Civil Society and Women Activists in the Middle East: Islamic and Secular Organizations in Egypt 9780755611669, 9781848858855

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am most grateful to the women who held interviews with me and allowed me to observe them participating in their respective private voluntary organizations and networks. In various ways, many allowed me spatially into their homes and sometimes even to become a part of their personal lives. Understanding that these women had extremely busy schedules or, in several cases, felt they were taking a risk, I am indebted to them all for their deep trust and faith in my work. They provided me with a rich opportunity to learn about and reveal the struggles and results of their political participation. They also gave me a lot on a personal level, in that many preconceived ideas I thought were shed were in fact brought to light to be dispelled – or to be embraced with greater appreciation given they were provided light from many more angles. It is my hope that this work adequately exposes their achievements and contributions. I am grateful to all experts in the field, government officials, and scholars who provided me with highly insightful suggestions and crucial links. Dr Sherifa Zuhur encouraged me to have faith that I would find a good sample for my study at a time when there were hardly any published works on Islamic women’s organizations in Egypt. She linked me with Dr Tonia Rifaey. I could not have done without her friendship, networking skills, and the insights, experiences and knowledge she freely shared throughout our conversations. Dr Iman Bibars and Dr Hebe Ra’uf threw several challenging questions my way

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from opposing points of view, which taught me to see facets of the same issue and to develop insight into my own observations. Dr Sherif Abdel-Azeem patiently endured my visits and questions. Thanks to Dr Nahed Ezzeldin for her insights into the protest-oriented elements of society. While I was able to consult some more than others, at times even a few words of advice were meaningful to this work and set me on a course of further inquiry that proved fruitful. However, many provided me with help and support far beyond what I thought could be possible given their busy lives. I would especially like to thank Dr Janine Clark, who helped guide this research and provided rigorous questions and important insights along the way for this study to prove richly rewarding. Nancy Arruda’s insights into research methodology and the ‘political’ activism of my case study were extremely helpful. Many thanks go to my colleagues at the University of Guelph when I began the research and friends, who supported my efforts and lent me an ear when needed. I thank particularly Rowena Dagaang for the practical help she provided throughout the writing up of the research. Dr William Gallois was gracious in proofreading earlier chapters and Kerem Yildirim and Dr Melissa Finn in subsequent readings. I thank Pat FitzGerald for her professional editing of the final version. Deep appreciation goes to my parents, Werner Krause and Pam Herdes, whose encouragement and advices have been essential. My inlaws, the late Abdel-Ghaffar Auda and Layla Abdel-Basset were of immense support – Layla particularly for sharing her wealth of experiences after years of feminist activism. I thank Radwa, Omar, Ahmed and Sarah Auda for their patience and understanding throughout a seemingly ongoing period of research and writing. And most important in my gratitude is my husband, Jasser Auda, for all his support, encouragement and patience throughout this work.

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CHAPTER 1 WOMEN ACTIVISTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction If one is looking for change in any Middle Eastern country, the participation of women matters. I remember beginning my quest to understand the roles of women in the Middle East and stumbling across book after book that told of the unfortunate plight of women in the Middle East, their oppression and subjugation to patriarchy. The picture presented is that men play a role in public and women, too repressed, cannot. I persisted in wanting to know what was beyond what most of the literature was claiming. Exceptions to related established ‘knowledge’ surfaced as I began to delve deeper into my study of the region. Perhaps it was also partly subconscious in that my greatgreat-grandmother fled her home in the Middle East to be with the one she loved, my great-great-grandfather. Especially for her time, she most strenuously defied authority and norms to marry someone she loved outside of her nation and not born of her religion – his effort to convert did not cut it. Certainly, there would have to have been many women contributing to change in the Middle East as they saw fit, too. The first country I visited in the Middle East was Egypt. Since then I have lived in more countries in the region. However, what became quickly evident was that women played a role in society; they are not passive, and this is not an exception to any rule. As a female protester

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in the Mubarak uprisings asserted, ‘Egyptian women have an important role in society by their nature. It is very usual in Egypt to see a woman making peace between two quarreling men in the streets.’ I met women from the educated class, such as my mother-in-law, who has worked ardently in the way of women’s rights for decades, and that includes within government, secular feminist organizations – the public sphere. True, comparatively few women have government posts so there might still be the understanding that participation in politics is the exception. Much of the literature succeeds in establishing within the minds of many enquirers into state-society relations the view that if women are not seen in government it is a reflection on their level of participation in what matters. The 2011 revolution in Egypt has illustrated that focus on the state for change and institution of democracy has been entirely misplaced. What matters is how politics is not only driven but sustained. Change at the state level and within what is termed the public sphere cannot stick if it is not developed and supported from the grassroots and what is termed the private sphere. If a woman disrupts the patriarchal, patrimonial or even economic frameworks that govern her everyday life, that creates a ripple effect on the world outside the home. It follows then that participation within the most everyday ways or within the organizational types that support her to pursue her context-specific needs, and secure sometimes the most basic rights, must be included in any serious study of change. These avenues are most significant because through them women change the political culture on which ideology and action sprout. Most useful for identifying how women’s struggles result in securing the ‘good’ life and attempting to correct a number of biases that obscure an understanding of women’s activism is the application of a civil society framework. It is within associations, groups and networks that resistance and initiatives take place to respond to or circumvent other or overriding power structures. Many scholars have recognized the usefulness of employing a bottom-up approach to the study of state-society politics and political reconfigurations of the state. Nonetheless, impediments to the study of existing and substantive political processes persist even within frameworks that focus on

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change from the societal level. Large sectors of the population, such as women, the poor, or those who use Islamic frameworks within their strategies remain hardly represented and little understood. In looking at what are often referred to as ‘illiberal’ movements, this work seeks to provide more depth to the types of activism that are marginalized. This is particularly important not only in the way of striving as an academic to study and include all actors. It is important because as part of actual developments, in Coleman’s words (2010: xxiii): ‘It is fair to say that secularism as a political force is on life support across the Middle East.’ Coleman points to the secular leaders in the region who have fallen and the ascendency of political Islam as rooted within society and, thus, puts forward the argument that Islamic feminism should matter in the study of political change in the Middle East (ibid.). Despite the significance of both secular feminist organizations and women’s Islamic organizations, when I began my study there was almost nothing published on women’s Islamic organizations in Egypt that I could start with. This was indicative of the enormous gap in analyses on civil society in the Middle East as women whose activism is motivated by and framed through Islam are certainly not marginal. Through research I have conducted on Egypt, initially through a case study and then with follow-up over 10 years, I argue that women’s organizations, as demonstrated in both Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations in Egypt, exhibit a wide range of activities that serve to expand civil society in the Middle East. While my research looks specifically at these two organizational types, I asked questions about networks as a significantly growing avenue in Egypt for women to pursue their interests. Oftentimes, networks comprised the more protest-oriented expressions of activism and it was through the mushrooming social networks before the 2011 revolution in which women pushed for freedoms and democratic rights. I followed up with further research that I include for a more nuanced picture. I argue, importantly, that secular women’s organizations cannot be placed hierarchically above Islamic women’s organization in terms of their effect. In fact, it is more often through the Islamic discourse that activists can expand civil society more effectively and participants within organizations deemed secular, therefore, very often use the same lingo and frame

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of references. It is also interesting that activism of a decidedly feminine and practical nature sometimes has an advantage over strategic activism in creating openings for participation, despite the importance political and feminist scholarship has allotted to the latter. Beyond my study on Egypt, my research on the Middle East has shown that the epistemological bias towards the state and secularism has so grossly misconstrued the nature of politics as it continually transforms from the grassroots that I argue a major refocusing is required for which blinkers need to be dropped. Throughout the period of research, change appeared to be slow and, at times, it proved to be a contradictory process. By keenly watching developments, I have learned a precious lesson from the women. Real change must be slow and the women I studied seemed to know this already as, despite several setbacks experienced, they persevered. If one is looking to the sudden developments at the state level starting in early 2011 and the momentous successes achieved, this is really a result of a long period of struggle in which an ethos of democratic desire and values has been impregnated into society from the grassroots up. More importantly, when change is fast, one should not be quick to be too jubilant. It is the ethos which has pervaded a polity’s political culture that will determine what politics will really look like in the time to come. The impact of the women studied is enduring because they structure civic principles and reform into their activism. Women activists in Egypt are politically significant to developing basic principles of democracy from the grassroots, and this includes secular and, importantly, Islamic or Islamist women activists. This is significant because if the state remains the focus, incomplete and grossly wrong conclusions about where politics is headed will be drawn. If the activism of women’s Islamic organizations is discounted as ill-suited to such a project, perhaps one of the greatest resources for ‘civilizing’ will be lost. It is also my hope that this book will serve to illustrate that while state politics might be so authoritarian that greater stagnation or a ‘blow over’ may be the possibilities for other countries in the surrounding region, in whatever happens the developments underneath all this will be enduring. These include the instilling of democratic principles at the foundations. To this, women matter.

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The Female Struggler as Political Actor In what Egyptians consider a village, though it is really a denselypopulated urban slum, I stayed with some women in their homes. Some, certainly not all, of these women lived in homes with their spouses and children whose entire circumference is that of my humble living and dining room put together. Others had surprisingly reasonable living quarters although the shack-like outsides concealed their better living standard. Many of these women had at least four children. Yet their generosity could not be matched anywhere as I have never experienced anything like it. Generosity was their signature and they were proud of this quality when they compared themselves to ‘real’ city dwellers. I was comfortable enough and fed far better than I had hoped, despite having to walk over mounds of garbage in the street outside the entrances every day or sleep with lice every night. I spent a total of three months on and off. My mother thought placing me on a farm for ‘research’ would be good for me – once in the field, I discovered that such an option would be a little far-fetched. Yet, without having had these generous invitations and, hence, having the experiences I did, I could never have remotely understood so many intricacies of this research and what some people sometimes thought they could never possibly convey to a foreigner, and these certainly did etch in my heart and mind a fuller understanding of life. These women are originally fallaheen (farmers) and called sha‘b (common folk or popular people) by the more well-to-do Egyptians. They did not stay at home, although nearby the women who did were engaged in extremely difficult tasks to keep up the fallaheen means of subsisting. Some of these women were related to those who subsisted as fallaheen and I would visit them as well. Where I stayed, the women were educated, although no household had a single book except on occasion a Qur’an, and few people in these areas are literate. Otherwise, these women could not afford to stay home. Their income was maximum LE 240 ($40) a month, which was crucial to use towards the family budget, which was always more than the cumulative family income (in a few cases not reaching more than LE 350 or $50). These households would even help a relative who was in yet

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greater need. These women’s concerns were not women’s rights as the common westerner often understands women’s rights or even as some Egyptian women might describe. Their concerns were dominated by finding ways to put food on the table or related issues such as, in one case, how to fix a roof that had cracks so large I could put my hands through and, as the mother of the house feared, could result in the roof caving in on her children. Feminists examine politics as the study of power. Power is the ‘capacity to have an impact or produce an effect’ (Rowlands 1998: 14) and as such can be both a source of oppression and emancipation. How many such women are able to make changes in their own lives and those they care for has not mattered, however, within mainstream feminism or political science. As Diane Singerman argues (1995: 5), these people are still largely portrayed as objects of political rule rather than architects of political change. At the same time, however, how Islamist programmes (along with secular organizations) set up in some such neighbourhoods to address these large-scale concerns might affect political outcomes is largely ignored. Politics has been defined so narrowly that the struggles of not just a group of women in a village out there but, in fact, the majority of women and their families in poor circumstances in the Middle East have been entirely ignored. These living conditions were not an exception to any norm in Egypt, yet the struggles of the poor and programmes at the grassroots level to fill such a large vacuum and to which particular discourses are attached remains little understood. How patriarchy is subverted does not begin within an organization that aims its activities at the state; it begins within the home, within the village and among women whose concerns, dreams, and ingenious ways to achieve these practical things in life do matter. When these women together formed a daycare centre out of one of their homes to host their several children and take turns caring for the children in that home so that they could all together improve their economic circumstances, they contributed to their empowerment. They are perhaps not subverting government policies that marginalize women more generally and nor are they necessarily strategizing that such is their goal. They are, however, subverting economic constraints that oppress not only them but also all members of their immediate society.

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Such women may not be purposefully subverting patriarchal laws that govern women’s lives, nor are some of these women even aware of many of these laws. They have much less to do with the legal system or government in their daily lives than would their sisters in some areas in the bigger cities, at least in direct terms. However, as I witnessed, when a divorcee is told that she must only leave the family home accompanied by a younger brother and she protests and eventually makes headway in securing spatial movement without a male guardian, she has indeed contributed to greater freedoms from these norms that can permeate public life and are sustained within the private. I learned of secular organizations that helped such women change the minds of the patriarch in the family to allow for greater freedoms. That is achieved by entering the home, the private sphere, and working on the individual level as a strategy to eventually create shifts in thinking within the public. Securing the wellbeing of women in ‘private’ concerns is securing the wellbeing of society – they are half of any citizenry. It is essential to recognize the multifaceted nature of women’s struggles. Women sometimes do address the state in an attempt to gain more voice and secure rights, and throughout my study this avenue was becoming much more pronounced. Women do struggle against a great many patriarchal ideas, norms and policies that they perceive to oppress them. However, it is crucial to understand that women’s participation in the Middle East is so much broader if a more accurate understanding of politics that will have impact at the state level is to be gained. Sometimes they have patriarchy to work with. Not all that might be considered patriarchal from a western point of view is deemed an issue or something that must be fought against. Some of the women I got to know through my research were the ones who embraced and sustained patriarchy as a variable in a way of protecting and securing their view of a ‘common good’. What is also important to emphasize is that women do not necessarily struggle against the state or state policies. Some of the women I worked with could not name a single minister, nor could they relay anything about their president’s recent decisions, speeches or what he stood for. Others who might be able to really could not care less. Their

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struggles are shaped by their immediate circumstances and a variety of sources they perceive as a more direct threat to their wellbeing. The strategies to combat these threats may be secular in nature, grounded in Islamist discourse, and importantly variations of these. The overriding concerns will be related to their economic wellbeing because such interests comprise immediate dilemmas. Other concerns include ensuring piety or a moral society. State-directed action or fighting patriarchy form only a few aspects of women’s participation. The literature on popular participation in the Middle East contains numerous misconceptions and biases which serve to delineate inquiries on these political processes and function to exclude these women from the political process. A significant bias in this respect is the problem of politics viewed as the sole domain of formal institutions. As Parvin Paider (1995: 2) underscores: One widespread assumption is the only political and economic domains worth studying in Muslim societies are the formal ones, and Muslim women are unimportant or at best marginal to these domains because they have few formal political and economic rights and make a limited contribution to formal domains.1 The drive to see change by looking for signs within the state results from and continues a form of prejudice and misunderstanding about politics. This bias and approach has grave consequences more generally in misunderstanding political processes. There is little sign of change happening by way of democratization or liberalization if one insists on looking towards the state. Although protest movements had gathered pace towards the ousting of Hosni Mubarak and ministers, these cannot help explain change adequately either. If anything, their analysis supports conclusions drawn from studying the regimes, in large, that there had been no progress in terms of greater rights, freedoms, and participation. A prejudice and misunderstanding about the sphere of political action that matters results, more particularly, in misconstruing women’s actual roles in political life. Women’s activities are misrepresented as politically inconsequential to state politics as a result of how politics

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has traditionally been burdened by methodological and epistemological bias. Today’s scholarship has grown from works based in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in which a methodological bias is often evident. Travellers to the Middle East were predominantly male and did not have access to women’s quarters to be able to describe what they saw, or in most cases, did not see. Thus, the harems were of great interest and became the subject of several writings. Female writers who were able to travel to the region were generally elite women who also had sporadic access to women’s lives and described what little they observed from a Eurocentric point of view. Because little case study research is available to address these resilient biases adequately, misrepresentation is a continuing feature among scholarship on women in the region. As one remnant of orientalist discourse on Middle Eastern women and a direct result of a considerable bias towards the study of institutional politics, a theoretical division has enabled the continued marginalization of women’s activities. The public/private divide has served to secure this bias in the literature and is still followed in scholarly work. The private sphere is typically defined as that realm which comprises the family (though it is sometimes viewed as encompassing the neighbourhood or even the community) and interpersonal relations between friends and acquaintances (Bystydzienski 1992: 2). Thus, as Jill Bystydzienski points out, in contrast to the public sphere, perceived as an area of male activity, women’s roles have been defined by and to a large extent limited to the private sphere and their activities deemed apolitical (ibid.). As such, what is termed as apolitical will be eliminated as insignificant for the study of civil society politics. Gender analysis, though further blurring the public/private dichotomy, has further marginalized sectors of women’s activism that fall outside mainstream feminist discourse. As Saba Mahmood has argued in her analysis of women in religious lessons (dars; plural: durūs) located in Cairo mosques, feminist scholarship overemphasizes the politically subversive form of agency, while it has ignored other modalities of agency whose significance is missed within what she refers to as the ‘logic of subversion and resignification of hegemonic terms of discourse’ (Mahmood 2004: 155). She argues that this overemphasis results from

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feminism’s teleology of progressive politics on the analytics of power (ibid.: 9). Not only forms of resistance, but also other expressions of power are excluded through this narrow lens of both politics and feminism. Michele Foucault explains that power cannot be understood merely within the framework of domination, as something possessed and used by persons or states over others. Instead, it permeates life and produces new forms of desires, objects, relations, and discourses (Foucault 1978, 1989, cited in Mahmood 2004: 17). There is, furthermore, the bias that when women’s activism in the Middle East is studied, whether as civil society actors or as protest movements, strategically formulated goals that shape women’s activism are given significance and practical or feminine forms of activism are seen as insignificant. This hierarchalization exists because western feminism discriminates against activisms of poor women and Middle Eastern women, in general. It marginalizes the struggles of poor women because of a theoretical differentiation between practical and strategic interests. A reference that feminists widely cite for analyzing women’s civil society associations in the developing world, in general, is Maxine Molyneux’s distinction between practical and strategic gender interests.2 Referring to Molyneux’s dichotomy, Laurie Brand defines practical gender interests as ‘those that are apparent from the objective conditions women work in and the roles they fill in the gender division of labor’ (Brand 1998: 5). These interests are usually a response to immediate needs. Examples of such would be seeking easier access to clean water, affordable medical services, adequate housing or available daycare facilities. These groups are usually those termed feminine, while groups that are objective-oriented are termed feminist. The objective-oriented is derived ‘from the analysis of women’s subordination and from the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist’ (Brand 1998: 5). Such examples would include seeking to change laws that discriminate against women, the attainment of formal political equality, and access to birth control. Laurie Brand states, however, that in the expression of the practical, for example, women who make demands for greater access to childcare facilities, ‘although [it may] help mitigate certain inequalities, [it does] not necessarily challenge existing structures that oppress women’ (ibid.).

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I agree with Maria Pilar Garcia-Guadilla (1995: 215) when she determines that such a dichotomy must be seen as false. The danger is that Molyneux’s distinction, though claimed as highly valuable in development theories (see, for example, Moser 1991), obscures a comprehensive study of the impact of social movements. ‘Narrow-minded feminism denies the importance of struggles for practical gender needs and devalues organization around these issues’ (Rodriguez 1994: 42). Only if the boundaries of what is constituted as politically relevant are broadened to include the everyday struggle to survive and power relations in society are changed can a more accurate representation of political processes be achieved (Morgen and Bookman 1988). Furthermore, Marianne Marchand warns against placing one above the other in political importance. Such a privileging causes the activities of women whose struggles are shaped by their lower socio-economic class to be excluded in scholarship by denying them their own political and discursive space (Marchand 1999: 64). As such, western feminism is not immune to the bias created in determining the activism that matters within political science. In line with the same theoretical differentiation, it emphasizes the state as the exclusive rights violator. It casts strategic rights-based struggle as the legitimate struggle for feminism, while diminishing the importance of other forms and sources of struggle for wellbeing (Kiss 1997: 7). Crucially, this work illustrates that activities involving responses to immediate needs, or what women may pursue as practical/feminine interests, such as sharing information or resources to improve their economic positions or developing a self that embraces her feminine qualities, are politically significant to the distribution of power throughout society. Other activities involve actions that are strategically aimed at bettering the conditions of a particular group, for example citizens who were repressed by the Mubarak regime, by addressing more consciously the sources of oppression. These will be discussed for the important role they also afford for change. However, as Jean Bethke Elshtain argues, practical and feminine concerns translate to the public sphere the concerns of the private sphere and, in particular, those connected to the protection of children and other vulnerable people (cited in ibid.).

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Feminism is not immune to the male-dominated theorization that pits western civilization against societies outside Europe that have been depicted as backwards and failing in conforming to Europe’s trajectory of enlightenment, development and civility. Feminism has served, in fact, to reproduce strong binaries between what it frames and categorizes as liberal and illiberal groups (Phillips 2007: 25). In general, feminist analyses continue to discriminate against Middle Eastern women by giving research on them an orientalist interpretation through essentializing (Hale 1997: 30).3 The privileging of dichotomies here too has limited studies of Middle Eastern women to dress, segregation, polygamy, and female genital mutilation (FGM), relating these to the main cultural determinant – Islam (Hale 1997: 31; Phillips 2007: 25). It is through such a dichotomization between those constructed as leading freedom and those in need of being freed that Middle Eastern women are depicted as passive actors in the public domain (Hale 1997: 31). As Mahmood explains, a long history of colonialism helped in securing this essentialist framing. Colonialism was rationalized on the basis of the ‘inferiority’ of non-western cultures, as evinced through their patriarchal practices. Indigenous women needed to be rescued from this patriarchy through the agency of colonial rule (Mahmood 2004: 189, 190; see also Mohanty 1991; Ahmed 1992). There are indeed many issues affecting access, the ability to voice their concerns, and the general wellbeing of women and those they care for that exist because of patriarchal norms and laws. Within organizations, networks and the privacy of homes, I was sometimes astounded by the abundant stories told or observations I made first-hand. However, an overemphasis on oppressive norms and policies exists in studies to the neglect of the wider processes and actual activities and concerns of women. This overemphasis has contributed to the view that women in the Middle East are passive or too oppressed to have real political impact. Within the privacy of homes and within public organizations women were identifying problems that are related to patriarchal norms, policies and laws. They demonstrated through various activities that they wanted to better their circumstances in these areas, as well; they are taking action. However, they voiced so many

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more concerns and these must matter because their struggles revolve around these too, and often much more substantially. A similar approach to the study of Islamist politics and secular politics exists, which offers skewed conclusions as to the goals and strategies of each. Actions that are propelled by either piety or practical considerations are essentially relegated to the private or deemed inconsequential to the larger political processes. Most movements in the Middle East have been spurred by such motivations and such motivations acquire a momentum for activism that in fact serves to push boundaries that other activists’ strategies fail to do. The feminine aspect of and practical drive for political change have not received adequate theorization yet explain the resilience of activism and actual developments from the grassroots, such as the decades-long protests leading up to the 2011 uprisings in Tahrir Square and other cities. There is gross misunderstanding, thus, on a number of counts. As such, this book provides an account of women’s activism that demonstrates the fallacy of the various theories that scholars continue to apply to the region and, hence, end up offering distorted conclusions in the literature and for policy making. By examining the agency of women in their social context, this work challenges narrow conceptions of feminism. Despite marginalizing structures, women are transcending the public/private divide through various activisms not yet fully recognized in the literature. Civil society scholarship on the Middle East is almost completely void of the activities and collective action of women, representing it as an all male entity. By including their activities into the study of civil society, this research attempts to add to the few but growing works that offer a gendering of civil society. In this way, new values are added, which become significant to the context within which the concept develops in the Middle East. It is the recognition of the agency of women in their social context and how their actions can influence civil society, which needs to be included in the framework for studying civil society. As Singerman (1995: 4) stresses, ‘Equally important, each society manifests political activity in different ways, depending on an ever-changing variety of factors, and political scientists need to be more aware and sensitive to the creative mechanisms people use to

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further their aims’. Through the study of the significance of women’s Islamic and secular feminist organizations, as well as networks, to the development of civil society, a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of what action constitutes change will be achieved. By focusing on the various actions of women that influence civil society, it is hoped that this work will contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the civil society concept in the Middle East and, furthermore, the endeavours to broaden the political. In the recognition that the focus on state actors blinds one to the view of a broader picture of politics in the Middle Eastern region in general, and Egypt in particular, this research includes a broader spectrum of actors. News broadcasts pick up on lively protest and angry expressions or, of course, Islamist activity, to the neglect of the subtle, yet integral shifts pushed by other societal actors. I will argue that female activists have changed the face of politics by instilling democratic values from the bottom up. Moreover, it may not only be those who profess to be progressive, secular, and liberal who are significant in this respect, and this should be key to policy initiatives. After immersing myself in everyday life lived by Egyptians from vastly differing locations, backgrounds, economic status and ideological outlook, I focused my research on women’s activism towards the investigation of women’s Islamic and women’s secular organizations in Cairo. Whereas secular feminists firmly believe in grounding their discourse outside the realm of any religion, be it Christian or Muslim, and so ‘religion is respected as a private matter for each individual’ (Karam 1008: 13), Muslim women activists do not see religion as a private matter. Nadje Al-Ali (2000) advocates using the term ‘women’s activism’ over ‘feminism’ claiming that most Egyptian women activists reject the label.4 Indeed, throughout my fieldwork most women cringed or volunteered some sort of gesture of exasperated disapproval at the term ‘feminism’. For some of these women, feminism is viewed as synonymous with liberation from the foundations of religion and culture to allow for copying the West. This view was verbalized by Christian, Muslim and secular interviewees. Theoretically, I term both categories of women’s organizations ‘activists’, as they are also the category of women in networks. They are seeking to mitigate inequalities

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that affect their lives or the lives of the women or children they seek to help and better their circumstances – as they see fit. I should here point out there is some obscurity existing in the conceptualization of these women, their discourses and activities. Al-Ali explains that from her fieldwork on Cairo women activists, the term, ‘secular (feminism)’ has become highly misleading and homogenizing. Secular feminism has had its abuse from not only Islamists but various opponents for a variety of reasons. Islamists equate secularism with atheism. It should, thus, be clear from the onset that I understand and use the term ‘feminism’ ‘in its many variants, [to be] rooted in the recognition of women’s oppression at all levels’ (Smyth 1992: 134) and ‘the political action of women . . . as agents effecting change in their own condition’ (Ackerly 2000: 17).5 Based on this definition, I use ‘empowerment’ as a main indicator to evaluate the contribution of women to the development of civil society, as will be detailed in the section of this chapter on key indicators. The term ‘Islamic feminism’ has gained some popularity and has been employed to describe a sort of women’s activism that works within Islam and questions aspects of traditional Islamic orthodoxy (Coleman 2010: xxiii). Islamic feminism is differentiated from Muslim feminism in that within the former term non-Muslims may be found to also use the Islamic sources in their argumentation, whereas the latter term comprises specifically Muslims. Most who use the two terms use them interchangeably. Coleman argues, ‘Many Muslim feminists are strong proponents of ijtihad, the process of arriving at new interpretations of Islamic law through critical reasoning, rather than blindly following the views of past scholars’ (ibid.: xxiv). She further argues that at the heart of Islamic feminism is pushing the gates of reasoning open and that ‘Islamic feminists are now combing through the centuries of Islamic jurisprudence to highlight the progressive aspects of Islam’ (ibid.). This is not exactly true, and so I will address such misunderstanding in the usage of this term but underscore Coleman’s argument as valid in terms of the liberalizing effects Muslim or Islamic feminism may potentially have. The argument is certainly valid and key in that the terms may help raise some appreciation within the mostly non-Muslim

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world of a framework that can be used to garner women’s rights. In particular, this may be considered in policy-making circles. Muslim majority states have adopted the fiqh leaning towards the most conservative of edicts for women and, hence, re-interpretation of the scripts and hadith can be effective as much of the same language and references often form a common ground to legitimize a case. Some who employ its usage also discuss women’s rights with reference to non-Muslim feminist theory or wider issues of social justice. Directly using the script and sunnah does, moreover, give one leverage and likely comprises the most effective means in arguing for women’s most basic human rights to education and access to public places in areas of the Islamic world in which women’s mobility and access is tightly monitored and severely constrained by extremist groups, repressive states or village traditions. The importance of such a tactical methodology takes on added value, given the premise, that I find partly true, that (liberal) secularism is losing credibility in the Muslim world. Indeed, in this research I have interviewed women, both secular and religious, who must necessarily rely on these sources to help women achieve access and greater control over their lives in very poor areas. This is mostly due to cultural views about the lower status of women in mostly very poor areas. The significance here is that because women are most often caught in the crossfire of defining identity and morality, not only in poor areas but also among various groups, one often calculates the risk of being outspoken on several issues considered core, including issues related to women’s rights. For example, the late Nasr Abu Zayed was divorced from his wife and had to flee Egypt after he was found guilty of heresy for expressing his analysis of the procedure of Qur’anic revelation. Nonetheless, the term ‘Islamic feminism’ more often provides obscurity to women’s activism than clarity.6 The sources and traditions used by these women comprise what Talal Asad refers to as an ‘Islamic discursive tradition’ or such ideas as the narratives and meta-narratives developed within coherent, ongoing traditions relating to and often through time linked to the larger framework of Islam (Asad 1986). Meta-narratives often exist in competition with one another through those who advocate one stream or another. The significance of the political process behind the shaping of roles and practices within the

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Islamic tradition according to gender or groups is often overlooked. By using reinterpretation, these meta-narratives can be used to secure rights for women in relation to men. These can also result in greater subjugation of women to men. The discourse can result in either effect, among various other possibilities. Islamic feminism does not necessarily lead to a liberal movement. It can be entirely illiberal. I have now also sat in enough halakas (religious study circles) to know the value of using scripts to argue for greater mobility and rights and argue for women’s constriction of mobility and rights – all by women for women and all for women’s betterment and protection. On an abstract level also, there is no adequate differentiation between reformist and apologetic re-interpretation conceptualized by most Islamic feminists. As Jasser Auda (2008) clarifies, apologetic re-interpretation merely justifies a certain status quo.7 Muslim feminist re-interpretation of scripts most often includes the employing of an apologetic re-interpretation. The problem is that these women operate within detailed political structures, for which interpretations were made also in support of medieval traditions deeprooted in the fabric of the Islamic law (ibid.: 175). The term is used normatively and, hence, one overlooks the fact that Islamic feminism can secure liberalism just as readily as illiberalism, equality or inequality, justice or injustice. As such, I use the term ‘Islamic feminism’ to denote a form of activism in which women may resort to the Islamic scripts, sunnah, and wider traditions and practices linked to a framework narrated as Islamic in order to advance their view of wellbeing and empowerment. This is because what some women may consider contributes to their wellbeing and empowerment comprises a worldview that other women may find disempowering and even harmful. The political significance determined by the dichotomy defining feminine and feminist activities impelled me to test if the activities of Islamic or Islamist women activists and secular feminists reflect these theoretical assertions. Furthermore, the stark contrast claimed in the literature on the positioning of the two organizational types of my case study in the literature as ‘political enemies’ (Karam 2000: 204) spurred my interest to investigate if their views correspond with this

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affirmation. Apart from including interviews with Islamic activists and secular feminists in my case study, I used all opportunities to interview members of various other organizations, groups, networks and households, which provided me with valuable experience and insight that I will draw on throughout this book. What comes to mind for most western scholars and scholars within Egypt alike with the notion of Islamic groups and organizations is something backward in relation to something better, liberal, progressive and secular. For most, such as Nemat Guenena and Nadia Wassef, ‘Islamic activism means the engagement in behaviour aimed at the reinstatement of Islamic rule, including Islamic law (Shari‘a)’ but can also more broadly ‘refer generally to all proponents of an Islamic social alternative in Egypt’ (Guenena and Wassif n.d.: 2). As the authors elaborate, some Islamic activists (they do not differentiate between Islamic activists and Islamists) choose violent modalities and mechanisms to implement an Islamic state. They argue that the majority seeks to reinstate the Islamic state and society through advocacy and proselytization (ibid.). It is pertinent to point out that, based on the evidence, violence has been extremely sparse in Egypt in the past decades and in the cases where it has been used the perpetrators of violence claimed allegiance to a particular fringe group. The escalated attacks on Christian churches in late 2010, including one in which the attacker was allegedly Christian, have deviated from the general norm of relative tolerance between these religious groups in everyday life, although this eruption in violence shows some serious tensions in existence that have also been ignored. Still, even in these attacks on churches the perpetrators were found to be among the extremists of both religious affiliations. Based on this and other research I have conducted in the Middle East, it is often difficult to draw a line between Islamists and Islamic activists. However, most Islamic activists do not, in fact, seek to establish an Islamic state through their activities and, more interestingly, a small but growing number of Islamists do not view the establishment of an Islamic state as ‘the solution’ any longer in Egypt or ever had this goal as a main objective in other parts of the Middle East. It is, moreover, essential to identify how the distinction between moderate

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Islamists and fringe minority groups is mostly blurred in today’s climate of international politics and policies. Significantly, the vast array of Islamism as currently existing in the rest of the Middle East and beyond was born in Egypt with the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood. There are various reasons put forward as to why the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) gained power and recognition when it did, such as a vacuum being left by government that it aimed to fill, western influences being greatest in Egypt, western modernization, imperialism, nostalgia for the past, or a real or imagined moral decadence. Interview with a senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood member showed that one internal view is that Hassan al-Banna began the movement simply because he wanted to bring people back to an ideal of living under a Khilafa (Caliphate). Al-Banna began speaking in cafes on a very small scale and soon gathered a few followers who together sought this objective after establishing that, as the interviewee describes, al Banna announced, ‘We are brothers, we love each other, so we will call ourselves the Muslim Brothers’. Essentially, out of love between a group of men – six at the time – a desire to return to living according to a rule described as God’s rule after the retreat of the Ottomans would become the rallying cry behind the most influential Islamist movement. Love through brotherhood (and soon enough a sisterhood branch) and the return of the Khilafa would be ‘the Solution’ in the context of occupation understood as one predictable outcome of moral decline. As Roger Owen (2000: 183) points out, the group aimed to reform both the individual and society and I believe this is key to understanding the methodology of Islamists as working at the individual level to change society, which in turn is expected to result in change at the state level. The same methodology is strategically applied in some of my case study organizations. However, it is important to understand exactly what ideas and practices they aim to influence society to adopt. Hassan al-Banna was born in 1906 in the province of Buhyra, East of Cairo, into a religious family. His father, Abdel Rahman al-Sa’ati, was an Azhari sheikh known to have made a significant rearrangement of Imam ibn Hanbal’s collection of hadith (sayings of Mohammad).

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Many analyses view al-Banna as having deviated from his father’s tradition of Islamic thought for a period. This results from resorting to a definition of Islamic thought as having two opposing poles, Salafism and Sufism, and where contradictions are defined into the categorization. Al-Banna was a member of the Dhikr circle and the Hasafiyyah Sufi Order. When he moved to Cairo in 1923, he studied at the Dar al-Ulum. Many analyses place al-Banna’s founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in the context of a reaction to modernization and westernization. Furthermore, other analyses argue that the Ikhwan founded itself by calling for a return to the Khilafa as part of its stance against the West. However, the call for a return to the Khilafa was not so much a solution in reaction to modernization and westernization. It was a reaction to a perceived social and moral decadence seen as resulting from forgetting God. As such, the Ikhwan believed that it was this decadence that caused an immobility within society to deal with occupation, corruption and injustice as the overriding oppressive sources. There are references made to the effects of westernization; however, aside from the issue taken towards pro-western monarchies, there still is very little in al-Banna’s speeches to substantiate such a framing of his thought as dominant. The literature homes in on and repeats these quotes, and often in conjunction with quotes taken from Sayyid Qutb. Qutb, also born 1906 in Egypt, was notably anti-West and influenced the discourse of the Ikhwan to take a more militant tone later during the 1950s and 1960s in the context of Arab countries gaining independence. Al-Banna, in contrast, saw that reforming the self by means of love between individuals and God to attain piety and to form virtuous citizens would be the means of organizing society and state: Our duty as Muslim Brothers is to work for the reform of selves, of hearts and souls by joining them to God the all-high; then to organize our society to be fit for the virtuous community which commands the good and forbids evil-doing, then from the community will arise the good state. (Quotes in Takeyh and Gvosdev 2004: 8)

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The discourse subscribed to and developed by al-Banna is rooted, thus, in identifying a deviation from a virtuous society, an ideal that can be achieved because it once existed, and must because it is Islam’s destiny to have a Khilafa on yet a larger scale. Hope for a virtuous life and freedom from an oppressive source can become reality if each individual takes responsibility in achieving these common goals. As such, a responsibilization among willing individuals takes place in which the desire to be virtuous, pious and free is achieved through this discourse. Again, this discourse is significant to note because this is the means through which a spectrum of Islamists that exist in Egypt and beyond today have been grounded. These discourses continue to form the framework upon which the Ikhwan gather membership (to a lesser degree), support (through membership, sympathizers, funding and networks) and promote their cause, as do other Islamist organizations, most of which have splintered off from their mother group and, significantly, various Islamic organizations not categorized as Islamist. In general terms, how the discourse becomes Islamized is by situating piety, virtuosity and the good state within the framework and precepts of the Qur’an and the sunnah. This does not exclude interpretations of Scripture or related sources and, in fact, involves heavy interpretation of the core sources of Islam. Hence, the sources for defining the Islamic frame of reference are broadened to include either conservative, liberal or fabricated hadith, fiqh developed by chosen schools of thought or scholars, certain cultural traditions, and references made to various Islamic rituals by the modern Islamist thinker. How the discourse becomes Islamist in nature is due to the linking of specific narrations carrying specific meaning motivationally to political action for specific political ends. This particular methodology is not exclusive, however, to Islamist groups as I will illustrate later through the study of Islamic organizations in which women play an important role in Islamizing discourse. This occurs through a subsystem of discourse formation that is gendered and most expediently and effectively so. Al-Banna formed the first women’s wing of the Ikhwan about the same time as Zainab al-Ghazali (1917–2005) founded hers. She is arguably the most prominent female Islamist internationally. Al-Ghazali was also born into a religious family with her father educated as an

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Azhari scholar. Her association was on informal terms, as she never formally tied her association, the Muslim Women’s Association ( Jama‘at al-Sayyidat al-Muslimat), to the Ikhwan. However, as she narrates in her book, Return of the Pharaoh (a reference to President Nasser), she vowed to collaborate with him, his followers, and also his women’s wing, and did so on a regular basis, whereby she would often hold meetings with the leaders in her home. She eventually took an oath of allegiance to alBanna (see al-Ghazali 1994: 27). Although she was vehemently against divorce and instructed women to obey their husbands, she relates that her fervour for her activism actually caused her first marriage to end as she had asked her husband upon marrying him to agree to release her from the bond if he should ever oppose her activism, and he eventually did (ibid.: 38). Throughout her lifetime, al-Ghazali played a leading role in developing and spreading Islamism through her activism and her organization and endured the consequences of her activities. She drew 3,000 to her weekly khutbas (religious sermons), more during Ramadan, and claims she had a following of three million women. Beyond holding halakas and the activities of her organization, such as running an orphanage, she wrote regularly in many magazines on women’s issues, including that of her organization and the Ikhwan’s, al-Dawah. When al-Banna was assassinated in 1949, she played a principal role in regrouping the Ikhwan (ibid.: 37). In 1965, she was imprisoned until Sadat released her in 1971. During this period, her second husband divorced her after he received threats that his property would otherwise be confiscated, but then died. In her book, she details her days in prison in which she endured various means of torture: standing upright in water for days, vicious dogs released upon her, whipping over open wounds, being injected with substances to stay awake, an incident where she killed a guard who attempted to rape her, and watching Ikhwan male members tortured, some to death (ibid.: 45). The Ikhwan helped overthrow the monarchy and helped Egypt lead the way as Arab nations gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s. The group is responsible for numerous political and social changes in the wider Middle East; greater conservatism has been its by-product which has affected the way women’s roles have been shaped

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and defined. Importantly, women have played a role in this trend too. I should point out, as well, that the vast majority of studies on the Ikhwan’s illiberalizing political effect on women have completely ignored the context of a political culture and laws being in place in which women’s rights were already tightly constrained. The repeated analytical mistake is the criterion of comparing the wearing of western mini-skirts and scarcity of the hijab to assess how a marked difference (in terms of some imaginary regression) is obvious, with the majority of Muslim women appearing in hijab today. At the time of al-Banna’s birth, Egypt was still, compared to other Arab countries, the most populated nation in the Middle East and the intellectual centre for the Arab world. Egypt led the Middle Eastern countries in the experience of modernization and westernization. Up until the uprisings of 2011, Egypt was looked to for any changes manifesting that could potentially cause ripple effects in the Arab world. With an estimation of nearly 90 million citizens, Egypt has roughly one-fourth of the population of the Arab world.8 Egypt is said to have over one-third of the number of non-governmental organizations in the Arab world, one half of Egypt’s organizations being located in Cairo. Many analysts had predicted that political change in Egypt would easily influence the entire region. Indeed, what is happening on the ground has proved to be indicative of the kinds of change that are happening in the surrounding countries. Egypt offers abundant opportunity to study and research processes that are also occurring in the region. Certainly, there are other developments occurring in the region that analysts had been warily looking towards for clues to changes within Egypt and the region. This includes the parting of South Sudan from the rest of the country, for hints as to what may also influence similar or larger change in the region. This development has left some analysts questioning what effects may possibly manifest in Egypt, especially after the violence on Christian churches and the responses, at the end of December 2010. The ousting of Tunisian President Zine Al-Abedine ben Ali from his stronghold in power since 1987 in mid-January 2011, after weeks of street clashes, when waves of protesters were shot dead in the streets and (some say) millions who flooded these streets in outcry,

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began to shake the region. During this time, the news channels of various countries around the globe showed these clashes, the millions of protesters on the streets, some showing beatings and killings, while when I flipped to Egypt’s satellite channels all I found aired were the regular programmes – soap operas, old films, music, partial news. The other news channels covered people from Tunisia screaming at the rest of the Arab world to take to the streets and to follow their example. The emergence of small pockets of protestors within, for example, Algeria, Jordan and Egypt, gathered pace with the example. In dramatic and symbolic displays of discontentment, individuals within many other Arab countries, with Egypt next in line comprising a handful after a man set himself ablaze in front of the Egyptian parliament, emulated the shaheed (martyr) in Tunisia who burned himself alive to protest against poverty and government oppressive policies. The Mubarak government’s initial response comprised halting the increase in gas and bread prices, promising to hand out raises to government employees (which it never did, adding to the anger), and acquitting imprisoned Ikhwan members of charges held against them (only a tiny number and then arresting more) – all before cracking down on protestors through numerous incidences of violence. Such movements and demands for change had been influenced by deep discontent and protests were becoming an increasing feature before full-scale unrest as seen sweeping the Arab world. However, while analysts look at such massive display of protests, it is pertinent to emphasize that other processes may offer greater insight into lasting political transformation. Egypt offers a great opportunity to study civil society associations and how they may influence political change. As Singerman notes (1995: 5): ‘Egypt offers vibrant evidence for revising the boundaries of political research as well as our notions of the political, public, and private spheres, and avenues by which a variety of constituencies participate in politics.’ Singerman’s focus is to bring a better understanding of how seemingly apolitical, social networks in Cairo effect political change by affecting the distribution of goods and services through the activities of the sha‘b. I concur with Elshtain when she affirms that the activation of a female participatory capability must begin with her immediate

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concerns (cited in Rian 1998: 14). Hence, studies must focus on struggles around such concerns. This is particularly important for the context of most of the Middle East and other developing regions where the majority of women’s struggles are shaped by economic hardship. This research will, as well, briefly look into the economic strategies utilized by the organizations, demonstrated to be especially effective in Islamic organizations, through the study of the concept of networking. Networking is ‘the political lifeline of the community, allowing individuals and groups to cooperate with other members of the community to achieve individual and collective goals’ (Singerman 1995: 133). Similarly, the focus of this research is to expose the political significance of Cairo women’s organizations through its inquiry into their impact on civil society. Rather than passive beings, these women are ‘architects of political change and struggle’ (ibid.: 5). The political significance of these women’s organizations is determined through an examination of the politics of empowerment and practice of democratic values demonstrated in their activities. Rather than looking to state activities to understand democratic change, I argue that it is necessary to look within civil society for the study of political processes particular to the developing world. This work illustrates how actions traditionally designated to be outside the realm of high politics – or which in many instances do not engage the state and in several examples are not intended to effect change and are thus seemingly apolitical – are political. Such a conclusion in this book is drawn from the impact these women’s organizations have on civil society in terms of democratization. And hence, in this work the neat distinction of political and apolitical behaviour drawn between that which is consciously directed at collective behaviour to have an influence on decisions in the public realm and that referred to as merely individual, self-interested and aimed toward private ends is disproved (see also ibid.: 7). For example, if one gives charity to a mosque such an action must be viewed as political, as the alms-giving is used by the mosque for its various activities, as it is a community institution where the social, economical and political intertwine. It is in such a setting that funding may at times be requested for support of war efforts far or near.

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Unconventionally, political theorist Hannah Arendt (1958: 214–42) defines the boundaries of the political as excluding the emotion of love: ‘Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than its rarity that it is not only apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most antipolitical force.’ Arendt’s boundary is unconventional in that she thus allows for a wider scope of activities to be included in the political by stopping short of the act of love. For her, love is the opposite of what drives power. In this sense, pure worship as an expression of love for God would be understood as apolitical action. Pure worship might, for example, include giving charity to a Musalah (prayer space). A Musalah is entered and used for the sole purpose of worship. Going along with Arendt’s thesis, such an act would be seen as apolitical because love for God is expressed as a private act and, hence, inconsequential to the public. The private and public division of acts, however, forms a false paradigm from which theorists have drawn conclusions about power. It has enabled conclusions that obscure an understanding of true political impact. It must be noted that in the context of authoritarianism several examples of political action occurring among civil society organizations must necessarily be extremely subtle (Singerman 1999: 177). Karam (2000: 74), in fact, argues that precisely because of restrictive government laws on organizations, increasingly creative strategies are being developed. Because of great risks under the Mubarak regime, no organization ever called its activities political and, in fact, any mention of the word ‘political’ would often be encountered with horror, as I personally experienced in my initial interviews. Arendt enables a broader view of the political, a necessary step in light of the fact that too many political theorists still view politics as state-centred practice. However, as a graduate student during class once insisted while I was teaching on Arendt, stopping short of acts of love still does not enable a comprehensive understanding of politically significant acts. The effects of the acts that I researched can only be understood more comprehensively if this false boundary is removed. Love is not a passive act. Therefore, it is not anti-political. Love is a force that empowers one to do something, even if to endure a situation. One finds the energy or motivation through love to do an act or the

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power from love within to endure, in addition to various other forms and expressions. A ‘pure’ act of love expressed to God, an individual or object can, in fact, be the fuel or the motivation to perform acts defined or even manipulated to be in line with this love. Thus, ‘pure’ love will invariably be burdened with some meaning so that its energy creates the force behind various actions. Similarly, devotion that is reconfirmed in a Musalah may be what is needed to be consistent with acts that are defined within certain worldviews of what are necessary acts for the God-loving. In other words, pure acts of love may form the basis as an indirect but conditional step to the performing of other acts that are built upon and sustained by the original force of love. As Foucault (1978, 1989, cited in Mahmood 2004: 17) has argued, power permeates life by producing new forms of desires, objects, relations, and discourses, and is exercised through the meaning that is attached to its expression. The political thus not only permeates life through state policies and strategies and the observed reactions to these, but through permeating the ideas that people hold. Forms of power are excluded in modern scholarship because there is a lack of understanding of resistance in terms of what can be seen as a material force and that which is at the level of consciousness (Mitchell 1990). James Scott (1987: 307) also argues that power is exercised not only in material form but at the level of consciousness. He further argues that for power to truly ‘work’, it requires a normative dimension. What better arena of thought to influence but that which is held as ideal and has emotive capacity – love. Consequently, love creates many possibilities. The most powerful Islamist group, the Ikhwan, justified its formation based on this most basic yet essential formula, love between ‘brothers’. Love does not create violence and is anti-violent yet comprises an energy that can be directed or even manipulated through meaning making of, for example, a bond or a situation which encompasses defining the transgressor and the victim. As such, making meaning of something understood as ‘pure’ can result in differing and conflicting perceptions of it. For example, out of love, a mother can kill to save her baby from an aggressor and the consensus will be that she was virtuous to do so. I know of a case in Egypt where wife number eight attempted to kill wife number nine (as

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narrated by wife nine), newly wed to her Saudi husband, by putting poison in her food – initially out of love for him. But for another example, an extremist leader may, in fact, use this variable of seemingly apolitical consequence to motivate students to perform various acts, even acts of violence. In this sense, this seemingly apolitical force – love – can be manipulated into hate. Thereby, an individual finds the fuel to execute an act of potentially enormous negative effect. Theorists on the political have not fully comprehended how significant the expression of love within the smallest of acts can be to producing profound changes. As was taught in a few of the halakas visited in this research, each individual one has worked together with to achieve a goal, each person one has taught something to, even if letters of the alphabet, quoting a hadith, each person one has ever smiled at, quoting another hadith, has been affected by a simple act. This act will have an effect that will carry over to somewhere else. Various traditions have stated that a little drop in a pond creates a widely-spreading ripple, whether we are conscious or unconscious of that fact, and every wave started with a ripple. This principle is taught within these study circles because in theory and practice such privately-oriented acts are viewed as effective on wider change and development. The principle of small individual acts having larger consequences on the public is also incorporated within Islamist thinking. Islamists will attempt to infiltrate society by imbuing it with particular ideas of morality and practices of piety and sustaining these with reference to ‘for the love of God’. Whatever agendas love is used to fuel, love is not passive as it produces consequences. Love as a core part of Islamic activism or secular activism can ultimately also bring about bettered circumstances or secure peace. Love creates compassion, understanding, tolerance and cooperation in the relationships between individuals. Without the essence of love fuelling disciplined action, there can be no civility. Whether or not love can be expressed in a ‘pure’ form may be debated; however, the meaningmaking attached to love through which justice, caring, giving, reciprocity, trust, etc. are practiced within sets of higher principles and intentions can have enormous positive effects. Power does not result in either resistance or compliance. The exercise of power can be with love to dispel hate, evade manipulation, or abate greed for more power. The

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effect of such an exercise is higher outcomes and better circumstances for both or all parties involved. The exercise of ‘power over’ another, manipulation, or coercion will never succeed to create or sustain higher outcomes and truly improved circumstances for all. Love then is not only political; it is potentially the most powerful act. Love is viewed as a feminine quality and as with most actions that are considered feminine, a woman’s disciplined action in the way of expressing love for God or another through giving, sharing, tolerating, trusting, building relations, or creating peace, is automatically placed outside the scope of political study. Indeed, women’s and men’s activities will often take different shapes, as well. The problem, however, is that the strategic and logical are placed in a hierarchy above the practical and emotional, the latter pair constituting a larger proportion of women’s forms of participation in the Middle East and, I would argue, most areas. As this occurs, women’s forms of participating become devalued. Scholarly attention then remains fixated on male-dominated spheres, such as the state, to identify politically relevant action. However, from my research both men and women have attested that in fact women are the most active in society. Asked why this is perceived so, the belief I have heard time and time again is that women have ‘greater compassion’ or a ‘bigger heart’ to work ardently in the way of bettering society. In other words, because it is often thought that women have the capacity to love they have what it takes to participate. What is crucial here to identify is that it is not only the view among both men and women that actually women are participating to a larger degree but that it is through what is stereotypically deemed a feminine quality in particular that they have the capacity to do so. The objective of this book, furthermore, is to identify in which ways women are participating that on the ground have been acknowledged as occurring on a large scale yet remain marginalized and discounted in the literature on what matters to the political.

Key Issues and Debates In sum, including the rising organization numbers, their expanding membership and their expanding programmes in Egypt, as quantitative

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indicators, this research also stresses the importance of examining the actual activities of the women’s organizations in their struggles against structures that disempowered them as an important indicator for the expansion of civil society. Re-examining the existence of civil society and the role its associations play with qualitative indicators, this book argues more specifically that such activisms foster democratic values, civility, and empowerment. These activisms serve to expand civil society on the practical level and add new values to the study of civil society and the political in the Middle East, on the theoretical level. In examining the political significance of women’s organizing within a civil society framework, I cover four main debates by asking: 1) whether or not there is a civil society in Egypt; 2) whether or not associations play a positive role in the development of civil society through the spreading of democratic values and, hence, form the locus for true democratic change at the state level; 3) if a theoretical difference can be made between organizations struggling for either strategic/feminist or practical/feminine goals; and 4) if networking can be an effective part of civil society. The first question posed here actually addresses a broader debate on whether or not there is a civil society in the Middle East in general. Basing my inquiry on the fieldwork determining if the women’s organizations studied exhibit activities and activism, which make up a civil society, I ask specifically: does Egypt have a civil society? Many scholars assert that a civil society is absent in the Middle East. Challenging this view, I hold that there is a civil society in Egypt, even though it may be weak. Certain sectors have long been excluded from studies on civil society and democratic participation, thought to be either irrelevant or uncivil enough to initiate democratic political change. The exclusion of politically relevant sectors of society has handicapped a thorough study of actors and influences in civil society and on the state. The second question attempts to tackle the second broad debate on the role of associations in the developing world in general. Scholars question whether or not civil society associations contribute to a democratization process or, in fact, hinder its development. Some scholars directly relate the expansion of civil society to democracy

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while others do not see a direct relationship. Although I do not believe that a democracy can be sustained without a vibrant civil society, I do not agree that there is a strict correlation between the expansion of a civil society and the institutionalization of a democracy. From such a perspective, civil society is defined too narrowly within a purview of functionality that simply limits the scope and capacity of a strong civil society. I see the rooting and development of democracy as one potential outcome of an expanded and mature civil society, and that is why studying the potential role of civil society actors is crucial. However, democracy is a theoretical concept used to express the idea of pluralism, freedom, egalitarianism, transparency and fair access, as will be elucidated later. In my view, not all democracies today can be credited with bringing peace or dignity to others globally, nor are some of these an example of fairness, egalitarianism or transparency, let alone truly ensuring pluralism. Where I find a correlation is within the development of democratic principles on the tiniest unit – the individual. Only once the individual has the capacities of civility, can she or he develop those in her or his surrounding environment, as in through relationships, networks, groups and associations. If she or he is empowered, then self-sufficiency to extend and sustain these practices in these interdependent relationships is ensured. As this research is focused upon the potentials at the associational level, the impact of the associations on the wider society will be established. With the bottom-up approach to the study of political change in Egypt, this research asks: do the activities of these organizations studied actually serve to expand civil society in Egypt? Applying the concept of civil society to the Middle East, I argue the activities of these women’s organizations prove to have meaning for and offer a deeper understanding of political change that has taken place culminating in the 2011 revolution. They have been expanding civil society, even if the process has been slow-moving. The expansion of civil society through the development of a political culture will be crucial for supporting and sustaining true democratic practice at the level of governance in the time to come. Feminist scholarship has placed a clear theoretical distinction between women who seek strategic goals and women who seek

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practical goals. The result has been a marginalization of important women’s action groups. Addressing this analytical problem, if the various activities of women’s Islamic and secular feminist organizations serve to expand civil society, I ask: can a distinction be accorded to the political significance of these two types of associations based on a practical/strategic dichotomy? I argue that these two organizational types exhibit a wide range of activities that need to be studied on the ground to understand their strategic and practical value. I clarify that their activities cannot be distinguished in this dichotomy as political and apolitical and that strategic or feminist and practical or feminine concerns and goals cannot be neatly separated and accorded to either secular feminist or Islamic women’s organizations. The definition of civil society has become synonymous with nongovernmental organizations. However, in contexts different to those in which the concept has its roots different kinds of organization have sprouted. Formations will take on different shapes based on local factors. Especially under authoritarian regimes, civil society elements will need to take on more fluid formations, such as that of networks. In this regard, social media takes prominence as the most effective strategy. Hence, I ask if networks can be considered functional in expanding civil society. The effectiveness of networking is studied in view of understanding the potential for true democratic change at the state level. Summing up the purpose of this study, this book centres on the question: do women’s Islamic and secular feminist forms of organization constitute activism and activities relevant to the expansion of civil society in terms of securing democratic principles and general wellbeing, and if so can a distinction be made between them in their political value? In short, the activities of these women’s organizations, taken as a whole, I argue, foster not only practices but values that are inherently democratic. Such women empower themselves individually and collectively to take responsibility to effect change in their lives and those around them in light of the oppressive structures they both resist and transform. It is through their actions that the empowerment process takes place and a democratic culture is spread. There is a larger

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picture of the political process in Egypt to be seen, and the change that has manifested with the revolution and subsequent demands to end authoritarian practice and corruption in all sectors can only be accounted for if women’s activities are accounted for – in the private and the public. The book is divided into eight chapters. In providing an account of the political significance of women’s activism in Egyptian civil society in regard to democratization, I rely on a broad spectrum of literature related to women’s activism in general, feminism, political theory, gender and development, civil society, and democratic development, which I elaborate on in Chapter Two. I focus in particular on the literature on civil society concepts applied to the Middle East. In Chapter Three, I provide background information on Egypt so as to be able to ground my findings in the context of women’s marginalization and poverty. The activities of the women interviewed must be contextualized to better understand the political ramifications of their struggles. Therefore, I lay out a broad base of knowledge on Egypt covering general country information, statistics, and formal political structure. A brief socio-political history of the development of organizations is provided to shed light on what processes have shaped current organizations and networks and the constraints under which women in Egypt, nevertheless, manoeuvre. In Chapter Four, I describe my methodological approach to the study of the women’s organizations and present further observations. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I analyze the data I collected in light of the literature. Finally, Chapter Eight provides brief conclusions.

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CHAPTER 2 CIVIL SOCIET Y AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Introduction Action groups politically relevant to creating a healthy functioning civil society have been excluded in the literature, rendering inaccurate conclusions on civil society development in the Middle East. To assess the impact of the organizations of my case study, their activisms must first be situated within the relevant contemporary debates. What follows is discussion of a selective survey of the literature dealing with civil society and the political, in which I identify some of the inadequacies of studies on women’s activism with a focus on Egypt as a case for the Middle East. The three main issues that I am addressing are reiterated as follows: the presence of a civil society in Egypt, the positive role women activists play in spreading democratic principles throughout society in (an expanded) western-developed civil society framework, and in particular the crucial role of practical-oriented groups with a discussion of inadequate and discriminatory theories.

Theoretical Considerations in Democracy Before delving into the literature on civil society and the political, it is important to understand some of the basic premises of democracy and to highlight some problems with its theoretical underpinnings relevant to this study. A logical starting point in defining democracy

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would be to turn to Robert Dahl’s classic definition listing the basic requirements for a democracy as: (1) political competition for office and widespread participation of the population to ensure ‘the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens’ (cited in Fischer 1996: 3). Furthermore, (2) ‘the process of selection should rest on the broad inclusion of all individuals and groups in the society’ (ibid.: 4). Similarly focusing on governmental politics as comprehensive to the study of democracy, Samuel Huntington’s (1991: 7) definition of democratic practice is when ‘its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adult population is free to vote’. As Tim Niblock points out, the theoretical conception of liberal democracy is an ideal, which does not exist anywhere in reality. He further warns that comparing Middle Eastern states to this illusion has a negative impact on research on Middle Eastern political systems in that ‘[h]aving written off the political systems of the area as being congenitally undemocratic, researchers have clearly felt that it would be a waste of time to examine or analyse the participative or representative aspects of the system’ (1998: 224). In reference to those who may be defined as its participants, Doug McAdam takes the argument further when he points out that with narrow definitions of democracy as such ‘our attention is thus squarely focused on the formal political actors (lobbyists, elected officials, civil service bureaucrats), and political processes (elections, court challenges, lobbying)’ (quoted in Arruda 2001: 12). The predicament in restricting democracy and participation to the realm of institutional politics is to follow a public/private split having severe consequences on the study of civil society forces. To do so is to designate meaningful action to the public sphere where maledominated elite interests reign, while relegating women’s interests to the private sphere, and as a result, excluding their actions, in general, as unimportant to the study of political change. And with respect to the ideal of democracy, Martha Ackelsburg (1988: 299) advances the argument when she attests, ‘the pluralist model is flawed’. Her critique of liberal democracy is that citizens do not meet as equals in a free and open political arena and some interests are perceived as more

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legitimate than others (ibid.). And as will become relevant to the discussion on women’s collective actions in Egypt, Ackelsburg calls into question the liberal democratic premise that citizens must enter the public arena as ‘individuals’: ‘Networks and community associations develop from women’s responses to issues that confront them not as isolated individuals but as members of households, and, more important, as members of the communities in which those households are embedded’ (Ackelsberg 1988: 303). In the case of Egypt, Singerman (1995: 8) illustrates that Egyptian society is not ‘a collection of undifferentiated and unrelated individuals’ but a society where individuals must go to great lengths to develop ties to others, sometimes even creating fictive kin in these efforts. David Held emphasizes the importance of including the social components of democracy, which would mean acknowledging ‘both a high degree of the accountability of the state and a democratic reordering of civil society’ (quoted in Sorensen 1993: 10). Linz and Stepan (1996) offer conditions in addition to the political society in which ‘political actors compete for the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus’ (ibid.). Among a rule of law, ‘which all major political actors, especially the government and the state apparatus, must be effectively subjected to’ (ibid.), a state bureaucracy, that is ‘usable by the new democratic government’, (ibid.), and an economic society (ibid.), they list a free and lively civil society, where ‘self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests’ (ibid.: 17). As Kamrava (1998: 3) notes: ‘the simple ability to vote for one’s political leaders does not make a democracy.’ Beyond mere voting, political participation must encompass participation in informal community efforts (Burns, Lehman and Verba 1997). The underlying theme in these arguments is the contestation of democracy and participation belonging to the sole domain of institutionalized politics, which in effect only allows a top-down approach to the study of democracy. Scholars are recognizing the role of civil society in providing the building blocks for democratic practice. Yet few recognize the need to analyze which values are learned that also

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contribute to democratization. Janine Clark (1994: 35) points out that the question of which values are learned through individuals’ experiences within the association is not being asked. Goran Hyden (1998: 27) emphasizes that it is important to know what is going on within civil society associations and to study the norms or values they foster as regards democracy. Hyden, as well as all authors in the volume edited by John Burbidge, Beyond Prince and Merchant: Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society, holds the view that democracy cannot be created from the top down, but below within existing civil society institutions (ibid.: 28). And a growing number of scholars see the need for a democracy that is much more comprehensive. This would transcend an institutional definition of democracy to one that includes social justice, in order for democracy to take hold and survive in the context of the developing world (Clark and Kleinberg 2000: 301). Augustus Richard Norton (1995: 7) states, ‘a vital and autonomous civil society is a necessary condition of democracy (though not a sufficient one)’ and that ‘citizenship, with associated rights and responsibilities, is part and parcel of that concept’ (ibid.: 11). Here, ‘citizenship implies social participation and services to the common good’ (Voet 1998: 10). To understand the process of democratic development or civil society expansion in Egypt better, scholarship must shift from focusing on elite, male-dominated politics, where it is obvious that a country’s leaders have a strong interest in holding onto power, to such agents of change within civil society. Stability, peace and a pluralistic existence cannot be sustained without a vibrant civil society.

Is there a Civil Society and, Therefore, Prospects for Democratization in Egypt? The question of if a civil society exists in the Middle East will most undoubtedly be revisited with analyses on how the common people have helped overthrow despotic leaders in the Middle East, starting with Tunisia and Egypt. Yet, few scholars believe that the Middle East has civil societies. Literature on political participation, civil society, and prospects for democratization exists on Eastern Europe (see, for example, Cohen and Arato 1992) and, to a greater extent, Latin America

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(see, for example, O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). Yet, for the Middle East scholars are quick to presume that no evidence for civil society growth and democratic development can be found. John Entelis (1996: 44) comments: ‘Compared to other Third World regions, the Middle East and North Africa have lagged significantly in providing theoretical insight and empirical evidence for explaining the origin and development of state-society relations.’ For Jeff Haynes (1997: 48), ‘the virtual absence of civil societies in the Middle East’ is the reason for the lack of democracy. Haynes’ argument further includes blighting Middle Eastern women when he compares them to Latin American and Indian women. While he grants women’s movements the distinction of often being the ‘cutting edge of democratization’ (ibid.: 169), he repeatedly expresses doubt that Middle Eastern women have the ability to fulfil any such role (see ibid.: 48, 120, 121, 169). The rejection of a civil society in the Middle East is not only advocated among western academics. Locally, most Arab intellectuals hold such a position. For example, al-Tahir Labib, Ali al-Kinz and Ad al-Qadir al-Zaghl all believe the Arab world is devoid of a civil society (Hamzawy 2003: 32). Because the question of whether the Middle East might have civil societies will resort to a western framework (whether used by westerners or Middle Easterners is irrelevant) and has traditionally been set in strict terms of whether or not a certain county has a civil society, the debate is led by misconceptions and follows faulty logic. One approach of such sceptics focuses on the structural relationship between state and society. It is within this framework many argue that sectors of civil society – non-governmental organizations or particularly women – are so repressed as to have no functional value in developing a civil society. Some have perhaps rightly pointed out the growth of technocrats around the leadership but then argue that with the rise of other newly emergent groups, no societal differentiation in terms of equally strong groupings has resulted. An erroneous idea for countries ruled by authoritarian leaders, some argue that government must organize civil society associations in order for them to be considered civil (see, for example, Toprak 1996). Even with ever-growing grassroots organizations in the developing world as an indicator for civil society growth, it is argued that they are so buffeted by corporatist pressures,

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so insignificant in their capacity to influence, or so ‘little-institutionalized’ that they can barely be constituted as civil society (Carapico 1996, ibid.: 287, 288). Hamzawy refers to many such sceptics as those who, therefore, define civil society in the Middle East as a ‘system of absences, a list of missing elements’ (Hamzawy 2003: 33). Another approach is orientalist, which has remained influential in the works of some contemporary scholars. Scholarship that follows an orientalist slant has in the approaches mainly either a Euro-centric – more often now referred to as a Western or more particularly American bias, or a Middle Eastern essentialism, in which people’s (wrong) behaviour is circumscribed by culture and religion. Western essentialists typically argue that deep religiosity and Arab culture are absolute impediments to the development of civic values and institutions that are by definition secular (Carapico 1996: 288) while local expressions of the same focus on religiosity. Within the Middle Eastern countries, both Islamist thinkers and some secular thinkers use a definition of civil society to prove that their political visions are best for society and the other’s is detrimental. These secularists insist civil society is by definition secular and frame all Islamists as fundamentalists who fall outside this framework.3 Part of this framing includes essentializing. Linking civil society with democracy and in opposition to Islamists, Al-Sayyid Yassin (quoted in Hamzawy 2003:33), for example, sees civil society as the ‘democratic, secular sphere between the authoritarian Arab states and the movements of political Islam’. Exemplary of local secularists, he views the role of civil society as resisting the power of these groups, who he sees as having archaic social and political ideas (ibid.). However, essentalizing is not necessarily confined to groups, few of which are violent. An entire religion as currently practiced is blamed for the absence of civil society and democracy. Mehran Kamrava (1998: xv) states: ‘democracy in the Middle East is at present highly implausible, if not outright impossible.’ The rooting of democracy in the Middle East is problematic. Authoritarian politics at the state level in Egypt under the Mubarak regime among various practices within society itself that could arguably comprise an aspect of political culture that is also authoritarian and increasingly individualistic may have accounted for the ‘recent’ and seemingly

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‘immovable’ challenges to an equitable form of political organization. However, for Kamrava (ibid.: 226), it is ‘Islam, which, again, in its current militant form poses an immovable obstacle to social and cultural democratization’. And, naming the most famously quoted figures of an orientalist stance, Elie Kedourie, Bernard Lewis, Albert Hourani and Samuel Huntington as personas who back his view, he advises: ‘Thus there would seem to be hardly any room for yet another rehash of old arguments so meticulously presented by giants of the discipline’ (ibid.: xv).4 There has been an explosion of articles addressing Huntington’s thesis and article, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, which appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1993, in which he describes a post-Cold War world order emerging in which the West is culturally differentiated from the rest, specifically Eastern Europe, China and the Middle East. He allocates a precise boundary between countries in the West, running down Europe except Turkey, and the East, which includes the Middle East with what he has famously called its ‘bloody borders’. This differentiation of country-bound identities is marked by intense struggle for hegemony in which an America is portrayed as the ‘civil’ civilization and the East delineated by Islam, the uncivil ‘civilization’. The late Edward Said (2001) points out ‘Huntington relies heavily on a 1990 article by the veteran orientalist Bernard Lewis, whose ideological colors are manifest in its title, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” [whereby] in both articles, the personification of enormous entities called “the West” and “Islam” is recklessly affirmed’. Very recently, a few of these scholars have revisited and clarified some essentialist assumptions in the approaches to the Middle East, including their own and including Huntington himself. Other scholars, such as Augustus Richard Norton, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Amani Kandil, Jillian Schwedler, and Sheila Carapico, have not rejected the existence of a civil society in the Middle East. They acknowledge the complexity of both the development of civil society and the democratization process and discuss the problems associated with the region’s ability to sustain a democracy. These include addressing authoritarian politics and religious extremism, and as such, some of the issues orientalists have raised are not ignored. In sum, these are examples of

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scholars who hold the view that the Middle East has a civil society, if but at all weak. The point of departure in many writings by scholars on the two sides of the debate has often been the notion of culture as a defining factor to evaluate Middle Easterners. It has been done in respect of the wellplaced European culture in an imagined hierarchy of cultures along an imagined continuum of modernization. In this respect, beginning with the Enlightenment period, said to have begun in Europe and led the rest of the developing world, was shown a model of the ‘good life’ to be emulated. Within the modernization project placed upon developing countries there was no other way ‘forward’. As such, in reply to those (western) researchers who contend that there is no civil society in the Middle East, Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1998: 57) points out how often they forget how long, arduous, and even bloody their march was towards a civil society and democratization. This is also on the understanding that the developing world was to emulate Europe to begin with. Jillian Schwedler (1995: 1), however, reminds us that ‘[t]here are many paths to democracy, few of which are smooth’. In other words, there is no particular model that must be followed within what are referred to as today’s developing countries. A more profound observation is the hierarchilization in Euro-centric arguments in which the West is not only exemplary of what the rest of the world should logically strive for but remains the dominant cultural civilization no matter how much others try to emulate it. Therefore, culture is a contentious variable. Looking beyond ‘cultural’ explanations, these scholars are pointing to a wide variety of civil society sectors to illustrate that civil society not only exists in the Middle East, but is oftentimes a vibrant civil society (ibid.: 9). Mustapha Kamil Al-Sayyid differentiates between moderate Islamic activists and fringe Islamist groups in the way of participation. Different to Yassin, Al-Sayyid includes religious institutions, specifically PVOs, due to their social basis and centrality for consensus in ideological production. For Al-Sayyid, Islamic PVOs and mosquecommunities representing peaceful, political resistance and tolerating others contribute to the forces that can build a democracy (Hamzawy 2003: 34). As such, he argues that the controversy around secularism

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in the Arab world serves as a major obstacle to liberalization and, in fact, allows the existing authoritarian regimes to retain their hegemonic power (ibid.: 35). Similarly, Hassanain Taufiq argues that the civil society concept has been misused in the Middle East as a ‘new version of secularism’ directed at excluding Islamists. His qualification is that these movements must not use violence and must respect pluralism (ibid.: 36). Rached Ghannouchi cautions that the civil society concept, as developed in the West, has been situated as oppositional to a religious society. In his view, the roots of this conflict come from French cultural history, which witnessed a violent conflict between the church and the French Revolution. The result of this conflict was the idea that religion and civility cannot be one and the same thing (Ghannouchi 1999: 83). To aid in the assessment of a civil society in Egypt Al-Sayyid lays down three criteria (1993: 230): the presence of formal organizations of various types among different social groups and classes; an ethic of tolerance and acceptance by the majority of minority legitimate rights, no matter how such minorities are defined; and limitations on arbitrary exercise of state authority. Al-Sayyid lists statistics of a budding number of associations in Egypt to demonstrate that the first indicator has been met (ibid.: 231). He cautions in the assessment that all three criteria are not met entirely in any society (ibid.: 230). He goes on to conclude, however, that the other two indicators ‘are lacking’ (ibid.: 239). Although noting a contribution of greatly needed services to the communities, he does not analyze the actual activities of these growing PVOs to understand what function these organizations might play in contributing to civil society. To transcend biases in the study of civil society in the Middle East and to fully recognize their force vis-à-vis the state, Carapico (1996: 288) argues we need to look at their actions within a political environment. She reasons that a civil society in the Middle East ‘may more closely resemble what Jean-Francois Bayart described as the process whereby society seeks to “breach” or counteract “totalization” by the state, or, in Henri Lefebvre’s term, “an autonomous space of mass

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expression,” than formal organizations cooperating within legal guarantees conceded in advance’ (ibid.: 289). In other words, by including informal associations’ struggles against the Mubarak regime into the political, a growth of civil society may be observed. A growing number of scholars have picked up on this indicator of civil society, as a plethora of organizations are sprouting not because of a space being provided by the state but rather because of an authoritarian state using greater force against elements within civil society. In fact, it is within war-torn areas that new strategies are developed to help people cope with greater oppressive structures and people find themselves in a position where survival is dependent on the every day forms of cooperation of community members that were previously in place only on occasion. Within such new strategies are forms that are often more intensely grassroots or familial based. Schwedler (1995: 16) emphasizes the need to look for civil society by focusing on the function, rather than the structures of civil society, ‘be they familial, professional, tribal, religious, or clan-based’. To understand civil society processes she proposes asking the question: ‘How do citizens and communities address their interests or grievances vis-a-vis government policies?’ (ibid.). She argues that by framing the question in this way a range of social interactions might be highlighted that might otherwise be dismissed as insignificant (ibid.). Despite a broadening of the civil society sphere, in Carapico’s and Schwedler’s arguments (as with Al-Sayyid’s), the government remains the focus of political action if one is to see civil society expanding. But, as Ghannouchi (1991: 81) reminds us, power is not only exercised by the state but within civil society. The actions of civil society actors are not merely reactions to state authoritarianism or policies, but also initiations for a wide range of interests. And as Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato argue (1992), civil society is much more than merely the safeguard against state authority and power. They further assert that the ‘civil’ behaviour of members in their dealings with one another is central to civil society. By providing larger variables essential for any evaluation of civil society, the works of such scholars have been important in assisting a better understanding of civil society in the Middle East and especially

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so since Middle Eastern, and particularly Arab or Islamic, culture has been presented as static and unchangeable. Although some underscore the significance of the value systems, culture is still viewed as a problematic issue to return to in any related discussion. Although certainly a contentious matter to treat, culture should not be set aside entirely. Indeed, what some essentialists have pointed out as religious-based impediments may be worth investigating further. In such cases, it is not Islam as a religion that serves as an impediment since Islam, as all other major religions, is based on core principles and values that could best be resorted to in order to develop and strengthen civil societies. What needs greater analysis are the ‘values’ that have been added to the religion’s core precepts and which are also accurately or inaccurately called ‘Islam’. Apart from core texts, over time the narration becomes solidified in some form, usually when linked to core teachings. Additions and editions often relate in some powerful way to the political. This process occurs all the same in various ways to effect a political culture that describes many behaviours within a society. As some dominant discourses encourage love and cooperation, other dominant discourses discourage enabling access or enjoyment of dignity, resources, etc. to a greater number and instead to a specified group of individuals. While not all members of a group will be part of or perpetuate one or more of these discourses, there still exist dominant discourses which either a larger or louder group is part of or perpetuates. The dominant political culture does carry some indicators for the direction of politics. As Sami Zubaida explains (1993: 94), while political culture is not in itself a political force, it may become an important ingredient in the constitution of political forces. In respect to at least part of the argument, Chris Hann (cited in Antoun 2000: 445) considers it necessary for all human communities to seek and create a version of civil society and that the ‘burden of scholarship’ is to investigate these different versions. But in order to compare these versions, scholars must then ‘shift the debates about civil society away from formal structures and organizations and towards an investigation of beliefs, values and everyday practices’ (ibid.). Bringing in an evaluation of beliefs and values as those components that help define a particular people’s behaviour or culture, however,

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will not always escape an orientalist slant. Richard Norton (1996: 5), rightly, warns of the tendency to idealize civil society through a western lens: At times, civil society is described in such rarefied, ideal-typical terms that ‘sightings’ of civil society are dismissed as spurious. Often, one has the sense that civil society is so pristinely defined that it could not possibly exist anywhere. Civil society is a social phenomenon and to presume that it is broadly representative, self-regulating or a beacon of unmitigated virtue is unjustified on the evidence. Similarly, Kumi Naidoo and Rajesh Tandon (1999: 2) caution that ‘[o]ur greatest enemy is arrogance and the notion that a strong civil society is an end in itself rather than the means by which peoples express their civic side in the collective enterprise we all share’. They further argue that Middle Eastern institutions are left having no worth when measured as regards ‘civility’ with that of the West (ibid.: 444). Hefner explains that scholars who follow a ‘culturalist’ line of analysis base their conclusions on the belief that what he terms a ‘civil democracy’ (or participation, equality, freedom and tolerance) rests upon a constellation of values and institutions unique to the West alone. And by implication the Middle East can only become truly democratic if ‘the tiger can somehow change its stripes to a Western dress’ (Hefner 1998: 11), which according to them cannot happen because of a lack of this heritage (ibid.). A debate has ensued, hence, in terms of the actual usefulness of the imported term in the region. Saif al-Din Ismail rejects the universal transferability of western theories and ideas, in general.5 In common with a growing number of scholars, Ismail believes the closer version in Arabic is mujtamah al-ahli rather than the more popular, mujtamah al-madani, the latter referring more to organized urban-based movements. The former relays the more original manifestations of civil society in the Middle East, representing the interests of the ummah (community, not necessarily Muslim, although usually). For many such scholars, it is useful to implement a wording that embraces original

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formations of civil society as studied throughout history. Ghannouchi (1991: 81), on the other hand, does not believe that concepts such as ‘civil society’ or ‘democracy’ are unique to and belong to the West, despite their western connotations and ‘non-Islamic’ philosophical basis. However, for Ismail, protection of the interests of the ummah includes not only struggling against authoritarian regimes, but protecting religion, democratically implementing Shari‘a, and reducing the increased foreign influence. As Hamzawy (2003: 38) points out, among many other things nothing is said in regard to how women’s interests would be protected under such an understanding. Clark cautions that, even though the term ‘civil society’ undoubtedly carries with it western ‘connotational “baggage”’, to exchange the term for another will not necessarily add accuracy, but will increase confusion ‘to a theoretical field already plagued with different understandings of this term’ (Clark 1994: 17, 18). Hefner (1998: 22) clarifies that though such ideals may have been influenced by the West, they are ideals that are not merely ‘Western’, and at times may need ‘reelaboration’ in their own contexts.

The Concept of Civil Society The above differences in experts’ opinions about the existence of a civil society in Egypt have emerged from the differences within civil society scholarship in defining its meaning and role. The conclusion that a civil society is nonexistent in Egypt, I argue, has been based on definitions that demonstrate biases and weak analysis. Defining civil society in such a way that important action groups become excluded cannot afford accurate judgement. This contention is brought forward in the following discussion of the literature concerned with characterizing the notion of civil society and its function. Limitations in the Definition of Civil Society and Political Activism The vagueness of the term ‘civil society’ is due in part to various different realities surrounding its emergence in Europe. The concept was imbedded in particularist notions due to specific contexts, such as in France and Germany. It has also been imprecise because of its

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various uses, being mostly used by the liberalists/secularists pitting themselves against Islamists, especially in Egypt and Turkey, to gain popularity within society and define the terms of progress, change and the ‘good life’. Employing the term ‘civil society’ had a resurgence in the 1980s at a time when new economic policies, external agreements and the opening-up of economies begun in the 1970s led to significant structural changes that affected people on the street directly, leading to some brief examples of violent protest against state initiatives or to opposition groups. The discussion of the role of civil society was placed in this context among intellectuals in the Middle East in terms of how they could contribute to alternative state formations. After Pan-Arabism came the examination of alternative models, and whether they should be socialist or secular, and modern (for some). It is in this vein that civil society was seen as a vehicle for modernization. For others, the question was how to establish an Islamic state through non-violence. The concept could be used in the endeavour of fighting against what were deemed foreign secular and liberal ideas that would eventual harm Middle Eastern society. However, more significantly for secularists, civil society became a more tangible means to establish the sort of ‘good life’ that the government was previously looked upon to establish but at which it was failing (Hamzawy 2003: 14). In terms of its location, civil society has generally been referred to as that part of society which stands between the household and the state, or in other words, between what has been traditionally viewed as the private and the public (ibid.: 6). A mainstream view is provided by Edward Shils: The idea of civil society is the idea of a part of society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly different from the state, and which is largely in autonomy from it. Civil society lies beyond the boundaries of the family and clan and beyond the locality; it lies short of the state. (Quoted in Schwedler 1995: 5) Besides its impreciseness, the problem with such a definition is that civil society is cast as an entity which operates separately from the

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state. Many scholars have recognized that civil society cannot occupy a space entirely distinct from the state, but is a sector of society that fluidly intermingles with the state (see Troxel 1998; Antoun 2000: 445). As many scholars of the developing world in general have pointed out, survival tactics can be seen in patron-clientelism. As Singerman notes in Egypt (1995: 246), PVOs, including many charitable associations which may seem apolitical, frequently have complex relationships with powerful figures. Bureaucracy is circumvented by extremely important ties. Scholars have, furthermore, pointed to the fact that the state is not a monolithic entity but made up of individual citizens. By defining civil society in such a way, institutions are deemed as either insignificant or not civil enough to be included in its definition. The family and women’s concerns as a whole are relegated to the private sphere and overlooked as having any political meaning to the public. Others, however, have successfully broadened civil society to be positioned between the individual and the state. I agree with Jürgen Habermas when he defines civil society to ‘include virtually all nonviolent associational activity between individual citizens and the state’ (Schwedler 1995: 5). Cohen and Arato (1992: x) emphasize the inclusion of the family in their definition as: A sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of association (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication. While Cohen and Arato distinguish between civil society and the market economy other scholars, such as Darrow Schecter (2000: 3),6 who follows a Marxist or Hegelian conception of civil society, insist that the two cannot be separated. As the Centre for the Study of Civil Society (2005) explains, ‘In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated’. Because of the overlap between the civil society and the economic and political spheres, there will be grey

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zones in which it is hard to draw a clear line to categorize particular actors and actions within these spheres. An exclusion would clearly put obstacles in the way of research on Egypt. Firstly, income-generating associations may clearly contribute to the empowerment process, needs or interests of the poor, whether or not intentionally. I include within activism as a part of civil society the struggle among marginalized persons for economic empowerment, which comprises part of their effort towards an overall goal of empowerment. Such activism often contributes to an empowerment process in which women and minorities attain greater self-reliance, productivity, self-esteem and autonomy from oppressive (often structural) forces.7 Howell also argues for recognition of the way in which different cultural contexts dictate the different manifestations of boundaries between civil society and other spheres (see Howell 2005: 19, fn. 7). Other case studies have illustrated that women’s empowerment through small-scale economic enterprises involves changes in power relationships, explained as in both the economic sphere (as an input) and in the social and political spheres (as an output) (Carr, Chen and Jhabvala 1996: 215). In all his case studies on PVOs in Egypt Ibrahim notes a ‘spill-over effect’, in which most start out as economic initiatives for immediate needs, and soon give the participants ‘self-confidence and broaden their quest for further sociopolitical action’ within local and state institutions (Ibrahim 1996: 226). Therefore, these forms of organization are part of civil society and are politically relevant. Secondly, social movements in Egypt may use ‘businesses’ for income generation for the political goals some have or to spread their political ideas or values. Thirdly, in order to escape constricting state laws on voluntary associations some PVOs have taken on an outward form and register as a ‘business’. As such, a restructuring of the social order is sought through either the practical means of a ‘business’ or a façade. Hence, practically speaking, ‘businesses’ in Egypt do not necessarily act within the theoretically defined market sphere only. As such, I exclude here political society and in theory the economic sphere as essentially separate realms while I acknowledge that these spheres will overlap in various ways, and especially the economic activities that enable women to rise above their marginalization are part of civil society.

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Nonetheless, the traditional characterization of civil society when applied to the Middle East tends to exclude sectors of the Middle Eastern population; thus terribly obscuring our understanding of political processes, influences, and change in civil society. Richard Antoun asserts that this gross oversight is due to the limitations of what is constituted as ‘civil institutions’. In his case study on Jordan and clanship, Antoun addresses the problem in civil society literature of having ‘discounted important action arenas of civil society [. . . and . . .] hav[ing] thus obscured a significant process that has contributed to civil society in the Middle East for generations’ (Antoun 2000: 441). As discussed earlier, the inclusion or exclusion of Islamic groups or associations as civil society institutions has also been a matter of considerable disagreement. Not only has the debate escalated among some secular modernists and Islamists in the Middle East; international politics has forced the debate to be examined again with the drawn out ‘war on terror’. In this climate, Islamic-based groupings and organizations are not viewed as having any potential to contribute to civil society in the region. Some go further to describe such institutions as contributing rather to injustice through politics that take advantage of the poor. A RAND report (Rabasa et al. 2004) has argued: The insurgent rhetoric of Islamic justice can be buttressed by the ability of these organizations to use humanitarian facilities to support their political and military objectives. Insurgents (both jihadist and Muslim ethno-nationalist) are using hospitals, schools, and mosques for deployment of personnel and supplies and have established clandestine clinics to treat fighters and their families, as well as members of the local community. While many argue that Islamic groups or associations fall outside the realm of civil society, most scholars, however, acknowledge the contributions of religious organizations to include these groups within civil society.8 Most research on Islamic movements has been directed towards Islamist groups and their Islamisms as opposed to Islamic organizations. Islamists use an Islamic doctrine as a guide for political action. Islamist movements can vary significantly in their doctrines and

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should not be confused with Islam, which is a much broader concept referring to the Islamic religion. Obviously, the conclusions of scholars who focus on the former cannot be applied to the latter. Yet, despite insufficient fieldwork on Islamic organizations, it is often asserted that Islamic organizations are a channel through which Islamist groups Islamize society (see, for example, al-Sayid 1993: 239). In either case, other scholars assert that religious organizations have an important function to play in civil society. Clark clarifies that a danger in analyses has been the blurring of the minority of violent Islamist groups and majority non-violent Islamist groups, whereby Islamic associations are characterized as instruments of such undemocratic and extremist Islamic groups (Clark 1994: 3, 35). Kandil recognizes that religion plays a key role as a motivating factor for women’s voluntary initiatives. Religion enables them to assume a profound role in civil society as it encourages them to volunteer time and give charity (Kandil 1999: 63).9 Gannouchi (1999: 83) argues that Islam is naturally strengthening to civility. Kate Crowe’s research on the role of religious organizations in civil society, in fact, concludes that organizations that are disengaged from local values and structures are severely handicapped in the way of developing civil society (Crowe 2007: 10). Those associations which do not fulfil the normative criterion of civility fall outside the civil society concept (Naidoo and Tandon 1999: 13). Obviously terrorist organizations cannot contribute to the strengthening of civility as they demonstrate intolerance and violence (ibid.). And, as Maha Abdelrahman argues, some Islamists in Egypt do not advocate pluralism as they believe Islam offers means of governance that is supreme (2004: 187). Absolutism places a stranglehold on civil society growth. But excluding Islamic organizations means ignoring the fact that they are of the most effective means of challenging the state and responding to the needs of citizens in Egypt (Schwedler 1995: 16). While sectors of political activism have been discounted because of analytical problems with the application of civil society literature, scholars disregard other sectors because they are thought to have no political import, or in other words are apolitical and offer no relevance to the study of political processes. Placing our western construct of the public/private divide and our theories of political institutions and

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behaviour on contexts where the majority of people must develop their own form of political institutions and activisms to influence politics within an authoritarian environment can only provide inaccurate conclusions on political change. Especially the activisms of women become marginalized and/or misconstrued in the process. As outlined in the second section of this chapter, Haynes fails to conduct an adequate analysis of Middle Eastern civil society activisms – his comments being highly superficial. In his project on (parts of) the developing world he nonetheless brings in a much more insightful approach when he argues that the political significance of action groups stem from: ‘(1) the varied responses to a lack of development and empowerment; (2) demands to reduce the state’s influence; (3) the effects of economic decline; and (4) the spread of demands for “real”, what I call “substantive”, democracy’ (Haynes 1997: 12). Angus Stewart explains that power and politics are thought of ‘exclusively’ in terms of discord, but ‘need not and should not be at the cost of denying the equally important “responsibility to act”, above all to act politically in pursuit of projects of empowerment’ (Stewart 2001: 4). Within the present argument, gender relations analysis has been a valuable tool with which to expand the boundaries on political participation to include women’s groups as politically significant action groups. If we study women’s groups without the narrow view that they must be goal-oriented, the idea of civil society highlights a wider range of social interactions that are otherwise dismissed as irrelevant in regard to what is and what is not political (see Singerman 1995; Schewdler 1995; Arruda 2000). Thus, it is important to understand politics as Bystydzienski (1992) has defined it: interpersonal networking, grass-roots economic development projects, protests of many kinds, and use of traditional women’s activities in the cause of national liberation, and involvement in nongovernmental and informal women’s groups and organizations . . . politics includes people’s everyday experiences of oppressive conditions, the recognition of the injustice of power relationships at all societal levels.

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The notion of civil society is a political concept. It is concerned with exercising power to advance and struggle for economic, social, and political interests of citizens (Naidoo and Tandon 1999: 8). Yet what many of the women’s PVOs in my case study found to be of utmost concern to them, such as obtaining an identity card, receiving citizenship for their children, learning how to raise children, being able to read, learning to knit and sell the resulting products to feed a family, attending religious study, doing charity work, receiving proper health care, or protecting religious ideology are examples of practical interests that have been treated as unimportant or at best secondary within literature on civil society politics. Activities as such are classified as belonging to the domestic or private domain as opposed to those pushing for demands strategically, consequently accorded to the public domain (Garcia-Guadilla 1995: 214). However, because poor women engage in activities that enable them to circumvent or challenge power structures, they are contributing to the process of empowerment and their development; hence, political change. Their struggles for empowerment, however, must be analyzed within the differing social contexts. In these organizations, women come together to learn ‘a different womanhood’ (Duval 1998: 64). Soroya Duval (ibid.) points out that they are ‘learning the ethical, just, egalitarian voice of Islam and are demanding its implementation in their family politics’. Having conducted previous fieldwork on Islamic women groups in Egypt, Duval views even the distinctive dress of such activists ‘as a democratic dress that to a large extent erases class origins’ (Ibid.: 63). Furthermore, for such women the dress is highly economical and allows them to leave their homes to enter the public sphere (ibid.: 62, 63); hence, it must be claimed as empowering for these women in their social and economical context. Such examples result in the empowerment of women; consequently they are a contribution to the democratic ideals of equality. However, despite differing social contexts, in many cases both secular feminist and Islamic women’s organizations seem to use similar strategies. When secular feminists struggle over culture and values their actions are politically significant, as a transformation of power relations is occurring, but between entities apart (though not always entirely

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excluded) from the state. When Islamic women’s organizations challenge other cultural, social, or ideological codes through activities such as providing charity or establishing welfare programmes, these activities similarly spread values which affect civil society. When halakas, or religious study circles, are made mandatory to be provided alongside charity or welfare programmes, the organization is then addressing practical concerns, strategically, and in this way, the political includes the symbolic struggles over Islamic meaning and values that constitute what Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori term Muslim politics – ‘the competition and contest over both the interpretation of symbols and the control of the institutions, both formal and informal, that produce and sustain them’ (Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000: 687). Conversely, they both contribute to the democratic ideals in much the same way, by contesting opinions, whether Islamic, western, or secular, that they feel are incompatible with a specific understanding of the truth. Margot Badran notes, in fact, fluidity between the perceived barriers between Muslim women activists and secular feminists. She clarifies that Egyptian women’s feminism has been called secular, simply to signify the inclusivity of Muslims and Copts (Badran 1999: 171).10 Furthermore, Nadia Wasif, Aida Saif Addawla and Nawlah Darwish conducted a study to compare the organizations of two prominent Egypt women, Huda Sharawi, referred to as the mother of feminism in Egypt and the Arab region, and the mother of religious movements in Egypt and the Arab region, Zainab al-Ghazali. They concluded that there were striking similarities between the organizations formed by both women, structurally, financially, and philosophically (Kandil 1999: 321). Nonetheless, Islamic women’s organizations do not always express any intent to elevate women’s status. What is of foremost concern to this analysis for civil society is not whether these organizations intend to act politically but what is really happening on the ground. Singerman has pointed out that the western mind fixated on stereotypes often gives little attention to the structures of power and that the important variable is not whether one intends to act politically. It is rather, whether one’s actions ‘individually and cumulatively, actually influence the political order, the distribution and redistribution of public goods and services’ (Singerman 1995: 7). It is recognized in

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the literature that Muslim women activists are not monolithic (Duval 1998: 49, 50). And just the same has been accepted for secular feminists (Kandiyoti 1996: 9). It should then be easily understood that activisms within feminist organizations cannot always be termed strategically oriented. I argue that neither Islamic women’s nor feminist secular PVOs are monoliths. Hence, they cannot be neatly categorized and explained as either strategic or practical as theory might lead one to believe. Scholarship has to give more attention to the actual activities of women’s groups without any theoretical hierarchilization which diminishes the political significance of an action group to learn how their strategies can meaningfully contribute to the expansion of civil society and, thus, the democratization process.

The Role of Civil Society With the proliferation of literature on civil society beginning in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, it is now recognized that civil society associations are important to any democracy and its political processes. Even if they are not engaged in formal politics (as they are forbidden to in Egypt) or do not seek to influence state behaviour, they are always interacting with the state and various other political processes (Uvin 2000: 24). Peter Uvin asserts associations ‘play a profoundly and inherently political role, for they affect the distribution of power and scarce resources in society’ (ibid.: 23). However, for the developing world, the body of research that exists on the role of associations demonstrates along the broad spectrum two opposing views, which may be traced back to two sources. The first may be referred to as the Anglo-American, which defined liberal positions within society, the individual, and the state. The second is termed post-Hegelian or Marxist, which stressed the contradictions in civil society – the precursor of socialism today (Seligman 1992: 10, 11). Hence, the two contemporary views: the liberal or Lockean view that assumes ‘associations are deemed to foster participatory experiences, leadership skills and democratic values’ (Clark and Kleinberg 2000: 1) and a rejectionist (Marxist) view that sees associations possibly as ‘a handmaiden in the state’s project of domination’ (ibid.). Proponents

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of the former view can be seen among the hundreds of foreign donors, northern NGOs and advocacy groups (Kilby 2000: 48, 49). For the last-mentioned, a problem with the idea that civil society naturally promotes democracy is that, as Andy Knight maintains, a fusion of state interests can occur, stifling the abilities of civil society associations to pursue their own interests. To back up his argument, Knight points to Indonesia’s Suharto regime ‘where a “strong” state took steps to control civil society – effectively confining organized interests within its coercive embrace’ (Knight 2000 quoted ibid: 41). While the same line of analysis, which focuses on the state, is used to establish that the state has a stifling degree of control over Egypt’s associations, and thus, impedes the civil society component of autonomy (see Zuhur 2001), experts such as Mamound Fandy and Dana Hearn claim that, despite a strong presence of the state in associational affairs, a gradual widening of political space is occurring as these associations nonetheless ‘exercise significant freedom in carrying out their activities and levelling criticism against the state’ (Fandy and Hearn 1999: 113). Other experts on Egypt point to new indicators that reveal the political effect of civil society activism notwithstanding state restrictions developed under the Mubarak regime. D. Putnam emphasizes that civic associations help democracy grow ‘by fostering norms of reciprocity, improving information flow, reducing opportunism, and, in general, heightening people’s trust in each other and political institutions’ (Hefner 1998: 36). Consequently, the cultivation and practice of ‘civility’ becomes an integral part of associational life. And as de Tocqueville had already stated over two centuries ago, voluntary associations serve as the ‘free schools of democracy’ where citizens exercise their rights and accept responsibilities to their group (Naidoo and Tandon 1999: 12). Civil society associations educate individuals in the values of collective action, which also includes participation in both organizational decision-making and leadership selection (ibid.). Looking towards the Arab world in particular, Mahmood Auda’s case studies confirm that democratic practice within the organizations is occurring (though at uneven levels throughout country case studies). However, the participation of the popular people within such avenues is important as it is through these organizations that development

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and real democracy will come about, as the practices translate into the formal institutional realm. When individuals participate in selfmanaged organizations with predefined structures and objectives, the result is active citizens who are dedicated to the public good and are able to criticize and question official decision-makers. These organizations also foster democratic behaviour through democratic processes like nomination and election. Individuals develop the ability to practice democracy within the governmental structures and therefore, the ability to abide by the consequences of democracy, for example, the peaceful exchange of power (Auda et al. 2000: 274). While some scholars have acknowledged the existence of democratic practice within civil society, few have incorporated such qualitative indicators to understand the impact of participation in terms of the process of empowerment and proliferation of democratic values in Egyptian society and the developing world in general. The women’s PVOs play an important role in empowering women with skills individually and collectively to take responsibility for the way in which their lives have been negatively impacted (or are perceived as such). In effect, as illustrated in other case studies, through empowerment women learn and derive the confidence to speak out at all levels – so as to share problems, make demands, negotiate and bargain, and participate in public speaking and decision-making (Carr, Chen and Jhabvala 1996: 218). In fact, as Kandil points out (1999: 58), most women in formal political leadership positions emerge from civil society institutions. The principal role, however, of civil society, as Naidoo and Tandon attest, is its contribution to the creation of a healthy public life (ibid.: 6). In sum, oversight on the subject of civil society and democratization in the Middle East is due to the analytical weaknesses of Middle East studies (Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995: 17; Clark 1994: 17). However, it is not surprising that much of the literature has drawn conclusions that the democratization process is ‘doomed’ when several avenues of political participation have been overlooked. This study confirms women’s PVOs, long excluded from mainstream studies, do serve to foster an atmosphere conducive to the expansion of civil society and to the spreading of democratic practice in Egypt through their participation and the resulting process of empowerment.

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CHAPTER 3 KEY ISSUES FOR STRUGGLE: POVERT Y AND M ARGINALIZATION

Introduction The objective of this chapter is to provide background information that helps to place the following chapters in the right political, economical, and historical context. It is my argument that women’s struggles cannot be analyzed without contextualizing them in the wider political, economical, and historical experience. Consequently, first, a country profile is given on Egypt. From this information the political significance of half the Arab world’s associations in their struggles against the most oppressive problems of poverty and illiteracy can be better understood. Second, the marginalization of Egyptian women is exemplified through a discussion on laws, norms, and the economic crisis. Third, a historical account is provided on Egyptian PVOs to show their evolution over the past two centuries and the ways in which they have organized themselves and their activities in their various circumstances.

Egypt: Challenged by Poverty Egypt is a popular holiday destination due to the beauty of the beaches, especially by the Red Sea, and is also popular for its marine life for divers. For those interested in ancient history and culture,

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there is a plethora of ancient temples, tombs, monuments, art galleries, not to mention mummies and the pyramids. Ethnic groups include Eastern Hamitic stock (Egyptians, Bedouins, and Berbers), 99 per cent, Greek, Nubian, Armenian, and other European (primarily Italian and French), 1 per cent. Egypt is Muslim (mostly Sunni) 90 per cent, Coptic Christian and other, 10 per cent. The country is estimated to have a population of more than 80,471,869, according to an estimate from July 2010. But I met people ‘without IDs’ and I was told that a significant number of people are simply not registered with the government, which means perhaps that the population is actually more. In 2010, the annual population growth rate was estimated at 1.99 per cent per capita and life expectancy at birth is 72.4 years (69.82 for males and 75.1 for females) (CIA World Factbook). In Egypt, of those who are 15 and over, 71.4 per cent are literate with 83 per cent male and 59.4 per cent female from a 2005 estimate (ibid.), a jump in 10 years from 51.4 per cent literate with 63.6 per cent male and 38.8 per cent female from a 1995 estimate (Library of Congress Study) although male-female ratios remain unchanged. Of these women, 76.5 per cent are in rural areas (Legal Research and Resource Center for Human Rights). Women are 49.5 per cent of the population and men 51.5 per cent (CIA World Factbook). However, beyond the attractions and general information on this developing country, what becomes an ever more dominant feature of Egypt is poverty. The CIA World Factbook assesses Egypt as a poor country, citing a 2005 estimate of 20 per cent falling below the poverty line (in line with many other estimates) which it explains is assessed through surveys of sub-groups. This, it says, is despite high levels of economic growth in recent years, and is due to aggressively pursued economic reforms between 2004 and 2008. Its 2009 GDP assessment is set at $6,000 per capita (ibid.). But even this information does not provide a true picture of people’s lives in this developing country. The poverty assessment published by the Mubarak government is curious given that I have entered numerous middle-class homes whose standard of living could unmistakably be assessed as impoverished, with cramped living conditions, obstructed access to living quarters

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unsuitable for elderly and the very young, safety traps disregarded and ailing furniture. Although my experience in these homes involves being treated to a lavish meal, I am often informed that the meat presented is a once a week occurrence. These same people have often acquiesced to providing their actual income as in the range of $50–$300 per month. Those in the latter income bracket are those who are either comparatively well-to-do or have the luck to have a family member abroad to send home desperately needed money. The homes of the former, however, have often been those where meat is eaten only twice a year. Many Egyptians will concur that this assessment comes closer to the real figure. The truth is, some of the places I have been to and which are included as part of my case study are areas where no one can gather statistics on any household. Indeed, Al Ahram, Egypt’s leading newspaper, estimates that 50 per cent of Egyptians live on $2 a day or less (Global Post 2009).1 The middle class represents the bulk of the population, yet its members are often categorized as lower class due to their extreme low levels of income, both in rural and urban areas. Manal El-Jessri is among many investigators – and commoners – who have similar findings for household income, signalling a fundamental misunderstanding of poverty in Egypt and gross underestimation of household income for a large part of the population. She argues that while ‘the figures tell you the country is moving in the right direction . . . [f]oreign direct investment is pouring in — billions of dollars of it . . . the people on the street have not felt the benefits of this growth’ (El-Jessri 2008). In such a case, where does the middle class end up? What does it really mean to be poor? What do these promising figures actually represent? In a brief answer, commentators and my research point to a trend where a few members of this class have sprung up to join the ranks of the rich – almost, the rich are now richer. However, the bulk has indeed dropped below the poverty line, a harsh reality of everyday worry about how one will feed the family and meet basic needs. I set this poverty line as defining those below it as unable to eat meat more than once a week (a popularly quoted variable for commoners in Egypt which alone accounts for the majority of Egyptians – in Egypt), who cannot afford to place their children in non-public schools (an important variable in separating those who are viewed as having a chance at life from those

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who have the cards stacked against them, with below standard education in classes commonly reaching 60 students to one teacher), and who could not possibly clothe their children adequately without ‘hand-medowns’ or charity. With data taken from 2010, the average low-level government employee whose monthly income is LE 240 ($41), the average public school teacher whose income is LE 600 ($103)2 or the pensioner who told me she served her country as a parliamentarian and was rated for some years as one of the top female writers in Egypt whose pension is LE 1,200 ($203), comprise the kinds of everyday people whose lives are surrounded by worry and stress over how to buy the most basic amenities.3 Low-level government employees, however, were given a 15 per cent income increase by the army that took over interim functions of the state after it dismantled the Mubarak government, providing a tiny reprieve. Although using household income as an indicator is valuable, the above criteria provide a fuller understanding of poverty because of actual costs of items and services – which keep rising – or the problem of purchasing power as an evasive concept. Many items I might buy in Egypt will cost me triple the amount as in other parts of the Middle East or even North America – let us take meat as an example at LE 80 ($14), the cheapest LE 60 ($10) a kilogram – and, so, these include products and items not produced in North America. It is also important to consider that because the majority of Egyptians would fall below this poverty line, there are different levels of poverty. I have witnessed, for example, the case where members of a family, unable to eat meat more than once a week and occasionally agonizing over not being to buy milk for the children, scraped money together with a few relatives to come up with the $200 needed for a widowed aunt to set up a business selling vegetables in the street to be able to feed her children. This is not an odd case. The diet of this level is narrowed down to the usual foul (Egyptian beans), ta’miyyah (Egyptian falafel), subsidized bread, cucumber, tomato, and twice a year, meat; and on occasion or for those one level up, maybe additionally white cheese, molasses, potato, rice or macaroni. Fruit will be incorporated into the diet of those the next level up. If these people are obviously unconscious of any tangible benefits from the 4.7 per cent

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growth rate estimated for 2009 (keeping in mind this figure reflects an economic downturn from a growth rate stated as 7.2 in 2008 and 7.1 in 2007) (CIA World Factbook), how is it being accounted? Similarly to El-Jessri, Abu el-Ezz el-Hariri, Vice President of the Tagammu‘ Party, argues the returns of this growth are not reaching the people because the dividends are not distributed justly (El-Jessri 2008). El-Hariri and an interviewee explain the instrumental value of the ousted Mubarak government was in safeguarding the interests of the merchant class. For example, at the end of 2010 the Mubarak government had argued that a minimum wage placed upon businesses would not be good for the economy. Of course business owners do not want to pay out more, and why should they when they were well represented by the vast majority of ministers in the Mubarak government. For another example, taxation is unfair in that the burden has been placed upon the poor while with the fixing of tax rates the rich and large business owners were enabled to pay less tax than previously. As the interviewee explained, the statistics on average income ($6,000 yearly for 2009) announced by the Information Centre at the Prime-ministry is probably correct but misleading. The Centre does not announce the disparity between the rich and poor and because there is a much larger number of millionaires in Egypt today, the average number will be high despite there being a much greater proportion of poor people. The interviewee describes the economic policies of the Mubarak government as ‘neo-con’, in which he attests the business people control the government and they give themselves financial benefits claiming that they will create jobs for the people. Another interviewee who worked for the Centre, furthermore, disclosed being asked to fumble with statistics to provide misleading, indeed, false, stats to be published. When asked at the first request how to go about changing numbers so completely, the answer received was, ‘It is your area – you just do it.’ El-Hariri concurs that the richer people who get the money do not spend it in a way that would benefit the less fortunate as extravagant consumerist habits can be viewed in the greater and increasing proportion of goods being imported to those exported (ibid.). Poverty is not a feature of a very small but of a growing part of the population. It is many of the rich who are thriving and benefiting according to many interviewees. It is

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these individuals who had been benefitting from the increase of cash flow. Where once certain areas within Cairo, such as Dokki, Muhandeseen, or Maadi, and cities outside Cairo, such as Sixth of October, were the places the more wealthy claimed, with over-priced apartments and villas in the last-mentioned, within a short period of time vast areas for luxury compound-style housing that cannot be compared by any standard have sprung up. These are the gated communities outside Cairo, such as the Golf City or Qattamiyah, with armed guards at the gates for protection. Curiously, it is not only those who have worked in wealthier countries abroad for years who mortgage these luxury homes; it is mostly the families of those places previously thought to have provided sufficient status that have migrated to these multi-million dollar villas. Although a few officials in the fallen government, among the many members of the opposition parties, decried what appears to be a situation they claim is unjust, the merchant class and many top-ranking businessmen had dominated government posts. Up until the Mubarak regime was toppled, such positioning was of critical value and was growing stronger with also a younger generation of businessmen welcomed as associates in various capacities around Hosni Mubarak’s son – who many feared was due to step into office. Another strategy of government was to make this glaring scene palpable by the use of religious preachers to confirm that it is good to be rich (then one can help others), the most obvious of which have been paid by government officials/businessmen. These strategies aimed to ensure the continued existence of Mubarak family rule and excessive corruption underpinning its existence and that of many elites. The unjust situation further comprised an ignored high level of unemployment, extremely low salaries and rising inflation. These are many of the issues that guided activism in Egypt and continues today. After the revolution, many thousands escalated their activism in carrying out strikes against their companies and continued to take to the streets to protest against company managers whose wealth was perceived as unjustly accumulated. The prevalence of corruption, hence, was not only a feature of the state but woven into the culture of business practice. Many heads of companies were successfully removed in the way of creating a fairer mode of governance and management as a new political culture. However, poverty is still

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a growing reality among a greater number of individuals and more deeply felt by those already challenged by financial constraints. Except for the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952 and the bread riots in 1977, Egypt had been witnessing a very slow rise in protest-oriented activity until the massive display of discontent on the streets of all major cities, culminating in Tahrir Square, and reverberating through all major wealthy and corrupt companies, in 2011. Since the late 1970s, beginning with the Bread Riots, labourers, factory workers, and civil servants have carried out a number of strikes and demonstrations – many prompted by women. As the textile-manufacturing town, al-Mahalla al-Kubra, located between Cairo and Alexandria, had witnessed two major protests and strikes in the last decades, it witnessed the same initiated and mobilized now by female workers in December 2006 in response to the failure to receive long-promised bonuses (Alexander and Koubaissy 2008). These strikes encouraged many more around the country to appear, especially in 2007, which witnessed another major wave with hundreds of thousands of labourers protesting, a large number being female workers. This includes, for example, in 2008 citizens and farmers in Kafr al-Sheikh who blocked the international northern beach road because of the water shortage they had been suffering due to the government redirecting water supplies. Labour protests have been a significant component to developing the confidence the masses displayed in protesting against the Mubarak regime. Large numbers have also protested the Israeli assault on the people in Gaza, such as in January 2009, and the attack of the Israeli forces on the flotilla boat carrying aid to Gaza in June 2010. The tearing down of the wall surrounding the Israeli embassy and tearing down of the embassy’s flags in September 2011 illustrated escalated anger not only towards the interim government for stalling promised changes and elections but what protesters have stated are unacceptable transgressions with the killing of five Egyptian soldiers on the Israeli-Egyptian border. Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party brought in 97 per cent of the vote, along with independent members (on the principles of the National Party/National Party members) in the November 2010 elections through what all Egyptian human rights groups and all opposition party representatives angrily call the most outrageously

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rigged election. There had been much discussion that later a possible move was to bequeath presidency to his son, Gamal Mubarak, who headed the Policies Committee under the National Democratic Party under his father’s regime. However, a tipping point had, indeed, been reached for the masses. Intense protest-oriented activism and civil unrest began at the end of January 2011 when millions took to the streets in all urban areas demanding that Hosni Mubarak leave office after the masses succeeded in bringing down Ben Ali in Tunisia. Leading the movement against the extended presidency under Mubarak or the possibility of a sort of monarchy is a group that came on the scene with its first protest in 2004 called Kefaya (Enough), comprised of mostly urban, professional men and women from a broad base of ideological backgrounds. Previously, loose groups formed of members of the various syndicates, university students, and opposition parties led opposition movements. Most active were the students, especially Islamist and including females, who had braved the staging of demonstrations in spite of security forces blasting their gatherings, sometimes resulting in deaths. Kefaya has succeeded in bringing together the various groupings. The movement is of particular interest in that the groupings it comprises represent members advocating the concerns of ‘street politics’ even though the movement began as a means to include university professors and those apathetic from experiences of the political process.4 The demand for democratization is contextualized within the neglect of services and basic needs of the poor. Legal and political issues have also been at the forefront. What is to this movement’s advantage is its use of newly emergent technologies. It makes use of communication technologies to communicate with young people through publishing its news, events, flow and exchange of information; calls for gatherings and regular protests, via the internet, emails, text messages, and Facebook. Kefaya, however, split into two groups in 2009. El-Baradei, the former head of the UN Nuclear agency and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005, led his group, now called The National Front for Change, and took prominent members from the Kefaya movement with him. While many were looking to this figure at the beginning of 2011 to take the lead in toppling the Mubarak regime after his return to Egypt, others were sceptical due to his elitist experiences and

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alleged high life, much of which has been spent outside Egypt. Among his campaigns to weaken the ruling National Democratic Party, he tried in 2010 to motivate ‘Women for Change’ but because they are viewed by the masses as elitist liberals and non-representative of society, this move confirmed many people’s reservations. On the other hand, he and Kefaya gained greater popularity when in May and June 2010 a number of government scandals became known. These include corruption scandals and the alleged torturing and killing of a young man, Khaled Said, in Alexandria in June 2010 by police with the subsequent attempt at cover up, sparking numerous marches and protests lead by Kefaya and women’s student organizations in the University of Alexandria, among others.5 Starting the end of January 2011 with mass civil unrest shown through what some news channels say comprise hundreds of thousands but many protesters assert were clearly millions uniting on the street to demand self determination and enough of a corrupt and repressive regime until its overthrow, much is to be seen in terms of change ahead. However, little is understood in this process as to how principles of compassionate dealings, transparency, equality, fair access, cooperation, trust and tolerance are being integrated into any new order.

The Marginalization of Women in Egypt Reforms have been in place and women might be able to celebrate developments secured through the enactment of some laws. However, male-dominated state policies, many remaining laws, and norms within society do continue to cause the marginalization of women in Egyptian society – and more profoundly, their poverty. Poverty exacerbates their marginalization by further limiting their range of choices and otherwise available means to assert rights. And quite significantly, although successes may be listed the reality of marginalization through the inability of women to actually claim rights in practical terms is a deeply felt reality. Women have previously been sorely underrepresented in formal politics, and so, there is some progress to be acknowledged. In

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December 2008, lawyer and Coptic Christian Eva Kyrolos became the first female mayor in Egypt, presiding over the village of Komboha in Upper Egypt (Abdel-Moneim 2009). After two years of discussion and debate, in 2009 a new law was passed to allocate 64 seats in the lower house of parliament for women as a minimum quota, which was aimed at providing women with at least 64 seats or at least 12 per cent of the house at the parliamentary elections of 2010. When the law was passed, there were debates as to the quality of women and whether they would really represent women’s interests. In Egypt, as is predominantly the case of any developing country, women do not necessarily form a bloc representing some sort of women’s consciousness, as class and class interests become greater variables. However, such a disparity between the percentages of women to men in formal political positions is still of significance because women in these positions still have the potential to influence policies, which may have a direct impact on the lives of women. With such small percentages, women are still unable to potentially form a bloc in pushing issues of concern possibly shared by women. Progress is, however, elusive and the phase during the interim government has not shown itself to offer women any better conditions. The interim government, although purportedly secular, had only one female minister, a carry over from the Mubarak government. It is pertinent to emphasize that the process of women taking up positions of influence is slow not only because views are deeply entrenched in society but because religious edicts and fatwas6 play an important role in swaying opinion, and most religious scholars (who have influence in the judiciary) in Egypt adopt conservative interpretations over issues governing women’s lives. According to a survey conducted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), just over 60 per cent of the Egyptians interviewed believed women should have the right to political participation, and 66.1 per cent believed that women should have the right to become a cabinet minister. Significantly, 45.9 per cent believed women should have the right to become prime minister, and a mere 25.7 per cent believed women should have the right to become head of state (UNDP 2006). Critical for changing common beliefs, the Grand Mufti of Egypt (the highest ranking Islamic jurist in Egypt), Ali Gomaa, made a grand statement in 2009

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(confirming his statement of 2007) that a woman could in fact be head of state according to Islamic law and that he has always held this opinion, against a wave of protest among Islamists and many scholars. Still, many women in Egypt will uphold the conservative Islamic opinion that it is in fact forbidden and, hence, ideas do not shift immediately with fatwas or religious opinions uttered against the long-held beliefs. After years of struggle on the part of a number of lawyers and organizations, in 2004 a new law was approved by the legislature that enabled Egyptian women married to foreign men to pass on their nationality to their children, a continuing issue in most countries in the Middle East. The law does not apply to children of Palestinian fathers. Furthermore, these women still cannot pass their citizenship on to non-Egyptian husbands. Nonetheless, this new law is significant because it has helped to secure the rights of many children whose fathers are non-Egyptian. In 2008, an amendment to the law raised the minimum age of marriage to 18, important to the furthered protection of adolescents. In the same year, after intense struggle with several setbacks over the years, female genital mutilation (FGM) was criminalized. The Muslim Brotherhood expressed opposition, arguing that FGM is not prohibited by Islam and is an established Egyptian custom. Egypt has one of the highest rates of FGM with approximately 95.8 per cent of women aged 15 to 49 having undergone the procedure as of 2005 (UNICEF 2005). Some families in rural areas who advocate this practice now seek out often ‘incompetent’ doctors or nurses to perform the operation. FGM is, indeed, a deeply rooted social practice, and some have vowed to defy the ban because they believe it ensures that their daughters will be pure, free from sexual desires (this is dependent upon how much of the clitoris is removed) 7 and sin, and accepted by future husbands (see Stack 2008). The Grand Mufti, Ali Gomaa, had also stated, in 2007 before the law was passed, that the practice was forbidden in Islam, after an incident of a 13-year-old girl dying from the operation.8 Women have been slowly occupying other positions of potential significance in growing numbers. In 2003, a woman was appointed as the first female justice on the Supreme Constitutional Court. However, she could not act as a trial judge and could not hold hearings as it was not until 2007 that the long-standing ban on female judges was lifted

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(Tadroz 2010). In 2003, 30 women were appointed as judges. The new judges faced stereotypes in their assignments as many were assigned to family courts and none were sent to criminal courts (ibid.). In 2009, women submitted hundreds of applications for a judicial post. However, as a major setback in this development, in 2010, the General Assembly voted by 334 out of the 380 members and with four abstentions to bar women from being appointed to the court. In 2008, Egypt became the first country in the Muslim world to appoint a female wedding officer (Maazun) to undertake Muslim marriage ceremonies. Discrimination within the legal system continues to seriously affect women’s lives. As such, some forms of activism have been directed at the state. A female protester who took part in the protests against the Mubarak regime January and February 2011 argues: The woman is strong and can play the man’s and woman’s role at same time. But the bad economic circumstances made many Egyptian families depend on the earnings and contributions of women. Yet, on the political and constitutional levels the woman is discriminated against; the man has the upper hand, in the criminal law if a man sees his wife in bed with a man and kills her he is not to be sentenced to death but if a woman sees her husband with a woman in similar circumstances she is to be sentenced to death. The old constitution implies that the president must be a man; it discriminates against women as citizens. Egyptian men married to foreigners can have their wives and children acquire the Egyptian citizenship, but women do not have the same privileges. My husband cannot get the Egyptian citizenship. Currently, Egyptian women married to Palestinians cannot get the citizenship for their kids while kids born to Egyptian men married to Palestinians are born Egyptians. Of course, all these kinds of discriminations must disappear. (interviewee) The penal code ensures that men convicted of committing honour killings are handed down lenient sentences. It further defines the crime of adultery differently for male and female perpetrators (ibid.). The

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personal status law, which regulates issues such as marriage, divorce, and custody, has received the greatest attention for the stark inequality between men and women that has been the source of pain and despair for many women. For example, a man need not inform his wife of any divorce process in place and may divorce her unilaterally and unconditionally. He can pronounce that she is divorced from him by simply uttering ‘divorce’ three times and then registering the divorce. A woman who initiates divorce needs to seek permission from her husband by asking for the talaq (divorce) and so make it up to him, in fact, to apply for the divorce for her. Of course, that rarely happens. If she has significant grounds for divorce, she may, only recently, seek a divorce through petitioning the court. Sufficient grounds are categorized as illness, which could include mental or impotence; failing to financially support the wife; abandonment over a long period of time or imprisonment; harmful behaviour, such as physical or mental abuse, adultery on his part; and now also marriage to another woman. It is normal to hear of a woman’s divorce process potentially taking six years to be finalized, keeping in mind she cannot marry during that time but he can. As such, there are numerous challenges. After a decision in 2000 that was delayed and debated further, women can subsequently resort to a khula‘ but she is then forced to give up her dowry, among many other rights. In practice, unless she has sufficient funds to opt for this avenue, it is usually too costly financially and emotionally for a woman to pursue and carry through a khula‘. Sufficient funds could include the ability to bribe individuals involved in the process who will accept. A few will not accept bribes on moral grounds but many expect it. She could face the consequences of her husband returning with a larger bribe, if he had not already bribed to begin with (men usually do not need to, placing the burden of bribing on women). Many women are simply unable to financially cover the lawsuits involved with lengthy divorce procedures. It is virtually impossible to prove adultery for either the woman or the man. Men who ‘run off’ with another woman can simply claim an ‘urfi or unregistered (or registered!) marriage with the other woman which, as such, will not count as grounds for declaring adultery under the law. Furthermore, legal marriage of a man to more than one woman

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is currently an increasing phenomenon, although such cases were previously rare. In such cases, if the woman either cannot afford to or chooses not to divorce, she and her children are almost always neglected or abandoned, financially and emotionally. It is worth noting, too, that in most of the current cases the marriage, registered and especially unregistered, to a second wife is treated as a ‘fling’ and does not last. Another type of ‘marriage’, known as the nikah misyar (traveller’s marriage), is engaged in by a very small but also increasing number of Egyptians after Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi popularized it by promoting it as a solution to people’s ‘problems’, especially in the Arab Gulf, and Ali Gomaa sanctioned it as a legitimate form of sexual relations under ‘Islam’. The traveller’s marriage involves a contract in which the woman gives up many of the rights she would otherwise be given under the typical marriage contract, such as financial support and a home. The man is further not required to support any children that result from their relation. The man, often already married, visits this woman and is allowed to engage in sexual relations with her in the country in which she lives and he visits often (usually for business). The practice is everywhere in the Arab world and in Hyderabad, India, there is a sub-city called Arabic City where women are married for one night and given a few hundred dollars as a mahr (dowry). However, it is also known that there are examples of men from richer Arab countries who practice this form of ‘marriage’ when holidaying in Egypt, usually through an agency. In application of the law, a judge has leeway to be either lenient or harsh and women have often claimed discrimination and injustice in family courts. However, more significantly, due to the worth of a woman’s testimony in family court her testimony is considered to be half that of a man’s, as per the conservative interpretation of Shari‘a (Islamic law) chosen. The interpretation of Shari‘a law provides the basic framework within which judges can make their decisions but the judge often chooses conservative interpretations over an array of interpretations that are sometimes, not always, afforded by the framework. A lack of effective enforcement mechanisms persists, such as in enforcing child support payment, which can be ridiculously minimal and not reflect a ‘good’ income of the father, in such cases.

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In 2005, an important law was passed to raise the age at which a divorced woman could retain her child from 10 for boys and 12 for girls to both aged 15 or, as before, until the woman remarries, whichever is first. Under the interim government, however, this law, first among other gains women have made in the laws, has been targeted by Islamists as unfavourable towards men. Children of divorced parents whose mother is Christian and father Muslim are routinely placed under the custody of the father. Similarly, if the Muslim father dies, custody of the Christian woman’s children is given to the deceased father’s sister or mother (although not all such families will agree with the verdict). Once a woman loses custody, she also loses the right to the marital home or housing support (ibid.). Under amendments to the child law made in 2008, illegitimate children may now receive birth certificates in the mother’s name if the father is unknown. Previously, these children did not have citizenship rights, unless the father claimed them for the children. Even medical tests proving the identity of the father would not stand up in court to provide an identity for the children or to claim child support. Now these children have the right to nationality and an education. The new provision is especially important for children also born into an ‘urfi (customary) marriage since, as of recently, women can ascertain who the father is. ‘Urfi marriages were illegal informal marriages until 2000 when these informal marriages were given legal status. ‘Urfi marriages are especially popular among the Egyptian youth who do not have the socially specified financial requirements to marry yet want to have intimate relations within an ‘acceptable’ arrangement. A paper or contract is signed in front of two witnesses. Most couples who marry in ‘urfi marriages have done so in secret without their families’ knowledge. Around three million ‘urfi marriages have been documented by notaries in Egypt, although the actual number of existing ‘urfi marriages is clearly much higher (Wheeler 2008). ‘Urfi marriages can be particularly hurtful for women as they are not registered as traditional marriage contracts, and the husband is not deemed financially responsible for the wife, held liable for alimony or, until recently, responsible for child support in the case of separation. A large number of paternity suits have been put forward. If an ‘urfi husband hides or destroys the marriage document, the wife can neither petition for divorce nor

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remarry. There are, in fact, a number of cases where the father refuses to acknowledge the ‘urfi marriage and hides or destroys the marital document (Tadroz 2010). Gender differences in the law further include allowing a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim (especially if she proves to be a Christian or Jew). In June 2010, the Egyptian Administrative Court passed a law that proclaimed that Egyptian men married to Israeli women have their citizenship stripped by the Interior Ministry and justified this decision as a national security issue.9 It is illegal for an Egyptian woman to marry a non-Muslim man. It is already perceived by some Egyptian women (in Egypt) as an unfair predicament that many men travel abroad for work or education and marry foreign women, thus lowering their chance of finding a suitable marriage partner.10 Inheritance laws do not differentiate between faiths in that all women receive half that of men (except in case of a marriage between a Christian woman and Christian man). However, a non-Muslim woman cannot inherit from her deceased Muslim husband and the children of that marriage do not receive any inheritance kept for them until they are no longer minors. As a result, the widow will have to find other means to sustain her children if his family did not take the children as per the law. Many women have lost their domestic functions to the market.11 State policies and laws are not, however, separated from the prevalent norms. Women are still marginalized in the workforce because there is the view, though it is not as significant as in the Arab Gulf countries, that men and women should observe separation of sexes. The home is preached as being the best place for women and the public sphere for men. Society in Egypt places motherhood before any other role that a woman can potentially play. And thus, if she does work outside the home, which most do, she becomes overburdened on two fronts – her position as full-time employee outside the home and the culturally-expected full-time mother and homemaker. Despite the need for her to contribute to the family income (or head a household practically and financially), the home is to be her ‘honour’. The female participation rate for women aged 15–65 in the labour force (on a full-time basis) is 25.7 per cent, according to a 2007 estimate (UN Report 2008: 42); however, this figure completely misrepresents the reality of women taking on numerous roles to be able to put food on the

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table for their families. Some claim women aged 15–24 are the group with the highest participation rate, because of the social stigmas and policy obstacles in work outside the home once a woman has a family (Zurayk and Saadeh 1995: 40, 41). But as poverty is a feature of most lives, most Egyptian women are indeed forced to enter the workforce, whether or not their numbers show up on statistics. This point is noteworthy because their often extremely low incomes are commonly excluded from per capita income, although some of these women must wrestle with more than one part-time job in an attempt to make ends meet. Furthermore, since poor women have been essentially barred from education, their choices are further limited. The poor and illiterate often end up selling fruits or vegetables in the streets for long hours. These typical activities of the very poor are not factored into the statistics on labour and household income. Representative of a trend of the developing world, many of these women are becoming the sole providers in their families. Iman Bibars estimates female-headed households (FHH) in some areas to be 18 per cent, but as high as 30–35 per cent in certain Cairo areas (for example, Manshiet Nasser) (Tadroz 2000). Estimates by at least four experts during the fieldwork confirm the fact that Iman Bibars’ figure is representative of many other areas, too.12 FHHs are more vulnerable to poverty. One study found that FHHs are 30 per cent more likely to be poorer than male-headed households in urban areas and 20 per cent more in rural areas (el Dawla, n.d.). As Iman Bibars (2001: 5) has repeatedly emphasized, the marginalization of women is a serious problem in Egypt. Not recognizing this leads to the disregard of the lives and the struggles of a huge sector of the population. When women are marginalized from the ‘public sphere’, it is a symptom of deeper, structural issues (Coleman 2010: 26). However, as Soroya Duval (1998: 51) stresses, western feminist researchers are in great error to assume that Egyptian women will, therefore, become passive and their activism suppressed.

The Nature of PVOs in Egypt: MOSA Laws and Women’s Organizing The Egyptian revolution of 1952, also called the July 23 Revolution, inspired numerous other Arab and African countries to overthrow

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imperialist governments or monarchies. On July 23, 1952, groups, mostly officers, banded together calling themselves the Free Officers Movement to overthrow the monarch, King Farouk, through a military coup, and then disband the constitutional monarchy. The effects of Arab nationalization culminated in 1958 with the merger between Egypt and Syria as a republic and with the 1958 Lebanese crisis in which after a civil war a national reconciliation government was formed. Notably, Iraq witnessed its 14 of July Revolution in which a coup took place against the Hashemite monarchy of King Faisal propped up earlier under the auspices of the British. Both as a process in the way groups and individuals sought means to pursue their interests and as a higher Arab socialist interest, organizations were affected. In order to gain insight into the political activities of the women’s PVOs in Cairo, a description of the nature of PVOs in Egypt is provided in context of this development. A few defining features of the law which has governed them is also provided to offer insight into their current activities, but furthermore, to establish an understanding of the particular environment in which they operate and adapt. As such, an overview of the concepts which have justified the establishment and types of organizations in Egypt historically and presently will be given. There is no consensus regarding the definition of PVOs. The Ministry of Social Affairs in Egypt (MOSA) differentiates between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).13 NGOs can be viewed as an umbrella term for the third sector that comprises various associations, including professional groups and trade unions. But as professional syndicates (whose membership is mandatory by law) and trade unions are governed by laws which are different to those of PVOs, PVOs have a distinctive place among NGOs. Thus, defined, PVOs, or the ‘indigenous sector’,14 are those organizations outside the realm of government and distinct from the business community and professional syndicates and, as the name implies, are comprised of private volunteers who have chosen to participate in the activities of a given PVO (Ibrahim 1996b: 33). Even though participation may be voluntary, this feature, however, does not rule out a salary for one’s participation; or the acceptance of donated funds from national or local public endowments; or even a certain degree of government involvement within the activities of the PVO

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(Ibrahim 1996b: 33). Since the term NGO has been so widely circulated it may, nevertheless, be heard within social science discourse and has to a wide extent been absorbed by even the Egyptian media. Within the broad spectrum of PVO activity in Egypt, one will find a myriad of activities and foci. According to MOSA laws, PVOs must have some social objective and their nature must be strictly apolitical (Kandil 1995: 24, 31). As Ibrahim (1996b: 33) notes, there is no general philosophy that guides voluntary action. The spectrum of associations covers large national organizations with international affiliations to small informal groups, such as gama‘iyat (a group of individuals who pool their funds together and rotate the use of the fund among its members). Whereas PVOs are registered under MOSA, Clubs and Youth Centres are formally registered with the Higher Council of Youth and Sports (HCYS) (ibid.). Within each of the above categories associations may be classified, furthermore, by size, nature of service, and form of administration (ibid.: 34). PVO activity in Egypt can address developmental needs: social welfare and the upgrading of the standard of living, whether economic or social (ibid.). Welfare PVOs will address issues such as child and maternity care, family welfare, care for the elderly and the disabled, health care, and housing. Developmental PVOs or Community Development Associations (CDAs) will cater to cultural, educational, artistic, literary and environmental services, and religious services (classes to teach religion and the recitation of the Qur’an and to organize pilgrimages to the Holy Places), for example (Kandil 1995: 25). Charitable PVOs account for one third of all PVOs (ibid.: 62). Kandil attests that the number is actually much higher if one takes into account those associations which are classified as cultural and religious organizations under MOSA. These categories of PVOs, nevertheless, often overlap in their activities. From data tabulated in 1991 – which continues to be quoted – there were approximately 20,000 registered PVOs in Egypt, 14,000 of which were registered with MOSA (Ibrahim 1996b: 237),15 half of which were located in Cairo. Today, organizational leaders quote vastly different numbers. However, taking into consideration more recent restrictions, putting these quotations together and using a general guide, I have come up with an estimation of 30,000 for 20 years on. I have taken note of additional names of organizations for the various needs,

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such as especially the increasing human rights organizations – many of which are national – those that have been established to monitor a democratization process, monitor the elections, plus various others that are, for example, attached to the growing number of mosques. Even though MOSA claims that no unregistered NGOs exist (ibid.), Singerman (1995) and Ibrahim have found that thousands, indeed, can be found. Ibrahim (1996b: 27) attests that informal associations make up five times as many. Shahida El-Baz (1997: 162) estimates the number of women’s PVOs in Egypt at 200 while Kandil (1995: 68) sets the number at a precise 22. This number becomes even larger in the field, where I was given estimates from various organizations. The number ranged from 16 to 1,500 women’s organizations. According to Karam, of the 330 religious PVOs registered with MOSA under what Karam refers to as ‘general benefit’, 40 per cent of the PVOs registered with MOSA professed to work in the name of Islam. Kandil’s indicator of PVO Islamiscity for all PVOs registered with MOSA is the Islamic reference within the organization’s name (Karam 1998: 131). Ben Nafissa-Paris’s number was 34 per cent with indicators of the name being Islamic together with the location of the organization being attached to the mosque (cited in Clark 2004: 175), which might account for a reduced percentage. It must also be noted that according to Egypt’s Law 32 of 1964, Islamic groups were banned. Women’s associations are defined by the New Woman Research Centre (NWRC) in Cairo as: 1. Those organized around promoting all women’s issues mainly through research. 2. Those organized around particular concerns (e.g. reproductive and health rights) and whose aim is to empower women through certain projects. 3. Those who work from within different organizations in special women’s committees. 4. Those formed on a temporary basis to follow or study a particular issue (e.g. preparing for the Beijing Conference). 5. Those who concern themselves with women’s interests as a part of their overall Programmes (Karam 1998: 122, 123).

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The definition of women’s organizations, however, has been more broadly defined after the Beijing Conference of 1995. Included in the definition are issues related to children, particularly the female child (see Badran 2001: 51–56). In the context of a decade of independence under a charismatic socialist leader, Law 32 of 1964, which has shaped the relationship of civil society organizations to the state, was established. It essentially reflected the subordination of independent civil society to what was seen as the higher Arab socialist interest, and ‘neither open political opposition nor an independent sector existed in Egypt during this time’ (Agati 2007). All associations were required to be listed under MOSA by Law 32 of 1964, and their applications could be accepted or rejected without much explanation. Through this law, MOSA had been able to refuse an association permission to be formed, prevent the association from receiving funds from abroad, appoint a temporary board of directors, dissolve an association and transfer its money to another, merge two or more associations performing similar activities, or deny permission to raise funds through donations (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999: 26). The Mubarak government promised to change the law due to pressures from several PVOs, but when an unsatisfactory revised version was presented in 1999 as Law 153 of 1999 a few months later in 2000 it was deemed unconstitutional by the Egyptian Court of Cassation. Under this law, which has shaped the formation of organizations for so long, MOSA specified that the minimum number of people to form an association must be ten. Under this law, a person previously stripped of his/her political/civil rights cannot become a founder of an organization. PVOs have been restricted to only one field of activity from a prescribed list by MOSA, though they may apply for additional activities. They nonetheless often target more than one community need. The 14 categories MOSA had listed under Law 32 of 1964 (the last four added by Decree no. 12 in 1968) are as follows: 1. CDAs, 2. Social Assistance, 3. Religious, Scientific and Cultural Services, 4. Maternity and Child Care, 5. Family Welfare, 6. Special Categories and Handicapped Welfare, 7. Old Age Welfare, 8. Friendship Among Peoples, 9. Family Planning, 10. Social Protection, 11. Management

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and Administration, 12. Prison Inmates’ Welfare, 13. Literacy, 14. Multiple Activities (Ibrahim 1996a). As is evident, Islamic PVOs are not differentiated from Christian or other religious PVOs. Nor do women’s activities comprise a single choice.16 Apart from dissolving an organization or changing its board, the law had enabled the Mubarak regime to modify plans of PVOs or even demand that they implement the Ministry’s own agenda (Ibrahim 1996a: 47). In only a limited number of instances had MOSA executed its far-reaching powers but these have also included a women’s organization. Many organizations that have had their agendas specified through the law have often been referred to as what might be called GONGOs (government-created non-governmental organizations) in the literature (Zuhur 2001). The Mubarak regime had not only altered the agenda of many organizations, it has created its own organizations and called them non-governmental. These may have dealt with issues that need to be addressed but often they are not the most pressing issues and the issues themselves are framed or even manipulated in ways that serve the best interests of the state. After pressure from various elements within civil society for MOSA to alter Law 32 of 1968 in 1999, the law was suspended until the enacting of Law 84 of 2002. In the context of its precursor, there were few changes. Law 84 of 2002 removed the requirement that PVOs seek government approval before purchasing real-estate and, more significantly, the government’s right to appoint members of any association’s board of directors (el-Bakry 2004). However, the registration of all organizations and their activities continued to remain mandatory, which has caused one of the major stresses to PVOs as activities can take years to be given approval or for no obvious reason not be accepted. The government could then impose a punishment of up to one year in prison and a fine of LE 2,000–10,000 on individuals who form a PVO without proper registration. Any person who conducts activities on behalf of an organization before it is fully registered could then be punished with three months in jail and fined LE 1,000 (art. 76). This had been particularly worrisome as it is estimated that there are many more organizations functioning than those actually registered. It is very difficult for a group of individuals to grow an organization with

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a Board already envisioned. It is the nature of most organizations in Egypt to develop out of immediate concerns and these concerns are then later dealt with in a more organized way. Many groups have not acquired the skills to establish an organization according to the specified organizational framework without prior experience of implementing strategies at the grassroots level. More significantly, it is the poor, who do not have the guidance to establish organizations, who have been hit the hardest, yet have numerous issues to contend with at such a grassroots level that their communities are effectively neglected by both the state and larger organizations that profess to help the poor. PVOs have been subjected to burdensome and discretionary processes, inappropriate supervision, and unnecessary severe criminal punishments (‘Global Trends in NGO Law’ 2010). The result had, furthermore, been a further tightening of activities, such as, for example through greater restrictions on foreign funds coming into Egyptian PVOs. As per Law 84 of 2002, PVOs may not accept funds from a foreign source or send funds abroad without permission from the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Associations had been required to inform what was called the Ministry of Social Solidarity and the General Federation of Associations and Foundation under the Mubarak government of any upcoming assembly meetings. With submission of the date of meeting, the entire agenda had also been submitted. The General Federation was entitled to send a representative to the meeting and the minutes of the meeting must subsequently be sent to the Ministry of Social Solidarity (ibid.). Additionally, the Mubarak government required that associations submit a list of all the names of candidates for the position of Board of Director to the Ministry of Social Solidarity at least 60 days prior to the elections. Subsequently, the administrative authority could remove an individual from the list of nominees for ‘not fulfilling the nomination requirements’, which are unspecified (Law 84 of 2002 art. 34; see ibid.). Description of this law demonstrates what kinds of interventions and constraints PVOs have had to anticipate and grapple with. Pressures continued to mount regarding the 2002 law that has served to address the issues of concern about the previous law inadequately and has enabled greater and harsher containment of civil society

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organizations. In 2008, the Egyptian Minister of Social Solidarity and other government officials under the Mubarak government promised that the government would revise Law 84 of 2002. While it is understood at the time of writing that a new law has, indeed, been drafted, it has not yet been made public. Among the changes in the law, the General Federation of Associations and Foundations was expected to be assigned a supervisory role, along with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, over registration and funding applications. For many, this had meant an extra phase for the establishment of organizations on top of the lengthy procedure and extra scrutiny of funds will further constrict the effective functioning of civil society (Guirguis 2009).17 Egypt’s official associational life began in the early nineteenth century, in 1821 (Kandil 1995: 38). PVOs were led by the aristocracy and religious leaders. The first PVO in Egypt was established in 1821 by the Greek Benevolent Society by a decree from the king of Greece. It was not until 1868 when the first truly Egyptian PVO, Gama‘iyat al-Ma’aref, a publishing organization, was founded, followed by the Geographic Society in 1875, and then the Islamic and Coptic Benevolent Societies (1878, 1891) (Ibrahim 1996a: 37). These focused on education. One reason PVOs came into being was to counter the expanding influence of western missionaries, who often founded schools and charitable causes to convert Muslims, Copts and Egyptian Jews to Protestantism. A second reason was to counter the influences of the numerous, mostly western, foreigners in Egypt who were perceived to pose a threat to Arab culture. In analyzing the effect of colonialism Kandil (1995: 40) notes how the budding of associations in the nineteenth and twentieth century ‘reveals that the entire sector is blended with political action’. In both religious and secular PVOs, whether at the national or grassroots level, education was given greatest priority on the agenda to defend Arab identity (ibid.). Three major trends began to develop within this movement: the liberalist, mostly comprised of students returning from the West, mainly Europe; the Islamic, whose adherents were both conservatives and liberalists and who sought to deepen Islam among its adherents; and the progressive socialist trend, which was denied legal acceptance by the state and so formed underground organizations to

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advocate revolutionary social change (ibid.: 41; Ibrahim 1996a: 38). Organizations such as Jama‘iyat Tawheed al-Thaqafa al-‘Arabiya (the Unification of Arab Culture), established in 1887, and Jama‘iyat alWihda al-‘Arabiya (Association of Arab Unity), established in 1936, influenced several other Arab countries by extending their activities beyond Egypt (Kandil 1995: 41). Since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, however, the steady growth of associations stopped as they faced problems with adapting to a stronger presence of the state in the area of welfare service and PVO activity (Ibrahim 1996a: 34). President Nasser changed several policies to establish and broaden a system of social services for the Egyptian people. He further developed and expanded social planning programmes throughout the 1960s. Nasser’s ‘Arab Socialism’ together with Law 32 of 1964 constrained any new growth of independent associations. Associations were further affected by the inevitability of modernization during the 1950s and 1960s under which urbanization and industrialization resulted. Moreover, as was the case long before, these organizations faced several obstacles including the difficulty of raising funds or providing professional expertise (ibid.: 35). When Sadat came into power in 1970, he initiated liberalization policies, which in turn allowed new PVOs space to grow. And by the 1980s, during the Mubarak era, which began after the assassination of Sadat in 1981, a greater interest in the revitalization of PVOs in Egypt could be seen. This is said to be a direct response to the liberalizing policies, which resulted in a need for new services that the Egyptian government could not effectively provide (ibid.). Ibrahim states, however, that the growing number of PVOs is greatly due to an increasing demand amongst the general public for a stronger civil society (ibid.). Throughout these eras, Egyptian women played a prominent role as pioneers and leaders. In fact, women were ‘among the social and political vanguards working through the channels of private voluntary work’ (Kandil 1995: 39). Feminism in Egypt has always been linked to political issues such as colonialism, nationalism, economic development, and cultural imperialism from the West. As in many other developing nations, Egypt’s struggle against foreign domination served as a catalyst for growing women’s activism (Fokkena n.d.). But

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the changing circumstances brought on by increasing population, urbanization, environmental degradation and industrialization have changed the character of women’s activism. Where feminism was once linked in general to nationalism, it is now linked to issues of economic development in Egypt. Women’s activism revolves around empowerment from poor living standards, illiteracy, laws, and norms within society perceived as oppressive. These are the circumstances under which both Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations operate and form their activities. This chapter highlighted these particular circumstances so that the struggles studied on the ground may be viewed in their own unique context for Egyptian women’s struggles.

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CHAPTER 4 PR ACTICAL CONSIDER ATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWOR K

Introduction I began my research, from which I built a case-study sample, in 2001. This work has been in process since I started interviewing the sample of women I chose as part of this investigation until I broadened its scope to include discussion on the 18-day protests of early 2011. Interviews between the researcher and various individuals have taken place to offer a broad and contextualized view of the subject matter. The purpose of the fieldwork as a basis for this research was to produce a case study to learn about the activities, motivations, needs, and goals of the respective organizations to discern the differences between two groups – Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations. The goal was to investigate if a dichotomy existed in political participation based on their impact on the growth of civil society in terms of grounding principles of democracy in society structurally and as a political culture. I have visited some of these organizations or followed up on their activities up until the completion of this book. This has enabled me to confirm their growth in activities, size and contributions. Egypt, having an estimated one-third of the number of associations in the Arab world, provides rich opportunity to study among

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the ever-growing associational life, the mostly untapped group in civil society research – women’s organizations. At the start of my study of women’s organizations, there had been no research conducted on Islamic women’s associational life. Since, a few works have looked into Islamic women’s forms of organizations in Egypt. Hence, this area is sorely understudied and misrepresented, which provided both additional challenges and excitement in working through a previously uncovered area. As such, there are numerous practical considerations for social science fieldwork in which qualitative data forms the basis of findings. More significantly, there is still very little published material available today that offers guidance on how to interview and study in authoritarian environments. To compound the complications for fieldwork endeavours such as this, available social science methodology books fail to provide the groundwork imperative for a researcher to be armed with the necessary ingredients for interviews among groups that are ostracized, legitimately or illegitimately, or deemed to be outside the parameters of who would make good candidates for interviews with respect to good governance, peace-building, freedom or, in this case, establishing democratic principles in way of developing a civil society. Their marginalization could be on an international or local level, usually both – theoretically and in practice. Naturally, these groups and individuals often fear being interviewed due to political repercussions that could ensue as a result. Consequently, finding a ‘representative’ sample and learning about their goals and activities is fraught with several hindrances. This chapter discusses the methodology used for data collection during the initial fieldwork. It combines methodology with the actual fieldwork experiences which have an impact on methodology. Conducting fieldwork on an area little researched is exciting. However, as the study, furthermore, takes place in an environment where government repression or interference had been feared by the associations under study the fieldwork is also challenging. How a representative sample was achieved, despite several issues to contend with, will be discussed. I will explain how organizations were selected. How questions were designed and how they were responded to within the field

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will be detailed. It is hoped that beyond offering a detailed account of this particular interview process for a case study sample, that was subsequently built upon, intricacies of such fieldwork may offer some aspect of guidance, understanding or confirmation for the social science researcher.

The Question of Representative Sampling For this research, I aimed to provide a profile of Islamic women’s and secular feminist private voluntary organizations by aspiring to select a random stratified sample from Egypt’s urban centre, Greater Cairo. While I took all feasible steps to meet this goal, some obstacles must first be pointed out. As mentioned in Chapter Three, there is no categorization for women’s organizations under MOSA. Moreover, there is no categorization by the ministry separating Islamic PVOs from other religious PVOs. No government directory is published for the public which lists either categorization. Government documents are scarce or inaccessible. Furthermore, as stated in Chapter Three, experts claim that many more associations exist than are registered with the government. Therefore, government sources cannot be reliably used. Few studies have been conducted on Islamic organizations in Cairo and as a result, no confirmed number has been ascertained.1 In terms of significant contributions, other than Soraya Duval’s limited case study prior to this work, Sherine Havez’s study of three Islamic women’s organizations in Cairo carried out simultaneous to my case study interviewing, and Saba Mahmood’s research on five Islamic women’s organization subsequent to the start of this research, virtually nothing was known about Islamic women’s organizing in Egypt when I entered the field. Accordingly, no fixed number of existing Islamic women’s PVOs in Cairo has yet been established. In fact, during interview one of the organizational leaders of a secular feminist PVO, Amel Abdel-Hadi, a prominent Egyptian feminist and researcher, exclaimed that in the 15 years of her profession she had never come across an Islamic women’s organization. She hurriedly added that if I did find one I must let her know. Another

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organizational leader of a secular feminist organization and researcher on women’s organizations in Cairo, Iman Bibars, could recall the name of only one Islamic women’s PVO towards the end of a later meeting. A third well-known researcher and author of several books/articles on Egyptian women, including women’s organizations, Sherifa Zuhur, supported my goal to find and study five Islamic women’s PVOs. However, while she provided me with a list of secular feminist PVO names she was personally familiar with, she was lost at naming any Islamic women’s PVOs. The above illustrates that turning to feminists/academics who specialize in Egyptian women’s issues and organizations for information on Islamic women’s organizations proved to be most discouraging. My success in finding a representative sample for Islamic organizations lay in establishing trust with contacts. Only after a second interview with Heba Ra’uf, a Political Science academic and leading female Islamic figure in the Arab world, was I able to build a certain amount of confidence in my intentions to be provided a further name of one such PVO. Developing a rapport with a founder of three Islamic organizations and one such contact before beginning fieldwork proved to be crucial. In the field, a PVO leader ‘interrogated’ me with questions, some revolving around how I knew this contact, an Islamic activist, and even for how long, before she would permit any interview session. If I had not been able to prove having ‘known’ the person for some time, I would not have been granted the minimum level of trust required to be provided an interview. There is no doubt that trust has placed me in a position where I have been given ample opportunities to talk to women in these key positions of activism. Confidence that I had no ill intention enabled the leader of this PVO to provide me another contact for a women’s Islamic organization, though it was located outside the vicinity of Cairo. There is, furthermore, very little written material available for researchers to help guide with the necessary preparations for interviews. This is the case not only within an authoritarian environment but among groups that are ostracized or deemed outside the parameters of who would make good candidates for interviews with respect to good governance, peace-building, freedom or, in our case, establishing

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democratic principles in way of developing a civil society. Although before the fieldwork I was advised not to ask organizations for further contacts (to avoid sabotaging a representative sample) I found no other way. With the state of affairs of unreliable government sources, typical under authoritarian regimes, and lacking research on or knowledge about Islamic women’s PVOs, typical of groups deemed ill-suited to progress and a ‘common good’, all leads came necessarily purely from contacts. Despite the scarcity of sources, a representative sample using contacts was achieved. Keeping pace with their developments and the growth of similar organizations, their work is typical of women’s organizations, with the addition that Islamic women’s student organizations among the universities have seen an upsurge in activity after a lull during the 1990s. Their contribution to the voices demanding change in Egypt has, indeed, been significant and their participation brave. During the 1980s female students organized rallies alongside male students that were bold and at a time when few other groups dared to take to the streets. Few lost their lives for simply protesting. One activist present recalls how a bullet zinged what felt like millimetres above his head and hit one of the female protesters doing nothing but sitting on the shoulders of her brother directly behind him, killing her. These groups prove to be at the forefront again at the turn of the century. While such groups are pivotal to change in Egypt, in analyzing this change my queries are the contribution of women to democratic values in order to provide a broader view of what elements of capacity building within society are present. With regard to the sample, when I asked PVO leaders for further PVO names, mostly the same few names from my shortlist of women’s Islamic PVOs would come up – when such information would be shared. For example, while in the field I connected with Shireen Hafez, whose specialization is the empowerment of Muslim women in Egypt examined through her case study sample of three Islamic women’s organizations. With regard to names of PVOs, my modest survey of the Islamic women’s PVOs in Cairo coincided to a large degree with the handful of which she was aware. The contacts I forged and the acquaintances I developed were of different classes,

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professions, and interests. As such, I did not stumble across the same PVO names because of any limited number of contacts or single network of connections. Thus, I am confident that my survey allowed me to achieve a representative sample of Islamic women’s PVOs. While I do not include organizations outside Cairo in my actual case study, I will clarify that I do draw on informal interviews, visitations and discussions over ten years to give perspective to my work and its conclusions. When I did achieve receiving a contact, it was sometimes just the name of a person. I resorted to the phone directory numerous times. Most phone inquiries proved fruitless. Interestingly, if I called the directory the next day for the same name, many a time with persistence in the directory search I would obtain a completely different number – whether or not it worked. Phone numbers seemed to change frequently. I was occasionally successful when I pursued finding the names and numbers of related contacts, colleagues, previous work places or PVOs etc. of the person. In a few instances I finally reached a contact of the person I was trying to track down and was denied further information. However frustrated I was, I found this understandable, as will be described later, as some of the people I set out to meet were in sensitive situations. I otherwise chose my stratified sample from the following sources: contacts with researchers before entering the field; a book (Kandil 1997) I purchased at the organization Amani Kandil heads, the Arab Council for Childhood, listing hundreds of NGOs and their contacts in the Arab region; a list of all the well-known Cairo secular feminist PVOs; Tonia Rifaey, another researcher in the field who was gracious enough to share with me; asking numerous people I encountered about organizations in their neighbourhoods; or simply while walking/driving the streets keeping an eye open for MOSA signs. However, as already described above, trusting contacts proved to be absolutely crucial in this endeavour for both organizational types, though particularly for the initial contacts with Islamic PVOs I made. As per the official districts, the Greater Cairo is divided into two cities – Cairo to the East and Giza to the West of the Nile. The city

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of Cairo is divided into five districts: the south, north, east, west and middle zones. The city of Giza is divided into four districts: south, north, east and west. Dispersing my interviews over this arrangement would not make my sample truly representative as to the different circumstances under which associations typically form themselves and their activities. For example, in the district of East Giza the random area of Bashteel is very poor, whereas the area of Mohandeseen, separated from Bashteel merely by a small bridge, is a middle- to upper-class area in general. Therefore, a vigorous attempt was made to target PVOs from the different zones of Cairo and Giza, depending on class/poverty differentiations, regardless of the official zoning scheme. Indicators used to make this differentiation between poor, lower-middle and upper-middle class were the following: the price of apartments, the development of infrastructure, the size and prestige of shops in the area, and the existence of green areas (in the random areas it is rare to find any trees). In addition to the ten PVOs visited in the case study sample, an extra location was visited for two of the PVOs. This, however, does not mean that other PVOs did not have additional locations. Associations 3b and 7 are within the random areas of Greater Cairo, which have very poor infrastructure and are rarely accessed by the middle and upper classes. Interestingly, leaders of a few associations, even within close proximity, had no idea these two areas existed.

The Selection Criteria for the Target Organizations A number of criteria needed to be met to satisfy the case study sample for the purpose of examining if women’s organizations have a positive impact on civil society growth and if a marked difference can be ascertained between specifically the two organizational types: women’s Islamic and secular feminist. The criteria established before I went out into the field were as follows: that the association meets the definition of a PVO, is defined specifically a women’s organization, meets certain requirements to be classified as either Islamic or secular, and lastly, is labelled as a service PVO.

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The prospective association needed to meet the definition of a private voluntary organization, as defined in Chapter Three. However, no stipulation was set as to whether it was registered with MOSA, or another ministerial section of government, or even whether it was registered at all. I thought it would be useful not to place a bias against the majority of associations not registered under government laws. However, during the introduction, each organization was asked whether or not it was registered and if so under which ministry of government. Of the ten PVOs chosen for the case study, six were registered under MOSA, three registered under civil companies (nonprofit organizations), and one was registered under charity associations (under Nasser Bank, which is the official charity organization under MOSA). No unregistered association comes under the case study sample, although interviews were subsequently held with participants of unregistered organizations. To establish that the prospective organization be classified as Islamic the Islamic women’s PVO would need to meet at least two of three criteria. These were: 1) the condition that it was attached to a mosque; 2) that the outward appearance of the women conformed to the established Islamic norms for dress by the Egyptian ‘Ulama (Islamic scholars); and 3) that the name of the PVO was considered Islamic. For the second criterion, this would be a style of dress leaving only the face and hands uncovered. Since the present fashion in Egypt among the youth and older women is to wear a headscarf but leave a few shirt buttons open or cover the entire body but with stretch-type material for clothing, awareness of conformity to the professed Islamic dress would be illustrated in the upper chest being covered and looser clothing worn. Thus, given that the Egyptian traditional or customary dress may be confused with religiosity, a hijab or headscarf is not used as a necessary indicator of Islamic dress. Additional indicators were observed. If the headscarf was not of the kind that could be tied behind the neck, but the typical Egyptian khimaar that flows below the waist, this would be considered a stronger indicator of Islamicity. It is, however, a current trend for especially young women and university students to tie a colourful scarf by twisting it around the ponytail. This might indicate a slightly higher class and awareness of fashion,

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Women Memory Forum New Women Research Centre N/A N/A

N/A N/A Zakah Committee – Salah al-Din Mosque

3b

4 5 6 7

8 9 10

1b 2 3a

Islamic Islamic Islamic

Secular Secular Islamic Islamic

Secular Secular

Secular

1a

Centre for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (Head Office) CEWLA Alliance for Arab Women Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (Head Office) ADEW

Category

Organization Or Name of PVO

Table 4.1 Secular feminist and Islamic women’s case study PVOs

Manshiet Nasser (Random area) Mohandeseen Mohandeseen Mohandeseen Bashteel (Random area) Faisal Pyramids Manial

Bulak Adli Manial

Saad Zaghlool

Area

Lower-middle Lower-middle Upper-middle

Upper-middle Upper-middle Upper-middle Poor

Poor

Poor Upper-middle Upper-middle

Lower-middle

Economic class

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although many young women now subscribe to this style. Colourful scarves worn without showing the neck indicate greater Islamicity. Also, since very poor women revert to the Khimaar for economic reasons, a closer look at colours (looking for darker shades, though women who belong to the very low class and countryside areas typically wear all black – however though with a distinctive Ta’seebah or black hair wrap) and importantly, the material worth of the garment would need to be warranted.2 I use hijab and modest dress as part of a set of variables to determine to what degree an organization they participated in fit what I would confirm was ‘Islamic’. However, the wearing of hijab was calculated among parents of teenage girls in preparation for marriage or women who did not wish to be ostracized. Through informal interviews, I heard several times how important it was for a daughter to start wearing the hijab to attract a suitable husband. Hence, hijab does not necessarily denote piety but often did indicate bodily conformity to the norms that prescribed the wearing of the scarf and, as such, a whole set of other norms that determine the same kind of ‘Islamicity’. This would be understood by those who also adhered to more or less the same set of norms and Islamic rulings, much like the sharing of the same language. For the name to be considered Islamic a reference would be sought that would typically be made in the title to Qur’anic names, names of historically important figures from the Islamic point of view (for instance, the names of companions of the Prophet Mohammad, especially female companions or prophets, Caliphs or Islamic battles), or a reference including ‘Allah’.3 For the secular feminist organization, the criteria for its identification as secular would rely initially upon the name of the PVO as detached from any religious or denominational affiliation. As this indicator was not always reliable, verification could not be made until I actually spoke with the organizational leader about the mission or juridical reference (the Egyptian constitution versus Shari‘a or Islamic law) of the organization. This verification would in most instances be made once I informed the organizational leader that I had categorized the organization as a secular feminist organization, which would

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then be confirmed or elaborated upon by the interviewee. The obvious indicator, however, to determine that the PVO is consciously feminist would be first to look for wordings within its name or mission statement to indicate the goal of some kind of liberation or empowerment of women (or women and children). Of both or either of the Islamic and secular organizations, they included job skills training set-ups, tutoring set-ups, orphanages, charity centres, literacy classes, and educational workshops, law advice, counselling, or research on women. A total of 33 interviews from women in five Islamic women’s and five secular feminist PVOs were obtained: 23 members and ten directors/organizational leaders. In addition to my case study sample, participants were interviewed from loose organizational formations, plus four further organizations: one secular feminist PVO (the Women’s Writer’s Association), one Islamic group (Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen or the Muslim Brotherhood), and two further organizations (one dealing with street children and one with children with cancer). Men were among those interviewed from those outside my case study sample. Furthermore, casual interviews were conducted with several other women participants who are differentiated from the case study sample in that their participation was merely based on receipt of welfare or other services. Interviews with this latter group entailed mostly testimonies of their struggles and future hopes. For the others outside my case study sample, an interview questionnaire was not necessarily adhered to. The length of the interview varied. After the usual Egyptian formalities including tea, cold drinks and Egyptian sweets, during which some ease for the interview would be established, interviews with both leaders and participants lasted a minimum of 20 minutes and a maximum of two hours a session. One interview, however, lasted only ten minutes because the leader asked that the interview with the participant be cut short. The average time typically for leaders was 40 minutes to an hour and for participants 25–30 minutes. The organizational leader’s questions, being 17 in all, required more time than those for participants. However, the leaders were typically more willing to talk than the participants. A lengthier introduction was usually given to the leaders, which commonly led to more questions about my research. On the other hand, the participants in some cases

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seemed more anxious about perhaps saying something that would jeopardize the interests of the organization, and so were much more abrupt with their answers. Many were shy about being interviewed by a foreigner. In most situations I had to resort to several probing questions to encourage them to speak. Others simply did not have answers to my questions and I learned that some of my questions were actually beyond what some could possibly answer.4

Design of Interviews The primary technique of data collection for this book was semi open-ended interviews. After several discussions with my supervisor on the questioning methods and referencing of relevant literature on methodology (for example, Singleton and Straits 1999; Bernard 1998; Murphy 1999), two sets of fixed questions were designed: one for participants and another for organizational leaders of my sample. However, a number of revisions were made before and after the first few interviews. Predetermining questions was important for comparing responses across all informants. A few probe questions were also predetermined and utilized when needed. As shown below, the wording of a few questions was changed, depending on whether or not the participant or leader was part of an Islamic or secular PVO. The two sets of interview schedules used throughout the fieldwork were: Interviews with Participants 1. What do you do in this PVO and what are all the activities that take place? 2. What are your motivations behind working/participating in this organization? 3. What are the needs and interests of the women within this group? And the women in the community using the services of this organization? 4. What skills have you learned while at this organization? 5. How does this organization make decisions? Does the management ask you your opinions?

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What ideas or issues have you brought up? Have they been implemented? 6. Do you consider yourself a feminist? What do you feel it means to be a feminist? 7. What do you feel is the greatest problem presently facing Egyptian women? 8. Do you participate in any other activities in the community? For example, in your child’s school or a local Gameyat? 9. Do you feel the work of the organization and the work you do personally help meet the needs of the people seeking your services? 10. What kinds of changes in society and politics would you like to see happening in Egypt? 11. Does your organization work towards common goals with the government? 12. Do you wish to see Egypt as more democratic? How do you understand democracy? If the government ever became Islamic or democratic at the same time, do you think the state could function as both? Is this organization working towards this goal? How? Interviews with Leaders of Organizations 1. For what reasons was your organization founded? 2. What are the current activities of this organization? 3. How is your organization different from a) secular women’s organizations (if Islamic) b) Islamic women’s organizations (if secular)? 4. How many people participate in your organization? 5. For what reasons do your members work with this organization? 6. (posed to Islamic PVOs only) Do they have to have a particular ideology? Do they have to wear hijab? 7. How many people participate in your organization? How many men and how many women? 8. What skills have your members brought with them and have learned here?

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9. How many people on a weekly basis use your services? How adequately do you feel your organization meets the needs of the people using the services you provide? 10. How much funding do you receive from donations? What percentage of this is from zakat (for Islamic PVOs)? What percentage is from the government? From abroad? From loans? And from networking (through individuals and other associations)? Any other sources? 11. What kinds of demands do some of these sources place on you in terms of what activities or programs to pursue? 12. What are the costs of running this organization? 13. What restrictions does your organization face in its operation (i.e. government laws, financial)? 14. What in your opinion is the greatest problem or challenge facing Egyptian women today? 15. Do you coordinate any of your activities with other organizations? 16. Do you have a vision for change in Egypt? (If yes) What is it? 17. Do you wish to see Egypt as more democratic? What does democracy mean to you? If the government ever became Islamic and democratic at the same time, do you think that the state can function as both? The 12 questions developed for the participants seek to uncover the kinds of activities the participants took part in and what experiences were gained from their participation. The questions try to decipher in particular if their activities were aimed at improving the position, situation, or status of the participants and those who used their services. When examining their experiences, specific attention was given to any resulting empowerment process, any cultivation of democratic values or practices, and a general level of civility. The set of 17 questions given to the organizational leader aimed to collect the same data, but furthermore explored the workings, funding, networking, and philosophy of the organization. To learn of the workings of the organization and to measure participatory experiences and civility requires a method including indirect questioning and crossexamination. Cross-examination questions were needed to follow the

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flow of the conversation. Thus, such questions were mostly in the form of probe questions. For instance, in one case, when an organizational leader was asked if any funding came from overseas (question 10), she answered ‘no’ to the direct question. But observing body language, I noticed that her eyes shifted away from those of the translator when she briefly put her head down. The appropriate follow-up probe question was more of a prompting for an accurate answer, when the translator commented that he would normally offer such organizations some charity when home (overseas). She quickly confided that she would be glad to take up his offer and she provided us with her own personal bank account (highly illegal in Egypt)5 and explained that it would just be a matter of trust that he wired the money to her account and the money was given to the organization. Measuring impact on civil society is enhanced when the validity of what is said during the interview is accounted for through participant observation, which includes observing facial expressions and body language during the interview. Participant observation during my fieldwork, moreover, included walking round the facilities (some had more than one location) to observe their operation and interaction between their volunteers, actually helping with or taking part in the activities, sitting in on a meeting/voting session, or lingering in the room where the activities are taking place. While I spent a full day in one PVO conducting all the aforementioned before returning the next day for actual interviewing using the questionnaires, only a few more opportunities arose where I could spend some extra hours at the facility beyond the time used for conducting interviews. As the questions were designed to be open-ended, room was allowed for the interviewee to explain ideas from her own point of view or elaborate on what she thought was most important. As such, answers were sought systematically for the given questions together with data further probed into based on the responses. A few questions were designed to test the knowledge of the respondent on the interview topics (for example, 6 and 12 for participants). Gathering data on civility and attitude took place in the form of participant observations; but importantly through several questions (for example, 3, 6, 15, 16, and 17 for leaders). I would analyze, for example, cooperation, how the

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participants felt towards others of a different ideology or the mere act of voting. The way in which the questions are numbered above would be the ideal chronology for presenting the questions. However, in order to allow the interviewee to become comfortable and less apprehensive within the interview each question was given in accordance with the ‘flow’ of the conversation. In spite of a fieldwork environment in which wariness of my intentions was a natural reality, I managed to develop rapport with a few organizational leaders and participants from both organizational types, who were eager to discuss their organizations, any more questions, or my research further, shown either through an invitation back to the PVO or out to a café. Since I returned to Egypt once or twice yearly until the publication of this project, I was able to keep in contact with a few of the organizational leaders and participants of the case study who were interested in this work and afforded time for revisiting over my returns. In addition, I was able to gather information on some extra organizations and networks. Such follow-up on both sides was extremely productive in that a continued engagement of the topics and issues of concern could be delved into much further with yet greater ease and trust. It has been my objective, thus, to be well-positioned to be able to provide an accurate account of the development of civil society within the focus I have chosen. I also do not wish to breach the trust that has been nurtured. There is obviously a balance that needs to be struck whereby not only are identities protected but some of the stances interviewees expressed dropped from further interrogation, not because I found them loathsome but because my purpose for interview was not to rehash points of much orientalist focus that detracts from other important developments, unless I found them also important for an overall picture. So, for example, authoritarian stances were expressed more than I would have liked to hear but an extended period of visit also illustrated that authoritarian discourses can change with time and so focusing on them would not convey this process. Indeed, the successes that became more obvious after later visits are sometimes so immense that it makes no sense to ‘stare at the thorns of a rosebush’.

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Key Indicators and Approach In order to assess the extent to which these women’s organizations are contributing to civil society three main indicators are briefly outlined here. These are participation, civility, and empowerment. I analyze the level of participation, which I use to mean some active involvement on part of the volunteers. Participation is said to occur when people organize around specific interests, and negotiate and collaborate to reach particular ends. To assess participation quantitatively I inquire whether the organization is growing in size, both vertically and horizontally. I analyze pluralist practices. I inquire who makes decisions and how decisions are made in the organizations to understand how democratic or inclusive their methods are. If, for example, a participant suggests a change in policy and the request is not implemented, brought to a committee, discussion, or vote, then this may be a demonstration of a rather authoritarian form of organization. To further analyze pluralist practices, I inquire how a leader received his/ her post. Analyzing how a leader received his/her post demonstrates if democratic practices are put in place and if these practices develop a rotation of leadership positions, and hence, quantitatively more leadership experiences within the group. The degree of civility observed within the organizations is measured as the second indicator. While ‘tolerance to the other’ as most often defined as synonymous with civility is an indicator for fieldwork analysis (Norton 1995: 213), a wider range of ‘civil acts’ or what is referred to as ‘values’ for the normative part of civil society are considered for this book within the term ‘civility’. Jillian Schwedler (1995: 6) argues that ‘tolerance toward those with different views is paramount’ and Richard Antoun (Antoun 2000: 456) believes that it is necessary to include ‘the practices and ideas that generate cooperation and trust for the purpose of accomplishing social goals’. Hence I rely on these values as important indicators measured within the organizations. As Singerman (1995: 50; see also Seligman 1992: 182) emphasizes, ‘cooperation, trust, and mutual dependence’ are important factors in a context, such as Egypt, where financial scarcity, political exclusion, and lacking information are everyday realities. To

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measure tolerance, I inquire how tolerant the participants are towards the religious beliefs or practices of others within the association and their organizational ‘opposite’ (which would mean primarily women’s Islamic organizations for the secular feminist organizations and vice versa). For example, whether a member is forced to either cover up with a headscarf or not indicates rigid and inflexible ‘values’. Civility is observed if the pluralist practices, modes of decision-making, or actual projects are conducted in a cooperative, peaceful, respectful, and trustful manner. Cooperation and mutual dependence is in each member’s ability to trust the other’s maturity and self-responsibility. Civility encompasses tolerance, some level of trust, mutual respect, respect for individual freedoms and rights, and cooperative decisionmaking. Importantly, I try to identify and make sense of the values and ideas that bring the people together and spread to the participants and beneficiaries. The empowerment process has not been a determining evaluating factor among analyses of social movements and associational activism, although it is identified as a leading indicator for women’s development and wellbeing among some of my case study secular organizations. Empowerment is discussed and incorporated within some capacity building programmes in the Middle East, although I would argue that a good number of these programmes achieve little in the way of empowering women – a subject that requires in-depth and impartial study. Indeed, a healthy civil society must be built upon selfreliant individuals and autonomous collectivities and capacity building programmes and other initiatives, including some of those studied here, need to have this objective as unconditional. As Adam Ferguson (quoted in Schwedler 1995: 5) comments, ‘The happiness of individuals is the great end of civil society: For, in what sense can a public enjoy any good, if its members, considered apart, be unhappy?’ In defining empowerment, feminists have emphasized the effect a woman has on her institutional environment as ‘circumventing, changing, or eliminating the society’s values, practices, norms and laws in order to lessen the extent to which they constrain her activities and choices’ (Ackerly 1997: 141). It is, however, important to emphasize the other

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part to empowerment, as Jo Rowlands (quoted in Dawson 1999: 126) defines empowerment for the developmental context: ‘A process whereby women become able to organise themselves to increase their own selfreliance, to assert their independent right to make choices and to control resources which will assist in challenging and eliminating their own subordination.’ Sherine Hafez (2003) rightly argues that the usage of empowerment in the literature is inadequate in understanding empowerment that subscribes to systems different from the tradition out of which the terms have evolved. She provides a definition of empowerment especially useful for the case in hand in assessing empowerment among the women through their participation in Islamic-oriented organizations. Hafez defines empowerment of Muslim women as the bolstering of women’s self-esteem, solidarity, and confidence, which comes from an inner satisfaction brought by the improvements they implement in the community. It is an empowerment that is predicated upon relinquishing the forms of power deriving from overt resistance and relies instead on notions of perseverance, submission and higher levels of religious attainment. (Ibid.: 5) Rather than categorizing the women’s modes of action as necessarily fitting either resistance initiatives or compliance, their modalities of agency can thus be viewed in a broader framework of power relations in order to uncover various other meanings that will inform an empowerment process. As the problems facing women in a developmental context are many and varied, it is important that, as with empowerment, the emphasis is not on women’s status relative to men as the sole area of contention, but on the redistribution of power within society (Moser 1991: 168). ‘For these women, empowerment begins when they change their ideas about the causes of their powerlessness, when they recognize the systemic forces that oppress them, and when they act to change the conditions of their lives’ (Bookman and Morgen 1988: 4). In this sense, power is no longer in a finite form as ‘power over’, which is

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controlling power and which may result in compliance or resistance, but described as ‘power to’, ‘power with’, and ‘power from within’. Power over is defined as controlling power, which prompts a response of compliance or resistance. Power to is a generative or productive power, which creates new possibilities and actions without domination. Power with ‘involves a sense of the whole being greater than the sum of the individuals, especially when a group tackles problems together’. Power from within is ‘the spiritual strength and uniqueness that resides in each one of us and makes us truly human. Its basis is self-acceptance and self-respect which extend, in turn, to respect for and acceptance of others as equals’ (Rowlands 1998: 14).6 It is also important to emphasize empowerment as ‘the carving out of public space by women for themselves, sometimes paradoxically by not even leaving the home, through which space they are able to derive benefits for themselves and impose their presence on society at large’ (Afsarudden 1999: 5). As such, I add power for as a necessary ingredient for the evaluation of changes in power relations and power exercised throughout society, in referring to the power one generates to help others. Rowlands reminds us, however, that certain activities may be empowering in one way and disempowering in another. Thus, the empowerment process is not necessarily linear (Rowlands 1999: 126). When women’s organizations feel some sort of agency and autonomy in the control they have taken in their lives through their collective action they have acquired values that must be considered for the evaluation of civil society, as the empowerment process serves to add a more defined meaning to the understanding of power relations. To assess women’s impact on civil society through the empowerment process, I measure the degree of control they are shown to have in decision-making in the various positions they may hold. Furthermore, I explore from their own narrations any consciousness-raising, skills or education for self-advancement or development, or any other ways they feel they have benefited from their participation in the organization. As Robert Bothwell (1998: 252) asserts in his article, ‘Indicators of a Healthy Civil Society,’ ‘[t]he first step is to define the significant indicators of civil society in qualitative terms, then, when appropriate, to suggest possible quantitative indicators’. Civil society is strengthened

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when there is increased citizen involvement in the political process (Troxel 1998: 99). But as Terry Bergdall and Frank Powell (1998 ibid.: 91) maintain, it is important to stress participation in fostering responsibility and self-confidence in building civil society.

Intricacies of the Interview Process Before beginning all case study interviews the interviewee was informed about the purpose of my study. Permission was sought that information collected throughout the interview be used for my research while doing graduate work at the University of Guelph, Canada. As most of the women requested that their names never be cited, I soon began each introduction with the assurance that I would not use their names within the book. A mini tape recorder was used with the vast majority of interviewed for the case study sample. The interviewee was asked before the interview if the recorder could be used and was assured that only the researcher would have access to the tape. Only two interviewees requested that a tape recorder not be used and in four other situations I assessed it would be better not to pull it out of my bag. In some more situations the interviewee was hesitant before agreeing. On one occasion an organizational leader asked that we continue the last few questions of the interview off-tape, as any overt talk about ‘politics’ within the PVO as a policy was forbidden. With or without the use of a tape recorder, I used a notepad to write down the interview session (except when I was explicitly asked to keep certain information off the record). I would make it a goal to put the information into a file on my laptop as soon as possible. I created a separate file on my laptop only for impressions I would later record. For the protection of all those interviewed (whether or not they are part of my case study sample) no original names are used throughout the book, except those of experts. While all five secular feminist organizations had no reservations about my using their PVO names in the book, two of the five Islamic women’s organizations strictly requested that I omit their PVO names. In fact, I was not permitted to know the name of a third organization I was interviewing members of!7 I found the name out after an expert, whom I would frequently

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visit, enlightened me and the third interviewee, the director, invited me to the organization itself – which had its name on a MOSA sign. Despite the obvious sign, beforehand I was nonetheless not given the name of the organization and was cautioned by the director not to ask any surrounding neighbours for any direction to any description of a PVO, should I lose my way. While I continue to describe and discuss the three women’s Islamic organizations with reference to their activities, I was not disallowed from using the names of the two further Islamic women’s PVOs. I have chosen to omit the name of any specific organization, whether Islamic or secular, when presenting data I collected through interviews, participant observation or even feedback from experts I feel is highly insightful, but detailing the information gathered with reference to the PVO name I am sure would be perceived as a betrayal of the trust given me. The interview was designed to be a one-on-one interview. This was adhered to where the interviewee was fluent in English. But, while my Arabic was admittedly not quite up to par (adequate enough to carry on a non-intellectual conversation), in many interviews either a male or female researcher, who could speak fluent Arabic, would accompany me. However, I realized that the broken Arabic I did resort to was essential to develop some level of trust and ease. The Arabic/Islamic greetings I often used also had their place. While many of the interviewees could also speak English, most would still prefer to speak in Arabic. For such interviews I would present my question in English. A translation would be given back to me. This method was, nonetheless, efficient. The usefulness of this method was seen as being in eliminating cultural misunderstandings. Further elaboration was given by the translator when required. While it may be questioned that the sex of the translator may have an impact on the data collection where the male translator was present, I do not believe that this is true to the degree of obscuring the required data for this research. In fact, that the person is originally Egyptian seemed to take precedence in terms of how comfortable and willing to speak the informants were in the interviews. Exceptions were likely if the participant would have wanted to bring up emotional issues. As cultural barriers exist between men and women in regard to what

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can be appropriately discussed, I concluded that women would not have elaborated on personal sufferings. Testimonies of the emotional part to women’s struggles and pains endured, while brought up in the presence of the male person accompanying me, were more frequent in interviews without his presence. Discussion on the struggle for power between spouses was brought up slightly more frequently in womenonly interviews, although it was never a main theme. Remarkably, discussion on how daughters (the participants themselves) stood against traditional norms, instituted through their fathers or villages of origin, only came up during the interviews in which the male was present. The issue of abuse was raised by the interviewee in at least two instances without his presence and only once in his presence. Besides this exception, I perceived the company of both was especially beneficial. The Cairo accents, a familiar accent to most participants played a role, even if small, in developing a sense of familiarity. Their better sensitivity to the local cultural norms minimized cultural barriers and eliminated misunderstandings. During the individual interviews his choice of Arabic words would vary depending on the organizational type or even educational level or openness of the particular person interviewed. As most of the organizational leaders had been western educated, sharing similar backgrounds enabled an important level of identifying with the other. Even certain references and understandings were unique to this combination and resorted to. For example, the word ‘feminism’ was often used in its English form among leaders, while the translation varied depending on the meanings or connotations the participant expressed understanding. In three of the PVOs in total (two Islamic and one secular), the participant was required to be interviewed with the organizational leader present. This of course had implications on how much and what exactly the participant was willing to say. In all three situations the leader intervened to give her own input (despite having already been interviewed). In the case of one Islamic PVO, the leader had to stop a few participants from talking about politics too openly and the secular PVO leader on one occasion instructed the participant to refrain from a personal opinion the participant was expressing. In all three cases, eye contact was for the most part maintained between the participants

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and the leader and in several instances the participant would look to the leader for some kind of non-verbal assurance that she could either go ahead and answer the question herself or that what she was saying was ‘correct’. With the above-described Islamic PVO, the leader asked whether I preferred to interview each of the three participants singly or as a group. Against my polite reply to of course permit individual interviews she, nonetheless, called all three participants into her office, and so a group interview was carried out. While I tried to remedy the situation by asking a participant who agreed with the first participant’s reply to my question to elaborate or give further examples, the variation between their points of view remained small. When I entered the field, my target number was interviews from ten organizational leaders and 30 organizational participants. I initially assumed that I would simply request from the organizational leader that I interview three participants and orderly arrangements would be made. I quickly learned that this is not the way things were going to happen. In fact, within the first session of my interviewing with an organizational leader I was countered with surprise that I should want to seek additional interviews beyond her. With several of the organizations, a number of visits needed to be made to interview the other participants. Sometimes a scheduled meeting would be cancelled and in virtually all such situations I did not find out until arriving at the place agreed on for interviewing. I had to persist in returning for another scheduled appointment, and even after the second (but not after the third) cancellation humbly returned. I simply had to accept after the third cancellation, which occurred twice, that I was not going to get an interview. Initially, many interviews were scheduled for a week later or even more. I soon learned that the risk of a visit not expected on that day was too high. Therefore, I scheduled most interviews for the same day, at most two days ahead. To do this took a great deal of assertion on my part, but I realized this was the only way I would come anywhere close to my target number for the initial stage. Interview timings were arranged mostly by telephone, but sometimes by simply showing up at the place of the organization. Some of the locations were so poor that that they did not even have telephones. But no interview took place with the participants for my case study sample without the permission of the organizational

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leader. The interviews took place mostly within the organizations themselves. Others took place at the participants’ workplaces, since several had full-time jobs not affiliated with the organizations they participated in. A few took place in the homes of the participants. At first I set out to interview participants holding different positions or carrying other responsibilities within the association to gain a more profound understanding of the various activities within the organization. However, limitations were placed upon my preferred sample choice within the organization itself. As with the above example, it was typical of the organizational leader to be somewhat hesitant about allowing an interview with participants. In many of the organizations, the participants were clearly too busy with activities of the organization. And if one takes into consideration the heavy demands placed on most of these women from other areas of life, in sum, if I interviewed more than two participants beyond the PVO leader it was a considerable achievement. While I expressed a preference to interview participants of different positions, in the vast majority of cases organizational participants were chosen by the organizational leader. Through several examples, I realized that the participant chosen was higher up in rank with the organization and often the most educated. This bias could not be controlled by the researcher. Persons holding ‘sensitive’ positions would also be excluded for interview with me. For example, within an Islamic women’s organization I requested that I interview the halaka leader. The organizational leader explained that no one could be banned from attending this participant’s halaka,8 but that I was explicitly forbidden to approach her or ask her any questions, lest ‘people fly out of the windows in fear’.

Limitations Posed by Suspicion and Fear Fear shared by PVO participants and leaders of both organizational types was clearly a factor which posed potential obstacles to the depth and amount of information typically gained through interviews. The constraints placed on the role of PVOs and the timing of my fieldwork seemed explained in Chapter Three to be the two main factors which played a role in developing angst among those interviewed.

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Less than a month before my arrival in June 2000, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, professor at the American University in Cairo and director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies, and prominent human rights activist, had been jailed together with 27 of his colleagues from his Ibn Khaldoun Center. He was accused of taking foreign funding, misappropriating EU funds (declared not true by EU reports), and tarnishing the image of Egypt. During my interviews a few organizational leaders, among several experts, referred to this case9 to explain or justify limitations put on what could and could not be discussed throughout the interviews. Both factors affected the level of suspicion and fear the organization developed towards any greater monitoring or scrutiny, which needless to say could possibly be assisted through research. While the timing was, indeed, a factor, discussing issues related to the role of women in contributing to change, and especially Islamic activists, is still viewed as contentious and a great deal of reservation and careful answers are still part of any ‘talk’ among people I have not established sufficient rapport with yet. During interviews with the first PVO, an Islamic PVO, I promptly learned how severe the fear actually was and potentially how much of a deciding factor it could become in landing interviews or how willing the interviewee would be to talk. The initial questions posed to me by the organizational leader, which I became accustomed to expect, demonstrated guarded suspicion. Questions were if I had affiliations beyond what I had already stated or if I had chosen my research topic myself. It was with the first PVO that my interview was cut short. It was probably the clearest example of trepidation. The participant was chosen by the leader, an authoritative and intimidating woman, as the leader explained to me, ‘because she is the most educated here’. She, visibly shaking, would look towards her supervisor, the organizational leader, before answering all questions. The supervisor did on a few occasions interject and answer my questions on the participant’s behalf. The participant (not understanding English) exclaimed that I must be saying things that she was not to understand (probably through the interjection). When I posed the question from an earlier version, which was number 5 of the schedule: ‘Do you feel the work you are doing is political? What do you understand to be political activity?’ the leader exclaimed that I had

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better stop the interview there. After the participant exited the room, the leader asserted that if I finished the questions she would have lost this participant. While I never came across another leader I perceived as intimidating in any of the subsequent interviews or a participant as unmistakably fearful as the first, I took all steps and precautions to ensure that my questioning methods would be much less direct and more subtle. Before dropping the question altogether, I had formulated another that I thought was much more subtle. It again evoked an uncomfortable situation in a subsequent interview. I also found it necessary to alter question 11 of the questionnaire (for participants) from a question directly asking about the relationship between the PVO and the government. Questions were edited for other reasons. For example, a question directed at the organizational leader asked if they would coordinate activities with men. The question was omitted after establishing through their responses that both organizational types found that my question missed the reality of their struggles. Coordinating a project with men when the situation required was naturally given. To ensure a smoother and more relaxing interview session, immediately afterwards I memorized the two sets of questions and only looked them over towards the end of a session if I felt I had missed something. Interview with at least three PVOs was not possible due to the great risk these PVOs evidently felt existed. Two secular feminist organizations, one working with abused women and one on human rights issues, were targeted as potential case study samples. After at least three attempts to set up interviews, the leader of the PVO working on abused women’s issues only handed me informational pamphlets in English that are geared towards international assistance. She then invited me to come back many months later. I visited the PVO dealing with human rights issues a total of three times. I received illogical excuses to reschedule my appointments. On the third try, I actually did sit down to an agreed-upon interview with a participant. But for the first few questions about the PVO, which were meant to be casual (not getting to the actual schedule of questions yet) she needed to get up and exit the room to ask her supervisor (as she nervously explained) – I imagined to ask what to say – and then would return. The first time lasted 15 minutes. When I pulled out my mini tape recorder and

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asked whether I could use it, instead of answering yes or no, she again got up to exit the room, this time coming back to announce that the interview could not be continued. I similarly received a large stack of books and pamphlets, all in Arabic, but no interview. I was interested in the activities of the women’s section of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since then, I have interviewed several female Ikhwan members. However, during this fieldwork, a participant belonging to a branch outside Cairo proved herself trusting and open. I achieved a one-on-one two-hour interview with her. And though her interview is not part of my case study sample, her knowledge as a halaka leader and willingness to talk provided me with in-depth information behind the philosophy and about the various activities of the group as a start. I was even provided further important contacts. I was promised by a Cairobased female Muslim Brotherhood participant that I could accompany her to their group’s halaka. Each week she would postpone this visit until I realized towards the end of my stay for this phase that I was actually never going to see this halaka. I therefore requested a male contact to meet one of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, whose area of interest is Muslim women activism, Mohammad Badawi, where he attended his Friday prayer. The contact met Mr Badawi and related his message cautioning me to refrain from all the participants for my own safety as, in addition to his three-year jail term after the 1995 military trials,10 he has been arrested twice. In the last instance, which occurred only two months prior, he was lecturing for the women’s Muslim Brotherhood halaka and, together with the women participants, had been arrested. When I persisted, the contact declined to help me further. He explained it was now for his own safety, as he had realized his could be jeopardized by merely being seen talking to this well-known Islamic figure. An additional factor to be considered with this group which distinguishes it from the PVOs in my sample is that it was banned. Thus, mistrust would in general be higher. It therefore took several attempts through subsequent visits to start interviews, which I was able to receive without the unnecessary complications, and which provided ample insight into the group. Furthermore, an organization that deals with abused women may have additional sensitivities. Nonetheless, suspicion was an element to contend with in both organizational types of my study.

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Thus, successfully collecting data involved crucially developing tactics to minimize discomfort or suspicion and build trust. So that I could achieve a greater understanding of the activities of the organizations studied, as already illustrated, I included interviews or consultation with researchers and experts in the fieldwork. I was also fortunate to be able to bounce my perceptions, confusing information, etc. off friends/acquaintances and family members during my stay, some of whom are also researchers or activists. It cannot go unsaid that casual conversations with cab drivers, friends, acquaintances, and maids/helpers were in several cases highly valuable in drawing a larger picture of political influences and struggle.

Conclusions Several problems were faced while attempting to achieve representativeness of the studied sample of organizations. The scarcity and inaccessibility of government sources (for example, MOSA) suggested the dependence on previous research. However, the few available sources of literature could not offer a comprehensive survey, especially for Islamic organizations. I depended on the group of experts specializing in the area of study, who were mostly ‘secular’, in compiling my list for secular organizations. However, those experts proved to have no contact with Islamic organizations, for which I had to depend on contacts with the main Islamic figures in Egypt, known to specialize in Muslim women activism. Moreover, the samples were chosen to cover the different economic classes, rather than the official geographical zoning scheme, in Cairo. The classification of organizations into Islamic and secular depended on a combination of factors related to their stated governing bylaws/mission statements, the name of the PVO, and signs of religious attachment. This has aided in categorizing the types of organizing registered with government as part of this study. However, as networks are fluid, form and change depending on shared needs, it is noteworthy that although some movements will form specifically for Islamist goals and others with a decidedly secular orientation, the categorization essentially collapses among this sector more quickly.

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This is especially true as many networks form to either serve financial empowerment, for which ideology often plays little part, or have taken on more of a protest-orientation, for which also ideology can be relegated to the back burner.

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CHAPTER 5 THE ISL A MIC AND SECUL AR AS MEANS OF PARTICIPATION

Introduction If th[e] widespread misperception of the Middle East is ever to be overcome, it will begin with the realization that there is more to the region than religious zealotry and fanatical terrorism. (Schwedler 1995: xi) This chapter examines how the participants of this study contribute to the expansion of civil society in Egypt. As demonstrated through a case study on Egyptian women’s associations in Cairo, there is a plethora of civil society institutions that are pushing for their democratic rights through various peaceful means. To capture the breadth of their actions, one must not look solely at activism consciously directed towards influencing state laws and policies, or even those consciously trying to play a role in democratization. Their activities embody much more meaning to the study of civil society and political participation when analyzed in their own context. The values that build a good individual and society may look different from those situated neatly within a secular liberal discourse. As Hafez argues (2003: 48), Islamic activists ‘force a re-examination of the issue of empowerment and agency, as these women who are clearly involved in processes of self-development

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and reinvention do not comply with feminist liberal paradigms that have traditionally been employed in interpreting women’s agency in the Middle East’. Despite the merit and contributions of chiefly anthropological works in presenting the behaviours and actions of their subjects as absolutely normal in a quest for the appreciation of relativism, I insist on placing the activism of the organizations and networks I studied within a normative framework of civil society. I draw upon the strengths of such literature to argue for the broadening of the civil society framework to include those that have been deemed outside the established tradition of political science in order to illustrate their significance. For example, studies on the development of and role of women in Middle Eastern societies resort to listing the contributions of feminist organizations to the neglect of Islamic organizations, for the reasons discussed in Chapter Two. The inclusion of marginalized groups is hoped to offer not only broader perspective of relevant actors, but also a more accurate understanding of those actors who do in fact play a positive role in developing the ‘good’ life for a broader spectrum of people. However, what is ‘normative’ should not be rigidly defined according to a dominant culture’s view – what is called western, or previously imperialist notions – as what was ‘normative’ included that which at best was placed in a trajectory of European enlightenment and at worst served imperialism. My objective in this chapter is to illustrate the value of actors whose activism is grounded in religion and the more practical-oriented activism, marginalized in the literature as being ill-suited for the expansion of civil society or of lesser importance as compared to strategic activism. The emphasis that follows will, thus, be on the contribution of those women who do not partake in a rights-based form of organization but, rather, address basic needs of a more immediate nature or personal forms of expressing virtuosity and morality. The emphasis was actually defined for me by these women themselves. What is defined as worthy of pursuit for the good life has its context that must be considered for interpreting development, the improvement of circumstances and achieving the wellbeing of those concerned. In trying to identify what those goals worthy of pursuit might be and why, it has become clear to me that those groups considered illiberal and backward in fact have enormous function in the

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way of establishing democratic values in society. There is so much more to Islamic-based activism than the extremism and terroristic methods with which we have become so accustomed to identify Islamic groupings. Moreover, what is ‘secular’ in the literature does not necessarily take shape in those organizations categorized as ‘secular’ either. As will be illustrated in this and the next chapter, activisms between both groups studied are very similar due to the nature and context of women’s actual concerns. This chapter answers the question if these organizations serve to expand civil society in Egypt and if any marked difference can be ascertained in the political effect of these two organizational types. It attempts to bring in a better understanding of the activities of these women’s associations. It discusses a homogenization and teleological interpretation of women’s organizations that obscures the actual goals and strategies of many women in the Middle East. In particular, however, this chapter illustrates that Islamic organizations, which have been overlooked as either irrelevant or ‘uncivil’ enough to be included in mainstream scholarship, play a significant role.

Why Women Participate It is a context made up of a number of variables in Egypt, as found in many parts of the Middle East, that motivates women to participate through such avenues as the Islamic or secular women’s organizations. Both organizational types help women in need or women who have been disempowered by poverty, illiteracy, certain marginalizing traditions, patriarchy, or laws – to various degrees and with differing concentrations. It is vital to study what motivates women to pursue their activisms through these avenues as this provides insight into wider power structures that are identified by these women as well as the ideological frameworks that essentially govern and direct their actions. There are specific values each participant holds which motivated her to join the respective associations. These values are established within this context. Understanding these values, thus, helps explain how women become empowered in contexts outside the narrowly defined and dominant theoretical paradigm of ‘freedom’. Understanding these values, furthermore, contextualizes how women have understood ‘freedom’ when they were motivated to join in protest against oppressive forces.

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Some women state outright that they joined the association out of a need for a salary. An intention to make some money is often the same intention that may motivate a woman to join any type of work. The emphasis is placed on a monetary incentive over the development of society. In Egypt, where poverty or lack is a significant variable in most women’s lives, this is not surprising. A number of these women were, thus, also quick to clarify that they would not be able to participate in working towards the betterment of society if they did not have a salary to do so. This does raise some questions as to the idea that civil society participation must be exclusively volunteer based. Although this issue will be discussed in more detail later, I will argue here that a salary does not necessarily preclude an intention to help others; often self-reflection and readjustment in understanding participation occurs as a product of their participation. A small number of women joined the two organizational types out of a perceived immediate need. The examples of such for my case study included escaping harsh economic circumstances and patriarchy. In the association that provided an orphanage for boys, at least two of the participants, the director related to me, had themselves been orphans. It is conceivable that in the context of Egypt, marriage to a good suitor for these women would be almost impossible. Thus, working in an orphanage would satisfy a certain void and partly remedy this social stigma. In the process, much more is gained through the giving of themselves. No one could understand the needs of these orphans as completely as these women, either. In some cases, women joined the organization as a way to find solace from various experiences. These included leaving a village because of the stigma of divorce and patriarchal norms that were applied in such case, limiting spatial freedom. This also included women who faced hardship in the sense of losing someone in the family, such as a child, and wanting to find other women to find strength to endure while participating. In this chapter, the narrations of some of these women illustrate that irrespective of the initial reason for joining, their perception of their roles changed and so did their activism. Importantly also, many attest to an empowerment process they experience. When asked why they had joined the association, of the ten directors all five of the Islamic PVOs stated that the purpose was to serve

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Allah and all responses of the five secular PVOs could be categorized as humanitarian. In other words, one set of organizations helps poor women in their subjugated condition because of a moral obligation to serve Islam – hence, the Islamic cause – and the other set because of a moral obligation to serve humanity. If querying were to stop here, the conclusion drawn would be that the two organizational types are very different, as might be expected from the biases that govern the neat separation of the two in the literature. Indeed, the mission statements of both organizational types were carefully formulated and the directors of each organization were clear about the categorization under which their organizations were listed on paper with the respective government authority. Nonetheless, motivations among the participants of both organizational types were so much more nuanced and informative of the kinds of activism their joining the organization would entail. Among the participants of both organizational types, the majority stated in different ways that they participated for the sake of doing khair1 or the sake of helping humanity. Thus, even within each of the two organizational types, it made little difference what the leaders claimed was the mission of the whole organization. One Islamic PVO leader assured me that all participants were there for the service of Allah. Yet, while that was one reason listed by a participant, it was not listed as the first. While a secular feminist PVO leader attempted to make it very clear that her PVO’s mission had opposite goals to those of Islamic PVOs, the participants interviewed, observant of religion at least in appearance, named khair as part of their motivating factors – the same motivating factor for many Islamic PVO participants. In the same secular PVO, one member explained that she used the Qur’an as her source of reference to help women become aware that the men of their families oppress them. While the management may differ in their motivations, all the above participants are accomplishing more or less the same goals. It is important to recognize what motivating factors contribute to participation. Motivating factors translate into action that will directly and indirectly produce political consequences. These were the main motivating factors expressed by Islamic PVO participants: ‘Allah created

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the souls with khair. Our ideology is to develop khair in people . . . Khair is a seed that you plant. But the growth of the seed depends on activism’; ‘after resigning as a teacher I felt I must help more and get involved with the community.’ For secular PVOs typical statements were as follows: ‘I love to help people, especially the poor. It is something that fulfils me in life’; ‘I love to see everyone helping to protect children’; ‘why – it is humanitarian to do khair.’ The desire to do something good for society is a general theme that runs through both types of organization making the separation between the two in actual goals often difficult. Behind the desire to do khair, however, there can be greater strategizing in place which also serves to influence exactly how khair will be achieved and this theme will be discussed in regards to the empowering effect in the following chapter. The issue, however, that strategies do exist within the more practical-oriented organizations that proclaim to be mostly providing charity and welfare problematizes the thesis that practical-oriented organizations may be neatly categorized as apolitical when the strategies devised aim for the giving of charity or welfare to have political impact in the ideological choices the recipients make. My data illustrating that only a small number of women join PVOs to meet an immediate economic need is partially substantiated through Ibrahim’s study, although I will briefly qualify and discuss these overlapping conclusions in terms of the comparisons that are made to Latin American initiatives. He concludes that Egypt’s case differs from what has been viewed as the typical example of grassroots activism found through the study of initiatives mostly in Latin America. It differs in that it is not the very poor who begin the initiatives, but rather those who have sufficient means to aid the poor (Ibrahim 2006a: 226). The practical needs of women which might influence their participation in organizations could not be adequately discerned in his research as his does not focus on women’s organizations (ibid.: 225–44). Women’s Islamic and secular feminist organizations in Egypt are essentially service organizations or in the former developed to address two main issues: poverty through the provision of charity or low-fee services and what is framed as the need for society to develop morally. In the majority of cases, those who join Islamic organizations and women’s secular feminist organizations have an outward-looking approach to

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their activism rather than the organizations presented in many studies in Latin America, in which organizations and movements are often founded to address a problem facing the community. The participants arise from those communities (see Arruda 2000). Diane Singerman and Salwa Ismail have documented numerous cases of smaller informal initiatives created by the very poor themselves. Significantly, Singerman had found that the family serves as the political institution among the very poor communities in Egypt. She states: ‘A “family ethos” fashioned by the sha‘b supports channels of arbitration, conflict resolution, economic assistance and cooperation in the community, and the reproduction of the family (or marriage and children)’ (Singerman 1995: 42). Singerman argues that the family must be considered an important part of the political because of the context of ‘financial insecurity, considerable government intervention in the economy, and a tradition of political exclusion in Egypt’2 (ibid.: 42, 43). Ismail’s research on Egypt also unearths the various ways in which ‘states’ exist under the state – places in the very poor areas where people find strategies of self-governance. She found that within these areas people develop forms of organization that are designed to deal with a range of recurring problems (Ismail 2006: 34). These can be simple transgressions between neighbours. An important feature of intervention includes the status a person has so that he is called upon, accumulation of ‘good deeds’, wealth and using some for charity, or visible contacts with or links to state officials or police, essentially wasta (ibid.: 38). Similarly, Asef Bayet (1998: 10) argues that the very poor participate around the redistribution of social goods, opportunities and attaining autonomy from the regulations, institutions, and discipline imposed by the state. After incorporating some research into unregistered forms of organization, such as networks, and the sparse research that exists on initiatives started by the poor themselves, there is likely some analytical misappropriation in the comparison between women’s organizing in the Middle East and Latin America among the very poor. Women do seek to better themselves economically; however, they often do rely on the services that organizations offer to use as welfare or to start up small-scale businesses. From the research I have gathered on these particular avenues of activism, it may be a matter of scale if

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comparisons are made between Middle Eastern and Latin American countries. From the replies to questions I posed, I conclude that while the structure of associations I focused on may differ from the Latin American example of grassroots initiatives, there is a difference in terms of who begins them in many but not all cases. In the Egyptian context, those associations that eventually registered with the government were founded by the more affluent. Certainly, not enough data has been gathered on informal initiatives in the Middle East, in general, and Egypt, in our case. However, the work that both accomplish seems to be, nonetheless, similar. Women’s struggles in the developing world revolve primarily around practical issues. Intent is not the key to understanding political participation as demonstrated in their activities. Interviewees passed judgement about the ‘other’ based on subjective constructs of what is a good or worthless intention. Women in secular feminist organizations expressed little knowledge about Islamic women’s organizations, but sometimes provided intrigue in how women consciously operating under Islam may be navigating a largely male-dominated sphere. More often than not, biased understandings of the category were expressed when referring to women who participated in organizations under an Islamic banner. A great deal of misunderstanding was evident when I asked how the secular organizations thought they differed from Islamic organizations. This probably stems from knowledge that some women have about Islamist groups, as dominated by male activists and masculine interests. Interviewees in Islamic organizations passed judgement about secular feminist organizations in terms of what they supposed was primarily a secularizing agenda pursued by these organizations to the detriment of their efforts to save society. However, despite an acute level of misunderstanding both among these organizations and within the literature, this research uncovers that in many ways the more practical reasons women participate through either avenue and the actual activities overlap.

What Does Democratic Practice Mean? Did the participants of this study illustrate a sound knowledge of democratic practice? Among those below the leaders, no, the vast

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majority did not. When asked to define how ‘democracy’ was understood, one interviewee after another dashed my (biased) hopes that they had a clear agenda. I needed to make sense of what contribution these women were making in terms of democratic practice as part of the normative criteria for my assessment of civil society expansion. Hence, I needed to take a step back and stop letting my preconceptions and narrow frames of reference filter what they were actually saying. What evolved in my understanding of their activism was that I did not need to have proof that they grasped my understanding of democracy for some process to be unfolding. More profoundly, they did not need to prove to have a dictionary definition of democracy if they were practicing essential principles that enable more people to be part of a decision-making process, or ‘civilize’ and empower their society. Firstly, many of the individuals that I interviewed professed that change must occur first at the fundamental levels of society. It is within the very small, subtle individual acts of giving, tolerating another and building relationships of trust that higher principles are developed. This is actually an ageless wisdom that people from long ago to people in many parts of the globe today have known. Nothing can be sustainable without strong foundations. Public expressions, such as a vote, may be quantifiable but if it will not be sustained by the masses, it represents nothing more than a shaky number. Further, as any human rights organization in Egypt will point out, the votes counted from each election have been a farce. Hence, a foundation of principles must be developed within the individual self and then in one’s immediate vicinity – the home, the neighbourhood, one’s community. I was being told this. Secondly, those associations that practice democratic acts serve to develop a civil society. I argue that it is as simple as that, and this is why: when they practice democratic behaviour within their private spaces, such attitudes and propensities will be carried over as dominant behaviour within organizations and vice versa, and between the respective organizations. Toleration, trust, reciprocity, cooperation and compassion comprise a culture. When the women work with the public, they disseminate these experiences not only among their participants, but directly to society at large. Individual personal acts are

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underestimated in their value within a male-dominated framework, which focuses on public expressions for significant proofs for change to be pinpointed. It is, however, profoundly the opposite that is true. As such, these women form a major component to shaping the democratization process. Again, looking for intention to spread democratic ideas means very little when the activities, nonetheless, expand civil society. This was observed through the spreading of sometimes the most basic premises of democratic human interaction. While democracy is typically discussed in terms of how governments can foster and institute this framework, little is invested in the role of societal actors in determining what that might actually look like. Middle Eastern governments are mostly secular but they are authoritarian and the laws they apply to women are not secular. Their lip service to liberalization and democratization is seen by the masses as exactly that – lies. As well, a western-developed framework might not result as it is practiced in western countries – in most cases, it is practiced with a variety of shortcomings and failures. It is pertinent to recognize, thus, that the challenges ahead are not just in terms of how to democratize but to understand how this process is, indeed, already unfolding from the ground up, in its own way. A truly peaceful, egalitarian and transparent society cannot operate as such from any outside imposition and more clearly so as indigenous preferences are almost always sidelined for a western idealization of what progress means. Again, the development of democratic principles through civil society participation does not necessarily lead to the establishment of a democracy. Civil society expansion through the instituting of democratic principles and values and society’s overall betterment must not result in a decidedly democratic form of state governance. However, it is likely to lead to a more inclusive, transparent and tolerant society supportive and expectant of the same principles within the state. The state cannot operate as a democracy without a democratic culture. The more pertinent problem in the broader perspective of this discussion, however, is that in Egypt, as with many Middle Eastern states, democratic practice is seriously absent at the state level. Embracing the prospect that the sustainability of a strong civil society begins within the smallest units of the individual, family,

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networks and then groups within society may be difficult for most of us trained within political science especially. Most training has been rooted within traditional, purportedly ‘objective’, male-dominated methodologies and only recently have scholars begun to question such methods in explaining social and political phenomena, especially the obsession with politics exercised by state actors to the marginalization of the political effect of societal actors. As individuals, we really do behave and make choices that have public effects firstly by the way we think about the world and secondly how we act out our belief systems or how we behave with others on an individual level. It is at the nonmaterial or non-manifest level that we can learn a great deal about the roots of public conduct. How we have been produced by, maintain and influence thought provides great insight into what motivates and propels certain observable or ‘bodily’ acts. It is the non-material that shapes and manifests the material. Beyond the value of organizations, how we conduct ourselves with lovers, partners, friends and groups is of immense value in evaluating to what degree we have the capacities to build peaceful relations, trust, cooperate with and empower. Therefore, various seemingly personal expressions within the organizations are shaping civil society. The means of peaceful competition and attainment of leadership positions can be through voting or other manifestations of inclusive decision-making. The practice of shura3 is a case in point that has been debated in the literature as authentically democratic practice. I observe decision-making and self-expression. Further, I study participation within the respective PVOs and discuss their expansion, quantitatively. I argue that decision-making and self-expression occur at all levels within Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations to a large degree. Decisions made through consultation, voting, or consensus is practiced also to a wide extent. I further argue that while the rotation of leadership positions at the level of director remains minimal, participants gain leadership experiences through other leadership activities. Decision-making was observed through voting and through consensus. Majority voting was implemented as a policy in three of the five women’s Islamic PVOs. In two of the five women’s Islamic PVOs, the participants attested that decisions are never overridden. As a

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participant of the largest women’s Islamic PVO in Cairo verifies to me, ‘We have full democracy in our organization. We even choose leaders from among ourselves, democratically. As I already told you the board does not impose anything on us.’ In the other two PVOs, participants insisted that incidences had already taken place where the majority vote was put through even when the board was in complete opposition. However, in one of the latter two PVOs, I witnessed an incident where the founder changed a particular policy without calling for a vote. The founder, the only male founder of the ten PVOs, had stopped the PVO following up on its operation. I had overheard a discussion between the founder and director. The founder, concerned that this policy would eventually have a negative effect on donations, ended their debate stating, ‘Consider it an executive decision and tell the rest that they must abide by it’. Thus, not all issues came to a vote. Though in another Islamic PVO, the director did not have a problem with democracy as a principle she did not elaborate on it insofar the PVO itself was concerned. My observation of her interaction with staff was that it was rather authoritarian in practice. One Islamic PVO institutionalized the system of shura and one secular PVO implemented what was termed ‘decision-making through consensus’. Despite the choice of terminology the procedures of both were, nevertheless, similar. The Islamic PVO implements a centralized system of shura. Votes will be taken in this form of shura, but if the management disagrees with the majority vote the final decision will rest with the management. As one of the PVO’s participants elaborates: ‘The management also sometimes intervenes to show us something that we were not aware of. So if they override our decision we understand why they did that. We always reach a consensus anyway. Once we make a decision then everybody must follow.’ The same participant criticizes western democracy because she fears the possibility of being in opposition to the ‘majority opinion that may be wrong’. She explains that with shura one always ‘leaves the room convinced.’ Another participant begs to differ, quoting historical Islamic scholar, Al-Shafee: ‘My opinion is right but it might be wrong and my opponent’s opinion is wrong but might be right.’ She elaborates that her view of shura is ‘accepting the majority vote because I assume that I

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am wrong’. The secular PVO implementing consensus took this form of decision-making as a conscious decision. The director explains her reasoning: From the very start we have clear bylaws that we put for ourselves and that we are committed to. We agreed on consensus and not voting. We have to convince ourselves and agree on certain things. If even one does not agree it does not go through. We are very like-minded so even when one of us opposes something it has never posed any problems. One of the three Islamic PVOs implementing the voting strategy as a principle stood out from the rest in one important way. This PVO made it a top priority to consciously institutionalize the practice of democratic principles. The participants interviewed were sure I would not find another PVO in Cairo similar in terms of the importance given to inculcating democratic values in its participants, the majority of whom did not make up its core group but were university students. University students made up a large part of the unpaid voluntary force not considered to be part of the core membership in three of the ten PVOs. Of the four remaining secular PVOs in the case study, two said they had a voting scheme but did not seem to focus on it as anything exceptional. The other two did not consciously make it a goal to form a procedure of consensus or shura, but made decisions according to discussion, sometimes with just the board members, and at times with participants outside the core group. Despite any voting policy, of all ten PVOs, nine of the ten executive directors had either been appointed or were also the founder. Only in one example, which was a secular PVO, was a conscious system expressed where the position of director was rotated among its core membership at fixed intervals of two years. The positions that participants held demonstrated that some further form of hierarchy beyond the executive director and/or board members existed within all but one organization. This enabled several women within each organization to hold some kind of leadership position. Women, for example,

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held positions as manager of a specific project, thus supervising a group of participants working on a certain project. Some projects were designed for a specific aim and once the aim was achieved or deadline of the project met, the committee would be terminated. As such a new project did not necessarily entail that the previous project manager would be appointed. In this way, further leadership experiences were spread among the group, which in most cases meant participants from the core group of the organization. Peaceful competition was expressed by other means, as well. A participant of the largest Islamic PVO described how her branch competed against the other three branches: ‘All of us mostly know each other through our meetings. We meet and show each other what we have done so that we can compete. If you don’t compete you feel that your work is static. But if you see that others are doing something great you are motivated to do something great as well.’ When asked if the management requested opinions from the participants or if suggestions were made to the management and were, in fact, implemented, participants, especially among the Islamic PVOs, made their point very clearly that they always bring up new ideas. As one Islamic activist explains, ‘We do the various projects one after the other and any time the ladies have an idea, we start a new project . . . Anything that serves the society that is suggested becomes a project after we discuss it as a group.’ An Islamic activist from another PVO supports this assertion: ‘Sometimes people bring new activities that were not there before out of their own creative ability. We welcome any idea and talent as long as it is compatible with our objective.’ Four PVOs, two Islamic and two secular, asserted that the women they serve are asked what they wanted to learn and the activities (of the particular projects referred to by the respective PVOs) were tailored accordingly. A member of one Islamic PVO admitted that no one outside the membership, referring to the community, brought forward any ideas that had been implemented. Projects geared towards the poor, whether by secular or Islamic PVOs were all very similar as they addressed the same issues. In contrast to the women served who were of higher income levels and status, however, no PVO had asked poor women receiving such services for any input.

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As such, among most participants within the organizations, democratic practice was experienced in numerous ways. In limited cases, there was in fact not only an understanding but the conscious implementation of strategies that aimed to foster these experiences. Whether the intention was there or not, the women proved, nonetheless, to be fostering the principles of decision-making that enabled a wider pool of actors to gain experience and grow from it. What is particularly interesting in this process is the understanding of collective decision-making among several participants whereby a western notion of deciding was not prominent or simply not the desired method and instead a mechanism of decision-making grounded in a particular but notable discursive Islamic tradition was implemented. Whereas shura is debated as authentically democratic, one organization proved to consciously prefer the method intellectually and practically in its mission to provide pluralistic experiences among its members and spread the idea of greater inclusivity within the wider practices of society. The fear among secular intellectuals of a form of decisionmaking that is grounded in religious tradition is that it absorbs the discourse of the more literal leanings within the larger framework of Islam that could result in authoritarian modes of decision-making. My argument is that for authoritarian practices to govern any such organization, time is usually not wasted on any intellectual exercise by the more authoritarian elements of the leadership. Thus, the goal of implementing shura is a consciously chosen intellectual arena to convince those who are actually used to authoritarian practice to adopt more egalitarian practice. In such an endeavour, legitimacy of democratic practice might, in fact, best be placed within an Islamic discursive tradition because it garners legitimacy whereas the idea of democracy is misunderstood and viewed as something foreign. While one organization did exactly this, others followed the same example in practice without naming it as shura but rather as collective decision-making. What differentiated one PVO from the other Islamic PVOs was its stress on inculcation of principles of democracy in its western form at the practical level over the practice of shura as understood by mainstream Islamic scholars in the Middle Eastern world. For the (male) founder of this PVO, democracy is Islam. The founder, referred to as a

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modern Neo-Islamist,4 explained that ‘only if we establish democracy in Egypt can Islamic principles be adhered to among the population. First must come democracy detached from any tenets of Islam and then Islam will naturally come.’ This Islamic thinker’s methodology is not to work towards establishing an Islamic form of democracy, but a democracy as understood in the West, detached from any religion. No organization as a whole wished to establish a form of Islamic democracy. Even though a few participants thought it would be a good idea, most demonstrated little knowledge about what Neo-Islamists describe as an Islamic and democratic form of governance. Despite at least four women’s criticisms of western-type democracies, no member from within the leadership, or any participant who expressed a good understanding of this form of government, wished to see the practical implementation of an Islamic democracy in Egypt. And despite several highly positive appraisals of what interviews thought to be a democratic system in Iran, all women opposed this form of government in practice. They expressed the opinion that such a goal was either unattainable in Egypt because of widespread ignorance in religion, undesirable because of potential disharmony it might place between Egyptian Muslims and Copts, or undesirable because they feared the result would inevitably be oppression. The general view is summed up in this participant’s words: Islam and democracy? First democracy has to be given to women. Democracy institutionalizes equal rights. People interpret Islam the way they want and many forms of governing with Islam as its banner has already been attempted. So we know there are limits. Very serious problems can be created. The acknowledgement that democratic practice may differ from the conventional western definition is important for evaluating whether an expansion of civil society is occurring. These organizations, thus, illustrate that whether their activism is consciously influenced by broader discourses on democratic practice or grounded in an Islamic discursive tradition, they are nonetheless implementing strategies of decisionmaking that offer pluralistic experiences and more inclusiveness.

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Obviously, there will be authoritarian practice in these very organizations. The example from the previous chapter where the director of an Islamic PVO intervened in the interview by answering for the participant – and then stopped the interview, the director that I never saw who stopped the interview I held with a participant among a secular PVO, plus other examples of intervention by organizational leaders I observed, all provide indication that an authoritarian ethos does exist. Beyond my case study sample, I have had abundant opportunity over several years to observe democratic and authoritarian practice among the leaders in places where the guard was let down because I was not necessarily perceived as a researcher. As such, I ground my conclusions for my case study interviews in this wider experience and argue that despite authoritarianism at the state level and numerous institutions, all the way down to the family, there are numerous organizations and networks that do endeavour to be more inclusive. What is important to note is that although many participants may not fully understand a western-type democracy, the leaders implement strategies at the executive level to be more inclusive. They implement strategies at this level to be more pluralistic because of an acute understanding that authoritarianism exists with its negative repercussions – a situation that they can change. This I have found to be the case especially among women’s organizations, both secular and Islamic. Just as significantly, at the lower levels of these organizations women may not consciously be implementing strategies of inclusion but are practicing how to relate to each other and other organizations through principles that guide cooperation, trust, sharing and tolerating. While a western theory of democracy may be illusive – or, in fact, rejected – there was not a single participant who was unclear about principles and values that contribute to a better individual and a better society. As will be discussed later, altogether, such understanding and behaviour change the ethos or political culture of authoritarianism.

Organizational Growth and Civil Society Expansion In assessing if these organizations are contributing to an expansion of civil society in Egypt, I seek to learn if vertical and horizontal growth has resulted by asking about how the organizations began and how the

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organization has developed in terms of numbers of participants and if any additional activities can be listed since its formation. Pertinent to the discussion on participation, I address the issue of dedication to one’s mission or aim, despite little resources with which to finance activities in some cases or no pay at all, in respect to volunteerism. Quantitative evidence for the expansion of civil society is determined through the increasing numbers of organizations and the expansion of PVO size. Statistics and guestimates by leading academics on Egypt on the numbers of civil associations in Egypt demonstrate a steady growth. As discussed in Chapter Four, the figure tabulated for PVOs registered in 1991 was set at approximately 20,000 (Ibrahim 1996a: 237).5 This figure increased to 30,000 in 2001, according to unofficial statistics,6 revealing that they continue to be budding throughout the country. My estimation is that they currently amount to at least 30,000 with factors I considered and explained in the previous chapter. Clark confirms these numbers from similar sources and attests to a continued growth despite there currently being no precise data (Clark 2004: 50). No further numbers have been revealed officially to date. Moreover, Ibrahim and Singerman have clarified that registered associations make up only a fifth of the actually existing numbers. A continuous expansion within the individual organization is proven through my case study examples. This conclusion is based on the narrations of members on how they started functioning, the activities they offered, and follow-up on the continued growth with some of the organizations after the initial fieldwork listed in Table 6.1. All ten PVOs started off with fewer participants than at present. Many told the story behind the evolution of their PVO. At least six of the PVOs started out as a small group of women. The women usually knew each other from university or a particular circle of friends and found that they shared the same interests. They formed a group that worked towards meagre aims that later became registered and formed larger projects. The usual length of time my case study PVOs operated, at least loosely, before registration was two years. Networking is a feature of most organizational forms in the Arab world and is almost always a precursor to organizational forms that began by addressing immediate needs, which comprise the majority of existing organizations. Hence, a

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law punishing unregistered organizations further potentially impacts upon their growth in the early phases. One from my sample did not register until approximately 20 years after its initial formation. The beginning lifecycle of my sample PVOs is confirmed as typical for the thousands of Egyptian PVOs (see Ibrahim 1996a: 227–36). At least eight of the ten PVOs expected further growth of the organization. The director of one of the eight explained that expansion risked greater state scrutiny so steps were simultaneously taken within legal boundaries to conceal that that the organization is enlarging so quickly. Participants of other organizations detailed the new projects the PVO was about to begin. Examples for PVO size increase were the plan to move to a better building through sufficient funds, the building of an additional location, sufficient funds to begin a new project or the instance of one PVO’s predicament: ‘We now have a surplus of volunteers and we don’t know what to do with them all!’ One organization with an orphanage now has five separate places to host orphans and runs three clinics with a fourth opening early 2012, in addition to further projects, all of which is supported by participants whose numbers have mushroomed into literally the thousands across the country, illustrating a spill-over effect beyond Cairo. The director is extremely pleased with the exponential growth, but had to find strategies to deal with scrutiny under the Mubarak regime as a result. Directors of two secular PVOs, less optimistic in terms of their survival, claimed they faced problems of inadequate funding. In contrast, the funding of Islamic PVOs enabled them to resist government intervention under the Mubarak regime more resiliently than those that must rely on government assistance or western/northern donors. Their existence is furthermore less determined by foreign donors’ availability of funds. Bibars expressed concern as she stated that donors are beginning to pull out of Egypt.7 Another organization, ADEW, has proved to have extended its services to thousands more and has expanded upon its programmes already in place, such as through greater advocacy of women’s rights which has no doubt been an added voice to those petitioning against discriminatory laws, many of which have been addressed in the last few years. The law passed to allow citizenship to children whose fathers are non-Egyptian and

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mothers are Egyptian is credited to ADEW’s relentless efforts. As of 2007, ADEW has been able to help around 2,500 women acquire birth certificates in one of the areas the organization has concentrated activities, which means these women are able to access many rights previously denied them without an ID. In 2006, ADEW won the award for best research by the Forum for Development in the Middle East, which was a project entitled ‘The Role of Civil Society Institutions to Support Women’s Political Participation’. The Alliance for Arab Women has developed numerous projects now in more targeted areas. For example, in 2009 it began educating women about their role in water management, an increasing concern in Egypt; in 2009, it also helped women in the very poor district, Manshiet Nasser, in acquiring khula‘ in some necessary cases; starting in 2009, it helped women of FHH in another poor district, Qalubiya, to gain skills to feed their families; in 2008, it helped raise awareness and responsibility among the youth in Sinai as there has been concern about extremist tendencies; and in 2007, it focused on raising awareness of violence among both men and women in a few other poor districts. The Alliance for Arab Women continues to focus on laws and government policies; however, these projects illustrate that the Alliance has diversified its projects over time to address significant problems among the very poor. In terms of goals and objectives, I conclude that the organizations in my study strive to continue serving women out of dedication to their cause, despite projected difficulties. Their visions and strategies seem to be pulling them through with all the challenges they face, reflected in the growth of their organizational numbers, added projects, and proven abilities to diversify to address the most pressing needs all occurring at different levels. Participation, whether salaried or not, is an essential feature of civil society in poor contexts. If participation without pay were to be a marker of civil society, we would miss the actual growth. Due to the harsh economic situation, volunteerism has declined in Egypt. But while this is often used as one sign of regression in the value systems of civil society,8 my fieldwork demonstrates that the concept still remains and can be observed in practice in several forms. Firstly, a PVO is named a private voluntary organization, whether or not the staff or

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volunteers are salaried. This is particularly important to understand when interviewees repeatedly state that despite their work being paid, the effort and time they actually put into the PVO is much more in relation to any material benefit. Several of the women who received a salary for their participation argued that they saw their role as encompassing so much more and that they would not be able to do the good or khair they are doing without this sort of ‘help’ or support. Women of both organizational types described how they brought upon themselves several difficulties and hardships because of the amount of time they chose to take from their homes or work places to invest in the PVO. Not all their husbands or even friends could fully understand their dedication. Secondly, poverty is increasing and the unemployment situation for both men and women has worsened despite official statistics that economic prosperity is being felt. With this change, the face of volunteerism has also. Earlier works point out that those participating in Islamic work in particular are those from the middle class. My interviews with directors demonstrate that those who dedicate their time as PVO leaders are no longer from the lower-middle class. The middle class is now poor in Egypt. All directors of my sample were judged to be from the affluent class. All but two directors, who belonged to secular PVOs, had been educated either in western schools or western universities. This observation is supported by Ibrahim (1996a: 238). Bibars’ observations also support these findings: ‘People who run such organizations are really volunteering. You cannot volunteer unless you are sure that your children are eating at home. You have to be sure first that you have enough money to live’9 (interview with Iman Bibars, Cairo). She further explains that means for social mobility can virtually only be accomplished through a western education (ibid.). Thus, I conclude people who participate in a PVO in Egypt usually need some backing to carry on or participate in its activities. I learned that some of the salaried volunteers came from very poor economic circumstances. And while for some their participation within the PVO may have been influenced by a salary, all salaried volunteers nevertheless expressed a genuine love or duty for helping people in need. A salary makes volunteerism possible in the present economic reality.

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All directors and participants expressed a spirit of giving in one way or another. With a notable expansion among the vast majority of the organizations studied, illustrated through the numbers of participants and projects increasing, civil society is growing in Egypt.

Civility and Islamicity Vertical and horizontal growth of the women’s organizations, as evident, comprises a significant indicator for the growth of civil society in Egypt. Also of importance is the ‘civilizing’ effect on the participants through their participation and on society at large. Growth without an illustration of the nature of their contributions would not do justice to comprehending their actual political impact. Again, it is the ideas they hold that also matter and these can best be studied through their contributions. The study of their contributions to the breakdown of the principles of civility provides more evidence of their value to the development of civil society. Given a context of authoritarianism and poverty, their activities help in understanding how they attempt to deal with numerous challenges and what they accomplish along the way. For my assessment of civility, I examined value systems adhered to within the organizations and spread out to the public at large. I looked at the level of tolerance practiced and among civil acts, cooperation, trust, and reciprocity. While I looked at all PVOs from my case study, I gave particular attention to the Islamic organizations for this section, since the literature demonstrates bias against Islamic forms of organizations, and renders them, as a whole, ill-suited to the project of civil society. In addressing this issue in particular, I argue that Islamic PVOs demonstrate a high degree of civility and contribute to values within Egyptian civil society. To measure tolerance, I asked participants and directors of the Islamic PVOs whether all members of the respective organizations had to adhere to a specific ideology and if all women were required to be veiled. All asserted that no such code for either was placed on the organizational members. It was explained to me in at least two of these five PVOs that Islam was different to a specific ideology and that spreading a particular ideology was not at all in their interest. Two

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Islamic organizations claimed that Coptic Christians had previously volunteered within the PVOs. Therefore, they claimed that personal belief was a non-issue and did not pose any difficulties in way of volunteerism or cooperation. Therefore, I had to rely more heavily on my methodology of observation. An incidence of prejudice was exposed to me while I was conducting participant observation at the aforementioned PVO founded by a male. While updating himself through the director, he became clearly upset about an incident. A part-time supervisor who was training some of the leadership the previous day had taken the liberty to refuse a donation of gold10 from a philanthropist on the grounds that the donor was a Christian. The founder exclaimed: ‘If anything goes against the culture here you must let me know immediately. We are developing tolerance and cooperation here!’ Tolerance and cooperation were precisely my indices, and I was hearing that these indicators are strategically developed. I was in earshot of this utterance and it could be that the director wanted to make it explicitly clear that I could not make any conclusions contrary to the best picture possible to convey. However, having visited the organization several times I had enough assurances that he has made tolerance a priority. Moreover, the actual incident whereby a participant’s prejudice materialized and when exposed is ‘corrected’, in fact sternly, for her to practice tolerance and inclusivity, is indicative of the function of these organizations. Not only can they spread values of democratic practice through examples and through teaching. They can also act as corrective institutions so that when authoritarian behaviour does present itself – as it must – it is actually an opportunity for actions that work against civility to be stopped. Even though all organizations claimed that no particular ideology was imposed, the director of one Islamic PVO explained that providing services was in reality of secondary importance. Of primary importance was the propagation of ‘the right way in Islam’. This was accomplished through the services. A participant of the same organization explained how this worked: ‘The women must listen to a khutba (religious sermon) and then they receive their services. They must listen or else they don’t get it.’ It was not clear to me from talking to the

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participants and even recipients, though, if there was a specific ideology guiding the lessons, or at least that it differed drastically from that of the other organizations. The expression of love – khair through charity – was decidedly conditional. Giving was circumscribed by the objective of guiding to the subjection of a set of ideas. This approach was found only in one case study PVO. However, after studying Islamic organizations further overt instruction before providing charity or other forms of help is not the only way that preaching becomes part of the programme. As such, greater insight was gained into the fact that any organization categorized as Islamic will more likely than not keep in purview the pedagogic significance of its founding and existence. Most organizations do have a primary objective to spread Islam throughout society. These are not only those clinics and organizations that are established and run by Islamist members. These include those whose mission is to perform da‘wa as part of the good they do to achieve God’s blessings, as was explained to me. Some form of da‘wa is a part of mostly any Islamic institution. Da‘wa is akin to preaching as occurs among adherents to various religions whereby the da’ii (propagator) seeks to convert others over to her religion. In the case of these organizations, the da’ii rather focuses on Muslims who are seen as having gone astray or who need to practice their religion properly. The participants who make da‘wa their objective have been taught and usually believe that it is a religious duty to spread the word and call people back to the ‘straight path’. Part of any typical lesson on the performance of da‘wa is the reference to the Qur’anic verse: ‘Say, “this is my way: based on clear evidence, I, and all who follow me, call [people] to God – Glory be to God! – I do not join others with Him”’ (12:108). Those who propagate the Islamic religion are not necessarily doing so under a particular Islamist banner or ideology. Because many of the women at the leadership or strategy level of the Islamic organizations believe it is a part of the religion to steer women and society towards the ‘right way’, as understood to be a Qur’anic command and supported by several hadith, da‘wa will often be part of the programmes at the Islamic women’s organizations. It makes

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no difference whether one is decidedly Islamist or simply an Islamic activist although I have been told by some within the leadership of Islamist groupings that there is a big difference. The difference will be on the interpretation of that ‘straight path’. There will be many paths that are ‘straight’, including the narrowing and the broadening, the illiberalizing and liberalizing. Subtle strategies further include simply announcing to women who benefit from the services offered that classes are available at the same location. This practice applies particularly to those organizations that are attached to mosques as these mosques hold lessons in Qur’an memorization and tajweed either by those who run the organizations or, as in most cases, by regular teachers whose classes will be recommended. While they might be recommended without pressure, a common strategy is to ‘inculcate’ capacities among the beneficiaries to want to deepen their knowledge about the Qur’an. As the receivers of charity are Muslim, it is not difficult to convince them that they need to learn more as this capacity is already there to be worked upon. Learning the Qur’an does not involve only memorization. Within many of the halakas, an explanation follows for each section of the Qur’an that is memorized. It is within these interpretations of the text that specific ideologies are introduced and meanings are constructed, which, again, could be liberal but also conservative. It is usually not that simplistic, though. ‘Liberal’ could involve telling a woman whose husband has eloped with another woman that it is lawful and that she should sacrifice her desire to have him all to herself and ‘conservative’ in that she is reminded that she should observe a version of the veil that covers her face. I sat in on a halaka where the woman was blamed for her husband marrying another woman because she did not observe the wearing of hijab (in her everyday life outside the group). Conservative standards are typically applied to women and liberal to men. What is important to recognize is the political power of these places for learning in developing the individual to appreciate and want what is presented as ‘good’, and as such, through meaning making, what is, in fact, ‘civil’. While I have used printed material to study the specific leanings among some of these lessons, I have also learned from first-hand

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experience that the more politically-oriented lessons do not necessarily follow the teachings within the material distributed. In fact, the material could be used to show any interested state official what they are supposed to be learning. Some halakas reveal that what is said is sometimes very different to what is on paper, and intentionally so. However, I did not find that they differed much from the other organizations in terms of the content, only that at higher levels it was decided that some more sensitive issues, such as Palestine, would be the subject of discussion. Such topics were taken up at the initiatives of lesson leaders or participants of the other organizations. Some classes offer only memorizing. These are still, however, highly political in that the women sit together after their memorization classes and ask questions or simply talk. To elongate this ‘unplanned’ or ‘non-official’ part of the gathering, sometimes tea is offered, and depending on the occasion, dates and sometimes a meal. It is precisely within casual conversations that some of the halaka leaders make sure to pass on their worldview and refute any ideas which go against their interpretations and beliefs. The significance of such training and developing of the capacities of these women is to establish a society based on a set of principles that each Islamic organization deems contributes to the betterment of the whole. The idea among some of the organizations is that women become honed as better instruments for the betterment and purifying of society when they themselves are bettered and purified. Betterment and purification include various ‘civilizing’ training, such as desisting from wrongful behaviour (i.e. smoking, swearing, lying, backbiting, displaying anger) so that the subject has a ‘good’ comportment (see similar findings by Mahmood 2004). A woman who is ‘civilized’ through the inculcation and absorption of certain guiding and existential principles then has the capacity to ‘civilize’ her family and her society. All participants and directors verified that the veil is not a condition of participation in the PVO. However, in only one organization did I see one member unveiled and she was, moreover, not part of the core group. All other participants at least conformed to the code for Islamic dress established by the Egyptian Ulama. In some cases,

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women took more steps in covering, for instance, by wearing the khimar that reaches from the head past the waist. At one PVO, the vast majority of participants were dressed in the khimar, even though the director, a well-known Islamic scholar appearing regularly on Egyptian television, wore only the hijab. Some informants (in khimar) held that not wearing this long khimar indicated looseness in morality. What was clear, however, was that the wearing of the scarf was an identifier for true Islamic activism. While participants verified that the management did not make the veil mandatory, pressures from the group would be likely. As one director put it: ‘We tell them if you enter the mosque you must wear the hijab, otherwise you are free to do what you wish. And Allah will account everything anyhow.’ She confirmed, however, that there were women participating in the PVO who did not wear the hijab. Covering, I conclude, is equated by these PVOs as a pillar of Islam,11 practically speaking. Not wearing the veil is signalled as non-practicing, if not secular. Within meaning-making, Islam is here interpreted as advocating an exacting stance on veiling (within these halakas usually the face is uncovered). Masculine and particularly feminine codes of conduct are elevated, thus, to the level of core beliefs. The bodies of women have become a more concentrated area for Islamic discourse in Egypt, in general, and ‘practicing’ means the ability to incorporate such outward expression equally as to perform core rituals, such as fasting in Ramadan or core practices, such as the daily five prayers, as obligatory acts of worship. With such importance attached, I did not categorize hijab wearing women as necessarily ‘pious’,12 but conclude that for these organizations it forms the most essential ingredient to forming a pious identity and marker of those who might have greater capacity for ‘civilizing’. In her study on Moroccan women’s self-fashioning, Christiansen uses Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of self’ to refer to the process in which women in Islamic lectures build or forge the self. In a building of the self, these strategies or technologies permit ‘individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being. Such is to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state

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of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (Foucault quoted in Christiansen 2003: 152). As Christiansen argues, like any other type of technology (i.e. technology of production), these technologies result in the shaping of the individual and the acquisition of skills (ibid.; see also Mahmood 2004). Hence, submitting oneself to a notion, such as seeking closeness to Allah by producing specific acts of love and submission, carries great weight in the collective psyche of what produces a virtuous self as a means to struggle on the straight path. The various expressions of submission or love to God that Islamic activists practice, such as the wearing of hijab, are enabled through a worldview in which the subject accepts and confirms what is ‘right’ at possibly both a conscious and unconscious level. A particular dress code thus is defined in terms of what is not only right but a core method of expressing Islamicity. The dress code defines the practicing in relation to the non-practicing, secular, or a part of the dichotomies developed within the dominant tradition of discourse, perhaps even pro-western, connoting a number of unIslamic and negative qualities. What is ‘right’ or ‘virtuous’ is already defined by a scholarship situated as ‘Islamic’ through a long Islamic discursive tradition. In the case of Egypt, in addition, that tradition has been formulated to be conservative-leaning. Nonetheless, nonconformity to the dress code had neither bearing on the receipt of services, nor provoked unfriendly demeanour towards the recipients, a finding substantiated by Clark’s (2004) study of Islamic clinics in Cairo. Though the majority of women receiving services did wear some sort of a hijab, several further did not conform to the dress code, by, for instance, wearing a ta’seebah. This was viewed merely as a remnant of tradition, but not a sign of immorality. Such women needed to be educated in their religion and the usual reason of poverty, which led them to the organization, was seen as an opportunity to educate them about their religion. In this perspective, a sense of moral obligation to guide these women to a better understanding of their religion and to better their circumstances in all possible ways enabled tolerance. There are further examples of the achievement of tolerance and better understanding of the other through cooperation between PVOs

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of different ideologies. Of the five Islamic PVOs, all stated that they coordinate work efforts with at least one other organization. Two stated that they coordinate work together with Coptic and secular organizations. A PVO member said that its organization had been ‘chosen’ by Mrs Mubarak’s organization, the National Council for Women. Another interviewee explained that this intervention on part of this ‘arm of the’ government had allowed their work to distract from poverty as the real issue.13 A ‘secular’ expert I consulted held the opinion it was a means by which the Mubarak government could monitor the organizations more closely. Indeed, this is a typical strategy authoritarian governments use to monitor and control organizations. Not only this Islamic women’s organization but other secular feminist organizations became absorbed into such monitoring scheme under the name of ‘cooperation’. Cooperation – as an important component within the indicators used to assess democratic practice – can also be seen in the relationship between PVOs and government. As far as I could ascertain, none of the Islamic organizations viewed their work as a threat to government. In fact, I learned from two Islamic PVOs that they saw the work they carried out as aiding government in its burden. The view was also expressed that that the organizations did a better job. Certainly, other studies have confirmed that the government also needs Islamic organizations to function as welfare providers because of its withdrawal from that responsibility (see Clark 2004). From non-case study examples, however, I have developed an understanding that some leaders see their activism as a means of gaining popularity and making links with those who opposed the Mubarak government. While their work may not have been a direct threat, the owners and directors did at times view their work as a means to establishing a base to add to a growing force opposing repressive government laws and policies. Such individuals wanted the Mubarak government out and wanted to position themselves in a way that they are able to do the work of government as a civil society worker, and later perform in a political position. They view their work as overtly political. Cooperation was, furthermore, observed within the organizations through the roles each played. In a secular PVO, each member of the

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core group had a unique role that was not played by any other of the core members. Therefore, each trusts and relies on the others to fulfil their parts. All three programmes for credit or loans14 (see Table 6.1) required that a group of women guaranteed each other. Thus, cooperation involved the mixed elements of trust, cooperation and consolidation. These programmes are continuously expanding the numbers of women who participate in them. The Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW) alone has already reached thousands of women. Cooperation could not exist without a high level of trust between the participants within the respective PVOs and trust between participants and the population at large. Beyond trust illustrated through the loans schemes, donations would not be freely given were there insufficient trust between the donor and the recipient that the money would go to the stated cause. Another example of trust between donor and PVO was exemplified in the example given in Chapter Four, when the director displayed faith in my intentions by providing me with her bank account number for transferral of funds from abroad, despite the harsh consequences other organizations faced for alleged acceptance of foreign funds. As Ibrahim (1996a: 241) confirmed in his study, ‘Trust is a key variable in generating money for community development schemes’. Both cooperation and tolerance were observed in the way the women of my study sample viewed dealing with men through their volunteerism. All organizations except one, an Islamic PVO, stated that they either had men participating in the PVO itself or extend their services to men in some projects. The one exception reasoned: ‘No, we have never invited the husbands. We only deal with women. She is the one who can reform the house.’ But, more exemplary of the other PVOs, another Islamic PVO explained: Women only? No, we are an example. Women can do a lot for their society. We even have men working with us and we all integrate each others’ efforts. It is called a women’s organization [referring to ‘women’ in the PVO name] but underneath the board many men help us. We are just a group of women who

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are providing an example. We are not doing something that is exclusively for women. We all participate together. Though I never saw a man in the above PVO I did on visits to five PVOs, three secular and two Islamic. Nonetheless, several examples of cooperation with men were given to me within the nine PVOs. Participants provided numerous examples of sharing between organizations, illustrating both a high level of cooperation between organizations and the development of an ethos of giving and receiving. Reciprocity was developed as one PVO member asserts: ‘We are giving and at the same time receiving. Experiences are assets.’ In one of these organizations, women would make it a point to meet regularly with another organization to learn from its experiences and failures and hear advice. This organization and another from the case study would also share between other organizations for each to better its performance and best achieve goals. The women, however, provided more examples of the sharing of items in kind. Some had a surplus of

Figure 5.1 A photograph taken during the researcher’s visit to a literacy class offered by CEWLA, a ‘secular’ organization in the random area of Bulak, Cairo. Note a male student to the left. The teacher stands to the far right.

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items that another could use and would benefit from the items that other organization could afford to give. Within the organizations themselves, women found precious opportunity to share challenges they were going through in the home and seek advice. The organization thus served as a place where women could gain experiences and insights that they would otherwise lack from staying at home. Thus, reciprocity is observed on the material, mental and emotional levels.

Conclusions This analysis shows that Islamic women’s organizations cannot be placed hierarchically below the secular women’s organizations in their contribution to democratic practices and the various values. Participating in these civil organizations, these women cultivate experiences that advance pluralistic and cooperative ways of decisionmaking. They foster ‘civility’, which encompasses tolerance, cooperation, trust, and reciprocity. It may seem that some of the actions will not significantly contribute to these values but I argue that, given the context of authoritarianism, these have immense value. From the discussion, some acts may not be consequential to the development of civility as expected through a liberal paradigm. I will remind the reader that enormous emphasis is placed on defining Islamic practice with the submission to bodily display, significantly covering with the headscarf. Most of the participants and attendees accepted and embodied the idea that it is in fact a signifier of being on the ‘right path’ and, hence, they desire to express Islamicity by adopting the scarf. While the scarf is simultaneously probably the greatest political marker over women’s bodies to signify compliance to an authority that seeks to secure the existence of the veil in the public, it cannot be used to argue this expression of Islamicity or the success of Islamization indicates the women who are veiled are ill-suited to develop civil values. The hijab comprises one practice among many others that are deemed to produce a ‘civilizing’ self, which then has a ‘civilizing’ capacity. Most important for an evaluation is understanding that many organizations in an authoritarian environment will suffer in some ways from a larger

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political culture but contribute to development by often making incremental change through their practices of inclusion, tolerance, cooperation and acts of reciprocity. Hence, civil society expansion is dependent on a healthy level of participation and civility of such organizations. There can be no expectation of perfection according to ideals that do no exist in the West either. As will be described in the next chapter, it is, moreover, the ‘empowering’ results of such activisms which must be understood within the context of poverty and illiteracy as the main oppressive structures. I argue that both organizational types exhibit a wide range of activities that serve to expand civil society in Egypt. Consequently, I maintain they are equally politically significant to a democratization process that invests upon rooting democratic principles and ‘civilizing’ capacities within society. In a broader view, this illustration allows for a differentiated understanding of the kinds of politics happening in Egypt that I argue are significant because they will be enduring, despite the massive changes through the dismantling of the Mubarak regime, as focused on at the state level.

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CHAPTER 6 EMPOWER MENT THROUGH THE FEMININE AND STR ATEGIC

Introduction This chapter uncovers the multiple ways in which women become empowered through both practical or female-oriented activism and strategic activism. In order to uncover the various manifestations of empowerment I move beyond the mainly male-theorized dichotomization of power – the resistance or compliance framework, adopted without little analytical thought by feminists and routinely applied to women’s struggles. I necessarily place women’s modalities of agency in a broader framework of power relations. As the problems facing women in a context such as Egypt’s have been many and varied, it is important that the emphasis is not on women’s status relative to men or the state. These will not be the critical areas for contention or desire for change to be expressed. Rather, their actions provide much more meaning if one looks at the redistribution of power as occurring within society by investing in contemplating the advantages women actually bring to the exercise of the political through the capacity of the feminine. Women initiate a process of empowerment in their own lives when they realize that they are not powerless and identify the forces that oppress them in their most mundane tasks and basic ability to live the

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‘good’ life. Civil society expansion occurs when women recognize these forces and begin to initiate ways in order to improve conditions and secure the ‘good’ life for themselves and the people they care for. Power takes on new meaning in the lives of these women and those they affect when they exercise power through both masculine and feminine capacities as resides in each woman, with what I argue will usually encompass greater capacity for the expression of the feminine as it often manifests through practical-oriented activities. If one is looking for clues as to the developments behind Egypt’s regime change and the same process occurring through the Middle East, one cannot be fixated on the mostly masculine expressions of power as within the state or the protest movements. As such, I argue it is pertinent that the ‘political’ is broadened to acknowledge the value of the feminine capacities to the change. I seek to achieve this appreciation through the study of how these capacities contribute to the expansion of civil society here specifically through the process of empowerment. Power, hence, will not be presented here merely in its form as ‘power over’, which is typically the masculinely-expressed dominating, coercive force with which power has become synonymous. To gain a better understanding of the various ways in which the women of this study contribute to empowerment, I seek to identify their activism in more ways. As detailed previously in my methodology section, I study a ‘power to’, which is a generative or productive power; ‘power with’, which involves the working together to achieve something and sense of greater power to do so; and ‘power from within’, as a spiritual strength and uniqueness that comes from within. I add ‘power for’ as a necessary ingredient for the evaluation of changes in power relations and power exercised throughout society, in referring to the power one generates to help others. This forms a key component of any service or charity organization. Based on the findings presented in Chapter Five on participation and civility and the findings I discuss on empowerment in this chapter, I proceed with a comparison between the two organizational types in the context of their contributions to civility while focusing on their empowering effects. I analyze the values that motivate women’s participation and the values thereby disseminated. Can a feminine or

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practical and strategic distinction be made between Egyptian women’s Islamic and secular feminist organizations? Applying a theoretical distinction made between practical/feminine and strategic-oriented struggles, I argue that neither women’s Islamic nor secular feminist organizations can fit into this taxonomy as has been assumed in much of the literature for those organizations that do not direct their activities towards the state and those that do. My data finds clear evidence that secular feminist and Islamic women’s organizations cannot be distinguished in a dichotomy as political and apolitical and that strategic and practical/feminine concerns and goals cannot be neatly separated and accorded to either organizational type. A dichotomy dividing one from the other as political because it is assumed to involve primarily rights-based struggle against government is disproved. The struggles of both are shaped by mostly the same oppressive impediments they seek to overcome. As a consequence, both clearly illustrate similar activities, with secular feminists choosing appropriate ways to sometimes take the risk and address government policies head on that Islamic women’s organizations do not. As the activities serve to broaden civil society – not only through high levels of participation and the extending of democratic principles, but through a indispensible empowerment process – both organizational types are equally political.

The Basics of Empowerment They do not have anything. What I mean by ‘anything’ – they are on the average much sicker than middle- or upper-class women. They are illiterate and they are ignorant. They are ignorant about how to live. So, you have to teach them how to live in a healthy and clean place. We go to their homes. We teach them how their faces should be cleaned and that of their children, even how to wash tomatoes – the ABCs of life. (interviewee) Rights-based activism is only one part to the empowerment of women in the developing world and means little for women whose greatest concern is poverty. Thus, how the organizations of this study contribute to

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the expansion of civil society is not only about pushing for certain laws or educating women about their rights in relation to laws or men, but through the teaching of basic skills in life. For the very poor women to become empowered in these senses, empowerment must begin with the ability of these poor women to live life in a healthy way, put food on the table, and learn ways and skills to make the best of their situation. Such may sound mundane and has routinely been viewed as tangential to political scientists looking for dramatic displays of power on part of activists. But both Islamic and secular PVOs are fully aware of this bitter reality that governs and directs where they will work to give power to the people. The context that determines such an empowerment process can be best understood through an illustration of the concerns and, hence, the activism around such concerns. When I asked the 33 interviewees what they thought was the greatest challenge facing Egyptian women, the overwhelming majority of participants determined that illiteracy was the most pressing problem. The ability to read and write is something that we take for granted because it forms the ABCs of life. Imagine what it would be like to need to rely on your child, who was fortunate to start going to school to begin with and is just beginning to read. Some of the recipients of literacy programmes expressed deep pride that their children were able to read but embarrassment that they had to ask their children to tell them what a sign said, and especially in the street. Hence, not only is not being able to read a logistical problem; it can cause serious low self-esteem which can potentially affect all areas of one’s life. This most pressing problem facing women in Egypt today has other serious consequences, too. One of the women I got to know within the village I stayed in filled me in on her life with numerous stories. Unfortunately, as dramatic as they all were, hers did not differ too much from those of some other women who faced the same conditions because of their gender and illiteracy. Hoda (not her real name), although rather inclined to starting regular bouts of arguments with someone, was an excitable and fun-loving person. Although missing several teeth, she was beautiful for her age and had a voluptuous shape. She had just entered into her fourth marriage. The two previous

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marriages were disasters, as she narrated. She fondly related stories about her first husband who she married when she was in her late teens. They met, fell in love, and soon were blissfully together. Their love grew but a few years had passed and she had not become pregnant. Since this is a matter that concerns the extended families, and particularly the man’s family, a solution had to be sought. His mother decided that he should divorce Hoda to marry someone with whom he could have children. As a divorcee, Hoda felt she had to marry a married man, and so she married a businessman from the Arab Gulf who came often to Egypt. Since this was akin to a misyar marriage, the man was glad that she could not have children. Soon, Hoda hit her head in an accident and she was taken to hospital. The doctor told her that she needed to be operated on immediately or else she would completely lose the sight in one of her eyes. The doctor then told her that there was only one complication in regard to the operation she was about to undergo. She was also pregnant and would need to know that she would lose the baby with the operation. Hoda related that that was such wonderful news that she quickly answered that she did not care about her eye if she could have a baby. After all, she thought it was impossible for her to bear children, and she did not know if this might be the only chance in life she would get to become a mother. It wasn’t – it was not Hoda who could not bear children, but in more cases I knew of in the sha‘bi areas it is often considered to be the woman’s fault and no medical checks are usually done. The news that she was expecting a baby was bad news for the husband. He already had a family and did not wish to have any children with her. He demanded that she have an abortion; she refused. A few months later, he returned and told her about a lovely large villa he would purchase for her and the child in Egypt. He presented her with the papers that she needed to sign. She was illiterate, so he explained the text and pointed to where she could just place her signature. She signed. Her marriage was over. The papers were divorce papers. Hoda’s experience is not an isolated occurrence in the broader perspective of the various ways in which women suffer oppression and discrimination because of their disadvantages. Such occurrences are symptomatic of deep-seated ideas about women but compounded

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by the inability among the vast majority of these women in sha‘bi areas specifically to read. However, it is not just illiteracy that leads to Hoda’s oppression; it was also her relative poverty and naivety, as in when she was blamed in her first marriage for not bearing a child. Many of the women interviewed insisted that the answer to my question should not list only one issue as many problems concerning women’s welfare were faced in their struggles and because the problems are interrelated. Next to illiteracy was ignorance and poverty. These were the primary concerns of women of both organizational types. Ignorance included lack of education in matters having to do with laws that govern women’s lives or how and where to find useful agencies and institutions. Ignorance was stated in relation to women not knowing where to go or what to do if they were being divorced. However, ignorance mostly consisted of lack of understanding among the women in how to take care of their children, look out for indicators of learning difficulties or recognize if their children are mentally or physically handicapped, what typical symptoms of illnesses in their children may look like, what safety means for the children and themselves, what kind of discipline may be helpful or considered abuse, what it means to be physically abused, what healthy food and nutrition is, or what basic hygiene entails. Poverty is identified as one of the major concerns despite statistics obscuring the degree of struggle and oppression. Importantly, what emerged from this question was that, while illiteracy was top of the list, one cannot look at it as an isolated variable because the problems the participants faced in trying to help disadvantaged women were that more variables contributed to an overall unhealthy situation for women. What also became evident to me was that an equal number of participants across both organizational categories attested to the same problems they thought were priorities. Only four participants – again equal numbers across both organizations (two of Islamic and two of secular PVOs) – stated that the challenge was for women to prove themselves to be capable human beings as men did not take their views, opinions, or capabilities seriously. It is significant to note that oppression experienced by men is listed by only 8 per cent of the women interviewed as most significant. When

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compared with the percentage of women who stated the variables of illiteracy, ignorance and poverty as priority, the variable of men essentially fell to four. Put another way, roughly 85 per cent of the participants in both Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations listed these three forces as most serious. These participants altogether arguably offer the most professional assessment of the oppressive sources women face in Egypt. I find it useful to lay out these oppressive forces in such order because the western feminist literature homes in on the issue of men and patriarchy to the neglect of illiteracy, ignorance and poverty. Only one respondent claimed rights-based struggle in terms of laws was the most important issue. At least five women, mostly from Islamic PVOs, insisted that laws were the last issue on the agenda. Obviously, the problem of ignorance also entails the need for rightsbased knowledge. In view of the participants insisting on being careful not to separate the variables, it should also be emphasized that the oppressive forces of unfair laws, policies and patriarchal treatment by men (and often women) is not a small problem. Indeed, it is an endemic problem and from my observations often a root problem for the outcome of illiteracy, ignorance and poverty. As characteristic of root problems concerning practice in any society, the behaviour is learned and observed in childhood. For example, near to the sha‘bi area I stayed, one of the families I learned of among the fallaheen, who had two boys and two girls, sent the boys to school beyond primary school and kept the girls at home ‘because the man must take care of his family and the woman stays at home’, as was explained to me. Today, the women do not stay at home, and they cannot afford to, yet this was the rationale. There were more examples I familiarized myself with as I learned about cases in which the sons were sent to university and the girls not where money was scarce and the cost of travel and books would be too burdensome (unaffordable even with university subsidies). I learned from a family member of one of the families that the parents fed the boys the scarcely available meat and hid that knowledge from the girls. The explanation I received upon enquiry into this practice was a rationale that the parents simply wished to ensure that the boys would grow into strong men so that

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they could take adequate care of their future families. Indeed, within the sha‘bi area, I have also witnessed on more than one occasion the display of sadness or even utter desperation upon receiving the news that yet another girl is born in a family that has no boys. It is, thus, not unheard of in these areas to find that a newborn baby boy has been wrapped in pink or even had its ears pierced for fear of people’s envy that the family has had yet another boy. These are really only a few examples for illustration, as everyday practice of discrimination between boys and girls is often not discreet in these areas. Although the vast majority of participants argued for the recognition of illiteracy and poverty as major forces that served to oppress women, it can be seen from their activism that they do not neglect the multivariate ways in which women are simultaneously marginalized. Table 6.1 details the activities of the organizations. As can be seen from Table 6.1, several approaches are followed in these PVOs’ struggle against the various sources of marginalization and oppression. One approach is lobbying against laws that oppress women. Several secular organizations in Egypt had been working towards the elimination of a law that acquitted a rapist by marrying him to the victim. Two of the above secular organizations played a role in the long process. Four of the secular PVOs in my sample ardently lobbied for the transferral of citizenship to children born to Egyptian mothers married to non-Egyptians and their efforts have now paid off. The same concern was expressed in two of the Islamic PVOs, but no organized effort was put in place to lobby against this discriminatory law. None of the Islamic women’s PVOs have taken up rightsbased activism to date as any main objective listed in their mission statements, except for women within the Women Memory Forum, although theoretically categorized here as a secular organization, who used Islamic feminist approaches to women’s marginalization through studying the scripts from a consciousness that interpretations have been male-dominated. The activism of women in both organizational types also aims to address oppressive forces that are not particular to women. The feminist PVOs especially would at times lobby against laws discriminating against marginalized sectors of both men and women. In the context of

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Alliance for Arab Women (secular PVO)

ADEW (secular PVO)

2

3

14

14

CEWLA (secular PVO) 6

Years Registered

1

Name of PVO

Table 6.1 PVO projects

40 (27 salaried)

30 (15 salaried)

27 (27 salaried)

Core Membership

– donors

– donors

– donors

Funding

– awareness conferences – credit – empowerment of FHH – health awareness – legal assistance – literacy classes – networking (local/intl) – newsletter – research/statistics – seminars

– awareness conferences – networking – seminars

– awareness – legal assistance – literacy classes – lobbying against laws – seminars

Activities

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Continued

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Women Memory Forum

NWRC (secular PVO)

N/A (Islamic PVO)

4

5

6

Name of PVO

Table 6.1

150 (8 salaried)

– donations – awareness (+ in kind) – counselling services – income generating – empowerment and development of activities the mentally handicapped – zakah – halakas – health care and health awareness – job-skills training – literacy classes – loans – research and statistics – seminars

– awareness conferences – lobbying against laws – networking (local/intl) – newsletter – research/statistics – seminars

– awareness conferences – analyzing Scripts and narrations from gender perspective – rewriting of texts/folklore with gender perspective – newsletter – research

Activities

WOMEN

11

– donors

– donors

Funding

AND

20 (5 salaried)

7 (7 semi-salaried)

Core Membership

CIVIL SOCIETY

17

5

Years Registered

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N/A (Islamic PVO)

9

7

2

2

28

60 (0 salaried)

40 (4 salaried)

16 (12 salaried)

25 (16 salaried)

– daycare – elderly housing – health care and health awareness – literacy classes – orphanage (boys)

– income-generating activities – zakah

– charity – counselling services – halakas – health care and health awareness – job-skills training – literacy classes – loans

– donations – computer instruction (+ in kind) – income generating – orphanage (girls) activities – zakah – zakah – halakas – job-skills training – literacy classes – networking (local/Middle East) – newsletter/magazine – research and statistics – seminars

– donations – zakah

THROUGH THE

Zakah Committee – Salah al-Din Mosque (Islamic PVO)

N/A (Islamic PVO)

8

10

N/A (Islamic PVO)

7

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Egypt, many problems women face are also experienced by men, and to improve women’s conditions will, thus, require that the problems are tackled in a holistic perspective of family members being attached to one another. The issue for many of these organizations identified is that because state repression or poverty are major forces to contend with, it is often futile to focus on issues of inequality between men and women without a broader perspective for understanding why discrimination might be continued. For example, the choice some families have made in the sha‘b areas to send the boys to university and not the girls is related to severe economic restraints and, hence, the actual observable outcome of discriminating against the girls cannot be tackled as an independent variable.1 One PVO leader explains regarding Law 32 from 1964, ‘We have worked very hard to change the law. We lobbied, held discourses, and had public hearing with the government.’ A small percentage of organizations had been pressuring the Mubarak regime for greater democratization through petitioning for the elimination of state laws that discriminate. They are successful because, despite disappointments along the way, a gradual change of laws has been, nonetheless, a result of their struggles. A great number of changes occurred in the laws between 2004 and 2011. This period saw changes in laws due to the past decades of struggle with setbacks and disappointments. As Ibrahim had argued for the Mubarak era, margins of freedoms are occurring partly because of the resourcefulness of people in negotiating state powers (Ibrahim 1996a: 254). Problems identified are not just discriminatory laws in Egypt but the practical obstacles in place that bar women from accessing their rights. In fact, access to the rights protected by laws continues to be a severe problem. For example, pensions can be hindered by the absence of identity cards and birth, marriage, and divorce certificates. As a few secular feminist PVOs explained, sometimes the women do not even know their last name to obtain any identification. All rights as citizens are denied without an identity card. ADEW was the first PVO in Egypt to address this issue and has since granted thousands of ID cards to women. Specifically addressing the obstacles that obstruct women from pulling themselves out of economic marginalization is identified as a

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significant means for the empowerment of women. The documentation services and legal advice, which two secular PVOs of my study extend to women who do not have certificates or ID cards, are a principal means of enabling more economic freedom. Women are enabled to apply for jobs or credit, for example. But this is only a partial step towards the empowerment of poor women. They continue to face economic hardship and this is a major concern identified in all the organizations interviewed. Yet, as Anne Phillips (2007), among many others, points out, western feminism neglects the primacy of economic hardship faced by the majority of women. Because many of the organizations found that the issues of marginalization and inequality have multiple sources and causes, they have had to devise strategies that can truly sustain an empowerment process among the women who use their services. Most of the women who they try to help still do not have the skills necessary to attain a rewarding job or one that can meet the demands of the household to any reasonable degree. Consequently, the programmes that several of my case study samples implemented focused on elevating the status of women by several means and through several stages. What is also interesting to identify in this comprehensive approach is the appreciation of the feminine aspects that the organizations embrace and develop for the practical outcome of empowerment. As one Islamic PVO describes: ‘Literacy is the start; then intellectual development, professional development, and comprehensive development.’ A participant of another Islamic PVO describes its approach: We form what is called ‘producing families’. We bring those women [enrolled in the literacy programme] in and teach them to sew – how to be productive. We improve their income by teaching them to share in the production of something by having them work on a production line to sew clothes for poor people and school uniforms for children at the schools in their district and as presents for the two feasts . . . It is a way they all work together so that they gain a feeling of dignity, that they are accomplishing something good and that they are human beings . . . We start the day with a talk about how to give good

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nutrition to their children, how to have better thoughts about themselves, how to make the best of the little money they have. A holistic approach to the enhancement of poor women is crucial for actual and sustainable political change. These programmes are effective because the participants study where the women are at along a scale of personal development and accordingly tailor the programme to get a woman from place A to B, not A to Z. Thus, it is important that for an empowerment process to be observed and accounted, classifications of where women are supposed to be, for example, in terms of their status in relation to men are, at least temporarily, done away with. For example, the role of literacy education in the empowerment of women has been thoroughly studied and proved to be highly effective. However, even literacy cannot empower on its own, and that is because of the severity of disempowerment a woman may be suffering along a scale of disempowerment. I learned from three PVOs, two Islamic and one secular, that the very poor often do not see any benefit in learning. I will stress that three organizations out of the ten is not a small number for this finding. Moreover, these findings are supported by K.R. Kamphoefner’s (1998: 90–98) study on poor women in Cairo. Many of the illiterate women of her sample said that given their extreme economic situations learning to read ‘had no immediate practical use’ (ibid.: 94). Asserting that literacy classes did not address the spheres felt important by these women, Kamphoefner raises the question of whether these poor illiterate women can actually become empowered through education (ibid.: 105). I insist that despite several difficulties faced in receiving an education among these women, they do become empowered. Empowerment must be developed through other means sometimes more immediately, for example, with the provision of food. However, because education will then get them from B onwards along a scale of means of empowerment, literacy does need to be a part of a holistic approach. I illustrate this assertion through the testimonies I gathered from them and members of various PVOs. The PVO must find means to get them to learn. A participant of an Islamic PVO comments:

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To teach them is very difficult because they don’t want to learn. They have other things to do. They have to sell bread, lemons, etc. or they are working. Some are maids, for example. So, you have to tell them that it is very important to come to learn. So, we decided to give them money to come. But some still don’t come even with money offered because they get too tired from learning. They believe they can’t learn. So, to make them learn you have to counsel them and share with their problems, because these women like to have somebody listen to their problems. Within the three PVOs offering credit or loans, women are taught sufficient management skills to run their own business. Both organizational types provided assistance to open small-scale businesses, such

Figure 6.1 Photograph of handicrafts made by women at The Women’s Zakah Committee of Salah al-Din mosque in Manial, Cairo. These women learned to crochet and knit from recycled material. The products are sold at an annual fare, and the profit is distributed among the women based on their need.

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as buying and selling goats, birds, poultry and selling their produce, buying and selling fruits, vegetables, food and beverages. Typical examples of work the women would be trained in are knitting, crocheting, embroidery, and sewing. The materials, provided by the PVO, were often recycled. To get women to actually finish their courses as within a holistic approach, the participants and management were aware that within the learning process several steps must be taken. In the above secular PVO, the participant teaching the literacy class explained that their programme had to undergo a few changes and a new curriculum had to be implemented before it could claim that a satisfactory number of women had actually completed the course successfully. As such, the programme is fine-tuned according to careful observations and trial and error; the programme is enabled to have the capacity to empower these women from the grassroots up. In another Islamic PVO, a participant mentioned that it takes between two to four years to get women from a particular random area to come to literacy classes. One step the PVO members took in this process was appointing neighbours who were literate to communicate with the other people in the neighbourhood as they understand them best and could convince them more easily. Several of these neighbours who participated in the effort of the PVO were teachers themselves. In the evaluation of capacity to empower women in a sustainable manner, such an approach illustrates furthermore the commitment or participatory will on part of the participants and an impressive degree of awareness of the precise problems and challenges facing the very poor women through this commitment over time. One secular organization developed a number of programmes for literacy, all close to homes of the women they sought to educate. One major obstacle, the participants of this as well as another PVO informed me, was the women’s husbands. The men, mostly illiterate, did not want their wives to become literate. They resorted to several excuses for why the women, or in many cases the daughters, could not leave the house. Subsequently, individual programmes were developed within the homes. This, according to the participants, made their programme successful. Significantly, the main method to development was the implementation of programmes that integrated the

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learning of other skills, relevant to these women’s lives, within the literacy programme. I personally met several examples of women who were successful in their literacy classes and conducted casual interviews with at least seven women from three PVOs of both organizational types specifically in these literacy programmes. Three young women attending literacy classes in a secular organization (two in their teenage years and one 24 years old) were confident that they would land jobs in the public service.2 They personally knew women from the community who attended the same course they were enrolled in and took this path afterwards. One woman said that she felt she would be better equipped to help her children succeed in school and for her this was a dream. She at least felt more confident in the way her children would view her abilities. In this sense, she becomes a role model for her children. I detected a genuine feeling of pride and confidence among all such examples I had met. But even without further assistance through the other PVO programmes, women’s empowerment was achieved. Whereas once they could not read signs in the streets and were too embarrassed to ask for assistance, they became self-reliant by simply being able to find their own way. They had access to information that they were previously denied. To serve their own interests husbands or even fathers could say that the Qur’an, the ultimate word for most of these women, said things it does not by any means. These men could now be challenged because women now have direct access to the Qur’an, among a variety of resources. There is clear evidence from my own observations and from various stories narrated to me that these literacy classes raised women’s self-esteem and independence through several results of their literacy. As Rowlands has pointed out, empowerment is a process that may in certain instances be seen as disempowering (cited in Dawson 1999: 126). It is not a linear process. Thus, empowering women through literacy classes only may indeed be disempowering in another area as the perceived immediate need of the recipient is to provide food for the household. However, this may be at the initial stage of the programme and, hence, taken as a whole, it might be that the process of empowerment may hardly be noticed at the start but then grows

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exponentially as part of these women’s lives. More programme developers need to follow the examples of a holistic approach to remedy this obstacle illustrated through these PVOs. The women of both organizational types prove to have amazing capacities as civil society actors in the strategies they implement in their broader perspective and comprehensive understanding of the ABCs to empowerment in their own context.

The Feminine and Productive Capacities of Women Skills as mother and decision-maker in the home and community were emphasized in the majority of PVOs. The view both organizational types expressed was that the enhancement of the mother is the link to the enhancement of the entire family. ‘We concentrate on girls because we teach them things for her future, how to be women, how to be good Muslim women, how to be mothers.’ Another PVO participant explained: ‘We had to direct mothers to build a basis of love. Based on love everything else will come.’ And another member emphasizes her independence: ‘We develop her as a human being. When she becomes independent she can raise her family properly.’ The potential of women to influence decisions from within the basic unit of society to the community is recognized and enhanced. As a participant describes, ‘If you develop the mother the family will be developed, the child will be developed. In reality we cannot reform the country unless we reform women.’ The ideas are summed up through one woman’s elaboration: We sit down with married women and teach them to be a decision-maker inside the family. We brainstorm ways each individual woman can be empowered within the family, how she can talk effectively and be a pillar for the family. We teach the women how they can negotiate with their husbands. We teach them how to participate in social life, how to participate in the society. What we are teaching is negotiation skills and how to carry out peaceful dialogue.

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Figure 6.2 Photograph taken during lunch at a girl’s orphanage. The two women are working as ‘mothers’ for the children. In the background to the right are computers for computer courses volunteered by university students. The profit goes to the orphanage.

Significantly, within a broad or holistic approach to empowering women, these organizations use the reproductive capacities of the women as the most important means. The literature on political change and civil society development targets specifically the productive dimension as assessed to be present within most predominantly male-centred activities of production; yet these women’s organizations have discovered that the means to producing ‘productive citizens’ is to target and enhance the feminine capacity of these women. If the majority of women’s concerns revolve around practical issues and the organizations have found that building on the feminine is the most strategic in the endeavour of empowerment, certainly the feminine must be considered the most productive aspect in the way of empowering women within feminist theorization of the developing world and within studies on civil society development.

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A value attributed to the feminine capacity among Islamic women’s organizations forced me to learn more about why this capacity was so treasured and how developing this capacity was seen as productive for the development of the participants and society at large. The feminine capacity was particularly honed within halakas on the subject of the role of women. However, women’s roles are typically defined within one’s relationship to God, to the husband, the children, society and even the state whether the organization is Islamic or secular, although a woman’s relationship with God is of interest particularly within the Islamic women’s organizations. The feminine capacities that must be considered are those that both organizations found are the essential ingredient to the elevation of women within their families, societies and places of decision-making power. These are the organizations that have spent years studying the women carefully and trying out programmes with some failure until they could get it right and see results, such as more fundamentally, keeping women within their programmes long enough to benefit, given the enormous constraints on these women’s ability to attend, such as needing to put food on the table. The feminine capacities include the ability of a woman to be a good mother. If the context is that a mother does not know how to wash her child’s face, as participants attested is sometimes the reality they work with, the capacity to practice hygiene is just as important as the capacity to vote. It’s the basics of the ‘good life’ as experienced in and determined by the present situation of a woman. There is enormous emphasis placed on the need to teach the women how to raise children properly and be good wives, the latter mostly the concern of Islamic organizations. The first concern is evaluated as equally important by both organizations. Because the woman is viewed as the pillar of the family, it is necessary that the pillar is strengthened through their programmes. The children rely on their mother for emotional and physical development. The idea is that if she contributes to the healthy development of her family, the family altogether forms the essential unit of society. As the participant explained in context of the family, ‘we cannot reform the country unless we reform women’. If the mother is weak, the family is weak, if the family is weak, then all

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else deemed the ‘public’ becomes dysfunctional. Hence, from a systems point of view, ‘public benefit’ must be seen within a whole system in which the family is the fundamental part and can only be conducive to the ‘public good’ and ‘benefit’ if the woman is ‘developed as a whole human being’, as the participant had stated. The relationship a woman has with her husband is also of strategic concern, as if she is able to develop the skills to deal effectively with her partner she has developed essential skills to negotiate what she wants, what is good for her and basic rights. These skills benefit her in family life and the organizations understand and calculate these transfer to life outside the home when she needs to negotiate with others or government officials. Like literacy, negotiation skills are recognized as an essential ingredient for a woman to stand up for herself and gain independence. Almost all PVOs expressed independence and self-reliance to be major aims. They strove to teach skills that would serve to create an empowerment that nobody could take away if the organization should ever cease to operate. Empowerment was for the woman and through the woman for society. Negotiation skills are importantly also taught within particular understandings of how a woman can best negotiate versus what is expressed as masculine. The examples I was given was how women needed to learn how to ask for something in both the home and government. Participants stated that when women spoke demandingly, they did not get what they wanted but if they learned to be patient and asked using very respectful tones, they were more likely to be convincing. Hence, the kinds of skills that are actually taught are gender sensitive in that women learn how to develop and take advantage of specifically feminine ways of expressing themselves in order to stand up for themselves and assert their rights. In her role as mother and wife, her reproductive role is enhanced by the power of love. As the participant described, everything flows from love. As such, many participants recognize the power from within as a spiritual or bonding power that exists and can be worked upon so that it translates into producing a cohesive and healthy family unit. The power of love is recognized as a resource that comes from within and is directed with care and persistence to provide all the necessary skills

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for the development of all those who are dependent on the mother’s and wife’s love. Truly what occurs through these organizations is an empowerment by working on the reproductive capacities of women, which translates into an enhanced productive capacity of society. Some of the participants did not necessarily draw a link between the reproductive and productive but many did comprehend the value of women to the development of the country. Because the reproductive and productive is intimately linked, the ‘personal is political’. When a woman learns how to read and write, she becomes an instrument for the enhancement not only of herself, but of her family in a context in which literacy is a missing skill and necessary for the ability of the individual to be self-reliant and contribute better to society. When a woman learns the ABCs in life, such as how to wash tomatoes or wash her children’s faces, she also contributes to a healthier life experienced by her and her family. The significance is in the context of a reality that is circumscribed by poverty, firstly, and then a number of other serious oppressive forces. There are a number of issues, in fact, that the women in the organizations sought to address and for this they also used advice and help from outside the organizations. Several organizations said they would bring in a specialist from outside the organization. Both the participants and those receiving services benefited from the specialist. In one PVO, a psychiatrist taught the women how to deal with the mentally handicapped. None of the women had any experience with the mentally handicapped previously. But as they discovered that several children of the women they were providing services to were so malnourished that ‘a 13 year old would be at the level of a five year old’, they quickly realized they needed to develop skills to benefit these children appropriately. These skills were taught to the parents of the children. The skills assisted in the progress of these children in their specialized educational programmes. The parents were taught how to be happy, despite their situation. The result was empowerment on several levels. The participants all spoke about a feeling of satisfaction as a group and as individuals. As the participant of this Islamic PVO explains, ‘They are still poor, but they are kissing their children and are happy to have them. They can now watch them without crying.

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This is for us a significant achievement. You see they teach the others what they know. We started out with ten mentally disabled and now they are 50-something in this one area.’ Therefore, not only the whole family, but growing numbers of children and their families within the community are developed and empowered. Along with helping poor women to access available rights, educating women at the grassroots level on their rights comprises a part of some of the organizations’ strategies. CEWLA has been particularly active in this regard. As such, strategies for empowerment include not only helping women gain access to rights that can potentially afford them a life lived in greater dignity and less hardship, but the awareness of rights that they previously knew nothing of. Empowerment, thus, occurs in various areas. Of importance for the evaluation of the impact of these organizations is the impact the organizations have on civil society not only through the empowerment of the women they seek to help but especially the impact their activism has on themselves. When asked what the directors and participants had gained from participating in their respective organizations the most frequent reply was ‘patience’. In other words, they had found and developed ‘power from within’ themselves to deal with practical realities. The second most frequently quoted attained skill was communication skills with people of all levels. Several women expressed a better understanding of people different from them and an ability to deal with them. Not only is civility a product of enhanced understanding and appreciation of people who are different but it is also a skill that develops through practice. Skills that are developed here are produced as a ‘power to’ do things that facilitate better cooperation, trust and understanding between people. The third named skill for self-development was decision-making. In these ways, these women acquired the skill and ‘power to’ assert their opinions and beliefs. Self-expression is an essential skill for asserting one’s rights and pursuing one’s interests. Because experts were often resorted to for at least a specified period of time or seminars were conducted either within the individual PVOs or between other organizations, professional skills were also among those enhanced. Seminars also served to enhance awareness of new

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projects within other PVOs, disseminate information, or research findings. Beyond basic social skills, education was a notable part of the empowerment process that occurred with participating in these organizations and between organizations. Even literacy was a skill gained by organizational participants. In this example, participants came to take part with a respective organization and remained afterwards to take part in other projects they would later teach others. These participants served as powerful models of self-help. These women were looked to for motivation when attendees of the literacy classes felt they could not communicate their desperate situations and sometimes sense of limited capacity to learn to read. In one example, the participant of an Islamic PVO, bursting into tears at the recollection of her motivation for joining, explained that the organization was a source of solace and a place she could fill a void in her life. She had tragically lost her daughter a few years before. A participant of a secular PVO said her most empowering experience was when she left her home in Southern Egypt to join the organization in Cairo. She was destined to become a divorcee, something that rarely happens in her area, and she could only continue life by escaping from this unbearable shame. These women experience an essential ‘power with’ one another that provides each other strength, solace and the ability to continue helping others. Exemplary of three other similar stories, a teenage ‘mother’3 in the orphanage for girls told how she had to fight against patriarchy in the home and village by using all possible arguments to be allowed to leave the home to go to Cairo for work. Her father insisted that none of his girls would ever spend a night outside the home until marriage. But only when the economic situation worsened in the home was she finally granted her wish. All women with similar experiences expressed that this act of leaving home to come to Cairo on their own and finding support among other women was a major breakthrough for them which provided confidence and a sense of power. These women had achieved autonomy from patriarchal traditions and economic reliance that to the westerner, trained to recognize feminist struggle in terms of rights-based activism, may not seem that significant. But when observing their enthusiasm in the

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narration of their stories, one learns that such a feeling of empowerment cannot be fully comprehended in words. Both the participants and those who used the services develop in many ways, all of which contribute to empowerment that is ‘personal’ yet affects everyone around them. The appreciation of the political effects of their personal experiences can only be understood with an appreciation of their immediate concerns. Concerns are often expressed within organizations as encompassing the material, but also include knowledge, spirituality, morality and social issues. As such, much of these women’s activism relates to actual experiences of poverty that affect the majority of women to varying degrees in Egypt. These women, however, sometimes address patriarchal norms which also can change the way other women begin to identify and perceive patriarchy in their society and government laws. These activists implement and respond to discursive traditions that frame women’s roles as relates to morality and when they do develop an awareness that goes beyond their circles. The sorts of activism and, hence, the kinds of feminist subjects found within these organizations are predominantly practical and feminine. The practical and feminine orientation to their activism is characterized largely by a reproductive role they play and the productive dimension of doing good or khair for society that is different to the male productive contribution as, usually, the breadwinner in the economic sphere. As such, the actual activism that is part of both organizations demands a re-evaluation of what can be considered political and what can be considered as often most central in defining the feminist subject in contexts outside which feminism has been developed.

‘Khair’ as Power for the People The predominant mission expressed as to do khair or good in society puts into question the kind of subject that is assumed to be normative within the feminist imaginary. Women who chose to participate through a secular organization also comprise those who simply want to do ‘good deeds’ and the ‘good’ in society, a value motivating their

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participation that is shared by their sisters in Islamic organizations. In the feminist imagery, a woman is motivated to struggle in way of garnering greater freedoms from an oppressive force, normatively the state or men. Doing khair is not a protest-oriented form of action. Neither does it fit into the framework for struggle as necessarily bearing down on the language of ‘freedom’ and ‘rights’. Because such initiatives cannot be placed within the false framework for politically relevant action as simplistically resistance-oriented or complianceoriented, they are dismissed. Yet, the majority of women declared this goal as their motivating reason for the participation in both organizational types. The motivation to do khair, furthermore, raises the question: how does this shared goal across both organizational types explain the presupposed difference in political commitments? Quite simply, it does not. The word, khair, is stated numerous times in the Qur’an, such as in 99:6: ‘On that day, people will come forth in separate groups to be shown their deeds: whoever has done an atom’s weight of good will see it, but whoever has done an atom’s weight of evil will see that.’ The word khair thus signifies a metaphysical effect as to be seen on the material and the spiritual planes for many of the women. The act will be manifest in terms of its effect produced materially and reflexively for the practitioner who expects to also experience the effects of her choice of action. Deduced from other texts, khair may become manifest for the practitioner of khair in this life as well as life on the spiritual level. Significantly, for many in both organizational types this will be the deeper context and motivator. Religiously-motivated goals are not simply among women who belonged to Islamic organizations, as shown through their narrations. Religion guides the lives of the majority of people who participate in these organizations as it does most individuals of Egyptian society. However, for others, within both organizational types, doing good deeds is expected simply to produce ‘the good’ in way of doing what is expected of a human on a more humanistic level. The meaning attached may not be deeply religious at all. The word khair has deeper connotations among Islamists than for those who use it to refer to a humanitarian reason. What is most important in the evaluation of this motivator is

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that women identify that a productive form of activism, as in making positive changes in the lives of people, is most beneficial to those who use the services of both organizational types. There is no difference in terms of the effect on civil society because of the intent expressed behind either doing khair or extending help in one’s neighbourhood out of an obligation to humanity; however, doing khair must be an important value considered for the effect it produces on the expansion of civil society. This shared goal serves to confirm that political commitments are produced largely in the imaginary of political theorization of liberal and non-liberal groupings, such as secular and religious-based organizations. Such an imaginary serves to interpret the kinds of activism that will likely be observed because of the organizational type. It thus obscures the actual effects of those who participate in what are deemed progressive and modern forms of organization and what are often deemed backward and regressive forms of organization. It also enables the pitting of the two forms of participation against each other as political opposites, which has effects beyond misunderstanding within the literature to include policy-makers and funders who divert resources and support to one or the other forms to the neglect or even aggressive sidelining of the other. Both are important to the development of civil society. Shared commitments in regard to identifying oppressive sources showed a different kind of feminist subject, in fact, when just studying the feminist organizations. When I asked women in secular feminist organizations to explain their position on feminism, except for the odd case, they routinely clarified that they did not see their mission remotely in synchronicity with a ‘western’ agenda. What many interviewees in the secular feminist organizations emphasized was that their focus could not always be on the state or men because the problems were deeper and to struggle against state policies under the Mubarak regime could be damaging to the existence of their organization. The context of poverty, exclusion, and the extended era of Mubarak’s government crackdown often created a different focus for activism. The focus on more practical-oriented activities was shared by both Islamic and secular women’s organizations.

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The overlapping goals further illustrate a problem within the feminist and political imaginaries in terms of the kinds of activism that are deemed worthy of study because of the form of power exercised. ‘Negative activism’, as in actions directed at challenging what is wrong, is the focus of study on power. This bias is a serious political and analytical mistake as the productive dimension of doing what is right for the sake of humanity or khair is entirely devalued, resulting in the actor of ‘the good’ dismissed as apolitical. The actual effects produced from a commitment to doing khair have little to do with challenging a dominant force. Doing khair is based on ‘positive activism’, changing power relations by investing ‘good’ into society. It is simply a matter of choice of strategy and concentration of activism. It changes power relations through the act of giving to people who have been disadvantaged and marginalized. Doing khair for society is a focused way of giving. Giving in many traditions is equated with expressing love. In the Islamic literature, doing khair is equated as deeds, so that any expression of love for God is countable. It is often synonymously used with the giving of charity. In the halakas visited, it was, indeed, part of their programmes whereby women were taught its meaning, obligation and effect. Khair could entail giving clothes, money, a loan, food, a job, a service, knowledge, respect, time, advice, a smile, anything one can give to help another better her situation. Importantly, imbued in the practice of khair is the practice of what is constructed and idealized as ethical behaviour. Because acts of doing good, such as khair, produce change at the fundamental levels where inequality is produced and sustained, it must be considered instrumental in the study of the political. Giving is a certain way of exercising power. Actions based on khair can produce immense changes that shake up other power structures, especially structures identified as unethical. Similarly, women whose activism is sustained by a motivation to empower those in need or the marginalized by giving charity and the various expressions of ‘love’ must be considered as potentially even more transformative within the study of feminism. The transformative powers of acts based on ‘doing good’ and giving are especially of consequence to the development of civility and

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democratic principles. Practicing khair has a civilizing quality because rather than protesting against oppressive sources that can clamp down or react violently to the pressure for reform – in addition to potentially provoking counter-violence – doing khair is actually committing people to reform from the grassroots up in a peaceful manner. The interviewee who stated, ‘Allah created the souls with khair. Our ideology is to develop khair in people . . . Khair is a seed that you plant. But the growth of the seed depends on activism’ is illustrative of this point. Furthermore, protest- or resistance-oriented activism has an end when the goals upon which it was developed are fulfilled. The productive dimension to doing khair, however, has no end and, hence, participation in way of doing ‘good’ has no end. There is the recognition within such individuals as shared among the predominantly Islamist groupings that khair is something at the soul level. The framework or belief system from which these actors speak presuppose that each human being has a soul – this idea of a soul, I should point out, encompasses a belief system everybody these activists will be in contact with probably also shares. Because the activist sees khair in every soul, such ideology will motivate her to home in on, breathe life into and ‘grow’ this aspect that resides in every human being. As such, she will not judge the propensity of someone to do good just because he or she does not share the same ideology or just because his or her actions may seem unjust. Every single human being in her society is potential for her programme of growing the seed of khair – possibly the broadest framework to guide the inculcation of values and principles. This is highly transformative because beyond the values and activism purportedly a part of the practitioner of khair, the host body of her target is now also growing and blossoming in the capacity for khair to be personally lived and practiced. The capacity to do good things is now to spread through society from one ‘host body’ to the next, and so on, through the ‘seeds’ of khair. In democratic terms, based on her belief system, her actions will not be exclusive but inclusive of every being that has a soul. Since ‘the growth of the seed depends on activism’, activism becomes a goal in and of itself, established among individuals. In these terms, women’s participation is identified and

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nurtured as a necessary ingredient for spreading the ‘good’ in society and, consequently, effecting change. This productive dimension is strategically developed, therefore, at the level of civility and the level of empowerment. The act of giving one’s time, money or other resources is ‘civilizing’. It facilitates a political culture of generosity and provides some access to a somewhat better life that each individual deserves, framed as such through using an Islamic discursive tradition or humanitarian argument. Sacrificing resources helps to serve, as stated in a few of the halakas, to diminish the gap between rich and poor in society. Importantly, however, it facilitates an understanding among practitioners of khair that those who have more have an obligation to help those who are disadvantaged. As such, a responsiblization of the community in which one is a part (or lives in proximity to) is developed within individuals. In this way, these organizations contributed simultaneously to civility and awareness-raising. Several interviewees attested that they always knew that helping others is the right thing to do but were lazy about it. Some claimed that through the organization they participated in they now were motivated to do what is right on a continuous and regular basis and were encouraged by the reminders they heard, inspirational stories they learned, and the enthusiasm they saw among those they participated with. Through participating in their respective organizations, they raised their capacity as well as understanding the importance to give to society. In both organizational types there were women who said that they initially saw their participation (for salaried positions) as a job and afterwards developed a feeling that they had a moral obligation to serve women or their community, in general. Other women said that the opportunity to work with other women was what enabled awareness of their own marginalization or the different forms of marginalization they had never imagined. Women in the latter example were from the upper class. Raising the levels of practicing generosity is civilizing in that the practitioners, or those who have been responsibilized to give, serve to develop a political culture of sharing. A culture of generosity and sharing is an essential feature of civility.

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Does a Practical/Feminine and Strategic Difference Exist? When I asked members of both organizational types to describe how their organization differed from the other organizational type, little understanding of the other was in most cases observed. Most expressed in the various responses that their PVO type was superior. Three out of five Islamic PVO directors claimed there were substantial differences, in terms of intention and organizational structure. In their responses, feminist PVO members usually referred to known Islamic figures and at times general Islamic PVOs, but never Islamic women’s organizations. Between the experts, who could also include PVO directors, antagonistic remarks were, in a few instances, resorted to. A minority within the Islamic organizations warned of the infiltration of western ideas through the secularists. Interestingly, a minority of ‘secular’ women believed the work of Islamic activists sabotaged their efforts towards the elevation of women’s status. Hence, a certain degree of ideological battle for the ‘hegemony of ideas’ was ascertained. But this was predominantly among the theorists and experts, some of which were organizational leaders. As Islamic women’s PVOs are a very little understood phenomenon, no ideological battle between Islamic activists and secularists on the associational level could be evaluated. On the other hand, despite an ideological battle between Islamic and secular experts, both not only agree on the major challenges facing women in Egypt, they both also put a western understanding of the feminist subject into serious questioning in discussion of what feminism means to them. In addition to the majority of Islamic women’s PVO participants, two ‘secular’ directors and several participants in the secular PVOs said that they were strongly opposed to westerntype or radical feminism, as they understood it. Two other ‘secular’ directors were of the opinion that the concerns of their PVOs could not be explained or developed within a western view of feminist struggle. One of these last-mentioned explained that she regularly attended conferences abroad but could only take bits of information back with her that would be useful for the context of feminist struggle in Egypt. The other defined the feminism of her PVO as having been shaped by mainly post-colonial feminist struggle, and thus was an indigenous

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form. During interview in one secular feminist organization, the interviewee took Nawal El-Sadawi as an example of the type of feminism that feminist organizations did not embrace and who in fact was in contradiction to the feminist movement in Egypt. Her supervisor, who was present, however, quickly asked her to refrain from talking about El-Sadawi and not refer to any particular person for illustration, although she did not contradict the point. Slightly fewer than half of the 33 women interviewed stated they were not feminists, although after discussion, as many were interested to discuss the concept further, more women claimed that they could consider themselves feminist. But in the vast majority of cases, their activism was defined to be within Islamic limits or not as radical as the most well-known Arab feminists. Qualification applies equally to participants in both organizational types. Within both organizational types some women expressed that they did not think about feminism and other women did not seem to even understand the term, even in the various ways it was translated.4 As a participant of a secular PVO stated: ‘Feminist? No, not really. I simply strive to increase women’s status. My goal is to just add one more voice to those who are doing the same.’ Secular feminism as defined by the mission statements of the organizations visited does not reflect the very same commitments and clearly not the same concerns as western feminisms. Islam, for some secular feminists, is an indispensable tool in finding a common ground with those they seek to empower – and using it. These could be termed Islamic feminists as they consciously used the scripts for empowerment of women. For other ‘secularists’, Islam is not a tool but sets the parameters in terms of how they operate. One who advocates the term might label such as serious Islamic feminists. Though two secular PVO directors expressed strong disapproval of goals or views they asserted some women Islamic activists have publicly expressed, in both cases they made it clear that they were Muslim. Another secular feminist PVO director clarified that the reference of the PVO is to the UN Human Rights Resolution. However, she qualified, ‘On the other hand, I do not go to the extreme of, for example, equating men and women in inheritance. This is something that is clear in the Script.’

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Interestingly, her strategies include tapping into Islam. She also added that several times she has brought in an Imam (religious leader), trying a new one each time, to educate poor women on their religion as a means of empowering them from oppressive traditions. The women will often be sceptical about information that contradicts deeply-held norms thought to be part of religion. She added, though, that never has a single Imam she has asked to visit adequately dealt with the area of FGM. A second director of a declared feminist PVO described her role as, besides managing the PVO for her two-year appointment, rewriting folklore and re-examining Islamic religious texts from a gender perspective. She was, in fact, referred to by some as an Islamic activist and after reading her works I would argue that she does, in fact, contribute to a fairer perception of women’s historical roles in Islamic history. She is an Islamic activist in the sense that she uses religious scripts for her proof – a methodology ‘secular’ feminists would not normatively implement. Not all the women of this PVO did work of religious content, but roughly half did. In both the above cases the women participated in secular feminist organizations and, from the description of the boundaries they placed on themselves, worked within the parameters of Islamic scripts. Thus, it is through the secular organizational institutions that they continued an Islamic discursive tradition that did not step outside a stipulated boundary of what would be considered allowable by mainstream and conservative Islamic scholars. The example of inheritance being used to demarcate the boundaries of struggle for women’s rights is not only within a distinctive Islamic discursive tradition; it is within a conservative framework that uses a literal understanding of the script. Hence, no pushing of boundaries but rather a sanctioning of boundaries results. For a ‘secular’ feminist, such could also be viewed as continuing a means by which women are discriminated against. Islamic feminism does not comprise necessarily liberalist notions of Islam. The vast majority of women in the case study did not endeavour to use the scripts to argue against discriminatory laws against women. Scripts were used to help provide guidance as to the best conduct and to a transformation of the ‘self’ by wresting with the nafs or base desires. Whether on the level of engagement with government or

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engagement with the scripts, women’s activism was not characterized by ‘negative’ but rather by ‘positive’ politics. Indeed, self-transformation for many of the organizations meant achieving morality and piety as goals in and of themselves, and the PVOs set the standards through various means. Perhaps a drawback of such focus is that discriminatory laws are largely based on interpretations that do not serve the wellbeing of women. In general, apart from the examples above within an organization, academic secular feminists do not see it as part of their strategy, especially if unlearned in Islamic jurisprudence, to use scripts in lobbying against government policies. Also, among the organizations studied in few cases were women educated in jurisprudence using the religious texts to change laws through court and parliament. It should not, however, be concluded that a sort of Islamic feminism is not in place in which the scripts are revisited from a gender perspective to provide liberal opinions and interpretations on them. Both men and women are attempting to provide reformist interpretations. For example, in 2008, Zeinab Radwan, a deputy speaker of the lower house of parliament and an expert in Islamic jurisprudence, contested the interpretation of Qur’anic verses that are often used to establish the testimony of women as worth half that of men in family court. She contested this, saying that the verses ‘related to a specific situation in which women were illiterate at the time, and could also forget the details of the incident since what they were giving was verbal testimony, not written’ (Reem 2008). In response, parliamentarians and some lawmakers, particularly Islamists, argued that Radwan’s views were a distortion of the Muslim faith (Zeid 2008). Zeinab Radwan also proposed an amendment to the inheritance law that would allow non-Muslims to inherit from Muslims. The Islamic Research Council turned down the proposal on the grounds that it was in violation of Islamic jurisprudence. Instead, the Council agreed that wills could be imposed to ensure a non-Muslim widow’s welfare (Tadroz 2010). A tiny concession resulted but comprised a move in the right direction. Thus, the burden rests on Islamic activists who are learned in the Islamic sciences to wrestle with the source of much discrimination that exists in the beliefs that have sustained discriminatory laws and

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entrenched ideas that continue to impact upon women’s lives in practical ways. Nonetheless, intent expressed within the mission statements of secular and Islamic organizations proves to mean very little when the context of struggle and the activities that are directed to remedy these issues is taken into consideration for the evaluation of civil society. They are addressing the same issues and I argue that their approach, as evinced from their activities, displays few differences. I find much evidence through an illustration of their activities that they similarly instil democratic practices, display civility, and serve to empower women and, as a result, their families and communities. Therefore, no difference in their political effect can be claimed in their demonstrated ability to expand civil society. Both are politically significant players in contributing to change in Egypt. Contrary to what may be assumed by a categorization as strategic activists, many of these feminist organizations working within a developing and patriarchal context recognize that appeals through rights activism persistently directed at the state will not always fundamentally change women’s lives. My data on secular organizations does not support the argument that secular PVO activities focus mainly on constitutional or rights-based issues in terms of state laws (see, for example, Kandil 1999a). In fact, feminists in Egypt know that rightsbased politics, in terms of struggling against state laws, may in fact at times be detrimental to the majority of Egyptian women (Kiss 1997: 8). Therefore, focus may also strategically be turned to poverty or social norms that oppress women. Of the five secular PVO directors, only two stated that rights-based struggle was their stated focus. Yet one clarified that the actual work of the group was gearing its activities equally to practical issues. Most activities of both types of associations are consciously aimed at empowering women in various ways, including at times awareness of social norms or reigning religious interpretations that affect them, or literacy classes. Importantly, several issues are taken to be women’s issues – for instance, children. A participant of a secular PVO explained, ‘Feminism is different to the movement in the West. Men are not the issue. Here, we concentrate on teaching children about life.’ Abu-Bakr elucidated:

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We are Arab Egyptian feminists and we are feminists operating and working in Egypt. This means that we are concerned with practical issues on the agenda of Egypt. We are not going to pursue something that is on the international agenda of international feminism. We read them and we learn from them. We read western feminist theory, but in the application, we take what is relevant to our problems. (Interview with Omaima Abu Bakr, Cairo) Feminism, in fact, is defined to reflect the concerns of women in Egypt that are predominantly practical/feminine. A ‘secular’ participant explained, ‘Feminism means the liberation of women. It means to liberate her from psychological captivation, illiteracy, and ignorance, to be independent. First is literacy and then she is a better person.’ Thus, they strategically strive to elevate women’s status from their point of view of what oppressive or threatening structures may be. As Abdel-Hadi asserts, ‘It is high time that we call feminist discourse discourses. This is important because we are reacting to the time, to the different forces’ (interview with Amal Abdel-Hadi, Cairo). Both on an intellectual level and largely through the level of activism of both organizational types, the feminist subject as framed in western political thought is simply proved a false construct. In fact, from the descriptions offered by several participants, the feminist subject has many variations. One notable assumption found even among Egyptian secular feminists is that no Islamic women’s organization which propagates its activities as feminist exists. One out of the five Islamic PVOs declared that its aims were to empower women and raise their awareness of rights as women. However, as one participant made clear: ‘Freedom is something we work for; but not liberation. Those who call for liberation always call for the liberation of religion. But we call for freedom, which is what we define as women’s rights.’ The directors of two others assured me that their association had been developed to serve women in their deprived condition. The other two did not declare that any feminist goal per se was on the agenda. And while the last-mentioned two Islamic women’s organizations did not articulate any feminist tendency in their

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orientation, some of their participants said that they were, indeed, feminists and, in a few instances, that their life experiences as women in particular were what makes their participation in the organization meaningful to them. While the PVO that aimed to elevate women’s status even conducted research on the female condition in the Arab world and collaborated with other similar Islamic women’s PVOs in the region, a few of its participants could not define what feminism meant to them. Most significantly, however, though some feminist organizations may have mission statements clearly expressing the will and intent to elevate the status of women, several of the volunteers expressed, among their various reasons, more practical needs and goals for taking part in the organization. The western-developed practical/strategic dichotomy defines those who work towards strategic goals as truly feminist and as such political and excludes those who work towards practical goals as apolitical. Yet my study demonstrates that in the context of Egypt, women’s struggles are predominantly shaped by practical concerns. Does that mean that those self-declared feminists who have shifted their main strategy from rights-based activism to the pressing practical issues now fall out of the realm of political activity, as have the Islamic women activists whose activities do not engage the state? Such an assumption would disregard the struggles the majority of feminists wage in Egypt and the meaning of feminism in the development context, in general. These secular feminists are strategic but have realized the best strategy for the empowerment of women entails not necessarily fighting state laws. And in several instances, women who joined the PVOs to meet a practical need stayed with the organization to give back to women what they had attained. Thus, through their own empowerment they became conscious of strategies to provide positive change for other women. As such, the practical becomes strategic (Arruda 2000: 76). Perhaps out of fear of engaging the state or the twin goal of creating ‘social Islam’, Islamic women’s PVOs did not engage the state under the Mubarak era. Moreover, some do not say that they are feminist. But the point is not that they are strategic, but that their activisms have a political effect, regardless of whether or not they intend to

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effect change. Within a civil society framework, such activism proves to contribute to women’s empowerment and a ‘democratic culture’. Hence, both so-called practical- and strategic-oriented actions must be considered equally political. As such, I maintain that a strategic/ practical dichotomy cannot be applied to either set of PVO types in my case study. The practical versus strategic dichotomy fails to take into account several forms of political participation.

Conclusions Both Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations prove to empower women through resorting to both practical or feminine oriented activism and strategic activism. It is through an empowerment process that civil society expansion occurs and most pertinently within a developmental context in which disempowerment is a major fact of poor women’s lives. Although Islamic women’s organizations may concentrate on developing the feminine aspect by grounding knowledge of it within a discourse on morality and piety, these organizations do so strategically. They do so in order to contribute to an enhancement of a woman so that she becomes a pillar for the family and hence builds the essential unit of a society. As such, change of the social order is in the larger purview. The strategic objective might be to affect the state in this way but that is really no different from the strategic objective of some secular feminist organizations to change the state by addressing laws. In the latter, although they will address discriminatory laws, in practice, neither the state nor men are their major focus of attention. As such, both organizational types study the specific conditions that serve to oppress women and share in their focus on the immediate concerns of women to empower them. In order to assess how the organizations contribute to the empowerment of women, it was necessary to broaden the resistance or compliance framework, used by mainstream feminists. The context for these women’s actions provided much more meaning as redistribution of power became the outcome of their activism around immediate concerns to secure basic freedoms, rights, access and needs. Doing khair or good for society is a means of fostering civil society growth. Through

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their participation, women developed the capacities to contribute to the expansion of civil society through their own empowerment. They also helped mitigate power structures that served to oppress women in their everyday lives. As such, they are highly political in the way they transform women and, thereby, society. Because both organizational types identify the same concerns which seriously impact on the lives of women they seek to help, their activities aim to address very similar concerns. Neither women’s Islamic nor secular feminist organizations can fit into a female/practical and feminist taxonomy and many secular feminists reject the notions and binarisms of western feminism in theory and practice. Both are indispensible for the empowerment of women in Egypt; both organizational types are equally political.

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CHAPTER 7 WOMEN’S ACTIVISM THROUGH NET WOR KING

Introduction The 25th of January, called the ‘Day of Anger’, marks the date for yearly protest in Egypt. A woman screams into the Al Jazeera camera that all she and her family have to eat is bread. A female lawyer yells atop a group of protesters that all the people want is to live. Many angrily shouted: ‘The people want the fall of the regime’; in front of the parliament, ‘Where are the thieves? Here are the thieves’! After the Tunisian president was forced to flee and the parliament was dissolved through the power of protest, Egyptians called out: ‘Look at the Arab World: The Tunisians set it on fire’, ‘Hosni Mubarak, Hosni Mubarak, Saudi Arabia is waiting for you’, ‘Change, freedom, and social justice’! The Egyptian 18-day uprising of January and February 2011, however, was unprecedented, culminating in the change that many people had long worked towards and yet some say they never expected would come so soon. But while the media covered and highlighted the protest scenes to show the unfolding change dramatically occurring, it must be emphasized that even before this monumental occurrence, these activists, and others, already existed, and had been very instrumental in developing a culture of democratic practice and awareness. It is these activists, which I argue are largely comprised of women, whose work and struggle will help define and contextualize the way forward

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for both the Egyptian government and society. It is, thus, crucial to understand all players in this process. With worsening conditions for most Egyptians, there are indications that they have had ‘enough’. Living standards for the bulk of families among the middle and lower classes have decreased. Indeed, human dignity had long suffered under repressive government policies. However, the deepest of concerns among the bulk of Egyptians, poverty and deprivation, fell, practically speaking, on deaf ears. As such, it must be remembered that activists have pursued the most practical of interests, thereby forming demands for democratic rights. As activists had been developing a democratic culture throughout society, a tipping point was reached whereby poverty, unemployment, corruption, repression and misery could no longer be endured and democracy was long overdue. Essentially, a firm and unrelenting demand for either freedom, democracy or both is in large part due to the increased awareness and practice of democratic principles within society resulting from the pursuit of basic rights and basic human dignity. Different to the PVOs of this study which pursue a better life and freedom through ‘positive’ activism, networks pursue these through both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ and in their protest formations choosing to use the ‘negative’ or overt resistance. Likening this political strategization to a soccer game where each player has her role to play in the pursuit of winning the game, each actor pushing for change has played a particular and essential role. Sometimes individual players consciously change roles and sometimes they must adapt to new roles but they continue to pursue the goal. In a broader view for describing women’s activism in Egypt, there are the essential protest elements among networkers in the context of greater repression in Egypt. These comprise the fuller picture for analyzing change. This chapter investigates where activism has been emergent in an attempt to cope with increased poverty, human rights abuses and various issues created during the Mubarak rule with a focus on women’s activism outside the PVO formations registered with government. It looks at the activism of women in forms of organizing that are more loosely structured, often initiated largely as a result of greater state scrutiny. I argue that in times of increased repression through

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government control of civil society formations as typically defined in the literature, it is useful to look at other formations of civil society. It is useless to signify the concept of civil society with registered forms of collaboration in authoritarian contexts. Civil society organizations and networks often overlap in goals, making them of mutual benefit and significance. Islamic and secular activists are seen to be asking for the same rights, repressed under the same conditions. It is pertinent to include actors who fall outside the organizations and learn what their focus is and why. I ask if networks of individuals serve to contribute to a civil society in Egypt and if they do, how. Empowerment, levels of participation and civility are main indices used to determine the effectiveness of the women participating in networks. As with the investigation of the previous forms of collaboration in this study, empowerment is a crucial component for making sense of the impact these networks have on civil society development. Women produce empowered selves when they share information, pursue what they want, and take action together to challenge oppressive structures. Empowered selves emerge whether participants seek to better the conditions of others or simply to advance their individual positions economically – together, both have a cumulative effect. Power is exercised and distributed throughout society (positive activism) when participants seek improvement, better conditions, happiness, or a greater good in collective struggle for their needs or that of the marginalized. Participation in networks means taking part in activities with one or more persons to achieve individual and collective goals. The factors that motivate individuals to participate in networks allow us to understand the variables that assist women to collaborate through such a modality of action better, and explain why networks are sometimes the preferred choice. Individuals will often choose participation in networks for advancing individual and group interests that have been denied by the state. As such, not all networks pursue ‘negative’ politics. It is crucial to determine civility, since civil society expansion cannot be put in motion without people dealing with each other with dignity and respect. The networks provide key mechanisms through

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which norms essential to a civil society – tolerance, trust, cooperation, and reciprocity – are nurtured and developed. Tolerance and inclusivity are necessary principles of democratic behaviour. However, these values are not the only means to crucially develop the groundwork for a discourse on rights, freedom and dignity. It is often the case that under extreme levels of repression and neglect of basic rights intolerance to the oppressive source manifests as the contextually required means of securing greater freedom and dignity. In such cases, civil disobedience may be the necessary tactic in struggle. This chapter is divided into five parts. The first describes the function of networkers in the Middle East. It discusses how the same conditions of authoritarianism provide the need for an avenue for the more protest-oriented elements to work with less risk of complete disablement as organizational forms that are registered with government will suffer. The second part looks at general networking activity in the Egypt. This section emphasizes that a vast array of networking activity exists that produces effects on the political and societal arenas. The third part presents Egyptian women’s participatory abilities through networking, while the fourth describes their impact on empowerment and the fifth discusses their ability to secure civility. The women assume a social responsibility, especially to those whose rights and wellbeing have been violated. This chapter aims to illustrate the transformative role of female networkers in Egypt through a discussion of their multiple orientations, especially in the context of growing discontent with the Egyptian regime.

Function of Networks in the Middle East The concept and function of networking have been closely tied to social movement theory. Networks are studied to explain the structures and dynamics of social movements. Much theorization has also revolved around strategies of recruitment into social movements through social ties and the influence of friends for participation.1 Scholars focus on a multitude of forms of network participation, from extremist to peaceful interest groups. However, despite the breadth of analysis and the various aspects of networking examined, the overwhelming majority

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of studies frame the function of networks as protest-oriented and especially state-centred. While many networking activities, also identified in the case study, address government, many of the networkers’ actions are embedded within other power structures. The western literature has not yet unearthed the scope of networks or fully comprehended their function within authoritarian environments. However, a few scholars on the Middle East have provided some significant insight in this respect. For example, Bayat (2000) proposes the ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ in describing the agency of the poor in a case study on Cairo’s poorest areas and the individuals’ slow but effective impact on state resources. His case study on Iran similarly shows how the poor utilize networks as a survival strategy (Bayat 1998). Singerman (1995), too, exposes the agency of Cairo’s poor in networking to attain greater economic access and services and to influence politics. Clark (2004) adopts a different focus from the many works on Islamist movements that accentuate the activities of fringe Islamists in terror organizations, and elaborates instead on mainstream Islamist networks that contribute to development. Denouex’s work on Egypt, Iran and Lebanon (1993) shows that networks can be used for both political stability and urban unrest. And although Purushothaman’s work (1997) is not Middle East-based and focuses primarily in the impact of actions on the state, her study on women illustrates the function of networks in advancing women’s interests and rights. Networks not only form a structure that is less easy to dismantle or scrutinize in repressive environments; they have a function to address multiple concerns that are more than state-centred. These forms of participation have a unique ‘embeddedness’ in a socio-historic system. Thus, the agency of these actors can become more apparent in the study of meaning making. As Snow and Benford argue (1992: 135, 136), actors are not merely carriers of extant ideas and meanings that have resulted from structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies; rather they engage in the production and maintenance of meaning. A structuralist approach to social movement theory will view networks as embedded in identities. Structuralist approaches emphasize identities, values and social networks as determining factors for

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participation. Rationalist approaches emphasize the role of human agency. As discussed in the previous chapters, desires and the formation of particular selves are attached to a socio-historical context. Thus, while ‘rational’ decisions are made according to the cost of participating on an individual basis,2 actions within network activism cannot be viewed as disconnected from the discursive traditions to which meanings are attached and from which an individual’s worldview has been fashioned. The networks in Egypt have multiple interests. They have functioned to serve, more generally, a public benefit that the state failed to provide. Participation of networks had typically avoided direct engagement within government although elements increased this direct engagement through protest and strikes culminating in mass street protest against the Mubarak regime. Similarly, charity is provided through this avenue as through organizations, except that through organizations there are a number of hurdles in their ability to legally provide charity and especially so after the 9/11 attacks. The concerns around human rights issues, particularly around the right to participate in the political process and self-determination have been central reasons for networks to form and grow. Because of many shared experiences and interests across different ideological groups, these networks are more readily able to bridge the various ideologies. While some networks form out of a specific concern or comprise a specific group thinking, such as Islamist, they are not limited to the goals of such. They increasingly overlap in common interests, especially in the context of greater repression. Of all the forms of collaboration in Egypt, human rights issues in the context of state repressive policies and the state’s inability to provide for its citizens more adequately were better articulated among networks. The bread riots started up by loosely formed groups and movements comprising the poor or students have developed into voicing concern over access to justice and the securing of rights to choose representatives by now more diverse groups – university professors, students and various others on the Egyptian street. For Bayat (1998), it is on the Egyptian street where people must express their concerns. Consequently, studying the transformative capabilities of networks

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within Egypt is crucial to a discussion of civil society in similar environments. The discourse of women on human rights violations and human dignity opens new opportunities for activism and mobilization that have an important impact on the shaping of ideas. Thus, this chapter queries how such networks affect civil society expansion by analyzing their discourses and modes of action. The dominant interest of ‘doing good’ that broadly guides the activities of networkers also empowers the marginalized and poverty-stricken outside the networks themselves. Another interest found among a small number of the case study networks was the securing of better conditions, and access to a social web for various personal psychological, material, and spiritual benefits. Consequently, the chapter asks how the networks of ‘good-doers’ contribute to the empowerment of the marginalized, and how their work may expand a civil society. It queries, too, how the networks that form to create better opportunities and access for participating members also involve an empowerment process and develop norms of civility.

Forms of Networking in the Egyptian Context In defining networks, Diani (2003) suggests beginning from the conventional view that refers to networks as ‘sets of nodes, linked by some form of relationship, and delimited by some specific criteria’. Nodes have been used to mean individuals, organizations, and other entities such as neighbourhoods or even states. They have, moreover, referred to events linked by persons or elements of speech (ibid.: 6, 7). Nodes may be linked directly, as, for example, when two individuals form explicit modes of interaction and interdependence. They may also be indirectly linked, e.g., when two separate organizations overlap in activities without direct collaboration. Nodes may be linked differentially according to terms of contents, emotional intensity and strength (ibid.: 7). The present forms of networking in Egypt have variants, some of which, I maintain, form the most effective means for civil society expansion and growth among alternatives, though some forms of networking will be at war with civil society. Most studies linking

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networks to civil society activity or social change discuss the effectiveness of networks by analyzing their structures (see, for example, Osa in Diani and McAdam 2003: Gould 1991). By elucidating the spectrum of networks through a few examples, I first briefly delineate which forms are not conducive to a civil society and then those which can be in terms of civility and purpose. Networking is the means used to pursue interests that are legal and otherwise. Anheier’s study (2003: 49, 50) elaborates this point in discussing the development of the Nazi movement, which, he argues, was formed not by isolated individuals, but more typically through persons who were part of an extended organizational network of the nationalist-militarist right wing, which challenged the legitimacy of the new political order. Della Porta’s work (in Diani 2003) argues the same point in relation to how networks formed the Italian left-wing underground organizations. Numerous works can also be found under the ‘terrorism’ rubric, expounding on those Islamist fringe networks that do not rule out terrorist acts to achieve their political aims. Networking is not inherently an act that is virtuous or civil and can, in fact, fall outside civil society activity. Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) initially sprouted out of students among the Ikhwan and rose to popularity during the 1960s. However, they were more influenced by the Indian/Pakistani Islamist organization, Jamaat-i-Islami, founded by Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi in 1941. As their message became more militant than the Ikhwan, the two organizations halted any collaboration. The Gama‘a has been blamed for more than 60 per cent of terrorist incidents in Egypt in recent years, including assassinations, bombings, shootings, and most of the attacks targeting tourists and foreigners (Absood 1995: 2). The Gama‘a is most notable for its attacks on tourists in predominantly tourist areas. Some of its main members have been released from prison after renouncing the group or its strategies; hence, it has not played any major role as a group. In recent years, smaller groupings or networks seeming to have no link to the Gama‘a or some of the other smaller extremist groups have appeared on the scene, although very little is known about them.3 In and outside Egypt, it is a crucial means for economic empowerment and distribution of funds. Islamists, among others, recruit and

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collect funds to fight what they refer to as the ‘occupiers’ of Iraq or Gaza. For social movements, activism does not stop at country borders. Their forms of networks extend transnationally. For instance, one could speak of a political economy of the Ikhwan in which thousands are positioned in the Arab Gulf States for the sake of the financial function of the group. These Egyptian Ikhwan members must pay 10 per cent of their income to the group, which can be used for projects in other countries as well as projects in Egypt. Such contributions will pay for, for example, clinics in Egypt, their services, overheads for da‘wa projects, funding students’ (of the group) graduate studies, even abroad in Europe and North America. Networks can comprise horizontal ties or vertical collaboration. Horizontal network ties, i.e. ties between nodes within the public sector (such as civil organizations or participants of relatively equal rank), are generally hailed as the means to the formation of social capital. In the literature, vertical collaboration often refers to ties of patronage, including ties to state actors or any person in a higher hierarchy of influence (Cinalli 2004). A typical manifestation in the Middle East, wasta, has taken on the intercessory meaning of a link between two or more persons, often of lower and higher ranks, by which a person, usually (though not always) of a lower rank, can achieve some personal benefit, such as a job position. The salient bases for such stratification will be based on military and political power, religious rank and lineage (Zubaida 1993: 85). Vertical ties in authoritarian contexts can be just as invaluable as destructive for the development of civil society. It is through vertical ties, some of the women of my study pointed out, that Suzanne Mubarak had taken control over some women’s organizations. In this way, the government is in a better position to set agendas and monitor the activities of a sector of civil society deemed consequential to politics. Vertical collaboration has been widely recognized as the cause of sometimes grossly unfair treatment. Inequality in access results when a particular individual or group has the most powerful official on their side in government or wasta. It is argued that other capable persons or groups find a barrier to resources, opportunities, or upward mobility. This form of collaboration has been credited for not only

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the economic sluggishness and widespread corruption in Egypt but the tens of billions of dollars that have been found to have accrued to Hosni Mubarak and several of his ministers. Speaking about the dangerous ramifications of wasta and favouritism, Qazzaz notes (2005), ‘There is an intricate relationship between corruption, favouritism, and WASTA, as they all create an atmosphere of mistrust because people will depend on personal and familial ties instead of qualifications and expertise in assuming public jobs’. Interviewees, including one highranking government official, were vehemently against favouritism and implemented ways in their every day life to go against the system of corruption. This official provided some stories about bribes that were offered routinely while he was in Mubarak’s government and, always to the shock of the person offering them, declined. These, thus, provide some comprehension of the durability of corruption in Egypt under the Mubarak regime. In these narrations was the theme that life has been hard because some bribes that were turned down harmed the individual and his family, and importantly, the relationships he would have otherwise developed between people in various positions. There are real calculations made on the part of individuals in terms of not only the benefits of corruption through wasta, but also the repercussions of not playing by the rules. The wife of this official was part of the interview and did not wholly agree with her husband’s stance against ‘the system’, as she called it. She explained his drive to fight corruption caused many problems in the family she was not prepared to deal with. For one example of many, during a meeting with Mubarak and other ministers and deputy ministers, when asked to comment on some aspect of the strategies of one of the ministries, he volunteered to tell the group: ‘The Ministry of Information is propagating the kind of media that urinates on the minds of the people. Our country is becoming backwards because of him.’ When Mubarak asked him to clarify more politely, he clarified with a ruder Egyptian Arabic swear word. He was subsequently excluded from further meetings that were otherwise part of his job, although he retained his post in name. He was, however, fired later in a similar setting for listing the corruption deals a number of ministers had made in recent years in addition to the

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women they were involved with (some known actresses) who benefitted from embezzlement of millions of dollars and bribery. Upon being fired, he in fact took six of these government officials to court (and during the Mubarak regime unsurprisingly lost all cases). On another occasion, when he stood up in a party with some ministers, known figures, and actresses and attempted to bring out some truths about the corruption of many present, although horrified, his wife found she had to step in to defend him. She was physically attacked by a wellknown belly dancer and suffered a heart attack – which changed her life considerably afterwards. Various international organizations and think tanks, such as the World Bank, had been voicing concerns about the level of corruption in developing states, such as Egypt, negatively impacting productivity, and invariably the confidence in financial projects (World Bank Group n.d.). Interviewees, laughingly or taking in a deep breath of exacerbated patience, explained the need for corruption. The police or common government worker’s salary is so low that the Mubarak government expected the practice of bribery. Consequently, I have witnessed or heard about various transactions in government spheres where cash was matter-of-factly handed over in exchange for the transaction to simply be executed. More cash was expected for the service or transactions to be speeded up. Such vertical collaboration had long become embedded within the political culture because it has been practiced on the most individual level in everyday life. As such, many had argued that life could not function without it. Though scholars argue that intercessory wasta furthers a person’s interests, and so harms the collective interest, Cunningham and Sarayrah (1994) have pointed out that among Middle Eastern states intercessory wasta is the norm, and that it functions as insurance for an individual’s social, psychological and economic wellbeing. Wasta is, indeed, a major part of life in Egypt. On one hand, networking through wasta occurs mostly with a lack of sense of social responsibility. On the other hand, self-interested action cannot be considered as inherently bad in cases where it does not threaten the opportunities, access to resources, or general happiness of other groups and individuals in society. Individuals can network through wasta for a variety of

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reasons beyond mere self-interest. Benefactors often require the help of individuals in important or strategic positions. Since wasta is, in effect, the norm, civil society work must sometimes be achieved via networking with those who can exert influence. One organizational leader (not among my case study sample) explained that without the ties the organization has to a few of the (then) ministers in government, the organization would have been shut down from the start. It is these ties that gave the organization immunity from what were perceived as more disastrous forms of intervention. In this particular organization, I was amused to see pictures of the organizational leader together with some of these state officials of Mubarak’s regime for one of their ceremonies hung on the wall of the main entrance. The visual symbol of collaboration used to pronounce that all activities are in the open and endorsed by government was especially surprising, given that this organization was not only Islamic; according to two other interviewees, its leader had ties to the Ikhwan – which had formed the most significant opposition in parliament. Importantly, odd groups can form under a network if shared goals exist. For example, Islamic organizations in Egypt collaborate with Ikhwan members or in fact relied on the group to initiate rallies, some of the protests, or gathering of funds for Gaza. Increasingly, secularists had also been utilizing these avenues in seeking the same ends. Comparatively few Ikhwan were initially on the streets when the wave of protests began in early 2011. It was largely initiated by the youth with various ideological leanings. However, when an estimated 350 Ikhwan were jailed during those street protests (http://www.manalaa.net/), some Islamic activists and secularists looked to El-Baradei, who returned to Egypt to take part in the protests, to keep people motivated. Networks that comprise the case study for activism in civil society development in Egypt normally include the nodes that represent individuals, the youth, university students and professors, organizations, groups, and syndicates. As such, we speak predominantly of networks of individuals in which individuals are loosely tied to one another. In other words, persons will maintain regular means of communication and interaction to produce a desired effect or attain a specific goal

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that all those who take part in maintaining their connection with one another share. They furnish their link to one another as individuals with common goals, not primarily as persons representing groups or organizations. At times, the nodes represent individuals connected to groups or organizations, as well as organizations collaborating with other organizations. Individual-based networks are utilized for the advancement of some kind of interest. Social movement networks whose activities fall outside the scope of civil society, such as those that advocate any form of violence, are not situated within this case study.

The Nature and Advantages of Participation within Networks Because there are so many different kinds of networks, their purpose for forming and actual activities can also differ substantially. Networks working for change work along much the same lines as organizations except that their focus can more readily be the state and, hence, their activities necessarily more confrontational. Often their reason for forming is to evade state scrutiny and, therefore, they do not direct any activity whatsoever towards the state or state representatives. In general, their focus is on providing charity and seeking to better the circumstances of their families, neighbourhoods and communities, as well as human rights issues and expression. Although some comprise women only, in general, networks in Egypt tend to incorporate participation with men to a much greater degree. The formation of a network can change considerably. The participants seek to accomplish tasks sometimes on an individual basis, with just two persons, a handful, dozens, or as representatives of specific organizations. For an example of those interviewed, a handful of women would collect clothing, gold jewellery (to eventually sell), and money for poor women who used the services of an organization of this study. They cooperated as individuals with that organization plus other organizations, usually together but sometimes with men, yet their network would be in a state of abeyance if other life circumstances called to its core members. As such, network size and object can shift.

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Networking between organizations can also shift in intensity considerably, although once they have cooperated have a sort of memorandum of understanding that can be recalled and activated at any time. For example, one organization provided assistance and advice to a newer organization that was in its early stages until the organization could run on its own with a larger number of participants who joined later. When management style proved to cause the new organization to suffer many months later, the leader of the longer-existing organization was called in not only for her management expertise but to actually run the organization for a period of time. The network’s goals can be followed through by one person and can easily involve dozens of individuals or the involvement of organizations at any given time. Many blogs that functioned as networks for protesters grew exponentially in hits and participants. Consequently, a network is not only fluid; it shrinks and can grow exponentially in a day, depending on the type of activity at a given moment. Most organizations, in fact, have developed out of networks. A spillover effect of networking is sometimes its development as a more solid form of organization. Several organizational leaders attested to this progression of their own organizations. Some started off with a few women discussing an idea over teas, pursuing their interests together in a loosely organized form and then applying for full recognition by the state. Almost all the organizations continued to grow in size and programmes, illustrating the potential of what a few women can eventually set in motion together. On the other hand, organizations joined into larger formations of networks across ideological spectrums when members quickly mobilized people to join their organizations’ protests against the Mubarak regime at the end of January 2011. Within the loose and even small structures, however, women participate in various ways that can have immediate effects. Some aims are to redress the forces that serve to place obstacles in way of women’s rights to equality and a ‘good’ life that affects women in particular. Others aim to produce change that offers freedom for women as embedded within marginalized groups, more generally. The main issues that networks are formed around are the securing of better economic conditions as the main component of empowerment, gaining equal rights to

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men, and freeing themselves, their families and their country from the repressive Mubarak regime. While the majority of women do not use social media or new technology in their struggles for greater empowerment and rights in Egypt, nonetheless, the use of emerging technology by women as such strategies is proving significant. Women strive to better their economic situations. These forms of organizing often comprise survival strategies to meet basic needs and secure their ‘bread and butter’. A prime example, as will be described in the next section for its empowering effects, is the formation of gam‘iyat. This networking practice occurs among mostly poor women to better their economic situations. Singerman (1995) also found that the practice of gam‘iyat among the sha‘b is an indispensable tool for bettering one’s conditions. Such examples take on added value when one considers that even charity organizations operate predominantly in neighbourhoods that are not comprised of the very poor (Clark 2004; UNDP 2008). According to the 2008 Human Development Report, 70 per cent of registered organizations are found in urban governorates. Although the practice was observed – and documented by other researchers – predominantly in poorer areas, it is not only the poor who attempt to better their conditions or status through practicaloriented activities. The forming of gam‘iyat is an old Arabic practice exercised by upper, middle, and lower classes. Through networks, women are taking practical steps to defy laws that govern their lives. The literature on rational choice articulates the view that people will calculate the cost of activism and opt not to participate in an activity that will cost them too much (see, for example, Klandersman 1997; Oberschall 1993). Many women do not want government to intervene in their lives as intervention can be heavy-handed in authoritarian contexts. Calculations are warranted. Yet such works are unhelpful in explaining participation in collective action in high-risk activities (Loveman 1998: 480). Women take part in networking initiatives because they sometimes desire to see more direct and immediate change that they are fully aware organizations cannot afford to push for. Thus, it is often a tactical calculation for action that can involve risk of injury and to a woman’s life. For example, two of the lead mobilizers of the Mahallah labour protests

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in 2008, including political activist Esraa Abdel Fattah, helped organize women and men at the end of January 2011 uprisings (Slate 2011). Indeed, those killed by the Mubarak security forces during the mass protests included women. It is thus essential to understand what forms of consciousnesses promote women’s participation in networks. McAdam (1992) argues the most important variable in participation studies that is largely ignored is gender. The collective experience and recognition of marginalization may result in higher activism levels among women who tackle gender specific discrimination (see, for example, Krause 2004). In Egypt, this consciousness is a significant part of women’s organizing, as seen in the organizations of this study. A female consciousness is also essential for women to empower themselves through the sharing of experiences, as is discussed among several blogs. However, among the very poor who initiate ways of bettering their conditions and among those who face extreme levels of government repression, there is a higher percentage of women participating with men. It is essential to also study how and why consciousnesses shift. Significant for such study, a collective identity for women does not mean that all women will sympathize with women who suffer discrimination. Women of different classes and affiliations have different priorities and interests. For example, an interviewee told me that when speaking to the (former) First Lady, Suzanne Mubarak, during the Mubarak rule, she was asked what the most pressing problem in Egypt was. The interviewee narrated that she answered that it was of course, poverty, to which Mrs Mubarak stated that the most pressing problem facing Egyptians was the disputes between Christians and Muslims in Egypt.4 The interviewee commented that either the (former) President’s wife is entirely disconnected from the masses or she has an agenda to divert from the real issues. During her husband’s rule, Mrs Mubarak had also stated that what women most needed was education and the most effective way to address the issue would be to open a library and distribute books through her Million Books Initiative. Interviewees decried that this statement and move to open a library had nothing to do with women’s real concerns and pointed out that the library (named after herself)

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remains empty of people who desperately need their concerns met. The opening of such a library would address women’s concerns but the point is that these concerns might comprise a tiny fraction of women (and men) among the English-speaking tourists who go there and among the Egyptian elite who have ample time to transport themselves to the library to browse books – not to forget the ability to read. Other interviewees have been quick to point out that other activities of hers (for which she had also received awards for her ‘contributions’) illustrate the profound unwillingness of the Mubaraks to address the real concern of poverty and their pronounced interest to concerns of the elite. Identity will be a factor in activism level. However, what functions as a motivator is probably a combination of gender solidarity, a religiously held or moral obligation, or what Loveman (1998: 492) refers to as ‘prosocial’ collective action and identity, after Martín-Baró, in which commitment to community or greater good outweighs individual needs. Similarly, identity within networking in Egypt often includes a woman-consciousness but the orientation of activism is predominantly towards securing rights for the poor and politically marginalized, which includes women, men and their families, among sometimes people of different ideological leanings. Hence, any discussion on women’s activism in Egypt and the wider Middle East must acknowledge a greater level of cooperation between genders in the shared struggle for basic rights and freedoms. Networking thus becomes a central avenue to address pressing issues that are simultaneously felt by men and always affect the entire society. Poverty and government repression are experienced by both men and women. As an expert in the field asserted, studies on gender bias and women’s activism often neglect the fact that under such dire circumstances women will usually participate with men with much greater force. It is within such concerted efforts that prove successful because their strengths are combined to build a larger force to contend with and the issues they are addressing are exposed to affect an entire society. Women’s issues are always society’s issues. Greater levels of participation can be achieved quickly among networkers because networking is supported through a structure of social

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ties and informal modes of recruitment. The incentive of opportunities for socialization is a technique implemented by some networkers to get women involved in charitable work or protest activities. Typically, sweets and tea are offered when women get together to discuss issues of concern and strategies of action and a cordial atmosphere is maintained in which a newcomer such as myself can feel very welcome and a sense of belonging. An upper-middle-class interviewee described how much she looked forward to such meetings, usually held in hotels, for the food and opportunity to reconnect with those she had been active with in other organizations and work. Such means of maintaining ties for cooperation could involve tea or dinners that last several hours. Outward social ties are crucial for a network’s growth. As Gould has argued (2005: 236), ‘If there are obstacles standing between sympathizing and participating, or between feeling neutral and sympathizing, a social relationship with someone who is already a participant helps to overcome them’. However, participatory growth is enabled through a number of techniques. People within a network do not necessarily know each other. Funds, for example, are collected through personal contacts, but also the contacts of those personal contacts can be called upon. Participants are motivated to action through word of mouth, by phone, or frequently by SMS (mobile texting). Word of mouth includes people discussing a problem or expressing the need to collect funds to solve a problem. Friends or a core network of individuals will widen their circle of contacts to people they trust or people they have contacted previously for help. Contacts are maintained for future utilization, and hence, a larger network of individuals is established. Significantly, contacts for the building of networks are sought within associations. Through Twitter, a participant in an organization can simply send out any request for collaboration, foodstuff, or information, and receive a response within a minute. Within an association that is established for specific purposes, people will be confident to approach other participants or individuals using the services of the organization to contribute money or actions to a cause similar to that of the association. Often when a person agrees to participate in some effort, she has proved she can be counted on to work in the way of helping others or taking part

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in protest, and her contact will be put into a database as on a mobile phone and consequently added to a network. The person then receives phone calls, or more usually SMSs, with updates on future projects. Such informal modes are effective because people need not make a conscious decision to choose a particular organization to participate, yet remain connected through an often impersonal lifeline that can be activated at any time for whatever pressing issue that arises beyond the regular activities of a core membership. Furthermore, while these avenues of connecting are still a privilege of the wealthier, activists confirm that they now connect to the very poor. Indeed, I have seen activists in poor areas connected to the World Wide Web through high-tech devices. Newly emergent technologies provide a lifeline to which individuals may stay connected and be informed of quickly developing news. Significantly, they share views, problems, challenges and eventually goals. Networking through ‘blogging’ is a mode of action executed by numerous networks in Egypt5 mostly to share ideas and information whereas Facebook and Twitter have taken prominence in spreading news fast. Twitter functions especially for motivating and mobilization. According to Alaa Abd El Fatah (http://www.manalaa.net/), a well-known Egyptian blogger, when blogging began to take off in Egypt, well under a decade ago, over 70 per cent of bloggers were women; now they are just over 50 per cent. All these avenues may be used by well-known protesters connected to a potential force for protest as has been illustrated through the mobilization of protesters, especially beginning 2011 when protesters hit the streets, some claiming that they were part of a transnational movement as spurred by their links in Tunisia. Networks of women use these avenues to advance a variety of interests or simply enter discussion on a variety of issues. Typical topics some women’s blogs cover are religion, halal/ haram, dua’s/prayer, the need or need not to wear hijab, international news, advertisements, stories, cooking, the definition of feminism, lesbianism, and significantly government repression. These places for connecting and self-expression are becoming the most precious avenues for protest movements. The government has normally tolerated these avenues and allowed them to function. However,

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during the escalation of protests starting at the end of January 2011, in which millions took to the streets of all major cities in Egypt, burning police stations, police cars and demanding freedom from government repression, the government blocked the social media activities, such as the airing of Al Jazeera, that attacked the government. Such a move on the part of the Mubarak government indicated the force it knew it was contending with. During this time, one activist who called for Egyptians to take to the streets claimed he had over 300 million hits on his Facebook in a single day, mostly by people from outside Egypt (Al Jazeera News, 28 January 2011). These newly-emergent avenues proved to be literally a lifeline for many Egyptians when these modes of expression were taken away by the Mubarak government. Common people who were not particularly protest-oriented turned angry. Furious teenagers were interviewed on news programmes, and a young woman made an international cry to hackers to hack into the Egyptian government for people to get their rights back to express themselves and connect with the world. As such, these forums for discussion of mundane and everyday interests where users once showed little consideration for government repression or struggles of the poor can quickly be absorbed into larger linkages that form the networks of protest and expression of discontent. The encompassing and activating potential of networking is probably one of the most important aspects of the power these newly emergent forums accrue to the people that the Mubarak government failed to comprehend. Thus, the significance of these forums is that they offer women a discursive space to discuss issues of concern. Although repression and poverty are main issues women express, in addition, they find that these avenues are instrumental to discuss issues that are taboo or sensitive. Many use women’s blogs to express themselves anonymously. Discrimination against women takes a greater focus than in many of the organizations and it often takes a dimension that includes a shared concern among women in the Arab world. One blog has at one point included 200 women collectively calling themselves Kolena Leila (We are all Laila) (since 2006) (http://laila-eg.blogspot.com/) as an empowerment initiative and each actively taking part in discussing numerous issues affecting women, such as the role of feminism and what it

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means to common Egyptian women. Mothers and grandmothers have discussed their lives and their struggles as women in Egypt through this blog, which was nominated by Deutsche Welle for ‘Best Weblog’. These avenues are used to discuss issues that are taboo or ignored in society, such as sexual harassment. Interviews have brought to light that sexual harassment on the streets is a growing problem but that it is not an issue that is taken seriously by the state or men in society. Nermeena Idris, among one of the longest existing female Egyptian bloggers (since 2005) (http://nerro.wordpress.com/), asked people to provide suggestions on her blog on how to deal with harassment. She soon used her blog to call for a silent protest in which women were to wear black and hold a sign demanding an end to the sexual harassment that has been growing on the streets of Cairo. However, the ‘Girl from Cairo’ started her own blog after she experienced a gang attack (2006) that comprised an incident in which several women were sexually attacked on the streets of Cairo and the government denied it had happened (http://woundedgirlfromcairo.blogspot. com/). An informal coalition has since been formed to bring more attention to the long-concealed problem of harassment in Egypt. Her blog spurred the start of several other blogs, including by men, to address the increasing problem of street attacks on women. As a result, registered women’s organizations have since taken the issue more seriously in their programmes to offer awareness raising and related campaigns. These women bloggers are attempting to make it a serious issue by using online avenues and engaging not only women but men, and have seen some fruits of their work. Specifically, networks provide an avenue through which women can express the discontent with the oppressive sources that they could not voice in the same manner within their organizations. In other words, their tactics change by recourse to these spheres of communication. For example, Dalia Ziada (co-author of A Modern Narrative for Muslim Women in the Middle East: Forging a New Future and blogging since 2006) uses Twitter and Facebook for her activism and also used her blog to express discontent directly with the Mubarak government in her discussion under the key entitled ‘Democracy: Egypt’s Mission Impossible’: Egypt is not a hybrid state that inhibits both democratic and authoritarian practices. It is a centralized dictatorship that has

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been abusing democracy for decades to protect the authoritarian regime and the corrupt government on the expense of people’s rights and liberties. Egypt is considered a living example of Zakaria’s concept of illiberal democracy. As such, women’s networks are contributing to the pressing issues within Egypt that organizations have also identified but cannot address in direct terms because of fear of state repression. Nora Younis also uses various online avenues to stay informed and participate with others. On her blog (http://norayounis.com/), she gives voice to people in Palestine who narrate everyday struggles and repression and provides her thoughts on dictatorship in general, and the Mubarak dictatorship in Egypt in particular. Blogging obviously does not ensure immunity from state repression, and as Ziada says on her blog, her friend, Al-Azhar student Kareem Amer, was jailed and sentenced for four years for allegedly ‘defaming the Egyptian president and disdaining Islam on his blog!’ (http://daliaziada.blogspot.com/). As such, when women speak out on their blogs, many are taking enormous risks. Women do not necessarily use networks over established organizations but may turn to this avenue when engaging in a discourse specifically on government repression. These women do not want to compromise the work of the organizations in which they work. At the same time, because each organization promises on its founding never to take part in what are called ‘political’ activities by government, the women are not permitted by government and by their organizations to participate in the way of confronting the state. The interview described earlier that was stopped promptly when I asked if their activism was political is illustrative of a deep fear the women have of any activity being associated with what is deemed ‘political’. Women nonetheless demonstrate that they lead the way in taking risks to confront rights issues affecting women, their children and their society. Indeed, women have taken advantage of social media and new technology to take part in more protest-oriented elements and then return to activism within parameters set within their organizations.

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It is within such forums for protest-oriented forms of activism that women used the discourse of democracy as a way of demanding the rule of law, expansion of public space, recognition of political liberties, and the ability to organize as groups to express discontent with repressive laws. Because of the ability of networks to tackle various problems of concern and people bringing to them their unique skills, such means for activism will often not stop when a project has been completed or a particular task finished. As such, this form of organizing provides activists a forum for tackling issues in many ways that organizations cannot.

Constructing Empowered Selves through Networking Through many of the networks, an empowered self was constructed when women learned to stand up to oppressive structures and forms of dominance that embraces the power to pursue the ‘good’ life. This construction enables women to realize and work upon their ‘power with’ each other using ‘power from within’ which translates into a distribution of power throughout society. Women are developing a consciousness or awareness that women (and men) have the power to better their conditions, and that that can be acted upon. Consequently, through acting on the power that each woman has, they are in the process of enabling an empowerment process in various ways. Many are facilitating a process of developing a discourse among individuals, state actors, and media in which concerns over basic needs and rights may be articulated. Economic empowerment through networking within a community or family is less tangible than has been documented within studies on Latin America among communities, yet represents also a major area in which women seek to better their conditions and that of those who are dependent upon them. The reason for this is perhaps the function of the extended family that exists to a greater degree in the Middle East as compared to Latin America where networks and collaboration for economic empowerment will normally encompass individuals living within a short distance from each other. In the cases in Egypt that I have observed, networking among a handful of individuals has

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predominantly been within extended families whose help will be carried to a nearby village in which the family members live and perhaps have requested assistance. Such examples where a family member sets a relative up with a small business abounded in the field. However, as the extended family comprises the theoretical private sphere, little attention has been given to the functions of the extended family within civil society or the economy. One strategy akin to a small business is to stash gold as prices hopefully rise. In poor areas, one may be shocked to perhaps stumble upon women who attest they actually have gold jewellery in their homes. When one such woman informed me of her stash, looking at her unadorned arms, chest, and ears I had to ask the obvious question as to why then she did not wear any of them. She leaned towards me so that I could better view her ear that showed a tiny scar. She narrated that when she was two years old someone in her neighbourhood ripped the gold earrings she was wearing off and ran away with them. She asserted that it is simply too dangerous to walk around with jewellery although at the same time it is embarrassing to appear without any. I learned that accumulating gold was an investment scheme that was in fact one of the most popular in poor neighbourhoods. Some of the women who took part in one of the organizations in this study used their gold as collateral for the loans they took to start small businesses. While some can afford to scrape together some savings to buy a larger amount of gold, it is often the case that the gold bought is really nothing to boast about; but it accumulates. By putting any money into the form of gold, women said they were forced not to spend money that they would need more crucially for something else – major and sudden expenses are expected. The saving was there should a family member become ill and the hospital bill need to be paid immediately or should a daughter marry and the family’s side of the bargain for furniture need to be met. Since the extended family is factored in as part of the essential network, the gold was there more or less for whoever needed it – a favour that would be returned. Indeed, even gift giving could comprise a means for economic security among one’s network of friends, relatives or wasta. I have observed

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the practice of gift giving as instrumental for survival among the very poor and among wealthy Egyptian women, as well. Like anywhere else, Nadia (not her real name) would naturally give gifts for the occasions that required gift giving. However, she had a list that she kept safe detailing each family member or friend she had given a gift to and the occasion. Beside each gift, she wrote the price it cost or was worth. In just the same way, for each gift she received she wrote the name of the person who gave the gift and the estimated price of the gift. I learned from a few other women that they did the exact same thing – for gifts given and gifts received. They were proud, too, of what they attested was a skill in estimating the worth of a present received. The purpose of this balance sheet is to keep track of what is owed on both sides. What is owed comprises either a liability or a security deposit. In other words, the women who were responsible for gift giving within their families formed a sort of banking system that was updated. This system entailed that a list of ‘participants’ were down on paper as part of this type of network. The one who was expected to give could be reminded before an upcoming occasion, or in cases if the need was great enough – usually subtly. Normally, a reminder is not required. What was interesting was that Nadia bought a gift for a person she received a gift from at some point in recent history worth the exact same amount. What is beneficial in this system is that during times of greater affluence, gift giving can be more generous (in case of new occasions among non-family members or wasta) for the times when money will be scarce. However, I have also seen gift giving to the persons who act as wasta, especially in times of greatest need. That this system may be practiced by some does not detract from the fact that many people who give may also give without accounting nor does it mean that those who take part in the system are incapable of generosity. Acts of generosity also abounded among those who practiced this form of material securitization. A network of women practiced the gam‘iyat on a regular basis as far back as they could remember. Each member pitched in an amount of money each month and a rotation was followed in which a member would collect from the pool of money and buy something for her household. In another gam‘iyat comprising sisters of a family,

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each of them had families themselves, and each pitched in what she could afford. Among the four sisters it was common that one sister would pitch in a little more than another and much more than two other sisters. During an earlier phase, the other sister would pitch in the largest amount and in yet an earlier phase one of the poorest sisters, who was the eldest, had initially been in the financially more able position to offer more to the pool. As such, this gam‘iyat was the lifeline for the extended family and kept alive by the women of the households based on economic ability and need, securely in place for a few decades. Moreover, into the concept of gam‘iyat is added the sharing of other commodities beyond money – time. As previously mentioned, women in a very poor area took turns looking after all the other women’s children who comprised the gam‘iyat so that each could work. Their salaries would never be enough to put their children in daycare. In some poor neighbourhoods, secular and Islamic organizations ran daycares for women with low incomes; however, it is my observation, as backed up by the 2008 Human Development Report, that such a set up that can be depended on to continue functioning is rare to find in the very poor areas for women with such low incomes. Networks, as such, are created for personal advantage. However, including such forms of activity into civil society action for the empowerment of women is important. As Carr, Chen and Jhabvala argue (1996: 215), ‘economic empowerment’ involves changes in power relationships in both the economic sphere as an input and in the social and political spheres as an output. As Anne Phillips stresses (n.d.), the study of political inclusion among western feminists entirely neglects economic and social inclusion ‘as if challenging the indifference to gender difference or raising the proportion of women in politics is itself enough of a change’. Systems such as the gam‘iyat that serve to provide a group of women more financial power thereby serve to empower women with more financial decision-making power and freedom. And with an empowerment process occurring here, civil society expansion is closely linked to issues concerning the ‘quality of life’ (Loizos 1996: 51) and remedying of the financial disparity often found not just between the two genders but, for example, between very poor

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and the poor families. Phillips is right to note that in many developing countries there is widespread retreat from redistributive policies. This is particularly acute in Egypt. She thus argues, that it is essential that the economic change that is occurring through redistributive strategies is included in the study of political change. As Singerman argues (1995: 3), ‘Far from being unimportant, politically apathetic, or acquiescent, popular classes under authoritarian regimes engage in a range of activities that have political import and aggregate power for collective benefit’. Empowerment results through the sharing of the skills and resources that each member brings to the network. In some organizations, a person might have a specific role in which she will manoeuvre, especially if a person is in a paid position. A person in a network will also take on certain roles that are particular to her skills. These skills include educational background, for example, law degrees, media studies, computer skills, or public speaking aptitude. However, because the roles are also fluid, individuals are provided opportunities to switch roles and seek the advice of their networkers on how to use the skills that are taken into the network. In her blog with the banner ‘My blog is a way to remind myself that I am not alone’, Ziada finds comfort through the contributions of others that she shares the same struggles as other women. Providing a forum for shared experiences, she enables women the ability to exercise ‘power with’ each other to grow, learn, endure, and find strategies to make changes. Such online forums provide a crucial avenue for women to build a sense of community and belonging as a basis for empowering each other, especially when they cannot talk to anyone in their immediate vicinity about taboo topics. They enable the personal to have political consequences. From such a basis of shared experience, women find the strength to exercise their ‘power to’ challenge oppressive societal norms and repressive policies and provide awareness among other women and men of these oppressive forces that affect all. Among the various possibilities, this occurs through discourse formation started on these blogs and the rallying of individuals to take to the streets to express their grievances.

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As such, when women collaborate together to empower others they effect a cumulative process which leads to their own empowerment. Importantly, one of the most common expressions of significant change from the women’s own perspective is their new lack of fear and their new-found ability to speak out at all levels so as to share problems, make demands, negotiate and bargain, and participate in public speaking and decision-making. (Carr, Chen and Jhabvala 1996: 218) When women collaborate, share skills and experiences and enter a learning process together, they ‘discipline the self’ to be productive agents of civil society. Moreover, they strengthen themselves as a cohesive group, and with their solidarity establish a stronger voice with which to contest. Hence, they are a more powerful force as civil society actors. The strategies implemented by many of the women in their online networking endeavours include references to Islamic obligations and the right to fulfil these, or human rights frameworks. Expression through Islamic feminism is part of these women’s strategy to secure legitimacy as is sometimes crucial in a patriarchal society if these women expect to realistically push change. In such expression, these women demonstrate strategies of linking into the dominant discourses by working from the inside, not from the outside. As Cheriet points out (1997: 17), because human rights issues and empowerment of women and marginalised groups form such contested discourses, as found in international forums such as the Beijing conference, empowerment must be demanded and pursued from within, forged in debates, conflict and consensus if social change benefiting women is to be achieved. It is often the case that dominant discursive traditions change most effectively through actors who link their frames to orthodoxy. Charles Tilly (1998: 501) describes the effect of ongoing conversations that occur between social movement actors: Conversation in general shapes social life by altering individual and collective understandings, by creating and transforming

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social ties, by generating cultural materials that are then available for subsequent social interchange, and by establishing, obliterating, or shifting commitments on the part of participants. As such, a human rights discourse is also constructed within the Islamic discursive tradition. However, as with any discursive tradition the Islamic has many voices and the tradition itself will shift with added discourses. Within her blog, Dalia Ziada expresses her discontent with Saudi Arabia’s limitations placed on Muslim women’s ability to fulfil an Islamic obligation that includes pilgrimage to Mecca. She asks, Do you know what a male chaperone is? A first-degree male relative: father, brother, husband, or son! I am in a big trouble, then. My father is dead, my two brothers are not interested and I cannot afford to pay for their tickets. I do not have a husband and of course I do not have a son! What can I do, now? (http:// daliaziada.blogspot.com/) Significant for change among particular discursive traditions, Dalia steps out of the norm for Islamic feminists by not using religious scripts to argue the right to practice her religion. Rather, she facilitates a discussion grounded in an international human rights discourse of equality and discontentment with state repression of religious duty. It should be pointed out that the small fraction of female networkers who use new technology as their preferred mode of participation to address state repression and inequality between genders, among various concerns, are usually, although not exclusively, from the upper middle and upper classes in Egypt. Hence, a more international frame of references guides most blogs discussing rights. As their personal information indicates on many of their blogs, many of these women have received a western education either abroad or within Egypt. It is mostly a distinct layer of society that engages in discourse formation online or the ‘public sphere’. While most women do not feel they are pursuing strategic feminist goals, the networks that challenge norms and laws that govern their

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lives and the marginalized, which also comprise men, do serve to contribute to a discourse that puts long-held beliefs that sustain discriminatory and oppressive laws into question. These women are able to do so not because they necessarily address the bias in laws, but because they contribute to change on the individual, social and state levels. As such, even the women whose discourse does not revolve around state laws but pursue greater rights within the home and community directly and indirectly challenge dominant forces that affect them. However, there are those women who assert that they have had enough with discrimination and repression. Those women who directly challenge state rule also pursue greater rights that affect all; yet, their participation is often underestimated. Certainly, the 25 January revolution could not have succeeded without women. As the Russian revolutionary leader V.I. Lenin (in Freedom Socialist Party: April, 2011) had also once emphasized: ‘The experience of all liberation movements has shown that the success of a revolution depends on how much the women take part in it.’ Few blogs and other social media covered the activities of women during protests, such as the ‘Women of Egypt’ Facebook page. Estimations by protestors of women’s actual numbers in the partaking of uprisings have varied between 20 and 40 per cent. The numbers would vary depending upon risks of imprisonment, injury and the threat to loss of life at different times during the period of uprising in January and February 2011. Although sexual harassment of women has been an increasing concern in Egypt, protesters attest to the ability of women to protest and sleep in blankets or tents with unprecedented respect displayed by their male counterparts. The risks were yet immense. One interviewee who took part in the protests stated that she and her family knew of people who were killed in the Square and even those shot dead by snipers who were watching the scene on Tahrir Square from their balconies. Another interviewee described that he held a dying man in his arms shot with bullets who stood beside him on two separate occasions. Indeed, Sally Zahran is among the women killed when she was brutally and fatally clubbed. Another interviewee, who wore cardboard fastened to his head on the day the police entered the Square on horses and camels, described the stones thrown at them as man-made sharp concrete. He got badly

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injured from one of them. Not all families allowed women of the family to attend the protests at the height of violent clashes and attacks; every peaceful protest was actually responded to with violence. Despite enormous risks, many women protested. In fact, before 25 January, women organized women and advised on how to protect themselves from harassment by the street thugs and Mubarak’s police, such as with tying hijabs firmly, wearing extra layers of clothing or carrying Mace, and spread through word of mouth, SMS and tweets. Women were determined to take part. As mentioned, political activist Esraa Abdel Fattah helped organize women and men in the beginning of the uprisings (Slate 2011). Asmaa Mahfouz played a lead role two weeks before the 25th when she called Egyptians through social media to stand up to Mubarak and went to Tahrir Square with two others yelling at the top of their voices for people to protest with her on the 25th, as she also explains in a Youtube video. On the day of the Battle of the Camel women, including old women, carried rocks to the protesters who were attacked with rocks. At night several women banged on a large wall made up of metal sheets, which protesters attest was crucial at the time to make it sound like their numbers were much larger than they really were. Her plea to the masses was to be fearless. As a female protester explained: Women like men were shot dead in the demonstrations, women faced the tear gas with the men, female doctors and nurses helped in Tahrir curing the injured of the camel battle led by Mubarak and his gang. They remained in Tahrir for many days and nights, slept in tents and inside the mosques; they faced what men faced to overthrow Mubarak. (interviewee) Similar to protests which women led in Chile and Argentina during dictatorship, Egyptian women who lost their children were counted among those who took to the Square in desperate resolve to stand against a force so cruelly repressive against its own people. Blogger Leil-Zahra Mortada risked imprisonment when she persisted in reporting the events of the protests. Women in Egypt proved that protesting for empowerment from government violence and decades of repression was worth the risk.

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The roles women played involved not just organizing and taking part in the protests but also tending to the wounded, administering medicine, distributing food and from home supporting family members who took part in the protests, sometimes day and night. In trying to capture and bring awareness to the important roles women do play, the few sites and tweets that enabled viewing women who took part in the uprisings also often neglected to show all facets of women’s participation. Attending to the injured was also a significant role among those committed to the cause of freedom, as another interviewee’s participation illustrates: ‘We stitched them, wrapped, and bandaged them up and sent them straight back out to protest.’ This interviewee’s objective and acts also provides an insight that participants who nurtured perceived the protests as critically important and each person’s role as crucial, akin to a battle. Importantly, empowerment in such acts is of the whole, not only women. Feminine acts, such as these involving nurturing, must also be included as the interviewees saw their roles as indispensible and part of the whole. As the previous interviewee describes: ‘In Tahrir people were polite, men did not abuse women, they fought together for freedom, justice, equality and human dignity. People were nice to each other; women proved they are vital to any movement of progress or renaissance.’

How can Networks Construct the Civil Self? Do these networks contribute to civility? This can be determined through analyzing the main values of civility – tolerance, trust, reciprocity and cooperation. This is determined in individual acts, interaction between members and between other networks and organizations. A significant step towards developing an ethos of civility, however, is constructing civil selves. The majority of networking in Egypt takes on the same characteristics as the Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations in sharing the same objectives of securing bettered conditions in the context of poverty, lack and disadvantage. Indeed, the Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations participate with networks due to overlapping interests and identified needs. Their struggles are characterized by ‘positive’ activism as they circumvent

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power structures by persisting in doing ‘good’ or khair in reproductive and productive capacities. In pursuing their interests for justice, however, other networkers’ strategies become normatively resistance oriented or ‘negative’ oriented. This form of activism grew exponentially and became indispensible for overthrowing the Mubarak regime. The various means by which networkers pursue their interests produce effects on the development of the self, civil society and change differentially. As discussed earlier, the Islamic women’s and secular feminist organizations of this study also link into networkers and prove networking capacities between other organizations. Such collaborations offer examples of the achievement of tolerance and better understanding of the other since, significantly, there is cooperation between PVOs of different ideologies. Where the PVOs cooperated across ideological spectrums, greater tolerance is a natural by-product. Such networking also enables co-dependence and cooperation between the different religious affiliations especially. Three of the five secular PVOs network with at least 100 other PVOs. The main objective of one was to create a massive network between PVOs all around the country. The director of another PVO detailed examples where the organization had gone to great lengths to understand smaller women’s associations so that efforts could be coordinated. Networking was seen in further examples where if one of the case study organizations had received donations in-kind that were more than what it needed, it would give the extra to a PVO it maintained ties with. In such a case, such reciprocity had usually been sustained between the network of PVOs for some time. Another interesting example was in terms of funding. In one PVO, I learned that a person had actually been hired on a part-time basis to form a network to collect donations. This network brought in a stable source of funding through establishing links with wealthy contacts. Some had never even heard of the organization previously or even set foot in the PVO, yet they donated a fixed amount monthly. This and other PVOs pursued establishing networks through friends or colleagues. Such networks, as Singerman’s study demonstrates, could become vast. Trust and reciprocity form an important basis for the strength and growth of such networking.

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In the interests of helping others and securing democratic rights, women do not focus on the moral aspirations of ideology as they might continue to do in any respective organization of which they are a part. This occurs when women have already established their cooperation on the basis of pursing common objectives. The Kefaya movement in which women and men collaborate to secure the right of self-determination illustrates shifts to this frame as a more immediate concern. Through interviews with Kefaya members, it became apparent that participants have often extremely different ideological views, despite the literature glossing over the existing differences. However, it is through this shift, demanded not always by preference or ideological openness but by the premise of participation, that participants develop the capacities to embrace tolerance. Tolerant selves, hence, are a by-product of these individuals’ participation. In many instances, the construction of tolerant selves took place within discourses on the elevation of people to better opportunities, standard of living, or fair access to resources and rights. The emphasis on the themes of human rights and personal freedoms of the oppressed illustrates a kind of civil society capability, or in Shils’ (1992) words, ‘civil politics’, that organizations are often handicapped in doing. A socialization process occurs through these networks in which new participants are introduced to an ethos that places value on human rights and freedom from oppression. This process is achieved though framing the situation of the people they help or the issue they are challenged with within language that attaches meanings of oppression and injustice. Somers (cited in Passy 2003: 24) explains that this framing occurs through the use of symbols, rituals, or narratives that build and solidify identities among these actors. These actors find themselves embedded in a structure which creates or solidifies political consciousness towards a given issue (ibid.). This solidified consciousness and solidarity cannot be created without a discourse. In engaging in this discourse, new participants become aware of what it means to achieve freedom and dignity. Furthermore, this solidified consciousness and solidarity cannot be created without a structure built on trust, cooperation and tolerance. But as Passy further points out, trust already plays an important role

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when newcomers join a network because they take the initial step to partake in a network due to the trust they have in the networkers with which they already have social ties (ibid.: 37). What can be further noted in this regard is that already existing identities form a partial basis for this trust even when the social ties are weak. For example, among the Islamic-oriented networkers women would speedily commit to networks because they trusted that the network’s members shared the same ideological perspectives towards particular issues. Similarly, women who had aspirations for advancing human rights causes could readily join a network which fought along these lines because there is an implicit trust that working together for such noble causes is worth the risk. It is essential to emphasize that networks usually involve the cooperation of both sexes. Thus, an evaluation of women’s ability to develop ‘civil selves’ must encompass networks that are not necessary formed by a consciousness of women as a group. Although some of the online networks discussed issues of equality with men or addressed the difficulty in getting men (or the state) to take their concerns seriously, the issues that women sought to address comprised much more. Hence, within networks women initiated or participated in, the women rely on the skills and resources that men can offer. Indeed, collaboration with men is stronger among networks than in other forms of collaboration studied in this project. Beyond a cooperative consciousness in addressing issues that affect women, such inclusivity can enable greater efficiency. Whether between ideological groups or men and women, sharing in struggle against systemic forms of oppression, whether embodied in state laws or poverty, also establishes closer friendships among those people networkers participate closely with. As such, standing together, especially taking risks together, in struggle against shared notions of oppression, produces rewards and fulfilment from which empowered and civil selves emerge. The achievement of goals rests squarely on modes of collaboration among the participants. This, however, does not mean that empowerment and civility cannot result from participation that is directed to practical and immediate goals of an inward nature among the poor. This is particularly

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true for networks whose focus is on practical issues that directly affect the participants themselves as a group. So, for example, the women who direct their efforts to establish links among themselves, including within familial boundaries, for example, with the practice of a gam‘iyat, make reciprocity a goal in itself. An ethos of reciprocity builds the structure of a network and defines who is in. Who gives and receives forms part of the network. Yet, by establishing an ethos of reciprocity, the lifeline of access to material and social benefits is ensured. As such, developing reciprocity among these individuals is a value that serves the survival and benefit of those who can sometimes be severely materially deprived. As such, even the most basic expressions of reciprocity and cooperation are key features of any network, and thus a variable in a network’s ability to expand civil society.

Conclusions Networking has several benefits. An increasing number of studies support my observation that networking sometimes becomes the more effective means for participation, and especially within repressive environments (ibid.; Osa 2003 ibid.; Loveman 1998; Opp and Gern 1993). Although the organizations of this research serve to ground principles of democracy within the private and the public, they have limited capacity to directly tackle issues related to government repression because they easily suffer increased scrutiny by the state, with an example of the Mubarak regime. The interventionist powers of the Mubarak regime have demonstrated in numerous ways that there was the fear among organizations of being shut down, punished or co-opted. Consequently, when individuals exchanged ideas through the discourses they subscribe to and collaborate through loosely formed relations, they form an important sector. The modes of participation through new technologies that they resort to has in fact illustrated the enormous power they can amass to act as a buffer against the state in the case of the wide protests and demonstrations directed at the Egyptian state under Mubarak in early 2011. Numerous individuals themselves attested to the power they acquired through Facebook, Twitter, SMS and the new media to organize against the Egyptian state.

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All the goals the women of the networks pursue, whether practical or objective-oriented, are significant actions for the evaluation of civil society. Many of their actions serve to mitigate inequalities and help themselves in some cases, and others in most cases, in their quest to rise above oppressive structures. Significantly, irrespective of whether they are practical- or strategic-oriented, they assume a responsibility towards themselves and others. In this process, civil society expands but society is built upon self-reliant selves that illustrate their capacities for tolerance, trust, and cooperation. Significantly, networks contribute to empowerment when they bring awareness to situations of oppression, while at the same time mitigating the oppressions on the ground. Each form of oppression raised as a concern by the networkers enables the development of a discourse on rights. In affirming and illustrating the significant contributions of women, one must not lose sight of the fact that Egyptian women are struggling against substantial and deeply felt forms of oppression that continue after the revolution. The subjecting of women to virginity tests, jailing, stripping, beating and torturing of women on International Women’s Day after women continued their protest of existing forms of discrimination, as detailed by Amnesty International (8 March 2011), illustrate that the struggle for basic rights and freedom continues. However, such struggle not only serves to improve the conditions of individual people but challenges systematic forces of oppression and engages contesters over rights, meanings and symbols. Whether they are struggles for personal freedom or for the freedom and dignity of others, these forms of protest and networking are central to the study of civil society actions. Their actions have indeed already enabled changes to occur on the level of ideas and practice of individuals within the social arena and, therefore, also the political arena as with the overthrow of the repressive Mubarak government. Within the process of change, there is yet much more to be accomplished.

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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS

This study illustrates that there is indeed a civil society in Egypt and that it is expanding through the activism of civil organizations and networks. These forms of organizing were, moreover, crucial in rolling back state powers as seen through the 2011 revolution. A culture of cooperation, reciprocity, trust and civility have been the fabric of the organizations, networks and individuals that came together for the common purpose of securing rights, dignity and a better life. Indeed, today, half a year after the revolution, I walked again through the square where protesters, though in smaller numbers, still sleep, sing and march with slogans for justice, as much in this regard remains to be seen. The taxi driver who took me to my place from the vicinity remarked that he has seen people eating out of garbage cans on several occasions, a scene he was not accustomed to before the revolution. However, he affirmed that he himself has continued all these months to sleep at Tahrir every night despite having a family with three children. As others I interviewed have told me, he noted that he was also between those that fell dead on the fierce days of protest in which individuals stood for the principle of civility despite violent attacks. As the taxi driver added, however, he already feels greater dignity. He says: When I went to the police station, I was stopped by a policeman at the door. He asked me ‘Where do you think you’re going?’ I directed him to a sign that read ‘The police are at the service of the people [sha‘b]’ [a sign that returned to the police stations

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after the revolution]. ‘I am the sha‘b. You are here to serve me,’ I told him. Then I walked ahead. Only now can the sha‘b stand up for rights. The 2011 revolution and protests themselves serve to show that a democratic culture has developed. The fruits of these protests are still unfolding. It is hoped that this book has served to contribute to correcting several prevailing misconceptions and refining fundamental definitions relevant to the field of politics and civil society. Primarily, it has attempted to correct a gross misunderstanding of the majority of women’s struggles, caused by a focus on the state. Analyses which purely focus on the political cast the state as an entity separate from the rest of the society. The result is the exclusion of a range of political activism that serves to shape – or to even end up toppling – the state, as developed from the grassroots. By applying a methodology that includes democratic principles, civility and empowerment, a wider range of democratic acts is highlighted to provide a broader view of developments in the Middle East in general and Egypt in particular. Crucial developments indicative of sustained change and an enduring political ethos are, thereby, uncovered. Women matter in these crucial developments. A male-dominated focus on masculinely-expressed political action obscures and serves to devalue the enormous contribution women are making towards meaningful change in Egypt. Strategic-oriented interests have now long dominated the discourse on the political. This work argues that this dominant leaning within the literature on politics and change provides an inaccurate evaluation of what is really happening. Women’s contribution to the political can be viewed mostly within their reproductive roles, which have a productive capacity to expand civil society and secure a democratic ethos within society – all of which must affect the state. The private/public divide and the emphasis on the strategic over the practical and feminine modes of action have obscured women’s actual contributions. It is hoped that through a gendering of the study of the political, women’s contributions are adequately exposed to illustrate their actual impact and value to change. In this way, a broader

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view of political change is exposed in Egypt. Where much is affected on the state level through actors that directly intend to produce that change towards greater inclusivity, the allowance of self-determination and a rule of law, it should be asked what kind of an ethos will sustain future developments to respect what these actors, both men and women, have pushed for. I argue that the women of my study matter because, through mostly ‘positive’ activism, they develop a political culture that will serve to sustain democratic practice because they expand civil society through the inculcation of democratic practice and modes of empowerment. When women’s activism is included, vastly different prognoses must be arrived at. If the road to democracy is secured in Egypt, it cannot be sustained without a civil society that is built on principles of civility and what the people call the ‘good’ life. The women of my study prove that it is possible to broaden a civil society in Egypt based on these principles and values. Decision-making as shown in the PVOs in this study demonstrates that several organizations consciously implement democratic strategies, whether as a mostly western-type democracy or, in the limited cases, some form of shura. The latter is an example of peaceful decisionmaking that warrants further study within the concept of democratic decision-making in a Middle Eastern context. However, this research has leaned, as part of its methodology, towards a preference for using democratic principles as indicators for evaluation. This has been in the hope of understanding whether a civil society is expanding and if democratic values are part of this process as a possible means to producing a society and governing system premised on democratic values. Civility was defined as encompassing tolerance, mutual respect, trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. The organizations in this case study contribute to the value of tolerance and mutual respect through the acceptance of differences in opinions, views and ideologies. Tolerance was, furthermore, illustrated in terms of men participating in common goals in the various women’s organizations. A deep level of trust is exemplified through, for instance, charity or the guaranteeing of loans. Cooperation and reciprocity were observed in the sharing of responsibilities to reach common goals.

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Marginalized groups in civil society find it extremely difficult to place their concerns on the formal agendas of the elite political society. Consequently, they learn that to assert fundamental rights for equality or claims for dignity they must pursue their interests through collaborative efforts within civil associations and networks. The results of their struggles become empowering when through collaborative efforts they circumvent power structures or they achieve rights they had been denied as a marginalized group. A few examples found in my sample were the altering of laws that discriminated against women, attaining citizenship documents without any recollection of family name or date of birth, the attainment of job-training skills to find more dignifying jobs or more adequate pay, access to literacy classes which improve selfesteem and increase life choices, and the sharing and gaining of mere information on rights versus government policies or available services. The development of women, especially poor women, cannot be viewed as detached from the health of the entire society. In developing individuals through teaching principles and values of democracy and elevating the human consciousness and condition, civil society expands. Because these women’s actions serve to expand civil society, their actions must be seen as political. Traditionally, ‘politics’ has been used to refer to competition or collaboration between the political elites. The study of politics has, thus, been focused on the state. As such, the struggles of disenfranchised groups such as these women’s PVOs have been overlooked as ‘irrelevant’ in the study of political participation in the democratization process. But implementing a civil society approach, it is shown that a much wider range of political actions are revealed. Middle Eastern women are not passive political actors. As demonstrated, they join together within women’s associations and networks with men to combat oppressive structures and advance their interests, despite risks. Moreover, because these women’s associations and the networks studied prove to foster democratic practices, civility, and empowerment they must be viewed as civil. This is particularly important for the Islamic women’s PVOs, as the lingering perception still persists that Islamic organizations are intolerant and uncivil. It is important to recognize what motivating factors and value systems furnish the

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kinds of selves conducive to greater levels of participation, civility and empowerment. The motivating factors that enable women to participate include value systems ascribed to Islam, such as striving to attain mercy, blessings, or good deeds for the afterlife, for example. Such existentialist value systems motivate to action just as does compassion for humanity. Thus, these examples prove that civil society is not always linked to institutions that are by definition secular. This observation has been supported by a growing number of scholars (see, for example, Béteille 1999: An-Na’im 2002; Lewis 2001). The inclusion of actions that are not necessarily consciously intended to result in a democratic culture or change government policies is also important to an understanding of civil society growth. Moreover, the stated goal to commit oneself to the feminist cause does not determine whether or not an action becomes political in terms of its effect on civil society or the state. It is the bias that one must look for answers among those claiming to be political or feminists intending to elevate the status of women that detrimentally limits further inquiry. This study proves it makes little difference if struggles are aimed at strategic feminist goals or practical goals, such as the mere alleviation of poverty. What is of significance to an evaluation of civil society expansion is what action can translate into greater civility, power, freedoms, and voice for the marginalized and oppressed and additionally, what actions and discourses contribute to change for a perceived common good. This is particularly important for a context in which poverty is a significant experience and concern. Therefore, a practical/strategic dichotomy, as developed within a western context, cannot apply to Islamic women’s and feminist secular PVOs in Egypt. Feminism cannot be viewed as a single movement that encapsulates a specific mode of action. Women in Egyptian civil organizations and networks, whether feminist or Islamic in orientation, do not see a struggle constantly aimed at government policies necessarily as fruitful. Nor do they view men as a main focus of their struggles. Both organizational types share a common context of government authoritarianism and high rates of poverty and illiteracy. Due to the structure of networking, women are sometimes able to expand a civil society more forcefully within an authoritarian

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environment. ‘Where the state is unresponsive, its institutions are undemocratic, or its democracy is ill designed to recognize and respond to citizen demands, the character of collective action will be decidedly different than under a strong and democratic system’ (Foley and Edwards 1996: 49). Accordingly, a civil society cannot be state-fostered in an authoritarian environment. Organizational forms of collaboration in which an association operates legally through its registration with government cannot effectively tackle issues that might be interpreted to threaten major actors in government or actors in powerful positions. Networks, having no legal basis, can only be traced back to individuals. To obstruct the activism of individuals in collaboration through networking is more difficult as networks are harder to detect and dismantle than establishments. These can be easily shut down.1 It does not mean that individuals are not associated with a particular association, as many networkers do participate in organizational activity. However, the most sensitive issues are not pursued in the name of an organization. Consequently, such a dense and vibrant form of collaboration must be acknowledged as an essential part of civil society if the concept is to have meaning for any context of an authoritarian polity. There is so much more to consider in the study of the political. The study of women in the Middle East offers abundant opportunity to view the processes that are simultaneously occurring which have enormous impact on state politics and the development of society in the Middle East. Women are anchoring crucial change within various modes and practices and serve as examples in the securing of democratic principles and values through their ability to distribute these as a reconfiguration of power throughout society, starting from the individual all the way up to the state. As one participant had put it, ‘one day we will get there’. Many of these women count the toppling of the repressive Mubarak regime among one of the greatest achievements and the marker of their success. Their struggles to secure a better life and the dignity of people have certainly enabled a consciousness and capacity for the pursuit of democratic values and freedoms that has brought this change. These women continue to struggle because much more is required for people to live in dignity. As many more

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challenges to securing the good life are yet ahead as part of the process, the way forward crucially means further expanding civil society through the inculcation of democratic values. Thus, the fruits of their struggles are still to be seen in view of a democratic culture that they have been long nurturing and that they will need to continue nurturing. This will be through their sustaining of true democratic practice in government as well as in the social, economic and familial institutions on which the health of all of society depends.

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NOTES

Chapter 1

Women Activists in the Middle East

1. Quoting statistics from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Azza Karam (2000b: 64) put the percentage of women in the legislatures at 3 per cent, which she comments on as being next to the lowest figure in the world. This was raised through a quota system to 12 per cent at the end of 2010. 2. For more on a distinction in the literature between practical and strategic goals which was first formulated by Maxine Molyneux, see Molyneux (1985). For a discussion, see Carr, Chen and Jhabvala (1996: 5); Brown (1999); and Arruda (2000). 3. Orientalism refers to the essentiality of cultures and considers Islam as the factor that distinguishes it from the West. Orientalists have regarded Islam to be the sole designator of Middle Eastern society and as such the main determinant of women’s positions (Paider 1995: 5). 4. For an overview on other reasons for rejecting western feminisms, see Bulbeck (1998). 5. The definition used in this book does not fully agree with the leading Arab feminists’ definitions, for example Egyptian leading feminist, Nawal El-Sadaawi (El-Sadaawi and Ra’uf: 2000). See p. 27 for example, where El-Sadaawi frames feminism as in contradiction to the three monotheistic religions. This explains in part why several of the women in my interviews (whether belonging to secular or Islamic PVOs) disassociate themselves from the term ‘feminism’. 6. See Moghadam (2002) for an overview of the usage and debates on the term. 7. Auda lists works of Islamic activists who either employ a model of apologetic re-interpretation or, in most cases, move back and forth between reformist and apologetic re-interpretation. See 2008: 287, 288.

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8. With the 22 countries (including the Palestinian territories) making up the Arab world, stretching from Mauritania across North Africa to the Arab Gulf region, it comprises nearly 360 million people (Reuters Africa, ‘Arab World Faces Worsening Water Crisis’ (Nov. 4, 2010), http://af.reuters.com/article/ sudanNews/idAFLDE6A31BB20101104 quoting U.N. projections).

Chapter 2 Civil Society and Political Participation 1. Robert W. Hefner (1998: 9) backs up Ackelsberg’s assertion. This theme is taken up in detail (especially pp. 11–32) in Gairdner (2001). Refer to the 533-page book for a lengthy and detailed critique of liberal democracy, as illustrated through the American and Canadian systems. 2. For similar conclusions, see also Kiss (1997: 4). For an insightful discussion on the issue, see Minow and Shanley (1997), ibid.: 84–108. 3. See al-Tahir Labib, Ali al-Kinz and Abd al-Qadir al-Zaghl as examples in Hamzawy (2003: 32, 33). 4. For a further example, see Ernest Gellner, a widely cited scholar who views civil society as absent in the ‘Islamic’ world because of the Islamic religion and customs (p. 26) in Gellner (1996). 5. See also, for example, Alwani (1996). 6. For an illustration of further arguments that the economy and civil society cannot be separated in the study of politics, see Crystal (1996). 7. For further details on economic empowerment, see Carr, Chen and Jhabvala (1996). 8. For a discussion of the debates, see Bothwell (1998), Clark 1994 and Ibrahim (1998: 53–66). 9. Hebe Ra’uf claims that on average the majority of participants in a given PVO are women (interview with Hebe Ra’uf). Kandil (1999: 63) attributes the large number of women in Egyptian PVOs largely to their traditional mothering roles. 10. Sherifa Zuhur (2001) holds the same view of Egyptian Muslim and secular women feminists. Sondra Hale (see 1997: 6) draws the same conclusion for secular and Islamic organizations in Sudan.

Chapter 3 Key Issues for Struggle: Poverty and Marginalization 1. At the time of trying to access Al Ahram’s online newspaper, during civil unrest on 30 January 2011, the original source was down. 2. Many do provide after-school tutoring to their own students from which they can generate a significant amount of money.

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3. The World Bank published a report in 2007 using a survey of households to establish different levels of poverty under its designated poverty line set with an income of LE 111 ($20) a month, which placed 43.8 per cent of the population below. This report concurs with my research that a much larger proportion of the population is poor than, for example, the cited CIA report or recent UN estimates. However, my research, corroborated by others, establishes poverty as the defining characteristic of a much larger percentage of Egyptians whose incomes are higher than the LE 111 mark. 4. Surveys have shown that membership of the political parties never exceed 5 per cent of the population. See citations in Ezzeldin (2010: 30). 5. Interview with Nahed Ezzeddine, expert on Egyptian protest movements, Professor at Cairo University, Political Science Faculty, June 2011. 6. A religious opinion issued by an Islamic scholar based on knowledge of Islamic law and traditions. 7. Interview with an individual who performs marriages and divorces and has thereby taken on marriage counselling roles, has pointed out that the reason for cheating and the taking on of more wives has sometimes been a result of the inability of the wife to reach orgasm due to a deep injury of the sexual organ sometimes caused by FGM. 8. Mohammad Sayyed Tantawi (Sheikh of Al Azhar University until his death in March 2010 and previous Mufti of Egypt) and Coptic Patriarch Chenouda III also declared it had ‘no foundation in the religious texts’ of either Islam or Christianity. See Middle East Times (2007). 9. Some believe the figure is around 30,000 cases. See the Jerusalem Post (2010) http://www.panamalaw.org/egypt_revoking_citizenship_of_egyptian_ men_married_to_israeli_women.html 10. However, most Muslim women adhere to and promote the illegality of marriage to a non-Muslim man. 11. In 1990, 27 per cent of the total urban workforce (15 to 65 years) was in the informal sector (Labour Force Sample Survey); in 1994, their number reached 1.9 million, i.e. 60 per cent of the total private sector labour force. See El Dawla (n.d.). 12. Interviews with Tonia Rifaey, Cairo; Hebe Ra’uf, Cairo; Layla Abdel-Basset, Cairo; and Shiren Havez, Cairo. 13. I use PVO and ‘organization’ interchangeably throughout. 14. The ‘indigenous sector’ is the reference widely used in the Middle East for PVOs, as in the context of PVOs it implies a strong linkage made to the grassroots populace and more specifically initiatives coming from the people or community directed towards those initiatives by the state (Kandil 1995: 9, 24). 15. According to Sullivan (1994: 13), this figure is much more than the total for all other Arab countries combined. According to an unofficial estimate from

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a participant of The Alliance for Arab Women, this figure has actually reached 30,000 registered PVOs (interview, Cairo). 16. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, this lack of differentiation poses some methodological problems. 17. The General Federation of Associations and Foundations is a quasi-governmental organization tasked with setting a vision for the role of NGOs, carrying out studies, and organizing the technical, administrative, and training programmes for NGOs’ employees; 19 of the 30 members are elected by associations and foundations that are members, and 11, including the powerful office of President of the Federation were appointed by the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (‘Global Trends in NGO Law’ 2010).

Chapter 4 Practical Considerations for Methodology and Fieldwork 1. See Clark’s survey of works conducted on Islamic associations in Cairo, including Sarah Ben Nefissa-Paris and Morroe Berger’s, in Clark (2004: 49, 178, 231). 2. A good description of and motivations for Islamic and cultural dress among Egyptian women is provided by Zuhur (1992: 113–16). 3. ‘God’ in Arabic. Such analysis is not always dependable and cannot be used without some perception or understanding. In one instance a PVO name was understood to be Islamic not by the above criteria but by knowledge of what the title could only be referring to. It also did not make sense, grammatically. When queried, the PVO leader explained the reason was that the ministry had required that the PVO drop the name ‘Allah’ from the title in order for it to be registered. 4. Questions 6 and 11 for participants posed the most difficulties. I noted, however, that with some prodding or explanation some participants who had never finished school had much to say to some questions not initially understood; whereas, in a few instances, participants with a university degree, even with further explanation, could not comprehend the same schedule of questions. Thus, alluding to the scholastic level attained as the sole determinant would be misleading. 5. Beyond the Saad Eddin Ibn Khaldoun Centre being shut down on these grounds, a further PVO, an Islamic women’s PVO, had similarly been dismantled for accepting foreign funds prior to my arrival. 6. For a more detailed explanation of the different forms of power see Townsend et al. 1999: 23–45. 7. Besides observing the outward appearance of and overt Islamic references used by the participants, to establish that I was dealing with an Islamic PVO, as defined by the criteria set for its identification, at the outset I obtained a

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verbal confirmation that the name of the PVO had an Islamic reference and that, as described, the PVO building itself had a small mosque inside. 8. As my presence at the halaka would be viewed as a threat, I decided not to attend this halaka. Nonetheless, I was able to get around the leader and obtain the halaka curriculum outline and content for the PVO. 9. Saad Eddin Ibrahim was given a new trial and released from prison in February 2002. 10. In 1995, several Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including Badawi, were referred to a military trial and were sentenced to jail terms between three and five years.

Chapter 5 The Islamic and Secular as Means of Participation 1. Khair is a Qu’ranic word literally translated as ‘good-doing’. Khair work may be an objective in itself for some Islamic activists to fulfil an Islamic duty. It may be a means for others to achieve an ‘Islamic society’. 2. Indeed, many wars historically that have produced significant impact on the state level have been along family divisions rather than class, as Sami Zubaida (1993: 89) points out, offering more insight into the saliency of the family in Middle East politics. 3. Shura is literally ‘consultation’, a decision-making technique mentioned in the Qu’ran. It is interpreted through either of three schemes: consultation (which is the most traditional form), consensus building, or voting. 4. This group, indigenous to the Arab world and learned in its culture, laws and religion, does not contrast Islam with a liberal democracy as understood as a western construct, but rather tries to show that these two are not incompatible and that a combination is possible (Korany 1995: 41). Such scholars and thinkers include Mohammad Selim Al-Awa, Rashed Al-Ghannouchi, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Fahmi Huwaidi, Mohammad Emara, and Tariq Al-Bishri. 5. Quoting figures for the Arab world in general Ibrahim also notes that associations ‘have mushroomed over the last two decades’ (Ibrahim 1996: 253). 6. The Alliance for Arab Women, interview, Cairo. 7. Interview with Bibars, Cairo. This observation is confirmed also by Clark (2004). 8. Interview with Tonia Rifaey, Cairo. For a historical overview of volunteerism in Egypt, see Nelson (1996). 9. Interview with Iman Bibars, Cairo. 10. In Egypt, gold can be viewed as a form of currency. Poor women will sometimes buy gold with all their savings not out of vanity, but for security.

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11. The five pillars of Islam are: the belief in one God and Mohammad as his messenger, prayer five times daily, fasting the holy month of Ramadan, payment of zakah, and the performing of Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in one’s lifetime). 12. I do not equate Islamicity with piety because Islamicity comprises a set of behaviours that are externalized due to calculation, rationalization, or even as part of acts of sacrifice or enduring what was perceived as imposed. 13. I had visited a PVO outside my case study sample that dealt with street children. At both locations all but one participant, the secretary, were all male and the children were boys only. I was not permitted to visit the third location until later because it was still under construction to accommodate girls. I learned that the government had intervened and forced the PVO to open this section to accommodate girls in the programme as well. 14. Whereas credit entailed an administrative fee and interest, loans had no interest attached.

Chapter 6 Empowerment through the Feminine and Strategic 1. Indeed, I have had interviewees among the more affluent city dwellers who attested that as girls growing up they were ‘spoiled’ and supported all the way through university whereas the boys were expected to fund their education more independently – perhaps a sort of reverse form of discrimination based on similar premises. 2. Public service was viewed as a respectable area of work throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, this sector has been occupied by employees who receive very little pay and who could not find employment elsewhere. However, given the poor economic level of the women enrolled in literacy classes a job that offers some security and small additional benefits is a great accomplishment. 3. In the two orphanages of my sample, the children called the participants who provided the care for them on a full-time basis, ‘mama’ for mother. The objective was to institutionalize a family-type atmosphere. 4. There is no literal translation for the word ‘feminism’. The Arabic term commonly used is the liberation of women movement, ‘Harakat Tahreer Al-Mar’ah’.

Chapter 7 Women’s Activism through Networking 1. Some of the works that can be cited that emphasize the role of social ties are Barnes and Kaase (1979); McAdam (1982); Gould (1991); Oberschall (1993); Diani (1995); Klandermans (1997).

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2. For more on participant rationalization for participation see McAdam (1986). 3. A number of ‘small’ attacks have peppered Cairo’s Khan Khalili, a market close to the Hussein mosque and densest tourist and most targeted area. I was shopping less than a kilometre away during the September 2008 attack. I walked over to its location to see that the incident took place right in front of the shop where I had dinner the night before. Bystanders claimed they had spotted two men standing on the roof of the restaurant where I had eaten who had disappeared after throwing the first bomb. They had makeshift bombs made out of bottles. The following day, however, when I returned to Khan Khalili, the market place was crowded and thriving as usual – illustrating a reaction among tourists and foreigners that ‘small’ attacks can happen. 4. It should be noted in this context that the government’s policies are highly discriminatory against Christian minorities. Indeed, papers found in the internal intelligence building after protestors accessed it in February 2011 showed evidence of government-instigated violence against Christian communities and churches. Although in an economic evaluation a few Christian families own some of the biggest corporations in Egypt, most Egyptian Copts are materially disadvantaged. The strikes put on by garbage collectors in Egypt at the end of 2010 in protest at the government’s reluctance to deal effectively with the attacks on Christian worshippers is merely one example. It illustrates the position of many Copts in Egypt although many do occupy the upper class. It also illustrates the ability of the lower Christian class of garbage collectors to cause chaos when they refused to collect the garbage throughout Cairo. Copts are not allowed to be part of the military. Other forms of government discrimination include excluding Coptic Christians from specific legal positions and representation within areas of the legal system. 5. ‘Blogs’ is short for ‘weblog’. Blogs are online newsletters networkers usually update on a daily basis and need very little knowledge of computers to maintain. However, participants often pay a software company to develop a site for them.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

1 Wiktorowicz’s (see 2000: 236) findings on Salafis in Jordan support this observation on networks. He found that the Salafi network is efficient because no leadership structure, group, publishing centre, meeting space or membership list exists that would enable government to target a responsible centre of activism.

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INDEX

Abd al-Nasser, Gamal 22, 83 absolutism 52 abuse 107, 111, 112, 154, 220, 225 Abu Zayed, Nasr 16 activism context and definition of 2–33 feminine forms of 10–13, 17, 161, 220 Islamic 3, 4, 16–18 negative 176, 182, 190, 191, 221 networks 3, 14, 21, 24, 32, 37, 100, 113, 121, 125, 189–225 positive 176, 182, 190, 191, 220, 229 practical 6, 10, 11, 13, 29, 30, 32, 35, 54–56, 116, 120, 122, 129, 130, 149, 150, 151, 173, 175, 179–187 practical vs. strategic 10, 32, 179–187 protest oriented 3, 23, 24, 64–70, 89 secular 3, 4, 14, 28 strategic 4, 10, 30, 32, 55, 56, 149, 151, 179–187 Abdelrahman, Maha 52 Ackelsberg, Martha 36, 37 Ackerly, Brooke 15, 102 Agati, Mohamed 79 al-Ali, Nadje 14, 15 Alliance for Arab Women 93, 134

Index.indd 257

Antoun, Richard 51, 101 Arab Council for Childhood 90 Arabic City 72 Arab Spring see uprisings and revolutions, 2011 Arato, Andrew 44, 49 Arendt, Hannah 26 Asad, Talal 16 association formal 8, 44, 45, 55 informal 22, 43, 44, 53, 55, 77, 78, 121, 122, 209 Islamic 78, 115–148 secular 3, 6, 7, 32, 56, 82–91, 94–96, 102, 105, 111, 113, 151–156, 160–165, 173–191, 214–221 women’s 78 Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW) 93, 133, 134, 144, 157, 160 Auda, Jasser 17 Auda, Mahmoud 57–58 authoritarianism 26, 32–33, 40, 44, 129, 131, 136, 146, 192, 209–210, 231–232 Badawi, Mohamed 112 Badran, Margot 55 al-Banna, Hassan, 19–23

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Battle of the Camel, the 219, 220 Bayart, Jean-Francois 43 Bayat, Asef 193, 194 ben Ali, Zine Al-Abedine 23, 66, 189 Benford, Robert 193 beneficiaries, empowerment of 102, 139 blogs 202–210, 215–219, 241 see also social media Bookman, Anne 103 Bothwell, Robert 104 Brand, Laurie 10 Bulak random area 145 Burbidge, John 38 businesses, 50, 62, 63, 64 small-scale 50, 121, 163, 212 Bystydzienski, Jill 53 Cairo 64, 65, 75, 91 Greater 87, 88–91 organizations in 9, 14, 23, 24, 76, 77, 87–89, 142, 145, 163, 172 Caliphate (Khilafa) 18–21, 94 Carapico, Sheila 41–44 Carr, Marilyn 214, 216 Centre for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CELWA) 93, 171 charitable donations 25, 26, 52, 54, 55, 99, 120, 121, 138, 139, 176, 194, 201 charity giving of 25, 26, 138, 176 organizations 55, 92, 95, 120, 150, 194, 203 Chen, Martha 214, 216 Cheriet, Boutheina 216 children, empowerment of 11, 15, 54, 61, 62, 69–74, 79, 95, 120, 133, 151, 154, 156, 162, 165, 167–171, 183, 210, 214 churches, attacks on 18, 23, 241 Christians 18, 60, 74, 80, 137, 203, 229 discrimination against 73, 204, 241 see also churches, attacks on Christiansen, Connie 141, 142

Index.indd 258

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MIDDLE E AST

citizenship 38, 54, 69, 70, 73, 74, 133, 156, 230 civil society bias in literature on 2, 9, 13, 17, 20, 29, 33, 35, 38, 39–41, 47, 51, 52, 54–58, 116, 136, 151, 155, 167, 175, 193, 228 and business sector 50, 212 contribution to democracy 56–58, 229 contribution of Islamic associations to 3, 4, 14–21, 25, 32, 42, 51–56, 87–95, 102, 103, 115–187, 216, 217, 220, 223 definition of 9, 10, 32, 40–56, 191, 197 idealization of 46, 124 impact of restrictions on charity 26, 81 networking 25, 32, 53, 132, 189–225 state, boundaries 49 volunteerism 52, 76, 99, 101, 118, 132–137, 144, 167, 185 civility 136–146 definition of 31, 43, 46, 102, 136, 137, 229 through cooperation 146, 171, 176, 191 through reciprocity 146, 176, 178 through tolerance 52, 146, 101–102 through trust 146 Clark, Janine 38, 47, 52, 56, 78, 132, 142, 143, 193, 203 clientelism 49 clinics 51, 133, 138, 142, 197 Cohen, Jean 44, 49 Coleman, Isobel 3, 15 Copts see Christians credit 144, 161, 163 see also loans crisis, 1958 Lebanese 76 culture Arab 40, 42, 45, 82, 83 democratic 32, 123, 124, 129–133, 137, 178, 186, 189, 190, 227, 228 political 2, 4, 23, 31, 40, 45, 64, 131, 147, 178, 199

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INDEX Cunningham, Robert 199 custody rights 71–73 see also family law custom 69, 73 Crowe, Kate 52 Dahl, Robert 36 dars see lessons da‘wa 138, 197 democracy definition of 35–38, 123–131 and Islam 130 literature on 39–42 Denoeux, Guilain 193 Diani, Mario 195, 196 divorce khula‘ 71, 134 in personal status laws 70 obstacles for women 72, 73, 118, 153, 154, 160 process of 71 dress codes 54, 92–94, 140–142 Duval, Soroya 54, 75, 87 economy development of 63, 212 family income generation 5, 49, 54, 61, 62, 74, 75 per capita 60, 75 political 189, 197 economic society 37 as economic sphere 49, 50, 121, 173, 214 education through associations 82, 204 basic skills 170–172 courses 170, 172 literacy 162 elections 36, 65, 68, 78, 81 Elshtain, Jean Bethke 11 empowerment definition of 15, 102, 103, 104 economic 50, 84, 114, 211, 214

Index.indd 259

259

process of 53, 54, 58, 98, 102, 104, 118, 149–187, 191–195 Entelis, John 39 essentialism 40 fallaheen 5, 155, 165 family (clan) sphere 9, 48, 49, 131 law 70, 72, 74, 77, 79, 182 child law 73 inheritance law 74, 180–182 patriarchy 7, 153, 155, 156 as political institution 121, 124, 131, 140, 153, 160, 166–171, 186, 189, 211–214, 220 Fandy, Mamound 57 female headed households 75 female genital mutilation (FGM) 12, 69, 181, 237 feminism bias in literature 161, 173 definition of 9–17, 84, 107, 176, 184, 185–187 Islamic 13–17 secular 2, 3, 13–18, 55, 83, 84, 175, 179–184 feminine, the 30, 32, 149–187 codes of conduct 141 and enhancement of capacities 149, 150, 167–173, 186 and love 27, 29 and reproductive roles 78, 166–173 and activism 10–13, 17, 161, 220 and the political 149, 150 fiqh 16 Foucault, Michele 10, 27, 141 Free Officers Movement 76 Gama‘a al-Islamiyya 196 Gama‘iyat al-Ma’aref 82 gam‘iyat 77, 203, 213, 214 Garcia-Guadilla, Maria Pilar 11

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260

CIVIL SOCIETY

AND

WOMEN

gender analysis 9 as means for empowerment 69, 181, 182, 205, 228 differentiation 13, 17, 21, 152, 204, 205, 214, 217 division of labour 10 interests 10, 11 relations 9, 53 Ghannouchi, Rached 43, 44, 47 al-Ghazali, Zainab 21, 22, 55 Gomaa, Ali 68, 69, 72 Greek Benevolent Society 82 groups extremist 16, 19, 28, 51, 52, 134, 192, 196 liberal 12 illiberal 12 Islamic 17, 18, 51, 78, 85, 89, 116, 117 Islamist 19, 21, 40, 42, 51, 52, 122, 194, 223 Neo-Islamist 130 Habermas, Jürgen 49 hadith 16, 19, 21, 28, 138 Hafez, Shireen 89, 103, 115 halakas 17, 22, 28, 55, 109, 112, 139–141, 168, 178, see also lessons Hann, Chris 45 harassment, sexual 209, 218, 219 see also abuse Haynes, Jeff 39, 53 Hearn, Dana 57 Hefner, Robert 46, 47 Hegel 49, 56 hijab (veil) 23, 92, 94, 139, 141, 142, 146, 207, 219 housing 10, 64, 73, 77 Howell, Jude 50 human rights concerns 111, 119, 190, 194, 195, 201, 216, 220, 222 discourse 217

Index.indd 260

IN THE

MIDDLE E AST

organizations 78 struggling for 16, 65, 174–180, 190, 201, 216, 220, 223, 230, 231 Huntington, Samuel 36, 41 Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies 110 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin 42, 110 ID cards 60, 160–161 ijtihad 15 al-Ikhwan al Muslimeen (the Muslim Brotherhood) 20–24, 95, 112, 196, 197, 200 illiteracy 59, 75, 84, 117, 147, 152–156, 184, 231 imprisonment 24, 71, 218, 219 Information Centre (Egypt) 63 interview schedule 96–98 Islam as a religion 3, 12, 15, 16, 45, 52, 54, 69, 80, 82, 119, 122, 129, 130, 138, 141, 210 as a discursive tradition 16, 129, 130, 142, 173, 178, 181, 194, 216, 217 vs Islamist 51, 52 as political ideology 3, 130, 136, 138, 141 see also groups, Islamist Islamicity 92, 94, 136–146 Jamaat-i-Islami 196 Jama‘at al-Sayyidat al-Muslimat (Muslim Women’s Association) 22 Jhabvala, Renana 50, 58, 214, 216 Kafr al-Sheikh 65 Kamphoefner, K.R. 162 Kamrava, Mehran 37, 40, 41 Kandil, Amani 41, 52, 58, 77, 78, 82, 90 Kefaya 66, 67, 222 khair 119, 120, 135, 138, 173–186 khimaar 92, 94, 142 khutba 22, 137 Knight, Andy 57

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INDEX labourers 65, 74 and al-Mahallah al-Kubra protests 203 law, criminal 69, 70 leader despotic 38, 39 extremist 28 organizational 77, 87, 88–119, 122, 131, 135, 160, 179, 200, 202 secular 3 lessons, religious 9, 138–140 see also halaka Lewis, Bernard 41 loans 144, 163, 212, 229 see also credit love in Hannah Arendt’s theorization 26 as feminine form of activism 29, 120, 166 within Islamic ideology 19, 20, 28, 45, 142, 176 as political act 26–29, 120, 135, 138, 149, 166, 169 Loveman, Mara 205 al-Mahallah al-Kubra 65 Mahfouz, Asmaa 219 Mahmood, Saba 9–12, 87, 142 mahr (dowry) 72 Manshiet Nasser 75, 134 Marchand, Marianne 11 marriage contract 72, 73, 153 difficulties 22, 71, 74, 118, 152, 153, 237 laws 69, 70, 160 polygamy 71, 72, 237 nikah misyar 72, 153 unregistered, 72 ‘urfi 73, 74 martyr 24 Marxism 49, 56 McAdam, Doug 36 media 189, 198, 211, 215 Mohammad, the Prophet 19, 94

Index.indd 261

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Molyneux, Maxine 10, 11 mosque 9, 25, 42, 51, 78, 92, 139, 141, 219, 239 al-Hussein 241 Salah al-Din 163 morality 16, 28, 116, 141, 142, 173, 182, 186 MOSA (The Ministry of Social Affairs in Egypt) 75–80, 87, 90, 92, 106, 113 motherhood 74, 166, 167, 168, 169, 209 Mubarak, Gamal 64, 66 Mubarak, Hosni and corruption 198, 199, 205 era 83, 160, 185 regime 11, 24, 26, 40, 44, 57, 60–70, 79–82, 133, 143, 147, 160, 175, 189, 194, 198–200, 202–205, 208–210, 224 2011 revolution against 2, 8, 189, 202, 218–221, 224, 225, 238 Mubarak, Suzanne 143, 197, 204, 205 al-Mufti 68, 69, 237 musalah (prayer space) 26, 27 Muslim Brotherhood, the see al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen Naidoo, Kumi 46, 52, 54, 57, 58 National Council for Women, the 143 National Democratic Party, the (NDP) 65, 66, 67 National Front for Change, the 66 networks as civil society 189–225 definition of 25, 132 through blogging 205–207 secular 14 New Women Research Centre 93 Niblock, Tim 36 nodes, linking in networks 195, 197, 200, 201 Norton, Richard 38, 41, 46

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262

CIVIL SOCIETY

AND

WOMEN

orphanages 22, 95, 118, 133, 167, 172 Owen, Roger 19 Paider, Parvin 8 parliament, women in 68, 182 participation formal 8, 10, 36 informal 37, 53, 77, 206, 207 secular 8, 54, 115–147, 172 Passy, Florence 222–223 patronage 49, 197 personal status laws see marriage law and family law Phillips, Anne 161, 214, 215 piety 8, 13, 20, 21, 28, 94, 182, 186, 240 political society 37 politics vs apolitical action 9, 24–28, 32, 49, 77, 120, 151, 176, 185 formal 8, 33, 36, 45, 55, 56, 58 high 25 informal 53, 55 poverty and illiteracy 59, 117, 147, 151, 154–156 and patriarchy 117, 118 protests against 24, 175, 190, 195, 204, 231 tackling 120, 136, 160, 173, 183, 220, 223 and unemployment 75, 135 and women’s marginalization 33, 59–67, 173, 205 power definition of 6, 10 as distributive 50, 5–56, 103, 123, 149, 164, 191, 211, 214, 232 exercise of 11, 44 from within 104, 150, 169, 171, 211 of love 169 see also love masculine 122, 141, 150, 169, 228 power for 104, 150, 173–178, 215, 221 power over 29, 103, 104, 149, 150

Index.indd 262

IN THE

MIDDLE E AST

power to 104, 150–152, 171, 211, 215 power with 104, 150, 172, 211, 215 of protest 189, 224, 230 see also protesters private sphere 2, 7–11, 36, 49, 212 private voluntary organization defined 76–79 protesters 1, 23, 24, 65, 67–70, 89, 189, 202, 207, 208, 218, 219, 227 public sphere 2, 8–11, 29, 36, 54, 75, 217 Purushothaman, Sangeetha 193 Qalubiya 134 Qazzaz, Hadeel 198 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf 72 Qur’an 5, 16, 21, 77, 94, 119, 138, 139, 165, 174, 182 Qutb, Sayyid 20 random area 91, 45, 164 revolutions see also uprisings 2011 Arab 2–4, 31–33, 64, 218, 225–228 against business practice 63–65 1952 Egyptian 75, 76, 83 1952 14 of July Iraq 76 riot, bread 65, 194 Rowlands, Jo 103, 104, 165 rule of law 37 al-Sa’ati, Abdel Rahman 19 Sadat, Anwar 22, 83 Said, Edward 41 Said, Khaled 67 al-Sayyid, Mustapha Kamil 42, 43 Sarayrah, 199 Schwedler, Jillian 41, 42, 44, 101, 115 Scott, James 27 secularism definition 14, 15, 40, 56 security forces, Mubarak’s 204, 218, 219 sermons see khutba

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263

sha‘b (people) 5, 24, 121, 153–156, 160, 203, 227, 228 Sharawi, Huda 55 Shari‘a 72, 94 Shils, Edward 48, 222 shura (consultation) 125–129, 239 Singerman, Diane 6, 13, 24, 36, 49, 55, 78, 101, 121, 132, 193, 203, 215, 221 socialism 56, 83 social media 32, 208, 210, 218, 219, 224 Snow, David 193 state analytical deconstruction of 8, 11, 14 authoritarian 40, 44 bureaucracy 37 changing of 8, 19, 25, 26, 30, 32, 37, 48, 70 Islamic see Caliphate and society, boundaries 2, 4–7, 49 Stewart, Angus 53 strikes 64, 65, 194 sunnah 16, 17, 21

ta’seebah 142 thugs 219 Tilly, Charles 216 torture 22, 225 see also imprisonment Tunisia 23, 24, 38, 66, 189, 207

Tagammu‘ Party, the 63 Tahrir Square 13, 65, 218–220, 227

Zubaida, Sami 45 Zuhur, Sherifa 88

Index.indd 263

‘Ulama 92, 140 Ummah 46, 47 unemployment 64, 135, 190 urban slum 5, 61, 75, 83, 84 participation 46, 66, 193 uprisings 13, 23, 189, 204, 218, 219, 210 see also revolutions virginity tests 225 volunteerism see civil society wasta 121, 197–200, 212, 213 Women Memory Forum 93, 156 Women’s Zakah Committee Salah Eldeen Mosque 93, 163 World Bank 199

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Index.indd 264

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