range of support by maintaining a type of power balance between groups. Co-opting the clans into compliance does pose its own risks. It reinforces a political culture of entitlement where the state may be regarded as a way of personal and clan enrichment. The newly elected leader may be forced to maintain payments to powerful clan elders to maintain stability and support. These issues will be discussed in greater detail in the section on civil society and clans. A mutually agreeable accommodation between the central government and a clan-based society was reached between the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and its minority clan-based indigenous population. Upon the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the northern indigenous peoples of the Republic of Sakha and the autonomous districts of Mansiikii and Yamalo-Nenetskii, successfully negotiated greater rights of self-determination. Between 1992 and 1999, “seven laws were passed designed to clarify the legal status of the indigenous peoples of Yakutia”.56 Although the laws passed do not allocate any support funding, they allow indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional economic models. 54 55 56

Jim Lederman, “Palestine and Israel: clan vs nation, tribe vs state”, Open Democracy 10 July 2006, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/gaza_sum_3727jsp/, (accessed July 26 2019). Jim Lederman, “Palestine and Israel: clan vs nation, tribe vs state”, (accessed July 26 2019). Anna A. Sirina, “Clan Communities Among the Northern Indigenous Peoples of the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic: A Step to Self-Determination?” Rebuilding Identities Pathways to Reform in Post-Soviet Siberia, (ed) Erich Kasten (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 2005), 198. http://www.siberian-studies.org/publications/PDF/risirina.pdf, (accessed September 1 2010).

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There were some concerns about the degree of assimilation of the Northern indigenous populations into other cultures, and their focus was more on the family and not “the clan”. The so-called “clan communities” were effective vehicles for preserving reindeer herding, among other traditional methods of livelihood.57 6

Clans and the Rule of Law

In an effort to strengthen the state, the first prerequisite is to reinforce the rule of law. The rule of law is based on the separation of powers (Trias Politica), as formulated by Charles de Montesquieu. The legislature, the executive and the judiciary should function independently of each other, with a division of responsibilities, though each should also hold the others responsible.58 The rule of law is broadly defined to include many different components, including checks and balances, institutional mechanisms that support peace and human rights, functioning courts and legislatures as well as a free press, freedom of speech and the existence of non-governmental organisations.59 The rule of law can be seen as containing “moral or legal goods”, such as ensuring “justice”, “equality” or “fairness”. Furthermore, the rule of law “focus on how well the law and legal system perform some function”.60 This includes an expectation of a fair trial, integrity of the police, which includes a ban on torture and the taking of bribes, transparency in the recruitment of public jobs, the power to collect taxes, state monopoly on violence, the principle that all citizens are equal before the law, minorities are treated equally before the law, the condition in jails and prisons is in compliance with (inter)national legal standards, and elections are fair and free and take place regularly. 7

Clans and John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples

In this book the aim is to explain how the democratisation of the clan society should be both a bottom-up and top-down process. This interdisciplinary 57 58 59 60

Anna A. Sirina. “Clan Communities Among the Northern Indigenous Peoples of the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic: A Step to Self-Determination?” 202–206. Charles-Louis de Secondat de la Brède et de Montesquieu, De L’Esprit des Lois (London, 1787). Jane Stromseth. “Post-Conflict Rule of Law Building: The Need For a Multi-Layered, Synergistic Approach”, William and Mary Law Review 49 (2008), 1444. Brian Levy. Governance Reform Bridging Monitoring and Action (Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2007), 67.

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r­ esearch, which takes into account aspects of anthropology, which are apart from international law and political science, differs from Eurocentric political theories. In order to see how these theories differ, and where they overlap, we will compare the reality of transforming a clan society with John Rawls The Law of Peoples, as an example of a Eurocentric political theory. Our work continues Rawls’ analysis of the ideal state, which he explained in A Theory of Justice, but considers as well relations with other states. According to John Rawls the basis of the relationship between citizens in a state is the social contract. His theories are influenced by the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau and his Du Contrat Social (1762). Citizens freely give some of their power, which they had in the original position to the state, in order to protect them and enable them to live their lives to their maximum benefit. This is the social contract. Rawls states that the ideal democracy is a state consisting of informed and politically active citizens. The state is transparent, has a functioning system of checks and balances and is respectful of human rights. How does this utopian view of the state apply to the state building and democratisation process of states with a clan structure? Analogous to the procedure in his book A Theory of Justice, Rawls discerns eight principles of justice among free and democratic peoples: 1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. 2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 5. Peoples have the right to self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence. 6. Peoples are to honour human rights. 7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions to have a just or decent political and social regime.61 Rawls concludes with respect to the equality of peoples: “No people has the right to self-determination, or a right to secession, at the expense of subjugating another people. Nor may a people protest their condemnation by the world society when their domestic institutions violate human rights, or limit the rights of minorities living among them”.62 John Rawls defines the law of peoples as “a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law 61 62

John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) 37. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 38.

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and practice”.63 In the ideal state, a utopian state, there is a law of peoples based on the rule of law. John Rawls takes as the starting point a decent people, defined as a people living in a state which follows the structure of what Rawls calls the ideal state. The organs of the state have respect for culture, the cultures represented in the state and religion. Since decent people have the right to approve or disapprove of the policies of their government, conflict and war will only be waged in self-defence. The autonomy of others is respected. A decent people, thus governed by respect for culture, human rights and being peace-loving, needs public reason in order to have a working democratic system guaranteeing these rights. The exercise of public reason presupposes that peoples need to have a public political forum, impartial judges, government officials, legislation and candidates for office. In addition to free and democratic peoples, Rawls calls those peoples who are not free to choose their leadership on a periodic basis “burdened peoples”. They lack basic and human rights, and thus are less protected by their leaders. Burdened societies have unfavourable conditions. They do not have the knowhow and resources to be decent states. Burdened societies may have an oppressive government, a corrupt elite and may be unable to uphold and respect women’s rights. The aim of state building should be to assist these societies to acquire the know-how and resources to become a well-ordered society.64 Finally, Rawls characterises outlaw states, inhabited by peoples who are neither liberal peoples nor decent peoples. They cannot choose their government, don’t have functioning checks and balances and there are problems with respecting human rights. The states in which they live are characterised by aggression and expansion. In outlaw states the regime refuses to acknowledge the population with a reasonable law of peoples.65 Rawls furthermore distinguishes between liberal peoples, who are decent peoples and characterised by tolerance towards others, and non-liberal peoples, who can be decent but can also not be decent. He indicates three basic features that liberal peoples have: “a reasonably just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental interests; citizens united by what Mill called ‘common sympathies’; and finally, a moral nature. The first is institutional, the second is cultural, and the third requires a firm attachment to a political (moral) conception of rights and justice”.66

63 64 65 66

John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 3. John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples”, Critical Inquiry Vol. 20, No. 1 (1993), 62, 64. John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples”, 60. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 23–24.

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Well-ordered, non-liberal societies will accept the same law of peoples that well-ordered, liberal societies accept. Here Rawls understands a well-ordered society as being peaceful and non-expansionist, where there is legitimacy and respect for human rights. Its law is based on the common good and a wellfunctioning justice system. The state has a reasonable consultation hierarchy, in which there is room for different positions and respect for basic human rights.67 The question is to what extent the liberal decent people in their foreign relations with decent non-liberal peoples or outlaw states are bound to have respect, toleration in Rawls’ vocabulary, for these peoples. Rawls even mentions that violation of certain rights may result in sanctions against those who are not in compliance with the rights of decent liberal peoples. 8

Liberal and Decent States

Liberal and hierarchical states, which are defined as parties to the Law of Peoples, are not burdened states or outlaw states, and can at best establish a modus vivendi with outlaw states. Rawls regards cooperation in federative organs like the United Nations (UN) as a possibility to help states that are not (yet) hierarchical, decent states to acquire democracy and formulate human rights.68 By working through the UN, states avoid interference in other states, since respect for states, even if these are not organised according to the preferred principle, is part of Rawls’ worldview. The clash between Rawls’ utopian view and the reality is that there are states that do not want to be democracies, or at least not the kind of democracy that is presented by Rawls. Many states that are in transition towards democracy have problems with corruption, fair elections, transparency, accountability and respect for human rights. Nevertheless, we call them democracies. These states may aim for another kind of democracy than those kinds of democracy found in the West. States in transition may not be interested in democracy, but rather prefer some form of authoritarian regime. Finally, there are states that are an absolute monarchy, like Saudi Arabia, or a theocratic state, where there is no room for other forms of religion, like Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. Based on the above analysis of John Rawls Law of Peoples, we apply his theory of decent people and decent society to the clan society and state building efforts. The question is: How can a description of the “decent society”, if state 67 68

John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples”, Critical Inquiry Vol. 20, No. 1 (1993), 37, 50–52. John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples”, 61.

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building is the main goal in a democratic state or a moderate state, be applied to the cases in this book? How are the peoples that do not get full democratic and human rights characterised? And if human rights are granted, which human rights? If we take into account values and norms of a clan-based society in the state building process, how does the fact that women’s rights are less developed affect this categorisation for clan-based societies? Which values must be conserved and which values can be dismissed? Why would clan societies be interested in a transition towards democracy? Would they have the right to form an authoritarian regime or theocracy according to Rawls? In this book what seems to be a dichotomy is addressed: on the one hand, the thesis is that in weak states clan-based societies have more influence. In state building or in state reconstruction it is necessary to take into account this political, cultural and religious fact. On the other hand, one can also say that clan-based societies impede the construction of a modern, democratic state. The causal relations between the political and social factors can be very different if one takes one or the other epistemological point of view. If the theory of the Law of Peoples with its decent peoples, burdened peoples and outlaw states is applied to the relation between the clan society and the state, the question is the following: Does clan society impede proper state building aimed at democratic or moderate states? In the terminology of Rawls, the intervention of decent peoples has to take place with the aim to bring human rights to the peoples and the right to vote to non-decent peoples or burdened peoples (and in some of our cases an outlaw state or at least a burdened state). This would certainly be a Eurocentric way of classifying peoples. It seems in the case of clan societies, where for example women’s rights are underdeveloped and given less priority, that this might result in sanctions to force rights to be adopted. If we take the view that we need to incorporate the clan society in state building efforts, we create the state from a bottom-up perspective, building on what is in place. Here a danger is that we give old systems too much credit, while new tendencies in the state are overlooked. We could wonder if people can be inherently decent within a clan society, or if they need to be educated into becoming a decent people. The historical perspective of Rawls is based on the social contract theory of Rousseau and his utopian state as developed in A Theory of Justice, where the state is developed without interference by others, a situation that is not the case in international relations. One would say that the society provides for important and less important clans, an institutional structure and legislation within the clan system. In the cases under investigation, we see that the clan will be co-opted into the

33

Clans

state structure, regardless of whether this is in a communist, Baathist or other system, as will become clear in the case studies. This is the case because the clan society adheres to the social contract of Jean Jacques Rousseau. If we look at the respect for human rights granted in clan societies there is a problem with transparency and corruption. Clan members have a duty to support their fellow clan members. This means that clientelism, or corruption, to a certain extent, is a fact. Since clan societies are often patriarchal, the unequal position of women with regard to men has to receive special attention. These are two problems that would not allow the peoples in the cases under investigation to be called decent peoples. And maybe they don’t want this either, because it is part of their culture. Do we force them to adopt human rights and democratic values? Positive aspects of clan society are its conflict resolution methods in which mediation and reconciliation are central. The parties will be able to continue living together. A negative aspect is the existence of blood feuds, which continues and aggravates conflict. In conclusion, it is difficult as an outsider to be sufficiently respectful of clan societies, when intervening in order to strengthen the state. John Rawls expects a decent people to be tolerant towards those who are different, but that being said, his ideal state remains a utopia. Clan societies provide different challenges. In this debate the role of cultural relativism, and the standard for human rights and democratic rule play major and contradicting roles. 9

Clan Politics

As we saw on page 17, Collins described clan politics as: Clan politics creates an informal regime, an arrangement of power and rules in which clans are the dominant social actors and political players; they transform the political system. Clan networks, not formal institutions and elected officials, hold and exercise real power. Clan politics has a corrosive effect on the formal regime, especially on democratic ­institutions; it further erodes the durability of both democratic and ­authoritarian institutions over time, as fragile, personalistic regimes cling to power.69 69

Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 3.

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The Soviets were able to suppress much of the clan related politics, but once the counter-force was removed, clan politics quickly returned to the public arena throughout parts of the Caucasus.70 A 2009 report by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee described the recent political history and the role of clans in Azerbaijan: “Since late President Heydar Aliyev, came to power in 1993, the influence of regions and clan was strengthened in the political and economic sphere in Azerbaijan”.71 The Norwegian Helsinki Committee report went further and stated: A key factor in the power structure built by Heydar Aliyev was the selection of managers based on close contacts and family ties. Under the rule of the senior and junior Aliyevs, the country was, and is still, dominated by two main clans – the Nakhchivan and the Yerevan Azerbaijanis (the YerAz clan). The Yerevan Azerbaijanis are ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia who were deported in the 1950s and most recently in 1988.72 Clan representation in the administration is a way to guarantee representation of clans in the political process. There are several ways of ensuring group representation in administrations. In the North Caucasus, Russian President Putin favoured supporters of his policies from big clans. In Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov is from an important clan and was brought to power in April 2007. Members of Kadyrov’s clan are appointed to important positions within his administration.73 In Albania, there is a significant power imbalance between the northern clans and the southern clans. The northern part of Albania tends to be more isolated and traditional than the southern part. That said, the s­ outhern clans exert considerably more influence and power in the national government than do the northern clans.74

70 71 72 73 74

Joseph A. Kechichian and Theodore W. Karasik. “The Crisis in Azerbaijan: How Clans Influence the Politics of an Emerging Republic”, Middle East Policy 4 No. 1, 59. Norwegian Helsinki Committee. “Azerbaijan’s Dark Island: Human Rights Violations in Nakhchivan”, Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2 (2009), 15. Norwegian Helsinki Committee. “Azerbaijan’s Dark Island: Human Rights Violations in Nakhchivan”, 16. Liz Fuller. “New Chechen Head Moves to Consolidate Power”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, April 13 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347534.html, (accessed February 28 2008). Miranda Vickers. The Albanians, A Modern History (London, Tauris, 1995), 5, 102–103, 105, 235.

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10

Western Prejudices of Clans in Society

While investigating the role of clans in the state, we noticed several differences between the clan society and the Western democratic, merit-based state. One of the aspects was the existence of prejudices towards clan society, which might hamper the debate on the relation between the clan and the state. We will now investigate some of these prejudices, which may be explicit as well as implicit in the debate about the incorporation of the clan in the state building project. 10.1 Clan is Not Equal to Backwardness There is a perception among many donors and interveners that clan societies are not well-developed societies.75 Clan-based societies have their own mechanisms of social regulation and play a vital role in maintaining social relationships between clan members and between clans. Whenever clan rules are violated, there are conflict resolution mechanisms within the clan and conflict resolution mechanisms between clans. For example, in Somalia, women developed inter-clan dialogue opportunities in an effort to increase communication and reduce violence between warring parties. Somali women used their position as both members of their father’s clan and used their knowledge of their husband’s clan, as their children belong to the husband’s clan, to develop mediation and peace building opportunities.76 When the nation-state is unable or unwilling to provide basic political services, the clan is able. When the nation-state is unable or unwilling to develop and implement sound macro-economic policies that promote prosperity for all, the clan will seek to provide work for its clan members. The network within and between clans is not substantially different from professional networks within an open society. One difference is that the open society has – in an ideal situation – transparency with regard to the appointment of people for specific jobs. Another difference is that open societies have stronger law enforcement mechanisms to combat a black economy and corruption.

75 76

Lowell Barrington. Comparative Politics: Structures and Choices (Australia, Wadsworth Learning, 2013), 101. Sumie Nakaya. “Women and gender equality in peace processes: from women at the negotiating table to postwar structural reforms in Guatemala and Somalia”, Global Governance 9 No. 4 (2003), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/glogo9&i=469, (­accessed July 26 2019).

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10.2 Are Clans and Democracy Opposed? The horizontal organisation of clan societies, often without nobility, means that it is easier to democratise such a society than a society that is composed of an elaborate system of social classes, which are impenetrable.77 In Chechnya, outsiders can join the clan and marriages take place between spouses of different clans. Though one is born in a clan and cannot choose a clan, marriage and the resolving of blood-feuds can result in a change of clan. It has often been the desire of other states to impose democracy (or communism in the case of Central Asia and the Caucasus) to eradicate the clan structure in state organs in order to replace it with loyal persons. The removal of clans from state institutions has been a problematic process. In the Caucasus, the removal of clans from state institutions has resulted in a practice where the important clans have been co-opted in the state administration, and after decades of communism, the power balance was comparable to the situation before the communists came to power.78 One of the crucial elements in democracy is transparency, both in engaging people, where the government (in principal) appoints the best person to a specific office, and in accounting for government expenditure. These aspects of accountability remain concerns in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus. Clientelism is also a problem that has its roots in the clan democracy, where clan members are appointed to positions by other clan members. The policy by the Communist government to eradicate aspects of clan society in Central Asia and the Caucasus failed. The same holds for the policy of eradication of clan society in Albania, which started already in the early 1930s under King Zog. Especially in the north of Albania, where the state is less successful in maintaining law and order, infrastructure is less developed than in the rest of the country, unemployment is high and security of the citizenry cannot be guaranteed sufficiently by the government, while the power of the clans is considerable.79 Despite decades of war, clans and clan law continue to play an important role in Afghanistan. 10.3 Are Clans and Democracy Compatible? As we saw above, clan societies tend to be horizontal, decentralised and often do not have nobility. If they have had nobility, as in the case of the Circassians,

77 78 79

Arthur Byhan. Civilisation Caucasienne (Paris: Payot, 1936), 50–51. Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 225. Charlotte Hille, Statebuilding and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus (Leiden, Brill, 2010), 19.

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the social status of the nobility is not far above the average citizen.80 As we saw, the clans are often accessible by non-clan members. Through a series of rituals, a non-clan member can join a clan. This means that clan societies allow for inclusion. Clans are social and political actors and project their interests in the public sphere through supporting their members in elections and in social and economic relationships with other clans. Clans and clan alliances can also serve as the basis of a political party or political platform. A study conducted in Chechnya found that the outcome of the elections is strongly influenced by clan affiliation.81 One of the important tenants in democracy is transparency of governmental processes. Transparency is demonstrated in the election process in which the most qualified candidate is elected. Transparency is also the accountability of public funds, to whom they were paid and for what purpose. Thirdly, transparency is also needed in the decision-making process. Transparency International defines transparency as follows: “Transparency” can be defined as a principle that allows those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes. It is the duty of civil servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, predictably and understandably.82 Clientelism is also a concern and can be defined as: Clientelist relations as dyadic (two-person), voluntary, reciprocal, faceto-face links between individuals of unequal status who exchange noncomparable goods and services in a relationship that may involve ­affectivity, is based on norms of reciprocity and obligation, and plays out over time and across a broad series of interactions.83 80 81 82 83

A people in the North Caucasus, divided over several republics, notably Adygea, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Abkhazia, Arthur Byhan. Civilisation Caucasienne (Paris, Payot, 1936), 150–151. Yekaterina Sokirianskaia. “Families and Clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya, A Fieldwork Report”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 4, (2005), 463–464. Transparency International. “What is ‘transparency’?”, Transparency International http:// www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq#faqcorr2 (accessed October 5 2010). Tina Hilgers. “Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico’s prd in Comparative Perspective”, Latin America Politics and Society Winter 2008, https://doi-org .proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2008.00032.x, (accessed July 26 2019).

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Clientelism or patrimonialism is usually interpreted in one of the following ways: (1) a set of social relations at either the community or nation-state level, mediated by personal loyalty and governed by bonds of dependence and subordination; (2) the rent-seeking behaviour and personalist patterns of authority practiced by African leaders in selected country settings; (3) an economic logic distinguished by the continual blurring of public service and private gain, with serious implications for economic development; (4) a characteristic regime type associated with most African countries not only during the period of one-party rule, but also in the present period of democratization.84 The concern with clientelism in clan-based societies is two-fold. The first aspect of clientelism is that it weakens the state and makes processes less transparent. The second aspect of clientelism in many parts of clan-based societies is that it is culturally demanded that members of the same clan help one another out, even when they hold public office. In Tajikistan corruption and clan affiliations are closely interrelated. Members of the same clan receive preferential treatment.85 Representing the clans in the administration is beneficial to strengthening the state, provided that the administration is strong enough to detect and prevent corruption. This means that whenever assistance is given by foreign donors to strengthen the state, the assistance must go towards the strengthening of state institutions, not enriching a specific clan. The United States Institute of Peace argued that restoring the rule of law and promoting good governance were key aspects for societies emerging from long-term violent conflict.86 We have to realise that restoring the rule of law means restoring the positive law, not the traditional law, and good governance is state governance, and will not per se include room for clans in the state institutions. The United States ­Institute of Peace report identified the following lesson learned from 84 85 86

Anne Pitcher, Mary H. Moran, and Michael Johnston. “Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa”, African Studies Review April 2009, https://doi-org.proxy .uba.uva.nl:2443/10.1353/arw.0.0163, (accessed July 26 2019). Letizia Paoli, Irina Rabkov and Victoria A. Greenfield. “Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narcostate”, Journal of Drug Issues 37 No. 4 (2007), 957. United States Institute of Peace. “Between the Jirga and the Judge Alternative Dispute Resolution in Southeastern Afghanistan”, United States Institute of Peace The Liaison Office Program Brief/1 March (2009), 1, http://www.usip.org/files/file/jirga_judge.pdf, (accessed October 6 2010).

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­ fghanistan: “Collaboration between traditional and modern systems enhancA es the transparency and accountability of both systems”.87 The conflict resolution capabilities of clan-based societies are beneficial in state building efforts. These conflict resolution mechanisms help reduce violence and can help reduce social strife. Not all clan-based societies use the same conflict resolution mechanisms. The specific methods of conflict resolution for the four case studies will be discussed in greater detail in Part 2 of this book. 10.4 Incorporating the Clan in Weak State Structures Clans have very strong horizontal stability, forging alliances quickly as the situation dictates and deploying resources rapidly to combat an outside threat. Should a clan leave a region because of a blood feud, the other clans expand their territory, larger clans may split and form smaller clans. Hence, the socioeconomic political void is quickly filled by another clan. The challenge in clan societies is vertical stability. Loyalty in clan societies is to the leaders, not the institution. When looking at the Chechen society, before the Russian conquest there were no social distinctions other than wealth and honour. The state had a uniform code of law, but lacked a government.88 Iraqi historian Ghassan al-Atiyyah said about the difference between the nomadic settled tribes: War rather than peace was their natural condition. Each tribe has its own rules and norms which regulated a life based on the principle of equality of kinsfolk and of supremacy of communal interest… Traditionally, the Bedouin tribes had defied all kinds of authority and had constituted a permanent menace to the settled tribes and fringe towns.89 Lack of respect to formal institutions poses several threats to the stability of government and the sustainability of reforms. Without any form of loyalty of clans state building becomes very difficult, if not impossible. In order for a clan-based society to successfully democratise, their practices and habits need 87

88 89

United States Institute of Peace. “Between the Jirga and the Judge Alternative Dispute Resolution in Southeastern Afghanistan”, United States Institute of Peace The Liaison ­Office Program Brief/1 March (2009), 6, http://www.usip.org/files/file/jirga_judge.pdf, (accessed October 6 2010). Johanna Nichols and Arbi Vagapov. Chechen-English and English-Chechen Dictionary (Oxon: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 6. Samira Haj. The Making of Iraq Capital, Power and Ideology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 15.

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to be incorporated within the overall processes of the state. This might give the clans a reason to co-operate. There is a relation between the reluctance of tribes to cooperate with the central authorities and the fact that the tribes play a pivotal role in the conflict in Afghanistan.90 An example of constructive accommodation between state institutions and clan-based governance mechanisms is provided by the United States Institute of Peace’s The Liaison Office, in which they stated the following about Afghanistan: As a matter of fact, tribes often establish agreements when the formal governance system has failed. By contrast, when the state is strong, it signs agreements with tribes that oblige them to maintain security (or other state policies) within specified areas of tribal jurisdiction in exchange for resources and a degree of local autonomy.91 Though it is argued in this book that clans and state are not mutually exclusive, the co-operation between the two is not necessarily friendly or easy. Thus, in clan-based societies the challenges to effective state building include the ability of the central government to negotiate a mutually agreeable legal code, even dividing which legal codes (national law, traditional tribal law, religious law) apply to specific situations, as well as the nature of the enforcement mechanism. By expressly including the tribes in negotiations, state institutions are strengthened because there is the potential for greater acceptance and legitimacy of state institutions from a wider segment of the population. 11 Conclusion It might appear as if clans are mini-states, often being located in specific areas, having their own internal conflict resolution system (as indicated in the adat, pashtoonwali, kanun, and other customary codes of behaviour), having their own rules of behaviour, and providing security and financial wellbeing for 90

91

Roohullah Rahimi. “Afghanistan: Exploring the Dynamics of Sociopolitical Strife and the Persistence of the Insurgency”, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (2010), 6, https://reliefweb .int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-exploring-dynamics-sociopolitical-strife-and -persistence-insurgency, (accessed July 26 2019). The Liaison Office. “Tribal Jurisdiction and Agreements The Key to Sub-National Governance in South-eastern Afghanistan”, The Liaison Office, 3, https://www.boell.de/sites/ default/files/uploads/2010/03/tlo_policy_brief_-_tribal_contracts_-_2009.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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their group. They also have a clan elder who has political, religious and judicial powers and can mediate with other clans. Clan societies are horizontally organised. There is not always a need for a unifying leader in times of peace.92 Therefore, it is rather easy to organise clans in a nation-state, as long as the internal structure is left intact. Using a blueprint from non-clan-based society when strengthening state institutions will fail as it severely disrupts the relations and power bases that have existed for centuries in a clan-based society. The local population will not easily be willing to shed their traditions and practices, depending on the level of closedness of society. However, when the state is able to provide rights and respect for all clans and minority groups, able to provide security, create stable macro-economic conditions for job growth, and create a strong and transparent administration, there is no reason to expect the clans to oppose state building measures. 92

Major David Allen. “The Trembling Balance: Peacekeeping in the Tribal City”, Defence Studies 3 No. 2 (2003), 85–91.

Chapter 2

Statehood and the Clan “Liberal democracies which are unwilling to repair collapsed states, to create democracy where none existed, and to remain on guard until the institutions are self-sustaining and self-reproducing, must inevitably discover that virtual victory is a poor substitute for the real thing”.1 michael ignatieff

After the fall of Communism at the beginning of the 1990s, when several new states were created, the right to self-determination became an important tool to deal with minorities and peoples. State building got momentum. Many states went through a period of violent conflict, and all faced weakness during their transition phase. In the cases analysed in this book state building took place after the Second World War, and in the case studies the interest is especially focused on state building during the 1990s and beyond.2 This chapter is concerned with defining the criteria on state building from a legal perspective, in order to understand how the state functions. Aspects central to the state such as sovereignty, the right to self-determination, the definition of the nation state, the principle of uti possidetis, and the risks that weak and failed states pose when it comes to the rule of law and security in a wider context are investigated. With this background we can analyse the relation between the clan society and the state in later chapters. 1 Sovereignty Article 1 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, also referred to as the Montevideo Convention of 1933, describes a state as having a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the ability to enter into relations with other states.3 James Crawford, the specialist on state building, further elaborated on these criteria and included independence, sovereignty, 1 Michael Ignatieff. Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Chatto & Windus, 2001), 210. 2 Part of this chapter was previously published in Charlotte Hille, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus (Leiden, Brill, 2010). 3 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 70–71, Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (London: Routledge, 1997), 75–79.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_004

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permanence, the willingness and ability to conform to international law, a certain degree of civilisation, recognition by other states, and an internal legal order.4 Territories that have not been internationally recognised as being states are often regarded as secessionist or breakaway territories. If they comply with the criteria of having a territory, a permanent population and a government, they fit the criteria the declaratory theory applies to states, and can therefore be seen as de facto states.5 One such example is Nagorno Karabakh, which has not been internationally recognised and cannot enter into treaties with the United Nations or other states. The general practice in international politics is to be cautious to recognise territory that seeks external sovereignty in order to avoid the splintering of larger nations into numerous small nations and to maintain some global stability in international relations.6 Explicit recognition by other states, which is a fourth criterion in the Montevideo Convention, is important for the constitutive theory, and is leading in international law and international relations. Two leading international lawyers, Antonio Cassese and Ian Brownlie deal extensively with sovereignty in their books. Antonio Cassese states about sovereignty: Traditional international law was based on a set of rules protecting the sovereignty of States and establishing their formal equality in law. In 1945, while drafting the UN Charter, the “founding fathers” proclaimed “sovereign equality of all its Members” (Article 2.1) as one of the organization’s principles.7 Cassese gives an extensive definition of sovereignty: Sovereignty includes the following sweeping powers and rights. (1) The power to wield authority over all the individuals living in the territory. This power might even be regarded as the quintessence of sovereignty. (2) The power to freely use and dispose of the territory under the State’s jurisdiction and perform all activities deemed necessary or beneficial to the population living there.

4 James Crawford. The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 62–95. 5 James Crawford. The Creation of States in International Law, 22–26. 6 Gerard Kreijen deals in his dissertation with the different aspects of sovereignty in case of state failure in State failure, sovereignty and effectiveness: legal lessons from the decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa, University of Leiden, 2003. 7 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 89–90.

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(3) The right that no other State intrude in the State’s territory (so-called jus excludendi alios, or the right to exclude others). (4) The right to immunity for State representatives acting in their official capacity (so-called functional sovereignty). (5) The right to immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts for acts or actions performed by the State in its sovereign capacity, and for execution measures taken against the use or planned use of public property or assets for the discharge of public functions. (6) The right to respect for life and property of the State’s nationals and State officials abroad.8 Ian Brownlie finds the following aspects in the concept of sovereignty: The principal corollaries of the sovereignty and equality of states are: (1) a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living there; (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states; and (3) the dependence of obligations arising from customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor.9 A central aspect concerning sovereignty is the fact that it works internally, the government has sovereignty within the territory of the State, and sovereignty works externally, since the government represents the state exclusively in the international arena. The definitions of sovereignty all lay jurisdiction exclusively in the hands of the central (government) authorities. Non-intervention by other states in the sovereignty of the state is another shared characteristic. Now that we know the scope of manoeuvre of the government, we want to know how autonomy of specific groups in the state is guaranteed. 2

Internal and External Aspects of Self-determination

The right to self-determination has many components and is therefore an important instrument to accommodate minorities and groups within the state. Therefore, it is an important tool in state building. 8 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 89–90. 9 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 287, and the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2625, “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States: A Survey”, American Journal of International Law vol. 65, Issue 1 (January 1971), 243–251.

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Self-determination as a right for peoples has been laid down in article 1 (2) and article 55 of the United Nations Charter. Internal self-determination is the right of all peoples to pursue their culture, language and religion as they see fit, according to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also guarantees the right to all people to “freely pursue economic, social and cultural development”.10 This is regarded as internal self-determination. The right to self-determination has also been confirmed by the common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.11 Internal self-determination also means participatory democracy; the right to decide the form of the political system and the kind of rulers by the population of a State and the right of a particular group within the State to participate in decision-making at the State level or to have some form of autonomy within the boundaries of the existing state. Internal self-determination, for example for indigenous peoples and minority groups, is the full socio-cultural expression of a people within an existing nation-state. External self-determination (described by some as “full self-determination”) means the right to decide on the political status of a people and the right to separate from the existing state of which the group concerned is part, and to set up a new independent state. The decolonisation process provided external self-determination and external sovereignty for former colonies, provided the new states adhered to colonial borders, the principle of uti possidetis. In international law, there are no rules that forbid an entity from using the right of external self-determination and declaring independence, and there are no rules which specifically allow it. In practice the right to external self-determination is not often granted. Specific reasons to recognise a new state are the fact that the government does not grant any form of internal self-determination to a people or population on its territory, or if a genocide is taking place against that people or population.

10

11

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “International Convention on Civil and Political Rights”, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (1966). https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, (accessed July 26 2019). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “International Convention on Civil and Political Rights”, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (1966). https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, (accessed July 26 2019). “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (1976), https://www .ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx, (accessed July 26 2019).

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The right to self-determination as a legal right under international law has been acknowledged by the International Court of Justice in the Namibia Opinion and the Western Sahara Case and more recently in the East Timor Case, where the Court stated that the right to self-determination has an erga omnes character.12 This obligation exists especially in the face of decolonisation, and is supported by UN GA Res. 1514 (xv) of 14 December 1960. In the case of Québec, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that there was no external right to self-determination for Québec to secede from Canada. The French speaking Québécois had language rights in Canada and therefore did not qualify for external self-determination.13 3

Nation State

State and nation are concepts that are used together but are not the same. A nation has a shared history, and those forming a nation may have a shared religion, culture or language. Those belonging to the nation have a feeling of belonging together. In this respect the nation may differ from the state, which may comprise several nations on its territory. Therefore, there are states where the state and the nation do not overlap, but there are also many in which they do overlap, hence the notion nation-state.14 The populations of newly independent states need to form an emotional attachment to the new nation-state. Part of nation-building can be an attempt to develop nationalism and nationalist sentiments in states which had or still have a highly fragmented population. James Dobbins, an American diplomat who served as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan defines nation building as “the use of armed

12

13 14

International Court of Justice. “Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971”, International Court of Justice (1970), paragraphs 52–55 https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/53/053-19710621 -ADV-01-00-EN.pdf, (accessed March 6 2008), International Court of Justice. “Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975”, International Court of Justice (1975), 100–101, http://www .icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6197.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019), International Court of Justice. “Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) Judgement of 30 June 1995”, Inter­ national Court of Justice (1995), 78–79, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/84/08419950630-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Obligation or right towards all members of the international community. See P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 58–60. Erga omnes indicates that a rule is applicable to all. Antonio Cassese, International Law, 107. Charlotte Hille, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 28.

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force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy”.15 Cynthia Watson, a specialist in security studies, offered a similar definition to Dobbins when explaining nation-building: “Nation-building is generally seen as stopping violence against a population of a country and then constructing a society supported by institutions based upon the rule of law and various other norms that will make it function autonomously and to the benefit of its population”.16 In a legal sense, state building refers to the prerequisites a state needs to have in order to be called a state and to be able to engage in relations with other states and international intergovernmental organisations. These prerequisites comprise territory, a population, a government, and, for some theorists in international law, recognition, as we saw above.17 State building, from a political science point of view, refers to increasing the capacity, effectiveness, scope and professionalism of the institutions of the state.18 The difference in perspective is that the legal definitions formulate criteria for the politicians to base their policy on, either by the politicians in the state to be or politicians from other states who want to have an indication whether they can safely enter into relations with the new state. The political definitions centre on the development of state institutions from an institutional perspective, and the development of mechanisms that create accountability. 4

Approaches to State Building

There are two basic approaches in political theory and international law to state building: top-down and bottom-up. In the top-down approach, the constitution and political-legal frameworks are central and the object of research.

15

16 17 18

James Dobbins. “Nation-Building the Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only ­Superpower”, Rand Corporation 2003, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/ external/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/rr.summer2003.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Cynthia A. Watson. Nation-Building (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2004), 10. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 70–71, Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 75–79. Michael Wesley. “The State of the Art of the Art of State Building”, Global Governance 14 No. 3 (2008) 373.

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The top-down approach focuses on creating a national constitution, national institutions and formal legal institutions that will implement the rule of law.19 In addition to the traditional top down approach to state-building and postconflict reconstruction, increasingly the necessity to apply a bottom up approach is felt by social scientists. An example in recent history was the challenge to build and strengthen the republics that came forth from the disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the lessons learned from this process. In the bottom-up approach, each locality develops its own approach to addressing a particular problem or concern. Björn Hofmann, a specialist in human security and peacebuilding argued: According to the bottom-up approach, on the other hand, supporting local initiatives and focusing on cultural institutions will lead to more sustainable and legitimate institutions of governance.20 Working with existing local institutions in Afghanistan may be the best way to develop an effective bottom-up strategy, because the tribal and religious leaders will understand the needs of the local community best.21 The bottom-up approach may also be more appropriate for building peace in Somalia. For example, the existence of cross-clan marriages can support the resolution of conflicts between communities. When there are relations through marriage among different clans and sub-clans, this will increase the likelihood that communities can work together towards a lasting peace.22 When comparing bottom-up state building practices within two regions of Somaliland, a de facto state within Somalia, there are noticeable differences in terms of stability and peace building. Awdal and Sanaag are two different administrative regions within Somaliland. Awdal experiences a high degree of 19

20

21 22

Michael Schoiswohl. “Linking the international legal framework to building the formal foundations of a “state at risk”: constitution-making and international law in post-conflict Afghanistan”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law May (2006), https://heinonline .org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/vantl39&i=831, (accessed July 26 2019). Björn Hofmann. “Are Hybrid Political Orders an Appropriate Concern for State Formation? Timor-Leste Revisited”, in Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure, eds. Martina Fischer and Beatriz Schmelze, (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre, 2009), 81. Amitai Etzioni. “Bottom-up Nation Building”, Policy Review 158 (2009), https://www .hoover.org/research/bottom-nation-building, (accessed July 26 2019). Nuredin Netabay. “Bottom-up Approach: A Viable Strategy in Solving the Somali Conflict”, Beyond Intractability March (2007), https://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/ netabay-bottom, (accessed July 26 2019).

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clan homogeneity and this homogeneity increases the decision-making ability of local clan elders. As a result of a shared identity within Awdal, the dominant clan has been able to broker agreements with dominant clans on the federal level.23 In contrast, in the administrative region of Sanaag, where there is greater diversity of clans and their interests as well, the ability to form cohesive local institutions is compromised. People remain closely attached to their sub-clans and there is little to no inter-clan negotiation for trade or political matters.24 As we see in the case of Somaliland, even bottom-up approaches to state building need to take into account specific local conditions. Without a common identity, it is more difficult for the clans to cooperate with one another. However, there are clan-based mechanisms that are respected and offer the prospect of bottom-up stability. Before beginning the (re)construction of formal state institutions, attention must be placed on restoring clan relations with the use of traditional clan-based reconciliation processes. 5

The Relevance of Uti Possidetis in the Post-Cold War Era

The principle of territorial integrity, or uti possidetis, was most prominent during the decolonisation process in the 1960s. The principle however dates back to the 19th century, when it was used in Latin America. It stressed that state boundaries were fixed and could not be modified by force, but only by negotiation. This principle gained importance during decolonisation when in 1960 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514. Resolution 1514 (1960) gave former colonies the right to external self-determination. The colonial boundaries were to become the national boundaries to avoid further devolution of national boundaries, which in turn could increase the number of intra-state and inter-state disputes and civil wars. However, the principle of uti possidetis does not take into consideration the method in which boundaries were first created. Many colonial boundaries were arbitrarily drafted and divided the same socio-religious-ethnic population into two or more sovereign territories.

23 24

Tobias Debiel, Rainer Glassner, Conrad Schetter and Ulf Terlinden. “Local State Building in Afghanistan and Somaliland”, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice Vol. 21 (2009), 41–42. Tobias Debiel, Rainer Glassner, Conrad Schetter and Ulf Terlinden. “Local State Building in Afghanistan and Somaliland”, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice Vol. 21 (2009), 42.

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The desire to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict through the adherence of former colonial borders was underlined in 1970 by the Declaration on Friendly Relations among States.25 Paragraph (a) of the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations (1970) stated the necessity to abstain from using force against a state: The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.26 Future situations of border changes shall thus be realised through negotiation and mutual consent. There is no ground in international law for the use of force or the threat to use force in order to change a border. 6

Disintegration or Secession

In 1991, when Yugoslavia was disintegrating, the European Community created the Badinter Commission. This Commission was tasked with formulating criteria that would be applied in the recognition, or withholding of recognition, of new states emerging out of the old Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The Badinter Commission had to answer three questions: The first question was whether the Socialist Federative Republic was in the process of experiencing secession from a number of republics or whether this process was to be considered disintegration or breaking up. If the decision qualified as secession, then the international community would need to refrain from officially recognising the republics as they were violating the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. If the Commission decided that the Socialist Federative Republic was dissolving or disintegrating, then the republics were to be recognised as sovereign states. The Badinter Commission ruled that Yugoslavia 25 26

United Nations. “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, UN Resolution 2625 (xxv)”, United Nations (1970), http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dpilfrcscun/dpilfrcscun.html, (accessed July 26 2019). United Nations General Assembly. “Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, United Nations General Assembly (1970), paragraph a. https:// www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/3dda1f104.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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was in the process of dissolution. The arguments were that plebiscites had been held on sovereignty and independence in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, and the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina had adopted a resolution concerning sovereignty on 15 October 1991. Furthermore, federal institutions such as the Federal Presidency, the Federal Assembly, the Constitutional Court and the Yugoslav´s People´s Army had ceased to function as representative bodies of the federation. A last argument was that the federal authorities and the republics had been unable to enforce respect for the cease-fires that had been negotiated, and therefore the federation had lost its ability to project power within its territory.27 The second question the Commission had to answer was to determine whether or not the Serbian population in Croatia and Herzegovina, as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right to self-determination. The Commission determined that international law in its 1991 state did not adequately clarify the conditions and requirements for self-determination. The Badinter Commission did also rule that external self-determination must respect the borders of their respective republics at the time of separation. The commission also ruled that all groups have the right to the recognition of their identity under international law.28 The third question asked to the Commission was in reference to the internal borders between Croatia and Serbia, as well as the internal borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The commission was asked whether or not these internal borders should be the frontiers of the republics. The Badinter Commission ruled that both the internal and external frontiers of the republics had to be respected and could not be changed by force.29 7

Recognition of Nation-States after the Cold War

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the European Union (EU) needed principles to which emerging, post-Soviet states were measured in order to determine if the emerging territory was sovereign. In order to determine which 27 28 29

Alain Pellet. “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, European Journal of International Law 3 No. 1 (1992), 182. Alain Pellet. “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, 183. Alain Pellet. “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, European Journal of International Law 3 No. 1 (1992), 184.

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post-Soviet territories were to be recognised as sovereign nation-states and which territories not to recognise, the outcomes of the Badinter Commission were used. The EU member states affirmed “their readiness to recognise, subject to the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case, those new States which, following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations”.30 However, on December 19 1991, Germany chose to recognize Croatia as a sovereign nation, before Croatia had fully complied with the EU’s recognition guidelines.31 This was done because of the special historical relations between Germany and Croatia. The recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign nation was delayed because Greece protested the use of the name “Macedonia”, fearing that it might develop claims on the Greek province Macedonia.32 The requirements for European Community-wide recognition of sovereignty of emerging states were published on 16 December 1991 and was comprised by the following criteria: − Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights; − Guarantees the rights of the ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce); − Respect the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and common agreement; − Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability;

30 31

32

Roland Rich. “Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union”, European Journal of International Law 4 No. 1 (1993), https://heinonline.org/HOL/ P?h=hein.journals/eurint4&i=58, (accessed July 26 2019). Patricia J. Smith. “The Impact of Post-Cold War Changes on the U.S.-German Relationship”, in Coming from the Cold War Changes in U.S. -European Interactions since 1980, eds. Sabrina R. Ramet and Christine Ingesbritsen, (Lanham Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2002), 112. Anthony Aust. Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 24.

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− Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes.33 The Declaration underlined the premise that the European Council and its members would not recognise new entities that were the result of aggression. Apart from the question of recognition, the state-building process in the entities arising from the disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia after disintegration show that there is inherently a period where the new state or states become weak, and where there may even be a danger that the state will fail. The infrastructure has to be changed, new relations have to be established, and there are shifts in the identity of the citizens. What dangers are there when a state is temporarily weak, or becomes a failed state? 8

Transition and Ideology

When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ussr) dissolved and numerous new states were established, in many instances the national unifying principle became ethnicity and language. Political parties tended to be centred on nationalist issues for several reasons. Ethnic politics marked a clear distinction between Soviet and then present-day (circa 1988–1991) policies. Ethnic nationalism was sufficiently unifying in many instances to rally public confidence. If ethnic groups were large enough, national myths could be created and reinforced through a standardisation of education, national language and cultural policies.34 The intentional creation of ethnic national narratives not only created a marked distinction from Soviet policies; it also fostered the rise of ethnic nationalism and in some instances the politics of exclusion. Ethnic groups were mobilised and rallied behind the rediscovering of a national history, one that was suppressed by the Soviets in efforts to homogenise society and to centralise power at the national level. In the former Soviet Republics, a considerable amount of de-Russification occurred. In many states, such as Latvia, ethnicity became a dominant factor in acquiring citizenship. When the Soviet Union collapsed, many other ethnic groups were living in Latvia as Soviet citizens. The declaration of independence 33 34

Danilo Türk. “Recognition of States: A Comment”, European Journal of International Law 4 No. 1 (1993), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/eurint4&i=88, (accessed July 26 2019). Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth. Nation Building in the Post Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 15–16.

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of Latvia from the former Soviet Union created two types of citizenships: Latvian citizens and non-Latvians who were citizens of the former Soviet Union.35 Inga Reine, Council of Latvia to the European Union, remarked about this latter group: In 2006, approximately eighteen percent of the Latvian population was stateless as they were not ethnically Latvian and were not granted the citizenship of another region of the former Soviet Union. (pavalstniecību). Thus, Latvia did not grant anew the citizenship, but restored the status and the rights thereof to those persons who were recognized as citizens under the 1919 Law, as well their descendants.36 Latvia has been encouraged to increase the speed of naturalisation but in recent years this process has slowed down.37 9

Failed and Weak States

State building normally takes place when a state comes into being. State building is however not a linear process, and when states weaken, processes to strengthen it may be necessary. Once a state has been recognised, it cannot lose its statehood. Therefore, the criteria as formulated in the Montevideo Convention are only applicable in the case of new states. States that have been recognised cannot lose their recognition by the international community, when they become weak, failed or collapse. We will proceed now with definitions of failed and weak states, and move on to investigate what the role of clans in weak and failed states is and can be. Robert Rotberg, former director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution at Harvard University, in his book State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror describes how states can fail and collapse. He states that 35

36 37

Inga Reine. “Protection of Stateless Persons in Latvia”, European Parliament Seminar on Prevention of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons Within the European Union, (June 26 2007), 3 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20070626/libe/reine _en.pdf, (accessed October 9 2010). Inga Reine. “Protection of Stateless Persons in Latvia”, 3–4 http://www.europarl.europa .eu/hearings/20070626/libe/reine_en.pdf, (accessed October 9 2010). Council of Europe. “Resolution 1527 (2006) Rights of national minorities in Latvia”, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Council of Europe. “Resolution 1527 (2006) Rights of national minorities in Latvia”, (accessed July 26 2019).

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Nation states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nationstate itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens.38 One of the problems of a weak state, a failing state and a collapsed state is that the state is no longer capable of providing the necessary protection, services and goods to the population. Furthermore, one sees a diminishing role of the judiciary and legislature, often due to corruption, while the executive becomes stronger, often under the influence of an authoritarian ruler. Rotberg argued that the ability to give security to the population and the territory are the first and central aspects of rebuilding the state: The state’s prime function is to provide that political good of security – to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.39 Only when security is sufficiently guaranteed is it possible to address the issue of reforming the judiciary into an accountable organ that can guarantee a fair process, restructuring the political process and strengthen the rule of law, and create an environment where the citizen can freely and openly participate in the political process. This also includes respect and security for property and respect for institutions. Apart from this, a state in transition needs to guarantee a health care system and education to the citizens as well as a functioning infrastructure and promotion of civil society. If we want to judge a state as weak, failing, failed or collapsed, we need to check on these issues.40

38 39 40

Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, in Robert Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1. Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, 3. Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, 3–4.

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Rotberg defined failed states as follows: Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. […] Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state.41 One of the important aspects that disappear in failed states is the control of the border. The government is no longer capable of controlling the borders, and subsequently may lose authority over territory. This may be the result of neighbouring states taking possession, or of warlords bringing the territory under their sphere of influence. Warlords often subdue their territory by inciting fear in the population. Human rights abuses occur often. The less the government is able to maintain the rule of law and the monopoly over violence, the more the state uses repression towards its citizens, and will resort to violence to subdue the citizen. This, in turn, leads to more criminal violence and a further deterioration of the state.42 We have to take into account that classifications as weak, failed and collapsed states are Eurocentric inventions. However, since nearly all international public law and much of international relations theory is Eurocentric in origin, this book does not aim to challenge this. Daniel Thürer, a specialist on international law identified three characteristics of a failed state. According to Thürer, failed states tend to occur in situations in which there is significant internal strife and conflict. An important aspect is the internal collapse of institutions that once provided law and order. Thürer argued that high levels of insecurity in such cases are not the result of a splintering of the security services, in which different branches of the security forces support different factions or leaders. Rather, it means the complete absence of any institution that is capable of effectively maintaining law and order. The third characteristic of a failed state is the absence of a state institution that is capable of entering into relations on the international arena as well as the absence of an institution that is capable of being influenced by international actors.43 41 42 43

Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indi­ cators”, 5. Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, 5–6. Daniel Thürer. “The “failed state” and international law”, International Review of the Red Cross No. 836 (1999) https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/ 57jq6u.htm, (accessed July 26 2019).

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Thürer further argued there were three geo-historical contexts in which failed states are likely to be present. The first is the end of the Cold War and super-power support of institutions. Once outside support mechanisms were withdrawn many governments lacked the ability to generate resources to continue their activities. Consequently, some states and their institutions collapsed. The second theme pertaining to failed states is the destruction of traditional or indigenous governance structures. Attempts to circumvent and remove traditional governance mechanisms and replace them with Western governance institutions was only partially successful. In other words, traditional governance structures were removed but there was not a complete transfer and adhesion to Western governance institutions. In essence, with the decolonisation process, there was the removal if not collapse of Western-style governance institutions occurring in a context in which traditional or local governance mechanisms were absent or too weak to effectively carry out the transition. The third geo-historical context is the presence of modernisation processes without sufficient state capacity to manage and direct these modernisation processes.44 Signs of a weakening state include an increased inability to deliver basic social services and increasing levels of corruption within the police services. A failed state means the disintegration of the socio-political culture. A collapsing state system means the complete inability to perform basic state functions. A collapsed state shows the complete disintegration of all government systems, structures, and institutions.45 The state has lost its ability to project any power. Throughout the process of state failure to collapse, the state gradually loses its ability to respond to warlords, economic stagnation or decline, and the health needs of its population. State failure and collapse, whether it is sudden or gradual, is the product of the inability of state institutions to renew its authority and power.46 State collapse arises from several factors, such as war or massive corruption, but it is primarily the complete loss of political legitimacy of the state. The loss of legitimacy gives rise to competing sources of power and influence with which the state is unable to compete. These other centres of power erode public confidence in the state while building its own credibility as an alternate structure. Over time, the state is unable to mount a challenge, let alone a successful challenge, to the warlords, organised crime, epidemic or 44 45 46

Daniel Thürer. “The “failed state” and international law”, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jq6u.htm, (accessed July 26 2019). Major T.P. Robinson. “Twenty First Century Warlord’s Diagnosis and Treatment”, Defense Studies, 1 No. 1 (2001), 123. Marina Ottaway. “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States”, Development and Change 33 No. 5 (2002), 1016.

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natural disaster. This is not only a risk to the territory of the state concerned, but may spill over to neighbouring states. The lines of communication as well as command structure between the government and the agencies and departments of state have been so weakened that it fails to generate a response and subsequent action. An imploding state system leaves a state incapable of performing its function outside the immediate area of the capital. A broad spectrum of states could be considered failed states. Some central governments no longer have control over the totality of their territory (such as Sudan, and Haiti) while others are unable to meet the basic needs of their population (such as Lesotho, Ghana, Indonesia).47 In 2002, approximately fifteen percent of all states, or thirty states, were unable to meet the basic needs of their own population.48 The 2018 Fund for Peace report on Fragile States indicates despite critical situations of fragile states in South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, the overall global trend is for improvement in state strength.49 State failure is correlated with the collapse of the economic system. When the economy is so weak that it can no longer support its population and the state can no longer support its minority groups, the government will attempt to bribe its population into complacency. As resources are depleted and the ability of the state to buy off its population diminishes, it is left with no other option than to punish or to violently repress its citizenry.50 Failed states such as the Central African Republic, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo do not have complete control over the totality of their territory, yet they retain the ability to deliver some social goods to the majority of their population.51 Failing states also lack a degree of political legitimacy. Failed states, like Somalia, can not deliver any political good, do not have

47 48 49 50 51

Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace. “Failed State Index 2010”, Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace (2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_ states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings, (accessed October 8 2010). John J. Hamra and Gordon R. Sullivan. “Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, The Washington Quarterly 25 No. 4 (2002), 85–86. Fund for Peace. “Fragile States Index 2018”, Fund for Peace (2018), http://fundforpeace.org/ fsi/2018/04/19/fragile-states-index-2018-issues-of-fragility-touch-the-worlds-richest-andmost-developed-countries-in-2018/, (accessed June 17 2018). Han Drussen. “Governance, Development and State Building”, European Journal of Development Research, 17 No. 3 (2005), 412–415. Fund for Peace. “Fragile States Index 2018”, Fund for Peace (2018), http://fundforpeace.org/ fsi/2018/04/19/fragile-states-index-2018-issues-of-fragility-touch-the-worlds-richest-andmost-developed-countries-in-2018/, (accessed June 17 2018).

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much, if any, control over their territory and do not have broad legitimacy in the eyes of the population.52 Even though the discussion is often on strengthening a failed state in order to become a weak state, and trying to avoid that a weak state becomes a failed state, we can also discern a collapsed state, which is a category worse than a failed state. Rotberg defined a collapsed state as follows: A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the strong. A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen.53 10

Weak States and the Rule of Law

Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative for Bosnia, explains that security does not come through elections but through the rule of law.54 The rule of law necessitates law enforcement agencies and an independent judiciary, which are adequately funded. It requires citizens to place confidence in the legal process, to believe in its legitimacy.55 States may be weak for several reasons. The government may be stable but be unable to provide enough border security to prevent incursions by smugglers and warlords from neighbouring states. The state can also be weakened in the process of transitioning from an authoritarian to a democratic governance structure. The state may also be experiencing a violent conflict (internal or external) or high levels of crime.56 In the case of states experiencing violent conflict or states that are in a postconflict situation, the nature of contemporary violent conflicts and their 52 53 54 55 56

Stefan Mair. “A new approach: the need to focus on failing states”, Harvard International Review Winter (2008), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/login.aspx?di rect=true&db=aph&AN=31437928&site=ehost-live&scope=site, (accessed July 26 2019). Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, 9. Tegenlicht. “Democracy for Beginners”, Tegenlicht (2004). Interview with Paddy Ashdown, http://www.vpro.nl/programma/tegenlicht/afleveringen/18247440/, (accessed March 20 2007). Ekkart Zimmerman. “System Transformation and Political Violence”, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 6. www.prio.no/files/file47688_ekkart_zimmermann_nicosia_paper.doc, (accessed October 20 2010). Robert I. Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States”, 5.

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impact on a state’s institutions needs to be discussed. Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, examined violent armed conflict from a historical perspective and made a distinction between Old Wars and New Wars. Old Wars according to Kaldor fit the Clausewitzean model where states maintained their monopoly over violence domestically and had professional armies project their power abroad. There was a clear distinction between peace and wartime. Private armies were directly challenged and disbanded by the state and not permitted to engage in combat operations. Old wars were state centric, peace agreements were between states, war ­reparations paid from states to states. In contrast, New Wars directly challenge the state’s monopoly over violence, where there may be intra-state conflicts. Combatants do not wear uniforms and are not members of a professional standing army. The distinctions between peacetime and wartime as well as the separation of public and private spheres are not clear.57 The devolution of war to non-state actors further weakens the state. It generates and maintains grey, or informal, and black economies. Non-state violent wartime actors also create their institutions, drawing loyalty away from the nation state. Non-state actors extract taxes, create militias and sometimes invest in community infrastructure. All of these activities challenge the state’s monopoly over violence, its ability to project authority (implement policy, enforce the law) and erodes public opinion on the legitimacy of the state. Christine Bell, a specialist in international law and peace processes drew attention to the fact that with the signing of a peace agreement, three common concepts were used: state redefinition, disaggregation of power and dissociation of power.58 Bell states: The peace agreement attempts to mediate between the past and the future, the old state and the new, elites as private actors and elites as public actors, the peace agreement as treaty and the peace agreement as constitution, and war and peace. To do this, the peace agreement must articulate a constitutional order capable of functioning even when the normal precursors of constitutionalism – stable social order, shared community, and agreement over political institutions – do not pertain.59 A new order has to be established, in which the balance between groups in society has to be restored, which may result in a division of power and rights 57 58 59

Mary Kaldor. New and Old Wars (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 17–19. Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace. Peace Agreements and Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 199. Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace. Peace Agreements and Lex Pacificatoria, 200.

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that may be different from the status quo ante, and where more attention may be focused on the periphery, on minorities, on groups that where before not in a similar way represented in government structures or in the constitution. 11

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Often an outline of the post-conflict reconstruction program has already been included in the negotiations over a peace agreement. If at an early stage topics like self-determination for certain groups, empowerment of specific groups, including women, transitional justice and the organisation of post-conflict reconstruction are not regulated, there is a danger that some aspects which are vital for the reconstruction will be left out of the process, or be brought in at a moment when the situation starts to deteriorate. One of the first things in the post-conflict reconstruction process is the restoration of the law, and prosecution of those who have been supposedly responsible for (gross) human rights violations and violations of humanitarian law. Some states decide to use traditional law next to the positive law, and some states decide to introduce reconciliation processes and install a truth and reconciliation committee. Post-conflict reconstruction rests on four pillars: security, justice, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation.60 Robert Orr, former director of the Belfer Center at Harvard University, elaborated on these four pillars and presented three scenarios in which the international community can assist. According to Orr, at first the international community can support a process in which a legitimate government is formed and help build the capacities of the government. Once a legitimate government is established, processes and policies can be installed that facilitate economic stabilisation and growth. S­ econd, the international community can help enhance the capacity of the existing state. The third option is creating a framework for broad public participation.61 Another approach to support weak states is to examine the factors that weaken it. For example, in West Africa, diamond trafficking fuels violent armed conflict and state weakness. Efforts to reduce the international purchase of illegal diamonds, sometimes referred to as blood diamonds, included the creation of the Kimberly Process.62 Although this process has not completely 60 61 62

John J. Hamra and Gordon R. Sullivan. “Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, The Washington Quarterly 25 No. 4 (2002), 91–92. Robert D. Orr. “Governing when chaos rules, Enhancing Governance and Participation”, Washington Quarterly Vol. 25, No. 4, Autumn (2002), 139. This process is a common effort to reduce the flow of diamonds used to finance wars, “What is the Kimberley Process?”, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/what-kp (accessed July 30 2019).

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stopped the flow of illegal diamonds, shifting economic policies can reduce some specific pressures on a weak state. These economic measures won’t necessarily strengthen the state but they can slow down the decay process. These scenarios will be applied to the case studies later in this book. A final question is however, what happens if the government is not capable or willing to protect its population adequately, or worse, when the government would plan or execute a policy of genocide towards part of its population? 12

Responsibility to Protect and the State

Governments are responsible for the well-being of their population. If a state or government is not willing or not capable to protect its population, there is a responsibility of last resort for the international community to intervene. In the report Responsibility to Protect the following three pillars of responsibility are formulated: 1. the State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement; 2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility; 3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. Is a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the UN Charter.63 The document Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was drafted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.64 The authors of R2P argued that contemporary violent conflicts are most likely to be internal conflicts. The premise of the United Nations is to promote international peace through peaceful relations between nation-states. Whilst only nation-states can be members of the United Nations, each nation-state has an internal population. Even though the sovereignty of a nation-state is inviolable, there are obligations towards the citizenry of each nation-state in terms of their overall 63 64

Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”, December 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20 Report.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”, December 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20 Report.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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physical and human security (sufficient nutrition, adequate shelter, health services). The authors of R2P argued that nation-states can no longer hide behind the concept of sovereignty to shield them from the United Nations or other nations’ efforts at stopping mass human rights violations.65 The authors of R2P argued when a nation-state is unwilling or unable to ensure the human rights of its population, “it becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in its place”.66 One of the criticisms of R2P is that it violates the sovereignty of the state in that it allows for international intervention without expressed invitation in internal matters and therefore violates Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. Coupled with this argument is the belief that a great power can use R2P to exercise coercive force in the internal matters of a sovereign state. Alex Bellamy, Director of the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Professor of Peace and Security Studies argued the concept of R2P has been applied to nine specific cases: Sudan in relation to Darfur, Kenya, Georgia, Myanmar in relation to Cyclone Nargis, Gaza, Democratic Republic of Congo, North Korea and Myanmar in relation to its treatment of ethnic minorities.67 In Libya, the application of the Responsibility to Protect has been so troublesome and has been regarded by some as driven by power politics, that it has not been used in following protracted deadly conflicts. David Chandler, a specialist on state building said about the changes in the interpretation and application of R2P: What we are seeing in the shift to liberal institutionalist perspectives, highlighted by the shifting discourse of R2P, is, in fact, a shift away from responsibility. In effect, no one becomes responsible. While the icc approach of laying responsibility at the feet of individual government leaders and army officials is clearly inadequate as a way of grasping the causes

65 66 67

Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”, December 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”, December 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Alex J. Bellamy. “The Responsibility to Protect-Five Years On”, Ethics & International Affairs 24 No. 2 (2010), 149–152, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Bellamy.pdf, (accessed August 26 2010).

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of conflict or of preventing it, the R2P approach suggests even less responsibility.68 The 2005 World Summit Outcome report reiterated the members of the United Nations’ responsibility and obligation to prevent and stop crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The report also argued that the institutions, mechanisms and resources available to the United Nations must be used to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing and war crimes when individual nation-states are unable or unwilling to do so.69 Thus, R2P can be coupled with the right to internal self-determination. When no internal self-determination is provided, but instead a policy of genocide is being used by the central government, this group acquires a recognised right to secession, and there is a responsibility for states to act when a genocide takes place.70 These obligations to other states are erga omnes in the prevention of genocide. This responsibility is also found in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Specifically, Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish”.71 13

Conclusion: Criteria for Statehood Revisited

The criteria of the Montevideo Convention are still applicable today, but have been expanded by the Badinter Commission. Human rights, minority rights and peaceful resolution of conflicts have become part of the state building process. New insights in peace negotiations show that it is important to include all 68 69

70 71

David Chandler. “Unravelling the Paradox of ‘The Responsibility to Protect’”, Irish Studies in International Affairs 20 (2009), 38. United Nations General Assembly. “2005 World Summit Outcome”, United Nations General Assembly (2005), paragraphs 138–139, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Marko Milanović. “State Responsibility for Genocide”, European Journal of International Law Vol. 17 No. 3 (2006), 564. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ crimeofgenocide.aspx, (accessed July 26 2019).

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parties to a conflict in the peace negotiations, which means that the process is no longer as top-down as it was, but may include minorities and other groups (or clans) necessary for a stable peace. The whole peace process and postconflict reconstruction is aimed at strengthening the state, where the approach is much more holistic than it was some 30 years ago. Negotiations are no longer seen as linear, which means that ceasefire agreements sometimes are broken and have to be renegotiated. Transitional justice is an important element in order to reconcile former warring parties in society. This may necessitate the normal and traditional judgement of those who committed human rights violations. It may also result in a truth and reconciliation commission in order to make room for a new start. This inclusive approach also means that clans in a clan society will be taken into consideration in the new state building project. From a political point of view the state building process demands decisions concerning the involvement of minority groups and clans in the state building project. This concerns their involvement in the state institutions on a national, regional and local level, decisions concerning the political make-up of the state, such as representation of minorities and clans in parliament, choices concerning election types (multiple districts or one district) and it demands policies on the strengthening of the rule of law, including the strengthening of state institutions. In many cases this involves also a reform of the security s­ector and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants. In the first chapter the relation between the state and the clan was analysed from a bottom-up perspective, in this chapter the process of state building has been analysed from a top-down perspective. In the chapters ahead the two will be merged to analyse how, using the framework of democracy, the clan can be included in the state.

Chapter 3

Warlords and the Clan Society Co-written by Renée Gendron During conflict, when the state is no longer capable of providing security to the population over all of its territory, others fill this void. In clan societies we see that the clan becomes stronger, and that clan members defend the interests of the clan, including the guarantee of protection of life, liberty and goods. However, sometimes security is also taken over by warlords, who, for economic or strategic power, exercise influence over a specific territory. The similarity between a warlord and a clan leader is that they both use clientelism, the difference is that the warlord often extorts part of his income from the population, and does this by using violence, often committing human rights violations. Such behaviour would be a very dangerous move for a clan leader, since he has to be supported by his clan, and may be removed from his position, if he does not pursue a policy that is regarded as sufficient for the benefit of the clan as a whole. Actions detrimental to the interests of the clan in turn could easily result in a blood feud and a conflict within the clan. There are situations where the warlord and the clan leader overlap, and are the same person. This poses a challenge, but understanding is needed when states or international igo’s intervene to support the peace process. In order to understand the differences and similarities between warlords and clan leaders, and their relation with the state, we will analyse what defines a warlord, and how a warlord and a clan leader commit themselves to the state building project. 1

The Warlord Defined

Warlordism occurs when the state is too weak to control its entire territory.1 Therefore, a warlord is the leader of an irregular armed force that is not under the direct control of the recognised government and has a private army that is self-funded. The warlord has power over a specific territory within the state. Often warlords are involved in the trafficking of human beings, drugs, guns and lootable resources. The private army does not necessarily have an ideological 1 Glen Segell. Civil-Military Relations After the Nation-State (United Kingdom: Glen Segell, 2000), 188.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_005

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position. In some instances, the warlord has a monopoly on violence over a specific territory as well as the ability to administer or govern this territory. There are several criteria that are specific for warlords. First, they operate in a collapsing or collapsed state. Second, they pursue narrow economic interests and are able to resort to violence in the pursuit of those interests. Last, they do not have a democratic mandate.2 It should be added that warlords must be perceived as legitimate within the community as the lack of legitimacy would render a warlord a bandit.3 According to John Mackinlay at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, warlords are the main actors in societies in transition that are accompanied by civil war and humanitarian disasters. Mackinlay states: [the warlord] … confronts national governments, plunders their resources, moves and exterminates uncooperative populations, interdicts international relief and development and derails peace processes.4 Warlords operate out of the reach of any governmental judiciary, thereby directly challenging the authority of the state. Warlordism offers a different source of political legitimacy, where the creation of a legal order is not in their interest. Therefore, warlords may become spoilers in the peace process. 2

Warlords and the State

When the central government is no longer capable of protecting the security of citizens and their property, there is a risk that warlords will take over the protection of the population in certain areas of the country. Consequently, the government loses its monopoly on violence. The warlords often originate from local or regional clans or ethnic groups, which reinforces their support in the region.5 Jean Paul Azam, professor of Economics, argued that warlords would purposely terrorise their own population, raze farms and loot to intentionally lower the prospects of livelihood while immediately acquiring the resources 2 Major T.P. Robinson. “Twenty First Century Warlord’s Diagnosis and Treatment”, Defense Studies 1 No. 1 (2001), 123. 3 Kirill Nourzhanov. “Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 2 (2005), 110. 4 John Mackinlay. “Defining Warlords”, in Oliver Ramsbotham Tom Woodhouse, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution (London: Cass, 2000), 48. 5 Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, 6.

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plundered. This forces many men to reconsider their economic options. The local men can rebuild their farms and restore their crops at great personal expense and run the high risk of being raided again, or they can join the warlord’s militia to gain a chance at a regular income.6 George Klay Kieh, a former professor of Political Science, contended that the inadequacy of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration efforts at the end of the first Sierra Leonean civil war created circumstances in which warlords and armed factions were able to challenge the nascent government. Attacks by “warlordist groups” initiated the second Sierra Leonean civil war.7 A similar situation occurred in Chechnya in which the warlords Basayev and Khattab launched an attack into the neighbouring republic of Dagestan. The attack on Dagestan launched the beginning of the Second Chechen War.8 According to a joint Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and British fact-finding mission, in the case of Somalia, warlords were active participants in kidnappings: In some instances, the kidnapping is conducted by militias known to be associated with local warlords, who reportedly profit from the enterprise. In Puntland, a related problem has been piracy, in which foreign crews are held for ransom by militia equipped with armed speedboats. Those militia are in some instances linked to the Puntland administration.9 These crimes highlight the inadequacy of the government to provide protection to its citizens and to acquire the monopoly on violence. More complicated is the situation where clans and adherence to the clan are involved. 3

Clans and Warlords

In clan-based societies, a person more strongly identifies with the clan than with their ethnic group. According to Sasha Lezhnev, a specialist on warlords, 6 Jean Paul Azam. “On Thugs and Heroes: Why warlords victimize their own civilians”, Economics of Governance 7 (2006), 54. 7 George Klay Kieh Jr. “The roots of the second Liberian civil war”, International Journal on World Peace March (2009), https://www-jstor-org.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/stable/20752871, (accessed July 26 2019). 8 Jonathan Steele. “Shamil Basayev”, The Guardian July 11 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ news/2006/jul/11/guardianobituaries.chechnya, (accessed August 27 2010). 9 The Danish Immigration Service. “Human rights and security in central and southern Somalia”, Danish Immigration Service, March (2004), 17, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/405b2d804 .pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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the warlord may have an ethnic or clan affiliation to the region over which he issues control but that is not the absolute basis of his power. Lezhnev explained “the leaders of such ‘ethnic entrepreneur’ groups have mixed motives of both helping their ethnic or religious group, together with amassing wealth and power for themselves”.10 Clan politics and warlordism can intertwine. R. Grant Smith, a former American diplomat, stated that warlords often have ethnic and tribal (clan) ties to the region in which they operate. Even though the warlord may be in control of a few villages and draw fighters from the local tribes, people or clans, the warlord himself may be accountable to another warlord.11 Collins described clans as having two distinct characteristics. The first characteristic is kinship, all members of a clan share a common ancestor and this family linkage forms the foundation of one’s identity. The second characteristic of a clan is that of a network. By network Collins referred to Williamson’s work and quoted Williamson by stating that “multiple individuals are connected by kin-based bonds (sometimes distant sometimes immediate), with concomitant responsibilities for the members of that identity network”.12 There is a dynamic relationship in many cases between a warlord and clans and clan elders. Warlords engage in politics to advance their own personal goals. In Somalia, the dynamic between clans and warlords is as follows: Warlordism became an enterprise of using clan militia for one’s personal interest. The role of the clan leaders became redundant. The role of the intellectuals disappeared. Warlords became richer and richer by controlling airfields and sea ports.13 Similar developments were seen in Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan, as will be seen later in this book. We will now consider one example of warlords and clans during violent conflict in more detail, and analyse the case of Tajikistan.

10 11 12 13

Sasha Lezhnev. “Crafting Peace. Strategies to deal with warlords in collapsing states” (Lexington Books, Lanham, 2006), 12. R. Grant Smith. “Dealing with Warlords”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute January 30 2002, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/7046-analytical -articles-caci-analyst-2002-1-30-art-7046.html, (accessed July 26 2019). Kathleen Collins, “Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia”, 25. Abdullahi Haji-Abdi, Critical Realism, Somalia and the Diaspora Community (Oxon: Routledge 2014), 36.

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Warlords, Clans and Violent Conflict

The Tajik civil war (1992–1997) was originally triggered when the elites had been unable to reach an agreement on how to govern an independent Tajikistan while maintaining balance between Tajikistan’s ethnic regions.14 Nourzhanov stated: “The involvement of extended families and other patronymic associations in the civil war brought to the fore the custom of blood feud, which made the conflict even more ugly and uncontrolled”.15 The Tajik factions engaged in the Tajik Civil war were based on clan affiliations. The power vacuum left from the collapsed Soviet Union hastened the rush to control the state, secure the state’s resources and solidify the group’s position as the dominant party. Clan politics and clan linkages quickly outpaced any call to adhere to official, pre-determined, lawful procedures. The proximity to Afghanistan, coupled with the cheap and easy access to weapons, hastened the rise of warlords in the Tajik civil war.16 The Tajik state was able to reign in the warlords. The central government entered into agreements with a dozen or so warlords, granting them a certain amount of legitimacy and access to state resources. The Tajik central government also disarmed some of the smaller factions and absorbed lower level field commanders into its military. A rotation system was also introduced in the civil service. Civil servants are regularly moved from one region to another in efforts to promote contact and foster trust between the ethnic groups.17 The former belligerents with the highest amount of autonomy or power were encouraged to participate in the new state structures. The weaker players were removed entirely from the political scene, reducing the potential for escalation back into violence and reducing the amount of factions vying for power. Gradually the central government was able to make once independent warlords semi-dependent on the state for their future success and survival as leaders.

14 15 16

17

Shirin Akiner and Catherine Barnes. “The Tajik Civil War: causes and dynamics”, Con­ ciliation Resources March (2001), http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/tajikistan/causesdynamics.php, (accessed October 8 2010). Kirill Nourzhanov. “Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 2 (2005), 113. Erica Marat. “The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan”, Silk Road Paper October (2006), 28, 104–105, 116, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0610EMarat.pdf, (accessed September 1 2010). Kirill Nourzhanov. “Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 2 (2005), 121–122.

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In the case of Somalia, some clans offer protection to pirates and others do not. The clans that are dependent on taxing imports and exports from ports they control do not extend protection to pirates. By contrast, the clans that do not have legitimate trade routes to protect do extend protection to pirates.18 The influence of warlords can reduce when viable economic alternatives are presented to the men who staff the warlord’s illegal army. The sources of revenue of warlords can be cut off. Clans, on the other hand, are durable social structures that are not determined by economic benefits. They impose strong moral codes and social pressures on their members to preserve their culture. When both clans and warlords occupy the same territory, they can form a mutually dependent relationship. The clan can be the warlords’ primary source of income, in the form of protection money and its main supplier of warriors. In return, the clan can preserve its closed culture and defiance of state policy, as state intervention on the territory must now focus on two sets of actors. When examining the root causes of different types of violence, it is imperative to take into consideration the relationships to clans and how they promote and hinder that type of violence. 5

Conclusion: Warlords, Clans, State Building and Democracy

The existence of warlords poses a number of challenges. They hamper the strengthening of the state, since the monopoly over violence does not lie with the central authorities, but is shared with the warlords. In an economic sense, the warlords have an interest in keeping the state weak in order to keep their power base and income. Effective remedies for human rights violations are not in their interest, since they often use violence and coercion in their policies to extort money from the population. In order to fight warlords they are either fought with military might, in order to demilitarise them and prosecute them. If this is not feasible, the warlord is sometimes included in the state building program, in order to lure him away from his power base. By removing him physically, the central authorities hope to break his power. By including him in the official politics, he is made responsible for the strengthening of the state. In practice we will see that the warlord often kept his power base, continued

18

Federico Varese, Anja Shortland. “Why some Somali clans protect pirates while others don’t”, University of Oxford, published 10 July 2014, paras. 1–4, http://www.ox.ac.uk/ news/2014-07-10-why-some-somali-clans-protect-pirates-while-others-don’t, (accessed July 26 2019).

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to order human rights violations, and used the immunity that membership of parliament brought him to stay out of prison. When we look at the position of the clan elder who is a warlord, the analysis is only slightly different. Because of the closed society, those belonging to the clan will protect the warlord. The clan elder may try to get more benefits for his clan. Though the clan is not against the state building project, there is an issue when the clan has to give over power to the state. When the state wants to democratise, there is a possible clash between the state authorities and the warlord. There is no reason for the warlord to support democratic principles, since his power base is not democratic. For a clan elder, it depends very much on what democracy is since the clan is less rigidly ruled than the population under a warlord, but they are not necessarily democratic either.

Chapter 4

Society and Democratisation Co-written by Renée Gendron “…. the rapid secessions, without guarantees, institutions, or political power for the many minorities living within the newly emerging countries, have caused spirals of rebellion, repression, and, in places like Bosnia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, war”.1 fareed zakaria

1 Introduction The security of the state and the security of its citizens are two of the central aspects of state building. In order to realise lasting security in a state, it is important for both politicians and civilians to restore their feelings of trust in their fellow citizens and in the former enemy. The citizens also need to have trust that the state building project at hand will be successful. In clan societies, with their strict rules concerning honour and mutual support, trust is of great importance. One needs to trust the other, clan member or member of another – maybe rivalling – clan, to participate in the state building project. Trust between the clans and the central authorities is the key to successful state building, without trust in government institutions, the clans will not give up power. This chapter discusses the forms that trust can take and how this pertains to state building in clan societies. We also look at state building mechanisms that are related to security, a topic that was also discussed in the previous chapter, and relate it to security sector reform, where transparency and accountability are of central importance, as well as to demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, where the former warrior needs to find trust in the system to lay down his or her weapons and reintegrate into civilian life. Once security is restored, democratisation, as part of the state building project, can be implemented. The topics that need to be addressed include the strengthening of institutions, the division of powers, and a system of checks and balances. During a democratisation process, procedures are put in place to 1 Fareed Zakaria. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 76 No. 6 (1997), 35.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_006

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guarantee respect for human rights, which includes individual human rights and rights for minorities and other groups. Women’s rights need to be addressed. There also needs to be attention to the development of political parties, regular elections, and the development of a civil society. Non-governmental organisations play an important role in the bottom-up process, supporting the awareness of the population in the political process, giving input for the framing of the political agenda when it comes to needs of specific groups, needs that are area specific, but also in the education of the population in the political process. The non-governmental organisations should preferably have access to the formal political process, including to those negotiating in the peace process. Since, in many of the cases that will be discussed in the second part of this book, outsiders intervened to support in state building projects, we look at the relation between a clan society and democratisation efforts, and how outsiders can play a role through intervention in the state building process. The challenge is to do justice to the (Western constructed) state building process while also having respect for the local culture at hand. 2 Trust Social trust is vital in a stable democracy. Trust is necessary to influence and persuade members from different groups to voluntarily participate in the political process. A strong sense of social trust enables and facilitates political participation across groups as opposed to political participation based on ethnic, religious or tribal affiliations.2 The issue of trust is very important in many aspects of state building and is crucial in post-conflict reconstruction. Trust is part of a nation’s social capital. Without trust, meaningful relationships between individuals and groups within a particular society are extremely difficult to form.3 Developing and implementing a peace plan requires that there is trust between the parties and there are clear benchmarks that progress toward the final stage, peace. In many cases trust is built on reciprocating a gesture. This is how momentum for peace is established, through a series of progressive gestures to stabilise and r­ e-establish 2 Lawrence Chickering and P. Edward Haley. “Strong Society, Weak State”, Policy Review 143 (2007), https://www.hoover.org/research/strong-society-weak-state, (accessed July 26 2019). 3 Mark R. Amstutz. “Is Reconciliation Possible after Genocide?: the case of Rwanda”, Journal of Church and State 48 No. 3 (2006), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/login .aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=22868547&site=ehost-live&scope=site, (accessed July 26 2019).

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lines of communication between parties. In post-conflict societies there is a trust deficit. Due to high levels of mistrust between the numerous factions and their constituents, the population may become more polarised. In the postconflict phase, with its formal, institutionalised power-sharing mechanisms, there is a danger that the population is more likely to support extremist positions and more radical leaders.4 State building projects emphasise the importance of developing a civil society. In order to succeed, trust between members of a population is required. This means that people from various religious or ethnic backgrounds work together to promote their collective interests. Many intra-state conflicts are perpetuated by a lack of trust between the parties. Often such conflicts require a credible third party to intervene and develop lines of communication between the parties involved. One of the principal goals of the intervention is to facilitate communication and subsequently inter-communal trust between the parties.5 Only once some trust has been restored can meaningful negotiations and conflict resolution activities begin. Trust is important in both peacetime and post-conflict situations as it reduces the likelihood of misinterpreting the other party’s actions. Low trust environments tend to form organisations based on one unifying identity, a religion, a tribe or an ethnic group. The position of low trust neglects possible contacts with other groups with similar grievances and it negates opportunities of economic, social and educational contact between groups. In low trust environments, flashpoints – a series of events that can lead to sudden violence or conflict – are more frequent and are more likely to become violent. It is an event that in other countries would cause dismay or public outrage but would not spark violence. In stable countries, democratic or not, several significant events are required to destabilise institutions or the administration. In weak states, it is often one event that is enough to reduce the legitimacy of the government and push it towards instability. The unexpected death of a political leader may cause high levels of tension within the party and its constituents. If the state is sufficiently strong, the public will wait until the official investigation is over and see if there have been any arrests. However, in a weak state with low levels of trust, the rule of law is not always strong and there is often a lack of transparency.

4 Kirsti Samuels. “Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making”, Chicago Journal of International Law 6 No. 2 (2006), 670. 5 Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz. “Intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era”, International Journal on World Peace December (2007), https://www-jstor-org.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/stable/ 20752800, (accessed July 26 2019).

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Trust and the Clan

First among the challenges of state building in a clan-based society, is the issue of trust. Trust in the political process, trust in the government, and trust in the “other”, i.e., those who are not members of your clan or tribe. Anthropologist Paul Spencer stated the following with regard to trust in clan societies: “Another aspect of this clan solidarity is the general exclusion of members of all other clans from its intimate affairs, and the mistrust, amounting at times to hostility, between clans”.6 The issue of trust and mistrust is important in state building. The ability to reach out to other groups and form broad coalitions is important to social inclusiveness and stability. Robert Bruce Ware, a specialist on the North Caucasus, argued the following about the lack of trust between clans in Chechnya: Many Chechens are likely to have difficulty offering their full allegiance and support to a leader from another Chechen teip, or clan, due to their sense of fidelity to their own teips. Hence, any Chechen who comes to power in Chechnia will sooner or later be forced to seek administrative support from members of his own teip.7 Somalia is another situation in which allegiance to the clan is paramount. On the surface, Somalia has the building blocks for effective state institutions: a common language, a common ethnic group, a strong egalitarian sense between the clans, and a common religion. However, trust between the clans is often non-existent and, in many cases, leads to violent conflicts and blood feuds. The lack of a social contract and trust between Somalis hinders effective state building.8 The type of social interaction between clans is not always reflected in institutions. Few, if any, formal institutions have a mechanism to intervene and deter blood feuds and other potentially violent inter-clan relations. Most flashpoints are centred around offences on honour. A woman may be kidnapped for marriage, and to restore honour the woman must marry the kidnapper. If this situation is not quickly resolved, violence may follow to avenge the dishonouring of a clan woman. 6 Paul Spencer. The Samburu (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., reprinted 2004), 29. 7 Robert Bruce Ware. “Prospects for Peace in Chechnia”, Central Asia and the Caucasus 2 No. 20 (2003), http://www.ca-c.org/online/2003/journal_eng/cac-02/03.wareng.shtml, (accessed March 18 2010). 8 Christian Webersik, Stig Jarle Hansen, Adam Egal. “Somalia: A Political Economy Analysis”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (2018), 3, 37.

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Democratisation and Open Society

Democracy, which originates from the Greek word demos, meaning people, and kratein, the verb to govern, means government by the people. Definitions of democracy are: A system of government in which the views and interests of the population are represented and promoted through the mechanism of free and fair elections to the political institutions and governance.9 and ‘A political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent, fair elections in which a sizeable portion of the adult population can vote’ and they state that ‘this definition encompasses two major aspects of democracy: contestation, or the ability of different individuals and groups to compete for political office; and participation, or the ability of a large portion of the country to be involved in the selection process through voting’.10 David Chandler, a specialist in international relations, said the following about democratisation: The two key components of the current approach to democratisation that are interlinked and mutually reinforcing: first, the shifting definition of democracy itself, with less focus on the institutional level of elections and government process and more on imputed values and cultures of a society, and second, the internationalisation of questions of democratic consolidation, where the problems of democratisation are held to necessitate international institutional guidance and support.11 Richard Ponzio, a specialist in state building, argued, “at its core, democratic peace-building refers to a dynamic, long-term process of institutionalizing and 9 10 11

J. Baylis, S. Smith, P. Owens. The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 562. Jeffry Frieden, David A. Lake, Kenneth A. Schultz,. World Politics: Interests, Interactions and Institutions (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010), 155. David Chandler. Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton 2nd Edition (Sterling VA: Pluto Press, 2000), 7.

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expanding democratic authority […]”.12 According to Ponzio, democratic peace building has two main objectives: to develop and strengthen institutions of a state for capable governance and to reduce the levels of violence. Robert Dahl in his book Democracy and Its Critics identified the following five aspects that needed to be fulfilled to speak of a democracy: − Effective participation. Citizens must have adequate and equal opportunities to form their preference and place questions on the public agenda and express reasons for one outcome over the other. − Voting equality at the decisive stage. Each citizen must be assured his or her judgments will be counted as equal in weight to the judgments of others. − Enlightened understanding. Citizens must enjoy ample and equal opportunities for discovering and affirming what choice would best serve their interests. − Control of the agenda. Demos or people must have the opportunity to decide what political matters actually are and what should be brought up for deliberation. − Inclusiveness. Equality must extend to all citizens within the state. Everyone has a legitimate stake within the political process.13 In order to realise this democracy, the citizen needs to be educated in the political process. There is however also a role for the government to be educated in a free and fair election process. How this set of criteria is operationalised also depends on the make-up of the state, being bicameral or unicameral, having a multiple district election system or one district, and having a parliamentary system or a presidential system. The choice to start educating the population is either starting at local elections and teaching the population to take responsibility for local concerns, or on a national level, where the formation of political parties is important and the national identity is stressed. Dahl argued that democratisation is easier in a socio-cultural context in which “rules and habits of competitive politics exist prior to large-scale elections”.14 Samuel Huntington defined a wave of democratisation as: “A group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occurs within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumbers transitions in the

12 13 14

Richard J. Ponzio. “Transforming political authority: UN democratic peacebuilding in Afghanistan”, Global Governance April-June (2007), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein .journals/glogo13&i=263, (accessed July 26 2019). Robert Dahl. Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 221. Christopher J. Coyne. “Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Insights from Tocqueville”, Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 31 No. 2 (2006), 152.

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opposite direction”.15 The third wave of democratisation led, in the 1990s, to a significant increase in political and ethnic violence.16 Huntington argued that periods of democratisation are followed by periods where the increase of democratic states diminishes. Since the 1970s, a third wave of democratisation is visible, with an increase of democracies that has not been witnessed before in history. The emergence of “ethnic leadership” in the late 1980s and early 1990s posed several direct challenges to more moderate leaders.17 The third wave of democratisation created circumstances in which more moderate and accommodating parties lost public and political ground through elections.18 The emerging “ethnic leaders” had an interest in promoting violence and driving as many wedges and divisions between groups. Moderate leaders were unable to effectively develop and implement conflict resolution mechanisms. As ethnic leaders grew in popularity and were elected into office, opportunities for moderate leaders to negotiate across ethnic and religious groups and effectively diffusing a situation before it became violent diminished.19 Democratising clan-based societies presents unique challenges. Clans will compete for access to state resources. Christopher Coyne, a specialist on state reconstruction, presented challenges to democratisation in Somalia. He states that among the difficulties encountered in democratising Somalis was the discrepancy between Somalia’s governmental institutions on paper and the actual behaviour of Somalis. Somalis organise themselves according to clans and die-paying groups. A dia-paying member is someone who will need to engage in a blood feud or pay blood money to defend a members’ honour. Somali 15 16

17

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Samuel Huntington. The Third Wave; Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (­Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 15. David Carment. “Exploiting ethnicity: political elites and domestic conflict”, Harvard International Review Winter (2007), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/ login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=24468420&site=ehost-live&scope=site, (accessed July 26 2019). David Carment. “Exploiting ethnicity: political elites and domestic conflict”, Harvard International Review Winter (2007), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/ login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=24468420&site=ehost-live&scope=site, (accessed July 26 2019). David Carment. “Exploiting ethnicity: political elites and domestic conflict”, Harvard International Review Winter (2007), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/ login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=24468420&site=ehost-live&scope=site, (accessed July 26 2019). David Carment. “Exploiting ethnicity: political elites and domestic conflict”, Harvard International Review Winter (2007), https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/ login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=24468420&site=ehost-live&scope=site, (accessed July 26 2019).

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elected officials engaged in politics at the national level. But due to a long history of nepotism, the Somali parliament quickly became a way to enrich oneself or one’s clan instead of a vehicle of socio-economic improvement for Somalia writ-large.20 Often the international community makes it a top priority to hold elections immediately after the cessation of hostilities or the removal of the current regime from office. Political parties may be quickly organised to hold relatively competitive and fair elections but this rapid push for elections does not guarantee that the structural needs for a sustainable democracy can be filled as quickly as the elections were held. Nor do holding free elections ensure that the institutions of government have the necessary capacity to implement the decisions taken. Six suggestions should be taken into account when supporting a democratisation process in states without a democratic past or states that, due to a conflict, can be characterised as weak or failed states: 1. look at how much and what kind of need there is for assistance 2. be modest as external party 3. put the process above the structure 4. understand the political reality 5. foster countervailing powers as non-governmental organisations, trade unions and the media 6. democracy assistance is indispensable. A choice should be made between creating an electoral system in which the government wants to emphasise the unity of the state by organising national elections, or prefers to bring politics close to the population by starting with local elections. Giving preference to national elections encourages the creation of national political parties, compared to the emergence of regional political parties.21 Simon Chesterman, professor of international law, writing on state building, stated: In less developed states lacking adequate bureaucratic institutions, elections held before those institutions can be created may hinder long-term democratic practices and stability. In other situations, however, early

20 21

Christopher J. Coyne. “Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy”, Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (2006), 346–348. Simon Chesterman. You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 209.

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elections may lock in a peace process and provide tangible political gains to stakeholders in the peace.22 Political parties have to be accessible for different groups in society, such as minorities, women, advantaged as well as disadvantaged groups. The parties should be financed by public and private funds, in order to avoid being dependent on specific elites.23 On the importance of having an independent media, former coordinator for the US on the future of Afghanistan, Richard Haass, said: Power must be shared with a vital, pluralistic civil society that possesses the “associational life” of which Alexis de Tocqueville wrote 170 years ago, namely, a wide array of private groups and private institutions including political parties, trade unions, business associations, schools, and media independent from one another and from state control. In addition, no ethnic group, gender, or class of people can be excluded from full participation in political life. Democracy inherently requires and protects individual rights of freedom of speech and worship.24 The need to develop an independent media is crucial for an informed citizenry. Democracies are only as transparent as the accuracy of the information available to their public. It is also the media’s responsibility to be the fact checker, to seek out independent sources of information to validate or invalidate the foundations upon which the government has made its decisions. Understanding the political reality within a given society must be interpreted as not only recognising national and local power structures but also finding ways to work with them. It is important to recognise local organisations and cultural groupings within the democratic process. This is different from the traditional realist perspective which organises the state from a top-down perspective. Understanding the political reality is crucial in developing a democracy that meets local norms and customs. In a country that is historically highly regionalised, the method in which the elected seats are distributed is most likely to reflect the identity of the population within the regions. 22 23 24

Simon Chesterman. You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 208. Joris Voorhoeve. From War to the Rule of Law. Peace Building after Violent Conflicts (­Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 79. Richard N. Haass. “Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World”, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2003), 139–140.

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Civil society organisations, using civic initiative and self-organisation, play a vital role in bridging the institutional gap in governance. This guarantees citizen participation in the state building process. The development of a viable ngo sector is necessary to bring economic elites, economic power agents and citizens together.25 Jan Aart Scholte, a specialist in civil society, presented this definition of civil society: With this objective in mind, “civil society” is taken here to refer to a political space where voluntary associations deliberately seek to shape the rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life. “Rules” in this conception encompass specific policies, more general norms, and deeper social structures. Thus, civil society actions may target formal directives (such as legislation), informal constructs (such as many gender roles), and/or the social order as a whole.26 In clan societies this civil society takes the form of a society that has strong family links and a strong power base in a specific area in the country, the area where the clan has its power base. 5

Democratisation and Clan Societies

There is a fundamental dynamic between state building, clan societies and democracy. State building requires individuals and institutions to build cross group relationships and to adopt transparent methods for the implementation of policy. Clan societies largely base their decisions on tactics and the question of which outcome will give the clan the most immediate benefit. The immediate benefits of being able to redirect resources to clan members becomes very tempting. For example, during the Tajik Civil War (1992–1997), clans (avlod) played an instrumental role in filling the functions of the state when the state was

25 26

Atanas Gotchev. “ngos and Promotion of Democracy and Civil Society in East-Central Europe”, nato Research Fellowships Programme 1996–1998, (1998), 11. http://www.nato .int/acad/fellow/96-98/gotchev.pdf, (accessed October 9 2010). Jan Aart Scholte. “Civil society and democracy in global governance”, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, The University of Warwick, January 2011. http:// wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2060/1/WRAP_Scholte_wp6501.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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­ eakened from the war.27 The importance of clans in current Tajik society is w considerable, since they have a great flexibility and adaptability, and therefore can play a positive role in the social development of Tajikistan.28 Another example is the case of the Albanians who did not comply with anticorruption laws, and cited this as an abuse of personal freedom. Political debates in Albania framed legal questions, such as anti-corruption and antiextortion laws, and government abuse of power. The reformers, attempting to implement and enforce legislation, were portrayed as backward, infringing on personal rights and liberties whereas the politicians promoting a reinforcement of the clan system and its associated kickbacks and cronyism were viewed as modern and progressive.29 The nature of the debate in Albania illustrated the type of problems clan societies face as they attempt to democratize. While donor agencies and foreign governments promote programmes that create transparent and accountable institutions and political order, these initiatives are superimposed onto existing structures that are more closely linked to tribal societies. In hierarchical societies the citizens have a certain level of confidence that both the immediate needs of the population will be met, and that the governing structures are able to forecast and reasonably meet future needs. It is important that a modest third party allows local structures to develop according to the pace and design of the local population. An example would be multi-decade support for reconstruction by international intergovernmental organisations, instead of a few years. The successful strengthening of the Afghan state, the successful delivery of social goods such as universal elementary education for all children and basic health care for all citizens, will take several decades. Those intervening should recognise the political implications of each decision, minimize arrogance, and avoid the establishment of a post-war caste system. In the case of Iraq it should have included to avoid that all Iraqis were looked at with suspicion, and Ba’athists and those loyal to Saddam were isolated and branded as criminals who had betrayed the Iraqi people.30 27 28 29 30

Yusufbekov Yusuff, Babajanov Rustam and Kuntuvdiy Natalya. “Civil Society Development in Tajikistan”, Aga Khan Development Network (2007). 18. http://www.akdn.org/ publications/civil_society_tajikistan_development.pdf, (accessed October 9 2010). Yusufbekov Yusuff, Babajanov Rustam and Kuntuvdiy Natalya. “Civil Society D ­ evelopment in Tajikistan”, 18. http://www.akdn.org/publications/civil_society_tajikistan_development.pdf, (accessed October 9 2010). Ilir Meta. “Building the Future of Albania”, in The First Decade and After F. Tarifa and M. Spoor Eds. The Hague Institute of Social Studies (2000), 23. Ray Salvatore Jennings. The Road Ahead, Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq, US Institute of Peace, Washington DC, (2003), 7.

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It is often the lack of continuity in support programmes that erodes public confidence in external actors. This system of development aid is one of partial reinforcement where the end user is uncertain whether or not the services stated will actually be provided. In so doing, it slows down momentum gained from the peace agreement or from the official start of the democratisation phase – whether it concerns the fall of the Soviet Union, decolonization, or the fall of an authoritarian regime through internal revolution. In clan-based societies, where division of various ministries is used to maintain alliances and social equilibrium, significant possibilities of inter-ministerial conflict arise as clan and power rivalries are expressed through nepotism, staffing of various positions with clan members and the use of ministerial staff and resources to acquire more power for one clan. In appointing certain clan members to ministerial positions, it reduces the transparency of government and subsequently its international legitimacy. Internally, this may be viewed as an acceptable way to maintain social balance; it may also be viewed as reconciliation as opponents may be appointed to office. The potential for damage comes from the expectation of an appointment. There is also the possibility that a person or faction will use their position or influence within a state institution to continue the violent conflict. Centralising requires applying national policies that can challenge the clan’s authority. If this occurs, clan members from various clans may feel that their way of life is under threat, they may feel that the central government is trying to expunge their traditions and customs. Any action that the clans perceive as a threat to their independence may be met with hostility. This may come in the form of non-compliance, disengagement from political processes, or outright violence directed at the government and its structures. Implementing state building programs that focus on the local and the regional governments allow for the benefits of stabilisation and reconstruction to be visible to the citizenry. The capture of the state and state institutions by clans and tribes, makes the de-escalation and the post-violence phase more fragile than in other types of societies. During the de-escalation phase clans can be used as active political actors. Their interests can be represented during cease fire and peace negotiations, and their intentions should be made clear. Putting process over structure is here important. If holding an elder meeting is viewed as a legitimate mechanism to bring together various clans to discuss a cease fire or peace agreement and the subsequent enforcing mechanism, it grants greater cultural legitimacy to the entire process. This was the reasoning behind the Loya Jirga, Grand Council, in Afghanistan. Representatives from the different areas of Afghanistan were locally selected to represent their region in the Loya Jirga. These

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comprised tribal elders and political leaders, as well as women. The Loya Jirga convened to debate which programs were most needed in Afghanistan, which aspects to concentrate on and how to achieve them.31 The peace was not imposed upon the population by the United Nations and the solutions came from within. Clan societies have a rich history of conflict avoidance and settlement. It is far better to acknowledge the interests, powers and motivations of these ­organisations than to ignore them. Tamara Duffey, a specialist in conflict resolution and military intervention explained the political dangers of ignoring the interests and motivations of clans in Somalia: Furthermore, the UN´s misunderstanding of the clan system and the decentralised nature of traditional Somali political institutions led the UN to pursue basic political errors. […] Amid this view, unosom´s efforts were concentrated on reconciling the leadership within the Hawiye (­Aideed and Ali Mahdi´s clan family) rather than promoting the maintenance of traditional clan equilibrium and power-sharing.32 As we see, the importance in negotiations between the clans and the government is that the clans need to be able to trust the government, which requires the government to be transparent and accountable with regard to all actions it takes in the security sector, defined here as the army, the police, border control, intelligence and the rule of law. 6

Democratisation and Security Sector Reform

In a democracy with a functioning rule of law, the government, both on a national, regional and local level, has to be accountable and transparent. This is often a problem in the transition towards a democracy. In clan-based societies it is even more a problem, since the more a society is closed, the more reason there is to believe that clan politics are not transparent and therefore, the clan politics may be accountable to the clan, but not to the government or the population at large. In a state that is in transition towards democracy, the areas 31 32

Baqer Moin. “Analysis: Afghan political healing”, bbc June 20 2002, http://news.bbc .co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2055461.stm, (accessed April 17 2008). Tamara Duffey. “Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping”, Journal of International Peacekeeping vol. 7, no. 1, 2000, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310008413823 (accessed July 30 2019), Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodward (eds.) Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution (London: Cass, 2000), 158.

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that need transparency and accountability most are the army, border protection, the police and intelligence organisations. To this can be added the judiciary and the state institutions that together are responsible for the rule of law. Internal as well as foreign funded projects concentrating on accountability and transparency aim to make the security sector safer. This is done through projects in Security Sector Reform (ssr). Security Sector Reform offers an integrated approach to assist states in transition to strengthen institutions, and provide security for the population. It is top-down and bottom-up, and requires close cooperation between international donors and recipients. ssr is only successful when supported by the local leadership. Furthermore, the success of ssr depends on the level of inclusiveness of all national or local parties, including civil society. Building up civil society in transitional countries should coincide with the process of implementing security, rights and freedoms through the rule of law for all members of society. These processes should be initiated by top-down and by bottom-up decision-making. Intercultural communication and local ownership are keys to successful donor-recipient policy. Nicole Ball, a specialist on Security Sector Reform presented this definition of Security Sector Reform: “Security sector reform consists of a broad range of activities involving a wide variety of local stakeholders and external partners. The unifying factor is the focus on democratic governance”.33 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development presented the following definition of security sector reform: “It seeks to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their socie­ ties in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law”.34 The report continued in stating: ssr itself also extends well beyond the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing. The security system includes the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie, intelligence services and similar bodies, judicial and penal institutions, as well

33

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Nicole Ball. “Dilemmas of Security Sector Reform: Response to ‘Security Sector Reform in Developing And Transitional Countries’”, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management (August 2004), 2, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publica tions/dialogue2_ball.pdf, (accessed October 10 2010). oecd (2005). Security System Reform and Governance, dac Guidelines and Reference Series, oecd Publishing, Paris https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264007888-en, (accessed July 26 2019).

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as the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, and the Defence Ministry).35 Working towards reform of the security sector, which is transparent and accountable, is one way to strengthen the state, and appease possible conflicts over power between clans. How this is done with regard to fair representation of the different groups and clans in society depends on the make-up of the state. 7

Negative Consequences of Democratisation

The process of democratisation can further weaken the state, instead of strengthening the state. Democratisation opens up the state to competing groups. By allowing competing factions access to the state, penetrating and corrupting the state becomes easier.36 In the documentary Democracy for Beginners Paddy Ashdown explains that the importance Western states gave to the organisation of elections as an important aspect of democracy did not necessarily result in the expected outcome. Nationalism in Serbia and the conflict between Serbia and the Bosnian ethnic groups resulted in growing nationalism, which threatened democratisation rather than fostering it. Ashdown concluded that though the legitimisation for intervening was to bring democracy as soon as possible, the reality is that sometimes it is better to set up institutions before organising elections.37 Kidane Mengisteab, a specialist in African state building, argued that identity politics played a critical role in inter-group hostilities in Ethiopia and presented a significant challenge in evenly distributing political goods. The nature of identity relations, in turn, is likely to impact the nature of the state. The more identity politics are characterised by state-identity or inter-identity hostilities, the more difficult it will become for the state to provide public goods and services effectively or to establish itself as a neutral promoter of broad social interests. It is also more difficult for the 35 36 37

oecd (2005). Security System Reform and Governance, dac Guidelines and Reference ­Series, oecd Publishing, Paris https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264007888-en, (accessed July 26 2019). J. Moran. “Democratic transitions and forms of corruption”, Crime, Law and Social Change 36 (2001), 382–385. http://tegenlicht.vpro.nl/afleveringen/2003-2004/democratie-voor-beginners-1en2.html, (accessed 12 February 2014)

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national elite to overcome the temptations of ethnic loyalties in favour of national goals.38 Mengisteab further elaborated upon the challenges of identities and identitypolitics in state building in Ethiopia: Such characteristics of the state are not attainable without reconstitution of the state and transformation of state-identity relations, however. In countries, such as Ethiopia, which are characterised by chronic crises of state building, manifested in the volatile state-identity relations and a state which is widely perceived to favour one identity group or another, breaking the vicious cycle and transforming identity relations is a daunting task. The combination of ethnic-based political parties and majoritybased electoral systems adds to the complexity.39 While it is possible to remain a clan member from clan A, it is also possible to be labelled a middle-class engineer. In creating layers of identity, greater contact between various core identity groups (based on inherited traits such as religion or ethnicity and not acquired traits such as profession or political ideology) helps promote indigenous civil society organisations, civilian contacts between various groups and promotes a national identity based on common interests. This is of specific importance to women and other minority groups because as the definition of the individual shifts, it tends to become more inclusive of acquired identities and places less importance on inherited identities. As the options of self-identity increase, the process of social, political and economic inclusiveness is strengthened. 8

Clans and Civil Society

Civil society is often viewed as the stimulation of political expression. Voluntary and uncoerced political expression is essential in a pluralist democratic society. Although clans are not recognised as formal civil society actors, they do exert considerable public influence.

38 39

Kidane Mengisteab. “Identity Politics, Democratisation and State Building in Ethiopia’s Federal Arrangement”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 7 No. 2 (2007), 67. Kidane Mengisteab. “Identity Politics, Democratisation and State Building in Ethiopia’s Federal Arrangement”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 7 No. 2 (2007), 68.

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“Crowding out” is a tactic sometimes used by clan members. Kathleen Collins described this when after the fall of the Soviet Union clan members would purposely outnumber non-clan members to ensure that their position was upheld during the vote.40 Foreign observers who are unaware of clan affiliations are led to believe that the process was democratic, the majority of voices carried the day. What was left unseen was that the individuals in the room did not only represent themselves, they represented a larger group’s interest, that of their clan. In some instances, foreign donors intentionally seek clans out to partner with them and strengthen their democratic governance mechanisms. In 2006, the Australian Aid Agency issued its strategy in which it stated: Support and partner with institutions that show political will. The program highly values institutions that show interest in and commitment to democratic governance. It will cherry pick those provinces, districts, wards, etc. where clans, churches, state agencies, etc. show the political will to form partnerships and to implement democratic reforms;41 During the British rule over Afghanistan, clans as civic agents were able to negotiate with the British over legal structures in the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan. According to Maria Sultan, a Defence specialist writing on South Asia, the negotiations between the British and the Pashtun tribes were successful because they addressed the concerns and interests of both the tribes and the British. Here tribe is used as a synonym for clan. The tribal areas were never part of the British Empire thus making both parties in the negotiations equals. The British government paid allowances to the tribal councils in accordance to tribal (clan) tradition. In return the tribes guaranteed safe passage along highways traversing their territories and surrendered tribesmen who had committed offences on British soil to British authorities. The tribe paid damages for any British property damaged or destroyed by any of their tribesmen.42 The Afghan tribes successfully played the role of advocates, they convinced the British not to make the area British territory and they effectively monitored and enforced the territory. This system was successful for many reasons. 40 41 42

Kathleen Collins. “The Logic of Clan Politics Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories”, World Politics 56 No. 2 (2004), 244. Australian Aid. “Democratic Governance in Papua New Guinea”, Ausaid (2006), 4, http:// www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/strategy_draft_png.pdf, (accessed October 10 2010). Maria Sultan. “The Quest for Peace in Chechnya: the relevance of Pakistan’s Tribal Areas Experience”, 449–450.

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The tribe remained outside the political and legal jurisdiction of Britain which meant that the Pashtun had retained their right to internal self-determination. The tribe took collective responsibility for its member’s actions, which was in keeping with its traditions and laws. When an offence was committed, the British would approach the Malik, who would deliver the offender to the British.43 If the accused could not be produced, the tribe would pay the British restitution for the offence. In return for their cooperation, the British paid a tribute to the Malik. The funds allowed the Malik to gain greater importance within the community. If the Malik pursued policies that were unfavourable to the British, they would withdraw funding and the leader would lose his respect within his community. The British also received Khassadars, or tribal warriors who were used as a paramilitary force. They were under the command of the British but were entirely staffed by tribal warriors.44 In the case of Somalia, clans within the country and the diaspora play a vital role in promoting civil society. Several Somali diaspora non-governmental organisations are divided along clan lines. As many of these civil society organisations are based along clan lines, their areas of work are correlated with the strongholds of their clans. As with other aspects of Somali life, civil society organisations become entangled in clan politics. Consequently, politicians and others may use civil society organisations to promote long-standing inter-clan conflicts or to provoke new ones for their own political or economic gain.45 9

Clan Influence in the State

Crowding out and clientelism are just two ways in which clan societies influence the legal and political structures of a country. The collective interests of the clan are protected when the clan is able to find a few key patrons within government. The positive result is that the interests of the clan are represented in government. This can also translate to a lack of enforcement of the existing laws, allowing clans to control border check points without government oversight, that forced marriages are not annulled by the state and charges brought 43 44 45

A malik is a leader of a town. Maria Sultan. “The Quest for Peace in Chechnya: the relevance of Pakistan’s Tribal Areas Experience”, 450. Feysal Osman. “The role of civil society in Somalia’s reconstruction: achievements, challenges and opportunities”, Safer World, 4 June 2018, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/ news-and-analysis/post/775-the-role-of-civil-society-in-somaliaas-reconstructionachievements-challenges-and-opportunities (accessed January 25 2019), paras. 8–9.

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up against the husband or honour crimes are not prosecuted. It can also mean that corruption, criminal law, transparency and equal hiring laws are not enforced. When clans are able to obtain influence in the state, the collective rights versus the rights of the individual may come into conflict. It is in the interest of the clan to maintain good relations with key government personnel, whereas the individual rights of the voter are neglected since the individual is expected to support the clan and vote accordingly. Clans can and do play a positive role in public life. This is highlighted by the following example. In efforts to control onchocerciasis, a disease that is transmitted by black flies and causes skin lesions and blindness, efforts were made to engage the Ugandan government to distribute and administer a treatment, a drug called ivermectin. There were strong suspicions about outsiders administering the drug, fearing that it had been poisoned. When the government charged local kinship groups with the collection of the drug from distribution points, and then further redistributing it among community members, the uptake of treatment was maintained at ninety percent. When kinship groups were not used to distributing the medicine, researchers discovered that people either refused to take the medication outright, levels of treatment were low, or it was found that the people who were administrating the programme were asking for more and more money to implement it. Katabarwa, Richards and Ndyomugyenyi, of the Carter Centre Global 2000 River Blindness Program, also noted that women were active in the public discussions and important in swaying the community’s views on the program.46 The ivermectin distribution programme improved the health of the local population. It is important to note that the success of this programme and the high uptake of medication, is directly dependent on the clan’s ability to take ownership of the process. It is the clan’s responsibility to make the pickup of ivermectin and to distribute it to its members. It is the clan’s responsibility to ensure that its members are informed on how to take it. It is the clan’s responsibility to monitor people who were absent or pregnant at the time and could not take the medication. It is also the clan’s responsibility to detect any potential adverse side effects and report them to the local health authorities. By enabling the clan to take ownership of this program, the government has respected local

46

N.M. Katabarwa, F.O. Richards Jr., and R. Ndyomugyenyi. “In rural Ugandan communities the traditional kinship/clan system is vital to the success and sustainment of the African Programme for Onchoecerciasis Control”, Annals of Tropical Medicine and Parasitology 94 No. 5 (2000), 486–491.

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norms and attitudes and has made use of an active, although invisible, social network. 10

Economic Development and the Clan Society

There are differences in black, informal and a-legal economies. A black economy is in direct violation of current legislation. An informal economy is also described as a social economy where bartering and the direct exchange of goods and services are common. An a-legal economy has transactions that are neither considered legal nor illegal; they have not yet been codified. Wallace and Latchawa also identified a negative spiral. As the public increasingly perceives their government as corrupt, the public loses confidence in their political leadership. As this trend continues, the public shift toward the informal as a means of livelihood reduces the taxation base of the government.47 This loss of revenue further diminishes the state’s ability to project power and implement policy, further reducing the public’s confidence in their government. The social unit of clans is not necessarily positive or negative. Each clan may engage in lawful or unlawful behaviours. The degree or scale of unlawful behaviours will impact overall economic development. Mark Galeotti, a specialist in transnational crime, described how the Chechen clan system negatively impacted state functioning and crime rates. The foundation of many Chechen criminal groups is the teip. Their identities are strongly linked to the inheritance of names, blood ties and traditions. Tukhums are the alliances between clans which can pool resources. The result of such an alliance was seen when former President of Chechnya, Dudaev, allowed armed gunmen from allied clans to work as law enforcement officers.48 Such a close relationship to government and its funds increased the instances of money laundering in Chechnya. 11

Clans and Women’s Rights

There are social mechanisms enforced by women placed on women in clan societies that propagate strong sentiments of being citizens with little to no 47 48

Claire Wallace and Rosalina Latcheva. “Economic Transformation Outside the Law: Corruption, Trust in Public Institutions and the Informal Economies in Transition Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Europe-Asia Studies 58 No. 1 (2006), 81–83. Mark Galeotti. “Brotherhoods and Associates: Chechen Networks of Crime and Resistance”, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 11 No. 2/3 Winter (2002), 340–342.

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political, economic or social voice. One practice that diminishes the rights of women is a badal marriage, where a sister and a brother marry another sister and a brother from a different family. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that all individuals have the right to freely enter into a marriage as well as freely dissolve the marriage.49 From an international legal point of view the habit of badal marriages is in violation of the law. Badal marriages work in groupings, should one couple divorce then the other couple must divorce. As badal marriage is practiced in the Middle East, third party women actively seek out siblings to marry other sets of siblings for a fee.50 In the Middle East strong social pressures are exerted on the targeted women to marry. Director Ibstisam Mara’na filmed the documentary “Badal” in which she followed a badal broker, in this case the grandmother (the father’s mother), a father and a daughter around while the broker haggled over the conditions of the double marriage.51 The film followed Palestinian women living in Israel. The documentary showed how the daughter was repeatedly referred to as (nearly) too old to get married and how it would be difficult to marry her off. A woman is in her marrying prime in her late teens, early twenties. The broker (the grandmother) indicated that it would be easier to seek a bride for the father alone, in essence stating that the daughter was no longer of any familial value. The daughter was not yet twenty-five years old. It was the pressure from the grandmother and the indications that it would be very difficult for her to marry that left the granddaughter feeling socially and culturally isolated. Mara’na explores the concept of women oppressing women in a group session of wives who were married by the badal system. Many women indicated that they felt that their lives had been in some ways deprived of liberty and happiness. In Afghanistan, a badal is also an exchange for a feud. A woman given in marriage to resolve a feud is called a bad. The resolution of feuds falls under the purview of men.52 In Kyrgystan, there is a tradition of kidnapping for marriage, the ala kachuu. Parents normally select their children’s spouses, however, when the daughter 49 50 51 52

United Nations. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, United Nations, http://www .un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a16, (accessed April 27 2008). Ibstisam Mara’na. “Badal”, Cinephil http://www.cinephil.co.il/Index.asp?ArticleID=339&C ategoryID=68&Page=1., (accessed March 7 2008). Ibstisam Mara’na. “Badal”, Cinephil http://www.cinephil.co.il/Index.asp?ArticleID=339&C ategoryID=68&Page=1., (accessed March 7 2008). Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. “Evaluation report on General Situation of Women in Afghanistan”, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, https://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfad5d.html, (accessed July 26 2019).

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wants to marry another man, the woman arranges for herself to be kidnapped by the man she wants to marry. Although no sexual contact between the individuals occurs, the absence of the daughter from the family home is seen as suspicious. To reconcile this, the woman is allowed to marry the man who kidnapped her to protect her and her family’s honour. Historically, this practice has mostly been done with the consent of the woman, both parties wanted to marry each other. However, since 1991, there has been a growing trend of men kidnapping women for marriage without their consent. Research indicated that 84% of women that were kidnapped marry their kidnapper, this included women who did and who did not consent to the kidnapping. The researchers estimated that 35% to 45% of Kyrgyz women were forced to marry someone they did not choose by the process of kidnapping.53 Similar experiences are applicable in Chechnya. Russian News Agency RiaNovosti reported in 2010 that as part of the practice of kidnapping women for marriage in Chechnya the Chechen government had introduced a fine of 1 million roubles ($33,400) for bride kidnapping.54 Traditional tribal law rests on the principle of restoring social equilibrium and not on the rights of the individual. State building projects aimed at reinforcing human rights legislation focus on the equality of individuals and the fact that human rights are inalienable. The victim has the right not to be persecuted as well as not to be further victimised by their communities and law enforcement. When investigating women’s rights in clan societies, rape is a taboo topic. It is particularly challenging in clan-based societies where there is already a strong emphasis on a strict division between male and female and honour, which has to be preserved by the chaste behaviour of the woman. A woman relative who has been raped diminishes the honour of her father, her brothers, her husband and her sons. Moreover, it diminishes the honour of the entire clan. Yet rape is a violation of human rights, is an act of aggression against a person and has been used as a weapon of war. The systematic kidnapping and raping of women for marriage or the murder of rape victims to restore family or community honour are practices that are common throughout clan-based societies. In the Northwest Caucasus, rape victims are often forced to marry the rapist.55 The practices of raping women 53 54 55

Russell Kleinbach, Mehirgiul Ablezova, and Medina Aitieva. “Kidnapping for marriage (ala kachuu) in a Kyrgyz village”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 2 (2005), 192–193. RiaNovosti. “Chechnya introduces fines for bride kidnapping”, RiaNovosti October 6 2010, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101006/160855432.html, (accessed October 12 2010). Walter Cummins-Richmond. “Legal Pluralism in the North West Caucasus: The role of Sharia Courts”, Religion, State and Society 32 No. 1 (2004), 63.

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in order to marry them or forcing a raped woman to marry her attacker, are not unique to the Northwest Caucasus. In the Nijrab District in Afghanistan, it happens that gunmen abduct and rape a girl. In raping the girl, she loses all social and familial value. Due to social custom, the family is obliged to drop their complaint with law enforcement institutions and allow the daughter to marry the kidnapper. Frequently, it is the family that approaches the rapist and asks the rapist to marry the daughter.56 There are three options for restoring the honour of the family after a woman has been raped. The woman can be forced to marry her attacker, the woman can be killed or the clan can retaliate against the rapist(s)’ clan to avenge her attack.57 Kidnappings for ransom and trafficking of women in Iraq has increased significantly since the American-led invasion in 2003. Women and girls are abducted from the street, lured from orphanages or falsely promised work elsewhere. Trafficked women are often given prison sentences for prostitution, for using false documents or entering a state illegally. Prison sentences are usually the only method which the state can use to protect the women from their families and the gangs that trafficked them. Trafficked Iraqi women have been located in Yemen, Jordan, Syria and other Persian Gulf countries. Victims of human trafficking in Iraq are often regarded as “impure” and “unchaste”, a smudge on family honour.58 There are several programs and initiatives aimed at addressing honour killings. Each program or initiative has a different approach to addressing the matter. The European Commission support document for Fighting Violence Against Women states: One of the main products of the project’s final conference was the adoption of a Plan of Action to combat honour-based violence in Europe. This was adopted and introduced at the highest political levels in Sweden and participating countries. It highlighted the importance of addressing the issue from a human rights perspective, while underlining

56 57 58

Amnesty International. “Afghanistan – Abduction and Rape at Gunpoint”, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/92000/asa110132004en.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Declan Walsh. “Pakistan’s Gas Fields Blaze as Rape Spark Threat of Civil War”, The Guardian, February 21 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/21/pakistan.declan walsh, (accessed July 26 2019). Brian Bennett. “Stolen Away”, Time, April 23 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,1186558,00.html, (accessed June 17 2008).

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the importance of cultural dialogue and integration in addressing honour-based violence.59 In 2007, Amnesty International reported the following situation in Iraq: In 2000 and 2002, the Kurdish authorities introduced amendments to the law, but incidents of “honour crimes” continue to be reported. In its statement of 1 May, the Kurdish Regional Government (krg) said there had been 40 convictions for “honour killings” in the Kurdistan region and that at least 24 other cases are pending.60 Amnesty International called upon the Iraqi government to “make honour crimes a serious offense” under the Iraqi legal code.61 Traditional codes of conduct governing behaviour, such as the kanun (Albania) or the adat (Chechnya), in practice often overrule national laws as they are widely viewed as more legitimate. Also, these traditional codes pre-date the civic laws and generally penetrate society more than state law enforcement. A delicate balance between assisting in the foundation of human rights and strengthening local structures that are viewed as legitimate by the local population must be upheld. A rapid process of individualisation can be devastating to communal ties and can ruin indigenous support networks. Another aspect that touches upon the status and rights of women in clanbased societies are inheritance and land ownership rights. It is important to elaborate on the difficulties of transparent property rights and property transfers. In clan societies, when the male head of the family dies, the property is distributed along one of two lines. It gets divided between his sons or it gets allocated to the council of elders for further redistribution. Four common scenarios hinder durable and equitable economic development: (1) the absence of women in the inheritance line, thus depriving them of economic security, especially when their husband dies young and the wife has young children for 59

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European Commission. “Youth Action Programme Support Document on the Annual Priority 2008 and 2009 Fighting Violence Against Women”, European Commission Education Culture Youth, Sport and Citizenship Youth in Action, (2008–2009), 6 http://ec.europa.eu/ youth/pdf/doc1062_en.pdf, (accessed October 12 2010). Amnesty International. “Stop ‘honour killings’ in Iraq”, Amnesty International (2007), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/68000/mde140312007en.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Amnesty International. “Stop ‘honour killings’ in Iraq”, Amnesty International (2007), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/68000/mde140312007en.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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which to care; (2) parcelling of land into smaller and smaller units to provide some land to all sons thus weakening their economic security [creation of near landlessness because the plots are too small to sustain a family or an individual]; (3) informal property transfers that are difficult to challenge in a court of national law; and (4) the vulnerability of the woman to other men of the husband’s family who wish to marry her to acquire more land.62 Loss of access to land ownership and inheritance increases the vulnerability of women as a whole. She is often overlooked for inheriting the land and is often evicted by the extended family or forced into marriage to increase the holdings of another man. 12

Conclusion: Clans and Democratisation, Are They compatible?

In this chapter several aspects of the relation of the clan and the state in society during democratisation were analysed. Trust needs to be restored in order to meaningfully rebuild a state and society. This means that trust between the citizen and the state, between the clan and the state has to be restored. It may also include restoring trust between clans, and between groups in the population. Directly following from the restoring of trust is the safety of citizens within the state. An important part of the rebuilding of the state involves the guarantee to the population that they are safe. This requires the combatants to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate into society. Former combatants need to feel safe enough to lay down their weapons, and feel that they can reintegrate in their civilian life, without repercussions by the local population. A second aspect is the reform of the security sector, to build certain guarantees in the security system to avoid a relapse into violence. This involves a reform, often supported by international parties, of the army, the police, the border protection and the intelligence services. It also includes in a broader sense the strengthening of institutions, on a local, regional and national level, and the judiciary. Non-governmental organisations play a vital role in the post-conflict process. They are able to formulate what topics need to be addressed to stabilise the state. They often participate in the peacemaking effort, and are the voice of the population. This is the bottom-up part of the state building process.

62

Human Rights Watch. “Illustrative Cases: Kenyan Women Tell of Property Rights Abuses”, Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/women/property/cases.htm (accessed March 9 2009).

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The rights of the citizens need to be guaranteed. This includes not only individual rights, but also group rights for minorities or peoples within the state. Special emphasis has to be paid to women’s rights, since in many of the cases given in this book, the rights of the women are not guaranteed on the same level as those of men. This has to do with the patriarchal society, where women are responsible for the honour of the family and the clan. Therefore an infringement on their honour, even if this is done without her consent, is held against her. This results in unequal access to legal redress for women, and unequal responsibility for cases such as kidnapping and rape, forced marriage, and domestic violence. International organisations and international intervention forces are challenged with the dilemma that they intervene in order to bring security, both national and regional, and secondly, they intervene in order to bring democracy. The dilemma is that the state structure and relations between the state and the clan are often more complicated. This means that if the clan is not involved in a top-down implementation of democracy, this will lead to a failed attempt of democratizing, since the clans may not participate in the transition process, or actively fight it. There might be a friction between the Western based ideas of democracy and the local cultures.

Conclusion Part 1 At the end of Part 1, let us answer the central question based on the literature review and the examples found in the cases under consideration. Clan societies often predate the modern nation-state. This means that the clan society is incorporated in many aspects of the state. Three aspects concerning state building were found that are relevant for the relation between the state and the clan: The first is the organisation of the state and the cooperation between the different governance levels within that state, as well as the level of cooperation between citizens and the state apparatus. The clan has a political, social and economic role. The clan furthermore brings some stability and its own identity. None of the examples stated in this book are strong states, all show signs of a weak or failing state. In the following chapters there will be a further investigation whether there is a correlation between the weak state and clan society. The second aspect is the functioning of the state. How does the state function, what do we expect from a state and how does the clan fit in? If we analyse the state with a clan society from the perspective of state building, we realise that our perception is Eurocentric, since the requirements of the modern – democratic – nation state are by origin, Western. In the case studies we see that the state with a clan society performs poorly when it comes to clientelism, corruption, free and fair elections, party politics, and often human rights, specifically women’s rights. There are also problems with transparency and accountability. This again underlines the conclusion that states with a clan society are more prone to be weak states. The third aspect is the international context in which state building takes place. International actors involved may be neighbouring states, international intergovernmental organisations like the United Nations, non-governmental organisations which give humanitarian support like the International Committee of the Red Cross, but also jihadist groups supported by other states. When looking at the international context, we notice a clash between the rights of the individual and the rights of the clan and its members (group rights) in clan societies, which differ from Western-based democracies, and may not fully be understood by those international actors that intervene. International actors pose a threat to the stability of the state. They may interfere having their own geo-political and geo-strategic agenda, which may not correspond with the priorities that the state with a clan society would formulate. This may prove detrimental to the state building process. Warlords, whether having their power base and income within the state, or being financed by outside (international) donors, hamper the centralisation of violence in the © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_007

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hands of state authorities, in their effort to restore the monopoly on violence. Furthermore, international involvement through the financing of weapons, whether in the hands of state support groups or in the hands of opposition groups, may influence the outcome of the process in unexpected ways. And finally, an international intervention force may take over part of the state building effort, which as we saw may have a dual effect. On the one hand this may be regarded as neo-colonialism, and not be greeted with enthusiasm by the population, on the other hand it may give a boost to institution building and a basic security in the state, on condition that the clan society is involved in the process. How does this fit in with the central question in this book: How do clan societies and the state interact? Subquestions discussed are: − Are state building efforts and a clan society compatible? − What happens if clans co-opt state structures? − How is a state, based on the rule of law, built in a clan-society? − How does one incorporate the clan in weak state institutions? − How does a clan-society relate to democracy? − How do we deal with the prejudice that a clan society is backwards? With regard to the first subquestion we have seen that state building efforts and clan society are compatible. Central however is the need to involve the clan in the state building process. An external party must be aware which clans are powerful in a specific territory and which clans are less or more powerful. Reconstruction and elections are influenced by clan politics. This can go unnoticed by powers who intervene, but when those intervening leave out an important clan, this can result in an impasse in the reconstruction effort, since the clan could decide to no longer cooperate. Co-opting clans by state structures guarantees cooperation of the clan in the state building process. In order to have an inclusive peace process, it is necessary to include the clan, and be aware of the relations between clans with regard to the scale of the clan, its importance and its willingness to cooperate with those installing new state structures. The rule of law is regarded as an important aspect in state building. In principle it does not clash with the clan society. A fair trial is in line with clan law, but in a clan society there might be a discussion on the role of adat law in the state, next to positive law or incorporated in positive law. Adat law is more focused on reconciliation, where positive law concentrates on solving a conflict where one party wins and another party loses. Since in clan societies group rights are considered more important than individual rights, there is often an issue with women’s rights, while these societies are patriarchal and characterised by a strict code of honour.

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A state in transition, in the course of state building as part of secession or state reconstruction as a consequence of conflict, is weak. The state institutions have to be restored and strengthened. We found that it is important to include the clan in the state building process, in order to guarantee that they have sufficient representation in the state structures and are committed to the state building process. Clan societies have the form of decentralised states, where the clans have autonomy in their own areas of influence. This makes a clan-structured state fit for a government model in which there are multiple parties, where the regions have some form of autonomy, or a federal state design. It is important that all groups -in this book clans and tribes- are represented in state building, which allows for attention for group rights and minority rights. The conclusion is that a clan society and democracy are certainly compatible. The previous chapters show that it is a prejudice to think that clan societies show signs of a state that is underdeveloped, or backwards. The clan society is just another form of society, a state structure has existed in Western Europe and the United States in the past, but is still prevalent in many parts of the world. We can learn from the legal system of clan societies that reconciliation is of a more lasting nature than the legal system of Western Europe and the United States. Therefore, the clan society is just another kind of society, which should certainly not be regarded as backwards. Based on the above, the four assumptions stipulated in the introduction can be answered: The first assumption is: when the state becomes weak, the clan takes over responsibilities that are supposed to be in the domain of the state. Indeed we saw the interaction between the clan and the state. The clan structure resembles the basic structure of the state, with adherence to the clan leader, compared to adherence of state organs to the government, the observing of sentences based on adat law, comparable to the functioning positive legal system, the defence of clan territory and clan members, comparable to the duty of the government to defend the territory and its citizens, and the social system in which clan-members support each other and watch over vital infrastructure, a responsibility also necessary for the government. In the case studies in Chapters 5–8 an analysis will be given how this interaction takes place. A second assumption is: clan societies are less developed societies than non-clan-based societies. Clan societies are characterised as closed societies, and therefore different from Western open societies. They are based on group solidarity, while the western states are based on individual rights for the citizen. During elections, clan members will be prone to vote for fellow clan members. This will result in a reflection of the clan power in the state. These

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d­ ifferences between clan societies and Western states do not mean that clan societies are less developed, but that they are different. A third assumption is: clan societies can be democratised, since the clans together form a decentralised structure in the state, where the power of the clans is vested in specific territories. As we saw above, the clan society contains many aspects of a state. The clan elder, often in cooperation with a council is responsible for decisions on war and peace between clans and with external forces, clans unite in times of external enemies, the clan elder and the council are judging cases brought before them, using the traditional adat law. Infrastructure and social policies are provided by the clan. This has a downside, since it means that clan members support each other, which can be read as nepotism. The clan elder is elected by his members, based on his knowledge and wisdom, and/or his excellence and bravery in warfare. If the state does not include the clan in the state building process, clan society can become an additional society next to the state, which increases the danger of a weak state and internal conflict. Though the clan society can be democratised, the different roles the clan elder performs are not in line with the trias politica. Since the clan society is primarily a patriarchal society, the position of women in society is not equal to men. Although women’s rights are an issue in Western democracies, they are even more an issue in clan societies. Women are responsible for the honour of the clan, therefore it is difficult for them to report rape and sexual assaults, both in wartime and in peacetime. Just as in most Western states, women, in practice, do not have the same equal rights as men. A fourth assumption is: when the state gets stronger, the clan has to withdraw from some political fields, and this creates friction between the state and the clan. There is a relation between the strength of the state and the influence of the clan. When the state institutions are no longer capable of providing political goods to the population, the clan takes over responsibilities in the field of protecting the life and good of the clan members, upholding infrastructure and supporting the members of the clan. This can be seen as nepotism and corruption. When the state gets stronger, the clan needs to have sufficient trust in the state to hand over power. This trust can be created by involving the clan in the state building process. The state can create autonomy in certain regions or even opt for a federal system, thus integrating clans in the process. If the clan is not (sufficiently) involved in the state building process or is dissatisfied with the outcome of the state building process, this may result in prolonged civil unrest or a weak state. The following chapters will show how the state and the clan interact in state building efforts.

Part 2 Case Studies

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Chapter 5

Clans in Chechnya The aim of this chapter is to give an insight into the structure of Chechen clans and their influence on Chechen society. Although the Chechens have a strong history of clans and see themselves as freedom loving, they have been part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union for more than 100 years. The clan has played an important role in Chechen history, and is even visible in modern politics. This means that the clan will not disappear. The clan is incorporated in life and politics, and as many as 80% of the elections can be explained by voting behaviour along clan lines. Clan society in Chechnya means that to a certain extent, the clan will take care of the clan members in a social-economic sense, and provide security, if and when the state is not capable of providing such basic needs. The influence of the clan on Chechen politics has been visible in the right of Chechens under Communism to use traditional law instead of the official Soviet, positive law. Even in present day politics decisions on appointments have been, and are taken, with a view to the clan background of the person.1 This chapter will provide a historical overview of Chechen efforts at independence. It will be argued that there are different social forces exerting influence over Chechens, which strengthen or weaken efforts at fostering the rule of law, transparency in government and adherence to human rights. 1

The Role of the Clan in Chechnya

The clan, or taip (sometimes spelled teip), as it is called in Chechnya, has always played an important role in Chechen society. The importance of the clan predates the practice of Islam. The clan has a very close relationship with the territory on which the clan members live. Many clans have their power base in specific areas, either in the mountains or in the plains. The clan culture is also mixed with aspects of the former animist religion. The Chechens converted to Islam relatively late, at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th

1 Parts of this chapter have been previously published in Charlotte Hille, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus (Leiden, Brill, 2010).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_008

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­century.2 They adhere to Sunni Islam, and have Sufi brotherhoods (wirds). The two branches of Sufism that are practiced are the Naqsbandiya and the Qadiriya.3 In spite of, or maybe due to, the many social categories in Chechen society, such as the clan or the Sufi brotherhoods in religion, Chechnya has held aspects of democracy for a long time. Amjad Jaimoukha, a specialist on Chechen history and culture, states that “The Chechens are accustomed to democratic ways, their social structure being firmly based on pluralism and deference to individuality”.4 Before the Russian conquest in the late 18th century and early 19th century, the Chechens had formed an independent nation which complied with the requisites of statehood, such as an own language, defined territory, and social and political structures based on autonomous clans which had mutual support relations and were linked to larger tribal confederations. ­Decision-making and justice are strictly organized in the clan society: “Each clan was headed by a respected elder and decisions were taken by elected councils or plebiscites”, according to Jaimoukha.5 Chechen society has changed from a matriarchal society to a patriarchal society.6 Jaimoukha refers to the 19th century anthropologist Maxime Kovalevsky, who assumed that some customs and traditions could only be explained by a matriarchal system that preceded the current patriarchal system. Traces of matriarchy include the following behaviour: a married woman could have a lover, and the husband would not consider this a shame. The maternal uncle played an important role in Chechen society. When a nephew reached adulthood, he would receive a present from his maternal uncle. This custom originates in the matriarchal custom that a nephew inherits from his maternal uncle.7 For the individuals in a clan it is important to remember their ancestors. Clan lineage is learned at a young age. Knowing one’s ancestors is to know who is part of your clan and who is not. It also indicates territorial boundaries, since specific clans used to inhabit specific areas.8 In times of peace, the society has often been divided internally, with clans fighting clans. When there is a common enemy, the tukhums (which supervise groups of clans) and ­confederations 2 A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay. Le Soufi et le Commissaire, Les Confreries Musulmanes en urss (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), 183. 3 The differences between the two branches is explained on page 87–88. 4 Amjad Jaimoukha. Chechens: A Handbook (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 13, and Anatol Lieven, Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 341. 5 Amjad Jaimoukha. Chechens: A Handbook (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 13. 6 Amjad Jaimoukha. Chechens: A Handbook, 83–84. 7 Amjad Jaimoukha. Chechens: A Handbook, 84. 8 Amjad Jaimoukha. Chechens: A Handbook, 15.

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unite the different clans to fight the outside threat. The Chechens have an egalitarian system and will unite behind one national leader when facing a common enemy or threat. The Chechens have a long tradition of brigandry and respect for the abrek, the robber who hides in the mountain woods, often as a result of blood feud. It was customary that they rob persons traveling and abduct persons, either from another clan or foreigners, in order to exchange them for money and/or goods.9 2

How Are the Clans Structured in Chechnya?

Clans consist of seven families, united by one forefather. The number of clans in Chechnya is approximately 150, though new clans can be created when an existing clan splits.10 The clans have a clan elder, who is selected by its members due to his achievements in life, which can include bravery in conflict, a strong financial or economic position, or a strong sense of justice. Clans are named after their founder.11 Hospitality is part of the clan culture, which is even given to enemies, when these enemies are in need and ask for help. Hospitality is not unlimited, in the case of Chechnya this is three days, after which the guest is supposed to contribute.12 In the 19th century there used to be a civilian clan elder and a military clan elder. The military clan elder took over the leadership in times of war. A clan elder can be old, but also middle aged or younger. The clans are called taips or teips, and these taips form part of tukhums, clusters of clans. The clans are ­often concentrated in specific areas, where they have their power base. Central aspects of the clan society are exogamy (marrying a woman from another clan), a common mythic ancestor, a common taipa mountain, a common tower, common soil and a common cemetery where the most prominent amongst the clan members are buried.13

9 10 11 12

13

John Baddeley. The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908) 488. S. Arutounov quoted in E. Sokirianskaia. “Families and Clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 4 (2005), 454. Viatcheslav Avioutskii. Géopolitique du Caucase (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005), 56. When an enemy leaves the house, he is given a specific amount of time, after which his hosts can run after him and perform that act which evens the blood vengeance. John Baddeley. The Rugged Flanks of the Caucasus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), i 137, 250. Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 4 (2005), 470.

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The description of clans in Chechnya started only in the 19th century by the Chechen ethnologist Magomet Mamakaev. He differentiated between three levels of societal organisation: the first three levels of the Chechen kinship structure, from the smallest to the largest groups, can be described as some form of joint extended family, to which the ‘dözal’, the ‘ċa’ and the ‘nēqē’ belong. The dözal consisted, according to that model, of a joint extended family of four generations; the ċa united several dözals and formed the family space around the hearth, a holy place in the Vainakh societies that served not only for cooking, but also for the veneration of the deceased. The nēqē is simply the next level, including several ċas and forming a lineage over four to six generations.14 On the national level there was a central organisation, where the “confederation of all Chechen tribes” was a uniting factor. This confederation was represented by the mexk khel (council of the land), which observed the compliance with customary law. In the mexk khel clan elders and animist priests were represented.15 The mexk khel assembled twice a year. The meetings took place at holy places and were attended by elders and animist priests and later by qadis.16 The Mexk Khel formed a connection between place, religion and politics.17 Family life took place in the high towers, called auls, in which extended families lived. These towers were societal units on their own, in which men, housed on the ground floor, could defend the tower. The activities that took place in the auls are described below: In the aul each tuqum elected its elder [qeno, pl. qenoi], who acted as an arbiter for internal and village wide conflicts. All qenoi together represented the aul in negotiations and the council of qenoi could appoint a military leader, but it had no executive power and – a point that may be

14 15 16 17

Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, 470. Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, 471. Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, 473. Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, 481.

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very important – in at least a large part of lowland Chechnya and p ­ robably in Ichkeria, the village qadi controlled the qenoi of the various tuqumaš.18 There is a division between highland taips and lowland taips, which originates in the changes in Chechnya that took place in the 17th and 18th centuries. Christian Dettmering, a specialist in Chechen history, describes the differences between the two different tribes: As taipanaš abandoned their common territory in the 17th and 18th centuries when separate ġāranaš left the mountains for the rich fields of the lowlands, a division occurred between the mountain region and the lowlands, each region acquiring distinctive economic and social features. In the mountains the taipanaš preserved their exclusive territories determined by natural frontiers, the culturally important taipa maintaining its influence. The taipa lived in a handful of villages, the oldest one bearing the highest authority. Approximately five ġāranaš formed a mountain taipa, but most taipanaš had ġāranaš dispersed in the plains where villages were considerably bigger and consisted of several kups from various taipanaš.19 The military role of the taip did exist in the 19th century, and again, the taips in the highlands are known to have cooperated militarily against outside threats.20 After the Russians captured the North Caucasus, they followed a policy aimed at destroying the taips. Some Chechen groups were deported, either inside the Russian Empire or to the Ottoman Empire.21 This long tradition of fighting has given the Chechens a reputation that they are not easily incorporated in bigger state structure and that they do not appreciate foreign dominance. Some 150 years of Russian domination have not eradicated the clan society. It may have become less visible in everyday life due to modernisation, and the conflict in the 1990s, as well as the deportation in the 1940s may have its impact of the Chechen culture, but has not changed the culture of the clan society fundamentally. 18 19 20 21

Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, 479. Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, 477. Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, 477–478. Christian Dettmering. “Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh) clan structures in the 19th century”, 483.

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Chechen Clan Society

The clan as such can be characterized as a closed society, because members are accountable to their clan, and have to protect their fellow clan members. Clans protect their traditions. Clan practices and expectations of clan members from fellow clan members can potentially be contrary to accountability and transparency in the national open political process. In times of emergency, the clan provides security and means of subsistence for its members, and the clan elder is responsible for the resolution of conflicts and blood feuds. Chechnya has held relatively long traditional or adat law. The traditional adat law has remained important within families and society, even though Soviet law since 1920 and later Russian law were in power. Examples of adat law are the exclusion of women from public life, respect for elder people, a dominant role for the clan elder, and a strong bond with the territory of the clan.22 This has to be differentiated from sharia law. Sharia law is based on a religious law and was introduced in Chechnya only for a very short time after the first Russian-Chechen conflict by former president Maskhadov in 1998. Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, former Project Director, Russia and the North Caucasus for the International Crisis Group, stated that there is agreement among scholars that the clan plays a pivotal role in the political process of Chechnya: State building and policy-making in Ingushetia and Chechnya are shaped by the interaction of primordial patterns of social integration, primarily teips (clans) with the formal state institutions.23 One is born into a clan, and cannot choose another clan. However, marriages often occur between clans, rather than within clans, and due to the patriarchal system, the women will leave their family and belong to the family and clan of their husband. 4 Religion Another division that is seen in Chechen society is related to religion: The Chechens are Sunni Muslims, adhering to Sufi brotherhoods. There are two Sufi branches in Chechnya, the Naqsbandiya and the Qadiriya. These Sufi 22 23

Viatcheslav Avioutskii. Géopolitique du Caucase, 56. Ekaterina Sokirianskaia. “Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya” in Central Asian Survey 24, No. 4, (2005), 454.

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brotherhoods centre around a sheikh (religious person), who is responsible for a wird (branch) of the brotherhood. The sheikh is appointed by a Sufi master after having followed training. A wird normally has the name of its founder (a sheikh). One is born into a Sufi brotherhood. The prayers of the Naqsbandiya are quieter than those of the Qadiriya, who also perform the zikr (a dance where the participants enter a trance). The Naqsbandiya is older than the Qadiriya, having been founded in the North Caucasus by sheikh Mansour.24 A historically important sheikh is Imam Shamil, who brought the idea of an Imamate to Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Shamil was an extremely important political and religious figure during the Murid Wars (1829–1854), which were fought between the Russian Empire and the mountain peoples in the North Caucasus. The aim of Imam Shamil was to create an Imamate of the North Caucasus, that would be independent from the Russian Empire.25 The founder of the Qadiriya in the North Caucasus in the 1860s and 1870s was Kunta Haji. His family members are still held in high esteem in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Daghestan.26 The Naqsbandiya have their power base in Tolstoi-Yourt, Urus Martan and the district of Naderetshny. There is also a political difference between Naqsbandiya and Qadiriya. The Naqsbandiya have always remained positive about the idea of an imamate of sheikh Shamil, while the Qadiriya were opposed to fighting the Russians. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Naqsbandiya were active in the struggle against Russia in 1920–1921, while the Qadiris cooperated with the Russians. During the Soviet period the brotherhoods went underground. After 1991, former Chechen President Dudayev and subsequent groups seeking independence from the Russian Federation were primarily supported by Qadiris, while Russia appointed Akhmed Arsanov, a Naqsbandi, as representative for Russia.27 This seems contradictory. The reason for this appointment by the Russian Federation is that the Naqsbandi are the intellectual and 24 25 26

27

Viatcheslav Avioutskii. Géopolitique du Caucase, 60. Viatcheslav Avioutskii. Géopolitique du Caucase, 60, Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule (London: C. Hurst & Co. 2006) and Moshe Gammer. Muslim Resistance to the Tsar (London: Cass, 1995). Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. “Cooptation of the Elites of Kabarda and Daghestan in the Sixteenth Century”, in Abdurahman Avtorkhanov (ed.). The North Caucasus Barrier. The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World (London: Hurst & Company, 1992), 41, and Marie Bennigsen Broxup. “The Last Ghazawat: The 1920–1921 Uprising”, in Abdurahman Avtorkhanov (ed.). The North Caucasus Barrier. The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, 118–119. Viatcheslav Avioutskii. Géopolitique du Caucase, 61.

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influential elite of Chechnya and the majority of Chechens in Moscow belong to the Naqsbandi. Therefore, they are in a better position to negotiate with the Russian government in Moscow.28 5

Chechnya Between 1800 and 1900, Wars and Prominent Figures

Chechnya in the Murid Wars 1829–1854, the Relation between Clan and Society In 1829 the Murid War started in the North Caucasus. The term “murid” is a Sufi term indicating that one is “committed”. In this case, one was committed to fight against the Russians. Daghestani and Chechen clans fought against the Russian invasion. Their leaders, Kazi-Mullah, Hamzad Bek and Shamil were clergymen, who favoured Muridism. Muridism combined religion and politics. The aim of those fighting in the Murid War was to create a Muslim state in Daghestan, Chechnya and other Muslim North Caucasian territories. In 1837, Cherkessia was ceded by the Ottoman Empire to Russia, after it had been occupied by Russian troops.29 That same year, Shamil and Russian Emperor Nicholas I concluded a shortlived peace. On 21 March 1838, a new Russian commander in chief for the Caucasus was appointed. General Golovin made a plan of action for the Caucasus, comprising: 5.1

a descent on the Black Sea coast; the final subjugation of the Upper Samur communities; the conquest of Chechnya and northern Daghestan.30 In the period from 1828 to the capture of Shamil by the Russians in 1859, Circassian emissaries were frequently sent to Shamil in order to get his advice on planned uprisings against the Russians. Support from the Circassians increased the strength of Shamil’s position.31 In 1846, the Murids (mostly Chechens and Daghestani) invaded Kabarda, which officially accepted Russian administration. An understanding was reached that the Kabardians would support their fellow North Caucasians against the Russians.32 28 29 30 31 32

Viatcheslav Avioutskii. Géopolitique du Caucase, 61. FO 97/344, A.L.P. Burdett. Caucasian Boundaries (Slough; Archive Editions, 1996), 41–66. Charlotte Hille. State Building in the Transcaucasus Since 1917 (Leiden: dissertation, 2003), 41. John Baddeley. The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, 413. John Baddeley. The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, 425–426.

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Shamil was defeated by the Russians in the Darghi confederacy and its capital Akusha in October 1846. His period of strongest power was over. Only in 1857 was lower Chechnya completely occupied by Russian troops. During 1858, the Russians occupied more and more territory while Shamil lost support of several clans, which sided with Russia and were incorporated in the Russian Empire. In 1858, Shamil still held a portion of Northern Daghestan and the adjoining district of Andi and Ichkeria (South-East Chechnya). On 25 August 1859, Shamil surrendered. It took the Russians until 1864 to place Cherkessia under Russian administration. From that moment on, the whole Caucasus formed part of the Russian Empire. During the following decades skirmishes incidentally occurred between Russian troops and Caucasians. 5.2 Sheikh Mansur and Kunta Haji Sheikh Mansur is seen as the first Naqsbandi sheikh rebelling against the Russians. According to Zubeide Gune Yadcy, Mansur (1732–1794) is said to have been of Italian origin. His original name is supposed to have been Giovanni Battista Boetti, others claim his real name was Elisa Mansur.33 Yet others believe Mansur was a Nogay, or a Tatar from Bukhara.34 He went to the Ottoman Empire, converted to Islam, and was sent to the Caucasus by the Sultan to organise resistance against the Russian advance in the region.35 Because of the easiness with which Mansur understood Caucasians, some believe Mansur must have been a Chechen. Those who support this claim believe Russian reports that mention Mansur as being Chechen.36 Whichever story is true, it is certain that Mansur became active in 1785 when he published letters written by him to the Muslims of the Caucasus, in which he appealed to them to fight against the infidel Russians. In turn, the Russians attacked the village of Andi, where Mansur was, in an effort to capture him and stop his movement. Mansur escaped and in the following years got more support from the clans in the ­Caucasus, as well as from the rank and file military in the Ottoman Empire.37 During the Russo-Ottoman war (1787–1791), the Ottoman Empire tried to 33 34 35 36 37

Zubeyde Gune Yadcy. “A Chechen National Hero of the Caucasus Sheikh Mansur”, Central Asian Survey 22, No. 1 (2003), 105. Zubeyde Gune Yadcy. “A Chechen National Hero of the Caucasus Sheikh Mansur”, 105. Zubeyde Gune Yadcy. “A Chechen National Hero of the Caucasus Sheikh Mansur”, 105.. Zubeyde Gune Yadcy. “A Chechen National Hero of the Caucasus Sheikh Mansur”, 105–106. Zubeyde Gune Yadcy. “A Chechen National Hero of the Caucasus Sheikh Mansur”, 109.

in the 18th Century: in the 18th Century: in the 18th Century: in the 18th Century: in the 18th Century:

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­ ersuade the clans in the Caucasus to fight on their side. In 1791, the Russians p captured sheikh Mansur and imprisoned him. He died in 1794, while the struggle of the Caucasians against Russian domination continued.38 Although Imam Shamil is the most remembered political Caucasian figure in the 19th century, there were more persons important for the political developments in de Caucasus. Kunta Haji founded Zikrism. Zikrism is an ideology based on pacifism and nonviolence. He started his pacifist activities, when he returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1848 or 1849. He had to leave the Caucasus because the Naqshbandiya were hostile towards his preaching. However, he was successful in Chechnya, Avaristan, and northern Daghestan. Kunta Haji is seen as the founder of the Qadiriya. In 1864 he was arrested and declared insane. Subsequently he was sent to a hospital, where he died three years later.39 6

Chechnya Between 1900 and 2000

6.1 Clan Representation in Chechen Politics During the 20th century, the political history of Chechnya was turbulent. After the Russian Revolution some Chechen politicians took power in Chechnya, while waiting for the outcome of the Revolution. In 1918, efforts were made in the North Caucasus to form the short-lived independent state of the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus. When, by 1920, it became clear that the Communists would win and bring Chechnya back under Russian rule, some politicians fled with their clan members. The Second World War saw the deportation of nearly the entire Chechen population to Central Asia and Siberia. Even in exile the Chechens kept their clan society, albeit very much practiced in secret. The period after the collapse of the Soviet Union saw a resurgence of the clan in Chechen society and politics. Since then power structures within Chechen politics have been governed by clan affiliation. This is not only visible in political appointments, but also in the outcome of elections. Within the power structures in Chechnya, there is still a patronage system. As an example of how clans can and do influence Chechen society, current Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov appointed many friends and family to public ­office during his first 100 days in power.40 38 39 40

Zubeyde Gune Yadcy. “A Chechen National Hero of the Caucasus in the 18th Century: Sheikh Mansur”, 110–111. Marie Bennigsen Broxup. “The Last Ghazawat: The 1920–1921 Uprising”, 118–119. Liz Fuller. “Chechnya: Kadyrov completes first 100 days in office”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, July 11 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077571.html, (accessed February 28 2008).

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6.2 Chechnya after the Russian Revolution One of the first indications of the collapse of the Russian Empire was the disbanding of the viceroyalty in the Caucasus.41 On 27 March 1917, the Chechens founded a Chechen Council and nominated Tapa Chermoev as chairman. In March 1917, a similar Ingushetian Council was installed in Ingushetia under the leadership of Vasan Giray Jabaghi.42 Between 14 and 23 May 1917, a meeting was convened in Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia) aimed at uniting the Mountain Peoples in the Alliance of the United Mountaineers of the North Caucasus, also called the Confederation of North Caucasian Mountain Peoples. This had become necessary after the Russian Empire collapsed, with the ousting of the Czar and the overthrow of the government by the Communists. Anarchy reigned, while there was still no end to the First World War. In order to protect the territory of the North Caucasus, an army and a government were created to take over responsibilities until rule had been restored in Moscow. The representatives of the different peoples present at the meeting adopted a constitution and elected a Central Committee. Those present at the meeting also drafted a program.43 Basiyat Shakhanov became Chairman of the Congress. Tapa Chermoev and Vasan Giray Jabaghi also participated. The aim was to hand power back to the central government in St. Petersburg once peace was restored. When restoration of the old regime did not materialise, the government changed its policy and sought international recognition. In 1918 Turkey recognised the republic.44 The republic also aimed at closer cooperation with the Federation (Federative Republic) of the Transcaucasus.45 A problem for this Mountain Republic was the fact that part of its territory was in the hands of the Bolsheviks and that there were also frequent attacks by the White Army of Denikin. 41 42 43

44 45

Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of ­Russian Rule, 199. Charlotte Hille. State Building in the Transcaucasus Since 1917, 51. Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 120. Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 120 and Soiuz ob’edinenykh gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza I Dagestana (1917–1918gg), Gorskaia Respublika (1918–1920gg), (Makhach-Kala: 1994), 23–24 (letter from Shakhanov concerning the institution of the Alliance of the North Caucasian Mountain Republic and Daghestan), 47–50 (political platform and program of the North Caucasian Mountain Republic), 50–53 (constitution). Charlotte Hille. State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 55. Most documents refer to the republic as a federation, but French sources speak of a confederation, Firouz Kazemzadeh. The Struggle for Trans Caucasia, 1917–1921 (Oxford: Templar Press, 1951), 103–108, and Antoine Poidebard. “Le Transcaucase et la République d’Arménie dans les texts diplomatiques du traité de Brest-Litovsk au traité de Kars, 1918– 1923”, Revue des études arméniennes (Paris: 1923).

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The president of the Confederation of North Caucasian Mountain peoples was Chechen, Tapa Chermoev, as was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Haidar Bammate.46 The Confederation had a government and an army, as we saw above. The republic was however not successful, neither politically nor military. The lack of success was attributable to poor communication between the government and the areas where they were fighting, and the fact that the North Caucasus was attacked by both the Reds, the Bolshevik army, and the Whites, the army of Anton Denikin, trying to restore the Russian Empire. At the armistice of Mudros in the fall of 1918, the Mountain Republic had moved its seat to Temir-Khan-Shura, now Buynaksk in Daghestan. In March 1919, a new government of the Mountain Republic was formed under Pshemakho Kotsev. The reason a new government had to be formed was that Chermoev, Bammate and Gaidarov had left for Paris to attend the Peace Conference. The new government was not able to defend its territory, and in May 1919 the White Army of Denikin conquered the territory of the Mountain Republic in Chechnya and Daghestan, and the Mountain Republic ceased to exist.47 Between 1920 and 1921 and again between 1920 and 1924 there were two separate experiments to form an Islamic state, both situated in the east of the North Caucasus, in the east of Chechnya and in the north of Daghestan. This was possible because the central authority did not exercise effective power in the North Caucasus. Furthermore, during the first years of Communist rule, the rulers allowed some local initiatives. The first Emirate for the North Caucasus, from 1920 to 1921, was followed with suspicion by the Russians and was abolished as soon as the Russians were able to do so.48 The other Emirate, called the Mountain Soviet Republic, even benefited from official recognition by Moscow. However, once Joseph Stalin came to power, he abolished the Mountain Soviet Republic, and made new territorial divisions.49 6.3 Emirate of the North Caucasus and Mountain assr In 1919 Uzun Haji founded a theocratic state in Upper Chechnya, the emirate of the North Caucasus, modelled on imam Shamil’s Imamate. It controlled Avar and Andi territories in northern Daghestan, Chechnya and parts of Inghushetia and was placed under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan Khalif.50 46 47 48 49 50

Haidar Bammate. “The Caucasus and the Russian Revolution (From a Political Viewpoint)”, in Central Asian Survey 10, No. 4 (1991), 21–22. Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 128. Charlotte Hille. State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, 57. Charlotte Hille. State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, 57. Marie Bennigsen Broxup. “The Last Ghazawat: The 1920–1921 uprising”, 114.

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To ­secularist nationalists, the Emirate was seen as the successor of the Mountain Republic.51 In August 1920 the Bolshevik army attacked Chechnya from the north, and the leaders of the emirate, Sheikh Uzun Haji, Pshemakho Kotsev and sheikh Akushinskii, called for a jihad, asking the grandson of imam Shamil, Sait Shamil, to lead the fight. He was one of the two survivors of this fight and later fled to Turkey.52 Apart from the above-mentioned Naqsbandi sheikh Uzun Haji of Salty, the uprising was led by a sheik from Daghestan, Sheikh Najmuddin of Hotso (Gotsinskii), who had been elected sheikh of Chechnya and Daghestan in 1917.53 The area that rose up corresponded to the area of support by imam Shamil in the period from 1834 to 1854. It took the Russians until 1925 before they arrested and killed Gotsinskii.54 The uprising was inter alia successful because the Caucasians obeyed the requests of the Sufi clerics who organised the revolt. In April 1921, a Mountain assr (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), of which the Chechen territory was part of, was established within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (rsfsr). On 20 January 1921, the Daghestan assr was declared, and on 30 November 1922, a Chechen Autonomous Oblast (an administrative unit with less authority than an autonomous soviet socialist republic) was created.55 These rapidly changing entities show the weakness of the Russian Federation at the time. The state was still in the process of delimiting itself, and the beginnings of the divide and rule policy of the central government in the North Caucasus was already visible. 6.4 Chechen Clans during the Soviet Union In 1922, Chechnya became an Autonomous Oblast within the rsfsr. In 1934, Chechnya and Ingushetia merged in the Checheno-Ingushetian Autonomous Oblast.56 The former Soviet Union sought to diminish the role of religion and 51 52 53 54 55 56

Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 130. Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 133. Marie Bennigsen Broxup. “The Last Ghazawat: The 1920–1921 uprising”, 114. Marie Bennigsen Broxup. “The Last Ghazawat: The 1920–1921 uprising”, 121. Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 139. Anna Matveeva. “Chechnya: Drive for Independence or Hotbed for Islamic Terrorism?”, in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia, eds. P. van Tongeren, H. van der Veen, J. Verhoeven (London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2002), 354.

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clan in society, which resulted in both the Muslim brotherhoods and the clans having to go underground. Even the deportation of all Chechens in 1944 to Central Asia did not eradicate the importance of the clan for Chechen society. The Chechen culture remained strong, and when Chechens were allowed to return in 1957 to their houses, it was important for them to go back to those areas where they traditionally lived.57 6.5 President Djokhar Dudayev and Blood Feud When Chechnya declared unilateral independence, President Boris Yeltsin decided that he had more pressing problems to solve, and boycotted Chechnya, without planning any full-scale military campaign against Chechnya. Elections were organised and president Djokhar Dudayev was elected president. Dudayev followed a nationalist policy, laying emphasis on tradition, the clan, and religion. In 1992 Chechnya adopted a new Constitution. The policy of president Dudayev became more autocratic, and on 17 April 1993 Dudayev adopted a decree that suspended the work of the Constitutional Court, dissolved the municipal council of Grozny, and introduced direct Presidential rule.58 This practice alienated many Chechens from him. Another factor for the outbreak of hostilities with the Russian Army in 1994, and a further alienation from the Chechen people, was Dudayev’s warlike tone towards Russia, and towards president Yeltsin in particular. The Chechen intelligentsia, who had studied in Russia, did not want to alienate or provoke Russia.59 The security situation in Chechnya became worse as a result of the inability of the Chechen government, as well as other governments in the North Caucasus, to provide basic law and order. Gail Lapidus, a Caucasus specialist, stated that the infrastructure in Chechnya was already disrupted by the Russian boycott. Yeltsin and Dudayev did not like each other, and this influenced the decision making of both presidents. Concerning the room of manoeuvre in negotiations between the two men Lapidus states: The successful effort by political figures around Yeltsin to turn him against Dudayev and to delegitimate Dudayev’s rule effectively blocked

57 58 59

Charlotte Hille. State Building in the Transcaucasus Since 1917, 197. Carlotta Gall, Thomas de Waal. Chechnya, A Small Victorious War (London: Pan Original, 1997), 119. Anatol Lieven. Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 75.

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the prospect for high-level negotiations between the two presidents to seek a political solution.60 On 11 December 1994, nearly three years after the fall of the Soviet Union and Chechen unilateral independence, Chechnya was invaded by Russian troops, which had entered through Ingushetia. Anatol Lieven, a Caucasus specialist, explained how the Federal Security Service (fsb), the Russian intelligence organisation, did try to learn from Afghanistan, and from their past encounters with the Chechens in the 19th century. They understood that the clan was key to understanding the “closed, internally cohesive and mutually exclusive blocks”.61 The taips were in revolt against the domination of the Tyerekshskoi clan, which had dominated the Soviet structures. The fsb advised to supply arms and money to Dudayev’s opponents, through the Tyerekhskoi clan, and that the fsb would simultaneously use bribes and mediation to win over possible opposition, with a pre-agreement on how to share the spoils of victory.62 Anatol Lieven’s analysis of the fsb plan is that the organisation did not grasp that the clans were not rigid, but that they were related by marriages, ­being neighbours, wider clan alliances (tukhums), and Muslim brotherhoods. A second point was that 73 years of communism, and the deportation of Chechens to Central Asia in 1944, had weakened the clan system. If the fsb had understood that the conflict was over nationalism, this would have implied that the Russian Federation was acting as an imperial power. Therefore, Lieven concludes, “It was much more convenient – and of course wholly in tune with old Russian prejudices – to portray them as a pre-national, primitive, tribal and bandit people”.63 The fighting during the First Chechen war was particularly brutal. To compensate for poorly equipped and poorly trained personnel on the Russian side, particularly harsh tactics were used to clear and pacify Chechen positions.64 Two years later, Russian troops withdrew after the signing of the Khasav Yurt

60 61 62 63 64

Gail Lapidus. “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya”, International Security 23 No. 1 (1998), 15. Anatol Lieven. Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power, 336, Charlotte Hille. State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, 293. Anatol Lieven. Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power, 337. The kgb had become the fsk after the emergence of the Russian Federation, and this was later renamed in fsb. Anatol Lieven. Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power, 338. Anatol Lieven. Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power, 102–108.

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agreement on 25 August 1996.65 In this agreement, signed by Aslan Maskhadov for Chechnya and Alexander Lebed for Russia, it was decided to leave a final decision on the status of Chechnya until five years later, 31 December 2001. On 12 May 1997 a bilateral treaty, signed by President Boris Yeltsin and President Aslan Maskhadov, “on peace and the principles of Russian-Chechen relations”, strengthened this document.66 During the fighting, the centres of power had been around the warlords. These were often people who had started as freedom fighters, but consolidated their power when the Chechen state weakened, and especially after the fighting between Chechen and Russian troops started in 1994. The warlords held their base of power in the area where their clan had its power base. In this sense the warlord and clan politics, or clan elders, had some overlap. Much of the warlord’s power was derived from his clan. The challenge for President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev (1996–1997) during the war, and later President Aslan Maskhadov (1997–1999), was to disarm the warlords. Disarming the warlords was done by incorporating some of the most influential warlords, such as Shamil Basayev, in the government. In 1997 Basayev was appointed prime minister, having finished second after Maskhadov in presidential elections. Basayev soon left to pursue his own aims, establishing a Shura chaired by himself, rivalling the power of Maskhadov.67 Incorporating former warlords into the government was a solution that worked only during a short period of time. Basayev took the radical position that he did not only want full independence from Russia, but also the creation of a North Caucasian emirate. The proposed emirate was comparable to the aim of imam Shamil in the first half of the 19th century, and the experiments just after the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 in the North Caucasus. Basayev got financial support from abroad, especially from Wahabis and groups in Saudi Arabia.68 In order to maintain some social order, Maskhadov sought a compromise with influential Chechens who wanted religion to play a greater role in Chechnya. In 1998, Sharia law was implemented and the Islamic Republic of Ichkeria

65 66 67 68

Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 221. “Yeltsin and Maskhadov Sign Peace Treaty”, Itar-Tass, 12 May 1997, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 3, Issue 93, https://jamestown.org/program/yeltsin-and-maskhadov-sign-peace-treaty/, (accessed July 26 2019). Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 212–213. Charlotte Hille. State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, 301.

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(Chechnya) was declared.69 Though a final settlement of the status of Chechnya was to be decided in 2001, it was clear in 1998 that Chechnya had weak institutions and was a failing state. There was an absence of basic rule of law, there was high unemployment and the infrastructure had been destroyed as a result of the war. The attack on some Daghestani villages near the Chechen border (and inhabited by ethnic Chechens) by Basayev in the summer of 1999 triggered the start of the Second Chechen War. Although fighting stopped in 2001, skirmishes continued. Putin declared an end to hostilities on January 31, 2006.70 7

Resurgence of the Clan in the Period Since 1991

Throughout the Soviet Union, the government tried to eradicate the role of clans. Though the role of the clan diminished, it never disappeared, and with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly elected Chechen president, Djokhar Dudayev, decided to use the clan as a nationalist symbol. After the unilateral declaration of independence of Chechnya, many clan elders decided to educate the young generation in the history of their clan.71 This meant that the role of the clan increased after the unilateral declaration of independence of Chechnya. President Doku Zavgayev ruled over Chechnya in 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved. He originated from a clan from the plains. Zavgayev gave jobs to many of his clan affiliates.72 Dzokhar Dudayev came to power in 1991 after having ousted Zavgayev. Dudayev came from a clan in the mountains. The clans from the plains were traditionally more willing to cooperate with Russia than the clans from the mountains. This influenced the politics between the Russian Federation and the Chechen authorities. Between 1991 and 1994 the policy of Dudayev was to strive for an independent Chechnya. This would mean that the assr Checheno-Ingushetia would split, since Ingushetia was content as part of the Russian Federation. The entities in the North Caucasus got the status of “republics” in the Russian 69 70 71 72

Anna Matveeva. “Chechnya: Drive for Independence or Hotbed for Islamic Terrorism?”, 356. Chris Stephen. “‘Victorious’ Putin declares Chechen war over”, Scotsman February 1 2006, http://news.scotsman.com/chechnya/Victorious-Putin-declares-Chechen-war.2747024 .jp, (accessed February 28 2008). Ekaterina Sokirianskaia. “Families and Clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya”, Central Asian Survey 24 No. 4 (2005), 463. Anatol Lieven. Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power, 57, 59.

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F­ ederation. Due to the transition process in the Russian Federation, there was not much room to deal with the wishes of Chechnya. This changed in 1994 when president Yeltsin of Russia and president Dudayev fell into an open conflict. Russian troops invaded Chechnya through Ingushetia. The first Russian-Chechen war (1994–1996) was devastating for the population. It was particularly harsh for ethnic Russians living in Chechnya. They did not have support from a clan to help them through the war. The clan system, where members help each other in times of distress, worked better for Chechens, and the clan took over where necessary. 8

Adherence to Adat Law through Chechen History

In principle, the clan provides the members with clear rules on how to behave, and what judgments there are for violations of the law. Since blood feuds are a risk for the whole clan, people are under pressure from the clan to behave respectfully (unless of course the honour of the clan is being violated, when every male clan member has a duty to take part in the blood feud). However, during the 1990s, the situation became so dangerous, due to a failing state and the extreme brutality of the war, that the clan rules did not protect the population sufficiently. This was aggravated by the fact that many young men turned to religion. Many Wahhabis tried to convert Chechens to adhere to another form of Islam, which was alien to the Chechen culture. The introduction of Wahhabism into Chechnya created conflicts between the young and the old, where respect for elders and parents diminished.73 The brutality of the fighting and the many displaced persons have led to a decrease of adherence to traditional values in certain younger groups of society, while these were strengthened just after the struggle for independence started, as part of their newly developed identity. The reason for this shift in values, ideologies and perspectives in many young men is a breakdown in social ties, where respect for the older generation diminishes, and old customs cannot be sufficiently upheld due to the war conditions. The war has led to widespread trauma, making it harder to keep faith in the closed clan society. The years of violent conflict have undermined the traditional Islam, which was much more in line with the clan culture. Kidnapping for money or kidnapping to force a marriage, a traditional brigandry in Chechnya are now frequently 73

Information gathered by the author during several meetings with the former Chechen Minister of Health, dr. Ljuba Archakova, during the period 1995–1996.

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occurring. The kidnapping of Westerners also increased in frequency, including the case of the Dutch Arjan Erkel, working for Doctors without Frontiers.74 9

Chechnya and the Rule of Law: Clans and Elections

There are several concerns regarding the weak rule of law in Chechnya. Reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, among other organisations, cite evidence of abuse, false arrests, false imprisonment, torture and extra judicial executions and kidnappings.75 The executive is exponentially more powerful than the judiciary. Law enforcement is problematic when Special Forces commit human rights violations against civilians on orders of the executive power.76 According to a number of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, many Chechens who were victim of human rights violations by the Russian military did not get a swift and fair trial.77 This has resulted in an increasing amount of convictions of the Russian Federation. Additionally, the force that the Russian Federation used in the conflict was on several occasions, like in the Isayeva i and Isayeva ii cases, regarded as disproportionate, thereby violating humanitarian law in an internal conflict.78

74 75

76 77

78

Arjan Erkel. Ontvoerd (Amersfoort: Balans, 2005). Human Rights Watch, Front Line, International Federation for Human Rights, Civil Rights Defenders, “Joint Press Release”, April 3 2011, http://www.fidh.org/Joint-press-release -Human-Rights-Watch-Front-Line, (accessed 5 April 2011), “Chechnya: Research Shows Widespread and Systematic Use of Torture”, Human Rights Watch, November 12, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/11/12/chechnya-research-shows-widespread-and-sys tematic-use-torture, (accessed July 30 2019), “Russia: Torture Victim Abducted in Chech nya”, Human Rights Watch, August 5, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/05/ russia-torture-victim-abducted-chechnya, (accessed July 30 2019), Freedom House Report 2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/russia#.Uxi8_txH__E, (accessed March 6 2014). Thomas Grove. Groups urge Medvedev: bring rule of law to Chechnya, http://www.reuters .com/article/2011/04/20/us-russia-chechnya-idUSTRE73J5TP20110420, (accessed March 6 2014). http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=20&portal=hbkm&action=html&highl ight=russia&sessionid=5501351&skin=hudoc-en http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view .asp?item=38&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=russia&sessionid=5501351&skin=h udoc-en, (accessed February 15 2008). William Abresch. “A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya”, European Journal of International Law 16 No. 4 (2005), 763.

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In the 1990s, as we saw earlier, the clan became an important aspect of society in Chechnya, both politically and culturally. This is even witnessed in the behaviour during elections.79 During the preparation for elections, it is clear that nominees in specific areas belong to the important and less important clans in this region. This results in political power bases for the regionally important clans, which also reflects power bases in national politics. Many of the elections since 1991 have either not been recognised by Russia and the international community because they were organised by what were called secessionist groups, or they were regarded as fraudulent.80 10

Appointment of Presidents

After the terrorist attack in Beslan, North Ossetia, in 2004, Russian president Vladimir Putin decided that the presidents of republics of the Russian Federation would no longer be elected.81 Instead, the President of the Russian Federation would appoint the presidents of the republics. Putin selected a Chechen president that was loyal to Russia and from a powerful clan, Ramzan Kadyrov. Kadyrov has been president of Chechnya since spring 2007.82 Ramzan Kadyrov is the son of a former Chechen president, Imam Akhmad Kadyrov (2003–2004), and has the full support of Putin. Kadyrov originates from a bigger clan in Chechnya, and is seen as loyal to the central government in Moscow. Ramzan Kadyrov was regarded as a future president of Chechnya even before he held the minimum age required of 30 years. A few months after he reached the age of 30 in October 2006 the head of the Chechen administration, Alu Alkhanov, stepped back in February 2007, paving the way for Kadyrov to be named president.83

79 80 81 82 83

Ekaterina Sokirianskaia. “Families and Clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya”, 455. osce Dismisses Chechen Elections, The Jamestown Foundation, 2, No. 116 (June 19 1996), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=14936&tx _ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=210, (accessed 24 February 2011). Charlotte Hille. State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, 275–284. “Ramzam Kadyrow, Chechnya strongman, installed as president”, The New York Times, April 5, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/world/europe/05iht-web0405-chech .5161439.html, (accessed July 30 2019). Liz Fuller. “Kadyrov in Strong Position to Become Chechen President”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 10(7): February 16 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347497.html, (accessed February 28 2008).

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11 Conclusion The clan in Chechen society has had a solid base in politics for centuries. The clan survived under the Tsarist regime in the 19th and early 20th centuries, under Communism and as a republic in the Russian Federation. Within the Chechen clan society support of fellow clansmen is central. There are conflicts, or blood feuds, within clans and between clans, also nowadays. This poses challenges between the traditional law and the positive law. It also challenges the monopoly over violence the state is supposed to have. However, when an external conflict erupts this has traditionally led to unity among the Chechen clans. The ongoing insecurity in Chechnya in the past 28 years however also means that many families have suffered loss, and many feel deprived and traumatised. This erodes the clan culture. The strengthening of the clan in society, when Chechnya was in transition, has shown the deep roots of tradition, and the need to use the existing societal fabric when (re)constructing a republic. President Ramzan Kadyrov has been appointed to his post based on the loyalty of his clan for Russia. Kadyrov uses aspects of clan society in his politics, such as clan loyalty and nepotism. This proves to be a balance between support to the Russian Federation and the benefits of financial support from Moscow, and adhering to aspects of traditional Chechen society.

Chapter 6

Clans in Albania In this chapter the position of the clan in Albanian society and politics is analysed. An important question is what influence the clan has had on national politics. Ethnic Albanians live in Albania as well as across the border in neighbouring states, which means that there is an ethnic spill over of culture, but also an incentive for neighbouring states to favour regional stability. The same holds for Albania, which saw violent ethnic conflicts across its border in Kosovo in the 1990s, with a danger of spill over. Throughout Albanian history, foreign powers have been interested in the territory. Albania has been part of the Ottoman Empire, and during the 20th century, a German Prince was declared the sovereign by outside powers. Italy had political influence in Albania just before the First World War and during the Second World War. After the fall of the Communist regime there were many international organisations, which wanted to support Albania’s transition towards democracy, such as the UN, osce and the Council of Europe. nato has employed preventive forces. This shows that there is a permanent international interest in the Albanian state and its state building activities. It is also important that those organisations that intervene understand the clan society that still exists in parts of Albania. The position of clan society in Albanian society will be described in this chapter, as well as the position of traditional – kanun – law. Often, tradition and traditional law was prevalent in Albanian politics, and sometimes several legal systems, traditional law and positive law, existed parallel of each other. This chapter will investigate why this is the case. The research includes how aspects such as corruption have a link with the clan society. One of the central questions is whether incorporating aspects of the clan society in the new state, or whether tolerating parallel systems in the institutional design of the country will strengthen Albania as a state. 1

Clans and Tribal Structures, the Role of Religion

Albania has a population where 83% is Albanian. Minorities comprise Greeks, Roma and Macedonians.1 The Albanians can be divided in two major 1 cia Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html, (accessed July 29, 2019).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_009

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subgroups, the Ghegs, who make up 49% of the Albanians and live north of the Shkumbin river in the more isolated mountainous north of the country, and the Tosks who live in the plains and in the south of Albania along the coast, south of the river. The Albanian language belongs to the Indo-European language family. The Ghegs and Tosks speak different Albanian dialects. The Gheg dialect of Albanian belongs to the Slavic languages, while the Tosk dialect of the Albanian language belongs to the Greek language group. Albania has a long tradition of extended families, which support the individual members in different ways, both morally and economically.2 Albanian society has a traditional patriarchal system where the basis of the clan structure is formed by the houses. These individual houses could comprise up to 100 extended family members, though in the 20th century the amount of people living in one house went down to often not more than 20. The head of the house was traditionally the oldest male member. A group of houses, under the leadership of a hereditary leader, the krue, was called a mehola. Several clusters of houses formed a clan, called fis. Several clans formed a tribe, led by a hereditary chief, called a bajraktar. It was also not unusual for a tribe or a group of tribes to be led by a prince.3 At the village level, the head was called the kryeplak. His duties comprised taking care of public order, access to drinking water and irrigation, and the use of lands for pasture. Also, the kryeplak often heard complaints and demands.4 There are also aspects that consider the matrilineal origins of the family. According to the Kanun, the traditional law of Albania, there can be no intermarriage between members of the fis (male ancestral line) and the gjini (­female ancestral line). Even if clans have godparents, who are not blood ­related, they cannot intermarry. The degree to which members of the same tribe could marry was not fixed but varied according to region. People who were fifth cousins could marry in southern Albania, but not necessarily in middle or northern Albania.5 Before becoming part of the Ottoman Empire, the territory we now call Albania was religiously divided; the southern part, where the Tosks lived, was mainly Christian Orthodox and belonged to the Patriarchate of C ­ onstantinople,

2 Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence (London: I.B. Taurus, 2005), 90. 3 J. Fischer Bernd. “Albanian Highland Tribal Society and Family Structure in the Process of the Twentieth Century Transformation”, East European Quarterly 33 No. 3 (1999), 281. 4 Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 84. 5 Ines A. Murcaku and Zyhdi Dervishi. “Albanian’s First Post-Communist Decade. Values in Transition: Traditional or Liberal?”, East European Quarterly 37 No. 2 (2003), 231–234.

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while the northern part, where the Ghegs lived, was Roman Catholic and fell under the Holy See.6 There was a continual strife for dominance between north and south. However, even though there were religious differences, these never went so deep so as to affect the underlying clan with its traditions and fis.7 Clan traditions and religion merged sometimes. Antonia Zheliazkova, a specialist on the Balkans, gave an interesting example of how traditional culture and religion intermingled: (T) he Berisha fis worshipped Virgin Mary whom they called Lady Berisha and celebrated the clan festival on the day of the Assumption (15 August). The Merturi clan called the Holy Virgin Lady Merturi and observed the fis patron’s day on 8 September, the day of the Nativity of Mary. The Thaçi clan venerated St. John on 27 December, and the Krasniqe revered St. Sebastian on 20 January.8 The majority of the population in the south of Albania is Muslim, while in the north several forms of Christianity are practiced. As was the case in Chechnya, underlying Islam and Christianity were often pre-Islamic and pre-­ Christian religions and beliefs such as shamanism and doctrines and rites from ­Manicheanism. The Bektashi and other Sufi orders in Albania are influenced by mysticism. Influences that can be retraced within the mysticism include ­Zoroastrianism, Indian beliefs, pantheism, Neo-Platonism and dervish brotherhoods.9 2

Prevalence of Blood Feuds

The clan system knows the system of blood feud and as late as the 1920s around twenty percent of male deaths could be attributed to blood feuds.10 In 1995 some 60,000 people were actively involved in blood feuds in northern Albania, leading to approximately 900 vendetta deaths. In July 2008, an organisation dedicated to the peaceful resolution of blood feuds, the National Reconciliation Committee, reported that more than 20,000 people had been caught up in 6 7 8 9 10

Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, (2000), 16–17. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 17. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 16–17. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 18. Miranda Vickers. The Albanians, A Modern History (London: Tauris, 1995).

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blood feuds since the collapse of Communism in 1991. They also reported that 9,500 had been killed. A further 1,000 children were unable to attend school out of fear of being targeted in a blood feud. This lack of effective power over all of the state territory has left many children out of school and many men trapped in their homes out of fear of revenge killings.11 Due to violent blood feuds, many men were unable to work and this placed additional stress on women who had to take up the work of men in a society that had a patriarchal structure. When all men in the family had died, this ­became a serious problem. In such an instance, a woman would decide to become a “man”. This custom of sworn virgins will be discussed later in this chapter. It was in such cases, given the inferior position of women in society and the law, the only chance of survival for women who did no longer have a man in the family. The collapse of communism, the rapid deterioration of the Albanian economy and the weakening of police authority and capacity resulted in feelings of insecurity, and initiated a return to the adherence of the Kanun, the traditional legal system, most notably in northern Albania, where clan structures and practices are strongest.12 In April 2005, 5,000 people met in a Northern Albanian village to discuss changes to the Kanun. These changes were designated to reduce the amount of people involved in blood feuds, spill over effects to other clans and narrow the targets of violence. It was decided that in case of manslaughter only the murderer should be attacked, the clan members of the murderer would no longer hide him, and that the children of people who harbour murderers would not be offered in marriage to other families. This meeting however did not address the issue of law enforcement. The murderer will still be sought out by members of the victim’s family and will be killed without having had access to Albania’s legal system or having pledged his case in front of an impartial judge, unless a verdict is given by the clan elder or a group formed to render justice.13 The issue at stake is how the practice of following the traditional law, the Kanun, can be reconciled with the positive law in Albania. This question will be further developed after having looked at the position of religion in Albanian

11 12 13

Dan Bilefsky. “Tenacious custom of feuding isolates Albanian families”, New York Times, July 10 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/world/europe/10iht-feud.4.14397736 .html, (accessed July 16 2008). Mike Donkin. “Eyewitness: Albania’s Blood Feuds”, British Broadcasting Corporation May 5 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1964397.stm, (accessed April 17 2008). Christopher Jennings. “New honour code aims to cut killings”, The Scotsman April 23 2005, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1389788/posts, (accessed September 2 2010).

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clan society, cultural identity of Albanians and the history of state building in Albania. 3

Position and History of Major Albanian Clans

In the previous pages the most important clans were described, the Geghs and Tosks. This paragraph gives an overview of important clans and their area of influence. The Kelmendi, Kastrati and Shkreli tribes are highland tribes situated in Malësia in northern Albania. The Kastrati claim that they come originally from Montenegro and have been mentioned in documents from the early 15th century onwards.14 They are in majority Christian, and comprise several families within the tribe. They derive their name from the ruins of a Roman castra – buildings or plots of land reserved for the construction of defensive military positions (campment). The Kelmend tribe lives in the area called Kelmend, and is in majority Roman-Catholic, with a minority of Muslims. The tribe is named after the stronghold Clementiana, and they worship Saint Clement. The Shkreli come originally from Bosnia and have been Islamised for the most part. They derive their name from a church in their nuclear village, which around 1600 was burned, together with the houses of the village. This church, St. Charles (Shen Kerli in Albanian), has become the name of the tribe. The patron of the Christian Orthodox part of the tribe is St. Nicholas.15 Other tribes in Northern Albania comprise the Berisha, Krasniqi, Nikaj-­ Mërtur, Shllaku, Gjoni, and the Djukagjins. According to Edith Durham, a renowned expert on Albania, the Berisha tribe is the oldest in northern Albania. The Berisha tribe is not only found in Albania, but also in Serbia and in Kosovo. They are originally Christian-­ Orthodox, but many have converted to Islam. The Krasniqi tribe is also living both in Albania and Kosovo. They live in the area called Krasniqe. They were originally Catholic Christians, but many have over the centuries converted to Islam. This tribe is old, and was mentioned already by Herodotus. The Nikaj-Mërtur tribe geographically bordered the Krasniqi. The tribe partly originates from the Krasniqi and partly from the Berisha tribes. In central Albania we find several tribes and clans, of which the most prominent tribes are the Merditi, the Zhuba and the Mat. 14 15

Mary Edith Durham. Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs of the Balkans, Vol. 2 (­London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 22. Mary Edith Durham. High Albania and Its Customs in 1908 (London: Edward Arnold, Publishers to the India Office, 1909), 454, 455, 466.

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Sworn Virgins

When in a family all the men had died, there was often a problem in the patriarchal tribal society of Albania. Certain types of work were only performed by men. Men inherit, women could not buy land, women could not vote in local traditional politics, and women often could not inherit. Women who married moved to the family of the men, and were regarded as property. The solution for families without men was that a virgin woman in the family would declare that she would take up the position of man in the family. This included that she would take an oath of chastity in front of a group of 12 men of high standing in the village, and from that moment onward would live on as a “man”. She would wear male clothes, do male work, be accepted by the men as a “man” in society and politics, not marry or have children. She could buy and sell land and inherit. A sworn virgin would participate in blood feuds, and her death would count as a full life, while the death of a woman in a blood feud would only count as half a life.16 This habit has existed until well into the 20th century, out of pure necessity, because the rights of women were not developed and for security and legal reasons, necessitated a man in the family.17 Part of the problems that these women face originate from the laws of the Kanun, which deprived women from certain rights that we now consider part of the equal rights between men and women. 5

National Identity

The identity of Albanians was in the first place defined along Gheg and Tosk lines. Religion was much less of an identifier than clan affiliation or regional background. Lastly, ethnicity played a role in defining Albanian identity.18 In the latter half of the 19th century, nationalism in Albania grew, just as it did in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Growing nationalism in Albania led in 1878 to the founding of the League of Prizren, which was based on the League of Lezhë, established some centuries earlier by Skanderbeg, an important person in Albania who codified traditional law, as we will see later in this chapter.

16 17 18

Antonia Young. “Sworn Virgins, The Case of Socially Accepted Gender Change”, http:// scholarworks.dlib.indiana.edu/journals/index.php/aeer/article/viewFile/687/780, (­accessed July 7 2014). The lives of sworn virgins is extensively described in Antonia Young. Women Who Become Men, Albanian Sworn Virgins (Oxford: Berg, 2000). Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 23.

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The aim of the League was to protect the interests of the populated Albanian areas.19 The Young Turk movement, which came to power in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 was a Turkish nationalist movement. It inspired other ethnicities in the Ottoman Empire to develop their own ethnic identities and nationalism. It has to be emphasised here that this rather undermined the stability of the Ottoman Empire, because it showed the differences between peoples instead of the unifying aspects. Albanian constitutional clubs were created to discuss how to acquire more autonomy. Some strove for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, while others preferred full independence. The underlying fear for those who favoured to stay within the borders of the Ottoman Empire was that they did not want the Albanian population to be divided between several states, such as Serbia, Greece and Montenegro.20 Let us now first look at a cultural practice that is a direct consequence of the patriarchal clan society, the reparation given to families, in which all of the men have died. 6

Legal System

6.1 Customary Law Customary law in Albania finds its basis in the importance of kinship, the clan, and brotherhood. Rules deriving from customary law have been positivised in the Kanun of Lek and the Code of Skanderbeg. This has for centuries been the law that was observed and known by everyone. Later, it operated parallel to other national legal systems. One of the specific aspects of customary law in Albania is the importance of collective liability within the tribe. There is no individual liability, because the individual is not regarded as a legal entity. The jury in the judging of an accused is selected from members of the brotherhood, and the accused has to vow “I have not committed this”. Since someone’s word was very important, this provided the tribe or clan to admit guilt, and follow the procedure of paying damages and reconciliation.21

19 20 21

Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 24. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 25. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 17.

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Aspects which are important in the Kanun of Lek are loyalty, hospitality, honour and keeping your honour, and pride.22 The verdicts could be that a fine had to be paid, in money or in goods, where the height of the fine would be in line with the crime, and would depend on the wealth of the perpetrator. Other verdicts could be exile, where the house of the family would be burned to make sure the family could not return, or disarmament. The last sentence was regarded as the gravest, since the possession of arms was regarded as very important in clan society in Albania. This customary law was used on a wide scale in both the north and the south of Albania until 1945. Edith Durham, who travelled to Albania at the beginning of the 20th century, found: “The teachings of Islam and of Christianity, the Sheriat and Church laws, all have to yield to the Canon of Lek”.23 The Albanian clans held common property. Use of this common property by individual clan members was decided on by a meeting of representatives of all households. In times of danger the common property was defended by all (male) clan members. Conflicts within a clan were solved by the clan elder, and conflicts between clans were solved by the clan elders of the clans concerned. In specific cases an elder of a clan not connected to the conflict could be asked to judge in a conflict.24 The Kanun has proven important in periods when the power of the state was weak. When state authority was weak, when law enforcement personnel and persons in the legal profession could be bribed, the state could not guarantee justice and continuity. This also counts for the period just after the fall of communism. When positive law could not be upheld there was always the Kanun that was known by everyone, and could, given the form of the society, be adhered to. Everyone accepted it and an additional advantage was that the traditional law was designed to result in reconciliation, which would guarantee that parties stopped revenge attacks. Only during the years of communist rule was the Kanun banned.25 Clarissa de Waal, a specialist on Albania explains how the Kanun survived 40 years of communism: 22 23 24 25

Douglas Saltmarshe. Identity in a Post-Communist Balkan State (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2001), 190. Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence (I.B. Taurus, London, 2005), 72, Mary Edith Durham. High Albania and Its Customs in 1908, 25. Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 75. Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 85.

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In view of the ban on the Kanun under communism, one might have expected the young to be ignorant of Kanun rules. In fact, I found that they had a detailed knowledge of both rules and procedures. Suppression of the Kanun probably contributed to its survival and clandestine transmission to the young. […] The presence of at least three generations in one household inevitably fostered a greater stress on tradition, authority and rules for cooperation than would have been the case otherwise.26 Based on field research, she found the following with regard to adherence to traditional law: Whenever I came across a case where a villager had flagrantly abused another’s rights, blocking off an access path, for example, I would ask why the case had not been referred to a court of law. S’ka shtet, s’ka ligj – there is not state, there is no law – was always the reply. Experience had shown that appealing to a court of law rarely brought a solution.27 After the fall of communism the Kanun was able to fill a void that resulted from the difficult transition process to democracy.28 The rule of law was weak, police enforcement was weak, and weapons were easily available after several weapons depots were raided in 1997 when the pyramid scheme, a financial scheme in which many lost their money, collapsed. Notwithstanding, or rather because of the use of the Kanun, there are still people who cannot go into the street because their family is involved in a blood feud.29 De Waal describes how even demarcation of land was ruled by the Kanun: A majority of men on the land commissions were older men familiar with the former boundaries and the commissions followed the Kanun’s exhaustive guidelines on boundary recognition and marking. […] The restitution of the Kanun necessitated the reestablishment of the pre-communist council of elders (pleqni/pleqnësia) and headman ­(kryeplak). The Kanun’s rules were, in theory at least, followed exactly; each clan in a village elected a representative to sit on the council. These 26 27 28 29

Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 85. Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 94. Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 85. Mike Donkin. “Eyewitness: Albania’s Blood Feuds”, British Broadcasting Corporation May 5 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1964397.stm, (accessed April 17 2008).

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in turn chose one of their number to be village headman. In some cases, particularly in certain districts such as Orosh and Kaçinar, regardless of political affiliation, Mirditan villagers chose a descendant of a former bajraktar or similarly persecuted family to be headman. This was at once a symbolic restitution of the pre-communist order and a gesture of atonement for the sufferings of the deklasuar. The headman and his elected council of elders were not however a local deviation from the official administrative structures. […]30 The instances that adjudicated cases in line with the Kanun were the Council of Elders and the “Commissions of Blood”. One of the dangers that de Waal sees for the traditional justice system is that criminals in the post-Soviet period play an increasing role in the rendering of traditional justice.31 In Albania the problems with gang involvement, trafficking human beings, drugs and arms, and disrespect for tradition became problematic after 1997.32 This was aggravated by the fact that the position of women in traditional Albanian society was very low. This has a close link to the existence of warlords and criminal gangs, sometimes with political links in certain areas, that (want to) take over roles, which before were in the domain of the clan elders. This proves that communism had not eradicated the clan, and that after the communist regime fell and Albania went through a period of weakness, the old system was reinstalled. 7

Clan History of Albania

During the Roman occupation of the territory now called Albania, people, organised along tribal lines, inhabited the territory. They were regarded as free people by the Roman authorities. The tribes were only nominally subject to Rome.33 The main means of living in the mountainous part of Albania was peasantry. Most peasants paid taxes to feudal lords, but in very remote places, even taxes were not paid. The last category occasionally raided the lower land villages and farms, and did not have any formal contact whatsoever to feudal

30 31 32 33

Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 83–84. Douglas Saltmarshe. Identity in a Post-Communist Balkan State, 192. Douglas Saltmarshe. Identity in a Post-Communist Balkan State, 199. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 1.

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lords or princes.34 In the 14th century there was much internal struggle, while big clans clashed and expanded their influence. Three of these clans turned their territories into principalities.35 The situation of the Albanians did not change when they came -nominally- under the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century and could govern themselves, provided that they would not attack the Turks.36 Near the end of the Middle Ages, in March 1444, George Kastrioti, later also known as Skanderbeg, assembled the Albanian princes and mountain clans in Lezhë to form a union to fight the Ottomans. Skanderbeg became the leader of the League of Lezhë, which could mobilise 8000 combatants.23 This League formed in practice an effort to have a common foreign and defence policy. Finances were realised by a contribution of each family. Those forming the League thus created a kind of federation. This meant that the internal affairs within the territory of the respective clans and princes remained within their power. After eleven years, in 1455, the personal interests of the clans and princes took precedence over the joined efforts to fight against the Ottomans. The League started to erode, and some princes left or chose to join the Ottoman forces. Skanderbeg is still held in high esteem and regarded as a hero, because he and the League personify the fight against an external power, the Ottoman Empire, and they created a union of Albanians. In particular, up until 1912 when the Albanians created an independent state, this was a highlight in Albanian history.24 Albania was isolated during Ottoman rule. The north, because of the mountains and the difficult terrain, was more isolated than the south’s coastline area. The Albanians rebelled several times against the Ottoman Empire. Apart from the fact that the Albanians refused to put down their weapons, part of the grievance was also the fact that the Christian Albanians did not want to be ruled by an Islamic Empire. Indeed, in the 16th century, an Islamisation took place, which resulted in a Muslim south, and a Christian north. The policy of the Ottoman rulers to ask high taxes of Christians did not apply in the north of Albania, because no taxes were paid.37 Just as in Chechnya, clans who moved to other parts of the country often did this to avoid a blood feud.38 Similar to our findings in Chechnya, the Albanian 34 35 36 37 38

Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 4. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 5. Clarissa de Waal. Albania Today, A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence, 70. Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019). Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 4.

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tribal culture in the north is explained in terms of inaccessible mountains, inhabited by a freedom loving tribal population, which will defend its freedom and property fiercely.13 The population living in the south developed nobility and was influenced by the powers that ruled Albania over the centuries.39 When the Young Turks came to power in 1908, they did not grant Albania the autonomy that these expected from the government. Fights started in Albania, which in 1912 led to the granting of autonomy by the Ottoman government and Albania’s declaration of independence. This declaration of independence was issued in Vlöre on 28 December 1912 and Albania was recognised as an independent state on 29 July 1913 by the Conference of London. The great powers, Great Britain, the German Empire, the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, France and Italy had won the Balkan wars and decided to delimit the territory of the new Albanian state. They did however not follow the division along the lines of habitat of the Albanian ­population, and therefore ceded Kosovo to Serbia, and the south territory was ceded to Greece. This resulted in half of the Albanian population living outside of Albania.40 An area in the south where Greeks lived was included in Albania. 8

Lead up to the First World War

Although the First World War would only start in 1914, the weakness of the Ottoman Empire was already evident in 1912 and led to tensions in the Balkans and in Albania. There was a danger that Albania would be partitioned between Serbia, Greece and Montenegro. At the same time, the other neighbouring republics of Albania, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia worried that their areas inhabited by Albanians would rise against them. They declared war on Turkey and invaded Albania.41 Other states in the region interested in Albania were Austria-Hungary and Italy. Great Britain was also involved in negotiations about the status of Albania. As we saw, Albania did not have a territory that comprised all Albanian population, since there were also Albanians in Serbia and Kosovo. As Antonina Zheliazkova states,

39 40 41

Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 5–6. Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019). Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019).

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On 28 November 1912, delegates from all over the country gathered in Vlora and officially proclaimed Albania’s independence. Albania was not recognised in its ethnic boundaries, but as dictated by the international political conjuncture: Kosovo and Metohija were left outside the borders of the Albanian state, but Serbia’s claims to Northern Albania, and Montenegro’s to Shkodra, were rejected, Korça and Gjirokastër were given to Albania, while the region of Çameria was annexed to Greece.42 In July 1913 Albania was recognised as an independent neutral state, but it did not rule itself completely independently. The German Prince Wilhelm zu Wied became prince of Albania, the Dutch were responsible for the gendarmerie in Albania, and representatives of the Great Powers were – together with ­Albanians – responsible for the civil and financial administration. Wilhelm zu Wied was in power only from 21 February until 3 September 1914, and then left Albania. During the time that he resided in Albania he was not able to understand the culture of Albania and was not accepted by the Albanians, according to the Dutch Captain Fabius.43 J. Fabius was one of the Dutch gendarmes who was deployed to Albania. He writes in his memoirs that from the beginning there was no cooperation between the Italians in Albania, who had invaded even before the outbreak of the First World War, and the Dutch gendarmerie, since they had another political agenda. It was impossible for the Dutch to do their work in an efficient manner, since the ruling sovereign did not always back them. There was increasing anarchy in Albania, notwithstanding Wilhelm’s efforts to establish security in the country. The result was that the gendarmerie’s mission failed, and the Dutch returned home just before the outbreak of the First World War.44 This means that at the start of the First World War, Albania did not have a central authority and chaos reigned. Albania entered the First World War in 1916 when the country was occupied by Italy, France, and Austria-Hungary.45 At the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War all aspects of sovereignty over territory were discussed. The American president Woodrow Wilson was instrumental in the survival of the Albanian state, since other states were in favour of partitioning Albania among its neighbours.46 In December 1920 Albania became a member of the League of Nations. This was an important 42 43 44 45 46

Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 26. J. Fabius. Zes Maanden in Albanië (Uitgeverij de Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam, 1918). J. Fabius. Zes Maanden in Albanië, Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 26. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 27. Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019).

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step in the international recognition of the state. The independence of Albania and the territory it was given were not obvious. A Secret Treaty, signed in 1915 in London, guaranteed Albanian territories to Italy. The priorities of the Albanian government were thus securing the state and preserving its sovereignty.47 The Albanian state was modernised when Ahmet Zog, a tribal leader, came to power in 1920, and introduced a parliamentary system. 9

Ahmet Zogu and Clan Policies

During the first years of independence there were two important politicians. Ahmet Zogu, who represented the beys and bajraktars (chieftains), and was in favour of traditional and local custom, finding his support primarily in the northern mountainous part of the country. Fan Noli, a cleric educated in the United States of America, represented the part of the population that wanted to strengthen relations with Western Europe and look for economic expansion. Zogu participated in Albanian politics starting in 1920, and was appointed prime minister in 1922. After a failed attempt to murder Zogu by persons belonging to Fan Noli’s political party, the Liberals, a member of Fan Noli’s political party was killed, which sparked an uprising among the population. Zogu had to flee to Yugoslavia in 1924 and Fan Noli was elected prime minister. Fan Noli formed a centre-left government, which aimed to form a Western style democracy. His government lasted six months, after which it was overthrown by Ahmed Zogu, who returned with the support of Yugoslav and Ukrainian troops and mercenaries.48 Zogu, also called Zog, came back to power and became president. He ruled as president from 1925 until 1928. Zogu was a dictator, who manipulated clans and other groups in Albania. There were numerous attacks on his life. When he would go out, he would take his mother with him, because in clan code it is not allowed to kill someone in the presence of his mother. In 1928 Zogu crowned himself King Zog. Albania’s governance system was changed to an authoritarian monarchy.49 He reigned as monarch from 1928 to 1939, when he had to flee the country after Italy invaded on 7 April 1939. King 47 48 49

Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 27. Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019). J. Fischer Bernd. “Albanian Highland Tribal Society and Family Structure in the Process of the Twentieth Century Transformation”, East European Quarterly 33 No. 3 (1999), 282–283.

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Zog went into exile in Greece. King Zog never returned to Albania. He formally remained king of Albania until 1946.50 During the Depression in the 1930s, the economic situation was bad, and remained bad notwithstanding efforts to attract foreign interests. Zog signed financial accords with Italy from 1928 onwards. This expanded the influence of Italy in the economic sector. Under Zogs rule, the police also became effective in the northern regions. One of the political themes of King Zog was modernisation and expansion of the possibilities for education for men and women, both in the cities and in the rural areas. Zog did not touch the topic of land reform, which had been on the agenda of his opponent, Fan Noli. Due to social inequality and limited political freedoms, there were regular uprisings against the regime of Zog. This weakened his internal power and was a breeding ground for the emergence of the first communist parties. Albania became a protectorate of Italy. The Albanian government appointed King Victor Emmanuel iii as the new king.51 10

Albania during the Second World War

The Italian occupation of Albania went so far that the administration was moved to Rome. There was no form of self-rule, which normally, under occupation, is the case. The Albanians had to hand in their weapons. Given the history of Albania and its culture with blood feuds, at least in the north, this policy was not successful.52 In November 1941 the Albanian Communist party was established. The party became active in the resistance against fascism and against the occupation of Albania. One of those communists was Enver Hoxha. He was a Tosk from the south of Albania, just like many others active in the National Liberation Front.53 During the war, Albanian populated territories were transferred from one state to another. Kosovo and Camëria became part of Albania in 1941. In 1943 the Germans occupied Albania, and the Italians withdrew. This occupation lasted only one year, because the Germans withdrew in 1944 when the Second World War was nearing to an end. Albania was partitioned: Kosovo went to 50 51 52 53

J. Fischer Bernd. “Albanian Highland Tribal Society and Family Structure in the Process of the Twentieth Century Transformation”, 282–283. Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019). Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 27. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 28.

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Yugoslavia, Camëria became part of Greece. On January 10, 1946, the Albanian People’s Republic was declared and Albania came under communist rule.54 11

Albania in the Aftermath of the Second World War

After the war Albania was economically in a poor condition. The position of women in society was bad, the health care system had to be modernised, and education had to be modernised, since many Albanians were illiterate. Furthermore, there were problems with blood feuds that undermined the stability in parts of the state. Under communist rule the land was redistributed, landowners lost their land, and the landless acquired land. Farms were collectivised. The economic sector was nationalised.55 The communists aimed at crushing the old patriarchal society in the north, by putting an end to blood feuds and limiting the power of clans, as well as liberating women by giving them equal rights as men, where the position of women previously had been to take care of the home and the farm. Enver Hoxha, a schoolteacher, was proclaimed leader of Albania. He remained in power until his death in 1985. The alliances of Albania shifted. From 1944 to 1948 Albania aligned with Yugoslavia. Hoxha severed relations with Yugoslavia, when Tito broke relations with Stalin in 1948. From 1948 to 1961 Albania aligned with the Soviet Union. Upon Stalin’s death, Khruschev applied pressure on Hoxha to have political prisoners released. Khruschev also began a process of de-Stalinisation. Both processes were strongly objected to by Hoxha. He broke ties with the Soviet Union in 1961. From 1961 to 1978 the Albanian government aligned with China and pursued Maoist policies. When Mao died, Hoxha broke with Beijing. After 1978 Albania was its own, independent, Stalinist bastion. The reason for the isolation was Hoxha’s disappointment with the relations of other communist states with the West.

54 55

Elez Biberaj. Albania in Transition, The Rocky Road to Democracy (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), 19. Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019).

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The “Cultural Revolution”

Between 1961 and 1971 Albania underwent an intense period of industrialisation, centralisation and education. This period is often referred to as the “cultural revolution”.56 Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, specialists on Albania remarked: The development in the late 1960s of Albania’s ideological and cultural revolution was intended to bring about a complete transformation in the mentality, psychology and general outlook of the people.57 Clan elders were killed or put in prison, in an effort to eradicate the clan from society. The hope of the communist regime was to make sure that traditions were eliminated and replaced by communist ideology.58 Traveling abroad was banned for citizens, and in 1967 all Christian and Muslim places of worship were closed. In 1976 Albania included the ban on religion in the Constitution.59 Hoxha turned Albania into the first atheist nation. Priests and Islamic leaders were shot for wearing religious emblems. Hoxha continued his reforms and outlawed cars, expelled girls from school for wearing makeup, priests and Islamic leaders were shot for wearing religious emblems, and he abolished the Ministry of Justice. Only minors, foreigners, or the mentally ill were entitled to have a defence lawyer.60 In 1976 the name of the state was changed to the Peoples’ Socialist Republic of Albania. It was certainly the case that Albanians were very isolated from the rest of the world, and the regime was very repressing. This all affected the state and the Albanian people, but could be reversed after the fall of Hoxha and the communist regime. 13

Fall of Communism and Resurrection of the Clan

Enver Hoxha died in 1985 and was succeeded by Ramiz Alia. The latter started a process of modernising the Albanian economy. As a result of the political 56 57 58 59 60

Isa Blumi. “Hoxha’s Class War: The Cultural Revolution and State Reformation, 1961–1971”, East European Quarterly 33 No. 3 (1999), 303–304. Miranda Vickers, James Pettifer. Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 98. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 29–30. Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 29. Tina Rosenburg. “Albania: Habits of the Heart”, World Policy Journal 11 No. 4 (1994), 86.

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turmoil in other Eastern European states and the Soviet Union, an opposition movement was developed. When president Alia allowed political parties in 1990, Albania became a multiparty state. In 1992 a new president was elected, and the communist party lost its power.61 Albania reattached to Europe, first in its participation in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce), and later by becoming a member to the Council of Europe.62 At the beginning of the transition process away from totalitarianism, many Eastern European and Middle European states returned to constitutions and political institutions that had existed prior to communism. In all republics in transition in Middle and Eastern Europe, including Albania, national identity was redefined along national, ethnic and religious lines.63 This strengthened the state where it concerned a common identity, but created possible conflict where there were different identities within the state, since these needed all the necessary guarantees to be protected by law. The transition process from totalitarianism to democracy proved to be complicated. As in many other Eastern European states in transition, the strengthening of institutions was both necessary and complex. The long isolation of Albania resulted in a lack of understanding about what representative democracy looked like. Transparency and accountability were difficult to incorporate in Albanian politics, which hampered the position of civil society in the political debate.64 By 1996, Albania may have become a one party state. Government policy was often based rather on government directives than on decisions by parliament.65 The financial sector was underdeveloped and poorly governed. Corruption in Albania was widespread. Informal financial companies sprang up, which were neither banks nor brokerage houses. There was no regulation available to keep an oversight of the activities of these informal companies. The companies provided pyramid schemes in which more short time profits could be acquired compared to normal banking. Some of these companies generated additional revenue through smuggling, and did not have real assets. Christopher Jarvis, an economist at the International Monetary Fund (imf) explained this further: 61 62 63 64 65

Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019). Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019). Antonina Zhelyazkova. “Albanian Identities”, 29–30. Douglas Saltmarshe. Identity in a Post-Communist Balkan State (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2001), 179. Douglas Saltmarshe. Identity in a Post-Communist Balkan State, 178.

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Some of the Albanian companies [..] were pure pyramid schemes, with no real assets. Other cases are more ambiguous. Some of the largest of the companies – in particular vefa, Gjallica, and Kamberi – had substantial real investments. They were also widely believed to be engaged in criminal activities – including violating United Nations sanctions by smuggling goods into the former Yugoslavia – that were thought to be the source of the high returns they paid.66 Because of the high revenue, formal banks started to invest in these schemes as well.67 In 1997 the system collapsed. Many people lost all they had. The government refused to compensate customers for their losses and it froze the accounts of Xhafferi and Populli, two pyramid schemes. At the time, Xhafferi and Populli had combined deposits of 10% of Albania’s gdp. Protests began in late 1996 and early 1997 which led to mass riots. More than 2,000 people were killed in the violence. With the loss of the money, the government was limited in what it could invest and subsequently, lost control over large sections of the country.68 Weapons were looted from government armouries, and many citizens possessed weapons. Gangs took over control of the streets, which weakened the position of the police, the army and therefore the state, even more. Political groups were aligned with criminal gangs. In the north of the country the police was not able to function properly, because of intimidation. While the power of the state weakened, the gangs took over, and pretended to work under the traditional law, the Kanun. In July 1997 a new government was formed that was able to create some security in the country.69 Smuggling and corruption became even more widespread with the collapse of the Albanian economy. One of the worst consequences was that the trafficking of human beings, especially women and girls, increased dramatically. These women were forced into prostitution in Western Europe.70 The ­international 66 67 68 69 70

Chris Jarvis. “The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes”, Finance & Development March 37 No. 1 (2000), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/jarvis.htm, (accessed April 28 2008). Carlos Elbirt. “Albania under the Shadow of the Pyramids”, Transition Newsletter 8 No. 5 (1997), http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/so97/albania2.htm, (accessed October 13 2010). Chris Jarvis. “The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes”, Finance & Development March 37 No. 1 (2000), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/jarvis.htm, (accessed April 28 2008). Douglas Saltmarshe. Identity in a Post-Communist Balkan State, 197. Douglas Saltmarshe. Identity in a Post-Communist Balkan State, 197.

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non-governmental organisation (ingo) Transparency International ranked Albania in 2018 99 out of 180 states, which means that Albania falls in the category “corrupt”. The ingo Freedom House ranked Albania partly free, with a partly free press.71 Journalists are intimidated and attacks by the government are widespread. In 2006 the Albanian government implemented reforms to strengthen the rule of law and fight corruption. Italy was forced to set up an emergency aid package for Albania at the end of the 1990s, to help stem the tide of Albanian (economic) immigrants, asylum seekers and illegal workers. As early as September 1991, more than 40,000 Albanians had sought refuge in Italy.72 14

UN Mission Deployed

In response to the economic crisis in Albania, the United Nations Security Council issued Security Council Resolution 1101 (1997) in which the Security Council stated: Determining that the present crisis in Albania constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council this evening welcomed the offer by certain Member States to establish a “temporary and limited multinational protection force” to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help create a secure environment for international organizations in Albania.73 This resolution was followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1114 (1997) as the legal basis for a preventive military intervention.74 The United Nations dispatched a force of several thousand soldiers to help restore order and 71 Freedom House, “Albania”, http://freedomhouse.org/country/albania#.U7lW5F5gP_E, (accessed July 6 2014). 72 Associated Press. “Ferryboat With Italian Relief Arrives in Albanian Port”, New York Times, September 18 1991, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE3D61730F93A A2575AC0A967958260, (accessed April 28 2008). 73 United Nations Security Council. “Press Release: SC/6347”, United Nations Security Council March 28 1997, https://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19970328.sc6347.html, (accessed July 26 2019). 74 Sokol Braha, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the United Nations. “Legal aspects of the multinational intervention in Albania”, September 27, 1997, http://reliefweb.int/report/albania/legal-aspects-multinational-intervention-albania, (accessed April 23 2013).

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­government.75 In addition to the above-mentioned aim, the mission also paved the way for the osce/odihr election-monitoring mission to prepare the country for the elections of 1997. The UN intervention, called “Alba” was successful, and law and order were restored.76 The Albanian Socialist Party won the parliamentary elections that took place in 1997. This party remained in power after the 2001 elections, which were full of corruption. All elections, with the exception of the 1992 elections, were fraudulent or not accepted by one or more parties.77 15

Refugees and Transborder Insecurity

The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro, followed by the intervention in Kosovo by nato in 1999, led to an influx of around 450,000 Albanian refugees from Kosovo.78 This put a strain on the internal policies of the Albanian government. To give support to the refugees was expensive, and hampered the already bad economy. Also, there was a danger of tension between the refugees and the local population. The Albanian minority in Macedonia rebelled against the central government in Macedonia. A UN peacekeeping force was installed as a preventive deployment force (unpredep) and served from 1995 to 1999, when China vetoed an extension of the mandate in the UN Security Council.79 unpredep was stationed in Macedonia and had to control the border areas to avoid a spill over of unrest from and to Macedonia.80 75 76

77 78 79

80

Paul Lewis. “U.N. Backs Sending Troops to Restore Order in Albania”, New York Times, March 29 1997, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE5DD133AF93AA15 750C0A961958260, (accessed April 12 2008). Sokol Braha, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the United Nations. “­Legal aspects of the multinational intervention in Albania”, September 27, 1997, http:// reliefweb.int/report/albania/legal-aspects-multinational-intervention-albania, (accessed April 23 2013). Albanian Elections Observatory Brief. Issue 1, (April 19 2013), (April 19 2013), https://www .eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/bn1.pdf (accessed July 30, 2019). International Crisis Group. Albania: State of the Nation, March 1, 2000, 1, https://www .files.ethz.ch/isn/27999/087_albania_state_of_nation.pdf (accessed July 29 2019). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, Former Yugoslav Repiublic of Macedonia, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/ unpred_b.htm, (accessed July 30 2019), “World: Europe UN peacekeepers prepare to leave Macedonia”, bbc News, March 1, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/288402 .stm, (accessed July 30 2019). http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unpred_p.htm, (accessed July 6 2014).

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In August 2001 nato deployed Operation Essential Harvest (or Task Force Essential Harvest) for a period of 30 days to disarm Albanian groups in Macedonia. This mission was followed in September 2001 by a mission of nato, called “Operation Amber Fox”, which also had a preventive mandate.81 The mission was changed into a lighter mission called “Operation Allied Harmony”, which functioned until 2003, when the EU took over.82 At the basis was the strained relation between the Albanians in Macedonia and the Macedonian population. The Macedonian Albanians were economically far less of. These ethnic Albanians in practice did not have equal access to education, because of language requirements in Macedonian, which the Albanian Macedonians often did not meet. There were no Albanian language universities in Macedonia. An important question was whether there would be a risk of spill over from Macedonia to Albania. This has not happened. The former High Commissioner for Minorities of the osce, Max van der Stoel, has been instrumental in establishing an English language university for the Albanian youth in Macedonia. The Macedonian government has recognised the university.83 16

Membership of nato

In 2005 the Albanian Democratic Party under Sali Berisha came back to power. One of the focal points in their policy was to strengthen the economy and the rule of law, in order to be able to start discussions over a membership of the EU and nato.84 On 1 April 2009 Albania became a member of nato. This process towards membership started in 1992 when Albania joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This program aimed to strengthen institutional cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries. In 1994 Albania started to participate in nato’s Partnership for Peace program, and this led in 1999 to a Membership Action Plan.

81 82 83 84

http://www.nato.int/fyrom/, (accessed April 23 2013). http://www.nato.int/fyrom/, (accessed April 23 2013). personal conversation with Max van der Stoel during a visit to this university in summer 2002. Peter R. Prifti, Elez Biberaj. “Albania”, July 12 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ Albania, (accessed July 30 2019).

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Membership of the EU was problematic because Albania struggles with high crime rates, corruption, trafficking in people and drugs.85 However, in June 2014 the EU at the summit decided to make Albania an official candidate for membership, followed in June 2018 by a decision to start the accession ­negotiations in 2019. 17

Conclusion: The Role of the Clan in the Albanian State

The underlying unity of Albania as a state is to a considerable extent based on the old traditions of the clan society and its law, the Kanun. This cohesion has been cemented through the centuries, and has survived 45 years of communism. Occupying forces like the Ottoman Empire were not able to change the clan politics. King Zog used the clan norms, though also trying to modernise the state. Intervening forces such as the German Prince von Wied, the Dutch gendarmerie and the Italian and German armies were not capable of transforming Albania into a strong state. Nor was the communist regime able to eradicate the clan society. In the post-communist era, when the transition process towards democracy began, Albania witnessed a decline in power of the state institutions and government. This void was filled by the old traditions of the clan and the Kanun. Part of the transition process is now how to fight aspects that we saw in other examples of transition processes and clan societies, corruption and patronage. The question is whether the balance between the influence of the state institutions and the clan society will yield to the favour of the state, or whether the traditions will remain strong while the state remains weak. A third possibility, a workable marriage between the two, can also be envisaged. A remarkable difference between Albania and the other case studies is that the Albanian clans and tribes know a hereditary system in the mountains. Similar to other findings, the clan structure is strongest in more mountainous, less accessible regions, where infrastructure is poor and the government is not very visible. This underlines the idea that the clan will take over responsibilities from the central authorities if the state is not capable of providing infrastructure and law and order. In Albania the clash between tradition, in this case the clan, and the state which tries to strengthen its grip on territory asks for solutions which respect the regional culture. 85

Matthew Jenkins, “Albania: Overvierw of Political Corruption”, Transparancy ­International, https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/albania-overview-of-political-corrup tion, March 20, 2014, (accessed July 29 2019).

Chapter 7

Clans in Afghanistan This chapter focuses on the clan society as it exists in several parts of Afghanistan. How has clan society influenced and still influences the political map of Afghanistan? What does the political power division look like, how does the clan society function, both internally and vis-à-vis 19th century British rule, during Soviet occupation and during the intervention of nato? Afghanistan has a multi-ethnic society, where some ethnicities have a clan structure, and others do not. There are several legal systems in Afghanistan, which, though different, also have similarities. The traditional legal system includes the pashtunwali and other traditional systems used by those inhabiting Afghanistan. Politicians in Afghanistan try to unite traditional law, sharia law and the official positive law of Afghanistan. They also aim to form a balance of power between the bigger ethnic groups, as well as between clans and warlords. This multi-layered process makes Afghanistan, to some extent, different from Chechnya and Albania, as we will see, but it also adds to the discourse that blueprints are only partially useful in a state building process, and it underlines that a balance has to be found between old traditions and the requirements of modern day democracy, especially with regard to transparency, accountability and respect for human rights. 1

Afghanistan’s State Structure

Afghanistan has many ethnic groups including Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Baluchi, and Aimaq, Kirghiz, Pashai, Nuristani, Arab, Qizilbash, Gujur, and Brahwui.1 Afghanistan is a multilingual state, where Pashtu and Dari are the official languages. In the capital, Kabul, many people are bilingual. Other languages spoken include Uzbek, Turkmen, Balochi, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri.2 These languages are the third official language in areas where the 1 Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 1 and the Constitution of Afghanistan, Chapter 1, Article 4, which also includes the phrase “and others” to include all groups, http:// www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf (accessed May 27 2019). 2 Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Fact Book: Afghanistan”, Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html, (accessed

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_010

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majority speaks them, according to Chapter 1, Article 16 of the Afghan Constitution of 2004.3 The majority of the Afghan population is Sunni Muslim, belonging to the Hanafi sect, which accounts for 80% of the population. Shia followers are primarily found among the Hazaras in Hazarajat. Some Pashtun tribes, Tajiks and Heratis are also Shia.4 A special group of Shiites is formed by the Ismaelis, who follow the Agha Khan. Ahmed Rashid, a specialist on Afghan politics, describes how the Sunni Hanafi sect is organised: The Sunni Hanafi creed is essentially non-hierarchical and decentralised, which has made it difficult for twentieth-century rulers to incorporate its religious leaders into strong centralized state systems. But for centuries this admirably suited the loose Afghan confederation. Traditional Islam in Afghanistan believed in minimum government, where state interference was as little and as far away as possible. Everyday decisions were carried out by the tribe and the community.5 In traditional Islam in Afghanistan, a moderating factor can be found in Sufism, a mystical trend that has wide popularity. Two main Sufi orders can be found: the Naqshbandiyah and Qadiriyah. These played an important role in uniting Afghans against Soviet occupation. They were a factor of importance next to the Mujaheddin and other ethnic groups.6 2

Clan Structure in Afghanistan

Though not all of those inhabiting Afghanistan have a clan structure, the Pashtun, who form the dominant group in Afghan society and in Afghan politics, know a clan society. This is reflected in the political make up of the state. A number of families form a kahol (in Pashtu). These families share a common ancestor seven or eight generations back. More kahols form a khel or zai,

3 4 5 6

February 12 2008). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af .html, (accessed February 12 2008). Constitution of Afghanistan. http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution .html#chapterone, accessed 20 May 2011. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 83. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban. 83. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban. 84, Robert D. Crews, Amin Tarzi (Eds). The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 37.

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which means clan. A number of clans form a taber, or sub-tribe. Two or more sub-clans form a tribe (tayifa of qabila in Pashtu).7 Clans are at the base of the Afghan state. Neamatollah Nojumi, a specialist on state building and conflict transformation, notices that two aspects, which unite the different ethnic and linguistic groups, are ethnic identity and national identity. He states: On the ethnic level the members of the group, in particular within a tribe, share ‘a common ancestor, a common leader and a common territory in a positive way and harbour negative attitudes toward members of other tribes’.8 The Pashtuns are the biggest group, divided into the Durrani and the Ghilzai. Former President Karzai is a member of the Durrani, and more specifically of its sub-tribe the Popalzhai. President Ashraf Ghani belongs to the Ahmadzai tribe. The Pashtuns dominate in the south of Afghanistan. Other powerful tribes in Khost Province are the Mangal tribe and the Zadran tribe (also present across the border in North Waziristan). In Uruzgan the Hotak tribe is powerful, although they only form 4% of the population in Uruzgan, in Zabul the Ghilzai tribe, in Kandahar the Popalzhai tribe, part of the Durrani tribe, and the Achakzai tribe, and in Paktika Province the Ghilzai tribe have considerable power. The tribal organisation of the Pashtun is based on the Pashtunwali, which forms a traditional legal system. The tribe has its own military organisation, the Lashkar, and has its own decision-making system, the Jirga.9 The clans and tribes in the mountains are more prominent than in the lower lands. This is because the population living in the mountains needs to have a strong solidarity to survive, which creates an egalitarian society with a strong position for the family. The solidarity creates a tight commitment to society and a warrior society. In lower lands, the farming and trade create different social layers in society.10 While the nomination of a clan elder in the m ­ ountains

7 8 9 10

W. Vogelsang. The Afghans (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 21–23, M. Ewans. ­Afghanistan: A  Short History of its People and Politics (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 7. Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region, 2. M. Ewans. Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 7, v. Schofield. Afghan Frontier: At the Crossfield of Conflict (London: Tauris Parke, 2010), 116–120. Antonio Giustozzi. The Art of Coercion (London: Hurst, 2011), 28.

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is based on accomplishments and charisma, and therefore does not g­ uarantee that the position can be inherited, the clan elders in the lowlands have land that can be inherited, and this makes it easier to realise a socio-economic division in society.11 The basis of the Afghan clan society is the importance of honour, hospitality and revenge.12 However, when a national crisis would occur, the clans would join forces, and fight the external enemy. The clan rules through council meetings, called jirga.13 Since the 18th century the Pashtuns have been in power in Afghanistan with some short interruptions, having their power base in Kandahar. The Kandaharis have a special status among the Pashtuns, specifically for having ruled Afghanistan with a few interruptions for 300 years. The founder of the Durrani dynasty, Ahmad Shah Durrani, built the state in 1761. He was the first of the Durrani tribe to rule, and the first to unite the Pashtuns. Ahmed Rashid states: “As a concession to their home base, Kabul’s kings absolved the Kandaharis from providing manpower for the army”.14 This has long been a privilege for the Kandaharis. 3

History of Afghanistan from the 19th Century

During the 19th century, alarmed by the expansion of the Russian Empire in Central Eurasia, the British fought two Anglo-Afghan wars. The British were defeated in the Khyber Pass by Afghani and Persian troops (1839–1842). A second Anglo-Afghan war (1878–1880) resulted in a change in the Afghan monarchy. Amir Abdur Rahman became king, succeeding Amir Shir Ali. During the reign of Amir Shir Ali, the boundaries of contemporary Afghanistan were established by the Russian and British Empires. However, Afghanistan’s foreign policy was determined by the British. After 1919, the Afghan king Amanullah regained control over Afghan foreign policy when the third British-Afghan war ended (6 May 1919–8 August 1919). The Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed on 8 August 1919 transferred power from the British to the Afghan government, ending sovereignty of the British Empire 11 12 13 14

W. Vogelsang. The Afghans, 21, T. Barfield, Afghanistan. A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 61. Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region, 4. Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region, 2. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 20.

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over Afghanistan.15 This treaty is still celebrated in Afghanistan as the day of Independence on August 19. As part of the treaty, the British promised not to expand their territory past the Khyber Pass. 4

Lessons Learned from British Rule over Afghanistan

According to Maria Sultan, the policy of the British in colonial times in Afghanistan was using the tradition and laws of the area in order to rule. An important success factor was the fact that the issue of political status or statehood was avoided, and traditional ways of living were respected: It has simply fulfilled the major demand of the tribal people and their representatives, namely to be able to continue living according to the existing social organization, resolving disputes internal to the tribe within the tribe according to the customary laws, avoiding forcible integration into the legal and political system of the state, perceived by the tribal people as alien and conflicting with their own system of values.16 The British were never able to fully colonise the border area between what is now Pakistan and Afghanistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. This area borders Afghanistan to the North-West, Gilgit-Baltistan to the North-East, Azad Kashmir to the east, the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (fata) to the west and south, Balochistan to the south and finally Punjab and the Islamabad Capital Territory to the South-West. The delimitation of the Afghan border with Pakistan and Persia (Iran) has been an outstanding issue that has its roots in the 19th and 20th centuries. The British concluded several international treaties concerning the northern and northwestern frontier with Russia, among which were a series of protocols in London in 1885, at Khamiab in 1886, at St. Petersburg in 1887, and at Chehel Dukhtaran in 1893.17

15 16 17

Nancy Hatch Dupree, Victor P. Petrov, Frank Raymond Allchin, Louis Dupree, Mohammad Ali, Marvin G. Weinbaum,. “Afghanistan”, July 5 2019, https://www.britannica.com/ place/Afghanistan (accessed July 30 2019). Maria Sultan. “The Quest for Peace in Chechnya: the relevance of Pakistan’s Tribal Areas Experience”, 446. For the delimitation of the frontier by the Mixed Commission of British and Afghani’s, read George Passman Tate. The Kingdom of Afghanistan: a historical sketch (New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 2001) 186, for the Protocol of 1885 between the Russian

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The British delimited the frontier in the southwest of Afghanistan by arbitration in 1872 and 1875. In the east and southeast the frontier was imposed by the Government of India, which informed the ruler of Afghanistan that Dir, Swat, Chitral and Bajaur were no longer part of Afghanistan. Only in 1893 the formal international frontier between British India and Afghanistan was established.18 The Treaty of 1893 was subsequently confirmed in 1905 and once again in 1919 by the Treaty of Rawalpindi.19 The frontier that came forth from this delimitation is called the Durand line, named after the Foreign Secretary for British India at the time, Mortimer Durand, who signed it. The Durand Line was established in 1896 by Mortimer Durand and the Afghan Amir Abdurahman Khan, after a delimitation that had taken place in 1894. The British regarded Afghanistan as an independent state, even though foreign policy and diplomatic relations were controlled by the British. Another treaty concerning Afghanistan’s sovereignty followed with the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921, in which, among others, Afghanistan would respect the independence and the frontiers of India.20 This treaty was reaffirmed on May 6, 1930. On July 3, 1947, with the secession of British India from Great Britain, the government of Afghanistan sent a note to Delhi and London declaring that the people of the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan should be given the option of becoming independent or joining Pakistan or Afghanistan. The British rejected this claim, and subsequently the Afghan government proposed the creation of a separate Pakhtun state that would be called Pakhtunistan. The name Pakhtunistan refers to the area lying on both sides of the Durand Line, partly in Afghanistan and partly in Pakistan. Since Afghanistan’s independence, the Afghan authorities have questioned the validity of the Durand Line and have stressed the right to self-determination of the Pakthuns living in the area. Pakistan regards the Durand Line as the valid international border

Empire and Great Britain, see the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1979, http://encyclopedia2. thefreedictionary.com/Russo-Afghan+Conflict+of+1885, (accessed July 28 2011). 18 S.M.M. Qureshi. “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Pacific Affairs, 39 No. 1/2 (Spring – Summer, 1966), 102. 19 S.M.M. Qureshi. “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 103, “Boundaries of Afghanistan”, Encyclopedia Iranica, http://www.iranica.com/articles/ boundaries-iii, (accessed July 28 2011). 20 Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921: The Outcome of Peace Negotiations Following the Third Anglo-Afghan War http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-afghan-treaty-of-1921-theoutcome-of-peace-negotiations-following-the-third-anglo-afghan-war (accessed May 9 2014).

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between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was the intention of the Afghan government to incorporate such a state as a possible Pakhtunistan in Afghanistan.21 S.M.M. Qureshi of Alberta University stated with regard to the claimed territory: According to Afghan sources, Pakhtunistan consists of the area west of the river Indus up to the Afghan frontier, a tract of land of 190,000 square miles inhabited by seven million people who are divided into numerous tribes.22 He continues with a detailed description of the border delimitation: It extends from Chitral in the north to Baluchistan in the south, both inclusive, and besides them includes the districts of Hazara, Kohistan, Swat, Dir, Buner, Peshawar, Tirah, Bajaur, Kohat, Bannu, Deraghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Waziristan, Khyber, Pezu, Gomal, Bolan and Malakand.23 With regard to Baluchistan Qureshi states: […] According to the same sources Baluchistan is also inhabited by Pakhtun clans, principally the Shorani in the north and the Kahari, Dunar, and Mandokhel in the south.24 Among the reasons the Afghan authorities wish to change the frontier of the state is that most of their population is made up of ethnicities that also live across the border, like the Aimaq, Baluch, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek tribes.25

21 S.M.M. Qureshi. “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 103–104. 22 S.M.M. Qureshi. “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 99. 23 S.M.M. Qureshi. “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 99. 24 S.M.M. Qureshi. “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 99, Thomas Barfield, “The Durand Line: History, Consequences, and Future”, The American Institute of Afghan Studies/The Hollings Center, November 2007, http://www.bu.edu/ aias/reports/durand_conference.pdf, (accessed March 3 2008). 25 Cindy Fazey. “Responding to the Opium Dilemma”, in Building a New Afghanistan, ed. Robert Rotberg, (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2007), 181.

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The Federal Administered Tribal Areas

The Federal Administrated Tribal Areas (fata), comprise the seven tribal agencies of Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur and North and South Waziristan in eastern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. The area is inhabited by 4.5 million Pashtuns, next to 28 million Pashtuns in the North West Frontier Province, while another 15 million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan.26 The British established fata in 1901 as a no-man’s land between Afghanistan and British India. The British governed indirectly over the area through a Governor General who ruled the North West Frontier Province, while there were agents on the ground. The power of these agents was based on the Frontier Crimes Regulations (fcr). The agents could prosecute without taking into account due process. Furthermore, they could hold a whole tribe accountable for the wrongs of an individual member of the tribe. Also, they could hold a tribe collectively responsible for a crime that took place within their territory. Finally, the agents could handpick tribal councils to adjudicate cases, which undermined due process.27 The political rights of the tribal inhabitants of fata are limited. They could not participate in the politics of fata, because political parties, aid agencies, and civil society organisations were not allowed to work in the tribal areas.28 The government of Pakistan used to give power and money, hoping that the agents would be loyal to the government. Not surprisingly, the system was prone to corruption.29 We will now go back to the moment where Afghanistan became independent after signing the Treaty of Rawalpindi. 6

Afghanistan as a Kingdom, 1919–1973

The aim of King Amanullah after independence was to modernise the country. Primary education became compulsory under his rule. He also lifted the obligation for women to wear a veil outdoors. Due to his modern ideas, rebellion

26 27 28 29

Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 224, 237. Barnet Rubin, Abubakar Siddique. “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate”, in Scott Smith, Moeed Yusuf, Colin Cookman (eds). Getting it Right in Afghanistan (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 2013), 114. Barnet Rubin, Abubakar Siddique. “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate”, in Scott Smith, Moeed Yusuf, Colin Cookman (eds). Getting it Right in Afghanistan, 115. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 237.

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broke out and on 14 January 1929 he was forced to abdicate. One of the rebels, Habibullah Kalakani, came to power. Kalakani ruled only for a short time. In November 1929 he was defeated by a nephew of the former king Amanullah, who in turn became King Nadir Khan. Nadir Khan was militarily supported by Pashtun tribes from both sides of the Durand Line to overthrow Habibullah.30 There were benefits in it for the tribes that participated in the overthrow, because in return the tribes would be exempt from paying taxes, they would not have to serve in the army and they got maximum autonomy when they would promise to participate in war when asked to.31 The son of Nadir Khan, Mohammad Nadir Shah ruled Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973. King Nadir Shah appointed his uncles as Prime Minister. In 1953 he appointed a cousin, who was also his brother in law, Mohammed Daoud Khan, as Prime Minister. Daoud’s foreign policy was based on warmer relations with the Soviet Union and less attention to the relation with Pakistan than had been the case in the past. This led to conflict with Pakistan, and Daoud Khan had to resign in 1963. In 1964 King Zahir Shah adopted a new constitution, which introduced a democratic system, where one-third of the deputies were appointed by the king, one-third by the population and one-third by provincial assemblies. 7

The Republic of Afghanistan until 11 September 2001

While King Zahir Shah was abroad for medical treatment in 1973, Daoud Khan plotted a coup d’état. He abolished the monarchy and declared Afghanistan a republic, with himself as president. He abrogated the Constitution. In 1978, Daoud was assassinated and three communist politicians took power, Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and Amin Taha. A year later, Nur Mohammad Taraki was assassinated by Hafizullah Amin, who took over as Prime Minister and changed the political ideology to Leninism-Marxism. Women got more rights, and religious practices like men wearing beards or women wearing a chador were banned. Part of the elite was tortured and killed, though another part of the elite supported Amin. Ethnic minorities were oppressed. The U ­ nited

30 31

Barnet Rubin, Abubakar Siddique. “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate”, in Scott Smith, Moeed Yusuf, Colin Cookman (eds). Getting it Right in Afghanistan, 105–106. Barnet Rubin, Abubakar Siddique. “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate”, in Scott Smith, Moeed Yusuf, Colin Cookman (eds). Getting it Right in Afghanistan, 106.

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States started to fund the Mujaheddin who fought the communists through the Pakistani secret services, the isi. When communists came to power, several political groups went into opposition. The opposition groups consisted of moderate democrats, nationalists and Islamists. The Afghan communist government tried to restructure the social cohesion of the country, and killed many landowners and clan elders. The government wanted a collectivisation of the agrarian sector, which did not work out.32 A civil war started, where many joined the Mujaheddin, financed by involvement in the opium trade.33 This unrest in Afghanistan following the communist changes led to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, it was clear to him that there was no easy solution to the conflict in Afghanistan, and that the Soviet Union could not win this war. From the very beginning Gorbachev prepared a political and military withdrawal. The communist government in Afghanistan was directed towards negotiations with the Mujaheddin, and from 1987 onwards these negotiations prepared for the moment the Soviet army would start its withdrawal.34 Until the withdrawal of the Soviets, following the Geneva accords in 1988, the resistance against the communists found its origins in Kandahar and was tribal.35 The withdrawal of the Soviet troops took place in two phases: the first phase from April until August 1988 and the second phase from November 1988 to February 1989.36 The Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation continued to support president Najibullah until 1992. When external support for the communist government was withdrawn, the government fell. From 1992 onwards, General Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, had influence in the North of Afghanistan. He favoured a change in Afghanistan’s state structure from a unitary state (according to article 1 of the 1987 Constitution of Afghanistan) to a federalist system. He was supported in this idea by the Shia’s.37

32 33 34 35 36 37

R. Braithwaite. Afgantsy. The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–89 (London: Profile Books, 2011), 43–44. Robert D. Crews, Amin Tarzi (Eds). The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 94. Richard Schultz, Jr., Andrea Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 174. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 18. Richard Schultz, Jr., Andrea Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias, 176. Robert D. Crews, Amin Tarzi (Eds). The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan 26, Constitution of Afghanistan from 1987, https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=54783a5f4, (accessed July 31 2019).

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Moderate politicians in the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran worked for a return of the Afghan king and the formation of a Loya Jirga.38 Many moderate Afghans were active in ngos, which supported the refugees, or were active in the refugee camps. This was not without danger, since many of these important and active moderate figures were murdered by extremists.39 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia structurally supported these extremist Mujaheddin groups. The United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Mujaheddin parties on a structural basis. The Mujaheddin were loosely connected opposition groups, consisting of religious fighters who fought as part of a jihad for freedom in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of the Soviets the different groups started to fight each other and in majority joined either the Taliban or the Northern Alliance. Beginning in 1996, the United States supported the Northern Alliance, which was made up of tribes that had fought the Taliban. Many Talib (Talib means student of a madrassa, Taliban is the plural) were and are not Taliban full time. They work for the Taliban, because this group is powerful in the region and joining them is a way to make money. This means that the organisation can easily disappear in the population, and that the Taliban members are active in the region where they live.40 They have a national focus, in which they differ from Al Qaeda, which has an international focus. The fight against lawlessness and corruption is among their aims. The ethnicities represented in the Northern Alliance are comprised of Hazaras, Tajiks (among them Atta Nur), and Uzbeks (among them Dostum).41 Within the Northern Alliance two clans were very important, the Haqqani clan and the Mansur clan. They have, over the years, extended their influence not only in the Northern Alliance, but also within the Taliban.42 The Haqqani network consisted originally of the founder, Jalaluddin Haqqani and his seven sons, some of them already dead. Burhanuddin Rabbani was the political 38 39 40

41 42

A Loya Jirga means in Pashto “Grand Council”. Traditionally clan elders meet in the meeting to discuss important matters concerning the political future of Afghanistan. All ­ethnicities are represented in the Loya Jirga. Robert D. Crews, Amin Tarzi (Eds). The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, 94. Thomas Ruttig. How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report, 04/2010, June 29 2010), 3, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/ uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Richard Schultz, Jr., Andrea Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias, 41. Thomas Ruttig. “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity”, in Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the Taliban, Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 59.

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l­eader of the Northern Alliance, before rising to the position of chairman of the High Peace Council. Regional powers, and especially Pakistan’s intelligence agency, have links with the Taliban and Haqqani networks.43 One of the brothers and present leader in the Haqqani network, Sirajuddin, is second in rang in the Taliban. Other regional powers that have tried to consolidate influence in Afghanistan are China, which is interested in the extraction of natural resources in Afghanistan and Russia and Central Asian states, which are all afraid of a spillover of conflict across their borders. Iran wants to strengthen its position as a regional power, and India and Pakistan consider Afghanistan and its contested border areas important because of their own border conflicts, such as over Kashmir.44 In 1992 most parties that had been in opposition to the communist regime signed a peace and power sharing agreement, the Peshawar Agreement, in which power was divided between the different groups in government. Afghanistan became the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Several forces in the country were supported by regional powers as Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Lawlessness and cruelty were a problem throughout the country. One of the fighting groups was the Taliban under Mullah Omar, which from 1994 onwards tried to stop the lawlessness. 8

Relation between Clan and Taliban

From the beginning of the 1990s, when the Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan, a religious movement of young believers, called the Taliban, gained power swiftly. Their policy was aimed at eradicating anarchy and lawlessness, as well as banning Western influence. The Taliban was supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and managed to come to power in 1996. They declared the Emirate of Afghanistan. During the reign of the Taliban in the 1990s, the army killed many tribal leaders in fata, and those who did not want to cooperate with the Taliban were also killed.45 The organisation of the Taliban has aspects of the traditional tribal militia forces, as they existed in Pashtun society. These Lashkar, as they were called, 43 44 45

Minna Jarvenpaa. “Making Peace in Afghanistan, The Missing Political Strategy”, in Scott Smith, Moeed Yusuf, Colin Cookman (eds.). Getting it Right in Afghanistan, 16. Minna Jarvenpaa. “Making Peace in Afghanistan, The Missing Political Strategy”, in Scott Smith, Moeed Yusuf, Colin Cookman (eds). Getting it Right in Afghanistan, 19. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 238–239.

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could quickly be mobilised. The men participating in the Lashkar were volunteers, they were not paid but shared in the looting. Taliban forces in the 1990s however were not allowed to loot.46 The Taliban are organised along a vertical structure, using a supra-tribal and supra-ethnic Islamic ideology, which sometimes is nationalistic, referring to the Afghan nation. At the same time it is also horizontal, using network-like structures. According to Thomas Ruttig, a specialist on Afghanistan, religious, tribal and regional components overlap in the organisation of the Taliban.47 9

Clans and Warlords

As we saw earlier, it is important to differentiate between clan elders and warlords, although in some cases clan elders may be warlords. Kimberley Marten, a foreign policy analyst and professor of political science, describes how the state apparatus and international interference can change and strengthen this combined activity: warlords cannot exist without support, either from within the state or from outside supporters. In particular, failing or collapsing states that have a history of clientelism and lack a tradition of stable institutions and good governance are prone to encounter warlords. Though in the short term it may be profitable to work together with warlords within state structures, in the long run this is detrimental, because the warlord will use the state apparatus to consolidate his power and wealth, giving way to coercion and corruption. He has no incentive to give up power and income.48 The clans have gained strength in the past decade because the Afghan government in Kabul was willing to recognise the autonomy of areas under the local command structure.49 The security situation in Afghanistan held such challenges, that at first the aim of the international intervention force was to guarantee safety in Kabul, and to fight the Taliban in areas that extended beyond the capital. In order to strengthen security outside of Kabul, recognising 46 47

48 49

Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 100. Thomas Ruttig. How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent movement ­between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report, 04/2010, June 29 2010), 3, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/ uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States (Ithaka and London: Cornell University Press, 2012), 188–190. Astri Suhrke. “Afghanistan, Retribalization of the War”, Journal of Peace Research 27 No. 3, August 1990, 243–244.

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the factual situation where warlords and clan elders held some form of security in their territories was a solution. In casu, it also involved some degree of autonomy for warlords and groups resisting the Taliban. This shows how, in a state in transition towards peace, positive aspects of state building also include negative aspects that may destabilise the state at the same time. The government nevertheless regarded activities in the region with suspicion, since it hampered centralisation of governance in the country. Thomas Ruttig, cofounder of the Afghanistan Analysis Network, states: It seems that the Kabul government perceives tribal self-organisation as a threat rather than a stabilizing factor and prefers a form of patronage that is not inclusive but serves only one side. This neglects the jirga’s inherent principle of mitigating conflicting interests and rather tends to deepen conflicts.50 After the Taliban regime, the communist occupation and other conflicts, many Afghans have more trust in their clan(s) or ethnic group(s) rather than in the government for their security. This is visible in conflict resolution, where 80% of conflicts are solved through traditional systems, often clan systems or local systems, instead of going to court. A considerable part of the support enjoyed by warlords come from their tribe(s) in specific areas. Even part of the Taliban’s success can be traced back to clan affiliations, especially among the Pashtun. Apart from the clan influence, there is also influence by ethnicity and regional affiliation. The challenge of strengthening democracy in Afghanistan is that the power of warlords and clan policy can only be diminished if the state or international organisations present in Afghanistan have an alternative for those in power, in the form of subsidies or a prestigious job in the institutional framework of the state. This has both positive and negative sides, since having different groups represented strengthens democracy, and can consolidate the country. The negative side is that these groups can grasp the opportunity to weaken the state from inside out. The warlord may depend on his clan for support, and vice versa. However, there are also clear differences between a warlord and a clan elder. The warlord 50

Thomas Ruttig. How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report, 04/2010, June 29 2010), 3, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/ uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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gets and keeps influence through the use of force against the population, by inciting fear in the population, whereas the aim of the clan elder is to function as a politician, a judge, and a commander in conflict for his people.51 In Afghanistan warlords are involved in the drug trade and corruption. This power base of the warlord makes it difficult for intervening forces, such as nato and the UN, to break a cycle of adherence to the warlord – due to family and clan ties and fear for the warlord. It is especially in taking away the power of the warlord that the intervening force can win. This has been done until now by removing the warlord from his area, for example by giving him a job in Kabul in the case of Abdel Rashid Dostum, or by fighting the warlord. This has only partly been successful since several warlords were able to keep their power base and acted in pursuit of their own welfare, not that of the country. Some former warlords are in parliament and have even been appointed Minister in order to give them responsibility to rebuild (and unite) the state. However, there are examples where they have used their position as parliamentarian to avoid being brought to justice, since parliamentarians have immunity, and in some instances they have continued to commit human rights violations, committing violence against women in particular. Former Afghan female parliament member Malalai Joya has addressed the impunity of warlords in parliament, and the problems this creates when warlords continue to violate human rights.52 She prefers lifting immunity of warlords, thus cutting them off from their profits and power. As a result of her lobbying, the warlords have put the speaker of parliament under pressure to lift her right to speak in parliament. Since this speech Malalai Joya has survived several attacks on her life.53 Kimberley Marten rightly states that warlords hamper the state building process. The past decade has proven this in Afghanistan. As long as the government is willing to cooperate with warlords, while knowing that they have an economic incentive to maintain the status quo (because this will also consolidate their power) the state will not be strengthened. As long as the funnelling of support from external sources for the Taliban – who get support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia among others – is not cut, as long as the government is not willing or capable to put warlords in jail and disband their support groups, and in addition make sure that their support groups change to supporting the 51 52 53

Antonio Giustozzi. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), p. 19, David Shams. Democracy’s Dilemma. the Challenges to State Legitimacy in Afghanistan (Lulu.com, 2008), 32. Malalai Joya. Een Vrouw tussen Krijgsheren (Breda: De Geus, 2010), 134. David Shams. Democracy’s Dilemma. The Challenges to State Legitimacy in Afghanistan, 13, 32, 39.

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state institutions, there will not be a strong state. Another conclusion that must be drawn in this respect is the fact that the international interveners can worsen the situation by supporting clan elders and turning them into warlords by giving development aid instead of combating them. This does not exclude the moral responsibility of humanitarian intervention to support the population that needs it. 9.1 Clans and Warlords in North and South Afghanistan Warlords are found both in North and South Afghanistan. In the North, one of the powerful warlords was Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was considered a leader of the Uzbek people.54 The Northern Alliance under Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum retained power in the north of Afghanistan. The Taliban held power in over 70% of Afghan territory, the Northern Alliance has held power in the remaining 30%. The power of the Northern Alliance lay in Badakshan, Kapisa, Takhar, parts of Parwan, Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman, Samangan, Kunduz, Ghor, and Bamyan. The Taliban were especially harsh to Shia’s and Hazara’s. 9.2 Clans and Conflict in Greater Kandahar In 1964, two provinces were created out of Greater Kandahar: Uruzgan and Zabul. The political, tribal and economic networks still exist on both sides of the border. Martine van Bijlert, co-Director of the Afghanistan Analyst Network, describes how the clan make-up of Greater Kandahar, including Uruzgan and Zabul, comprises the Durrani Zeerak (Popalzai, Barakzai, Achekzai, Mohammadzai, Alikozai) and the Durrani Panjpai (Noorzai, Ishaqzai, Kakar) and the Ghilzai.55 Tension between the tribes was common. The Popalzai were the most powerful tribe, which was due to the fact that former President, Hamid Karzai, belonged to the tribe. His half-brother Ahmad Wali Karzai and the former governor of Uruzgan, Jan Mohammad, also belong to the Popalzai. In Helmand, the Barakzai and the Alizai tribe are the most influential.56 54 55

56

Scott Baldauf. “Key to governing Afghans: the clans”, Christian Science Monitor June 24 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0624/p01s04-wosc.html#tableTop, (accessed March 2 2008). Martine van Bijlert. The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan, (New America Foundation, September 2010), 4–5, http://www.operationspaix.net/ DATA/DOCUMENT/4566~v~The_Battle_for_Afghanistan__Militancy_and_Conflict_in _Zabul_and_Uruzgan.pdf (accessed May 27 2019). Martine van Bijlert. The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan, 4–5.

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The majority of the population in Zabul belongs to the Ghilzai tribe, and conflict between the tribes is seen, on the one hand, between the Tokhi and the Hotak, and between these two tribes and the rest of the tribes in the area.57 Since the Tokhi form one of the bigger Pashtun groups in the province Zabul, they hold high posts in the local administration. Within the Tokhi there are conflicts between the Nasser and Shomolzai branch over land distribution in the border areas of the Shomolzai district. In Uruzgan, there are many conflicts between clans and ethnicities. Among the tribes are the Hazaras and the Pashtun, who were in conflict in Gizab and Khaz Uruzgan in the 1980s. The Popalzai and the Barakzai are in conflict, and the Zeerak-Panjpai have conflicts with the Durrani-Ghilzai. In addition to these bigger and more long-lasting conflicts, there are also conflicts between commanders who aim for more access to resources or a higher position within the tribe or clan.58 In Zabul, there are only some tribal conflicts between clans of the Ghilzai. Van Bijlert emphasises that although the clan affiliation plays an important role in many provinces, other affiliations are significant as well, such as marriage, having been a classmate and colleague, having fought together, or religious affiliations.59 The sometimes violent conflicts between clans and tribes are a destabilising force for the Afghan national government. On the other hand, the weakness of the Afghan state is signified in the lack of power to suppress these violent conflicts between clans and tribes. In Paktya, the tribes are organised along egalitarian and horizontal lines. In their politics, consensus building is important, and the tribal norms are still observed in everyday life.60 In the 1990s, it was not difficult for the Taliban to build a stronghold there. Thomas Ruttig states: Lacking a consistent supra-tribal leadership, the Loya Paktia tribes were hoping that the Taliban would put an end to the post-1992 political chaos in their region, and also assumed that they would support them in 57 58 59 60

Martine van Bijlert. The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan, 4–5. Ahmad Wali Karzai was killed on July 12, 2011. Martine van Bijlert. The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan, 5. Martine van Bijlert. The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan, 5. Robert D. Crews, Amin Tarzi (Eds). The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 22.

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e­ scaping the influence of the mainly non-Pashtun Norther Alliance that ruled in Kabul.61 The policies of the Taliban created tensions in society, but the period after the fall of the Taliban shows that inter-clan conflicts and conflicts between clans within the same tribe still form a major concern of regional insecurity. In the following paragraphs the intervention and the restructuring of ­Afghanistan are analysed. 10

Intervention by the International Community: nato, UN and Clans after 2001

After the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, for which Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were held responsible, the United States decided to intervene in Afghanistan in order to capture Osama bin Laden. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1386 (2001) in which it authorised the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (isaf), a mission performed by nato to assist the implementation of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the ReEstablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, also known as the Bonn Agreement, agreed upon in December 2001. The intervention deposed the Taliban government for having given support to Al Qaeda by allowing it to reside, train and prepare terrorist attacks on Afghan territory and by having given shelter to Osama bin Laden.62 Troops that formed Operation Enduring Freedom invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001.63 nato’s force, working under the auspices of the UN, had a mixed mandate in Afghanistan. The intervention force performed postconflict reconstruction activities (a peace-building mandate) and was also fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda with heavy weapons (a peace-enforcing mandate).64 This gave mixed signals to the population, who, on the one hand, 61 62 63 64

Thomas Ruttig. “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous ­ ntity”, in Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the Taliban, Insights from the Afghan Field (New E York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 58. United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1386”, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1386, (accessed July 26 2019). Global Security. “Operation Enduring Freedom – Operations”, Global Security http://www .globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom-ops.htm, (accessed October 23 2010). United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1386”, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1386, (accessed July 26 2019).

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saw the peace support troops use violence, as well as underlining that they were there to provide safety. Knowledge of clan relationships plays a vital role in ensuring that peacemaking and peace building activities reduce the violence. International organisations as well as peace workers need to consider and incorporate the influence of clans on local relationships when implementing peace projects.65 The clan can assist the central authorities in the state building process in several ways: help to restore state institutions, fight corruption, establish transparent decision-making processes, and support fair and transparent elections. The clan society can and does play a role in rendering justice at the local and regional level, next to government institutions. How did the international community include the clan in efforts to stabilise and strengthen Afghanistan? In December 2001 several Afghan political leaders and representatives of the international community came together to prepare for an interim authority, which would rule Afghanistan until a Loya Jirga convened to decide on a government and on elections. This Loya Jirga was made up of representatives from different parts of the country, including many clan elders. During this meeting the Bonn Agreement, which was officially called the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the ReEstablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, created an Afghan Interim Administration (aia), which would be the temporary government of Afghanistan.66 The aia made preparations for the organisation of a Loya Jirga (grand council) which was to choose a new Afghan Transitional Administration (ata), presided by president Karzai. The aim of the Afghan Transitional Administration was to prepare free and fair elections and to draft a new constitution. After six months the Afghan Interim Authority was replaced by the Transitional Authority. The rule of law had to be restored to Afghanistan, and the Bonn Agreement envisaged a new legal system that would comprise Islamic law, standards of international public law, and traditional law. The Bonn Agreement also introduced a Supreme Court.67 This conference was followed by a conference in 65 66

67

Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 128. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions”, United Nations Assistance Missions in Afghanistan, http://unama.unmissions.org/ Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf, (accessed October 23 2010). Agreement on Provisional Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan -agree.htm, (accessed July 28 2011).

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The Hague in 2009, which emphasised the commitment of states to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Other commitments were the fight against the drug trade, regional stabilisation – especially a more stable Pakistan – and more military involvement in the International Security Assistance Force (isaf). The mandate of isaf, based on Chapter vii of the UN Charter and operating under UN Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776 and 1833 comprised the following aspects: (1) conduct stability and security operations, (2) assist in the development of Afghan National Security Forces, (3) identify reconstruction needs, (4) support the Afghan government to disarm illegally armed groups, (5) provide support to the Afghan government and internationally-sanctioned counter-narcotics efforts through intelligence-sharing and the conduct of an efficient public information campaign, as well as support the Afghan National Security Forces (comprising the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police) conducting counter-narcotics operations, (6) support humanitarian assistance operations.68 The goals of the mission were to restore security first to the capital Kabul and later to other parts of the country, and to fight Al Qaeda. The challenges that the mission encountered included rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, curbing the influence of clans, which had broadened, and resisting entrenched warlords.69 11

Clan Society and State Building

When speaking about clan society and state building in Afghanistan, the Pashtun are dominant, having been the dominant ruling group in Afghanistan during the past three centuries. However, aspects of a clan society are seen with the Hazaras as well, and the traditional legal system of the different peoples in Afghanistan without a clan structure have a similar emphasis on reconciliation 68

69

International Security Assistance Force, “isaf Mandate”, nato, http://www.nato.int/isaf/ topics/mandate/index.html, (accessed July 28 2011). The legal basis is Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001, International Security Assistance Force, “isaf Chronology Table”, nato, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/chronology/index.html, (accessed July 30 2019) International Security Assistance Force, “isaf Mandate”, nato, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html, (accessed July 28 2011). An example is the leader of the Northern Alliance, Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was nominated Afghan army chief command. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. “Afghanistan: ­Kabul Siege Underscores Warlord Threats to Rule of Law”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty February 3 2008, http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/02/86f04501-3930-4d2a-9cc2 -eba34a4de5f4.html, (accessed February 12 2008).

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and mediation in conflicts. Restoration of the relation for the longer term is prevalent. This is necessary to avoid bloodshed as a result of blood feuds. Another important aspect is that the international intervention in Afghanistan had several aspects: on the one hand, it aimed at intervention with a light footprint, which means that the initiative in the reconstruction process was not taken away by the international community, but rested with the Afghans. On the other hand, the intervention aimed at reconstructing security in Afghanistan. To judge what would guarantee a safe state, Western principles concerning state building and democracy were used. Moreover, the clan was taken into consideration when dealing with people on the ground by the intervening military, but the knowledge of clan societies was not in each national group participating in the intervention equally present. In the following paragraphs, the relation between the clan, the state and ethnicities is analysed. Topics discussed are the Taliban and the effects of corruption, how state reconstruction has taken place, including transitional and traditional means of rendering justice. Finally, there are ongoing challenges in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, notably in the North West Frontier Province and along the Durand Line. 12

State Building after the Fall of the Taliban

After the fall of the Taliban, the international community took the decision to appoint Tajiks, specifically Panjshiris, and persons of the Northern Alliance at key ministries. The choice for Tajiks on key ministries was taken because they controlled at the time the security in the capital Kabul.70 Karzai was nominated president, a clan chief of the Polpalzai-Durrani Pashtuns. A question was whether the Afghan king should return, and whether Afghanistan would be a kingdom. The United States supported the position that Afghanistan would remain a republic. The nomination of Zaher Sha, the former king, was withdrawn only one day before the Loya Jirga began. With the experiences of post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Kosovo in mind, where the international community took over considerable parts of the administration, it was decided that in the case of Afghanistan the reconstruction process would be done differently. The light footprint approach would be used, giving Afghan politicians as much influence in the state building process as possible, in an effort to try to guarantee the cooperation of the 70

Thomas H. Johnson. “Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building ­after war”, Central Asian Survey (March–June 2006) 25 No. 1–2, 2–3.

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Afghan population in this hard and lengthy process.71 The Americans in this case broke with their policy in the 1990s on the Balkans where part of the administration was temporarily taken over by the intervening forces, and the Bush administration did not aim at nation building, as President George Bush stated in 2000. However, the states and organisations delivering support to Afghanistan were forced into nation building in 2001, due to the amount of work that had to be done to strengthen the state. .

13

State Reconstruction Accomplishments

Since 2001, there have been internationally monitored elections, support with the preparation of the elections, good offices and help in reconciliation processes, concentrated efforts to strengthen the legislature, programs to disarm and demobilise former fighters, many children have been able to return to school, and women have had the opportunity to regain a position in politics and society. International intergovernmental organisations like unama have been important in Afghanistan, but international non-governmental organisations like usaid and the International Crisis Group have also been active.72 On a bilateral level many states have given development support to Afghanistan. Physical as well as social infrastructure in many areas of the country needs to be improved. The post-conflict reconstruction efforts concentrate in the first place on realising a secure environment for the population. Secondly, in order to strengthen state institutions, these have to be transparent, accountable and effective. It is important that in order to realise this, there needs to be a strong political leadership and continued presence and financing of the international community.73 This will be difficult to reconcile this with existing patronage systems in several parts of the country where clans are dominant political actors.

71 72

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The light footprint approach is dealt with in greater detail in Michael Ignatieff. Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003). United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, http://unama.unmissions.org, usaid, Afghanistan, https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan (accessed July 30 2019), International Crisis Group, Afghanistan, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan (accessed July 30 2019). Sarah Lister and Hamish Nixon. “The Province in Subnational Governance”, in Building a new Afghanistan ed. Robert Rotberg (ed.). (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 208.

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The Role of Clans after 2001

In present day politics, clans play both a formal and informal role. On an informal level the clans are represented both at the village level and on a higher administrative level. Each village selects its own clan elders and chiefs, who, in turn, select and support representatives of their tribe for the government in Kabul. Along the formal lines, selection takes place through the Provincial Shura. The challenge for nato, the UN and the United States is to work with the clans, since they have taken over duties from the central government. The registration of births and deaths is in some places performed by the clan elder. Many politicians get their power from their tribe, and are therefore popular in specific areas of the country. Since the representation in the Wolesi Jirga, the House of the People, comparable to the lower house, is based on representation of constituencies and provinces, there is a clear link between the chosen delegate and his or her area of origin.74 One has to realize that the link between state and clan elder can be weak, because the loyalty of the clan elder does not necessarily lie with the state, but rather with the village or tribe. This does not strengthen the state building process, although on paper it looks as if the old structures are incorporated into the new ones. There may even be a conflict of goals between the state that tries to exercise its authority, and local leaders who have the power and can decide how much authority the state will get. This strengthens the authority and power of the local leaders rather than strengthening the state. 15

Khyber Pastunkhwa and Clan Society

The violent conflict in Afghanistan is not only caused by differences between internal groups. The external frontiers with Pakistan, such as the frontier with Khyber Pastunkhwa (until 2010 called the North West Frontier Province) are disputed, and offer opportunity for Pakistani fighters (sometimes of the same clan and ethnicity as the adjacent area in Afghanistan) to infiltrate Afghanistan.75 This leads to regional instability. Iran, which has a border with 74 75

Decree of the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan on the Adoption of Electoral Law, Chapter vi, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ APCITY/UNPAN018178.pdf, (accessed 20 May 2011). The Wolesi Jirga is the Lower House. On the dispute concerning the status of the Durand Line and the frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan, see American Institute of Afghanistan Studies with the Hollings Center for International Dialogue, Thomas Barfield. “The Durand Line: History,

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Afghanistan, is interested in the political process of the state, since Iran wants to profile itself as a regional power. Pakistan has put forward a plan to place fences along the border with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is opposed to the measure, arguing this would result in a de facto delimitation of the border. The problem for both Pakistan and Afghanistan remains that insurgents cross the border to fight in Afghanistan. One of the problems that the US government has signalled in this area is the fact that according to clan custom, nomadic tribes give hospitality to those who ask for it. This may result in a situation where the nomadic tribes give hospitality to insurgents out of custom. It is of the utmost importance that representatives of the different ethnicities, religions and clans are represented in central politics as well as in lower politics, in order to pacify the different groups. As Howard T. Johnson, a specialist on Afghanistan, has stated: Questions of ethnicity are critical in assessing the implications of the Loya Jirgas to future Afghan political and social stability. Past attempts at modern state formation in Afghanistan that have directly challenged the local tribal and religious structures of society have resulted in ethnic backlash and state failure.76 J. Alexander Thier, a specialist on state building in Afghanistan, has argued that there is a danger in the fact that the money made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan is considerably less than in other areas: Progress on reconstruction was also hindered by insecurity, slow delivery on donor pledges, lack of capacity within the government, and an overall insufficiency of resources. The US$5 billion over five years pledged for Afghanistan’s reconstruction in Tokyo in January 2002 provided Afghans with only one-eighth of the funding Bosnians received on a per capita annual basis between 1996 and 1999.77

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­ onsequences, and Future”, The American Institute of Afghan Studies/The Hollings CenC ter, November 2007, http://www.bu.edu/aias/reports/durand_conference.pdf, (accessed March 3 2008). Thomas H. Johnson. “Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war”, 5–6. J. Alexander Thier. “The Politics of Peace Building”, in Antonio Donini, Nora Niland, Karin Wermesterm (ed.). Nation Building Unraveled? Aid Peace and Justice in Afghanistan (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2004), 41.

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Only when financial support is guaranteed over a longer period of time can we expect the transition process towards democracy to be consistent and more prone to success. When a state has a clan-structure, it is even more important to guarantee that donor-support is given over a prolonged period of time, because one may expect a more complex and therefore lengthy process to transfer power from the clan to the state. 16

Position of the New Taliban in Afghanistan

The years after 2001 saw the (re)strengthening of the Taliban. There are several reasons for the resurgence of the Taliban. They can rely on more foreign fighters, notably suicide bombers, a tactic which is alien to Afghan culture. There is outside support for the Taliban. They can take refuge in Pakistan, also because the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not efficiently guarded. The Taliban have better tactics and they have more revenues with the increased income from narcotics production and trafficking. As they used to do in the past, when they were in power in Afghanistan, the Taliban attack rural education projects and health services, and control certain roads, denying Afghan, nato and US led Operation Enduring Freedom security forces the ability to sufficiently project power.78 The new Taliban has, since 2001, been characterised as more international, belonging to a global jihadist movement with foreign jihadist fighters. This has led to more foreign support, and has made the fighters more flexible with regards to the use of modern technology in their fight.79 Regional leaders often got their power based on their support for president Karzai. After acquiring power they were often corrupt, and the strife for regional power sometimes left room for the Taliban to (re) emerge.80 Antonio Giustozzi, a specialist on Afghanistan, describes how the Taliban are winning ground, and how the Taliban should not be regarded as similar to clan society or rural society:

78 79 80

Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, in Robert Rotberg (ed.). State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 11. Antonio Giustozzi. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop. The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 13–14. Antonio Giustozzi. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop. The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 17.

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It is tempting to see the Taliban as an expression of rural-urban conflict in Afghanistan, but it is important to stress that they were the expression of a specific rural culture, that of village mullahs, and stood in opposition to the tribal code of Pashtunwali, often ruling against its application.81 The insurgency in Afghanistan is made up of seven groups, of which four together form the Taliban. Thomas Ruttig, describes them: The core of the insurgency is the Taleban movement, with its ‘Kandahari’ mainstream and associated, semi-autonomous networks, those based on the Haqqani and Mansur families and the Tora Bora front in eastern Afghanistan based on remnants of Hezb-e-Islami (Khales). Those four segmented components form the Islamic Movement of the Taleban.82 The other groups making up the insurgents are the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and small Salafi groups active in Eastern Afghanistan. The last group consists of Mujaheddin groups who feel abandoned by the peace process, which started in 2001.83 17

Relations between Clans and Ethnicities

While the clan has gained importance in those areas of Afghanistan where people live, the cruelty and massive scale of the fighting and the trauma this has brought to many families and communities has disrupted the social balance and traditional values of Afghan society. Young men, especially those who have been raised and educated in madrassas in Pakistan, do not always respect and obey their parents and their elders, which is the custom in clan society.

81 82

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Antonio Giustozzi. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop. The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 12–13. Thomas Ruttig. The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and Approaches to ‘Talks’, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2009), 1, http://www.afghanistananalysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/200907-AAN-Report-Ruttig-TheOther-Side.pdf (accessed May 28, 2019). Thomas Ruttig. The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and Approaches to ‘Talks’, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2009), 1–2, http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/200907-AAN-Report-Ruttig -The-Other-Side.pdf (accessed May 28, 2019).

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The Pashtun tribes have held difficult relations with the Hazaras, who also have clans.84 17.1 Position of Hazara’s The Hazaras are ethnically of Mongol-Turkic descent. They are in majority Shia.85 The most important clans among the Hazaras are the Daikundi, Daizangi, Polada, Jaghori, Uruzgani, Dahla, Dai Khitai, and Dai Chopan.86 In the late 18th century king Ahmad Shah Durrani ethnically cleansed many Hazaras from the southwest of Afghanistan. Hazarajat lost its autonomy under British rule and became part of the Afghan kingdom in 1893 when it was occupied by the army of king Abd al-Rahman.87 Hazarajat was divided into three provinces: Kabul, Bamiyan, and Kandahar. This was part of a divide and rule policy. In the last decade of the 19th century Amir Abdul Rahman Khan followed a policy of ethnic cleansing of Hazaras.88 They were replaced by Pashtuns who migrated to the area. In the 20th century under Nadir Shah Pashtun culture was advocated in the Hazara populated areas, to the detriment of Hazara culture. Nadir was in 1939 killed by a Hazara who wanted to change the discrimination against the Hazaras.89 In 1979 there was a rebellion of Hazaras against the authorities on the local level. The Hazaras created local self-rule. However, very soon conflicts between the Hazaras started, which undermined their unity. They did not get much international support for this, which is understandable, since this would have meant an interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Under Soviet rule the Hazaras also rose up against the authorities.90 The Afghan authorities tried to subjugate the Hazaras by fighting 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

William Charles Brice (ed.). “Hazāras” An Historical Atlas of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 367, Hafizullah Emadi. “The Hazaras and their Role in the Process of Political Transformation in Afghanistan”, Central Asian Survey (1997, 16 No. 3), 364. Grant Farr. “The Hazara of Central Afghanistan”, in Barbara Brower, Barbara Rose Johnson (Eds), Disappearing Peoples? Indigenous Groups and Ethnic Minorities in South and Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 2016) 157–158. Hafizullah Emadi. “The Hazaras and their Role in the Process of Political Transformation in Afghanistan”, 367. Sayed Askar Mousavi. The Hazaras of Afghanistan. An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 111–138. Hafizullah Emadi. “The Hazaras and their Role in the Process of Political Transformation in Afghanistan”, 369. Hafizullah Emadi. “The Hazaras and their Role in the Process of Political Transformation in Afghanistan”, 376. Kristian Berg Harpviken. “Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan”, Journal of Peace Research (1997, 34 No. 3), 278.

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them mercilessly in 1994 and 1995.91 In 1995 troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance, slaughtered Hazaras in Kabul. In retaliation, mass killings of Taliban members by Hazaras occurred in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997. This was followed in 1998 by a retaliation of the Taliban on Hazaras and Uzbeks.92 18

State Building, Ethnicity and the Clan

The longstanding conflict in Afghanistan has led to a more regional view by many Afghans, instead of a feeling of belonging to one state. This regional view developed due to the problems in getting access to facilities organised on a national level, and the knowledge that, in the end, there might not be help from the national institutions. Therefore, many people were dependent on regional and tribal solutions to political, social and economic problems. This will make it more complicated to re-unite the country. Ahmed Rashid mentions that people feel more Kandahari or Pansjiri than Afghan, Pashtun or Tajik. The problems faced to unite the different groups in Afghanistan are huge. Rashid states: “Fragmentation is both vertical and horizontal and cuts across ethnicity to encompass a single valley or town”.93 In the case of the Pashtuns, the warfare has resulted in loss of grazing grounds for livestock and common tribal property. The traditional tribal leaders who mediated disputes are in exile or have been killed. Although there are new tribal leaders, this adds to the fear that Afghanistan might become more fragmented. Traditional social and political values have been weakened. The younger generations sometimes question the authority of the elders.94 The danger of spill over to the region, and further destabilisation of this region is constant.95

91 92 93 94

95

Hafizullah Emadi. “The Hazaras and their Role in the Process of Political Transformation in Afghanistan”, 381, Sayed Askar Mousavi. The Hazaras of Afghanistan. An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study, 189–202. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 83. Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 208. Thomas Ruttig. How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic ­Report, 04/2010, June 29 2010), 3, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 208.

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The policy of bribes, corruption and clientelism is a problem in governance on a national, regional and local level.96 19

Drug Trafficking and Corruption

During the reign of the Taliban, from 1996 to 2001, growing and trafficking opium was forbidden. This led to a considerable drop in the amount of drug trafficking from Afghanistan. However, notwithstanding eradication programs financed by donor countries, since 2001, there has been a rise in the trafficking of drugs, which is coordinated by warlords, where, according to Gretchen Peters, a specialist on terrorism and transnational crime, the distinction between criminal and terrorist is often blurred.97 The main problem is that warlords and tribal chiefs who are involved in drug trafficking are represented in the administration on different levels, which makes legal action against them more difficult.98 The scope to which warlords are represented in organs of central politics is surprising: warlords, including former Taliban officials who had been ousted from government, made up half of the house’s members.99 As long as warlords get their finances from outside of Afghanistan, as long as the trade in opium is enough to keep the warlords powerful, and corruption and patronage cannot be minimised, the central government will remain weak. Ahmed Rashid concludes that in order for Afghanistan to rebuild, the financing of warlords with money and weapons has to be stopped: A possible solution might lie in a process which would have to begin from outside Afghanistan. All the regional states would first have to agree to an arms embargo on Afghanistan, implement it sincerely and allow it to be monitored by the UN effectively. The regional states would have to accept

96 97 98 99

Scott Baldauf. “Key to governing Afghans: the clans” Christian Science Monitor June 24 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0624/p01s04-wosc.html#tableTop, (accessed March 2 2008). Gretchen Peters. Seeds of Terror, How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War (New York: Picador, 2009), 11. Gretchen Peters. Seeds of Terror, How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War, 215. David Shams. Democracy’s Dilemma. the Challenges to State Legitimacy in Afghanistan, p. 39.

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limited areas of influence in Afghanistan rather than continuing to push for their proxies to rule the entire country.100 Rashid considers an Iran-Pakistan dialogue essential to guarantee the rights of a Shia minority.101 “Afghanistan’s biggest problem isn’t drugs”, said Doug Wankal, a former dea agent who later ran the Counternarcotics Task Force at the US Embassy in Kabul. “It’s corruption”.102 Part of the corruption is the support that clan members give each other as part of the patronage and clientelist system that goes with a clan society. Rivalry between clans also leads to a certain power structure. Gretchen Peters noticed during her research in Afghanistan that members of the clan of Hamid Karzai were less affected by eradication programs, and persons of rivalling clans had more problems with insurgent groups.103 State building in the case of Afghanistan, with its fluid borders with neighbouring Pakistan, also means the strengthening of the power and possibilities of border guards in order to combat trafficking. When the border is effectively protected, and the region is capable of countering trade in narcotics, it is easier to have efficient programs to diminish the trade in opium.104 Many of the fighting groups in Afghanistan are involved in trafficking. They use the proceeds from trafficking to maintain their fighting capabilities. Narcotics are the principle item that is trafficked, although there is also considerable human trafficking. In addition to trafficking, individuals and criminal groups extort money from aid organisations, development groups and individuals.105 According to Gretchen Peters, an effective strategy against drug trafficking should combine nine pillars, which should involve regional peace, free trade, effective governance, respect and implementation of the rule of law, a strategy on counter insurgency, blended intelligence, effective law enforcement, military capability to fight the drug trade, a network to support farmers, and an 100 Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 214. 101 Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 214. 102 Gretchen Peters. Seeds of Terror, How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War, 215. 103 Gretchen Peters. Seeds of Terror, How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War, 124. 104 Gretchen Peters. Seeds of Terror, How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War, 226. 105 Gretchen Peters. Seeds of Terror, How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War, 10–11.

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alternative livelihood program, to support those farmers who decide to stop growing poppies. The strategy of former US President George Bush to support eradication programs, ought to have been used only, according to Peters, when other efforts had failed.106 20

The New Constitution

The Constitution of 1964, which was adopted while Afghanistan was still a monarchy, was reinstalled in 2001. At the time, the 1964 Constitution was more acceptable for the US than the constitution that had been drafted under Soviet occupation in 1987, even though the state had changed from a monarchy – as was the case in 1964 – to a republic in 2001. A Constitutional Committee was formed to draft a new constitution. It was decided that within 18 months after signing the Bonn Agreement a Loya Jirga had to be convened. This Loya Jirga adopted the draft constitution in 2003, and on January 4, 2004 the new constitution went into force.107 Since the clan elders largely agreed upon the content of the new constitution, there was greater popular acceptance of it. The Afghan state has a strong presidential system, in which the President is both Head of State and Head of Government. The President can serve two terms of five years. The constitution has created a bicameral structure and Afghanistan has a Supreme Court. The Wolesi Jirga (Lower House or House of People) prepares and promulgates laws, including the ratification of treaties and the Wolesi Jirga approves the budget. It is made up of a combination of directly chosen candidates of the constituencies (at least two per constituency) and directly chosen candidates of the Province.108 At least two female candidates should be elected from each province.109 The Meshrano Jirga (Upper House or House of Elders) is made up of appointed and elected members. 106 Gretchen Peters. Seeds of Terror, How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War, 225. 107 Adam Bennett (ed.). Reconstructing Afghanistan (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2005, 1), International Security Assistance Force. “isaf Chronology Table”, nato, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/chronology/index.html, (accessed February 12 2008). 108 Decree of the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan on the Adoption of Electoral Law, article 19, article 22 and 23, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/ public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN018178.pdf, (accessed May 20 2011). 109 Constitution of Afghanistan, article 83, http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current _constitution.html#chapterone, (accessed 20 May 2011).

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One-third of its members is elected by the district councils, one-third is elected by the provincial councils, and one-third is appointed by the president.110 Of these appointed delegates, 50% have to be female.111 Its task comprises the approval of laws that have been adopted by the Wolesi Jirga, and approval of the budget.112 21

Rule of Law in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, there is a mix of Sharia law, common law, and customary law, practiced on a lower level by clan elders, especially in the more traditional Pashtun populated areas in the south of Afghanistan. Traditional customary law is still especially strong in domestic matters.113 In practice, traditional law is often used, and courts refer cases to traditional courts, consisting of Mullahs or clan elders. The law practiced depends on the people. Every province or area and sometimes every ethnicity has its own laws.114 The Pashtuns have developed plans to re-establish (inner) tribal solidarity.115 Thomas Ruttig offers some examples: as early as 2003 the Mangal Central Shura in the Southeastern region of Afghanistan implemented a decision that banned poppy growing on the tribe’s territory that stretches over a number of districts in two provinces, Paktia and Khost. This was completely ignored by Kabul and external donors, including the UK (then the lead country for drug control). 110 Decree of the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan on the Adoption of Electoral Law, article 24, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ APCITY/UNPAN018178.pdf, (accessed May 20 2011). 111 Constitution of Afghanistan, article 28, http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current _constitution.html#chapterone, (accessed May 20 2011). 112 Thomas H. Johnson. “Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war”, Central Asian Survey (25 No. 1–2, 2006), 9–10. 113 Robert Rotberg. “Failed States, Collapsed States and Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, in Robert Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 4–5. 114 International Legal Foundation. The Customary Laws of Afghanistan, (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 2004), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ilf_customary_law_ afghanistan.pdf (accessed May 28, 2019). 115 Thomas Ruttig. How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report, 04/2010, June 29 2010), 3, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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[…] Later, the Mangal committed themselves to defend their territory against the Taleban by a traditional Pashtun pact (tarun). The Mangal also played a prominent part in the Tribal Solidarity Council which brought together Paktia and Khost’s major tribes in 2003/4, an initiative that was met with the same ignorant response from Kabul.116

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Traditional Conflict Resolution

The International Legal Foundation has done research into the use of different legal systems in Afghanistan, and has found that traditional tribal justice is accepted by the central authorities in addition, and often as a replacement, of the national legal system and positive law.117 Thomas Ruttig found that the majority of conflicts in Afghanistan are settled by village elders through a jirga or shura, or by district governors, clerics or police chiefs.118 According to Ruttig’s information, more than 80% of conflicts are resolved in this way. The reason to opt for a local, traditional jirga or shura is because they are perceived to be “more accessible, more efficient (in terms of time and money), perceived as less corrupt, and more trusted by Afghans compared to formal state courts”.119 Women, for example, may have a problem having to travel accompanied to a city to attend a court hearing, while they can also opt to stay in their community and ask for justice. Another conclusion from the report of the International Legal Foundation is that if we compare the traditional law of the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan, there is not much difference in their resolution of conflicts, where reconciliation is preferred over simple punishment, and the punishment for certain crimes is comparable. 116 Thomas Ruttig. How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent movement ­between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report, 04/2010, June 29 2010), 3, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/ uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019). 117 The International Legal Foundation. The Customary Laws of Afghanistan, ilf_customary _law_afghanistan.pdf, (September 2004), (accessed April 24 2011). 118 A jirga is a council, a shura is the name for a parliament. 119 Thomas Ruttig. How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s Largest Insurgent movement ­between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report, 04/2010, June 29 2010), 3, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/ uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf, (accessed July 26 2019).

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Transitional Justice

Transitional justice is an important step towards reconciliation and overcoming war trauma. The aim of bringing perpetrators of serious crimes against humanity to justice is however not always easy. The perpetrators have an influential network, power, and try to escape unpunished. In the case of Afghanistan, part of the dilemmas that state builders face is what to do with former warlords and former Taliban fighters. Bringing them to justice has not in all cases had the intended outcome, namely the termination of their activities and influence as well as satisfaction for their victims. The effectiveness of bringing warlords to justice also depends on the power of the clan of the warlord or Taliban fighter, and their remaining influence in their area of origin. Like in any state where a conflict has severely damaged the state and the infrastructure, in some cases those who have been in power and perpetrated the law are needed to rebuild the country because of their network and ability to govern.120 Another aspect concerning transitional justice is that, during a state’s reconstruction process, the weakness of the state’s institutions and its levels of corruption give room for former warlords or Taliban fighters to remain unpunished. If the decision is taken to incorporate the warlords or Taliban members in the administration as part of the reconstruction process, the question remains how to incorporate these men in the administration. Since they are not always in favour of the new regime, they might still have other political agendas and, in the worst case, they might hamper the reconstruction process from within. Warlords in parliament have parliamentary immunity and cannot be prosecuted. Kimberley Marten states with regard to the dangers of keeping relations between the state and the warlord: In both fata and Chechnya, warlords gained a fair amount of legal control over security provision on their territories. In the fata this was institutionalized in Pakistan’s constitution: Pakistani security forces lacked the legal right to enter the fata except in extraordinary circumstances. That meant that Pakistani intelligence about the fata was limited and could be manipulated by the political agents and official maliks, or by the

120 Joris Voorhoeve. From War to the Rule of Law, Peace Building After Violent Conflict (­Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 93.

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state-supported Islamist militants who supplanted them. In Chechnya this was institutionalized by a series of presidential decrees that gave the kadyrovtsy more and more control over the regional interior ministry forces, internal intelligence, and counterterrorism efforts, even though the province on paper remained subordinate to Russian law.121 Marten concludes that warlords cannot be regarded as state builders, since they usurp part of the state’s sovereignty. It becomes even more complex when the warlord is financed by an external (foreign) power.122 Transitional justice can take several forms. Apart from justice through a court, there is a possibility to set up truth and reconciliation courts, as was done in South Africa and has been suggested at the Peace Jirga in 2010.123 Another possibility is to refer cases to traditional courts, where reconciliation and truth finding is central to restoring the feeling of justice and making sure that parties have a possibility to continue living in the same village or area, or in the same family. Most of the common cases are referred to traditional courts, where clan elders, mullahs or local administrators render justice. Notwithstanding differences in ethnicity and structure of society in clan and non-clan-based groups, the ethnic, or local, legal systems show a great overlap.124 This means that the legal landscape in Afghanistan is made up of three different legal systems: (1) the traditional, regional, or ethnic legal system, (2) the use of Sharia law by the Taliban and (3) the state legal system. Where the state legal system is not sufficiently trusted by the population, or not sufficiently able to enforce the law in a fair way (independent judiciary, access to legal support), the population uses other forms of law enforcement. Here, as with the relation between the clan and the state, when the state gets stronger, it has to find ways to incorporate or eradicate the other legal systems.

121 Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States (Ithaka and London: Cornell University Press, 2012), 194. 122 Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States, 200. 123 Robert D. Lamb, Mehlaqa Samdani, Justine Fleischner. Afghanistan’s National Consultative Peace Jirga, Centre For Strategic and International Studies, (May 27, 2010), http://csis .org/publication/afghanistans-national-consultative-peace-jirga-0, (accessed April 22 2013). 124 International Legal Foundation. The Customary Laws of Afghanistan, September 2004, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ilf_customary_law_afghanistan.pdf, (­accessed July 26 2019).

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Strength of Afghanistan and Clan-Society?

In 2010 an international conference on Afghanistan took place in London. The aim was to see how isaf could pass responsibilities to the Afghani army, and whether Taliban members would publicly denounce the use of violence. One of the assumptions was that Afghanistan would be under the control of the Afghani army within five years. Taliban leaders would be asked to the negotiation table for peace negotiations. A national council for peace, reconciliation and reintegration was to be set up. The council would be funded in order to make it possible for fighters to leave the Taliban. Following this meeting, in May and June 2010 a peace Loya Jirga was organised by President Hamid Karzai. The outcome of the Loya Jirga, which had a consultative status, was that some members were in favour of including Taliban and Islamists in negotiations.125 In 2011, a second conference was organised in Bonn as a marker of 10 years of involvement of the international community in Afghanistan. In the final document a commitment was formulated to continue support for the reconstruction and strengthening of Afghanistan after security had been transferred to the Afghan authorities. 25

Influence of United States and the Soviet Invasion on the Afghan State

Afghanistan has experienced violent conflict for over 35 years. Apart from regional actors, major world actors have been involved in these conflicts. The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan did not create a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. The US led intervention that began in 2001 has not resulted in a stable state. The Soviet Union and later the International Security Assistance Force (isaf) had difficulty controlling the mountainous area where tribal allegiance is still strong. Moreover, nomads cross the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where border control is inefficient. In comparing the two interventions, Martin Kipping, a German diplomat who has been stationed in Afghanistan, draws four general conclusions with regard to interventions: Before an intervention, a state building strategy should be designed, and sufficient resources should be made available to acquire a 125 “Karzai Says He has Always Favoured Peace Talks with the Taliban”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, January 29, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Karzai_Says_He_Has_Always _Favored_Peace_Talks_With_Taliban/1943664.html, (accessed July 28 2011).

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minimum number of conditions for success. The most basic of all is territorial control.126 A second argument made by Kipping is the lack of fiscal sustainability. As long as the state is not sufficiently reconstructed, and fiscal sustainability has been reached, donors need to continue to give support. Capacity and institution building should only be performed in areas that are ready for it. This can create areas where state building is taking place, and areas out of control of the central authorities. According to Kipping it is a waste of time to invest in areas that are not yet, or are no longer, ready for state building. Instead of using all energy to counter “spoilers” in the local process, Kipping considers it more important to strengthen local supporters, in order to marginalise the spoilers.127 This conclusion has some overlap with the ideas of Ahmed Rashid on reconstruction of the Afghan state. Rashid considers allowing for a weak central government for an initial period, with a high degree of autonomy in the regions controlled by factions. Furthermore he proposes that Kabul be demilitarised. The aim of all factions should be to build a strong central government in the longer term, and maintain their autonomy in the shorter term.128 A factor that has to be taken into account when looking at the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s is the role the Soviet Union and the US have played in their fight for influence in the region. They have not taken any action against human rights violations by the Mujaheddin and the Northern Alliance, which fought together with the US forces.129 This influenced the support the Taliban could get from the population in those areas. 26

Conclusion: State Building and the Clan in Afghanistan

One significant challenge to the reconstruction of Afghanistan is that rebuilding a state is both time consuming and a big financial commitment. The amount of time and resources required are often substantial and require longterm commitments from donor countries and international ­intergovernmental 126 Martin Kipping. Two Interventions, Comparing the Soviet and US-led state-building in ­Afghanistan, (Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 2010), 2, https://www.afghanistan -analysts.org/publication/aan-papers/two-interventions-comparing-soviet-and-us-led -state-building-in-afghanistan/Weber, (accessed May 23 2011). 127 Martin Kipping. Two Interventions, Comparing the Soviet and US-led state-building in Afghanistan. 128 Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, 214. 129 Robert D. Crews, Amin Tarzi (Eds). The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, 51.

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organisations, which have a tendency to favour quick fixes. Democratisation processes are lengthy and in order to show enduring success may easily take more than a decade. This is one of the reasons that a reduction in violence, prosperity and the broader process of stabilisation are all developing more slowly than may have been hoped for. It is useful to take the lessons from the past to adjust the policies of the international community in Afghanistan where necessary. Using a light footprint approach empowers the Afghans to construct appropriate institutions that will be accepted by the population. Having knowledge of, and respect for, the traditional cultures in Afghanistan, may be successful in strengthening security in the area and helping to create a functioning state. This does not mean that modern aspects of the nation-state such as transparency, accountability and respect for the rule of law should be abandoned. The whole modern process of transition towards democracy should be aimed at, keeping in mind the obstacles which the Afghans may encounter, given their culture and expectations of the country and the region, which is so different from Western Europe. There are dilemmas that cannot be solved. One of these dilemmas is the use of traditional law. Even though the rights for women are not as well protected in traditional law as they are in positive law, the reality is that for the time ­being the traditional law is within reach of the women, while the positive law through a court of justice sometimes is not. Another dilemma is how to work with clans. The positive aspects are that by working with them, the traditional infrastructure can be used in state building. The negative aspect is that, to some degree, corruption, nepotism and regional clan conflicts are adopted in the state structure. There is no solution for this, and one may ask whether it is not more realistic to fight corruption and nepotism, but live with the certainty that these will not disappear altogether in a clan-based society.

Chapter 8

Clans in Iraq Similar to Afghanistan, Albania and Chechnya, Iraq has a clan-based society. This chapter aims to explain the position of clans and tribes in Iraqi society and politics, and how this has shaped the Iraqi state. An overview of the clan society and its historical development will be presented, followed by an explanation of the choices made in state building since 2003 in Iraq and the role the clan plays in the current society and politics. The term “clan” is different from the term “tribe” in this chapter. A tribe is made up of a group of clans. 1

The Ethnic Composition of Iraq Society

Around 97% of the population in Iraq is Muslim, with 65% Shia and 35% ­Sunni. The majority of the population, 75–80%, is Arab, while 15% is Kurdish, and the remaining percentage is divided amongst Turkmen, Assyrians and Chechens. The two official languages in Iraq are Arabic and Kurdish, while Syriac (the language spoken by the Assyrians) and Turkmen are recognised as regional languages. Article 4 of the 2005 Constitution states: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac/Assyrian, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions. 2

Structure of Clans in Iraq

Clans in Iraq share a common family past, a common history, their own geographical sphere of influence, and their own code of conduct, including adherence to a set of legal norms. Since the tribes are older than the religion in Iraq, they may consist of groups, which adhere to either the Sunni or Shia religions.1 1 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (accessed May 1 2011).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_011

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The leader of a clan is called a sheikh, indicating that someone is a revered elder. The clans are more influential in the rural areas than in the cities. All male offspring who share the same great-great grandfather, that is five generations, form the greater extended family with their wives and children, the kham.2 In a case of a blood feud the members of the kham to which the victim belongs can avenge someone from the kham of the murderer. An alternative is that a blood price, compensation, is paid. Women who marry go from the clan of their father to the clan of their husband. Because this means that the clan of the father will no longer benefit from the woman or her children, many women marry within the clan with cousins. The structure of the clan society is described as follows: A biet, or “house”, is similar to a khams. It can resemble a single, vast extended family with hundreds of members. A number of “houses” form a clan, or fakhdh. A group of clans forms an ‘ashira’, or tribal organization. [..] A group of tribes forms a confederation, or qabila, which consists of a number of tribes. In Saddam’s case, his Al-bu Nasir tribe was part of a federation named after the town, al-Tikriti.3 Hosham Dawood, a specialist on Iraq and the Kurds, describes how the social tribal make-up is organised: the term ashira (tribe) signifies an ensemble of individuals and groups speaking the same language and dialect, split into multiple sub-groups.4 The influential confederations and tribes during the 19th century included the Shammar, the “Anaza, the Bani Tamim, and the Zafir”.5 In summary Iraq’s clan society is formed as follows: The clans consist of several extended families. Several clans form a tribe, and several tribes form a 2 Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 203. 3 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (accessed May 1 2011) and Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 203. 4 Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, New York, 2006), 47. 5 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (accessed May 1 2011).

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c­ onfederation. Iraq knows nine confederations: the Muntafiq, the Zubayd, the Dulaym, the “Ubayd, the Khaz’al, the Bani Lam, the Al Bu Muhammed, the Rabi’a, and the Ka’b. Others add to this the Anaza and the Shammar”.6 For centuries the tribes and clans have been the primary unit to rule the area, and not only the Ba’ath party, but all those rulers before them, such as the English, and the King after Iraq became independent relied on the clans for political support. Therefore, they need to be part of any transitional political process. The Iraqi culture is very much influenced by tribal traditions. In fact, in ­order to understand Iraq, it is necessary to understand the importance of tribalism in Iraqi culture.7 Iraq has some 150 tribes. Three quarters of the population belongs to a tribe. Those who do not belong to a tribe follow tribal values, and seek assistance with tribal sheikhs when they need to. Even under Ottoman rule the tribes and confederations were powerful. They formed mini-states within the state. In order to solve conflict they used conflict resolution skills within the clan and between clans. Many groups at that time in Iraq were nomadic. Although the vast majority of the population is Arabic and Muslim, within a tribe or confederation families could represent different religious groups like the Shia or the Sunni.8 The values and norms an individual has to uphold according to clan tradition are hospitality, generosity, etiquette and civility. This is coupled with a strong sense of honour that needs to be upheld towards the family, the clan and the tribe.9 The advantage of the tribe, its protection of clan members, is also the disadvantage; compared to the Western individualised society, the clan society limits the freedom of the individual since the individual has to obey the norms and values of the clan and the family.10

6 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (­accessed May 1 2011). 7 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes .htm, (­accessed May 1 2011). 8 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www .globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/images/tribes.jpg|||, (accessed May 6 2013). 9 Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq (Columbia University Press, New York, 2006), 204. 10 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (­accessed May 1 2011).

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History of Clan Society in Iraq

Iraq has a rich and old history, dating back to the 6th millennium before Christ. The Mongols invaded several times, destroying Baghdad on multiple occasions. In the 18th and 19th centuries the territory of Iraq was governed by the Mamluks and formed part of the Ottoman Empire. During the Ottoman period, the Iraqi tribes subsisted on animal herding, raiding and collecting tribute. Over time this resulted in an economic and social hierarchy. The agricultural professions were added to this hierarchy.11 In the 19th century the Ottoman rulers decided on land reform and settlements. This decreased the influence of the tribes. Another important aspect that diminished the power of the tribes was the vast amount of people who settled in the cities, while nomadic tribes settled in villages. When it became apparent that the Ottoman Empire was going to lose the First World War, while Russia was increasing her influence in the Middle East, the French and the British arranged for the creation of spheres of influence after the war. This was formulated in the secretly drafted Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, an agreement that was signed by the British and the French, stipulating that after the war, independent Arab states were to be established in Damascus, Aleppo and Mosul.12 The agreement stated: That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.13 During the First World War, the British were able to get a considerable number of tribes to fight the Ottoman rulers by promising self-determination for Mesopotamia. However, during the Paris Peace Negotiations, and at the conference of San Remo on 11 November 1920 Iraq was placed under a British mandate. 11 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (­accessed May 1 2011). 12 Elie Kedourie. England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914– 1921 (London: Mansell Press/Westview Press, 1987), 40–42. 13 The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_ century/sykes.asp, (accessed July 14 2014).

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This mandate would be an A mandate, which meant that the territory, as part of the former Ottoman Empire was envisaged to acquire independence in some future. In fact this was a continuation of the status quo, since Britain had in 1917 occupied Iraq and its capital Bagdad. The occupation resulted in resentment and uprisings of both Sunni and Shiite Iraqi’s against the British, because the British had not kept their word. The uprising turned into tribal warfare against the government and the British.14 The state of Iraq that became part of the influence of Great Britain consisted of three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire: Basra, Mosul and Bagdad. The British made Iraq into a Hashemite kingdom and appointed Faisal i as king of Iraq. Faisal had been ousted from Syria, where he had been king for a short time. The British appointed the Sunni elite to government positions and divided the power between the central authorities and tribes by giving the tribal sheikhs ownership over the tribal lands.15 The British respected the ­traditional Iraqi political culture. However, the British did extend their political and economic power by appropriating land, water distribution and law enforcement. The mandate formulated at the Paris Peace Conference was to be for the whole of Mesopotamia, but in fact was never ratified, and therefore never went into force. Instead, an Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed in 1922 and ratified in 1924, which regulated the limited sovereignty that Iraq would have. Great Britain would be responsible for Iraq’s foreign affairs and defence, including the military. The British mandate over Iraq came to an end in 1932 when Iraq became an independent state, although British influence remained strong. Britain negotiated the right of passage for its military through Iraq, and held some military bases on Iraqi soil. Iraq became member of the League of Nations. One of the conditions that the League of Nations formulated was that Iraq would become a party to treaties on protection of minorities. The groups the League of Nations had in mind were Yazidis, Christians and Jews. Special emphasis was put on the Kurds and Assyrians.16

14 15 16

Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, 212. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, 213. Concerning the request for membership of the League of Nations, see League of Nations, “Request of the Kingdom of Iraq for Admission to the League of Nations”, August 16, 1932, http://www.atour.com/government/un/20000609a.html, (accessed July 30 2019).

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The strengthening of the state did not take place. This was primarily ­because, instead of stable institutions, “there emerged Sunni and Shi’a landowning tribal sheikhs [who] vied for positions of power with wealthy and ­prestigious ­urban-based Sunni families and with Ottoman-trained army officers and bureaucrats”.17 When King Faisal i died in 1933, his son, king Ghazi, succeeded him. During the latter’s reign, which lasted until 1939, Iraq saw several uprisings, mostly by groups of the population agitating for more autonomy. One of them was an uprising by the Assyrians in 1933, which soon expanded to tribal areas of the mid-Euphrates. Another problem was the tense relationship between the central Iraqi authorities and the Kurds, since the Kurds wanted as much autonomy as possible and did not appreciate interference in their region. The problems in the south of Iraq concerned the Shia, who felt and actually were underrepresented in the central government.18 The policy of King Ghazi concentrated on strengthening the military as compared to the civilian government, and he aimed to unite Kuwait with Iraq. When King Ghazi died in a car accident in 1939, his underage son Faisal ii came to the throne. Until the time he would acquire maturity in 1953, Abdallah, cousin of the deceased King Ghazi, ruled as regent. During the Second World War, Abdallah was pro-British. In 1941 there was an attempted coup when his pro-German former prime Minister started a revolt. Abdallah fled Iraq, and tried to mobilise the clans to fight against the proGerman government. The British participated in this war, which proved successful and after a few months, on 31 May 1941, an armistice was signed and Abdallah returned to Iraq. British troops remained in Iraq, and after the war, regent Abdallah signed several treaties with the British, which aimed to strengthen the bond between the two states in terms of foreign policy and security. Faisal ii became king in 1953 when he reached the age of 18 years. He had been educated in England, which might be an additional argument for his decision to align with the British after the Second World War. The former regent Abdallah remained one of Faisal’s close advisors, as well as Nuri as Said, who had been in politics for decades and a close associate of Abdallah.

17 18

Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, 214. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, 215.

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Rise of the Baath Movement

The Baath movement was established in 1947 in Syria. The movement stood for pan-Arab nationalism, secularism, and socialism.19 The Iraqi branch of the Baath movement was established in 1954. Specific for the Baathists in Iraq was their fear that communism would become too strong in Iraq. Pan-Arab nationalism gained support as a reaction to the pro-British policy of the government. Many saw the influence of the British on Iraqi policy as colonialism. This clashed with the traditional policy of the Iraqi government to have close cooperation with Britain. In 1955 Iraq became a party to the Treaty of Baghdad, which formed the basis of the Central Treaty Organisation. The Central Treaty Organisation aimed at mutual cooperation and non-intervention in internal affairs of the cosignatories. The organisation was meant to contain the influence of the ussr in the region. Other partners in this Treaty were Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Great Britain.20 Unrest in neighbouring states and alienation of the population due to the pro-British and pro-Western policy of Abdallah and Faisal led to a revolution in 1958, which dethroned the Hashemite monarchy. Many members of the royal family were killed during the revolution. One of the leaders of the 1958 coup was Abdel Salem Arif, who soon started to appoint members of his family and tribe on important positions. In this sense he tribalized the politics of Iraq. The new government followed a more pro-Russian line. Iraq withdrew from the Treaty of Baghdad and was governed by a Council composed of the three main ethnic groups: the Shia were represented by Muhammed Mahdi Kubbah, the Sunni were represented by Najib al-Rubay’i and the Kurds were represented by Khalid al Naqshabandi. Colonel Abd al-Karim Qasim became Prime Minister. The wish of the government to nationalise oil companies alienated Iraq from foreign powers such as Great Britain and the US, who had important investments in Iraq’s oil industry. In 1963 there was another revolution in which the government of Qasim was brought down, and Qasim was murdered. One of Qasim’s colleagues, Abdul Rahman Arif, took over. In 1968 the government was overthrown and the Baath party took power. 19

Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, 216. 20 The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th _century/baghdad.asp, (accessed July 14 2014).

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Role of Clans during Baathification

When the Baathist coup took place in 1968 the Sunni Tikriti clan, situated around the town of Tikrit, which lies northwest of Baghdad, played a decisive role. President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr belonged to this clan, just as Saddam Hussein, who was a leader in the coup, and a relative of al Bakr. In the 1960s the tribes were further weakened by the fact that the influx of people migrating to the cities continued. Land reform meant that tribes lost some of their power. The Baathist party preferred a shared identity, based on nationalism to clan and tribe affiliations, which necessitated concentrating on the modernisation process to the detriment of traditional culture.21 The Baath Party adopted Communiqué No. 1 in which it renounced tribalism, regarding it as a remnant of colonialism and a sign of backwardness.22 The policy pursued was to bring ethnic and religious communities under the control of the central government, with the intent to overcome divisions. The formulation of a national ideology, based on the Baathist ideas, was part of this policy. 6

Clans and Clientelism

Since the coup of 1968 Saddam Hussein had been deputy president and deputy chairman of the Regional Command Council. The Albu Nasir tribe, and more specifically the Al-Beijat clan, had the most influence within the government.23 As early as 1974, Saddam Hussein started to contract tribal mercenary fighters to fight the Kurds. The larger tribes were contracted as national security forces and the smaller tribes were contracted as local law enforcement officers, tax collectors and dispute arbiters.24 By awarding contracts and positions to amicable tribes and demoting the recalcitrant ones, Hussein was able to 21 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (accessed May 1 2011). 22 Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 220. 23 Faleh Jabar. “Parti, clans et tribus, le fragile équilibre du régime irakien”, Le Monde ­diplomatique, October 2002 http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2002/10/JABAR/17020, (accessed April 10 2008). 24 Faleh A. Jabar. “Clerics, Tribes, Ideologies and Urban Dwellers in the South of Iraq: The Potential for Rebellion” Toby Dodge and Steven Simon (ed) Iraq at the Crossroads Adelphi Paper 354 (Oxon: Oxford University Press, 2003), 173.

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remain in power. This made the clans and tribes dependent on Hussein for funding. If they were unable to take care of their members, their honour and position within their clan would be diminished. In return for supporting Hussein, the tribal sheiks had enough resources to keep clan members satisfied. This made Hussein the primary source of revenue for the sheiks, as they were cut out or off from other historical economies. Their land had been removed by Hussein and the process of urbanisation drew members away into different social arrangements. The sheiks were not able to diversify their revenue streams in the event that they wanted to oppose Hussein. In 1976 Saddam became general in the army. Saddam Hussein forced the president to resign and became president in 1979 after he purged the Baath movement of all potential enemies, and appointed people from his clan (Bayjat) and his tribe (Albu Nasir) to key positions. Saddam Hussein appointed people from closely related tribes to the National Guard, such as the Dulaym, Dur, Jabbur, and Ubayd tribes.25 This was a break with the policy of the Baathist party since the 1968 revolution, which brought the party to power. Hussein used the tribal sheiks as intermediaries; they legitimised Saddam Hussein’s authority with their clan members. In return, the sheiks received financial backing and weapons. As a result of direct backing from Hussein, the tribes increasingly depended on the government for their survival, which resulted in diminished contact between them. It segregated the tribes from one another, and they were unable to unify against Hussein.26 According to Schultz and Dew, the tribal patronage system that Saddam used was already in place, and in a tribal community weapons are important and easy at hand.27 7

Iraq-Iran War

In 1980, just a year after the Iranian change of power, a war between Iraq and Iran erupted which would last until 1988, with no clear winner. The Iraqi army invaded Iran on 22 September 1980 and sought to control and annex the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan. There were several reasons for this war, the first being many border disputes between Iran and Iraq. More 25 26 27

Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 218. Andreas Wimmer. “Democracy and Ethno Religious Conflict in Iraq”, Survival (45 No. 4, 2003–2004), 119–120. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 220.

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than 560 border incidents were reported by Iraq in 1979 and 1980.28 One of the border conflicts was over the delimitation of the Shatt al-Arab, an important border river. The Algiers Accord of 1975, concluded between Iran and Iraq, governed relations and access of the Shatt Al-Arab, a river that is formed from the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates. It opens into the Persian Gulf, near the city of Basra in Iraq. The second reason for the war was the fear of the regime in Iraq that Iran would export the Islamic revolution of 1979, for which imam Khomeini had called. A third reason is that Saddam aimed at becoming the most important power in the region, now that Iran was losing some of its regional power due to regime change and the following internal unrest. The Iraqi government did not only fight Iran, but also its own minorities. During the al-Anfal campaign, which lasted from 1986 to 1989, between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds and other minorities such as Assyrians, Turkmen, Yazidis, Jews, and Mandaeans were killed. Towards the end of the war, between August and September 1988, Iraq deployed chemical weapons such as mustard gas and sarin against Iranians and against the Kurdish population in the North of Iraq, in contravention of international humanitarian law.29 The operation was headed by Ali Hassan Al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein, who was also known by his nickname Chemical Ali. In addition to the use of poisonous gas, the attacks were aimed at ethnically cleansing parts of northern Iraq, where looting by the military of property and goods was allowed. Men of combatant age, between the age of 15 and 50 and sometimes even between 15 and 70, were arrested and often killed in mass executions. At the end of the war, the troops withdrew to the borders that were reached between the parties in the Algiers Agreement of 1975.30 Iran and Iraq never came further than a cease-fire agreement, since the conflict continued at the negotiation table.

28 29

30

Farhang Rajaee. The Iran-Iraq: The Politics of Aggression (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1993) 26. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/download-the-cwc/, (accessed July 28 2014). The treaty went into force for Iraq on 12 February 2009. Treaty Concerning the State Frontier and Neighbourly Relations between Iran and Iraq, done March 6, 1975, in force June 22 1976, http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/iran-iraq.html, (accessed May 28 2019).

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Tribal Policy during the Iran-Iraq War

During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein had reversed the official Baath policy of discouraging tribal policy, which was regarded as a remnant of colonialism. Saddam Hussein reconciled with many of the tribes, in order to be able to have the support of their fighters in the war against Iran.31 Richard Schultz, professor of international relations and Andrea Dew, specialist in irregular warfare state: Tribes were assigned responsibility for maintain law and order locally. Tribal chiefs were to “settle disputes among members, between them and the members of other clans or between them and the public at large”.32 During this war the regime increased its control over the country by relying on both Sunni and Shia tribes. The reason for Saddam Hussein to do this was that many of the tribes were regarded as Bedouin, notwithstanding the fact that they had settled. The Bedouin culture made them trustworthy during conflict. They were supposed to have retained values such as communal spirit, honour, and valour. Sunni tribes that closely supported the regime include: the Dulaym, Jubbur, Ukaydat, Mulla, Sa’idat, and Shammar. Within the Tikrit region there was also a Shia tribe, al-Ahbab, that supported the regime.33 The economy was in bad shape due to the war, which had led to damage to oil facilities, and huge expenditures to keep the war going. Decentralisation of power through the tribes was an alternative. For many men the incorporation of the tribe in the state structures, incorporating them into the military and in government positions, brought more wealth and political influence. The Iraqi government encouraged tribal culture and values. A symbiosis between state and tribe developed. Infrastructure projects were a compensation for tribes that cooperated. Roads were built, and villages were connected to water and electricity systems. Tribes were given responsibility in their areas to establish traditional conflict resolution councils. They could also be made responsible for police control and economic activities in the region. The arming of certain tribes was to the detriment of tribes who did not participate in this. 31 32

Amatzia Baram. in Insurgents in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 220 (footnote 63). Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 224. 33 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (accessed May 1 2011).

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Those tribes that did not want to cooperate with Saddam Hussein were punished, sometimes persons were even killed. In the Kurdish areas, Saddam tried to divide and rule between the clans, just as Stalin had done between the peoples of the Caucasus. When in 1991 there was an uprising against Saddam Hussein, some of the Shia tribes therefore did not participate in the uprising, and even supported the government.34 The reality in Iraq during the 1980s and 1990s was that those belonging to the al Tikriti tribe were supposed to have ties with the regime and the state. Those who were on unfavourable terms with the al Tikriti had difficult relations with the state. Similar systems functioned in Iraqi Kurdistan where a conflict with the Barzani family created problems, while in the South, where the Shia are in the majority, those in conflict with the Halabchei family, who was involved in the Islamic Movement were in trouble. 9

Gulf War

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, in order to have access to the oil revenues that Kuwait could provide. Kuwait was subsequently annexed as a province of Iraq. Hussein argued that Kuwait was a natural part of Iraq. In fact, during Ottoman rule, Kuwait had indeed been part of Iraq. Since the annexation of territory is in violation of the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs (article 4(2) UN Charter) and the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1929, the international community had to act. The UN Security Council adopted several resolutions, which urged Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and finally, based on article 39 jo. 43 of the UN Charter ordered the formation of Operation Desert Storm, which was to liberate Kuwait. The United Nations first imposed economic sanctions on Iraq through UN Resolution 661 (1990).35 United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 Paragraphs 1 and 2 stated: Determines that Iraq has so far failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; 34 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (accessed May 1 2011). 35 United Nations Security Council. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 of 1990”, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/3b00f16b24.html, (accessed September 2 2010).

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Decides, as a consequence to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;36 This resolution was soon followed by UN Security Council Resolution 665 (1990), which made a naval blockade possible to enforce the sanctions.37 UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) urged Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwaiti territory. This had to happen before January 15, 1991.38 The formulation was such that non-observance would give the international community the opportunity to interfere because it authorised “all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660”. Iraq did not comply with the resolution, and thus on 17 January 1991 an attack was launched to withdraw Iraqi troops by force from Kuwait. The coalition consisted of 34 states and was led by the United States. Its mandate was provided by UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990). The operation lasted until 28 February 1991. When the Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait, they set fire to around 700 oil wells, placing mines around the wells to complicate extinction of the fires. The coalition of intervening forces did not cross the Iraqi border to depose Saddam Hussein. The rationale to keep the Baath party with Saddam Hussein in power was that the intervening forces wanted to avoid instability in the region and chaos in Iraq. An additional argument was that the intervening forces wanted to remain within the scope of international law.39 However, no fly zones were instituted on Iraqi territory by the US and Britain. The areas where the no fly zones were active were in the north in order to protect the Kurdish population and in the south in order to protect the Shia population.40 These no fly zones have remained in operation until the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in 2003. Operation Provide Comfort controlled the no fly zone until 1996, when it was taken over by the US in Operation Northern Watch (unterm), which 36 37 38 39 40

United Nations Security Council. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 of 1990”, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/3b00f16b24.html, (accessed September 2 2010). Security Council Resolution 665 (1990) Iraq-Kuwait, http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/ texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f16428, (accessed July 14 2014). Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) Iraq-Kuwait, http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/ texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f16760, (accessed July 14 2014). Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 223. Mamoun Fandy. “Tribe vs Islam: The Post-Colonial Arab State and the Democratic Imperative”, Middle East Policy 3 No. 2 (1994), 47.

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started on January 1, 1997.41 In the south, the mission was called Operation Southern Watch.42 After the Iraqi forces had left Kuwait, sanctions against Iraq remained in place. Iraq was urged to respect the rights of its population, and provide humanitarian organisations access to populations in need. The sanctions were authorised based on UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).43 Resolution 687 also ordered Iraq to disarm its weapons of mass destruction, as well as its missiles with a range longer than 150 km. A Special Commission was established to inspect that Iraq comply with the resolution. The UN started an Oilfor-Food program to assure that the sanctions against Iraq would not result in the starvation of the population. This program was not successful, because the food did not reach the population. 10

Expanding Role of Clans, Honour Crimes and Clan Society

After the First Gulf War, the survival of the Baathist party depended on maintaining the legitimacy of the state. Saddam Hussein actively started to use the tribe in order to strengthen his policy and divide and rule among the tribes. By 1996, officially recognised tribes were responsible for law and order and tax collection. In exchange for cooperation, the tribes would receive ammunition, vehicles, logistical support and cash payment.44 Lisa Verdon, a cultural advisor to the US Army in Iraq states: Saddam supported and rewarded the tribes who were loyal to him, and diminished the power of those who were not. He recognized the benefits of empowering tribal leaders and sheiks with control of local projects because he knew that, in return, the tribes would rally nationalist ­support in time of war.45 41

“Operation Northern Watch”, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ops/northern_watch.htm (accessed July 30 2019), http://unterm.un.org/DGAACS/unterm .nsf/8fa942046ff7601c85256983007ca4d8/a1702556aaa2a94685256c550050cb08?Open Document, (accessed July 14 2014). 42 Operation Southern Watch, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/southern_watch .htm, (accessed July 14 2014). 43 S/RES/687 (1991), April 1991, http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf, (­accessed July 14 2014). 44 Robert E. Looney. “The Iraqi Impasse: Sustaining Economic Reconstruction during WarTime”, International Journal on World Peace (23 No. 4 2006), 3–4. 45 Lisa A. Verdon. “From Peddlers to Sheiks A Contracting Case Study in Southern Baghdad”, Military Review 89 No. 2 (March April 2009), 51, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/

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In order to consolidate power, three positions were given to powerful clans; minister of defence, chief of the military and chief of national security. The al-Beijat clan had 10 branches. As the balance of power within the clan shifted in the 1990s, seven of these branches became insignificant. As a result of these changes in influence, the Albu-Ghafur clan became dominant in the 1990s. This was Hussein’s sub-clan. At the same time, the Al-Majid clan was also gaining influence and its two key members were Hussein Kamel and Saddam Kamel. Saddam Hussein had two of his daughters marry Hussein and Saddam Kamel. However, Hussein’s sons, Udai and Qusai were also acquiring more influence and a conflict between Hussein’s sons and Hussein’s sons-in-law was inevitable. The sons-in-law fled to Jordan but upon their return to Iraq were shot alongside their families.46 Here we see an example of the importance placed on cementing relationships between clans with marriages. It unifies the bloodlines and reduces the risks of blood feud as well as divergence of interests, though this did not prevent the murder of Hussein’s sons-in-law. As long as the clan remains united by blood, it can remain relatively unified in the face of an outside threat. In this particular case, the challenge to Saddam Hussein’s rule over Iraq by the sons-in-law was viewed as too high of a threat to Hussein’s dictatorship. Phebe Marr, a historian specialised in Iraq underlines this when she argues that Saddam Hussein gave prominent positions to people from his kin group. She also argued that the clan network would also remain, even if a new leader would emerge. A distinction needs to be made between the top leaders of institutions, those who had very close kinship ties to Hussein and the technocrats who actually administered the system.47 Saddam Hussein created a point structure in which he controlled the administration of Iraq with his two sons. After that, there was a power vacuum. There was no legitimate method of selecting a replacement for Saddam Hussein. In 1992, a plot to overthrow Hussein was formed by the Jubur clan. The following year, another plot to overthrow Hussein was hatched by the Tikitris. What was not witnessed was a coalition of clans joining efforts to overthrow Hussein.48 As there was no clan that could unify other clans behind it, no single clan was able to legitimately pose a threat to Saddam Hussein. He had used various incentives to keep the

46 47 48

Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090430_art009.pdf (­accessed May 28, 2019). Pepe Escobar. “What is the US really up against?”, Asia Times, February 21 2003, http:// www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EB21Ak04.html, (accessed April 10 2008). Phebe Marr. “Iraq ‘the Day After’”, Naval War College Review (Winter lvi No. 1 2003), 21. Ellen Laipson, Patrick L. Clawson, Andrew Parasiliti and Rend Rahim Francke. “Symposium: After Saddam, What Then for Iraq?” Middle East Policy (6 No. 3, 1999), 13.

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clan leaders on his side, or at least not openly opposed to him. The clans that were not supportive of Hussein did not receive any state funding or favours. After 1990, there were quite a number of honour crimes in Iraq. According to Iraqi law, honour crimes are not punishable. If a woman transgressed a social norm, e.g. by having sexual relations with a man outside of marriage or eloping with her husband-to-be without permission of the family, the tribal law prescribes capital punishment for this behaviour. This punishment is acceptable according to the Iraqi criminal code. The women are held responsible for upholding the honour in the family. This creates inequality in the family and in the society, where men have more rights, also the right to punish out of a court case, and women are held responsible, even when they have been a victim of gossip or sexual violence. The result is a circle of social relations at home, with the brothers having superiority to the sisters and the father having superiority to the rest of the family. 11

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Clan

As a follow up to the Gulf war, a UN led delegation oversaw the destruction by Iraq of its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. Iraq was unwilling to cooperate with the United Nations Special Committee (unscom) and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) after 1991 and in 1998 stopped all cooperation.49 The fact that Iraq kept its chemical and biological weapons and had proven willing to use them even against its own population worried the international community. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) underlined the importance of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (unmovic), which had been established in UN Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) checked on the production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction.50 At the beginning of 2003, it had become clear that the sanctions were not efficient, because in addition to the fact that Saddam Hussein did not cooperate enough with the Special Commission (unmovic), there were UN member states that had violated the sanctions installed upon Iraq. This eventually led 49 50

see background in S/RES/1441 (2002), November 8, 2002, https://www.un.org/Depts/ unmovic/documents/1441.pdf (accessed May 18 2019). The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: an Update, http://www.iaea.org/newscentre/ statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml, and S/Res/1284 (1999), December 8, 1999, https:// www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Keyresolutions/sres99-1284.htm and S/RES/1441 (2002), ­November 8, 2002, https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf (accessed July 16 2014).

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to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 that could be read as either allowing intervention or prohibiting it. The US interpreted UN Security Council Resolution 1441 as allowing an armed intervention, while France and the Russian Federation, also permanent UN Security Council members, were of the opinion that an additional resolution would be necessary, and that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 in itself did not provide interpretation to intervene militarily in Iraq. Subsequently, France and Germany opposed an intervention.51 The formulation that led to multiple interpretations can be found at the end of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002): 13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.52 Just before the invasion, in February 2003, the UN delegation published a report in which they stated that they had not found “evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq”.53 Nevertheless, the position of the United States was that Iraq could use its weapons of mass destruction within 48 hours, which necessitated intervention. The United States and Britain perceived the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein as a real and imminent threat. The fact that afterwards the weapons of mass destruction could not be found, although the intervention was then legitimised referring to the gross human rights violations Saddam Hussein inflicted upon the population, was a political and legal problem for the intervening force. In combination with the imminent threat that was perceived by the United States and Great Britain, there were some serious public relations problems. In order to justify an intervention that is pre-emptive, it is necessary to prove that there is an imminent threat against the state that performs the preemptive strike. This means that the imminent threat is so close, that it could not be expected of the other party to wait as a lame duck until the attack materialises. If this is not proven, the attack might be regarded as an act of aggression and interference in the internal affairs of another state. Therefore, the 51 52 53

“France and Germany Unite against Iraq War”, The Guardian, January 22, 2003, http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/22/germany.france, (accessed November 7 2014). S/RES/1441 (2002), November 8, 2002, http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/documents/1441 .pdf, (accessed May 28 2019). The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: an Update, http://www.iaea.org/newscentre/ statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml, (accessed July 16 2014).

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United States had to prove that there was an imminent threat that necessitated a military intervention in Iraq. In addition, the pre-emptive strike has to meet the criteria of proportionality and necessity. On March 20th, 2003, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq. The fighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom lasted from 17 March to 1 May 2003, when American troops entered Bagdad. When the United States intervened in Iraq, they encountered an unexpected reaction by the population. While US forces expected to be greeted as liberators, history shows that large parts of the Iraqi population had been for decades anti-US and anti-British. The 1991 intervention in Kuwait, which affected the Iraqi population due to the sanctions imposed and the intervention’s aftermath, did not give reason to think that the population would become more pro-West, notwithstanding the severe human rights violations that Saddam Hussein committed. It was more likely that the United States and Britain would be seen as an aggressor. Therefore, the attacks by armed insurgents came somewhat as a surprise for the war planners in Washington after Saddam Hussein was ousted from power.54 Schultz and Dew state that the planners for the intervention of Iraq should have taken the basis of Iraqi society as a starting point, being its history, Arab and tribal culture, and religion.55 Schultz and Dew state: “Historically, the influence of tribal organisation has ebbed and flowed, but it has never vanished as a core element of Iraqi identity”.56 Louise Fawcett, a specialist in Middle East politics stated: its (the international intervention C.H.) justification was highly questionable. Iraq was found to have no weapons of mass destruction; nor did it have links to the extremist group Al-Qaeda. […] Taking into account the spill over effects of the more recent Arab uprisings and renewed sectarian violence, the political future of Iraq and the regional balance of power remain highly unstable.57

54 55 56 57

Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 199. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 200. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, 203. Louise Fawcett. “The Iraq War ten years on: assessing the fallout”, in International Affairs (89 No. 2, 2013), 325.

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UN Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) called upon the United States to continue rebuilding the Iraqi state, while also preparing for the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi’s.58 In the new Iraqi government there was no place for former Baath members, and the military that had Baath members were not allowed in the new army. Most of the military in the Saddam era had belonged to the Sunni minority. 12

Coalition Provisional Authority

After the defeat of Saddam Hussein in 2003 the Baath party ceased to have influence, while other political parties still had to develop. The clan elders were the logical party to turn to for the intervention force, since they had influence among their clan members, and had by virtue of their position also a political aspect to their role. This means that the clans retained political power, and to a certain degree gained more influence.59 The Coalition Provisional Authority (cpa), the transitional government that was installed after the invasion of Iraq, tried to balance ethnic and religious groups in power on a local, regional and national level. This resulted in other groups coming to power, which in turn led to violence, because some persons felt attacked in their honour, and therefore wanted to revenge themselves for perceived wrong done to them. It also meant the end of domination by the Sunni Muslims and the Baath party.60 The aim of the cpa was to rule Iraq until elections had been held and the Iraqi politicians would form their own government. The cpa was the follow up of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (orha) that had been set up two months before the invasion by the United States. US Lieutenant General Jay Garner, who had extensive experience and knowledge of Iraq, led the orha. Garner had participated in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Provide Comfort in the North of Iraq. He knew Iraqi culture and politics well. However, Garner was soon dismissed, as he did not agree with the

58

S/RES/1511(2003), 16 October 2003, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1511 (accessed July 26 2019). 59 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes .htm, (­accessed May 1 2011). 60 The cpa was based on S/RES/1486 (2003), 11 June 2003, https://undocs.org/S/RES/ 1486(2003) (accessed May 28 2019). The government was active ruling from 21 April 2003 to 28 June 2004.

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decision of the United States government to start a de-Baathification ­campaign. Garner was replaced by Paul Bremer iii, former US ambassador to the Netherlands (1983–1986) and coordinator for counterterrorism (1986–1989). Bremer became Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq. The cpa was divided into four subsections, one in the north in Arbil, one in Bagdad, one in Hilla and one in the south, in Basra. There was relative autonomy, all sub-administrations had the same program, although with differing success. 13

Death of Saddam Hussein

On 14 December 2003 Saddam Hussein was arrested in the area of his clan, the al Tikriti. He became a prisoner of war of the American forces, and was handed over to Iraqi officials on 1 July 2004. Prosecution against him started immediately in Iraq, while Saddam Hussein was held in prison by the Americans. The rationale for the Americans to supervise Saddam Hussein in prison was to avoid that Iraqi’s would hurt Saddam Hussein while in prison out of revenge. Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death on 5 November 2006. In appeal on 26 December 2006 the death sentence was confirmed. On 30 December 2006 president al Maliki signed the death sentence of Saddam Hussein. That same day the execution took place. 14

Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Clans

In 2005 the United States decided to introduce Provincial Reconstruction Teams (prt) in Iraq. Their aim was to support the government in the reconstruction of the state. The prt’s consisted of specialised military-civil servants from several relevant ministries working on reconstruction and diplomats. They assisted in the reform of the security sector. This has to be understood as security in the broad sense, comprising the army, the police, border protection, intelligence, the judiciary, and reform of the institutions to be more in line with principles of accountability and transparency. Robert Perito from the US Institute of Peace noted the following about the inclusion of tribes into local governance councils: Embedded prts have worked on resolving local differences and promoting reconciliation among tribal groups. They have also met with civil society groups and helped promote their work. […]

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They have also tried to connect district and sub-district government units to provincial authorities and the central government. In this regard, they have trained municipal leaders, encouraged the formation of district and sub-district councils, and promoted tribal engagement.61 Among some of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts were the provision of micro grants targeted at specific tribes. These micro-grants assisted widows and small business owners to develop a sustainable livelihood.62 In 2008, cnn reported that local tribesmen were being employed in pipeline protection teams, thus playing a crucial role in enforcing the law and reducing the influence of criminal elements. cnn reported: The tribes along the pipelines have been aware of and have helped facilitate smuggling activities, he said. But that will change as Iraq aggressively recruits locals to join the oil protection forces and builds schools and hospitals for poor communities in oil-producing areas.63 15

Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Clan

A discussion is possible on the question of whether it is wise to involve clans and if so to what degree in national policy, because it might hamper the reconstruction process of the Iraqi state, since it will be difficult to cut back the influence of the clans and turn this influence towards political parties. As we saw earlier the transition from clan-based voting to party voting can be a slow process. The intervening forces in 2003 had to find a balance between cooperating with the tribal sheikhs, because otherwise the sheikh would be shamed, and compromise in order to observe the rule of law. Especially in the field of law enforcement tribal leaders will often solicit the release of tribal members who have committed a crime. The intervention force however decided to leave 61 62 63

Robert Perito. “Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams”, United States Institute of Peace, February 2008, https://www.usip.org/publications/2008/02/embedded-provincial -reconstruction-teams, (accessed July 26 2019). U.S. Embassy Baghdad Iraq. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams News – Basrah Micro Grants Will Help Local Tribe Launch 47 Businesses”, U.S. Embassy Baghdad Iraq, January 6 2010, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/prt_basra011910_1.html, (accessed October 13 2010). Kyra Phillips. “Iraq recruits tribes to combat oil smugglers”, cnn March 5 2008 http:// edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/03/05/iraq.oil/, (accessed October 13 2010).

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matters that could be handled by the tribes within the competence of the sheikhs, and other matters within the competence of the intervention force.64 Amatzia Baram, a specialist in the history of the Middle East, underlines that the tribes and clans had not necessarily supported the regime of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, after the fall of his regime and the loss of power of the Baath party, the influence of the tribes and clans did not diminish with them.65 This could be expected, since the tribe and clan are more basic to Iraqi society than the state and its institutions. Andrew Rathmell, specialist on the Middle East, argued that Iraqi institutions prior to the 2003 war were weak. He explained the situation as follows: It had not put down roots into society, the rule of law had been completely voided and, since the 1980s, the state had not generated legitimacy through its provision of goods and services. Instead, para-state structures such as the security services enforced obedience through intimidation and violence while the loyalty of parochial groups, such as certain families or tribes, was purchased through material rewards.66 In terms of rebuilding governance mechanisms, some Iraqi tribes sought to cooperate with one another and create local councils. The function of these councils was to better coordinate reconstruction and socio-economic development, determine which projects were to be funded and to monitor the transfer of funds. In December 2006, in response to fact that the local district government failed to provide the necessary political and economic goods, the leaders of the Awakening, a group discussed in further detail on page 172 and the Albu Thiyab tribe discussed forming a new council just north of Ar Ramadi. They also hoped to organise the tribes to reconciliate and cooperate in economic development instead of allowing reconstruction projects to move forward on a ­case-by-case basis.

64 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm, (accessed May 6 2013). 65 Amatzia Baram. The Iraqi Tribes and the Post-Saddam System, Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution, July 8, 2003, http://www.brookings.edu/research/ papers/2003/07/08iraq-baram, (accessed May 6 2013). 66 Andrew Rathmell. “Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What can we learn?” rand Corporation (2005), 1019, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1197 .pdf, (accessed October 13 2010).

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Each of the four cooperating tribes had a representative on the new council to discuss coalition project allocation, develop legislation, address security and development issues, and seek recognition from the provincial government in order to receive funds for infrastructure improvement.67 Rory Stuart, a British diplomat and politician, was appointed in 2003 governor of Amara Province. His task was to introduce security and cooperation among the different groups vowing for power, in preparation of the elections. It was important for him to work with the clan leaders, though they were often regarded as thieves. Religious groups such as the Sadr brigades however were also regarded as unreliable fanatics. The criticism of these groups was that their leaders had been raised in Iran as refugees. During the Iran-Iraq war they had fought against the regime of Saddam Hussein on the Iranian side.68 Stuart gives an example of the distrust between the groups, and the absence of democratic experience, when he suggests to an important clan leader to share power with other relevant groups in the Province. The answer of Abu Hatim, the clan leader, is to give all power to him, while fighting the other – religious groups – together. He expresses a dislike for politicians.69 The task of Stuart and those in his position was difficult. Earlier in history, the Ottomans, the British and the Baath believed that in Amara they had built a modern state out of tribal chaos.70 Some old clan leaders speak with respect about former British officers, whom they remember from the colonial times. These British stayed for decades in Iraq, learned the local languages and customs. They ruled indirectly, and used local leaders to collect taxes. This situation is very different from the situation after 2003, when there was more money than in former times, but the local needs were not sufficiently taken into ­account. The idea that the transition process could be done in a few years was also rather naïve in a culture that is very different, also with respect to the perception of time, from the British and American way of dealing with things.71

67 68 69 70 71

Captain Chad M. Pillai. “Tal Afar And Ar Ramadi: Grass Roots Reconstruction”, Military Review 89, No. 2, March April (2009), 34, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/ Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090430_art007.pdf, (accessed October 13 2010). Rory Stuart. The Prince of the Marshes and other occupational hazards, a year in Iraq (­Orlando, Harvest Book, 2007), 60–61. Rory Stuart. The Prince of the Marshes and other occupational hazards, a year in Iraq, 74–75. Rory Stuart. The Prince of the Marshes and other occupational hazards, a year in Iraq, 46. Rory Stuart. The Prince of the Marshes and other occupational hazards, a year in Iraq, 65–66.

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An Iraqi Government

Shia politicians who came to power ethnically cleansed Sunni areas. The ethnic cleansing also formed part of the fight of Shia against Al Qaeda in Iraq.72 From 2004 onwards Al Qaeda in Iraq attacked purposely Shia religious places and aimed at spiralling a revenge gulf, which would increase the anarchy in the country. Increasing the lawlessness would discredit the Shia government. In December 2005 there were parliamentary elections. The outcome showed that the three major groups, Shia, Sunni and Kurds, had voted along ethnic lines. A government of national unity was formed, and Nouri al Maliki (a Shia) became prime minister on 20 May 2006. The government of al Maliki was thus the successor of the Transitional Government of Iraq. The political power of the government was undermined by the discontent of other groups than the Shia about the politics of Al Maliki. During his second term as prime minister he held also the post of minister of the interior, minister of national security, and minister of defence. On 14 August 2014 al Maliki had to give up his position, having lost all support, even from his own political party. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the fact that al Maliki was not capable of stopping this movement was one problem.73 He was succeeded by Haider al Abadi, who was appointed under president Fuad Masum, and just like his predecessor Jalabani of Kurdish background. In 2015 fighters of IS slaughtered in the Sinjar district, populated by Yazidis, many men, women and children. Apart from killing and torturing, many girls, women and children were kidnapped and brought in captivity as “wives” and sex slaves. This got so bad that the activities were described as genocide on the Yazidis, based on their religion.74 In the fall of 2017 the Iraqi forces, supported by international intervention, were capable of pushing IS out of Iraq. In the parliamentary elections of Spring 2018 Muqtada al Sadr won a majority and was allowed to start negotiations on a coalition government.75 He has issued that his aim is to form an inclusive government. 72 73 74 75

Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong Armbrokers in Weak States, 146–147. Many supporters of Al Qaeda in Iraq were Sunni. Universiteit Leiden, Leiden Islam Blog, “Beyond Sunni vs. Shia – not sectarianism, but systematic violence”, July 24, 2014, http://leiden-islamblog.nl/articles/beyond-sunni-vs.shia-not-sectarianism-but-systematic-violence, (accessed November 7 2014). Peter Nikolaus, Serkan Yuce. “Sex-Slavery: One Aspect of the Yezidi Genocide” in Iran and the Caucasus 21 No. 2, (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 198. Qassim Abdul Zahra. “Iraq’s Al Sadr Says Next Government will be Inclusive” in AP News, May 20, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/3569c40cfe1f47f798b35ef5cf6be7c6/Iraq%27s-alSadr-says-next-government-will-be-%27inclusive%27, (accessed June 5 2018).

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Constitution of 2005

In December 2005, two months before the election of the parliament, a new constitution was adopted, after having been approved in a national referendum. The Constitution defined Iraq as a democratic, federal, parliamentary Islamic state. Iraq was to have a federal government, regions (which comprise one or more governorates), governorates and districts. The Kurdish area got its own government and its own army, the Peshmerga. Article 2 of the Constitution balances the rights of Muslims to honour the Sharia, respect democracy and human rights. The article states: A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam; B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy; C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution. Although Arabic and Kurdish are the official languages, other languages, such as Syriac and Turkmen may also function as the official language, next to Arabic, in the regions “where they constitute density of population”. (Article 4). Article 7 of the Constitution shows the politics of the period in which the constitution was drafted. The government has the responsibility to fight racism, terrorism, religious intolerance and ethnic cleansing and shall ban the Baath party. Article 8 of the Constitution is modern and underlines the importance of adhering to and ruling in line with principles of being a good neighbour. It means that Iraq shall not harm its neighbours intentionally or interfere with internal affairs. When trans-border problems would occur, according to the principles of good neighbourliness, the state that is in violation of international law shall inform the neighbouring states and take those measures necessary in that specific circumstance.76 Section 3 of the Constitution regulates the government of the Iraqi state. The legislative will be made up of the Council of Representatives and the Federal Council. The Council of Representatives is made up of 1 member per 76

The UN already in 1988 affirmed the importance of goodneighbourliness, see United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/43/171, 9 December 1988, http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/43/a43r171.htm (accessed May 28 2019). Professor Sompong Sucharitkul has written an excellent article on principles of goodneighborliness, Sompong Sucharitkul, “The Principles of Good-Neighborliness in International Law”, April 27, 1996, http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1559&context=pubs, (accessed July 28 2014).

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100,000 inhabitants of Iraq (article 49). The Federation Council will comprise members of the different regions and governorates, when these last do not form part of a region of Iraq (article 65). The executive consists of the President and the Council of Ministers (article 66). Remarkable is that the constitution does not specify the number of members the Council of Representatives, Federal Council or Council of Ministers will have. Section 4 regulates the powers of the federal government, while Section 5 regulates the regions and governorates that are not incorporated in a region. 18

Influence of Clans in Law Enforcement and Judicial Institutions

Under the reign of Saddam Hussein, Sunnis were given a lighter sentence than Shiites. This was due to internal Baath party politics. The Sunnis in the Baath party at the time were simply better connected to law enforcement and the judiciary. They could then petition on behalf of a family member facing charges.77 Upon the removal of the Hussein administration in 2003, the United States created the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (ccci). This Court was to replace military tribunals to try suspected insurgents and suspected terrorists. There have been numerous obstacles in obtaining guilty verdicts in this court. Michael Frank argued that this is a result of legal rules particular to Iraq and some judges’ sympathies for the defendants. One issue raised by Frank is the judges’ unwillingness to convict a suspect unless two witnesses saw the suspect commit every aspect of the crime. Another issue contributing to the judges’ reservations in convicting a suspect is if they are members of the same tribe, or religious group.78 This applies for Sharia law and elements of traditional law. After the American-led invasion of Iraq, efforts were directed at retraining and reconstituting Iraq’s Ministry of Interior police and security services. The persistence of loyalty to tribal affiliations is such that officers assigned to the Bureau of Dignitary Protection are selected from the dignitary’s own tribe. Such was the level of insecurity and mistrust towards others in Iraq in 2005, that the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi ordered his own security force to shoot any police officer that approached his office without prior notice.79 77 78 79

Yousif Bassam. “Economic Restructuring in Iraq: Intended and Unintended Consequences”, Journal of Economic Issues (41 No. 1, 2007), 44. Michael J. Frank. “U.S. Military Courts and the War in Iraq”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (39 No. 3, 2006), 645–648. Gary Felicetti. “The Limits of Training in Iraqi Force Deployment”, Parameters (36 No. 4, 2006), 74–76.

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There is a division of ethnic representation, where the Shia are most powerful in government, but the presidency is exercised by a Kurd. 19

Clans and Elections

One of the aspects of a functioning state is the ability to organise elections, which preferably are free and fair. Elections in a clan-based society might reflect the power between the clans, and between the ethnicities in a state. Hamid al Hais, a tribal chief stated on the eve of the Iraqi elections in 2011: “If we had a modern state, we wouldn’t have to rely on the rule of tribes”, but until then, “a little bit of evil is better than more”. [..] “A little bit of evil is better”, he said again.80 Clans play an instrumental role in elections in Iraq. Clan elders, the sheikhs, will advise to vote on the clan member that is on the election list for the parliamentary elections. Voting along kinship lines is old, and is still en vogue. The weakening of the state has led to clan influences in politics not only in the rural areas, but also in big cities such as Bagdad. Due to the insecurity in Iraq, political parties have lost credibility, with the result that the population now has more trust in the clans to provide security.81 20

President of Iraq

Jalal Talabani, an Iraqi-Kurd, became President of Iraq in 2005 and remained in office until 2014. Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (puk). When he took office his vice presidents were a Sunni and a Shiite, which was intended to reflect the different groups in Iraqi society. Talabani originally was a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (kdp) but created the puk as an intellectual alternative, which aimed at a modern and democratic Kurdistan. Over the years the relations between the kpd, led by Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani were difficult. While Barzani tended to cooperate with the 80 81

Anthony Shadid. “Iraq Election Highlights Ascendency of Tribes”, Washington Post, January 25 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/24/ AR2009012402051_5.html, (accessed May 1 2011). Adnan Abu Zeed. “Clans Play a Decisive Role in Iraqi Elections”, Al-Monitor, http://www .al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2014/02/clans-major-role-iraq-politics-elections .html#, (accessed January 7 2015), Anthony Shadid. “Iraq Election Highlights Ascendency of Tribes”, Washington Post, January 25 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2009/01/24/AR2009012402051.html, (accessed January 7 2015).

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regime of Saddam Hussein, Talabani preferred contacts with Syria, Iran and the United States. At the beginning of the 1990s he worked together with Western allies and Kurdish opposition groups, including Massoud Barzani’s pdk, and formed in 1992 the Kurdish Regional Council. Both Talabani and Barzani are said to have been supported by Turkey. Jalal Talabani formed part of the Interim Iraq Governing Council, and in this capacity, he was one of the negotiators of the Transitional Administrative Law, which preceded the Iraq Constitution of 2004. Jalal Talabani described the role between clan and politics as follows: The Kurdistan region’s two principal political movements are the Kurdistan Democratic Party (kdp) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (puk). They are essential clan-based war-fighting groups that have morphed into political blocs over the years, thanks to heavy lobbying in Western capitals and a great increase in stability in Iraqi Kurdistan since the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003.82 War correspondent Jon Lee Anderson said about the Talabani, He has been able to both use his mettle and his contacts and his charisma to try to broker unity between the Shiites and the Sunnis in Baghdad while steering business towards Kurdistan and arguing for greater and increased clauses in the various bills that have been put forth in this young democracy that is Iraq, which would ultimately make Kurdistan a much more viable, autonomous place.83 Given the precarious balance that has to be sought to include all major ethnic and religious groups in the administration and politics of Iraq, the role of Jalal Talabani is important for two reasons: the first is that he represents the Kurds, who had been in a difficult situation after the conflict over Kuwait, and the second reason is that he has been able to reduce sectarian violence and improve relations with Turkey, which was weary of Kurdish nationalist and autonomous sentiments. Another important focus was the fight against corruption in Iraq. 82 83

Derek Henry Flood. “Seeds of Change in Iraqi Kurdistan”, Asia Times, October 6 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KJ06Ak03.html, (accessed October 13 2010). Robert Siegel. “Talabani’s Role in Iraq: Mr. Big?”, National Public Radio January 30 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7085624, (accessed October 13 2010).

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In 2012, Talabani suffered a stroke, and went to Germany for treatment. After 18 months he returned. The Kurdish politician Fuad Masum in 2014 succeeded him as president of Iraq.84 21

Clans in Iraqi Kurdistan

In Kurdistan, tribes and clans have been active in politics along ethno-nationalist lines in their aim for more autonomy and self-determination. The strength of the Kurdish tribes in Iraqi politics has varied over time. Their struggle against the Islamic State is actively supported by many Western governments. The role of the Kurds in Iraqi politics reflects the cohesion of Iraq through the years. When there are weak state institutions, the influence of the clans and tribes is more notable. This proves our assumption that the clan grows in power and importance when the state retreats. The Kurdish tribes assign their own people to specific positions based on tribal background, thereby guaranteeing support from their fellow tribe members in politics. In this sense their tribal policies are very similar to those in the rest of Iraq. Both main Kurdish political movements, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (puk) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (kdp) include specific tribes in their groups.85 According to Martin van Bruinessen, a specialist on Kurdistan, this meant that tribes have supplanted their existing conflicts and rivalries onto state politics. Where one tribe has had control of the state, their rivals, for military reasons, have been forced to seek outside partners and allies. This dichotomises the ethno-nationalist debate, between “patriots” and “traitors”, resulting in a fractioned Kurdish political voice.86 Since 2003 many attempts at s­ trengthening the state have been undertaken. This was realised by including Kurds in the central Iraqi government. Another measure was to allow extended autonomy for the Kurdish populated regions in the North of Iraq, after the no fly zones were instituted in 1991 and after the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, in 1994 fighting broke out 84

Jalal Talabani, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 1109944/Jalal-Talabani, (accessed February 23 2015). 85 Tribal Structures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes .htm, (­accessed May 1 2011). 86 Martin van Bruinessen. “The nature and uses of violence in the Kurdish conflict”, International colloquium ‘Ethnic Construction and Political Violence’ organised by the Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Cortona, July 2–3, 1999, https://www.academia.edu/3776022/ The_nature_and_uses_of_violence_in_the_Kurdish_conflict, (accessed July 26 2019).

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­between the puk and the kdp. Many people fled the region, some to Iran. The representatives in the regional government and parliament lost their power to military militias. Members of the puk were arrested. In 1996, a cease-fire was brokered. 22

The South, Marsh Arabs and Clans

Originally the tribes in the West and the South of Iraq were Sunni Muslims. Between the 18th and the 20th century many converted to Shi’ism and Iraq became one of the most important places for Shia Muslims, with holy cities as Karbala and Najaf. Most of the conversion though took place in the 19th century. Yitzhak Najaf states two important reasons for the conversion. The first was that the nomadic tribes settled, either voluntarily or under pressure of the Ottoman Empire. The second reason was that the tribes used the conversion to Shi’ism as a revolt against their Ottoman Sunni rulers.87 22.1 Shiite Leader Abdul Qasim al Khoei The most important Shia leader during the 1980s and beginning 1990s was sheikh Abdul Qasim Al Khoei (1899–1992), whose influence went further than Iraq, and spanned the whole Shia community.88 Abdul Qasim Al Khoei worked most of his life as a teacher and scholar in Najaf. He established many philanthropic institutions worldwide. Saddam Hussein imprisoned al Khoei, who was at the time of his arrest already in his nineties. Al Khoei died in custody in 1992. Abdul Qasim al Khoei was succeeded by Ali al Sistani. However, after al Khoei died, his family was not spared. His son Mohammed Taqi al Khoei was killed in 1994 in a road accident that was thought to have been organized by Saddam Hussein in Iraq. His younger brother Abdul Mayid al Khoei, who had been leading the Al Khoei Foundation from London since 1994, and had been asked by the US to return because he was considered moderate, was stabbed to death when he returned in 2003 to Najaf to help rebuild the holy city.89 87 88 89

Yitzhak Nakash. The Shi’is of Iraq, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 27–28, 30, 42. Yitzhak Nakash. “The Shiites and the Future of Iraq after Saddam”, Foreign Affairs (82 No. 4, 2003), 20. Safa Rasul al Sheikh and Emma Sky. “Iraq Since 2003, Perspectives of a Divided Society”, in Survival, Global Politics and Strategy (53 No. 4, 2011), 141.

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During the US-led intervention in Iraq, there were some major operations, which need to be mentioned. It concerns the Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah, and the Surge. Operation Vigilant Resolve aimed at restoring security to Fallujah. The Surge aimed at reconciling ethnic groups in an effort to strengthen the state. 23

US Operations in Iraq

23.1 Operation Vigilant Resolve From April 4th to 9th 2004, the First Battle of Fallujah, also known as Operation Vigilant Resolve, took place. The operation was intended to pacify the area around Fallujah after four contractors in Fallujah and five soldiers in Habbaniya were killed on March 31, 2004. The Iraqi Police Services and the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps helped secure key government buildings and installations.90 Tribal warfare was involved in the Second Battle of Fallujah, which lasted from November 2004 to January 2005. The U.S. Military operation was named Operation Phantom Fury and was renamed by the Iraqi Defence Minister Operation al-Fajr (Dawn). Amatzia Baram argues that the second Battle of Fallujah was far bloodier than the first because the insurgents realized that the American fighting style was different than theirs. The insurgents in Fallujah had come to understand that killing an American soldier did not necessarily bring retaliation against their tribe or clan. If a member of their tribe was killed, they would retaliate against the offending tribe. This is not the case with the US military. As such, the insurgents were much more willing to take risks and target American forces. If the fighting was directed at another tribe, the aggressor tribe would need to carefully select its target or risk drawing a third or fourth tribe into the conflict.91 23.2 The Surge In January 2007, the US President George W. Bush decided to strengthen the US military presence in Iraq. The aim was to help Iraq rebuild, reconcile ethnic groups and be a partner in the fight against terrorism. Some 20.000 additional

90 91

“Operation Vigilant Resolve”, Global Security, April 5, 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/ops/oif-vigilant-resolve.htm, (accessed April 17 2008). Dan Murphy. “At vortex of violence – Fallujah”, Christian Science Monitor (April 2 2004), http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0402/p01s04-woiq.html, (accessed April 20 2008).

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US troops were deployed. Most of the troops were deployed to Baghdad and Al Anbar province. The strategy comprised six elements: Let the Iraqis lead; Help Iraqis protect the population; Isolate extremists; Create space for political progress; Diversify political and economic efforts; Situate the strategy in a regional approach.92 However, one year later the majority of Iraqi citizens did not consider the actions of the US military in Iraq to contribute to the safety or the prevention of terrorist acts in the country. The different groups were not reconciled, and corruption led to new groups that could find the means to acquire weapons, fighters and supporters.93 We will now focus our attention to the groups that threatened the state building process after the international intervention of 2003. 24

Opposition to the Iraq Government

The overthrow of the government of Saddam Hussein did not lead to a harmonisation of Iraq. Shia troops of warlord Al Sadr started to attack the government and international forces. The unrest in the country was also triggered by tribes and clans that fought against groups linked to Al Qaeda, or were aligned with them. 24.1 Muqtada Al Sadr Muqtada al Sadr, founder of the Sadrist movement, comes from an important Shia religious family. Both his father and father in law were murdered during the regime of Saddam Hussein. He set up his own army, the Mahdi army, shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The army is named after an imam who is said to reappear when the end of times will be nearing. Al Sadr has set up his 92 93

The White House, President George W. Bush. Fact sheet, The New Way Forward in Iraq, January 2007, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/2007 0110-3.html, (accessed February 23 2015). Alex Kingsbury. ‘Why the 2007 surge in Iraq actually failed’, Boston Globe, November 17, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/11/17/why-surge-iraq-actually-failed -and-what-that-means-today/0NaI9JrbtSs1pAZvgzGtaL/story.html, (accessed February 23 2015).

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own religious court system, law enforcement and social services. He has stated earlier that his aim is to create an Islamic democracy. As such, he was regarded as a warlord. An area of Bagdad has been renamed Sadr City, after the grandfather of Muqtada al Sadr. The father of Muqtada al Sadr was himself a well-known scholar of Shia Islam. He was murdered in Najaf in 1999.94 Muqtada al Sadr has been politically active until 15th February 2014, when he announced the closure of all institutions set up in his name in Iraq. However, the rise of the Islamic State has made him return to politics, asking his followers to fight with him against religious fanatics, the American military and UN troops. Critics think that his retreat from politics, a move he made earlier in 2007, was meant to reorganise his organisation and army, in order to come back stronger. From 2012 onwards Muqtada changed his vocabulary, no longer calling for violence, but presenting himself as a moderate politician. Al Sadr has his stronghold in Najaf, one of the holy places in Iraq.95 In 2018 his political alliance got the most votes after national elections. 24.2 Al Qaeda in Iraq The Provisional Reconstruction Teams (prt’s), which were set up as part of the intervention force in 2003 were to work with local leaders. It took some time before the population in the Sunni areas had the idea that cooperating with the United States would bring them anything good, as the war had shown them that they only lost power in politics to other groups in society. Many joined opposition groups, which either aimed at destabilising the Iraqi government or were against the intervening force. One of these opposition groups was Al Qaeda in Iraq (aqi), which destroyed telephone and internet infrastructure and beheaded persons who were thought or known to negotiate with US citizens. The brutality of the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq led to a counter reaction, and after some years the same clans and tribes that provided persons to aqi now changed sides and started a movement against aqi, which was called the ­Anbar Salvation Council.

94 95

Anthony Shadid. “Iraq Election Highlights Ascendency of Tribes”, Washington Post, J­anuary 25 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/24/ AR2009012402051_5.html, (accessed May 1 2011). Leslie Bayless. “Who is Muqtada al Sadr”, in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (35 No. 2 2012), 136, 139, 146, 149, Matthew J. Godwin. “Political Inclusion in Unstable Contexts: Muqtada Al Sadr and the Sadrist Movement”, Contemporary Arab Affairs (5 No. 3, 2012), 448, 450–454.

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24.3 Anbar Salvation Council The Anbar Salvation Council was a coalition of tribes founded by former Baathists to fight suspected Al-Qaeda members in Iraq. Individual tribes were approached to join the council from September 2006 onwards. The United States supported the initiative. In March 2007, troops from Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior, American forces and fighters from the Anbar Salvation Council united in battle against insurgents in the town of Amiriya, in Anbar province.96 Soon after this coordinated action, in June 2007, the coalition of tribes was each going their own way. Some members felt that the group was too close to American interests, while others had developed sympathies for the insurgents.97 24.4 Sons of Islam In the period 2005–2006 a group of Sunni tribes, among them tribal leaders such as Hais and Alwani, changed its policy from supporting Al Qaeda in Iraq and fighting the Shia government in Baghdad, to fighting against Al Qaeda in Iraq.98 This process started in Al Anwar province and became known as the “Awakening”.99 Sunni tribes in eight other provinces joined in 2007 and 2008. These groups came to be known as the Sons of Iraq (soi).100 In the beginning the United States cooperated with local influential figures.101 The diminishing support for Al Qaeda in Iraq by the Sunnis had as an extra effect that in many places the Shia, who were attacked by aqi and Sunnis, and needed their own groups to be protected, became critical towards these more extremist and corrupt Shia groups, whom they at first had supported. Kimberley Marten states that many Sunni militia groups were made up of former

96

Bill Roggio. “Al Qaeda, the Anbar Salvation Council and the Amiriya Battles”, The Long War Journal March 20 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/al_qaeda_ the_anbar_s.php, (accessed April 20 2008). 97 John Ward Anderson. “Fallujah Bombing Targets Mourners of Tribal Figure”, The Washington Post, May 25 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/ 24/AR2007052402327.html, (accessed April 20 2008). 98 Anthony Shadid. “Iraq Election Highlights Ascendency of Tribes”, Washington Post, January 25 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/24/AR 2009012402051_5.html, (accessed May 1 2011). 99 Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong Armbrokers in Weak States, 139. 100 Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong Armbrokers in Weak States, 139. 101 Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong Armbrokers in Weak States, 142.

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i­ntelligence officers of Saddam Hussein or persons who formerly formed part of the army, thus, former Baath members.102 The whole process of integrating the Sons of Islam into the Iraqi security apparatus, or provide them otherwise with a job, was only partly successful, because some of the jobs offered were regarded as humiliating or far away from the home of the prospective worker. By 2010, 40% of the fighters were integrated.103 Many who remained unemployed could and would join the ranks of IS. 25

Instability, the Rise of the Islamic State and the Clan

The organisation that calls itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ­Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was created in 2013. The organisation has been fighting in Syria against the government of Bashar el-Assad. The Islamic State (IS) is a Sunni Wahabi salafist-jihadist militant group, which at the beginning of 2014, booked several military successes on the Iraqi army, and introduced a strict form of Sharia wherever it got a foothold. Although the organisation calls itself a state, and since 2014 the Islamic State (IS), it has the appearance of an organisation forcing its rigid ideology on the population and rules in areas under its power with extreme brutality. An extremely strict form of the Sharia is upheld, and the organisation uses e­ xtreme violence against Shia, Christians and other religions. The ultimate aim of the organisation is to unite Muslim populations in a Caliphate which should comprise not only Syria and Iraq, but also Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Kuwait, southern Turkey and Cyprus. One of the aims of the Islamic State is to undo all decisions that were taken in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. Discontents under the Sunni population in Iraq about their treatment made the organisation grow. Although at first there was cooperation with Al Qaeda in Iraq, in 2014, Al Qaeda has cut ties with Islamic State because of the latters’ brutal behaviour. The terror, by some formulated as genocide, of IS against the Yazidi’s created so much upheaval in Western Europe and the US that more efforts were formulated to withdraw IS from Iraq. Those who support the Islamic State are primarily men who are disappointed about the political developments in Iraq. Quite a number of them belong to the Sunni group, and some are former Baath members. After the ousting of 102 Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong Armbrokers in Weak States, 145. 103 Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong Armbrokers in Weak States, 180.

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Saddam Hussein, these former Baath members sought refuge in groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq. IS could develop because the government under al Maliki did not do enough to satisfy the needs of Sunni groups that became disenfranchised after 2003. IS-fighters consist of former military and certain clans.104 This underlines the complexity between state and clan, between groups that feel disenfranchised and the state. It once again underlines that if the state retreats, the clan can and does take over responsibilities. 26

Conclusion: State Building in Iraq and the Role of the Clan

A recurring problem for outsiders, who intervene in a clan-based society, is to find out who belongs to which clan, and who is the legitimate clan elder, or in Iraq, the sheikh. This is one of the general observations in this book, based on research on Iraq, Albania, Chechnya and Afghanistan.105 The sheikh, or clan elder, in Iraq is responsible for the safety and security of his people, and holds a political, military and legal position, by reconciling warring parties within the clan and reconciling conflicts between the clan and an outside partner. Kimberley Marten in her book Warlords, Strong Arm-brokers in Weak States puts forward the hypothesis that warlords emerge whenever the state (or statelike) security institutions are too weak to effectively control territory. In this conclusion we would stipulate that this is not only the case with warlords, but also with clans and tribes. Governments may come and go, regimes may come and go, but as we have seen in Iraq, the clan and tribe remain, and with them their regulatory aspects. Tribal rules and tribal allegiance survive weak states, because they are older than the state, and therefore deeper rooted in the local community. We saw this when Saddam Hussein tried to bribe the tribal leaders in supporting him, while they also did cooperate with the United States after Saddam Hussein had been ousted. It is of the utmost importance to understand the clan basis in a society, and understand how the relation between power brokers works from a tribal perspective. This helps us understand what the risks and opportunities are to

104 Abdulrahman al Rashed. “Do the Iraq Rebels belong to isis, the Baath Party or Clans”, Al Arabiya, June 15 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/ 06/15/Do-the-Iraq-rebels-belong-to-ISIS-the-Baath-party-or-clans-.html, (accessed January 7 2015). 105 Kimberley Marten. Warlords, Strong Armbrokers in Weak States, 153.

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work with them, and which other beneficiaries are seeking to cooperate with them. It is important to work with the clans, but also to keep in mind that they should not develop into warlords with their own agenda, but rather be part of the state. In the case of Iraq this means that there has to be a balance between Sunni and Shia, where both have to feel safe in Iraq. The aspect of autonomy for the Kurds remains a regional tension, since this also affects Syria, Turkey and Iran with their own Kurdish populations. In addition, minority rights, either religious or ethnic, have to be respected. One important way to incorporate the tribal society in the state is by reconciling those tribes and minorities that feel disadvantaged with those in power. Traditional systems can be used simultaneously with modern 21st century state building processes and human rights protection, including protecting women’s rights. The challenges in this scenario only get worse when foreigners join the (jihadist) forces. The problem lies in the fact that either the reasons for fighting among foreigners and Iraqis may be different, because the foreigners are not acquainted with the tribal culture, or that those supporting or intervening are considered as a common enemy by many in Iraq. This means that even more cultural differences, but also different reasons to fight, may exist between the original parties and the foreign jihadists or mercenaries. A fact is that many use the clan in their policies in the cases under consideration. Saddam Hussein used the clans to his own benefit within the formal state policies. Paul Bremer iii, as governor of Iraq in 2003, aimed to work with the clans to introduce democracy in Iraq. The US army during the Surge used clans in its effort to reconstruct and strengthen the Iraq state. The terrorist organisation Islamic State uses clans in order to get more power, with the aim to create an undemocratic, Islamist state.

General Conclusion At the beginning of this book several questions concerning the relation between the state and the clan were formulated. Central in the book is the question: how does a clan society interact with a state, during a state building process, as defined according to international laws on state building. Can this be regarded as a clash between “modern” Western style state building and “traditional” clan society? Is it possible to create a stable state in a clan society? Can a clan society be democratic? In order to answer these questions an analysis was given concerning what a clan society looks like, how it is organised, and what history the clan society has in the cases under consideration. It was also analysed what signifies a state, and to what extent we regard the clan-society as not Western, and the state as a Western concept. We realised that when talking about a state, this state might be strong, weak, failed or collapsed. The state does not stop being a state, but our general perception of a state is a strong state with a democratic government, where democracy is defined along Western lines. The clan-society predates the state. The analysis showed that there is an interaction between the strength of a state and the strength of the clan. When the state becomes weaker, the clan takes over certain responsibilities, while the state has to deal with the clan in one way or another, sometimes having to take back power from the clan in order to strengthen the state. This may result in a situation where the state is stronger than the clan, and that the state should have, or has preference over the clan society. Therefore, one question was whether there are not prejudices against the clan society in the discourse on state building. Can a clan society be democratic? Is the clan society similar to backwardness? The four case studies were selected because they all involve clan societies that are in transition, and all are in some way or another characterised as weak or failed states. In all cases either the international community has interfered, or, as in the case of Chechnya, another government, – in casu the Russian government – has interfered. Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the armed intervention and open conflict between the presidents of the Russian Federation and Chechnya, followed by reconstruction (partly) financed by the Russian Federation is comparable to the interventions of outsiders in cultures that differ at least in part from their own. The fact that the war between Chechnya and the Russian Federation was due to secession attempts strengthens this position. Though it is dangerous to stipulate that the Western concept of state building, with its democratic values, is better than the old clan

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society, this book showed that a transition process aimed at constructing a democracy based on Western values might be difficult. It is important to take into account the culture and norms that the state, to which these state building efforts are applied, traditionally has. The state in question can use aspects of the clan society to strengthen the state, next to the requirements that Western donors expect. In the cases of Chechnya and Albania the momentum where the question of state with or versus clan society became relevant was the moment when the communist political system changed to a new system that held at least some elements of democracy. In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq the population is multi-ethnic, and only some groups have a clan structure, though it is precisely these groups that usually are in power. Both Afghanistan and Iraq have known decades of conflict and oppressive regimes. This weakened the state, and in both cases the clans still form a serious component of power on a local, regional and national level in those areas where there are clan populations. It is the interaction between the clan and the state that keeps the state from being failed, and merely weak, since the clans create some structure in society. In Afghanistan and Iraq there is also an international aspect that is relevant, since some tribes also align along religious lines and get support from foreign p ­ owers. The international community in both cases intervened in order to restore stability and strengthen the state. These interventions complicate the analysis. It was noted that some deep-rooted aspects of clan society, helping clan members, resulting in clientelism and corruption, might not so easily be solved. However, it is fair to object to the assumption that the state can only be strengthened when it follows the Western concept of state building, i.e. a democracy. All states that have a serious change of system, new states that secede, or are entities that are part of a state after secession, witness a period of weakness, given the change in politics, and choose the political system that fits the society at that specific time. Conflict in the states under investigation often resulted in the coming to power of warlords. The aim of warlords is to attain or protect a power base, and in many cases they do so by acquiring funds through extortion. There are situations where the warlord is also a clan leader. Both warlords and clan leaders use clientelism. In all case studies, there are similarities between warlords and clan leaders, though there are also differences, since the use of violence against the civilian population in the areas of power may be a tool for a warlord, but may be very dangerous for a clan leader, because it may result in blood feuds, and loss of respect among the clan. When rebuilding a state after conflict or after secession, the clan can be involved in the efforts to realise a strong and stable state. Saddam Hussein used

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the clan in his quest to strengthen power as a dictator, and Putin cooperated in Chechnya with the clans loyal to him. The United States sought to cooperate with clans when they intervened in Iraq. There are problems that can be encountered when cooperating with clans: relations between clans will be visible in the state, and the clans can decide to oppose the government. Elections will initially be along the lines of clans, rather than based on political parties in those areas which prior to the state building effort did not know a functioning multi-party system. Nationalism may be used by those reconstructing the state as a tool to bring cohesion between groups in the population. In clan societies this may have adverse effects if certain clans don’t feel included and consider that they are part of another identity, like we saw in the case of Akhmed Noukhaev in Chechnya. Three aspects concerning state building are relevant for the relation between the state and the clan: The first is the organisation of the state and the cooperation of the different governance levels within that state, as well as the level of cooperation of citizens with the state apparatus. The analysis showed that the clan has a political, social and economic role. The clan furthermore brings some stability and its own identity. However, none of the examples presented in this book are strong states, all show signs of a weak or failing state. The second aspect is the functioning of the state. How does the state function, what does one expect from a state and how does the clan fit in? If we analyse the state with a clan society from the perspective of state building, we realise that our perception is Eurocentric, since the requirements of the modern – democratic – nation-state are in origin Western. In the case studies we see that the state with a clan society performs poorly when it comes to clientelism, corruption, free and fair elections, party politics, and often human rights, specifically women’s rights. There are also problems with transparency and accountability. This again underlines the conclusion that states with a clan society are more prone to be weak states. The third aspect is the international context in which state building takes place. International actors involved may be neighbouring states, international intergovernmental organisations like the United Nations, non-governmental organisations which give humanitarian support like the International Committee of the Red Cross, but also jihadist groups supported by other states. When looking at the international context, a clash between the rights of the individual and the rights of the clan and its members (group rights) in clan societies is visible, which differ from Western-based democracies, and may not fully be understood by those international actors that intervene. International actors pose a threat to the stability of the state. They may interfere having their own geo-political and geo-strategic agenda, which may not overlap with the

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priorities that the state with a clan society would formulate. This may prove detrimental to the state building process. Warlords, whether having their powerbase and income within the state, or being financed by outside (international) donors, hamper the centralization of violence in the hands of state authorities, in their effort to restore the monopoly over violence under state control. Furthermore, international involvement through the financing of weapons, whether in the hands of state support groups or in the hands of opposition groups, may influence the outcome of the process. And finally, an international intervention force may take over part of the state building effort, which may have a dual effect. On the one hand, this may be regarded as neo-colonialism, and not be greeted with enthusiasm by the population, on the other hand, it may give a boost to institution building and a basic security in the state. Are states that have a clan society inherently weak? This question is difficult to answer, but it is a fact that the examples in this book are all states characterised as weak. This can be the case because these states make interesting examples, and stand out more in the news. Another reason might be that no other examples of successful democratic states with clan societies can be found. Based on the situations described the conclusion is drawn that there are very strong bindings below the state level in clan societies, on a family, clan and tribe level, which are absent in mono-ethnic states which do not have a clan society. Given the analysis in this book, a state in transition, that knows a clan structure, is more prone to be weak over a longer period of time, than a state that does not have a clan society. The case of Chechnya was illustrative of a state, which is mono-ethnic and has known a period where formal politics supported the clan society and clan politics in the process after 1991. The Chechen state weakened due to internal politics and two military interventions by the Russian Federation. During the conflicts again the clans provided services to the population that the central state organs were not able to provide, such as rebuilding roads and providing means for medical care. President Putin used knowledge of the clans in Chechnya by appointing a representative from a lowland clan, President Ramzan Kadyrov, and earlier his father Akhmad Kadyrov, were positive towards staying in the Russian Federation and cooperated with the Russian authorities. The Chechen state is now relatively quiet, and clan affiliation still does play a role, in that Ramzan Kadyrov ruthlessly eliminates his political opponents from rivalling clans. In Albania the population is also mostly mono-ethnic, and clan society is still concentrated in the north of the country. Due to the inaccessibility of the north, the traditional society remained in place. The central state was not able to provide goods that are expected from a state. After 1991, when the ­communist

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regime had fallen and state-building efforts centred on democratisation, there was the need to provide political goods to all in society on an equal basis. The period of weakness the Albanian state witnessed after the fall of communism brought to the fore also aspects of the clan society that needed attention, such as the blood feuds which forced many young men to stay at home in order to survive, and inequality between men and women. Afghanistan has known conflict since the 1970s. The population consists of several ethnicities. Even in the weak state that Afghanistan has been since the ousting of the Taliban and the intervention of nato, the relation between clan members in the region has been strong. Some of these clan leaders turned warlords for economic or strategic reasons, some still maintaining good relations with the central authorities. This was possible because the central authorities only had power over the capital Kabul and some of the adjacent regions. One of the striking results of the merge of clan society in the state was the use of traditional law next to sharia law and positive law. It guarantees access to justice for those who otherwise would not be able to travel to a courthouse. In Afghanistan the internal conflict is not yet over. In that sense the case is different from Chechnya and Albania. Following the criteria of Robert Rotberg, Afghanistan is still rather a failed state than a weak state. It means that the relation between the government, between the state and the clan society, is not yet crystallized, though visible. The intervention by Western states on the one hand, and jihadists from abroad on the other, also blurs the situation, if compared with Albania and Chechnya. This makes the analysis of the relation with the state more complex. What is dominant, the central state institutions supported by the West, or the traditional society – to some extent supported by the jihadists and Taliban? To what extent does religion play a role? For the Taliban religion is of importance since they base their state structure on it, so they use religion for political purposes. But how powerful is the Taliban in military capabilities and support under the population? In Iraq, the clan society can contribute to the state building practice because it is part of the populations’ past. The detrimental aspects like cooptation and clientelism play a role in the politics of Iraq, and were used by Saddam Hussein after 1980 as an official policy, when he changed his policy and favoured clans. Just as Afghanistan, Iraq is characterised by several ethnic groups, some of which have a clan society, while others do not. The majority of the population is Shia, while the ruling elite until the fall of Saddam Hussein was Sunni. At the beginning of the 20th century uprisings against the British and the kings in Iraq were successful because of the ability to mobilise certain clans. The uprising of Islamic State since 2014 is also partly to be understood because Sunni tribes, frustrated by the loss of power in Iraq, support Islamic

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State and use the organisation for their own politics, sometimes by settling scores with other tribes. When it comes to state building, the tribes are part of the state building project, and even modernisation of society and the state along Western lines does not change this. The move of clans from the villages to the cities did diminish the adherence to the clan, but did not eradicate the influence of the clan in national politics. To conclude, based on the theoretical debate and the four case studies, the following has been found: clan societies are very old societies, mostly older than the state. During the modernisation process and the transition to an open society, the individuals modernise, but in case of emergency there is always the underlying knowledge of the clan society and dependence on the clan. More precisely, the everyday life of the citizen may be characterised as open to the world, but when it comes to important decisions, tradition for a serious group of the population may prevail, and this increases when the state structures are weak and matters of protection of life, goods and house are no longer guaranteed by state institutions. All of these cases concerned states in transition, and all of them were states that had or have conflict on their territory, where an outside power, be it an intervening force like nato or the UN, the Russian Federation or jihadists, interfered. The assumption is that these outside powers do not necessarily share the history and reasons for the conflict, but enter with their own agendas, which in turn may result in a clash between parties or a change of the conflict towards the outsiders, but not to the insiders. The analysis of this book shows that the clan society has features as clientelism and corruption that do not fit in easy with a Western idea of state building and democracy. The old traditions need to get some place in the state building project, or at least need to be acknowledged and addressed in the state. Those who interfere in a clan-based society need to be aware of the relations between clans and the specifics of clan society. This will improve a politically correct analysis and sound solutions as how to intervene. State building projects should include those aspects of a clan society that augment the protection of the civilian, while not including those aspects of a clan society that do not fit in modern state building. The central question in this book is: how do clan societies interact with the state? In order to answer this question, let us return to the four assumptions presented in the introduction of this book. The first assumption read: when the state becomes weak, the clan takes over responsibilities that are supposed to be in the domain of the state. In our four case studies there is ample evidence to prove this assumption. In all cases the clan became more important during

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transition, not necessarily in all parts of the state, but primarily in those parts of the state where the influence of the clan had remained visible before the transition process started. In Chechnya president Dudayev encouraged the clan society, in Albania the highland clans dominated life, in Iraq there had already been a revitalization of the clan in the state since the 1980s, but the intervening forces in 2003 also used the power of the clans for their state building activities. In Afghanistan the clans were a power to reckon with, and remain so until now. The second assumption read: clan societies are less developed than societies that do not know a clan structure. Based on the analysis of Claude LéviStrauss the answer would be yes. He regards the clan society as an archaic society. In this book however the clan society is seen as just another society than the Western based often mono-ethnic state. It would be too euro-centric to regard the clan society as inferior to our Western based society. A difference between the two societies is the role of the family and community, which is very strong and important in clan societies, whereas the Western style democracy concentrates more on the rights of the individual. In this book one society is not judged better or worse than the other, and the fact that the clan society, in this case with the patriarchal society, does not always give women equal rights and opportunities than men is taken into account. A positive aspect of the clan society is its emphasis on reconciliation in case of disputes, where the clan elder or the clan elders in a conflict between clans solve the conflict with an eye on the future relation between the clan members and between the clans. Reconciliation and mediation are much less common in Western style democracies, though it is on the rise. A third assumption was that clan societies can be democratised, since the clans together form a decentralised structure in the state, where power of the clans is vested in specific territories. On the one hand we see that the clans often strive for power between themselves, which makes the state as a whole not a safer place to be. On the other hand there can be a valuable balance within the clans and between clans, either of similar size or of different seize, where the clans know their role in society. In Chechnya we saw that president Putin manipulates by appointing persons from important lowland clans on high positions like the presidency, and he does this on purpose, because they support him. During the 1990s clans protected their own area, and took over infrastructural responsibilities in Chechnya. In Iraq the clans have regional power, and it is indispensable to know whom to turn to if an outsider wants anything done. In Albania the clan law and the position of women in the clan is very strict in the north, and is a regulatory force to be reckoned with. In Afghanistan the role of clan leaders and warlords sometimes blurs, but here again, just as in Iraq, it

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is important to be aware whom the power brokers are in order to intervene efficiently. A fourth assumption stipulated was that when the state gets stronger, the clan has to withdraw from some political fields, and this creates friction between the state and the clan. This assumption was proven true when the Afghan government decided to include warlords in the government. The aim was to lure the warlord away from his power base, and give him responsibility for the rebuilding of the whole country. This has only partially been successful. Some warlords saw membership of parliament with its immunity as a good way to escape prosecution, and went on with their extortion practices. In Iraq and Chechnya there is definitely a balance of power that has to be reached. The Chechen president restored power in the country through rebuilding the state with money from Moscow, by brutally murdering his opponents, and by creating a sphere of intimidation. The reclining of the state to give more room for the clans in the 1990s has not been positive for the Chechens. In Iraq president Saddam Hussein has used the clans, but has been very rude towards clans that did not cooperate, killing and torturing members of those clans. There needs to be enough trust in the state and its institutions to return power from the clan to the state. Incorporating clans in state institutions is one important solution that has worked in the past in communist regimes, both in Chechnya and in Central Asia, as the examples of Kathleen Collins showed. In Albania the relation between the state institutions and the north has always been difficult in the sense that infrastructure to the north was not as good as it was in the south, and that support from the state institutions was less available than in the south. Therefore, this assumption has proven to be correct in most instances. We arrive now to the central question in this book: how do clan societies interact with the state? Clan societies seem to have a double bind; the civilians are part of a family, part of a clan, part of a tribe, part of a people and the civilians of a state. They are embedded into more structures than the population in Western Europe and the United States, where the civilian is primarily an individual with individual rights, part of a loosely organised family, living in a city and in a state. It is the feeling of belonging to a smaller entity that protects when the bigger entity might fail, where the clan society is different. The clan society will expect more from the civilian with regard to helping the clan members, and group rights are more important than individual rights. The political system in a clan society will be presidential rather than parliamentary, and the position of women in the patriarchal systems that were researched gives room for improvement. The final conclusion therefore is that there is a strong interaction between the clan and the state, though not always a positive one.

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How does our conclusion compare to what Kathleen Collins calls “clan politics”? In Chapter One, Kathleen Collins described clan politics as: Clan politics creates an informal regime, an arrangement of power and rules in which clans are the dominant social actors and political players; they transform the political system. Clan networks, not formal institutions and elected officials, hold and exercise real power. Clan politics has a corrosive effect on the formal regime, especially on democratic institutions; it further erodes the durability of both democratic and authoritarian institutions over time, as fragile, personalistic regimes cling to power.1 Where Collins speaks of “an informal regime, an arrangement of power and rules in which clans are the dominant social actors and political players”, we saw that through cooptation clans play a formal and an informal role in the state building process. In Chechnya this role was formal, in Albania the role was informal, in Iraq this role was formal and informal, and in Afghanistan the role was also both formal and informal. By realising this dual position, the core problem that can arise in clan societies in transition becomes clear: when the state becomes weaker, the clans take over state responsibilities such as working on infrastructure, which is part of the informal sphere in the state. When the state transitions towards a stronger state, where the rule of law is upheld, there may be friction between the clan and the state, since the clan wants to be involved in the state building project. In this respect our conclusion differs from the description of Collins, or, you might say, it takes the discussion a bit further. In keeping with Collins’ argument, clans have a transformational role in the political system. Kathleen Collins states: “Clan networks, not formal institutions and elected officials, hold and exercise real power”. In this book the analysis shows that clan networks as well as formal institutions and elected officials (in which the clan members are represented) hold and exercise power. How much power lies with the clans, and how influential the state is, depends on the strength of the state. Over time the relations between the clans are coopted in formal politics. Collins’ assumption that “Clan politics has a corrosive effect on the formal regime, especially on democratic institutions” is in line with the findings in this book. Due to a lack in transparency and the duty of helping your fellow 1 Kathleen Collins. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 3.

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clan members, combined with the problem that arises from this, a certain level of corruption seems inevitable. The clan society is a closed society, while the state is part of the open society, as discussed in Chapter One. Collins states: “it [the clan CH] further erodes the durability of both democratic and authoritarian institutions over time, as fragile, personalistic regimes cling to power”. Based on our findings this is not always the case. Chechnya has had an authoritarian ruler for more than ten years and politics in Albania have quieted down in recent years. In Afghanistan, one of the factors which fuels the unrest is intervention from outside powers, both groups and states. The same is applicable to Iraq. The question of how democratic a state has to be, and if a state has to strive for a Western style of democracy, may be seen now in a more nuanced and realistic way. May this book have contributed to understanding the challenge between clans and democratisation.

Appendix

Clans, Tribes and Their Locality in Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq While compiling the lists with clans the author found that in some cases lists do not (completely) overlap. Since the sources are trustworthy, they are indicated here. This shows the importance of correct knowledge of clans and their influence in the areas they are inhabiting.

1

Clans in Chechnya1

Confederation

Clans

Localisation

A’kkhiï

Bartchakhoï, J’evoï, Ziogoï, Pkhiartchoï, Pkhiartchakhoï, Nokkhoï, Va’ppiï Amkhoï, Bia’stiï, Bienastkhoï, Italtchkhoï, Kamalkhoï, Kkhoratkhoï, Kiegankhoï, Mechiï, Sakankhoï, Teratkhoï, Tchiarkhoï, Erkhoï, Yamkhoï Aïtkhaloï, Belguiatoï, Benoï, Biltoï, Guandarguenoï, Guiordaloï, Gouonoï, Zandak’oï, Ikhiiroï, Ichkhoï, Kourchaloï, Sessankhoï, Tchermoï, Tsientaroï, Tchartoï, Eguiachbatoï, Enakkhaloï, Enganoï, Chouonoï, Yalkhoï, Yaliroï Nik’aroï, O’chniï, Cho’ndiï, Eltpkh’arkhoï

In the east of Chechnya, near Daghestan; North of Daghestan In the south west of Chechnya, along the frontier with Ingushetia and Georgia

Malkhiï

Nokhtchmakhkoï

Terloï

East, Southeast and part of central Chechnya

Along the Tchanty-Argun

1 M.A. Mamakaev. Le taipe (lignee) tchétchène dans la période de sa désintégration (Grozny: Maison d’édition tchétchéno-ingouche, 1973), 18–19 in Viacheslav Avioutskii, 54.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004415485_013

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Confederation

Clans

Localisation

Tchianti

Borzoï, Bouguiaroï, Khildekh’aroï, Do’rakhoï, Khouokkhadoï, Kh’atcharoï, Toumsoï Diaï, Makajoï, Sadoï, Sandakhoï, Sikkhoï, Sirkhoï

Along the river Tchanty-Argun

Tchebarloï

Charoï Chouotoï

Erchtkhoï

2

Kinkhoï, Rigakhoï, Khikhoï, Khoï, Kh’akmadoï, Chik’aroï Varandoï, Vachandaroï, Guiattoï, Keloï, Marchoï, Nijaloï, Nikhaloï, Pkh’amtoï, Sa’toï, Kh’akkoï Galoï, Guiandaloï, Guiartchoï, Merjoï, Moujakhoï, Tsietchoï

Southeast of Chechnya, the northern part of the valley of the Charo-Argun Central Chechnya, along the river Tchanty-Argun Valley of low Martan (Fortanga)

Clans in Albania2

Region

Clans

Malësia e Madhe

Kelmendi Gruda Hoti Kastrati Shkreli Triesh Plani Xhani Kiri Suma Drishti Shala Shoshi Shllaku Mazreku

Pulat

Dukagjin

2 Robert Elsie, The Tribes of Albania, History, Society and Culture (London, IB Taurus, 2015).

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Region

Gjakova highlands

Puka

Mirdita

Lezha Highlands

Kruja Highlands

Mat region Upper Drin basin

Clans Dushmani Toplana Other sources: Kiri Xhani Plani Nikaj Mërturi Krasniqi Gashi Bytyçi Qerreti Puka Kabashi Berisha Thaçi Mali i Zi Skana Dibrri Fani Kushneni Oroshi Spaqi Kthella Selita Bulgëri Kryezezi Manatia Vela Kurbini Ranza Benda Bushkashi Mati Hasi Luma Lura Arrëni Dibra

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APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribes in Iraq3

Confederation

Tribe

Region

Shammar

Toqa Jarba (connected to Jannabiyin, Ubayd, being of Zubaydi origin)

Central Iraq North-northwest Western province of Anbar, around Ramadi In the north along the rivers as far as Mosul and Khabur

Dulaym Jibur Al-Tikriti Khaza’il-al Anizah

Hushaim Al Aqrah Zubaydi

Ubayd

Albu Nasir Al Shallal Al Salaman

Baghdad area

Near the border between Iraq and Syria to the east bank of the Euphrates (of Shammar origin) Along the Euphrates (of Shammar origin) Along the Shatt al Dagharah (Dulaymi, Jibur, Ubayd albu Amir Originally from Yemen, they are of the Zubaydi stock) live scattered throughout Iraq Between Mosul and Baghdad, on the river banks of the Tigris

Another Division of Tribes in Iraq4: Al Glall Al Hassan Unizzah Albuh Mohammed Al Ozairij Bano Bayat Al Zobayd Al Rabi’h Albu Timin Al Montifig 3 Hussein D. Hassan, Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, crs Report for Congress, March 15, 2007. 4 “Tribes in Afghanistan”, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (unami), August 3, 2003, https:// www.refworld.org/docid/4693430d0.html, (accessed June 20 2019).

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APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Al Dufeer Al Motairat Al Asdy Al Kindy Bano Malik Al Khazraj Al Ribad Al Sawae’id Bano Lam Al Agr’a Albu Yaser Al Khaz’il Al Fatla Al Jubour Al Laith Al Hawashim Al Janaby Al Qaraghoul Dulaim Al Ssalhi Al Dduri ‘Ateeghi Al Qarah Somaida’ Al Nifeesah Al Takaretah Al Samarray Tkrity Sinjar Shammar

Kurdish Tribes5

Confederacy

Tribe

Location

Delo

Gash, Jamrezi, Karez, Khush mountains to Sarkala Panjankushti, Salim Waysi, and Khanaqin [Diyala] Taskawand

5 Mehrad R Izady, Kurds: A Concise Handbook (Washington, Taylor and Francis, 1992), in ­Foreign  Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Iraq: Blood Feuds, August 2017, 9–12,

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APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Confederacy

Tribe

Location

Dizai/Dizay

Gondola (Gontola), Maman, Piran Begzada, Chingini, Kafrushi, Mamand, Piriyai, Ramawand, Rashwand, Safarwand, Shitabisar, Sofiawand Amala, Badghi, Baseri, Bashki, Haruni, Isai, Ismail Uzhayri, Jalali (Galala), Jawanrudi, Kamali, Mikaeli, Muradi, Nawroli, Pishtmale, Rashubari, Rogai, Sadani, Safiwand, Shatri, Shaykh Ismaili, Tarkhari, Tawgozi, Yazbanbakuk, Yarwaysi, Yusifjani Sandula Begi, Kokha Bahram, Sarkala Bapirvand, Braspi, Chaydarvand, Dustalivand, Guran, Haywari, Jabirvand, Jugi, Kalkuh, Khizirvand, Kowkirvand, Mamasivand, Nowruzrand, Osivand, Papi, Shakarbegi, Sharaka, Sulamankahni, Zargush Bazayni, Khasa

Erbil to Trigris river

Hamawand

Jaf

Keza/Kaza Pahla/Fayli

Sharan/Shiwan Zand

Alyan (Elyan), Gheni (Qini), Mamsalih, Tayer Khani Ako Baban (Babani)

Chamchamal [Sulamaniyah] to Sirwan river and Bazayn region

Sulaymaniyah to Klar and Halabja

Shi Kifir to Chinchaldan In pockets from Baquba, northeast of Baghdad to Khuzistan [Iran]

North of Kirkuk, between Khasa and Zeh rivers Kifri to Sirwin river Around Raniya [Sulamaniyah]

North of Kirkuk and in Khanaqin

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/641597/Iraq_-_Blood_feuds_-_CPIN_-_version_1_0.pdf, (accessed July 30 2019).

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APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Confederacy

Tribe Belikan (Balik, Balikiyan)

Location

Between Rawanduz [Erbil] and Rayat in Balik Heights [Erbil] Barzanji (Berzinji) Barzanji (Berzinji) Bayati Tuz Khurmatu [Salah al-Din] to Kifiri Bazanyni (Shaykh Bazayni) Erbil to Kirkuk Boli South of Bilek Chigini North of Sulamaniyah Dumbuli (Dunbeli) Shaykhan [Ninewah] Daudi (Dawde) Tawq, Kifri to Tuz Khurmatu Gakhar (Qara Tapa) Girdi North of Erbil and Koy Sanjaq Homermil Sarkala to Kocha Sanjaq Jabbari (Jebzari) Kirkuk to Chamchamal and Laylan [Kirkuk] Kakai Kirkuk to Tuz Khurmatu Khalkan (Khalkani) Northern Balik Mountains and north-east of Erbil Khoshnaw Around Shaqlawa Kura Erbil to Shaqlawa Laylani Laylan Palhani Zanabad to Qara Tapa Pizhdar Peshdar. Around Qala Diza Salhi Between Kirkuk and Qara Hasan. Also in Damascus, Syria Sherwan North of Rawanduz [Erbil] Siyan North of Kirkuk Surchi Middle course of the Greater Zab river to Rawanduz Talabani (Telshani) In pockets south-east of Kirkuk, northeast of Klar Talshani Ski Kifri to Zardawa Zangana Kifri to Klar Zarari North of Basturicha Zudi Rawanduz region

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APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Assyrian Tribes6

Tribe Albaq Barwar Baz Botan Chal Diz Bash-Kalak Gawar Halim Jilu Kasran Nochiya Qodchanis Taimar Tkhuna Tyari (lower)

Tyari (upper)

Location

Area Northern Iraq Konak (Hakkari) Sirnak province and Darwodiya Chal region

northern Iraq

Baghdad, Iraqi Kurdistan Region Konak (Hakkari) Gunduktha Mazra Ashitha Bnematha Biraul Lizen Minianish Muelgipa Sulbag Zawita Nouhara Banimatu Byalta Kelaita Lakina Romta Geramon

Hakkari and northern Iraq

Hakkari and Dohuk province

6 The Assyrian tribes are situated in the border region between Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. Though the author has tried to make a list of Iraqi tribes, there are tribes that do live across the border with neighbouring states. “List of Assyrian Tribes”, https://ipfs.io/ipfs/ QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/List_of_Assyrian_tribes .html, (accessed July 11 2019).

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APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

Location

Urmia

Baradost Margawar Salamas Somai Tergawar Ushnuk

Walto

4

Clans in Afghanistan



Pashtun Tribes7

Area

Walto river, upper Zab

Confederacy

Tribe

Clans

Durrani super tribe

Barakzai Clan (Zirak)

Angizai, Ghaibizai, Hutmanzai, Khirzai, Khunsezai, Muhamadzai/ Muhammadzai, Nasratzai, Sulimanzai, Umarkhanzai, Bakilzai, Gurujizai, Khanchazai, Malikdinzai, Nasinzai, Sherzai, Sundarzai Gulbaz, Khabast, Kharbun/Khairbun, Khyrbun/Karbun, Sherzad, Wazir/Vaziri/Laili Adinzai, Adozai, Alizai, Badizai/ Badizae, Chalakzai/Chalakzae, Ghorizai, Gurgan, Jamalzai, Jiji, Kurezai, Mirgian, Pataz, Samizai, Umarzai Ali Shah Khel, Angurai, Jinigar and Hassan Khel, Qalandar Khel, Sultan Khel, Tsapparai

Khugiani Clan (Panjpai) Nurzai Clan (Panjpai)

Daulatzai super tribe

Khadi and Barat

7 This list has been compiled as careful as possible. However, since sources were difficult to find, there might be minor mistakes. “Afghanistan, Ethnic Identity and Genealogies, Tribe, Clan & Ethnic Genealogies”, Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, https://my.nps.edu/web/ccs/ethynic-genealogies, (accessed July 8 2019).

244 Confederacy

Dotani Qabayil

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

Clans

Khoidad Khel

Alama Khel, Maniwal, Nurwal, Shinkiwal Labizai, Hassanzai

Hasan Khel Bana Khel Umar Khel

Usmanzai Ghilzai super tribe Ali Khel (in Ghazni province)

Hassan Khel Hotak Khel

Badin Khel/Budin Khel, Gurbaz, Ibrahim/Ibrahim Khel, Ranra Kehl, Sankizai/Sarkizai Adu Khel, Bukhran Khel, Dawalaq, Gaddai/Gaddi, Isaf, Kamvar Khel, Khudzai (Khuduzai), Mamozai, Manzar Khel, Maskai, Mush Khel, Saikach, Shahmurad Khel, Urba, Banjar/Banjari, Chaka, Gada Khel, Gargin, Isap Khel, Khozai, Maist, Mamun, Mardan Khel, Minzai, Nikab, Shah Alam Khel, Sulaimanzai, Uria Khel Malezai, Mandezai, Utman Malak Yar, Dolat Yar, Yusuf, Ghon, …. (Akazai, Ataghar Hotak, Isakzai (Ishakzai), Malizai, Marufzai, Ramzai, Saghari, Sakzai, Shangri, Tahiri, Tunzai, Umarzai/Umarza, Yusufkhel, Alizai, Babazai, Baratzai, Khadzai, Manjar Khel, Polad, Saghari, Saghadzai, Satkhel, Tadzak, Thari/Tahre, Umar Khel, Utmankhel, Yusufzai) Salaar, Thapai, Nona, Musa Khel

Marwat Tribe Andar (in Paktia, Ghazni province) Chamkani (in Mada Khel, Kamzai, Babu Khel, Chamkani Darman Khel, Sulaiman Khel, district, northern Baghiar, Hisarak Paktia)

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Confederacy

Ghorya Khel Super Tribe

245

Tribe

Clans

Suleiman Khel

Ahmadzai (in Paktia, Paktika and Khost), Chakmani, Kaisar Khel, Sarprekara, Babikar Khel, Samalzai, Tuta Khel, Khojak, Minzai, Astanazai, Liasi Khel, Stanizai, Khwazak, Piaro Khel

Kharoti Durani Clan

Aba, Ama, Azgar, Buchal, Darbi, Haji, Haraira, Ibrahim, Jaeli, Kala, Langar, Mandar, Marcha, Mati, Nazal, Nur, Pandiali, Sado, Sarbedal, Taraki, Wali Beg, Ahmad, Ayub, Babi, Dadu, Ghazi, Halim, Hasan, Isa, Jani Beg, Khojar, Makh, Mando, Mati, Musa, Nekbi, Nur, Rawal, Sak, Suleman, Umar, Ya’ub

Kakar Super Tribe Abdulazai/ Abdulazae Alizai/Alizae Charmi Dhamad Hamzazai/ Hamzazae Jalazai/Jalazae Kabizai/Kabizae Khidarazai/ Khidarazae Kudizai/Kudizae Mandukhel Musakhel Nurzai Panazai/Panazae Psein Kiral, Zaku Sanatial Shabozai/ Shabozae Sini Siona

246 Confederacy

Khostwal Super Tribe

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe Suliman Khel Tenizai/Tenizae Utmankhel Alisher Arun Khel Bakir Khel/Bacir Ismail Khel/ Ismail Lakkan/Lakan Mali/Malli Mandozai/ Mandu Mandu Matun

Mula Saban Sabari/Saban Shamil/Shamo/ Shamal Tani

Mangal Super Tribe Shinwari Super Tribe

Clans

Tarawi Tarwizai/Tarizai Miran Khel, Khajuri, Gabar, Marghai, Kamal Khel Alisher Khel

Aidar Khel, Barkhan Khel, Dadwal, Difpari, Mardi Khel, Pirs Adam Khel, Ismail Khel, Kamar Khel, Kurian, Machar, Malli Khel, Manz, Sarki Khel, Tsalari, Zaki Khel Hasan, Muhammad Ahmad Khel, Haji Khan Khel, Kajuri, Khojal Khel Wazir, Kundi Khel, Landiwal, Mangash, Modi Khel, Patara, Sodi Khel, Zaghu

Mallizai Kandaharis, Narezai, Parbah, Pirs Arevzai, Durnami, Khabbi Khel, Mari Khel, Sinkai/Sinaki

Adil Khel, De Saruk, Khuga Khel, Kuhai, Mirdad Khel, Pa Khel, Paya Khel, Pekha, Pirwal Khel, Shaikhai Khel, Ash Khel, Kali Khel, Khwaja Khel, Lohargai Khel, Otar Khel, Past

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Confederacy

Tribe

Manduzai/ Mandu/Mandhi Zai Sangu Khel/ Sangukhel Sipai/Sehpai/ Sipai Other tribes:

Bangash Tribe Betani Qabayil Tribe Dalazak Tribe Dawarh Tribe Gorbaz Tribe Hani Tribe Jadoon Tribe Kakhar Qaum Kasi Tribe Khogiani Lodhi Qabayil Mahsood Tribe (in south Waziristan) Malagori Tribe

247

Clans Khel, Piro Khel/Peru Khel, Piset Khel, Shemak Khel Hamza Khel, Hasan Khel, Ilias Khel Gadu, Haidar Khel Karmo Khel, Khani Khel, Mirjan Khel, Soulor Ptar, Ghani Khel, Karchal Khel, Karmu Khel, Mai Khel, Mullagoris Babar Khel/Babur Khel, Haidar Khel, Rahimdad Khel, Shabul Khel, Suliman Khel Gaar, Jamshed, Ameer Shajara Lodi Khel, Ya’qub Khel Karlanri Salaar, Mansoor Qais Abdul Rashid Alo Zai, Muhammad Zai, Seron, Qaum Yar, Herh, Zamarianai, Moseegh, Kattran, Shinwari, Slatt Shah Hussein Ghauri

Ghaurya Khel

248

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Hazara Tribes8

Tribe Abak/Abaka Allakah Allaudin Bacha Shadi Baichazi Baiya/Baiyah Barat Barbari Begal Beguji/Baj Guji Besud/Behsud/ Bajsuti Bolgor Bubak Chagai Shahar Dasta/Urni Chula Gur Dhala/Dai La Dai Barka Dai Chopo Dai Dehqo/Dehqan Dai Kundi/Deh Kundi

Dai Mardah/ Dahmarda Dai Mirak

Clan

Abdul, Ata, Babaka, Babali, Baian, Behbud, Bul Hussum, Boorjugiye, Bul Hasan, Burjagai

Chahil Gori Akzar/Aghzir, Aladai, Beth Dara, Chahar Deh-i-Bebud, Kuluj, Param

Ainak, Alak, Babuli, Baibagha/Baibagh/Baibogha, Barat/ Burat, Bubak, Chahkuk, Chahush/Chaoosh/Chaush, Chora, Daulat Beg, Doda, Fihristan, Haider Beg, Jami, Jasha, Kalanzai (Burmain, Chora), Kaum-i-Ali, Khudi, Khushak, Khoshak

8 “Hazara Tribe”, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, https:// web.archive.org/web/20150121163505/http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCs/Docs/Tribal%20 Trees/Hazara.pdf, (accessed July 12 2019).

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

249

Clan

Dai Mirkasha Dai Qozi Dai Zangi/Deh Zangi Bacha Ghulam/Bacha-i-Gulam/Buchu Ghoolam (Bubak, Gaoshak, Ghulam Ali, Ismail, Kaum I Barfi, Kaum I Mirza, Neka, Waras) Daltamur Damarda Darghun Dastam Dayah Dayu Deh Zengi Di Meri/Dai Meri Di Mirlas/Dai Mirlas Di Nuri/Dai Nuri Dinyari/Dinyar Dosti Faoladi Chingar, Elibai, Kara Jangal, Muhammad, Zai Golak Gadi/Gadai Gangsu Garhi Gavi/Gawi Ghaznichi Gudar Habash Jiblai, Ketar, Khalik, Wazir, Zai Wahid Hasht Khwaja Ihsanbaka Jaghatu Ahmada, Alishgi/Aishghi, Aludini, Balat, Farash, Karasuf, Karim Dad Khel, Karghani, Khataghan, Khwaja Miri, Kimlut, Laghri Jaghuri/Jaghori Ata (Maska), Baghuchari, Bubak, Damardah, Gari, Gujaristan, Izri (Musqa), Kalandar, Malistan, Tughai Buga, Jaokar Kadelan Kagai Kalah Surkhabi

250

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

Clan

Kala Nao

Bai Baka/Baibagha/Baibaka, Barankari/Barankavi, Barat/ Baiat, Beguja/Begujai/Bai Gujai, Bubak, Dai Zangi (Karianash), Faristan, Ihsankaka, Kadi, Kah Kah, Khwaja Hazara, Kohmari, Kokdari, Kundilan, Laghari/Lagari, Mahmaka/ Mamuka/Mahmakar, Mirmarg, Najak

Kalak Kalanzai Kalta Kamarda Kara Mali Karabagh Kazlak Kham-i-Baba/ Khan-i-Baba Khatai Khozi Khubzat Khwaja Khwaja Sayyid Koh-e-Gadi/ Koh-i-Gadi/Kohadai Kohistani Kolian Kubti Kundelane Kuru Lal Logai Mingak Mirale Mohammed Khwaja/ Khoja

Nadir Najik

Aldai Kirigu

She-Pai, shephai

Alam, Amin, Bahi, Bahram/Bahran, Bandali, Bubak, Chalma, Doka, Ikhtiar, Jaffah/Jaffa, Jamal, Karachah, Khapar, Khazar, Khusal/Khisale, Khwaja, Mirak/Mirag, Nur Muhammada, Ornee, Sagadee, Shahu, Tamakee Taltamoor, Tochin

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

251

Clan

Nakodari Nek Pai Neka Neza Paraganda Pas-i-Koh Polada/Daya Polada/ Aji, Basi, Besudi, Butao, Chakar, Dah La, Dalai, Daulat Khan, Fulado/Faolad Daulat Pai, Khesh, Dayah (Besudi, Daulat Kahn, Deh Barka), Deh Barka, Haidar, Haji, Inal, Iska, Jamal, Kalanzai, Khoninda, Khubzat, Khurdakzai, Kimsan-Dangula, Kimsung, Malanak, Mir Adina, Musat, Panjpat Sadat Sadmarda Sag Pah/Sagpah Sahkhdar Sar Janghali Sayyid Sayyid Ishan Shani Shahi Shahristani Tajik Shaikh Ali/Sheikh Abak/Abgah, Ali Jam, Ash Khoja, Babar, Bacha Shadi, Chahil Ali/ Dai Kalu/ Ghori, Dai Chopan, Dai Mirak, Daolat Pah, Darghan, Khinjanis Deh-e-Miraq, Gadai, Gadi, Gaohi/Garhi/Girahi, Gawi, Habash, Hasht Khoja/Hash Khwaja, Kaghai, Kalu, Karai, Karamali/Karam Ali, Karluck/Kalluk, Karluk, Koh-i-Gadi, Kollak, Naiman, Nekpai/Negpai, Pas-i-Kundi, Pasira/Pasir, Sad Marda/Sadmarda, Sagpa, Turkmush, Tatar, Tili/Thuli, Tokhta, Toth, Turmush, Wala Shakhdar Surkhabi/Surkabi Takana Begal Taraghai Tli Timuri Afghani/Afgani, Beika’i, Hasani, Malang (Sir Ahmad), Odil (Afghani, Sabs, Sodkhom), Sabs, Shir Ahmad, Shodkom/ Sodkom

252

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

Clan

Turkoman/Turkmen Urazgani/Uruzgani Yangur Yasumbagha Yekh Aulang/Yawk Alang/Yakalang Zaidnat/Zeidnat Zamiat/Zaimat Zirak



Mukadam Sayed/Saiat

Achakzai

Baluch Tribes9

Baji Zai Bazi Zai Borzai Dah Mardah/Dah Marda Dar-I-Zai Gargeg Garm Seli Ghallahacha Ghurghij Gorgeg Gorget Gurej Gurgej Hasanzaj Kabdani Kalbali Kautani Lajai Makaki Malki

9

“Baluch/Baloch Tribe”, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, https://web.archive.org/web/20150226132250/http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/ Tribal%20Trees/Baluch.pdf, (accessed July 12 2019).

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Kirghiz Tribes10

Tribe

Clan

Teyet/Tait

Sari Teyet (Qutan Oghlu, Mama Oghlu, Haider Oghlu), Chal Teyet, Chapan Teyet, Laqay, Qara Teyet, Qarleq, Yaman/Yaman Teyet Qezil Ayagh (Baki Jan, Jelma, Meta, Mirza) Chawugh, Jeghjem, Mushke, Quralay, Bustan (Mowlamey, Sar Washel), Ghedirsha (Engershaq, Hait Aka), Mama Shar, Qara Sadaq, Qushqulaq Chela, Kara Qepchak, Kulchaq, Sart Qepchak Chela, Kara Basterghay Naiman, Bowa Naiman, Ghuran Naiman, Jawun Put Naiman, Jowru Naiman, Jurde Naiman, Ken Naiman, Keyek Naiman, Kok Echke Naiman, Mirza Naiman

Kesak/Kasak/ Kasik Qepchak Unk Naiman

Tajik Tribes11

Tribe

Clan

Aimakh/Aimaq Akil Allahyari Arbab Zai/Arbabzai Baraki Bazy Furmuli Jagatai Jotegh Kabuli Khabar

Chobaki

10 11

253

Ragan

“Kirghiz/Qirghize Tribe”, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, https://web.archive.org/web/20150223022828/http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CC s/Docs/Tribal%20Trees/Kirghiz.pdf, (accessed July 12 2019). “Tajik”, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, https://web .archive.org/web/20150223034441/http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCs/Docs/Tribal%20 Trees/Tajik.pdf, (accessed July 12 2019).

254

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

Clan

Khoja Kohistani Larkhabi

Tatar Ethnic Group12

Tribe

Clan

Chagai Hai Hubi Mekhzari Meriji Muhammad Kuli Zai Batur Zai Bi Zai Chopan Zai Chunika Zai Ghola Zai Hubi Zai Hundu Zai Kara Zai Mahmad Zai Mirzari Zai Murtumi Zai Nabaki Zai Nazar Zai Payandabeg Zai Qabiz Zai Qara Zai Shakur Zai Shokor

Chagil Ghori Hazara

12

“Tatar Ethnic Group”, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, https://web.archive.org/web/20150223024251/http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCs/Docs/ Tribal%20Trees/Tatar.pdf, (accessed July 12 2019).

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

255

Clan

Zai Shola Zai Ulusi

Nuristani Tribes13

Tribe

Ashkunu/Ashkun/Ashkund Bashkul Katir

Chanak Dutak Gramsana Istrat/Gourdesh/Gordesh Kalasha Kantor Kastan/Kastuz/Kashtan Kata Katir Kieth

13

Clan Barmodari, Charedari, Jannadahri, Mutawadari, Shakladari, Shtukdari, Sowadari

Chima Nishei, Vai, Vata Kaymgal (Atergam, Bairkama, Pimichgram)

Kti/Katwar, Kullum/Kulam, Ramguli/ Gabarik

The clans have been analysed until three levels, many clans have even more levels. Sources: “Afghanistan, Ethnic Identity and Genealogies, Tribe, Clan & Ethnic Genealogies”, Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, https://my.nps.edu/web/ ccs/ethynic-genealogies, (accessed July 8 2019) and “Nuristani Tribe”, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, https://web.archive.org/web/2015 0121153921/http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCs/Docs/Tribal%20Trees/Nuristani.pdf, (accessed July 12 2019).

256

APPENDIX: CLANS, TRIBES AND THEIR LOCALITY

Tribe

Clan

Kom/Kam/Kamtoz

Batardari, Bilezhdari/Bilezhedari, Demidari, Garakdari, Gutkechdari/ Gutkechdar, Kanardari/Kanaldari, Lanandari, Sukdari, Utah-dari/Utahdari, Waidari

Kshto Madugal/Muman/Manugul/Mundegal Mumo Paintar Paj Pashagai/Pashagae Peh Pendesh Presun/Viron Rahrah Sanu Tapahkal Tregami/Traiegma Vasi Wadihu Wai/Waegal Wama/Wamai/Wamaite

Devi, Gumbeer, Kaltar

Tregami/Traiegma (Bungalee, Paintar, Willwal)

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Index Accountability 6, 21, 31, 36–37, 39, 47, 73, 86, 99, 110, 143, 149, 186, 206, 226 Achakzai tribe 151 Adat law, traditional 102, 110 Adinzai 243 Administration, transparent 41 Administrative regions 48–49 Adygea 37 Affiliations religious 165 tribal 74, 212 Afghan Amir Abdurahman Khan 154 Afghan authorities 154–55, 175, 184 Afghan border 153 Afghan clan society 152 Afghan communist government 158 Afghan confederation 150 Afghan Constitution 150 Afghan culture 173 Afghan government 152, 154–55, 168, 231 Afghani army 184 Afghan Insurgency 174, 275 Afghan Interim Administration 167 Afghan Interim Authority 167 Afghanistan 3–4, 6, 8–9, 13, 36, 39–40, 46, 48–49, 69–70, 78, 81, 84–85, 93, 95, 149–87, 228, 230, 232–33, 243, 255, 257–64, 267–69, 271–80 area borders 153 conflict in 40, 158, 176, 181 contemporary 152 post-conflict 48, 275 reconstruction of 168, 172, 185 Afghanistan and Iraq 6, 188–89, 194–95, 197, 199, 204, 225, 235, 276 Afghanistan and Pakistan 154–55, 169, 171, 173, 184 Afghanistan’s independence 154 Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition 169, 172, 180, 269 Afghanistan’s sovereignty 154 Afghanistan warlords 163 Afghan king Amanullah 152 Afghan kingdom 175

Afghan monarchy 152 Afghan nation 161 Afghan National Army 168 Afghan National Police 168 Afghan National Security Forces 168 Afghan-Pakistani border area 24 Afghan politicians 169 Afghan politics 8, 150 Afghans, uniting 150 Afghan society 150, 174 Afghan state 83, 151, 165, 179, 185 Afghan territory 164, 166 Afghan Transitional Administration 167 Afghan tribes 89 Afghan War 273 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending 166–67, 258 Agreements 29, 40, 53, 60, 70, 110, 120, 190, 277–78 Albania, southern 127 Albanian clans 8, 133 Albanian clans and tribes 148 Albanian Communist party 140 Albanian Democratic Party 147 Albanian families 20, 129, 261 Albanian government 139–41, 145–46 Albanian Highland Tribal Society 127, 139–40, 264 Albanian history 126, 136 Albanian Identities 128, 131–32, 135–40, 142–43, 281 Albanian language 127 Albanian Macedonians 147 Albanian minority in Macedonia 146 Albanian People’s Republic 141 Albanian politics 20, 126, 139, 143 Albanian refugees 146 Albanians 7–8, 20, 34, 83, 126–32, 136–38, 140–42, 145, 147, 280 Albanians in Serbia and Kosovo 137 Albanian Socialist Party 146 Albanian society 126–27 traditional 135 Albanian state 126, 138–39, 148, 228

Index Albanian Sworn Virgins 131, 281 Albanian youth in Macedonia 147 Albu-Ghafur clan 201 Albu Nasir 188, 194–95 Aliev clan 21 Alikozai 164 Alizai tribe 164 Alu Alkhanov 124 American forces 206, 217, 220 American-led invasion of Iraq 212 Amir Shir Ali 152 Anbar Salvation Council 219–20, 275 Ancestors 106 Andi 113 Andi territories 116 Al-Anfal campaign 196 Anglo-Afghan Treaty 154, 259 Anglo-Afghan War 152, 154, 259 Anglo-Afghan war, second 152 Anglo-Iraqi treaty 191 Anthropology, cultural 2 Anti-corruption 83 Arab states confederation of 190 independent 190 Army, private 66 Assimilation 25, 28 Assyrians 187, 191–92, 196, 242, 257 Assyrian tribes 242 list of 242, 257 Autonomy 30, 44–45, 70, 101–2, 132, 137, 161–62, 175, 185, 192, 215, 223 Azerbaijan 14, 21, 34, 73, 269 Baathist party 194–95, 200 Baathists 33, 193–94 Baath members 205 Baath Movement 193, 195 Baath party 9, 193–94, 199, 205, 208, 211–12, 222, 258 Baath policy, official 197 Badal 93, 271 Badinter Arbitration Committee 51, 273 Badinter Commission 50–52, 64 Baluch/Baloch Tribe 252, 257 Baluchistan 154–55 Barakzai 164–65 Basayev 120–21

283 Bedouin tribes 39 Behaviour, voting 20, 105 Berisha tribes 130 Berzinji 241 Besudi 251 Betani Qabayil Tribe 247 Blood diamonds 61 Blood feuds 7–8, 17, 19, 33, 39, 66, 70, 76, 79, 107, 110, 118, 122, 125, 128–29, 131, 134, 136, 140–41, 225, 228 Blood-feuds 36 Blood money 79 Blood revenge 13 Blood vengeance 107 Bolshevik army 116–17 Bonn Agreement 166–67, 179 Border areas 146, 153, 165, 169 contested 160 Border control 85, 184 Border delimitation 155 Border disputes 195 Border incidents 196 Borders 50–51, 56, 126, 132, 138, 151, 155, 160, 164, 171–73, 178, 184, 196, 238, 242 fluid 178 internal 51 valid international 154 Boundaries colonial 49 ethnic 138 national 49 territorial 106 Boundaries of afghanistan 154, 257 Bribes 28, 58, 119, 177, 222 British-Afghan war 152 British India and Afghanistan 154 British Rule 89, 149, 153, 175 Building, institution 100, 185, 227 Burdened societies 30 Burdened states 31–32 Camëria 140–41 Central Asia 1–2, 14, 17–18, 20–22, 25, 33, 36, 69–70, 76, 114, 118–19, 167, 231–32, 262, 264, 271 Central Chechnya 235–36 Central Iraq 238 Central Treaty Organisation 193

284 Chechen Autonomous Oblast 117 Chechen border 121 Chechen clans 105, 112, 125 Chechen Clan Society 7, 110 Chechen clan system 92 Chechen culture 109, 118, 122 Chechen government 94, 118 Chechen History 105–6, 109, 122 Chechen kinship structure 108 Checheno-Ingushetian Autonomous Oblast 117 Chechen people 18, 118 Chechen Politics 105, 114 Chechen population 114 Chechens 7, 16, 19, 25, 76, 105–7, 109–10, 112–16, 118–20, 122–23, 187, 231, 268 Chechen society 16, 19, 39, 105–6, 110, 118, 277 the clan in 114, 125 traditional 125 Chechen state 120, 227 Chechen teip 76 Chechen territory 117 Chechen tribes 108 Chechen war 121, 277 Chechnya 3, 6–8, 14, 16, 18, 21–22, 24, 34, 36–37, 68–69, 89–90, 92, 94, 96, 105–7, 109–12, 114–25, 136, 182–83, 187–89, 194–95, 197, 204, 224–28, 230–33, 235–36, 257–58, 265, 270–71, 276–77 attacked 117 boycotted 118 the clan in 6, 105 clans in 76, 105, 107–9, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 125, 227 declaration of independence of 121 independent 121 invaded 122 lowland 109 president of 124 rule of law to 123, 266 status of 120–21 Cherkessia 112–13 Christian Albanians 136 Circassians 25, 36, 112 Civil society 27, 55, 74–75, 81–82, 86, 88, 90, 143, 266 role of 90, 273

Index Civil society organisations 82, 88, 90, 156 Civil war 49, 67–68, 70, 95, 149, 151–52, 158, 269, 280 Clan affiliates 121 Clan affiliations 7, 9, 20, 37–38, 69–70, 89, 114, 131, 162, 165, 227 Clan allegiance 20, 23 Clan alliances 27, 37, 119 Clan-based societies 2, 4–6, 10, 14, 19, 23, 25, 27, 32, 35, 38–41, 76, 79, 84–85, 94, 96, 186–87, 222, 229 Clan Communities 27–28, 276 Clan culture 20, 105, 107, 122, 125, 266 Clan democracy 36 Clan elders 69, 72, 102, 107, 110, 120–21, 129, 133, 135, 142, 151–52, 158–59, 161–64, 167, 171, 179–80, 183, 230 Clan-families 23 Clan history 7 Clan identities 22 Clan justice 7 Clan law 7, 36, 100, 230 traditional 10, 24 Clan leaders 5, 7, 66, 69, 101, 202, 209, 225, 228, 230 Clan lineage 2, 106 Clan members 15, 19–21, 24, 26, 33, 35–36, 66, 73, 82, 84, 88–89, 101–2, 105, 107, 110, 114, 129, 133, 189, 195, 228, 230–33 individual 133 male 122 Clan militia 69 Clan networks 17, 21, 33, 201, 232 strong 19 Clan patronage networks 23 Clan politics 7–8, 14, 17, 21–23, 33–34, 85, 90, 100, 120, 148, 227, 232, 261 Clan populations 225 Clan power 101 Clan rules 35, 122, 152 Clans 1–11, 13–29, 31–43, 47–49, 53–55, 65–66, 68–73, 76, 79–80, 82–85, 87–92, 94–95, 97–102, 105–8, 110, 112–14, 118–30, 132–36, 141–42, 148–49, 151–52, 159–62, 164–78, 182–83, 185–89, 194–95, 197–98, 200–202, 205–8, 212–18, 221–33, 235–56, 260–61, 267–68 allied 23, 92

Index autonomous 106 clans fighting 106 co-opt 13 cooptation 232 de-escalation phase 84 highland 230 important lowland 230 local 22 lowland 227 regional 67 rivalling 178, 227 rural 22 Clans and democratisation 97, 233 Clans and ethnicities 165, 174 Clans and tribes 4, 9, 84, 151, 165, 187, 195, 215, 219, 222 Clans and warlords 68–69, 71, 149, 161 Clans in Afghanistan 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 185 Clans in Albania 126–27, 129, 131, 133, 135, 137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147 Clan societies 1–10, 13–14, 16, 19–20, 28–29, 31–33, 35–37, 39, 41–42, 65–67, 69, 71, 73–74, 76, 82, 85, 92, 94, 96, 99–102, 106–7, 109, 125–26, 148–50, 167–69, 171, 173–74, 187–88, 190, 224–33 closed 122 democratising 4 patriarchal 132 problems 83 traditional 2, 9, 224 Clan-society 2, 100, 184, 224 Clan solidarity 76 Clan-structure 173 Clan structures 1, 3, 5, 9–10, 19–20, 22–24, 26, 29, 36, 101, 107–9, 127, 129, 148–50, 225, 227, 230 Clan system 8, 32, 83, 85, 119, 122, 128, 162 Clan territory 101 Clash 3–4, 13, 31, 72, 99–100, 148, 224, 226, 229 Clientelism 4, 19, 33, 36–38, 66, 90, 99, 161, 177, 194, 225–26, 228–29 Closed societies 4, 13, 19, 21, 72, 101, 110, 233 Collins 14, 17, 20, 22, 33, 69, 232, 262–63 Colonialism 193–94, 197 Combatants 60, 97, 136 former 65, 97

285 Common ancestor 15, 69, 150–51 Common ancestry 17 Common mythic ancestor 107 Communism 1, 7–8, 24, 36, 42, 105, 119, 125, 129, 133–35, 142–43, 148, 193, 228 Communist government 6, 36, 158 Communists 7, 33, 36, 114–15, 140–41, 158, 225, 227 Communities 14, 17–18, 38, 48, 67, 90–91, 94, 150, 174, 181, 207, 230, 265 tribal 18 Confederation of North Caucasian Mountain peoples 115–16 Confederations, tribal 106 Conflict resolution mechanisms 24, 35, 39, 79 Conflict resolution mechanisms help 39 Conflict resolution methods 33 Conflict resolution skills 189 Conflicts armed 60–61 border 160, 196 ethnic 26, 126, 277 internal 3, 62, 102, 123, 228 intra-state 60, 75, 281 open 122, 224 regional clan 186 tribal 165 Conflict transformation 3, 151 Constituents 75 Constitution 47, 60–61, 115, 142–43, 150, 157, 179, 211–12 national 4, 48 new 118, 157, 167, 179, 211 Constitution of Afghanistan 149, 158, 179–80, 262 Contracts power-sharing 25 social 29, 33, 76 Cooperation 7, 44, 50, 52, 90, 99, 102, 134, 138, 143, 200, 202, 209, 221, 226, 279 Co-operation 14, 40, 50, 279 Co-opt 24–25 Co-optation 24, 26 Corruption 31, 33, 35, 38, 55, 57, 87, 91–92, 99, 102, 143–44, 146, 148, 156, 159, 161, 163, 177–78, 182, 186, 225–26, 229, 271 Court, traditional 180, 183

286 Crime organised 57 transnational 92, 177 Cross-border criminality 3 Cultural dialogue 96 Cultural relativism 33 Cultural revolution 142 Culture patriarchal 19 traditional 128, 186, 194 Customary law in albania 132 Customary Laws of Afghanistan 180–81, 183, 268, 277 Dagestan 68 Daghestan 111–12, 115–17, 235, 270 Decent peoples 30–33 liberal 31 Decent states 30–31 Declaration of Principles of International Law 279 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 50 Declaration on Friendly Relations 50 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 279 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 44, 50 De facto delimitation 172 De facto states 43, 48 Definitions of clans 5, 19 Demarcation 134 Demobilisation 65, 68, 73 Democracy liberal 21, 265 merit-based 4 participatory 45 representative 143 strengthening 162 Democratic principles 72 Democratic rule 33 Democratic states 32, 79 successful 227 Democratisation 3, 5, 10, 73, 75, 77–79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 228, 233 third wave of 79 Democratisation efforts 74 Democratization 38, 79, 267

Index Denikin 115–16 Deportation 25, 109, 114, 118–19 Diamonds, illegal 61–62 Dia-paying groups 24 Disarmament 52, 65, 68, 73, 133 Disintegrating 50 Disputes political 13 regional 53 Division, political power 149 Drugs 3, 66, 91, 135, 148, 177–79, 273 Dudayev 118, 121 Durand Line 154–55, 157, 169, 171, 259–60 Durrani 151, 243 Durrani tribe 151–52 Eastern Afghanistan 156, 174 Elders council of 96, 135 military clan 107 powerful clan 27 tribal 19, 85 Election process 37 Elections 3, 7, 10, 37, 77, 79–81, 87, 100–101, 105, 114, 118, 123–24, 146, 167, 170, 205, 209, 211, 213 free 80 local 78, 80 national 80, 219 parliamentary 146, 210, 213 regular 74 transparent 167 Elites 20, 60, 70, 81, 112, 157 political 79, 262 Empowerment 25, 61, 266 Ethnic Albanians 126, 147 Ethnic cleansing 62, 64, 175, 210–11 Ethnic composition 19 Ethnic groups 22, 53, 67–68, 70, 75, 81, 87, 149–50, 162, 181, 193, 217, 228 Ethnic Identity 151, 243, 255, 257 Ethno-nationalist debate 215 Euphrates 196, 238 Extended families 14, 70, 97, 108, 127, 188 Failed and weak states, definitions of 5, 54 Failed states 2, 42, 53–59, 67, 78, 80, 173, 180, 224, 228, 263, 275, 278 defined 56 Fair elections 31, 77, 80, 99, 167, 226

287

Index Fallujah, second Battle of 217 Family honour 95 Family members, extended 127 Feuds, violent blood 129 Fighters foreign jihadist 173 religious 159 tribal mercenary 194 Fighting corruption 2 First World War 3, 9, 115, 126, 137–38, 190 Flashpoints 75 Force coalition 199 coercive 63 destabilising 165 irregular armed 66 national security 194 paramilitary 90 peacekeeping 146 preventive deployment 146 traditional tribal militia 160 Forefather common 16 mythic 15 Foreign policy 25, 58, 152, 154, 157, 192, 265 Formal law, national 24 Formal state-institutions 18 Freedom fighters 120 Genocide 45, 62, 64, 74, 210, 221, 259, 271–72 policy of 62, 64 Ghazi, King 192 Gheg dialect of Albanian 127 Ghilzai 151, 164–65 Ghilzai tribe 151, 165 Gorbachev 158 Governance democratic 6, 86, 89, 259 good 38, 161 non-democratic 6 Government 5, 30, 36, 39, 42–45, 47, 55–59, 61–62, 66–68, 75–78, 80–81, 84–85, 90–92, 101, 115–16, 118, 120–21, 137, 144–46, 148, 154, 156, 158, 162–63, 171–72, 193–95, 205–6, 210–11, 218, 221–22 federal 211–12 legitimate 61 transitional 205 Government institutions 73, 167 Government structures 61

Government support 27 Greater Kandahar 164 Group rights 98–99, 101, 226, 231 Groups clan-based 27 die-paying 79 insurgent 178 jihadist 99, 226 kin 201 linguistic 151 minority 41, 45, 58, 65, 88 non-clan-based 183 political 144, 158 tribal 206 warlordist 68 Hakkari 242 Haqqani networks 159–60, 166, 275 Hazarajat 150, 175 Hazara of Central Afghanistan 175, 264 Hazaras 149–50, 155, 159, 164–65, 168, 175–76, 264 Hazaras of Afghanistan 175–76, 271 Hazara Tribe 248, 257 Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan 174 High Albania 130, 133, 263 Honour 13, 16–17, 19, 73, 76, 79, 94–95, 98, 100, 102, 133, 189, 195, 197, 202, 205, 211 Honour-based violence 95 Honour crimes 16, 91, 96, 202 Honour killings 96, 259 Hopi 14, 16 Hospitality 19, 107, 133, 152, 172, 189 Hostilities inter-group 87 inter-identity 87 Hotak tribe 151 Hoxha, Enver 140–42 Humanitarian law, international 196 Human rights basic 31 individual 74 Human rights violations 20, 34, 61, 63, 66, 71–72, 123, 163, 185, 204, 272 Human security 48, 63 Huntington, Samuel 78–79 Identity cultural 130

288 Identity (Cont.) ethnic 132 national 78, 88, 131, 143, 151 shared 49, 194 unifying 75 Identity politics 87–88, 271 Identity-politics 88 Ideologies communist 7, 142 national 194 Illegal workers 145 Illiberal Democracy 73, 281 Imamate 111 Imam Shamil 111, 114, 117, 120 Independence, unilateral 118–19 Indigenous Groups 175, 264 Indigenous population 14 Infrastructure social 170 traditional 186 Ingush 107–9, 263 Ingushetia 18, 37, 107, 110–11, 115, 117, 119, 121–22, 124, 235, 277 Insecurity, regional 166 Instability, regional 171 Institutional capabilities 27 Institutions democratic 17, 33, 232 formal 17, 33, 39, 76, 232 Insurgency 40, 56, 174, 274 counter 178 Insurgents 158–59, 172, 174, 188–89, 191–95, 197, 199, 204, 217, 220, 276 armed 204 Inter-clan conflicts 166 Intergovernmental organisations 8 International Court of Justice 46, 267 International law 1–2, 5, 29, 42–48, 50–53, 56–57, 60, 64, 75, 80, 211, 258–59, 262–63, 265, 270–71, 273–75, 277–79 International relations 32, 43, 50, 77, 197, 260 Intervention 3, 6, 8, 32, 62–63, 74–75, 146, 166, 169, 184–85, 203–4, 224, 228, 233, 269, 274 Intervention force, international 9–10, 98, 100, 161, 227 Invasion 158, 203, 205 Iran 153, 159–60, 171–72, 193, 195–97, 209–10, 214, 216, 223, 240, 242, 272, 278

Index Iran-Iraq 196, 274 Iran-Iraq War 9, 197, 209 Iraq 3–4, 6, 8–10, 13, 23–24, 26, 95–96, 187–223, 225–26, 228, 230–33, 235, 238–39, 242, 258–60, 263, 265–66, 268–74, 276–78, 281 clans in 187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203, 205, 207, 209, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223 invaded 204 occupied 191 politics of 9, 193, 214, 228 president of 213, 215 Iraq Constitution 214 Iraqi culture 189, 205 Iraqi government 96, 193, 196–97, 210, 219 Iraqi Kurdistan 198, 214–15, 264 Iraqi politics 215 Iraqi population 204 Iraqis, traditional 191 Iraqi society 187, 204, 208, 213 Iraqi state 9, 187, 205, 207, 211 Iraqi Tribes 190, 208, 242, 260 Iraq-Kuwait 199, 276 Iraq War 203–4, 257, 264 IS-fighters 222 Islamic Republic 120 Islamic State 9–10, 116, 210, 215, 219, 221, 228 Islamic State of Afghanistan 160 Islamic State of Iraq 221 Islamic Terrorism 117, 121 Italian occupation of Albania 140 Jalal Talabani 213–15, 257 Judgments 78, 122 Jurisdiction 44 Justice court of 186, 267 traditional 135 traditional tribal 181 transitional 2–3, 5, 61, 65, 182–83 Kadyrov 114, 124–25, 265 Kandahar 151–52, 158, 175 Kandaharis 152, 176 kanun 40, 96, 126–27, 129, 131, 133–35, 144, 148 Kanun of Lek 132–33 Kanun’s rules 134

Index Kastrati and Shkreli tribes 130 Kellogg Briand Pact 198 Kelmend tribe 130 Khan, Daoud 157 Khan, Nadir 157 Khostwal Super Tribe 246 Khyber Pass 152–53 kidnapping 68, 93–95, 98, 122–23, 269 bride 94, 274 Kingdom of Afghanistan 153, 273 King Zahir Shah 157 kinship 2, 14–15, 17–20, 24, 69, 132, 271 elementary structures of 1, 14–15, 270 fictive 18 kinship groups, matrilineal 16 Kirghiz/Qirghize Tribe 253, 257 Kosovo 21, 42, 126, 130, 137–38, 140, 146, 169–70, 267 Krasniqi tribe 130 kryeplak 127, 134 Kunta Haji 111, 113–14 Kurdish conflict 215, 261 Kurdish opposition groups 214 Kurdish populations 196, 199, 223 Kurdish Regional Government 96 Kurdish tribes 215 Kurdistan 26, 213–15 Kurdistan Democratic Party 213–14 Kuwait 198–99, 204, 214, 221 Kyrgyzstan 23, 70, 261, 271 languages national 53 regional 187 Latvia 53–54, 262, 274 Law anti-corruption 83 customary 23, 44, 108, 132–33, 153, 180 international public 56, 167 religious 40, 110 sharia 110, 120, 149, 180, 183, 212, 228 thin 23 Law enforcement agencies 59 Law enforcement institutions 95 Law enforcement mechanisms 35 Lawlessness 159–60, 210 Leaders ethnic 79 hereditary 127

289 League of Nations 138, 191, 270 Legal framework 5 international 48, 275 national 26 Legal systems, traditional 129, 149, 151, 168 Legislation 5, 30, 32, 82–83, 92, 209 Legislature 28, 55, 170 Legitimacy 31, 40, 55, 57, 59–60, 67, 70, 75, 200 political 57–58, 67 Lek 132–33 Lévi-Strauss 14–15, 270 Claude 14–15, 230 Lévy-Strauss, Claude 1–2 Light footprint 169 Light footprint approach 169–70, 186 Lineages 15–16, 24, 108 common 14 Localisation 235–36 Low trust environments 75 Loya Jirga 84–85, 159, 167, 169, 172, 179, 184 Macedonia 51–52, 146–47, 258, 279 Madrassas 159, 174 Mangal Super Tribe 246 Mansur 113 Marriage, badal 93 Maskhadov 120 Mass destruction, weapons of 200, 202–4 Matrilineal origins 127 Mechanisms, enforcement 40 Mediation 33, 35, 119, 169, 230 Mercenaries 139, 223 Mesopotamia 190–91 Military intervention 2, 4, 9, 85, 204, 227 Military militias 216 Military tribunals 212 Militias, warlord’s 68 Minorities, national 54, 262 Moderate states 32 Monarchy 157, 179 Mono-ethnic states 227, 230 Montesquieu 28, 271 Montevideo Convention 42–43, 54, 64 Mountain assr 116–17 Mountain clans 136 Mountain Soviet Republic 116 Mujaheddin groups 174 Murid War 6, 111–12

290 Muslim brotherhoods 118–19 Muslims 2, 113, 128, 130, 136, 142, 187, 189, 211 Muslim World 81, 111, 261, 266, 270 Mysticism 128 Nakhchivan 34, 272 Naqsbandi 111–12 Naqsbandiya 106, 110–11 Narcotics 178 National governments 4, 34, 67, 165 Nationalism 7–9, 23–24, 46, 87, 119, 131–32, 194, 226, 261 ethnic 53 Nation building 7, 17, 21, 46, 53, 83, 170, 267, 269, 273, 276 Nation-building 46–47, 263 Nations, sovereign 52 Nation-state 5, 22, 26, 35, 41, 45–46, 51, 55, 62–63, 66, 186, 226, 276–77 Negotiations 3, 23, 40, 49–50, 52, 61, 65, 75, 85, 89, 108, 118, 137, 158, 184 inter-clan 49 Neighbourliness, good 211 Neo-Taliban Insurgency 266 Nepotism 80, 84, 102, 125, 186 Nobility 15, 36–37, 137 Non-clan members 37 Non-governmental organisations 28, 74, 80, 90, 97, 99, 145, 226 international 3, 170 Non-intervention 29, 44, 193, 198 North and South Afghanistan 164 North and South Waziristan in eastern Afghanistan 156 North Caucasian Mountain Peoples 115–16 North Caucasus 18, 25, 34, 37, 76, 109–12, 114–18, 120–21 Northern Albania 127–30, 138 Northern Albanian 129 Northern Alliance 159–60, 164, 168–69, 176, 185 Northern Daghestan 112–14, 116 Northern Iraq 196, 242 North of Afghanistan 158 North of Iraq 196, 205, 215 North of Kirkuk 240–41 Northwest Caucasus 94–95 North West Frontier Province 156, 169, 171 Nuclear Inspections in Iraq 202–3, 278

Index Nuristani 149 Nuristani Tribe 255, 257 One-party rule 38 Open society 4–5, 13, 19, 21, 35, 77, 229, 233, 260, 274 defined 20 Operation Amber Fox 147 Operation Desert Storm 198, 205 Operation Enduring Freedom 166, 173, 266 Operation Northern Watch 199–200, 257 Operation Phantom Fury 217 Operation Southern Watch 200, 272 Operation Vigilant Resolve 217, 257 Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah 217 Opium 9, 177–78 Opium trade 158 Opposition 7, 22, 119, 158, 160, 174, 218 Opposition groups 100, 158, 219, 227 Oppressive government 30 Order, political 83 Organisation terrorist 9 tribal 151, 204 Ottoman Empire 25, 109, 112–13, 126–27, 131–32, 136–37, 148, 190–91, 216, 269 Ottoman rule 136, 189, 198 Outlaw states 30–32 Pacificatoria, Lex 60, 260 Pakhtun clans 155 Pakhtunistan 154–55, 274 Pakistan 19, 46, 89, 153–57, 159–60, 169, 171–74, 184, 193 Pakistan’s Tribal Areas 22, 24, 89–90, 153 Paktia 180–81, 244–45 Palestinian territories 26, 221 Pan-Arab nationalism 193 Paris Peace Conference 138, 191 Pashtuns 8, 90, 149–52, 156, 162, 165, 168, 175–76, 180 Pashtun society 160 Pashtun tribes 89, 150, 157, 175 Pashtunwali 19, 149, 151, 174 Patriarchal system 20, 106, 110, 231 traditional 127 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 213–15 Patronage 148, 162, 177–78 Patronage networks 22–23

291

Index Patronage systems 114, 170 tribal 195 Peace international 25, 62, 145, 273 stable 65 Peace agreement 60–61, 84, 260 Peacebuilding, democratic 78, 273 Peace building activities 167 Peace Conference 116 Peace Jirga 183 Peace Loya Jirga 184 Peace negotiations 64–65, 84, 184 Peace processes 35, 60, 65–67, 74, 81, 174, 272 inclusive 100 Peoples 8–9, 22, 28–33, 35–37, 45, 49, 51, 75, 77–78, 80–81, 91, 120, 122, 127–29, 132, 134–35, 142, 144, 148–49, 151, 154–55, 168–69, 171, 174, 176, 179–80, 215–16, 262, 264, 273–74 burdened 30, 32 democratic 29–30 indigenous 27, 45 mountain 111, 115 non-decent 32 non-liberal 30–31 north Caucasian 7 tribal 153 Political system 10, 17, 33, 45, 77, 153, 225, 231–32 Popalzai 164–65 Popalzhai tribe 151 Popper 19, 21, 260, 274 Population, permanent 42–44 Positive law 7, 38, 61, 100, 105, 125–26, 129, 133, 181, 186, 228 Post-conflict reconstruction 1, 4–5, 58, 61, 65, 74, 169, 207, 266 Power clan’s 18 executive 108, 123 external 136 imperial 119 internal 140 judicial 41 national 7 regional 7, 160, 172–73, 196, 230 restored 231 strategic 66 warlord’s 120

Power base 5–6, 16, 23, 41, 71–72, 82, 99, 105, 107, 111, 120, 124, 152, 163, 225, 231 political 124 Power brokers 231 Power imbalance 34 Power politics 63 Power rivalries 84 Power structures 34, 114, 178 local 81 Prejudices 1, 35, 100–101, 224 President Ashraf Ghani 151 President Aslan Maskhadov 120 President Boris Yeltsin 118, 120 President Djokhar Dudayev 118 President Doku Zavgayev 121 President Dudayev 118, 122 President Hamid Karzai 184 Presidential rule, direct 118 Presidential system, strong 179 President Putin 227, 230 President Ramzan Kadyrov 125, 227 President Yeltsin 118, 122 President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev 120 Priests, animist 108 Principles of Good-Neighborliness in International Law 211, 277 Process modernisation 57, 194, 229 top-down 28 Property, common 133 Protocols 153 Provincial Reconstruction Teams 206 Pshemakho Kotsev 116–17 Putin 121, 124, 226 Qadiris 111 Qadiriya 106, 110–11, 114 Al-Qaeda 25, 273 Qaeda in Iraq 9, 210, 219–22 Ramzan Kadyrov 34, 114, 124, 227 Rape 20, 94–95, 98, 102, 259 Ratification 179 Rawls, John 3, 29–31, 33 Reciprocity 37 Recognition 43, 47, 50–54, 209 international 115, 139 Reconciliate 208

292 Reconciliation 33, 84, 100–101, 132–33, 168, 181–84, 206, 230 Reconstruction process 169, 182, 207 post-conflict 6, 61 Red Cross 99, 226 Refugee camps 159 Refugees 146, 159, 198–99, 209, 279 Regime 30, 80, 115, 140, 142, 196–98, 208, 222, 228 authoritarian 31–32, 84 communist 126, 135, 142, 148, 160, 231 formal 17, 33, 232 informal 17, 33, 232 Regime change 196 Regional governments 84, 216 Regional states 177 Religion 8–9, 13, 20, 30–31, 88, 94, 106, 108, 110, 117–18, 120, 122, 126, 128–29, 131, 204, 210, 221, 228 Republic of Afghanistan 157 Republic of Albania 145–46, 261 Republic of Sakha 27 Responsibilities 1–2, 4–5, 28, 62–64, 78, 101–2, 115, 148, 163, 211, 222, 224, 229, 231, 260, 274 Rights, individual 81, 91, 98, 100–101, 231 Rule, communist 116, 133, 141 Rulers, authoritarian 55, 233 Russia 110–13, 118, 120–25, 153, 160, 190, 258 Russian-Chechen war, first 122 Russian Empire 6–7, 25, 105, 109, 111, 113, 115–16, 120, 137 Russian Federation 6–7, 111, 117, 119, 121–25, 158, 203, 224, 227, 229 Russian invasion 112 Russian Power 106, 118–19, 121, 270 Russian Rule 111, 114–17, 120, 265 Saddam Hussein 9, 24, 194–98, 200–206, 212, 214–16, 218, 221–23, 225, 228 Sadrist Movement 218–19, 266 Saudi Arabia 31, 120, 159–60, 163 Schemes, pyramid 134, 143–44 Secession 6, 29, 50, 64, 101, 154, 224–25 Second Chechen War 68, 121 Second World War 22, 25, 42, 114, 126, 140–41, 192 Security economic 96–97

Index national 4, 201, 210 regional 3 restore 168 Security Council 145–46, 198, 203 Security Council Resolution 145, 166, 168, 199–200, 202–3, 205, 276, 279 Security sector 2–3, 65, 85–87, 97, 206 Security Sector Reform 73, 85–86, 260 Security System Reform 86–87, 272 Self-defence 29–30 Self-determination 3, 5, 27–29, 42, 44–46, 51, 61, 154, 190, 215, 276 external 45–46, 49, 51 full 45 internal 45, 64, 90 Self-organisation, tribal 162 Self-rule 140 Semi-nomadic 23 Semi nomadic regions 14 Serbia 51, 87, 130, 132, 137, 146 Sexual assaults 102 Shamil 111–13 Shamil Basayev 68, 120, 277 Shatt Al-Arab 196 Sheikh, tribal 189, 192, 207 Sheikh Abdul Qasim Al Khoei 216 Sheikh Akushinskii 117 Sheikh Mansour 111 Sheikh Mansur 113–14, 266 Sheikh Uzun Haji 117 Sheiks, tribal 195 Shia 9, 150, 158, 164, 175, 187, 189, 192–93, 198, 210, 213, 220–21, 223, 228, 280 Shia tribes 197–98 Shiite Iraqi 191 Shiites 150, 212–14, 216, 272 Shkreli tribes 130 Shura 120, 181 Skanderbeg 131–32, 136 Society archaic 230 democratic 88 hierarchical 83 liberal 31 matriarchal 106 multi-ethnic 149 non-clan-based 4, 10, 41, 101

293

Index non-liberal 31 patrilinear 16 rural 173 traditional 9, 227–28 tribal 26, 83, 131, 223 warrior 151 Solidarity, tribal 180 Somali clans 23, 71, 280 Somali Conflict 48, 272 Somaliland 48–49, 263 Sons of Iraq 220 Sons of Islam 220–21 South Afghanistan 164 South-East Chechnya 113 Southeastern Afghanistan 38–39, 280 South-eastern Afghanistan 40, 277 Southeastern region of Afghanistan 180 South of Iraq 194, 216, 268 Sovereign nation-states 52 Sovereign states 50, 63 Sovereignty 5, 42–44, 51–52, 62–63, 138–39, 152, 205, 269 definitions of 43–44 external 43, 45 Soviet occupation 149–50, 179 Soviet Union 7, 21–22, 24, 51–53, 84, 89, 105, 114, 117, 121, 141, 143, 157–58, 184–85, 274 Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 46 Spoilers 67, 185 State collapsing 69, 270 fragile 58 State boundaries 49 State building 2–8, 10, 17–18, 20, 29–30, 32, 42, 44, 46–47, 49, 54, 63, 65, 71, 73–74, 76–77, 80, 82, 88, 99–101, 110, 112, 115–16, 118–20, 168–69, 176, 185–87, 224–26, 229, 267 effective 40, 76 successful 5, 23, 73 State building activities 126, 230 State building efforts 1, 4, 31–32, 39, 100, 102, 225–27 State-building efforts 228 State building measures 6, 41 State building practices 4, 48, 228 State building procedure 23

State building process 1, 3, 6–9, 22–23, 74, 82, 97, 99–102, 163, 167, 169, 171, 218, 224, 227, 232 State building projects 3–6, 8–10, 22, 35, 65–66, 72–74, 94, 229, 232 State capacity 57 State failure 43, 48, 57–58, 172, 267, 269 State formation 48 State institutions 13, 19, 24, 36, 38, 40, 47, 56–57, 65, 84, 86, 101–2, 148, 164, 229, 231 Stateless Persons 54, 274 State monopoly 28 State organs 36, 101 State reconstruction 32, 79, 101, 169 State structures 1, 33, 98, 101, 109, 161, 186, 197, 228–29 clans co-opt 1, 100 State succession 53 State support groups 100, 227 Sub-clans 23, 48–49, 201 Sub-tribe 151 Sufi brotherhoods 106, 110–11 Sunni 9, 187, 189, 191, 193, 210, 212–14, 220, 223, 228, 280 Sunni and Shia tribes 197 Sunni clans 10 Sunni groups 221–22 Sunni population in Iraq 221 Sunni tribes 197, 220, 228 Sworn virgins 129, 131, 281 Sykes-Picot Agreement 190, 193, 221, 278 Syria 58, 95, 191, 193, 214, 221, 223, 238, 241–42 System badal 93 communist 7 decision-making 151 federalist 158 hereditary 148 indigenous governance 22 majority-based electoral 88 matriarchal 106 matrilineal 14 multi-party 226 parliamentary 78, 139 Taips 105, 107, 109, 119 highland 109 lowland 109 Tajik Civil War 70, 82, 258

294 Tajikistan 14, 38, 67, 69–70, 83, 271, 273, 281 Tajiks 70, 149–50, 155, 159, 169, 176, 253, 258 Talabani 213–15, 241 Talib 159 Taliban 6, 8–9, 149–52, 156, 158–66, 169, 173–74, 176–78, 180–81, 183–85, 228, 257, 263, 272, 274–75 Taliban fighters 182 Taliban government 8, 166 Taliban members 159, 182, 184 Tapa Chermoev 115–16 Tatar Ethnic Group 254, 258 Taxes 21, 28, 135–36, 209 Teips 18, 76, 92, 107, 110 Territorial integrity 49–50 Territory claimed 155 common 109, 151 defined 42, 106 Terrorism 177, 211, 217, 219, 260 Terrorists 158–59, 177, 188–89, 191–95, 197, 199, 204, 276 Theocratic state 31, 116 Theory constitutive 43 declaratory 43 Theory of Justice 29, 32 Third Wave 79, 267 Tikriti tribe 198 Tikrit region 197 Tokhi 165 Tosks 127, 130, 140 Totalitarianism 143 Traditional codes 96 Traditional law 9, 38, 61, 105, 125–27, 129, 133–34, 144, 149, 167, 180–81, 186, 212, 228 Trafficking 66, 95, 135, 144, 148, 173, 178 drug 3, 177–78 human 95, 178 Trafficking opium 177 Transcaucasus 112, 115, 118, 267 Transition 1, 3, 6, 17, 21, 31–32, 53, 55, 57, 78, 85–86, 125, 127, 141, 143, 224, 227, 229–30, 232 Transition processes 1, 5, 98, 122, 134, 143, 148, 173, 209, 225, 230 Transparency 21, 28, 31, 33, 35–37, 39, 73, 75, 84, 86, 91, 99, 105, 110, 143, 149, 226, 232

Index Treaties 29, 43–44, 60, 153–54, 179, 191–93, 196 Treaty of Baghdad 193 Treaty of Rawalpindi 152, 154, 156 Tribal areas 24–25, 89, 156, 192 Tribal law, traditional 40, 94 Tribal leaders 25, 139, 160, 200, 207, 220, 222 traditional 176 Tribal policies 197, 215 Tribal rules and tribal allegiance 222 Tribe affiliations 194 Tribes 9–10, 13–14, 16–17, 25–27, 39–40, 75–76, 89–90, 127, 130, 132, 148, 150–51, 153, 155–57, 159, 162, 164–66, 171, 187–91, 193–95, 197–200, 206–9, 212–13, 215–17, 219–20, 222–23, 225, 229, 235–57, 273 coalition of 220 highland 130 local 69 nomadic 172, 190, 216 powerful 151, 164 super 243–45 Tribes and clans 20, 130, 189, 208, 215, 218 Tribes in afghanistan 238, 258 Tribes of Albania 236, 264 Trust, low 75 Tukhums 92, 106–7, 119 Turkmen 149, 187, 196, 211 Ubayd tribes 195 United Nations 31, 43, 50, 52, 62–64, 80–81, 85, 93, 99, 145–46, 198, 226, 261–62, 279–80 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 167, 170, 278–79 United Nations General Assembly 49–50, 64, 211, 279 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 45, 64, 272 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 198–99, 279 United Nations Security Council 145, 166, 198–99, 279 United Nations Security Council Resolution 198–99, 279 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 93, 280 Upper Chechnya 116 Uruzgan 151, 164–65

295

Index US Operations in Iraq 217 Uzbek tribes 155 Vainakh 107–9, 263 Vasan Giray Jabaghi 115 Violence domestic 20, 98 ethnic 79 sexual 202 Warfare, tribal 191, 217 Warlord Defined 66 Warlord politics 70, 272 Warlords 5, 7, 9, 56–57, 59, 66–72, 120, 161–64, 177, 182–83, 210, 218–23, 225, 227, 230–31, 270–71 existence of 71, 135 former 120, 163, 182 independent 70 local 68 powerful 164 power of 162, 225 Warlords and clans 9, 69 Warlords victimize 68, 259

Warriors, tribal 90 Weak states 2, 5, 54–56, 59, 61–62, 67, 74–75, 99, 102, 173, 180, 183, 220–22, 226, 228, 271, 275 Weapons, biological 202 West-Caucasian people 25 White Army 115–16 Wolesi Jirga 171, 179–80 Women kidnapping 94 position of 15–16, 102, 135, 141, 230–31 Women’s rights 32, 74, 92, 94, 98–100, 102, 226 Yakutia 27–28, 276 Yazidis 191, 196, 210, 221 Yeltsin 118, 120, 258 Yerevan Azerbaijanis 34 Yugoslavia 48, 50–53, 139, 141, 274 Zabul 151, 164–65, 261 Zadran tribe 151 Zog, King 36, 139–40, 148 Zogu, Ahmet 139