Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro: Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges (Southeast European Studies) [1 ed.] 9781472446411, 9781315572185, 1472446410

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

Southeast European Studies Series Editor: Florian Bieber, Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz, Austria The Balkans are a region of Europe widely associated over the past decades with violence and war. Beyond this violence, the region has experienced rapid change in recent times, including democratization and economic and social transformation. New scholarship is emerging which seeks to move away from the focus on violence alone to an understanding of the region in a broader context drawing on new empirical research. The Southeast European Studies Series seeks to provide a forum for this new scholarship. Publishing cutting-edge, original research and contributing to a more profound understanding of Southeastern Europe while focusing on contemporary perspectives the series aims to explain the past and seeks to examine how it shapes the present. Focusing on original empirical research and innovative theoretical perspectives on the region, the series includes original monographs and edited collections. It is interdisciplinary in scope, publishing high-level research in political science, history, anthropology, sociology, law and economics and accessible to readers interested in Southeast Europe and beyond. Forthcoming titles in the series Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece Civil Society at the European Frontline Edited by Jennifer Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos Croatia and the European Union Changes and Development Edited by Pero Maldini and Davor Pauković Social Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslavia Edited by Rory Archer, Igor Duda and Paul Stubbs Negotiating Social Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina Edited by Stef Jansen, Čarna Brković and Vanja Čelebičić Civic and Uncivic Values in Montenegro Edited by Kenneth Morrison and Kristen Ringdal

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges

Jelena Džankić European University Institute, Italy

First published 2015 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © Jelena Džankić 2015 Jelena Džankić has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows: Džankić, Jelena. Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro : effects of statehood and identity challenges / by Jelena Džankic. pages cm. -- (Southeast European studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4724-4641-1 (hardback) 1. Citizenship--Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2. Citizenship--Macedonia (Republic) 3. Citizenship--Montenegro. I. Title. JN2203.A92D93 2015 323.609497--dc23 2015011041 ISBN 9781472446411 (hbk) ISBN 9781315572185 (ebk)

Contents List of Figures and Tables vii List of Abbreviations ix Acknowledgementsxi 1 Introduction

1

2

Transitional Triangle: State, Nation, Citizenship

23

3

Historical Routes to Contemporary Citizenship

45

4

The Politics of Contemporary Citizenship

71

5

Intergroup Competition, Ideational and Symbolic Dimensions of Citizenship

93

6

Dual Citizenship in Challenged and Unconsolidated States

119

7

Citizenship en route to the European Union

137

8 Conclusions

157

References165 Index189

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List of Figures and Tables Figures 5.1 5.2 5.3

Citizenship, loyalty and state identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina   94 Citizenship, loyalty and state identity in Macedonia   96 Citizenship, loyalty and state identity in Montenegro   99

Tables 2.1

Factors influencing citizenship in unconsolidated and challenged states   2.2 Institutionalism and citizenship regimes   2.3 Europeanization mechanisms   5.1

Lyrics of national anthems   

24 28 38 104

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List of Abbreviations BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina CoE Council of Europe DPS Demokratska partija socijalista [Democratic Party of Socialists] DUI Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim [Democratic Union for Integration] EC European Commission ECN European Convention on Nationality ECHR European Convention on Human Rights ECtHR European Court of Human Rights EU European Union FPR Federal People’s Republic FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine [Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina] ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ICG International Crisis Group IDP Internally displaced persons NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-governmental organization OFA Ohrid Framework Agreement OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OHR Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina RS Republika Srpska [Serb Republic] SDP Socijaldemokratska partija [Social Democratic Party] SDSM Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija [Social Democratic Union of Macedonia] SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia SNP Socijalistička narodna partija [Socialist People’s Party] SNSD Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata [Alliance of Independent Social Democrats] UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees US United States of America

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VMRO-DPMNE

Vnatrešna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity]

Acknowledgements Writing a book is an incredible and adventurous journey. Writing this book, I have sometimes felt like Alice in Wonderland – chasing a white rabbit, I fell down a hole right into a fantasy world, full of extraordinary creatures and astonishing situations that challenged my sense of logic. Indeed, quite a few times I drank the wrong potion, which made me shrink to the size of an ant, an insect so small that it sees even the tiniest obstacle coming across as frightening and insurmountable. And the burden it carries on its back seems often quite heavy. Yet the ant is a hardworking little buddy and trust me, if there is a cake to be eaten, it will find it. And eat it. So the cake I ate helped me grow. I did not become a giant, but I can now take up the advice from that caterpillar without having my neck growing high into trees, or play chess with the Queen of Hearts without getting my head chopped off. As I am writing these acknowledgements, I realize that delving into academic exploration, similar to writing fiction, requires strength, persistence and above all – creativity. Indeed, writing a research-based book is far from being a fairy tale. Having started this journey in misty Edinburgh, I have glided through the wind and the rain but I have learned to appreciate the long days of sun and enjoy the little things that make our lives glitter, even if for a moment. My journey then took me to sunny Florence, Europe’s renaissance capital, which gave me as much sunshine as it did rain. Yet during my journey, if I may quote the Liverpool FC anthem, I’ve never walked alone. Many people have been there for me and I know I will not be able to do justice to all of them on these pages. My family and friends have always been there for me and there is nothing that I can appreciate more in the world than that. They have helped me grow, helped me change and I wish to thank them all just in case I forget to mention either of their names in the following lines. We all tend to become forgetful with age, don’t we? Still, there are those people in our lives or work who leave a mark so deep, that we are simply unable to erase it. For me, one of those people has certainly been Jo Shaw (maybe I should say Professor Jo Shaw), who in addition to being an incredible scholar is also a dear friend. In 2010, when I was working as a researcher at her CITSEE project at the University of Edinburgh, she encouraged me to look into the citizenship regimes in weak and unconsolidated states. She then extended my original contract for a further six months for me to be able to start working on this book and commented on earlier drafts. Hence, I really have to say that ‘this work was supported by funding from the CITSEE project (The Europeanization of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia), based at the University of Edinburgh, UK. CITSEE is funded by the European

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Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme, ERC Grant no. 230239, and the support of the ERC is acknowledged with thanks.’ During my time at CITSEE, I have also benefitted from collaboration with and friendship of a number of young scholars. From among the Edinburgh bunch, the closest ones to me remain Ljubica Spaskovska and Gezim Krasniqi, the two people who have helped me settle in Edinburgh, find my way around CITSEE, and who have been an incredible wellspring of support and inspiration in my work. They know why. Igor Štiks has also been a lovely colleague and offered me guidance on my work, and I appreciate his friendship and that of his wife Jelena Vasiljević. And a big thanks to Mr Alf for making our academic days a bit less academic, and thus more fun. My route then took me to Florence, where I spent two years as a Jean Monnet fellow at the European University Institute (CARIM EAST project DCI–MIGR/2011/229–847–2.62). I am still based at the EUI, now as a Marie Curie fellow. To this end, the support of the European Union under a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship for Career Development (PEF–GA–2012–326865) is acknowledged with gratitude. In this ‘ivory tower’, as people often refer to the EUI, I have had the opportunity to meet a number of exceptional individuals. Above all, I benefitted from working with Professor Rainer Bauböck whose advice and guidance has helped me unpack the many layers of citizenship. I am also very grateful to my friend and colleague Tamara Popić, who invited me to present my preliminary work on this book at the EUI’s East European Working Group, whereby I received very useful comments and suggestions. While incredibly useful in terms of academic advancement, the EUI has also blessed me with the friendship of Visnja Vukov, Mateja Đurović, Trajche Panov, Julija Sardelić, Maja Spanu, and many others, without whose support and encouragement I never would have managed to finish this project. And the final Florentine ‘thank you’ goes to the three people whose smiles brightened up my days. Now, being labelled as ‘the conference queen’, I also wish to thank all the people whom I have encountered during my travels, and whose insights helped me to structure, shape and polish my argument. Here, I particularly refer to Branislav Radeljić, Sören Keil and Florian Bieber. Yet none of this would have been possible without the help and support of all of those who helped a chubby girl from a Montenegrin village, which is almost impossible to find on a map, to become what I have become. For this, I extend my most sincere gratitude to the OSI, FCO and New Hall (Murray Edwards) College. It is on the road of my education that I have encountered some truly wonderful people including Ciki, Duda, Irena and Krpeljce in Podgorica; Cimerke in Bulgaria; Zoka, Ivan, Jeska, Majda and Zana in the United Kingdom. From among them, I need to single out Simonida, my PhD and conference buddy, who has given me her constant support to keep working on this book (even when, honestly, I felt like I had enough of it and just wanted to quit). Last but not least, I want to thank from the bottom of my heart, those few people who have always been with me, regardless of where my adventures would

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have taken me. My family: Medo, Cuki, Bubica, and the newcomers – Tanja and David. Their love and encouragement keeps me alive and kicking. So, this is the end of my first adventurous journey and I am keen on starting a new one. Maybe today. Maybe tomorrow. Maybe soon, and for the rest of my life. Florence, 2015

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Chapter 1

Introduction What happens to the citizen when states and nations come into being? How do the different ways in which states and nations are established make people feel towards their polity and towards ethnic groups living therein? And, last but not least, are all citizens equal in their rights and duties? These questions lay the foundations for this book, which reinterprets the place of citizenship in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the creation of new states in the Western Balkan region.1 The book proposes an analytical grid, which locates the dynamics of political developments in these countries within the broader academic debates on citizenship, nationalism and state-building. This framework will help us to understand the contemporary citizenship governance and practices, taking into account not only the immediate political contexts that generated them, but also the historical trajectories and societal environments, as well as the transformative powers of international and European factors that affected them. By encapsulating the construction of states and the relationship between the polity and the people living within its boundaries (whether real or imagined) at its core, citizenship is central for analysing the political developments after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. The implosion of multinational socialist federations was followed by the rise of national movements, the re-creation of borders and the redefinition of citizenry in the new states. At these times, marked by tectonic political changes and viral national revivals, political entrepreneurs sought to engineer the ethnic balances in their fresh and institutionally feeble states (KirkGreene 1983; Štiks 2006). This would help them to legitimize policies of statebuilding, while strengthening their rule during the moments of national reawakening across post-communist Europe. In other words, the definition of citizenship in the post-communist space was not only a matter of belonging to a state. It was often a mechanism of constructing the state, its institutional framework and its day-today operation. As Štiks (2006) noted, at the time of the initial determination of citizenry of the newly created states, ethnic engineers posed the rules for the inclusion, invitation and exclusion of specific groups of people. The aim of such policies was to reinforce the sense of appropriation of the state by the dominant ethnic group, who would then claim ownership of its institutions. Far from controversial, this initial determination of citizenry sparked numerous questions related to the rights 1 Western Balkan region is a term including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. That is, the post-Yugoslav states minus Slovenia, but plus Albania.

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of minorities and other ethnic communities in the new states. Occasionally, this ethnification caused some minority groups to refuse to identify with the newly established polity. The troubled relationship between such groups, or the ‘selfexcluded’ (Štiks 2006), with the state defined along rigid ethnic lines resulted in group grievances, the desire for autonomy, or secessionist movements. After almost 25 years since the socialist Yugoslav federation fell apart, seven states (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia), occupy its geographical and political space. The post-Yugoslav states, despite being small in terms of inhabitants and territory, are populated by a wide variety of different groups exhibiting an incredible spectrum of, and variation in, intergroup relations. As such, they represent a true laboratory for understanding people’s attitudes towards post-communist, post-partition and post-conflict states and the rights they have within them. Each of the post-Yugoslav countries displays a different dynamic between the state and the people. It is precisely this dynamic, which has a major role in shaping the legal, political, symbolic and ideational aspects of citizenship, that has remained unexplored in the academic work on this turbulent region. The countries born out of the painful death of the former Yugoslavia provide very fertile ground for the exploration of the interplay between the formal establishment of new states and their relationship to the population. While a full and systematic account of the abundant literature on the processes that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia falls beyond the scope and length of this book, it is important to highlight that academic publications have thoroughly examined the conflicts in the 1990s (Woodward 1995; Cohen 1993) and the subsequent difficult transition to democracy of the newly established states (Cohen and DragovićSoso 2005; Ramet 2010). This initial interest in the troubled post-Yugoslav space inspired further case studies of the politics, history, and nation-building in Croatia (Bellamy 2003; Kapović 2011; Kasapović 2012), Serbia (Gordy 1999; Miller 1997; Ramet 2006; Zuber 2013), and more recently in Macedonia (Graan 2013; Vangeli 2011a; Wagner 2014). Academic work on Montenegro has been very scarce and only a handful of studies exist on this state’s political and social transformation (Bieber 2003a; Džankić 2014; Morrison 2009; Roberts 2007). By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina has provided copious academic puzzles, ranging from questions related to post-conflict reconstruction and consociation (Bell 2013; Bieber 2013b; Horowitz 2014; Stroschein 2014; Wolff 2013), ethnic politics (Kapidžić 2014; McClelland 2013; Šedo 2010), multinational federalism (Erk and Anderson 2009; Fleet 2014; Keil 2013), and transitional justice and reconciliation (Hayner 2010; Jones 2012; Rajković 2011). More recently, the focus of academic efforts on the Western Balkans has shifted to the examination of how the European Union (EU) has affected and potentially transformed the institutional, economic and societal dynamics in these countries (Bieber 2013; Džihić 2013; Elbasani 2013; Fagan 2011; Freyburg and Richter 2010; Juncos 2013; Noutcheva 2012). However, in attempting to explain why the secession of the Yugoslav republics was followed by such intense conflict, what the problems of transition

Introduction

3

to democracy were, or the effects and limitations of the transformative power of the EU, scholars of social and political science often neglected a whole range of issues, including citizenship. This has recently been highlighted in Sören Keil’s (2013, 48) study of multinational federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereby he called for an examination of the ways in which ‘citizenship policy can contribute to a strengthening of dual political loyalty and identification’. This is particularly relevant in political contexts in which the competition between territorial and group loyalties has an impact not only on the institutional, but also on the societal plane. Citizenship, as it will be argued in this book, is a reflection of the dynamic between state and (mutually reinforcing or competing) nation-building projects. It is not simply a matter of the passport. Rather, it includes questions of the rights and duties, as well as the intricate symbolism of membership. Citizenship also tells us about how countries relate to each other, and how such relationships among states can reshape the way in which states relate to their population. As such, citizenship offers us unique lenses for understanding the continuing transformation of Europe’s most troubled region. In particular, looking at citizenship in the challenged and unconsolidated postYugoslav space unveils how national reawakening and state-building manifest themselves in the countries that have taken diverging transition routes. To that end, this book offers a comparison of the link between the state and individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. As will be explained in more detail, these three ethnically heterogeneous countries have all once been republics in the former Yugoslavia, and thus share a similar pre-independence understanding of citizenship. However, the post-Yugoslav paths of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro have diverged significantly. The three countries each had a unique experience of the disintegration of the federation: from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the creation of the mini-federation between Montenegro and Serbia, to the peaceful departure of Macedonia. This was followed by different and complex transitional routes that eventually shaped Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro as they are today: states in which the internal ethnic balances are governed through a federal, a consociational and a unitary state model. Moreover, each of these states is challenged either internally by a non-dominant ethnic community or externally by a neighbouring country. The combination of these two elements implies an incongruence of the processes of state and nation-building, which have been captured in the underlying countries citizenship regimes. The transformation of the governance and practices of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, stretches far beyond being an exclusive question of legal status. Rather, this book understands citizenship as an array of rights, relations and statuses that the individuals have in their state of membership, as well as their identification with that state. The broad governance of citizenship is thus understood as ‘citizenship regime’, a concept that is further explored in Chapter 2.

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Against this background and drawing on original research on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, this book argues that in societies with manifest ethnic cleavages that are at the same time states internally unconsolidated or externally challenged, citizenship regimes are more likely to be restrictive as a result of the incoherent paths of state and nation-building, while citizenship as the collective identification with the state is virtually non-existent. In other words, while the regulation of citizenship may even be formally declared as ‘civic’, ‘territorial’, or even ‘inclusive’ the laws will contain provisions aimed at preserving the fragile ethnic balances. Keeping the ethnic composition stable through formally inclusive citizenship laws reduces the possibility for the competing ethnic communities to challenge the state. However, as these laws commonly contain provisions favouring one or more ethnic groups, they will ultimately lead to an uneven distribution of rights of citizenship among groups. The most common consequence of this dynamic is an imbalance in the different groups’ approval of the state and its contestation at the symbolic level. Why Citizenship? Ever since philosophers started deliberating the complex notion of the state, a plethora of attempts have been made to explain the meaning and underpinnings of citizenship (Aristotle 1941; Shafir 1998; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Marshall 1965; Rousseau 1913; Brubaker 1996; Joppke 2007). Each historical period, each ideological movement, and each major change in the global outlook has led to its own visions of citizenship. However, the accumulation of a voluminous literature attempting to cast a light on this concept has only contributed to the deepening of the citizenship conundrum. The roots of this conundrum penetrate the scientific worlds of social, legal and political studies, where the notion of citizenship becomes the nexus of the triangle it forms with the concepts of the state and nation. The intimate relationship among these concepts has often led to the confusion between the meaning of the terms nationality and citizenship (Boll 2007, 57). The term citizenship, apart from denoting the tenure of legally conferred rights and duties, coincides with the term nationality in that the latter designates the relationship between the individual and the state in international law (Boll 2007, 60). This particular relationship refers to those rights and duties that the individual possesses by virtue of his or her membership in a polity. Equally, the question of membership has generated another conceptual overlap between citizenship and nationality because both denote belonging to a particular state or ethnic/national group. The distinction between citizenship and nationality is particularly relevant in the post-Yugoslav context, due to the common conflation of the notion of ‘nationality’ with ethnic belonging, as opposed to the scholarly work that defines it in legal rather than identitarian terms. The latter is better represented by ‘citizenship’, which in addition to epitomizing the formal belonging of individuals to polities also includes symbolic and ideational elements that characterize such a belonging. Therefore, any

Introduction

5

reference to citizenship, which is ‘an essential element of democracy and a universal feature of the modern state’ (Cohen 2009, 13), presupposes an understanding of the fine embroidery of links that relate it with the concepts of the state and nation. The triangle between the citizenship, state, and nation gained paramount importance with the fall of socialism in eastern Europe, which brought along the disintegration of multinational federations, and the mushrooming of nation and state-building projects. These processes have revealed the multivalence of citizenship, which is defined as ‘a major feature of modern society: a simultaneous and interconnected struggle for membership or identity or both with the intention of ensuring access to rights that are distributed by the state (and occasionally local and international institutions)’ (Shafir 1998, 23–4). Building the state and defining its citizenry have thus become central to post-communist transitions. That is, states established their ‘citizenship regimes’. Adapting the term from gender studies, where the notion of ‘gender regimes’ explains how gender relations are regulated in different societies, Shaw and Štiks (2013, 3) define a citizenship regime as ‘a range of different legal statuses viewed in their wider political context, which are central to the exercise of civil rights, political rights and socioeconomic membership in particular territory’. The two authors bring the definition closer to the post-Yugoslav experience with citizenship, and narrow down Jenson’s (2007, 5) reflections on citizenship regimes as ‘institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens, and claims making by citizens’. By doing so, they also place an emphasis on the lived dimensions of citizenship, which animate a deeper analysis of the social, political and legal factors that affect the link between individuals and polities. A rich, interpretative investigation of citizenship can help us to understand how new states came into being, how they manage the different ethnic communities living in them, and how they adapt to the myriad of domestic and external pressures that they are constantly exposed to. The nexus of citizenship is the relationship between the individual and the state, which includes the rights and duties stemming from that relationship. On the one hand, we can look at citizenship as a purely legal concept, that is, as a legal status (Brubaker 1992). This narrow definition of citizenship has been much examined in political and socio-legal studies, particular in the context of the evolving and changing citizenship legislation after the fall of communism in Europe. On the other hand, citizenship can also be understood in broader, ideational, terms because it epitomizes social, political and historical milieu of the state. Citizenship designates ‘the nature and quality of relations among presumed members of an assumed society’ (Bosniak 2008, 2). As such, it is inextricable from the notions of nation and state, which are essential for creating ‘moments of citizenship’, meaning citizens’ solidarity, or the collective identification of individuals with the political community that they are related to. The roots of the idea of citizens’ solidarity can be traced back to Rousseau (1913, 112–14), who defined it as moral solidarity and innate compassion towards humanity. Kant

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(2001) further elaborated this idea of moral solidarity with humanity, considering it a moral obligation for individuals. Hence the normative understanding of solidarity is not related to a single political community, but extends to include all humankind. Bringing the concept of solidarity closer to that of citizenship, Hannah Arendt (1990, 98) defined it as ‘a principle that can define and guide the action’. As such, solidarity requires from an individual to assume the interests of other fellow citizens in participating in political life. Hence, thinking of citizenship as a multidimensional concept is key for understanding the objectives and the contents of this book. Citizenship is defined here not only as the people’s legal relationship with the state, giving rise to the rights and duties inherent in such a link, but also as their emotional attachment to the state and the willingness to take part in the day-to-day functioning of the polity. In other words, this book conceives citizenship as a state identity along the following lines: 1. Citizenship policies are created by political elites who a) transform their visions of the state into laws and b) are affected by external factors (other states, international and transnational organizations, for example). 2. Citizenship practices reflect how individuals envision the state and practice solidarity with other members of community. In a metaphorical sense, citizenship is born out of the marriage of the people and the state. It precedes the state, because it represents the community of people and their association to a particular territory. At the same time, citizenship reinforces the state by creating the legal link between the individual and the polity, by establishing prerogatives for the individual’s participation in the polity, and by engendering his or her identification with the state. While this identitarian aspect of citizenship is very much connected to the idea of the nation, the two are not coterminous. Traditionally, citizenship, similar to nation, is viewed either as civic, whereby the primary link of the individual is with the state, or as ethnic, whereby people relate among themselves and with the state on grounds of the perceived kinship bonds. In his seminal work Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Brubaker (1996) explored these two characteristics of citizenship by counterposing the state and nation formation in these two European states in the nineteenth century. Yet, the traditional ‘civic’ vs. ‘ethnic’ dichotomy of citizenship is of a limited value in the post-communist space, particular in those countries in which state and/or nation-building processes were weak, or challenged internally (by groups with claims to power) or externally (by kin-states of different groups, or regional stakeholders). To avoid contestation of membership boundaries of the state, policymakers in these unconsolidated and contested countries have opted to define citizenship exclusively as the legal bond between individuals and the state, circumventing overt references to kinship bonds. As there are no explicit ethnic elements in it, this variant of citizenship formally appears as ‘civic’. As is the case with the studied countries, the regulation of citizenship becomes a mechanism

Introduction

7

for ensuring the viability of the state, and managing the ethnic relations therein. However, it would be erroneous to claim that the substance of the citizenship regimes in the unconsolidated states in the Western Balkans is free from ‘ethnic’ elements. Since the population of such states is fragmented into differentiated and competing groups, collective citizenship as belonging to the state is rather loose. The group that claims ownership over the state will acquire a strong stateoriented identity based on the ethnic principle. By contrast, the identification of the competing groups is more likely to be with their ethnic kin, or another kinstate, and thus citizenship in terms of such groups’ belonging to the state is much weaker. This implies that there is no clear dividing line between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ citizenship, which has most recently been supported by the empirical work of Vink and Bauböck (2013). As a result, this book approaches the citizenship regimes in the unconsolidated and challenged Balkan states not as ‘ethnic’, but, following Spaskovska (2012), as citizenship regimes ‘fractured’ along ethnonational lines.2 A citizenship regime that is fractured along ethnonational lines does not contain elements in the citizenship policy aimed at preferential access for co-ethnics. However, the distribution of citizenship rights is based on ethnonational cleavages, which are further mirrored in the different groups’ attitudes towards the state. Even so, when looking at the place of citizenship in the new Balkan states, we need to be fully aware of the fluidity of the concept. Citizenship, similar to nationhood and statehood, is by no means fixed, but is transformed to reflect the changes in the link between the people and the state. Joppke (2007) argues that the three dimensions of citizenship (status, rights, and identity) have undergone significant alterations in the last century. While the boundaries of membership have expanded, minority rights have superseded social rights in the political arena of citizenship, and identities have become universalistic rather than ethnically exclusive (Joppke 2007, 37–48). While on the one hand this dynamic of citizenship transformation has characterized the Western democratic societies, crises and conflicts have had a different effect on the challenged and unconsolidated postYugoslav states. Even though minority rights lay at the core of citizenship regimes of the countries examined in this book, we see the toughening of access to citizenship and a departure from universalism for the sake of ethnic identification. In other words, not only does democracy transform citizenship, but so does instability. The cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro reveal that the interplay between the governance and practices of citizenship generates outcomes different to those described in the scholarly literature (Joppke 2007; Bosniak 2001; Susen 2010). The very governance of citizenship is a broad umbrella concept. It refers to the citizenship policy of a country, contained not only in nationality laws, but also in related legislation including minority policy, electoral laws, education, and so on. 2 While Spaskovska (2012, 383) uses the concept ‘fractured citizenship’, for purposes of clarity this book specifies that these citizenship regimes are ‘fractured along ethnonational lines’.

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

In other words, the regulation of citizenship takes place in multiple, overlapping arenas, in which individuals can claim rights stemming from their membership in a given polity, while fulfilling their duties and obligations towards the state. The boundaries of these arenas are defined by the state itself, and thus the governance of citizenship is a top-down process. By contrast, the practices of citizenship are all the matters that pertain to the exercise of membership, including not only the rights and duties of citizenship but also the emotions individuals have towards the state. These emotions are reflected in the symbolic and ideational elements of the state, including symbols such as flags and anthems. Contrary to governance, citizenship practices are created by individuals, and they may or may not overlap with those of citizenship governance. This potential incongruence in the governance and practices of citizenship becomes salient in circumstances of political and economic instability, when people’s security is vulnerable and their loyalties are most likely to shift (Harris 1992). People tend to affiliate themselves to ideas that provide them with a greater guarantee of well-being and their loyalties become changeable. Moving away from the post-Yugoslav context, we can see for instance, the effects of the global financial crisis, which induced changes in both the governance and practices of citizenship. The most obvious example of this is the countries seeking to attract rich investors to become their citizens, and change their citizenship policies. At the same time, the practices of citizenship in such countries are marked by responses of individuals to the policies adopted by governments, which may include acceptance, dissent, or protest. In the most extreme circumstances of instability, such as war, citizenship may become a powerful weapon of combat. In terms of the governance of citizenship, it can give rise to claims over people and territory. This tendency can be integrated even in the regulation of membership, as has been the case in the Republika Srpska during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration or, most recently, with Russia regarding the issue of Crimea. The practices of citizenship can result in the drawing of people into overt conflict as a manifestation of loyalties to either the state, or competing group. Unfortunately, and as has been the case in throughout Europe’s history, citizenship practices can sometimes result in atrocities committed during warfare. In the former Yugoslavia, the first signs of dismantled security appeared in the late 1980s, with the failure of the project of Yugoslav socioeconomic reconstruction. The socialist economy that guaranteed people a sense of stability suffered a rapid decay, which intensified the societal turmoil. This process culminated with the collapse of the common state at the beginning of the 1990s (Dallago and Uvalić 1998). The wars of the Yugoslav disintegration in the early 1990s, followed by the hyperinflation in 1993, the brief conflict in Macedonia in 2001, and the strained relations between Serbia and Montenegro after 1997, were all further manifestations of insecurity and perceived threat. The perpetuation of instability opened up the possibilities for the competing elites to reconstruct political and national identities, and to redefine citizenship in line with their political goals. The regulation of citizenship depended on the visions of the state and nation of the principal political

Introduction

9

players and their relationship to external factors such as kin-states of minorities, or international organizations. These visions and relationships, as has been the case in the former Yugoslavia, may have ranged from the appropriation of the state by the dominant ethnonational community to the attempts to consolidate or appease different groups neither of which was an overwhelming majority in the respective state. As a consequence, citizenship became instrumental not only for the formation of new states (regardless of whether in conflict, or generally undergoing a period of instability), but also for the management of ethnically heterogeneous societies. Looking at how the policies and practices of citizenship have been reconstituted in the post-communist period, we can argue that these were a product of the interplay between domestic and external political factors. Due to the dynamic between state and nation-building processes in post-communism, citizenship regimes operate within ‘wider political settlement, reflecting, for example, contestations between, for instance, titular ‘national’ and minorities, among ‘constitutive peoples’, political and ideological groups or simply citizens over citizenship and related rights, especially rights of political participation’ (Shaw and Štiks 2013, 4–5). If we think about how citizenship legislation in these new states has come into being, we will most certainly find some reliance on the historical regulation of the link between the individuals and the state. The ways in which this link was formalized amidst different political circumstances and ideational contexts helps us to understand the continuities and discontinuities in the centuries-long process of transformation of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space. The seven postYugoslav states had very different experiences of the period before the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formally constituted in 1918. While Serbia and Montenegro joined Yugoslavia as independent states, similar to their neighbours, they experienced being a part of multinational empires for centuries. Hence the organizational, institutional and legal structures of the constituent parts of the first South Slav state contained elements that reflected discrepant experiences of the formal link between the people and the polity. These experiences contained a tension between the rule by a distant centre (for example, Vienna, for the countries that were under the Dual Monarchy, or Constantinople, for the ones that were under Ottoman rule) and the relationship to the ethnic kin as the primary community of belonging. The unfortunate citizenship experience of the first Yugoslavia, a centralized authoritarian state that collapsed due to nationalist tendencies at the dawn of the World War II, also exhibited these tensions. In the period between 1918 and 1928, the citizenship regime of the first South Slav state was externally defined, as the legislation of the then decayed Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires remained in place. In the attempt to preserve the state, the then Yugoslav monarch adopted the 1928 Citizenship Act of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. According to Rava (2010, 4), ‘this supported an approach to the citizenship law that introduced a unified Yugoslav citizenship that was expected to prevent ethnic disintegration and establish a cohesive Yugoslav nation’. Even so, the centralization of the Yugoslav kingdom only produced intergroup tensions, thus hardening the ethnic

10

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

boundaries. This equally challenged the establishment of a Yugoslav nation and the institutional setup of the state, leading to its downfall in 1941. In federal Yugoslavia, constituted after the World War II, individuals also simultaneously related to different polities and ethnic communities. At the institutional level, the regulation and practice of citizenship consisted of two tiers: federal and republican. There was a federal Citizenship Act, but each of the former Yugoslav republics also had its own Citizenship Act. The republican citizenship was used to regulate the rights and duties of citizenship. After the Yugoslav breakup, the legacies of the previous system affected not only citizenship policies, but also the institutional arrangements for implementing them. The new states largely relied on the second-tier citizen registries of the republics of the former Yugoslavia. At the level of belonging, the two-tiered citizenship regime of the socialist Yugoslavia allowed for the simultaneous but not coterminous, and overlapping but not equivalent, development of a supranational (Yugoslav) identity and the ethnically grounded (republican ones). As a consequence, identities in those postpartition states of the former Yugoslavia in which belonging was not primarily related to the ethnic kin, but to the polity (either republican or supranational) are still weak and unconsolidated. This is even more pronounced in post-conflict societies, where the dominance of the identitarian link with the ethnic kin has been cemented by wartime experience. Equally, due to the mechanisms of conflict resolution (both domestic and international) references to ethnic identities are avoided in these countries’ citizenship legislation. Yet if we wish to fully understand the place of citizenship policies in the postYugoslav space, in addition to an awareness of history we need to explore how both domestic and external factors have affected the shaping and the transformation of citizenship. At the domestic level, the regulation and practices of citizenship depend on the institutional mechanisms of the state, and on the aims and motivations of political elites that develop such mechanisms. This domestic shaping of citizenship takes place in two arenas: the regulatory and the symbolic. In the regulatory arena, the redefinition of citizenship is done through the formulation of citizenship policy and laws directly related to it (such as election laws, minority laws). In the emotional one, the shaping of citizenship takes place when the substance of the link between individuals and their primary community of belonging changes. In this sense, we can claim that the Yugoslav citizenship was expansive, in terms of attempting to create loyalties that were not exclusive to ethnic kinship. The most obvious contemporary illustration of an expansive shaping of the emotional arena of citizenship is EU citizenship, whereby the institution of EU citizenship allows individuals to express their belonging to a community that stretches beyond their ethnic kin. Other examples would include federal and confederal states, or immigrant countries, such as Australia and the US. By contrast, an exclusionary construction of the emotional dimension of citizenship occurs when the dominant group seeks ownership of the state by strengthening the citizenship bond within its public space, while diluting the ones of the other groups. For instance, a state

Introduction

11

may adopt a citizenship policy that deliberately excludes or includes certain ethnonational groups within or outside of its territory. An example of the exclusionary citizenship policies is the case of Slovenia, where a group of people (ethnically non-Slovenes) remained without a legal status after the country became independent. On 26 February 1992, the Slovenian government removed 18,305 citizens who did not obtain Slovene citizenship under article 40 of the 1991 Citizenship Act from the Register of Permanent Residents (Džankić 2011). The erased included new minorities such as ethnic Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Kosovans and Roma. At the time of the Yugoslav dissolution these individuals possessed the federal citizenship and the citizenship of a republic other than Slovenia, but had long-term factual residence in Slovenia. In some cases, these individuals did not wish to obtain Slovenian citizenship, while for others, their applications were rejected or withdrawn which rendered them de facto stateless (Medved 2009).3 An example of a citizenship policy inclusive of certain ethnic groups is Serbia. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 6, this country grants external citizenship to its ethnic kin in the region under facilitated conditions. Furthermore, in May 2012, Serbia abolished fees for naturalization for the citizens of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Hungary and Albania (Zaključak Vlade Republike Srbije od 16. marta 2012. Godine). Commenting on the decision, the public relations officer of the Serbian government stated that the decision had been made ‘because of the difficult economic situation and because naturalization is in the interest of Serbia’ (RTS 2012b, web). In addition to the factors referring to the domestic political context, the external environment also has an important role in understanding the process of transformation of citizenship. In other words, interests, stakes and actions of external actors (the United States (US), the EU, and regional forces) are mirrored in the regulation and practices of citizenship. The effects of these forces are far from uniform, and they influence citizenship regimes of the different countries in substantially different ways. In attempting to broadly classify the types of this influence, we can identify two types: the horizontal and the vertical. When two polities of the same instance, that is, two states affect one another’s citizenship regime, we can then speak about the horizontal external influence. In the unconsolidated states, the common trait of the horizontal external forces is that they have a restrictive impact on the regulation of citizenship. Challenged states tend to have stringent naturalization rules and a more restrictive approach to dual citizenship because they seek to prevent possible foreign influence in their territory 3 On 13 July 2010, ruling in the case of Kuric and others v. Slovenia (No. 26828/06), the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) concluded that the ‘erasure’ from the Slovenian Register of Permanent Residents constituted a violation of the right to a private and family life protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), as well as a breach of the right to an effective remedy (article 13 of the ECHR).

12

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

through naturalization. This is a trait we will recognize, although in different forms, in each of the countries examined in this book. Conversely, when supranational polities, such as the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE), or the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) affect a country’s citizenship regime, we can refer to this effect as the vertical influence of the external factors. This vertical influence often generates new norms and can, provided that the reward is tangible, have a liberalizing effect on the regulation and practices of citizenship in the new states (such as reduce the residence requirements for naturalization). However, it often has by-products and unintentional consequences. This is commonly the case when the requirements of international organizations are transposed verbatim in the domestic legislation, without accounting for the initial conditions in which the new rules are applied and without considering the dynamics of state and nation-building. The transformation of citizenship regimes induced in such a manner can also lead to the marginalization or exclusion of certain groups, commonly the most vulnerable ones. An example of this, examined in Chapter 7, has been the situation of the Roma, where many have been left without a legal status due to the switch to biometric documents required by the European Union as a precondition for the abolishment of visas. Hence exploring the different layers of the rich varieties of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space can help us to better understand the interplay between challenged states and tangled identities in this region. Why Yugoslavia? When we think about Yugoslavia nowadays,4 we commonly refer to the geographical and political space that is occupied by the present-day Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. The very notion of a state of the South Slavs originated in the nineteenth-century pan-Slav national movements that sought to liberate the Slav peoples who were at the time ruled by either the Ottoman or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1918, the political efforts to establish a South Slav state resulted in the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929). This first Yugoslavia was a centralized state under the Serbian crown. It was composed of ethnic communities who had different visions of the common state. The tension between the Serb centralization and the Croat aspiration to preserve their ethnic and political distinctiveness manifested itself through manifold power struggles. It eventually resulted in the first breakdown of the Yugoslav state at the dawn of the World War II. The second, socialist, Yugoslavia was resurrected in 1943 as a federation of six republics equal in status (and two autonomous provinces of Serbia), and fell apart in 1991. Its constituent republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia opted for independence in the early 1990s, 4 Yugoslavia (Jugoslavija), etymology: jug – South; slavija – Slav.

Introduction

13

while Serbia and Montenegro continued to cohabitate until 2006. Kosovo, one of Serbia’s autonomous provinces in the socialist Yugoslavia, declared independence in 2008, and became the seventh state in the post-Yugoslav space and the only one whose statehood is yet to be fully recognized by the international community. Yugoslavia in itself was an unconsolidated state, in that it had historically been torn by the competition among its constituent peoples. The Yugoslav state never managed to create an overarching state-centred identity, despite the common argument that the percentage of people primarily identifying themselves as Yugoslavs increased from 1.3 in 1971 to 5.4 in 1981 (Jović 2009, 22). In practice people who did not belong to the titular nations, or people born out of mixed marriages, would identify as Yugoslavs (Sekulić, Massey and Hodson 1994, 85). Rather than subscribing to a sui generis supranational Yugoslav identity, individuals associated themselves primarily with the different ethnic communities. The two-tiered regulation of citizenship in the former Yugoslavia also reflected this dynamic. While the federal citizenship provided a broad umbrella for belonging to the Yugoslav state, the rights of citizenship were linked to the republican citizenship policies. In other words, one would possess the Yugoslav passport and ascribe to the Yugoslav identity externally. Internally, however, individuals would be subject to the citizenship regime of each individual republic of which Yugoslavia was constituted. The three countries explored in this book – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro – are examples today of ethnically heterogeneous, unconsolidated post-Yugoslav states. Within the former Yugoslavia, they were recognized as constituent republics only following the federalization of the state after the World War II. At the time of the creation of the first state of the south Slavs, these peoples were not acknowledged as the Slav ‘tribes’ that established the state (Jović 2009, 49). This fact differentiates the cases studied from Croats, Serbs and Slovenes whose status as titular people was recognized from the beginning. The formal recognition of these three republics as titular nations helped to cement their ethnic identities. The degree to which ethnic identities were consolidated in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia was most manifest at the time of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, when each of these republics turned to an ethnically-driven statebuilding project (Woodward 1995; Ramet 2006; Cohen and Dragović-Soso 2005). By contrast Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro had no explicit historical memory of a distinct and unchallenged ethnic identity, as will be elaborated in Chapter 3 of this book.5 These Yugoslav republics were pluriethnic,6 5 Montenegro had experience of independent statehood, but the ethnic dimension remained largely vague and many Montenegrins often believed themselves ethnically indistinct from Serbs. See Chapter 3 for further details. 6 This book deliberately does not use the term ‘multi-ethnic’ to refer to the composition of the respective republics. The reason for this is that the notion of a ‘multi-ethnic’ state implies the existence of a greater permeability of membership boundaries. Rather, the term ‘pluriethnic’ is used to denote that boundaries of ethnic kinship are rigid.

14

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

and their societies experienced strong ethnocultural cleavages. Subsequently, the creation of pervasive national identities was not possible, since many individuals related to their ethnic kin, and not the republic. As a result of the different claims to statehood of the competing groups, experiences and outcomes of the Yugoslav disintegration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro were very different from those of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. These divergent experiences and outcomes are mirrored in the regulation and practices of citizenship. In the first group, challenged statehood and unconsolidated identities are reflected in different statehood models and complex dynamics of intergroup competition. This yielded restrictive and fragmented citizenship regimes, which Vink and Bauböck (2013) defined as ‘ethnoculturally selective’. In the second group, the consolidated territorial and membership boundaries resulted in unitary states, termed in the recent literature as ‘ethnoculturally expansive’ (Vink and Bauböck 2013). While both groups of states present fertile ground for the exploration of citizenship, due to a broader variety of statuses and the diversified distribution of rights, herein we explore only the former category including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. The case selection certainly precipitates the question of whether Kosovo should have been included in this analysis as a further example of an unconsolidated and challenged post-Yugoslav, post-partition, and post-conflict state. While the case of Kosovo can certainly be analysed through the lens of this book, a thorough understanding of this country’s citizenship regime requires the addition of variables that can not be applied to the other cases examined here. Above all, during the existence of socialist Yugoslavia, unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, Kosovo was not a constituent republic. Rather, it was an autonomous province within Serbia from 1946 until Milošević revoked its autonomy in 1989, shortly before the break-up of Yugoslavia. Hence, unlike the rest of the post-Yugoslav states, ‘[in] the absence of a previous separate and formal citizenship regime on which it could be based, Kosovo’s only viable solution was to opt for what Brubaker calls the “new-state” model’ (Krasniqi 2013b, 73). This model, applied by many of the post-Soviet countries, is characterized by the zero option for citizenship, which is the granting of citizenship to those who resided on the state’s territory at the time of independence. Moreover, contrary to the other three cases examined in this book, Kosovo experienced war and international administration before rather than after independence, which significantly affected the creation of its citizenship governance and practices after the declaration of independence in 2008. For these reasons, the analysis here is restricted to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Despite being governed through different modes, citizenship regulation and practices in these post-Yugoslav countries exhibit a number of similar characteristics. The governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia is modelled on power-sharing. Keil (2013, 5) notes that ‘[w]hilst the Bosnian constitution does not define Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal state per se, the application of the principle of self-rule and shared-rule, the

Introduction

15

territorial organization of the country, and the interpretation of the constitution by the Bosnian Constitutional Court and other international actors allow for the definition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal country’. Hence, after the transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, Bosnia and Herzegovina has remained the only post-communist federation. Macedonia has shifted from a highly centralized unitary state to a decentralized consociational democracy since the 2001 conflict, in order to allow power-sharing between the different groups. Even though there has been much debate over whether Macedonia is a true liberal consociational model, Ilievski and Wolff (2011, 38) note that despite the departures from some of the traits of liberal consociationalism and institutional mixtures, the governance of the country falls under the wide umbrella of this model. Contrary to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, Montenegro does not have an experience of domestic power-sharing. Rather, after having experienced the status of a republic in the FRY from 1992 to 2003, and that of a member state in Serbia and Montenegro, in 2006 it became an independent unitary state. The three cases have been selected on grounds of their common history as republics in the socialist Yugoslavia, their manifest ethnic polarization, and their aspiration to eventually integrate into the EU. Moreover, the statehoods of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are challenged both internally and – to a certain degree – externally. While the current citizenship regimes of these three post-Yugoslav states share some similarity in terms of being restrictive and protective of the state and its ethnic balances, there is significant variation in their approach to citizenship. The differences in the nature of conflict, transition courses, and distinct institutional designs of the three states feature as factors that explain the variations in citizenship in these post-Yugoslav states. Bosnia and Herzegovina is Europe’s most complex state. The Dayton Agreement, concluded in 1995, ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and laid the groundwork for the institutional establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country is composed of two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska) and the neutral, self-governing territory of the Brčko District that belongs to both entities. Ending the hostilities between the Bosniaks and Croats, the Washington Agreement of 1 March 1994 established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a constituent part of the then Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Almost two years prior to the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement, ‘Bosniacs and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with others) and citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniac and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation, which is composed of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities’ (Washington Agreement 1994, 1). The ten federal units within the Bosniak-Croat federation include five with Bosniak majority (Una-Sana, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje and Sarajevo), three with Croat majority (Posavina, West Herzegovina and Canton

16

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

10) and two ethnically mixed cantons (Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva). The Republika Srpska is a unitary entity, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Serbs. Both entities are then further divided into municipalities. As explained previously, governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on consociational democracy. According to Lijphart (1984, 23–34), consociational democracy is a system designed to govern societies with strong ethnic, political, or religious cleavages. It allows the elites of the respective communities to articulate ‘group interests, and offer protection for these interests through guaranteed representation in decision-making bodies and veto mechanisms’ (Weller and Wolf 2006, 4). Following Bieber (2006, 15–31), we can observe a double consociation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1) at the level of the sovereign state (between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska); and 2) the regional consociation within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The governance of both the state and the federation within the state exhibit the four features of consociationalism described by Lijphart (1977), including proportional representation of different communities at all levels of government, veto and co-decision mechanisms, grand coalition governments, and broad autonomy of sub-state units. While such a multi-tiered governance structure was successful in halting the armed conflict, it cemented ethnic divisions and closed the arenas for the exercise of citizens’ rights. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 4, the rights of citizenship are linked to the individuals’ entity citizenship and not to the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A further legacy of the conflict is that some civic and political rights are confined to the ‘constituent peoples’ – ethnic Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs, while excluding the minority communities such as the Jews or Roma. The recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (27996/06 and 34836/06), confirmed the discrimination of the non-constituent peoples in standing for election to the collective State Presidency and to the House of Peoples, as well as the lack of political equality for the constituent peoples residing outside the entity in which they form an ethnic majority (for example, Croats residing in the Republika Srpska). The judgment intensified the debate about the need for constitutional reform of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the actual effects of the judgment did not go beyond the rhetoric on the need for reform (Hodžić 2011). It is one of the best indicators of the complexities of citizenship in this post-Yugoslav state, which attempts to balance its fragile statehood with the claims of the competing groups, which are – in the case of Croats and Serbs – more affiliated to their ethnic kin, or the kin-state,7 than to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Citizenship is none the less intricate in the case of Macedonia. For a decade from its independence in September 1991 Macedonia was considered an ‘oasis of peace’ in the Balkans. However, the post-Yugoslav Macedonia was constituted as 7 For instance, many of the Bosnian Croats possess Croat passports, although this was illegal in Bosnia and Herzegovina until late 2011.

Introduction

17

the state of the Macedonian people, causing grievances of the ethnic Albanians who were deprived of certain group rights. The conflict climate developed progressively and resulted in a short war in 2001, upon the outbreak of hostilities between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The hostilities were brought to a halt with the EU and US mediation, which changed the institutional structures of Macedonia to accommodate the claims of the ethnic Albanian population. The formal accommodation of these rights in the institutional setup of Macedonia has been stipulated in the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), examined in more detail in Chapter 4 of this book. OFA directly influenced the meaning of citizenship in Macedonia, as it regulates the power balance between the different ethnic groups. In addition to the OFA, the country’s neighbours have significantly affected the conception of citizenship in Macedonia by contesting elements of Macedonian statehood or nationhood. Its southern neighbour, Greece, challenges the state’s name, claiming that ‘Macedonia’ is part of the Greek cultural and historical heritage and approves of its United Nations membership only under the provisional name The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Serbia challenges its church; Bulgaria denies the existence of a Macedonian nation distinct from the Bulgarian one. As a result, the combination of the state seeking to preserve its identity amidst external challenges and the internal ethnonational cleavages between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnics has significant effects on the Macedonian citizenship (Spaskovska 2010a). It creates rigid governance, and fragmented practices of citizenship. Out of the three cases examined, Montenegro is the only one that had no experience of an armed conflict on its territory. As a consequence, the state is unitary and legally defined as civic. In other words, formally, no group is constitutionally designated as the sole ‘owner’ of the state. Montenegro carved its statehood out of the dissolution of two federations and one state union. During the wars of Yugoslav disintegration (1991–1996), Montenegro sided with Serbia, and as a constituent of the FRY, waged wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, the second half of the 1990s resulted in a serious polarization of political life in the smallest of the former Yugoslav republics. From 1997 until the country became independent in 2006, Montenegrin politics was dominated by strong internal divisions over whether Montenegro should be an independent state or not and an equally intense discord over whether Montenegrins were a separate nation or a subgroup of Serbs (Morrison 2009). The most manifest indicators of the divide were from the 2003 census, whereby 43.2 per cent of people in Montenegro declared their national identity as ‘Montenegrin’, while 32 per cent professed it as ‘Serb’ as opposed to the 1991 census in which 61.9 per cent of the population defined themselves as Montenegrins, 9.4 per cent as Serbs (Monstat 2003; Federal Statistical Office 1991); the 2006 referendum on independence, whereby independent statehood was supported by 55.5 per cent of those who went to the polls, showed the preservation of the union with Serbia was supported by 44.5 per cent (CDT 2006). This divide was further reinforced by the challenges to Montenegrin nationhood and statehood stemming from Serbia in

18

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

the pre-independence period. As a result of the political and societal divisions, the post-independence politics in Montenegro exhibit a strongly nationalizing character. In the desire of the political entrepreneurs to consolidate the Montenegrin identity after independence, the Montenegrin citizenship pendulum oscillates between the ethnic and civic principles. While exclusively defined as the link between the individuals and the state, the Montenegrin citizenship regime exhibits strong protectionism through its restrictive provisions. Many of these provisions were a direct a consequence of the divide over statehood and identity and the desire of the domestic policymakers to prevent the potential inclusion of a large number of ethnic Serbs in the citizenship of Montenegro; a situation which would change not only ethnic but also electoral balances. Comparing the citizenship policies and practices in these three unconsolidated and challenged post-Yugoslav countries can reveal not only how the new states establish the link between the individual and the state, but also how this link is transformed. Indeed, citizenship regimes all over the world are constantly adjusted, not only at the level of legislation, but also at the level of social practices and symbols. These adjustments follow the overall transformation of the polity, which includes changes in its legal status, demographic and political shifts, as well as the nature of its foreign relations. The contested and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are ideal for studying these multiple transformations. Despite having different modes of governance, all three states under consideration have had the experience of partitions, ethnic conflict, and troubled neighbourly relations. Equally, all of the three states under consideration aspire to EU membership, which will help us to discern the effects of external factors on the transformation of citizenship governance and practices. Therefore, understanding the varieties of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro does not only enhance our knowledge about the post-Yugoslav region. It also illustrates what place the notion of citizenship occupies in the ever-changing world. A Note on Methodology Being aware of the dynamics of the interplay of state and nation-building in the Western Balkans, and the citizenship regimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, this book adopts an interdisciplinary approach, blending insights from history, law and politics. This approach helps us to understand how citizenship regimes are established and changed under the influence of domestic and international factors. However, in order to understand the transformation of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, we need to be aware of the fact that none of the three concepts under examination in this book – citizenship, state-building, or nation-building – is static. For this reason, it is important to mention that the analysis here is limited to the period from the Yugoslav break-up to December 2012, with insights in

Introduction

19

history where appropriate to explain the fine nuances of citizenship regulation and practices.8 Having in mind that the varieties of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space have been given limited academic attention – only under the auspices of the ‘The Europeanization of Citizenship in the Successor States in the Former Yugoslavia’ (CITSEE) project at the University of Edinburgh, and in the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) at the European University Institute – the value of this book lies in its capacity to unveil the intricate relationship between laws and the socio-political environment in which they were adopted. While drawing on my research and the research of my colleagues in the CITSEE and EUDO projects, this book moves beyond them. It compares the citizenship regimes in unconsolidated states within the contested interplay between state and nationbuilding. This allows me to introduce an analysis of the symbolic aspects of citizenship, which fall beyond the scope of the CITSEE and EUDO projects. The methodology employed here is qualitative. In brief, the current text brings together the analysis of the field research, the author’s knowledge of the context in which the studied political actions took place, theoretical and historical literature. In order to show the changing nature of citizenship and its relationship to national identity and statehood, the study has benefitted from both primary and secondary literature. Chapters 1 and 2, which lay the theoretical and historical postulates for analysing the regulation and practices of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, are largely based on secondary sources. These introductory chapters contain a selection of the most relevant conceptual and historical literature and enable the positioning of this comparative study within wider academic debates. Certainly, due to the time and space limitations of this book not all of the academic work on the theory of citizenship, state and nationbuilding, or the history of Yugoslavia is presented here. Rather, I have focused on those works that bear particular significance for understanding the links among the studied concepts and their positioning in the post-Yugoslav space. Furthermore, secondary sources have also been used in the empirical part of the book (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), as a mechanism of control and comparison between the theoretical literature and the primary sources. To support Chapters 4 and 5, this research utilized the results of the Survey (2011) conducted under the aegis of the project ‘Symbolic Nation-Building in the Western Balkans’ of the University of Oslo and the University of Rijeka. The Survey has been carried out simultaneously by IPSOS from 31 August to 18 September 2011 in all of the Western Balkan states (post-Yugoslav states minus Slovenia, plus Albania), with a sample size of approximately 1,500 respondents per country (adjusted slightly in each country to reflect its ethnonational composition). In the absence of another survey targeting individuals’ attitudes on symbols of the state and citizenship, this project represents a credible dataset despite the 8 In addition to this, Chapter 5 contains a brief note on the protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina that took place in 2013.

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

small sample size. The Survey dataset included a total of 89 questions, but this book considers only those questions that have proven statistically relevant for the analysis of citizenship policies.9 As a researcher, I have also participated in the development of the methodology for this Survey. This experience has allowed me to better position citizenship in the context of state and nation-building. It also helped me to analyse individuals’ attitudes towards specific policies adopted by the governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro (Collier and Elman 2008, 782–99). In addition to this, primary sources (legal documents, publications, semistructured interviews and newspaper articles) were collected during the fieldwork for this study. They included 1) archives, academic, legal and journalistic publications, as well as 2) semi-structured interviews with government officials, political party activists, members of civic organizations, domestic and international political analysts, journalists and intellectuals in all of the three countries. In order to collect these primary sources, I moved between Edinburgh and the post-Yugoslav capitals and other cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro where sources were located. I collected archive materials there, which encouraged me to look in depth at the history of citizenship in these countries. Newspaper sources, legal documents, and domestic research (in the local languages) were provided to me either through local contacts, or via libraries and non-governmental organizations, which were indispensable for completing this book. Finally, interviews helped me to gain a deeper understanding of many intricate aspects of citizenship in these countries, even though they have not been the primary source of information but complemented other data. The interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2012, mostly through ‘snowballing’ (via recommendation). The people that I interviewed were engaged government officials, political party activists, members of civic organizations, domestic and international political analysts, journalists and intellectuals. The fact that the interviewees had different interests and commitments increases the credibility of the conclusions of research, because it allows for the comparison of different perspectives on citizenship, state-building and nation-building. In order to comply with regulation on data protection, they will not be identified by their name but will be distinguished by their position, the date and place of the interview. In the period under consideration in this book, all of the interviewees were either engaged in shaping these countries’ policies or in reporting and analysing the context in which political actions took place. Consequently, they all had good knowledge of the events that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro in the period studied and influenced them either directly (through political or intellectual activism) or indirectly (by informing the domestic and international public of the social, political and economic environment). However, the choice of interviewees was also largely driven by the political circumstances 9 The calculation of the statistical relevance is explained on page 5 of the Survey (2011) report.

Introduction

21

in the underlying countries and the politically sensitive nature of this research. In fact, ministry and party representatives, which had been the primary target of the interviewed sample, were occasionally unwilling to discuss the dynamics of state and nation-building, as these were sensitive issues. Their responsiveness to official interview requests was very low, particular in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. In Macedonia, I interviewed two representatives of the Ministry of Interior whose contacts I obtained through ‘snowballing’. As a result of the reluctance of political stakeholders to take part in this research, the interviewed sample included a greater number of international analysts, non-governmental organization (NGO) activists, and journalists who provided valuable materials for this book. All of the primary materials and sources have been critically assessed and triangulated with other data,10 in order to avoid respondents’ bias and ensure objectivity. Roadmap of the Book Following this Introduction the book is divided into three parts, each consisting of two chapters. While the first part unveils the theoretical and historical pillars for the understanding of continuity and discontinuity of post-Yugoslav states and nations, the second and the third part, respectively, deal with the effects of domestic and external factors on the construction of citizenship amidst the complex state and nation-building processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. The conclusion provides an overview of the book, its theoretical and case-specific implications, and hints at areas for further research related to disentangling the knot of citizenship, statehood and identity in the post-Yugoslav space. The leading chapter in the first part of the book (pp. 23–71), entitled ‘Transitional Triangle: State, Nation, Citizenship’ examines the relationship between the three aforementioned concepts, and as such provides the theoretical keystone for the book. As a novelty in the studies of citizenship and nationhood, this chapter develops an analytical framework based on the understanding of citizenship as a state identity in pluriethnic and unconsolidated states. As such, it provides a natural lead in into its counterpart, Chapter 3, entitled ‘Historical Routes to Contemporary Citizenship’. This, second, chapter of the book surveys the histories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Rather than offering a detailed historical analysis that would stretch beyond the scope and length of this research, the chapter focuses on those episodes from these countries’ history that have affected the post-communist reconstruction of citizenship. In this context, the chapter unveils the processes that have pushed the three countries into three different directions at the dawn of the Yugoslav crisis, and helps us to understand how past legacies have affected these countries’ citizenship regimes. 10 Interviews are used as complementary examples or illustration of the argument alongside other data; they are not the foundation of the analysis.

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

The second part of the book (pp. 71–119) is devoted to the analysis of the effect of domestic forces on citizenship regulation and practices in unconsolidated states. It starts with Chapter 4, entitled ‘The Politics of Contemporary Citizenship’, which examines the elite competition in each of the countries studied from the disintegration of Yugoslavia to 2012. It situates the anachronous, but occasionally overlapping, processes of constructing states and reconstructing citizens within the struggles for political power that took place in different fashion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Yet, as elite actions do not occur in a vacuum, but in different socio-political contexts that shape the political choices and preferences, political dynamics are examined against relevant spectrums of domestic factors. The way in which elite actions have affected the individuals living in the countries studied is examined in Chapter 5, entitled ‘Intergroup Competition, Ideational and Symbolic Dimensions of Citizenship’. This chapter analyses the interaction between elites and society in reconstructing the postYugoslav citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. It highlights the societal factors that have contributed to the fragmentation of these countries’ citizenship regimes. It also pays attention to the symbolic dimensions of citizenship, such as constructions of political identities, and images of the ‘Other’, as elements that affected the self-awareness of individuals as citizens of these contested polities. Apart from the domestic factors, citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space has also substantially been shaped by external actors and forces, analysed in detail in the third part of the book (pp. 119–57). Given the intricate embroidery of regional relationships, Chapter 6 of this book is entitled ‘Dual Citizenship in Challenged and Unconsolidated States’. It is devoted to the analysis of the effects of regional pressures on the reconstruction of the post-Yugoslav citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. In the context of citizenship in transition, state-building and identity reconstruction in the countries studied, the effect of the competing interests of regional actors was far from insignificant. Quite the contrary, competition and conflict generated through clashes of regional interests induced a high reliance on the external factors, explained in the last chapter of the book. Chapter 7 of this book entitled ‘Citizenship en route to the European Union’ looks at how the external pressures shaped the states and citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro in the context of democratization, transition, and Europeanization. It highlights the different degrees of involvement of the EU, CoE, and other organizations whose effects fall under the definitions of Europeanization for the transformation of citizenship in these three unconsolidated and challenged post-Yugoslav states.

Chapter 2

Transitional Triangle: State, Nation, Citizenship The state is a compound made of citizens; and this compels us to consider who should properly be called a citizen and what a citizen really is. Aristotle (1941, 1247b–75a)

The primary purpose of this chapter is to propose an analytical grid that will enhance our understanding of the transformation of citizenship in the unconsolidated and challenged states in south-eastern Europe. The lack of consolidation in these ethnically heterogeneous states is commonly due to the domestic disturbances of the institutional structures resulting from intergroup competition. Challenges to the state emanate both from the non-dominant ethnic communities inside the state and from the neighbouring countries. As a consequence, the framework presented in this chapter accounts for the role of historical, domestic and external factors in the creation and development of citizenship regimes in the new states. Particularly, it deepens the argument as to why we need to find an adequate theoretical filter for analysing states that have undergone multiple disintegrations, conflicts, changes of borders, and that are yet to reach stability both internally and externally. The framework has been inspired by the institutionalist approaches for the study of citizenship, which offer useful yet incomplete lenses for understanding the transformation of membership. After presenting the framework and its sources, this chapter explains how it can be used for understanding the varieties of citizenship in states that are simultaneously faced with pressures of retaining and relinquishing their sovereignty in the context of state-building and EU accession. An Analytical Framework for Understanding Citizenship in Challenged and Unconsolidated States Understanding how a citizenship regime is established in the context of state and nation-building entails the awareness of how multiple ties are created between institutions and actors, and how they are framed within broader domestic and international processes. Although it is impossible to view state and nation-building as fully separate from each other, it is possible to map a dynamic structure that continuously (re)shapes both the way the state operates and the way in which it is seen by its inhabitants. This structure is defined through the interplay among four agents of change: domestic factors – elites: political, intellectual, economic, institutions, societal dynamics (including and assuming the institutional and non-

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

institutional bonds that relate individuals to each other), and external factors (forces external to both state and society, including other states, and non-state actors). Activities and decisions of each of these agents, as well as the response from their counterparts, yield their outcomes and consequences for state and nationbuilding in the context of reinforcing or competing historical, ideological, political and economic circumstances. For instance, the same action of the external factor in different historical, cultural, or geographical contexts will generate different responses on behalf of the domestic players, and equally different consequences for the country’s citizenship regime. This is schematically represented in Table 2.1. Table 2.1

Factors influencing citizenship in unconsolidated and challenged states

Factor

Means

Characteristic

Domestic 1

Elites (ethnic)

Cooperating

Citizenship Governance

Citizenship Support policy marked citizenship as by ethnocultural state identity inclusiveness

Competing

Domestic 2

Symbolic assemblages

External 1

Other states (horizontal)

External 2

International organizations (vertical)

Citizenship policy marked by ethnocultural selectivity Weak or no Consensus on ethnic cleavages state symbols as markers of citizenship Strong ethnic No consensus cleavages on state symbols as markers of citizenship Consenting Open approach to dual citizenship Contesting Restrictive (exceptionally, tolerant) approach to dual citizenship Strong Direct norm transfer Weak

Practices

Weak to no norm transfer

Challenge citizenship as state identity Support citizenship as state identity Challenge citizenship as state identity Support citizenship as state identity Challenge citizenship as state identity Support citizenship as a state identity Challenge citizenship as state identity

Transitional Triangle: State, Nation, Citizenship

25

Table 2.1 above represents a model that captures the different factors influencing continuities and discontinuities in the citizenship regimes of challenged and unconsolidated states: 1) historical path dependency; 2) domestic factors (political and symbolic); and 3) external factors (other states, international organizations). For each of them, the table illustrates how the different characteristics affect the governance and practices of citizenship. The analysis in this book will proceed to look into detail in each of these factors, as a step necessary for the full understanding of how citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro is created, why has it been established as such, and what induces it to change. Citizenship is a mirror of the state’s identity and the above framework can help us to understand the functioning of contemporary polities. The case in point could be summarized as follows: • History affects the governance and practices of citizenship through narratives and institutional legacies. If the narrative on national identity is consolidated, and if institutional legacies offer a network for articulating this identity, the governance of citizenship will be marked by strong ethnic elements (such as facilitated admission for ethnic kin, diaspora policies, and liberal dual citizenship). In other words, citizenship will represent not only the link between the individuals and the state, but it will also reflect the ownership of the state by the dominant ethnic community. Equally, the practices of citizenship will support the symbolic and ideational elements that characterize the state identity (such as broad support for the country’s anthem or flag). By contrast, competing identity narratives, coupled with institutions that unevenly articulate such identities, lead to a governance of citizenship that is formally de-ethnicized. In such a system of citizenship governance, no group claims ownership of the state. However, the practices of citizenship will reveal challenges to the state’s identity as designated by the symbols of citizenship. • Domestic factors can be divided into actors, or political elites adopting citizenship policies, and assemblages composed of symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship. –– If ethnic elites are cooperating, the governance of citizenship will be marked by ethnocultural inclusiveness and preferential treatment for ethnic kin. The practices of citizenship will support the articulation of citizenship as state identity. If ethnic elites compete for dominance of the state’s structures, citizenship policies will be ethnoculturally selective (restrictive or tolerant) approach to dual citizenship, high naturalization barriers, no facilitation for ethnic kin). The practices of citizenship will be associated with ethnic kinship, and will challenge the state identity. –– If the symbolic assemblages are characterized by weak or no ethnic cleavages, the governance of citizenship will be based on a consensus on the state symbols, while practices will support citizenship as state identity. By contrast, strong ethnic cleavages are unlikely to result in

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

consensus on the state symbols, and citizenship as an articulation of the state identity will be challenged. • The external factors can be divided into horizontal (other states) and vertical (international organizations). –– If the horizontal factors pose no challenge to the state, the country is likely to have an open approach to dual citizenship as it will support the identity of the state. However, if one or more horizontal factors contest the state, the country will have a restrictive (exceptionally, tolerant approach to dual citizenship. The practices of citizenship will thus challenge the state identity. –– If the effects of the vertical factors are strong, and the state is required to comply with rules and regulations of international organizations it has joined (or seeks to join), citizenship governance will be transformed due to direct transposition of supranational laws in the domestic context. While membership to such organizations inevitably erodes the state’s sovereignty, it will reinforce the identity of the state as articulated by the dominant political actors. By contrast, if vertical factors have weak effects, the norm transfer that is not compulsory will only marginally affect the governance of citizenship. Such factors are also likely to challenge citizenship as state identity. No country’s citizenship regime emanates from a single source. Hence, while it is important to distinguish among above-mentioned influences on a country’s citizenship, it is equally significant to be able to discern the dynamics among them. In practice, citizenship regimes are adopted and implemented by political elites. These agents operate within institutions, which are path dependent. Therefore, citizenship will bear the marks of the history of that institutions’ decision making. Both actors and institutions are influenced by societal dynamics, which also has direct consequences for the norms and practices of citizenship. People elect their representatives and outcomes of elections are a mirror of the state of society. Even in authoritarian regimes, electoral outcomes are a manifestation of the societal inability to take collective action. Societal dynamics shape and transform institutions, which in turn affect the decisions that political actors take in shaping citizenship norms. Once these norms are applied in a state, they generate the practices of citizenship. These entail different forms of political participation, symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship, including the identification with the state whereby citizenship is exercised. Equally, domestic regulation and practices of citizenship are affected by external factors, be it the neighbouring countries, regional/global/colonial powers, or international organizations. Some of these dynamics have been captured in Rogers Brubaker’s (1996) model for analysis of nationhood and ethnicity in Europe based on a ‘triadic nexus’ between national homelands, nationalizing states and national minorities, commonly used to unpack citizenship regimes. In an attempt to adapt Brubaker’s model to the patterns of development of the new European democracies, David

Transitional Triangle: State, Nation, Citizenship

27

J. Smith (2002) used the analytical prism of four layers (‘quadratic nexus’ – an upgrade to Brubaker’s ‘triadic nexus’), including the international community, to explain how identities in central and eastern Europe were framed after the fall of communism. He claims that the interaction of the processes of ‘Europeanization/ Westernisation’ with Brubaker’s nationalizing state, national minorities and external homelands is essential for understanding post-communist nation-building (Smith 2002, 8). This is so because the rhetoric of Euro-Atlantic integrations helped to shape many eastern European states as it epitomized what Kundera (1984, 33) defined as the ‘return to Europe’. Looking at the interplay between domestic and international factors in the context of citizenship and state-building in Albania and Kosovo, Krasniqi (2013a) applied the concept of the ‘quadratic nexus’ on the Western Balkans. In discerning the multi-tiered relations between actors, Krasniqi (2013a, 409) observed how ‘various actors observe the behaviour and attitude of the other actors (even on the situations outside the given nexus) and take it into consideration while adopting their response or position’. This approach allowed him to depart from the common monolithic view of actors and to consider them ‘arenas of struggle’ for dominance (Krasniqi 2013a, 410). Following on from Krasniqi (2013a), this book is premised on the understanding that actors’ behaviour is shaped by a structure of opportunities and constraints that emanate not only from within the country but also outside of it. Hence the notion of an ‘actor’ is in this book replaced by ‘factor’, which allows us to understand the plurality of interests associated with political action emanating from a particular nexus. Furthermore, while both Brubaker’s triadic and Smith’s quadratic nexus explain some aspects of interplay between state-building and citizenship, neither of them suffices to untangle the citizenship puzzle the unconsolidated and challenged states. More specifically, neither of the two models takes into account the significance of the external factors, which are neither the kin-states of national minorities, nor the international factors in Smith’s sense. For example, in the context of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece would be such states. In addition to this, neither Brubaker’s (1996) nor Smith’s (2002) model can offer a reason for the difference between citizenship as an expression of the state’s identity and citizenship as an identity of individuals. Even though the latter dynamic is difficult to fully capture analytically, this book operationalizes this distinction by looking at the symbols of state identity. In doing that, it juxtaposes policies (as adopted by policymakers) and individuals’ attitudes towards the symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship, such as flags and coats of arms. This distinction is essential for understanding the difference between how the state constructs its membership and how its citizens feel towards it. Sources of the Framework The analytical framework presented above draws heavily on the institutionalist approach, which academics often use to analyse and compare citizenship regimes

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

(Brubaker 1996; Ette 2003; Joppke and Morawska 2003). Institutionalism looks at the emergence of rules in the context of historical path dependencies, actor preferences, and cultural socialization. In the context of citizenship studies, institutionalism has developed along three strands: historical, rational choice and sociological. Each of these three institutionalist schools has some explanatory power for the convergence and divergence in citizenship legislation. Yet neither of these schools fully captures the origins, development, and transformation of citizenship laws. As a consequence, in comparing citizenship legislation in Germany, Poland and Hungary, Maatsch (2011) opted to look at all of the three schools as a conceptual framework for analysing ethnic citizenship regimes. Such an integrative approach to institutionalism has inspired and informed the analytical framework for understanding citizenship regimes in unconsolidated states presented in the previous section. Table 2.2 illustrates the explanatory power of institutionalism for studying citizenship. It also highlights the limits of each of the strands of this approach, explaining why it is essential to blend insights from all three schools. Table 2.2

Institutionalism and citizenship regimes

Approach

Focus

Limits of explanatory power

Historical

Historical path dependencies (link: state/nation-building and citizenship)

The role of actors adopting citizenship policies

Rational Choice

Actors and interests in regulating citizenship Broader international Citizenship and European governance and developments practices shaped by other countries (not international organizations)

Sociological

Use in framework

Narratives and institutional structures that shape citizenship governance (policies) and practices (symbols) Citizenship practices Agency in developing detached from actors citizenship regulation External structuring of opportunities and constraints

Source: Table developed by this author with reference to Maatsch (2011, 13).

Studying citizenship regimes through any of the three institutional approaches can reveal to us many interesting dynamics in the relationship between the individual and the polity. For instance, as a result of the common history in the former Yugoslavia, there are similarities in the citizenship regimes of the studied countries. These similarities can be explained through the prism of historical institutionalism. That is, we need to take into account the fact that the post-Yugoslav citizenship

Transitional Triangle: State, Nation, Citizenship

29

legislation largely reflects this region’s political realities after the Yugoslav breakup. These political realities, simultaneously marked by the legacies of the previous system and the struggle to define territorial and membership boundaries, have also been strongly influenced by the international factors. Having in mind the theoretical models presented above, the general effects of international factors can be explained by the combination of rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Nonetheless, a number of norms and practices of citizenship in these challenged states of South East Europe stem precisely from the fact that their underlying trajectories of state and nation-building are incongruent and challenged by one or more domestic or regional actors. For this reason, a comprehensive approach to this complex topic also requires an understanding of horizontal external factors, which neither of the theories takes into account separately. These factors, usually neighbouring countries or kin-states of significant minorities, have a significant impact on the regulation and practices of citizenship in the new Balkan states. Their influence is not mirrored only in the development of the citizenship policies and the country’s overall approach to the construction of membership. Historical Institutionalism Historical institutionalism looks at the tradition of nation-building as the nexus from which citizenship regimes emanate (Brubaker 1992). As noted already, in his seminal book Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Brubaker (1992) differentiated two models of conceiving nationhood and thus citizenship – German and French. In Germany, the state was conceived by the unification of the people by ‘blood and iron’ (Taylor 1954, 142–70), which reflects the German ethnic (jus sanguinis) principle of state and nation-building. Culture, language, the collective sense of history, solidarity, and a belief in a common destiny are all traits related to the community of sentiment. As a consequence, the German citizenship regime is largely reflective of kinship bonds. By contrast, the state was the main driving force behind the formative aspects of nation-building in France. Hence the relationship between the individual and the polity was based on territory (Brubaker 1996, 411–37), giving rise to the civic (jus soli) paradigm of citizenship. The characteristics of the interplay between citizenship and national conception in France include membership in ‘the republic’, submission to law, to the sovereign, submission to reason (as opposed to submission to emotion, to a community of sentiment) (Magnette 1997, 66–7). In the contemporary citizenship regulation, we can see the interplay between these two modes of establishing the relationship between individuals and states. In essence, individuals can become citizens of a given state either at birth (automatically) or after birth (by various forms of registration and naturalization). The acquisition of citizenship at birth is commonly determined through pure jus sanguinis, that is descent (such as both parents are citizens of a given state), or a combination of jus sanguinis and jus soli (such as one parent is a citizen of a given country and the child is born on the territory of that

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

country), while pure jus soli is used in very limited circumstances, such as cases of foundlings. The acquisition of citizenship after birth can, however, reveal deeper issues with the construction of membership, as it clearly determines which groups are included and which are excluded from the polity. Here we can generally distinguish between ethnic and civic citizenship regimes. In practice, ethnic citizenship regimes favour the admission of non-resident co-ethnics to foreigners born on the country’s soil, while integration in the state regardless of ethnic belonging would prevail in cases of civic citizenship laws. Even so, the major criticism of Brubaker’s paradigm for understanding citizenship regimes has largely been similar to the criticism of the ‘ethnic vs. civic’ dichotomy in the studies of nationalism. That is, most citizenship regimes cannot be explained by either ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ nationhood models because most of the recent national movements contain a mixture of ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ elements. In his later work, Brubaker (1999) has also questioned the conceptual consistency of these models, claiming that a full understanding of citizenship regimes in the new states requires transcending simple dichotomies. Moving away from Brubaker’s work, the fall of socialism and the rise of new states across Europe and Central Asia motivated the most recent classification of citizenship regimes that Vink and Bauböck proposed in early 2013. Based on an empirical study of the citizenship policies in the EU and its neighbourhood, Vink and Bauböck (2013) have argued that rather than being fixed along the linear ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’, citizenship regimes tend to be configured on the grounds of five different purposes that they have: intergenerational continuity, territorial integrity, singularity, genuine link, and special ties. In their study, the authors propose a two-dimensional model through which they identify ‘four idealtypic citizenship regimes: those that emphasize either ethnocultural or territorial selection criteria and those that combine restrictions or inclusiveness on both dimensions’ (Vink and Bauböck 2013, 628). That is, the four types of citizenship regimes include those that are 1) ethnoculturally selective; 2) ethnoculturally expansive; 3) territorially selective and 4) territorially expansive. Interestingly, the empirical classification of the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were not included in the analysis) revealed the predominance of ethnocultural models: Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia are ranked as ethnoculturally selective, while Serbia and Croatia are classified as ethnoculturally expansive citizenship regimes (Vink and Bauböck 2013, 639). This implies that the regulation and practices of citizenship in Macedonia and Montenegro analysed in this book do contain strong ethnic elements aimed at curbing the expansion of citizenship. As will be explained through the analytical frame used in this book, the ethnocultural selectivity despite the declared ‘civic’ nature of these laws is a combination of the interplay between domestic and external factors that emerge from the unconsolidated and challenged state and nation-building, and that shape and change these countries’ citizenship regimes. The transformation of citizenship resulting from the dynamic between statehood and nationhood has also informed several other efforts to study citizenship

Transitional Triangle: State, Nation, Citizenship

31

regulation and practices through the prism of historical institutionalism. Favell (2001) argued that it was not the conception of nationhood that shaped citizenship legislation but the symbolism thereof; Hansen and Weil (2001) explored the state’s migration patterns; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2001) emphasized the impact of the combination of the statehood and migration experiences in constructing citizenship legislation. More recent studies of citizenship regimes (Bauböck, Perchinig, and Sievers 2007) maintain that legislation regulating membership in a polity reflects a ‘path dependency’ in relation to the conception of national identity, and experience of the state in the context of broader European developments. Although the earlier classification made by Bauböck, Perchinig, and Sievers (2007) based on central and east European post-communist states is useful for understanding the general impact of structures on citizenship legislation, it is of limited applicability in the post-Yugoslav context. That is, the division of citizenship regimes in line with the experiences of restored states, states with shifted borders, post-partition states, and states that used to be members of empires is of limited use for studying Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, all of which have experienced most or all of the above in addition to interethnic conflict in recent years. Therefore, while acknowledging the value of historical institutionalism in accounting for the general trends in shaping citizenship regimes, a full understanding also needs consideration of the role of actors and processes that had an input in conceiving and transforming membership in a polity. Rational Choice Institutionalism Rational choice institutionalists sought to mitigate the limits of historical institutionalism by switching the focus from structure to agents in making political decisions. Commonly, this strand of institutionalism argues that policies are the product of a set of choices that rational actors make in an environment of opportunities and constraints in order to maximize their utility. In the context of studying citizenship through rational choice institutionalism, Joppke (2001; 2005) argued that actors seek to moderate their political preferences and enshrine those in nationality legislation. Hence, structures that dominate the historical institutionalist approach do not, in themselves, shape the preferences of actors. Rather, they present a framework within which political players exercise their interests and aims (Ette 2003; Joppke and Morawska 2003). While rational choice institutionalism can indeed account for certain aspects of citizenship legislation, it would be overly simplistic to conclude that citizenship legislation in the unconsolidated post-Yugoslav states is merely a product of political agency. Citizenship regimes in these countries have emerged from a particular post-partition context. This implies that they bear the legacies of the previous systems, and thus need to be considered in the context of ‘path dependency’. In terms of acquisition and loss of citizenship, some of the institutions and norms have been inherited from the socialist Yugoslavia. Equally, the distribution of many of the rights of citizenship (for example, education and

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

social rights) also mirrors the legacies of the legal and institutional pillars of the former Yugoslav state. However, citizenship laws and practices, as well as the countries in which they were adopted, have undergone a process of transformation over the past two decades. Although one could claim those changes were merely a reflection of the agents’ political preferences, they also contained elements that mirrored broader regional concerns, pressures from the international community, or European citizenship norms (such as the European Convention on Nationality). In addition, whereas rational choice institutionalism may account for the regulatory aspect of citizenship, the practice of citizenship and the way people perceive their membership in a community is rather detached from actors’ preferences. This makes rational choice institutionalism a useful, yet an imperfect framework for understanding citizenship regimes in challenged states. Sociological Institutionalism Sociological institutionalism seeks to provide a loose umbrella approach to looking at the origins and development of citizenship (March and Olsen 2004). Sociological institutionalism contextualizes the changes in citizenship legislation in the light of broader international or European trends, and complements the actor-based approach to understanding citizenship. The liberalizing effect of international norms, and in particular the impact of human rights instruments as outlined by Soysal (1994) are particularly relevant in understanding the construction of citizenship regimes in post-conflict societies. Although this approach has been criticized by Joppke (1999; 2001), on the grounds that human rights norms have been the basis of democratic societies, this criticism fades away in the context of unconsolidated states. The main reason for this is the wartime experience of the post-Yugoslav states, and the international involvement in enshrining human rights principles in the legal and political systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Similarly, the ‘Europeanization’ strand of sociological institutionalism accounts for the changes that have taken place in the regulation of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav context under the influence of the Council of Europe, or as a result of the pressures stemming from the European Union (EU) to which all of the studied countries aspire to accede (Checkel 2001; Dell’Olio 2005; Vink 2001). Neither of the two strands of sociological institutionalism, however, can suffice to explain a significant trait that characterizes the post-Yugoslav space – the limits of ‘Europeanization’ (Bideleux 2001; Börzel 2011; Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit 2012; Subotić 2012), analysed in more detail in Chapter 7. These limits are particularly relevant for examining the transformation of citizenship in countries faced with a tension between state and nation-building, and EU membership.

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Citizenship Between State-Building and ‘Europeanization’ The notion of citizenship is located at the very heart of new states precisely because it is not restricted to mere formal aspects of membership. Rather, it includes questions of identity and belonging, whose importance peaked in the last decade of the twentieth century. At that time, in many of the newly created postcommunist states, the fresh elites sought to combine nationalism with practical policies in order to legitimize the dominance of the majority community over the state structures. The legal norms that arose within such polities were tainted by what Hayden (1992, 655) termed as constitutional nationalism, in other words ‘a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state’. Granting such privileges to a certain ethnic community helped to consolidate the power of that ethnic community in the state. The constitutionally nationalist citizenship regimes also establish a firm link between individuals belonging to the dominant ethnic group and the state as the institutional mirror of that group. While applicable to those states where there existed a consolidated dominant ethnic/national community, any attempt to implement ‘constitutional nationalism’ in states with no majority ethnic/national community or states populated by significant ethnic minorities would destabilize the state’s structures and lead to conflict. The examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the FRY (as regards Montenegro and Kosovo) in the early 1990s clearly show this tendency. A scrutiny of the new states in the post-communist world reflects two outcomes of the interplay between state and nation-building. The first one has yielded stable states, which are based on the dominance of one ethnic/national group. Almost by rule, citizenship regimes in these countries are ethnic and generally stable. The reason for such a stability of the citizenship regime in this category of states is the absence of a major internal or external challenge to either the state or the identity of the dominant ethnic/national group. The second paradigm of state and nationbuilding is the one of pluriethnic (and often contested) states. Such states are challenged either at the level of statehood, at the level of nationhood, or both. As a consequence, their citizenship is commonly not defined in ethnic terms. Instead, it is explicitly conceived as the link between the individual and the state, and the ethnic dimension is avoided. Moreover, the power balances among different ethnic communities largely shape citizenship regimes in the challenged states. Such a conception of citizenship is based on a particular trajectory of state and/or nationbuilding, whereby the state acts as a link between the polities/communities it is composed of. Unconsolidated states are characterized by three traits emerging from the discrepant state and nation-building processes, which prevented the rise of constitutional nationalism and thus of ethnified citizenship regimes. First of all, no ethnic group in these states can claim absolute dominance over the state or the appropriation thereof. Hence these states are by default pluriethnic. Second, even if an ethnic group is numerically dominant, it is engaged in constant competition

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with other groups who claim institutional power over the state. These states are unconsolidated not because of the lack democratic institutions which they usually have, but because of the constant shifts of institutional power balance induced by intergroup competition. Third, these states are challenged internally or externally, or both. As a consequence, one or more of the ethnic groups objects to the existence of the state itself, or the nationhood of one or more rival ethnic groups, or both. Similar challenges may occur from the country’s neighbours, who can put forward claims over the territory of the state or over its population. External challenges mostly come from kin-states of the competing ethnic groups, which may also seek power in the state itself. These traits can also be observed in the citizenship regimes of the challenged and unconsolidated states in the Western Balkans – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Their citizenship regimes are continually exposed to multiple pressures, including the domestic ethnicization of politics by rival ethnic/ national groups, external challenges to the state and nation-building processes and the persistence of the EU to build ‘open’ and ‘civic’ societies. In order to respond to the domestic pressures, membership policies of these states are the key mechanism for maintaining the balance among ethnically heterogeneous groups. For instance, barriers to naturalization tend to be higher in challenged polities, as the expansion of citizenry is closely connected to minority rights, electoral balances and interethnic relations. This is so, because naturalization is related to the expansion of the state’s populace, which in turn reflects upon the core elements of the state, such as its political and socioeconomic systems. In other words, citizenship regimes not only mirror the political circumstances in their respective countries, but are also used as a tool of managing the institutional and societal dynamics in them. At the same time, the practices of citizenship in such countries are marked by the conflation of the symbolic dimensions of the state and those of ethnic kinship. This implies very firm boundaries between different groups and the fragmentation of citizenship, as the relationship to the state becomes secondary to that to ethnic kin. Equally, in responding to the external pressures – be it from the neighbouring countries or from the EU – the country’s citizenship regime both embeds and projects a country’s foreign policy. In stable and unchallenged societies, citizenship regimes are often expansive, and they seek to transcend the state’s borders. If those states have a strong ethnic identity, they are likely to project the interest of the state in establishing links with the members of the dominant ethnic group who are simultaneously nationals of other states. This is often done through facilitated naturalization for ethnic kin from the neighbouring countries, or other diasporaoriented policies. Using citizenship as a mechanism of foreign policy has two aims. 1. reinforce the ethnic structure of that state internally; 2. establish its presence in other states, thus expanding the state’s sphere of influence regionally/globally insofar that is in congruence with the competing external forces.

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Stable and unchallenged states are proactively exercising horizontal influence on citizenship regimes of other countries. By contrast, in unconsolidated and challenged states, the regulation of citizenship is often more rigid, and aims (roughly) to achieve the congruence of state and territorial, as opposed to ethnic/ national membership boundaries. The practices of citizenship are marked by constant challenges to the symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship (such as flag, coat of arms, anthem, identification with the state) by the different ethnic communities. In this context, the actual discrepancy between the state-building process and the dynamics of competition among ethnic groups also means that these states are likely to try to resist the horizontal impact of other states on their citizenship regimes. In other words, the dual citizenship policy of these countries is likely to be very restrictive, particular as regards the kin-states of the rival ethnic/national communities. Dual citizenship raises issues of loyalty, particularly if members of an ethnic minority in the (contested) also hold the citizenship of their kin-state. However, while being resistant to regional influence on their citizenship regimes, the challenged and unconsolidated states are moderately porous in respect to adapting to international pressures. We could refer to the state’s responsiveness as the ‘elasticity of the citizenship regime’ in describing the propensity of the state’s conception of citizenship to change in view of endogenous and external pressures. Here, in relation to the regulation of citizenship, we can observe three trends. First, if there is an overt competition between the state and the external factor in terms of state and nation-building, such a competition is likely to produce restrictive citizenship regulation (for example, prohibition of dual citizenship). Second, if the competition between the said state and the external factor is limited to a part of populace or territory, such competition is likely to generate limited restrictions in terms of citizenship regimes (such as toleration of dual citizenship). Third, if there is no competition between the country and the external factor, as is very often (but not always) the case with EU or CoE, such a relationship is likely to have an expansive effect on the citizenship regime, thus loosening the naturalization conditions, or allowing dual/multiple citizenship. In terms of the practices of citizenship, the situation is somewhat different. Competition between the state and the external factor (kin-state of a minority community) can cause tensions between groups, failure of minority communities to identify with the state, and challenges to state symbols. By contrast, the non-existence of tensions with the external factor enhances the elasticity of citizenship regimes as it incentivizes people to accept the symbolic and ideational elements of membership. In other words, the association of the state with the external factor is perceived as positive, which in turn facilitates individuals’ recognition of the state as a significant, if not primary, membership community.

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Horizontal and Vertical ‘Constellations of Citizenship’ The effects of external influences on the citizenship regimes of the new states can be better understood by reference to Rainer Bauböck’s notion of ‘citizenship constellations’. In seeking to explain the liaisons that individuals have with multiple states, Bauböck defines ‘citizenship constellations’ as structures ‘in which individuals are simultaneously linked to several such political entities, so that their legal rights and duties are determined not only by one political authority, but by several’ (Bauböck 2010, 848). Having in mind that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro have a history of a common life in the former Yugoslavia, whereby relocations from one to another republic were common due to work or family reasons or in the 1990s because of the conflict, we can indeed speak of the existence of ‘citizenship constellations’ Bauböck’s (2010) that are nested through individual’s belonging to different citizenship regimes. However, these horizontal ‘citizenship constellations’ exist at not only at the individual but also at the polity level, and are manifested through both political and symbolic interactions among these polities (such as post-Yugoslav states vis-à-vis each other). As a consequence of the challenges that these interactions produce, the polity’s legal and institutional setups adapt in order to be able to respond. For instance, challenged states are unlikely to adopt ethnic citizenship policies and grant citizenship to their kin living outside the state’s borders, because the meaning of the ethnic kinship may be unclear and/or challenged. That is, an ethnic policy could result in the influx in the citizenship of the new state of co-ethnics, which essentially challenge that state’s statehood and nationhood. Equally, the practices and symbolism of citizenship will also be affected by such challenges when the institutional practices are implemented in ethnically fractured and divided societies, as is the case with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. In her description of the ethnic citizenship regimes in Germany, Hungary and Poland, Maatsch (2011) claimed that the horizontal norm transfer largely stems from the references to other states’ legal practices concerning citizenship. She maintains that this norm transfer induces the convergence among citizenship laws within the EU member states, whose increasing similarity can be explained through institutional learning. While widely applicable in the case of the EU member states as a force that explains the convergence of citizenship laws, such an institutional learning does not fully apply to the new and unconsolidated states in the Western Balkans. There are two pervasive reasons for this. First, in the post-Yugoslav context, some states – such as Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia – have a higher degree of consolidation of their statehood and nationhood. By extension, their citizenship regimes are based on ethnic inclusiveness, which obstructs the horizontal institutional norm transfer on the challenged and unconsolidated states whose citizenship regimes are not legally defined as ethnic. For instance, it is unlikely that a challenged state, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Montenegro, will be susceptible to importing institutional

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norms or practices of citizenship from an ethnically consolidated country like Serbia. This tendency is exemplified in detail in Chapter 6, which focuses on dual citizenship policies. Second, many of the post-Yugoslav states challenge some aspect of one another’s statehood and nationhood, which also implies a further burden on horizontal norm transfer through references to other states’ legal practices. That is, Maatsch (2011) maintains that in the European Union, reference to legal practices and court decisions in the neighbouring countries leads to convergence of the member states’ citizenship regimes. This is unlikely to happen in the post-Yugoslav space where references to judiciary practices of other states are scarce. In addition to this, due to the different nature of the construal of membership in the different post-Yugoslav countries, such references could result in divergence rather than convergence of citizenship norms and practices. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 7, dealing with relevant judiciary decisions. While we can infer that the neighbours cause the divergence of citizenship regimes, the aspiration of the post-Yugoslav states to enter the EU drives their institutional and political structures towards more convergence. Therefore, we need a broader understanding of Bauböck’s (2010) concept of ‘citizenship constellations’. In addition to explaining the horizontal relationship of individuals (migrants) to multiple polities, Bauböck (2010) applied ‘citizenship constellations’ vertically to federal states and supranational entities. The latter has been particularly useful for studying post-communist countries, many of which have seceded from multinational federations and/or integrated into the EU, thus having an experience of a vertical ‘citizenship constellation’. Although the studied countries do not belong to any such vertical ‘citizenship constellation’ at present, they did so in the past as a part of Yugoslavia, or multinational empires through history. Equally, they aspire to become EU member states, which implies that they will be included in vertically nested ‘citizenship constellations’ in the future. Hence the current citizenship regimes of these countries and any amendments to them have been affected by the competing streams of the legacies of constellations past and the prospects of constellations future. Referring to the example of EU citizenship, we can infer that vertical nestedness indeed brings about convergence in citizenship legislation albeit at a slower pace than commonly argued since citizenship is the prerogative of sovereign states. Equally, the socialist Yugoslav citizenship resulted in the convergence of republican citizenship norms. Belonging to a broader and stable community of states is therefore likely to generate convergence of citizenship regulation and practices over time. This implies that, for as long as the countries studied are not nested, divergence among their citizenship regimes will prevail. Europeanization in the Aspiring Members and its Effects on Citizenship The notion of Europeanization is an umbrella concept, denoting a set of processes triggered by the interaction between the national governments and the EU. The

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scholarly conceptualization Europeanization emerged in the late 1990s, in the attempt to explain the adaptation of the political, social, and institutional milieus of the member states to the dynamics of integration. Claudio Radaelli (2000, 4) defined Europeanization as a set of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.

Following on this initial definition, scholars of social and political science have looked at how the top-down pressures from the EU level affect the national policies (Börzel 2005; Börzel and Risse 2003, 2007; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Falkner 2003; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Ladrech 2010; Mair 2004; Radaelli 2004). In doing do, they identified that the effects of the process of Europeanization differs in countries that had a direct say in making the EU rules, from those aspiring to EU membership. In the member states, Europeanization is bidirectional. National governments feed into the process that subsequently affects them. However, in countries seeking to join the EU, Europeanization is unidirectional. These countries are affected by the EU’s rules, but have no direct impact on their formulation (Jacoby 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006). As a consequence, the process of Table 2.3

Europeanization mechanisms

Europeanization mechanism

Conditionality

Socialization

Imposition

EU factors

clarity of demands strength of conditionality (ratio: incentive – compliance – sanctions) size and timeline of reward monitoring

legitimacy of the process legitimacy of EU demands

capacity of the EU to enforce (asymmetry of power) costs of imposition monitoring

Domestic factors

administrative capacities societal support/ opposition to reform institutional responses domestic adaptation costs (political competition, veto players, ethnic balances) 

acceptance of EU values no conflict between state identity and EU demands transnational networks

institutional capacity to implement domestic adaptation costs (political competition, veto players, ethnic balances) 

Source: Table developed by this author with reference to Sedelmeier (2011, 13).

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Europeanization in the non-EU countries is also commonly viewed through the lenses of institutionalism, which identifies three complementary mechanisms through which the ‘domestic adaptation to EU integration’ (Graziano and Vink 2007, 7) is carried out: conditionality, socialization, and coercion (Noutcheva 2012; Sedelmeier 2011). These processes are schematically presented in Table 2.3. Conditionality is the mechanism through which the EU transforms the aspiring members into countries institutionally capable of integrating in the EU by using both incentives (for compliance) and sanctions (for non-compliance) (Grabbe 1999; Vachudova 2001; Noutcheva 2012). In the studies of Europeanization through conditionality, the success of adaptation depends on the clarity of EU demands, the size and tangibility of rewards from compliance, and the asymmetry of power between the national government and the EU (Vachudova 2005; Parau 2010). In this respect, compliance is more likely if the EU’s demand is clear, if the reward for such compliance is tangible, and if non-compliance results in repercussions for the national government (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). As a consequence, this mechanism has been most commonly used to study the Europeanization of the candidate countries for EU accession (Sedelmeier 2011). The socialization mechanism of Europeanization refers to the process of social learning from the EU, based on the internalization of norms and the development of new identities (Börzel and Risse 2003; Radaelli 2003; Schimmelfening and Seldemeier 2004). This norm-internalization is largely conditional on how the country perceives the EU’s conditions. That is, the more legitimate the country believes the EU’s conditions are, the more likely is it to implement them. According to Freyburg et al. (2009), such rules are perceived as more legitimate if they are derived from international organizations or through the EU acquis. Finally, imposition is the least studied mechanism of Europeanization, which entails elements of direct governance of the EU in the challenged states aspiring to membership, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Juncos 2011). In cases of imposition, the EU has the powers to override domestic veto players in transposing norms in the domestic context. All of these mechanisms do not imply only the direct transfer of norms and values of the EU. Rather, they also include the indirect impact of other international organizations (such as the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank) whose inputs are commonly enshrined in the conditionality and imposition mechanisms and values in the socialization mechanisms of Europeanization. This fact is particularly relevant for understanding the impacts of Europeanization on citizenship, as the latter is not covered by the EU acquis. Rather, the regulation of membership is the prerogative of member states. At the EU level, some voluntary convergence in citizenship policies has been achieved through the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Nationality (ECN). The ECN has the objective to set the standards for the acquisition of citizenship for different categories of applicants (such as ordinary, spouses, children, refugees) and regulate issues such as dual nationality. However,

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the ECN has been ‘has been ratified by only 20 member states of the Council of Europe, most of which have also made reservations or declarations’ (Cilevičs 2013, 1). In addition to this, its provisions are rather broad and commonly understood as standard-setting rather than legally binding. Hence following Vink (2002, 11) who referred to ECN as ‘weak positive integration’ of European citizenship policies, this book approaches it as a weak mechanism of Europeanization. As such, it is likely to generate some convergence of citizenship in the candidate countries. However, given the very scarce rewards that it offers and potentially high adaptation costs, its effects remain limited. The process of Europeanization does not only transform the citizenship policy but also the rights of membership. Unlike the ECN, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) has become an integral part of the enlargement process in the Western Balkans. Within the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), offering a prospect of EU membership in exchange for compliance with a set of conditions, the underlying countries are required to fully meet the human rights standards of the CoE. These standards include not only the ECHR, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML), but also judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and recommendations of other CoE bodies (such as the Venice Commission, parliamentary committees). In this context, we can observe that the implementation of the CoE human rights acquis bears far greater domestic political costs, as they often require redistribution of citizenship rights among different groups. As a consequence, the effects of this mechanism of Europeanization may range from the very strong to the very weak, depending on the balance between the domestic adaptation costs and incentives, as outlined in the table above. In addition to these two mechanisms of Europeanization, the process of abolishing visa restrictions had a major impact on the transformation of citizenship in the Western Balkan states. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the technical requirements specified by the European Commission (EC), coupled by the clear timelines of the ‘award’ proved to be a major ‘external incentive’ for transforming citizenship regimes in line with the four blocks required by the EC (Trauner 2009a; Kacarska 2012a), including document security, illegal migration, public order and security, and external relations and fundamental rights linked to the movement of persons. Unlike the conditions and recommendations of the CoE, the technical requirements of the visa liberalization process have proven to have had fewer domestic adaptation costs because they required little to none redistribution of political rights among different ethnic groups. In summary, when thinking about how Europeanization has affected the citizenship regimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, we need to acknowledge that the effects of this process vary across the three countries. This is largely due to the different state of state-building in these countries (Bieber 2013a), the divergence in their absorption capacities, their party politics (including interethnic competition), and their institutional stability. Therefore, the impact of

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Europeanization will not depend only on the degree of misfit between the EU and domestic policy and the adoption costs in terms of bargains among actors. Rather, they will also be influenced by the degrees of clarity of the condition, the feasibility of its implementation, as well as the tangibility of the reward(s) for compliance. Particularities of the post-Yugoslav Citizenship Space In explaining the series of events that were triggered by the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, Robert Dahl noted that ‘during the last half of the twentieth century the world witnessed an extraordinary and unprecedented political change’ (1998, 1). The tectonic changes in political landscapes of eastern Europe were, however, different from the ones in the former Yugoslavia. In the majority of the former Soviet Union countries, and in the states under the grip of the Kremlin, the processes of transition and consolidation were initiated through the breakdown of the previous coercive socialist regime. The ideological breakdown also bore its consequences for the culturally heterogeneous and politically unstable federations, whose components were held together by communism. Nevertheless, political transformation and state disintegration in this region were largely followed by the newborn states commitment to democracy, or the rhetoric of democracy. The transitions of the Asian post-communist states bore numerous traits that distinguished it from their European counterparts. Kaldor and Vejvoda (2002) have also observed that the Central and East European states (CEEs) was ‘a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of this world’, that is, a ‘sui generis post-communist political model’ (2002, 2). Indeed, the particularities of the transitional routes of the CEEs stem from the interplay between the legacies of communist rule and the impact of Western democratic forces, especially the EU in the process of democratic consolidation (Hanson 2001). By virtue of having belonged to the same country for almost a century, the post-Yugoslav states are also characterized by the legacies of socialist citizenship. These legacies, which are still present in the regulation and everyday practices of citizenship, show two aspects of path dependency of citizenship regimes in the post-Yugoslav states on the legacies of the previous system. First, the postYugoslav citizenship regimes arose out of the two-tiered socialist citizenship systems. Hence the new states had the experience of management of sub-federal citizenship, both institutionally and symbolically. Second, these sub-federal citizenship regimes became the pillars of new states. As the socialist institutional framework was in place at the time of establishment of the new states, new (and often nationalist) elites consolidated new states by operating within the constraints posed by: 1) the nature of the polity after disintegration; and 2) the external environment composed of multiple emerging polities. The socialist citizenship regimes aimed at providing umbrella frameworks for the operation of ethnically, socially and structurally diverse states. As rightly observed

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by Katherine Verdery ‘[s]ocialist constitutions had placed all socialist citizens on formally equal footing, guaranteeing the rights of co-resident nationalities and providing for proportional representation of national minorities in Party organs’ (1996, 294). Yet far from being a mere ideological product, citizenship in socialist times was one of the means of ensuring the structural operation of multinational and often multilingual federations. Precisely due to the need to operationalize these distinct elements of the socialist space, many of the socialist federations had two-tiered citizenship regimes: a federal and a sub-federal (republican) one. In this respect, the federal citizenship would exhibit centripetal tendencies, in the attempt to consolidate the mixed population of the state with the ideological underpinning of the state (such as Soviet citizenship, Yugoslav citizenship). By contrast, the subfederal citizenship would have centrifugal effects, in that it would acknowledge the territorial and cultural diversity of the different components of the federation (such as republican citizenship laws in USSR and Yugoslavia). As noted by Štiks (2006), at the time of the disintegration of these multinational federations, the sub-federal citizenship took precedence in defining membership in the new states. This is so because in the era of national revivals across Europe the alteration of territorial and membership attachments was more significant than any other political process. The desire to change territorial boundaries implied aspirations for governance over the land over which a community of sentiment had claims (Kupchan 1995). In turn, who would and who would not belong to that community was, in the first instance, regulated by the previous sub-federal citizenship. Very often, however, new and unconsolidated states used citizenship policies to define the insiders and the outsiders in a community affected by a major ideological breakdown. In fact, socialism aimed at eradicating class differences among individuals and generated a stronger orientation towards the group. The strong attachments towards the group were revealed due to the insecurity caused by the fall of the system, when the economic conditions virtually abolished the middle class and created a greater reliance on the governing structures, that is, ‘nationalizing states’ (Brubaker 1996). This structural anomaly of the transitional societies ‘enabled ambitious politicians to manipulate the very definition of citizenship’ (Verdery 1996, 294). In fact, the definition of citizenship was of major significance for the postcommunist societies, in which the scope of the demos had a twofold function. It simultaneously epitomized the pillars of the state’s constitutional identity and the mechanics of belonging through the inclusion and exclusion from membership. In the transitional countries, even minor differences in the scope of the demos became magnified in importance, especially in small polities. For instance, the definition of citizenship was closely related to electoral policies, and thus non-citizens were excluded from participating in political processes. This has been the case in a number of post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav countries, whereby electoral engineering was intimately related to the definition of citizenship (Džankić 2010; Koska 2011; Rava 2010; Ross 2011). By the same token, citizenship policy regulated the degree of ethnification of political life of the new states. It was pivotal in determining in

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whether a group of citizens different from the majority would be included in the community of citizens. That is, post-communist citizenship regimes determined who the minorities would be, bearing in mind the perceived threat from and the potential for loyalty of the minority group to the new state. These issues have gained paramount importance in the post-Yugoslav context, which is characterized not only by partition but also by conflict. As a result of the particular course that the successor states of the former Yugoslavia have embarked upon after the fall of the common state, the questions of belonging and loyalty gained particular salience in the context of symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship. In particular, in the unconsolidated and challenged post-Yugoslav states these issues had an effect on how the respective societies are constructed. Given that these states host a number of competing ethnonational communities, their societies represent a ‘melange of social forces, offering individuals strategies of personal survival and upward mobility. In the state as a field of power, leadership struggles take place in different arenas, not only at the top level’ (Migdal in Touquet and Vermeersch 2008, 274). This societal arena is the most vibrant one in the new Balkan states. It represents not only the milieu of newly formed states, but also produces, moulds and transforms shared meanings for individuals and their reference groups. These shared meanings are, in turn, reflected in the relationships between the individuals belonging to those reference groups (ethnonational communities) and the state. They shape not only the status and rights dimensions of citizenship, but also the symbolic dimension thereof, thus preventing the formation of ‘postethnic citizenship’. For the purposes of this book, the concept of ‘postethnic citizenship’ is based on Touquet’s (2012, 205) understanding of ‘postethnic identity’, which comes into being in exactly the places where conflicts over boundaries exist – that is, not just boundaries themselves, but also why and when categorical membership becomes salient, and how salient it becomes. Post-ethnic identities form one side in this conflict. For postethnics, ethnic categories are salient, but not to the extent that they should become politicized in the way that they have in some divided societies. For postethnics, solidarity extends beyond the boundaries of ethnic categorizations. For postethnics, religious categories are only salient for individual identification, not as a collective one. Postethnics attain the status of outsiders, or deviants.

In other words, postethnic citizenship in this book refers to the capacity of individuals to be loyal to the state instead of to the ethnic kin in practising citizenship; to show solidarity with all members of community and not only to the ethnic kinship group. Attaining this postethnic citizenship is indeed problematic in countries where ethnic categories remain pronounced as a consequence of unfinished or challenged state and nation-building projects. These distinct elements of the citizenship regimes in the post-Yugoslav states did not emerge only with the break-up of the common country. Rather, the institutional ones are based on the legacies of the previous system, while the

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symbolic ones draw from interpretations of historical narratives. Hence a full understanding of the citizenship regimes of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro assumes an overview of the historical narratives about challenges posed to their state-building and/or nation-building. These challenges, presented in the next chapter of the book, help to unveil numerous aspects of the regulation and practices of contemporary citizenship regimes in these unconsolidated and challenged post-Yugoslav states.

Chapter 3

Historical Routes to Contemporary Citizenship This chapter surveys the histories of citizenship policies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Rather than offering a detailed historical analysis, which would stretch beyond the scope and length of this book, the chapter focuses on those episodes from these countries’ history that made a significant impact on citizenship policies. The complex evolution of citizenship in the weak and unconsolidated states in the Western Balkans is first explained by an insight into the history of citizenship in the context of challenged statehood and nationhood in the pre-Yugoslav period. This is followed by an examination of the experience of citizenship policy and practices in the socialist Yugoslavia, where citizenship was two tiered: federal and republican. The intricacies of the federal and republican citizenship were largely related to the attempts to maintain an umbrella Yugoslav identity while simultaneously consolidating the national groups with the borders of the respective republics. Finally, we explore how the relationship between these two tiers played out at the time of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, when the interplay between the federal and republican citizenship regimes became salient, as it determined the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in the newly established post-Yugoslav states. A Pre-Yugoslav History of Citizenship in Challenged States and Nations Historically, the post-Yugoslav space has been at the crossroads of both empires (such as Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Hapsburg) and religions (Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Islam). This fact bears a twofold significance in the context of understanding the intricacies of contemporary citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. First, in the post-Westphalian time when the first modern states were formed, the countries studied were lands belonging to the Hapsburg or Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottoman millet system allowed the non-Muslim Slavs to govern certain aspects of their rights, such as civil and family affairs, through their own cannons and laws, its immediate consequence was that the region did not experience full self-governance over its territory, with the exception of some areas of Montenegro. Second, unlike Serbia and Croatia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the national movements in the countries studied did not emanate from their territories. Rather, they were integrated in the wider regional national revivals such as the South Slav, Serbian,

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or Bulgarian types. On the one hand, these dynamics may have adversely affected the consolidation of the people and the territory in the present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. In this respect, these countries had little experience with managing their citizenship in the pre-Yugoslav period. On the other hand, the history of the weak state-nation nexus also proved to be an invaluable source of history and myth, used to consolidate the emotional aspects of citizenship and ensure loyalty to various competing ethnic groups, which either challenge or support the state in the present-day. The territory of present-day Macedonia became a part of the Ottoman Empire in the late fourteenth century, and the polities existing on the territory of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent a century of struggles before becoming integrated in the Ottoman Empire. In 1499 Montenegro was also conquered by the Ottoman Empire, but as of the sixteenth century it enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, mostly due to the peculiarities of its societal organization (Andrijašević 2000). The refusal of the Ottoman rule in Montenegro sparked numerous rebellions in the seventeenth century, which later on enabled the introduction of theocracy based on Eastern Orthodoxy (Rastoder 2003, 112; Đurđev 1968). However, under the theocratic rule in Montenegro, some aspects of independent governance of citizenship emerged as did the manifold aspects of the debate over statehood and identity, which framed the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act (Džankić 2012). Until the mid nineteenth century, the territories of the Ottoman Empire were governed by Islamic principles and the Sharia Law, based on the millet system. According to Sarajlić (2010a), the first modern aspects of the citizenship regime in Bosnia developed with the Tanzimat reforms which lasted from 1839 to 1878. The same reforms affected the citizenship of Macedonia, which at the time was a part of a broader geographical region that included the northern territories of present-day Greece. Spaskovska (2010a) notes that the territory of the Macedonian region was divided in three administrative units (vilayets) – Salonica (Thessalonica), Uskub (Skopje) and Monastir (Bitola). In these territories the Tanzimat reforms, initiated by the 1839 Gulhane decree (Hatt-i Sharif), brought about the secularization of the Ottoman state. The Gulhane decree included provisions on the protection of the lives of subjects of the Ottoman Empire, the equality of religious communities (Muslims, Jews, and Christians) before the law, a taxation system, and military reforms (Palmer 1995, 91). As such, it was the predecessor of further reforms, including the 1858 Penal Code that marked a move towards the secularization of the Ottoman Empire. According to Yilmaz (2005, 90), The Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 was based on the Napoleonic code of 1810, putting aside Islamic punishments. It established a French-type system of courts, with tribunals of first instance, courts of appeals and a high court of appeals. These were the first distinct hierarchy of a secular court system of the country … This secular criminal code and court system remained in operation till 1923.

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The secularization of the Ottoman Empire, which sought to ensure the loyalty to the Empire and not to ethnoreligious groups, was followed by a resistance of many subjects, particularly Muslims, who lost the taxation privileges they had under the millet system. Due to this resistance, the Ottoman Empire attempted to transform the previous governing structures based on ethnoreligious belonging into new instruments developed in order to secularize and centralize the state. The outcome of this transformation was further detachment from ethnoreligious governance, mirrored in the January 1869 Nationality Law, which was also adopted as a part of the Tanzimat reforms. Aimed at ensuring the equality of all subjects, the underlying regulation of citizenship in the Nationality Law was based on the premise that ‘every person inhabiting the imperial dominion is considered an Ottoman subject and treated as an Ottoman subject’ (article 9 of the 1869 Nationality Law, in Flounroy and Hudson 1929, 569). This entailed the detachment from the collective rights for communities envisaged in the millet system to individual rights stemming from the direct link between the subjects and the Empire (Köksal 2008). As will be explained in the subsequent chapter of this book, this tension between the ethnification of communities of citizenship and the attempts to establish a community loyal to the new state can also be traced in the current citizenship regimes of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Yet, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the regulation of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia changed, as a consequence of broader geopolitical shifts on the European continent. As the result of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which ended the Great Eastern Crisis, the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina and administered it until 1918. Sarajlić (2010a) notes that each of the two decades of the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina had its own legal and political specificities.1 Prior to the annexation of the country in 1908, Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally governed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while the Ottoman Sultans had rule over the country’s subjects. Thus for a decade, the citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina was fractured: while the land belonged to the Dual Empire, the people were considered to be Ottoman subjects. The regulation of citizenship in this country under the Hapsburg rule did not improve in the decade after the annexation, as there was no unified citizenship legislation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself. Rather, the links of the inhabitants of the lands of the Dual Monarchy with the respective polities were regulated through the 1811 Austrian Civil Code for Austrian Lands and the 1879 Law on Hungarian Citizenship. A further complicating factor in the regulation of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina in this period was that it was separately administered, and that its citizens were neither Austrian, nor Hungarian, but ‘members of the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Imamović 2006, 202; 1 The term ‘Hapsburg Empire’ denotes lands under the rule of the Austrian House of Hapsburg until 1867, taking into account that from 1804 until 1867 the official designation was ‘Austrian Empire’. For the period between 1867 and 1918 the terms ‘Austro-Hungarian Empire’, or ‘Dual Monarchy’ are used.

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Sarajlić 2010a, 5). Their status was regulated through the 1910 constitution, which promulgated civic equality, yet leaving the issue of belonging to the land or the state rather ambiguous. Similar to the question of the legal aspects of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the identitarian layer of this concept remained rather convoluted, due to the intersecting and overlapping influences of both regional and broader European and Euro-Asian dynamics. Prior to its conquest by the Ottoman Empire, the Bosnian Kingdom included some Serbian and Croatian lands. The people inhabiting the Kingdom were predominantly of Christian faith, belonging to the Bosnian Church, whose canonical legality was challenged by both the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. In consequence, during this period unlike in neighbouring Serbia where Orthodox Christianity prevailed, or in Croatia where most people associated with Roman Catholicism, religious identity in pre-Ottoman Bosnia remained disjointed. Following the Ottoman conquest, the Bosnian Church ceased to exist. Either due to lower taxation and other political benefits, or the dissociation with the other Christian churches, a number of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar to other parts of the Balkans, converted to Islam. Hence during the Ottoman era, a community of Slav Muslims was formed in the territory of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the Austro-Hungarian period, under the administration of Benjamin Kallay, the Imperial Finance Minister, the policy of ethnoreligious pluralism was introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This policy inspired a distinct nation-building process, which was based on the existence of a separate Bosnian language, while the population was ‘divided into three religions with equal rights’ (Ramet 2008, 74). The aim of Kallay’s policy was to develop a separate sense of loyalty to the Bosnian state, which in the early twentieth century was challenged by the competing Croatian and Serbian nationalisms (Banac 1984). After Kallay’s death, the implementation of this policy ceased. The ethnoreligious cleavages between Slav Muslims, Croats and Serbs underpinned by the rise in the underlying nationalisms came to dominate the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years preceding the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. According to Rossos (2008, 1), being located between Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, ‘[t]hroughout its recorded history, Macedonia has been a strategic and economic crossroads’. From the late fourteenth century until the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, the territory of present-day Macedonia was under the Ottoman rule. During Ottoman times, Macedonia was integrated in the Rumelia beylerbeylik (administrative region) and divided in sanjaks. Initially, the largest part of the Macedonian territory belonged to the Pasha sanjak, which due to its strategic position and geographic location was ruled directly by the Rumelia beylerbeylik. The administrative reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century divided the territory of Macedonia into Uskub (Skopje) sanjak, and the southern Salonica sanjak, which in addition to some territory of the present-day Macedonia included Greek lands.

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Following the Balkan wars, the territory of Macedonia was partitioned among Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, all of which nowadays contest at least one element of Macedonian statehood or national identity. The history of the Ottoman rule, followed by the emergence of the thorny Macedonian question (Rossos 2008, 1) and its persistence to this date have reflected on the governance and practices of citizenship in this unconsolidated and challenged post-Yugoslav state. Similar to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the regulation of citizenship followed the developments in the Ottoman Empire, whereby the move towards secularization in the mid nineteenth century introduced the equality of subjects under the Ottoman rule. In turn, the move towards the secular rule significantly affected the different ethnoreligious communities in the territory of present-day Macedonia. Even though official data is unavailable and widely contested, during the Ottoman period, the people in Macedonia identified as Orthodox Christians, and the population were largely referred to as Bulgarians (Poulton 2000). At that time the meaning of ‘Bulgarian’ did not necessarily entail an ethnic identity. Rather, it denoted allegiance to the region and religious orientation. The question over a what constituted Macedonian identity emerged with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, when two groups of intellectuals made competing claims over whether Macedonians were a separate nation, or a subgroup of Bulgarians (Cowan 2000; Rossos 1994). Individuals, such as Georgi Pulevski, who in the late nineteenth century published the Dictionary of Three Languages: Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish (1875) claimed the existence of a separate Macedonian nation, on grounds of language, culture and more (Pulevski 1875). This group was supported in the early twentieth century by Krste Petkov Misirkov, whose 1903 book On Macedonian Issues dealt with the distinct aspects of Macedonian identity including language, religion, and self-governance (Misirkov 1903). Yet, unlike many nineteenth-century nationalisms, the ‘Macedonian movements not only lacked any legal infrastructure, they also lacked the international sympathy, cultural aid, and most important, benefits of open and direct diplomatic and military support accorded other Balkan nationalisms’ (Rossos 2008, 61). As a consequence, it developed as a sort of a reaction to the neighbouring countries that aimed to succumb it. Indeed, the 1903 St. Elijah’s Day uprising against the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the short-lived Kruševo republic had significance consequences for identity and statehood of Macedonia. After the uprising was suppressed by the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia’s neighbours – Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, which by then were free from the Ottoman rule, strengthened their presence in this region. This intensified the Macedonian question and highlighted internal discord between the Macedono-Bulgarists and Macedonists, which culminated at the time of the Balkan wars when the country was partitioned (Ristevski 1999). In the current political landscape of Macedonia, it is still possible to trace the identity dilemmas related to this country’s immediate neighbours, each of which significantly shapes the governance and practices of citizenship.

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By contrast, the geographical position of Montenegro, and the country’s history, affected its citizenship regime prior to the establishment of the ‘first’ Yugoslavia in 1918. In this period there were no separate citizenship laws. Montenegro was in part governed through the Ottoman Empire, in part by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and in part autonomously. Provisions regulating the relationship between the individuals and their belonging to the state were rather scarce and vague. The likely reason for this situation is the general absence of legal acts, largely caused by the modes of social organization and conflicts that existed on the autonomously ruled territory of the present-day Montenegro. The territory of present-day Montenegro that belonged to the two empires was, as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, governed by their respective laws. Until the late eighteenth century, societal and political organization in the autonomous part of Montenegro was based on the notion of the tribe, which was a ‘military, political and moral collective’ (Jovanović 1995, 65). In addition, the territory of Montenegro was divided into ‘Crna Gora’ (‘Montenegro’/‘Old Montenegro’) and ‘Brda’ (‘Highlands’), each consisting of a number of tribes. Consequently, the construction of a modern administrative and legislative framework in Montenegro was a lengthy process, often hampered by inter-tribal differences and feuds. Before Prince Petar I Petrović (1782–1830) assumed power, tribal divisions often prevented the implementation of any form of central authority. In 1803 Petar I Petrović promulgated the General Montenegrin and Hill Code, which is considered to be the first written law in Montenegro. Although no explicit mention of the term citizenship was made in this legal act, two of its provisions are particularly relevant for understanding the meaning of citizenship in nineteenth-century Montenegro. The terms Crnogorac (Montenegrin) and Brđanin (Highlander) denoted the legal relationship of the people inhabiting the two regions of Montenegro with the state (article 18). The term Primorac (Shoresman) was used to denote people who lived in the coastal areas of present-day Montenegro, that belonged to the ‘imperial land and state’ (Austria-Hungary). People referred to as Montenegrin and Highlander were considered to be ‘the sons of the fatherland’ and were bound to ‘be faithful and devoted to their fatherland and that no wealth can separate him from it, or bribe him so that he becomes a betrayer of his brothers and the fatherland’ (article 33). The provisions thus stipulated were based on the principle of jus sanguinis, and although defined by territorial principles, they were in fact related to descent. A similarly vague and poorly defined relationship between the people and the state was enshrined in the General Legal Code (1855), which reiterated the provisions of the previous law. However, this legal act introduced an important addition – the rights of aliens in Montenegro. It stipulated that any ‘member of a foreign tribe or faith can freely live [in Montenegro] and have the right to the same freedom and justice as any Montenegrin and Highlander’ (article 92). However, the overall legal framework in Montenegro was rather underdeveloped in the late nineteenth century. Following the expansion of the territory of Montenegro under Nikola I Petrović, the first Statute of Montenegro (1905) was

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adopted, after the country’s sovereignty was recognized at the Congress of Berlin. The Statute contained some reference to citizenship policies. The actual acquisition of citizenship was not promulgated in the Statute of Montenegro, although the term ‘Montenegrin citizens’ was persistently used instead of ‘Montenegrins’ and ‘Highlanders’. Notwithstanding, according to the Statute any citizen could renounce their Montenegrin citizenship, following the completion of military service and other duties towards the state (article 215). This article represented an important departure from the previous legislation, which contained no such an entitlement for ‘Montenegrins’ and ‘Highlanders’. In addition, the Statute of Montenegro provided continuity of rights for aliens, and clearly stipulated that foreigners were subject to Montenegrin laws regarding taxation, while the laws would ‘protect their person and property’ (article 216). In addition, foreigners convicted on political grounds were granted the right to asylum (article 217). These provisions marked an important advancement in the pre-Yugoslav legal framework in Montenegro, which – compared to the Western democratic countries – was unfledged. Despite the existence of some forms of regulation of citizenship in the preYugoslav Montenegro, there existed questions related to the identity of the Montenegrin people. During the rule of the Prince-bishops, a historical ambiguity about Montenegrin identity, which continues to resonate to the present-day, arose as a consequence of the interplay between ethnicity and religion in the writings of the Petrović prince-bishops Petar I and Petar II.2 The latter used the denomination ‘Serb’ when referring to the population, which resulted in two distinct interpretations of Montenegrin identity. Some authors (Banac 1984; Jelavich 1983), and the proponents of the unionist stance during the recent statehood and identity divide, perceived this as evidence of the Serb origins of Montenegrins. For others (Brković 1974), and more recently for the supporters of Montenegrin independence, the concept ‘Serb’ has exclusively been related to Orthodox Christianity. In the years immediately preceding the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918, the duality of identity in Montenegro became a salient issue, and divided the country’s population in two blocs: the Whites and the Greens.3 While the former proposed unconditional unification with Serbia prior to entry in the South Slav state, the latter advocated a federal model, which would preserve some elements of the Montenegrin statehood. 2 Aside from being known as the prince-bishops, Petar I and Petar II are among the most notable literary figures in Montenegro. While the writings of Petar I are generally considered to be of a historic value, his successor’s are regarded as important literary and philosophical pieces in Montenegro. 3 Some historians assert that the Whites and the Greens owe their name to the colour of the leaflets used for the movements’ propaganda in 1917 and 1918 (Jovanović 1995, 427). Others claim that the names come from the colour of the leaflets used to cast the ballot for the unification with Serbia (Vujović 1962, 77–84), or the colour of the candidate’s lists for the elections to the Grand National Assembly of Podgorica of 1918 (Rastoder 2003, 131/fn.60).

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The decision to proceed with the unconditional unification with Serbia in 1917 increased tensions among the Montenegrins. The Montenegrin population, instead of its allegiance to tribes, became divided over the question of identification with the Serbian or the Montenegrin state. This cleavage persisted throughout the existence of Yugoslavia to varying degrees, depending on the nature of the state of the South Slavs. It re-emerged after the Yugoslav disintegration, in the form of the divide which marked the past two decades of the Montenegrin politics: the question over Montenegrins were a separate nation or a subgroup of Serbs, and over whether Montenegro should be an independent state or continue to exist in the common state with Serbia. These issues still affect the Montenegrin citizenship regime, in that it appears as civic, but behind the ostensible inclusiveness there are clear elements of a new state with an internally and externally challenged identity. The Yugoslav Experience The establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 (renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929) marked a new era in the development of the citizenship policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro in the subsequent seven decades. At the time of the establishment of the common Yugoslav state, the post World War I settlement and international treaties determined the citizenship issues among the countries in the region (Kos 1994). The centralized Yugoslav kingdom enacted a Citizenship Act a decade after its creation. This Act established single Yugoslav citizenship based on the principle of descent through the paternal line, that is, jus sanguinis a patre (Kos 1994; Medved 2009). As noted in the Introduction to this book, the very creation of the first state of the South Slavs in 1918 had a deep impact on the identity issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, lands that had already been consumed by both internal ethnoreligious divisions and external contestation. According to historians and scholars of the Western Balkan region (Banac 1984; Jović 2009), the persistence of the identity conundrums in these three countries could in part be attributed to the fact that neither of the three belonged to the traditional South Slav ‘tribes’, after which the state was named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Moreover, since Montenegro, the only of the three studied countries that had a history of independent statehood prior to the creation of the first Yugoslavia, joined Serbia prior to Yugoslav unification, it is also safe to claim that neither Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor Macedonia, or Montenegro entered Yugoslavia as sovereign states. Indeed, while one may argue that in 1918, only Serbia was a sovereign state, the other two states whose statehood and identity are consolidated in present-day – Croatia and Slovenia – both had strong unifying movements in the early twentieth century, based on clear identity distinctions (for example, language or religion) from their immediate neighbours. The unification of the South Slavs under a Serbian crown aggravated the identity concerns among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia

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and Montenegro. The major issue was not only mirrored in the unconsolidated identities in these three lands, but also in the tension between the Serbian centralization and the Croatian attempts at regionalization. This tension was somewhat appeased through the division of Yugoslavia into 33 oblasts (županije), aimed at decentralizing the common state (Jovanović 1995). However, the oblasts that comprised the different geographical regions largely reflected the borders of the traditional territories: the six oblasts existing at the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina largely coincided with the six sanjaks from the Ottoman period; the three regions in the territory of Macedonia corresponded to the Macedonian lands included in Yugoslavia; while Montenegro was a single region (extending somewhat into the territory of the present-day Kosovo). Hence, the administrative division of the first Yugoslavia did not achieve its aim of erasing ethnic differences and creating loyalty to the common state. Rather, it reinforced them. The administration of the Yugoslav state changed following the introduction of the dictatorship in 1929. King Alexander divided Yugoslavia into nine administrative regions (banovinas), including Drava (Ljubljana), Sava (Zagreb), Vrbas (Banjaluka), Primorje (Split), Drina (Sarajevo), Zeta (Cetinje), Dunav (Novi Sad), Morava (Niš), and Vardar (Skopje) banovina. The intention behind such a division was similar to the one behind the 33 oblasts. In the new regionalization of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided between the Drina, Sava and Vrbas banovinas, Macedonia was a part of the Vardar banovina, and Montenegro of the Zeta banovina. The division into regions, which permitted a limited degree of administrative autonomy, did not fully coincide with the present-day territories of the respective states. As the national movements in the traditional lands that composed Yugoslavia intensified in the 1930s, the arrangement of administrative units caused grievances. An example of the effects of these national movements on the administrative division of the Yugoslav kingdom was the short-lived 1939 Cvetković-Maček Agreement. The Agreement established the Croatian banovina to comprise lands inhabited by ethnic Croats, further revealing weaknesses of the Yugoslav state in the late 1930s. The coming of World War II was accompanied by the decomposition of state structures across the Yugoslav kingdom and its rapid capitulation to the Axis forces in 1941. During this time, there were several attempts to establish independent countries (for example, Croatia, and short-lived attempts in Montenegro). Internal identity issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro persisted. After the Axis invasion, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a part of the Independent State of Croatia, while many of Bosnia’s Serbs joined the Serbian nationalistmonarchist četnik movement, which was often involved in the persecution of the non-Serb communities (Singleton 1985). In Macedonia, since the establishment of Yugoslavia, there was a tension between the Serb and Bulgarian national projects, with the Serb one being dominant in the period immediately preceding World War II. During the war, what was defined as the Vardar region in the Yugoslav kingdom became divided between the pro-German Bulgaria and Albania ruled by Italy. Similarly, the interwar history of Montenegro was marked by internal

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clashes between the partisans (communist fighters) and the četniks (Vujović 1997; Lakić 1981), which temporarily revived the centuries-long tribal divisions. Tribes endorsed either communism or nationalism, and re-engaged in blood feuds. This situation persisted until the capitulation of Italy in 1943, and the temporary German occupation of Montenegro in its aftermath. After the end of the World War II, the legal, political and identity aspects of citizenship in these three postYugoslav states developed within the framework of socialist Yugoslavia in the subsequent five decades. Following the collapse of the Kingdom during the World War II, the common state was restored in 1943 under the name of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DF Yugoslavia, renamed the Federal People’s Republic (FPR) of Yugoslavia on 29 November 1945). The decentralized model of Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia granted special statuses to nationalities and peoples through various constitutional provisions (Levandai 1991). While socialist rule granted Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro the status of a republic, it placed the perception of nation within the framework of the Yugoslav communist development. The constitution of 1946 recognized the existence of five nations, and the borders of the constituent republics largely reflected the predominant national groups that lived therein (aside from Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to its plurinational character). In addition, under the 1946 constitution all of the republics, apart from Bosnia and Herzegovina had their titular ‘nation’ (Serbs in Serbia, Croats in Croatia, and so on). The 1946 Yugoslav constitution was modelled after the 1936 Soviet constitution, and initially did not differ much from the other communist states. However, after the split between Tito and Stalin in 1948,4 the Yugoslav constitutional setup became more decentralized. The formal aspects of this decentralization were embedded in the Constitutional Law of 1953, which was a prelude to the constitution of 1963 (Lapenna 1969). The 1963 Constitution changed the name of the country from the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia to the Socialist Federal Republic of 4 Since the Red Army helped the partisan movement to liberate Yugoslavia in the World War II, but did not remain on its territory (unlike in the Soviet satellite states), the Soviet influence in Yugoslavia was lower than in that of the rest of the Eastern bloc. In the first three years after the war, Tito considered the USSR to be the country’s greatest ally, and much of the state’s centralization is due to this close relationship. However, in 1947 the first rifts between Yugoslavia and the USSR emerged, due to the former’s criticism of Soviet communism. The conflict reached its peak in 1948, when Tito proposed a merger between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria without consulting Stalin. This caused the USSR to accuse the Yugoslav leadership of slipping into nationalism, resulting in the formal expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948. This had three consequences for the subsequent development of Yugoslavia. First, it diverged from the Soviet-style communism and established the Non-aligned Movement during the Cold War. Second, domestically, Yugoslavia purged many of the supporters of the Cominform by sending them to Goli Otok (barred island in Croatia, a prison camp). Third, the departure from Stalin allowed the subsequent constitutional changes in Yugoslavia and a greater decentralization.

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Yugoslavia, and developed the concepts of self-management, self-government and social ownership. The subsequent 42 amendments to the 1963 Constitution, 23 of which were adopted in 1971, further developed the ideas of self-management, while equalizing the rights of the titular nations in the Yugoslav republics and the nationalities living in them. Ivo Lapenna (1969, 215) distinguished two periods between the adoption of the 1963 Constitution and the 1971 amendments; that is, ‘the period of compromises particularly between the idea of ‘socialist unity’ of Yugoslavia and the revised nationalism of individual nations and nationalities (questions of sovereignty, self-determination, and so on) under the new constitution of 1963; (iv) the period of prevailing nationalism reflected in the amendments of 1967 and 1968 which led to further radical changes in June 1971’. These changes emanated precisely from the tensions between the ‘new nationalism and the relations between the nations and nationalities’ (Lapenna 1969, 222). In this context, the last Yugoslav constitution in 1974 was intended to keep the centralization of Yugoslavia in line with the federalism on which the republics were postulated. In other words, it sought to balance the Yugoslav federalism with the tension between Croatia’s increasing desire for autonomy, and Serbia’s dissatisfaction with the decentralization caused by the existence of two autonomous provinces on its territory (Kosovo and Vojvodina). Importantly, in the 1974 constitution, Muslims became a constituent nation in the whole of Yugoslavia, which was another attempt at balancing ethnoreligious and territorial structure of the country. This constitutional change was preceded by the 1968 decision of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizing Muslims as one of ‘nations’.5 Accordingly the ‘Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was designated as the state of Serbs, Croats, and “Muslims by nationality”’ (Perica 2002, 75). In summary, the peculiarities of the Yugoslav constitutional establishment were rooted in the relative sovereignty of the republics, which were ‘considered states although self-determination was limited by the federal constitution, phrased in such a way as to make it appear that the right had already been exercised’ (Shoup 1968, 115). This principle differentiated Yugoslavia from many of the socialist countries, which were based on unitarism rather than on decentralization (Sekulić, Massey and Hodson 1994; Davis 1978). As a consequence of these constitutional developments, until the beginning of the 1980s all of the former Yugoslav republics followed an ostensibly similar pattern of evolution – inclusion in the federal structure and prevalence of the Yugoslav socialist ideology based on self-management. The belief of the Yugoslav communists was that allowing for the separate functioning of the republics would eventually lead to the erosion of economic and cultural differences among them, thus generating a new supranational identity in the future. In fact, according to the census data available for the former Yugoslavia, people’s national identity was 5 Capitalized ‘Muslim’ denoted the nation, as opposed to the religious community denoted by the term ‘muslim’.

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sub-Yugoslav, that is, predominantly based on their pertinence to the republics, aside from the case of Bosnia, which was a pluriethnic composite (Statistički bilten SFRJ 1982). As noted in the Introduction, Yugoslav identity was reserved for people without any other nationality, for children born out of mixed marriages, and for the officials of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Sekulić, Massey and Hodson 1994, 85; Bertsch 1977, 88–99). Even so, the attempts to establish a supranational Yugoslav identity, or even to balance out the differences between titular nations through constitutional changes proved to be an impossible task. The dissatisfaction with the federal Yugoslav structures was further exacerbated by uneven economic development of the republics, which underpinned nationalisms, particular in the richer republics (Dallago and Uvalić 1998). By contrast, the three cases examined in this book – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro – were the poorest republics in the former Yugoslavia. As these republics were the ones most dependent on the federal structures (Ramet 1984), communism in them was much stronger than in the rest of Yugoslavia. This, in turn, means that unlike in the cases of Croatia, Serbia, or Slovenia where nationalism of the titular group developed regarding the territory of the republic, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro communism became a blanket that covered internal ethnoreligious cleavages and external contestation. Many of the issues related to the status of the Yugoslav constituent republics and the identity of the people who lived in them were reflected in the laws that regulated the link between the individuals and the state. Evolution of the Regulation of Citizenship in Yugoslavia Ever since Yugoslavia was reconstituted after the World War II, its citizenship was two tiered: federal and republican, precisely reflecting the constitutional setup of the state and the relationship between the federal units. The constitutional changes of 1963 and 1974, driven by broader social problems, nationalism, and unrest, transformed the relationship between the federation and its components. By the same token, the evolution of the interplay between the federal and the republican citizenship legislation closely followed the constitutional developments. The first Citizenship Act, based on the principles of continuity and jus sanguinis, was enacted in DF Yugoslavia on 23 August 1945, and enforced in FPR Yugoslavia as of 5 July 1946. Pursuant to this Act, people who were entitled to Yugoslav citizenship included: 1) the people who had Yugoslav citizenship under the 1928 Citizenship Act; 2) people permanently residing in territories adjoined to Yugoslavia following the termination of the World War II (article 3);6 3) people having the ethnicity (narodnost) of one of the FPR Yugoslav republics and who were born or 6 A separate law was adopted on 27 November 1947 in order to regulate the citizenship of people residing in the territories acquired by FPR Yugoslavia following the conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy.

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raised therein, provided that they had no foreign citizenship (article 25). In addition, the provisions of this Act, and its subsidiary legislation,7 were largely a legacy of the communist victory and the World War II. Consequently, the conditions for naturalization for those people who cooperated in the national liberation struggle were facilitated. At the same time, the law deprived the citizens who were believed to have been disloyal to the interests of the FPR Yugoslavia,8 and stipulated that citizenship could be taken away on grounds of absence (article 15), which specifically targeted political, mostly right-wing emigration. The 1945 Citizenship Act had two further important implications. First, the citizenship of FPR Yugoslavia was exclusive to foreign nationals, so it did not provide for the acquisition of dual citizenship. Second, it established the category of republican citizenship (article 1, arts. 28–34) as the second tier of citizenship in Yugoslavia. This means that each citizen of the FPR Yugoslavia was simultaneously a citizen of only one of its constituent republics (arts. 28–34). The latter provisions sparked the adoption of Citizenship Acts in the constituent republics of FPR Yugoslavia. An interesting fact about these acts is that they stipulated identical conditions for the acquisition of citizenship. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro adopted their first separate Citizenship Acts in 1950, which were framed within the 1945 Citizenship Act of the FPR Yugoslavia. There were similar provisions in the Citizenship Act of 1965, which mirrored the federal citizenship provisions from 1964, and made no significant departure from the 1950 Citizenship Act. In line with these acts, republican citizenship was acquired along with the federal citizenship, and under the same conditions. That is, citizenship of any of the Yugoslav republics could be acquired by origin, birth, naturalization or under international treaties. The 1950 Citizenship Act also provided that citizens of other republics could acquire the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, provided that they renounced the citizenship of the other republic. In this case, their citizenship of another republic would be terminated on the day of the person’s acquisition of new republican citizenship. Yet, the primary rule for the acquisition of citizenship under the 1950 Citizenship Act was jus sanguinis, on the grounds of which a child would be granted the citizenship of their parents, regardless of the child’s place of birth. The republics’ Citizenship Acts had particular relevance in the development of the political processes in FPR Yugoslavia, and were closely related to people’s voting rights, as only republic-level registers of citizens existed until 1991. According to the Voters’ Register Act of 10 August 1946, voting 7 Law on the Deprivation of Citizenship for Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Former Yugoslav Army Who Do Not Want to Return to the Homeland, and for the Members of Military Forces Who Have Served the Enemy and Have Defected Abroad (invalidated in 1962). Official Gazette, No. 64/1945; No. 86/1946. Amendment and Addendum of the Law on Citizenship. Official Gazette, No. 105/1948. 8 Amendment and Addendum on the Law on Citizenship. Official Gazette, No. 105/1948.

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rights were granted in line with individuals’ republican citizenship, regardless of residence. For instance, if a person had Montenegrin citizenship acquired through jus sanguinis, but resided in Macedonia, he or she would have voting rights in Montenegro. During the existence of the socialist Yugoslavia, two further Citizenship Acts were adopted – in 1964 and in 1976. Both of these acts were preceded by constitutional changes, and aimed to consolidate the regulation of citizenship in the republics with the federal Constitutions adopted in 1963 and 1974, respectively. The two constitutions reflected the evolution of the socialist Yugoslavia since World War II. The 1963 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contained a definition of citizenship in article 118, which stipulated the existence of the two tiers of citizenship. The same article stated that the rights and duties of citizens of the republics remain the same if the person resides in another republic (1963 Constitution, article 118). Interestingly, the very definition of citizenship has been preceded in the text of the 1963 Constitution by a provision regulating the loss of the Yugoslav citizenship. Article 54 stated that ‘no citizen of Yugoslavia shall be deprived of his citizenship, exiled or extradited’, and that the deprivation of citizenship of Yugoslavia may occur only exceptionally, when ‘[a] citizen who is absent from the country may in accordance with law be deprived of Yugoslav citizenship only exceptionally, if by his work he causes harm to the international or other general interests of Yugoslavia, or if he declines to perform his basic civil duties and holds citizenship in another country’. In this context, the first novelty introduced by the 1964 Citizenship Act was the abolition of provisions related to the loss of citizenship on grounds of absence, and the ones referring to the enemies of the state (discussed above). The 1964 Citizenship Act further facilitated naturalization of foreign citizens, which is largely due to the international treaties that Yugoslavia had signed in the period from 1945 to 1964 (Medved 2009). To that end, a person could be deprived of Yugoslav citizenship if they abrogated from the general postulates of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter (article 19, para. 3). The second novelty introduced by the 1964 Citizenship Act was the explicit primacy of the federal citizenship over the republican one. The 1976 Yugoslav Citizenship Act streamlined the previous legislation and aligned it with the federal principles enshrined in the 1974 constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In particular, the 1974 constitution reflected the changes in the identity of the peoples and republics that constituted Yugoslavia. It enhanced the powers of the constituent republics vis-à-vis the federal state and significant political developments were captured in the constitutional provisions. In effect, the 1974 constitutional changes reflected some of the requests put forward by the Croatian Spring movement in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, which called for a greater decentralization of Yugoslavia (Banac 1984). The movement organized series of protests and sought to put forward on the Yugoslav agenda the question of greater civil rights for Croats. As such, the

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Croatian Spring was considered nationalist by the Yugoslav leadership, and many of its leaders were subsequently arrested. Even so, the decentralized Yugoslav model allowed for the flourishing of separate identities in the republics, particularly after the adoption of the 1974 constitution. However, proclamations of extreme nationalism were sanctioned in order to avoid the interwar and World War II Yugoslav experience. In consequence, the identity layer of citizenship in the republics of the former Yugoslavia was developed in line with the reasoning of the high-ranking Communist officials, Đilas and Kardelj, who defined it as ‘the democratic consciousness of the historically differentiated peoples’ (Benson 2001, 102). Still, some allegations existed during that period that Montenegrin and Macedonian national identities were created in order to tame the idea of the Great Serbia, in other words, that these two peoples were factions of the Serbian ethnic composite (Flere 1991). These allegations contributed to the debates over Montenegrin and Macedonian identity, affecting not only the identity dimension of citizenship but also its regulation in the Yugoslav and postYugoslav periods. The broader constitutional and socio-political changes in the socialist Yugoslavia have also reflected upon the regulation citizenship, particularly as regards the relationship between the federal and the republican Citizenship Acts. The 1976 Yugoslav Citizenship Act was, similar to its predecessors, based on the principle of continuity of citizenship under the 1964 Act. It did, however, provide two further titles aimed at resolving issues that arose as: 1) a result of conflict with republican citizenship norms (Title IV); and 2) a consequence of the previous non-regulation (in the Citizenship Act) of the Citizenship Register (Title V). The former provision regulated the acquisition of citizenship for children whose parents were citizens of different republics (article 22). In such a case, three options were possible: 1) if the child were born on the territory of the republic of which one of the parents had citizenship, the child would acquire the citizenship of that republic; 2) if the child were born on the territory of the republic of which none of the parents had citizenship, the child would ex lege become the citizen of the republic whereby he or she were born, unless the parents decided that the child should have the citizenship of one of the republics that they had the citizenship of; 3) if the child were born abroad, the parents would make an agreement as to which citizenship the child would acquire. In the case of the Citizenship Register, the legislation provided that the Registers were kept by the authorities of the republics, but that the Citizenship Certificate was of the Socialist Federal Republic (SFR) Yugoslavia, in which the republican citizenship was also noted (arts. 23–25). The citizenship acts of the socialist republics that comprised Yugoslavia were adopted shortly after the constitutional changes, with the exception of Montenegro. The Citizenship Law of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro was enacted on 27 May 1975, 18 months prior to the adoption of the Citizenship Act of SFR Yugoslavia. This fact made Montenegro the first among the Yugoslav federal republics to have adopted new citizenship legislation. This law became particularly

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relevant in the context of citizenship legislation in Montenegro, since it remained in force until the adoption of the 1999 Citizenship Act. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia adopted their citizenship acts in 1976, and these legal documents not only remained in force until the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, but also were significant for the initial determination of citizenry in the new states. The republican citizenship acts from the 1970s gave clear precedence to the federal citizenship, while establishing the republican ones. In terms of the acquisition and loss of the republican citizenship at birth, the provisions remained the similar to the one stipulated in the federal Citizenship Act of 1964. In terms of naturalization, the admission of foreign nationals into the republican citizenship was dependent upon the admission of foreigners into the federal citizenship. By contrast, the admission of citizens of other SFR Yugoslav republics to republican citizenship was done upon request, provided that the person had residence in the underlying republic (article 8). Children under the age of 18, whose both parents were admitted into the new republican citizenship, would also obtain citizenship by default. In line with the federal citizenship legislation, the republican citizenship acts from the 1970s stipulated that if a citizen obtained the citizenship of another Yugoslav republic, they would lose the citizenship of their republic of origin ex lege. The outcome of such a provision, and the complex (and often sloppy) administrative procedures was most apparent at the time of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, when the citizenship of a number of people depended on the citizenship registers resulting in a number of problems related to the acquisition of citizenship (Štiks 2006). Citizenship Struggles During Turbulent Years The early 1990s brought the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the bloodiest conflict that Europe had seen since the World War II. The ways in which the conflict unfolded throughout the former Yugoslav territory had significant consequences on the conceptions of citizenship in the states that emerged from the Yugoslav dissolution. In the late 1980s Yugoslavia was faced with a major economic crisis, which fuelled grievances and intensified nationalist movements. The economic downfall of the 1980s deepened the gap between the more and less prosperous regions in Yugoslavia. Exploring the effects of economic downfall on nationalism in Yugoslavia, Dallago and Uvalić (1998, 74–5) note that the ‘the gap between the per capita social product in the most and the least developed regions, Slovenia and Kosovo, increased from 5:1 in 1955 to 8:1 in 1989’. Income discrepancies caused grievances by both the richer Yugoslav republics, who were dissatisfied with the transfer of funds to the poorer regions; and the poorer ones, displeased by the fact that they provided cheap raw material that the more developed republics processed and placed on the market as the final product (Dallago and Uvalić 1998; Woodward 1995). These tensions also intensified with the introduction of the stabilization

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programme aimed at stopping the 1989 hyperinflation. While successful at halting the inflation, the programme had adverse effects on the economies of Slovenia and Croatia (Žižmond 1992), further motivating these republics’ departure from Yugoslavia. Following the referenda in Slovenia in late 1990 and Croatia in mid 1991, where dissociation from the federation was supported by overwhelming majorities, these two former Yugoslav republics declared independence from the socialist Yugoslavia on 25 and 26 June 1991, respectively. Having in mind the complexities of state dissolution, in August 1991 the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community (EEC) established the Badinter Arbitration Committee to offer legal guidance and criteria on the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the issue of recognition of the former Yugoslav republics (Rancharan 1997). In 1992, the Commission concluded that those entities that were considered republics in the former Yugoslavia had the right to self-determination, while the ‘Serbian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia is entitled to all the rights concerned to minorities and ethnic groups’ (Pellet 1992, 184). In order to appease the already tense situation in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and duly considering the citizenship tangles in the post-Yugoslav space, the Badinter Commission recommended ‘that the Republics must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups all the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in international law, including, where appropriate, the right to choose their nationality’ (Pellet 1992, 184). The constitutional protection of minorities was required from Croatia prior to the formal recognition of this country, while Slovenia was the only post-Yugoslav states that met all the criteria for recognition. The situation with the three countries studied was far more complex. The initial determination of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro (the latter within the FRY) after the Yugoslav break-up was driven by the dynamics of the Yugoslav break-up. The fourth opinion of the Badinter Commission stipulated that the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was preconditioned on a referendum on independence, which was subsequently held in this republic in late February and early March 1992. Out of the 63.6 per cent of the people who went out to the polls, 99.7 per cent supported the independence of Bosnia. Given that the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, it is safe to assume that the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was supported by the Muslim and Croat communities. The outcome of this referendum on independence had long lasting implications for the ethnically clustered Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serb community led by the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) rejected the referendum results and in conjunction with the parts of the Yugoslav Army commanded from Belgrade, initiated military attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The subsequent conflict was concluded only in December 1995 with the signature of the Dayton Agreement. The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a peculiar mixture of the civic and ethnic elements. The sovereignty was vested in ‘equal citizens, peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Muslims, Serbs and Croats,

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and all other peoples who reside therein’ (article 1). Article 6 of the Constitution stipulated the existence of a unified citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the attempt to placate the secessionist claims by the Bosnian Serbs. Yet, the 1993 Bosnian constitution was preceded by two competing laws – the 1992 Citizenship Act of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Law on Serb Citizenship. The wartime Citizenship Act of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was premised on legal continuity with the formerly republican citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajlić 2010a). In this respect, the original text of the law stipulated that all those residing in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992, the date of the declaration of its independence, for at least five years would be admitted in the citizenship of the new state. However, in 1993 this provision was amended to fit the ‘zero option’ for citizenship, and thus allow a greater number of individuals to obtain the Bosnian citizenship. Sarajlić (2010a) notes that this provision largely reflected the strategy of the ruling elites to include as many citizens as possible in the military duty. In fact, 1993 constitution posited a peculiar legal framework relating citizenship and military duty, which has somewhat drawn on the military provisions of the old Yugoslav framework, but also supplemented with the immediate experience of war. Article 163 of the 1993 Constitution stipulated general military duty, while according to article 153 every citizen of the country had both the right and the duty to defend the ‘freedom, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and uniformity of the constitutionally defined Bosnia and Herzegovina’. In addition to the establishment of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the police, article 162 of the 1993 Constitution stipulated that ‘every citizen who, with arms or otherwise, participates in the resistance against the aggressor, is a member of the Armed Forces of the Republic’. Indeed, the inclusion of citizens in the armed forces has somewhat been induced by the militarization of the former Yugoslavia, which in addition to the formal army, also consisted of Territorial Defence Forces (TO) composed of citizens trained to act in times of war (Dulić and Kostić 2010). During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the existence of the two-tiered military system in the former Yugoslavia intensified the local struggles. That is, some the citizenry that was supposed to defend the unified territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia as a part of the TO, was included in the military activities of the warring parties thus contributing to the Bosnian conflict. During this period, a further paradoxical variance of the post-Yugoslav citizenship emerged. In February 1992, the Bosnian Serbs established the Republika Srpska, constitutionally defined as the ‘state of the Serbian people’ (article 1). At the same time, the original text of the constitution (article 3) of the Republika Srpska was ambiguous, because the polity was defined a constituent of the Yugoslav federation. At the time of the adoption of the wartime Constitution of the Republika Srpska, the socialist Yugoslavia was still in the process of dissolution, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not constituted until April 1992. Even when the FRY was established, it was constitutionally defined

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as the federation of Serbia and Montenegro (article 2) and it did not include the territory of the Republika Srpska. In consequence, it remained unclear as to what the status of the Republika Srpska was given that no Yugoslavia existed at the time of its creation. The 1994 amendments to the constitution defined the Republika Srpska as ‘the independent state of the Serb people’ (article 1). In terms of citizenship, the original Constitution of the Republika Srpska was equally ambiguous, as it posited the existence of a two-tiered citizenship regime until the 1994 amendments to the constitution. Yet, the citizenship of the Republika Srpska was not the second tier of the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but of the Yugoslav federation, which was either non-existent at the time (if the article referred to the socialist Yugoslavia) or non-inclusive of the Republika Srpska (if the article referred to the FRY). After the end of the conflict, the Constitution of the Republika Srpska was further amended to reflect the Dayton setup of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as will be explained in the subsequent chapter. The wartime 1992 Law on Serb Citizenship, adopted by the People’s Assembly Republika Srpska was clearly based on ethnic principles and the achievement of intergenerational continuity through jus sanguinis. The admission of foreign nationals was subject to a number of criteria for naturalization, including ethnocultural markers, such as the knowledge of the ‘Serbian language and the Cyrillic alphabet’, and the acceptance of the ‘Serbian culture’. The residence criterion was stipulated to be five years (article 7), but completely waived for the spouses of the Serb citizens (article 8), emigrants and their families (article 9), as well as members of the Serb people who did not have domicile in the Republika Srpska (article 15). Similar to the wartime Bosnia and Herzegovina, the regulation of citizenship in the Republika Srpska, which at the time closely cooperated with Milošević’s Yugoslavia, was used as a tool for military operations. Neither the regulation that the armed forces of the Republika Srpska consisted of, nor the citizenship legislation of the FRY were adopted prior to 1996. Instead, the old legislation of the former Yugoslavia was used in both cases, which allowed the FRY policymakers to support the wartime activities of the Army of Republika Srpska during the Bosnian war.9 The legislation of socialist Yugoslavia provided for total mobilization in times of war for men between 18 and 65 years of age, which the authorities of the Republika Srpska used in their military efforts. The FRY police would forcibly recruit men who avoided draft into the Army of Republika Srpska as soon as they registered as refugees (European Civic Forum 1994).10 This allowed Milošević not 9 The Army of Republika Srpska was established in 1992, after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the army was of the Republika Srpska, it used the existing infrastructure of the Yugoslav Army, and was also heavily supported by the then Serbian authorities (Calic 2003, 112). 10 In addition, the FRY authorities supported the Army of Republika Srpska by forcibly drafting those people who had lived and/or worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina for

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only to conduct ‘ethnic engineering’ in the FRY (Štiks 2006), but also to pursue his ambitions towards the rest of the former Yugoslav lands at the time of the Yugoslav disintegration in the attempt to recreate Greater Serbia (Malcolm 1996). According to Keil (2013, 108), ‘[s]hortly after the independence of Slovenia, the Serbian leadership recognized that it would not be able to hold Yugoslavia together, therefore, its aim shifted from keeping Yugoslavia together to keeping all those in Yugoslavia that did not want to secede, which meant the creation of a Greater Serbia through the adoption of the Croatian and Bosnian Serb territories to Serbia proper’. These ambitions were halted with the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end, as well as the resolution to many of the above-mentioned citizenship ambiguities in this country. Even so, as will be explained in the next chapter, the tensions from the wartime years still linger in the day-to-day politics of this post-Yugoslav state. They are also encapsulated in laws, which regulate and deeply affect people’s lives through the rights and duties of citizenship. The situation in Macedonia at the time of the Yugoslav disintegration was much different from the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Macedonia was the only former Yugoslav republic to attain independence peacefully in the early 1990s. In its 1991 opinions, the Badinter Commission recommended that Macedonia’s request for recognition should be granted provided that this country upholds the general principles of peace and stability (Rancharan 1997). Yet the recognition of Macedonia was far from smooth, due to the Greek objection over the use of the term ‘Macedonia’ to designate the country’s name.11 In 1993, Macedonia became a member of the United Nations under the provisional name ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (UN Security Council Resolution 845), and two years later Greece and Macedonia signed an Interim Agreement. This Agreement established the grounds for the bilateral relations between the two states pending the resolution of the name dispute. The dispute, however, is still ongoing and in the last decade it has had serious repercussions on the Macedonian North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession and EU integration. In circumstances of contested sovereignty, further exacerbated by the Bulgarian challenges of the separate Macedonian nationhood, the 1991 Constitution of Macedonia was largely based on ethnic principles. The 1991 Constitution defined Macedonia as the ‘national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living [therein]’ (Preamble). The subsequent Law on the implementation of the constitution of Macedonia stipulated that the citizens of the former Yugoslav republics resident in Macedonia could obtain the citizenship of Macedonia pursuant to the provisions of the Law on Citizenship (article 6). However, the 1992 Law on Citizenship a few years only during the existence of the former Yugoslavia. 11 The Greeks consider the name ‘Macedonia’ to be the part of the Hellenic heritage. It also designates a geographical area in today’s Greece.

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followed the ethnonational conception of the state in Macedonia, in that it posed high barriers to naturalization including the residence criterion of 15 years, and considerably high naturalization fees (Spaskovska 2010a). According to Spaskovska (2010a), these requirements proved cumbersome for many Albanian and Roma people who habitually resided in Macedonia, but had not formally registered residence therein. The circumstances surrounding the regulation of citizenship in Macedonia changed throughout towards the end of the 1990s. During the Kosovo crisis in 1998 and 1999, 344,500 people temporarily fled to Macedonia from the neighbouring Kosovo (UNHCR 2000). A mere two years after the conclusion of the Kosovo conflict, a war erupted between the ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia, which until then was considered an oasis of peace in the Western Balkans. The 2001 conflict resulted in the change of the governmental structures, through the establishment of an experimental type consociation through the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), mediated by the EU. According to Daskalovski (2006), the OFA granted special rights in terms of political representation to Macedonian citizens of ethnic Albanian origin, and thus was an important mechanism for democratization in Macedonia. The setup of the Macedonia established through the OFA became important in the post-2000 developments of not only the regulation of membership in this post-Yugoslav state but also on the symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship. These issues are explained in the subsequent chapters. Unlike the other federal republics of the SFR Yugoslavia, Montenegro decided to remain in the common state with Serbia. At the referendum held on 1 March 1992, 95.4 per cent of the 66 per cent turnout expressed their preference for Montenegro to remain in a common state with other former Yugoslav republics wishing to do so. The independence-oriented Liberal Alliance of Montenegro and ethnic minorities boycotted the 1992 referendum. The two former Yugoslav republics established the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 27 April 1992. Montenegro stayed in the common state with Serbia (restructured into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on 14 March 2002) until 21 May 2006, when the population of Montenegro voted for independence. However, the history of common life of the two republics of the former Yugoslavia in the past two decades was far from smooth. From 1997 onwards, one section of the Montenegrin leadership detached itself from Slobodan Milošević and embarked upon a process of ‘creeping independence’, that is, the gradual establishment of institutions in Montenegro that would function independently from the ones of the FRY (Morrison 2009; Roberts 2007). After 2000, this tendency grew into the quest for independent statehood on the behalf of the Montenegrin ruling elites, and the resistance thereto by Montenegrin opposition parties. As a consequence of the progressive separation from Belgrade, the Montenegrin government utilized a series of laws and policies as a means of detaching the state from the federal institutions. One of them was the citizenship policy, as explained in more detail by Džankić (2010).

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The initial FRY citizenship policy was set out in the Constitution of 27April 1992. The Constitution established Yugoslav citizenship, and republican citizenship as its second tier (article 17). In line with the constitutional provisions, Yugoslav citizens could not be deprived of their citizenship or extradited to another country, while Yugoslav citizens residing abroad enjoyed the protection of the FRY (article 17, para. 3). Unlike the constitutions of the former Yugoslavia, the FRY constitution allowed dual citizenship, provided that those who also possessed the citizenship of another state were treated as ‘Yugoslavs’ when on the territory of the FRY. Almost simultaneously, the Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, enacted on 12 October 1992 established the category of Montenegrin citizenship. Montenegrin citizenship was inalienable, and Montenegrin citizens could not be deprived of the right to change it (article 10). Such provisions were clearly generated by the wartime circumstances on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s. The FRY Constitution also provided that a separate federal law would regulate the citizenship policies. In contrast to the practices in the other former Yugoslav republics, which adopted their citizenship policies shortly after the disintegration, the Citizenship Act of the FRY came into force only in 1996, over four years after the establishment of the state. The delayed adoption of the citizenship legislation allowed the FRY policymakers to circumvent clear legal definitions of citizenship policies. This avoidance, in turn, allowed them a greater margin of manoeuvre when it came to ethnicity and citizenship, which were particularly malleable at the time of ethnic conflicts (Džankić 2010). The 1996 federal citizenship law had a zero option for citizenship, and was applied retrospectively for four years. During this time, a number of Serb refugees12 from Bosnia and Croatia had settled in the FRY. The conditions for acquiring citizenship of the FRY were quite restrictive and a lot of discretionary power was granted to the Ministry of Interior in determining residence. According to Štiks (2006, 482), such an approach to citizenship turned refugees into hostages of Milošević’s politics, since they could neither return to their countries of origin, nor become full citizens of the FRY. In fact, the Serb refugees were commonly redirected to the ethnically mixed regions of the FRY, such as Vojvodina, Kosovo, or Montenegro with the objective of changing the regional ‘ethno-demographic balances’ (Štiks 2006, 482). Yet by the time the 1996 Citizenship Act entered into force, political circumstances in the FRY had changed significantly, with the Montenegrin ruling elites departing from Milošević’s politics. That said, the Law on Montenegrin Citizenship, enacted on 1 November 1999, is a clear example of how legislative measures were used to detach competences from the federal level as part of a process of creeping independence and of how citizenship policies were pivotal for the arithmetic of voting. The Law on Montenegrin Citizenship of 1999 was in conflict with the Yugoslav Citizenship 12 The current Montenegrin legislation terms these people as ‘displaced persons’. In the context of the Montenegrin legislation, that term will be used. Here, the term ‘refugee’ is more appropriate, and corresponds to the terminology used in the academic literature.

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Act of 1996 since the republican citizenship could be acquired without the prior or simultaneous acquisition of the federal one. In addition, the 1999 Law on Montenegrin Citizenship stipulated that Montenegrin citizenship could be obtained by birth, origin, naturalization, or international agreements (article 2). A ten year residence criterion was applied in the case of foreigners living in Montenegro. This residence requirement was reduced to five years in cases of spouses of Montenegrin nationals (article 9). The stringent criteria for naturalization were caused by the division that occurred on the Montenegrin political scene between the supporters of Milošević (after 2000 the pro-union camp) and the opponents of the regime in Belgrade (after 2000 the pro-independence camp). In effect, the margins by which the opponents of the Milošević regime won the elections in Montenegro have been rather small since the 1997 split in the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) which generated this division. Hence, the criteria for naturalization in the 1999 Law on Montenegrin Citizenship were stringent because the ruling coalition sought to prevent a large number of people who fled from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from obtaining voting rights (Džankić 2012). The displaced persons who settled on the Montenegrin soil at the time of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were predominantly of Serb ethnicity, and thus more likely to vote for the political faction that supported Milošević and – after his departure from power – the common state with Serbia. With the transformation of the common state of Serbia and Montenegro under the auspices of the EU, and the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union on 4 February 2003, the concept of citizenship changed significantly. Interestingly, the citizenship of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was never formally constituted. Rather, article 7 of the Constitutional Charter stipulated that ‘A citizen of the constituent state is a citizen of Serbia and Montenegro’. On the one hand, such a conception of citizenship bears some resemblance to EU citizenship, whereby membership in the encompassing polity is conditional upon membership in the national polities. This resemblance is reasonable since the structures of the common state were negotiated in an EU framework. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind that article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union reads ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established’, while a corresponding provision was not included in the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. Hence formally, until its dissolution in June 2006, Serbia and Montenegro had their own citizenship regimes, while the state union citizenship was virtually non-existent. Thus, the state union did exist as an externally recognized polity, but its citizenship was defined through membership in the subnational polities. This membership in Serbia and Montenegro as subnational polities emphasized the rights and duties of citizenship, and in particular the issue of voting rights. In effect, citizens of Serbia and of Montenegro had equal rights and duties in the other state, apart from electoral rights (article 7). This fact was extremely significant at the time of the debates over who could take part in 2006 referendum on independence

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in Montenegro.13 After Montenegro became independent, the Constitution of Montenegro enacted on 19 October 2007 established a separate Montenegrin citizenship, discussed below. The citizenship policy was more clearly defined in the Law on the Implementation of the Constitution of Montenegro. Enacted on the same day as the constitution, the Law on Implementation arranged the issue of dual citizenship following Montenegro’s independence. Citizens who had citizenship of Montenegro and another country before 3 June 2006 were allowed to retain both citizenships. Citizens who acquired the citizenship of another country after 3 June 2006 are allowed to retain the citizenship of Montenegro until the bilateral agreement of that country is signed, and – at most – for a year after the entry into force of the Constitution of Montenegro (article 12). Due to the political divisions in Montenegro, the constitution and the Law on Implementation were met with resistance from the pro-Serb parties. These dynamics delayed the adoption of the first citizenship law of Montenegro until early 2008. Conclusions Understanding the history of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro helps us to unveil those forces and processes that have shaped the citizenship regimes in these post-Yugoslav states after their independence. Historically, all three states have been contested, and they continue to be so to the present-day. They were also subject to different types of foreign rules, which have not only affected the regulation of citizenship, but also, and more manifestly, its identitiarian dimension. This identity dimension of citizenship was also pronounced during the formation of the first Yugoslavia, which Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro did not join as constituent tribes. This fact, coupled with the centralization of the South Slav state under the Karađorđević dynasty, contributed to deepening the identity dilemmas in these three postYugoslav states, which even in the first three decades of the Yugoslav existence experienced internal unrest. The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro in socialist Yugoslavia also had an impact on these countries’ current citizenship 13 Shortly before the referendum, then President of Serbia – Vojislav Koštunica – requested that 264,802 Montenegrins residing in Serbia receive voting rights in Montenegro. Because the voting population of Montenegro stood at 457,633 such a major addition of voters would have significantly affected the results of the plebiscite (voters from Serbia were likely to vote for the preservation of the common state). However, the request of Vojislav Koštunica was a political one and there were no legal grounds for it to be applied in Montenegro. The Montenegrin Law on the Election of Representatives and Deputies links voting rights (the same provisions applied to the Referendum Law of 2005) to both Montenegrin citizenship and residence. Only the people who resided in Montenegro for 24 months before the elections could take part therein (article 11).

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regimes. The legacies of the life in the common state are mirrored at three levels. First, the recognition of the three countries studied as republics after the World War II allowed for the development of the different institutional structures, which posed the base for these states’ functioning after the Yugoslav break-up. Second, the regulation of citizenship operated as the second tier of the Yugoslav citizenship policies, and largely determined the array of individuals’ rights and duties. These republican citizenship laws became the pillars of the new states’ citizenship regimes, in that they not only served for the initial determination of citizenship but also for framing some of the rights attached to membership. Third, the plurinational character of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro and the internal tensions therein were largely suppressed due to the strength of communism in these three former Yugoslav republics. The dismantling of the socialist rule, therefore, enabled the ethnonational divisions to re-emerge and affect these countries’ post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the way in which each of these countries experienced it, was a further factor that has left a deep mark in the regulation and practices of their citizenship. The conflict in Bosnia revealed the deep fragmentation along ethnic lines, which is enshrined in the present constitutional setup of the country. The resolution to that conflict through the Dayton Peace Agreement also points to the development of many contentious aspects of this country’s citizenship regime. Similarly, the initial centralization of Macedonia raised concerns over the rights of the Albanian population, which eventually culminated in the 2001 conflict. Similar to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the resolution to the conflict through the Ohrid Framework Agreement enhanced the rights dimension of the Albanian population in Macedonia, it also fragmented the country’s citizenship along ethnonational lines. This period also generated the dispute over the country’s name with Greece, which, as will be explained in Chapter 6, affects citizenship of Macedonia at many levels to this day. The path dependencies, particular at the identity level, have also cut deeply into the tissue of the Montenegrin citizenship. The divisions over statehood and identity caused not only the detachment from the FRY in the late 1990s, but also shaped the post-independence regulation of citizenship. The continuation of the internal divisions, in addition to the tense relationship with Serbia, has shaped the citizenship regime of present-day Montenegro. Elements of citizenship generated through these tensions and contestations are examined in more detail in the following chapters.

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Chapter 4

The Politics of Contemporary Citizenship A full analysis of the governance and practices of citizenship requires the understanding of the interplay between actors that formulate citizenship policies and institutions through which these policies are implemented. Hence this chapter situates the anachronous, yet occasionally overlapping processes of state and nation-building within the political dynamics that shaped the regulation of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. In line with the analytical framework applied in this book, it examines the politics of citizenship policies in each of the countries studied since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The domestic factors that shaped the citizenship governance in the three studied countries are considerably different, both in terms of agency, and structures in which political actors make their decisions. The role of domestic elites in adopting citizenship policies ranges from a very constrained one, to one marked by ethnic veto players, to one with strong interethnic competition but no veto players. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a prime example of the first dynamic, because its citizenship laws have been adopted and changed by international actors, while the local ethnic elites have failed to reach any consensus on citizenship related matters. In Macedonia, the first citizenship policy contained provisions that the ethnic Macedonian elites used to ensure dominance over the country. Only when the ethnic Albanian population emerged as a veto player in this country after the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement has this country’s citizenship policy become more inclusive. In Montenegro, in the absence of any veto players citizenship policy has been used as a tool of the ruling elite to stay in power by preserving not so much the ethnic, but electoral balances. In other words, since the political environment in these countries was crucial in determining the questions of membership, citizenship policies reflect different concepts of inclusion and exclusion. The definition of membership in turn determines the distribution of political rights to different groups. As we will see in the chapter, preferential allocation of political rights along ethnic kinship lines fractures citizenship along ethnic lines because it reinforces group boundaries rather than territorial and civic attachments. In order to explore the causes of the fractured citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro this chapter examines the domestic factors (structures of opportunities and constraints and domestic political elites) that have resulted in a particular vision of who the citizens of the state should be and what rights should be conferred upon them.

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Complexities of Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Two Tiers for Three Communities After the end of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged as a federation composed of two entities, different in terms of governance. While the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a federally governed entity, the Republika Srpska is a centrally administered one. Kasapović (2005, 3) notes that the Dayton Agreement did not establish Bosnia and Herzegovina either as a federation or as a confederation. Rather, it is an asymmetric federation, in which we see elements of territorial autonomy (the division into entities) and consociation (power-sharing between different groups). However, the Dayton Agreement posited not only this complex governance structure for Europe’s most fragile state, but also formulated the link between individuals and the different polities (federal and entity) they belonged to. International actors have formulated the citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact differentiates Bosnia from Macedonia and Montenegro, where dominant political elites shaped and transformed the governance of citizenship. Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Question of Primacy Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement contains the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina contains an extensive provision for regulating citizenship (article 1 (7)), which reads: Citizenship. There shall be a citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly, and a citizenship of each Entity, to be regulated by each Entity, provided that: a. All citizens of either Entity are thereby citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. b. No person shall be deprived of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Entity citizenship arbitrarily or so as to leave him or her stateless. No person shall be deprived of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Entity citizenship on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. c. All persons who were citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately prior to the entry into force of this Constitution are citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The citizenship of persons who were naturalized after April 6, 1992 and before the entry into force of this Constitution will be regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly.

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d. Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina may hold the citizenship of another state, provided that there is a bilateral agreement, approved by the Parliamentary Assembly in accordance with Article IV(4)(d), between Bosnia and Herzegovina and that state governing this matter. Persons with dual citizenship may vote in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities only if Bosnia and Herzegovina is their country of residence. e. A citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina abroad shall enjoy the protection of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each Entity may issue passports of Bosnia and Herzegovina to its citizens as regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly. Bosnia and Herzegovina may issue passports to citizens not issued a passport by an Entity. There shall be a central register of all passports issued by the Entities and by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This provision is unlike the corresponding ones in most constitutions, as the latter commonly affirm the existence of the formal link between the state and the people and are restricted to one or two lines. Obviously, the length and the scope of the constitutional provision on citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina have emerged from the post-conflict environment and have been significantly affected by the international community that enforced the Dayton Agreement. The constitutional provision on citizenship explicitly deals with the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of citizenship on grounds ‘such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’ (article 1 (7b)). It also regulates the question of initial determination, whereby those who possessed the republican citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the former Yugoslavia automatically became citizens of this state, while the status of those naturalized during wartime years is regulated through the actual citizenship law. Furthermore, article 1(7) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulates that the citizenship of the country is two tiered: ‘[t]here shall be a citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly, and a citizenship of each Entity, to be regulated by each Entity’. This fact makes Bosnia and Herzegovina the only post-Yugoslav state whose national citizenship is two tiered.1 However, as highlighted by Sarajlić (2010a), the link between the entity citizenships and the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina remains largely unclear. This lack of clarity has also been encapsulated in the 1999 Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the entity citizenship legislation. The constitutional provision related to citizenship specifies the 1 Indeed, with the entry into the European Union of Slovenia and Croatia, the citizens of these countries also became EU citizens which implies that the citizenship of these two post-Yugoslav states could also be considered two-tiered. However, EU citizenship is derived from and additional to national citizenship, while in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the tiers are interrelated in the context of national citizenship.

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precedence of the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina by referring to entity citizens simultaneously as the citizens of the state. Yet, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina can issue passports only to those citizens who do not possess passports issued by their entity (article 1 (7e)). The citizens of the Federation of BiH and of the Republika Srpska obtain the passports of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued by their respective entities. In practice, the provision covers mostly the citizens of the Brčko District, which is not a part of either entity but under the competence of the state. As a consequence of legal uncertainty, the citizens of this area are often forced into declaring their belonging to one of the entities in order to realize their rights (Stjepanović 2012). The Head of the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina noted, ‘should they [citizens of the Brčko District] fail to acquire entity citizenship, citizens there will be unable to fully enjoy their democratic right to vote’ (OSCE 2014, web). As will be discussed in Chapter 5, many of the political rights, including active and passive voting rights, depend not only on whether an individual lives in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Republika Srpska, but also on their ethnic affiliation. Other aspects of the fractured link between the state and entity citizenships are evident in both state level and entity legislation. The entity citizenship laws of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska almost read as citizenship laws of independent states, apart from the articles that provide that the citizens of the entities are simultaneously the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The precedence issue however remains ambiguous, as neither the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor the 1999 Law on Citizenship unequivocally state that the possession of the state citizenship is conditional upon the possession of the entity citizenship. Rather, this link is indirectly stipulated through the regulation of loss of the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1999 law and the bureaucratic procedures for the acquisition of citizenship. Article 27 of the law states that the loss of entity citizenship implies the loss of the state citizenship and vice versa. In the case of clear precedence of the state citizenship, the loss of the entity citizenship should not automatically result in the loss of the former. In principle, the citizenship laws of the entities are in line with the state citizenship legislation. However, if the naturalization criteria are examined more closely, a peculiar legal conflict emerges. The 1999 Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulates the residence criterion of eight years on the territory of the state. By contrast, article 11 of the 1999 Citizenship Law of the Republika Srpska explicitly requires that the applicant has resided for five out of eight years on the territory of Republika Srpska. Similarly, the 2001 Law on Citizenship of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina states that the individual should reside in the territory of that entity for two years immediately preceding the request for naturalization. In theory, this provision is aimed at establishing the genuine connection between the applicant and the entity. In practice, it challenges the state citizenship law, as the applicant may be required to reside in Bosnia and Herzegovina for longer than the legal requirement of eight years. For instance, if an applicant came to Sarajevo (Federation of BiH) in January 2000 and lived there

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until 2005, and then moved to Banja Luka (Republika Srpska), he or she would not be able to naturalize in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2008 because he or she could not be admitted to either of the two entity citizenships. He or she would have to either reside for further three years in the Republika Srpska, or to move back to the Federation of BiH for two years in order to receive his or her entity and thus state citizenship. The application for the acquisition of entity and state citizenship is submitted simultaneously. This is clearly stipulated in the procedural sections of the 1999 Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereby the decisions on naturalization are taken by entity and not by state authorities (article 30), apart from the very rare cases of facilitated naturalization on grounds of national interest which remains a competence of the federal state (article 30). This leads to the conclusion that although the citizenship law of Bosnia and Herzegovina has legal primacy over the entity legislation, in reality the case is the opposite as the majority of cases of admission and loss are decided upon by the entities. Hence, while the state citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina is largely emblematic, those of the entities are the ones that are administratively functional. The Question of Rights in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina The conundrum in the regulation of citizenship originates from the ethnoconstitutional arrangement for post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. The preamble to the Dayton constitution clearly distinguished between ‘Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Preamble, Annex IV, Dayton Agreement). In addition to the three constituent peoples, it identified the category of Others (such as Jews, Yugoslavs, Roma, Albanians) and the unspecified citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rights of citizenship have been attributed to the constituent peoples – Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs – rather than to all the citizens of the state. Such a political arrangement created a complex and contentious state structure in which people not belonging to a constituent ethnic community have been sidelined from a number of political activities. Laws favouring the constituent peoples limit their election to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three members – one Serb elected in the Republika Srpska, and one Bosniak and one Croat elected in the Federation of BiH. In addition to this, the legislature of Bosnia and Herzegovina is bi-cameral and all new laws require the approval of both chambers. The House of Representatives consists of 42 parliamentarians elected by party list proportional representation. The second tier of the legislature – the House of Peoples – which has 15 members in total, ensures the representation of the constituent peoples by allocating five members each to Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The membership of the House of Peoples is by appointment of the entity parliaments, which combined with the ethnic principles has significant implications on the practical aspects of citizenship including the rights dimension. By foregoing equal opportunities for representation of all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in addition to

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the three constituent peoples include minorities such as the Jews and the Roma, this institutional structure deepens the inequalities among the people living in this state. The problematic aspects of the institutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been outlined in the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (27996/06 and 34836/06) judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The case dealt with the status and rights aspects of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reveals the weakness of the state citizenship compared to ethnic principles in the institutional context of the country. Dervo Sejdić and Jakub Finci, representatives of the Roma and Jewish communities, each lodged a case before the ECtHR claiming that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina violated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The claim challenged the constitutional provisions which stipulate that only members of the constituent peoples are eligible to run for the country’s Presidency and the House of Peoples, thus discriminating other peoples living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the joint ruling on the pleas of Dervo Sejdić and Jakub Finci, the ECtHR confirmed that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina violated the ECHR. According to the interview with a Bosnian political analyst carried out for this research, the ECtHR judgment represents a real challenge not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for understanding power-sharing and constitutional arrangements in divided societies.2 In particular, the ECtHR judgment found the restriction that the plaintiffs had in running for the House of People in violation of article 14 of ECHR, which is a prohibition of discrimination in matters pertaining to the rights arising from ECHR, an integral part of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the Dayton Agreement. However, the violation of the ban of discrimination in matters pertaining to the ECHR needs to be proven for a specific right, which in this case was the right to free elections. According to the ruling (Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina 27996/06 and 34836/06), the restriction of Sejdić and Finci to take part in the elections to the House of Peoples is a violation of article 3 of the first Protocol of the ECHR. This article binds the signatory parties to ‘hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’ (article 3, First Protocol to the ECHR). Furthermore, the ineligibility of Sejdić and Finci to run for Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as they are not representatives of the constituent peoples was found to be a violation of article 1 of Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which stipulates a general prohibition of discrimination, in that: The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,

2 Interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (1), Sarajevo, 20 May 2011.

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political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph (article 1).

The ruling in Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (27996/06 and 34836/06) revealed a number of contentious issues related to the politics of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the country’s institutional structure brought about by the Dayton Agreement. In other words, not only are the minorities (that is, non-constituent peoples) in a position where their rights are violated by their inability to run for some of the state’s institutions, but also the constituent peoples when they seek representation outside the entity which corresponds to them. In other words, a Croat or a Bosniak from Republika Srpska has the same chances of being elected to the House of Peoples as Sejdić or Finci, as does a Serb from the Federation BiH, or a citizen of the Brčko District who has not chosen his or her entity citizenship. The same principle applies to the elections for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Keil (2013, 99–100) notes that ‘the strict power-sharing rules of the Presidency have been criticized as the key reason for the inflexible and slow nature of the whole political system … This double discrimination based on nationality and location has also been pointed out by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe’. Bosnian political analysts interviewed for this book have confirmed that the uneven distribution of the rights of citizenship is the major symptom of the structural problems of the Dayton Agreement.3 Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina and ‘Bosnia’s Gordian Knot’ As a result of the ECtHR’s decision, a debate on constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina intensified. This endeavour has been termed as ‘Bosnia’s Gordian Knot’ by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2012, web). By March 2010, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina had adopted the Action Plan for implementing the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina ruling (27996/06 and 34836/06), which would entail changing the country’s constitution. In the following six months, the Working Group of 13 members was established by the Council of Ministers with the aim of drafting the amendments to the constitution held seven meetings (Hodžić 2011, 30–32). However, the members of the Working Group failed to agree on the new institutional setup for Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the October 2010 elections. As a consequence, the constitutional debate decelerated after the elections, because the country’s key political actors could not reach an agreement on forming the government for 14 months. Even though the 3 Interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (1), Sarajevo, 20 May 2011; interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (2), Sarajevo, 19 May 2011; interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (3), Sarajevo, 16 May 2011.

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six political parties – the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), the Croatian Democratic Union 1990, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) – formed a coalition in December 2011, the coalition fell apart in May 2012 after failing to consent on the state’s budget. Hence the general political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a major hindrance in ensuring the equality of citizenship rights. The political representatives of the constituent peoples have posed a further obstacle to the constitutional reform. As corroborated by the interlocutors for this research, the political elites have sought to preserve the rights conferred upon their respective groups at the end of the war at the expense of keeping the system supported by discrimination.4 Introducing a fourth member of the Presidency, as had been proposed, was followed by objections to reducing leverages of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs within that institution. Similar concerns have also been raised in relation to the appointment to the House of Peoples, which reveals that any attention ‘given to implementing the ECtHR decision has focused on a solution that cements party leaders’ already extensive hold on power’ (ICG 2012, web). In this context, the distribution of power in Bosnia brought about by the Dayton Agreement prevents the development of effective politics of citizenship policy. The present policy reflects two major problems, namely the unclear relationship between the two tiers of the citizenship regime (the federal and entity citizenship) and the unevenness of citizenship rights. The latter affects not only the representatives of Others in Bosnia and Herzegovina who are effectively excluded from a part of the political process, but also the residents of the Brčko District who are required to choose their entity citizenship and indirectly to state their ethnic belonging in order to realize their rights of citizenship. Entity Citizenship of Brčko District Residents: Between Choice and Necessity Following the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the status of the Brčko District was to be resolved by the Arbitration Tribunal for the Dispute over the InterEntity Boundary in the Brčko Area, composed of an international representative and one representative of each of the two entities (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2006; Karnavas 2003). On 5 March 1999, the arbitration tribunal issued its decision (Final Award) establishing the Brčko District as an autonomous area belonging neither to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor to the Republika Srpska.5 4 Interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (2), Sarajevo, 19 May 2011; interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (3), Sarajevo, 16 May 2011; interview with professor of political science, Sarajevo, 16 May 2011. 5 While this section discusses only the citizenship issues in this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, further details on the negotiations of the status of Brčko District are provided by Karnavas 2003. For information on administration and multi-ethnic governance of the district see Bieber 2005, Clark 2010, Jeffrey 2006.

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Its citizens are citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such an administrative position of this area of Bosnia and Herzegovina created a peculiar situation in the context of the two-tiered (federal and entity) citizenship of this country. Article 3 of the Statute of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulates that the ‘[d]istrict has no other symbols than those of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, implying that its residents’ primary identity should be with the state. However, in the Brčko District, individuals are also implicitly required to self-identify with their ethnic group in order to realize their citizenship rights. In fact, the majority of civil and political rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including electoral rights, depend on entity citizenship. As a result, even though ‘Brčko was divorced from power struggles both within and between the entities’ (Bieber 2005, 431), its residents need to be in possession of one of the entity citizenships in order to exercise their rights at the state level. In addition to this, the status of citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina is dependent on entity citizenship. According to Stjepanović (2012, web), this leaves ‘citizens of the Brčko District without a citizenship’. While Stjepanović (ibid.) notes that the Office of the High Representative of the international community in BiH has taken note of this issue, little has been done to alleviate the problem due to the complex institutional setup of the state. This leaves more than 30,000 citizens of the Brčko District who do not possess entity citizenship in a legal conundrum. Unlike those born or residing on territories that belong to either the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Republika Srpska, the residents of the Brčko District do not receive their entity citizenship by default. Rather, following the changes to the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina,6 they are required to choose their entity citizenship and register accordingly. By opting for either of the entities, the residents of the Brčko District are entered in the electoral rolls, and thus have the opportunity to influence both the entity and the state-level processes. Stjepanović (2012, web) notes the importance of the latter, because ‘state-level policies are the only ones, apart from the district level, that can directly affect the everyday life of the Brčko residents. Possessing entity (Federation of BiH or Republika Srpska) citizenship, allows the residents of Brčko to influence (at least in theory) BiH foreign policy, military, customs as well as the other few issues reserved for the relatively weak central state’. However, by being forced to declare their entity citizenship, the residents of the Brčko District are also indirectly forced to declare their ethnonational belonging. That is, a Serb from the Brčko District is likely to take up the citizenship of the Republika Srpska and a Croat or a Bosniak is likely to take up the citizenship of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because in that way his or her political rights will be better exercised. For instance, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed from a Serb representative from the Republika Srpska, a Bosniak and a Croat representative from the Federation of BiH. Thus, in order for that person’s 6 See Chapter 7 for details.

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vote to be counted, he or she would have to take the entity citizenship, most likely in line with his or her ethnic belonging. Rather than being a mere example of the fractured governance of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the example of the Brčko District also shows how intimately related citizenship policies are to the symbols and practices of citizenship. In other words, by choosing one or the other entity citizenship in order to be able to exercise their rights, the residents of the Brčko District also subscribe to the symbols of ethnic kinship. Politics of Macedonian Citizenship Policy after the Ohrid Framework Agreement The signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in 2001 introduced a transformation of the legal, political and societal milieus in Macedonia. First, the OFA required constitutional and legal changes which redefined the way the Macedonian state was created after the Yugoslav break-up. According to one of the interlocutors for this book, the OFA paved the way for reconstituting the interethnic relations in Macedonia after the ‘Macedonian human rights tragedy’.7 Second, being a consociational agreement, it brought about a change in the dynamics of political competition and the politics of citizenship by requiring an Albanian minority party in each subsequent formation of the government. Third, the OFA deeply affected the identity aspects of citizenship, because the consociational agreement – while creating an ostensibly civic regime – deepened and hardened the ethnic lines in this post-Yugoslav state. From Ethnic to Fractured: Changing Conceptions of Citizenship in Macedonia Following the conclusion of the OFA, the Parliament of Macedonia introduced a series of constitutional amendments aimed at reflecting the new power-sharing arrangement. As explained in the previous chapter, the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia advanced a largely ethnic definition of the state. The Preamble to the 1991 Constitution gave precedence to the ‘historical, cultural, spiritual and state heritage of the Macedonian people’ in establishing Macedonia as ‘the national state of the Macedonian people, in which full civic equality and permanent cohabitation with the Macedonian people are guaranteed to Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma, and other peoples living in the Republic of Macedonia’.8 This implies that although equality of citizenship was guaranteed, the minority peoples in Macedonia were defined as ‘other peoples’ in the construction of the state, which had repercussions on their status and rights. For instance, the official 7 Interview with Macedonian political analyst and civil society activist, Skopje, 9 June 2011. 8 Author’s translation.

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use of minority languages was restricted to units of self-government where they would be a majority of the population. In addition to this, equitable and proportional representation of minorities was not constitutionally guaranteed, which resulted in group grievances that underpinned the 2001 conflict in Macedonia. Amending the position of the minorities, the legislative changes of 2001 brought citizens to the forefront of the Macedonian constitutional framework. The contentious ethnocentric definition of the state of 1991 was substituted by a greater emphasis on the civic elements of nation formation. After the constitutional amendments, the Preamble now specifies that ‘[c]itizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people as well as citizens living within its borders who are a part of the Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serb people, Bosniak people and others … decided to constitute the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign, independent state … ’.9 Still, this change in the Preamble of the constitution reveals a major tension in Macedonia’s citizenship regime. On the one hand, the international pressure to conclude the OFA and especially the country’s desire to join the European Union, has induced the shift towards a more civic state conception. As a consequence, the definition of the state as belonging to the Macedonian ethnics has been circumvented since 2001, and replaced by the reference to Macedonian citizens. This implies a change in the status of ethnic minorities compared to the 1991 Constitution, and the abolishment of their explicit marginalization through the deletion of the reference to ‘cohabitation’ (Preamble, 1991 constitution of the Republic of Macedonia). On the other hand, even the current constitutional definition of the state in Macedonia has retained some ethnic traits. While primarily all the people inhabiting the territory of this postYugoslav state are defined as its citizens, the constitution still reinforces ethnic boundaries by explicitly mentioning ethnic belonging of different groups. What comes across from this is that rather than reinforcing the civic identity of the state and its citizens, the new constitutional provisions make a clear difference between belonging to the state and belonging to an ethnic group. As rightly noted by Spaskovska (2012, 108), ‘[r]ather than being de-ethnicized, since the 2001 Ohrid Agreement the Macedonian citizenship framework was reformed, democratized and expanded, but re-ethnicized at the same time on multiple levels, resulting today in its “fractured” frame’. As regards the democratization and expansion of citizenship, the question of how the state should be constituted induced significant amendments to the citizenship regime of Macedonia, particularly in the domain of rights of minority communities. In the 1991 Constitution, minority languages were used officially in those municipalities where they formed a majority. With the 2001 amendments, in those municipalities where minorities constituted 20 per cent of the overall population, minority languages became official. The wording of the provision, however, generated a significant shift from group rights of the minority to use their mother language to the rights of ‘any citizen living in the self-governance 9 Author’s translation.

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unit where at least 20 per cent of the citizens speak an official language different from the Macedonian one … to use any of the official languages and scripts’10 when communicating to the state’s authorities (article 7, 2001 constitution of the Republic of Macedonia). By extension, all citizens were granted the right to have their documents issued in their mother language, a provision which did not exist in the earlier constitutional order of the state (article 7, 2001 constitution of the Republic of Macedonia). A further constitutional guarantee was established though the provision on the equitable representation of minorities at all levels of the state administration (article 8, 2001 constitution of the Republic of Macedonia). These constitutional amendments were followed by Macedonia’s ratification of the European Convention on Nationality (ECN) in 2003. The country’s accession to the ECN introduced a number of significant changes in the regulation of the link between the state and its citizens. First of all, article 1 of the Law on Macedonian Citizenship has been amended to include a provision that explicitly defines citizenship as the link between the individual and the state, forfeiting any ethnic belonging. Such a provision did not exist in the 1992 Law. Arguably, this shift has emerged following the de-ethnicization of the constitution, and the subsequent need to amend and de-ethnicize the derived legislation. However, interviews at the Macedonian Ministry of Interior indicate that the domestic environment was not the primary factor for changing the country’s citizenship policy. Rather, the signature of the ECN has been the major force behind it.11 Second, the residence criterion for naturalization, which was set to 15 years in the previous citizenship law, has been reduced to eight years thus allowing some of the residents from the former Yugoslav republics to receive the citizenship of Macedonia. While these provisions ostensibly liberalized the citizenship legislation of Macedonia, some of the ethnocentric requirements remained. In particular, the knowledge of the Macedonian language is a formal requirement for naturalization (article 7 Law on Macedonian Citizenship) even though other minority languages are officially used in many of the country’s municipalities. Hence despite some liberalization of the citizenship policy, the regulation of Macedonian citizenship still leans towards the ethnocultural model, as explained in more detail by Spaskovska (2012), and confirmed empirically by Vink and Bauböck (2013). Macedonian Politics and the Ethnic Fracturing of Citizenship The ethnification of political life in Macedonia also took its toll on party dynamics, which in recent years also hardened the ethnocentric nature of citizenship in his country. The introduction of the consociational system foresaw the alignment of ethnic Macedonian parties with the Albanian counterparts. The 10 Author’s translation. 11 Interview with the representative of Ministry of Interior, Macedonia (1), Skopje, 7 June 2011; interview with the representative of Ministry of Interior (2), Macedonia, Skopje, 7 June 2011.

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immediate aftermath of the conflict has been characterized with the demise of VMRO-DPMNE which had suffered a fractioning, leaving a segment of the party under the lead of Nikola Gruevski (still VMRO-DPMNE), and a number of new segments, such as VMRO–People’s Party, under the lead of Vesna Janevska. Such fragmentation of the Macedonian political society in 2002 resulted in the return to power of the reformed socialists, the SDSM in coalition with the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), one of the major Albanian political parties. Yet, the left wing government in Macedonia was short-lived in the post-OFA period. The 2006 parliamentary elections saw the return of the VMRO-DPMNE coalition ‘For a Better Macedonia’, which included the Socialist Party of Macedonia, the Democratic Alliance, the Party of Turkish Movement of Macedonia, the Party for Democratic Action of Macedonia, the Party of Vlachs, the People’s Movement of Macedonia, the Union of Roma in Macedonia, the European Party of Macedonia, the Green Party, the Party of Democratic Forces of Roma, and the Party of Roma Integration. Its consociational partner was the Democratic Party of Albanians. Although the Greek veto on the Macedonian NATO bid at the 2008 Bucharest summit instigated premature parliamentary elections the same year, the right-wing parties led by the VMRO-DPMNE remained in power, although with DUI as their new consociational partner. The two consecutive elections of the right-wing parties mirror what the ethnic Macedonians perceive as a twofold ‘identity threat’. On the one hand, the trend of right-wing victories reveals the tense relations between ethnic Macedonians and the Albanians, thus contributing to the fracturing of the citizenship regime along ethnonational lines. On the other hand, it indicates a hardening of national lines vis-à-vis Greece, which has been further reinforced by the nation-building policies undertaken by the VMRO-DPMNE government coalition. The policies adopted by the right wing in Macedonia are mostly related to strengthening the unfinished, challenged and weak national identity of ethnic Macedonians by reference to the narratives and myths of ancient descent of the nation. Vangeli (2011a, 13) defines the process of ‘antiquization’ as a set of ‘identitarian policies based on the assumption that there is a direct link between today’s ethnic Macedonians and ancient Macedonians’. To reinforce this link among the ethnic Macedonian population, the right-wing government initially renamed the airport in the country’s capital Skopje from ‘Petrovec’ to ‘Alexander the Great’, which the Greeks viewed as a violation of the 1995 Interim Agreement. Simultaneously, the Ohrid airport was renamed ‘Apostle Paul’ (Mirčeski 2007). While the antiquization is primarily related to the identity threat from neighbouring Greece, the association of the name of Ohrid airport with a manifestly Christian Orthodox saint has a major impact on the symbolic dimension of citizenship domestically. In this context, we have to bear in mind that the town of Ohrid is a region bordering Albania. Its inhabitants include a ten per cent Albanian minority, who are thus likely to object the official ethnocentric policies of the ruling elites. As a consequence, they are equally likely to dissociate from the symbolic citizenship and belonging to the

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state, which promotes an ethnic state model that is inclusive of minorities only to the extent formally regulated by the OFA. With the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE in power since 2006, the antiquization in Macedonia became intensified in the subsequent years. In addition to changing the name of both of the country’s airports, the main Macedonian highway was also renamed ‘Alexander of Macedonia’. This was followed by a series of publicly broadcast ‘video clips with explicit nationalist content featuring Alexander the Great as a part of a governmental campaign for “raising the national dignity and optimism”’ (Vangeli 2011a, 18). Such a campaign ultimately generated a citizenship model fractured along ethnic lines, while ‘Macedonia has been divided into symbolically demarcated territories, generally corresponding with the amended boundaries of local self-governance’ (Spaskovska 2012, 105). This process has been most manifest in the government’s Skopje 2014 project, which has the aim of revamping the look of the Macedonian capital. It entails the construction of over 20 buildings, bridges and over three dozen monuments including a colossal statue of the warrior on a horse, which informally represents Alexander the Great (Marušić 2013). This statute is intended to show the antique roots of the Macedonian people. The Skopje 2014 project that costs millions of euros was initiated in 2010 (Bertam 2010). At present, it is well underway with manifold buildings and monuments in place and others in the phase of construction. In academic work, Skopje 2014 is largely associated with what Hobsbawm (1983) termed as ‘the invention of tradition’, whereby the reproduction of culture seeks to inspire the sense of common remembrance of history among the population (Vangeli 2011a, 19). Thus, traditions are ‘invented’, or reimagined in the context of Macedonia’s ruling elites’ claims to an ethnified state which serves as a barrier to the perceived domestic and external identity threats. In the internal Macedonian discourse, the project has been particularly acrimonious. On the one hand, the representatives and the followers of the VMRO-DPMNE-led government deny any claims of antiquization and refer to the project as a mechanism for reinforcing the meaning and elements of the historical Macedonian identity. On the other hand, the country’s opposition, international and local analysts claim that the project is a populist mechanism of securing votes on grounds of reinforcing ethnic/national belonging. As noted by Sam Vaknin who formerly advised the VMRO-DPMNE Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, the major problem with the Skopje 2014 project, however, has been its internally divisive function. Drawing on the lack of symbolic representations of the Albanians in Macedonia, Vaknin criticized the project for the lack of ethnic sensitivity towards minorities, and noted that ‘[a]ntiquisation has a double goal, which is to marginalize the Albanians and create an identity that will not allow Albanians to become Macedonians’ (Georgievski 2009). As a consequence of this and similar criticisms, which have at heart the fragmentation of citizenship along ethnic lines, the VMRO-DPMNE government amended the original Skopje 2014 project to include statues of several Albanian historical figures including Nexhat Agolli, Josif Bagëri, and Pjetër Bogdani, and a square devoted to the Albanian

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hero Skanderbeg. While the latter may be considered a step towards a more unified citizenship, the clear orientation towards emblematic representation of either Macedonian or Albanian figures deepens – rather than erases – ethnic divisions. The emphasis of ethnic differences through symbols further reinforced the rightwing dominance, evident at the time of the 2011 elections, when VMRO-DPMNE and its Albanian coalition partner DUI won over two thirds of the parliamentary seats. The VMRO-DPMNE policies in terms of election legislation, however, raised significant concerns related to the uneven distribution of citizenship rights. Namely, the 2011 amendments to the Electoral Code, adopted shortly before the dissolution of the parliament stipulate that a total of three parliamentary seats are reserved for out-of-country voters, one from each of the electoral districts of 1) Europe and Africa, 2) North and South America, and 3) Asia and Australia (article 2, Electoral Code). A further criterion stipulated in article 2 of the 2011 Electoral Code of Macedonia requires the electors to have at least three months’ residence abroad, while article 165 of the same law stipulates that a polling station can be established if at least ten voters are registered. While out-of-country voting has been a common practice in many countries, the concern raised by the international observers and above all the OSCE (2011, 5) was that external voters are overrepresented. OSCE (2011) based its criticism on the inequality between in-country and out-of-country votes required for a parliamentary seat. This is illustrated by the example that ‘[i]n electoral district four (in-country), the minimum number of votes necessary to win a seat was 9,340, while in electoral district nine (out-of-country), the winning candidate won with 548 votes, representing a difference of over 1,600 per cent’ (OSCE 2011, 5). As noted in the fieldwork for this book, the fact that all three outof-country mandates were won by the VMRO-DPMNE coalition increased the debates over the equality of citizenship rights.12 Similar to the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OFA has been successful in halting the conflict in Macedonia and ensuring some minority rights. Even if it has had fewer exclusionary effects than its Bosnian counterpart, the OFA has also had several interrelated negative consequences. Firstly, it induced an ethnic fragmentation of citizenship and hardened the lines between the ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. Secondly, it increased the perception of the identity threat both from inside the country and from the outside, which intensified the antiquization process and the symbolic reinvention of citizenship. In turn, this symbolic reinvention of citizenship through ethnocentric policies poses an obstacle in creating a citizenship which is epitomized by the link between the individual and the state, and not the individual and his or her ethnic group. Finally, the fragmented political life in this post-Yugoslav state saw the strengthening of the right-wing coalition government, which through its policies not only pushes for an ethnocentric state model, but also creates a misbalance of citizenship rights through electoral legislation. 12 Interview with Macedonian political analyst and civil society activist, Skopje, 9 June 2011; interview with Macedonian political analyst and scholar, Skopje, 7 June 2011.

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Political Aspects of Contemporary Montenegrin Citizenship The first independent citizenship regime in Montenegro was established in the two years immediately following the separation of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006. Similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the politics of citizenship in Montenegro are marked by the internal ethnic/national divisions, even though unlike the other countries examined in this book Montenegro is a unitary state. As explained in the previous section, these divisions arose from the question of whether Montenegrins were a nation different from Serbs or not, and respectively, whether Montenegro should be an independent country or not. Given the victory of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)-led coalition on the referendum on independence and the subsequent elections, the country’s citizenship regime has been strongly influenced by state and nation-building. These elements include the institutional consolidation of territory and the population, as well as marking off the differences between the Serb and Montenegrin people. Citizenship: A Tool of Nation-building and a Mechanism for Preserving Electoral Balance The tensions between the ruling DPS and the opposition after the 2006 independence referendum environment led to the delay in the adoption of the Montenegrin Citizenship Act until 14 February 2008. The independence-supporting DPS had a far different vision of the new state’s citizenship policy than the former unionist opposition. After the declaration of independence, the DPS became the nationalizing Montenegrin elite, which sought to preserve ethnic and electoral balances in its favour. It argued that a restrictive law was a ‘better solution’ (Pobjeda Daily, 15 February 2008). The policy choice of the DPS, characterized by high barriers for naturalization and intolerance of dual citizenship was motivated by the small size of Montenegro. Dual citizenship, especially with other successor states of the former Yugoslavia (most likely Serbia)13 would have had a high impact on the voting population of the country and their electoral choices. In practice, the text of the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act is based on legal continuity of the republican citizenship of the former Yugoslavia. Those people who had the Montenegrin republican citizenship in line with the 1999 Montenegrin Citizenship Act automatically became the citizens of the new state. One of the major problems caused by such an initial determination of citizenship was generated by the multiple disintegrations of states that Montenegro was a part of before its independence in 2006. Namely, the republican citizenship in 1999 was based on the principle of continuity with the 1975 Citizenship Act of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro. In this context it is important to note that the citizens of SFR Yugoslavia could have only one republican citizenship, and by acquiring the 13 Serbian List (the major opposition coalition in 2008) produced a list of 100,000 people living in Serbia and seeking dual citizenship with Montenegro.

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citizenship of another republic, a person would lose their Montenegrin citizenship (1975 Citizenship Act, SR of Montenegro articles 13 and 14). The high mobility of people among the former Yugoslav republics and the inefficient administration of Citizenship Registers had major consequences after the Yugoslav break-up. Their combination caused a number of problems related to the initial determination of citizenry in the new states. After the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the citizenship of a number of people depended on the republics’ citizenship registers, which in most cases were not up to date. A part of the issue has been of an administrative nature, because complex procedures deterred people from registering in their new republic of residence. The other part of the problem was that many people were unaware that if they moved from one republic to another, they would need to formally change their residence accordingly. For instance, if a person who had Montenegrin republican citizenship went to Croatia to work temporarily, he or she may have registered there in order to enjoy the rights stemming from the republican citizenship (for example, electoral rights, welfare) while in Croatia. If after the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia, that person returned to Montenegro, he or she would not be included in the Montenegrin citizenship, as the acquisition of the Croatian republican citizenship resulted in the immediate loss of the Montenegrin one. Equally, if a person originating from any former Yugoslav republic came to Montenegro in the 1950s but never formally registered as a republican Montenegrin citizen, legally they would have been considered citizens of their republic of origin even though they resided in Montenegro for several decades. An interviewee for this research shared the experience of a member of his family, who moved from Serbia to Montenegro as a young man in the 1950s.14 The person in question completed his education in Montenegro, worked and lived there ever since. After Montenegro became an independent state, this person realized that he had never formally registered in Montenegro and that, consequently, did not have Montenegrin citizenship. Rather than being an isolated case, it is estimated that several thousand people have been faced with a similar problem (UNHCR 2010). A far greater issue in the citizenship policy of Montenegro has been the status of the people who settled in Montenegro after fleeing the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was how these people were registered, which proved to be a barrier to obtaining Montenegrin citizenship. Upon their arrival, these people were not granted refugee status, but the status of ‘displaced persons’ (from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia) or ‘internally displaced persons’ from Kosovo.15 After Montenegro became an independent state, the government decided to keep the status of these people unchanged. In 2008, the people from the former Yugoslav republics were allowed to register as ‘foreigners with permanent stay’ in Montenegro. This meant that they would be able to obtain the citizenship of Montenegro ten years after their new registration. That is, those who arrived in the early 1990s would have 14 Interview with NGO representative, Podgorica, June 2011. 15 Interview with representatives of UNHCR Montenegro, Podgorica, June 2011.

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had to reside in Montenegro for almost 30 years before becoming the citizens of the country. A further obstacle for these people has been the restrictive citizenship policy, which required them to obtain proof of release from their citizenship of origin. The rationale behind this provision, similar to the general restrictive approach of Montenegro to dual citizenship, has been a combination of ethnic and electoral engineering. In other words, as highlighted by Džankić (2013), the ruling Montenegrin elite has used the citizenship policy to ensure its electoral victories by preventing the potential influx of ethnic Serb voters. This mostly affected the displaced persons and internally displaced persons (IDPs), who largely identify as ethnic Serbs. Having fled Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, or Kosovo in the 1990s, many of these people did not possess travel documents that would enable them to physically cross the border and obtain release from their citizenship of origin in order to be naturalized in Montenegro. Furthermore, if they renewed the documents of their country of origin, these people would immediately interrupt their residence in Montenegro and disqualify themselves from obtaining the country’s citizenship. In July 2010, the provisions related to the citizenship of people from the former Yugoslav republics were amended following a political bargain in the light of EU conditions for accession. This reflects Shevel’s observation that ‘[p]ractical consequences of the first citizenship legislation will become apparent and will become an additional source of citizenship policy’ (2005, 9). The bargain, which is explored in more detail in Chapter 7, revealed the differences in the approach to citizenship between the Montenegrin government and the opposition. While the former resisted any change that would result in an influx of ethnic Serb voters who would support the opposition, the latter pushed for a more inclusive approach to citizenship as regards the citizens from the other former Yugoslav republics. Eventually, the amendments to the Montenegrin Citizenship Act enabled those citizens of the former Yugoslav republics (and their children), who had registered residence in Montenegro for at least two years before 3 June 2006, and a valid ID, to become exempt from the requirement to provide release of their citizenship of origin. In other words, the ten year residence requirement was substantially diminished, as well as the requirement for release from one’s country of origin. However, this provision was transitory, and applicable only to those who lodged their application for citizenship before 31 January 2012. This provision enabled over 5,000 people to become citizens of Montenegro, while four times as many are still struggling with their citizenship status in this new Balkan state (UNHCR 2014). Rights between ‘građani and državljani’: Who are the Citizens of Montenegro? The 2007 Constitution, formally instituted the Montenegrin citizenship (article 12), which exclusively denotes the relationship between individuals and the state, rather than national or ethnic belonging. Moreover, the Constitution of Montenegro proclaimed that sovereignty is vested in the ‘citizens having Montenegrin nationality’ (article 2). The ‘civic’ definition of the Montenegrin state is largely

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due to the country’s recent history and the division over statehood and identity and has two consequences for the country’s citizenship regime. On the one hand, it represents an attempt to placate the interethnic differences generated through the question of Montenegrin statehood and identity. More specifically, it represents a barrier against the claims of Serbs in Montenegro, which constitute one third of the population (Monstat 2011) to be recognized as a constituent people, which would lead to multipartite power-sharing and a situation of fragmented citizenship which we witness in the cases of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the ostensibly ‘civic’ Montenegrin citizenship regime includes two overlapping, yet different notions: the one of ‘citizen’ (građanin) and ‘national’ (državljanin).16 While the former concept denotes a broader universalistic concept of citizenship and is associated with civic rights and access to public good, the latter is the formal relationship between the individual and the state. Paradoxically, while many of the rights in Montenegro are citizens’ rights (građanska prava) irrespective of the status of citizenship, nationality (državljanstvo) is commonly a prerogative for their enjoyment. Given the complex political milieu in Montenegro, citizenship is inextricably related to voting arithmetic. As rightly noted by Marshall and Bottomore (1992, 8), citizens exercise ‘the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body’. The question of political will is particularly relevant in Montenegro, where owing to the small population of the country, individual votes count more as a percentage of the overall citizenry than they would in a country with more inhabitants.17 For that reason, the constitutional provisions regulating suffrage contain a barrier to the exercise of voting rights. On the one hand, the Constitution of Montenegro guarantees universal suffrage to the nationals (državljani) of Montenegro who have reached 18 years of age, and who resided in Montenegro for two years prior to the elections. In view of this, the 2007 Constitution made a departure from the 1992 constitution, which stipulated that electoral rights were granted to citizens (građani) of Montenegro, with no provision connecting residence to the exercise of electoral rights (article 32). The main difference between the two legal orders is the definition of the concept of citizenship. The term citizen (građanin) at the time was defined as the ‘Montenegrin citizen (državljanin) and the national (državljanin) of the other member state, with residence in the Republic of Montenegro’ (2005 Law on the Registry of Residence and Temporary Stay, article 5). Hence, nationals (državljani) of the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia residing in Montenegro were initially kept in the register of electors as citizens (građani).

16 In this section, the term ‘državljanin’ as stipulated in Montenegrin legal documents will be translated as ‘national’; and ‘građanin’ as citizen. This has been done for linguistic reasons, as the term ‘national’ refers to the person possessing the status of citizenship in Montenegro. The term does not imply ethnic belonging. 17 On 23 May 2010, the number of electors in Montenegro was 494,289 (CDT 2011).

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Even so, a few weeks after the 2008 Presidential elections the Montenegrin government adopted a new Law on the Register of Electors. The new law was in line with the 2007 Constitution as regards the voting rights for nationals (državljani) of Montenegro. Shortly after the adoption of this Law, municipal authorities disenfranchised citizens (građani) of Montenegro who did not possess the status of citizenship (državljani). This caused fierce criticism by the country’s opposition, who accused the ruling DPS of using citizenship in order to remain in power (SNP 2008). Having had the citizenship of the former Serbia and Montenegro, most of the citizens (građani) affected by this decision had the nationality of Serbia after the break-up. Therefore, they were more likely to support the Montenegrin opposition. Following a ruling by the Administrative Court (2008/1329), these individuals were reinstated in the Register of Electors, because franchise is a nonrevocable right. However, no new inscriptions of people without the status of citizenship were allowed, which caused a misbalance of the rights of citizenship. For instance, this would be manifest between citizens (građani) who are parents and children. While the parents would enjoy the voting rights in line with the old legislation, their children (who became of age after 2008) would not have the opportunity to be included in the Register of Electors unless they acquired the status of citizens of Montenegro. These insights into the political aspects of citizenship in Montenegro reveal an important dynamic. They show that citizenship is not only a tool for nationalist elites’ ethnic projects, but also a mechanism that the ruling parties can use to maintain or shift electoral balances in their favour. In this latter case, we see ‘electoral misconduct’ in the form of ‘deviations that reflect intentional efforts to manipulate elections for personal or partisan ends’ (Birch 2011, 703). Unlike in the former Soviet Union, where ‘electoral misconduct’ occurred through direct manipulation of the register of electors (Birch 2011; Ross 2011), this took an indirect form in Montenegro. Rather than manipulating the register of electors, the Montenegrin elite made a formal link between the status of citizenship and voting rights and used it to set the parameters for inclusion of individuals in political processes. Conclusions A country’s citizenship regime does not only reflect its political dynamics. It follows them, and changes in light of the major shifts in the country’s political environment. In the context of the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2 of this book, we can thus argue that citizenship regimes in unconsolidated states are shaped and constrained by ethnopolitical competition. The examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro confirm this is only partly true. While the domestic political arena appears to be a significant driver of citizenship policies, it is not the only one.

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The cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, both of which are post-conflict societies corroborate that the international factor – which brought the respective conflicts to an end – has had a significant role on creating and transforming these countries’ citizenship. The domestic political context thus has an impact only to the degree of its constitutional limits, which have been shaped by an external factor. The post-conflict arrangements in these two countries have however had two further repercussions in terms of the citizenship regimes. First, even though the Dayton Peace Agreement and the OFA have not exclusively related the citizenship regimes of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia to any ethnic community, the institutional accommodation of conflict largely reflects the power distribution among these communities. As a consequence, this power distribution affects the politics of membership, particularly as regards minority communities. Second, they allocated the rights of citizenship in line with the individuals’ ethnic belonging. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this has proven to be particularly problematic for three groups of people. First, the communities of the non-constitutive peoples (Others) do not enjoy all the rights of citizenship, including full active and passive voting rights. Second, the same rights of citizenship are limited for the members of the constitutive peoples living in an entity where they are not the majority. Third, the citizens of the Brčko District, which belongs to neither of the two entities, are required to select their citizenship of an entity in order to realize some of their rights. In that way they are also indirectly pushed to state their ethnic belonging. The case of Montenegro, whose post-Yugoslav political trajectory was not marked by overt conflict on its territory, in turn reveals how internal political dynamics and contestations at the levels of statehood and nationhood affect the regulation of membership. The attempts to preserve the electoral balances were indeed a major factor for the restrictiveness of this country’s citizenship legislation. However, this characteristic of Montenegro’s citizenship has emerged from the internal divisions, which played out not only between the political elites and the people, but also in the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia. Thus in Montenegro, as in the previous cases, the politics of citizenship is only one piece of the puzzle. Other domestic and external factors need to be taken into account when analysing a country’s citizenship regime, including its symbolic dimension.

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Chapter 5

Intergroup Competition, Ideational and Symbolic Dimensions of Citizenship As proposed by the analytical framework presented in this book, understanding the institutional and constitutional facets of citizenship regulation does not suffice to fully comprehend a country’s citizenship regime. We have already seen that citizenship policies embed and project the state’s identity as envisioned by the ruling elite(s). However, the identity of the state need not coincide with the identity of citizens, particularly in societies with manifest ethnonational cleavages. This discrepancy is commonly reflected at the symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship, such as flags and anthems, which the state uses to establish its own identity. Equally, the notion of ‘postethnic citizenship’ refers to the identification of individuals with the state, rather than with the community of ethnic kin. When the opposite occurs, that is when individual loyalties are vested in ethnic kinship, citizenship as the state identity becomes fractured, and postethnic citizenship difficult to materialize. Starting with the question of loyalty to the state, this chapter explores how competing ethnonational groups fracture citizenship of divided societies. According to Horowitz (2004, 515), deeply divided societies include those ‘in which ethnic divisions are salient in politics and interethnic antipathy is present’. The chapter further explores attitudes of the individuals towards the symbols of the state, which mirror the fractured citizenship regimes of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. It concludes by reflecting on the few disturbances of this fractured citizenship that created short-lived ‘moments’ of citizenship. Although such moments of citizenship briefly moved the conception of these states’ membership towards postethnic citizenship, in the long run they were unable to transcend deep ethnic divisions. Citizenship and Loyalty to the State Being a link between individuals and the state, citizenship embeds and projects the idea of loyalty. The notion of loyalty is of high importance for the new states, whose political entrepreneurs seek to ensure congruence of the population and the territory. Obviously, the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro show that in the unconsolidated and challenged post-Yugoslav states, loyalties are vested in ethnic communities rather than in the state. As a consequence, there is a discrepancy between how the state has formally been established and how its internal dynamics

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develop. Indeed, we can argue that in many divided societies, and even in countries with settled immigrant population, individuals are first loyal to the ethnic group and then to the state. Even so, in consolidated democracies, this has fewer societal repercussions than in challenged states, because in the latter split loyalties question the state at a much deeper level. In other words, being French Canadian and Bosnian Serb intuitively look like two very similar things: distinct ethnic groups, enjoying territorial and cultural autonomy, and seeking independence from the federal state. However, the loyalty of the French Canadian is to the French community in Canada, while that of the Bosnian Serb is to the neighbouring country that is the kin-state of the respective ethnic group. To illustrate this point, we can use the example of the attitudes of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the status of citizenship as captured by the IPSOS Survey (2011).1 Figure 5.1 (below) presents an overview of the responses to questions regarding citizenship, loyalty and state identity: • • • • •

What is your citizenship? Which passports do you hold? Which country do you perceive to be your homeland? Is there a Bosnian nation? Are you proud to be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina? (‘very proud’ category only).

Figure 5.1

Citizenship, loyalty and state identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Source: Constructed by this author in line with Survey (2011). For further reading, please consult Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in West Balkan States: Intents and Results, University of Oslo, at: http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan.

1 See the methodology section in the Introduction to the book for explanations of the sample and calculations.

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A total of 95.2 per cent of the sample possessed this country’s citizenship. However, as indicated in Figure 5.1 (above) while ethnic Bosniaks are almost exclusively the holders of a BiH citizenship, 12 per cent of the Serbs in Bosnia have a Serbian citizenship in addition to BiH (Survey 2011). Yet the most interesting observation comes across with those who identified themselves as Croats in the Survey (2011), out of whom a greater number holds a Croatian citizenship (81 per cent) than a BiH one (78 per cent). On the one hand, individuals’ motivation for acquiring Croatian citizenship may have been purely opportunistic, due to the visa restrictions to which Bosnia was subject to until 2010 and Croatia was not, the benefits of the education and welfare systems in Croatia, and this country’s EU accession in July 2013. On the other hand, until mid 2012, there was no dual citizenship agreement between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which implies that the majority of the ethnic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina were breaking the law of their country of origin.2 This fact indicates that citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina not only have split ethnic loyalties, but were also willing to cross legal boundaries of the country’s citizenship regime. Perceptions of the status of citizenship were also mirrored in the question ‘Which country do you perceive to be your homeland?’ to which all of those who identified as Bosniaks answered with ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Survey 2011). However, one third of the ethnic Croats and Serbs in this country stated that they consider their kin-states as their homeland. Equally, the loyalty to the state is most manifest among ethnic Bosniaks, who are the only group to be ‘very proud’ to be the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlike the majority of ethnic Serbs and Croats who ether feel ‘somewhat proud’ or ‘not proud at all’ to be the citizens of this country. The prevalence of ethnic categories over civic identity is also most manifest with the ethnic Croats and Serbs, of which 55 per cent and 67 per cent respectively consider their ethnic identity more important than their identity as citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlike the ethnic Bosniaks of whom only 20 per cent consider their ethnic identity more significant than the one as citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Survey 2011). Even so, the ‘Bosnian’ identity is conceived as a loose state identity. The majority of all groups believe that it is possible to subscribe to the ‘Bosnian’ identity in addition to their ethnic identities (Survey 2011). Yet, only for 72 per cent of Bosniaks the ‘Bosnian’ identity is a ‘national identity’. By contrast, 59 per cent of Croats and 69 per cent of Serbs believe that the ‘Bosnian’ identity is not a national identity. This question most manifestly indicates the difference between the conception of citizenship as state identity, and that of citizens’ identity. In fact, going beyond the mere case of Bosnia and Herzegovina we can identify such dynamics in many vertically nested citizenship regimes, including the former Yugoslavia, or even the EU. As explained in Chapter 3, at the level of the state, the Yugoslav identity was an expression of the idea of the principle of ‘brotherhood 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have a dual citizenship agreement (Sarajlić 2010b).

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and unity’.3 At the same time, a very small percentage people used this identity at the individual level. The low identification as ‘Yugoslavs’ attests to the fact that people’s primary identity community were the respective republics, and their ethnic kin (Sekulić, Massey and Hodson 1994). Similar to the case of Yugoslav citizenship, the Bosnian one is additional to individuals’ ethnic identification, but does not supersede it. Unlike in the case of Bosnia, where ‘Bosnian’ identity coexists along with ethnic identities, the Macedonian one is more complex, and leans more towards an exclusive ethnic identity. The Survey (2011) results indicate that, although some Macedonian respondents appear to include other ethnic groups in the Macedonian nation, the ethnic Albanians do not feel that they belong to this community. These ethnic lines are also manifested in their attitudes towards the status of citizenship of Macedonia and loyalty to the Macedonian state and nation-building projects. Figure 5.2 (below) indicates the responses to questions: • What is your citizenship? • Which country do you perceive to be your homeland? • Would you say that modern Macedonians are descendants of ancient Macedonians or predominately by Slavic origins? • Do you consider ethnic Macedonians, Albanians, Serbs, Vlachs, Roma and others who live in Macedonia as members of the Macedonian nation? • Are you proud to be a citizen of Macedonia? (‘very proud’ category only).

Figure 5.2

Citizenship, loyalty and state identity in Macedonia

Source: Constructed by this author in line with Survey (2011). For further reading, please consult Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in West Balkan States: Intents and Results, University of Oslo, at: http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan. 3 ‘Brotherhood and unity’ was the guiding principle of Yugoslavia’s interethnic policy after the World War II. It was based on the peaceful coexistence and equality of the Yugoslav narodi (nations – Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Macedonians, Slovenes, Montenegrins) and narodnosti (national minorities such as Albanians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Jews or Italians).

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Survey (2011) data confirms that 100 per cent of ethnic Macedonian and 91 per cent of ethnic Albanian respondents have the status of citizenship in Macedonia. At the same time, 9 per cent of the ethnic Albanian respondents had only the Albanian citizenship and not Macedonian. Unlike in the case of Bosnia, in Macedonia we see initial congruence between ethnic groups and their citizenship status. However, the meaning of citizenship in Macedonia is also very much understood along ethnic lines. The different feeling towards the country of their citizenship of the ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians was reflected in the question ‘Which country do you regard as your homeland?’ (Survey 2011). While each ethnic Macedonian surveyed replied that they consider Macedonia their homeland, 6 per cent of the Albanian population stated that they considered another country their homeland. This result is similar to the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the groups with an external homeland shared a more profound connection with the ethnic kin than with the state in which they lived. Another confirmation of the respondents’ primary loyalty to ethnic communities were the views on the question ‘How proud are you to be citizens of this country?’ A 79 per cent majority of ethnic Macedonians replied that they felt ‘very proud’, and an additional 18 per cent stated that they were ‘somewhat proud’, while mere 2 per cent of the ethnic Macedonians stated that they were ‘not proud at all’ to be the citizens of the country. The situation with ethnic Albanians was rather different, as only 32 per cent of this group were ‘very proud’ to be the citizens of Macedonia, 56 per cent were ‘somewhat proud’, and 13 per cent were ‘not proud at all’ (Survey 2011). Perceptions that these two communities have vis-à-vis each other further confirm the precedence of loyalty to the group’s perceived cultural distinctiveness. While 30 per cent and 50 per cent of Macedonians and Albanians respectively feel that they have more in common with members of their ethnic communities living outside the Macedonia, only a small percentage of both groups, 13 per cent and 7 per cent of Macedonians and Albanians respectively perceive similarities between their own group and other ethnic communities living on the territory of Macedonia. In this respect, the Survey (2011) also indicates that the Macedonian identity proves to be slightly more inclusive than the Albanian one. In fact, 73 per cent of the ethnic Macedonians stated that they ‘consider ethnic Macedonians, Albanians, Serbs, Vlachs, Roma and others who live in Macedonia as members of the Macedonian nation’, while only 27 per cent of the Albanians corroborated this claim. Indeed, the hardening of the ethnic lines within this new Balkan state has intensified with the Macedonian nation-building project. Claiming that the Macedonian nation has roots in antiquity (Vangeli 2011a), the country’s elite excluded the Albanian community’s vision of Macedonians. A total of 79 per cent of Albanians considers the ethnic Macedonians to be of Slavic origins, while only 38 per cent of the ethnic Macedonian population believes in their Slavic roots. Rather, a 56 per cent majority of ethnic Macedonians believe they are descendants of ancient Macedonians, a belief which has been reinforced by the nationalizing policies of

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the VMRO-DPMNE led government. In a similar fashion, while 95 per cent of the Albanian ethnics share the belief in their Illyrian roots, only 40 per cent of the Macedonians subscribe to the claim that Albanians are of Illyrian origins (Survey 2011). While the question of the origins of the nation appears to be intimately related to ethnicity and culture, it is equally relevant for the construction of citizenship. The VMRO-DPMNE narrative of the ancient roots of ethnic Macedonians reinforces the dominant group’s allegiance to the state. The minority communities are instead loyal to the external kin-state and not to the country of citizenship. We can observe a very similar dynamic in the case of Montenegro, where the gap between ethnic communities is very pronounced, even though the selfidentification of groups is far less stable than in the other post-Yugoslav states.4 Figure 5.3 (below) illustrates the question of loyalty to the state by looking at attitudes towards the status of citizenship in Montenegro, exemplified by questions: • • • •

What is your citizenship? Which passports do you hold? Which country do you perceive to be your homeland? Do you see Montenegro as an example of a multi-ethnic and multicultural country? • Are you proud to be a citizen of Montenegro? (‘very proud only’ category). The Survey (2011) results presented in Figure 5.3 show that in the case of Montenegro we see the major difference in attitudes towards the state between the Montenegrin and Bosniak/Muslim communities on the one hand, and the Serb one on the other.5 In fact, 99 per cent of Montenegrins and 96 per cent of Bosniaks/Muslims possess the status of citizenship, as opposed to the 78 per cent of the respondents who declared to be ethnic Serbs. Moreover, having in mind that Montenegro operates a strict dual citizenship policy, the possession of the passport of a different country also qualifies as a question regarding loyalty to the state.6 As implied by Boll (2007), dual nationality raises the important question of whether an individual can qualify to be loyal to two states at the same time. The problem is ever more pronounced in the case of Montenegro whereby Serbia is the kin-state to almost a third of Montenegro’s 4 That is, the meaning of ethnic categories Serb and Montenegrin has significantly changed since the 1990s, and group boundaries (between these two groups) are exceptionally fluid. There has been no similar change in the case of minority communities. For further information see Džankić 2014. 5 The Survey did not make a difference between the Bosniak and Muslim communities in Montenegro. According to the last population census, 3.3 per cent of Montenegro’s population identify as Muslim and 8.6 per cent as Bosniak (Monstat 2011). Albanians were not included in the study as a separate category, but were listed under ‘Others’. 6 So far Montenegro has concluded only one dual citizenship agreement – with Macedonia. See Chapter 6 for further details.

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Figure 5.3

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Citizenship, loyalty and state identity in Montenegro

Source: Constructed by this author in line with Survey (2011). For further reading, please consult Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in West Balkan States: Intents and Results, University of Oslo, at: http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan.

population. Regarding the possession of another passport, the Survey (2011) data in fact reveal that 16 per cent of the Serbs in Montenegro hold a passport of Serbia, as opposed to only 2 per cent of Montenegrins and 3 per cent Bosniaks/Muslims who are in the same situation. The significantly higher number of ethnic Serbs possessing a Serbian passport is a further indicator of loyalty to the kin-state than to the state of their citizenship. Indeed, the question of loyalty is also manifested in the fact that to 48 per cent of Serbs in Montenegro, their ethnic identity is more important than the identity as citizens of Montenegro, contrary to 22 per cent of Montenegrins and 23 per cent of Bosniaks/Muslims who see their ethnic community as the primary one (Survey 2011). The Survey (2011) data further indicates that the citizenship model adopted in Montenegro, which contains no ethnic elements, has been used for the ‘instrumentalization of minorities’ for the political aims of the DPS (Bieber 2003). In other words, the Montenegrin citizenship regime did not have an inclusive function towards the ethnic Serbs, who during the statehood and identity debate opposed the independence project of the ruling elite. This has also been mirrored in the question ‘Do you see Montenegro as an example of a multi-ethnic and multicultural country?’ (Survey 2011), to which 75 per cent of ethnic Montenegrins and 69 per cent of ethnic Bosniaks/Muslims gave a positive answer as opposed to 42 per cent of the ethnic Serbs. Almost all of the ethnic Serbs surveyed however professed their belief that the ‘Montenegrins are essentially Serbs’ (Survey 2011), indicative of the identity aspect of Montenegro’s internal division. Equally, almost all Bosniaks/Muslims stated that a Montenegrin can be a Muslim by confession (Survey 2011), which reflects this ethnic community’s belief in the civic nature of the Montenegrin identity. The same question was answered positively by 65 per cent of the ethnic Montenegrins and 56 per cent of the Serbs, which points to the fact that these two Orthodox Christian communities are less inclusive of the Islamic believers in what the ‘civic’ identity should represent. That is, the

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civic aspects of identity in Montenegro are largely a product of the struggle over statehood and nationhood, whereby the ruling elite needed the votes of minorities in order to stay in power and somewhat distanced itself from the rhetoric of statebuilding through exclusive ethnic kinship. The amplified interethnic divisions in the context of the independence referendum have had a major impact on how the citizens of Montenegro perceive the state that they live in. Only 22 per cent of ethnic Serbs stated that they feel ‘very proud’ to be citizens of Montenegro, which stands in stark contrast to the 64 per cent of Montenegrins and 65 per cent of the Bosniaks/Muslims who feel the same. These results can thus be taken as indicators of the rift between the Montenegrin and Serb ethnic communities in terms of loyalty to the state. Reflecting on the Survey (2011) questions regarding the status of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, we see several significant dynamics. First, with the exception of the Bosniak/Muslim community in Montenegro, minorities tend to be more loyal to their ethnic kin than to the state. They are also commonly willing to violate the laws of their country of origin in order to obtain the documents of the state of their ethnic kin. Second, while the citizenship regimes in all three states are constructed as ‘non-ethnic’, in the cases of Macedonia and Montenegro they favour the vision of the state of the ethnic majority community. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the international community and not the local political elites developed the citizenship policy, we still see that loyalties are directed towards the ethnic kin. As expected, ethnic Bosniak community is more loyal to the state than the Croat and the Serb ones. Bosniak is also the only community explicitly favouring a Bosnian nation, even though the Survey did not capture what the different groups understood by ‘Bosnian’. Citizenship and the Symbols of the State Symbols are important for the construction of nationhood, due to their association with history and the perceived continuity of the nation. They are equally important for the construction of citizenship, and can either cement or relax ethnic boundaries. Yet in circumstances when those national boundaries are unclear, the nationalizing elites seek to reinforce the belonging to ethnic communities rather than to the state. According to Popović, those who enforce such national ideologies ‘emphasize only those symbols and rituals – flags, anthems, parades, battles, dynasties, heroes, national costumes, state holidays, commemorations, religious dates – that they can use to unite the members of the nation’ (2010, 38). Symbols serve as instruments that can materialize the nation to citizens as they can be seen, heard, or touched. Flags and national anthems are in this regard the symbols that people associate with the most, as they are displayed during national holidays, or public ceremonies. They also stand for the country internationally, at competitions such as the Olympic Games and Eurovision.

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Flags: Paradoxes and Contentions The flags of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are all contested by at least one domestic or external factor. However, the reasons behind these contestations are different. The lack of support for the three countries’ national flags has its roots in the process of adoption of these symbols of the state. The post-Dayton flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally approved on 4 February 1998. It substituted the 1992 flag of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that featured a white background and a coat of arms consisting of six fleur de lys displayed around a white bend on a blue background. Although the fleur de lys featured on the flag has been used in the old Kingdom of Bosnia (Kotromanić dynasty, 1377–1463) and symbolizes a plant native to Bosnia (lilium bosniacum), the Serbs and the Croats protested against this symbol (Hašimbegović 2009). According to Dević (2014, 69), for the Serb and the Croat communities, the flag featuring the fleur de lys was representative of only the Bosniak community and a symbol of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995).7 The new flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina was introduced by the the Office of the High Representative (OHR) after the session of the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 3 February 1998, where the three constituent peoples failed to reach a decision on the flag. At a press conference held the following day, the OHR noted: Yesterday’s Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament session failed to unanimously adopt one of the three designs for the Bosnia and Herzegovina flag, offered by the expert commission appointed by the High Representative. However, one design did receive a considerable number of votes. It is the design with the stars and the triangle. In the absence of any absolute decision from the Parliament session, the High Representative has selected this flag for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bullivant 1998, web).

The current flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a blue background, featuring a yellow right triangle, with seven white stars along the triangle’s hypotenuse. The colour scheme of the flag reflects the colours currently used by the European Union and the Council of Europe: blue, white, and yellow traditionally being associated with peace, neutrality and prosperity (as opposed to red, which is usually associated with blood and war). The triangle is positioned in a way that it mirrors the shape of the Bosnian territory; its three angles are understood to be representative of Bosnia’s 7 The contention of this symbol as only representing the Bosniak community can be termed as the paradox of the fleur-de-lis. The golden lily is commonly featured as a dynastic and religious symbol in Western European countries (Pastoreau 1997). The royal houses of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Malta have commonly used the imagery of the lily on their coats of arms and flags. In religious terms, the lily is a symbol of chastity in Christianity as its petals represent the Holy Trinity and the band at the bottom denote Virgin Mary (Post 1986, 29).

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constituent peoples, while the stars stand for Europe (Tanner 1998, web). Even such a neutral flag is supported only by the 90 per cent majority of those who identify themselves as ethnic Bosniaks, while 48 per cent of Croats and 81 per cent of Serbs do not approve of the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Survey 2011). This is a further indicator of the fact that the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina is fractured along ethnonational lines and that non-ethnic symbols can hardly contribute to overcoming ethnic cleavages that are deeply rooted in society. By contrast, the flag of Macedonia indicates that the flag representative of one ethnic community in deeply divided societies creates both external and domestic contention. The first national flag of Macedonia was adopted in 1992, and it featured a 16-point star on a red background. Due to the protests in Greece that the symbols on the flag resembled the sun of Kutlesh or the Star of Vergina (Vangeli 2011a, 55), this flag was in use only for three years. The Star of Vergina is a symbol of the royal paraphernalia of the ancient Macedonia, as discovered in 1977 by the archaeologist Manolis Andronikos in a small settlement near Thessalonica (Vangeli 2011a, 44). Due to the implications of the Star of Vergina on the relationship between Macedonia and Greece, the former agreed to change its flag in 1995. Yet, in deciding on the colour and symbol scheme, the Macedonian government opted for continuity with the previous flag, in that the requirements for the flag stipulated that: 1. The basic colours of the new graphic design must be based on those in the previous state flags – a blood-red background featuring a yellow design. 2. The only design on the new flag must be the sun (Grčev 2011, 3). In line with the new designs proposed, as of October 1995 the flag of Macedonia features a sun with eight radial beams on a red background. Yet, the Albanian and Roma Members of Parliament (MP) were dissatisfied with the new flag, as it did not reflect the pluriethnic character of the country. Commenting that the flag has become ethicized, the Roma MP Faik Abdi noted, ‘[w]e are suggesting a state flag that would represent all Macedonian citizens, regardless of nationality, religious conviction etc.’ (Stenographic note from the 27th session of the Macedonian Assembly, 5 October, 1995. Address of Faik Abdi, II/6). The dissatisfaction of the other ethnic communities with the Macedonian flag persists to this date. While 91 per cent of the ethnic Macedonians support the flag, 41 per cent of the Albanians in Macedonia object to it. Such a contestation of a major symbolic element of the state is a further indicator of the fractured citizenship in Macedonia. We can also observe the divisive function of symbols, which are supposed to represent the state and thus all of its citizens, in the case of Montenegro. While in the different Yugoslav federations, the Republic of Montenegro used a red, blue and white flag. During the times of the socialist Yugoslavia, the republic’s flag was also adorned with a red star, symbolizing the Yugoslav partisans and their struggle to liberate the country in the Second World War. After the federation between Serbia and Montenegro was transformed in a union of states over 2002 and 2003,

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Montenegro adopted new state symbols to mark its aspiration for independent statehood. As such, they contained ethnic elements and evoked much domestic contestation, particular from the ethnic Serb community in Montenegro that at the time objected Montenegro’s independence aspiration and separate national identity. The 2004 Law on the State Symbols of Montenegro stipulated that the coat of arms consisted of a golden crowned double-headed eagle with it wings in flight, with a sceptre in its right and an orb in its left claw on a red base. On the eagle’s chest is a shield with a golden lion passant. The lion is on a green field with a blue background. The crown above the eagle’s heads and the sceptre are golden topped with a cross. The orb is blue with golden sheaths and cross (Law on State Symbols 2004, article 4).

The subsequent article of the Law defined the flag of Montenegro as red, bordered in gold, and with the coat of arms in the middle. Even at the time of its adoption, the Law on Symbols of the state was faced with major objections by the unionist opposition. The opposition claimed that the departure from the previous flag – red, blue and white similar to the Serbian flag – was an attempt to reinvent history and tradition (Đurković 2009, 6; Bogdanović 2003). According to writings on Montenegrin heraldry (Andrijašević 1998), we can observe that the new Montenegrin flag is a combination of the background of the dynastic army flag (red background with a golden border), the coat of arms of the Principality of Montenegro prior to the arrival of King Nikola (white eagle) and the colour of the eagle from King Nikola’s flag.8 Hence similar to the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the new flag was a combination of elements reminiscent of historical rulers and times during which the respective territories were self-governed. The domestic objections to the flag of Montenegro – supported by 90 per cent of ethnic Montenegrins, 76 per cent of the Bosniaks/Muslims and only by 39 per cent of the ethnic Serbs (Survey 2011) – can therefore be explained in the context of the division over statehood and identity. The ethnic communities supportive of independence and separate Montenegrin identity, including Montenegrins and Bosniaks/Muslims, favoured the flag.9 This is particularly interesting as it shows that the Bosniak/Muslim community in Montenegro is supportive of the state symbols even though they contain manifestly ethnic elements associated with Montenegrins. By contrast, the Serb community that objected to the statehood and nationhood of Montenegro finds the flag problematic, which further confirms the depth of fractures in the symbolic aspects of citizenship of Montenegro.

8 See Chapter 3 for information on the history of Montenegro. 9 As noted in the methodological notes, the Survey did not distinguish ethnic Albanians as a separate category, but they were listed under ‘Others’.

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Discordant Songs: National Anthems Scholarly work on political symbols notes that ‘[n]ational anthems, like national flags, are among the purest of political symbols. The music and words have little or no political significance except as they point to meanings outside themselves – except as they symbolically describe or represent the country, nation, or people’ (Zikmund 1969, 73; Edelman 1964). As such they represent symbols of unity and are commonly not sources of political conflict. However, contrary to the observations of Zikmund (1969) and Warner (1959), national anthems in the challenged and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav states have been a source of contention, not only among political elites but also among the different ethnic communities. Table 5.1 below represents an overview of the lyrics of national anthems of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Table 5.1

Lyrics of national anthems

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Macedonia

Montenegro

No official lyrics

Today over Macedonia, is being born the new sun of liberty. Macedonians are fighting, for their rights! Macedonians are fighting for their justice!

Oh, bright dawn of May Our mother Montenegro

Now once again the flag stands (that) of the Krushevo Republic Goce Delchev, Pitu Guli Dame Gruev, Sad na daski! Goce Delchev, Pitu Guli Dame Gruev, Sandanski! The Forests of Macedonia are singing new songs and newspapers Macedonia liberated Lives in liberty! Macedonia liberated Lives in liberty!

We are sons of your rocks and keepers of your honesty We love you, the rocky hills And your awesome gorges That never came to know The chains of shameful slavery. While our unity gives wings to our Lovćen cause Proud shall be, celebrated will be Our dear homeland. A river of our waves, Jumping into two seas, Will bear voice to the ocean, May eternal be our Montenegro!

Do not cry dear mother Macedonia, Raise your head proudly high, Macedonia free Free to live! Macedonia free Free to live! Source: This author with reference to: Decision imposing the Law on the National Anthem of BiH (1999); Law on state symbols and statehood day of Montenegro (2004); and Risteski and Kodra Hysa (2014).

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As we can observe from the table, the anthem of Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the four national hymns in the world, along with Kosovo, San Marino and Spain, that do not have lyrics but only melody. Imposed in 1999 by the then High Representative Carlos Westendorp and adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2001, the current anthem replaced the earlier version Jedna si jedina, a composition criticized for excluding the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Decision imposing the Law on the National Anthem of BiH 1999). Despite the attempts to introduce lyrics to the melody since 2007, so far the political elites of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been unable to agree on the matter. In 2009, the commission for the selection of the anthem chose the proposal of Dušan Šestić, the original composer of the melody and Benjamin Isović. The proposal foresaw lyrics based on the concept of territorial unity, and orientation towards the future, rather than on ethnicity (S.L. 2009) You’re the light of the soul Eternal fire’s flame Mother of ours, land of Bosnia I belong to you In the heart are yours Rivers, mountains Blue sea Of Bosnia and Herzegovina Proud and famous Land of ancestors You shall live in our hearts Ever more Generations of yours Show up one: We go into the future Together!10

However, after the amendments to the text proposed by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country’s Parliamentary Assembly failed to accept Šestić’s and Isović’s lyrics (Halimović 2012). The failure to adopt the lyrics to the national anthem is reflective of the ethnic divisions that have fractured the citizenship of this country, both as an identity of the state and as a community of membership. The Survey (2011) illustrates the effects of this discrepancy, whereby only 68 per cent of ethnic Bosniaks, 35 per cent of ethnic Croats and 5 per cent of the ethnic Serbs favour the country’s national anthem. Contrary to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the national anthem of Macedonia is manifestly ethnic in character. The lyrics of ‘Today over Macedonia’ 10 Author’s translation.

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presented in Table 5.1, explicitly refer to the struggles of the ‘Macedonian’ people for liberation, which became a point of contestation with the Albanian population of the country. The Albanian representatives were absent from the August 1992 parliamentary session when the Law on the Anthem was adopted (Risteski and Kodra Hysa 2014, 187). The major points of debate regarding the anthem’s lyrics were references to the national heroes, which were predominantly of ethnic Macedonian origin.11 Even so, the law was adopted by an absolute majority in Parliament, since 88 out of 120 MPs (ethnic Macedonian) voted for the new law. The dissatisfaction of a part of the Albanian population in Macedonia with this symbol of the state still persists. According to the Survey (2011), 54 per cent of the Albanians in Macedonia do not approve of the national anthem. Yet an even greater political and societal point of contention is the national anthem of Montenegro, adopted through the same legislation. The current Montenegrin national anthem is ‘Oh, the bright dawn of May’, with lyrics as presented in Table 5.1. Although the current version of the anthem refers predominantly to the country’s territory, the ethnic/national divisions that have fractured Montenegro’s citizenship make its lyrics one of the most contested political issues in Montenegro. The reason for this is that two last strophe of the text of Montenegro’s national anthem, ‘Oh, the bright dawn of May’, were rewritten by Sekula Drljević – the interwar leader of a Montenegrin nationalist movement affiliated with fascism and Italy. The rewritten anthem did not include references to Montenegrins as Serbs, contained in the verses ‘[Montenegro] you are the only one that stands for freedom/to the Serb people’ (Markuš 2007, 103).12 In addition, in the context of the pluriethnic environment in Montenegro, the anthem excluded the verses referring to the historically contested slaughter of the citizens of Montenegro who converted in Islam in the seventeenth century.13 The contestation of the anthem in the parliament of Montenegro resulted in the failure of the ethnic Serb parties to recognize the anthem, or to stand up when it is played, which is a common practice. For example, one of the parliamentarians of the ethnic Serb party Nova stated: We never accepted that anthem and we will not stand up. The reason is known: the author of the anthem’s verses is the war criminal Sekula Drljević, and thus it [the anthem] is not accepted by the majority of citizens, from anti-fascists to Serbs, in whose spite the anthem – as it is – has been adopted (Prelević 2010). 11 Goce Delchev, Dame Gruev and Pitu Guli were leaders of the historical Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (see Chapter 3 for details). 12 Author’s translation. 13 The deleted verses read ‘Since the Christmas Eve/Has purified our faith/Among us, peasants/No infidels remained’ (author’s translation). The slaughter of Montenegrins who converted to Islam has been described in the epic ‘The Mountain Wreath’, written by prince-bishop Petar II Petrović Njegoš. The piece is nowadays considered a major literary work in Montenegro.

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Moreover, the anthem appeared to be also contentious for the ruling DPS, as some of this party’s members, including the President of Montenegro – Filip Vujanović – objected to the two underlying verses of the anthem as controversial and related to fascism (Danas 2011). As a consequence of this division among the citizens of Montenegro, the national anthem is supported by 89 per cent of the ethnic Montenegrins, 94 per cent of the ethnic Bosniaks/Muslims and by mere 41 per cent of the ethnic Serbs (Survey 2011). The greater support of those who identify as Bosniak/Muslim to the symbols of the state is the outcome of the ruling party’s rhetoric of inclusiveness after 1998. In the case of the anthem, the DPS sought to eliminate negative symbolic references that this ethnic community might find adverse. By contrast, the quest for independence, accompanied by the Montenegrin nation-building project, implied the distancing from Serbia and clearly differentiating elements of the Montenegrin from the Serb ethnic identity, which has not been the case in the early 1990s. Symbols, Space and Fractured Citizenship: Skopje 2014 The question of who constitutes the nation is the core issue in the challenged and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav states. Monuments, rituals, and traditions help the people to relate to the nation as a community of sentiment (Hobsbawm 1983). While rituals and traditions reproduce the national ties across time, monuments occupy space and represent objects that people associate with national histories. Marking the territory with the symbols and monuments of one or more ethnic communities becomes essential for the identification of the people living therein (Herb and Kaplan 1999). Consequently, the physical reconstruction of space for the purpose of nation-building has a deep impact on citizenship. On the one hand, if the symbolic marking of territory takes into account the balance between the different ethnic groups, it can be beneficial for creating a sense among the people of belonging to the community of citizens. On the other hand, if it represents a single ethnic group’s aspiration to mark the territory with its symbols in order to reinforce its dominance in the state, it will lead to fractured citizenship. Perhaps the best example of the practice of reconstructing the nation in the post-Yugoslav space is the Macedonian antiquization process, described in Chapter 4. The antiquization process seeks to reinforce the national identity of ethnic Macedonians and relate it to the heritage of Alexander the Great through the erection of monuments and the physical reconstruction of space (Vangeli 2011a). An important part of that process is the Skopje 2014 project financed by the Macedonian government in order to recreate the outlook of the country’s capital. To that end, from 2010 to 2014, over 40 monuments were erected and two dozens of buildings constructed through Skopje 2014. Risteski and Kodra Hysa (2014, 198) note that ‘[t]he aim of the Skopje 2014 project and the monuments that are almost entirely dedicated to the Macedonian ethnic history, as well as of all the other public institution buildings, is to underline

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exclusively the “Macedonian ethnic character” and to glorify and celebrate the Macedonian past’. As such, the project has drawn significant symbolic and geographic boundaries between the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic communities. According to Marušić (2010, web), at the start of the project ‘[n]early all ethnic Albanian leaders in the country deemed the project to be discriminatory towards ethnic Albanians in the country, as it only profiled heroes from the ethnic Macedonian majority’. The leaders the ethnic Albanian community protested due to the lack of their national heroes in the project. Subsequently, the ruling VMRO met with their Albanian coalition partners and agreed on the introduction of Albanian monuments in the project, to reflect the ‘multi-ethnic’ character of the country. According to Risteski and Kodra Hysa (2014, 199) such a mixture of Macedonian and Albanian nationalisms is a ‘part of the process of designing the structure and character of the contemporary Macedonian nation and state’. However, contrary to these authors’ claim, the inclusion of both Albanian and Macedonian symbols in Skopje 2014 does not help to ‘achieve greater consistency’ (Risteski and Kodra Hysa 2014, 199). Rather, the very way in which the two groups appropriated the physical space of Skopje reinforces the fracturing of citizenship along ethnonational lines. In terms of spatial distribution, the majority of monuments representing ethnic Albanian heroes are concentrated on the side of the Vardar River predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians. While on the one hand, the erection of the underlying monuments does reflect an attempt to reach out to the Albanian community, on the other hand it equally draws not only symbolic but geographical boundaries between the two communities. That is, the Macedonian monuments occupy the space predominantly inhabited by ethnic Macedonians (and some areas inhabited by ethnic Albanians, which could be interpreted as markers of territory); the Albanian monuments are largely concentrated in the Albanian inhabited areas. This clear division of physical space reduces the transcendence of ethnic lines, and also divides the public opinion on the Skopje 2014 project. In fact, 63 per cent of ethnic Macedonians believe that the ‘project Skopje 2014 will present the history and historical figures of Macedonia correctly’, as opposed to the 17 per cent of ethnic Albanians. In addition to this, 58 per cent of ethnic Albanians believe that the ‘project Skopje 2014 harms the multi-ethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians and other ethnic communities’ (Survey 2011). The creation or the spread of narratives pertaining mostly to one ethnonational community in a pluriethnic country has an adverse effect on citizenship. Rather than collapsing the ethnonational lines within the state, such narratives reinforce the differences between communities. They perpetuate the feeling of being distanced from the state within the non-dominant community. In Macedonia, this has the effect of alienating the minority Albanian community, which accounts to about 20 per cent of the state’s population. The most manifest consequence of this is the perception of the Albanian community that they are second class citizens in Macedonia, as has commonly been emphasized in the statements of Albanian politicians and leadership (Witherspoon 2012, web). In turn, such a perception

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is closely related to citizenship rights of this ethnic group, in particular equitable representation guaranteed by the OFA. As recent studies of minority rights in have revealed, although the OFA has somewhat improved the situation of the Albanian community in Macedonia, its implementation has been far from perfect (Lyon 2012; Kacarska 2012b). Combined with the clear symbolic appropriation of space and the dissatisfaction with the distribution and implementation of the rights of citizenship it is likely to cause further grievances and reinforce the fracturing of citizenship along ethnic lines in Macedonia. Symbolic Potential for Unity: Bosnian Bridges and Sports Events Most of the symbols of the state or the nation, which have been adopted by either domestic political elites or imposed by the international community, have had a divisive effect on citizenship in the post-Yugoslav states. However, the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s non-political symbols indicates that this country’s three communities can equally relate to those aspects of the state and the nation for as long as they have not been polluted by the competing agendas of ethnic political elites. Interestingly, the results of the Survey (2011) indicate that when asked about the possible common symbols for all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of respondents from all three ethnonational groups identified two bridges – the bridge over the Drina River in Višegrad and the Mostar Bridge. Constructed in the fifteenth century, the bridge over the Drina River in Višegrad has been featured as the main character in The Bridge over Drina, the major novel of the Nobel Prize winning author from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ivo Andrić. The Mostar Bridge connects two parts of the city divided by the Neretva River. It was destroyed by the Croat forces during the Bosnian war and reconstructed in 2004. The perception of bridges as a symbol of all the citizens of Bosnia carries a deep emblematic meaning. On the one hand, they do not carry a manifestly ethnic or state-centric meaning, as anthropomorphist monuments often do. On the other hand, they represent links between territories and thus different ethnicities who inhabit those territories. This perception of the non-ethnic symbols as the possible unison for the citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been reflected in several other questions in the Survey (2011). The absolute majority of all three ethnic communities in this country responded that sports games are the ‘pan-Bosnian events’ they would identify the most with, while sports clubs are ‘secular institutions or persons … that play a major positive role for safeguarding Bosnia-Herzegovina as one country’ (Survey 2011). In the context of the fractured citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sport is more than a reflection of a physical contest. It becomes a manifestation of the unified elements of society, as is a common feature of states with a well-defined national identity (Allison 2000; Bairner 2003). By attending and supporting

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different sport events, people reinforce the identity dimension of citizenship. Supporting a sport team emphasizes an individual’s link to his or her polity, be it a city, a sub-state entity or a country. In particular, it should be stressed that in cases of new and unconsolidated countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, sport has a twofold function. First, at the domestic level it creates a sense of belonging to the community of the state, which in the case of most Bosnian citizens does not coincide with the individuals’ ethnic/national identity. Second, at the international level, sport events reinforce 1) the differentiation of the identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina from other competitors 2) the unity of community internally, which is achieved through the support for the competitors from Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of their ethnic background 3) the sense of national success at the international arena, which is domestically seen as a trade-off for poor political and economic performance. Hence for as long as international sports events are not seen as a catalyst for a particular ethnic community of Bosnia and Herzegovina to assert its dominance, they have the potential to be a powerful unifying symbol. Fractures: a Barrier to Practising Citizenship? All three countries examined in this book are states with deep ethnic cleavages. As explained in Chapter 4, these ethnic cleavages are key for the enjoyment of the rights of citizenship, even though membership is regulated through non-ethnic models. In other words, we cannot speak about ethnic citizenship regimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, or Montenegro because legislation defines citizenship as the link between the individual and the state. These countries’ laws do not grant preferential access to the status of citizenship to any ethnic group. However, the practices of citizenship reveal unevenness in the way group rights are distributed. In turn, this causes the reinforcement of ethnic cleavages and further fractures citizenship along ethnic lines. These fractures are therefore a major barrier to the achievement of ‘postethnic citizenship’ in terms of practicing citizenship beyond the kinship group. This issue is most manifest in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose citizenship is fragmented at the legal level (federal and entity), at the political level (ethnic communities), and at the level of society (loyalty to kinship communities).14 In this context, the state citizenship features as a meta-citizenship, a symbolic dimension denoting the existence of an independent state, mostly in the eyes of the international community. It provides those individuals who are linked with the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the possibility to be legally recognized beyond the borders of their state of origin. Simultaneously, the entity citizenships enable individuals not only to exercise their citizenship rights but also to a large degree to emulate ethnic and religious identities, in particular in the case of the ethnocentric citizenship of the Republika Srpska. The repercussions of such a 14 Interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (1), Sarajevo, 20 May 2011.

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fractured citizenship regime on the participatory and symbolic layers of citizenship are very significant. Touquet and Vermeersch (2008) partly explained this problem by arguing that ethnic elites hamper civic activity that transcends the borders of ethnonational communities. Hence the practices of citizenship in Bosnia remain at the level of ethnic communities, despite the existence of opportunities for citizens to cross the boundaries of citizenship. In her study of the postethnic mobilization in the Republika Srpska, Touquet (2012) paid particular attention to this issue, by using Tarrow’s (2002) paradigm for assessing mobilization and participation in centralized and decentralized states. According to this model, ‘centralized states with effective policy instruments at their command attract collective actors to the summit of the political system, whereas decentralized states provide a multitude of targets at the base … Federalism is a particular invitation to movements to shift their venues into institutions, because it provides so many pockets for participation’ (Tarrow 2002, 81). Following Kriesi (2007), Touquet maintains that decentralized systems open more opportunities for political participation than the centralized ones, due to the existence of ‘multiple access points for challengers’ (Touquet 2012, 208), while centralized states restrain such participation due to their ‘effective policy instruments’ (Touquet 2012, 209). She looked at the opportunities for political activism that crosses ethnic boundaries in the Republika Srpska, which is considered a centralized nationalizing unit for the purposes of her analysis. While Touquet maintains that postethnic activism is more likely in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina than in the Republika Srpska, due to the existence of more access points in the former, her analysis reinforces the intuitive observations regarding the nature of citizenship practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is, fractures along ethnic lines in this country are so strong that even though Bosnia and Herzegovina is a loose confederal state, offering ample access points (even more so than the Federation of BiH as its constituent part), there is scarce postethnic activism at the state level. Some aspects of the above dynamics are also visible in Macedonia and Montenegro. As Spaskovska (2012) notes, citizenship in Macedonia is also fractured along ethnonational lines, although slightly less so than in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fragmentation is not only due to the consociational nature of the state after the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but also due to the relationship of the two dominant ethnic communities – Macedonian and Albanian – towards the state. The Ohrid Framework Agreement has induced a constitutional shift towards a state that is not defined in ethnic terms. However, it has also reinforced two parallel internal nationalisms: one of the dominant Macedonian population, and the other of the minority Albanian one. As Berg and van Meurs (2002, 51) argue: [t]he ideology that nation and state must coincide has led multicultural states to engage in the construction of a single nation and the assimilation of the minority groups within their borders into the culture of the politically dominant group.

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro Conversely, it has led minorities to defend their separate identity by seeking political control over their own affairs.

Indeed, the nationalizing policies of the Macedonian government in the post 2001 period have contributed to reinforcing of both Macedonian and Albanian nationalisms. In an ethnographic study, Neofotistos (2004) explored how the two groups perceive each other. On the grounds of intensive fieldwork and interviews with members of both the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic communities, he noted sharp differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Both ethnic communities viewed the other in very negative terms, such as dirty (prljavi), smelly (mirisaat), stupid (glupavi), wild (divi/divjaci), left in the past (zaostanati vo minatoto), or without good soul (pa shpirt të mire), backwards (te prapambetura), two-faced (dyfytyre)’ (Neofotistos 2004, 49–51). These negative attitudes of the two communities have been strengthened by the perceptions of threat to the Macedonian ethnic community by the Albanian one. Equally, the Albanian community believes that, within Macedonia, Albanians are treated with lack of due respect.15 Such perceptions of the two communities have led to a series of incidents which included violent confrontation between the two ethnic communities in public places, such as schools and public transportation in 2012.16 The reinforcement of negative attitudes among people by the competing Albanian and Macedonian nationalisms further fractures this country’s citizenship regime. It locates citizenship activities with groups, which coexist in a society detached and mistrustful of the other. Distance towards other groups and mistrust are also characteristic of the Montenegrin politics. However, this country’s ethnic divisions are different from the ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In the other two cases examined in this book, ethnic lines between groups have been stable for decades, and have hardened with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. For instance, unlike in the case of Macedonia, the boundaries of ethnic communities in Montenegro are far less fixed than those between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, distinguished through language, religion and culture. Rather, fractured citizenship in Montenegro is a product of the internal division between those who consider themselves ethnic ‘Montenegrins’ and ‘Serbs’. As noted by Džankić (2014) and Jenne and Bieber (2014), group boundaries in Montenegro have been instable in the last two decades, and the meaning and the contents of the ‘Montenegrin’ and ‘Serb’ identities have changed significantly since the Yugoslav break-up. These identity shifts have been underpinned by the question of whether Montenegrins were a separate nation, or a subgroup of Serbs. The question of ethnic identities intensified after Milošević’s departure from power in Serbia, when the question of whether Montenegro should stay in the common state with Serbia or not became the main political issue. As highlighted by the interlocutors for this book, with the 2006 independence of 15 Interview with Macedonian political analyst and scholar, Skopje, 7 June 2011. 16 For examples of incidents see: Novosti, 12 March 2012; BH Dani, 23 January 2013.

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Montenegro, the division over statehood was formally resolved, but the debate over the ethnonational identity of the people of Montenegro persists.17 In particular, the question of whether Montenegrin is an ethnic or a political identity has had important consequences for how different communities understand their links with the state. As noted by Džankić (2014), as a consequence of the division over statehood and identity, the Serb identity in Montenegro became characterized by ethnoreligious exclusiveness. It included Montenegrins as a subgroup of Serbs, but obviously excluded minorities such as Albanians, Bosniaks, and Croats. By contrast, the Montenegrin identity became a function of Montenegro’s independence in that it excluded ethnic Serbs, but included minorities. The appeal to minorities was crucial in the quest for Montenegrin independence, and has caused the ‘instrumentalization of minorities’ by the proindependence camp (Bieber 2003). This approach to minorities was pivotal for the pro-independence victories in the parliamentary elections of 1998, 2001, 2002 and the referendum on independence in 2006. In addition, Montenegrin government owed much of the support of the international community to its rhetoric on inclusion of minorities (Clinton 1999, 781). Hence, what became Montenegrin identity – as promoted by Đukanović’s camp – came to epitomize an umbrella concept of multiculturalism. It is, however, important to stress that the notion of multiculturalism, framed by tolerance for the minorities’ differences rather than the true acceptance of diversity, emanated the need of the pro-independence camp to retain the votes of minorities. The consequence of this fluidity of ethnic boundaries and different construction of the Montenegrin state has caused a fracturing of citizenship that is somewhat different than those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. As we have seen in the previous sections, ethnonational groups that were considered minorities in the pre-referendum period, and that were included in the pro-independence camp (Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats and Muslims) show a greater degree of loyalty to the state than the ethnic Serbs. These groups identify with the Montenegrin state and the symbolic dimensions of its citizenship as much as those who identify as ethic Montenegrins (Survey 2011). By contrast, those who identify as Serbs in Montenegro challenge many of the symbolic aspects of the state. This implies that non-dominant ethnic communities become an essential part of a country’s citizenship, for as long as they are included in the construction of the state. If such groups challenge the basic conception of the state, they will equally fracture citizenship practices along ethnonational lines. In such cases, postethnic activism and postethnic citizenship as a manifestation of such an activism will materialize only in exceptional circumstances.

17 Interview with representative of civil society and public policy analyst in Montenegro, Podgorica, June 2011; Interview with think tank representative, and public policy analyst in Montenegro, Podgorica, June 2011.

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Brief Moments of Postethnic Citizenship: Three Snapshots Despite the sharp polarization of societies in the three countries examined in this book, each of them experienced a short-lived disturbance of citizenship fractures. Although a deeper analysis of these events transcends the scope of this book, on a few occasions outlined below, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro united around a common cause. Although the causes and the purposes of these events differed, people openly crossed the ethnic boundaries otherwise present in their everyday lives. However, in each of the cases, these moments of citizens’ solidarity grew out of single events of grief and were quickly subsumed by the ordinary ethnonational cleavages. Take 1: Bebolucija In June 2013, for over a month the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina protested in the country’s capital over the politicians’ inability to reach a decision over the unique citizens identification number (JMBG).18 This prevented newborn children from being registered, and unfortunately caused the death of a baby girl who was unable to obtain the much needed timely medical assistance beyond the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The death of an innocent child caused thousands of citizens of the country, regardless of their ethnic belonging, to come out on the streets in protest, named ‘Bebolucija’ (‘Bebolution’). Srdjan Dizdarević from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Helsinki Committee for Human Rights stated that the people protesting ‘are those who were fighting for their human rights and that there are no national connotations. This is a voice raised against an irresponsible government and there is no message other than the desire and aspiration that the government starts working’ (Deutsche Welle 2013, web). The mass gatherings continued over the following few weeks, domestic and international analysts hoped that the events surrounding ‘Bebolucija’ could transcend ethnic boundaries (Medic 2013, web). Bosnian academic Mujkić (in Sekulić 2014, 10) noted that the protests showed that ‘the malfunctioning of the ethnonationalist system happened’. However, by early July, the protests, which attracted low support from the political and intellectual elites as well as from international actors, faded away. Take 2: ‘No Police Brutality’ In 2011 in Macedonia, there was also brief moment of citizens’ solidarity. During the parliamentary elections in Macedonia in 2011, a tragic event sparked nonviolent protests by youth of all ethnic communities in the most southern postYugoslav state. On 5 June 2011, the day after the VMRO-DPMNE’s celebrations of the electoral victory, a man 22 years of age was found dead in the centre of Skopje. 18 Jedinstveni matični broj građana (unique master citizen number).

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As the subsequent investigations have revealed, the man was a victim of police brutality, which proved to be a catalyst for a ‘moment’ of postethnic citizenship in Macedonia. They motivated a series of protests against police brutality, which involved activism and calls through social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, as a result of people’s mistrust in mainstream media. According to Panov (2011, web), however, within a month from the start of the protests ‘the question of their final reach has been raised’. Even if these protests have been different in terms of their aims and substance to those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they showed discontent with the state’s actions by gathering different ethnic communities. In the case of Bosnian protests, individuals raised their voices against the inability of the ethnic elites to reach a decision, causing a paralysis of the state’s institutions. In the Macedonian ones, the dominant political group abused the state’s basic power (legitimate use of force), causing discontent that crossed ethnic boundaries. Yet in both cases, protests were short-lived and quickly substituted by ethnic fractures. Take 3: United in Grief In the case of Montenegro, the crossing of ethnonational lines did not take the shape of a protest against an action of the state. As highlighted in an interview for this research, protests against the state are rare in Montenegro. The interviewee explained this by the small size of the country and the dominance of the DPS over the country’s institutions and the fear of people that they would suffer adverse consequences by protesting (such as they or members of their family will lose their jobs).19 Hence, a brief disturbance of the fracturing of citizenship along ethnic/ national lines in Montenegro occurred in relation to a tragic event in mid 2013. On 23 June 2013, a bus of Romanian tourists crashed in the Morača canyon causing 18 deaths and leaving 28 injured (Portal Analitika 2013, web). Similar to the case of a train crash in 2002, the citizens of Montenegro regardless of their ethnic belonging united in their condolences to the families of the deceased and in their desire to help the survivors (by donating blood, for example). This moment of citizens’ unity, however, lasted only during the immediate period of grief, and it was shortly superseded by the common fractures along ethnonational lines. Conclusions As the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2 of this book suggests, understanding a citizenship regime of a country does not merely assume the analysis of the politics of citizenship policy. Rather, the way in which the individuals perceive their state, and how they relate to it at a symbolic level, is an essential ingredient of contemporary citizenship. The analysis in this chapter has shown that not only are the citizenship policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and 19 Interview with NGO representative, Podgorica, June 2011.

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Montenegro ‘ethnified’, but also, societies of these states operate within clearly demarcated ethnonational spaces. This leaves little, if any, room for the blurring of ethnic lines and the creation of postethnic citizenship. Going beyond the fractured citizenship and creating moments of unity in these challenged and unconsolidated states in the Western Balkans is an exception, rather than a rule. Bosnia and Herzegovina is perhaps the best example of the inability of a society to transcend ethnonational lines in the pursuit of postethnic citizenship. The constitutional and institutional structures of the state created as barriers to potential violent conflict appear to have erected equally high walls between Bosnia and Herzegovina’s three constituent communities. In addition to this, they have established a wall between the three communities and other citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as exemplified by the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina judgment of the ECtHR. The outcome of such a dynamic between the state and its citizens has been reflected in the results of the Survey (2011). Clearly, for the majority of the people inhabiting Bosnia and Herzegovina the citizenship of this country, including its symbolic aspects, fades away in comparison to their ethnic and thus entity belonging. This can be attributed to two factors. First, the three competing nationalisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the relatively recent conflict encapsulate the individuals into their ethnic communities. Second, due to its post-conflict arrangement, the state is unable to guarantee an equal distribution of citizenship rights. Rather this distribution is conferred upon entities, and often based on ethnic belonging. As a consequence, individuals are more prone to establishing symbolic links with their communities of sentiment, and not with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Competing nationalisms also characterize the Macedonian citizenship regime as well. In addition to this, the institutionalization of ethnic divisions through the OFA further fragments this country’s citizenship. Analysis shows that in the post-OFA period, ethnic boundaries between two groups have been anything but blurred. By contrast, the antiquization process, undertaken by the current VMROled government reinforces Macedonian ethnicity, while devoting very little space to the country’s minorities. As a consequence of being excluded from the ethnocentric project of the nationalizing state, the country’s Albanian population does not align itself to the symbolic and ideational layers of the Macedonian citizenship. Rather, the loyalty of the Macedonian Albanians is to their community of kinship. Still, looking at the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, one could erroneously conclude that the post-conflict power-sharing agreements result in citizenship fractured along ethnic lines. While this may partly be true, the fracturing of citizenship is also highly pronounced in Montenegro, which is a unitary state that has not experienced a violent conflict on its territory. The debate over the statehood and identity has resulted in sharpening of ethnonational categories, particularly between those who identify themselves as Montenegrins and Serbs. As a consequence of the political processes explained in Chapters 2 and 3, for the Serb community in Montenegro it is very difficult to identify

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with the Montenegrin state and the symbols of its citizenship. This is a strong indication that the ethnic communities and their leadership influence the ruptures in the citizenship regimes at least as much as the constitutional and institutional structures of states.

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Chapter 6

Dual Citizenship in Challenged and Unconsolidated States Being an expression of the state’s identity, citizenship is shaped by a wider environment which also includes the neighbouring countries, or kin-states of minority peoples. In line with the analytical grid used in this book, this chapter analyses effects of regional factors on the reconstruction of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. This is best accomplished by looking at dual citizenship policies, which have the question of loyalty at their core. The issue of loyalty is particularly salient in countries that are contested at the level of statehood and/or nationhood by the neighbouring states. The state’s approach to dual citizenship is a reflection of how this state conceives its membership. Countries with stable national identities are more prone to adopting a liberal approach to dual citizenship, and extending membership to their ethnic kin. Equally, challenged and unconsolidated states are likely to have a restrictive dual citizenship policy due to fears that kin-states of minority ethnic groups would destabilize the state or challenge the nation-building project. Bosnia and its Neighbours after Dayton Given the history of interethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its unique constitutional setup, and its geographical location in between external homelands of two of its three constituent peoples, dual citizenship inevitably raises questions of individuals’ loyalty, state and nation-building. The citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina is legally restrictive regarding dual citizenship. Pursuant to the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (article 4) dual citizenship is permitted only following the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the respective country. In addition to this, articles 17 and 39 of the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina provided that an individual who acquires a citizenship of a country with which there is no bilateral dual citizenship agreement would lose his or her Bosnian citizenship by force of law. The original deadline for the conclusion of such agreements was 1 January 2003. Given the large number of people originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina who had fled this country during the war, this provision implied that many of them would lose their citizenship of origin since at the time no dual citizenship agreements had been concluded. Consequently, in December 2002, the then High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, extended the deadline

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for the conclusion of dual citizenship agreements for ten years, until 1 January 2013. Even during this period, Bosnia and Herzegovina had concluded only three such agreements – with Sweden, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (legally succeeded by Serbia), and in 2011 after almost five years of negotiations and debates – with Croatia. In September 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the articles 17 and 39 of the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina related to the loss of Bosnian citizenship following an individual’s acquisition of a citizenship of another country unconstitutional. Following the July 2013 amendments of the citizenship legislation, Bosnia and Herzegovina has moved towards a greater legal tolerance of dual citizenship. In practice, this tolerance was already implemented largely due to the inexistence of mechanisms that would help to determine whether an individual from Bosnia and Herzegovina had naturalized in a state which does not require him or her to obtain release from the citizenship of origin. The majority of such cases have occurred among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, which evoked a series of political debates,1 and eventually led to changing this country’s Law on Citizenship in mid 2013. Therefore, in order to understand the effects of the neighbouring countries on the citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we need to take into account three important issues. First, Serbia and Croatia are kin-states to two of this country’s constituent peoples, which is a matter that touches upon the core of the issue of sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As pointed out by Guzina (2007, 226), the Dayton constitution stipulates that ‘the rightful owners of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, in apparently descending order, [are] members of the constituent nations, others (read, national minorities) and citizens. In this view, despite all the constitutional references to the full recognition of human rights, a ‘citizen’ emerges in a residual category which is of less significance than the national group to which such a person belongs’. In this context, the nation-building projects of Serbia and Croatia and their respective citizenship regimes, both of which are based on the dominance of ethnic elements and thus foster the inclusion of the ethnic kin outside these countries, reinforce the ethnic divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is, the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina have the opportunity to become citizens of their kin-states, which emphasizes their belonging to the ethnonational communities rather than to the community of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Second, at the time of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, both Serbia (as a part of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY) and Croatia had been involved in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to interviews for this research, this fact has also symbolically been reflected in the political debates regarding dual citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina.2 Third, a further consequence of the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the large number of people from this country who had sought refuge in the neighbouring 1 Interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (1), Sarajevo, 20 May 2011. 2 Interview with professor of political science, Sarajevo, 19 May 2011; interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (3), Sarajevo, 20 May 2011.

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countries during the war. In the cases of Bosnia Croats and Serbs, this relocation was usually to the kin-state of their ethnic group – Croatia for Croats, and Serbia or Montenegro (both part of the FRY at that time) for the ethnic Serbs. The matters of the status of these people, some of whom returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while others opted to remain in their destination countries, is yet another significant issue in the debates surrounding dual citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a dual citizenship agreement with Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. According to Sarajlić (2010a, 19), this agreement aimed not only at regulating the matters of status of the ‘ethnic Serbs who might have acquired Serbian citizenship as refugees from parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by the Bosnian Army or the Croat forces’, but also to ‘ethnic Muslims from the Sandžak area who migrated to Bosnia and Herzegovina’ who sought to avoid being drafted in the Yugoslav army during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration. After the disintegration of the common state of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, Serbia became the legal successor to the common state, thus inheriting the dual citizenship agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, the question over the validity of this agreement sparked an intense political debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007, following the ruling of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on genocide. In February 2007, the ICTY ruled that genocide had occurred in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica in July 1995, but that the Serbian state under the lead of Slobodan Milošević, could not be held responsible for the actions of the Bosnian Serb army and paramilitaries that executed 8,000 Muslim men in Bosnia, although the then FRY provided the Bosnian Serbs with political and military support at the time. The same ruling stipulated however that Serbia should be held responsible for not fulfilling its obligations under the Genocide Convention to prevent the crime from happening and for punishing the perpetrators (ICTY 2007, case No. 91). Shortly following the ruling a part of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the then Foreign Minister of the country – Sven Alkalaj – challenged the validity of the dual citizenship agreement. According to Gluščević (2007, web), the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Serbian authorities that the ‘bilateral agreement on dual citizenship signed in 2002 with the then FRY, succeeded by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, did not remain in force following Montenegro’s independence.’ Hence, Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained that no dual citizenship agreement was in force with Serbia, while the latter did not share this view. In response, Serbia sent an official note to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the receipt of the note on the challenged validity of the agreement had no legal grounds and that the underlying note does not annul the agreement. Following the internal debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereby many political parties and non-governmental organizations challenged the Foreign Minister’s note claiming that it caused regional tensions, the dual citizenship agreement with Serbia remained in force, although the then Bosniak member of the country’s Presidency Haris Silajdžić considered it ‘the continuation of the genocide’ (Gluščević 2007, web).

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The practical implications of the dual citizenship agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia need to be considered at two levels – the individuals’ access to rights, and the symbolic affiliation of the Serbs in Bosnia with Serbia as their kin-state. Although official statistics are unavailable at present (Sarajlić 2010a), the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina mostly access Serbian citizenship in order to be able to enter this state’s market. Pursuant to the Agreement on the Special Parallel Relations between Serbia and the Republika Srpska (1997), the citizens of this entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina have the same treatment as Serbian nationals for pursuing education in Serbia. Moreover, special arrangements of the Serbian government have allowed the students from Republika Srpska to obtain bursaries covering their tuition, the right to student room and board, which significantly lowers the costs of studying in Serbia from the students from this entity. In the context of the labour market, these citizens are equalized with legal aliens in Serbia, implying that they are subject to obtaining working permits prior to taking up employment (Pavlov, Predojević-Despić and Petronijević 2013). As a consequence, some of the Serbs from Bosnia take up the citizenship of Serbia in order to enhance their opportunities on the job market and gain access to rights that they would not have as legal aliens. However, the more significant aspect of this agreement is its symbolic power for reinforcing the links of the Bosnian Serbs with Serbia. Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia has an ethnocentric citizenship regime, and facilitates naturalization on ethnic grounds to the ‘Serbs from the region’ (Rava 2010; Vasiljević 2011). As of December 2012 Serbia has completely abolished the naturalization fees (at the time amounting to 203 euros, or slightly under a half of the average monthly salary in Bosnia and Herzegovina)3 for the individuals from the region who sought Serbian citizenship. The decision of the Serbian government applies to the individuals seeking naturalization in Serbia and originating from any of the post-Yugoslav states, Romania, Hungary and Albania, which can be seen as a mechanism of projecting the Serbian influence as the kin-state on the minorities living in these countries. The president of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik praised the decision of the Serbian government ‘having in mind the socioeconomic circumstances and the fact that mostly multi-member families seek citizenship’ (RTS 2012, web). This decision of the Serbian government is of particular significance for reinforcing the ethnic aspects of identity of the Serb citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (particularly the ones in the Republika Srpska), whose link with their kin-state will thus be increasingly pronounced. It can reinforce the already deeply rooted ethnic character of this entity. That is, following their naturalization in Serbia, the individuals’ loyalties will likely remain vested in the ethnonational community, even if those individuals remain the citizens of Bosnia

3 Calculated on grounds of the data for 2012 of the Statistical Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bilten 2013, 137). The average monthly salary for 2013 in Bosnia and Herzegovina amounted to 830 KM, or 423 euros.

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and Herzegovina because they will perceive their kin-state as the state that grants them opportunities and additional rights. Neighbouring Croatia, which has an ethnic citizenship regime, has had a similar effect on the citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Law on Croatian Citizenship provides the possibility to ethnic Croats residing outside of Croatia to acquire this country’s citizenship. Pursuant to article 16 of the Law, ‘the belonging to the Croatian people is determined on grounds of previous declaration of such belonging in legal affairs, declaration of such belonging in certain public documents, protection of rights and the advancement of interest of the Croatian people and active participation in Croatian cultural, scientific, and sports associations abroad’. According to Koska (2011, 18), unlike the foreign citizens seeking naturalization in Croatia, ethnic Croats are allowed to hold multiple nationalities, as their belonging to the Croatian ethnic community is perceived as a guarantee of loyalty to the state. Having in mind that Croatia is a kin-state to approximately 16 per cent of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the impact of this neighbouring country on the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina is very important. Sarajlić (2010a, 19) notes that, in addition to the 16 per cent of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who are ethnic Croats, a significant number of non-Croats have also taken the option of obtaining the Croatian citizenship. Although the official numbers are unavailable, research suggests that over half a million of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hold a Croatian passport (Sarajlić 2010a). The reasons for the high naturalization in Croatia for those individuals vary from declarations of ethnic belonging, to – more commonly – rights and opportunities provided to them as holders of a Croatian passport such as free education, social rights, and access to the job market in Croatia. In addition to this, two further factors have contributed to the high number of acquisitions of Croatian citizenship by the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, unlike the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the citizens of Croatia were not included in the EU’s Council Directive 2002/90/EC, which listed the third country nationals who must be in possession of a visa when crossing an external Schengen border. That is, those citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who possessed a Croatian passport could enjoy the benefits of visa-free travel to the Schengen zone. Second, while the EU integration timeline of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still unclear, Croatia became the EU’s 28th Member State in July 2013, which implies that those holding Croatian citizenship can enjoy the benefits stemming from European citizenship.4 Despite the high number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina holding Croatian citizenship, the question of dual citizenship between these two countries was complex until the ratification of the dual citizenship agreement in 2011. As already highlighted in this book, until recently the citizenship legislation of Bosnia 4 However, 13 EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, UK) have introduced restrictions on the right to work, in place until 2020.

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and Herzegovina stipulated that dual citizenship was possible only following the conclusion of a dual citizenship agreement. The dual citizenship agreement with Croatia was signed in 2007, but the then Bosniak member of the country’s Presidency Haris Silajdžić vetoed the agreement, citing the implications that the agreement would have on dual nationals with other countries, as article 17 of the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulated ex lege loss for those who voluntarily acquired nationality of another country. This put the agreement on hold for several years. As the agreement with Croatia was ratified only in late 2011, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who acquired the Croatian citizenship were in a situation of legal uncertainty. They were in breach of the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina and simultaneously at risk of being stripped from their Bosnian citizenship by force of law. However, due to the inexistence of dual citizen registries and the political implications of such a decision, the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina never resorted to this option. Similar to the case of dual citizenship with Serbia, the dual citizenship issue with Croatia also raises the questions of loyalty, particular in the context of Croatia’s accession to the EU in mid 2013. That is, given the opportunities that the Croatian citizenship can offer to them, it is likely that the dual nationals will establish a stronger link with their kin-state than with their state of origin. This fact may also reflect on the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the bargaining leverage of the ethnic Croats is likely to increase vis-à-vis Bosniaks and Serbs; a fact which may affect the dynamics of the debate on constitutional reform. Simultaneously, the strengthening of the ethnic character of the Croat and Serb communities through regional impact on the citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also likely to further cement the ethnonational divisions in this country. Macedonian Citizenship Tangled in the Neighbourly Relations The way in which citizenship regimes of neighbouring countries affect each other is also pronounced in the case of Macedonia. Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, this post-Yugoslav state has a slightly more liberal approach to dual citizenship issues. Article 2 of the 1992 Law on Macedonian Citizenship stipulates that ‘[a] national of the Republic of Macedonia may also hold citizenship of another state’, and that such an individual is under Macedonia’s jurisdiction during his or her stay in this country. In addition to this, the Law on Macedonian Citizenship does not contain a provision on the ex lege loss of citizenship following an individual’s naturalization in another state. However, the regulation of dual citizenship in Macedonia is not as liberal as the initial reading of the law may imply. Rather, pursuant to article 7(8) of the Law on Macedonian Citizenship those seeking to be naturalized are required to renounce their citizenship of origin. This is an indicator of an interesting tendency regarding Macedonia citizenship in the context of loyalty. Those who are already citizens of Macedonia are considered loyal, and their ‘outflow’ is tolerated under the national legislation. This may largely be due

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to the remittances from the diaspora, which according to a study of the Global Dialogue Foundation (GDF 2012, web) make up ‘20 per cent of the state treasury, increase the gross domestic product (GDP) by 10 per cent, and cover at least 50 per cent of the trade deficit’. The same study also considers the remittances, which come to Macedonia from Italy, Switzerland, Germany, the United States and Australia, a factor of stability in the country (GDF 2012, web). In fact, remittances are used to sustain 160,000 families in this country, which is approximately one third of the country’s population. By contrast, those seeking to be naturalized in Macedonia are required to become loyal exclusively to this country and thus to renounce their citizenship of origin. The rationale behind this request for exclusive loyalty is vested in the regional challenges to different elements of the Macedonian statehood and nationhood by Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Albania, each of which borders Macedonia. These contestations, which occur at the symbolic and political levels, have affected the regulation and practices of citizenship in this challenged and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav state. The impact of Bulgaria on Macedonia’s citizenship regime is a significant one, not the least because of its political, but also because of its symbolic implications. Engström (2002, 7) claims that although there are many challenges to the statehood and nationhood of contemporary Macedonia, ‘the Bulgarian perceptions of, and attitude towards, the Macedonian nation and territory is perhaps the most important and the Bulgarian case the most challenging one’. Following Macedonia’s declaration of independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, Bulgaria recognized this state’s sovereignty in 1992 and established diplomatic relations with it shortly thereafter. However, soon after this recognition the then Bulgarian President Zhelyo Zhelev, responding to the Greek objections to the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ stated that Bulgaria merely recognized the independence of the state, and that the Bulgarian view was that the term ‘Macedonia’ does not refer to the nation (The Independent 1992, 11). This statement hinted at the Bulgarian perspective on the Macedonian question, whereby the former does not consider Macedonia a nation separate from the Bulgarian one. As noted in earlier chapters, throughout the 1990s the conundrum over the Macedonian nationhood vis-à-vis Bulgaria was manifested mostly through the issue of language. According to Poulton (2000, 116), Bulgarians considered the Macedonian language a dialect of Bulgarian, and commonly ‘refused to employ interpreters or translators in official communications with the latter’. The tension regarding the language was resolved in 1999 by mutual recognition of the ‘Bulgarian language according to the Bulgarian constitution and Macedonian language according to the Macedonian constitution’ (Williams 2000, 29). However, other degrees of historical contestation remained, such as the ones over the identity of national heroes, claimed simultaneously by Bulgaria and Macedonia. As both the language and myths are important symbolic elements of nation-building, the identity conundrum resulted in political tensions between the two countries, because ‘what from a Bulgarian perspective is considered the protection of the Bulgarian national identity, is perceived by the Macedonians as a threat to their own

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national identity’ (Engström 2002, 7). The most obvious internal manifestation of the reaction to this perception of threat is the intensification of the nation-building project of the Macedonian government. For instance, the Skopje 2014 project includes monuments to individuals such as Goce Delchev, one of the leaders of the historical Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO–IMRO). Given that the VMRO–IMRO was a pro-Bulgarian organization, but that Delchev promoted a separate Macedonian identity, he is nowadays is claimed as a national hero both in Bulgaria and in Macedonia (Kaufman 2001). As a consequence of these conflicting views on Macedonian nationhood, Bulgaria has recently joined Greece in vetoing further progress of Macedonia in the EU accession process (Gotev 2012, web). In addition to increasing tensions with Bulgaria, these external challenges to the Macedonian nationhood, coupled with the domestic government’s response through nationalization, induce the fracturing of citizenship. As explained in the previous chapter, the nationalizing practices of the Macedonian government have an adverse effect on the country’s minorities, especially the Albanian population which feels excluded from the state which they are citizens of. Yet these symbolic and political contestations of the Macedonian nationhood have also had a rather interesting outcome in terms of citizenship. Bulgaria, which has an ethnic citizenship regime and has a liberal dual citizenship policy, makes a constitutional differentiation between ‘Bulgarians’ and ‘Bulgarian citizens’, whereby the former category reflects an ethnic (blood) belonging and the latter the civic (territorial) belonging (Smilev and Jeleva 2012). In line with this definition, naturalization in Bulgaria is facilitated for those individuals who can prove that they belong to the Bulgarian nation, in that these individuals do not need to pass the language examination and submit evidence of a criminal record. Smilov and Jileva (2012, 12) note that ‘the birth certificates of parents and grandparents, their mother tongue, membership in Bulgarian institutions such as the Bulgarian Church, schools, former Bulgarian citizenship of the parents and so on, are relevant criteria for the establishment of the ethnic origin of the applicant’. In the case of Macedonian citizens, declaring their national identity as Bulgarian suffices to obtain Bulgarian citizenship, without the requirement for permanent residence in Bulgaria, or the language examination. Most recent numbers suggest that in late 2012 over 86,000 Macedonian citizens held a Bulgarian passport (Telegraf 2013, web). While on the one hand, the issue of the Bulgarian defiance of the Macedonian national identity represents a challenge to the state and its authorities, on the other hand individuals seek to maximize their utility from this conundrum. That is, the Bulgarian passport, which requires only a formal legal plea of loyalty to the Bulgarian nation and no renunciation of the Macedonian citizenship, offers ample opportunities to its holders. It provides free travel to more countries than the Macedonian passport, as well as entry to the EU labour market and the benefits of European citizenship. In turn, the access to the European labour market yields remittances, which support the Macedonian state. This explains the rationale behind the Macedonian approach to dual citizenship, which is tolerated for those

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who are already Macedonian citizens, while prospective applicants are required to obtain release from their citizenship of origin. The citizenship issues in Macedonia also exist in the context of its postYugoslav neighbours, but are not as pronounced as in the case of Bulgaria. Serbia contests the religious elements of the Macedonian national identity, which is reflected in the regulation and practices of citizenship in Macedonia. That is, the Serbian Orthodox Church contests the Macedonian Orthodox Church. In this way, the Serbian Orthodox Church indirectly questions the existence of a separate Macedonian nation, since Orthodox Churches are national. In addition to this, Drezov (2001, 53) maintains ‘that throughout the ages the Macedonian Slavs were devoid of any particular ethnic characteristics, and always represented a part of “une masse flottante” that stretched between “true” Serbs and “true” Bulgarians’. The consequence of this contestation has been the delayed recognition of Macedonian statehood by the FRY until 1996. The FRY at the time was under Milošević’s rule underpinned by the nationalist elites (Engström 2002), which has affected the diplomatic relations between these two states until the ouster of Milošević in Serbia. In the context of citizenship regimes, this contestation has effects that somewhat resemble the Bulgarian ones. Similar to Bulgaria, Serbia also operates an ethnic citizenship policy, and facilitates naturalization to the Serbs from the region not only by waiving naturalization criteria such as residence and language, but also by abolishing all taxes and fees for naturalization. However, even with lack of official data, it is assumed that the number of Macedonian citizens naturalizing in Serbia is much lower than that in the neighbouring Bulgaria (Večernje Novosti 2012, web). This can be explained by two factors. On the one hand, the benefits of Serbian citizenship do not exceed those of Macedonia, as is the case with the Bulgarian citizenship. Similar to Macedonia, Serbia is also in the line of accession to the EU, and has almost identical visa restrictions to Macedonia, which reduces individual’s motivation to acquire Serbian citizenship. On the other hand, the Serbian contestation of the Macedonian identity through religious elements has a lower impact on Macedonian citizenship than the Bulgarian one. That is, neither the differentiation in religious terms nor the religious association of Macedonia with symbols that Serbia considers its own is enshrined in the nationalizing project of the Macedonian government. Rather than emphasizing the Macedonian church, the Skopje 2014 project in fact emphasizes Eastern Orthodoxy, as exemplified by the building of churches and the erection of the cross on the Vodno Mountain above the Macedonian capital. Unlike Bulgaria and Serbia, who challenge the separateness of the Macedonian national identity, the issue with Greece is more complex, and has further fragmenting effects on the Macedonian citizenship. While initially, after the declaration of independence of Macedonia in 1991, Greece objected to the country’s name, the antiquization process of the Macedonian government has induced further defiance on behalf of Greece of the national identity of Macedonians (Vangeli 2011a). As explained in Chapter 4, Macedonia’s membership in the United Nations was delayed

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until 1993, when the compromise over the name issue with Greece was reached. In admitting Macedonia to the United Nations, the UN Security Council stipulated that ‘the State whose application is contained in document S/25147 be admitted to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State’ (United Nations Security Council Resolution 817). The conflict over the country’s name has continued to trouble the relationship of Macedonia with its southern neighbour. This conflict has manifested itself through Greek vetoes regarding the Macedonian membership in international organizations. The most notable example of such a veto, commonly mentioned in interviews for this book, has been the 2008 NATO council in Bucharest, where Greece vetoed Macedonia’s membership to the Alliance.5 In a similar fashion, the name dispute with Greece has proven to be a major issue in the progress of Macedonia’s EU candidacy bid. Macedonia has been a candidate country for EU accession since 2005, yet due to the Greek objections the opening of accession negotiations is conditioned upon reaching ‘a mutually acceptable solution’ to the name dispute (Commission of the European Communities 2009, 24). The name issue, which initially challenged the Macedonian statehood, has recently gained a dimension of contestation of the modern Macedonian national identity. The nationalizing project of the VMRO-DPMNE government, which promotes the idea of the Macedonian nationhood rooted in antiquity, included references to the Greek national symbols such as Alexander the Great and his father Phillip II. According to Vangeli (2011b, 71), many of the national and ethnic narratives of the Balkan peoples including the Serbs, Macedonians, Albanians, Egyptians, Bulgarians and the Vlachs are supported by the myth of descent from Alexander the Great. However, it is only in Macedonia that this narrative has become operationalized as the dominant mechanism of constructing national identity through antiquization. As a consequence, for the Greek authorities the relationship between the present Macedonian nationhood and the ancient Macedonian one represents a threat to this country’s cultural heritage. As a result, Greece challenges the Macedonian nationhood. Very often, the holders of foreign passports (such as the US or Australia) who declared their ethnic identity as Macedonian in their travel documents were denied entry into Greece (MINA 2011, web). In addition to this, Vangeli (2011a) highlights that as the result of such symbolic relation of the Macedonian national identity to the historical meaning of the region of Macedonia and its rulers, the VMRO-led government has in fact intensified the Greek objections to the name issue. The manifestations of this debate for the internal citizenship in Macedonia are most visible in the relations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. As explained in the previous chapter, the process of antiquization has alienated the ethnic Albanians from the nation5 Interview with Macedonian political analyst and scholar, Skopje, 7 June 2011; interview with Macedonian political analyst and civil society activist, Skopje, 7 June 2011.

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building project of the Macedonian elites. The consequence of this alienation is the deepening of ethnic divisions in this challenged post-Yugoslav state. Unlike in the cases of Bulgaria and Serbia, the dual citizenship issues between Macedonia and Greece have not been significantly affected by this contestation. Although Greece has an ethnic citizenship model and recognizes dual citizenship, the conditions for naturalization in this country are more stringent than those in the neighbouring Bulgaria. Both a Bulgarian and a Greek passport grant the individuals significant freedom of travel and access to the EU market. Yet, the acquisition of Bulgarian nationality is based on a declaration of Bulgarian ethnic identity and does not assume language proficiency or residence in Bulgaria. By contrast the Greek citizenship legislation stipulates a compulsory residence on the Greek soil of seven years, in addition to other criteria, such as the ‘adequate knowledge of the Greek language so that he or she can fulfil the obligations stemming from Greek citizenship’ (Greek Citizenship Act, article 5a). This indicates that for the Macedonian applicants, obtaining Bulgarian citizenship is far easier than Greek. In addition to the technical requirements for naturalization, the identification with Greece through naturalization is likely perceived as disloyalty to Macedonia, which is not as pronounced in the case of Bulgaria. In fact, the Greek objections to the name of the country had practical consequences in terms of the NATO and EU accession. By contrast, the Bulgarian challenges to the Macedonian national identity have been largely symbolic so far, which facilitated the decision of some citizens of Macedonia to acquire the Bulgarian passport out of convenience. Macedonia’s eastern neighbour, Albania, also exerts another significant effect on this country’s citizenship regime. Albania is the kin-state to approximately one fifth of the Macedonian population. According to Isaković (2000, 220), Albanian authorities do not pose an overt challenge to Macedonia’s statehood and nationhood. In the years immediately following the independence of Macedonia, the relationship between these two countries was strained, due to the ethnic nature of the Macedonian state to which Albania objected. The then President of Albania Sali Berisha often emphasized the need to protect the rights of the ethnic Albanians in this country, which according to Williams (2000, 28) prompted protests from the Macedonian government that ‘Albania was interfering in Macedonia’s internal affairs’. While these issues became appeased with the guarantees of rights enshrined in the Ohrid Framework Agreement, it is worth mentioning that Albania is also the kin-state to the Albanians living in Kosovo, which are often seen as the main source of Albanian nationalism in Macedonia (Engström 2002). Hence, the Albanian influence on the citizenship of Macedonia is largely symbolic, in terms of reinforcing the minority nation-building project of the Macedonian Albanians. However, the influence of Albania on the Macedonian citizenship regime also has some practical implications, again mirrored in the regulation of dual citizenship. The Albanian Citizenship Law allows dual citizenship, and provides facilitated naturalization for ethnic Albanians through the reduction of the residency criterion from five to three years (Albanian Citizenship Law, article 9). According to the Survey (2011), 11 per cent of the Macedonian Albanians stated that they have

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used the option of gaining Albanian citizenship in addition to Macedonian. In this context, the possession of the Albanian citizenship grants the individuals certain rights in Albania (such as education or healthcare). However, similar to the Serbian citizenship, it does not offer the individuals many additional opportunities such as visa-free travel or access to the EU job market. Hence for many ethnic Albanian citizens of Macedonia, the possession of the Albanian citizenship is a mechanism for asserting their ethnic identity, which may be perceived as being under threat by the dominant Macedonian nation-building project. These two factors taken in conjunction, lead to the cementing of the divisions between the ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. Montenegro’s Citizenship in the Regional Context Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the effects of the neighbouring countries on the citizenship of Montenegro are reflected in two questions: (1) that of the status of people from the former Yugoslav republics and (2) that of dual citizenship. Both of these issues have resulted from the multiple disintegrations of what used to be the Yugoslav federation, and have been catalysed through the internal political divisions over the statehood and nationhood of Montenegro. Given the instability of Montenegrin national identity, the country’s recent independence and the fragile political balances, Montenegro’s membership policy is highly inflexible. That is, the country operates a very restrictive membership (naturalization) policy, coupled by an equally rigid approach to dual citizenship. In terms of Montenegro’s strict regulation of membership, the most illustrative is the case of the people who settled in this country after fleeing the wars of the Yugoslav disintegration in the early 1990s, or the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. Their status and access to Montenegrin citizenship are still unresolved. This fact differentiates Montenegro from the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, as these two countries were not the recipient countries for such individuals. In addition to this, most of these individuals are ethnic Serbs. Their naturalization in Montenegro, a small state whose population is divided almost in two halves over the question of the Montenegrin identity, would result in the shift of ethnic, political and electoral balances. As a consequence, this issue is still a subject of major political debates between the DPS-led government and the former unionist opposition. The former refuses to grant these individuals Montenegrin citizenship, seeking to preserve these balances and thus ensure its political longevity. The latter requests that they are naturalized, as they would likely become opposition voters. In terms of legal status, the people who have fled the successor states of the former Yugoslavia during the conflicts in the early 1990s, or the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, are not covered by the scope of the definition of refugee in the Montenegrin legal system. The 2006 Law on Asylum defines a refugee as ‘an alien who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of

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race, religion, citizenship, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside of his or her country of origin and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that state, or an alien without citizenship who is outside of the country of his or her last habitual residence and unwilling, or owing to such fear, unwilling to return to the country of origin’ (article 4).6 At present, no individual holds such a status in Montenegro, and refugee status had never been applied to the citizens of the former Yugoslav republics. The most likely reason for this is the political and ethnic engineering that the ruling Montenegrin elite adhered to while supporting Milošević’s policies in the first half of the 1990s. That is, the ‘deliberate manipulation of refugees’ and their resettlement throughout the areas of the FRY (including Kosovo) with the aim of increasing the number of ethnic Serbs (Štiks 2006, 484) resulted in the present unclear status of such individuals. In post-independence Montenegro, the position of the citizens from the former Yugoslav republics is based on legal continuity of their status from the common state with Serbia. Montenegro’s avoidance of regulation of the question of membership for these individuals has created numerous ambiguities. In fact, the Decision on the Temporary Retention of the Status and Rights of Displaced and Internally Displaced Persons in the Republic of Montenegro of 20 June 2006 stipulates that: displaced persons from the former Yugoslav republics whose status was determined on the basis of the Decree on the Care of Displaced Persons (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 37/92), and internally displaced persons from Kosovo for whom status was determined by the Commissariat for Displaced Persons of the Republic of Montenegro will temporarily retain the status and rights in the Republic of Montenegro that they had on 03 June 2006 (article 1).

Three years after the adoption of the above-mentioned decision, a total of 24,019 people were registered as displaced persons and internally displaced persons (IDP)s in Montenegro (UNHCR 2010). The question of their legal status and the prospect for their admission into Montenegrin citizenship was regulated in October 2009, when the government adopted the Action Plan for the Resolution of the Status of Displaced Persons from the Former Yugoslav Republics and IDPs from Kosovo Residing in Montenegro. As a consequence of the Action Plan, the amendments and addenda to the Law on Foreigners (Official Gazette of Montenegro 72/09) enable displaced persons and IDPs to register as ‘foreigners with permanent stay’ in Montenegro, thus making them ‘denizens’ in the light of Hammar’s (1990, 15) definition of the term. The status a ‘foreigner with permanent stay’ in Montenegro would grant the displaced persons and IDPs a series of rights, including the right to employment, education and social welfare, thus improving their socioeconomic position. In addition, this provision grants them a prospect of 6 Law translated by UNHCR Representation in Montenegro.

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Montenegrin citizenship, following the expiry of the legal deadline of ten years of residence, and subject to other conditions stipulated in the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act. The major problem with the new regulations is the requirement for re-registration of those displaced persons and IDPs who do not have ‘residence’ in Montenegro, but only ‘temporary stay’. In the Montenegrin legal system, residence (prebivalište) is defined as the place of permanent stay, while the term boravište denotes temporary stay. Residence needs to be formally registered with the Ministry of Interior. The legal differences between the procedures of registering residence and temporary stay have proven to be a barrier to citizenship to a number of displaced persons and IDPs (see EUDO Case Law on Montenegro 2010). That is, persons who have lived in Montenegro ever since their departure from their state of origin (which may have dated as far back as to the early 1990s) are required to reside for another ten years in Montenegro before being able to obtain Montenegrin citizenship if they had originally registered only ‘temporary stay’ in Montenegro.7 In case these individuals had originally registered ‘residence’ in Montenegro, article 41 of the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act provides a somewhat facilitated procedure for the acquisition of citizenship. Even so, this procedure is applicable exclusively to those citizens of the former Yugoslav republics, who held ‘residence’ in Montenegro before 3 June 2006, the date on which Montenegro officially declared independence from Serbia. In cases covered by this legal provision, the individuals did not need to fulfil the ten year residence criterion (article 41, article 41a), provided that they did not have the citizenship of their state of origin and that they submitted their application for naturalization within a deadline prescribed by the law (see Džankić 2010). This provision in the Montenegrin citizenship legislation has been changed several times since the law was originally adopted in 2008, due to the pressures stemming from EU accession.8 The initial deadline was one year from the date when the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act entered into force. The 2010 amendments and addenda to this law extend the deadline to 5 May 2011, provided that the individuals have not unregistered their ‘residence’ in Montenegro (article 41a). The first 2011 addendum to this article further extended this deadline for naturalization to 31 July 2012, yet required the applicants to obtain release from their citizenship of origin (article 41b). The second 2011 addendum to the law waived the release from the dual citizenship criterion, provided that the applicants had registered residence in Montenegro for at least two years prior to the declaration of independence (3 June 2006), that they had not unregistered that residence, and that they submitted their application by 31 January 2013 (article 41v). According to the data of the Ministry of Interior (Ministry of Interior and Public Administration 01–653/2), a total of 2,579 people submitted new applications, and a further 2,535 people whose admission to Montenegrin citizenship was on 7 Interview with civil society representative from Montenegro (2), Podgorica, 9 May 2011. 8 See Chapter 7 for further details.

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hold due to their dual citizenship submitted the written statement declaring that they accept the rights and duties of Montenegrin citizenship. Hence, a total of 5,114 people were admitted into Montenegrin citizenship on grounds of article 41v. Considering that the provision was applied from 24 September 2011 to 31 January 2012, article 41v induced the highest change in the number of naturalized persons in Montenegro by a single legal provision. The political issues related to the acceptance of displaced persons and IDPs into the citizenship of Montenegro are related to the ruling party’s aspiration to consolidate and retain its political power in the newly established state by controlling the effective number of voters. The small size of Montenegro and the voting population of less than half a million allow for such electoral engineering (Džankić 2013). In other words, given that citizens are the bearers of political rights, including voting rights, any significant increase in the number of citizens would seriously affect the voting arithmetic in Montenegro. This would be the case even though the participation in elections is limited by the two year residence criterion (Law on Election of Representatives and Councillors 2011), as voting preferences are unlikely to suffer a major shift. The majority of the displaced persons are of Serbian ethnic origin and thus likely to support the opposition parties. The situation of the IDPs is quite similar, despite the greater share in the IDP population of those who self-identify as ‘Montenegrin’. In 2009, when the last official data on ethnic belonging of IDPs were published, the majority of IDPs have declared their ethnic belonging as ‘Montenegrin’ (3,683), followed by the IDP RAE population (3,106), and ‘Serb’ (2,728) (Informacija o preregistraciji 2009). Ostensibly, the ethnic composition of the IDPs might imply that only the ‘Serb’ IDPs would be supportive of the opposition. Still, it is likely that many of the ‘Montenegrin’ IDPs would not support the government. This is mostly due to the fact that these IDPs have originally come to Montenegro from Kosovo, and thus strongly object Kosovo’s independence. The independence of Kosovo has been recognized by Montenegrin authorities since October 2008, but the Montenegrin opposition parties that are supportive of Serbia still challenge the independent status of Kosovo. The second issue where we can see significant influence of the neighbouring countries as horizontal external factors on the regulation and practices of citizenship is that of dual citizenship. The division over statehood and identity, coupled by the overall political context in the Balkans made the debate on the issue of dual citizenship in Montenegro politically sensitive. In the context of Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia in particular, dual citizenship is not only related to participation, as previously argued by Džankić (2010), but also raises issues of loyalty to the newly established Montenegrin state. Far from being an exception in Montenegro, other cases examined in this book have illustrated that the questions regarding dual citizenship are complex in the majority of the post-Yugoslav states (Ragazzi and Štiks 2009). As a consequence of the unconsolidated states and challenged national identities, the legislation in these countries is also quite ambiguous as to whether dual citizenship is possible or not.

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More specifically, in Montenegro the legislation implies that the state may permit dual citizenship, but in practice, this hardly ever happens. Article 2 of the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act notes that ‘a Montenegrin citizen holding at the same time also the citizenship of a foreign country’ will be considered a Montenegrin citizen when dealing with the Montenegrin authorities. This provision implies that it is possible to hold multiple citizenships, including Montenegrin. However, the restrictive Montenegrin citizenship regime allows dual citizenship only in certain limited circumstances (Džankić 2010). In the majority of cases, a foreign citizen is requested to obtain release from his or her other citizenship in order to obtain the Montenegrin one, or to declare that he or she will lose such citizenship by force of law upon becoming a Montenegrin national (article 8, para. 2). Therefore, most of the people requesting Montenegrin citizenship are required to relinquish their original citizenship. The issue with the Montenegrin nationals who are naturalized in another country is somewhat different. In most cases, the state’s authorities tolerate the acquisition of another citizenship, although such individuals would lose their Montenegrin citizenship by force of law (article 24 of the Citizenship Act), as has previously been the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reason for this tolerance is usually the unawareness of the authorities that a certain individual has obtained citizenship of another state. Despite the many instances of tolerance of dual nationality in these cases, some have become highly politicized, especially in the context of Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia. A notable example is the withdrawal of Montenegrin citizenship to the former leader of the People’s Party (a pro-Serb opposition party) Predrag Popović in 2011. Popović, who was a Montenegrin citizen by birth, voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Serbia in 2007 and announced it publicly. This prompted the authorities to exclude him from the citizenship of Montenegro, which has been deemed a political move in the public discourse (Bošković 2011). In fact, the current legislation (Law on the Implementation of Constitution of Montenegro 2007, article 12) states that only those citizens of Montenegro who possessed dual citizenship on the day of proclamation of Montenegro’s independence (3 June 2006) are allowed to retain their Montenegrin citizenship. Citizens who acquired dual citizenship between 3 June 2006 and the date of adoption of the Constitution of Montenegro (22 October 2007) were allowed to retain their Montenegrin citizenship until the signature of the agreement on dual citizenship between Montenegro and the respective state, and at the latest for one year from the date of the adoption of the constitution (that is, until 22 October 2008). In addition, the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act stipulates that dual citizenship is possible upon the conclusion of an international agreement between Montenegro and another country. So far, Montenegro has only concluded a dual citizenship agreement with Macedonia. This agreement is of a rather peculiar nature, as it reiterates the provisions stipulated in the Law on the Implementation of the Constitution of Montenegro. However, the agreement does not regulate any matters related to the acquisition or loss of citizenship (Ministry of Interior 02–3226/3, 2009).

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The negotiations for a dual citizenship agreement with Serbia lasted for several years, and are evidence of the unconsolidated nature of the overall Montenegrin political context. These negotiations formally ended in mid 2014 with the two countries declaring that no agreement was reached, due to Serbia’s and Montenegro’s diametrically opposite dual citizenship approaches. In summary, the issues of participation (political and legal aspects of citizenship) and loyalty (emotional aspect of citizenship) were ingrained in the different approaches of Montenegro and Serbia to dual citizenship. While the former operates a restrictive policy of dual citizenship, the latter has a liberal one. In the context of Montenegro, it may be argued that the restrictiveness of the citizenship regime has been a mechanism of consolidating (or at least covering) the internal divisions over Montenegrin statehood, while retaining the present voting arithmetic. In the case of Serbia, the liberal dual citizenship regime was primarily adopted as a means of resolving the issue of statelessness (Rava 2010, 27–8). However, it is also related to matters of expanding Serbia’s political influence in the region (Rava 2010). The latter trait of Serbia’s dual citizenship policy predominantly affects the citizenship regimes of Serbia’s unconsolidated neighbouring countries with a significant Serb population, such as Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conclusions The regulation and practices of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are affected by a series of domestic and external factors. Their interplay shapes and transforms the relationship between the state and the individuals inhabiting its territory. The way in which this relationship is regulated is often a manifestation of the dynamic between the domestic state and nationbuilding, and the effects of the external factors on this dynamic. As argued throughout the chapter, dual citizenship policies are likely to be more restrictive in the countries whose statehood and/or nationhood are contested by an external factor. Examples of this restrictiveness include requirements for release from the citizenship of origin, and the automatic loss of citizenship of the underlying state following an individual’s naturalization in another country. The potential toleration of dual citizenship – either the non-existence of the automatic loss of citizenship by force of law, or its non-implementation – are generated by two factors: economic and legal. First, states realize that their citizens may be able to obtain further rights stemming from a foreign citizenship, which in turn may have an economic benefit on the country through remittances. The experiences of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia point to the states’ tolerance of dual citizenship when such a policy may prove conducive to economic development. Second, the states in the post-Yugoslav space are unable to obtain the records of those individuals who naturalized elsewhere due to data protection issues. Such is the case in all three countries under consideration in this book.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina has a restrictive citizenship policy, which has been somewhat liberalized through the most recent Constitutional Court decision and the subsequent amendments to the citizenship legislation. By abolishing the automatic ex lege loss of citizenship following naturalization in another country, Bosnia and Herzegovina has moved closer to the tolerance of dual citizenship, although this was implemented in practice previously. However, the new legislative changes did not substantially relax this country’s citizenship regime, because they envisage no change to the requirement for the existence of a dual citizenship agreement for those naturalizing in the country. This means that any applicant for the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina will still be required to obtain release from his or her citizenship of origin. The rationale behind the retention of this policy is the unconsolidated nature of statehood and nationhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina, manifested in the interactions between the citizenship regimes of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. That is, the ethnic approaches of Croatia and Serbia to dual citizenship may solidify the ethnic divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the dual citizens may be inclined to identify with their kinstates rather with their state of origin. This conclusion is only partly true in the case of Macedonia, particularly as regards the ethnic Albanian community. That is, those who have dual nationality of Macedonia and Albania may be inclined to a greater allegiance to the ethnic community of Albanians than to the Macedonian state. Unlike them, for those citizens of Macedonia who hold a Bulgarian passport, the latter will be a matter of convenience. Even though these individuals formally declare they are of ethnic Bulgarian origin, this is largely instrumental. They commonly declare as Bulgarians not as an expression of identity, loyalty or belonging, but for the purpose of enjoying the benefits of the Bulgarian and thus EU citizenship. This leads us to the conclusion that the dual citizenship policies of the neighbouring countries that contest elements of statehood and nationhood of a particular country do not have a uniform effect. If the contesting neighbouring country is a kin-state to an organized/recognized minority in the contested state, the dual citizenship raises issues of loyalty to the state of origin. If, however, such a state is not the kin-state to a significant organized/recognized minority community, dual citizenship is unlikely to deepen ethnic divisions. The case of Montenegro, operating the most restrictive dual citizenship policy from among the three countries studied also confirms this conclusion. The restrictive nature of Montenegro’s citizenship regime stems largely from this country’s identity divide, described in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. Serbia, which is a kin-state of almost a third of Montenegro’s population, operates a liberal dual citizenship policy as a mechanism of reaching out to the Serb ethnics in the region. Due to its recent independence, which was opposed by 44.5 per cent of its population, including the majority of the Serb community in Montenegro, the smallest of post-Yugoslav states, retains a restrictive dual citizenship regime in order to preserve its fragile ethnic and electoral balances.

Chapter 7

Citizenship en route to the European Union The governance and practices of citizenship are affected not only by the neighbouring countries and kin-states of national minorities, but also by international organizations that have the capacity to shape the notion of membership and the rights attached to it. With this in mind, the key objective of this chapter is to examine whether the vertical external impact, understood as the international effect, generates the convergence or divergence in citizenship regimes. As explained in the analytical framework in Chapter 2, this type of impact is exerted by international organizations that are capable of the top-down norm transfer. Taking into account the processes of democratization, transition, and Europeanization that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are undergoing, international influence becomes a strong force in constructing and altering the governance and practices of citizenship. In particular, this chapter highlights the impact of Europeanization for the transformation of citizenship regimes, and the tension between the attempts to meet the accession requirements, challenged statehood, and unconsolidated nationhood (for example, the difficulties in adopting the Election Law in Montenegro; controversies surrounding the constitutional changes in Bosnia after the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina ruling). If we compare the present-day situation to that in the 1990s in the context of international influence in the post-Yugoslav states, we can observe that the latter was largely mirrored in the international community’s peace-making efforts led by the US. However, since the early 2000s and the start of democratic changes in the Western Balkans, the EU has emerged as the most significant external factor in this region and a major driver of political, economic, social and ideational changes. These changes come out of the underlying countries’ commitment to meet the conditions for becoming member states of the EU. The effects of the accession process on the societies of the aspiring members are amplified because the entry requirements do not only entail the formal rules of the EU. Rather, they also include a number of other conditions and recommendations posed by international organizations dealing with democracy and human rights, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. For this reason, while primarily analysing the impact of the EU on the citizenship regimes of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, we will also take into account other factors that had significant influence on the laws and practices of citizenship in the new states. The chapter maps the different kinds of influence exerted by these organizations and their success in transforming the citizenship regimes of the three countries. In line with the scholarly literature presented in Chapter 2 (Sedelmeier 2011; Trauner

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2009a), the chapter highlights that the clarity and feasibility of the reward for compliance increases the effects of Europeanization on citizenship regimes. The visa liberalization process and the legislative changes in Montenegro are used as an illustration for this dynamic. The chapter also identifies and analyses the limits of Europeanization on citizenship and maintains that this process can be barricaded by the lack of domestic consensus if the reward is unclear, or if there is a deadlock in the accession process. The cases of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are used as examples for this dynamic. Europeanization of Citizenship: Effects of Visa Liberalization It has been widely accepted that visa liberalization has proven to be the most successful mechanism of change that the EU applied in the case of the Western Balkans (Hernandez i Sagrera 2014; Kacarska 2012a; Trauner 2009a). It has been one of the few international instruments that managed to forge the policy consensus among the representatives of the constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is mostly due to two factors: 1) the significance of visa-free travel and its relevance in the political discourse and 2) the technical nature of the requirements, which did not imply any shift in the power balance among the constituent peoples. The technical requirements of the EU in the visa liberalization process, coupled with a clear reward (visa-free travel) had a greater impact on the regulation and practices of citizenship. Trauner (2009a, 68–9) noted that the EU’s external leverage in JHA proved to be strong, as the EU relied not only on membership conditionality, but also on policy-related conditionality that derived from the prospect of visa-free travel. The EU used this issue of high political salience in the Western Balkans as a threat and main incentive for cooperation. By defining visa liberalization as a gradual process to be achieved through the signing of a readmission agreement with the European Community and other reform steps in domestic JHA, the EU managed to fill its conditionality approach with more substance and to establish a clearer relationship between demand and reward. EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements became the most important intermediary reward in the process towards visa liberalization.

The importance of visa-free travel in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia has not only been related to the pragmatism of travel. Rather, it has a historical and emotional dimension, since the citizens of the socialist Yugoslavia enjoyed the visa-free travel both to the communist east and to the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia followed by a series of conflicts also had its repercussions on the citizens’ ability to travel outside the Western Balkan states. In particular, the adoption of the common visa policy at the EU level with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and its expansion in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, allowed the EU to ‘make up two lists of third countries:

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the positive visa list, which named the countries whose citizens do not require a visa to enter the EU, and the negative visa list, which specified the countries whose citizens do’ (Trauner 2009a, 75). The Council Regulation 539/2001 of March 2001 placed the post-Yugoslav countries (apart from Slovenia and Croatia) and Albania on a blacklist (list of countries whose citizens needed a visa to cross an external border of the EU). The regulation had major consequences for the post-Yugoslav states. Following the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, these countries remained an enclave surrounded either by Schengen countries or by countries that joined the EU and thus introduced visas for their citizens. Their citizens who wished to travel to EU countries were faced with major costs, including the visa fee, insurance, translation and certification of documents, and often travel to the place where the visa interview or the submission of documents would take place.1 The International Crisis Group (2005, 9) revealed that the costs of obtaining a Schengen visa were equivalent to a monthly salary in the post-Yugoslav countries. A further barrier to travel was that Schengen visas would be given for a very restricted period, commonly with a one-day window from the dates stated on the invitation.2 That is, each time an individual wished to travel, they were required to go through the entire process and be subject to the same costs. As a consequence, very few people from the Western Balkans had visited foreign countries. After the region stabilized politically the EU held the visa liberalization dialogues with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. The dialogues took place between 2008 and 2010. The process was managed by the European Commission (EC), which in 2008 prepared the roadmaps, specifying the criteria and benchmarks that the countries had to meet in order to be granted visa-free travel in the Schengen zone. The roadmaps contained mostly technical requirements and were structured along four blocks including document security, illegal migration, public order and security, and external relations and fundamental rights linked to the movement of persons. While liberalizing the visa regime with Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro in late 2009, the EC required Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania to make further progress in relation to the roadmap benchmarks thus postponing the visa-free travel for the citizens of these countries to late 2010. The opportunity to ensure the visa-free travel for their citizens thus proved to be a major incentive for these countries’ policymakers to comply with the EU requirements. In turn, the reward offered the domestic actors not only the legitimacy for the actions but also the popular support that they could use as political leverage. Kacarska (2012a) notes that in the on-the-ground assessments conducted by peer-missions of experts of the EC and the European Union member states, a 1 For example, until 2007, when the joint Schengen Visa Application Centre was opened in Podgorica, citizens of Montenegro were required to travel to Belgrade for all Schengen visas apart from the Italian one (issued by the consulate in Montenegro). 2 Long term, multiple entry visas were an exception, but their holders were few (commonly business people).

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greater emphasis was placed on the technical conditions related to border and document security than to the ones pertaining to fundamental rights. In relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina she also argues that ‘the interest of the EC in the anti-discrimination policies was formal and did not go into depth in relation to the ongoing problems’ (Kacarska 2012a, 21). For instance, there was a manifest difference in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the handling of purely technical requirements and in the implementation of more substantive political changes. The switch from paper to biometric documents is the example of the former, while the merger of the entity Ombudsmen perfectly mirrors the latter situation. The switch to biometric documents revealed a number of registration issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina whereby a number of people, mostly Roma, were unable to meet the costs of obtaining such documents. In order to resolve the underlying problem and meet the visa liberalization benchmarks, over 2008 and 2009 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina offered subsidies for ID cards to 527 Roma people (Kacarska 2012a). By contrast, meeting the political requirement of merging the entity Ombudsmen into a single office, which was another requirement in the visa liberalization process for Bosnia and Herzegovina, was met with political resistance from the Republika Srpska. This move was seen as shifting the power balance against this entity, which is why the objections to the merger of the entity Ombudsmen persisted until late 2010. Further external pressure was necessary to ensure compliance even if the implementation of the policy bore major benefits to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The merger eventually occurred only upon the intervention of the EC. This highlights that policies having the potential to disrupt the power balance among the political actors are more difficult to adopt in the divided societies. The visa liberalization process in Macedonia shows the power of conditionality coupled with a clear reward for compliance. Renner and Trauner (2009a, 457) highlighted that in the prospect of a more relaxed visa regime unified the domestic political actors and societal forces in their efforts to integrate in the JHA sector. By speedily adjusting to EU standards, Macedonian authorities hoped to convince their European counterparts that the country is capable of effectively guarding its external borders.

To that extent, the major concern of the EC was security, and the effects of Europeanization on the Macedonian citizenship regime were most obvious with regards to registration. One of the technical requirements of the process was the registration of the Roma people in Macedonia. The country’s authorities established a special commission aided through UNDP for this purpose. Kacarska (2012a, 9) notes that in the course of registration – from February 2008 to January 2010 – a total of 3,100 Roma people obtained access to personal documents. However, the effects of the visa liberalization process on the rights dimension of citizenship were far less pronounced due to the fact that the EU did not place

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an equal emphasis on the actual compliance with this requirement as it did with the securitization of documents. For instance, Macedonia adopted new anti-discrimination legislation in 2010 in order to meet the demands of the visa liberalization process. Yet, this legislation ‘did not include sexual orientation or gender identity as an area of discrimination to be covered by the law’ (Kacarska 2012a, 12). As such, not only has the 2010 anti-discrimination legislation in Macedonia been criticized by numerous international organizations, but it also shows the limited impact of Europeanization in this country. That is, the degree of effects of the vertical external factors depends not only on 1) the costs of the policy for the domestic elites, 2) the palpable benefits of the policy, and the 3) clarity of conditions that the international actors require for those benefits to materialize. Rather, the effects of the vertical external factors will also depend on 4) how that factor ensures compliance with each of the required conditions, and whether it places an emphasis on the implementation of some requirements (for example, security) while fully or partly waiving others (such as anti-discrimination, human rights). Similar to the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the technical requirements of the visa liberalization process also affected Montenegro’s citizenship regime. Unlike the other two cases studied, the particularities of the Montenegrin political context and the desire of the ruling elite to preserve the voting balance in this tiny country generated some adverse consequences on the most vulnerable groups of population, such as the Roma, or the internally displaced persons (IDPs) discussed in the previous chapter. These groups were further affected by the requirements of the visa liberalization process. They were faced not only with registration issues, but also with broader problems stemming from the lack of documents, such as access to rights. Montenegro, alongside the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia, has been considered a soft security threat for the EU as a transit route for illegal immigrants and countries related to organized crime (Schleter 2003, 7). As a consequence, the EU’s Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime with Montenegro (2008) included specific requirements related to document security, tackling illegal immigration, readmission, asylum policy, public order, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and non-discrimination in ensuring its citizens the freedom of movement (Kacarska 2012a). Two of these requirements resulted as rather problematic in view of the Montenegrin citizenship regime. The combination of the requirement for registration and biometric documents3 and the requirement related to non-discrimination had several effects. In fact, people who previously possessed the documents of the FRY but who were not registered as residents of Montenegro were unable to obtain Montenegrin citizenship (and thus Montenegrin identification documents). The IDPs were the 3 The requirement to change documents was generated also by Montenegrin independence. Thus, it is appropriate to assert that the repercussion created by this requirement has been a combination of Montenegrin independence and EU requirements.

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group that was affected the most by the need to obtain identification documents (CoE 2008, 12). At the time of their arrival in Montenegro, these people possessed the FRY documents, and in order to qualify for the Montenegrin citizenship (provided they fulfilled other requirements for naturalization), they needed to obtain further documents from the citizenship registries in Kosovo or in Serbia. According to the personal stories collected by UNHCR in Montenegro (2009), and interviews for this book, most of these registries have been inaccessible.4 As a consequence, many people who fled from Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 are unable to obtain the citizenship of either Montenegro or Serbia, which had a further exclusionary effect on this already socially vulnerable group. An additional problem, which predominantly affected the Roma, Egyptians and Ashkali (RAE) population (in particular the RAE who fled Kosovo in 1998 and 1999), has been the cost of obtaining the documents required for admission into Montenegrin citizenship. The RAE people who did not fall under the IDP category described above, and whose documents have not been lost or destroyed, have commonly been unable to cover the costs of collection of information from civil registries from Serbia or Kosovo. Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro does not provide legal aid for this category of people, which results in their de facto exclusion from not only the Montenegrin citizenship, but also from obtaining the minority status and exercising minority rights, as the two are related by law.5 Hence, the formal requirements of the EU had a spillover effect in that they created impermeable borders for the acquisition of citizenship for the ones who were affected the most by the wars of the Yugoslav disintegration. The example of visa liberalization process shows us how effective the process of Europeanization has been in transforming the citizenship regimes of the challenged and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav states. As noted by ESI (2008) and Trauner (2009a), conditionality based on a specific policy carrying clear rewards has been the most powerful mechanism of change that the EU implemented in the Western Balkans. However, its effects on citizenship regimes have been diverse in two respects. First, following Kacarska (2012a) we could observe strict compliance with those aspects of the roadmaps that carried technical requirements and that were related to border security. As confirmed by the cases of the merger of Ombudspersons in Bosnia and Herzegovina and anti-discrimination legislation, issues dealing with human rights were sidelined in the process. Second, as a consequence of the lack of emphasis on human rights issues, requirements related to security often had adverse effects on marginalized groups such as the Roma, whose status is still unresolved after the multiple disintegrations of Yugoslavia.

4 Interview with NGO representative, Podgorica, June 2011; interview with representatives of UNHCR Montenegro, Podgorica, June 2011. 5 Montenegrin citizenship is a legal requirement for minority status.

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The Power of the EU Carrot: Consensus on and Consequences of Citizenship Amendments in Montenegro The process of EU accession had a major effect on the citizenship regime of Montenegro, which unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, has not encountered any stalemates in the EU accession process so far. On the contrary, after having become an independent state in 2006 Montenegro has signed the Interim Agreement on trade, and trade-related issues were signed in 2007. A year later, the country submitted its formal application for EU membership and became a candidate country for EU accession in 2010. At the end of 2014, Montenegro is the only one among the Western Balkan states to have started the accession negotiations. In this context, a major transformative effect of Europeanization in Montenegro took place regarding the status of the citizens of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia who reside in Montenegro. The changes to the Montenegrin Citizenship Act of June and September 2011 were part of a package of legislative changes required from Montenegro to open the accession negotiations. In order to adopt the changes to the Election Code required by the EU, the Montenegrin opposition required the amendments to article 41 of the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act. This is an indicator of how EU accession criteria can forge political bargains and transform citizenship regimes of the unconsolidated states in the post-Yugoslav space. When Montenegro received its candidate country status in November 2010, the European Commission (EC) recommended that the country fulfil seven conditions before opening accession talks (European Commission 2010). The requirement that topped the EC’s list was the need to adopt a new Election Law so as to improve the legislative framework for elections. Yet the adoption of the new election legislation, which had been on hold since the country became independent in 2006, was a cumbersome task. Since Montenegro is a divided society it required a number of political compromises, notably on the name of the language subject in elementary education, and on the citizenship status for people from other republics of the former Yugoslavia. Hence, along with the adoption of the Election Law in September 2011, the process of Europeanization (through EU’s political conditionality) has also yielded a change in Montenegro’s citizenship legislation, resulting in a facilitated naturalization for citizens of the former Yugoslav republics. While the June 2011 changes merely extended the deadline for naturalization of the citizens from the former Yugoslavia, the subsequent changes to the Montenegrin citizenship law had a deeper effect. According to the new article 41v, citizens of one of the republics of the former Yugoslavia who registered residence in Montenegro at least five years prior to the date of Montenegro’s declaration of independence (3 June 2006) can be granted Montenegrin citizenship, provided they did not unregister their residency in Montenegro before submitting the application, and that they fulfil financial conditions and have security clearance as

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stipulated in article 8, para 1, points 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the Montenegrin Citizenship Act. In addition, the applicant is required to deliver a written statement about his or her acceptance of the rights and duties of Montenegrin citizenship, along with a request for admission to Montenegrin citizenship to the Ministry of Interior. In the context of Montenegro’s citizenship regime, which is among the most restrictive in the Balkans in terms of naturalization requirements and intolerance of dual citizenship, the amendment implies that applicants are no longer required to obtain release from their citizenship of origin. This facilitates the naturalization of a number of people from other former Yugoslav republics who could not obtain release from their citizenship of origin, or who wanted to keep their primary citizenship. In principle, the most recent amendment is also a step towards tolerating dual citizenship. By submitting the statement that they accept the rights and duties of Montenegrin citizenship the person essentially should renounce his or her citizenship of origin. Nevertheless, as no formal renunciation is required, naturalized individuals will be able to retain both passports. Data protection acts in other post-Yugoslav states prevent the Montenegrin authorities from withdrawing the Montenegrin citizenship of a person who holds another passport. In spite of the liberalizing effect of Europeanization on Montenegro’s citizenship legislation, a large number of people seeking Montenegrin citizenship will remain unaffected by the new provisions. This is especially true of the Roma, who came to Montenegro during the Kosovo crisis in 1998 and 1999. The problematic aspect of the new provision is that the law still requires the applicants to have registered ‘residence’ in Montenegro. However, most of the Roma had registered with the Bureau for the Care of Refugees, an institution that did not have competence to grant them the status of lawful residents. According to the interview with the UNHCR representative in Montenegro, being a marginalized societal group the majority of the Roma did not undergo the adequate procedures required to obtain lawful residence.6 In order to understand why the Roma population will be largely unaffected by the new provisions for naturalization, it is important to reiterate that the 2011 amendments to the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act came as part of the package of legislative changes that the government and the opposition agreed upon as preconditions for the adoption of the new Election Code. It was negotiated among the major ethnic (Montenegrin, Serb, Bosniak, Albanian, Croat) and political (DPS, SNP, Nova) players. Roma were at the margins of this debate as well as the Serbs from Kosovo, who had also registered with the Bureau for the Care of Refugees. The provisions adopted will mostly be of use to the people from Bosnia and Croatia who sought refuge in Montenegro in the early 1990s (who were predominantly of Serb ethnic background), registered lawful residence, but failed to naturalize previously as they could not obtain release from their citizenship of origin. 6 Interview with the representative of UNHCR Montenegro, 20 June 2011.

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The resistance of the Montenegrin authorities to include the people who declare their ethnic/national identity as Serb reveals the degree of politicization of the citizenship issue in this country. As explained in Chapters 4 and 6, voting rights are related to the rights of citizenship. Hence, franchise is of utmost importance in a country of less than half a million voters, where the electoral races of the past 20 years have had very tight outcomes (Džankić 2010). The question of whether the influx of pro-Serb voters would change the electoral results prevented the proMontenegrin government from changing the citizenship legislation and postponed the compromise on electoral legislation for almost five years. This proved to be a salient issue at the time of the adoption of the amendments to the Election Law in 2011. Yet, the approaching date of publication of the 2011 Progress Report of the EC forced the political actors to reach an agreement, which is an indicator of the transformative power of Europeanization. Weak Positive Europeanization: ECN Effects As noted in Chapter 2, the European Convention on Nationality (ECN) has had weak positive effects on integration of the EU member states. In the context of the challenged and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav countries, we can also observe the ECN effects as those of weak positive Europeanization. That is, rather than being a binding document the ECN is a standard-setting one. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are among the 20 countries of the Council of Europe in which the ECN has come into force, in 2009, 2003 and 2010, respectively. Following the signature and ratification of this document, Macedonia and Montenegro made some amendments to their citizenship legislation, which indicates the weak positive effects of the ECN on these countries’ citizenship regimes. By contrast, the ECN resulted in no changes to the citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to two reasons. First, the citizenship policy of this country has been adopted by international actors, and thus meets most of the prescriptive elements of the ECN. Second, amendments so far to the citizenship policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina have mostly been adopted through the imposition mechanism, in other words the OHR changed the country’s citizenship law. This was caused by the lack of consensus on legislative change by the domestic political actors. The absence of legislative changes following the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the ECN implies that in states with powerful veto players, weak positive Europeanization without a clear reward has virtually no effects. Unlike the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the accession of Macedonia to the European Convention on Nationality (ECN) in 2003 has motivated the changes to the country’s citizenship regime. In 2004, Macedonia amended its citizenship law with the aim of moving towards a de-ethnicized citizenship model and providing safeguards against statelessness.7 The de-ethnicization of the regulation 7 Interview with human rights lawyer, Skopje, 6 June 2011.

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of citizenship is mirrored in article 1 of the amended law, providing explicitly that ‘[c]itizenship is a legal link between the persons and the state and does not indicate the ethnic origin of the persons’ (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, article 1, para. 2). Despite the formal separation between citizenship and ethnicity induced by this legal provision, the amendments also contain naturalization conditions that indicate that the ethnocentric character of the law has not completely disappeared. One example of such a requirement is that the applicant needs to be proficient in the Macedonian language (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, article 7). As discussed in Chapter 4, this is a prime example of ethnocultural selectivity in this country’s citizenship policy. The signature of the ECN also reduced the residence requirement for naturalization in Macedonia from fifteen to eight years. The aim of this legal change was to approximate the residence requirement for naturalization in Macedonia to those that are in place in other CoE member states.8 Indeed, while the ECN or any other international organization, or the EU, do not regulate the citizenship matters of states, the 15-year residence criterion for naturalization was long even in the EU context, where in the most restrictive regimes this requirement ranges from ten to twelve years (Bauböck and Wallace-Goodman 2010). Further changes to the Macedonian citizenship law caused by ECN included provisions for the prevention of statelessness (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, article 7a), the naturalization of recognized refugees (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, article 7a), provisions concerning expatriates and the members of their families (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, article 8), those referring to spouses of the Macedonian nationals (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, article 9). Moreover, the changes to the law contained special provisions for the citizens of the former Yugoslav republics (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, article 14). The amended citizenship legislation stipulated that: The nationals of the other republics of the former SFRY and the nationals of the former SFRY who on 8 September 1991 had a registered domicile, until the submission of the application have been permanently living in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia and have a genuine and effective link with the Republic of Macedonia may acquire citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia if within two years after the entry into force of this law they have submitted an application, provided that no criminal proceedings are being carried out against them in the Republic of Macedonia, for criminal acts which threaten the security and defence of the Republic of Macedonia and that they meet the requirements of Article 7 paragraph 1 items 1 and 6 of this law (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, article 14). 8 Interview with the representative of the Ministry of Interior of Macedonia (1), 7 June 2011; interview with the representative of the Ministry of Interior of Macedonia (2), 7 June 2011.

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The latter change had particular implications for the citizens of the former Yugoslav republics, who were at a particular risk of statelessness. As explained in Chapter 3, the administrative procedures and the registers of citizens in the socialist Yugoslavia were rather imperfect. The break-up of the country resulted in many individuals having spent multiple years, even decades in a republic other than that of their birth without having formally obtained the citizenship of that republic. After the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, such individuals were required to fulfil the 15-year residence criterion in Macedonia, which complicated matters related to their citizenship status. Therefore, Macedonia’s legislative changes of 2004 is a prime example of the type of weak positive Europeanization that takes place as a result of a country’s accession to ECN. Similarly, the Council of Europe has had a major effect on the citizenship regime of Montenegro. Although there have been no judgments of the ECtHR related to Montenegro so far, the impact of the CoE is mirrored in legislative changes following the country’s accession to this organization’s conventions. On 28 April 2010, Montenegro ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession, with effect from 1 August 2010. Coupled with the most recent changes to the 2008 Citizenship Act (Džankić 2010), the ratification of this convention, which has become lex specialis for cases of statelessness, is expected to facilitate the procedure for the admission into Montenegrin citizenship of the people who are de facto stateless. Additionally, on 22 June 2010 Montenegro ratified the European Convention on Nationality (placing a reservation on article 16, dealing with dual citizenship), which came into force on 1 October 2010. In the context of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro is the third country to have signed and ratified this convention following Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, while being the only one to have opted for a reservation on article 16.9 The reservations that Montenegro placed on article 16 are however a direct product of the dual citizenship debate, and the resistance of the domestic elites to the penetration of the Serbian political influence in Montenegro through citizenship. This is a strong indicator of the overlap between the horizontal and vertical external factors, and an illustration of how one affects and limits the other. Yet the signature of the underlying conventions of the CoE triggered the first changes to the Montenegrin Citizenship Act in July 2010. If the 2010 amendments and addenda to the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act are viewed through the prism of the Europeanizing power of the Council of Europe, it is clear that changes to articles 6, 16 and 41 (Džankić 2010) have been driven by the ratification of the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession. These articles aim at preventing the statelessness of children (articles 6 and 16), and at regulating the status of the citizens of the successor states

9 Serbia and Slovenia have not signed the convention. Croatia signed it on 19 January 2005, but has not ratified it to date.

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of the former Yugoslavia resident in Montenegro (article 41).10 By the same token, the Europeanizing power of the European Convention on Nationality emanates from the change to articles 8 and 11. The change to article 8 (military duty and release from citizenship of the state of origin) is evidently related to articles 21 and 22 of ECN regulating military service in cases of dual nationality. In this respect, as military duty has been abolished in Montenegro, an applicant who fails to obtain release from citizenship of their state of origin as they did not complete the military service in their respective state, will be able to voluntarily denounce that citizenship before Montenegrin authorities prior to their naturalization. At the same time, the clarification of article 11 related to the acquisition of the Montenegrin citizenship in cases of spouses of Montenegrin citizens has been influenced by article 6 of ECN. The amendments to the Montenegrin Citizenship Act take the naturalization of spouses a step beyond the ECN requirements, by enabling the applicants to be naturalized in cases of death of the spouse possessing the Montenegrin citizenship. The above-mentioned legislative changes are an indicator that the weak positive effects of Europeanization had a greater transformative power on the citizenship regimes of Montenegro and Macedonia than on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Obviously, the political setup of Bosnia and Herzegovina poses a barrier to any substantial changes of citizenship legislation which may have the potential to disrupt the balance of power among the constituent peoples. As a consequence, international legal instruments of a standard-setting character, such as the ECN, are unlikely to have any effect on issues of high political salience, including citizenship. By contrast, the cases of Macedonia and Montenegro show that weak international legal norms have had some effect on their citizenship regimes. In the case of Macedonia the definition of citizenship, the reduction of the residence condition for ordinary naturalization, as well as various forms that facilitated admission for spouses, refugees for example, were a direct product of the ECN. Equally, Montenegro has adopted a range of legal provisions regarding the naturalization of spouses and groups at the risk of statelessness following the ratification of this convention. However, as much as the two countries have changed their citizenship regime under the influence of the ECN, the convention’s effect remains weak and limited even in Macedonia and Montenegro, due to these countries’ challenged statehood and nationhood. The examples include the persistence of ethnocentric elements in the process of naturalization in Macedonia and Montenegro’s resistance to dual citizenship. Imposition in Bosnia: Direct vs. Indirect Mechanisms of Change Bosnia and Herzegovina has a particular position in the post-Yugoslav space. Shaw (2010, 26) notes that the situation in Bosnia, where significant powers have 10 See Chapter 6 for details on the changes to article 41.

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been held by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and since 2011 by the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, can be best described as the one of ‘direct supervision’. This means that, although the international community does not fully administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, its representatives also have some leverage in imposing new rules in the country, including those related to its citizenship regime. In the context of EU enlargement, imposition of rules is generally understood through negative incentives such as sanctions. However, there are significant differences in the imposition mechanisms used by the OHR and the EUSR. Rather than using imposition to ensure the implementation of the Dayton Agreement as the OHR did, the EUSR imposes rules in Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘as a voluntary choice deriving from the desire to “join” Europe’ Chandler (2008, 76). As citizenship policy was integrated in the Dayton constitution, the implementation powers of the OHR were far greater than those of the EUSR in that respect. In fact, in the years immediately after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OHR had a major impact on the country’s citizenship regime. The Bonn powers conferred upon the OHR in 1997 in order to ensure the implementation of the Dayton agreement entailed the adoption of ‘binding decisions when local parties seem unable or unwilling to act’ (Venneri 2007, 26, fn 73). Shortly thereafter, the High Representative of the OHR proposed the text of the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was adopted without any changes by the country’s legislative branch. The law came into force in July 1999. While the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina made no further amendments to the country’s citizenship legislation, in 2002 the High Representative extended the deadline for the regulation of dual citizenship matters. In 2009, the OHR further exercised his Bonn powers and imposed further amendments to the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina regulated the status of the citizens of the Brčko District. The most significant change was the introduction of the new article 27a stipulating: A citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who does not have the Entity citizenship stated or a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the citizenship of Republika Srpska, who has a permanent residence in the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall acquire the citizenship of the Federation if he so wishes. A citizen of the Federation who has a permanent residence in the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina may change his citizenship of the Federation by acquisition of the citizenship of Republika Srpska.

Right of acquisition or of change of Entity citizenship referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article may be exercised only once on the basis of being a Brčko District resident.

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This amendment of the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina essentially meant that the residents of the Brčko District were free to choose their entity citizenship. As explained in Chapter 4, the possession of entity citizenship determines a wide range of political rights for the residents of the Brčko District. Hence the imposition by the OHR had a significant impact not only on the citizenship legislation in this post-Yugoslav state, but also on the distribution of the rights of citizenship. In 2011, the office of the EUSR was decoupled from the OHR. Unlike the OHR, the EUSR does not rely on Bonn powers, and thus has less leverage in directly affecting the citizenship regime of this country. To this end, the EUSR uses the mechanism of indirect imposition, where the representatives of the constituent peoples can freely choose from among certain policy prescriptions (Chandler 2008, 77). The objective of such an EU approach is to provide incentives for legislative reform and to reward the country with progress in the accession process following the fulfilment of benchmarks. An example of this is the case of the constitutional reform following the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (No. 27996/06 and 34836/06) ruling of the ECtHR. This case, however, shows the limits of the EU’s influence in this challenged and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav space. Even though constitutional reform was a condition for moving ahead in terms of EU integration, it faced major objections by the domestic political leaders. The Limits of Europeanization in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia In line with the Europeanization literature (Sedelmeier 2011), politicians can legitimize decisions adopted on grounds of clear conditions with palpable rewards for citizens (such as visa-free travel). Requirements under the visa roadmaps were implemented in all the post-Yugoslav states, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. By contrast, the implementation of the ‘soft’ norms engrained in the EU accession process has proved to be far more difficult, particular in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Unlike policy conditionality used in the case of visa liberalization, the ‘soft’ conditions generally aim at enhancing one or more aspects of democracy in a country. Consequently, they may bear high political costs for the ruling elite, and bear no palpable benefits in the near future for either the political actors or the people. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are both faced with a stalemate in their aspiration to join the EU, which poses a major barrier to the effects of Europeanization in these two countries. Sejdić and Finci and the Limits of Europeanization in Bosnia Implementing the soft norms of Europeanization in Bosnia and Herzegovina is obstructed by the constitutional setup of this post-Yugoslav state and the veto powers conferred upon the constituent peoples in the decision-making process. This can be best illustrated by the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina

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(No. 27996/06 and 34836/06) ruling of the ECtHR, which has become a part of the EU’s conditionality in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it is a precondition for the implementation of the SAA and the country’s further progress towards membership (European Commission 2013).11 Hence the implementation of this judgment is not perceived as an incentive by the domestic actors, since it blocks the accession process and does not represent a reward for compliance. In principle, the regulations and rulings of the ECtHR are of a prescriptive character, and have no binding effect on the sovereign states. In particular, as regards citizenship policy the ECtHR has emphasized that ‘no right to acquire or retain a particular nationality is as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols’ (Makuc and others vs. Slovenia No. 26828/06, ECHR 523, para. 160). Although the enforcement of the ECHR rules and adherence to CoE conventions such as the European Convention on Nationality may not induce significant change in the country’s citizenship regime, the ECtHR may still affect it. While the ECtHR has limited effects on citizenship legislation, it can change the allocation and exercise of citizenship rights, particularly as regards their alignment with the international human rights norms.12 As explained in Chapter 4, in the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (No. 27996/06 and 34836/06) ruling of 2009, the ECtHR judged that the rights to stand for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Dervo Sejdić and Jakub Finci, a Roma and a Jew, were violated through the Dayton constitution. The ruling however asserted the sui generis institutional setup of this country, intended primarily to provide the immediate solution to war that ravaged Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s. Indeed, the ECtHR concluded that (Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 27996/06 and 34836/06): when the impugned constitutional provisions were put in place a very fragile cease-fire was in effect on the ground. The provisions were designed to end a brutal conflict marked by genocide and “ethnic cleansing”. The nature of the conflict was such that the approval of the “constituent peoples” (namely, the Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) was necessary to ensure peace. This could explain, without necessarily justifying, the absence of representatives of the 11 Some international analysts, such as the European Stability Initiative (2013, 2) have criticized the EU for including the judgment in the political conditionality and noted that the ‘non-implementation of the Sejdić́ -Finci decision cannot justify blocking Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership’. 12 An example of this effect is the case of the ‘Erased’ in Slovenia, discussed in the Introduction. After the ECtHR found a violation of articles 8 (family life) and 13 (right to remedy) of the ECHR in its 2012 judgment Kurić and others v. Slovenia (No. 26828/06), the Slovenian authorities adopted the Act Regulating Compensation for Damage to Persons Erased from the Permanent Population Register in December 2013. Applied from June 2014, this law regulates the right to pecuniary compensation or other forms of just satisfaction (for example, preferential access to welfare, housing, scholarships) for the individuals that were adversely affected by the 1992 decision of the Slovenian authorities.

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Simultaneously, the ECtHR noted that the ruling was of a prescriptive nature visà-vis the Dayton setup of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in that ‘there is no requirement under the Convention to abandon totally the power-sharing mechanisms peculiar to Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the time may still not be ripe for a political system which would be a simple reflection of majority rule’ (para. 48). On grounds of the recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), the ECtHR suggested that ‘there exist mechanisms of power-sharing which do not automatically lead to the total exclusion of representatives of the other communities’ (para. 49). As the result of this ruling, the CoE urged the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the ECtHR’s decision in time for the October 2010 elections thus ensuring that Bosnia’s Others are guaranteed political representation at all levels (Council of Europe 2010). Nevertheless, as corroborated by interviewees for this research, the judgment had a limited impact on the process of constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus – so far – an equally limited impact on the country’s citizenship regime.13 As explained in detail in Chapter 4, shortly after the ECtHR ruling, the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina established a working group of the National Council of Ministers and adopted an action plan on how to pursue the recommendations of the CoE. By the time of the October 2010 elections, however, the different interests of the constituent peoples and the virtual absence of the Others from the group prevented any effective decision from coming into being (Wakelin 2012, web). The underlying elections, held in line with the previous legislation, resulted in a political deadlock which in turn left Bosnia and Herzegovina without a government until January 2012. This political deadlock obstructed the internal reform processes and halted constitutional reform, as no amendments to the Dayton constitution could be passed through the country’s bicameral legislature. The limited effect of the soft vertical factors is also mirrored in the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina persistently failed to meet the ECtHR deadlines for constitutional amendments, set for 30 November 2011: those for implementing the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina ruling as regards the applicants’ eligibility for official posts. The latter deadline was set in the Road Map to Europe in June 2012 with the target date for the implementation of reforms set at 31 August 2012. The non-compliance with these requirements obstructs the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the EU, since ‘[t]he Council of Europe and the European Commission note with great disappointment that the institutional and political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina missed the first timeline for implementing the Road Map and did not submit their joint proposal’ (European 13 Interview with political analyst and scholar (1), Sarajevo, 20 May 2011.

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Commission 2012b). Writing shortly after the ECtHR ruling, Shaw (2010) and Sarajlić (2010a) anticipated that the ruling would have a positive impact on the citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the soft nature of the ECtHR ruling compared to the rigid Dayton constitution has been unable to fully penetrate the political setup of this complex country. Effectively, the failure to reach an agreement on constitutional amendments and the inclusion of the Others in Bosnia and Herzegovina as equal citizens was largely due to the inability of the key political parties – the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ) – to relinquish their ethnonational agendas for the sake of civic and democratic values (Keil 2013b, web). That is, for the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, constitutional reform may result only in the decrease of their political power. The major parties, which still draw on nationalist rhetoric, may thus be faced with a dissatisfied electorate and hence are not inclined to support policies that could significantly alter the power balance stemming from the Dayton constitution. As a consequence, political conditionality has faced high barriers to substantially transforming the citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it bears significant costs for the political actors and offers very distant and unclear benefits. Disenchanted: Macedonia’s EU Story The transformative power of the international influence on the citizenship regime of Macedonia is, similar to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mirrored in the difference between the soft criteria with a limited effect, and the technical criteria with clear benefits, which the country’s government has had the motivation to implement. The limits in compliance with the vertical effects in the case of Macedonia are caused by two tightly interrelated factors, both of which are framed through regional issues. First, the name issue with Greece has had repercussions on the country’s EU and NATO aspirations and it causes disenchantment of the Macedonian elites and people with the accession process.14 Similar dynamics are also likely to emerge regarding the identity concerns with the neighbouring Bulgaria. Second, the unconsolidated statehood and identity in Macedonia generate an increasing emphasis on the necessity to emphasize the nation’s ethnic character. In turn, such a policy poses further strains on the regional relations. Given that both Greece and Bulgaria are members of the EU and NATO, the nationalizing policies of the Macedonian VMRO-led government pose barriers to the effects of Europeanization in this country.

14 Although the public support for EU accession is still high, it has dropped from 97 per cent in 2004 (Risteska 2007) to 80 per cent in 2014 (Pajaziti 2014). Moreover, only 26 per cent of the Macedonian population support the entry of the country in the EU with a changed name.

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The Europeanization of Macedonia has influenced this country’s citizenship regime on many levels, not the least through the direct impact of the EU’s conditionality, but also through the influence of the CoE and other international organizations. In 1999 the EU launched the Stabilization and Association Process with Macedonia (SAP), which at the time was considered an oasis of peace in the post-Yugoslav space. Due to the uncertain future of the region, the SAP with Macedonia did not entail a promise of EU membership. The latter was articulated by the EU only in 2003, when the Thessalonica Agenda based the promise of EU membership on ‘EU conditionality in the region, from compliance with the Hague Tribunal to institutional reforms, from trade liberalization to the unresolved strategic issues, like implementation of the Ohrid Accords in Macedonia’ (ESI 2005, 2). While Macedonia signed its Stabilization and Association Agreement in April 2001, the specificities of the Macedonian political context accompanied by the August 2001 conflict delayed the country’s progress in the EU accession process. Macedonia submitted its application for EU membership in March 2004, and was granted the status of a candidate country for EU accession in December 2005. In the period between the adoption of the OFA and Macedonia’s receipt of the candidate status for EU accession, the external factors have had the major influence on this country’s citizenship regime. Freedom House reports for 2005 indicate the positive efforts of Macedonia in the areas of ‘citizenship law and in the legal protection of citizens’ rights in relation to state institutions’ (Freedom House 2005, 11). These efforts had also been noted in the annual progress reports of the European Commission. On the one hand, the EU-mediated Ohrid Framework Agreement changed the constitutional definition of citizenship from an ethnic to a more inclusive model. Hence, in general terms in the post-OFA period, scholars considered the ‘legal system of the Republic of Macedonia, and especially its constitution as Europe-oriented both in terms of its conception and its contents’ (Bajaldzijev 2002, 72). Even so, the effects of the EU accession in Macedonia are negatively affected by the stalemate in the formal process of accession. Due to Greece’s objections over the name issue, the start of negotiation talks with Macedonia was recommended only in 2009, while the country is still waiting for their official start. Hence the country’s ‘transition from EU candidate to full EU member might prove to be a long and difficult process’ (Spaskovska 2010b, 27). The consequences of these mutually reinforcing processes in Macedonia are rather different than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even if both show the limits of Europeanization. In both countries, the failure to reach a decision that would substantively change the way in which the state has been conceived (the balance of powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the name of the country in Macedonia) hampers the accession process. As the process is at a stalemate, the countries receive no benefits from compliance. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the non-implementation of the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (No. 27996/06 and 34836/06) ruling leaves a part of the country’s population without political rights. In Macedonia, there are no issues comparable to the situation of

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the Others in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather, the limits of Europeanization cause disenchantment with the accession process, which is significant as ‘EU integration is the common goal which unites all citizens of Macedonia regardless of their ethnicity, political orientation, social status’ (Risteska 2007, 1). In other words, the deadlock in the accession process due to the objections of Greece to the country’s name has pushed the country towards emphasizing the Macedonian ethnicity rooted in antiquity. This impasse fractured citizenship along ethnic lines internally, because it effectively excluded the country’s minorities from the nation-building process supported by the state. Conclusions The process of Europeanization has played a major role in the transformation of the citizenship regimes in the challenged and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav states. For the purposes of this book, Europeanization is largely understood as the countries’ adaptation to norms and standards that emanate from the process of EU integration. However, the adjustment to the requirements of accession is premised upon the observance of the rule of law and human and minority rights, in line with international standards. As argued throughout this chapter, Europeanization does not only entail direct observance of EU norms enshrined in the Union’s Acquis, but also adherence to standards of other international organizations, such as the Council of Europe. The effects of Europeanization vary. In principle, soft prescriptive norms have a milder impact on the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes than the technical rules with clearly stipulated benefits. The examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro corroborate that the visa liberalization process, which required a technical adaptation to the EU’s requirements, had a deeper impact on these countries’ citizenship regimes than the prescriptions of the CoE and ECtHR. Still, in assessing the degree of legal and institutional adaptation in the context of Europeanization, we need to take into account the dynamics of state and nation-building in the respective countries and the symbolic and institutional obstacles they may pose in the process of norm adoption. That is, the greater the institutional and symbolic challenges – both domestic and external – to the state and nation-building processes in a country, the slower the adaptation to the EU’s requirements will be. The divided post-war context of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a clear example of this. The ECtHR judgment in the case of Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown the inconsistency of the Bosnian constitutional setup with the equality principle inherent in the rights of citizenship. Even though the judgment explicitly noted that at the time of its adoption, the Dayton constitution required the power-sharing that has been in place in this post-Yugoslav state since the end of the conflict, constitutional reform is needed to guarantee the equality of rights for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not only for the constituent

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peoples. Even so, the power distribution among the constituent peoples prevents the effective implementation of the recommendations stemming from the ECtHR judgment. Hence while the constitutional reform will be needed in order for Bosnia to progress on its EU route, the changes to the domestic power equilibrium are not welcomed by the ethnic elites who object to change the constitution as the costs of adaptation outweigh the benefits thereof. Conversely, technical requirements of the visa liberalization process and the changes introduced by the OHR directly, significantly transformed the citizenship regime of this ethnically divided postYugoslav state. Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ECtHR had no direct rulings regarding the rights of citizenship in Macedonia. Yet the clearest effects of Europeanization of Macedonia’s citizenship have been induced by the OFA and the ratification of the ECN. Despite the ethnopolitical divisions in the country, the OFA and the ECN resulted in liberalizing the naturalization requirements in this post-Yugoslav state. However, the external contestations of the elements of Macedonian statehood and nationhood, which come from Greece and Bulgaria – both EU member states – are likely to have an adverse effect on the Europeanization of this country’s citizenship regime. That is, the stalemate in the negotiation process generates the reluctance of the domestic elites to adopt EU norms, and reinforces their nationalist rhetoric. This in turn deepens the ethnopolitical lines between the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian citizens of this post-Yugoslav state. The Europeanization of citizenship in Montenegro also reveals the significance of whether the vertical norms have a soft or a more substantial character and whether they are accompanied by a clear reward or not. The requirements for changing the citizenship regime of Montenegro induced by the reward of progressing in the EU accession process forged consensus among the domestic political actors. The agreement on the legislative changes was facilitated in Montenegro (compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina) by the fact that despite the deep internal divisions over statehood and identity, no ethnic group holds a veto. This, accompanied by the fact that the challenging external factor – Serbia – is not an EU member state and thus has a limited effect on this country’s EU accession, has induced a deeper effect of Europeanization in Montenegro than the ones in the other two challenged post-Yugoslav states.

Chapter 8

Conclusions With the fall of socialism, the study of citizenship has been revived in the attempts to explain and understand the transforming societies east and southeast of the Bernauer Straße. Citizenship policies reflect how the state has been conceived, which groups have what kinds of rights, how those rights are related to ethnic kinship, and respectively, how ethnic identities interact and play out in the neighbouring and international contexts. Citizenship practices indicate not only how the state distributes the rights and duties of citizenship, but also how the individuals relate to their polity, whether they feel included in it or excluded from it; whether they have an ‘entry ticket’ that they can use to claim the rights of citizenship or choose to distance themselves from the state that offered them that entry ticket. They also tell us how individuals feel towards the symbols of the state, and whether they perceive them as unifying or divisive. If the former is the case, such symbols reinforce citizens’ solidarity in the pursuit of postethnic citizenship. If the latter, they induce the fragmentation of citizenship along the lines of ethnic kinship, often preventing grassroots citizenship practices to cross the boundaries of ethnic communities. Hence the objective of this book was to propose an analytical framework that will help us to better understand and study the citizenship governance and practices in states that have emerged from multinational federations, that are pluriethnic, and subject to the effects of domestic and external forces. These states are unconsolidated and challenged by the nature of their establishment and composition. They are unconsolidated not because they are pluriethnic, that is, because different ethnic communities live in them, but because these ethnic communities disprove of the way in which the state has been constituted. This means that the people inhabiting the territories of the underlying states feel closer to their ethnic kin than to the state itself. They are challenged, because they have emerged from one or more processes of disintegration, and because the confines of their territorial and symbolic boundaries are contested in the broader neighbourhood. These two characteristics make both Brubaker’s (1996) ‘triadic nexus’ of national homelands, nationalizing states and national minorities and Smith’s (2002) complementary ‘quadratic nexus’ adding the international community to the equation useful but insufficient tools for exploring the governance and practices of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav context. In fact, neither of these two concepts explores the effects of other countries that affect the articulation of the state’s identity through citizenship policies, unless they are kin-states to national minorities. They also do not fully capture the common discrepancies in individuals’ attitudes towards citizenship as an identity of the state and their ethnic kinship. The ‘citizenship triad’ of status,

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rights and identity (Joppke 2001), which is otherwise exceptionally valuable for exploring the legal, political and emotional aspects of citizenship, faces equivalent challenges in the analysis of the complex post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes. It explains the ‘how’, while leaving a number of questions as to ‘why’ the regulation and practices of citizenship are formulated and articulated in a certain way. The framework explained in detail in Chapter 2 identifies five factors that add to our understanding of citizenship regimes in these unconsolidated and challenged states. The first step is to analyse how the state came into being and what it was before it became what it is now. Obviously, the first element that enhances our understanding of citizenship regulation and practices is history. Such an understanding of history of a state’s citizenship does not merely rest on institutional path dependence. Indeed, some legacies of the old socialist institutions are present in the current post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes. However, many of the symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship existed before socialism and have been revived since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Having obtained an insight in the historical pillars of citizenship, we can move to the second step for analysing the policies and practices in these states – that of domestic political competition. As noted by Shevel (2009), citizenship policies are developed and enforced by the political elites in a country, which means they contain the ‘image of politics’, or some reflection of the interests of those elites. Hence the image of politics of a country discerns why its citizenship policy contains certain elements, such as an uneven distribution of citizenship rights. Knowing the formal aspects of a state’s citizenship regime, we can then embark on the third step of analysis, which is to discern how people perceive the symbols of citizenship. For instance, a particular citizenship regime may contain symbolic and ideational elements that are contested by some individuals and groups, which thus fragment the practices of citizenship along the lines in which those groups are organized. Alternatively, broadly accepted symbols of citizenship as an expression of the state’s identity lead to individual practices conducive to unifying ‘moments of citizenship’. Yet, no citizenship regime is an island but it interacts with others, either by virtue of individuals’ mobility or the state’s entrenchment in supranational or international organizations. Put simply, other states and transnational entities affect the policies and practices of citizenship, meaning that the construal of citizenship also has an external dimension. Hence the fourth and fifth elements of the analytical framework presented in this book inform the understanding of the external factors shaping the citizenship regimes in unconsolidated and challenged states. Respectively, the fourth step of analysis consists of understanding the impact of the horizontal external factors. This refers to the exploration of how other countries, and especially the neighbouring ones, perceive the polity and what relationship they have with it. The challenges stemming from the neighbouring countries will have a significant impact on the very policy of citizenship and in particular on the way the country regulates its dual citizenship. High degrees of contestation of elements of statehood and nationhood by the country’s neighbours often lead to restrictive dual citizenship policies. And finally, the fifth step for

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studying a country’s citizenship is the vertical external effects, which emanate from international institutions and organizations which are polities of a higher instance such as the EU, the CoE, or the UN. While these organizations do not formally prescribe citizenship policies, they do affect them through their recommendations and/or requirements for membership. However, none of these five factors alone can fully explain the citizenship regimes of the unconsolidated and challenged states. Rather, they need to be viewed as complementing each other and adding to our understanding of citizenship policies and practices. While the analytical framework presented in this book can be applied to study citizenship regimes in general, it is of particular value for understanding the unconsolidated and challenged states. Its value is in the separate analysis of horizontal and vertical external factors, which allows for the understanding of policy choices affected by either of these factors. Unconsolidated and weak states have been selected in this book as they are particularly affected by the unfinished state and nation-building processes. Their polities and societies face a more dynamic transformation than those of consolidated democracies, which makes them more interesting for comparative analysis. The unconsolidated and challenged states in the post-Yugoslav space are a microcosm created through multiple partitions and wars, a microcosm aspiring to become integrated in the EU. For this reason, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro have been selected as three cases on which the five-step analytical framework was applied. As explained in the Introduction to this book, these three countries do not only share common existence in the former Yugoslavia, but also the reality of domestic ethnonational tensions and contestation by their immediate neighbours. The outcomes of these dynamics are the three countries’ citizenship regimes, which share the trait of ethnocultural selectivity (Vink and Bauböck 2013) while formally proclaimed as civic and inclusive. That is, in order to manage the citizenship policies with the ethnonational compounds, these states formally avoid ethnic designations in their citizenship legislation. However, ethnocentric elements are enshrined both in laws and in practices of citizenship, leading thus to the uneven distribution of citizenship rights across ethnic communities and to the lack of citizens’ solidarity. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most complex from among the examined cases. The two-tiered citizenship, retained only in this post-Yugoslav state, is a clear reflection of its post-conflict constitutional and institutional setups. The legal citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which formally has primacy over entity legislation, features mostly as a symbolic umbrella clouting the internal fragmentation of the country. The rights and duties of citizenship are effectively related not only to entity citizenships, as has been argued in the case of the Brčko District presented in Chapter 4, but also largely restricted to the constituent peoples. The latter has been exemplified through the analysis of the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina judgment of the ECtHR, which showed that the power-sharing in this post-Yugoslav state has far reaching adverse effects on those individuals who are not Bosniaks, nor

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Croats, nor Serbs. The deep ethnic lines among the communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have also reflected upon the symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship, in that the majority of this country’s population does not approve of the symbols of the state. Rather, they emphasize the symbols of their ethnic communities as the dominant ones. The emphasis on and reinforcement of ethnic communities further fragments the citizenship regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina and presents an obstacle for achieving citizens’ solidarity. Yet, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also instructive of the limits that the international norms have in post-conflict settlements, especially when the influence of the kin-states of the constituent peoples on these states’ citizenship regimes prevails. As argued in Chapter 7, the inability of the political elites of Bosnia and Herzegovina to agree on constitutional reform following the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina judgment shows that ethnic divisions take precedence over loose vertical external effects. When these effects are clear and when they have tangible benefits, as noted by the visa liberalization process, reforms of the policies and practices in the unconsolidated and challenged states are indeed possible. Equally, in the case of Macedonia, the most southern post-Yugoslav state, citizenship policies and practice have undergone a remarkable transformation after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Initially it was conceptualized as an ethnic citizenship regime after the country became independent in the early 1990s. The first Macedonian citizenship regime was designed to link the state to the ethnic Macedonian community, while posing membership barriers to ethnic Albanians and citizens of other republics of the former Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of the conflict, which re-designed Macedonia through the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the country’s citizenship regime became focused on a more equitable distribution of the rights of citizenship between the ethnic Macedonian and the ethnic Albanian communities. However, while ensuring that there would be no overt institutional dominance by the Macedonian majority in the country, the Ohrid Framework Agreement also drew clear lines between the two communities. These lines are very obvious in the antiquization project, which aims at reconstructing the narrative of ethnic origins of the people in Macedonia. The divisions thus created in turn lead to the fragmentation of citizenship both in terms of the rights of citizenship and in the context of citizens’ solidarity. As highlighted in Chapter 5, this lack of citizen’s solidarity is most manifest in the attitudes of the people from Macedonia, especially ethnic Albanians, towards state symbols which they see representative of only the ethnic Macedonian community. Similar to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the horizontal influence of the neighbouring countries appears to have a greater effect on the Macedonian citizenship than the international factors. In particular, the name dispute with Greece, which acts independently as a horizontal factor, has had an adverse effect on the country’s EU integration. Given that Macedonia began its efforts at EU membership a decade ago along with Croatia (which is an EU member state as of July 2013), and has not started negotiating the acquis chapters, incentives in this country to adapt to the requirements of membership are progressively fading away. As a consequence, the Europeanization of citizenship

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in Macedonia is rather limited, and restricted to policies and practices with clear benefits, such as visa-free travel for the country’s nationals. In Montenegro, however, the citizenship regime has undergone manifold transformations since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia as a result of the changes in the domestic political context. In the first half of the 1990s the Montenegrin political elite followed Milošević and remained in the common state with Serbia, which means that the Montenegrin citizenship regime developed under the unclear FRY citizenship framework. The break-up of the ruling DPS in 1997 and the subsequent distancing of its faction that remained in power from Milošević, and the federal institutions resulted in the adoption of a Montenegrin citizenship regime in 1999, which conflicted with the federal citizenship policy. Montenegro’s approach to citizenship subsequently developed in the context of the division over statehood and identity, underpinned by competing historical narratives. As highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5, this trajectory comprised an inclusive approach to the rights of non-Serb and non-Montenegrin minorities (Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats) as a mechanism of securing the votes for the ruling party. By contrast, the country’s citizenship regime, and especially as regards the status dimension, remained rigid towards the citizens from the other republics of the former Yugoslavia who settled in Montenegro during the 1990s, the majority of whom are of Serb ethnicity. Moreover, the tensions between the Montenegrins and Serbs (the two largest ethnic communities) and in the relations between Serbia and Montenegro are also mirrored in the restrictive approach to dual nationality that the smallest post-Yugoslav state has adopted. Unlike in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia however, Montenegro’s citizenship regime is more permeable to international influence due to two reasons. First, Montenegro is the only one of the three countries that is a unitary state. The non-existence of power-sharing implies that there are no significant veto players that could block decisions, as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, such a state structure has allowed the domestic actors to forge consensus on many matters related to the rights of citizenship in light of the requirements for EU accession. Second, unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, which face major challenges from the neighbouring countries in terms of statehood and nationhood, Montenegro’s challenge that comes from the neighbouring Serbia is of a lower intensity. Even though Serbia is a kin-state to a third of Montenegro’s population, it does not extend the same influence to Montenegro as it does to Bosnia and Herzegovina through Republika Srpska, an entity of ethnic Serbs. In addition to this, unlike Greece, which is a horizontal factor that hampers Macedonia’s EU accession, Serbia does not have the same leverage as it is not an EU member state. As a consequence, Montenegro’s citizenship regime has undergone a significantly greater transformation under the influence of the vertical external factors than those of the other two countries examined in this book.

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Contributions to Comparative Citizenship Studies and Directions for Future Research This project makes several significant contributions to comparative citizenship studies, in terms of theory, methodology, and case selection. It also contributes to the more recent literature on Europeanization and the studies of the Western Balkan countries’ political transformation. The vibrant field of Europeanization studies has most recently been enriched by contributions on the diffusionist effects that the EU’s norms have in its near abroad and elsewhere (Börzel and Risse 2012). Still, the deeper effects that the EU has on these countries’ citizenship regimes have not been explored in detail so far. Obviously, as the regulation of citizenship is a prerogative of the member states, there is no explicit conditionality as regards the regulation of countries’ citizenship policies. However, both citizenship and Europeanization are concepts that stretch beyond the formal policy regulation. As argued throughout the book, citizenship includes not only the regulation of membership, but is also a reflection of state and nation-building, and as such encompasses the practices of citizenship, symbolic meanings that individuals attribute to the link between themselves and the polity. In addition to this, Europeanization, particular as regards the countries aspiring to membership, includes the effects of the EU’s conditions as well as the conditions and requirements of other international organizations that are directly or indirectly enshrined in the accession process. Hence the first contribution of this book is in the approach that links the formal and informal aspects of the transformation of citizenship to Europeanization. A further contribution of this research is in the development of an analytical framework that helps us to study and understand the dynamics of citizenship policies and practices in the newly established states. The studies of postcommunist citizenship so far have predominantly looked at the institutional and policy changes. In other words, they largely overlooked the context in which these changes took place, the historical, political and external forces that shape and transform the citizenship regimes of new, unconsolidated and challenged states. Understanding the effects of these forces helps us to unveil the intricate links between what actually happens in society, how the political actors respond to it in constructing the citizenship regimes, and how individuals feel towards the state’s conception of citizenship. By taking a comprehensive and cumulative approach to the multiple and simultaneous processes, the analytical framework presented in this book can help us to understand not only how citizenship regimes have been constructed and how they operate, but also why they have been constructed in such a way, as well as why and when they are permeable or resistant to change. In line with Maatsch (2011, 153), this study demonstrates that citizenship regimes do not emerge and depend exclusively on domestic practices, as previously maintained by Hansen and Weil (2001). However, while Maatsch (2011) scrutinized the EU’s effects on the EU’s member states, this book looks at broader multilateral (vertical) and bilateral (horizontal) factors that tailor the regulation and practices of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space.

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The empirical analysis in this book was not restricted to the formal aspects of citizenship regimes of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, in other words the laws of citizenship and the regulation of citizenship rights. Rather, it also included the study of political dynamics in these unconsolidated and challenged states as well as on the practices of citizenship in them. With the aim of explaining the adoption of specific regulatory framework, the book looked not only at the political discourses but also at the broader dynamics, including political competition and interethnic relations. This approach did not limit the research to discourse analysis which is common in political science nowadays. Instead, the topic was approached through interdisciplinary process-tracing and analysis. In addition to the qualitative sources, including primary and secondary materials and fieldwork in all three countries studied, the book used the Survey (2011) supported by the Norwegian Research Council for the purposes of the project ‘Symbolic Nation-building in the Western Balkans’. The use of the results of this study for analysing the symbolic and ideational elements of citizenship added to this project and moved it away from the institutional analysis of citizenship undertaken within the EUDO observatory on citizenship at the European University Institute, and enriched the findings of the interdisciplinary CITSEE project at the University of Edinburgh. Finally, this book also offered a contribution to the understanding of the complex post-communist, post-partition and post-conflict societies. It is currently the only comparative project that analyses Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro as examples of unconsolidated and challenged states in the post-Yugoslav space. Moreover, it is the only book that looks at the citizenship regimes in these countries as a product of the competing streams of state and nation-building processes, thus merging the most significant domestic and external political issues. The book offers original empirical material, experience and knowledge of an ‘insider’ to the region, familiar with the languages and cultures of the countries that have been formed with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. This is the book’s particular value, because the poor knowledge and the lack of understanding of Slavic languages often resulted in important information being lost in translation. In other words, drawing upon both theoretical and contextual literature and insider knowledge of the region coupled with extensive fieldwork, this book maintains that the transformation of the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia or Montenegro was a result of elite competition, societal dynamics, and external pressures to which both these states and societies were exposed. The incoherence of the paths of state and nation-building has resulted in equally incoherent citizenship regimes, whereby the regulation of citizenship touches upon the core issues of membership (formally defined as the de-ethnicized link between the individual and the state), while the practices of citizenship remain vested in ethnic paradigms. By examining the varieties of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space through a five-step analytical framework, this book opened up avenues for further studies of citizenship not only in this region, but also more broadly. The analytical framework

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used to study the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro could be applied more broadly and to larger clusters of countries. The examination of a larger number of countries would help us to understand not only how the various citizenship regimes operate, but also to identify regional similarities and differences, and forces that allow the convergence or divergence of the regulation and practices of citizenship. Last but not least, the analytical framework presented in this book opens up the possibility for developing advanced models in the comparative citizenship studies and the setting up of indicators that will foster our understanding of the delicate relationship between us as individuals and the polities that we are legally, politically and emotionally linked to.

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Yugoslav Army Who Do Not Want to Return to the Homeland, and for the Members of Military Forces Who Have Served the Enemy and Have Defected Abroad. (Official Gazette of FPRY 64/45; 86/46)]. Zakon o registrima prebivališta i boravišta. Službeni list Crne Gore 13/08 [Law on Registers of Temporary and Permanent Residence. Official Gazette of Montenegro 13/08]. Zakon o sprovodjenju Ustava Crne Gore. Službeni list Crne Gore 1/07 [Law on the Implementation of the Constitution of Montenegro. Official Gazette of Montenegro 1/07]. Zakon o strancima. Službeni list Crne Gore 82/08 [Law on Foreigners. Official Gazette of Montenegro 82/08]. Zakon opšći crnogorski i brdski iz 1803 [1803 General Montenegrin and Hill Code] 1995, in Istorija Crne Gore, edited by Jagoš Jovanović. Cetinje: Izdavački Centar. Zakonot za državjanstvo na Republika Makedonija (Služben Vestnik na Republika Makedonija) [Law on citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia. (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia 67/92)]. Interviews Interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (1), Sarajevo, 20 May 2011. Interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (2), Sarajevo, 19 May 2011. Interview with Bosnian political analyst and scholar (3), Sarajevo, 16 May 2011. Interview with professor of political science, Sarajevo, 16 May 2011. Interview with Macedonian political analyst and civil society activist, Skopje, 9 June 2011. Interview with the representative of Ministry of Interior (1), Macedonia, Skopje, 7 June 2011. Interview with the representative of Ministry of Interior (2), Macedonia, Skopje, 7 June 2011. Interview with Macedonian political analyst and scholar, Skopje, 7 June 2011. Interview with human rights lawyer, Skopje, 6 June 2011. Interview with NGO representative, Podgorica, June 2011. Interview with representatives of UNHCR Montenegro, Podgorica, June 2011. Interview with representative of civil society and public policy analyst in Montenegro, Podgorica, June 2011. Interview with think tank representative and public policy analyst in Montenegro, Podgorica, June 2011. Interview with civil society representative from Montenegro (2), Podgorica, 9 May 2011.

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Index References in italics are for figures and those in bold refer to tables. Albania Albanian Citizenship Law 129 dual citizenship arrangements with Macedonia 129–30 as horizontal external influence on Macedonia 129, 136 as kin-state to Macedonia 98, 129, 136 visa liberalization processes 139–40 Albanians, ethnic alienation of in Macedonia 108–9, 116, 128–9 citizenship, loyalty and state identity, Macedonia 96–8 conflict with ethnic Macedonians (2001) 15, 17, 65, 69, 81, 154 disapproval of Macedonian national anthem 106 lack of symbolic representation in Macedonia 84–5, 108 naturalization requirements, Macedonia 65 objections to current Macedonian flag 102 reinforced nationalism of 111–12 rights of in Macedonia 17 rights under the Ohrid Framework Agreement 17, 65, 69, 108–9, 129 as veto players, Macedonia 71 see also Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) Aleinikoff, A. 31 Alexander the Great, symbolism of 83, 84, 107, 128 antiquization process, Macedonia 83–4, 97–8, 107, 116, 128, 155, 160 Arendt, H. 6 Aristotle 23 Ashkali (RAE) 142

Austro-Hungarian Empire Bosnia and Herzegovina under 47 control of the first South Slav state 9, 12 Montenegro under 50 Badinter Arbitration Committee 61 Bauböck, R. 14, 30, 31, 36 Berg, E. 111–12 Bieber, F. 16, 112 birth right, citizenship territory (jus soli) 29–30 by descent (jus sanguinis) 29–30 Boll, A. 98 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993 Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 61–2 1995 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV, Dayton Agreement) 72–3 1999 Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina 74, 75 2001 Law on Citizenship of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 74 academic research on 2, 3 as asymmetric federation 72 under the Austro-Hungarian Empire 47 bi-cameral legislature 75–6 Bosnian identity alongside ethnic identity 95 Bosnia’s Gordian Knot 77–8 Brčko District and entity citizenship 74, 78–80, 91, 149–50 bridges as common symbols 109 citizens’ naturalization as Croatian 123

190

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro citizenship, loyalty and state identity 94–6, 94, 159 constitutional reform debate 77–8 as consociational democracy 16 constituent peoples and citizenship rights 75 current flag of 101–2 dual citizenship agreement with Croatia 123–4 dual citizenship agreement with Montenegro 121 dual citizenship agreement with Serbia 121–2 dual citizenship policies, restrictive 119–20, 136 ECN and lack of changes to citizenship regime 145 entity and state citizenship relationship 16, 73–4, 110 ethnic communities, political exclusion of 75–7, 91 ethnonational fracturing 95, 110–11, 116, 120 ethnoreligious pluralism, historical 48 federal structure 14–16 formation of 15 within the former Yugoslavia 13, 53 horizontal external influence of Croatia 120–21 and ICTY ruling on Srebrenica massacre 121 independence referendum 61 indirect imposition, EUSR 149, 150 internal and external challenges to state-building 34 internal factors and citizenship policies 91, 100 Law on the Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina 149–50 national anthem 104, 105 naturalization criteria 74–5 under the Ottoman Empire 46 paradox of the fleur du lys 101 n.1 political elite and constitutional reform debates 78 postethnic demonstration (Bebolucija) 114 Presidency of 75

Roma peoples’ access to visa-free travel 140 Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina 76–7, 150–53, 155–6, 159–60 sporting events as pan-Bosnian 109–10 symbols of state 160 Tanzimat reforms 46 two-tiered citizenship regime 73–4, 159 two-tiered military system 62 vertical external factors, Office of the High Representative (OHR) 149 visa liberalization processes 139–40, 155 see also Dayton Peace Agreement; Republika Srpska Bosniak, L. 5 Brčko District, entity citizenship and 74, 78–80, 91, 149–50 Brubaker, R. 6, 14, 26, 29, 30, 157 Bulgaria Bulgarian/Bulgarian citizen distinction 126 denial of Macedonian sovereignty 17, 125 dual citizenship arrangements with Macedonia 126–7, 129, 136 as horizontal external influence on Macedonia 17, 27, 125–6 Macedonians as Bulgarians 49 naturalization requirements 126 shared national heroes with Macedonia 125–6 tensions over Macedonian language 125 veto of Macedonian accession to EU 126 Central and East European States (CEEs) 41 citizen solidarity 5–6, 114–15 citizenship concept of 3, 4–5, 6, 7 effects of political/economic instability 8

Index emotional dimensions of citizenship 10–11 exclusionary citizenship policies 10–11 external influences on 11–12 governance of 7–8 inclusive citizenship policies 11 influencing factors 23–5, 24 overlap with nationality 4 regulatory dimension of citizenship 10 relationship to state-building and nation-building 3–6 citizenship regimes civic citizenship regimes 29–30 defined 5 ethnic citizenship regimes 28–30, 36, 110, 123, 126, 160 idealtypic citizenship regimes 30–31 and political processes 9 practices of citizenship 157 civic citizenship regimes 29–30 civic vs. ethnic citizenship and birth rights 29–30 civic processes 6 debate on, Montenegro 17–18, 99–100 dichotomy of 6–7 ethnic identity 6 former Yugoslavia 10 Cohen, E. 5 constitutional nationalism 33 consociational democracies Bosnia and Herzegovina as 16 defined 16 Macedonia as 80, 82–3, 111–12 constellations of citizenship concept of 36 horizontal norm transfers and 36–7 at polity level 36 vertical factors and convergence in citizenship 37 Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession 147 effects on Montenegro 147 human rights standards of and Europeanization 40

191

influence on regulation of citizenship 32 Croatia academic research on 2 consolidation of ethnic identities 13–14 dual citizenship with Bosnia and Herzegovina 123–4 ethnic citizenship regime 123 EU accession 123, 124 high citizenship naturalization rates 123 horizontal external influence on Bosnia and Herzegovina 120–21 independence referendum 61 Croatian Spring movement 58–9 Dahl, R. 41 Dallago, B. 60 Dayton Peace Agreement change imposed by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) 149 citizen vs. ethnonational identities 95, 110–11, 116, 120 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 72–3 and creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 15, 64 and minority rights to stand for the Presidency (Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina) 76–7, 150–53, 155–6, 159–60 uneven distribution of citizenship rights under 15, 75–7, 78, 91 Dević, A. 101 domestic elites, see political elites DPS (Demokratska partija socijalista) 86, 90, 107, 115, 130, 133 Drezov, K. 127 Drina River bridge, Bosnia and Herzegovina 109 dual citizenship agreements and access to EU labour markets 123, 126, 129 for Bosnia and Herzegovina 119–20, 121–2, 123–4, 136 for Bulgaria 126–7, 129, 136 for Croatia 123–4

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Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

for Greece 129 horizontal factors and 26, 35, 120 and kin-state loyalties 35, 119 for Macedonia 124–5, 129–30, 134 for Montenegro 86, 88, 98, 121, 130, 133–4, 135, 136, 161 restrictive policies and contested nationhood 135 for Serbia 121–2 vertical external influences and 35 Džankić, J. 88, 112, 113 ethnic citizenship regimes 28–30, 36, 110, 123, 126, 160 ethnic identity conflation with nationality 4 and constitutional nationalism 33 governance and identity narratives 25 in post-communist states 42–3 postethnic citizenship concept 43, 93 self-exclusion of ethnic minorities 2 see also civic vs. ethnic citizenship ethnic policies and constellations of citizenship 36 state formation and exclusion of minority groups 1–2 ethnic vs. civic dichotomy birth right, citizenship 29–30 citizenship 6–7 civic processes 6 debate, Montenegro 17–18 ethnic identity 6 former Yugoslavia 10 ethnocultural selectivity 30 ethnonational fracturing in Bosnia and Herzegovina 95, 110–11, 116, 120 in Macedonia 111–12, 116, 154, 155 in Montenegro 112–13, 116–17 postethnic demonstrations and 114–15 and Skopje 2014 project, Macedonia 108 ethnopolitical competition international factors 91 in Montenegro 86, 88, 89–90, 91, 131, 133, 145 European Commission (EC)

conditions for accession talks with Montenegro 143 see also visa liberalization processes European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 40, 151 European Convention on Nationality (ECN) effects on Macedonia 82, 145–6 objectives of 39–40 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling on Slovene citizenship 11 n.3 Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina 76–7, 150–53, 155–6, 159–60 European Union (EU) accession to, Croatia 123, 124 convergence of citizenship laws under 36–7 dual citizenship and access to labour markets 123, 126, 129 influence on regulation of citizenship 32 Macedonian candidacy for 128 Montenegrin candidacy for 88, 143–5 and regulation of membership 39–40 transformative power of 2, 3 and vertical influences on citizenship laws 37, 38 European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina 149, 150 Europeanization citizenship amendments, Montenegro 143–5, 155 conceptualisations of 37–8 conditionality mechanisms 38, 39 human rights and Europeanization processes 40 imposition mechanisms 38, 39 limited effects of soft criteria, Bosnia and Herzegovina 150–53 limited effects of soft criteria, Macedonia 153–5, 160–61 processes of 38–9 within quadratic nexus of statebuilding 27 socialization mechanisms 38, 39

Index and sociological institutionalism 32 as vertical external factor 137 weak positive effects of 145, 148 see also visa liberalization processes external factors on state-building in unconsolidated states 34 see also horizontal external factors; vertical external factors Favell, A. 30–31 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 1999 Law on Montenegrin Citizenship 66–7 constitution of 66 delayed recognition of Macedonian sovereignty 127 federal citizenship laws 66 formation of 65 influence on Montenegrin citizenship regime 161 foreign policies, citizenship as mechanism of 34 former Yugoslavia 1963 Constitution 55 1964 Citizenship Act 58–9 1976 Citizenship Act 59 academic research on 2–3 administration of 53 Citizenship Acts and jus sanguinis 56–8 citizenship of children 59 civic vs. ethnic citizenship 10 decentralization of 53, 54–5, 58–9 displaced persons’ refugee status in Montenegro 131–2, 143–4 economic crisis, 1980s 60–61 ethnonational communities and identity 13, 43, 52–3 federalist structure 55 historical citizenship processes 9 historical formation of 12–13 instability and changing perceptions of citizenship 8–9 legacies of socialist citizenship 41–2 and loss of Yugoslav citizenship 58 regulation of citizenship 55–60 relationship with the USSR 54 n.4

193

republican citizenship 10 status of Muslim population 55 sub-Yugoslav identities vs. supranational identities 55, 95–6 two-tiered citizenship regime 10, 13, 56, 60 France, nation-building in 29 Germany, nation-building in 29 governance of citizenship 7–8 domestic factors, ethnic elites 25 domestic factors, symbolic assemblages 25–6 historical influences 25 and horizontal factors 26 and vertical factors 26 Greece challenge to Macedonian nationhood 83, 102, 127–8 dispute over name of Macedonia 17, 64, 125, 127–8, 153, 155, 160 tensions over Macedonian language 125 and use of Star of Vergina, Macedonian flag 102 veto of Macedonian accession to EU 126 veto of Macedonian accession to international organizations 128 Guzina, D. 120 Hansen, R. 31 Hapsburg Empire 45, 47, 47 n.1 historical institutionalism 26, 28, 29–31 Hobsbawm, E. 84 horizontal external factors on Bosnia and Herzegovina 120–21 citizenship regimes 11–12, 17, 24, 26 constellations of citizenship 36–7 on dual citizenship 26, 35, 120 and governance 26 on Macedonia 17, 27, 102, 125–6, 128, 129, 136 on Montenegro 130–35 overview of 158 on state-building and citizenship nexus 27

194

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

and unconsolidated states 35 Horowitz, D. 93 human rights anti-discrimination legislation, Macedonia 140 and the Bebolucija demonstrations, Bosnia and Herzegovina 114 and Europeanization processes 40 Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina 76–7, 150–53, 155–6, 159–60 and sociological institutionalism 32 identity narratives 25 Ilievski, Z. 15 institutionalism approach 27–9 and citizenship regimes 28 historical institutionalism 28, 29–31 rational choice institutionalism 28, 31–2 sociological institutionalism 29–31, 32 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO-DPMNE) 83–5, 98, 108, 116, 126, 128, 153 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 121 Isaković, Z. 129 Jileva, E. 126 Jenne, E. 112 Jenson, J. 5 Joppke, C. 7, 31, 32 Kacarska, S. 139–40, 142 Kaldor, M. 41 Kallay, Benjamin 48 Keil, S. 3, 14–15 kin-states as external influences on citizenship regimes 9, 29, 34 identification with, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina 16, 94, 95, 120–24, 160 identification with, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia 98, 129, 136 identification with, ethnic Serbs in Montenegro 98–9, 136, 161

loyalty to and dual citizenship 35, 119 Klusmeyer, D. 31 Kodra Hysa, A. 107–8 Koska, V. 123 Krasniqi, G. 14, 27 Lapenna, I. 55 legal processes and constitutional nationalism 33 legal definitions of citizenship, contested states 6 state/individual relationship as 5, 6 legislation, sociological institutionalism 32 Lijphart, A. 16 loyalty of ethnic Albanians to Macedonia 96–8 of ethnic Serbians to Montenegro 99–100 ethnic vs. state loyalty 93–4 to kin-states and dual citizenship 35, 119 and Macedonian citizenship 96–8, 96, 124–5 and Montenegrin identity 98–100, 99 Maatsch, A. 28, 36, 37 Macedonia 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 64–5, 80–81 1992 Law on Macedonian Citizenship 65, 124 academic research on 2 admission to the United Nations 128 Albanian disapproval of national anthem 106 Albanian objections to the current flag 102 alienation of ethnic Albanians 108–9, 116, 128–9 anti-discrimination legislation 140 antiquization process 83–4, 97–8, 107, 116, 128, 155, 160 Bulgarian denial of sovereignty of 17, 125 citizenship, loyalty and state identity 96–8, 96

Index citizenship rights for citizens of former Yugoslavia 146–7 conflict with Serbia over religious elements of Macedonian identity 127 as consociational system 80, 82–3, 111–12 current flag, ethnicization of 102 de-ethnicization of citizenship 145–6 dispute with Greece over name 17, 64, 125, 127–8, 153, 155, 160 disputed identity as separate nation (historical) 49 domestic elites and citizenship policies 71 dominance of right-wing political parties 83–4 dual citizenship agreement with Albania 129–30 dual citizenship agreement with Montenegro 134 dual citizenship, regulation of 124–5 ethnic Albanians, lack of symbolic representation 84–5, 108 ethnocentric definitions of citizenship (1991 Constitution) 80–81 ethnonational fracturing 111–12, 116, 154, 155 European Convention on Nationality, weak positive effect of 82, 145–6 European Union candidacy 128 Europeanization, limited effects of soft criteria 153–5, 160–61 within the former Yugoslavia 13, 53 Greek challenge to nationhood 83, 102, 127–8 horizontal external influence of Albania 129, 136 horizontal external influence of Bulgaria 17, 27, 125–6 horizontal external influence of Greece 17, 27, 102, 126, 128 independence process 64 internal and external challenges to state-building 34 Macedonian/Albanian conflict 65 minority language rights 81–2 national anthem 104, 105–6

195

national heroes, conflicts with Bulgaria 125–6 naturalization requirements 82, 125, 127, 146 under the Ottoman Empire 46, 48 out-of-country voting rights 85 postethnic demonstration (No Police Brutality) 114–15 power-sharing governance structure 14–15 remittances from the diaspora 125 Roma peoples’ access to visa-free travel 140 Serb/Bulgarian tensions 49, 53–4 Skopje 2014 project 84–5, 107–8, 125–6, 127 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) 154 symbolism of Alexander the Great 83, 84, 107, 128 Tanzimat reforms 46 tensions with Greece over Macedonian language 125 tribal identities 54 visa liberalization processes 139–41, 155 see also Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) Marušić, S. 108 methodology 18–21 Milošević, Slobodan 64, 65, 66, 67, 121, 127, 161 Misirkov, Krste Petkov 49 Montenegro 1975 Citizenship Law of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro 59–60 2004 Law on the State Symbols of Montenegro 103 2006 Law on Asylum 130–31 2007 Constitution of Montenegro 68, 88–9 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act 86, 132–3, 134, 143–5, 147–8 academic research on 2 Action Plan for the Resolution of the Status of Displaced Persons from the Former Yugoslav Republics

196

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro and IDPs from Kosovo Residing in Montenegro 131–2 appeal to minorities and multiculturalism 113 under the Austro-Hungarian Empire 50 as candidate country for EU accession 88, 128, 143–5 citizen (građanin) vs. national (državljanin) status 89–90 citizenship, loyalty and state identity 98–100, 99, 113, 116–17 civic state in 17 civic vs. ethnic citizenship 17–18, 99–100 desires for independence from Serbia 65–6, 67, 112–13 displace persons and refugee status in Montenegro 87–8, 130–33, 141–2, 143–4 disputed identity as separate nation (historical) 51–2 domestic elites and citizenship policies 71 dual citizenship agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina 121 dual citizenship agreement with Macedonia 134 dual citizenship agreement with Serbia 133–4, 135 dual citizenship policies, restrictive 86, 88, 98, 130, 136, 161 effects of Council of Europe on 147–8 ethnic Serbian voters, exclusion of 88 ethnic Serbians, citizenship rights 133 ethnonational fracturing 112–13, 116–17 ethnopolitical divisions and 86, 88, 89–90, 91, 131, 133, 145 under the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 66–7, 127, 161 first Statute of Montenegro (1905) 50–51 flags of 102–3 within the former Yugoslavia 13, 53 General Legal Code (1855) 50 General Montenegrin and Hill Code 50

horizontal external influences on 130–35 internal and external challenges to state-building 34 national anthem 104, 106–7 naturalization requirements for spouses and groups 145 new Law on the Register of Electors 90 under the Ottoman Empire 46, 50 objections to the current flag 103 political elites use of citizenship rights and voting rights 86, 88, 89–90, 91, 131, 133, 145 postethnic demonstrations (united in grief) 115 republics’ citizenship registers 87 residency requirements 88 rights of aliens in, historical 50, 51 Roma peoples’ access to visa-free travel 141 Serbian non-recognition of the national anthem 106–7 tribal identities 50 unconsolidated state identities 14 unification with Serbia (1917) 51–2 vertical external influences on 161 visa liberalization processes 139–40, 141–2, 155 voting rights and citizenship status 89–90 nationality, term 4 nation-building and dominance on one ethnic group 33 and historical institutionalism 29 in pluriethnic states 33 relationship to state-building and citizenship 3–6 naturalization barriers to, unconsolidated states 34 criteria, Bosnia and Herzegovina 74–5 of ethnic Croats, Bosnia and Herzegovina 123 requirements, Bulgaria 126 requirements, Macedonia 65, 82, 125, 127, 146

Index requirements for ethnic Albanians, Macedonia 65 requirements for Roma peoples 65, 144 Neofotistos, V. 112 new-state model 14 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) and civic state conception 81 as consociational agreement 80–81, 111–12 and ethnonational fracturing 80, 81, 111–12, 116, 154, 155 negative consequences of 85 official status of minority languages 81–2 rights of ethnic Albanians under 17, 65, 69, 108–9, 129 Ottoman Empire Bosnia and Herzegovina under 46 Gulhane decree 46 Macedonia under 46, 48 millet system 45 Montenegro under 46, 50 Nationality Law, citizenship under 47 Ottoman Penal Code (1858) 46 secularisation of 46–7 Tanzimat reforms 46, 47 path dependency 31–2 Pellet, A. 61 Perchinig, B. 31 Petar I Petrović 50, 51 Petar II Petrović 51 political elites and citizenship policies 71 and constitutional reform debates, Bosnia and Herzegovina 78 implementation of citizenship regimes 26 use of citizenship rights and electoral power 86, 88, 89–90, 91, 131, 133, 145 political processes and citizenship regimes 9, 158 opportunities for in decentralized systems 111 path dependency 31–2

197

and rational choice institutionalism 31–2 voting rights and citizenship status 86, 88, 89–90, 91, 131, 133, 145 Popović, M. 100 post-communist states definitions of citizenship 42–3 ethnic identity in 42–3 legacies of socialist citizenship 41–2 sub-federal citizenship, dominance of 42 transitions of 41 postethnic citizenship concept of 43, 93 demonstrations of 114–15 mobilization in Republika Srpska 111 practices of citizenship 8 Pulevski, Georgi 49 Radaelli, C. 38 Rava, N. 9 Renner, S. 140 Republika Srpska 1999 Citizenship Law of the Republika Srpska 74 central administration of 72 Constitution of 62–3 criteria for the admission of foreign nationals 63 entity citizenship and 16, 110 ethnic identification with kin-state (Serbia) 122–3 and impact of visa liberalization process 140 military recruitment 63–4 postethnic mobilization in 111 regulation of membership 8 visa liberalization processes 140 Risteski, L. 107–8 Roma peoples naturalization requirements, Macedonia 65 naturalization requirements, Montenegro 144 and the visa liberalization process 140, 141 Rossos, A. 48, 49

198

Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

Sarajlić, E. 46, 62, 73, 121 Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina 76–7, 150–53, 155–6, 159–60 Serbia conflict over religious elements of Macedonian identity 127 consolidation of ethnic identities 13–14 dual citizenship agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina 121–2 dual citizenship agreement with Montenegro 133–4, 135 and ICTY ruling on Srebrenica massacre 121 inclusive citizenship policies 11 kin-state identification with by Republika Srpska 122–3 Montenegrin independence from 65–6, 67, 112–13 nation-building and horizontal influences on Bosnia and Herzegovina 120–21 naturalization on ethnic grounds 122 naturalization requirements for Macedonia 127 unification of Montenegro with (1917) 51–2 visa liberalization processes 139–40 see also Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Serbs, ethnic citizenship, loyalty and state identity, Montenegro 99–100 citizenship rights as displaced persons, Montenegro 133 ethnic identification with kin-state (Serbia) 122–3 and ethnonational fracturing, Montenegro 112–13 ethnopolitical divisions and, Montenegro 86, 88, 89–90, 91, 131, 133, 145 and Montenegrin identity 113, 116–17, 161 non-recognition of Montenegrin national anthem 106–7 objections to the Montenegrin flag 103

symbolic power of dual citizenship 122 Shafir, G. 5 Shaw, J. 5, 9 Shevel, O. 88, 158 Shoup, P. 55 Sievers, W. 31 Skopje 2014 project 84–5, 107–8, 125–6, 127 Slovenia consolidation of ethnic identities 13–14 European Court of Human Rights ruling on Slovene citizenship 11 n.3 exclusionary citizenship policies 11 independence referendum 61 Smilov, D. 126 Smith, D.J. 27, 157 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 10, 41–2, 54, 55, 58, 59 South Slav state, first 9–10, 12, 53 Soysal, J. 32 Spaskovska, L. 46, 81, 84, 111 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) 40 the state ethnic vs. state loyalty 93–4 relationship with the individual 5, 6, 33 State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 67–8 state-building and definitions of citizenship 1 and dominance of one ethnic group 33 new-state model 14 in pluriethnic states 33 quadratic nexus of 27, 157 relationship to nation-building and citizenship 3–6 triadic nexus of 26, 27, 157 in unconsolidated states 33–4 Štiks, I. 1, 5, 9, 42, 66 Stjepanović, D. 79 symbols of citizenship ethnic differences represented through, Macedonia 84–5 and practices of citizenship 25, 158

Index sporting events as 109–10 symbols of state bridges 109 flags 101–3 function of 100 languages 125 monuments 107–8 national anthems 104, 105–7 Tarrow, S. 111 the Washington Agreement 15 Touquet, H. 43, 111 Trauner, F. 138, 140 unconsolidated states horizontal external influences and 35 state-building in 33–5 vertical external influences and 35 United Nations 128 USSR 54 n.4 Uvalić, M. 60 Vaknin, Sam 84 van Meurs, W. 111–12 Vangeli, A. 83, 128 Vejvoda, I. 41 Verdery, K. 42 Vermeersch, P. 111 vertical external factors on Bosnia and Herzegovina 149 on citizenship regimes 11–12, 24, 26 constellations of citizenship 37

199

of international institutions 159 on Montenegro 161 see also Europeanization; visa liberalization processes veto players 39, 71, 145, 161 Vink, M. 14, 30, 40 visa liberalization processes Albania 139–40 Bosnia and Herzegovina 139–40, 155 criteria 139 impact on citizenship 40 importance of visa-free EU travel 138–9 Macedonia 139–41, 155 as mechanism of change 138, 142 Montenegro 139–40, 141–2, 155 Republika Srpska 140 roadmaps for 139 Roma peoples access to visa-free travel 140, 141 Serbia 139–40 technical requirements of 40, 138–9, 140 Weil, P. 31 Williams, A. 129 Wolff, S. 15 Yilmaz, I. 46 VMRO–IMRO 126