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Citiesina TimeofTerror
CitiesandContemporarySociety SeriesEditors:RichardD.BinghamandLarryC.Ledebur, ClevelandStateUniversity Sponsoredbythe MaxineGoodmanLevinCollegeofUrbanAffairs ClevelandStateUniversity Thisnewseriesfocusesonkeytopicsandemergingtrendsinurban policy.Eachvolumeisspeciallypreparedforacademicuse,aswellas forspecialistsinthefield. SUBURBANSPRAWL PrivateDecisionsandPublicPolicy WimWiewelandJosephJ.Persky,Editors THEINFRASTRUCTUREOFPLAY BuildingtheTouristCity DennisR.Judd,Editor THEADAPTEDCITY InstitutionalDynamicsandStructuralChange H.GeorgeFrederickson,GaryA.Johnson,andCurtisH.Wood CREDITTOTHECOMMUNITY CommunityReinvestmentandFairLendingPolicy intheUnitedStates DanImmergluck PARTNERSHIPSFORSMARTGROWTH University-CommunityCollaborationforBetterPublicPlaces WimWiewelandGerrit-JanKnaap,Editors REVITALIZINGTHECITY StrategiestoContainSprawlandRevivetheCore FritzW.Wagner,TimothyE.Joder,AnthonyJ.Mumphrey,Jr., KrishnaM.Akundi,andAlanF.J.Artibise THEUNIVERSITYASURBANDEVELOPER CaseStudiesandAnalysis DavidC.PerryandWimWiewel,Editors PEOPLEANDTHECOMPETITIVEADVANTAGEOFPLACE BuildingaWorkforceforthe21stCentury ShariGarmise CITIESINTHETECHNOLOGYECONOMY DarreneL.Hackler CITIESINATIMEOFTERROR Space,Territory,andLocalResilience H.V.Savitch
Citiesina TimeofTerror Space,Territory,andLocalResilience
H.V.Savitch
CITIES AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
M.E.Sharpe
Armonk, New York London, England
Copyright©2008byM.E.Sharpe,Inc. Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyform withoutwrittenpermissionfromthepublisher,M.E.Sharpe,Inc., 80BusinessParkDrive,Armonk,NewYork10504. LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Savitch,H.V. Citiesinatimeofterror:space,territory,andlocalresilience/byH.V.Savitch. p.cm.—(Citiesandcontemporarysociety) Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN978-0-7656-1683-8(cloth:alk.paper) 1.Terrorism.2.Urbanviolence.3.Citiesandtowns.I.Title. HV6431.S292008 363.32509173’2—dc22
2007021957
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Thepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsof AmericanNationalStandardforInformationSciences PermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials, ANSIZ39.48-1984. ~ BM(c) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Tothememoryofmybrother,SySavitch–– howdearlywemisshim.
Contents
ListofIllustrations Preface Acknowledgments
ix xi xvii Part1.BackgroundandTheory
1. SketchingUrbanTerrorism 2. TheEvolutionofUrbanTerrorism 3. TheFearFactor
3 26 44
Part2.TheGeospatialFeaturesofUrbanTerrorism 4. Terror’sSpaces:Identity,Haunts,andNodes 5. DecontrollingTerritory
67 94
Part3.PolicyResponsesandLocalResilience 6. SurveillanceandShrinkage 7. SustainingLocalResilience
123 148
Part4.Conclusions 8. RestoringaSelf-AffirmingCity
171
Appendix Notes References Index AbouttheAuthor
175 197 225 239 269
vii
ListofIllustrations
Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12
DistinguishingGroupTerrorismfromStateTerrorism TerrorinGlobal,Mega,andMajorCities,1990–2005 SeverityIndexofGlobal,Mega,andMajorCities,1968–2005 ScopeofTerror:Twenty-FiveNationsandTerritories,1968–2005 PublicAttitudesintheWakeofAttack:ProximitytoSitesofAttack PublicAttitudesintheWakeofAttack:ResponsestoAttack TerroristOrganizationsandIdentities TerroristIdentityandAttacksinTwenty-SevenCities,1998–2005 MegaAttacksinTwenty-ThreeNationsandRegions UrbanTerrorism’sWeaponry,Site,andImpactinTwenty-Five NationsandRegions EmploymentandTerrorisminNewYork,London,andJerusalem LargestInsuredLossesDuetoTerrorism,1970–2001 UrbanAreaSecurityInitiativeFundingfor2006 Twenty-FiveNations,Regions,andCitiesStruckbyTerror Global,Mega,andMajorCities:ShareofNationalPopulation TerrorinSecondCities,1990–2005 TerroristIdentityandIncidentsinTwenty-SevenCities,1968–2005 TerroristIdentityandCasualtiesinTwenty-SevenCities,1968–2005 TerroristIdentityinTwenty-TwoNations:Comparing 1968–1994and1995–2005 TerroristIdentityinTwenty-TwoNations:Comparing 1968–1994and1995–2005 TerroristIdentityinTwenty-SevenCities:Comparing 1968–1994and1995–2005 TerroristIdentityinTwenty-SevenCities:Comparing 1968–1994and1995–2005 ShareofTerrorAttacksinJerusalemNeighborhoods,1998–2005 ShareofTerrorAttacksinNewYorkCity’sNeighborhoods, 1993–2005 ShareofTerrorAttacksinLondon’sNeighborhoods,1998–2005
8 20 23 33 55 59 70 74 80 97 155 162 164 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 185 188 191 192 192 ix
xLISTOFILLUSTRATIONS
A13 A14
UrbanResilience:TourisminNewYork,London,andJerusalem, 1990–2005 UrbanResilience:OfficeVacanciesinNewYorkandLondon, 2000–2006
193 194
Figures 1.1 Global,Mega,andMajorCities 2.1 FrequencyofTerror:IncidentsinTwenty-TwoNations,1968–2005 2.2 SeverityofTerror:CasualtiesinTwenty-TwoNations,1968–2005 2.3 SeverityofTerror:CasualtiesperAttackinTwenty-TwoNations, 1968–2005 4.1 DistributionofAttacksbyTerroristIdentityinTwenty-SevenCities, 1968–1994and1995–2005 5.1 JerusalemTerrorAttacks,1998–2005 5.2 NewYorkTerrorAttacks,1993–2005 5.3 Schematic:AttackontheWorldTradeCenter,September11,2001 5.4 LondonTerrorAttacks,1998–2005 5.5 The7/7Attacks:UndergroundandBusLocations 5.6 IstanbulTerrorAttacks,1998–2005 6.1 PartofBelfast’sWall 6.2 VideoCamerainJerusalem 6.3 BarrieringtheNewYorkStockExchange 6.4 Gilo’sFortressConstruction 6.5 ShrinkingUrbanSpaceinLowerManhattan 6.6 SlowingMovementinLowerManhattan 6.7 ARingofConcreteinWashington,DC 6.8 “StreetFurniture”inWashington,DC 6.9 FieldofVisionattheWhiteHouse 6.10 BlockingOffandPatrollingtheWhiteHouse 7.1 ElasticityandResilienceinJerusalemTourism,1998–2004 A1 ShareofUrbanandNonurbanIncidentsinTwenty-Two NationsandRegions A2 ShareofUrbanandNonurbanCasualties,1968–2005 Photographsfollowpage168.
17 35 36 37 78 101 107 109 113 115 118 125 129 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 157 195 196
Preface
AThornySubject Theexperienceandworkforthisbookbeganbefore9/11changedourworld.I firstcameuponwhathascometobecalledurbanterrorismbackin1981.Atthe time,IwasspendingasabbaticalyearinParis.Myfamilyfoundresidenceina crowded inner-city neighborhood and all of us enjoyed its enormous diversity. Oneday,asweheadedtowardoneoftheneighborhood’slandmarks—aJewish restaurantnotedforitssuperbcornedbeefsandwiches—weheardloudclapping soundsandsawcrowdsrunninginthedirectionofthenoise.Withinminutesthe streetwasjammedandwediscoveredtherestauranthadbeenmachine-gunnedby menfiringfromaspeedingcar.Asisthecasewithsomuchofurbanterrorism,the restauranthadbeenselectedbecauseitcontainedlargecrowds.Thedeathlycharges weredirectedagainstanyonewhohappenedtobeinthevicinity.Ilaterdiscovered thatradicalsfromtheFrenchgroupDirectActionhadtargetedthispredominantly Jewishareaformasscarnage. Whiletheexperienceleftadurableimpression,Ihadnotquiteassociatedthe violencewiththecity’sbuiltenvironment.Theincidentdid,however,setoffa keenerawarenessofterrorism,andasIreadnewspaperaccounts,itsuniquecity qualitiesgraduallybecameevident.NotuntillateryearswhenIspenttimeatthe WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterdidthesubjectariseformeinanyscholarly form.Inthelate1990sagroupofuswereaskedtowriteindividualpapersoncities andnationalsecurity.Muchtomysurprise,Iwastheonlyonewhohadchosento investigateurbanterrorism. Mypaperwasshortandattractednounusualattention.Thesubject,however, sat with me—remotely because of the memory of Paris and more immediately becausethedatatoldmetherewassomethingtothisphenomenon.Workingwith agraduateassistant,Icontinuedreadingaboutthesubjectandexploringdata.By thespringof2001,IhadcompletedapaperforsubmissiontoUrbanStudies.The paperwaspublishedjustafewmonthslater,intheweeksfollowingdirectlyin thewakeof9/11. FromthatpointonwardIworkedintermittentlyonthesubject.Muchofthe subsequentresearchwaspromptedbystaysinFranceandIsrael,aswellasby short-term travel elsewhere.The rash of terrorist attacks in Jerusalem between 2000and2003wasparticularlyunsettling.Theexperiencedidputmeonthetrack xi
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ofcomparingJerusalem’sexperiencewiththoseofothercitiesaroundtheworld. September11waspulledintoacertainfocusbyseeingwhatwasoccurringin Istanbul,Madrid,andsubsequentlyLondon. Thecomparisonsthatseemedapparenttomeandmainstreamsocialscience werenotalwaysappreciatedinpartsoftheacademyorthemedia.Terrorismis athornysubject.Itisalltooeasytogetprickedbythosewhoseeitinpartisan terms.Therearepeoplewhorationalizeit,seektoexplainitaway,andevenrefuse tousetheword“terror.”Othersinsistthatterrorismisimpossibletodefineortoo slipperytobeputtoscholarlyuse.Someacademicsseeitasa“socialconstruct” andtoosubjectivetoclassify,thoughitiscuriousthatfortheseskeptics“race”or “colonialism”havenotposedthesameconceptualimpossibilities.Theclichéthat “oneperson’sterroristisanotherperson’sfreedomfighter”saysagreatdealabout itsproclivityforsubjectiveargument. Havinggrownacutelyawaretothisproblem,Idevotetherestofthissectionto methodologicalissuesofterrorismandIdefineurbanterrorisminthenextchapter. Spellingoutthesepreambleshasclarifiedmyownthinkingandwasofgreatvalue informulatingtherestofthevolume.Itrustthereaderwillalsoseethisasuseful forthelargeranalysis. MethodologyandData Howmightwestudyurbanterrorism?Inattemptingtoanswerthisquestion,the firstchallengeformewastocarefullydefineanddistinguishtheconceptandlay outthedimensionsthroughwhichittranspires—space,territory,andlogistics.The nextchallengewastoestablishboundariesaroundwhichtheanalysiscouldbe conducted.Thiswasnecessaryinordertocapturetheessentialsofurbanterrorism withoutgettinglostinperipheralexperiencesorbecomingunwieldy.Asoftenoccurs insocialscience,what,how,andwhycertainchoicesaremadeinvolvespersonal judgmentabouthowparticularcircumstancesfitselectedcriteria.Ihaveendeavored tomakethosechoiceswithinasoundframeworkandwithconsistency. Oneofthemorecriticalchoicesinvolvedselectingasizablenumberofnations andterritoriesthatmightbestrepresentgeneraltrendsinurbanterrorism.Thechallengewastoaccomplishthiswhileavoidingidiosyncraticcasesthatmightdistort theanalysis.AsIsawit,themostdistortingfactorsinvolvedareasbesetbymultiple kindsofwarfare.Thesewouldbecountriesthatwereenmeshedinexternalwars, endemiccivilwars,andinternalupheavalswhereterrorismcouldtooeasilybemixed orconfusedwithothertypesofwarfare.ForthisreasonIavoidedthemostextreme cases.NationslikeAfghanistan,Iraq,andLebanonwerenotpartofthisstudy,mostly becausetheirsituationsweretoocloudyandverydifficulttoascertain.Atthesame time,itwasimportantthatthebookcapture“hotspots”ofterrorism.Thesesites constituteanimportantpartoftheanalysisbecausetheytellushowterroristsbehave, howcitiesaretargeted,andhowpeoplerespondtosevereassaults.Some“hotspots” includeNorthernIreland(Belfast),Israel(JerusalemandTelAviv),Egypt(Cairo),
PREFACE xiii
Turkey(IstanbulandAnkara),andSaudiArabia(RiyadhandJeddah).Theselection processinvolvedsortingnationsorregionsstruckbyterrorismasmeasuredbyincidentsandcasualties.Thosenationsandregionswiththelargestnumberofincidents andcasualtieswerechosen.Listedbelowaretwenty-fivenationsandregionsselected bythisprocess.Asampleoftheirleadingcitiesislistedinparentheses. Algeria(Algiers,Oran) Canada(Ottawa,Toronto,Montreal) Chechnya(Grozny) Colombia(Bogotá,Cali) Egypt(Cairo,Alexandria) France(Paris,Marseille,Lyon) Germany(Berlin,Hamburg,Munich) Greece(Athens,Thessalonica) India(Mumbai,NewDelhi) Indonesia(Jakarta,Surabaya) Israel(Jerusalem,TelAviv) Italy(Rome,Milan,Naples) Japan(Tokyo,Yokohama)
Kashmir(Srinagar) Kenya(Nairobi,Mombassa) Morocco(Casablanca,Rabat) NorthernIreland(Belfast) Pakistan(Islamabad,Karachi) Peru(Lima) Russia(Moscow,St.Petersburg) SaudiArabia(Riyadh,Jeddah) Spain(Madrid,Barcelona) Turkey(Istanbul,Ankara) United Kingdom (London, Birmingham, Manchester) United States (NewYork, LosAngeles, Washington,DC)
ThisstudyutilizesdatafromtheRand–MemorialInstituteforthePrevention ofTerrorism(Rand-MIPT)TerrorismKnowledgeBase(TKB)database.Thedata havebeensorted,edited,andadapted.Muchoftheadaptationinvolvedexamininganddistinguishingurban-basedterrorismfromitsnonurbanvariant.1Thedata encompassmorethanthreedecadesofrecordedevents,beginningin1968and runningthrough2005;theyincludemorethan1,100citiesortownscoveringover 12,000incidents.Becauseofthedifficultiesincollectingconsistentlongitudinal information,Ihavedividedthedataintothreecategories.TheseincludeType1 data(domesticandinternationalincidentsfrom1968to2005);Type2data(internationalincidentsfrom1968to2005);andType3data(internationalanddomestic incidentsfrom1998to2005).2 Type1dataarenotuniformbecausetheycontaininternationalincidentsfrom oneperiodmixedwithinternationalanddomesticincidentsfromanotherperiod. Accordingly,Type1dataareusedsparingly,onlyforindicativepurposesorto maximizetheavailableinformation.Type2datahavebeenuniformlycompiledfor overthreedecades,thoughonlyforinternationalevents.Type3datahavealsobeen uniformlycompiledandareallinclusive,thoughforlessthanadecade.Naturally, differentdatabaseswillshortenorlengthentimeperiodsorconstrictorexpand information.Differenttypesofdatadoholdcertainadvantagesanddisadvantages, and I have endeavored to use them as appropriate to a particular discussion.3 WhereIthoughtituseful,IemploybothType2andType3datatoverifycertain
xivPREFACE
propositions.ThisprovedhandyinChapter4,whereIcomparedlong-termtrends (Type2data)withashortertimeinterval(Type3).Alldatatypesandsourcesare identifiedthroughoutthetext,andsupplementaryinformationcanbefoundinan appendixattheendofthevolume. Anumberofothertechniquescontributedtothenarrative.Ihavereliedonarchivalmaterial,newsreports,governmentdocuments,interviews,censuscounts, mapping, geographic information systems, and secondary literature. Especially importantforastudyofthiskindisspatialanalysis,andforthisIhaveusedmaps andvariousgraphicmaterial. Finally,Ihavetriedtoworkwithinaframeworkofstandarddefinitionsofterrorismandhaveadaptedthemtotheideaofurbanterrorism.Chapter1goesthrough thisinsomedetail,butitwillbeusefulheretoprovideadefinitionderivedfrom theRand-MIPTTKB.4Itreads: Terrorismisdefinedbythenatureoftheact,notbytheidentityoftheperpetratorsorthenatureofthecause.Terrorismisviolence,orthethreatofviolence calculatedtocreateanatmosphereoffearandalarm.Theseactsaredesignedto coerceothersintoactionstheywouldnototherwiseundertake,orrefrainfrom actionstheydesiredtotake.Allterroristactsarecrimes.Manywouldalsobe violationofrulesofwarifastateofwarexisted.Thisviolenceorthreatofviolenceisgenerallydirectedagainstciviliantargets.Themotivesofallterroristsare political,andterroristactionsaregenerallycarriedoutinawaythatwillachieve maximumpublicity.Unlikeothercriminalacts,terroristsoftenclaimcreditfor theiracts.Finally,terroristactsareintendedtoproduceeffectsbeyondtheimmediatephysicaldamageofthecause,havinglong-termpsychologicalrepercussions onaparticulartargetaudience.Thefearcreatedbyterroristsmaybeintendedto causepeopletoexaggeratethestrengthsoftheterroristandtheimportanceofthe cause,toprovokegovernmentaloverreaction,todiscouragedissent,orsimplyto intimidateandtherebyenforcecompliancewiththeirdemands.
TheRand-MIPTdefinitionisimportantbecauseitisthesourceformostofthe datagathered.ItisalsoconsistentwiththedefinitionusedbytheUnitedStatesand theEuropeanUnion.AdefinitionfurnishedbytheU.S.DefenseDepartmentpays attentiontothe“calculateduseofviolenceorthethreatofviolencetoinculcate fear”andacts“intendedtocoerceortointimidate,”whiletheU.S.StateDepartmentpointsupthe“deliberatetargetingofnoncombatants.”TheEuropeanUnion stresses“seriouslyintimidatingapopulation”andcitesexamplesof“attacksupon aperson’slife,”“kidnappingorhostagetaking,”or“seizureofaircraft,shipsor othermeansofgoodstransportation.”5 Whiletheemphasesmaydiffer,thestandarddefinitionscontaincertaincommon elements:(1)terrorisdefinedbythenatureoftheact,(2)theactiscenteredon theapplicationofviolence,(3)theviolenceisdeliberatelyusedagainstcivilians (noncombatants)tocreatefear,and(4)thefearisusedforpurposesofpolitical intimidation.Ihaveelaborateduponthesedefinitionsandadaptedthemtomyown conceptualizationofurbanterror.
PREFACE xv
OrganizationbyTheme Theorganizationofthisvolumeisbuiltonmajorthemes.Isuggestthaturbanterrorismisbasedoninculcatingmassfear.Thecoreofthisfearconsistsofterrorists targeting high-density, mixed-use, high-value, and strategically located spaces. Thebook’sthemesunfoldinthreebroadsectionsconsistingof(1)background and theoretical perspectives, (2) geospatial features of urban terrorism, and (3) policyresponsesandcityresilience.Theopeningsectiononbackground/theory containschaptersthatexplainthenatureofurbanterrorism,itspractices,andits corecomponents.Withinthissection,Chapter1explainshowurbanterrorismcan bedistinguishedfromothertypesofwarfareandsuggestshowterrorismmight bedefinedandappliedasabasicconcept.Italsousesglobal,mega,andmajor citiestoillustrateterrorism’skeyaspectsandpresentsabroadpictureofincidents andcasualtieswithinthesecities.Chapter2continuestheanalysisbyrecounting theeventsof9/11inNewYork,3/11inMadrid,and7/7inLondon.Itthenputs theseeventsinthecontextofterrorism’sevolution.Thechapterunderscoresthat whiletheattacksinNewYork,Madrid,andLondonbroughttheworldtoanew awakening,thiswasbutthetipofanicebergwhoseformationwasrecordedmany yearsbefore.Thatrecordisanalyzedthroughdifferentcategoriesthatmeasure thescope,thefrequency,andtheseverityofurbanterrorism.Chapter3movesto atheoreticaltreatmentofhowurbanterrorworksthroughintimidationandfear. Thechapterbeginswithmainstreamaccountsofurbanterrorasencapsulatedby the news media’s use of language. I suggest that language, particularly nouns, usedtodescribeterrorismisoftenshapedbytheproximityofindividualstoacts ofterrorandtheirsenseoffear.Characterizationsofterrorareafunctionofthe fearsitevokes.Anothersectiondealswiththepotentialuseofweaponsofmass destructionagainstcitiesanditsconnectiontoterroristtactics.Alsodiscussedis whathasbecomeknownaspost–traumaticstressdisorderanditsimpactoncity life.Thechapterendswithananalysisofhowmassanxietyisusedbyleadersand otherelitestoadvanceparticularends. Thenextsection,ongeospatialfeatures,containschaptersdevotedtoidentifying terroristorganizationsandhowtheyutilizeurbanspacetoattackcities.Chapter 4specificallydiscussesterroristidentityintermsofanarchistic,secular,andreligiouslymotivatedterrorism.Italsodescribesthespacesused(cityhaunts)andhow theysometimesconnectwithoneanotheracrosstheglobe.Chapter5analyzeshow urbanterrorismexploitscityvulnerabilitythroughtacticsthatincludedecontrolling territory,repetitiveattacks,and,ultimately,shrinkingurbanspace.Tacticsofthis kindareparticularlyeffectiveintransmittingtheshockofattacktootherpartsof thenationalandglobalsocialorder.TheexperiencesofLondon,NewYork,Paris, Istanbul,andJerusalemareinstructiveforhowcitiescopewithterrorism,how spaceschange,andhowurbanlifeisaltered. Thelastsectiondealswithpolicyresponsesandlocalresilience.Chapter6is dedicatedtoshowinghowcitiesattempttoconductsurveillance,broadlydefined
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toincludemanytypesofpublicscrutinyinordertohalt,deter,ormitigateterrorism.Surveillanceisfarfromnewandbeganwiththeconstructionofwallsaround ancientandmedievalcities.Itsmodernincarnationembraces“streetwatching,” panoptic devices, technological detection, barriers, and fortress construction. Whileunintended,surveillanceresultsintheshrinkageofurbanspace,andhas theparadoxicaleffectofconstrictingtheveryfreedomsitissupposedtoensure. NewYork,Washington,DC,London,Jerusalem,andMoscowserveaspointsof departureforexaminingitsmanyapplications.Thechapterconcludesbypointing upthetensionsbetweensurveillanceanddemocraticfreedoms. Chapter7wrapsuptheanalysisbylookingattheissueofurbanresilience,or howcitiesfareinthefaceofattack.Thischapteropenswithvariousprognoses aboutNewYork’sfuture.Astrainofintellectualopinionheldtopessimisticforecasts aboutthecity’sfuture—whichIsubsumeundertherubricof9/11dystopia.Most oftheseareshowntohavebeenincorrect,andthisleadsmetodiscussthecity’s capacityforresilience.Asthechaptersuggests,resilienceisbuiltintothenature ofthecity,thoughitwillvaryfromlocalitytolocality.Inlightofthis,Ireturnto broaderquestionsofhowpublicpolicymightbeusedtosustainresilience. Theverylastsectioncontainsconclusions.Chapter8pointstothepremises ofurbanterrorism—thatittriestoturnthestrengthofthecityagainstitself—and thengoesontodiscussthefindings,showingthevariouswaysinwhichterrorists exploittheurbanterrain.Infinishing,Ireviewwhathasbeendiscoveredabout urbanterrorism,itstendencytowardmegaattacksanditstargetingtactics.Emergingfromthischapteraretwonotionsofurbanvulnerabilityandlocalresilience, pittedagainstoneanother.
Acknowledgments
Ioweagreatdealtocolleagues,friends,studentsandstaffattheUniversityof Louisville’sSchoolofUrbanandPublicAffairs.SUPAallowedmetheresources, time,andgoodcolleagueshiptocompletethiswork.Itisawonderfulhomethat allowsmetoenjoyawonderfulprofession.SteveBourassaandRonVogelhelped withfriendshipandassistance.DaveSimpson’sexperiencewithhazardsresearch rubbedoffonme(oratleastsomeofit)andhelpedontheissueoflocalresilience. BruceGalecontinuestobeaterrificofficeneighborandgiftedkibitzer.Thestaff atSUPAisexemplary.ThanksgotoJuliWagner,PattySarley,andDionneMatthis fortheirhelp,efficiencyand,mostofall,theirgoodnature.Overinphilosophy AveryKolersprovidedconstructiveadviceontheVenndiagram. Asalways,studentsareourgreatestreward.InrecentyearsGregoryArdashev andAnarValyev,bothRussianspeakers,wereofimmenseassistance.Iprofoundly thankthemforgivingmethepleasureofbeingtheirmentor.LinYealsohelpedput togethermapsandanalyzedata.Hewasalwaysanenergetic,skillful,andcareful researcher.TheBrown&Williamsonfundwasinvaluableinenablingmetotravel, research,andwrite.Iamappreciativeforthatgift. IthasbeenapleasureworkingwiththeprofessionalsandstaffatM.E.Sharpe. HarryBriggsisamanofwonderfulabilitiesandevengreaterpatience.RickBinghamencouragedthebook,recruitedmetoM.E.Sharpe,andhasbeenanableeditor fortheseriesonCitiesandContemporarySociety.AnaErliccamethroughwith solidproblemsolvingforwhichIamgrateful.Aswithapreviousbook,Dianne O’Reganwastruetoformanddidawonderfuljobwiththeindex. Thepastisprologue,andIoweagreatdealofgratitudetotheWoodrowWilson InternationalCenterforScholarsinWashington,DC.Thatorganizationenabledme tofirstwriteabouturbanterrorbackinthe1990sandprovidedmewithsupportand anurturingatmosphere.BlairRubleandJoeTulchinwereinstrumentalincreating thatatmosphere.Wilsongavemetheopportunitytomeetandworkwithpeople likeRichardStren,GabiSheffer,MariaElenaDucci,andmanyothers. FartherawayfromhometheFloersheimerInstituteforPolicyStudies(nowatthe HebrewUniversity)providedresources,time,access,andtalent.ProfessorsAmiram GonenandShlomoHassonwereinstrumentalinthatendeavor.EranRazin,Danny Felsenstein,andNoamShovalwerewelcomingcolleaguesandintroducedmeto Jerusalem.ThelateArieShacharfurnishedhistalentsasafirst-rateraconteur,and xvii
xviiiACKNOWLEDGMENTS
weallmournhispassing.Floersheimeralsoallowedmetogaintheacquaintance ofYaacovGarb,andwelatercametocollaborateonissuesofterror,barriers,and there-topographyofthecity. In 2002 I had the privilege of serving as a Fulbright Scholar at the Maison MéditerranéennedesSciencesdel’Homme(Aix-en-Provence,France).Iremain gratefulforthatopportunity,whichallowedmetoruminateaboutthesubjectand getstartedonsubsequentwork.IowemuchtoAndreDonzel,AlainMotte,and DanielPinsonforamostproductiveandsatisfyingvisit. Noacknowledgmentwouldbecompletewithoutmyexpressionofgratitudeto SusanClarkeoftheUniversityofColorado(Boulder)andGabrielShefferofthe HebrewUniversityofJerusalem.SusanandGabireadmostofthemanuscript, carefullyandscrupulously.TheytoldmewhereIhadgoneastray,madeincisive comments,andofferedsoundadvice.Iremainintheirdebt.Naturally,theusual disclaimersareinorder.NeitherSusannorGabiareresponsibleforthefaultsthat lieherein.Thatissolelymydoing. Last,Ithankmyfamilyfortheirloveandsupport.Mywife,Susan,wasalways bymyside—listening,cajoling,andenduringmyidiosyncrasies.Adam,Jonathan, Jen,Luke,andEthanhaddifferingideasonwhatIwasuptoandwouldhavegiven theirkindnessnomatterwhatIdid.Iamafortunateman.
OceanGrove,NJ
Citiesina TimeofTerror
Part1 BackgroundandTheory
1 SketchingUrbanTerrorism
Whatthehammer?Whatthechain? Inwhatfurnacewasthybrain? Whattheanvil?Whatdreadgrasp? Dareitdeadlyterrorsclasp? —WilliamBlake WhatTerrorismIsandIsNot CitiesinaTimeofTerrortakesupthecomplexissueofhowcitieshavefaredinthe midstofpoliticallymotivatedviolenceagainsttheircitizenryandenvironment.Irefer totheoccurrenceofthisviolenceasurbanterrorism,andexploreitsevolution,its meaning,anditsramificationsforcitylife.Inthelastfourdecades,citieshavebeen subjecttomorethan12,000incidentsofterrorismandincurredover73,000casualties. Theproportionofurbantononurbanterrorismisstaggering.Approximatelythree outofeveryfourattacksandfouroutoffivecasualtiesoccurinacity.1Urbanterrorismhasbroughttheequivalentofamajorwartocitiesaroundtheworld.Itsmost conspicuousqualityisthatciviliansareboththeintendedandtheactualvictims. Thequestionsbehindthesebarefactsabound.Doesurbanterrorismdifferfrom itsmoregeneralizedversion,andifso,inwhatways?Inwhatwayshasurban terrorismchanged?Whoaretheurbanterrorists?Howdoesurbanterrorismaffectcitizens?And,arecitiesabletoadoptprotectivepolicieswithoutlosingtheir openness,pluralism,andvibrancy?Thesequestionslieatthecoreofthebroad designation“urbanterrorism.”Beforeturningtothesequestions,somedistinctions shouldbemadebetweenthegeneralformofterrorismandurbanterrorism. Inanyenterpriseofthissort,definitionsareimportant.2Theyclarifywhatthe writerisinvestigating,theylayoutthescopeofinquiry,theyguidethecollection ofdata,andtheyultimatelyshapetheanalysis.Definitionsareespeciallytrickyin dealingwithacontroversialsubjectliketerrorism,whoseperpetratorshavebeen variouslydescribedas“militants,”“freedomfighters,”“martyrs,”“jihadists,”and “fanatics.”Inanefforttofollowgoodsocialsciencepractice,Ihavetriedtoescheweuphemismssooftenusedbythepopularmediaorcharacterizationsusedby thosewithanideologicalaxetogrind.Nodefinitionisperfect,andanydefinition ofterrorismisboundtorunintoobjections.Thisproblemiscompoundedbythe vastliteratureonterrorismwithitsverydifferentperspectivesonthesubject.3To 3
4CHAPTER1
clarifytheissue,Ihaveadoptedadefinitionofterrorismthatbestdescribestheact itself,thatbestfitspatternsofterroracrossdifferentchronologicalandnational boundaries,andthatmostaccuratelydescribesterroristbehavior.Thedefinitionis alsowidelyacceptedinliberaldemocracies. Acommonlyusedlegaldefinitionofterrorismdescribesitasthepurposefuland deliberatetargetingofnoncombatantsthroughvariousformsofcoercion.4Terrorismemploysviolenceindiscriminatelyinordertothreatenorintimidatepeoplefor politicalpurposes.5TothisIshouldaddthatintimidationcanalsobebroughtabout byindiscriminateattacksonpeoples’sourcesofsustenance(shelter,infrastructure, livelihoods).Whatdistinguishesterrorismfromotherkindsofviolenceisitsdesire tostrikeasampleofagivenpopulationortheirsourcesofsupport,sothatoutof sheerdreadotherswillcapitulate.Indiscriminatetargetingisakeyterroristobjective becauseitcreatesanatmosphereofmassvulnerability.Terroristsdeliberatelykill, cripple,ordestroythatwhichpertainstoapeople(Israelis,Bosnians,Americans) orwhatthosepeopleconstituteasasocialgroup(bourgeoisie,Christians,kulaks, blacks). The inculcation of mass fear is inextricably linked to terror. Much of terrorism’seffectivenessdependsontheextenttowhichitcanbringfeartoahigh pitch—somuchsothatterrorismcanbedescribedasleadingtointense,sharp, overwhelmingapprehension. In settling on a definition we should understand that terrorism is a form of warfarecarriedoutunderconditionsofasymmetricmilitarycapability.6Thatis, terroristsactagainstpopulationsbyutilizingrudimentaryviolencethatincludes kidnapping,hijacking,shootings,arson,andplantedorhumanbombs.Muchof theterrorismweseeinvolvesanorganizationalinfrastructurethatcoordinatesattacksthroughdisguisedagents,makingdetectiondifficult.Terroristsaregenerally supportedbyanundergroundorganizationandtheydonotwearinsignia—allof whichenablesthemtoachievetacticaladvantagebypenetratingcivilianareasand blendingwiththepopulation. Sinceterrorismisinvariablyconnectedtopoliticalobjectives,itusuallyinvolves more than one person. From a conceptual view, the size of the organization is notcrucialanditmayvaryfromacellofafewpeopletoafull-blownhierarchicallyrunapparatus.Certainly,terroristorganizationswilldifferintheirpolitical demands.Someterroristdemandsaresubjecttonegotiationwhileothersarenot. PrimeMinisterTonyBlairmadethispointincontrastingthepoliticaldemandsof theIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)versusthoseofalQaeda.Whilethesedifferences shouldbetakenintoaccount,itdoesnotmakeoneorganizationless“terrorist” thananother.Differencesexist,butsotoodocommondenominators,andtheseare crucialforassessingterroristwarfare. Asistypicalinsocialscience,distinctionsarenotalwaystidy.Therearetimes whenconventionalforcesresorttoterror,muchastherearetimeswhenterroristswage conventionalwarfare.HereIdrawalinebetweenonegrouplegitimatelybeingdesignatedas“terrorist”becauseofitsveryfrequentuseofterrorasitsmodusoperandi, andanothergroupnotbeingconsideredas“terrorist”becauseofitsrareorinfrequent
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 5
useofterroristtactics.Byandlargeterroristwarfareisdistinguishablefromguerrilla orconventionalwarfare.Guerrillawarfareiscarriedoutbyirregularfighters,aimed atothercombatants,andreliesonunconventionaltactics.Guerrillasdosharesome attributeswithterrorists,likehit-and-runattacks.Guerrillasandterroristsalikeuse surpriseandlong-termattritiontodefeatmoreconventionalfoes.However,unlike thoseofterrorists,guerrillatargetsarequitediscreteandaimedatthemilitary. Whereasguerrillasseektocausemajordisruptionintheranksofenemyarmed forcesandwearthemdownwithcostlylosses,terroristsavoidopencombat.This maywellbebecauseterroristsknowtheywouldloseinanymilitaryconfrontation, sotheirlogicalrecourseistoattacksofttargetsorassaultthesocialorder.Guerrillas operateasarmedunitsthatseektoholdandoccupyterritory,whileterroriststryto preventpeoplefromusingtheirownestablishedterritory.Granted,therearetimes whenlinesbetweenguerrillaandterroristblur,especiallywhenanorganization conductswarfarethroughmultiplemeansorwhenanorganizationistransitioning fromoneformtoanother.Terrorismcanalsoevolveintoguerrillawarfareoreven developconventionalcapabilities,muchasguerrillaandconventionalwarfarecan turntoterrorism.Hezbollahembodiesthiskindoftransition.Duringthe1980s,its activitieswereheavilyterrorist,involvingabductionsandassaultsoncivilians.In thelastfewyearsithasdriftedtowardbuildingaguerrillaforce,engagingtheIsraeli armyin2006anddevelopingthepoliticaltrappingsofaquasistate.Hezbollah’s possibletransitiontellsusthathybridsdoexistandeachcaseshouldbeanalyzed onthebasisofitsdistinctattributes. Stillcleareristheconceptualdistinctionbetweenterrorismandconventionalwarfare.Asmentioned,terrorism’scorefeaturesareitspremeditatedviolenceagainst noncombatanttargetsanditsintenttoinfluencealargeraudience.Bycontrast, conventionalmilitaryactionhasdirectcombatobjectivesthatareaimedprimarily atmilitarytargets.Mostly,conventionalwarfareisbattlefieldcombat,designedto deprivetheenemyofitsfighters,logisticalsupport,andwilltocarryon.Tobesure, conventionalwarfareoftenresultsinciviliancasualties,butthisdoesnotamountto terrorism.Solongasthiswarfareiscarriedoutwithoutrecklessdisregardforthe livesorsustenanceofnoncombatants,itremainsasconventionalmilitaryaction, despitethefactthatnoncombatantsarekilledancillarilyorinadvertentlyaspartof alargereffort.Thisprinciplepertainstolethalinterceptionsofterrorists(“targeted killings”),preemptiveattacks,andotherwaysinwhich“tickingbombs”arestopped. Whenconventionalmilitaryforcesdoreverttokillingorinjuringnoncombatants asaprimaryobjective,theiractionsshouldbeassessedempiricallytodetermine whethertheyqualifyasactsofterror.7 GroupTerrorismandStateTerrorism:SameGenus, DifferentSpecies Thepictureofterroristsoperatingsurreptitiouslytoconductindiscriminateviolence evokesanimageofoutlawsandbrigands.Forsome,thisreinforcesthenotionthat
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terrorism should be viewed as uniquely outside the state. Some scholars argue thatsinceterrorismisaimedagainstgovernmentsandhasanunusualstructureof incentives,itshouldbeseenasessentiallyanonstatemovement.8Accordingto thisview,statesmaycommitatrocities,butbynaturetheyshouldnotbeseenas terroristentities.Myownviewisthatsuchcontentionsareproblematicbecause history is replete with states having conducted indiscriminate violence against civiliansforpoliticalpurposes.Itthereforebecomesdifficultifnotimpossibleto ignoretheexerciseofterrorismbystates.Indeed,themoderngenesisoftheconcept iscouchedinthegovernmentofrevolutionaryFranceanditsnotorious“reignof terror,”tosaynothingofstateterrorismthoughpreviousages. Stillandall,weshouldnotconflatenonstate(orgroup)terrorismwithstateterrorism.Therearesubstantialdifferencesbetweenthesephenomenathatembrace accountability,visibility,organization,resources,choiceoftargets,andimmediate objectives.9Beginningwiththemostobviousdistinction,groupterroristsleaveno addressandtheyassiduouslyavoidbeingtraced.Bydefinition,allstates(including thosethatengageinterrorism)areidentifiableandreachablethroughaddressesat theirnationalcapitals,theirforeignembassies,andtheirmembershipininternationalorganizations.Whilepossessinganaddressdoesnotassureaccountability, itdoesmeanthatstateactorsareanswerabletochargesinwaysthatgroupscan ignore. Having a national or diplomatic address ordinarily promotes restraint. Second,andrelatedtothepreviouspoint,groupterroristsoperateunderground, they have little visibility, and very heavily rely on disguised agents to execute attacks.Stateactorsarequitedifferent.Whiletheyalsopossessthecapacityto operateunderground,statesmustdemonstrateamodicumofvisibility.Theydothis throughuniformedtroops,trainedpoliceforces,state-runmedia,politicalparties, bureaucracies,andthelike.Third,groupterrorismisgenerallybuiltonlessformalorganizationalstructures.Thisorganizationalformatmayrunthegamutfrom themorehierarchicalapparatusthathadbeenthehallmarkofHezbollahwhenit wasexclusivelyaterroristorganizationtotheamorphousnetworksofalQaeda.10 Despitethevariation,evengroupswithasubstantialhierarchybearnorelationto thecomplexandextensiveinstitutionspossessedbynation-states.Fourth,because groupterroristshaverelativelylowresources,theirinstrumentsofcoercionare oftenprimitive,makeshift,andlow-tech.11Handguns,handgrenades,detonated explosives,andsuicidevestsaretheusualweaponsofchoice.Insharpdistinction,evenpoorstateshavehighresourcesconsistingofmissiles,artillery,tanks, armoredvehicles,boats,andaircraft.Fifth,thesedifferencesarealsorevealedin thecontrastingwaysgroupterroristsandstateterroristsconductviolence.Group terrorismusesrandom,scattershotviolencedesignedtostrikegenerictargetslike crowds,banks,transitsystems,andlargebuildings.Quiteapartfromthis,state terrorismismorelikelytorelyoncollectivepunishmentwhereretributionistaken againstspecificvillages,neighborhoods,orcommunities.Statesarealsomorelikely tomixtheirviolencebyusinganassortmentofforce—military,police,andsecret agents.Finallyandmostimportantly,theimmediateormedium-rangeobjectives
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 7
ofgroupandstateterrorismarequitedifferent.Groupterrorismseekstoupseta functioningsocietyoroverturnanexistingstateby“decontrollingterritory”and producingsocialchaos.12Thisiswhyitsviolenceiscarriedoutsurreptitiouslyand designedtoarbitrarilyshockmasspublics.Comparethistostateterrorism,which seekstostrengthentheexistingstateandreinforceitsterritorialcontrolthrough morepinpointedviolence.Thesecontrastingfeaturesramifyintosharpdistinctions inbehaviorandaresummarizedinTable1.1. So significant are these differences that group and state terrorism should be considered as separate species stemming from the same genus rather than as a single,undifferentiatedcategory.Asidefromthesubstantivedifferences,thereare practicalreasonsforlimitingastudytogroupactors.Whilestateterrorismismuch murkierandblendsintoahostofotherkindsofviolence,groupterrorismisrelativelyeasytoidentify.Thesheerscopeofterrorismisenormousanditsconception difficultenoughwithoutaddingtoit.13Forthesereasons,Ihavefocusedthisstudy onthemorecommonusageofterrorismasconsistingofnonstateorgroupactors, organizedforpurposesofviolenceandpoliticalintimidation. LocatingtheUrbaninUrbanTerrorism Whileterrorismcanbestudiedasformofgeneralwarfare,itcanalsobetreated fromauniquelyurbanperspective.14Thisperspectiveismostapplicabletocities thatarelocatedinwhatarecommonlycalledliberaldemocracies.Thereasoning behindthishastodowithboththestrengthsandvulnerabilitiesoffreeandcomplex societies.Theopenqualitiesofliberaldemocraticstatesareoftenreflectedinthe fluid,unboundedsocialrelationsoftheirlocalities.Thesetraitsaccommodatea chainofpositiveresponses—firstallowingcitiestodevelopinternalcomplexity, whichinturnfostersmutualtolerance,whichinturnnourishesthecity’screative energy.15Atthesametime,acity’scomplexinterdependencemakesitvulnerable toabruptandviolentstoppage—whichisacentraltacticofurbanterrorism.Itis noaccidentthatamongthemanydifferentsocialsystemsoftheworld,liberaldemocraciesabsorbthemajorityofterroristattacks.16Tousesomesharpexamples, LondonhasbeenmoresusceptibletoterrorthanBeijing;TelAvivmorevulnerable thanRiyadh;andMumbai(Bombay)morepronetoattackthanSingapore.This isnottosaythattherearenoexceptionsorthatnondemocraticsocietiesarefree ofterrorism,butratherthatliberaldemocraciesprovideespeciallyusefulinsights aboutterrorism. Evidentlycitiesdonotcauseterrorism,buttheirintrinsiccharacteristicsmake themasubjectandtargetofterrorists.Heretheemphasisisonurbandistinctiveness,notingthatthisisnotsimplyamatterofcitieshappeningtobevisibletargets, butattackedbecauseoftheiruniqueandinherentcharacteristics.Putsomewhat differently,theconnectionbetweencitiesandterrorismisnotjustduetocoincidentalassociation,wheretargetsarelocatedincities,butwherecitiesquacities becometargets.17
Heavilyclandestineordisguised
Amorphousnetworks,oftendecentralized
Makeshift,scattered,scarce,hamperedsupply
Heavilyrandom,indiscriminate
Overturnexistingstatesthroughterritorial decontrolandsocialchaos
Organizationalstructure
Resources
Targets
Immediateormiddle-range objectives
Accountability
Visibility
Groupterrorism
Hiddenheadquarters,difficulttotrace
Characteristic
DistinguishingGroupTerrorismfromStateTerrorism
Table1.1
Stateterrorism
Reinforcethepowerofexistingstatesthroughterritorialcontrolandadisciplinedpopulation
Generallydiscriminateandmixedwithdiscreetassassination,abduction,andimprisonmentofregime opponents
Relativelyabundantweaponry,organizedpolice,militaryforces,ofteneasytosupply
Hierarchicalleadership,bureaucracy,secretcourts, armiesandpolice
Oftenvisible,uniformedtroopsandidentifiablepolice
Reachable“address”throughnationalandinternationalinstitutions
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SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 9
Idefinecitiestomeanhigh-density,mixed-use,continuallydeveloping,bounded environments.Throughtheirdiversitycitiesgeneratehostsofsynergisticinteractions.18Theseintrinsicfeaturesmakeacertainkindofterrorismeffectiveandin manywayspossible.Indeed,weshallseeanextraordinarymatchbetweentheurban characteristicsofcitiesandtheevolutionofurbanterrorism.Terroristschooseto targetcitiesforparticularreasons.Wemightconsiderterroristwarfareasfunctioning viadifferentlogicsfortargetingaparticularsite.Targetinglogicsareadumbrated hereas(1)catalyticterrorism,(2)megaterrorism,and(3)smartterrorism. BycatalyticterrorismImeantherapidandwidespreadtransmissionofattacks thatshockthepublic.19Thelogicofcatalyticterrorismrequiresthatactionsbe viewedasspectacular,distressing,andwidelycommunicated.Acaseinpointcan bedrawnfromanonurbantragedy.In2004Islamistsvideotapedthebeheadingof aciviliancaptive,underscoredbythecaption“AlZarquawiSlaughtersanAmericanInfidel.”20Withintwenty-fourhoursthevideowasdownloadedhalfamillion timesandviewerswitnessedthegruesomescreamsoftorturebytheknife.This wascatalyticterrorismintheextreme.Othercasescanbeseenelsewhere.In1994 andagainin2002,terroristsinFranceplottedtoblowuptheEiffelTower.Had thisbeensuccessful,theattackwouldhavestartledtheworldanddrawnattention totheterroristcause.Catalyticterroroftenaimsatkeysymbols,andthesightof France’sculturalemblemlyinginruinswouldhavebeenetchedinmemory.Symbol canbeasimportantassubstance,andthisisonereasonwhycatalyticterrortargets iconicmonuments.WhetheritbeaplottoblowuptheEiffelTowerinParisorthe actualdestructionofancientBuddhiststatuesinAfghanistan,catalyticterrorseeks toannounceitselfwhileatthesametimedemoralizingtheenemy. Aswithotherterroristlogics,fearalsocomesintoplayincatalyticterror.This isbecausefearsoreadilyarousesthosewhoarethreatenedandlubricatestheflow of publicity.Terrorists play upon their own willingness to sacrifice themselves andtheircapacitytorecruitendlessnumbersofvolunteerssothatapprehension islikelytocontinueuntilsomekindofvictoryisachieved.Aboveall,catalytic terrorismismacabretheaterandterroristsitsshowmen.Inperformingtheseacts, terroristshaveconvertedwarfareintoapublicspectacle.Themorevividspectacles occurwhenterroristsfilmtestimoniesofsuicidebombersinpreparationforattack; themoststartlingincludevisuallyrecordedimagesofcapturedvictimspleading fortheirlivesorinthethroesofbeingmurdered.Ifcitiesareanything,theyare crowdedplacesthatprovideanaudiencewherethesespectaclescanbewitnessed andtheirmessagestransmitted. Therearemanyreasonswhyterroristswanttoinstillshockandfear.Thiskind ofintimidationmakespeopleawareoftheirownvulnerability(itcouldhappen here).Publicspectaclescanalsohelpinrecruitingvolunteerswhoareattracted bytheopportunityoffacinguptosuperiorforce.Last,wehavethegeneralmotiveofterroriststryingtogainrecognition;thebestwaytoaccomplishthisisto tiepropagandatodeed.Thisideaof“propagandabydeed”goesbackatleasta century,whenanarchiststhrewcrudepipebombsintocrowdstoattractattention.
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Knownasthedynamitards,theseanarchisticterroristscomprisedahomegrown EuropeanphenomenonthatspreadtotheUnitedStates.Today,“propagandaby deed”hasamuchlargerandreachableaudience.TheattackattheMunichOlympicsbyPalestinianterroristsdebutedmoderncatalyticterror.Itnotonlyresulted inthekillingofelevenIsraeliathletes,butcapturedtheattentionof600million televisionviewers.Worldrecognitionwasenhancedbywhathasnowbecomethe apothegmaticfigureofahoodedterroristpeeringdownfromabalconyathisnewly acquired“audience.” Asscholarspointout,continuousbroadcastsachievethepsychologicaleffect ofarousingthepublicandlettingthepopularimaginationdotherestofthework.21 Thisisparticularlyeffectiveinenvironmentswheremassralliescanbeheldand where word-of-mouth communication can instantly convey witnessed events. Versionsofcatalyticterrorismcanbeseenintheimagesproducedbyterrorists. OrganizationslikeHamasholdmassralliesthatfeatureblack-hoodedsuicideattackersarmedwithcanistersofexplosivestiedaroundtheirwaists.Theirwillingnesstodieinordertokillisaccompaniedbyreligiouschantsroaredinunisonby theirsupporters.AlQaedaoperativesdressintraditionalheadgearwithoverlaysof battlefatiguesandgunsattheready.Somecarrydaggersinbroadwaistbandsand publicizethebeheadingsofvictims.Inanotherpartoftheworld,theTamilTigers employdifferentsymbols,thoughwithsimilareffects.Theirflagcontainsared backgroundwithaferocioustigerleapingthroughthecenter.Thetigerisarmed witharoundofammunitioncrossedbytwobayonets.Theseimagesdesignedfor publicconsumptionarealsointendedformassintimidation. Thesecondtargetinglogic,megaterrorism,referstothetacticaladvantagegained byheavycasualties,massabductions,andlarge-scaledamage,allofwhichareoften causedbyimmenseblasts.Tomostpeopletheseactsmayseemlikesenselessmass destruction,butforterroristsmegaattacksareindispensableforsuccess.Fewacts areasintimidatingastheabilitytoinstillanunceasingfearofdeath.Asweshall see,overtheyearsterrorismhasbecomemorelethal,witheachattackcreating heaviercasualties.Terroristsworkpurposefullyanddiligentlytomagnifyhuman tollsbytargetingdenseenvironments,maximizingthepowerofexplosivedevices, andloadingthosedeviceswithmetalshardsdesignedtoextendinjury. Mega terrorism also demonstrates the seriousness of attack. By increasing casualties,hostages,ordamage,terroristsshowthattheiractionsarenotapassing occurrenceandcannotbeignored.Persistentactsofmegaterrorwillproduceunpredictableoutcomesandarousedifferentresponses.Massmurdermayconvince somethatterrorismshouldbefought,butitwillalsoconvinceothersthatterrorism shouldbenegotiated.Theresponsesbecomeallthemorecomplicatedovertheshort andlongterm,thoughterroristsareconvincedthat,givenenoughtime,established societieswillcapitulate.ThiswastheintentofChechenterroristsin1999whenthey blewuptwoapartmentbuildingsinMoscow.Theintentwasexplicitlystatedagain in2002whenterroristsattackedMoscow’sDubrovkaTheater,usingtherational thatitwas“inthecenterofthecityandtherewerelotsofpeoplethere.”22Noneof
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 11
thesesitespossessedstrategicortacticalworth,anditwasapparentthatterrorist objectivesweretokillormaimasmanyRussianciviliansaspossible. Turningtothethirdtargetinglogic,smartterrorisusedheretoconveythenotion thatattackerscanaimmorepreciselyathigh-valuetargetswhosedestructionhasa muchlargermultipliereffectandcauseslarge-scaleinstability.Smartterroroften triestodestroyinfrastructureorkeyfinancialinstitutionsthatlieatthesynapsesof theurbaneconomy.Smartterrormayalsoaimatasinglebundleofnerveswhose destructionhasmuchwiderramifications.Thistypeofterrorexploitsthecomplexity,interdependence,andfragilityofurbansociety,whichcanbeencumberedat anynumberofjunctures.Eventemporaryparalysisisareminderofterroristpresence,andthiscontributestoitslonger-termeffectiveness.Moreso,asingleactof pinpointeddestructioncanleverageterrorismbydisruptingsocietyorwreaking havocinthelocaleconomy.Thiscanbringaboutlarge-scalehelplessness,create widespreadpanic,orprecipitatetheflightofcapital.The2007threatbyfourmen toblowupfueltanksatKennedyAirportsoughttowreckairtransportandcanbe seenasanact,albeitfutile,ofsmartterror.HadPalestinianterroristssucceededin 2004inslippingintotheIsraeliportofAshdodandsettingablazechemicaltanks, theattackwouldhavebroughtimmeasurablecalamitytoIsrael’sshipping,energy, andcoreindustries. Banks,bridges,power-generatingplants,fueldepots,airports,andreservoirs are often targeted for destruction.That seeming “peasants” can acquire the sophistication to reach the interstices of capitalism creates an enormous sense of power.Smartterrortouchesdirectlyondestroyingakeyelementinavastchain ofpower,forifthesetargetscanbesoeasilypenetrated,victoryisalsopossible. Indeed,onereasonwhysuicideattackersareincreasinglyusedacrosstheglobeis thattheycanpenetrateandpinpointtargets.Suicideattackersmakesmartterror allthemorepossible. Finally,theseareheuristicdistinctionsusedtounderscorewhycitiesfigureso prominentlyinterroristlogic.Whiletherearepurecases,agiventargetcanbe attackedformultiplereasons.Thebestexamplecanbefoundinthe9/11attack ontheWorldTradeCenter,whichcombinedcatalytic,mega,andsmartterror.In pointoffact,themoretargetinglogicsprovidedbyasite,thegreaterthewallop. Fromaterroristviewpoint,certainsitesarepronetorepeatedattacksbecausethey holdthepotentialforgreateryields. FearandResponse Mycentralargumentistakenfromtheessenceofterrorismandappliedtocitiesin particularways.23Thatis,urbanterrorisbasedontheinculcationofmassfearand readinesstousemartyrdomasaweapon.Fearismadeallthemorepotentwhenitis inducedbyattackerswhoseinclinationfordestructionknowsnobounds.Powerlies inthecredibilityofthisthreat.Thetacticalployofterroristsistoconvinceothers thattheirwillingnesstokillisexceededonlybytheireagernesstodie.When,just
12 CHAPTER 1
weeksafter9/11,analQaedaspokesmandeclared,“TherearethousandsofIslamic youthswhoareeagertodie,justastheAmericansareeagertolive,”hewasbidding upthestakesinanefforttoexpandthosefearsandamplifyterroristpower.24 ThecredibilityofthreatconnectstheuncertaintiesofThomasHobbes’smedieval worldruledby“continualfearanddangerofviolentdeath”withthevulnerabilities ofDanielBell’s“post–industrialsociety.”25Uncertaintyrobsindividualsofsecurity aboutwhatthenexthourwillbring,whilevulnerabilityexposeseveryaspectof societytopotentialruin.Thisisanenormouslyintimidatingcombination,madeall themoredangerousbytheescalatinglethalityandthepotentialuseofchemical, biological,radiological,andnuclearweapons(CBRN).Thatanyoftheseweapons ofmassdestructioncouldfallintothehandsofterroristsisadistinctpossibility. Thisisthepointwhereterroristsreachthepinnacleoftheirpowerasa“weakforce” againstthefragilityof“powerfulsocieties.” Citiesareidealplaceswheresomuchofthisismanifest.Generallyspeaking, thelargestandmostimportantcitiesencounterthemorefrequentandmostsevere terror.Within these cities we can observe mega, smart, and catalytic terrorism workingintandem.Thequantityofnoncombatantskilled,injured,orkidnapped bymegaterrorshockspeople;thestrategicorpinpointeddestructionwroughtby smartterrordisruptseconomies;andthedramatictransmissionofgruesomeacts bycatalyticterrorismisaconstantremindertothelargerpublic. Citiesfacilitatecatalytic,mega,andsmartterrorism;or,toshifttheemphasis, citiesprovidetheelementsthatmakemodernterrorismsocombustible.Theirlarge populations,high-valueassets,capacitytoconnecttheworld,strategiclocation, andsymbolicimportancehavechangedthecourseofterrorism,givingitanew form.Henceurbanterrorismisabouthowterroriststurnthestrengthsofthecity against itself. Tourist cities are particularly susceptible to terrorist exploitation becausetheyareviolenceelastic.Onceterrorbreaksout,travelersareveryquick tochangetheirplansandthetouristeconomysinks.Besides,hittingahotelwith foreigngueststransmitsaninternationalmessage.Terroristshaverecognizedboth thevulnerabilityoftouristlocalesandtheadvantagesofstrikingtheminplaces likeBali,Luxor,Mombassa,andDjerba. Asidefromthetarget-richaspectofcities,therearepsychologicalandideological reasonsforstrikingurbanenvironments.Atleastinliberaldemocraciescitiesare placesthatthriveonpluralismandheterogeneity.Citiesforcepeoplewithdeeply differentviewstobumpupagainstoneanother,ineffectpromotingmutualtoleranceanddelegitimizingclaimstoanabsoluteorrevealedtruth.26Thisisprecisely whatdisturbsabsolutist,theocraticterroristsandprovokesthem.Demonstrating thatopensocietiesareafictionisavictoryforanyabsolutistmovement. Everyactionhasitsreaction,andurbanterrorismhasgeneratedatrainofresponses.Measurestopreventorthwarturbandestructionarenotjustengendered atanationallevelbutstemdirectlyfromcityhalls.Insomeinstancesthecity’s physical form has changed as high-value targets are covered by closed-circuit television,metaldetectors,barriers,portablepartitions,andpolicepatrols.Cities
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 13
haveestablishedspecialintelligenceandanti-terroristcapacitythatcutsacrossthe globe.OncebombshadgoneoffinMadridandLondon,membersofNewYork’s CounterTerrorismBureauwereeitherontheirwaytothosestrickencitiesoralreadythere.ThesameunithasestablishedlinkageswithofficialsinIsrael(TelAviv andJerusalem),Russia(MoscowandBeslan),andSingapore.Whilethenetwork overlapswithnationalauthorities,italsohasadistincturbanfocusbyconcentrating onmasstransit,entryports,bridges,andhigh-valuebuildings. Whilethesemeasuresmaybecomforting,theyalsocompromisethequalitiesof free-flowingopennessthatmakecitiesvital.Takentoofar,theycanweakenthecity byrobbingitofhumanassets,suffocatingitssociallife,anddehumanizingitsbuilt environment.Everyprotectivemeasureconveysamessagethatthepublicshould bewareandinadvertentlypromotestheveryfearterroristsseektoinculcate.There isadangerthatincombatingterror,citiesengageinaself-negationandbecome closedsocieties.Confrontedbythisdilemma,citiesmustfindabalancebetween therequisitesofsecurityandthoseofafreesociety. Theissueofachievingbalanceiscomplicated,especiallysincewedonotknow thelikelihoodofacitybeingattacked,muchlessthelocationofafutureattack. AtoneendofthespectrumtheFBI,MI5,andothersecurityagenciesunderscore thatthousandsofterroristsarelurkingincitieswaitingforanopportunemoment.27 Attheotherend,JohnMuellerandothercriticssuggestthatterroristthreatsare greatlyexaggeratedandthatweareadoptingexcessiveprotectionsforan“enemy thatscarcelyexists.”28Asweshallsee,ampledatafromaroundtheworldtellus thatterrorismisdeeplyseatedinanumberoflocales.ButMuelleristalkingabout terroristactivityintheUnitedStatesandheaskssomepointedquestionsaboutwhy, aftermorethan300millionlegalentriesbyforeigners,therehasnotbeenasingle attacksince9/11?InvestigativeofficialscounterMueller’sclaimbypointingto numerousattemptsthathavebeenthwarted.AndMuelleroffersthecounter-claim thatthosewhohavebeenapprehendedareeither“mentalcasesorsimplyflaunting jihadistbravado.”29WhileMueller’spointiswelltaken,investigatorsinNewYork andLondonclaimnearlyfiftyterroristattemptsinthepasthalf-dozenyears.Isit likelythatallofthesewerelonewolves?Todate,thebestanswerfortheUnited Statesisthatwedonotknowandcannotascertainthepotentialforfutureattacks. Thismakesfortheseeminglycontradictoryconclusionthatthethreatofterrorism isatonceconsiderablyoverstatedandalsoveryreal. Thereare,too,largerfactorssurroundingourdomesticresponse.Welivein aglobalculture,andbothexperienceandharddatarevealthatterrorismhasan international dimension, is highly adaptable, and its success is imitated.This makesinternationalterrorismverycontagiousanddifficulttoseparatefromits domesticroots.Itisevenmoredifficulttoinsulateacityfromforeigninfiltration.Afterall,the9/11attackwaslaunchedfromHamburg,Germany,andpoints farthereast.Somekindofsurveillanceisbothnecessaryandinevitable.Howwe mightweighsurveillanceagainstasuffocationofurbanfreedomsisaddressed inalaterchapter.
14 CHAPTER 1
FocusingontheTerrorized Astudyofthiskindnaturallyfocusesontheactualityofattack.Thisincludestactics,targets,anddamagetopeopleandplaces.Accordingly,Iamconcernedwith howterroristsusecities,whatkindsofplacesareattacked,howtheyareattacked, andthelong-termeffectsofattacks.Unlikemosttreatmentsofterrorismwhose concernsliewithgrandstrategiesorwithterroriststhemselves,Ioftenviewterroriststhroughthelensofhowtheiractionshaveaffectedtheterrorized.Thisis quitenecessaryforastudyofurbanterrorism.Scholarsandjournalistshavebeen mostlyconcernedwiththemakeup,motivations,andgoalsofterroristgroups.More recently,filmmakershavejoinedtheranksofothermediabyproducingpersonal portrayalsofterrorists.30Yetrelativelyfewwrittenorfilmedaccountsinvestigate theruinedlivesofvictims,theirfamilies,orwhatterrorismmeansforthosewho havetocontinuelivingandworkinginplacesthathavebeenattacked.Invariably, conversationswithvictimsofterrorismdisclosethepoignancyofmemory.Take, forinstance,therecollectionofafatherwhosefifteen-year-olddaughterlosther lifeinaJerusalemattack: Mydaughter,alongwithotherchildrenofIsrael,wasonholiday....Shewent todecoratethebedroomofherfriendwhowasgoingtocomebackhomefrom holiday.And thenshewentwithherfriendtodowntowntohavepizza.At2 o’clock the pizza restaurant disappeared from the face of the Earth.And my wife,whowaswatchingtelevision,andgotthefirstreport,calledmeatworkand toldabouttheterriblethingsthathadhappenedandshedidnotknowwherethe childrenwere.Andthiswasastartoftheprocess.WedidnotknowthatMalki wasmurdereduntilafter12hoursofvisitstothehospitals.31
Orconsideranaltogetherdifferentsituationfacedbyterroristvictimsinasmall cityinColombia.Thisinstanceinvolvedkillingcoupledwithkidnapping: Iwaskidnappedfor3years,soweremymomandmybrother.Mymomisstill kidnapped.Andmyfatherwaskilledtwomonthsago.Iwaswithmyfather,and wasshotinmyleg.Isawhimdead.Idonotknowthereason.Imean,guerrillas killedbecausetheythinknothingaboutit.Therearenoreasons.32
Though these circumstances were very different and took place at opposite endsoftheworld,bothdemonstratethedestructivecapacityofrandomviolence andensuingtrauma.Thereisapointwhereindividualtraumaturnsintocollective trauma—wherewholecommunitiesareconditionedbyrandomviolence.Given thenatureofmassbehavior,thosecitiesthathavebeenstruckarelikelytobefaced withmoreintenseorheightenedshock.Thismayvarygreatly,andterror-driven traumawillrecedeatdifferentialrates,butitislikelytobemanifestinhowpeople behave,howcitiesareused,andhowpublicpoliciesarechanged. Theprincipalpointsofthisinquiryconcernthetargetingofpeopleandplaces. Inworkingthroughthisapproach,Ifocusonthreekeyaspectsoftheurbanenvi-
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 15
ronment,namelyterritory,space,andlogistics.Fromthestandpointofterritory, urbanterrorismisdirectedagainstlargeswatchesoflandladenwithstrategicvalue. Becauseterroristsseektodecontrolasmuchterritoryaspossible,theychoosesites wheremassdisruptionislikelytomushroom.Territorialdecontrolalsodemonstrates thatcitizensareunprotectedandtheirlivescanbesabotaged.Fromthestandpoint ofselectedspace,urbanterrorismtargetssmallersitesbecausehittingthemwill optimizedamage.Thesespacesholdsomeimportance—eitheraspopulationcenters andtransportationjunctures;orashubsforbusiness,finance,politics,religion, andmedia;orasplacesofstrategicandsymbolicvalue.Moreover,terroristsare apttostrikepublicspaceslikesquares,openmarkets,andrecreationalcenters. Thesearetheveryspacesthatareeconomicallyvitalandlieattheheartoflocal democracy.Onceunderthreat,theuseofthesespacesquicklywithers,producing deadzones.Theeffectsareportentous,sharplyreducinghumanmovementand ultimately shrinking the space available for normal interaction. Once terrorists succeedinshrinkingurbanspace,theyestablishthepowerofthreat.JohnLocke stateditbestwhenhewrote,“whatworriesyoumastersyou.” Thelogisticalcharacteristicsofurbanterrorismarederivedfromitscapacityfor self-incubation,itsabilitytopenetrateurbanspaces,anditsproximitytopotential targets.Citiesareespeciallywellsuitedforfurnishingterroristswithanonymity, safehouses,andsupplydepotsinordertogainaccesstopotentialtargets.Thissays agreatdealaboutthelinkagebetweencitiesandlogistics.TakingaleaffromMao Zedong,terroristsrequirea“seainwhichtoswim”orapopulationbasecloseto potentialtargets.Asageneralrule,weexpectthatcitiesclosertosourcesofterrorismwouldexperienceagreaternumberofattacksaswellasmorelethalones. DiscerningGlobal,Mega,andMajorCities Notallcitiesareequal.Theyvaryinsize,function,importance,andsymbolicvalue. Indivergentways,todifferentdegrees,andfordiversereasons,citiesmayhave particularexperienceswithterrorism.Togetatthesespecificitiessomebroaddistinctionsshouldbemadebetweendifferenttypesofcities;somereadyillustrations canbeseenbycomparingglobal,mega,andmajorcities.Brieflyput,globalcities arebestdefinedbytheircommandingpositioninworldcitynetworks;megacities arebestdefinedbytheirhugepopulations,largeareas,andweightinessofsize;and majorcitiesaredefinedbyakeyfunctionoruniqueattribute.Whileglobal,mega, andmajorcitiesdifferfromoneanother,theydoshareadistinctivelycommon characteristic.Allofthemare“firstcities,”adesignationconveyingthenotionthat theyareallpreeminenturbanentitieswithintheirrespectivenations.“Firstcities” ofalltypesdrawwide-reachingattention,andtheconsequencesofattackingthem oftenspillontotheworldstage,thoughinquitedifferentways. Whileglobalcitieshavesubstantialpopulationsintothemillions,theyarebetter identifiedbytheirinternationalprofile.33GlobalcitiessuchasLondonandNew Yorklieatthecoreoftheworldeconomy,functioningas“switchingstations”where
16 CHAPTER 1
capitalisaccumulated,bundled,converted,andtraded.Whiletheimageoftheir beingcommand-and-controlcenterscanbeoverdrawninadecentralizedinternationalmarketplace,globalcitiesneverthelessdeterminetheflowofvastamounts of capital.As the locus for international business and stock exchanges, global citiesfunctiontwenty-fourhoursadayconductingandnegotiatinginternational transactions.Theinternationalizationofthesecitiesramifiesintoahugeinventory ofofficetowerssupportedbyinfrastructure,largemediaoutlets,andsizableimmigrantcommunities.34Attacksorthethreatofterrorismuponaglobalcityring veryloudly.Asingleeventcouldpromptinternationalinvestigation,intercession fromdifferentnationalsecurityagencies,andUnitedNationsresolutions. Megacitiesaregiantcitieswhosemetropolitanpopulationsencompassabout 10millionormoreinhabitants.ExamplesincludeCairo,Jakarta,andBombay. Demographicsanddevelopmentcountformuchinidentifyingmegacities.Often, theburgeoningpopulationofamegacityoutpacesthecity’scapacitytosupport itspeople.Thereareinstanceswheremegacitiesarehigh-growthmetropolises withlimiteddevelopmentandendemicpoverty.Assuch,theyareimpactedby congested inner neighborhoods (the slums of Calcutta) or overpopulated by migrants from the countryside (the shanties of Lagos), or ringed by squatter neighborhoods(thefavelasofRiodeJaneiro).Whiletheirinfluenceislimited, megacitiesthatarelocatedindevelopingnationsareoftenthesolesourceof nationalcommerce(corporateheadquarters)orholdcommandingpoliticalpower (presidentialresidences,legislativeseats,armycommands).Atthesametime, megacitiesaretheleadingeconomic,cultural,orpoliticalcenterswithintheir respectivenations.Whilemegacitiesarenotnecessarily“internationalized,”their sheersizeweighsheavilyatnationalandsupranationallevels.Attacksuponthese citiesattractinternationalnotice,thoughonlyonoccasionaretheyperceivedas generatinganinternationalcrisis. Last,thepopulationsofmajorcitiesvarygreatly,rangingfrom500,000tomany millions.Populationsize,however,ishardlyanadequateidentifier.Instead,major cities are better understood through their prominent roles as historic symbols, politicalcapitals,greatregionalcenters,orasplacesfilledwithreligiouslegacies, contestedbyclashingnationalrivalries,orbelongingtoagreatnationalpower. Athens,Belfast,orJerusalemarereadyexamples.Somemajorcitiespossessjust asingleattributeorplayasinglerole—say,asaprovincialcapital.Whilethereare somenotableexceptions,attacksuponasingle-attributemajorcityinfrequently reachbeyondnationalmediaorpoliceforces.Othermajorcitiesholdanumber ofrolesoraccumulatedattributes,andthesemagnifytheirimportance.Attacks againstamajorcitywithaccumulatedattributeshaveagreatercachéandattract widerpublicreaction. Figure1.1displaysexamplesofglobal,mega,andmajorcitieswithinaVenn diagram.Thefigureisillustrativeratherthanexhaustive,andcitiesareplacedwithin aspherethatbestillustratestheircharacteristics.Somecitiesmayfitwithinmore thanonecategoryandtheareasofoverlaparedesignated.
Figure 1.1 SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM Global, Mega and Major Cities
17
Figure1.1 Global,Mega,andMajorCities
Major Cities
Algiers Athens Belfast Berlin Bogotá Casablanca Jerusalem Lima Madrid Moscow Milan Nairobi Pristina Sarajevo Srinagar
Global Cities Paris Singapore
Mega Cities
London New York Tokyo
Cairo Istanbul Jakarta Karachi Lagos Mexico City Mumbai Rio de Janeiro Shanghai
London,NewYork,andTokyoaresituatedasglobalcitiesandfitattheintersectionofallthreespheres.NewYork’seconomicprowessmakesitoneofthe fewglobalcities,anditslarge,high-densitypopulationnestedwithinsprawling suburbsalsoconfersitsstatusasamegacity.Finally,itsculturallifegivesita personaasoneofAmerica’smajorrecreationalcities.Becausetheirmetropolitan populationsarelessthan10million,globalcitiessuchasParisandSingapore mightnotbethoughtofasmegacities,buttheirpoliticalstatusasnationalcapitals andtheirculturalimportanceallowthemtodoubleasmajorcities.35Singapore isauniqueglobalcity,achievingitsstatusbecauseitisagatewaytoSoutheast Asia and because it combines the flexibility of a city with the authority of a state.Itisaglobalandmajorcity,buthardlyamegacitybecauseofitssmaller population(4.5million). Megacitiesalsohavequalitiesuntothemselves.Theypossesssomeimportant prerequisitesofagreatcityyetareseriouslydevoidofothers.Forexample,Cairo, Lagos,andMumbai(Bombay)donothavetheeconomiccachéofglobalcities,but asnationalandculturalcapitalstheyhaveagreatdealofvisibility.Neithertheir powernortheirpotentialforachievementshouldbeunderestimated. Majorcitiesarefarmorenumerousandhavevariablequalities.Yetweshouldnot mistakethesecitiesaslackinginconsequence.Majorcitieshavealimitedthough verypowerfulnationalpresenceaspoliticalcapitals(Algiers,Bogotá,Jerusalem, Lima, Madrid, Moscow, Mexico City, Sarajevo), or possess regional economic clout(Milan,Karachi,Mumbai,RiodeJaneiro,Shanghai,TelAviv),orarevener-
18 CHAPTER 1
atedreligiouscenters(Jerusalem),orplayacriticalroleattheseamofterritorial disputes(Belfast,Jerusalem,Pristina,Sarajevo,Srinagar).Notonlydocitieswith accumulatedattributesattractgreaterworldattention,buttheirchancesoffrequent andsevereattacksarealsogreater.Thus,Jerusalemisattheverycruxofnumerous conflicts:itisapoliticalcapitalclaimedbytwonationalgroups,itsboundariesare contested,anditisahighlydisputedreligioussite.Palestinianterroristsofamore secularstripeaswellasMuslimfundamentalistsreadilyacknowledgeJerusalem astheirgreatestpotentialprizeandhaveuseditsstreets,buses,marketplaces,and plazasforextensiveterroristwarfare. Madridalsoisimportantbecauseofitsaccumulatedattributes.Overtheyears, Basqueseparatistshaveseenitasaprimepoliticaltarget.Aninternationalcadre ofMuslimfundamentalistsalsoterrorizedMadridforirredentistreasons(hoping toregaintheancientgloriesofalAndalusia)orbecauseitisaEuropeancrossroad. AnattackuponMadridconjuresupawellspringofattention—notjustbecause itisSpain’scapitalandoneofEurope’spremierculturalcenters,butbecause itholdsaccumulatedattributesastheleadingcityinanationwithmembership intheEuropeanUnionandNATO,andbecauseitexperiencedhistoriccontact withIslam.Notsurprisingly,anattackuponMadridwillbeperceivedinmuch broaderterms. Finally,itisimportanttorecognizethatinthepost–9/11zeitgeist,whoattacks whommaybeasimportantaswhatisattacked.MuslimsattackingotherMuslims willnotarouseasmuchattentionasMuslimsattackingWesterners—atleastnot inEuropeorNorthAmerica.AnattackbyBasquesinMadridwillnotarouseas muchworldattentionasanattackbyalQaeda.Likewise,IRAassassinationsof minor functionaries will not arouse the same attention as an attack by Muslim fundamentalistsagainstcommuters.Terrorismhasacontextthatisverymuchtied toitspotentialformetastasizingintolargerwarfare. Global,Mega,andMajorCitiesasTargets Inonewayoranother,mostglobal,mega,andmajorcitiesaresought-after targetsordisplayahighdegreeof“targetproneness”(seeAppendix,TableA1). Wecanunderstandtargetpronenessbyillustratinghowdifferentcitiesmight bechosentorealizedifferentterroristobjectives.Generallyspeaking,global citiesofferlargepayoffsintermsoflives(megaterror),resources(smartterror), andmediaattention(catalyticterror).Becauseoftheircharacteristics,global citieswillattractattackersengagedinforeignorexogenouslybasedconflict. NewYork,London,andParisbelongtopowerfulnationsthatareofteninthe thickofoverseasconflictslikewars,interventions,andcontroversialforeign policies.America’s contemporary role as the world’s superpower and Great Britain’sandFrance’scontinuingrolesassecondarypowersputtheircitiesat thecrossroadsofinternationaltrafficandimmigration,makingthemsusceptibletoforeignintrigues.Bycomparison,aglobalcitylikeSingaporehasnot
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 19
been directly targeted, partly because it plays a very different international role and also because it is more authoritarian and subject to greater control thanitsglobalcounterparts.EvenundertheseconditionsSingaporehasbeen anunwillinghostto“sleepercells”andremainsvulnerabletoIslamistmovementsinSoutheastAsia. Mega and major cities are also valued targets but appeal to different priorities.Thesetypesofcitiesaremorelikelytorefractdifferentkindsofhomegrown conflict. In such instances, cities have been used as battlefields. For example, ethno-religious clashes have occurred in mega cities like Cairo (government versusMuslimradicals)orMumbai(MuslimsversusHindus),orinmajorcities likeBelfast(CatholicversusProtestant)orJerusalem(ArabversusJew).Other megaandmajorcitieshavebeenbattlegroundsfornationalistmovementsseeking politicalindependenceorterritorialcontrol.TheseincludeIstanbul(Turksversus Kurds)andMoscow(RussiansversusChechens)aswellasPristina(Serbsversus Albanians)andSarajevo(Serbs,Croats,andBosnians).Anumberofmajorcities havebeenvenuesforcivilwarorrevolution.TheseincludeAlgiers(armyversus Muslimfundamentalists),Casablanca(governmentversusMuslimfundamentalists), Athens(governmentversussecularrevolutionaries),andLima(governmentversus secularrevolutionaries).Finally,drugandcriminalcartelshaveusedterrorismas aweapontocontrolpartsofBogotá. Urbanterrorismisnotmonolithic.Rather,itisacomplexandmultifaceted phenomenon whose roots vary and whose branches reach in many different directions.Someofterrorism’smanystrandscanbedistinguishedbywhether itemphasizeslocalorinternationalobjectives,whetherithasapopularbaseor onecomposedofaselectfew,andwhetheritispurelyviolentoriscombined withapoliticalmovement.Thisbeingfullyrecognized,Ialsoseeurbanterrorismasamethodofwarfarethatisoftendrivenbyideologicalextremism,and thisgivesitsomecommoncharacteristics.ThroughmuchofthisvolumeIfocus onthosecommonalities,especiallyastheyrelatetotheurbanenvironment.One of terrorism’s salient uniformities is the application of random violence and themannerinwhichcitieshavebeenusedtoinflictcasualtiesanddestruction. Thatviolencecontinuestohaveadisproportionateimpactbothnationallyand throughouttheworld. Table1.2presentstwenty-fiveglobal,mega,andmajorcitiesalongwithdata onterroristattacks.Alsoshownisthenationalshareofincidentsandcasualties ineachhomecountry.Thetablecoversaperiodofsixteenyearsbetween1990 and2005. Notethehighestnumberofincidents,foundincertainmajorcitieslikeJerusalem orAthens—bothofwhichhaveastringofaccumulatedattributes.Onceweturn tocasualties,majorcitieswithaccumulatedattributes(Jerusalem,Moscow,and Madrid)arejoinedbyglobalandmegacities(NewYork,Mumbai,andIstanbul). Especiallyinterestingarethesharesofnationalincidentsandcasualtiesheldby thesecities.Inalmostallcasesthecities’shareofincidentsandcasualtieswell
20 CHAPTER 1
Table1.2 TerrorinGlobal,Mega,andMajorCities,1990–2005
City Algiers Athens Berlin Bogotá Cairo Casablanca Islamabad Istanbul Jakarta Jerusalem Karachi Lima London Madrid Milan Moscow Mumbai(Bombay) Nairobi NewYork Paris Riyadh Rome Srinegar TelAviv Tokyo
Incidents 37 133 16 19 23 5 11 85 14 164 22 83 41 9 20 15 1 1 12 51 24 22 94 40 7
Casualties 83 12 10 91 182 134 143 1,021 378 2,040 178 147 806 1,694 7 885 1,517 5,291 10,807 389 333 12 467 1,048 5,012
Shareof incidentsin totalterror attacksin country(%)
Shareof casualties intotal terrorattacks incountry(%)
51 70 8 11 36 55 12 52 41 40 24 75 85 14 24 31 3 14 37 48 63 26 10 10 35
39 40 6 74 22 96 14 91 37 39 18 59 99 96 33 98 82 98 92 94 36 55 14 20 99
Source:AComprehensiveDatabankofGlobalTerroristIncidentsandOrganization.The NationalMemorialInstituteforPreventionofTerrorism(MIPT),availableatwww.tkb.org. Note:Type2datawiththeexceptionofSrinagar(Type1data).Globalcitiesareshown inbolditalics;megacitiesareshowninbold;majorcitiesareshowninregulartype.
exceedstheirproportionofthecountries’population(seeAppendix,TableA2). Thus,thepercentageofincidentsintwenty-fouroutoftwenty-fivecitiesexceeded thesecities’proportionateshareofthenationalpopulation,whilethepercentage of casualties in all twenty-five cities exceeded their proportion of the national population.Lookingatspecificcities,theproportionofnationalincidentsranged between 50 and 85 percent in cities likeAlgiers,Athens, Casablanca, Istanbul, Lima,London,Paris,andRiyadh.Similarly,theproportionofnationalcasualties rangesbetween50toabove90percentincitieslikeBogotá,Mumbai,Casablanca, Istanbul,London,Madrid,Moscow,Mumbai,NewYork,andParis.
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 21
FirstversusSecondCitiesasTargets Practicallyallglobal,mega,andmajorcitiescanbethoughtofas“firstcities” withintheirrespectivenationsorregions.Itisusefultocomparethesepreeminent firstcitieswiththeir“secondcity”counterparts.Asthetermsuggests,secondcities arespatiallyandeconomicallydistinctlocalitiesthatarenextinlineinnational importance.Secondcitiesarefarlesslikelytobeattackedthantheirpreeminent cousins.Algeria’ssecondcity,Oran,incurredjust6percentofnationalcasualties whileitsfirstcity,Algiers,absorbed39percent;Colombia’ssecondcity,Cali,had 2percentofnationalcasualtieswhileitsfirstcity,Bogotá,encountered74percent; andSpain’ssecondcity,Barcelona,sawjust3percentofnationalcasualtieswhile itsfirstcity,Madrid,absorbed96percent(seeAppendix,TablesA2andA3). When we turn to “first cities” of global stature, the pattern of casualties is especiallyapparent.Tocitespecificinstances,NewYorkabsorbed92percentof terrorism casualties while LosAngeles incurred less than 1 percent; Paris’s 94 percentofnationalcasualtiessetsitapartfromMarseille’s0percent;andTokyo experienced99percentofnationalcasualtieswhileYokohamastoodatzero.The UnitedKingdomisunusualbecauseoftheconflictinNorthernIreland,butbarring “domesticterrorism,”ittooconformstothepatternofinternationallydesignated terror. Thus, London encountered 99 percent of national casualties in contrast toBirmingham’s0percent.Clearly,citiesofglobalstatureareinacategoryby themselves,andwhiletheirincidentsarefarfewer,theattacksaredesignedtohave amuchbiggerbang. Exactlywhythereisalargedifferenceintargetingfirstcitiesratherthansecond citiescanbeexplainedbyterroristlogic.Firstcitiesusuallyaretheseatofmedia, therebyfurnishingarationaleforcatalyticterror;firstcitiesusuallyhavelarger populationsthansecondcities,therebyfurnishingarationaleformegaterror;and first cities usually have a larger economic function than second cities, thereby furnishingarationaleforsmartterror.36Aggregateallthreelogicsandreasonsfor thedisparityintargetingbecomeclear. Thelogiccanbetracedfurther.Whereanationhasmorethanonecitysharing preeminence, the differences in terrorist patterns dramatically narrow. In Italy, Romeexperienced55percentofnationalcasualtieswhileMilancamecloserthan mostsecondcitieswith33percent.InIsrael,Jerusalemmetwith39percentof casualtieswhileTelAvivalsocamecloserwith20percent.Similarly,Pakistan’s twoco-equalcities,KarachiandIslamabad,sharedasimilarportionofcasualties, respectively—18and14percent.Germany,whichtendstodistributeitsurbanpreeminenceamongBerlin,Hamburg,andMunich,alsoexperiencedsimilarlyclose proportionsofattack.Thisratherconsistentpatternsuggeststhatmostterrorists rationallyselecttheirtargetsandareable,implicitlyorexplicitly,toselectcities withcertaincriteriainmind.Terroristsnotonlychoosecitiesthatmaximizetheir objectives,butwherethosechoicesprovidemixedpayoffs,terroristswilldivide theviolence.
22 CHAPTER 1
Thissnapshotshowsusthatmodernterrorismisnotjustanationalorinternationalproblembutalsoanurbanone.Citiesareintheterroristbull’s-eye,with profoundconsequencesforthenatureofurbanlife.Further,themoreimportant andvisibleacity,thegreaterwillbeitstargetproneness. ComparingtheSeverityofAttack Mostoftheworld’sgreatcitieshavebeensubjecttoterrorattacksatonetimeoranother.Therehavebeenperiodicswingsasterrorismbecamemoreorlessascendant. Sincethemid-twentiethcenturyandupthroughthepresentera,Lima,Bogotá,and toalesserextentBuenosAires,havesustainedterroristattacks.InLatinAmerica, terrorismhassecularrootswiththegreaterpartattributedtopoliticalcauses(Lima andBuenosAires)orcriminalelements(Bogotá).TheIndiansubcontinenthasalso stoodoutsinceitspartitionin1947andcontinuestobeasorespot.Mumbai,New Delhi,Karachi,andIslamabadwereseatsfromwhichterroristsoperatedwithimpunity.MuchoftheconflagrationwasignitedbysectarianstrifebetweenMuslimsand Hindusandbyalong-burningdisputeoverKashmir.Istanbulhasalsoexperienced chronicepisodesofterror,mostlystemmingfromsecular/politicalmovementsand alsorelatedtoterritorialdisputesrelatedtoKurdishindependence. Duringthe1970sandthroughtwosubsequentdecades,Europeancitieswerethe focusofattacks.AttheforefrontwereLondon,Paris,Rome,Athens,andMadrid. WiththeexceptionofBasqueseparatistsinSpain,terroristsinEuropewereless concernedwithterritorialambitionsandbasicallymotivatedbysecular/political causes(oftenradicalleftist).Bythe1990sandupthroughtheturnofthecentury,the locusofurbanterrorhadshiftedtoNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEastwithAlgiers, Cairo,andJerusalemattheforefront.Muchoftheterrorismtookonareligious andIslamistcast,becomingprogressivelymoresevereasthecenturyturnedthe cornerintothecurrentmillennium.Overtheyearsterrorismhasbecomebothmore lethalandmoreoftenreligiouslyinspired.Duringthelastdecadeorso,casualties weremorethantwiceashighasthoseinflictedduringthepreviousthreeormore decades.Thelethalityforeachattackwasespeciallysevere.Between1995and 2005,eachattackbroughtanaverageof30casualtiescomparedtotheprevious periodbetween1968and2004wheretheaverageforeachincidentwasfewerthan 4casualties.Forthelastdecade,attacksbysecularterroristscaused6casualties perattack,contrastedtothereligiousterroristtollwhichaveraged166casualties perattack.Intotal,religiousterrorism,whichismostlyIslamist,accountedfor86 percentofcasualties(seeAppendix,TablesA6andA7). Weseeheretheincreasingseverityofterror.Severitycanbedefinedasunrelentingviolencecoupledwiththecumulativedamagecausedtohumanlife.Oneway tomeasureseverityistoassessthefrequencyofincidentsaswellasthefatalities andinjuriescausedbyattacks.Evenamonghighlyvulnerablepreeminentcities theseverityofattackvariesconsiderably.Bogotáhasbeenstruckmoreoftenand withgreatercasualtiesthanBuenosAires.Parishassustainedmoreterroristas-
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 23
Table1.3 SeverityIndexofGlobal,Mega,andMajorCities,1968–2005 Cities NewYork Jerusalem TelAviv Paris Madrid Istanbul London Rome Lima Islamabad Karachi Athens Mumbai(Bombay) Cairo Moscow Nairobi Tokyo NewDelhi Riyadh Berlin Haifa Ankara Washington,DC Bogotá Jakarta Algiers Frankfurt Munich Bali Barcelona
Rawindex
Standardizedindex
221 220 207 206 205 202 192 185 181 178 177 176 176 174 171 170 169 164 162 160 160 159 157 156 153 152 149 137 134 133
100 100 94 93 93 91 87 83 82 80 80 79 79 78 77 77 76 74 73 72 72 72 71 70 69 68 67 61 60 60
Source:TerrorismKnowledgeBase,availableatwww.tkb.org. Note:Type2data.Globalcitiesareshowninbolditalics;megacitiesareshowninbold; majorcitiesareshowninregulartype.
saultswithgreatercoststolifethanFrankfurt.LondonandJerusalemareamong themostheavilystruckcitiesinworld.Moreover,theseverityofurbanterrorwill changeovertimeandfromcitytocity. Table1.3providesaviewofhowmajorcitiesacrosstheglobecompareonthe issueofseverity.Thirtycitiesareincluded.Theperiodcoversmorethanthreedecadesofurbanterrorincurredbyglobal,mega,andmajorcities.Thetablecombines incidents,injuries,andfatalitiesbyconvertingthemintoasingleindexofseverity. Rawscoresfromtheindexarestandardizedsothatthenumber100representsthe highestscore,withothersindescendingorder.37
24 CHAPTER 1
AscanbeseeninthecaseofNewYorkCity,acatastrophicmegaeventcan shape the table’s results. Notwithstanding an exceptional event like 9/11, the overallscoresprovideareasonableaccountofhowtheworld’sleadingcities comparetooneanotheroverthelongterm.Confirmingourearlierobservations, citieswiththehighestseverityindextendtobeglobalormegacitiesandinmany casestheyarenationalcapitals.Populationsizemakesadifference.Foreachadditionalmillioninhabitants,thestandardizedscoreincreasesby4.85pointson theseverityindex.38Usingasimilargroupofcities,anotherstudyfounddensity ofpopulationtobeasignificantpredictorfortheseverityofattack.Itestablished that for every additional increment of 1,000 people per square kilometer (.4 squaremile)totheaveragedensityofthecity,thestandardizedseverityscore increasedbyonepoint.39 Manycitiessufferingfromseverityofattackarelocatedinnationsinvolvedin majorterritorialdisputes.TheIsraeli-Palestinianconflictisreflectedinindicesfor JerusalemandTelAviv,andthesecitiesrespectivelyholdthesecond-andthirdhighestscores.TheIndian-Pakistaniconflictcanalsobeseenintheseverityof attacksinMumbaiandNewDelhiThesameconditionistrueforTurkey,where territorialconflictwiththeKurdshasputIstanbulhighonthelistandAnkarafarther down.Russia’sterritorialconflictwithChechnyagivesMoscowasignificantindex. Notably,Russia’ssecondcity,St.Petersburg,isabsentfromthelist. Note,too,thatterrorismstrikescitiesindevelopedaswellasless-developed nations.Terrorismappearstohaveabolishedeconomic,social,orreligiousdistinctions,makingcitieslikeMumbai,NewDelhi,Karachi,andCairoassusceptibleto attackastheirmoreprosperouscounterpartsinEuropeorNorthAmerica.Indiaand toanevengreaterextentEgyptandPakistanhaveplacedhopesfordevelopment ontheirleadingcities.Citieswithlowerlevelsofdevelopmentaremoreeasilyset backbyapaucityofcapitalaccumulation.Lackingabaseofwealth,theyarelikely tofindrecoverymoredifficult. Theseverityofterrorhasadisproportionateeffectoncitiesperchedatdifferent levelsofdevelopment.Also,themeasuresusedtocreateaseverityindextellusa greatdealabouttheincreasinglethalityofurbanterror.Severityprovidesacluefor understandingthetrajectoryofthistypeofwarfare,enablingustoinquirewhether terrorismhasabated,gottenworse,orremainedstagnant.Lookingbackwardmay helpusunderstandtoday’schallengesandtomorrow’sthreats. Finally,theseverityofterrorisimportantbecauseitbearsdirectlyonthecapacity ofcitiestosurvive.Citiesarethreatenednotsomuchbytheraremegaattackbut bythehumantollandmaterialcostofcontinuousattacks.Theconstantfrictionof terroristherealenemyofcityresilience.Accountsofmedievalhistoryinformus thatcitiescandisappearwhentheyareplacedunderlong-termsiege.Atleastin ourcontemporaryperiod,citieshaveproventhemselvestobefairlyresilientand recoverquickly.Indeed,thisisnotthefirsttimecitieshaveadaptedtoexternal threatsandtheirresilienceiswellestablished.Thequestionislessofsurvivalthan themannerinwhichcitieswillcontinuetosurvive.
SKETCHINGURBANTERRORISM 25
Conclusions Terrorism is a complex phenomenon, defined as a type of asymmetric warfare that deliberately and indiscriminately employs violence against noncombatants andtheirsourcesofsupportinordertothreatenorintimidatethemforpolitical purposes.Thedistinctionsbetweengroupterrorismandstateterrorismaresufficienttowarrantstudyingthemasdifferentformsofwarfare.Urbanterrorpertainstohigh-density,heterogeneous,mixed-use,continuallydevelopingbounded environmentsthatgeneratehostsofsynergisticinteractions.Anystudyofurban terrorshouldbeconcernednotonlywiththeorganizationandtacticsofterrorists butwiththeterrorized.Boththedirectandtheindirectvictimsofterrorarevery muchpartofthestory,especiallyasitrelatestopersonalcostsandthelarge-scale suffocationofcitylife. Urbanterrorismcanbeunderstoodasconsistingofcatalytic,mega,andsmart terror. Catalytic terrorism attempts to broadcast the event by shocking a larger public.Megaterrorismuchlargerinscopeandattemptstoinflictmasscasualties andextensivepropertydamage.Duringthelastfifteenyearsorso,megaterrorhas takenonanincreasinglyreligiouscast.Bycontrast,smartterrorispreciselyaimed atvulnerablepointsofacity’sstrength,suchasitseconomyorinfrastructure.Urban terrorismcontainsallthreeelementsofcatalytic,mega,andsmartterror.Thismade theSeptember2001assaultontheTwinTowersallthemorepotent. Urbanterrormanifestsitselfandcanbeexaminedalongthreeparticulardimensions—territory,space,andlogistics.Urbanterroristsseektodecontrollarge swatchesofterritory,inflictdamageonsmallerspaces,andobtainlogisticalaccess topotentialtargets.Finally,themostfrequenttargetsofurbanterrorcanbelocated withinglobal,mega,andmajorcities.Generally,morepopulousandhigh-profile citiesincurdisproportionateattacks.Thesecitiescanbeassessedbythefrequency ofincidentsandthenumberofcasualtiesduetoterror,summarizedinanindex ofseverity.
2 TheEvolutionofUrbanTerrorism
As 2001 began counterterrorism officials were receiving frequent butfragmentaryreportsaboutthreats.Indeed,thereappearedtobe possiblethreatsalmosteverywheretheUnitedStateshadinterests— includingathome. —9/11CommissionReport,“TheSystemWasBlinkingRed” MegaTerrorinNewYork,Madrid,andLondon The event is all too familiar. September 11 happened on a crisp, autumn-like morning.Twohijackedpassengeraircraftsilhouettedagainstanazurebluesky came crashing into the twin 110-story towers of theWorldTrade Center.The NorthTowerwasstruckfirstastheAmericanAirlinesflightcrashedintofloors 93through99,ignitingeverythinginitspath.SeventeenminuteslateraUnited AirlinesplanehittheSouthTower,cuttingthoughfloors77through85,causing massivefireballstosurgethroughthebuilding.Tenterrorists,fiveineachaircraft, succeededinturningpassengerplanesintoguidedmissiles,instantlykilling600 peopleonthosefloorsalone.Othersdiedastheybecametrappedinelevatorsand cloggedtheexits.Manymorewouldfallastheystruggledthroughfume-infested, smoke-drenchedcorridorsandstairwells.Thesitecametobeknownas“ground zero,” and its fatalities rose to nearly 3,000 people with more than twice that numberofcasualties. Inlessthantwohours,thetwingiantsoftheWorldTradeCenter(WTC)had collapsed,spewingconcrete,glass,andmassiveamountsofashontothestreets andintotheair.Asthebuildingsfell,crowdsrandownthenarrowstreetsforsafety. Hourslater,anotherbuildingintheWTCcomplexcapitulated,addingtothetwisted andsmokingwreckagealreadyontheground.Ontheothersideoftheislandin Brooklyn,citizenswatchedinfrightaspartofNewYork’sskylinedisappeared.Days latertheodorofhumanlossandflakesofdebrisstillhungoverlowerManhattan. Theshockof9/11burrowedintopeoples’mindsand,yearslater,mostAmericans couldrecounthowtheycametorememberthatstunningday.Whatmade9/11 possiblewasmass.Thescaleanddensityofthecitywithitsmassivebuildings, teemingstreets,crowdedhotels,andjammedmasstransitpresentedenormousopportunitiesforterrorists.Morethan50,000peopleworkedattheWorldTradeCenter andanother80,000visitediteachday.Eachfloorofthetowerscoveredmorethan 26
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 27
40,000squarefeet,andthebuildingscontainedover200elevators.Thepotential forimmensegridlockandresultingcasualtieswasalarminglyclear.1 Accordingtoavailabledata,9/11wasthefirsttimemorethan500personswere killedinasingleterroristassault,thoughitsconsequencesextendedbeyondthat immediateloss.2Theeventshowedthatagreatcitycouldbebroughttoahaltby chaosandshock.Withinaflickeroftimethecityshutdown.Airports,tunnels,and bridgeswereblocked.TheNewYorkStockExchangeclosed,stoppingallfinancial services.Nonessentialgovernmentservicesweresuspendedwhileschools,theaters, andmuseumsclosedtheirdoors.Atthesametime,abombthreatforcedtheevacuationoftheUnitedNations,obligingdiplomatsandpersonneltoseeksafety. Largecitiesareidealbattlegroundsforterrorists.While9/11washardlythe firstepisodeintheterroristsaga,itwasadramaticinstanceofcatalyticterrorism. Itwokeupmuchoftheworldbytransmittingtherealityofagiantattackandthe possibilitythatitcouldhappenelsewhere.Catalyticterrorismcametotheforeby capturingpublicapprehension,catchingmediaattention,raisingintellectualdebate, andabsorbingtheresourcesofgovernments.TheattackonNewYorkbecamethe emblemofurbanterrorism.Soonafterward,thelanguageof9/11wasexpropriatedwithsubsequentattacksonMadrid,called“Spain’s9/11,”andLondon,called “GreatBritain’s9/11.”OfficialsinJerusalem,whosecumulativeexperiencewith terrorism was lengthier than NewYork’s, began to refer to its struck center as “Israel’sgroundzero.” Tobesure,theattacksinMadridon3/11(2004)andLondonon7/7(2005)were nothingnearthescaleofNewYork,buttheydidconfirmapatternthatcombined catalytic,mega,andsmartterror.Inallthesecases,terroriststargetedhigh-value resourcesandcongestedspacestosowpanic.Theyalsosucceededintransmitting the shock of these events to the rest of the world. Madrid’s 3/11 occurred atAtochaStation,ahugecomplexlocatedatthecenterofthecityandnearthe PradoMuseum—oneofthecountry’sgreatculturallandmarks.AtochaStationis theterminusforlongerraillinesextendingintothecountrysideaswellasalocal undergroundforshortercommutes. Tenbombshadbeenplacedonfourtrains,designedtodetonatesimultaneously ascommutersenteredthestationduringtheheightofthemorningrushhour(7:37 A.M.).Eachofthetrainswasfilledwithmanualworkers,officeemployees,older students,andyoungerschoolchildren.Hadthetrainsnotbeendelayed,theexplosion wouldhaveoccurredinsideAtocha,possiblycausingtheentirestructuretocollapse onamuchlargernumberofwaitingpassengers.Withinminutesofeachother,the packedtrainsburstfromtheexplosions,causing191fatalitiesand1,500injuries. Transportationwasdisruptedfordaysandthecatalyticeffectswerepalpable.Soon afterwardSpanishvotersbroughtamoredovishgovernmentintoofficeandannouncedthewithdrawalofSpanishtroopsfromIraq(oneoftheostensiblereasons fortheattack).TheeffortsbythenewSpanishgovernmentseemedtobeinvain, andjusttwoweekslaterexplosiveswerediscoveredontraintracks. TheLondonattackof7/7wasalsoaimedatmasstransit.Ittoodependedupon
28 CHAPTER 2
high-densitycrowdsforeffectivenessandboremanyofthemarkingsofMadrid. Approximately 3 million commuters ride London’s Underground daily, while buses carry more than 500,000 passengers into central London each weekday. AllthestruckareasweretransitexchangeswithincentralLondon,closetooffice complexes,retailshops,orotherareasofcongestion.Fourbombswereplacedat differentplaces—threealongUndergroundlinesatapproximatepointsinLiverpool,Edgware,andKingsCrossstations,andafourthinadouble-deckerbusat TavistockSquare.LikeNewYorkandMadrid,theexplosionsoccurredatornear morningrushhour,whencrowdswereatorneartheirpeakandsetoffwithina closetimeframe(8:49A.M.onward).Within60minutes56peoplewerekilledand 700injured.Notallthedeadcouldbecountedoridentifiedimmediately,because theywerecaughtinthesmoke-andfume-filledUnderground. The train blasts were frightful, and eyewitnesses described large explosions thatsentglassanddebrisineverydirection.Darkenedtunnelsandelectricaloutagesmaderecoveryallthemoredifficult.Rescueworkershadtousepickaxesin ordertofreetrappedpassengers.TheFireBrigaderesortedtoemergencytriage bytendingtothosemostlikelytosurvive.Thebusattackwasequallyshockingas theexplosiveforceblewtherooffromadouble-deckerbus. PartsofLondonseizedup.Theentiremetrosystemwasclosed,andbusesand trainsheadingintoLondonstoppedshortorturnedback.RoadsintocentralLondon wereblockedoffandvehiclescommandeeredforuseasambulances.Onehotel wasturnedintoanemergencycarefacility.ThroughouttheWestEndofLondon, shopsandrestaurantswereshuttered.Eventhemobilephonenetworkwasswitched offforatime,asauthoritiesfearedthatterroristswoulduseittolaunchafollowupattack.London’sinitialshockandsubsequentresponsetypifiesthepatternof confusion,diversion,orsemi-paralysisthatcanlastuptoafewdays. While 9/11, 3/11, and 7/7 received the widest coverage and are regarded as seminalevents,theyhardlytouchtheextentofurbanterrorism.Thesedatesare importantbecausetheyconstituteoneoftheraretimeswheneventsintersectwith largerhistoricaltrends,producinganewrealization.Wecanbetterappreciatethe scopeandseverityofurbanterrorbyturningtothatrecentpastaswellaslooking acrossthecontinentstoothercities.3 AttacksAroundtheWorld Urbanterrorismdidnotbecomeapublicspecterwith9/11,3/11,or7/7.Ithas hadadeepandpersistenthistory,whichmostAmericanshadhardlynoticeduntil itstruckhome.ForAmericansitisusefultorememberthat9/11wasnotthefirst attemptontheWorldTradeCenter.Thesimpleideaofcollapsingtwobuildingsin ahighlypopulated,denselybuilt“globalcity”occurredtoagroupofIslamicfundamentalistsalmostadecadeearlier.In1993,membersofacellbasedinBrooklyn andJerseyCityparkedatruckfilledwithexplosivesinagaragebeneaththeTwin Towers.Theensuingexplosionopenedagapsevenstorieshigh,causingthedeath
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 29
ofsixpeopleandmorethanathousandinjuries.Themanwhoplantedthebomb, RamziYousef,laterclaimedhehadhopedtokill250,000people.Yousef’sprojectionswereexaggerated,buthaditnotbeenforanerrorinplacingtheexplosives, theFBIestimatedadeathtollof50,000.4 Inthatsameyear,theFBImanagedtothwarta“summerofmayhem”planned byanothergroupofIslamicradicals.Hadtheterroristattacksbeencarriedtosuccess,thatmayhemwouldhavedestroyedtheUnitedNationsbuildingaswellas theLincolnandHollandtunnels,andFederalPlaza.Internationaldiplomatsand Americanpoliticalleaderswerealsoslatedforassassination.Most,butnotall,of theattacksintheUnitedStateswereofinternationalvintage.Thesituationacross theAtlantic is quite different and those countries have longer experience with domesticorhomegrownterrorism. GreatBritain’shistoryofterrorismisfarmoreextensivethanthefewdramatic eventssufferedonAmericansoil.TakingLondonduringseveraldecades,morethan 300incidentshavebroughtonthedeathofanestimated119peopleandinjured over1,500.5MostofthesewerelaunchedbytheIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)or itssplintergroups.Attackshavebeenleveledagainstfinancial,social,political, andtransportationtargets.WhileLondonsawitsfairshareofattacks,someofthe mostsevereterrorismoccurredinNorthernIreland,inpopulatedareasofBelfast, Londonderry(Derry),andOmagh.InrecentyearsArabsandIslamicgroupshave beenresponsibleforanincreasingnumberofepisodes. Madridalsohasalongandpainfulhistorywithterrorism,launchedmostlyby BasqueFatherlandandFreedom(ETA).OtherextremistgroupsalsofindMadridto beaconvenienttarget.TheserangefromleftistrevolutionariestonationalistArabs, Lebanese,Armenians,orMoroccans.ETA,however,hasbeenthesingularlargest sourceofattacks,andduringapproximatelyfourdecadesithasbeenresponsible formorethan800fatalitieswithmorethantwiceasmanywounded.Foreign-based terroristorganizationsfindrefugeinSpain’sliberalrulesforasylumanditsgrowing immigrantcommunities.Casualtiesfromthesegroupshavebeenlight,however,and upuntil3/11thelargestnumberofvictimscamefromanassaultbyHezbollahon arestaurantthatcateredtoAmericanservicemen.Thatattackresultedineighteen deadandmorethan80wounded(mostlySpanishcivilians).6 Upuntil3/11,targetsofchoiceinMadridhaveincludedrestaurants,embassies, touristcenters,andairlineoffices—almostallofwhichareindowntownlocations. Ahandfuloftheattackswereexecutedthroughplantedbombsorcrudemortars andgrenadesfiredfromadistance.Spanishpolicenowhavespecialbombsquads anddetonationteamsthatcombthecityregularly. Elsewhereintheworld,citieshavebeensubjecttohighlevelsofchronicviolence.Istanbulisapackedcitywithatumultuousatmosphere.Itsmixofancient touristattractions,crowdedbazaars,andmodernofficedistrictsmakesitparticularly susceptibletolarge-scaleattack.Duringalmostfourdecades,223Istanbulianshave beenkilledandnearly1,288wounded.Terrorismhasbeenmountedbyanumber ofgroupsacrossthepoliticalspectrum,includingnationalists(theKurdishWorkers
30 CHAPTER 2
PartyorPKK),radicalIslamicfactions(TurkishHezbollahandalQaedacells),and non-Kurdishleftists(RevolutionaryPeople’sLiberationFront).Majortargetsare oftenatbusycommercialcentersonthe“European”sideofthecitywherebanks, foreignbusinesses,andconsulatesarelocated.PKKterroristshavealsoattacked thecity’sOldBazaar(amainmarketplace)aswellastherenownedBlueMosque and Hagia Sofia Mosque (main tourist attractions). On two separate occasions, IslamicradicalsandalQaedaoperativestargetedNeveShalomSynagogue,located inanolder,crowdedneighborhood.TheNeveShalomattackcausedthedeaths offorty-fivepeopleandmanymoreinjuries.Duringthepasttwoyears,terrorists havecontinuedtostrikeIstanbul—withshootingattacksontheAsiansideofthe cityandadetonatedbusexplosionontheEuropeanside. Jerusalem’s experience has been fairly continuous. Urban terrorism existed before the birth of modern Israel and has continued ever since. Casualties and incidentsreachedminorpeakstowardtheendofthe1960s,abatedforawhile atthedawnofthe1970s,peakedagaininthemid-1970s,androseintermittently throughthe1980s.The1990sweremixed.WhiletheOsloAccordsbroughtabout arespite,terrorismbrokeoutagainsoonaftertheCampDavidtalks(1995).Duringthisperiod,journalistswereeagertoseealightinthepeacetunnelandcalled theseattacks“terror’slastgasp,”butfactsspokeotherwiseandterrorrosetounprecedentedlevelsattheturnofthecentury. Jerusalemalsorefractsthepatternscommonlyseeninothercities.Earlierattacks weremostlyconductedbyseculargroups.Towardtheendofthetwentiethcentury, IslamistHamasandIslamicJihadjoinedtheclashandterrorbecamemorelethal. Insteadofindividualknifings,high-poweredexplosiveswereemployed,increasinglybyyouthswhoturnedthemselvesintohumanbombs. AlsocountedasavolatileareaoftheworldistheIndiansubcontinent,itsconflictcenteredonKashmir.DuringnearlyfourdecadesIndia’scommercialcapital, Mumbai(Bombay),anditspoliticalcapital,NewDelhi,sustainedacombinedtotal of2,500casualties.Someoftheworstincidentshaveoccurredinrecentyears. In1993,morethanadozencoordinatedblastsinMumbaikilled300peopleand woundedanother1,200.TheattackersstrucktheBombayStockExchange,banks, hotels,airlineoffices,andbuses.In2001,thebombingoftheParliamentbuilding inNewDelhikilledfourteenpeopleandwoundedscoresofothers.Thisattack broughtIndiaandPakistantothebrinkofwar.ByJuly2006,megaattacksreturned toMumbaiwhensevencoordinatedexplosionsrippedthroughtrainsonitsbusy commuternetwork.Thismostrecentattackcametobeknownas“India’s7/11,” leaving188deadand800injured.WhilePakistandeniedanyrole,Mumbaipolice attributedtheattacktoIslamistsfromLashkar-e-TaibaandJaish-e-Mohammed.7 Theseaccountsbarelyscratchthesurface.Terrorismgoeswellbeyondasingle groupandsomepocketsoftheworld.ItextendsfromtheAmericasintoNorthand sub-SaharanAfrica,throughtheMiddleEasttoAsiaandthePacificBasin.Even inmostrecenttimes,terrorismhasmultipleexponents,anditwouldbeamistake toequatealQaedawithitsadvent.
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 31
TheScopeofUrbanTerror In1999,aprestigiousWashington,DC,thinktank,theWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenter,heldaconferenceoncitiesandsecurity.Papersfortheconference weresponsoredbytheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment.Scholarsfrom aroundtheworldwereaskedtoselectamajorthreattourbansecurityandwritea paperonthesubject.Sometwentypaperswerewritten,andoverfortyresearchersattendedtheconference.Thepapersanddiscussioncenteredaroundcrisesof governanceandcitizenparticipation,watershortagesandfamine,migrationand displacement,healthandtheenvironment,aswellascrimeanddrugtrafficking.The ensuingdiscussionscoveredagreatdealonthesubjectofurbansecurity,though hardlyapersonraisedtheissueofterrorismorchosetowriteaboutit.8 TheWilson Center’s concerns were complemented by a domestic focus on urbancrisesundertakenbytheFannieMaeFoundation.Inthatsameyear,Fannie MaepublishedastudybyRobertFishmanentitledTheAmericanMetropolisat Century’sEnd:PastandFuture.Usingasurveyofleadingscholars,Fishmansought toassesshistoricalaswellasfuturefactorsthatmightinfluencecities.Fishman’s respondentslistedwealthdisparities,suburbanpoliticalmajorities,thegrowing underclass,suburbandeterioration,andthelike.Butagain,therewasnomention ofterrorismorthethreatitposedtocities.9 ThegeneralinitiativestakenbyboththeWilsonCenterandFannieMaewerewell foundedandproperlyaimed.Citiesplayagrowingroleinworlddevelopmentand theyarethepivotalpointsofchange.Ahalf-centuryago,29percentoftheplanet’s populationlivedinurbanareas.By1980thatpercentageclimbedto39percent. Aswelookatcitiesattheturnofthecentury,wefind49percentoftheearth’s6.4 billionpeopleliveinurbanareas.Populationdensitieshavedoubled,andtheyare likelytoriseingeometricproportioninthecomingdecades.Fortyyearsagothere werejusteightcitiesintheworldwithmetropolitanpopulationsofmorethan5 million.Bytheturnofthecenturythatnumberhadreached42percent.Inthenext 15years,citieswithmetropolitanpopulationswithover5millioninhabitantsare expectedtogrowinnumberto61.10 Whilecitiesareswellingwithpopulation,theyarealsoexperiencingtwopolar tendencies—immenseinfusionsofwealthcoupledwithlarge-scalepoverty.One canvisitlargecitiesalmostanywhereandseewholeneighborhoodsfilledwith luxuryhousing,whilealsodiscoveringthat32percentoftheworld’spopulation livesinurbanslums.11Twoglobalcitiesillustratetheproblem.In1980,NewYork andLondonheldseveraltrilliondollarsinstockmarketvalue.Bytheendofthe lastcentury,thesetwocitieshadroughlytripledthatvalueto$12trillion,enabling themtocommandthemajorportionoftheworld’scorporateassets.12Atthesame time,NewYork’spovertyshotupfrom20percentin1980to24percentbythe endofthe1990s,whileduringasimilarperiodLondon’spovertyrosefrom20 percentto28percent.13Inthesecitiespovertyisbothspatiallyconfinedtoparticularneighborhoodsandsociallyconcentratedwithinparticularminorities.The
32 CHAPTER 2
polarizationhasgivenrisetowhatsomeauthorscharacterizeas“dualordivided cities”wheredifferentsocialclassesliveworldsapart.14Granted,NewYorkand Londonareextremeexamples,buttheydoillustratethegrowingdisparityofwealth incitiesaroundtheworld. Whileweshouldbecareful—indeedskeptical—aboutattributingthecausesof terrortoeconomicconditions,theeffectsareadifferentstory.Thereislessdoubt aboutwhatattractsterrorists.Theincongruousmixtureofgrowth,density,wealth, poverty, and immigration make these and other cities primary targets—both as venuesofoperationandtargetsofcalculation.Atoneendoftheurbanspectrum, poorer,oftenimmigrant,neighborhoodsprovidespaceswhereterroristscanembed themselves.Attheotherendofthespectrum,wealthanddensityprovidedesirable targetsforattack.Notsurprisingly,terrorismtakesonanurbancomplexion.The attacksonNewYork,London,Madrid,Istanbul,Jerusalem,Mumbai,andother citiesarealogicalextensionofthesedevelopments.Withthebenefitofhindsight, itmightbeeasytospotatrendtowardurbanterrorism,thoughyearsagocareful attentiontothedataalsowouldhavetoldthesamestory. Foralltheirsubstantialworth,theWilsonCenterandFannieMaepublications didnotpickuponthistrend.Fromaconceptualperspective,wecancallthisphenomenonthescopeofurbanterrorism.Bythephrasescopeofurbanterrorism,I meanitsgeographicalextensivenessandprevalenceacrossnation-states.Thescope ofurbanterrorismcanbeidentifiedbythedegreetowhichithasspreadtomany citiesaroundtheworld. Table 2.1 provides a picture of urban terrorism’s spreading prevalence. The tableportraystwenty-fivenationsandterritoriesintermsofurbanversusnonurban incidentsbetween1968and2005.Alsoshownarefatalitiesandcasualties. Ofthetwenty-fivenationslocatedinareasstretchingfromNorthAmerica toSouthAsia,onlythreefellbelowa50percentrateofurbanattack.During more than three decades, 76 percent of all terrorism occurred within cities. Giventherangeofurban-basedpopulationduringthe1960sand1970s(between30and40percent)andduringsubsequentdecades(plus40percent)the patternofurbanconcentrationisstriking.Ofcoursetherearecountrieslisted whoseurbanpopulationsarequitehigh—GreatBritainat89percent,France at75percent,andtheUnitedStatesat77percent—whoserateofurbanattack wouldbeconsistentwiththeirurbanizedinhabitants.Buttherearealsomany countries with very low urban populations—Algeria at 57 percent, Egypt at 45percent,Indiaat27percent,Moroccoat53percent,andPakistanat35percent—whoserateofurbanattackfarexceedstheproportionofpeopleliving inmetropolitanareas. Hasurbanterroractuallyincreasedacrosstheglobeasaproportionofallterrorism?Atimelinefrom1968onwardwouldrevealthatwhilecitieshavealwaysbeen populartargets,upuntil9/11thetrendwaserratic.BeforethebigattackonNew York,someyearsskewedoverwhelmingtowardurbanterrorismwhileotheryears
16,587
12,741
56,482
1,189 41 743 2,098 922 1,353 693 497 3,849 6,937 1,422 406 5,104 2,087 5,166 103 195 5,330 390 3,450 1,622 1,262 1,960 888 8,775
Injuries
Source:DatafromRANDdatabase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type1data.
TOTAL
959 7 377 1,410 346 188 89 145 1,501 1,387 454 86 19 1,412 320 52 68 1,482 174 1,396 314 292 512 362 3,235
213 27 230 1,608 130 1,085 462 619 540 825 219 417 79 912 11 25 683 657 363 417 60 1,286 1,152 169 552
Algeria Canada Chechnya Colombia Egypt France Germany Greece India Israel Indonesia Italy Japan Kashmir Kenya Morocco NorthernIreland Pakistan Peru Russia SaudiArabia Spain Turkey UK UnitedStates
Fatalities
Incidents
Country/Territory
ScopeofTerror:Twenty-FiveNationsandTerritories,1968–2005
Table2.1
73,069
2,148 48 1,120 3,508 1,268 1,541 782 642 5,350 8,324 1,876 492 5,123 3,499 5486 155 263 6,812 564 4,846 1,936 1,554 2,472 1,250 1,2010
Casualties
76
71 96 42 54 52 85 97 96 36 77 73 96 91 23 82 52 78 77 88 74 92 96 80 98 86
Urban incidents(%)
24
29 4 58 46 48 15 3 4 64 23 27 4 9 77 18 48 22 23 12 26 8 4 19 2 14
Non-urban incidents(%)
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 33
34 CHAPTER 2
sawadrop-off.After9/11andthroughtheyear2005,citiesaccountedforatleast 78percentofincidents(seeAppendix,FigureA1).Allthesame,thisdisproportion ofurbanterrorismconstitutesjustoneaspectofitsrise. TheFrequencyofUrbanTerror Inthesummerof2001,aformercounterterrorismanalystnamedLarryJohnson wrote an op-ed piece for the NewYorkTimes.15 Johnson titled his article “The DecliningTerroristThreat,”andheintroducedthearticlewithanassurancethat peoplewereneedlesslyworryingaboutterrorism: Judgingfromnewsreportsandtheportrayalofvillainsinourpopularentertainment,Americansarebedeviledbyfantasiesaboutterrorism.Theyseemtobelieve thatterrorismisthegreatestthreattotheUnitedStatesandthatitisbecoming morewidespreadandlethal.TheyarelikelytothinkthattheUnitedStatesisthe mostpopulartargetofterroristsandtheyalmostcertainlyhavetheimpression thatextremistIslamicgroupscausemostterrorism.
Johnsonwentontopositacounterargument,commentingthatthenumbersof terroristincidentsweredeclining,thatfeweroftheseincidentswerejudgedtobe “significant,”andthatevenfeweroftheattacks“involvedAmericancitizensor business.”Heexplainedthatmostterrorismwasforeignbasedandconnectedto businessventures.“Thegreatestriskisclear,”Johnsonadvised,“ifyouaredrillingforoilinColombia—orinnationslikeEcuador,NigeriaorIndonesia—you shouldtakeappropriateprecautions;otherwiseAmericanshavelittletofear.”The anti-terroristexpertbroughthispointhomebyconcluding: Althoughhigh-profileincidentshavefosteredtheperceptionthatterrorismisbecomingmorelethal,thenumberssayotherwise,andearlysignssuggestthatthe decadebeginningin2000willcontinuethedownwardtrend.Amajorreasonforthe declineisthecurrentreluctanceofcountrieslikeIraq,SyriaandLibya,whichonce eagerlybackedterroristgroups,toprovidesafehavens,fundingandtraining.
Inthefirstinstance,Johnson’sreasoningwasfaultybecauseheassumedterrorismcouldbeisolated.Asamethodofasymmetricwarfare,terrorismcanbe adoptedbyanynumberoforganizationsinordertoevenouttheodds.Terrorists learnfromoneanother,andwhatworkswillspreadtootherundergroundorganizations.Moreover,terrorismismutableor,asSternputsit,terrorismisa“protean enemy,” able to change shape and flourish in many environments.16 Terrorism occursinmanydifferentplaces,inmanydifferentforms,andcanbeadaptedto manydifferentofconditions. WhileJohnsonmiscalculated,fromonevantagepointhewascorrect.Within atleastsomeparticulartimeframes,theincidentsofterrorhaddeclined.Figure 2.1presentspreviouslyciteddatainadifferentformat.Takingthetotalnumberof
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 35 Figure2.1 FrequencyofTerror:IncidentsinTwenty-TwoNations, 1968–2005 300
250
200
150
100
50
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0
Source:AdaptedfromRANDdatabase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2data.
incidentsintwenty-twocountriesbetween1968and2005,itpresentstheresults asalinegraph.Bothurbanandnonurbanincidentsareincluded. ImagineJohnsonfromtheyear2001lookingbackwardtothepreviousdecade. Beginningin1993hewouldseeasharplyplunginglineculminatinginadeep trough.Withoutattentiontolongertrends,theslightupwardtiltofthelinefor 1998couldbeinterpretedasaglitch.Indeed,withsomelogicJohnsoncouldhave takenanynumberoflimitedtimeintervalsintherecordofterrorandconcluded itwasonadownwardslide. WhereJohnsonwentwrongwasinnotnoticingthemuchlongertimeline,characterizedbysharplyupwardpeaksfollowedbyplummetingdownwardlines.Taking alongerperspective,weseethatin1976thenumberofincidentsroseabove200 whilejusttwoyearslateritfellbelow150.Adecadelater,incidentsclimbedtoanalltimehighof228onlytofallbyalmosthalfinthemid-1990s.Thispatterncontinued throughouttherestofthecentury,withterrorismhittingasteepdeclinein2000. Thehard-wonlessonisthatthefrequencyofterrorismcanbequiteerratic.By frequencyImeantherateofoccurrence.Howoftenterrorismoccursorreoccurs iscriticalinassessingtrends,andtheseratesshouldbeexaminedoverdifferent intervalsoftime.Terrorismseemstooccurincyclesorwaves.Attackstendto bunchuparoundparticulartargetsandthenrecedeforatime,onlytoreappearin thesameoranalteredform.
36 CHAPTER 2
Figure2.2 SeverityofTerror:CasualtiesinTwenty-TwoNations, 1968–2005 12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0
Source:AdaptedfromRANDdatabase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2data.
Asweshallseeinlaterchapters,thereasonsforthisarenumerousandconnected tothepurposesofurbanterrorism.Oneofitscoretacticsistoinculcatefear,and assuch,theshockofattacksismoreeffectivelyreleasedinclusteredandrepetitive assaults,ratherthanattacksthatarespreadout.Forthisreasonalone,onecansee changesinthefrequencyofterrorism.Attimesitwillbeextremelyactiveandat othertimesitwillliedormant,perhapsvaryingbyplacesacrosstheglobe. TheSeverityofUrbanTerrorism Johnsonalsomighthavesystematicallyexaminedcasualties,orwhatisherecalled theseverityofattack.Asnotedinanearlierchapter,severityreferstoincidents, fatalities,andinjuriescausedbyattacks.Inseekingtoinculcatefear,terroristswill assessthe“payoff”ofanygivenattackintermsofitshumancasualties.Thegeneral notionbehindmeasuringseverityisthatterroristshavegrownmoreefficientand areabletoachieveabiggerpayoffwithfewerattacks.Thus,evenifincidentsappeartobefallinginnumber,totalcasualtiesmayberising.Accordingly,weturn ourattentiontothataspectofseveritydealingwithcasualties.Figures2.2and2.3 portraytheseverityofterrorintwenty-twocountriesacrosstheglobebetween1968 and2005.Figure2.2displaystotalcasualtieswhileFigure2.3showscasualtiesper attack.Includedinthefigurearebothurbanandnonurbancasualties.
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 37
Figure2.3 SeverityofTerror:CasualtiesperAttackinTwenty-TwoNations, 1968–2005 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0
Source:AdaptedfromRANDdatabase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2data.
Noticethemodestratchetingeffectofcasualties—extremelylowthroughthe 1970sfollowedbyaslightrise,witheachsuccessivedipfollowedbyaslightly higherjumpuntiltheradicaljumpduetothe9/11attack,followedbyirregular movements.Lookingatabsolutenumbers,Figure2.2tellsusthatinthe1970s casualtiespeakedat1,126;bythe1980stheyhadhit2,102;bythe1990sover 6,000;andbytheturnofthecenturyover10,000,onlytodropdownagainbelow 2,000. ThisratcheteffectisevenclearerinFigure2.3whenexaminingcasualtiesper attack.Here,thejumpsstandoutfortheentiretimetrajectory.Astimegoesby, theseverityofattackincreases,albeitinerraticpatterns.Forexample,intheearly 1970sterroristsexactedahighofalmost4casualtiesperattack;bythelate1970s, thehighrosetoalmost10casualtiesperattack;bythe1980sithadrisenslightly above10casualtiesperattack;bythe1990sthatrosetomorethan60casualties perattack;andbytheturnofthecenturyitpeakedatmorethan80casualtiesper attack,onlytofallby2005tolessthan30casualtiesperattack.17 That terrorists are exacting bigger payoffs is corroborated by other studies, manyofwhichuseadifferentmethodologyandrelyondifferentdatabases.Using atimeseriesanalysis,EndersandSandlershowthatovertheyears,victimsare 17percentmorelikelytobekilledorinjuredinterrorattacks.18Morepeopleare
38 CHAPTER 2
beingmoreseverelyinjuredbyterrorism,andthismakesitallthemorelethal.We canbestconcludethatwhileitispossibleforfrequencytodecrease,thelethality ofterrormayverywellincrease. Whatelsemightwelearnfromthis?Forone,terroristsare“rationalactors” interestedinresultsandwillingtopayahighpricetoachieveacertainoutcome. Second,suicideterrorisaparticularlyeffectivewaytobringthisabout.InHoffman’s words,suicideisthe“ultimatesmartbomb.”19Attackerswillingtoblowthemselves upcanrecognizestrategictargets,pinpointlargecrowds,andpenetratebarriers. Further,thechancesofasuicideattackersucceedingaremuchgreaterthanthe chancesofthosewieldinggunsorplantingexplosives. Solongasterroristscandrawfromapopulationwillingtosupplyrecruits(not alwayspossible),suicideattacksarelikelytoberesortedtobecausetheyareoptimal killers(creatingmegaterror)andcaptureattention(creatingcatalyticterror).The trendlinesbearthisout.Overthelasttwodecades,high-riskattacks(whereterrorists mightexpecttobekilledbyothers)andsuicideattacks(whereterroristspurposely killthemselves)havedramaticallyincreased.Whileanumberofterroristgroups claimtohavefirstemployedsuicidedecadesago,itscurrentusehasspreadglobally byalQaeda,ontheWestBankandGazabyPalestinians,inRussiabyChechens, andinIraqbynumerousinsurgentsrecruitedfromtheMuslimworld.20 Third, and for our purposes, this is most important: High severity requires massandsofttargetsthatcanbestbefoundincities.Poorlydefended,densely inhabited,high-valuesitesmakethebesttargets.Onceterrorevolvesfromsmall tolargescale,itrequiresthecity—particularlythemegacity.Wenowturntoa closerlookatthesetargets. Global,Mega,andMajorCities Askwhatkindsofcitiesarelikelytoexperienceterrorinthefuture,andsomeof theanswerswillvary,butotherswillnot.Byandlarge,megaterrorandsmartterror arelikelytotargetorexploitcitieswithhighdensityandthickinfrastructure,and concentratedhigh-valuecommercialassetswhilecatalyticterrorwouldtargetcitieswithaglobalorinternationalprofile.21Global,mega,andmajorcitiescontain mostofallofthesepossiblevulnerabilities,whichareamplifiedbelow. DensityandInfrastructure • • • • • •
clustered,congestedenvironments,largecrowds skyscrapers,officetowers,orlargepublicbuildings touristorvisitorattractions(hotels,restaurants,nightclubs,retailmalls, marketplaces,andhistoricsites) bridges,tunnels,metrosystems,railstations majorairports,dockingstations,seaports,andtransitinterchanges theaters,museums,sportsarenas,pubs,discos,andculturalcenters
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 39
ConcentratedHigh-ValueCommercialorPoliticalAssets • • • •
centerofworldandnationalcommerce largefinancialcenterswithbigstockexchanges majorbanksandlendinginstitutions government buildings, diplomatic offices like embassies, consulates, and internationalorganizations • large-scale tourism and tourist attractions like historic sites, hotels, cafes, beaches GlobalorInternationalProfile • • • • • •
acitybelongingtoastateinvolvedininternationalconflict aglobalreputation,acapitalcity,apoliticalseat majormedia(newspapers,radio,television) anintellectualcommunitythatfostersdebate multiethnicneighborhoods,largeforeigncommunities areputationforgrantingasylumtoimmigrants
Asmentioned,terroriststargetdensityandinfrastructurebecauseasingleattack maximizescasualties.Themethodsofassaultvaryandincludedetonatedexplosives, shootings,andsuicidebombing.Themostfrequentlyattackedsitesarepackedcity centers,encompassingrestaurants,hotels,retailoutlets,andmasstransitlines.Before thebigattackinNewYorktherewasOklahomaCity(1995),whereAmericanterrorists plantedexplosivesinaparkedvanatalargefederalofficebuilding.Thatattackkilled 168peopleandleftover500wounded.Manchester(1996)alsosufferedasimilar attackthroughanexplosive-ladenvanparkedoutsideadowntownshoppingcenter, resultingin200casualties.Tokyo(1995)experiencedasaringasattackinitsmetro system,killingelevencommutersandcausingthousandsofinjuries.22 Denselypopulatedcitiesinlessdevelopednationshavebeenchronicvictims, amongthemBogotá,Cairo,andCasablanca.Bogotáhasahistoryofterrorconnectedtoitsdrugtradeaswellaspoliticalinsurrection.Bombsweresetoffin downtownBogotáanditsmarketplaces(2002and2003),killingscoresofpeople andinjuringmanymore.Cairohasanextensivehistoryofdirectassaults;in1996 and1997,gunmenopenedfireontouristsoutsidetheirhotels,killingatotalof eighteenandwoundingsixteenothers.Sometimelater,attackersthrewbombsand openedfireontouristsoutsideamuseum,killingtenandwoundingscoresmore. Casablancaexperiencedaseriesofcoordinatedattacksinatwo-dayperiod(2003) thatkilledtwenty-ninepeopleandinjuredhundreds.Theattackswereaimedata foreignconsulate,arestaurant,ahotel,andaJewishcenter. Terroristsareespeciallykeenontargetingconcentrated,high-valueassets.More sothaneverglobalizationhasturnedcitiesinto“nodes”foravastinternational networkoftransactions.Economiccomplexityandinternationalinterdependence
40 CHAPTER 2
haveconvertedcitiesintopowerfulcommandcenters,directingbillionsofdollars ininvestment,managingmillionsofpeople,andcontrollingthousandsofwork sitesaroundtheglobe.23Thismaybeasignofenormouspower,butitisalsoa veryvisiblesignofvulnerability.Awell-placedexplosioncanproducecatastrophic reverberationsandparalyzeacity. September11isthemostconspicuousexampleofterror’sabilitytocreateacontagionofeconomicrupture.TheinitialattacksinNewYorkcausedstockexchanges intheUnitedStatesandothercountriestofall.Gradually,stockexchangeshave becomeinuredtotheseshocksandareabletoquicklyrecover.Thesametacticof economicassaulthasbeenemployedinLondonandalsoinIstanbulandJerusalem, thoughwithnarrowereconomicrepercussions.Duringtheearly1970s,planted bombs exploded in central London hotels and banks. By the 1990s, economic targetsincentralLondonwerestruckagain.Onebombblewaten-footbreachin thestockexchange,locatedinthefinancialdistrict,the“City.”Alargebombwas alsofoundanddefusedatCanaryWharf,thesiteofLondon’snewbusinessdistrict. Fromthestandpointoffinancialandbankingassets,themostnotableattackwas thebombingoftheBalticExchangeintheheartofLondon.Thateventbrought intoquestionthesafetyofconductingbusinessintheCity,raisedinsurancecosts throughouttheCity,andprecipitatedmassiveeffortstoprotectitsbuildingsand thoroughfares.24 In2003,serialassaultswerelaunchedinIstanbulontheBritishconsulateand HSBCbank.Usingtrucksfilledwithexplosives,theterroristsdetonatedtheircargo withintwominutesofeachother,blowingoutvitaleconomicfunctions.Jerusalem hasbeensubjecttoitsmostintenseattacks,generatedbyalAqsaviolencein2000. Mostoftheattackswereaimedatthecenterofthecityandcarriedoutbysuicide terrorists.Foratleastatime,thecumulativeeffectsofterrorismhavedevastated downtown,smallbusiness,andthecity’stouristindustry.25 Moreover,touristareaswithhistoricsites(Istanbul,Jerusalem,andLuxor)or withattractivebeachesandresorts(Bali,Djerba,Nairobi,andSharmal-Sheikh) havebeenstrucktimeandagain.Severalfactorscontributetothevulnerability oftouristcities,includingthepresenceofWesternerslivinganaffluentor“decadent”life-style,theresonancecreatedbyinflictingcasualtiesonaninternational clientele,thehighlyelasticnatureoftourismthatinducesconsumerstocancel vacationsbecauseofdanger,andtheimmediateimpactofthosecancellations onforeignexchangerevenues.Anattackona“touristcity”alsoputsinquestion governmentcontentionsaboutstabilityandsecurity.Thus,devastatingattacks in Bali brought Indonesia under suspicion as a hotbed of Islamic radicalism while Sharm al-Sheikh made Egypt’s claims of being the “Red Sea Riviera” ringhollow. Last,terroristsareapttobothoperateinandtargetcitieswitha globaland internationalprofile.Partofthisprofilestemsfromacity’sbelongingtoanation withhighlevelsofinternationalinvolvementorconflict.Duringthe1990s,Paris wasattackedbecauseofFrance’sinvolvementwithitsformercoloniesinNorth
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 41
Africa,particularlyAlgeria.MoscowandMumbaihavebeenatargetedbecauseof internationaldisputesoverterritoryandreligion.Themostobviouscasesof9/11, 3/11,and7/7inpartwereduetoAmerican,Spanish,andBritishinvolvementin theMiddleEast. Immigrants, guest workers, and international communities can also be a significantsourceofrisk.Whilesocialpluralismprovidesrichsynergies,under certainconditionsitcanbeanestinggroundforterroristorganizations.Terrorists findsafehouses,materialsupport,andrecruitswithinethniccommunitiesorwith co-religionistsinlocalmosques.Global,mega,andmajorcitiesnotonlysupply theseconditionsinabundance,butfurnishtheanonymityforterroristswhowish to“getlost.” Thereareinstancesaswellwhereheterogeneouscitiesprovideabattleground for intergroup conflict—sometimes fought out by using terrorism.A sense of relative deprivation sharpens as different groups come into closer proximity. Word gets around more quickly and socialization proceeds more rapidly in denselypackedenvironments.Beirutprovidesareadyexampleofhowdifferent groupslivingunderconditionsofhopelessnessandinproximitytooneanother canengageinmutualattack.SimilarecologiesofterrorhavepervadedBelfast, Londonderry,Sarajevo,andHyderabad.Ratherthanbeingdirectedvertically, warfareoccurslaterallyandbetweengroupsoperatingatthesamelevel—HindusfightingMuslimsinMumbai,AlbaniansfightingSerbsinKosovo,orrival criminalgangsfightingeachotherandthecitizenryinBogotá.Ethnic,religious, orunderworldgangssimplybattleitout. Evenmorethanthis,themediaplaysanenormousroleintheexerciseof terrorism.InIraq,apriorityoftheinsurgentsistofilmanattackanddownloadthefootagefordistribution.Theinsurgentshavenowhonedthatprocess toasciencesothatwithinthirtyminutestheattackisbroadcasttootherparts oftheworld.26Fewplacesenableterroriststoreachanaudiencemorethana citywithaprominentmediaandintellectualestablishment.Asoneterroristin Algeriaexpressedhislogic:“Isitpreferableforourcausetokilltenenemies inanoued(dryriverbed)ofTelergmawhennoonewilltalkofit...or[isit bettertokill]asinglemaninAlgiers,whichwillbenotedthenextdayinthe Americanpress?”27 Ablastinamountaintownorinthecountrysidemayarouselocalconcern,but isgenerallyoflittleornoconsequencefortherestoftheworld.Butanattackon WallStreet,amassacreinPiccadillyCircus,thebombingoftheEiffelTower,or poisongasinaTokyometroarousesinternationalalarm.Anysucheventwillbe instantlytelegraphedtoalargerworldandprovokeamuchlargeraudience.Ifterroriststhriveonanythingitismediaattentionandwidespreadrecognition.Graphic imagesofterrorcanbeusedtobothintimidatethepublicandenlistitssympathy. Publicityacquiredthroughlessviolentmeansalsoservestheterrorists’cause—not justbecauseitintroducesthemtotheworld,butalsobecauseitinducesasenseof vulnerabilityintothepopulationatlarge.Therearetwosidestothistactic.Onone
42 CHAPTER 2
side,vulnerabilityentailsthedreadofattackandmassfear.Ontheotherside,it softensuptheopposition,predisposingittotryto“understand”theterroristcause. Liberalsocietiesaccustomedtotoleranceareapttowonderwhyindividualswould resorttosuchbrutal,impersonalacts.Intellectualsandacademicsaskquestions, raiseissues,andsometimesblametheirownsocietiesforprovokingterrorism.28 Whensocietyisunderpressure,politicianswhowereonceonthefringecangain credibility.After7/7,LondonmayorKenLivingstoneblamedBritishandAmerican foreignpolicyfortheattacks,suggestingthatthosenationsreversethemselvesfor theirallegedmisdeeds.29Broadcastingtheotherside’spositionmakesthepublic sensitivetothegrievancesthatmotivateterrorists.Mediaattentionandconstant publicityalsoimpartterroristcauseswithquasilegitimacy.Themoreonehears aboutasetofgrievances,thegreaterthechancethosegrievanceswillgainaplace onthepublicagendaandbecomepartofawiderdiscourse. Theseincentivesmayexplainwhyterrorismwouldbesopronetoattackglobal, mega,ormajorcities.GlobalcitieslikeLondon,NewYork,andParisholdacumulativeabundanceoffeaturesthatmakethemdesirableandvulnerabletargets. Theyconveyapowerful“internationalmessage”thatattractspotentialattackers.30 Citiescapableofan“internationalmessage”magnifytheconflict;theybroaden itsmeaningandengulfmoreparticipants.Astrikeatanyoneoftheseramifies throughtheworld. Further, as globalization proceeds, the number of “global cities” is likely to increase—bothfrommajorcitieslocatedingrowingeconomiesandfrommega cities in burgeoning nations. Cities that were once in the mega city camp, like Beijing,Shanghai,orMumbai,willconnectwiththerestoftheworldandalso becomeglobalcities.OthercandidatesforglobalstatusinSouthAmericainclude MexicoCity,SãoPaulo,andBuenosAires;inAfrica,Johannesburgandpossibly Cairostandout;andinSoutheastAsiaandthePacific,JakartaandSydneyare reasonablechoices. Manyofthesecities,particularlythoselocatedinSouthAmericaandAfrica, havebeenimpactedattheirperipheriesbylargenumbersofsquattersettlements. Consisting of tin-roofed shanties with no plumbing, these settlements subsist throughinformaleconomieswherepeoplelaboratwhatevermenialjobstheycan findorearnmoneywithwhatevergoodstheycansell.Withmoreandmorepeople leavingthecountrysideandmigratingtocities,aswellingurbanizationofpoverty nowthreatensurbanstability.Theestimatesvary,butmainstreamprojectionssay that40to65percentofbig-citypopulationsliveinsubstandardconditions.31While thereisnocredibleevidencetosuggestthatpovertyleadstoterrorism,itdoescreate desperateconditionsandmountingchaos—bothofwhichmaybeprecursorsfor recruiting.32Formegacities,thedangerliesinapervasiveatmosphereoflawlessnesswhereanymethodofsurvivalgainssocialacceptance.Atbottom,terrorism feedsonpotentialrecruitsbecomingaccustomedtobreakingsocialnorms.Oncea personhastransgressedmoralcodes,itbecomeseasiertodosowithinaframework ofasymmetricwarfare.
THEEVOLUTIONOFURBANTERRORISM 43
Conclusions September11isnoteworthybecauseitconstitutedthequintessentialmomentfor catalytic,mega,andsmartterror.Forthefirsttimeinthemodernhistoryofterror, fatalitiesexceeded500inasingleattackandtheshockwastransmittedaround theworld.NewYork’s9/11wasfollowedbysimilarmegaterrorisminMadrid’s 3/11,London’s7/7,andIndia’s7/11.Fromthestandpointofmodernterror,9/11 wasunique,butitwasalsopartofalargertrainofurbanterrorrootedinthe1960s. Theseincidentscanbetracedbyexaminingthescope,frequency,andseverityof urbanterror—respectivelydefinedasthespreadofurbanincidents,thechronologicaloccurrenceofthoseincidentsoverthelongterm,andthetollincasualties.An examinationofthescopeofterrorshowsthatanoverwhelmingproportionofincidentstookplaceincities,andduringthepost–9/11periodthesenumbersroseeven higher.Thefrequencyofterrorhasalsorisen,erratically,inanupwardratcheting ofincidents.Theseverityofterrortellsusthatterroristshaveexactedmoretotal casualties,havingreachedahighin2001(duetothe9/11attack).Theyhavealso becomemoreefficientincreatingmorecasualtiesperattack.Whilethepost–9/11 periodhasnotreachedthehighscreatedbytheattackinNewYork,urbanterrorhas continuedtoescalatecomparedtoallothertimeintervals.Finally,wecanobserve a certain coincidence between the exercise of urban terror and the presence of global,mega,andmajorcities.Terroristsarelikelytotargetorexploitcitieswith high-densityandthickinfrastructure,concentratedhigh-valuecommercialassets, andaglobalorinternationalprofile.Theaccumulationofthesecharacteristicsand theirattributesaremostavailableincitieslikeNewYork,London,Paris,Mumbai, Istanbul,andMoscow.
3 TheFearFactor
Ifthoughtcorruptslanguage,languagealsocorruptsthought. —GeorgeOrwell Politicians,Media,andthe“T”Word Alltoofrequently,hot-buttonissuesareusedtoadvancepoliticalagendas.Terrorism isanidealcandidateforthisbecauseitisbasedonfearandeasilymanipulatedto misleadpeople.Themanipulationcrossestheideologicalspectrum,andpoliticians aswellasjournalistshavebeentheforemostprestidigitators.Thewordmagically extendsfarandwide,buttwoexamplesareworthnoting.TheAmericanWhite Housemanipulatesthe“t”wordtopropupits“waronterror,”andtheBritish Guardianusesittosatisfyitsownaddictionforblamingthevictim.Whilewemay notbeabletoavoidtherhetoricalmanipulation,wecantrytospeakstraightforwardlyaboutterror.Theremedyisnottobecloudbuttoclarify,andwecanstart withlanguage. Morethanafewmainstreammediaoutlets,includingtheBritishBroadcasting Corporation(BBC),Reuters,theWashingtonPost,theNewYorkTimes,andNationalPublicRadio,insistonusingwordsotherthan“terror”todescribepolitical violence against noncombatants.The insistence is especially pronounced when assaultstakeplaceincountriesotherthantheirown.1Thestatedreasonsfornot usingthe“t”wordaredrivenbyacommonrationale.Reuterswasoneofthefirst toannouncethat“terrorism”wouldbeabolishedfromitslexiconbecausethenews agencywantedtobeaccurateandfreefromemotiveterms.2TheBBCcautions itscorrespondentsthatthe“wordterroristcanbeabarriertounderstanding.”3A spokesmanfortheWashingtonPostdevotedanarticletotheissue,claimingthat “terrorism”isalabel“thatdoesnotconveyhardinformation”andsuggestingthat itsusemeantthenewspaperwas“takingsides”insteadofreportingwhatwasactually“seenandsaid.”4Besides,wrotethespokesman,someallegedterroristsmay alsobepartofa“nationalistmovementthatconductssocialwork.”5TheNewYork Timesalsoavoidedthe“t”wordinreportinganinterviewwithSecretaryofState CondoleezaRice.WhereRicehadrepeatedlyandclearlyused“terroristorganizations”todescribeHamasandsimilargroups,theNewYorkTimessubstitutedthe phrase“Palestinianfactions.”6 44
THEFEARFACTOR 45
Othermediarepresentativesexplainthatdescribingsomeorganizationsasterrorist“ignore[s]theircomplexroleintheMiddleEastdrama”andisa“bias”that “runscountertogoodjournalism.”7AreporterfromNationalPublicRadioalso felttheterroristnomenclaturewasnotappropriateforHezbollahbecauseithas “averyimportantstatus”and“isaveryimportantpoliticalparty.”8Francefound itselfcaughtinthediscoursewhenformerforeignministerDominiquedeVillepin repeatedmuchthesamereasoning.InopposingtheEuropeanUnion’sclassification ofHamasasaterroristorganization,VillepinarguedthatbecauseHamaswasa “massmovement”itshouldbeexemptfromtheterroristdesignation.9 Presumablynewsoutletsandothersareseekingtoconveyatypeofviolence oramethodofwarfare.Accurateandobjectivedescriptionsofthisviolencehave nothingtodowithwhetheritsprogenitorspossessa“popularbase,”muchless whethertheyareengagedin“socialwelfare.”Historytellsusaboutanassortment ofpoliticalorganizationswithlargepopularbasesaswellastheirprominence in taking up the cause of social welfare.This runs all the way from political conservativespromoting“faith-based”charities,tosocialdemocratsendorsing socialsecurity,totheSovietCommunistPartysponsoringtheYoungPioneers,up throughGermany’sNaziPartyusingsummercampstorecruittheHitlerYouth. HamasandHezbollahmaybemajorplayerswhoactivelyrecruitafollowing, butthisisentirelyunconnectedtotheirmethodofwarfare,howtheyattack,or whomtheychoosetotarget.Similarly,attemptsbythelefttodescribegroup terrorismas“resistance”orbytherightasanefforttocreatea“caliphate”do notaddressitsuniqueuseofviolence.Rather,theseareattemptstocharacterize politicalmotivesorobjectives. Moreseriousisthedebateovertheapplicationofthe“t”word,andthisisfar from a quibble over semantics.Words chosen to describe a critical event have a profound impact on how that event is internalized, perceived, and ultimately treated.Themostcommonlyusedsubstitutefortheterroristnounis“militant”; lessfrequentlyusedaredescriptivetermsakinto“fighter”or“armedfaction.”10 Much,thoughnotall,oftheworld’smainstreammediafavorthesenounsbecause theyaresupposedtobetterportraythefacts.11Butdotheyreally?Themedia’s chosen substitute, “militant,” is either vague or misleading. By most standard definitions, the term denotes a broad range of actions that encompass fighting, aggressive behavior, forceful action, stridency, or intolerance.While “militant” mightalsobeappliedtosomeonewhotookuparms,thearrayofpossibleactions couldincludealmostanything.Traditionally,“militant”hasbeenusedtodescribe strikingunions,civilrightspicketers,pacifistswhoblockeddoorways,andhard-line politicalmovements.Coalminerswhomarchedontheofficesofgovernmentor corporateexecutiveswereknownas“militants”;truckerswhoblockedhighways werecalled“militants”;doctrinairepoliticalmovementslikeLondon’s“Militant Tendency”calledthemselves“militants”;andradicalmembersoftheWomen’s LiberationMovementreferredtothemselvesas“militantfeminists.”12Whileall ofthesemovementspossessacommonaggressiveness,theirconductisafarcry
46 CHAPTER 3
fromtheRedBrigades,theIrishRepublicanArmy,Hamas,PalestinianIslamic Jihad,Lashkar-e-Taiba,oralQaeda. Termslike“fighter”or“armedfaction”areevenmoreambiguousandgenerally pertaintoengaginginabattleorcontest.Thiscouldapplytoarmies,guerrillas, orcivilians.Usingthesewordsamongothersassynonymsforterroristsisreasonable.Butwithoutmentioningalargercontextofterrorism,terror,orterrorists,the media’spreferredeuphemismsarenotonlymeaningless,buttheyconfoundahost ofbehaviorsthathavenothingtodowithrealactsofterror.Ifanything,choosing euphemismstodescribeindividualswhocarryoutthemass,deliberatekillingof civiliansisadistortionoftheveryactajournalistmightbetryingtodescribe. Euphemisms obfuscate rather than clarify, they conceal more than reveal, and theycamouflagerawfacts.Purposefulambiguityhasalwaysbeenusedbypropagandiststofoolaudiences,andwittinglyornot,newsservicespropagatethevery propagandatheyseektoavoid. Newsoutletsmayfeelintimidated,fallpreytowishfulthinking,orhavepoliticalreasonsfortreatingthesubjectastheydo.Butthewordschosendonotalways matchtheactstaken.Afailuretodescribeterrorproperlymeansnotbeingableto reportonitproperly.Toooftenthemediamissthesignificanceofaparticularact orlinkagesbetweenseeminglydifferentacts.Theconclusionsonhowtoreportthe masskillingofnoncombatantsarenotjustamatterofpositivist,empiricalsocial sciencebutalsocommonsense.Take,forexample,thefollowingactsandhow theymightbedescribed. • InJuly2005atSharmal-Sheikh,vehiclesladenwithexplosivesweredriven intoaresortdistrictandnearbyhotels.Thesynchronizedblastskillednearly 100touristsandworkersandleftmanymoreinjured.Agroupcallingitself theTawhidWalJihadclaimedresponsibility,saying“JewsandChristiansare ourtargetsatanytimebyanymeansandthatMuslimsarenotpermittedto minglewiththem.”13 • InSeptember2004inJakarta,acarbombingkilled10peopleandinjuredmore than180.TheincidentoccurredjustmetersfromtheAustralianembassyand wasintendedtokillormaimnationalsofthatcountry.AterroristorganizationknownasJemaahIslamiya,thoughttobeaffiliatedwithalQaeda,took responsibilityfortheattack,explaining,“Wedecidedtosettleaccountswith Australia,oneoftheworstenemiesofGodandIslam.”14 • Inthespringof2002,duringtheheightof“alAqsaviolence,”Palestinians launchedaseriesofsuicideattacksinbuses,markets,andpedestrianmalls locatedincentralJerusalem.Othermasskillingsoccurredintheresortof Natanya,arestaurantinHaifa,anentertainmenthallinRishonLeZion,and elsewhere.Theattackswerecarriedoutbyyoungmenandwomendisguised tomeldwiththecrowds,andtheyresultedinthousandsofcasualties.A spokesman for Hamas claimed responsibility, saying “Your children and yourwomen,everyoneisatargetnow.”ReferringtothewaveofalAqsa
THEFEARFACTOR 47
violence,YasirArafaturgedhisfollowers,“Wewillmakethelivesofthe Infidelshell....Findwhatstrengthyouhavetoterrorizeyourenemyand theenemyofGod.”15 • InAugust 1998American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were blownup,causinghundredsofciviliandeathsandmanymorecasualtiesto localinhabitants.Monthslater,OsamabinLadentookcreditfortheattacks andexplained,“Everystateandeverycivilizationandculturehasresortedto terrorismundercertaincircumstancesforthepurposeofabolishingtyranny andcorruption....Theterrorismwepracticeisofthecommendablekindfor itisdirectedatthetyrantsandtheaggressorsandtheenemiesofAllah....”16 • InOctober2002inMoscow,morethan800peopleweretakenhostagein a theater by a Chechen suicide squad. Forty-one Chechens conducted the attack,whichincludedwomenaccomplices(“blackwidows”).Thewomen hidsuicidevestsundertheircloaksandguardedthehostageswhilethemen took charge of exit points and gave instructions. More than 100 hostages werekilledasRussiantroopsstormedthetheater.Now-deceasedChechen leaderShamilBasayevclaimedresponsibility,andinaninterviewstatedhis “maingoalwillbedestroyingtheenemyandexactingmaximumdamage.” Basayevalsoremarked,“Iadmit,I’mabadguy,abandit,aterrorist...but whatwouldyoucallthem[theRussians]?”17 Thelessontobederivedshouldbeobvious.Outofanypossiblechoice,the word “terrorism” is “hard information” that most accurately conveys a type of warfarewhosemajorintentistotargetnoncombatantsforpurposesofpolitical intimidation.18WhetherattacksarecarriedoutagainstEgyptiansinresorts,Israelis inbuses,Australians,Indonesians,Kenyans,andTanzaniansinforeignembassies, orRussiansintheaters,journalistsinterestedinreportingwhatis“seenandsaid” haveampleevidenceattheirdisposal.Indescribingtheactionsoftheirownfollowers,YasirArafat,OsamabinLaden,andShamilBasayevhavereadilyusedthe descriptive“terror”oritsderivative. Nodoubt,alltheseincidentsdiffer.Theywereconductedbygroupswithdifferenthistories,differentgrievances,differentcompositions,anddifferentgoals. Buttheyalsobearsimilarities.Allarepartofapatterninvolvingindiscriminate multiplekillings,maimings,orhostagetaking;allaregearedtooptimizecasualties;allarecarriedoutbyinvisibleornearinvisibleattackerswithcamouflagedor concealedweapons;andallinvolveanenemywhosemodusoperandiistoignore rulesofwarfare.Furthermore,terroristsofallstripesareabletolearnfromeach otherwaystooptimizecatalytic,mega,orsmartterror,andtheydrawinspiration fromeachother’ssuccesses. Thereisalsoanothercharacteristicthesedisparategroupsshareandthattotalthe mediahaveyettofullyportray.Terrorismworksbyintimidation,andintimidation requirestheinculcationoffear.Itisnotonlythefearofterrorbuttheterroroffear thatenhancesthepowerofasmallminority.Fearhasmultipledimensionsandcan
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beapowerfulbargainingchip.Terroristsreadilyapprehendthisandunderstand thatpublictrepidationcanbetradedforsubstantialconcessions. TheRhetoricofFear Thefearfactormaycontributetoanunderstandingofwhyitisthatsomemainstreammediashyawayfromthe“t”word.Fearmanifestsitselfindifferentways, dependingupontheproximityofattack.Whenseenfromadistanceorreported to a faraway constituency, people have a tendency to rationalize terrorism and discountthefearfactor.Bythisrationale,terroristsactbecausetherearenoother ways to deal with deep-seated grievances. Their resort to mass intimidation is seenasduetotheabsenceofameansforconductingcivildiscourseorattributed tosocioeconomicprivation.Thereisalsoanotherreactiontoterrorismstemming fromadirectorpainfulexperiencewithit.Oncehavingencounteredterrorfirsthand,perspectivescanradicallychange.Terrormovesfrompoliticalabstraction topersonalbloodshed. Oneprincipleseemstoendure.Proximitytoactsofrandomviolencemakesfear difficulttodenyandmorerealisticrhetoricdifficulttoescape.ExamplesofrhetoricaltransformationcanbegleanedrespectivelyfromtheNewYorkTimesandthe BritishBroadcastingCompany(BBC).OnceNewYorkandLondonwereattacked, therhetoricbegantochange.TheNewYorkTimesreferredtothe“horror”ofterror duringthe9/11attack,andtheBBCmadedenunciatoryprofilesof“terrorists”in thewakeof7/7.19Whilebothmainstreamoutletsopenlyreportedeventscloseto homeasinherentlyterrorist,bothjustasfreelyusedwordslike“militant”toreport oncomparableeventsinRussiaandelsewhere. Themoststrikingconfirmationoftheproximitytoactualattackanduseofthe “t”wordcanbefoundinpublicopinionsurveysconductedinJordan.InNovember 2005,alQaedastruckthreehotelsinAmman,turningtheimmediateareaintorubble, devastatingaweddingparty,killing60people,andinjuringover100(overwhelminglyJordaniansandArabsfromothernations).TheattackshookJordanians,who, whileapeacefulpeople,hadbeforetheattackshownsomesympathyforalQaeda. Priortotheattack,only11percentofJordanianschosetodescribealQaedaasa “terroristorganization.”Aftertheattack,Jordanianpublicopinionhaddecisively reversed,with50percentchoosingtolabelalQaedaasaterroristorganization.20 Jordaniansalsotooktothestreetswithlarge-scaledemonstrationsinangryprotest againstalQaeda. Jordanianpublicopinionalsochangedtowardterrorinotherlandsandsotoo didtheirrhetoric.PriortotheattackinAmman,only34percentofJordanians regardedtheattackontheWorldTradeCenteras“terrorist”;aftertheattackthe proportiongrewto61percent.Interestingly,therewerealsoshiftsinattitudesabout terrorisminIsrael.PriortotheAmmanattack,24percentregardedattacksagainst Israeliciviliansas“terrorist”;aftertheAmmanattack,thatproportiondoubledto 48percent.Notsurprisingly,theproportionofJordanianslabelingtheattackon
THEFEARFACTOR 49
theirowncityas“terrorist”rosetonearunanimityat94percent.21Asweshallsee, adirectexperiencewithterrorbringsfeartotheforeandalongwithitawillingness tousethe“t”word.Directexperiencewillalsoinfluenceperceptions,andthistoo ismediatedbyresidentialdistancefromtheevent. TheTacticsofFear While strategy emphasizes long-term, broad-based objectives, tactics play to shorter and immediately achievable steps. Because of their immediate impact andtangibility,therearetimeswhentacticsdisplacestrategy.Thisisespecially trueforurbanterrorism,wheretacticshaveamarkedandprofoundimpacton urbanlife.Noticethatalltheincidentsdescribedabovetookplaceincongested, highlycomplexenvironments.Hotels,embassies,commercial/cafedistricts,and theatersarecrowdedvenuesthatcontributetothemakingofanintricateurban fabric.Citiesthriveonconditionswherelargepopulationsfunctionamidclustered diversityandinterdependence—allofwhicharesustainedbyanelaborateinfrastructureofinterconnectivity.Togethertheseaspectsoftheurbanenvironment constitutewhatorganizationaltheoristscall“tightlycoupled”societies—thatis, highlycomplexmassentitiescontainingmanypointsofinteractionthatarehighly sensitivetodisturbanceofanykind(accidents,catastrophes,warfare).22While intheUnitedStatesnewer“SunBelt”citiesarelesslikelytobetightlycoupled, moretraditionalcitiesintheNortheast,theMidwest,andsomeintheSouthfit thetightlycoupledpattern. Tobesure,citiesarepowerfulanddynamic,butdespitetheireconomicprowess,tightlycoupled,denselypopulatedsocietiesaredifficulttodefend.Spotting vulnerabilitiesisthekeytoeffectivetactics,andcitiesarethesoftunderbellyof anaggressivecapitalism.Fewsituationsprovokehostilitymorethananobjectthat isperceivedasbothmenacingandweak.Asinglewell-placedterroriststrikecan unhingeacity’sinterconnectivitywhileatthesametimeturnitstowersoffinancial mightintocascadesofdestruction. Asgoodtacticians,terroristsunderstandtheirenvironmentsandfigureoutways inwhichtheoverwhelmingconventionalpoweroftheirfoescanbeturnedagainst them.Thebasicideaistoprompttheenemy’sself-destructionbyresortingtoa militaristjujitsu.Thetrickistoapplyinordinatepressuretoasmallthoughcrucial areaandwatcheverythingturnupsidedown.Forinstance,officetowerscanbe turnedintomassiveblocksthatcrushtheirowninhabitants,transitsystemscanbe usedtoplugupacity,theaterscanbecomeholdingcagesforransom,andforeign touristscantransmitshock.Theseeffectscanalsobecompoundedbyforcinglocal officialsandpolicetooverreactwithindiscriminatearrests,massiveshutdowns, trivialregulations,andineffectivemeasuresthatdomoreharmthangood.Citizens mightseetheserestrictionsasanecessarynuisance,butastimegoesbytheymay alsogrowrestlessandirritated.Evenatatacticallevel,terroristshopetowaitthings outuntilasocietysplits,citizensbegintodissent,andpoliticianssearchforrelief.
50 CHAPTER 3
Whetherthistacticworksornotisadifferentquestion,andpartoftheanswer dependsontheabilityofterroriststosustainattacksaswellastheresilienceofa localpopulation.Byandlarge,citieshaveshownthemselvestobequitecapable ofwithstandingthesepressures.23Nevertheless,weshouldnotunderestimatethe efficacyoftheterroristarsenal. Terroristweaponsmaybeprimitive,buttheirtacticsarequitesophisticated. Tomistaketerrorismastheweaponoftheweakistomiscalculateitspotentialfor causingurbansocietytoimplode.Terrorismispowermadepossiblebyfear.The issueisnotwhetherterroristsare“weak”or“strong,”buttheeffectivenessofthe resourcestheyareabletouseagainsttheirenemies.24Indeed,terroristscanbequite effectiveandarebetterthoughtofashavinglowresourcesemployedinoptimal ways.Well-placedattacksuponmajorcitieshavechangedwholenationsandin manywaystransformedtheworld.Theyalsodemonstratethatthemorerobusta societygrows,themorecomplexandfragileitbecomes.Witnessthelarge-scale panicandoverreactionsbroughtaboutby9/11,3/11,and7/7wherewholeareas werecloseddown,substantialnumbersofpeoplewereinvestigatedorarrested, andmasstransitwastemporarilyfrozen. Recallthatsoonafter9/11,“whitepowder”wasdeliveredinenvelopestocongressionalandpublicoffices.Someofthisturnedouttobeanthraxanditcaptivated America.Postalservicesslowed,employeesrushedtothehospital,andpartsof governmentofficeswereputoff-limits.Someworkersdidnotreporttodutystationsandothersrefusedtoopenpackagesofunknownorigin.Thereactionwas instantaneouswhentwoyearsafter7/7aplotwasuncoveredtoblowupairplanes leavingfromLondon’sHeathrowAirport.Otherairportsaroundtheworldwere put on hold, aircraft were detoured, and passengers made to stand on lines for hoursonendinordertosearchbaggage.Extrememeasurestosafeguardsecurity reachedFrankfurt,Paris,NewYork,andasfarawayasAuckland.Liquids,pastes, gels,andanythingthatcouldconcealadetonatorwereconfiscated.Thesecurity panicwentasfarasrequiringmotherstosiptheirownbreastmilkbeforebeing abletoboard. Large-scale,massivepopulationsarealsoprecioustargets—notjustbecausethey yieldmorecasualties(megaterror)butbecause,inthecontextofthosecasualties, theyareabletotransmitendemicfear(catalyticterror)andbecausemassesofpeople cantriggereconomicdisruption(smartterror).Tightlycoupledcitiesmakefear especiallycontagious—intherapiditythoughwhichtheytransmitpersonalmessages,thebreadthoftheirmedia,andtheattentiontheygivetohumanemotions. Attackscreatewavesofanxietybecausethosewhohaveescapedalsowalkaway believingtheycouldbenext.Thesereactionsaremostvisibleintheaftermathof anattack.Masstransitlosesriders,peoplehesitatebeforeenteringlargebuildings, patronsarelesspronetolingerinmarketplaces,andevenparksseememptier. Addedup,thesetacticsaredesignedtowrecktheurbanenvironment,constrict cityspace,andcreateanatmosphereofambientsuspicion.Whileattackersharbor moredistantstrategicconsiderations,theirtacticalploysofsmartorcatalyticterror
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aredesignedtobreakdownthecity.Thesetacticsconstituteaformofpersistent, low-levelwarfare,orwhathascometobecalled“thefrictionofterror.”Inthe longtermthisfrictionfeedsinsecurity,precipitatesdisinvestment,andseeksthe atrophyofcivilsociety. FearandWeaponsofMassDestruction(CBRN) Weknowthatterroristweaponryhasgraduallybecomemorelethal—goingfrom shootingsandkidnappings,toexplosive-ladenvehicles,totheuseofnervegasand crashingaircraftintobuildings.Thistrajectorywouldsuggestthatchemical,biological,radiological,ornuclearagents(CBRN)couldbeusedinthefuture.Terrorists aroundtheworldhaveexperimentedwithCBRNweaponsofonekindoranother. Saringas,anthrax,ricin,andhydrogencyanideappeartobetheweaponsofchoice. Themostaggressiveterroristshaveexpressedaninterestin“dirtybombs”oreven nuclearsuitcasebombs.Ina1998interview,OsamabinLadenassertedthatitwas areligiousdutyforMuslimstoacquireweaponsofmassdestruction.25Theuseof CBRNisparticularlysuitedtocities,anddependingonthetypeofattack,would havevariableeffects. Aradiologicalattackintheformofadirtybomb(nuclearwastewrappedaround conventionalexplosives)couldcontinuetheupwardratchetofweaponry.Whilethe falloutwouldbegeographicallylimited,itsconsequenceswouldgowellbeyond attackswithconventionalweapons.Apea-sizedmorselofcesiumfromamedical gaugecouldbeencapsulatedwithintenpoundsofTNTanditsdetonationwould contaminate 300 city blocks. Buildings within the targeted area would become “poisoned”andradioactivematerialcouldnotbewashedorblownaway,butrequire weeksforremoval.Detonatingadirtybombwithincertainspaces,suchasNew York’sWallStreet,couldparalyzethenation’sfinancialcenter,causingadomino collapseincapitalmarkets.DetonatingadirtybombinpartsofWashington,DC, wouldcontaminatecongressionalbuildings,theSupremeCourt,andprecipitatea parallelchainofpoliticalchaos. The1995chemicalattackintheTokyometrocausedconsiderablehavoc.Imagesfromthescenewerebroadcastthroughouttheworld,andformanyJapanese theresponsewasoneofconsternationandforeboding.Clinicalreportsshowed thatmorethan600peoplewhocameintocontactwithsaringaswereafflicted byhamperedvision,numbness,lossofmusclecontrol,convulsions,andsevere pain.26Thefearsevokedbythiskindofattackhaveabasiselsewhereintheworld. Anumberofthreatsinvolvingdeadlychemicalslikecyanideorricinhavebeen uncoveredinJerusalem,NewYork,Paris,andLondon. Chemicalterrorismhasitslimitations.Whilethepotentialfordamageandloss oflifeisveryserious,attacksofthiskindarenotlikelytobringaboutlarge-scaleor long-termdestruction.Bycurrentthinking,achemicalattackwouldbegeographicallylimitedaswellascontainedbytheavailabilityofantidotes,gasmasks,and theabilitytosealoffcontaminatedareasorwatersupplies.
52 CHAPTER 3
Inthelongerterm,worsescenarioswithweaponsofmassdestructionarepossible.Terroristsmightseektodestroyonecityasanobjectlesson,therebydemonstratingaheightenedthreatcapacity.Nuclearorbiologicalattackcouldrealize theultimatefearoftotaldestruction.Thesmugglingofa“suitcasenuclearbomb” intoacityanditsdetonationisnotbeyondtherealmofpossibility. Stillmorelikelyisthepotentialforspreadingdeadlybiologicalagentsthroughoutacity.Oneoftheearlierusesofbiologicalagentsoccurredinthefourteenth century.At the time, the Mongols took corpses contaminated with the Black PlagueandcatapultedthemoverthecitywallsintoKaffa(Crimea).Duringthe nineteenthcentury,blanketsriddenwithsmallpoxweredistributedtoAmerican Indians,causingwidespreaddeath.Nowadays,smallpoxbacteriaaredifficultto obtain,buttheirmassusecouldcausemillionsofcasualties.Inthepost–9/11 era anthrax has been used to terrorize smaller numbers of people. If anthrax sporesweresuccessfullydeployedonalargescale,theycouldproducemillions ofcasualties.Anyrebirthofgermwarfarewouldcreateintolerablepanicand collapse,especiallyintheabsenceoffull-scalemedicalpreparation(vaccination ofhealthresponders,knowledgeofthebiologicalagentsortoxinsused,suitable methodsoftreatment,andsoon). GrahamAllisonpointsupthemassivedestructionsuchanattackwouldentail.27 Thisisnotanabstractproposition.Inasurveyofeighty-fiveintelligenceandother experts,mostbelievedthatifweaponsofmassdestructionweretargetedonAmericancities,terroristswouldmorelikelybetheattackersthananysinglegovernment. Amajorityoftheserespondentsestimatedthechancesofnuclearattackwithin thenexttenyearstobebetween10and50percent.Manyofthesameexperts estimatedtheriskofaradiologicalorbiologicalattackinthenexttenyearstobe atleast40percent,whiletheyjudgedtheriskofachemicalattacktobelower.28 Nodoubtexpertswilldisagreeandtheprognosticatorsaremakingjudgmentson thebasisofscatteredevidence.29Inthemeantime,cityplannersarepreparingfor theworst.AsurveybytheNationalLeagueofCitiesshowedthatbiologicalor chemicalattackswereregardedasthemostseriousterroristthreat.Anattackbya “dirtybomb”wasseenasthenextmostserious,followedbyasuicidebombing;a hijackedairplanestrikewaslast.Mostcitiesclaimedthesethreatswereaddressed inanti-terrorismplans.30 Theconcernsarerootedinuncertaintyaboutterroristcapacityandintentions. Allthemoresobecausewell-troddenrulesandunderstandingnolongerapply. Traditionaldeterrencewasrootedinabeliefthattheothersidewouldnotriskthe destructionofitsownterritoryandtherebyrefrainfromlaunchingweaponsofmass destruction.Butinternationaljihadistshavenoboundedterritory,anddeterrence maybeirrelevant.Moreover,theleadingobjectiveofurbanterroristodecontrol rather than consolidate territory, so here, too, deterrence might not work.Any terrorist acquisition of CBRN weapons would radically alter the asymmetry of powerbetweenlegitimateauthorityandrogueterrorism.Hereiswherethemost significantdangerslie.
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PublicFear Onethingisclear—thepurposeofhavingacapacityformassdestructionisto injectfearintothepublicpsyche.Fearisthegermthatcreatespervasivemistrust andhasacorrosiveeffectonurbanlife.Nothingbetterillustratesthisthananessay byjournalistGeneWeingarten.InthemidstofalAqsaviolence,Weingartentook the“terroristtour”onaJerusalembus.Hewantedtounderstandthepsychology notofterroristsbutofthosewhohadbeenterrorized,andheposedsomepenetratingquestions: WouldyourideabusinJerusalem?Rightnow?Here’syourfiveandonehalf shekels,gotakeabustomarket,buysomefigs.Pickabadday,aftertheIsraelis haveassassinatedsometerroristleadersandeveryoneiswaitingforthesecond sandaltodrop.TherearelotsofbusesinJerusalem—theoddsarestillinyour favor.Doyoutakethatdare?31
Weingarten’smessagegoeswellbeyondanapprehensivebusride.Oncepeople begintointerpretnormalactivitiesas“adare,”theyhaveconvertedpersonaltrepidationintoanubofcivicdistrust.Thatbreakdowncanmetastasizeandmakecities hazardousplacesinwhichtolive,luxuriate,orconductbusiness,ultimatelyrobbing urbanenvironmentsoftheirraisond’être.Thesehazardsaremanifestinthestares buspassengersgiveeachotherastheysizeuppeoplewithbulkyovercoats.Itwas evidentinParisduringthe1990swhensecurityofficialsinthatcityplacedlidson allpublictrashcansbecauseterroristshadusedthemasexplosivecanisters.Itleft ominoussignsinLondonwhenanationalnewspapercaptioneditsfrontpagewith theheadline“CityofFear.”Anothernewspaperfeaturedacartoonwitharedrawn mapoftheUndergroundanditsstationsdesignatedas“PanicandFearLeadingto Doom:DreadandWorryLeadingtoColdSweat.”32Thosefearsweretransformed intotragedywhenayoungman,animmigrantfromBrazil,wasmistakenfora terroristandshotbypoliceinLondon’sUnderground.Withinamonthafter7/7, policebelievedon250separateoccasionsthattheymightbedealingwithasuicide bomber.Onsevenofthoseoccasionstheynearlyopenedfire.33Alarmcanbeseen inrandomsearchesconductedbypoliceinNewYork’ssubwaysorbysecurity guardsatLosAngelessportingevents. Itisbynowcommonlybelievedthat9/11changedAmericaandbecauseofthat event,theUnitedStateschangedworldpolitics.Asidefromthepalpableshiftsin foreignordefensepolicy,9/11alsoreconfiguredpublicattitudes.Thethreatof terrorismbecamepartofthefabricofAmericanlife,wovenintoitbynewscasts, alerts,securitychecks,metaldetectors,firstresponders,andopinionpolls.TheattacksontheWorldTradeCentercausedtensofthousandstofleeinpanic,andan estimated100,000witnessedthecrashingplanesfromadistance.Withindays,the entirenationhadseenfootageofthetowersandthePentagonlyinginwreckage. FeweventsinAmericanhistoryhavehadsoprofoundanimpactonthepublic. Ayearafter9/11,morethantwo-thirdsofthoseinterviewedsaidtheeventhada
54 CHAPTER 3
greatdealofemotionalimpactonthem,thoughtheseeffectsweremoredeeplyfelt incitiesthanelsewhere.34Sopowerfulwerethoseimagesthatyearslaterasurvey doneinProvidence,RhodeIsland,revealedthat60percentofresidentswerewillingtoreallocatefundsforbetteranti-terroristprotection,28percentofresidents hadtakenemergencystepsincaseofaterroristattack,and45percentofresidents indicatedtheyhadbecomemorecarefulwhenterrorismalertswereannounced.35 Perceptionofimminentdangerfeedsfear,andthecloserone’sexperiencewith attack,thegreaterthepsychologicalimpact.Whiletheseimpactsarecollectiveand aresignificantforpublicpolicy,theyalsohaveastrongpersonaldimensionthat affectscitylife.IntheUnitedStates,anumberofsurveysconductedafter9/11 showedthatconcernaboutterrorismvarieddirectlywithwhethertherespondents livedincities,whetherrespondentslivedclosertoWashington,DC,orNewYork, andwhetherrespondentshadrelativesorfriendslivingclosetothesitesofattack.36 EvenafteranationaloutpouringofsympathyforthosevictimizedbythealQaeda attack,publicopinionremaineddividedoverhowtointerpretitsdangers.People livingoneithercoastfeltmorevulnerablethanthoselivingintheinteriorofthe country,andwiththepassageoftimethegapwidened.37 Thesedifferencesaredurable.Fiveyearsafter9/11,NewYorkerscontinueto feellesssafeaboutterrorthanAmericanslivingelsewhere.38Localgovernment officialsreflectmuchthesamepattern.Thoseworkinginlargecitiesreportahigher likelihoodofbeingattackedbyterroriststhantheircounterpartsinsmaller-sized cities.Theseofficialsalsoreportfeelingmorethreatenedbyterrorism.39 Proximityfeedsknowledgeandknowledgeshapesattitudes.Fully59percent ofNewYorkersand27percentofWashingtoniansreportedknowingsomeonewho waskilledorhurtintheattacks.Comparethisfamiliaritytothenationalfigure ofjust11percent.Intimacywith9/11wasalsoconcordantwithwhetherpeople werewillingtomovefromthecity,whethertheythoughtaboutterrordaily,and whethertheyexperiencedsleeplessnights.40Personalexperience,then,iscritical and can encompass numerous kinds of familiarity, including physical or geographicproximity,humanorsocialproximity,andrecognitionofapointintime orchronologicalproximity. Table3.1presentsthisproximityintermsofgeographical,social,andchronologicaldistance.Thetableisacompositeofvarioussurveysconductedwithrespect toNewYork’s9/11andLondon’s7/7.41Itisdesignedtodemonstratehowfearof terrorismasmeasuredbystressordepressionreflectsvariousproximitiesinboth theUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom. BeginningwithgeographicproximityweseethatahigherpercentageofindividualsfeelingstressordepressionlivedclosertothecrashsitesinNewYorkor Washington,DC.Thoseresidinginmetroareasalsofeltslightlymoreanguished thanthoselivingintherestofthenation.Whilethedifferencesinresidenceare noticeable,theyarestillrelativelymodest.IfweplacethefocusonManhattan, thesedifferencesenlarge.Herewefindasharpbreakbetweenindividualsliving fartherfromthecrashsiteinupperManhattanasopposedtothoseresidinginthe
THEFEARFACTOR 55
Table3.1 PublicAttitudesintheWakeofAttack:ProximitytoSitesofAttack Percentageaffected Geographicalproximity Fear(stress,depression,worry): Area’sproximitytocrashsites InNewYorkCitymetroarea InDistrictofColumbiametroarea Inothermajormetroarea InremainderofUnitedStates Residentialproximity UpperManhattan LowerManhattan
16.6 14.9 12.3 11.1 16.1 36.8
Socialproximity Fear(stress,depression,worry): Directlywitnessedtheevents Yes No Friendsorrelativeskilled Yes No Acquaintancesinjuredorkilled Yes No
21.2 14.8 29.1 15.7 23.3 11.0
Chronologicalproximity Worriedbygreaterchancesofattack: Pre–9/11 Yes No Post–9/11 Yes No Pre–7/7 Yes No Post–7/7 Yes No
36 30 51 12 35 63 55 44
Sources:“ChangessinceSeptember11,”NewYorkTimes,June11,2002;CNN/USA Today/GallupPoll,USAToday,12July2005,availableatwww.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005–07–11-bush-poll.htm;A.Etzioni,“AmericanSocietyintheAgeofTerror,” TheCommunitarianNetworkPapersandReports(2002),availableatwww.gwu.edu/~ccps/ news_american_society.html;S.Galeaetal.,“PsychologicalSequelaeoftheSeptember 11TerroristAttacksinNewYorkCity,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine346,13(2002): 982–987.
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vicinityoftheWorldTradeCenterinlowerManhattan.Onthiscount,lowerManhattanregisteredmorethantwicetheproportionofresidentsexperiencingstress ordepressionthanupperManhattan. Onceweturntosocialproximitythepatterncontinues.Clearly,thoseindividuals whoeitherdirectlywitnessedtheattackorwhosefriendsorrelativessuffereddeath orinjuryweremuchmorepainedbytheevent.Apparently,directlywitnessingthe attacktookitstoll,thoughthatemotionaltollrosefurtheronceamoreintimate connectionwasdrawn. Last,aswecanseefromthedataonchronologicalproximity,thetangibilityof experiencehasagreatdealtodowithanxiety.Itisonethingtohearaboutterrorist threatsorreadabouttheirfrequency,butquiteanothertofeeltheirpresence.As wesawinthelastchapter,terrorismwasquiteprevalentbefore9/11or7/7,but onlyafterthestrikesinNewYorkandLondondidamajorityofcitizensbeginto worryaboutfurtherattacks.Hereweseethatbefore9/11only36percentofrespondentsworriedaboutaterroristattack,whileafter9/11thatproportionjumped to51percent.MuchthesametendencyisevidentintheUnitedKingdom.Before 7/7,only35percentofrespondentsworriedaboutanattack,whereasafter7/7that proportionclimbedto55percent. Since 9/11 and 7/7, those fears have subsided somewhat, but remain high. ShortlyaftertheSeptember11attacks,75percentofNewYorkersfeltanotherattackwithintheimmediatefuturewas“verylikelyorsomewhatlikely.”Fiveyears later,theproportionofrespondentsexpressingthosefearsdroppedto57percent.42 Ahiatusinthefrequencyofattackwillreducebutnoteliminatethisapprehension. Theobverseisalsotrue—continuityofattackreinforcestraumaandanynewstrike wouldrapidlyincreasethefearquotient. Thisiswhyresidentsofcitiesthathaveincurredsustainedattacksexperience fargreateranguishthanresidentsofcitiesthathaveexperiencedirregularattacks. ThereisaconsiderabledifferencebetweenthechronicexperienceofBelfastduringthe1980sorSrinagarandJerusalemduringthelastdecadeasopposedtothe moreintermittentoccurrencesofNewYork,London,orMadrid.Indeed,sustained violence that entails geographic, social, and chronological proximity can bring aboutmasstraumaofthecitizenry.Putsomewhatdifferently,geographic,social, andchronologicalproximitybecometelescopedwithinsmaller,frequently,and severelyattackedcities,therebyleadingtomuchgreaterpublicanxiety. Jerusalemisacaseinpoint.TheJerusalemite’sawarenessofterrorisextraordinary,andIsrael’shistoryofwarfarewithneighboringcountriescausesitscitizenry to absorb every bit of news. In many ways the city’s reaction to terrorism is a functionofpopulationandgeographicsize.Jerusalem’s700,000inhabitantslive incompactanddistinctneighborhoodswhosemunicipalboundariesencompass anareaof50.4squaremiles(126squarekilometers).Inareaalone,Jerusalemis one-tenththesizeofLondon,one-sevenththesizeofNewYorkCity,andonetwelfththesizeofIstanbul.Giventhedifferentialsbetweenthesecities,casualties inJerusalemwouldbemagnifiedtentimescomparedtoLondonorNewYorkand
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twelvetimescomparedtoIstanbul.Anattackuponthislimitedspatialconfiguration reverberatesthroughoutthecity. Anumberofstudieswereconductedintheautumnof2000whenalAqsaterrorismstruckthecity.Thesestudiesconcernedthefrequencyofexperiencewith terroranditseffectsonpublicattitudes.Onesurveyfoundthatnearly22percent ofIsraeliJewshadfamilyorfriendswhohaddiedinaterroristattackorawar. Thatsamesurveyindicatedthat15percentofIsraeliJewshadbeeninjuredorhad anacquaintanceinjuredduringthecourseofalAqsaterror.43 Withnearlyanentirecivilianpopulationexperiencingpervasivefearduringthe worstyearsoftheviolence(2000to2004),Jerusalemhasbeenbesetbytrauma.44 Morethan90percentofIsraeliadultsindicatetheyhavegrownmorefearfulof terrorism, and similar proportions of children in elementary and high schools express the same apprehension.45 Phrasing the questions somewhat differently, anotherscientificstudyfoundthatalmosttwo-thirdsofrespondentsfelttheirlives wereindangerandmorethanhalftherespondents(58.6percent)reportedfeeling “depressed”or“gloomy.”Stillanother28percentofthoseinterviewedfelt“very depressed.”46 Jerusalem’sintensifiedexperiencestirstheimaginationtowonderhowother citiesmightrespondundersimilarcircumstances.Theissueremainingishowcitizenstranslatethoseapprehensionsintobehavior—howdotheirfeelingsmanifest themselvesineverydaylifeandpoliticalattitudes? TranslatingFear Regardlessofthenation,mostcitizensarewillingtotakeextraordinarystepsto assuretheirsafety.IntheUnitedStatestheavailabilityofopenlandtranslatedinto anurgetofleefromconcentratedsettlementsintheeventofanationalemergency. Theprospectofamassexodusbecameknownas“defensivedispersal”andwas designedtodeprivetheenemyofurbantargets.DefensivedispersalgainedpopularityasAmericanandSovietleaderstradedthreatswithoneotherovernuclear warfare.Apathfordispersingpopulationwasclearedinthe1950sbyacolossal interstatehighwaysystemdesignedtospreadfamiliesandcommerceintoAmerica’s hinterland.47Talkofdefensivedispersalresurfacedsoonafter9/11asawayto depriveterroristsofeasytargets.Naturally,mayors,localpoliticians,journalists, andacademicsresistthisthinkingandofferreasonswhythecollectivebenefitsof remainingincitiesoutweighanyimpulsetoescape.Whilesomewouldsuggestthat wefightfearbybravely“bunchingup”incities,humanbehaviordoesnotworkthat way.48Moralsuasioncangojustsofarandunfortunatelyevaporateswhenitcomes toindividualsurvival.Shoulddowntownsbesubjecttoattack,rationalchoicewill mostlikelyresultinaflightofpeopletothenearestdispersedsuburb. Thereasonsforthiskindofreactioncanbediscernedindatagatheredonterror’s victims.Peoplewhoinonewayoranotherhavebeenexposedtoterrorarelikelyto undergofairlylong-termpersonalitychanges.Theacceptedmedicalterminology
58 CHAPTER 3
forthisispost–traumaticstressdisorderorPTSD.Itsmajorsymptomsincludea feelingofhelplessnessandlostcontrolcoupledwithbehaviorsofavoidance,hypervigilance,andstartledreactions.Havingoncebeenexposedtotrauma,thesimplest remindercantriggerextremedistress.Fearisasignalforfutureavoidanceandcan betakentoanextreme.49PTSDsuffererswillstayawayfromanynews,sights, sounds,oraromasconnectedtoanattack.ThebehavioralconsequencesofterrorinducedPTSDaretoresistareaswithahistoryofattack.Thus,itisquitepossible forPTSDsubjectstoavoidcrowdedplaces,railstations,ortallbuildings.50 Thereare,too,cognitivesymptomsassociatedwithPTSDsuchaspanic,pessimism,irritability,andexcessiveconcernwithsafety.Livinginthisstateofapprehensioncanreduceone’sopennesstotheoutsideworldandinducevariouskinds ofhostilitytowardtheunfamiliar.Exaggeratedbeliefs,xenophobia,andreduced abilitytocopewiththesefeelingarecommon.Allthisisboundtoaffectone’s beliefsabouthowtodealwithterrorismaswellasshapepoliticalattitudes. We should remind ourselves that mostAmericans have not experienced an incidentofterror—eitherdirectlyorthroughacloseacquaintance.Theresultsof anyscientificsurveyarelikelytobequiteskewed,withsomefeelingintensely whilethemajorityofrespondentsremainminimallyaffected.Atthesametime, intenseminoritiescanhaveadisproportionateimpactonpublicopinionandvivid portrayalsofaneventlike9/11canleavealastingimpressionevenonthosewho hadnoexperiencewithit. Table3.2showssomeattitudinalandbehavioralresponsesinthewakeof9/11.51 Thetabledividestheseintotwobasicresponses.Thefirstdealswithspatialresponses,orhowcitizenstreatparticularkindsofurbanfacilities.Theseconddeals withpoliticalresponses,orwillingnesstocurtailcivilliberties. Thetableinstructsustobecarefulaboutjudgingtheproportionofindividualswhoperceivetrauma.Whilesubstantialminoritiesretainagooddealofapprehensionabouturbanspaces,themajorityofrespondentsstillfeelcomfortable withinthesespaces.Nevertheless,theminorityresultsaresignificant.Upwardof aquarterofrespondersfeltuneasyaboutenteringtraditionalurbanspaces.After 9/11,asignificantproportionofNewYorkersfeltuncomfortableaboutgoinginto crowdedareaswhilesmallerproportionswereuncomfortableinsubwaysandskyscrapers.Someofthesefearstranslatedintoadesiretoliveelsewhere,whileothers werereflectedinaconnectionbetween9/11andincreasedinsomnia.52Fiveyears later,theproportionofNewYorkerswhofeltnervousaboutanattackhadhardly changed.53Thesizeandscopeof9/11leftanenduringimpression,andsuddenly atremendousassaultonthecitynotonlybecameplausible,butmostlikelyinthe mindsofresidents. Stressproducesadesperatesearchforareprieveandforsolutions—someof which can be incommensurate with the size, content, or scope of the problem. Thetolloftenfallsoncivilliberties.Itmayalsobethatfeartranslatesintoanger andangerreleasesitselfbyplacingtheonusonsuspectbehavior.Theimmediate periodafter9/11sawan8percentjumpintheproportionofAmericanswillingto
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Table3.2 PublicAttitudesintheWakeofAttack:ResponsestoAttack Percentage affectedor holdingopinions Spatialresponse Uneasyaboutcrowdedareas(NewYorkrespondents) Yes No Uneasyabouttravelingbysubway(NewYorkrespondents) Yes No Uneasyaboutgoingintoskyscrapers(NewYorkrespondents) Yes No
41 57 36 51 26 60
PoliticalResponse Relinquishsomelibertiesformoresecurity(nationalrespondents) Pre–9/11 Yes No Post–9/11 Yes No Requiremetaldetectorsearchesforofficebuildings(national respondents) Yes No RequireArabstoundergospecialchecksatairports(national respondents) Yes No RequireArabstocarryspecialidentification(nationalrespondents) Yes No Governmentsearchesforborrowedlibrarybooks(national respondents) Yes No
58 23 66 24 81 18 53 46 46 53 37 60
Sources:“ChangessinceSeptember11,”NewYorkTimes,June11,2002;CNN/USAToday/ GallupPoll,USAToday,12July2005,availableatwww.usatoday.com/news/washington/200507-11-bush-poll.htm;A.Etzioni,“AmericanSocietyintheAgeofTerror,”TheCommunitarian NetworkPapersandReports,availableatwww.gwu.edu/~ccps/news_american_society.html; S.Galeaetal.,“PsychologicalSequelaeoftheSeptember11TerroristAttacksinNewYork City,”TheNewEnglandJournalofMedicine,346,13(2002):982–987;W.Schlengeretal., “PsychologicalReactionstoTerroristAttacks,”JournalofAmericanMedicalAssociation,288, 5(2002):586;“OnSecurity,PublicDrawsBlurredLines,”USAToday,August3,2005,available atwww.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-03-security-lines-public-opinion_x.htm?csp=N009; “TwoYearsLater,theFearLingers,”ThePewResearchCenter,September17,2003,available athttp://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=192.
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curtailcivilliberties.Therangeofresponsesonpublicrestrictionsisconsiderable. Eighty-onepercentofthosesurveyedwereinfavorofusingreasonableprecautions likemetaldetectors,andthisisnotsurprising.Moresurprisingistheproportionof Americanswillingtopredesignatepeoplesolelyonthebasisofnationalorethnic characteristics.MorethanhalfofAmericanswerewillingtosingleoutArabsand American nationals ofArab descent for special searches regardless of place or circumstance.Significantminoritieswerewillingtoinfringeoncivillibertiesby requiringthesesamegroupstocarryspecialidentificationorbymonitoringborrowedlibrarybooks. SomeoftheseattitudesfindtheirparallelsinBritishsociety.Pollsshowthata majorityofLondonersfeelmoreterrorismisinevitableandasignificantportion ofthepopulationarebracingformultipleattacks.Londonersarewillingtoaccept moreaggressiverestrictionsonfreedomandareinclinedtogivemorediscretion tothepolice.Inresponsetoaquestionaboutwhetherthepolicewere“right”or “wrong”inshootingaBrazilianmanthoughttobeaterrorist,morethan50percent ofrespondentsbelievedthepoliceactionwascorrect.Only20percentfaultedthe police.Asimilarmajorityvoicedsupportforpoliceandshowedamarkeddispositiontowardviewingthepolicefavorablysince7/7.54 Elsewhere in Europe, public opinion also appears to be supporting greater restrictionsoncivilliberties,andmuchofthisstemsfromfear.Apolloftwelve European countries shows that 66 percent of respondents see terrorism as an “important”or“extremelyimportant”threat.55Amajorityofrespondentssupport variouskindsofgovernmentintrusiononprivatecitizensthatincludemonitoring Internetcommunicationsandbankingtransactions.Concomitantly,largernumbers ofEuropeansaresuspiciousofMuslimsresidingintheircountries.Overall,56 percentofEuropeansbelievethevaluesofIslamarenotcompatiblewiththose oftheirownnation’sdemocracy.Thehighestpercentagesofthoseholdingthese viewsoccurredinGermany,Slovakia,Spain,andItaly.56 Asidefromthedemocraticimplicationsoftheseattitudes,theyalsoengender pragmaticinferencesforcitylife.Freedomofmovement,tolerance,andthecompatibilityofdiversepopulationsarewhatcitiesoffer.Thelifebloodofcitieslies intheirdifferences,nottheirsimilarities.Withoutthefreedomtopursuethosedifferences,urbanlifewithers.Weseehereaprofoundcontradiction:byembracing publicrestrictionsforthesakeofquellingpublicfear,weunderminetheverykind ofpublicweseektopreserve. ManipulatingFear Perceptionsarenotpassiveobjectsderivedfromexternalevents,noraretheyalways formedbyaccident.Perceptionscanbemanipulatedorarisefromelites.Theycan beshapedbyindividualswhoprofitfromaparticularversionofanincident.One doesnothavetoseeconspiracyinanyofthis.Onthecontrary,manipulationcanbe seenastheoutcomeofmultiple,discreetagendasderivedfromdifferentofficials
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andaimedatdifferentpublics.Theprocessbywhichthistakesplaceisakintoa versionofNortonLong’s“ecologyofgames,”wheredifferentpartiesinterprettheir needsandpromotetheirownversionsofanevent.57AdaptingLong’sterminology,wemightseeperceptionsasadvancedbypoliticians,bureaucrats,andlocal leaders—eachusingtheirversionofterrorinordertoadvancetheirown“game.” Terrorismistheperfectsymboltomanipulatebecauseitissubjecttoglaringly simple slogans. Politicians may make the most of people’s anxiety, sometimes exploitingthecitizens’impulsetosurrenderreasonedjudgmenttozealousreaction. Manipulationcrossespartylines.Politiciansontherightmayexaggeratethreatsin ordertomorphlocalthreatsintointernationalcauses.Conversely,politiciansonthe leftmaydiscountrealinternationalthreatsinordertoplacatealocalconstituency. Inthewakeofterror,thoseontherightmaywanttolaunchforeignwars,while theircounterpartsontheleftarepronetoblamethoseverysamewarsforcausing terror.Eventhoseinthecenterwilluseterrorismtoadvancetheirownpolitical careersbyofferingseeminglypragmatic,middle-of-the-roadsolutions. Urban terrorism mixes national with local politics. Tip O’Neil’s axiom that “all(national)politicsislocal”alsomeansthatalllocalpoliticsisnational.Territorialissuescanmixininextricableways.Politiciansatalllevelsjumpintothe fraywiththeirownversionsofterrorism.America’sGeorgeBushandRussia’s VladimirPutin—bothofwhomcouldbecountedaseitheronthepoliticalrightor asnationalists—rodetotheirreelectionsonthefearofterrorism.BushandPutin eachconductedhisown“waronterror”bydefiningitinparticularways.Bothmen gainedareputationas“hardliners”byusingmilitaryforceandbytheirunrelentingpursuitof“insurgents.”58U.S.Republicansinparticularcontinuedtoplaythe “terrorcard”throughtheelectionsof2006andarelikelytodosoin2008.Spain’s formerprimeministerJoséMaríaAznar,alsoontheright,wasquicktoblamethe BasqueETAfortheMadridattackof3/11.Aznarwasknownforatoughpolicy againstETA,andaterroristincidentinthemidstofanelectioncampaignwould havebolsteredhissupport.Asitturnedout,Aznarwascaughtmanipulating3/11 forhisownpoliticalgainandwhenhischargesagainstETAprovedwronghewent downtodefeat. Nordoestheleftlackdemagogues.Shortlybefore7/7,London’smayorKen LivingstonefoundjustificationfortheprevalenceofsuicideattacksinJerusalem,butsoonaftertheattackonLondonexpresseddismayaboutsimilaracts. LivingstoneunabashedlychargedLondon’s7/7bomberswithcowardlyacts,yet failedtoseethesamecowardiceinterroristswhostruckelsewhere.Themayor attributedtheattacksto“80yearsofWesterninterventionintopredominantly ArablandsbecauseoftheWesternneedforoil.”59Livingstone’sreasoninghas beenechoedbyGeorgeGalloway,amemberoftheHouseofCommonselected fromaheavilyMuslimEastLondonconstituency.Gallowayalsosoughttodeflect localfearsontoalargerarena.HefaultedBritishandAmericanaggressioninthe MiddleEastaswellasthe“globalisedcapitalisteconomicsystems.”According toGalloway,theseweretherealthingstofear,notterrorism,whichwould“dry
62 CHAPTER 3
up”assoonastheWestmendeditsways.60WhileGallowayisamarginalpolitician,electedfromanarrowbase,LivingstoneisavisiblememberoftheLabor PartyandhasasubstantialfollowingwithinLondon. Closertothecenterofthepoliticalspectrum,NewYork’sformermayorRudolph Giuliani’spublicstandingmassivelyimprovedasaresultof9/11.Priortothatevent, Giulianihadrunintotroubleonissuesofpolicebrutalityandadownturninthe city’seconomy.Atthetime,themayor’sapprovalratingshadplummetedaslowas 26percent.Oncecatastrophestruck,themayortookchargeandhisperformance shined.Henotonlymanagedtheemergencywithaplomb,butputthecitybackon itsfeetinthelastmonthsofhismayoralty.61Giulianiwastransformed.Hisapproval ratingsskyrocketedto50percent,andafterheleftofficetheycontinuedtoriseto 72percent.62Amanwhohadbeenpilloriedinthepressforlettingthepolicego wildwasnowcitedasoneofAmerica’smostinspirationalleaders.Giulianihas goneontobecomeapopularpresidentialaspirantfor2008. Portrayalsoffearchangeastheissueofterrorismwendsitswayintothemaw ofbureaucracy.Ministries,departments,thecourts,investigativeoffices,andpolice forcespromoteparticularversionsofwhathastranspiredorisabouttotranspire. Bureaucraciesadoptstandardproceduresfordealingwithterrorism.Large-scale, rule-orientedorganizationsareboundtotakeexcessiveprecautionsandoverstate thedanger.Theresult:apervasiveandgratingadmonitionabouttheimminence ofanattackthatisatthesametimeglaringlyunspecifiedandconfusing.Missing aredetailsrelatedtowhen,how,orwhere.Publicreactiontothesesignalscanonly swingbetweentheextremesofblanddisregardanddistortedapprehension. IntheUnitedStates,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityissuedvariouscolorcodedalertswithoutseemingtoknowwhattodoaboutthemortellingthepublic whattoexpect.Almostdailyannouncementswerebroadcastandthewarningshung intheair.Overtime,thedepartmentbecameanobjectofridicule,andwhilecolor codesremained,thefrequencyofannouncementssharplyabated.Othercountries havecreatedspecialcourtsorpolicetodealwithterrorists.Bureaucraciesinthe UnitedKingdom,France,andSpainareparticularlyactive.Investigations,raids, andprosecutionsserveasconstantsignalsthatterrorismisverymuchpartofdaily life,thoughagainthepublicisleftfeelinghelpless. Downtheline,localandnationalauthoritiesfollowdifferenttrajectoriesfor respondingtothreats.InSanFrancisco,localandstateofficialssoundedpublic alertsbecauseofthreatenedattacksonthatcity’sbridges.Teamsofsecurityofficialsmovedintokeylocales,onlytoberebuffedbythefederalgovernmentand toldthattheiractionswereunnecessary.Similarly,localofficialsinNewYorkput thecityonalertbecauseofreportsofanimminentattackonthecity’ssubways. Policefannedintosubwaystationsastransitworkerssearchedriders.Thesearchwas extensive—fromthosewearingshoulderbagstothosepushingbabycarriages—only tobediscountedbyWashington,DC,asafalsealarm.Thesedisparatesignalsleave citizensalarmed,cynical,orindifferent. Intheimmediateaftermathof7/7,armedguardswithautomaticriflespatrolled
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London’sUnderground.Policehelicoptershoveredoverheadandridersonmass transitdroppedbyasmuchas15percent.63WithinashorttimeLondonrecovered itsnormalpatterns,thoughformonthspoliceroundedupsuspectsandwarnedthe publictobewatchful.InRome,citizenshaverehearsedplannedresponsestoan attack.InParis,OperationVigilancehasplacedacanopyofsurveillanceacross thecitythatincludescameras,patrols,entrysearches,barriers,andtheclosureof publictoiletsandtrashbins.InAthens,securitymeasuresfortheOlympicGames included a dirigible flying over the city and scanning key locations with highpoweredcameras.Alloftheseexerciseskeyupthepublicandtellcitizenstotake extremecaution,yetatthesametimepoliticalleadersurgethecitizenrytobehave normally.NewYork’smayoropinedthatthebestwaytohelpthecitywastogo outandshop.Exactlyhowoneissupposedtobecautiousandbeeverwatchful, whilealsogoingaboutordinarybusiness,isneverquiteexplained. Conclusions Perceptionsofthreatandfearvaryandaremanifestedinbehavior.Atleastsome ofthemainstreammediaportrayterrorisminvague,ifnotmisleadingterms.At times, terrorism’s threat value and its concomitant fear may not be mentioned orfullyunderstood.Atothertimesitmaybeconfusedwithfeaturesofordinary politicsthatarebesidethepoint.Terroristpoliticsdiffersfromordinarypolitics muchasterroristwarfarediffersfromconventionalwarfare.Mistakingterrorism foraweaponoftheweakmissesitsrelationshiptothosebeingattackedaswell asitseffectivenessasatypeofwarfare.Abetterwaytounderstandterrorismisto seeitaslow-resourcewarfarethatcanbeveryconsequential.Someofthemore devastatingconsequencesofterrorismlieinthepotentialofterroriststoacquire chemical,biological,radiological,orevennuclearweapons(CBRN).Atthevery leasttheseweaponscanboostthethreatvalueofterrorismandcanreversetherelationshipbetweenroguegroupsandlegitimateauthority.Atworst,theycanlead tocalamityformoderncivilization. Constantintimidationandfearcanweardowncivilsociety.Surveyevidence showsthatindividualsexperiencingstressmaywithdrawfromsociallife,become overcautious,orresorttorepression.Whileallthismaybedoneinthenameof publicsafety,theeffectsactuallyunderminethebasisofaviableurbansociety. Inadvertentlyornot,politicians,bureaucrats,andlocalgovernmentmayfeedthe public’sfears—oftenindifferentorcontradictoryways.Justastheusageoffear varies,sodotheresponsestoit.Nonetheless,whilecitieshavebrieflysuccumbed tofear,theyhaverecoveredandremainremarkablyresilient.Thereisadifference, however,betweencitiesexperiencingchronicasopposedtointermittentterror. Intimidationisonematterandactualityofattackanother.Thechaptersinthe nextpartpointtogroupsresponsibleforthespreadofurbanterrorism.Thesechaptersalsoexaminethegeospatialfeaturesofterrorism,namelyeffortstodecontrol territory,launchrepetitiveattacks,andimplementlogistics.
Part2 TheGeospatialFeaturesof UrbanTerrorism
4 Terror’sSpaces: Identity,Haunts,andNodes
It’sabottomlesspit.Themoreweadvancethelessprogresswemake. Witheachdiscoverywefindendlesspermutationsandwitheachstep weseemyriadassociations. ––Frenchanti-terroristpoliceman IdentityIsNotAlwaysDestiny Terrorismtakesmanyforms,varyingthroughtimeaswellasacrosscontinents. It is a protean force whose metamorphic ability baffles those who study it and dauntsthosewhofightit.Whileterrorismhasalwaysbeeninspiredbymultiple sources(anarchistic,secular,religious),eachagehasproduceditswavesofterror. Tosimplify,“fourwaves”canbeidentifiedthatrunconcomitantlywithdifferent periods.The“firstwave”occurredduringthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturieswhenterrorismbecameaweaponofanarchisticrevolutionaries,mostofwhom wereofEuropeanorigin.Bythemiddleofthetwentiethcentury,a“secondwave” ofterrorismhadmigratedtoAfricaorAsiaandbeenputtousebyanti-colonial nationalistmovements.OnceabandonedbyAfricansandAsians,terrorismfound itswaybacktoEuropeandtookrootintheMiddleEast.The1970sand1980s sawa“thirdwave”ofterrorismtakerootinEuropeandveerstronglytowardthe extremeleft(Marxist-Leninism)orextremeright(neofascism);inNorthernIreland andtheMiddleEastterrorismarrivedintheguiseofanationalistagenda.Bythe turnofthecentury,terrorismhadenteredanotherphase.StrainsofIslamjoined withterrorism,andterrorismtookonareligiouscastinwhatRapoportcallsthe “fourthwave”ofterrorism.1 Farfromdisappearing,thehistoricrootsofterrorismcontinuedtoinfluence practicesthroughmuchofthecurrentperiod.TheAnarchistFaction(Greece)and RevolutionaryOffensiveCells(Italy)maintainedtheardorofnineteenth-century anarchicrevolutionaries.TheIrishRepublicanArmy(NorthernIreland)andthe ShamilBasayevGang(Chechnya)followalongthepathofmid-twentieth-century nationalistanti-colonialism.TheRevolutionaryArmedForceorFARC(Colombia), theRedArmyFaction(Germany),andtheRedBrigades(Italy)havepursueda Marxistvision.Downthroughhistory,variousreligiousstrainswerejoinedwith 67
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terrorandinmanywaysterrorismwasusedtoadvancepolitico-religiouscauses.2 Today,mostreligiousterrorismdrawsitsstrengthfromafundamentalistversion ofIslam.Astheyhavecometobecalled,Islamistsarehardlyofasinglestripe. TheycontinuetobeamajorforceandmanyoperatelegallyinLebanon,Syria, andIran.IslamistorganizationscanrangefromthedomesticjihadistHamas(West BankandGaza)totheIranian-linkedHezbollah(Lebanon)andtheglobaljihadist alQaeda.Religiousterroristgroupsofthenon-Islamistvarietyaremoreisolated frommainstreamco-religionists.Theseorganizationsoftenfusereligionwithan apocalypticorracistdoctrineandareoftenoutlawedintheirhomecountries.They includeAumShinrikyo(Japan,Buddhist)aswellasArmoftheLordandChristian Patriots(U.S.,Christian),andKach(Israel,Jewish).3 Theorganizationallongevityandformofterroristorganizationalsodiffer.Some groupsconsistofsmallcliquesthatsoonvanishonlytoariseagainashorttimelater underadifferentname.Thisisespeciallythecasewithleftistandfascistfactions, liketheBaaderMeinhof(Germany),DirectAction(France),orRussianNational Unity(Russia).Otherterroristgroups,likeColombia’sFARCorPeru’sShining Path,aremasspoliticalorganizationswithalong-timepresenceinthecountry. HamasandHezbollahhaveamasspoliticalbase,socialserviceoutlets,andoperate underadefinedhierarchy,whilealQaedaworksmostlythroughviolenceandhas averyamorphousstructure.AlQaedainparticularhasbecomemoreofaholding companythatemphasizes“leaderlessresistance”thanaspecificorganization. Somewouldarguethatbecauseterrorismisastrategyorsetoftactics,itcannotbetreatedasan“enemy”––how,afterall,canonefightagainstamethodof warfare?4Whilethepremiseiscorrect,theconclusiondoesnotnecessarilyfollow. Foralltheirdifferences,terroristsalsosharenotablesimilaritiesthatstemfrom thetypeofwarfaretheychoosetoconduct.5Terrorismrequiresanabundanceof disciplinedbrutalityandaneagernesstodeliberatelyviolateacceptednormsof warfare.Moreover,terroristscanbetreatedasbelongingtoaclassapartbecause theyareusuallymotivatedbyideologicalextremismthatdemandsagreatdealof them.Thesetraitsallowustorecognizeterroristsbywhatmightbecalledtheir underlyingcharacteristicsencompassingarigidbeliefsystem,asharplycurtailed viewoftheworldintermsofgoodandbad,apropensitytosacrificehumanlife, and a messianic belief that emphasizes purification through violence. Terrorist organizations are more likely to embrace authoritarian leaders, more likely to obeydogma,andmorelikelytopursueuncompromisingor“true-believer”paths toachievetheirgoals.6Nodoubt,thesecharacteristicswillpertainmoreorlessby typeoforganizationandbythetacticstheyemphasize.Somefairassumptionsare thatterroristswhodestroyhumanliferatherthanpropertyaremoreapttoholdthe mostrigidpositions;similarly,terroristswhoconductsuicideattacksratherthan abductionsaremoreinclinedtoholdextremeviews. Nordoesitnecessarilyfollowthatoncehavingachievedpower,terroristschange theirviewpointsorevolveintononviolentpoliticians.Someformerterroristsmost certainlyhaveevolved,suchastheleadersoftheAlgerianorSouthAfricanrevolu-
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 69
tions,anditcurrentlyappearsthatmembersoftheIrishRepublicanArmyorthe Basque ETA have moved toward nonviolent politics. But some terrorists never didevolveandinsteadinterpretedearliersuccessesasawaytoenhancepower. WitnesstheaccessiontopowerofNaziBrownShirtsinGermany’sThirdReich, thebehavioroftheTalibanaftertakingcontrolofAfghanistan,thejihadistfervor ofHezbollahaftertakingseatsintheLebanesegovernment,andYasirArafat’s continuedflirtationwithterrorafterachievinglegitimacy.Thereis,then,nohard andfastruleabouthowterroristswillbehaveafteracquiringpower. TargetingbyCityType Wecangetabettergriponterroristbehaviorbycomparingterrorists’identitywith both their choice of cities and their exercise of violence.To better explain this relationship,Table4.1listsavarietyofterroristorganizationsthathaveoperated overthelastfortyyears.Noticethatparticularidentitiesareusedtodescribeeach organization.Theseidentitiesarelistedinaspecificformasnationalist,leftist, Islamist, and so forth, but later discussed as three broad categories (anarchist, secular,andreligious).Also,theidentitieslistedinthetableareusedasmarkers representinganideology,abelief,orarationale.Nocausalconnectionisperforce madehererelatedtotheriseofabeliefandtheriseofterrorism(i.e.,thatnationalism orreligiositynecessarilyleadstoterrorism).Wheneverpossible,organizationsand theiridentitiesarelistedbyapproximatechronology,withearliergroups(1960sto 1980s)listedfirstandmorecurrentgroups(1990sto2005)shownthereafter.The tableshowstheseorganizationsrelativetothecitiestheyhaveattacked,somecities havingattractedattentionfrommoreandagreatervarietyofterroriststhanothers. Displayedinthetableare27citiesandmorethan100terroristorganizations. Startingwiththefirstcolumn,urbanlocationscanbeclassifiedas(1)cities subjecttoattackbyrelativelyfewandsimilargroups,(2)citiessubjecttoattack byalargenumberofsimilargroups,and(3)citiessubjecttoattackbyalarge numberofdissimilargroups.Thefirstofthesegroupingsconsistsofcitieslocated acrosstheworld(Algiers,Casablanca,Grozny,Lima,Nairobi,Riyadh,Srinagar, andTokyo).Mostoftheseplacesfallintothedesignationsdescribedearlieras single-attributemajorcities(seeChapters1and2).Citiesinthisgroupingexperiencedattacksfromrelativelyfeworganizations,andtheirattackersusuallybear areligiousidentityofonekindoranother.Thesecondgroupingofcitiesalsocan belocatedinageographicalbeltstretchingfromSouthAmericatoEuropeand throughtotheMiddleEast(Belfast,Bogotá,Islamabad,Jerusalem,Moscow,and TelAviv).Thesecitiesalsofallintothecategoryofmajorcities,thoughtheytend tohavemultipleattributesandholdconsiderableimportance.Theseplaceshave beensubjecttoextensivefactionalattacks,stemminglargelyfromacombinationof nationalistandreligiousorganizations.Thethirdgroupingholdsthelargestnumber ofcitiesthatalsoreachacrosstheworld(Berlin,Cairo,Istanbul,Karachi,London, Madrid,Milan,NewYork,Paris,andRome).Mostoftheseplacesareeitherglobal
70 CHAPTER 4
Table4.1 TerroristOrganizationsandIdentities City
Organization
Identity
Algiers
IslamicSalvationFront,ArmedIslamicGroup
Islamist
Athens
ASALA,BlackSeptember,RevolutionaryOrganization 17November,Anti-EstablishmentNucleus,Anarchist Faction
nationalist/ separatist, leftist, anarchist
Berlin
PFLP,BlackSeptember,RedArmyFaction,AntiAmericanArabLiberation
nationalist/ separatist, leftist,other
Belfast
IRA,UlsterDefenseAssociation/UlsterFreedom Fighters,LoyalistVolunteerForce
nationalist/ separatist
Bogotá
RevolutionaryArmedForceofColombia(FARC), leftist,rightNationalLiberationArmyofColombia,PopularLiberation wing Army,April19,UnitedSelf-DefenseForcesofColombia
Cairo
PFLP,al-Gama’aal-Islamiyya(GAI),IslamicLiberation Organization,ThawratMisr
nationalist/ separatist, Islamist
Casablanca AlQaeda,SalafiaJihadia
Islamist
Grozny
ShamilBasayevGang,RiyadusSaliheynMartyrs
nationalist/ separatist, Islamist
Istanbul
PFLP,ASALA,TurkishPeople’sLiberationArmy,Abu NidalGroup,PKK,28MayArmenianOrganization, DHKP-C,IslamicGreatEasternRaidersFront,alQaeda, TurkishIslamicJihad
nationalist/ separatist, leftist, Islamist
Islamabad
Amal,al-Gama’aal-Islamiyya(GAI),Moslem Commandos,HinduSena
nationalist/ separatist, Islamist, Hindu
Karachi
PLO,AbuNidalGroup,Amal,LashkarIJhangvi(LJ), MohajirQuamiMovement,Jaish-e-Mohammed(JEM)
nationalist/ separatist, Islamist
Jakarta
FreeAcehMovement,alQaeda,JemaahIslamiya
nationalist/ separatist, Islamist
Jerusalem
AlFattah,PLO,PFLP,DemocraticFrontforLiberation ofPalestine,BlackSeptember,AbuNidalGroup,Kach, PalestinianIslamicJihad,Hamas,Tanzim
nationalist/ separatist, Jewish, Islamist
Lima
ShiningPath,TupacAmaru
leftist
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 71 City
Organization
Identity
London
IRA,alFattah,BlackSeptember,AbuNidalGroup, Amal,DHKP-C,Hezbollah,AbuHafsalMasriBrigade (MohammadSidiqueKhanetal.)
nationalist/ separatist, leftist, Islamist
Madrid
alFattah,ETA(BasqueFatherlandandFreedom),PLFP, nationalist/ BlackSeptember,ASALA,AbuNidal,Hezbollah,al separatist, Islamist Qaeda(AbuHafsalMasriBrigade)
Milan
ETA,BlackSeptember,ASALA,RedBrigade,Angry Brigade,Hezbollah
nationalist/ separatist, leftist, anarchist, Islamist
Moscow
DagestanLiberationArmy,IslambouliBrigades,Movsar BarayevGang,RussianNationalUnity
Islamist, nationalist/ separatist
Mumbai (Bombay)
PFLP,AbuNidalGroup,AzadHindSena,Lashkar-eTaiba(LeT),Jaish-e-Mohammed,Students’Islamic MovementofIndia
nationalist/ separatist, Hindu, Islamist
Nairobi
alQaeda
Islamist
NewYork
PLO,BlackSeptember,JDL,LiberationArmyFifth Battalion(RamziYousef/SheikhRahman),alQaeda
nationalist/ separatist, Jewish, Islamist
Paris
IRA,ETA,BlackSeptember,ASALA,PKK,DHKP-C, ActionDirecte,Hezbollah,ArmedIslamicGroup(GIA)
nationalist/ separatist, leftist, Islamist
Rome
ETA,RedBrigade,BlackSeptember,ASALA,Japanese RedArmy,Hezbollah
nationalist/ separatist, leftist, Islamist
Riyadh
alQaeda
Islamist
Srinagar
HizbulMujahideen,LashkareJhangvi
nationalist/ separatist
TelAviv
BlackSeptember,PalestinianIslamicJihad,Hamas, alAqsaMartyrsBrigade
nationalist/ separatist, Islamist
Tokyo
Maruseido,AumShinrikyo
leftist, religious (cult) (continued)
72 CHAPTER 4 Table4.1(continued)
Source:TerrorismKnowledgeBase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type1database. Namesandabbreviationsofterrororganizations: ASALA ArmenianSecretArmyfortheLiberationofArmenia DHKP-C DevrimciHalkKurtulusPartisi-Cephesi—RevolutionaryPeople’sLiberation Party-Front ETA EuzkadiTaAskatasuna—BasqueFatherlandandFreedom JDL JewishDefenseLeague PFLP PopularFrontforLiberationofPalestine PLO PalestinianLiberationOrganization PKK PartiyaKarkeranKurdistan—KurdishWorkers’Party
Namesandyearsofoperationofterrororganizations: Abu Hafs al Masri (2003–current);Abu Nidal Group (1974–1994);Action Directe (1982–1999);alFattah(1950s–current);al-Gama’aal-Islamiyya(1977–1998);alQaeda (1980s–current);alQanoon(2002);Amal(1975–1998);Anti-AmericanArabLiberation (1986);April19Movement(1970s–1998);ArmedIslamicGroup(1992–2001);ASALA (1970s–1990s);AumShinrikyo(1987–1995);AzadHindSena(1982);BasqueFatherland andFreedom(ETA)(1959–current);BlackSeptember(1971–1988);DagestanLiberation Army(1999);DemocraticFrontforLiberationofPalestine(1969–current);DHKP-C(1978– current); FreeAceh Movement (mid-1970s–current); Hamas (1987–current); Hezbollah (1981–current);HizbulMujahideen(1989–current);IRA(1919–2002);IslambouliBrigades (2002–2004);IslamicLiberationOrganization(1974);IslamicGreatEasternRaidersFront (1970s–2004); Islamic Salvation Front (1989–1992); Jaish-e-Mohammed (2000–2004); Japanese RedArmy (1970–1988); Jemaah Islamiya (1993–current); Jewish Defense League (1968–1992); June 16th organization (1987–1989); Kahane Chai (1990–1995); Kach (1971–current); Lashkar-e-Taiba (2000–current); Lashkar I Jhangvi (1996–2004); LiberationArmyFifthBattalion(1993);LoyalistVolunteerForce(1996–2003);Maruseido (1974);May28ArmenianOrganization(1977);MohajirQuamiMovement(2001–2001); MoslemCommandos(1982);MovsarBarayevGang(2002);NationalLiberationArmyof Colombia(1964–2004);PalestinianIslamicJihad(1970s–current);PFLP(1967–current); PKK(1974–current);PopularLiberationArmy(1967–2002);PLO(1964–1991);RealIRA (1998–2004);RedArmyFaction(1978–1992);RedBrigade(1969–2003);Revolutionary ArmedForceofColombia(1964–current);RevolutionaryOrganization17November(1975– 2002);RiyadusSaliheynMartyrs(2004);SalafiaJihadia(1990–2003);ShamilBasayev Gang(1995–current);ShiningPath(1960s–2002);Students’IslamicMovementofIndia (2000–2004);Tanzim(1993–2004);ThawratMisr(1984–1987);TupacAmaru(1983–2001); TurkishIslamicJihad(1991–1996);TurkishPeople’sLiberationArmy(1971–1980);Ulster DefenseAssociation/UlsterFreedomFighters(1971–2004).
ormegacitiesandhavegenerallyincurredattacksbyalargernumberofdiverse groupsthatincludeleft(Marxist-Leninist),right(fascist,nationalist),andreligious (mostlyIslamist).Notsurprisingly,globalandmegacitieshaveincurredattacks bythelargestnumberandvarietyofgroups,theforemostofwhichhaveaworld jihadistoran“international”outlook.Asmentionedearlier,globalandmegacities arerichtargetswiththecapacitytorapidlytransmitcatalyticterrorwithramificationsacrosstheworld.Obviously,too,themoreheterogeneouscitiesarelikelyto attractandhouseamultiplicityofterroristorganizations.
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 73
Most instructive are issues of who attacks what, with what frequency, and whetherdifferentpatternsofattackscanbeassociatedwithparticularorganizations.Twodifferentdatabasesareenlistedtoanswerthesequestions:long-term databetween1968and2005thatincludeonlyinternationalevents,andshort-term databetween1998and2005thatincludebothdomesticandinternationalevents. Againweusearepresentationoftwenty-sevencitiestoverifyanumberofobservations.Short-termdataaredisplayedinthetextwhilelong-termdatacanbefound intheappendices.7 Beginningwiththefirstobservation,mostincidentsweresmallandofunknown origin.ThistrendcanbeseeninTable4.2.Thetableshowstwenty-sevencities alongwithincidents,casualties,thegenericidentityoftheorganization(anarchist, secular,religious,orunknown),andcasualtiesperattack.8Incidentsandcasualties areseparatedbyaslash. Wecanseethatduringjusteightyearsthesecitiesencountered1,652incidents, andalargeproportionofattacks(74percent)werecarriedoutby“others”or“unknowns”;heretoo,theunknowns/othersaccountedforrelativelyfewcasualties (13percent).Inotherwords,duringtheseyearsmostattackswereminorandoften intendedasaviolentstatementratherthanadeliberateattempttoinflictbodily harm.Thelong-termdataverifiesthisnotion.Takingthemuchextendedperiod between 1968 and 2005, our 27 cities encountered more than 2,400 incidents; slightlymorethanhalfofthesewerecarriedoutby“others”or“unknowns,”though attacksfallinginthiscategoryaccountforjust10percentofthetotalcasualties (seeAppendix,TablesA4andA5). The second observation is that actual casualties tell us much more about terrorism’senduringlegacythanincidents.Weknowfrompreviousdiscussions thatacrosstheworldterrorismexactedahigherhumantollwitheachsuccessive decade.Thebulkoftheseoccurredduringthemostrecenteightyears,whencasualtiessurpassed26,000(Table4.2).Tobesure,thetalliesclusteredinanumberof cities,withthehighestcasualtiesfoundinIstanbul,Jerusalem,Madrid,Moscow, Nairobi,NewYork,andTelAviv.Manyofthesecitiescontinuetoconfrontviolent Islamicfundamentalism.Itisalsothecasethatco-religionistsareoftenthevictims, sothattheseactsrepresentIslamistonIslamicviolence. Thethirdobservationisthatreligiouslyinspiredterroristswereresponsiblefor mostofthecasualties.Whileaccountingforlessthan7percentoftheincidents duringtheshortterm,religiousterrorismproduced79percentofthecasualties.This propositionbasicallyholdsforapreviouslong-termperiodwithreligiousterrorism continuingtoberesponsibleforaminorityofincidentsbutthelion’sshareofthe casualties(seeAppendix,TablesA4andA5). Thefourthobservationstemsfromtheprecedingoneandturnsonthosecities mostfrequentlyattackedbyparticularidentitygroups.ByscanningTables4.1and 4.2wecancompareanarchisticandsecularterrorismwiththeirreligiouslyinspired counterparts.Herewefindthatcitieswiththemostcasualtiesperincidentinclude Algiers,Casablanca,Islamabad,London,Madrid,Moscow,Mumbai,Nairobi,New
1,652/26,360
Incidents/ Casualties 19/294 154/7 242/69 0 67/635 3/32 6/135 79/659 16/324 353/1,126 43/516 151/1,634 113/828 12/52 20/285 68/1,001 26/2 64/1,678 9/358 1/5,291 8/9,755 14/11 28/393 29/6 92/466 25/802 10/1
1.7% 0% 0
28/0
2/0
43/6 52/20
26/0
17.4% 7.9% 7.2
287/2,090
6/4 10/20 11/400 3/0
4/0
1/109 33/201 3/35 17/403 11/176 7/48 6/9 38/210 11/2 4/5 1/80
26/362
Secular
Anarchist
Source:TerrorismKnowledgeBase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type3database.
Percentages: Incidents Casualties Casualtiesperattack
TOTAL
City Algiers Athens Belfast Berlin Bogotá Cairo Casablanca Grozny Islamabad Istanbul Jakarta Jerusalem Karachi Lima London Madrid Milan Moscow Mumbai Nairobi NewYork Paris Riyadh Rome Srinagar TelAviv Tokyo
TerroristIdentityandAttacksinTwenty-SevenCities,1998–2005
Table4.2
6.7% 79% 190
110/20,827
6/99 6/364
18/245
8/1,478 1/202 1/5291 2/9,749
4/276 5/791
14/449 7/377 23/909 5/44
1/22 5/131 2/370
Religious 2/30
74.2% 13.1% 2.8
1,227/3,443
6/6 10/11 10/148 23/2 76/347 8/38 7/1
41/273 2/10 1/4 77/289 15/215 306/476 33/104 111/322 97/608 5/4 10/0 25/0 13/0 52/195 7/76
Other/Unknown 17/264 85/1 190/49
15.956
Casualties perattack 15.5 0.1 0.2 0.0 9.4 10.7 22.5 8.3 20.3 3.2 12.0 10.8 7.3 4.3 14.2 14.7 0.1 26.2 39.8 5,291.0 1,219.0 0.8 14.0 0.2 5.1 32.1 0.1
74 CHAPTER 4
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 75
York,Riyadh,andTelAviv.InmanyofthesecitiesIslamistswereresponsiblefor thehighestratiosofcasualtiesperattack. Thatsaid,religiousterrorismisnotlimitedtoIslamists.Whilethenumbersare quitesmallforotherreligionsorcults,spirituallyinspiredterrorismdoessharea propensitytoproducelargenumbersofcasualties.Forexample,Hinduterrorists operatingontheIndiansubcontinenthaveanextensivehistoryofviolence(Hyderabad).IntheUnitedStates,fringeChristianshavecausedcasualtiesintheir driveagainstabortionclinics.InIsrael,outlawedJewishterroristshaveattacked Palestinians,withoneinstanceofadevoutsettlercausingdozensofcasualties. Also,TokyoislistedashavingveryfewincidentsandnegligiblecasualtiesbecauseTable4.2didnotcoverthe1995saringasattackonitsmetrosystem.That particularattackwaslaunchedbytheBuddhist-inspiredAumShinrikyoandcaused morethan5,000casualties.Bycontrast,mostofTokyo’ssecularattackerscaused relativelyfewifanycasualties.Theonlyexceptiontothisobservationwasthe leftistMaruseido,whoseattacksbroughtaspikeinTokyo’scasualtiesduringthe 1970s(seeAppendix,TablesA8andA9). Thefifthobservationisthatthereisadifferenceintheterrorexecutedbysecular asopposedtoreligiousgroups.Wecanbetterappreciatethisbytakinganother perspectiveonthehumantollandturningtothecasualtiesperincidentlocatedin thebottomrowofTable4.2.Fortheyearsshown,secularistsaccountedforjust7.2 casualtiesperincident,whilereligiouslymotivatedterroristsexactedanastounding 190casualtiesforeachattack.Asimilarpatternalsoholdsforapreviouslong-term period(seeAppendix,TableA5). It does appear that terror carried out by secularists pays greater heed to the destructionofpropertyorindividualassassinationsratherthanindiscriminatetargetinglargegroups.Therearemajorexceptionstothisgeneralization.Duringthe 1980s,Italianneofascistskilled84peopleandwounded200inaBolognabombing andleftistscommittedsimilaratrocitiesonthestreetsofParis.Throughthissame period,nationalistsliketheBasqueETA,IrishRepublicanArmy,andUlsterLoyalistswereresponsibleformorethanthreethousanddeaths.9Nevertheless,secular groupshavebeenknowntowarnnoncombatantstoevacuatepremisesthatareabout tobebombed.Othersecularterroristsweremorelikelytoresorttoabductionsor specificmurdersratherthanmasskillingormaiming.Thisisparticularlytrueof Marxistrevolutionaries,whoturnedtoterrorafterthefailedattempttooverthrow theFrenchgovernmentin1968.Somewouldthinkitfittingthatradicalschose todestroypropertyoramemberofthebourgeoiseliteratherthankillinglarge numbersofordinarypeople. Thiskindofterrorwasdifferentthanthesuicide-drivenmasskillingthatarrived inlateryears,mostlybecauseitwasconcernedwithcommittingtheactandgettingawaywithit.Writingaboutthisperiod,C.J.M.Drakecouldcautionthat“the mainrisktoaterroristisofbeingseenonCCTVandeithercapturedatthetime orhavinghismovementsrecordedandbeingidentified.”10Theriseofreligiously inspiredsuicideattackerssummarilydispensedwithDrake’sconcernandterror-
76 CHAPTER 4
ismbecameafarmoreefficientkillingmachine.Whilenotallsuicideattackers havebeenrecruitedthoughreligiousterrorism,manyhavebeenandreligionhas playedaroleinsanctifyingtheiracts.11Bythemid-1990s,suicidehadbecomean indispensabletoolofmegaandsmartterror. Exactlywhymasskillingandinjuriesaresocloselylinkedtoreligiousterrorismissubjecttoanumberofeducatedguesses.12Religioncandowhatsecular beliefsystemscannot,namely,eliminatetheemptinessconnectedtodeathby rationalizing it as a sacred act. Religion can promise martyrdom for suicide attackersandblesstheiraccumulationofcasualties.Divinesanctionsthatassurepromisesofafuturefilledwithraptureforsuicidebombersandhellfor theirvictimscanbeapowerfulsourceoflegitimization.Elaborateritualsand indoctrinationbackupthisbelief.InthePalestinianterritories,impressionable youthshavebeentoldthatasmartyrstheywillenterparadise,liveinbeautiful gardens,andenjoythecompanyofseventy-twovirgins.Afterayouthblows him-orherselfup,sweetshavebeendistributedandposthumousweddingshave celebratedtheoccasion. Religioncanalsoclaimtorepresentcertainty,assuringterroriststhatkilling isjustified.Holdingtoasingleabsolutetruthisextremelyappealingtopeoplein doubtorthosewhodonothavethesocialcapacitytoquestionreceiveddoctrine. ThisisthecaseforChristianfundamentalistswhoattackabortionclinicsbecause theybelievethatabortionsareagainstthewillofGod.ItisalsotrueforBuddhist cultslikeAumShinrikyo,whosenametranslatesinto“SupremeTruth.” Moreover, the most extreme fundamentalism can flourish in a number of seeminglydifferentenvironments.Theserunthegamutfromsecond-generation immigrantsrelegatedtopublichousingintheirhostsocieties,toalienatedMuslim immigrantslivingonthemarginsinWesterncities,toindigenouspopulationsliving insqualidvillages.Theseconditionsprovidefertilegroundforrecruitinghapless youthtoareligiousutopia. RogerMastersoffersanaccountofsuicideterrorbasedondemographyand availableresourcesthatmayshedadditionallightonthisissue.13Heexplainsthat rampantpoverty,highbirthrates,shorterlifeexpectancy,andlowinvestmentsper childmakeself-sacrificepalatable.Thisisespeciallytruewhenfamiliesmustcompeteforscarceresourcesandmartyrdomprovidesanopportunityforredemption. Whilethesearenonreligiousfactors,theycanalsoworkintandemwithreligion. Spiritualandmaterialrewardsprovidedbylocalclergy,operativesfromalQaeda, ortheocraticsupportersinIrancangoveryfarwithindesperateenvironments. PartsofLebanon,Pakistan,andthePalestinianterritoriesroughlyfitthesecriteria andhavealsospawnedhighratesofsuicideterror. Nosinglesetofpropositionsprovidescompleteanswers.Masters’shypothesis mightexplainGazaCity,butwouldnotapplytoRiyadh.Nordoesitexplainwhy terrorismwouldtakerootinandbedirectedtowardWesterncities.NaggingquestionsremainaboutthebackgroundofsuicideterroristswhodonotfitMasters’sdemographic/scarcityhypothesis.Thisisparticularlytrueforwealthier,well-educated
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 77
SaudisandEgyptians,orforWesternconvertswhofrequentradicalmosques,hook upwithalQaeda,orbecome“mujahadeen.” Theexplanationsbehindterroristrecruitmentarefarfromcomplete,butaswe reviewtheinformation,themostbasicdistinctionsdoholdbetweencitiesattacked aswellasdistinctionsbetweensecularandreligiousterror.14Duringthelatterhalf ofthetwentiethcentury,politicalattacksonEuropeancitieslikeAthens,Paris,and Rometooktheformofsmaller-scaleurbanterror.Atthattimemostpoliticalterror focusedonproperty,theabduction(orsometimeskilling)ofselectelites,andthe attacker’sownneedtoescape.Bycontrast,thelatter-daymostlyIslamistattackers ofCairo,Casablanca,Karachi,Moscow,Mumbai,Nairobi,andNewYorkwereless discrete,conductingmegaterrorcenteredonhumancasualtiesandself-sacrifice. Inaddition,ahandfulofcitieswithalongerhistoryofterrorexperiencedboththe secularistsmaller-scaleterrorandreligiousmegaterror;theseincludeJerusalem, TelAviv,London,andMadrid. OldSmall-scaleversusNewMegaAttacks Thereis,too,somethingelsetobederivedbycomparingseculartoreligiousterrorism.AtleastinWesternEurope,old-fashionedsecularterrorismappearstobe fading.15IthasbeenyearsnowsinceleftistandnationalistfactionsliketheRed Brigades(Italy)ortheRevolutionaryOrganizationof17November(Greece)have beeneliminated.Hadsecularterrorismcontinuedtobevital,wemightexpectthese factionstohavebeenreplaced,butnosuchregenerationhasoccurred.Another harbingerofdeepertrendscanbefoundintherecentrenunciationofviolenceby secularterrorists.TheabandonmentofviolencebyNorthernIreland’sIRAand possiblybytheBasqueETAcertainlyworksinthisdirection.Someoftheleftist declinecouldbefeltinindividualcitieslikeBerlin,Milan,andParis,wherein recentyearsterrorattacksandcasualtieshavedramaticallydeclined. Themostsignificanttrendscanbedetectedbyexaminingproportionateshares ofsecularandreligiousterrorismduringtwoperiods—1968to1994,and1995to 2005.Itisalsousefultodothisfortheoverallpictureof25nations(orregions) andmorespecificallyforour27representativecities.Beginningwiththenational level,intheperiodbetween1968and1994secularterroraccountedfor45percent oftotalincidentsand36percentoftotalcasualties(seeAppendix,TableA6).Since 1995andupthrough2005,theseproportionsshrankto23percentofincidentsand just5percentofcasualties. We now narrow the picture down to our twenty-seven cities. The pattern is very much the same with both incidents and casualties declining over the two timeperiods.Inthepre-1995era,secularterroristscommitted45percentofthe incidentsand50percentofthecasualties.Bythepost-1995period,wefindthat incidentsshrinktojust16percentandcasualtiesalsowithertojust3percent(see Appendix,TableA8). Ifsecularterrorismisexhaustingitself,thiscannotbesaidforreligiousterror-
78 CHAPTER 4
Figure4.1 DistributionofAttacksbyTerroristIdentityinTwenty-Seven Figure 4.1 Cities,1968–1994and1995–2005 Distribution of Attacks by Terrorist Identity in Twenty-Seven Cities, 1968–1994 and 1995–2005
Incidents, 1968–1994
Casualties, 1968–1994
Religious
Religious Other/ Unknown
Other/ Unknown
Secular Secular
Casualties, 1995–2005
Incidents, 1995–2005
Anarchist Religious
Other/ Unknown
Other/ Unknown Secular
Secular
Religious
Source:TerrorismKnowledgeBase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2database.
ism.Herethetrendlinesareupward,tellingusthatthevacuumhasbeenfilledby jihadists.Typifyingthisbrandofterrorism,casualtiesfarexceedincidents,though bothhaveclimbed.Thenationalpicturebringsreligiousterrorismintostarkrelief.Duringthepre-1995era,religiouslymotivatedterrorismaccountedforjust5 percentofincidentsand12percentofcasualties.Since1995,religiousterrorism hadrisento16percentofincidentsandskyrocketedto86percentofcasualties (seeAppendix,TableA6). Again,ourtwenty-sevencitiesreflectandperhapsmagnifythesebroadertrends. Thismorefocusedcitypicturerevealsthatinthepre-1995period,religiousterrorists accountedforjust6percentofincidentsand16percentofcasualties.After1995, religiousincidentsroseto17percentandnearlymonopolizedthetotalnumberof casualtiesat94percent(seeAppendix,TableA8). ThedistributionofdifferentlyinspiredterrorismisshowninFigure4.1.Data aredrawnfromtheearlierlistingoftwenty-sevencities(seeAppendix,TableA8). Thefiguredisplaysthetwotimeperiodsdiscussedaboverelativetoincidentsand casualtiesforeachidentity(anarchist,secular,religious,other/unknown).
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 79
Notethatthebulkofincidentsstillremaininthecategoryof“other”or“unknown.”Asmentionedabove,theincidenceofreligiousterrorincreased,butby themorerecentperioditaccountedforonlyslightlymoreepisodesthansecular terror.Therealexpansionforreligiousterrorhasbeeninitsproportionofcasualties. Herethe“piechart”graphicallydepictsfor1995–2005theoverwhelmingshareof casualtiesbyreligiousterrorism. Concomitant with increased lethality are bigger attacks on larger spaces, or whathavebeencalledmegaattacks.Attacksofthiskindarecriticalevents.Like 9/11,5/11,and7/7,mostmegaattacksprecipitatedadeepsenseofawareness, oftengalvanizingthenationinwhichtheattacktookplace.Thereislittledoubt abouttheprofoundimpactofmegaterroronpublicpolicy––especiallyintheWest. ResidentsofMadridwerestunnedbythe5/11attack,therulingpartywasturned outofoffice,andthatcountryreverseditscommitmentstotheIraqwar.Londoners wonderedhowthesonsofimmigrantscouldhaveturnedonthem,andtheUnited Kingdomenactedhighlyrestrictivelawstocounterterrorism. ButmegaattackshavelongoccurredincitiesoutsidetheWest.Theretoo,the responsehasbeenmixed.Inonesense,megaattacksdrewtheaffectedpopulation closertotheAmericanexperienceandevokedsympathyfromabroad––hencethe referencetoIndia’sorRussia’sorTurkey’s9/11.Inanothersense,somenations struckbymegaterrorrefrainedfromtakingaggressivemilitaryactionoutsidetheir borders,andthesecountrieswereinclinedtobemorecriticaloftheU.S.response. Whateverthereationandwhereverthecitiesstruck,megaattacksbroughttothe foreahostofemotionsandpunctuatedpeople’sexperience.Forthisreasonalone theyareworthacollectivereview. Table4.3illustratesthepresenceorabsenceofmegaterrorintwenty-threenationsandregions.Someareasexperiencedmorethanonesucheventwhileafew hadnoneatall.Thelistcontains21watershedevents,definedbyhavingcausedat least199casualties.Almostallattackscausedextensivepropertyorinfrastructure damage. Of the twenty-three nations and regions, all but eight experienced mega attacks. Targeted spaces included central business districts (CBDs), downtowns, citycenters,andresortareas.Withinthesespaces,thefavoredstructuresforattack weregovernmentheadquarters,hotels,retailorentertainmentfacilities,andpublic transitsystems.Mostoftheattackswerelaunchedbyreligiousterrorists,anda majorityoccurredaftertheyear2000.Justsixoftheattackswerepredominately domestic––thatis,undertakenbyterroristswhoseoriginsandsourcesofsupport camefromwithinthecountry.ThiswasthecaseinChechnya(Grozny),Egypt (Sharmal-Sheikh),Indonesia(Bali),Japan(Tokyo),SaudiArabia(Dhahran),and theUnitedStates(OklahomaCity).Themajorityofattackerswereofforeignderivation.TheprimevenuesforthesewereGermany(Berlin),India(Mumbai),Israel (Jerusalem),Kenya(Nairobi),Pakistan(KarachiandIslamabad),Russia(Moscow andBeslan),Spain(Madrid),andtheUnitedStates(NewYork).Usuallyforeign nationalsrequiredabasefromwhichtohouse,coordinate,andsupplyattackers.
Kashmir
Japan
Italy
Tokyo
Jerusalem
Israel
Citycenter:Tokyosubwaysystem
CBD:Yehudashoppingmall
Citycenter:entertainmentdistrictof KutaBeach
Citycenter:gatewayofIndiamonument, HindutempleofMumbadevi
Mumbai(Bombay)
Bali
CBD:BombayStockExchange,theheadquartersofIndia’sairline,threeluxuryhotels
Citycenter:LaBellediscothequeinSchoenbergdistrict
Citycenter:Oldmarket,GhazalaGardens Hotel,OceanBayHotel
Citycenter:headquartersbuildingoffederal government
Space
Mumbai(Bombay)
Berlin
Indonesia
India
Greece
Germany
France
Egypt
Sharmal-Sheikh
Grozny
Chechnya
Colombia
City
Nation Algeria
MegaAttacksinTwenty-ThreeNationsandRegions
Table4.3
March20,1995
September4,1997
October12,2002
August25,2003
March12,1993
April5,1986
July23,2005
December27,2002
Date
5,012
207
502
202
1,517
199
206
352
Casualties
80 CHAPTER 4
OklahomaCity
NewYork
UnitedStates
CBD:BritishconsulateandHSBCoffice
Istanbul
London
UnitedKingdom
Citycenter:NeveShalomandBethIsrael synagogues
Istanbul
Turkey
CBD:WorldTradeCenter
Downtown:MurrahFederalBuilding
Citycenter:LondonUndergroundsystem, TavistockSquare
Citycenter:trainstationsatdifferentlocations
KhobarTowershousingcomplex
Madrid
Neighborhood,schoolcompound
Beslan
Dhahran
Nearcitycenter:PalaceofCultureTheater “Dubrovka”
Spain
Outerneighborhoods:five-storybuilding
Moscow
Weaponsdump
Moscow
Citycenter:shoppingarea
Islamabad
Citycenter:U.S.embassy
Karachi
Nairobi
SaudiArabia
Russia
Peru
Pakistan
Morocco
Kenya
September11,2001
April19,1995
July7,2005
November20,2003
November15,2003
March11,2004
June25,1996
September1,2004
October24,2002
September9,1999
April10,1988
July14,1987
August7,1998
9,749
668
752
428
325
791
521
1,065
812
295
1,200
322
5,291
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 81
82 CHAPTER 4
ThemostsalientexamplesofthisincludedIndia(Mumbai),Pakistan(Karachi), Spain(Madrid),andtheUnitedKingdom(London). Mostinterestingistheinternationalcharacterofalmostallmegaattacks.Even attacksclassifiedasdomestichavesomeforeignlinkage,eitherbecauseoftrainingdoneabroadorexplosivematerialsmuggledfromabroad.Manyattackshave involvedcoordinationbetweenlocallybasedterroristsandinternationalsources. ThiswastrueforthebombinginBerlin,whereGermansworkedwithLibyans toexecuteanattackinadiscothequefrequentlypatronizedbyAmericanmilitary personnel.ItisalsotrueforattacksinIndiawherelocalMuslimswereenlistedby Pakistanis.TransnationallinkageswereespeciallyimportantintheMadridmetro bombing.Inthatinstancelocallybasedimmigrantscollaboratedwithterrorists fromMorocco,Algeria,Tunisia,andpossiblyIndiaandSyria. Theinternationalcharacterofattacksoftenmeantthatterroristswereimported toattackcitizensontheirhomesoil.Forexample,ChechensattackedRussiansin theaters,schools,andapartmentbuildings;PalestiniansstruckIsraelisincafésand commercial/entertainmentstrips;alQaedaassaultedTurkishJewsinsynagogues orstruckTurksandWesternersinabusinessdistrict.Someattacksinvertedthis scenario,sothatforeignerswereattackedoncetheysetfootonlocalsoil.ThisoccurredinBali,wheremostlyAustraliantouristswerestruckbyalocallybasedcell ofJemaahIslamiya.AsimilarattackoccurredinaSinairesortarea,whereEuropean touristswerekilledorinjuredbycarbombsandexplosive-ladensuitcasesplanted byterroristsbasedinEgypt.Finally,therewereinstancesofstateterrorisminthis mix.EarlierattacksinKarachi(1987)andIslamabad(1988)wereallegedtohave beencarriedoutbySovietintelligence,anxioustothwartPakistan’ssupportfor themujahadeenintheAfghanwar. Reviewingthecomponentsofthemegaattackwecanconcludethatmostterrorismwasfueledbyafiercelydefinedidentity(Islamistinterspersedwithnationalist), coupledtodistinctinternationalconnections,andframedbytacticalobjectivesto envelopelargenumbersofpeopleandpropertywithintheensuingcarnage.Itis hardlycoincidentalthatsomeofthelargestattackshadaninternationalpresence. Thismayverywellbeanextensionofthenotionthatinternationallyorganizedattacksrequireabiggerbangthanlocallyinitiatedassaults.Turkeyprovidesaready exampleofthelargestattacksbeingconductedbyalQaedaandmuchsmallerones executedbyseparatistKurds.Itmayalsobethatinternationalterrorismpossesses thecapacitytotakeonmegaattacks.Groupsappeartobelearningfromoneanother acrossboundariesabouthowtoconductmegaterror.Theyevenhavemanagedto reducetheircosts.The9/11attacksaresaidtohavebeencarriedoutforapproximately$500,000;3/11wassupposedtohavebeencarriedoutforafractionofthat sum;and7/7wasthoughttohavebeenexecutedforjust$14,000.16 This most recent brand of mass violence has been identified as Islamistdominated“fourthwaveterrorism.”17Thereligiousdistinctivenessofthismovement isderivedfromthespreadofIslamistideologyinNorthAfrica,theMiddleEast, andpartsofAsia.Ratherthanexaminingterrorismsolelyfromthevantageofwho
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 83
doestheattacking,wealsotaketheperspectiveofwherethoseattacksoriginate andwhatarethesitesofattack.Judgedbythiscriterion,fourthwaveterrorismis notsimplyamatterofreligiousinspiration,butalsobasedoncitiesasbothtargets andsourcesofattack.Wenowturntowhatmayliewithincitiesthatmakesthem soconvenientforworldjihadists. CityHaunts Itisnoteasytopreciselyidentify,muchlesspredict,thekindsofneighborhoods orcityhauntsthatterroristswillchoose.Somechoiceswillbedictatedbypure accident.Ratherthanhavingbeencarefullycalculated,theberthingofterrorist cellshassomethingtodowithhappenstance.Themainfactorsincludewherecoreligionistshavesettled,theirplacesofcongregation,theexistenceofsupportive institutionslikemosquesorsportsclubs,accesstoreligiousbookshops,andthe presenceofa“terroristentrepreneur”whoactsasanorganizerandmentor.Acity thatevolvesalongtheselinesmayhaveauniversitythathasattractedforeignstudentsandsubsequentlyprovidesanatmospherewheresectarianscanorganizefor socialorreligiouspurposes.Theseconditionssimplygrowupinaplaceandover timeevolveintofull-blowncommunities.Coincidence,however,goesonlysofar, andtherearealsostructuralcharacteristicsconnectedtocitiesthatdeterminewhy someplacesareespeciallydesirable. Experienceshowsthatfourthwaveterroristsarelikelytoflourishinacitythat isopen,containsamarkeddegreeofethnicdiversity,manifestsagooddealof sociopoliticaltolerance,andhasapermissiveattitudetowardimmigration.More oftenthannot,thecitychosenhasamixedurbanfabric,anabundanceofoldneighborhoods,andtheavailabilityofcheaprentalhousing.Thebestcandidatesarenot prohibitivelyexpensivecentralcities,butlessexpensivelocalitiesthatarecloseto them.Thesetendtobeold,smallerindustrialcitiesorworking-classsuburbsthat lieintheshadowoftheirlargerneighbors. Forurbanterrorists,theideaistofindalocationeitherwithinorclosetoa majorcity,whereonecanfindsupport,thatisaffordableandmostofallcontains placeswherepeoplecangetlost.Theabilitytogetlostwhilefreelyoperatingis anartformthatisbestpracticedinfacelessurbanenvironments.InSouthAsia, bustlingKarachihassuppliedanabundanceofcityhauntsbecauseamidsomuch publicdisplay,somuchisalsokeptsecret.“Whocouldnothide,”oneobserver comments,“inaplacewhereeverythingishidden?”IntheUnitedStates,Brooklyn andJerseyCityaresuperblylocatedwithinstrikingdistanceofManhattan.They also contain dense, pluralistic neighborhoods that provide anonymity within a contextofliberalvalues. TerroristhauntscanalsobefoundinmostWestEuropeancitiesfromMadrid toRotterdamtoBrusselsandwellbeyond.Forvariousreasons,somecitiesstand outmorethanothersandthesewouldincludeParis,Milan,Leeds,London,and Hamburg.Eachofthesecitiesisinhabitedbydistinctcommunitiesandeachhasits
84 CHAPTER 4
particulartraits.Athumbnailsketchofeachcityillustrateshowterroristcellsadapt totheirparticularenvironments.Thegreatmajorityofneighborhoodresidentsare peacefulandlawabiding.Thismakesiteasierforterroriststoshieldthemselves ormasktheiractivities.Thisisoftenaccomplishedbybuildinganichewithina neighborhood,establishinganetworkofrelations,andreconstitutingacommon identity(oftenthroughradicalIslam). RoubaixandtheParisianMaghreb MorethanmostEuropeannations,Franceisanationofimmigrantsandmanyfrom NorthAfrica’sMaghrebhavesettledthere.Overpastdecades,immigrantsmade theirhomesinnorthernindustrialcitieslikeRoubaixwherefactorieshaveclosed andunemploymentreaches22percent.Thecityisknownforhavingspawnedthe Roubaixgang,reputedtohavecarriedoutwavesofbombingsinParisduringthe 1990sandyearslaterattemptedtoblowuptheU.S.embassy. OntheoutskirtsofParis,ahostofworking-classsuburbshavealsobeentransformed.OnceknownastheRedBeltbecauselocalresidentsvotedtheCommunist ticket,thesesuburbsnowhaveadistinctethnicandreligiousflavor.Immigrants fromtheMaghrebliveintheagedandtornhousingstockofSeine-St.Denisor thehugeblocksofpublichousinginnearbyLaCourneuve.Fordecades,gangsof unemployedyouthsometimesturnedtominortheftanddelinquency.InSeine-St. Denis,theTablighiMosqueintroducesyoungmentofundamentalism,oftenwith mixedresults.AnumberofgangmembershavetakenupfundamentalistIslam, changedtheirhabits,andleadreligiouslives.Othershaveusedtheirexperiencewith streetviolenceandconvertedittoreligiousterrorism.Whilethereisnoevidence tosuggesttheTablighihasbeeninvolvedinanykindofillegalactivities,thesect hasproducedconspicuousjihadistswhohavegoneofftofightinforeignwars. TheTablighialsoservesasanideologicalwaystationtoventureintothemore aggressivestrainofSalafistIslam.Salafistsareknowntohaveharvestedproceeds fromarmedrobberiestofinancetheactivitiesofFrance’snotoriousterroristorganization,theArmedIslamicGroup(GIA).18Noclearleaderhasemergedamong thesejidhadists,thoughareligiousheadnamedAbuDohahasorganizedvolunteers forserviceabroad.Afghanistan,Pakistan,Chechnya,andmostrecentlyIraqare favored.AnumberofraidscarriedoutbyFrenchanti-terroristunitshaveturned uplargequantitiesofmaterialusedtomanufactureexplosivesaswellascaches ofexplosivesandchemicals.19 TerrorisminFrancefallsunderthepurviewofLaDirectiondelaSurveillance duTerritoire,orDST.InDecember2002,theDSTraidedtwosafehousesinLa Courneuveanduncoveredgascanisters,fuses,chemicals,andaprotectivesuit.The suspectshavesincebeenbroughttotrialandconvictedofacriminalassociation withterrorism.Meanwhile,JudgeJean-LouisBruiguiere,whopresidesoverspecial courtsthattryterrorists,forthrightlystates,“Thelevelofthreatisincontestably high.Radicalizationhasneverbeenthisstrong.”20
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 85
Milan’sFortressZone Italy’snorthernindustrialcitiesservemuchthesamepurposesasthoseinFrance, andimmigrantshavemigratedtocitieslikeTurinornearbyMilan.Asthecountry’s mostimportantcommercialhub,Milaniswellsuitedasahauntforterrorists.21Its winding,back-alleystreetsbustlewithtraffic,restaurants,countlessbusinesses,and thousandsofpassers-by.Milanisthickwithpoliticsandpackedneighborhoods. Duringthe1990sitbecameahotbedofterroristcellsthatrecruitedjidhadistsfor civilwarsinAlgeria,Bosnia,andChechnya.Milan’sterroristcellsaresustainedby religiousinstitutions––mostlymosquesalongVialeJennerandViaQuaranta.Duringthelastdecade,cellswereorganizedbyaterroristentrepreneurnamedAnwar Shaban,wholedsermonsatlocalmosques.Anotherterroristentrepreneur,Ahmed Rabei(aliasMohammedtheEgyptian),hasbeenconvictedofterrorismcharges inItalyandhassincebeenextraditedtoSpainonchargesofhavingmasterminded theattackinMadrid. RabeicastalongshadowoverterroristcirclesinMilanandelsewhere.Once havingarrivedinMilanhebecameintenselypious.Wearingafull-grownbeardand traditionalgarb,hefrequentedvarioushauntspreachingviolence.Rabeiwasput underpolicesurveillanceandoverheardcelebratingthebeheadingofanAmerican hostageasanexampleofhowtokillWesterners.ArmandoSpatero,aMilanprosecutorwithyearsofexperiencefightingleftistterrorandMafiacrime,looksatRabei withincredulity,“Howisitpossible,”heexclaims,“thathereinademocracythat welcomesimmigrants,therecouldbesomeonewhoharborssomuchhatredthat hecouldconsidertakinghisownlifetokillothers?”22 Milan’sjihadistsputsecrecyaboveallelseandcreatedtheirownnicheenvironment.PortaVeneziashowshowadenselypopulated,self-sustaining,mixed-use communityprovidesanairofnormalitythatcanalsoprotectaterroristunderground. Withincreasedimmigration,PortaVeneziabecamea“fortresszone”ringedbyan extensivenetworkoflookoutsandtrainedagents.Considerthefollowingdescriptionofthisparticularplace: [A] member of the cell spent hours in a littleArabic restaurant posing as a customer,theTunisianbarberkeepinganeyeonajunction,theAlgerianseller watchingoverapossibleescaperoute;theywerethesentrieswitheyesandears everywhere.Theynotedthefacesofall“suspect”persons:Italianlawenforcementagents,butaboveallspiesfromArabicintelligenceagencies.23
Acombinationoflocaloperatives,transplantedimmigrants,andforeigncontacts makesforaveryviableandeffectivenetwork.Localsandlong-termimmigrants canactatthemarginsofdifferentcommunities.Asmerchantsorartisanstheyassimilateintothemainstreamwhilealsomaintainingfriendshipswithmorerecent arrivals. Urban neighborhoods furnish a fertile ground for insulating ethnic or religiouscommunities,whileatthesametimeallowingthemnecessarycontact andintelligencefromtheoutsideworld.
86 CHAPTER 4
LeedsandthePakistaniDiaspora GreatBritain’snorthernindustrialcitiessharemuchthesameroleasthoseinFrance orItaly.LeedsexemplifiesthisforPakistaniimmigrants.The7/7bombershailed fromindustrialLeeds,whereunemploymentamongthecity’sseventydifferent nationalitygroupscanreach40percent.BeestonisLeed’smostdiverseneighborhood,withahightransitorypopulation.Itislargelyresidential,lacedwithrowsof back-to-backterracedhousing,andservicedbylocalshopsandthreemosques.24 ByBritishstandards,theneighborhoodcouldbedescribedasrun-down. ItwasinBeestonwhereMohammedSiddiqueKhan,ShehzadTanweer,Hasib Hussain,andJermaineLindsaymadeplansforearlierattacks.Khan’snamewas linkedtoanearlierandfoiledattempttodetonateatruckbombinLondon.Israeli sourcesalsoreportedthatKhanhadvisitedIsraelpriortothedeadlysuicidebombing of a discotheque inTelAviv.Two British citizens of Pakistani origin were involvedinthatattack,leadingtospeculationthatKhanhadbeenintouchwith anothergroupofterrorists. Kahn and Tanweer also came into contact with terrorists who were apprehendedinthemidstofplanninganattackinLondon.Inwhathasbecomeknown as“OperationCrevice”ahalfdozenothermenwerediscoveredtohavestashed away600kilograms(1,320pounds)ofammoniumnitratefertilizertobeusedin amassiveexplosion.LiketheLeedscell,theOperationCreviceterroristschose Londontargetsandhaddiscussedtherelativebenefitsofdestroyingashopping center,anightclub,waterandgasutilities,asoccerstadium,andeventheHouses ofParliament.AtleastsomemembersfromtheLeedsandCrevicecellshadmet inLondononfourseparateoccasionsandonceinPakistan.Thesecellssawtheir missionasthefurtheranceofjihad,somemembersreceivedtraininginPakistan, andcontactsbecamemoreelaboratefromlocalitytolocalityandacrossnational boundaries. Localgeographyisthebuildingblockofdomesticterrorism,andthepattern inLeedstypifiesthelargerprocessofrecruitment,planning,andimplementation. Along-termresidentofLeeds,Khanwasemployedasa“learningmentor”ata localschoolandsetupagymnasiumatalocalmosque.Heusedhispositionto advocateradicalIslamandbefriendtroubledyoungsters.Afterbeingexpelledfrom themosqueforhisradicalviews,Khanopenedanothergymnasiumandcontinued hiswork.Heworkedwithdistraughtyoungsterstoreordertheirlives,filltheir spiritswithpurpose,andwintheirloyalties.AlocalIslamicbookshopalsoserved potentialrecruits.Theshopsolddisks,tapes,books,andconductedsessionson Islamicradicalism.Mosque,gym,andbookshopstoodassupportiveinstitutions forthesemen. Gradually,Khanbecameaterroristentrepreneurbytakinginitiativeandoperationalcontrol.DuringhisprevioustripstoPakistan,hewasthoughttohave traveledtoadjoiningborderareasofAfghanistan,whereheestablishedlinkswith alQaeda.ByNovember2004,KhanmadeanothertriptoPakistan,thistimeac-
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 87
companiedbyoneofhisyoungerfollowers,ShehzadTanweer.Itwasduringthis lasttripthatbothmenarethoughttohavepreparedforthe7/7bombings.Other menwhotraveledbetweenKarachi,London,andLeedswerealsosuspectedof collaboratingwithKhan. BackintheUnitedKingdom,thefourmenneededaplacetoconductoperations andtheychoseanareaneartheUniversityofLeedsbecauseitshighturnoverstudent populationprovidedgoodcoverandcheaprent.Afterlettinganapartmentfrom anEgyptianchemistrystudentat18AlexanderGrove,Khanandhisfollowersset towork.At18AlexanderGrovetheyconvertedaground-floorflatofatwo-story buildingintoanexplosivesfactory.Khanandhisaccompliceslaboreddayand nighttopreparetheirultimateact.Itappearsthatthefourmenworkedwiththe windowsopeninordertoavoidfumesfromthechemicals,thoughthewindows werecoveredbynetcurtainsinordertoavoiddetection.Fromallindications,the mencouldcomeandgo,purchasetheneededchemicals,andworkfreelywithout arousingsuspicion.UnderthecollectivenameAbuHafsalMasriBrigade,afew disaffectedyouthtraveledtoLondonandsetofftheircargo,takingtheirownlives intheprocess.Forasomepeople,theirlegacyliveson. London’sFinsburyMosque Well before 9/11, London was reputed to hold the most extensive and robust groupofreligiousradicalsinEurope.Islamicfundamentalistswereclearabout theirviewsandbrazenintheirspeech.Theypostedcallsforjihadonpublicbillboards,spokeopenlyaboutevilscommittedbyJewsandCrusaders,andtoldnew recruitsthatkillingnonbelieverswouldbeapassporttoparadise.Thiscaricatured behaviorevolvedfromtheHydeParktraditionsoffreeexpression,whereanyone couldsayalmostanything.SopervasivewasreligiousradicalisminLondonthat itwasthoughttohavebecomethe“crossroadsofterrorism”andsomenicknamed it“Londonistan.” ItmaybethatbecauseLondonwasaplacewheretheextremesoffreespeech couldbetolerated,evenworsethingshadnotoccurred.Itispreciselybecausethe soundofworldjihadwassoloudandclearinLondonthatthecitybecamesoconspicuouslyidentifiedasaterroristhaunt.Asoneoftheworld’sgreatmediacapitals, LondonwouldremainacatalystforjihadwhileHamburgwouldbethecitywhere theactualplotfortheworld’sbiggestmegaattackwouldbehatched. AttheheartofthecallforjihadwastheFinsburyMosque.Themosqueis locatedattheintersectionofthreeLondonboroughs––Islington,Haringey,and Hackney.25 Once a working-class neighborhood, Islington has gone through large-scalegentrificationandbecomeoneofLondon’smostfashionableareas. Notwithstandingitsupscalestatusandlowunemployment(5.8percent),theboroughisrelativelydiverse,withnearly20percentofitspopulationfromAfrica, theCaribbean,orAsia.Haringeyislessupscale,thoughitsharessimilarlylow unemploymentratesandholdscomparableproportionsofnonwhites.Hackney
88 CHAPTER 4
islesswelloffthanitssisterboroughs,withhigherratesofunemployment(6.9 percent), a more diverse population, and a non-European population of more than40percent. TheFinsburyMosqueisjustatwenty-minutebusridefromcentralLondon. ThemosquedrawsfromsurroundingboroughsandservicesamultiethniccommunityofPakistanis,Bengalis,Algerians,andEgyptians.Forsixyearsaradical imam namedAbu Hamza preached out of Finsbury. Egyptian-born Hamza has oneeye,andbecauseofalosthandhewearsametalprosthesisintheshapeofa hook.Hamza’sunusualphysicalappearancewasmorethanmatchedbymenacing words.Hissermonswerenotonlymeantforcongregants,butaddressedtocrowds indecayedneighborhoodslikeWhitechapelinnearbyEastLondon.Theradical preachercalledfor“bleeding”theenemiesofIslamanddoingawaywithJews, gays,tourists,theroyalfamily,andwomeninbikinis. WhetherHamza’swordsledtoanyactualattacksisunclear.26Convicted9/11 terroraccompliceZacariasMoussaouiandshoe-bomberRichardReidhadbeen incontactwithHamzaandthemosque.UponraidingHamza’sapartment,police foundamanualforwagingterrorcalledtheEncyclopediaofAfghanJihad,plus thousandsoftapesadvocatingwaragainsttheWest.Interestingly,theEncyclopedia focusedonsymbolictargetslikeBigBen,theEiffelTower,andtheStatueofLiberty.Alsouncoveredwereforgedpassports,bio-nuclear-chemicalprotectivesuits, minorweapons,andaCScanister.Hamzahassincebeenconvictedofsoliciting murderandcausingracialhatred.27 Hamburg’s/Harburg’sAlQaeda IfLondonistheplacefromwhichthefuryofurbanterrororiginated,Hamburgand Harburgarewhereitsbiggesteventwasplanned.HamburgisoneofGermany’s wealthiestcities.IthaslongbeenGermany’smediacapital,andsincethecountry’s reunificationithasrecaptureditsrolesasaleadingportandgatewaytoEastern Europe.Hamburg’selegantbuildings,parks,rebuiltharbor,andsmartstreetsappear tojustifyitslong-heldclaimofbeinghometomostofGermany’smillionaires.28 TheadjacentcityofHarburg,lyingtothesouth,tellsamuchdifferenttale.Harburg isadrab,grayindustrialsuburbwithfewlandmarksorattractions.Manyofits factoriesandhousesweredestroyedbyAlliedbombingduringWorldWarII.Upon closeinspectiononecanspotweather-beatenplaquesonthewallsofbuildings, inscribedwithdatesofdestructionandreconstruction. WhilemuchhasbeenwrittenabouttheHamburgCell,thenearbyoffshootof Harburgiswheremuchof9/11wasplanned.Theplot’sleader,MohammedAtta, livedinHarburg,andwasjoinedtherebythreemajoraccomplices—RamziBinalshibh,Marwanal-Shehhi,andZiadJarrah.Thiscorewaslaterjoinedbyfour otheraccomplices.29Foratleastatime,threeofthesemensharedthesameapartmentatMarienstrasse54.Likemostofthebuildingsaroundit,Marienstrasse54 isvintage1950s,constructedwhentherewaslittlemoneyinGermanyandpeople
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 89
weregratefulforaplacetolive.Itisaplain,squarefour-storyhousewithayellow façade,squeezedintorowsofidenticalhouses. Someofthemenusedthelocaluniversity’sfacilitiestomeetwithcomrades andhostevents.Marienstrasse54isashortwalkfromtheTechnicalUniversity of Hamburg-Harburg (TUHH), whereAtta studied urban planning.Apartments inthevicinityrentquicklyandinexpensivelytoforeignersandstudents.Anyone rentingcanbesuretheywillattractlittlenotice.Asoneshopkeeperdescribesthe environmentchosenbythe9/11attackers: Idon’trecallthoseguys....AllIcantellyouisthatthereweremanyofthem.... IdoknowthatitispossibletoliveinaHarburgneighborhoodforyearswithout befriending,orevenrecognizing,asinglesoul.Ifyoupayyourrentontimeand don’tcauseanytrouble,youcanbecomeinvisible.30
Thecity’shightoleranceforprivacywassupplementedbyanindulgentattitude toward criminality. Conscious of the country’s Nazi past and sensitive toward allegations of racism, police shied away from investigating complaints against foreigners––even when those complaints involved petty crime or drugs. Police wereespeciallyreluctanttotargetsuspectmosques.ThisallowedIslamicradicals toenjoynearimmunityfrominvestigation. MembersoftheHamburgCellweredrawnfromNorthAfricaandtheMiddle East.Fromtheearly1990sonward,morethanahalf-dozenyoungmenfromthe ArabworldsettledinHamburg-Harburgasforeignstudents.Whiledifferentindividualswouldjointhecell,theywouldsoondisappear.Thismeantthatmembership washeldtoacoreofsevensteadfastindividuals,retrospectivelydescribedas“a bunchofguys.”Theseeminglyinnocuous“bunchofguys”wasmadeupoflost youngmenwhouponfindingthemselvesinanunfamiliarsettingwouldreconstitute theirowncollectiveidentity. Theactivitiesofthe“bunchofguys”revolvedaroundalQudsMosque,situated nearatrainstation,aredlightdistrict,andpoliceoffices.Asinothercityhaunts, theirreligiousorientationwasguidedbyaradicalimam—thisoneknownonlyby thesurnamealFazazi.31ThealQudsMosquewasnotonlyacenterofprayer,but ofbondingandindoctrination.CongregantsregularlyvisitedanIslamicbookstore justtwoblocksaway.Aspecialentrancewasreservedforaselectfewwhocould enterabackroomandpurchasejihadistbooksandtapes. Alongwithothercomrades,Attamadeampleuseoftheuniversity.Feesfor foreign students were low and rules allowed them to pursue academic degrees ataleisurelypace.Attahimselfhadarrivedin1992,takingnearlyeightyearsto completeamaster’sdegree.ForbothAttaandhisaccomplices,theextendedtime wasspentinotherpursuits.AtTUHHhefoundedanIslamicstudents’association thatsoonturnedtowardmilitancy.LedbyAtta,thestudentsobtainedpermission fromuniversityofficialstoreservearoomforcommonprayer.ThestudentIslamic associationsoonformulatedstrictrulesforattendanceandengagedinanimated politicaldiscussions.Accordingtoevidencediscoveredlater,thediscussionsre-
90 CHAPTER 4
volvedaroundcallsforworldjihad,attacksontheUnitedStates,andpunishment formemberswhodidnotprayregularly.32 Thecellseemedtobeabletoflourishinsomeofthemostrun-down,transitional neighborhoods.EverywhereAttalookedhewassurroundedbyugliness;themosque inaseedyneighborhood,thesterilityofTUHH,andthenondescriptbuildingwhere helivedwereallstrangeanddepressing.33Despitethis,thecityhauntallowedfor anonymity,freedom,friendship,acodeofbehavior,purpose,andportalstothe outsideworld.Fromthishaunt“thebunchofguys”traveledtopartsoftheMiddle EastandAsia.September11mayhavebeensanctionedbyOsamabinLadenor KhalidSheikhMohammed,sittingintheharshlandscapeofAfghanistan,butmuch ofitwasformulatedinanicheenvironment––acityhaunt––wherethecellcould comfortablyfunction. CityHauntsasReconstitutedPlaces Writingaboutwhatmakesaworldjihadist,MarcSagemanobservesthatalienated youngmenturntoapocalypticnotionsofaholywar“preciselybecause[they]lack anyanchortoanysociety.”34Heseesthesemenaspartofaminusculediaspora, rippedawayfromtheirformersocietyandlivinginastrangeland.Thesealienated individualsfindeachother,formanewgroup,andliveapartfromthehostsociety. AsSagemanputsit,they“becomeembeddedinasociallydis-embeddednetwork.”35 YetwhileSagemanoffersastuteinsights,hediscountstheroleofplaceinassessing thesenetworks.Farfrombeing“sociallydisembedded,”jihadistsareconnectedin criticalwaystotheirsurroundings.Connectionscomeinmanydifferentformslike marginalcontacts,friendshipswithassimilatedco-religionists,relationshipswith sympatheticorconvertednationals,andtheabilitytolead“doublelives.”Those connectionsmaybeerraticandtheyareoftenunusual,buttheyaretheterrorist’s lifelinetotheoutsideworld. Indeed,thetangentialnatureofconnectionsallowsjihadiststoworkorlearn withinmainstreamsociety,takerecreationalorculturaladvantageofconventional facilities,andpropagandizeorrecruitnewfollowers.Moreover,thelinesbetween localandinternationaljihadistsarenotalwaysclear.Localsserveasaninformational andsupplychannelfortheirinternationalcomrades.Long-standinglocalsmaymix withrecentforeignersandthosewhowereonceindigenousmay“goforeign”and viceversa.Evensome“sleepercells”wereneverreally“sleepers”inthesensethat adherentslayinquiescenceandwaitedforthedaywhentheycouldattack.Rather, muchofwhatpassesfora“sleepercell”reallyconsistsofsemi-assimilatedlocals whobeganhelpingIslamistsandwerelaterconvertedtoradicalism.Tobesure, the blending of different actors is very selective and it may be complicated by Europeansoflong-standinggenerations.Britishintelligenceestimatesthat1,200 jihadistshavereceivedtrainingabroadandthataportionofthemareEuropean converts.36 Other intelligence reports have identified 1,600 individuals who are “actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating terrorist acts,” either in the United
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 91
Kingdomoroverseas.37Roughestimatesalsoindicatethat100,000sympathizers couldoffersupportorcoverofsomekind. Certainly,socialblendingoccurredforlocaljihadistsintheParisiansuburbs andLeeds.Inbothplaces,“bunchesofguys”ledtwolives––working,studying, engaginginsportsandsocialrelationswithinthelargersociety,whilealsoplanning attacksathomeandspendingtimeabroad.TheheadoftheLeedsgroupworkedat localschoolsandstudiedattheuniversitywhilehealsoindoctrinatedyouthand traveledtoPakistan.Likewise,inMilan,London,andHamburg,thosewhomight bedescribedasinternationaljihadistshadampleconnectionstothesocialorder.In Milan,localintermediariesassistedterroristscells;London’sFinsburyMosquewas constantlyfedbylocals,whileitsradicalimampreachedinEastEndneighborhoods; Hamburg’scelldrewmuchofitssupportfromthelocaluniversity,whileoneofits membersfrequentedthecity’snightspotsandmarriedaGermanwoman. The more complex and alarming feature of Islamist terrorism is that its most exuberantfollowersarenotforeignbuthomegrownproducts.Itisthehomegrown natureofterrorismthatisparticularlyelusiveandthatsurprisesauthorities.TheLeeds cellconsistedofBritishcitizenswhowerebornandraisedinthatcountry.Similarly, the“bunchofguys”fromSt.DenisorLaCourneuvewerebornandraisedinFrance andwereverymuchapartoftheircommunities.Theconcernsabouthomegrown terrorismnotonlypertaintoEuropebuttoNorthAmerica.IntheUnitedStates,six YemeniAmericanstraveledtoAfghanistaninordertoundergotraininginalQaeda camps.KnownintheirhometownoutsideBuffaloasthe“LackawannaSix,”themen wereconvictedin2003ofproviding“materialsupport”forterrorism.InToronto, chargesweremadeagainstseventeenindividualsforconspiringtocommitterrorist acts.Dubbedthe“TorontoSeventeen,”theywereaccusedofplottingtoblowup buildingsandlandmarks.Canadianagentsmanagedtoinfiltrateeffortstopurchase explosivesandsubstitutedaharmlesslook-alikebeforeapprehendingthesuspects. Theconnectionsthatallowurbanterrorismtoflourishweremadepossibleby theelementof“place,”ormoreprecisely,aspecificlocalewherethegroupenjoyed freedom,exercisedcontrol,andcouldformsocialbonds.Without“place”jihadistscouldnotsocialize,recruit,organize,coordinate,supply,orlaunchattacks. Placescouldvaryinsizeandmeandifferentthings––fromwholeindustrialtowns nearParis,to“fortresszones”inMilan,tosportsclubsinLeedsandmosquesin LondonandHamburg.Allofthesecityhauntsheldonecentralfeatureincommon:theywerereconstitutedenvironmentsconnectedtotheirsurroundings,but alsoseparatefromthem. FromCityHauntstoGlobalNodes Oneofthemoreimportantfunctionsofplaceissupportandsupply.Cityhauntsare eminentlywellsuitedforterroristlogistics.Theirtight-knitfabricallowsfora“clustering”ofopportunitiessothat“bunchesofguys”canbeinfrequentcommunicationwith eachotherandworkincollaboration.Theclusteringofactivitiesoccursinanumber
92 CHAPTER 4
ofproximateplacesandforamultiplicityoffunctions.Theseincluderecruitment,socialization,bombmaking,forgingneededdocuments,safehouses,andfinances.City hauntscanbeturnedintofactoriesforassemblinganapparatusofurbanterror. Aswehaveseen,recruitmentandtrainingcanbeconductedinlocalmosquesor bookshops.Chemistscanbeenlistedfromlocaluniversitiesandtextsborrowedfrom theirlibrariestoproduceexplosives.Itiseasierintheseclusteredspacestoobtainraw materialandsuppliesforforgingdocumentsaswellasfindthenecessaryexpertise. Muchmoreavailableinclusteredcityenvironmentsare“safehouses”tokeeppotential operativesoutofsightorhidefugitives.Also,transportingoperativesfromoneplace toanotherismoreeasilyaccomplishedincrowdedratherthanopenspaces. Not the least, finances are more readily raised and in greater abundance in clusteredcityspaces.Citieshavelargerexpatriateandimmigrantcommunitiesthat arevaluablesourcesofsupport.Higherdensitiesandheterogeneouspopulations makeitmucheasiertolocatepatrons.Theseareoftendrawnfromsympathetic merchants; congregations at mosques; university faculty, staff, or students; and diplomaticmissionsfromsupportivegovernments. Clusteredurbanenvironmentsarenotonlybettercoordinatedinternally,butbettercoordinatedexternallywithothercities.Inmuchthesamewaythatinternational corporationsuseglobalcitiestocoordinateresources,sotodoterroristsconvert individualcitiesintoalargernetworkofconnecting“globalnodes.”Sagemanbrings thispointtobearbydescribinghowdifferentcitieswereusedtocoordinateterrorism acrossnationalboundaries.Thesecitiesformedacomplexofglobalnodesmadeup ofMontreal,London,Madrid,Hamburg,andMilan.Eachnodewasusedtoenlist volunteersandcoordinatetheirtraveltotrainingcamps.38Inthisway,terroristcells couldremainseparateanddecentralized,butwhennecessarycouldbandtogether andoperateasacomprehensiveunit.Forthistowork,efficienttransportationand reliablecommunicationareessential. Onlycitiespossesstheassetsandinfrastructuretocompletenodalloops.Metropolitanairportsallowforquickandrelativelyinexpensivetravelacrosscontinents. ParisianterroristsmaintainedpersonalcontactwithmembersoftheGIAinAlgeria. Leeds terrorist entrepreneur Mohammed Siddique Khan frequently traveled to Pakistan.The9/11attackerstraveledfrompointsfarandwideinordertomeetin theUnitedStates.TheHamburgcelltraveledseparatelyinordertoavoidsuspicion, thoughonceintheUnitedStatesthetwocellsoperatedasagroup.39Whenits memberswerescattered,theymaintainedcontactwithoneanotherandbolstered moralebystreamsofe-mails. TravelisparticularlyeasythroughouttheEuropeanUnion,eitherbyrailorair. RecallAhmedRabei(aliasMohammedtheEgyptian),whowasapprehendedin MilanfortheattackinMadrid.BeforeRabeiarrivedinMilanhehadspenttimein Germanyandwasregardedbylocalpoliceasanexperiencedoperative.AsMilan prosecutorArmandoSpateroputit,“Rabeiwassomesortofcontactpersonwith linkstocellsalloverEurope.WeverifyhispresenceinSpain,FranceandItaly. Besides,hehadcontactsinBelgiumandHolland.”40
TERROR’SSPACES:IDENTITY,HAUNTS,ANDNODES 93
WhathademergedearlierasanetworkofnodesvisitedbyoperativeslikeRabei waseventuallyturnedintoasystemofcybernodes.Thelinksacrosscityhaunts extendedintoavirtualworld.Cellphonesandcomputersbecameubiquitoustools ofthetrade.AlQaeda’strademarkofsynchronizedattackwasenhancedbythe digitalage.AftertheattacksinMadridandLondon,investigatorsfoundthatterroristshadusedmoderntechnologytocarefullyplanattacks,sotheycouldoccur withinminutesofeachother. Forthosewholaterinvestigatedtheseattacks,computerharddrivesprovidedvaluable information.AcomputercapturedinManilain1995furnisheddetailedinformation aboutaplottoblowupaircraftoverthePacific(BojinkaPlot).Amostmemorableportrait wasthatofa9/11plottersittingonthefloorofasafehouseinKarachi,surroundedby threelaptopsandfivecellphones.41Whileglobalizationandtheelectronicagemade citiesvitalnodesoftheinternationaleconomy,theyalsomadethemhavensforurban terror.Thereis,then,adarksidetoglobalizationfacilitatedbyhightechnology,permeableboundaries,transnationalcooperation,anda“loosecorporate”structure.Thevery toolsinventedbytheWesthavebeenturnedagainstit. Conclusions Terrorismhasalengthyhistoryrunningthegamutfromanarchiststosecularextremistsandreligiousradicals.Itsmostrecentmanifestation,“fourthwave”terrorism,is dominatedbyareligiousrationalewhosecontentisIslamist.Asdistinguishedfrom earliertypesofsecularterrorism,religiouslyinspiredterrorismismorelethal,causes greaterdestruction,anditsagentsaregiventoself-destructionthroughsuicide.Citiesareparticularlywellsuitedforthiskindofassaultandoverthepastdecadeorso havebeenblisteredbymegaattacks.Thesehavenotjustincluded9/11,3/11,and 7/7,butlarge-scaleattacksinMumbai,Bali,Jerusalem,Nairobi,Karachi,Moscow, Istanbul,andOklahomaCity.Whilesomeofthesearepurelylocal,mostmegaterror hasinternationallinkagesofonekindoranother.Morethanjusthappenstance,there isaconnectionbetweenaproclivitytowardmegaterrorandtheriseofinternational terrorism.Someofthismaybeduetothecapacitytocarryoutlarge-scaleattacks,but itisalsoduetothedesireofworldjihadiststoputtheircauseontheworldstage. Further,citiesarenotjusttheobjectsofattackbutoftenincubateterroristcells. Someofthebest-knowninstancesrevolvedaroundcoreandsatellitecitiesofParis, Milan,Leeds,London,andHamburg-Harburg.Inmostinstances,terroristhauntshave grownupwithinthesecitiesandreconstitutedsmallcommunities.Citiesprovidea clusteringfunction,pluralism,anduncommontolerance.Thesequalitiesenablecells torecruitmembers,findreadysourcesofsupply,hideoperativeswithinsafehouses, andcoordinateactivities.Universities,mosques,bookstores,localshops,andahousingstockofinexpensiveapartmentsprovideboththeinfrastructureandanonymity forcellstoflourish.Last,citieshavebeenlinkedtogetherinanetworkofnodesmade possiblebymoderntechnology.Emergingfromthisaregroupsofcybernodes,which haveenabledurbanterroriststotravel,communicate,andcoordinateattacks.
5 DecontrollingTerritory
Territorialityisaformofbehaviorthatusesboundedspace,a territory,astheinstrumentforsecuringaparticularoutcome. —PeterJ.Taylor CityTerritory We begin this chapter with some fundamental premises. Cities are located in boundedterritorieswheredifferentusesarecreated,mixed,andcontinuallyenhanced.Withinthisboundedterritory,citiesallowfortheproductionofthingsand theconductofsociallife.Humanmobility,interaction,andinformationfloware keystosustainingitsdynamic;sotooistheabilitytoassembleasmembersofone kindofcommunityoranother.Citiesgivemeaningtoanonymousspacesbyconvertingthemintowhatonewritercalls“rememberedlandscapes.”1Civitas,thepolis, theagora,theneighborhood,thecentralbusinessdistrict,andtheskyscraper—all sustainedbyatapestryofinfrastructure—endowthecitywithimmensecapacity. Becauseofthiscapacity,citiesareabletocontinuallyreinventtheirterritoriesand adapttochallenges.2 Theseconceptionshavebeencommunicatedindifferentwaysbyscholarswith vastly differing perspectives. Lewis Mumford wrote about the “crystallization ofthecity,”LouisWirthreferredto“amosaicofsocialworlds,”HenriLefebvre describedthe“rhythmofthecity,”andJaneJacobsdefineditallasa“settlement thatconsistentlygeneratesitsowneconomicgrowth.”3Despitetheirdifferentperspectives,thesewritersexpoundedthatcitiesarealive,theygrowandrecede,and theyarefilledwithmovementbetweentheirdiverseparts.Withoutthatmovement, citiescanbecomeparalyzedandwhither.4 Twoaspectsofthisdiscussionwarrantfurtheramplification.Oneisthatcities actuallymakespaceandthesecondisthattheyexerciseacertainmasteryover thatspace.Tobeginwiththefirst,citiesmakespacebyaddingvaluetoterritory throughinfrastructure,byassigningdifferentlegaldesignationstoproperty,andby connectingdifferentterrains.Theproductionofspacealsomeansthatterritoryhas becomeacommodity—anobjectofvaluethatcanbeinvestedwithwealth,traded, exchanged,andspeculateduponforprofit.Whiletreatingterritoryasacommodity typifiesliberal,capitalistcities,itisnotentirelyuniquetothemandinamodified mannerappliestocitiesincommandorsocialisteconomies.5 94
DECONTROLLINGTERRITORY 95
Moderncitiesalsomakespacebyaddingnewdimensionstoterritory.Cityterritoryhasafour-dimensionalcapacity—onland,underneathit,aboveit,andacross differentterritories.Onland,citiesbuildresidentialneighborhoods,factories,and centralbusinessdistricts.Underneathland,citiesconstructmetrosystems,undergroundpathways,andsubterraneancommercialcenters.Aboveland,citiesbuild skyscrapers,skyways,andelevatedtransitlines.Finally,acrossdifferentterrains, citiessetupelectronictransmitters,uplinkstations,andstreetsladenwithcopper orfiber-opticlinesthatconductbillionsofinformationbitesthroughcyberspace. Turningtothesecondpoint,citiesworkbecausetheycanmastertheirspaces. Theydothisbyexercisingpoliticalcontrolovertheirterritorythroughzoning, environmentalregulation,licenses,permits,prohibiteduses,municipalownership, publicinvestment,andthelike.Thatcontrolstimulates,facilitates,andregulates relationsbetweenacity’smultitudinousparts.Noristhisamatterofpassively adhering to a set of rules. Cities can be enormously active in raising massive amountsofmoneyfortransportation,conventionhalls,sportsstadiums,orparks andeducationalfacilities.6 Mastery allows for movement across spaces. The routine acts of municipal administrationpermitcountlesscommuterstotraveltomillionsofdestinations, stopandgo,speedupandslowdown,arriveanddepart.Themasteryovercity spacestranspireseachday,oftentwenty-fourhoursaday,sevendaysaweekand fifty-twoweeksayear,yearafteryear.Moreoftenthannot,itisexercisedwith minimuminterferenceandundertheprotectivecareofthrongsofmunicipalworkers.Indemocratic,liberalsocietiesthismasteryiscontinuing,encompassing,and usuallyexercisedbybenevolentlycontrollingterritory.Wetakethiscontrolfor granted,exceptwhenitstops. DecontrollingTerritory Ifinthenormalcourseofevents,citiesmakeandmasterspace,thetacticofterrorismistoundothatsupremacybydecontrollingurbanterritory.Theimmediateor medium-rangeobjectiveoftheterrorististoputahalttocityfunction—preventingit from“crystallizing”itscreativeenergies(Mumford),breakingdownitsrich“mosaic” (Wirth),upsettingitsnatural“rhythms”(Lefebvre),andsabotagingits“economic generation”(Jacobs).Urbanterrorismdrawsonlow-intensitywarfareinorderto destabilizecitiesbyupsettingtheirroutinesandundoingtheirproductivecapacity. Boileddown,wherecitiesseektomakespace,urbanterrorismseekstodespoilit; wherecitiesseektofacilitatemovement,urbanterrorismseekstoparalyzeit. Urbanterrorismaimsatallfourdimensionsofcityspacebyblowinguppeoplein cafés,crashingplanesintoskyscrapers,releasingpoisongasinmetrosystems,and, atleastpotentially,sabotagingcyberspace.Terrorismisnotjustaboutamessage, butaboutrawdestructionandthroughitchaos,confusion,anddemoralization.Its purposeistoshowthatoncesafeareascanbecomedangerous,thatdailylifecan becomeunpredictable,andthatassuranceofprotectioncanbecomehollow.Terrorist
96 CHAPTER 5
warfareemphasizes“massdisruption”sothatpeopleareseparatedfromplace,from eachother,andfindthemselvesinaconditionofprotracteddisassociation. Recallthatterrorismisnotstatic.Itchangesandadaptstocircumstancethrough manymutations.Partofthisevolutionentailschangingtheweaponryusedtointimidatepopulations.Duringthe1970sand1980s,kidnappingsandrapid-fireguns weretheweaponsofchoice.Later,morecommonlyusedweaponsincludedbombs plantedinparkedvehicles,railstations,pubs,orcrowdedthoroughfares.More recentlyweseeanincreaseinhigh-riskattacks(whereterroristsmightexpectto bekilledbyothers)andsuicideattacks(whereterroristspurposelykillthemselves). SuicideterrorhadbeenaHezbollahtrademark.TodayitisemployedbyalQaeda andHamasandusedwidelyinIraqandAfghanistanbydifferentgroups. Table 5.1 draws data from twenty-five of the hardest-struck cities examined inthisstudybetween1968and2005.Itdisplaysthetypesofweaponryusedfor attack,thepercentageofincidentsemployed,attackedsites,theimpactofattack, andcitiesinwhichtheeventoccurred.7Thecitiesarechosenforprevalenceof attackandforillustrativepurposes. Amongmorethan1,000citiesexaminedforthisstudy,theinstancesarerarein whichpiratedplanesweresuccessfullyemployedasmissiles,therehavebeenjust afewchemicalorbiologicalattacks,andweknowofnoinstancesofcyber,radiological,ornuclearterrorism(CBRN).Atthesametime,weshouldrecognizethat CBRNweaponsholdadisproportionateandmultidimensionalimpact.Frequency doesnotnecessarilyequatewithimpact.Theeffectofoneattackcombiningcatalytic,mega,orsmartterrorcanfaroutweighscoresofshootingsorplantedbombs. TherearegoodreasonswhyjustonesaringasattackinTokyoorcrashingthree planesintotheNewYork’sTwinTowersandWashington’sPentagonarousedthe world.Asweshallsee,high-impactweaponryhasadisproportionateeffectandthis accountsforitsprevalenceincarefullyplannedattacksagainstwhatwecalltargets ofcalculation.Suicideterrorisonewayofassuringthesuccessfulapplicationof high-impactweaponry,andwhileitaccountsforjust2.9percentofincidentsfrom oursample,itseffectsarefrightful. Interestingly,themostnumeroustypesofattackareplantedbombs,followedby shootings.Plantedbombsareoftensetwithinenclosedspacesinordertomaximize humancasualties.Placingthemwithinanenclosedspacelikeabusorinatunnel magnifiestheactualblastandnotonlyincreasescasualtiesbutbringsaboutgreater economicdisruption.Shootings,stabbings,stonethrowing,andkidnappingsare gearedtowardindividualcasualtiesandconductedinrelativelyopensurroundings. Thesearelikelytobeexecutedrandomly,whereveraconceivedenemyarisesor wherethereexistwhatcanbecalledtargetsofopportunity. Concentration,Repetition,andPenetration Not all terror is directed against targets of calculation, but when terror is well planned,anumberofmeanscanbeusedtoreachtacticalobjectives.8Theprime
2.16
0.68
Arson
Biochemical(saringas, anthrax)
0.12
Piratedplanesasmissiles
Casualties
Impact
Jerusalem,Istanbul
TelAviv,Jerusalem,Karachi, Cairo,Istanbul,Paris,Lima
City
Skyscrapers,militaryheadquarters
Hotels,restaurants,public transit,cafés,concerts,religiousinstitutions
Athens,Frankfurt,Paris,Rome, Istanbul
Source:AdaptedfromRANDdatabase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type1data.
Notknown
Notknown
Casualties,propertydamage, NewYork,Washington,DC economicdisruption
Casualties,propertydamage, Bali,Jerusalem,TelAviv,Mospublicshock,economicdis- cow,London,NewYork,Haifa, Istanbul,Jakarta,Riyadh, ruption Cairo,Islamabad,Karachi, Casablanca,Mombassa
Jerusalem,TelAviv,Madrid, Paris,Athens,Mumbai,Nairobi, Moscow,NewDelhi,Paris, Haifa,Lima,Istanbul,Karachi
Disruptionoftransit,stoppage Tokyo,NewYork,Washington,DC, ofgovernment Karachi
Propertydestruction
Businesses,diplomaticmis- Casualties,propertydamsions,governmentbuildings, age,publicshock,economic publictransit,cafés,restaudestruction rants,schools,markets
Publictransit,government buildings
Businesses,diplomaticmissions,houses,automobiles
Diplomats,businesses,mass Casualties,insecurity,intimida- Moscow,Bogotá,Munich, media,stadiums,theaters tion,fear Algiers
Touristattractions,pedestrian Casualties(lighttoserious) streets,businesses
Touristattractions,airports, restaurants,andcafés
Cyber/radiological/nuclear Notknown Notknown
2.93
Suicidebombings
72.33
2.28
Kidnappings/hostagetaking
Plantedbombs
0.36
19.17
Percentage Site
Stabbings/stonesthrown
Shootings(firearms)
Weaponry
UrbanTerrorism’sWeaponry,Site,andImpactinTwenty-FiveNationsandRegions
Table5.1
DECONTROLLINGTERRITORY 97
98 CHAPTER 5
ingredientsforcalculatedattacksconsistofconcentratingandrepeatingattacksat strategicsites,demonstratingovertimethatthosesitescanbepenetrated. Concentratinganattackatastrategiccenterisimportantbecauseitallowssmart terrortodooptimaldamage.Thehighestchoicesitesarebanks,hotels,entertainmentcenters,andpublictransit.Concentrationconveysthenotionthatattacksare geographicallycircumscribedwithinaparticularareaandareoftensynchronized inatimedseriesofmultipleassaults.Awell-knowntacticofalQaedaandHamas istolaunchsimultaneous,high-combustionattackswithinaconfinedarea.Concentrationisalsoimportantbecauseitoptimizescasualtiesaswellasshock.Infact, itisusuallytheforceoftheblast,ratherthanshrapnel,thatbringsabouthuman andpropertydamage.Tallbuildings,diplomaticmissions,andespeciallyenclosed publictransitlikebusesandmetrotunnelsmagnifyexplosions. Repeatingstrikesonthesameparticularspaceoverandoveragainreinforces conditionsforchaos.Asubstantialamountofurbanterrorconsistsofafirststrike andaseriesofsubsequentassaults.Therepetitioncantakeplaceovershorttime intervals(Jerusalem’sBenYehudaMall)oroverlongtimeintervals(NewYork’s World Trade Center) or in cycles that cluster attacks (London’s square mile). Repeatedattacksareaudaciousdemonstrationsthattheviolenceisunstoppable, securityisunattainable,andmayhemcanbreakoutatanymoment.Terroristshave beenabletoconstructmentalmapsofanareaandusethatknowledgetofindand conductsubsequentattacksonanurban“softspot”(definedasfrequentlyhabituatedbycrowdsoraspossessinghighmaterialorsymbolicvalue). The penetration of an area is essential for terrorist success, and this is why camouflagedattackissointimatelytiedtotheexerciseofurbanterror.Urbanterrorfunctionsthroughtheabilityofoperativestoblendintoacivilianpopulation and attack from within. Over the last ten years, terrorists have depended upon youngmenwillingtostraponexplosive-ladenvestsanddestroythemselves.Once personalsearcheswereputintoeffectandyoungmenwerestoppedassuspects, terroriststurnedtoyoungwomentoslippastguards.InMoscow,womenwere usedtopenetratearockconcertandsetoffsuicidevests.Womenandadolescents havealsobeenusedtopenetrateIsraelicheckpoints—sometimespreparedtoblow themselvesupandatothertimesservingascouriersforexplosives.9 Penetrationismadeeasierbyestablishingproximitytothetarget,sothatintelligencecanbegatheredandweaponryorexplosivescanbesetatadecisivepoint. Proximitycanbeachievedindifferentways.Often,national,ethnic,orco-religionist communitiescanbefoundadjacenttopotentialtargets.Thesecommunitiesmight providelogisticalsupport,buttheyalsoenableterroriststoblendintoalargerpopulation.InLondonderryandBelfast,localneighborhoodsservedaslaunchingpadsfor terroristswho,aftercommittinganassault,frequentedalocalpub.EastJerusalem andvillagesintheWestBankserveasimilarpurpose,andattackershaveusedthe homesofacquaintancestosetupshoporconcealthemselves.InAmman,neighborhoodanonymitynotonlyshieldedsometerroristsfromdetection,butenabledthem tostoretonsofexplosivesinundergroundcavernslocatedbehindtheirresidence.
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Anotherwayofachievingproximityistofinda“safehouse”withinenemy territorywhereoperativescanhideandexplosivescanbemanufacturedorstored. TurkishHezbollahavaileditselfofanetworkofsafehousesusedbothashideouts andtoimprisonkidnappedvictims.Aswehaveseeninthepreviouschapter,boththe LeedsandHamburgcellssoughtoutnondescript,inexpensivehousingintransient neighborhoodstominimizedetection.Onceinthethroesofanoperation,Islamist terroristswillshavetheirbeardsandwearWesternclothingsoasnottostandout. Sometimestheyareinstructedtostayawayfrommosques.AlQaeda’smanual tellsoperativestoadoptthewaysofthehostcountryandembedthemselvesinthe population.10Thegreatestobstaclestopenetratingtheenemyconsistoftravelto anothercountyandtheabsenceofsafehouses.Theseobstaclesdidnotstopthe 9/11terrorists,thoughsincethattimerestrictionsonforeigntravelandsurveillance haveincreased. Asageneralrule,themoreproximatethedemographicsupportforapossible attack,themorefrequenttheterror.Examiningthisfromadomesticperspective, Moscow,whoseterrorismfarexceedsthatofSt.Petersburg,ishalfthedistance fromChechnya;Belfast,whoseattacksarefarmorefrequentthanLondon’s,lies intheIRA’sheartland;andJerusalem’sfrequencyofattacksascomparedtoTel Avivcanalsobeattributedtoterroristsupportfromnearbyneighborhoods.Looked atfromaninternationalperspective,theissueofproximityisequallysignificant. CommunitiesthatmightharborterroristsarefartherfromandfewerinNewYork thanMoscow.ThosesamecommunitiesarefartherfromandfewerinMoscowthan London.AndtheyarefartherfromandfewerinLondonthanJerusalem. Last,citieswillexperienceverydifferentfrequenciesofurbanterror.Attacks maybecontinuous,sporadic,oroccurinintensecycles.Jerusalembestexemplifies ahigh-frequency,continualpatternofattack.NewYorkdemonstratesanirregular orsporadicpattern.Londonfallssomewhereinbetweenandhastendedtoward cyclicaloccurrences.Astreatedinthenextsection,eachofthesepatternstakes accountofconcentrated,repetitiveattacksandterroristpenetration. PatternsofAttackinJerusalem,NewYork,andLondon Jerusalem’sContinualAttacks Israel’sexperiencewithurbanterrorisalltoofamiliarandmuchtoocostly.Along withahandfulofnationsontheIndiansubcontinent,Israelicitiesregistersomeof thehighestpercapitatollsintheworld.Duringtheperiodbetween1968and2005, thecountryencounteredover700attacksandmorethan7,000casualties.Smaller attacks against individuals may be more frequent in rural areas or settlements, butthoseofsignificantsizehaveoccurredincities.Aswithanyterroristventure, noncombatantshavebeenthetargetsofchoice,andinIsraelalargepluralityof victimsconsistsofwomen,personsoverfiftyyearsold,andchildren.11 Jerusalemholdsthedubiousdistinctionofhavingsufferedmoreattacksand
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incurredmorecasualtiesthanthecombinedtotalofitstwolargestsistercities—Tel AvivandHaifa.Duringmorethanthreedecadesthecityaccountedfor40percent ofterrorist-inflictedcasualtieswithinIsrael.Thisshouldbeunderstoodrelativeto thelargermetropolitanpopulationsofTelAvivandHaifa.12 ForallthenotorietythatasurfeitofterrorismhasbroughttoJerusalem,most attacksaresmall.Between1998and2005,thecityincurred148incidentsand averaged11casualtiesperincident.Mosteasilytargetedforfrequentattacksare restaurants,shoppingcenters,andbuses.TheOldCityisespeciallypronetoattacks onindividualsbecauseitslabyrinthinestreetsarefilledwithhideoutsforthosewho choosetowieldknives.Whiletherearesignificantexceptions,terrorismhascrept uponJerusalemratherthanhavingpoundedthecityinonefellswoop.Itsshock derivesnotfromthebigmegaattackbutfromthecumulativeimpactofassaults thataremorelikelytoresemblecatalyticandsmartterrorism. Terror’s friction is made tenable by an assortment of weaponry including abductions, stabbings, shootings, thrown grenades, and planted bombs. These attacksaccountedforalittlemorethanhalfoftheincidentsduringJerusalem’s mostseverewaveofterror.Theremainingassaultswereconductedthroughsuicide bombings.13Dependinguponwhatandhowincidentsarecounted,suicideattacks generatebetweenfourandsixtimesthecasualtiesofotherterroristmethods.14In Israelasawhole,therateofsuicideattackshasleaptfrom9percentintheearly 1990sto58percentsincetheyear2000.15Justasimportant,suicideattackershave thehighestrateofsuccess.Almosthalftheplantedbombsarediscoveredbefore detonation,andindividualshurlinggrenadesorshootingintocrowdsarealsolikely tobestoppedatanearlystageofattackbysecurityforces. Thusfar,theyear2002hasbeenthemostsevereinJerusalem’smodernhistory. Attacksoccurredonanaverageofnearlyfourpermonth.Duringthefirstfour monthsofthatyear,Jerusalemwasstruckbycontinuouswavesofterrorinwhich nineassaultskilledormaimedhundredsofpeople.“Itwashorrendous,”onewoman said.“Noonewentoutforcoffee.Noonewenttorestaurants.Wewentasagroup ofpeopletooneanother’shousesonly.”16 Jerusalem’s“CityCenter”isthepivotalhubforIsraelis.Thisneighborhoodis locatedimmediatelytothewestandwithinwalkingdistanceoftheOldCity.Its majorthoroughfaresandmeetingplacesarealongKingGeorgeandJaffastreets with the BenYehuda outdoor mall nestled between them. Buses, taxis, private automobiles,andaprospectivelightrailsystemconvergeattheirmostprominent intersections.Theneighborhood’smixedusesembracedaytimecommerciallifeas wellasavibrantnightlife.Allthisismadepossiblebythecloseinterfaceofretail shops,cafés,restaurants,officetowers,banks,andgovernmentbuildings.Justa shortwalkfromtheKingGeorge/Jaffa/BenYehudacomplexistheMehaneYehuda market.Bustlingenterprisesalongthisroutehavebeenseverelystruck,especially onFridaymorningsorSaturdayeveningswhenlast-minuteshoppers,strollers,or partygoersflockintothisarea. Figure5.1displaysamapshowingtheconcentrationandrepetitionofattacks
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Figure5.1 JerusalemTerrorAttacks,1998–2005
Note:Numbersinthecirclesrepresenttotalincidentsfortheyearsindicated.
inJerusalem.Neighborhoodsinwhichtheattacksoccurredarelisted,alongwith casualties(designatedbythesizeofthecircle)andfrequencyofincidents(designatedbythenumberinthecircle).AlsodisplayedisRoute1,orthe“seamline,” whichonceseparatedWestJerusalemfromEastJerusalem,andwheretodayArab andJewishneighborhoodsareincloseproximity. NotethetightclusteringofattacksintheCityCenter.ThemunicipalityofJerusalemholdsaterritorialsurfaceof50.4squaremiles(130.5squarekilometers).
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Bycomparison,theCityCenterisjust0.4ofasquaremile(onesquarekilometer). Yetthistinyareaincurred20attacksandover900casualtiesandhadcometobe calledIsrael’s“groundzero.”Putanotherway,fortheperiodnotedinthefigure, 15percentoftheattacksand57percentofthecasualtieswereabsorbedonjust2 percentofJerusalem’sterritorialsurface(seeAppendix,TableA10).17Othernearby neighborhoodssuchasMeaShearim,theOldCity,andFrenchHill–MountScopus arealsotargetprone. Whilesomelocations,likeGilo,NeveYa’akov,andPisgatZe’ev,haveexperiencednumerousshootingincidents,thecasualtiesintheseneighborhoodsare relativelylow.Thecorrelationbetweenintensityofattackandurbandensitiesiswell establishedandhasbeenmappedbyotherscholars.18Asonemovesfartherfrom thecentertowardlowerdensities,terrorismmarkedlydeclines.Thisisparticularly trueforneighborhoodsfartherwest. ConcentratedandRepetitiveAttacks Acommonpracticeistoconcentrateonandstrikeatthesamesiteoverandover again.InJerusalemthepracticehashistoricalprecedent,withmuchofitaimed at the King George/Jaffa/BenYehuda complex.As Israel was about to declare its statehood in 1948, three truckloads of bombs driven byArab oppositionists explodedatthesite.Theattackleft52deadandover32injured.Terroristsstruck againatthissamesitein1975,whentheypackedarefrigeratorwithfivekilograms ofexplosivesandunloadeditontothestreet.Theevent,knownasthe“refrigerator bombing,”left15deadand77injured. Repeatingattacksatkeylocationsisintendedtoinducesemi-paralysis.Entertainmentdistrictsareparticularlypronetoattackbecauseoftheircrowds,festivities,andcelebratoryair.BenYehudaisoftensaturatedwithpedestrians,open-air diners,streetentertainers,andpeoplehawkinganythingfromchildren’stoysto politicalpamphlets.Itsremarkableambiancehasbeenupsetonnumerousoccasions.In1997,threesuicideattackersstruck.Oneoftheattackers,disguisedasa woman,wasstationedatacaféwhiletwootherstookpositions20metersdown thestreet.Withinhalfaminute,allthreehumanbombshadexploded,leaving8 Israelisdeadand208injured.19Todate,themostsevereattackoccurredinlate 2001,carriedoutbytwosuicideterrorists.Asambulancesandemergencymedical workersrushedtowardthevictimsandcrowdstriedtoescape,theyweremetbya thirdexplosion,detonatedwithinanearbyautomobile.Theexplosive-ladenautomobilealsocontainedmortarsthatweresetoffandsplayedthroughthedowntown area.ThisparticularattacktookplaceonaSaturdayevening,whenBenYehuda wasfilledwithyoungmenandwomen.Tenpeople—allbetweentheagesof14 and20—werekilledintheblastsandanother19werecriticallyinjured,while150 incurredmoderatetolightwounds. AsimilarmodusoperandicanbeseenalongotherpartsofKingGeorgeand Jaffastreets,nearZionSquare,aswellasatMehaneYehudamarket.ZionSquare
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isthecity’smajorcenterforbankingandprofessionalservices.MehaneYehuda’s freshfoodmarketisstaffedbySephardicvendorswhocatertoJerusalem’sbluecollarfamiliesaswellasmiddle-classadventurersoutforashoppingjaunt.Assaultsatthesesitesalsobearthemarkingsoforganizedterrorism.Thesearetightly coordinated,multiple,synchronizedstrikesthatareexecutedbytrainedoperatives whomakesuretoinflictmaximuminjuryordeath.Suicideattackershaveworn avarietyofinventivedisguisestomoveintothemidstofunsuspectingcrowds, dressingasIsraelisoldiers,OrthodoxJews,andmiddle-agedwomen.Andjustas securityofficialsbegantobelievethatonlyyoungmenwouldbechosenashuman bombs,terroristorganizationsbegantorecruityoungwomen. BusstopsandterminalsatKingGeorge/Jaffaareeasilyexploitedbyattackers. Theirtacticistoturnthegas-filledfueltankofabusintoafireballthatwillspread into adjoining traffic and waiting crowds. Once attacked, vehicles, commuters, andemergencymedicalpersonnelarethentrappedwithinamassivetrafficjam. Similarly,theMehaneYehudamarketcontainsalltheelementsofurbancongestion.Whileworkersoccupyitsmazeofstallsanddeliverytrucksstandoutside, terroristshavesetoffexplosionsthatcausedmayheminthearea. OneofthemorenotoriousattacksoccurredinAugust2001atapizzarestaurant locatedatthecornerofKingGeorgeandJaffastreets.TheSbarroPizzeriawasa favoriteforteenagers,schoolchildren,andyoungfamiliesseekinganinexpensive meal.Thesuicidebombersetoffthechargewhentherestaurantwaspackedwith summervacationers,killing15peopleandwounding90.AttacksattheYehuda Mehanemarketalsobearafamiliaremblem.InJuly1997,twosuicideterrorists enteredthemarketplace,tookpositionsamongthecrowd,andsetofftheircharge, killing16andinjuring178. Notallattacksaresowellplanned,andsomeassaultsaredirectedagainsttargetsofopportunity.Thesetargetsareattackedbecausetheyofferquickaccessto terroristsorenablethemtomoveundetected.OneofthesesitesistheOldCityof Jerusalem,anotherisintheFrenchHillneighborhood,andothersarescatteredsites inEastJerusalem.AlloftheselocationsareeitherpredominantlyAraborcloseto Palestinianpopulations.TheOldCityhasexperiencedarashofgunshotandknife assaults,oftencarriedoutbyunaffiliatedindividuals.Giventhefactthatamajority ofOldCityresidentsareArab,uncontrolledexplosionsarerelativelyrare.Onthe otherhand,predominantlyJewishFrenchHillhasseenaspateofbusesexploded bysuicidebombers.FrenchHill’svulnerabilitycanalsobeattributedtoitslocation ontheroadtoRamallah.OnebusjunctiononFrenchHillhasbeenstruckover andoveragainbysuicideattackers.ManybusattacksarecarriedoutonSunday mornings—thefirstdayoftheworkweekfordailycommutersandstudentsand theendoftheweekendforvisitorsandreturningsoldiers. AlsoonFrenchHill,theHebrewUniversity(MountScopusCampus)suffered anattackinwhich9studentswerekilledandover80injured.Theuniversityis an oasis of tolerance, liberalism, and fellowship betweenArabs and Jews, and fewthoughtitwouldbetargeted.Thebeliefamongmanyacademicsthat“neutral
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ground”wouldbeimmunetoattackprovedtobemistakenbecauseitoverlooked a fundamental component of urban terror—its shock value undertaken without regardtowhethertheareamightbeafriendlyvenueornot. Finally,itmayverywellbethathigh-frequencyattacksenabledJerusalem’s firstresponderstoactwithgreaterefficiency.Oncethedreadedsirenssound,police,firefighters,ambulancedrivers,rescueworkers,andinternalsecuritypatrols convergeonthescene,quicklycordoningitoffandtendingtothevictims.Israel’s MagenDavid(equivalentoftheRedCross)providesavarietyofemergencyand ambulanceservices.Duringtheworstoftheyearsitsresponseimproved.20Four majorhospitalsservetheJerusalemarea,andtheiremergencyphysiciansareamong thebestintheworld.Israelevenenlistsreligiousvolunteers(calledtheZaka)to conductthegrislytaskofcollectingbodyparts,whileotherspecialistsaretrained inidentifyingthewoundedandcountingthedead. Intheimmediateaftermathofattack,straymobilephonesordinarilyarepiled inacornerofthesite.Oneisstruckbythecontinuedringingemanatingfromthat moundofphonesasdesperatefriendsandrelativescontinuetosearchforthemissing.Anablecorpsofsocialworkersalsoassistsvictimsthroughconvalescence. Jerusalemstillfacesproblemsincopingwithterroristattacks,especiallyascrowds gatheraroundthesiteofanattackandblockaccess.Butitslongexperiencewith continualandoftensmallerattacksbetterenablesthecitytodealwithtraumatic situations. PenetrationbyProximity Forsome,JerusalemappearstobetwoverydifferentcitieswhoseArabandJewish populationsliveindifferentworlds.21Forthemostpart,JewsandArabslivein separateneighborhoods,withJewishcommunitiesconcentratedinwesternportionsofthecity,whilepocketsofArabandJewishneighborhoodsareinterspersed farthereast.ButJerusalemisalsoacomplex,wholecity—amultifacetedmosaicof neighborhoods,villages,urbancenters,parks,andcommercialstreetsthatisopen andeasilytraversed.Itisfilledwithgrandvistasanddottedbyanabundanceof hillsandvalleys.Fluidpathwaysallowtravelerstomovefromoneneighborhoodto another.WhilefewIsraelisventureintoArabneighborhoodsthesedays,itisnatural andeasyforpeopletotraveltoanypartofthecity—eitherbybus,automobile,taxi, oronfoot.Someinteractionbetweenthetwopopulationsisboundtooccur. WhilenotordinarilyreportedintheWesternmedia,manyterroristsinitiallycross fromtheterritoriesandenterJerusalemwithoutarmsorexplosives,onlytopick uplethalcargoatsafehouses.Overtheyears,thenumberofEastJerusalemArabs involvedinattackshasincreased,andasofthecurrentperiodover120individualshavebeenimplicatedinactsofterrorism.22AhandfulofJerusalemArabshave beenconvictedofassistingattackersbygatheringintelligence,movingexplosive material,transportingattackers,orcarryingoutassaults.Neighborhoodsinand aroundBethlehemoftenprovideeasyaccesstoIsrael,andattackersareknown
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tohavewalkeddirectlyintoIsrael.DuringtheheightofalAqsaterror,dozensof attemptswerefoiledeachweek.Atleast15suicidebombershavetraveledfewer than10milesfromtheirownhomestobeginthedeadlycarnage.23Theseattacks oftengrowoutwardfromtheseamlinealongRoute1,whereArabsandJewslive inproximitytoeachother. Easypenetrationallowsforfeasiblelogistics.Urbanterrorismisnotasimple matterofsendingoffsomeonewithexplosivesorweaponry,butentailsextensive cooperationacrossdifferentterritories.Thelistofoperativesusedtocompletethe logisticalchaincanbeelaborate.Theseincluderecruiters,wholocatevolunteers forhigh-riskorsuicideattacks;weaponsspecialists,whoconcocttheexplosive chargeandpacksuicidevestswithnuts,bolts,andmetalshardsinordertoaugmentthehumantoll;handlers,whoinstillspiritualorideologicalzealandmake surethatattackerswillnotlosenerve;reconnoiters,wholocatehigh-valuetargets; spokesmen,whotakevideosandrecordstatementsfromtherecruitsotheycan becommunicatedtothepublic;andtransporters,whodeliveranattackertothe target.Someoftheserolesoverlap,buttheyallinvolveorganization,adivisionof labor,andcoordination. Proximityallowsforpenetrationandfacilitatesterroristlogistics.Thisexplains whysomecitieswillexperienceagreaterfrequencyofattack.Theopportunityto launchpersistentattacksmayalsoencouragelower-impactassaults.Thenatureofthe targetsalsoinfluencesthenatureoftheattack.Jerusalemisasmallcity,andgrand targetsaresparsecomparedtothoseinglobalcitieslikeNewYorkandLondon. NewYork’sSporadicAttacks ThefirstbombingoftheWallStreetareadidnotoccuronSeptember11,2001, whenplaneshijackedbyalQaedasmashedintotheTwinTowers.Nordiditoccur onFebruary26,1993,whenatruckbombwentoffintheundergroundparking areaoftheWorldTradeCenter.Rather,itoccurredmorethaneightyyearsbefore theseevents,whenahorse-drawncartexplodedatnoononSeptember16,1920, atWallandBroadstreets,justasswarmsofpedestrianwereabouttostarttheir lunchtimebreak.24Theblastcausedthedeathsoffortypeopleandwassetoffby anarchistsintentondestroyingtheseatofAmericancapitalism.Theattackersleft behindpinkleafletsentitled“PlainWords,”whichread:“Therewillhavetobe bloodshed;wewillnotdodge;therewillhavetobemurder;wewillkillbecause itisnecessary;therewillhavetobedestruction;wewilldestroytoridtheworld ofyourtyrannicalinstitutions.”25 Other bombings had occurred inAmerican cities during this period, mostly attacksbyanarchistsandlaborradicals.Collectiveviolenceofthissortishardly newtoAmerica.Despitethishistory,however,Americancitieshavebeenspared thesystematicterrorismthatspreadthroughWesternEuropeinthe1960s,1970s, and1980s.NewYorkhadrelativelylittleexperiencewithassaultsuponitsterritory untiltheadventof“fourthwave”terrorism.BesidesthetwoattacksontheWorld
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TradeCenter,atleastfiveotherassaultswereplannedorcarriedoutby“fourth wave”terrorists.In1993,alQaedaagentsaimedtheirsightsonaquintetofmajor targets—the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, the GeorgeWashington Bridge, the UnitedNations,andFederalPlaza.Ayearlater,aPalestiniangunmanstanding ontheBrooklynBridgeopenedfireonavancarryingfiveHassidicstudents,killingoneofthem.In1997,anotherPalestinianchosetheEmpireStateBuildingto conductashootingspree.Themanproceededtothebuilding’sobservationdeck onthe86thfloorandshotsevenbystanders,killingoneofthem.Thatsameyear, thecity’spolicedepartmentuncoveredaschemetoblowupasubwaycomplexin downtownBrooklyn.Policeinterventionoccurredattheeleventhhour,justasthe potentialattackerswereassemblingtheexplosives. Since9/11morethanadozensignificantthreatshavebeendiscovered.These incidentsincludemailinganthraxtomajornewsmedia,“plots”toblowupthe stockexchangeandheadquartersofmajorcorporations,“plans”tobombasubway stationatHeraldSquareinanticipationofthe2004RepublicanNationalConvention,anda“plot”tofloodmasstransittunnels.Asofthiswriting,othernascent threatshavebeendiscovered––oneofthesearosefartherfromthecity,inFortDix, NewJersey,whiletheotheroccurredcloserbyatKennedyInternationalAirport. TheFortDixplotinvolvedsixyoungmenwhowereintentonrandomlyshooting downmilitarypersonnel.Themenalreadypossessedautomaticweaponsandhad trainedatlocationsinPennsylvania.ThethreatonKennedyinvolvedfourmenand wasnotasadvanced.Thatplancalledforblowinguptheairport’sfueltanksand causingachainofconflagrationthroughoutthearea.Atleastonemembertook stepstocasethefueltanks,makevideorecordings,andgathersatellitephotosof airportfacilities. NewYorkisaglobalcitywithacosmopolitanspiritandthismakesitdifficult toseethreatsascomingfromauniquebrandof“homegrown”terrorism.Inmany instancesdomesticrootsmixwithforeignones.SomeoftheFortDixconspirators werebroughttotheUnitedStatesillegallyandnowweresaidtobe“inspired”byal Qaeda.TheKennedyconspiratorswerebasedintheNewYorkareabutcamefrom Trinidad,Tobago,andGuyana.They,too,wereinspiredbyIslamistdoctrineand soughttoenlistIslamicgroupsintheCaribbeanorSouthAmerica.Takeninthe largerschemeofterrorism,someoftheseeventsmightbeseenasinconsequential, thoughpoliticiansandthemediahavemadethemostofFBIfindings. NotwithstandingtheflurryofFBIannouncements,NewYorkhasbeenacityof themegaattack.Itwas9/11andnotalongseriesofattacksthataccountsforNew York’slopsidedratioofnearly11,000casualtiesperattack.Weshouldalsounderstandthatthereisgreatvariationinwhatisconsideredtobea“plot”or“planned” attack.Somemayberatherminimalandamounttolittlemorethantalking,others maybemoreofanaspirationinvolvingsomeinitialreconnaissance,andafew mayhavematuredtoidentifyingagentsanddevelopinglogistics.26Withthiscaveat underscored,thesethreatsaresignificantbecausetheytellussomethingaboutthe mentalmapsusedtoselecttargets.
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Figure5.2 NewYorkTerrorAttacks,1993–2005
Note:Numbersinthecirclesrepresenttotalincidentsfortheyearsindicated.
ConcentratedandRepetitiveAttacks MostthreatshavebeenconcentratedinNewYork’stwocentralbusinessdistricts. OneofthesewassitedforlowerManhattaninthevicinityofWallStreetwhile anotherwassupposedtotakeplaceinmidtownManhattan,immediatelynorthor southofTimesSquare.MajortargetsliketheBrooklynBridgeandHollandTunnel arelocatedinlowerManhattan,whiletheUnitedNationsandEmpireStatebuildings aswellasHeraldSquarearewithinthemidtowncentralbusinessdistrict. Figure5.2displaysamapofactualattackslaunchedinNewYorkCity.Allfive ofthecity’sboroughsarerepresented.Themapcontainsthelocationofattacks, casualtiesinflicted(designatedbythesizeofthecircle),andtotalincidents(designatedbythenumberinthecircle).
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Toputmattersinperspective,NewYorkCity’sterritorialareaisquiteextensive, containingover300squaremiles(780squarekilometers)ofsurface.Yettheoverwhelmingportionofanticipatedandactualassaultsrepeatedlyfocusedonjusta fewsquaremilesofthecitywithinmidtownandlowerManhattan.Themidtown areaexperiencedthreesmallassaultsandahandfulofcasualties.Terroristsights werealsotwicesetontheBrooklynBridge—oneplotin1993andanactualattack in1994.Themostspectacularoccurrenceswereplannedorcarriedoutinlower Manhattan.Nolessthanfiveattemptsorattackswereaimedatthatarea. PenetrationfromaDistance Theattackof9/11sentshockwavesthroughtheUnitedStatesbecauseitcombined alltheelementsofcatalytic,mega,andsmartterror.Itwasalsothearchmega attack—carefullyplanned,centrallyplaced,purposefullyconcentrated,andshockinglymassive.Theironyofthisprofoundlyanti-urbanassaultwasthatamongits majordesignerswasastudentintheDepartmentofUrbanPlanningattheTechnicalUniversityofHamburg-Harburg(TUHH).MohammedAttahadspentyears studyingcitiesandhadtraveledtoAleppo,Syria,toresearchamaster’sthesison thatcity’shistoricquarter.TakingacuefromtheiracquaintancewithTUHH,Atta andhiscellassignedthetargetscodenames.TheTwinTowerswasgiventhecode name“FacultyofPlanning,”thePentagonwascalledthe“FacultyofArts,”and theCapitolBuildingwasdesignatedthe“FacultyofLaw.” Penetration was complicated. Nineteen terrorists traveled in separate groups fromdistantpointsabroadandhadnobaseintheUnitedStates.TheHamburg cellplannedtheirarrivalasacontingentwhileothersdidsoseparatelyandarrived fromvariouspointsintheMiddleEast.The“twentiethhijacker”wasnotgranteda visaandneverdidarrive.Thosewho“piloted”theplanestooklessonsatdifferent locations,whilethe“muscle”trainedabroad.AfterarrivingintheUnitedStates, mostofthemenlivedincitiesacrossthecountryincludingLosAngeles,Miami, NewYork,andLasVegas.Beingrootless,theyadaptedpoorlytotheirnewenvironments.Someoftheterroristsarguedwiththeirlandlordsorflightinstructors, otherswereseenasrude,andmanyofthemwereviewedbyAmericansasvery peculiar.Lifeinaforeigncountrywascomplicatedbyconstantlytransferringfunds fromabroad.Despitetheobstacles,thehijackerswentundetectedandarousedfew suspicions—perhapsbecauseattackingNewYorkandWashingtonwithpassenger airplaneswasunfathomable. MinimizingLogisticalObstaclesbyImplodingtheCity The9/11attackerssavedthemselvesthetroubleoftransportingweaponrybyconvertingcommercialairlinesintoguidedmissiles.Theyalsominimizedlogistical obstaclesbyusingthepoweroftheenemyagainstitself.Theselectionoflower Manhattanwasanactofquintessentialurbanterrorism.Thesiteisahighlyclustered,
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Figure5.3 Schematic:AttackontheWorldTradeCenter, September11,2001
Source:FederalEmergencyManagementAgency.WorldTradeCenterBuildingPerformanceStudy,FEMA,RegionII,NewYork.
intricately woven business district with very high-density workday populations whose operations contribute heavily to world finance.TheWorldTrade Center (WTC)isactuallyalargecomplexofsevenbuildings,withtheTwinTowersservingasitsflagship.ThecomplexisringedbyfourbuildingsoftheWorldFinancial Center(hometoAmericanExpressandMerrillLynch)andabevyofbanks,insurancecompanies,hotels,apostoffice,andaculturalcenter(theWinterGarden). TheNewYorkStockExchangeisjustthreeshortblockstothesoutheast.Some commuterstravelbybus,automobile,orfoot,whilethelargestnumberarefunneledtotheirofficesbyanetworkofundergroundmasstransit.Duringthedaythe neighborhoodpopulationswellsto58,000workers. Figure5.3presentsaschematicofthearea.SevenbuildingsoftheWTCare designated,asarefourbuildingsoftheWorldFinancialCenter(WFC).Alsoshown aretheWinterGardenandothersurroundingstructures. Itwasasiftheentireneighborhoodhadbeendesignedforurbanterrorism.Its thousandsofincomingcommuterswouldbethefodderformasspandemonium. ThepreeminenceoftheTwinTowerscoupledtoclustersofsatellitesmadethe sitevulnerabletoacontagionoffirestorms.Theimpactofanexplosioncouldbe telegraphedontoadjacentbuildings,streets,undergroundsubways,contaminating
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theairwithaswilloffumes,asbestos,andfragmentsformilesaround.At8:46 inthemorning,thefirstpiratedplanestruckWTC1(NorthTower),followedjust sixteenminuteslaterbyastrikeat9:02onWTC2(SouthTower).Withinanhour, theSouthTowerbegantocollapse,followedbythecollapseoftheNorthToweran hourlater.Theseismicvibrationofeachcollapsemeasuredbetween2.1and2.3on theRichterscale.AhugeamountofdebrisfellonadjoiningbuildingsWTC3,5, 6,and7.AshorttimelaterWTC7alsocollapsedandWTC3partiallycollapsed. Meanwhile,firesspreadthroughouttheremainingbuildings.27 Thesuddendisintegrationofthesebuildingsproducedpressurewavesthatspread morethanamilliontonsofpulverizedglass,asbestos,andconcreteinalldirections.Enormouscloudsofthesesubstancesrumbledthroughthenarrowdowntown streets.Theirdensityandpressureliftedsmallvehicles,brokewaterandgaslines, andsmashedwindows.Becauserescueworkersweretakenupwithtryingtosave lives,mostofthedamagewaslefttosimmer.Buildingscontinuedtoburnand spoutingwatermainswereleftunattendedforhoursafterward. Aboveground,chaosreigned.Officeworkerscaughtontheupperfloorsofthe NorthandSouthtowersmadetheirwaytohigherlevelsbecausetheymistakenly believedtheycouldbesavedbyhelicopters.Ontheground,crowdsfledfromthe site,blockingpoliceandfirefighters.Thecommandstructurefor“firstresponders,” fromthoseintheuniformedservicestoemergencymedicaltechniciansandambulancedrivers,justaboutcollapsed.Emergencyphoneoperatorswerelefthelpless, unabletoprovideescaperoutesorgivesoundadvicetothosetrappedinsidethe towers.Amidthetumult,communicationswereplaguedbymechanicalfailures. Phonelinesfailedtooperate,andcomputersdid“crazythings.”28 Theresponsewasextremelyupsettingforpeoplewhosoughtinformationabout casualties.Thenumbersofdeadandinjuredcontinuallychanged,andatonepoint estimateswentashighas5,000deadandmorethantwicethatnumberinjured. Tryingtolocatemissingvictimswasespeciallydisheartening.Relativesandfriends ofthemissingwereforcedtotakemattersintotheirownhandsandwalkedaround thesitefordayscarryingandpostingphotographs.Amakeshiftwallonthesitewas inundatedwithpostedphotos,earningamoroseplacein9/11memorabilia. Onemightsupposethat9/11wasthefirstsuchexperienceandthattheperformanceoffirstresponderscouldbeimproved.Whilereformingemergencyprocedureswillbringbenefits,thefactremainsthatglobalcitiesaredifficultplacesto defend.Tightlycoupledmassiveenvironmentsarebuilttotransmitandmagnify terror.Thestoryisbynowknownthatpriortothe1993bombingoftheWorld TradeCenter,RamsiYousefwasinspiredbyAumShinrikyo’schemicalattackin Tokyoandwantedtoemulateit.Theideawastoconstructamubtakkar,Arabic for“invention.”The mubtakkaris abulkydevicethatholdssodiumcyanidein onechamberandhydrogeninanother.Amubtakkarcanbemovedandsetoffby aremotecellphone,whichignitesthefuse,breaksthechamberseal,andcreates hydrogencyanidegas.Thisdeadlygasworksbypoisoninghumancells,stopping theflowofoxygen,andbringingaboutanagonizingdeath.29
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Chillingasthethoughtmaybe,themubtakkarisveryreal.Usedinaconfined spacelikeanofficebuilding,bus,ormetrostation,themonstrouspotentialofthe mubtakkarwouldbeaugmented.Byoneplausibleaccount,agentsfromalQaedahad plannedtosetoffthedeviceinNewYorksubwaycars.Cellmembersweresaidto havearrivedinthecityfromNorthAfricaandwerereadyingthemselves.TheWhite HouseandCentralIntelligenceAgencywereinanguishaboutaportableandconcealablechemicalweaponslippingintoapackedmetrosystem.AlQaedawasaboutto realizeitsthreattobringaboutasequelto9/11,butforsomereasonitcalledoffthe attack.Exactlywhythemubtakkarwasnotusedisnotknown,butsecurityofficials entertainthenotionthatalQaedafeltsuchanattackwouldnotbebigenough.30 London’sCyclesofTerror Attacks in London have neither been as frequent as those in Jerusalem nor as sporadic as those in NewYork. Between 1998 and 2005, London sustained 20 attacks,withtheeventsof7/7boostingcasualtiesto38perincident.31Thisisno smallamountandtheymakeLondonextremelytargetprone.Thefrequencywith whichthecityhasbeenstruckalsoshowsthatassaultshavebeenclusteredwithin particularperiods. NotallterrorhasbeenrelatedtothedisputeoverNorthernIreland.Onoccasion, attacksbytheIRAoritsdifferentfactionstookplacealongwithassaultsbyother radicalgroups.32Mostoftheviolencecanbecountedinchronologicalcycles—duringtheearly1970s,forshortperiodsinthe1980s,duringanintensecycleinthe firsthalfofthe1990s,andagainattheturnofthemillennium.Attimes,damageto propertyhasbeensubstantialandcasualtieshavevariedconsiderably;sometimes fewifanypeoplewerehurt,whileatothertimesdozensormostrecentlyhundreds wereleftdeadorneededhospitalization. TheBritish-Irishconflictgoesbackmanyyears,butthemostsevereattackon LondonreachesbacktothethirtieswhentheIRAtargetedit.Moresystematicattacksbeganin1972,whenafactionoftheIRA,theProvisionalIrishRepublican Army(PIRA),decidedtolaunchacampaignagainsttheBritisheconomy.The attacksbeganthroughoutthecountry,killingnearlyfiftypeople,andsoonfocused onLondon.33In1973,bombswentoffatacourthouseandagovernmentbuilding, killingonepersonandinjuring150others.34Duringthatsameyear,twoplanted bombswentoffinmainlinetransitstations.Thefirstexplosion,atKing’sCross,was powerfulenoughtocreateahailofshatteredglassandhurlabaggagetrolleyinto theair.ThesecondexplosionwentoffatEustonStationminutesafterawarning callwasmade.Theblastsentpassengersintoapanicandknockedthestationout ofcommission.Theseattacksweresynchronized,occurringwithinfiftyminutes ofeachotherandcausingthirteencasualties.Oneyearlater,atwenty-poundbomb explodedatWestminsterHall.35Thelastattackinthiscycleoccurredinthesummer of1975,whenbanksandhotelsincentralLondonweretargeted.36 ForawhileLondonwasquiet,butby1982and1983themetropolisburstasunder
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andtherelativepeacewaspunctuatedbytwoinfamousattacks.IRAbombswent offinHydeParkandRegent’sPark,killing11peopleandwoundingmorethan40. Anothermorespectacularattackoccurredwhenacarbombexplodedjustoutside Harrodsdepartmentstore.Thatassaultkilled6peopleandwounded100. ConcentratedandRepetitiveAttacks Whilemostoftheattacksmentionedabovetookplaceinwhatwouldbecalled “centralLondon,”subsequentattackswereevenmoreconcentratedwithinLondon’s financialdistrict,knownasTheCity.Consistingofjustonesquaremile,TheCity servesasanervecenterforglobalfinanceandislocatedattheepicenterofGreater London.ThisspaceisboththehistoricsymbolandeconomicsoulofLondon.Of thenearly3millioncommuterswhotraveltoLondoneachday,46percentofthem aredestinedforthesquaremile.37 Withinaspanofjustfouryears,PIRAlaunchedastringofattacks,allofwhich concentrated onThe City.The attacks hit the London Stock Exchange (1990), FurnivalStreet(1992),St.MaryAxe(1992),ColemanStreet(1992),Bishopsgate (1993),andWormwoodStreet(1993).Mostofthesesitesarewithin500metersof eachother,andalloftheattackswerecarriedoutthroughplantedbombs.38Justa fewmilesaway,thePIRAlaunchedamortarfromtheroofofaparkedwhitevan anditsshellexplodedinthegardenof10DowningStreet(1991).Theblastblew outallthewindowsoftheCabinetroom.Atthetime,PrimeMinisterJohnMajor wasleadingasessionoftheCabinet,thoughnoonewashurt.Theseareallinstances ofsmartandcatalyticterrorthathadsomeresonance.Thoughtheattackswithin TheCityproducedrelativelyfewcasualtiesandtheassaultat10DowningStreet causednone,alarmbellssoundedinfinancialquartersandthegovernmentsoon installeda“ringofsteel”aroundthearea(barriers,checkpoints,cameras).The primeministeralsotooknoteofthegovernment’svulnerability,asdidtherestof theworld.Meanwhile,theBritishwerestunnedattheaudacityoftheattacks.39 JustastheconflictinNorthernIrelandbegantodissipate,Londonwasbesetby “fourthwave”terrorism.WhileJuly7,2005,marksthebeginningofthismostrecent cycle,therewereampleindicationsthatnewsourcesofterrorismweregestating. RadicalIslamhadalreadygainedasmallbutsignificantfootholdwithinLondon’s communityof600,000Muslims.Bythistime,Londonhadbecomeahubforviolence-proneIslamists,mostofwhompreachedtheirdoctrineinafewmosques. Thepiecesgraduallyfittogether.ThealQaedaassaulton9/11,GreatBritain’s friendshipandsupportfortheUnitedStates,foreignpolicychoicesinAfghanistan andIraq,andtheproximityofradicalIslamistsmadeaterroristattackonLondon likely.July7wasasurprisethatwasfullyexpected.Indeed,priorto7/7atleastnine suspectedterrorattackshadbeenthwartedoveraprevioussix-yearperiod.40The Britishintelligenceservice,knownasMI5,alertedthepublicthatitwasnotsomuch aquestionofwhetherterrorismwouldstrikebutwhenandwhereitwouldstrike.41 WhileMI5recognizedtheimminenceofanattack,ithadnotfullyappreciatedthat
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Figure5.4 LondonTerrorAttacks,1998–2005
Note:Numbersinthecirclesrepresenttotalincidentsfortheyearsindicated.
homegrownterroristswouldlaunchanassault.Since7/7,Britain’sintelligencehas identifiedthirtyterroristsplotswithinternationalrootsinalQaeda.42 GivenLondon’searlierexperiencewithterror,itscentralneighborhoodswere logical targets. Most were close to immigrant communities, radical mosques, bookshops, and Islamic centers. Prospective attackers came to know the lay of thelandandconstructmentalmapsofvulnerablesites.InnerLondonwasagreat crossroadsofdiversity,packedwithpeopleandvaluableassets—apremierchoice forfringeelementsseekingtosendamessage. Figure5.4showssomeofGreaterLondon’scentralneighborhoods.Aswith previousfigures,themapdesignatesthelocationofattacks,thecasualtiesinflicted (designatedbythesizeofthecircle),andthetotalincidents(designatedbythe numberinthecircle). GreaterLondon’s32boroughsplusTheCityconstitutenearly610squaremiles (1,580squarekilometers)ofarichlybuilturbanenvironment.London’scentral businessdistrict,locatedimmediatelytothewestofTheCity,holdsapproximately 9squaremilesofterritorialsurface.TheseninesquaremilesinandaroundTheCity
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absorbedthebulkofattacks;foremostwastheterrorofJuly7,2005,inLondon’s Underground.Inthatattack,explosionsthatwrought179casualtiesweresetoff intunnelsunderneathTheCity.SimilarexplosionsoccurredinCamdenandabove groundinWestminster,bringingmorethan500casualties(seeAppendix,Table A12).Bytheendoftheday,Londonhaditsmostdramaticexperiencewithmega terror.July7leftmorethan700casualties. Thetimingaround7/7wasparticularlysignificant.Justadaybefore,theInternationalOlympicCommitteehadannouncedthatLondonwouldbethesitefor the2012games.Parishadbeenfavored,anduponhearingthenewsLondoners werecompletelybuoyed.Ontheverysameday,theG8(groupofbigindustrial nations)metinScotlandtodiscusstheglobalpolicies.GreatBritainanditscapital wereontheworldstage. MuchlikethesuicidebombingsatJerusalem’sBenYehudaMallandthepirated planesthatweresteeredintoNewYork’sWorldTradeCenter,London’sterrorists understoodthatconcentratedattacksaugmentedshock.Fourexplosionswereset offduringthemorningrushhouraroundthreecorelocations.ThefirstthreeoccurredintheUndergroundwithinthreeminutesofeachother;thefourthignited littlemorethanonehourlaterononeofLondon’sdouble-deckerbuses. July7wasexecutedadseriatimandtheattackscouldbecountedinminutes.At8:49 A.M.,somewherebetweenLiverpoolandAldgateEast(TheCity),atrainwasblown apart;at8:51A.M.atEdgewarRoad(Westminster)anothertrainexploded;thiswas followedatapproximately8:53A.M.byaseriesoftrainblastsbetweenKing’sCross andRussellSquare(Camden).Laterthatsamemorning,at9:47A.M.,anattackerat TavistockSquare(Camden)blewhimselfuponabus’supperdeck,shearingoffits rooftop.Morethanfourthousandpeopleweredirectlycaughtupintheconflagration, exacerbatingtheconfusion.43Figure5.5displaysthelocationsofeachblast.Shown arethetrainlinesaswellastubestations.HydeParkliessouthwestofthesites. Thescenesateachofthesesiteswerefilledwithcarnage.Belowground,portions ofthecity’sextraordinarytransitsystemturnedintodeathtraps.Theblastwithin thetrainscreatedsmallfireballs,andasthelightswentouteverythingturnedblack. Smokefilledtheairandaspassengersbegantochoke,theytriedtoexitthetrains, butthedoorslocked.Someofthepanickedpassengersusedtheirbarehandsto breakwindows,onlytodiscovertherewasnotenoughroomtosqueezeoutofthe tunnel.Allthistime,driversorconductorswereunabletocommunicatewithpassengersandadeathlysilenceensued.Asonesurvivordescribedtheattack: Splinteredandbrokenglassflewthroughtheairtowardsmeandotherpassengers.Iwaspushedsidewaysasthetraincametoasuddenhalt.IthoughtIwas goingtodie.Horrificloudcriesandscreamsfilledtheair,togetherwithsmoke, bitsandchemicals.Largeandsmallpiecesofstuffhitmeandcoveredme.... Iwashitontheheadbyapieceofmetalandcoveredwithsplintersandbroken glassfromthewindowbehindme....Icouldnotbreath,mylungswereburningbecauseofthesmokeanddust.Icrashedmyheadbetweenmykneestoget someair.Therefollowedasilence.44
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Figure5.5 The7/7Attacks:UndergroundandBusLocations
Pandemoniumfilledthestreets.Passengerspouredoutofthestationsdazed, someweeping,andothersshoutingforhelp.InitialreportsindicatedthatLondon’s Undergroundhadincurreda“powersurge,”andofficialsbroughttheentiresystem toahalt.Firstrespondersoftenfiledmultiple,conflictingreports,anditwasunclear whathadhappened,whetheranaccidenthadoccurred,orwheretheemergencies werelocated.45 London’sFireBrigadewasunabletocoordinateitsresponsewiththeAmbulance Service.Thepolicewerealsoconfusedabouttheextentoftheexplosions.46For sometimeafterward,hospitalswereunawareofwhathadoccurredandunprepared fortheonslaughtofemergencypatients.Communicationsbrokedownandambulancesreportedtoincorrectsites.Othercallsweredelayedandfirstresponders wereunabletoreachthosemostdesperateforhelp.47 Victimsandtheirfamiliessufferedfromthehavoc.Duringmuchoftheday, neithertheextentnortheidentityofthecasualtiescouldbeascertained.Friends and family trundled through the areas searching for suspected victims. In desperation,photosofmissingpersonswerehungonnearbylampposts.Sceneslike thisarenotuncommonforamegaattack,andtheydemonstrateitscapacityfor contagiousdisruption. Exactlytwoweekslater,onJuly21,Londonconfrontedanothersetofattacks. This time the attackers were unsuccessful. Once again the target was central London’spublictransit.FourmenattemptedtosetoffbombsattheOvalStation (Lambeth),atWarrenStreetStation(Camden),atShepherd’sBush(Hammersmith), andHackneyRoad(Hackney).Bypurefortune,thebombseitherfailedtodetonate ordetonatedwithnoeffect.Theirchoiceoftargets,threetubestationsandabus,
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matchedthoseofthe7/7attackers.Whetherthiswasacoincidentaloranintentional choiceisunclear.Moreapparentistheinspirationgeneratedbythe7/7attackers andanattempttomimictheiracts.Whilethescalewasconsiderablysmallerthan NewYork’s,theLondonassaultsdemonstratedthepowerthatcanobtainfromsuch inspirationaswellaseffortstocombinemega,catalytic,andsmartterror. PenetrationandLogisticsfromWithin Londonhasbeenconfrontedbytwomajorgroupsoperatingatsomewhatdifferent periodsoftime.Bothgroupshadrelativelyeasyaccess.OperativesfromtheIRAor itssplinteredoffshootscouldeasilytravelfromNorthernIrelandorresideanywhere inEngland.TheirphysicalfeaturesalsopermittedeasytravelthroughouttheUnited Kingdom,andtheymadethemostofthiswithamajorattackinManchester(1996) andacontinuousstreamofviolenceinBelfastandLondonderry. Secularviolencewasreplacedbyanotherstreamofterrorismstemmingfrom Islamicradicalism.Recruitmentcamelargelyfromimmigrantswhoarrivedfrom Pakistan,Bangladesh,Kashmir,andpartsofNorthAfrica.London’sFinsburyand othersmallermosquesbecamerecruitingstationsforterroristswhowentabroad tocarryouttheirwork.London’s“graduates”attainednotorietyandincludeda convertfromSouthLondon’sBrixtonMosquenamedRichardReid,whotriedto explodeanairplanewitha“shoebomb”;ZacariasMoussaoui,whowasimplicated inthe9/11attack;AhmedRessam,whowasarrestedforattemptingtobombLos AngelesAirport;andAbuDoha,whorecruitedterroristsinandaroundParis.48 Whiletheseedstookyearstobesown,Londoneventuallyharvestedasubculture conducivetoradicalviolence.Itwasnotlongbeforea“Londonistan”mentality wouldinspireagenerationofhomegrownterroriststhatincludedOmarKhanSharif andAsifMohammedHanif,whoparticipatedinabloodyattackinTelAviv.And notlongbefore,thatsubculturewouldturnagainstLondonon7/7and7/21.The captureofpotentialattackersduringOperationCreviceshowshowradicalthese youngmenhadbecome.ExplodinggasutilitiesorpoisoningLondon’swatersupplywasregardedasa“beautifulplan.”Blowingup“slags”(women)inanightclub seemedaltogetherjustifiedbecausetheyconsideredwomenwhofrequenteddancing clubstobemorallywanting.Killingkuffars(non-Muslims)waslegitimatebecause God“hatestheKufs.”49 Logisticswererelativelyuncomplicated.ThoseapprehendedinOperationCreviceusednearbyWestLondontostoreexplosives.The7/7attackerssetupshopina localneighborhood,whilethe7/21attackersweremuchsloppier.Thismostrecent cycleofterrorismdemonstratesthatpenetrationneednotbefromadistance(New York)norarisethroughpopulationsinanadjoiningterritory(Jerusalem),butcan begrownfromwithin.Ifopinionpollsaretobebelieved,over100,000British citizensconsiderthe7/7attackstobejustified,anditisnotafarleaptoimagine thathomegrownterroristscoulddrawsupportfromsomeofthesesympathizers.50 Hereinliesthegreatestrisk.
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Conclusions:ParallelsAcrossCities Threedifferentcitieswhoseterroristsarealsodifferentshowsimilarpatternsof targeting designed to bring about chaos, paralyze urban life, and decontrol the city. Striking Jerusalem were secular terrorists from the Palestinian Liberation Organization and alAqsa Martyrs’ Brigade as well as religious terrorists from HamasandIslamicJihad.Intheearlydays,thosegroupshittingNewYorkwere anarchists;morerecentlytheywerereligiouslymotivatedterrorists.Londonsaw attacksfromsecularnationalistsandmorerecentlyIslamists.Forallthevarietyof experience,terrorismstruckatthesamegeneralsites,withsimilarrepetitionand likeconcentration. Thetransferofsuccessfultacticsfromonesituationtoanothergoesbeyondcities likeJerusalem,NewYork,andLondon.Anothercitycrystallizesthelessonslearned andhelpsusunderstandgeneralaspectsofthepattern.Istanbul,Turkey,joinsEast andWest,andwhiletheTurkshavenoconspicuousquarrelwithalQaeda,theydo haveaproblemwiththeKurdishminority. Bythecriterionofseverityofattack,IstanbulresemblesJerusalemmorethan NewYorkorLondon.Duringthelastdecade,Istanbulincurredfrequentattacks, amountingto352incidents,thoughjustthreecasualtiesperincident.Thisiscloser toJerusalem’s11casualtiesperincidentthantoNewYork’sextraordinaryratioof nearly11,000casualtiesorLondon’ssubstantial760casualties.Ratherthanamega attack,Istanbulhasbeenthetargetofcontinualsmallerassaultsdesignedtoelicit theeffectsofcatalyticorsmartterror.AsinJerusalem,terrorisminIstanbuloperates throughcontinualpinpricksdesignedtodisruptorcollapseordinarylife. Majortargetsareoftenatbusycommercialcentersonthe“European”sideof thecityinwhatiscalledtheNewCity.LocatedjustacrossfromthehistoricOld City,thisspaceliesonthewesternsideoftheBosporousandislessthan0.8ofa squaremile(2squarekilometers).Istanbul’sNewCityisfilledwithfinancialinstitutions,businesses,hotels,andshoppingcenters.Foreignembassiesandconsulates havealsosettledinthisarea.Byday,businessandgovernmentexecutivesfillits streetsandbynighttouristspatronizeitsrestaurantsandshops.Mutatismutandis, Istanbul’scentralbusinessdistricthasmuchincommonwiththoseinJerusalem, NewYork,andLondon. Bythecriteriaofconcentrationandrepetition,allofthesecitiessharethesame terroristtactics.Figure5.6providesaglimpseofterrorstrikesintheneighborhoods ofIstanbul.Showninthefigureareneighborhoodsthathavebeenattackedalong withcasualties(designatedbythesizeofthecircle)andincidents(designatedby thenumberinthecircle). As with our other cities, attacks have been concentrated in the commercial heart—inthecaseofIstanbul,itsNewCity.Thesizeandnumberofincidentsboth diminishaswemovefartherfromthiscriticalcenter.51Attackshaveoccurredat theSwissHotel(1994),amainsquare(2001),ashoppingcenter(2001),andserial assaultshavebeenlaunchedontheBritishconsulateandHSBCbank.Theserial
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Figure5.6 IstanbulTerrorAttacks,1998–2005
Note:Numbersinthecirclesrepresenttotalincidentsfortheyearsindicated.
attackswereespeciallytraumatic.Usingtrucksfilledwithexplosives,terrorists detonated their cargo within two minutes of each other, killing 27 people and injuring400.Asiftoopenlymockconventionalauthorityanddemonstratethat nothingwasbeyondtheirreach,thebombersstruckwhilePresidentGeorgeBush andPrimeMinisterTonyBlairwereholdingajointappearance.Reportsdescribed thecityasinchaosandthegeneralsceneasfollows: There is collapsed masonry, shattered windows, burned out cars and general scenesofconfusionatthetwosites.Muchofthecity’sphonenetworkhasbeen cut.Hospitalsareinundatedwithhundredsofwoundedpeople,trafficisblockingtheroadsandcrisisofficialsareaskingpeopletoleavethecentertoclear thewayforambulances.52
Theelementsofpoliticaltimingaswellasconcentrated,repetitiveattacksto producechaoshaveafamiliarring.Changeafewnounsandtheaboveparagraphs couldhavebeenwrittenforothercities.Thefactofthematteristhatterroristsnot onlylearnfromeachother,butalsoimitatethedetailsofattackandthesymbols ofsuccess.OneofTurkey’smostnotoriousgroups,TurkishHezbollah,bearsno relationshiptoitscounterpartinLebanon.Ithas,though,adopteditsnomenclature andcopiesitsstyle. Whatmightaccountforthesimilarityofattack?Forone,simplelogicmight
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betheanswer.Terroristsstrikewherepeoplecongregateandassetsaccumulate. Concentrationandrepetitionmaythenbeareflexiveaction,soterroristsgravitate toparticularlocales.Asecondexplanationisthatbecausethesitesarecentral,they arealsoeasilyaccessible.Manytargetsareproximatetocommunitiesinwhich terroristsfindsafeharbor,andmostareeasytoenterorexit. Whiletheseexplanationshavesomeplausibility,athirdpossibilityisthemost compelling,simplybecauseterroristtacticsacrosssomanydifferentcitiesaretoo similartobeexplainedbycoincidence.Thestrongestexplanationcanbefoundin therudimentsoforganizationalbehaviorandtheempiricsofurbanterror.Organizationsseektoimprovetheirefficiencyandterroristsarenodifferent.Terroristsdo learnfromeachother,fromtheirsuccessandbyexchangingknow-how.Information canbeobtainedinformallyandnonsystematically,oritcanbesharedsystemically throughestablishednetworks.Likeanycircuitofinformation,whatworksbestis oftencommunicated,adoptedbythegroups,andadaptedtothecircumstances.For alltheirdifferences,IrishandArabterroristswereincommunicationduringthe 1970and1980s.TodaythealQaedanetworkstretchesacrosstheMiddleEastinto Chechnya,theBalkans,andtherestofEurope.Itselectronicsitesandoperatives provideareadysupplyofinformationabouttacticsandarésuméofmethodson howbesttostriketheenemy.AvarietyofotherorganizationslikeHezbollahand freelanceterroriststhroughouttheworldalsoperformthesamefunction. Tacticaltransferisverymuchpartofurbanterror.Thisisaphenomenonthat hascertaincommonalities.Itstandstoreasonthatiftacticaltransferisviable,so tooistacticaldefense.Tothisissuewenowturn.
Part3 PolicyResponsesandLocalResilience
6 SurveillanceandShrinkage
Themarkofgeniusisknowingwheretolook. —AlbertEinstein WallsandBarriers ThroughantiquityandintotheMiddleAges,citiesweredefinedbytheirwalls. Thesebarriersencasedthecityandsetitsouterboundaries.Settlementsoutside thewallswereknownasfaubourgs.Asthecitygrewoutward,oldwallsweretaken downandreplacedbynewonestoencompassthefaubourgs,whichbythistime werejoinedtothecity.Andsoitwent;likeatreesproutingnewlayersofoutward growthwitheachnewage,additionalsettlementswereincorporatedintothecity andwallslaidouttheircontours. Mostgreatcitieswereprotectedbywalls,andafewhavelastedintothemodern era. Paris, London, Moscow, Quebec, and Istanbul began as walled cities. Throughoutitshistory,Jerusalemhasbeenwalled,unwalled,andrewalled.Like Beijing’sGreatWallandMoscow’sKremlin,thewallaroundJerusalem’sOldCity stillstands,attractingtouristsfromaroundtheworld.EventherelativelynewcitiesoftheUnitedStatesweredefinedbytheirwalls.ElevenAmericancitieshad wallsduringtheearlyyearsoftheircolonialdevelopment.TheseincludedBoston, Charlestown,Savannah,Albany,NewOrleans,Detroit,andSt.Louis.NewYork wasthemostprominentamongthecolonialcitiestohaveabarrier,andtodayits WallStreetmarksthesite.1 Wallswerebuilttodefendcitiesagainstinvadingarmiesandhostileintruders. Theyfurnishedasenseofsecuritytoinhabitantsofthemedievalcity.Thoseliving outsideitswalls,inthefaubourg,soughtthecity’sprotectioninthefaceofinvaders. LewisMumford’sclassicworkTheCultureofCitiesbeginswithachapterentitled “ProtectionandtheMedievalTown.”Mumfordrecountsthat“interrorofinvaders,” theinhabitantsofMainzrestoredtheoldRomanWallandthesurroundingmoatto keepattackersout.2AnotherwriterpointsoutthatinChina,themostcommonly usedwordsfortheearlycityrelatedto“wallsandgates,”andbarriersofallkinds wereusedextensivelytoprotectOrientalcities.3TheBelgianhistorianHenriPirenne describesthecitywallastakingthe“shapeofarectanglesurroundedbyramparts flankedbytowersandcommunicatingwiththeoutsidebygates.”4 Inourmodernage,wallshaveusuallybeenusedtostopillegalbordercross123
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ings,impedemilitaryforces,orimprisonpeople.Morerecently,somehavebeen builttocombatterrorists,thoughthedefinitionofawallhasbeenlooselyapplied toanybarrierthatcutsoffopenspace.Thebest-knownuseofa“wall”toimpede terrorismistheextensivebarrierbegunbyIsraelin2002duringtheheightofal Aqsaviolence.Whilereferredtobyitsdetractorsasthe“apartheidwall”andbyits supportersasthe“anti-terroristfence,”itisneitherentirelya“wall”norentirelya “fence,”butacombinationofconcrete,wiremesh,ditches,roadways,sandpaths, andelectronicdetectors.Thoughthemediacontinuetophotographitsmoredramaticconcreteslabs,thewalledportionsoftheIsraelibarriermakeuplessthan5 percentofthetotal.5Israel’sbarrierstretchesfor430miles(687kilometers)along itseasternperipheriesthatmarkoffPalestinianareas.6 Less-known walls have been built in Kashmir and Northern Ireland. On the Indiansubcontinenta“lineofcontrol”separatesIndianfromPakistaniKashmir. Thisparticular“wall”risesto12feethighandspreadsanother12feetinwidth. Itisconstructedfromcoilsofconcertinawirelayeredbetweenrowsofpickets. Sharp-edgedmetaltape,electrification,scanningequipment,andborderguards preventunauthorizedpersonsfromcrossing.This“lineofcontrol”isbeingbuilt along460miles(736kilometers)ofterritory.LiketheIsraelibarrier,Kashmir’s walldividesformerneighborsandbreaksupland.Aseriesofgatespermitfarmers andanimalstocrossintograzinglands. Inanothersideoftheworld,Belfast’s“peacewall”wasbuilttopreventviolence betweenCatholicsandProtestants.InsheermassthewallinBelfastrivalsitsIsraeliandKashmiricounterparts.Itisconstructedinanarrayofbrick,iron,steel, andconcrete,toppedoffbybarbedwireandinterspersedwithobservationtowers. Belfast’swallisrelativelyshort,coveringjustthirteenmiles.InNorthBelfast’s parishofHolyCross,athirty-footwallstandsasasectariandividebetween“green” and“orange”partisans.Paramilitarygangsroamthestreetsoneithersideofthis divide,enforcingtheirownrulesofconduct. WallshavebeenbuilttoseparateGreekfromTurkishCyprus,Moroccofrom WesternSahara,BotswanafromZimbabwe,SaudiArabiafromYemen,Northfrom SouthKorea,andtheUnitedStatesfromMexico.Manywallshavesignificantsocialdetriments,createpowerdifferentials,andscarthelandscape.Otherwallshave succeededindesignatingrespectiveturfsbetweenwarringfactionsandtemporarily pullingthemapart.Atleastsomewallshavesavedlivesandbroughtameasureof safetytoareas.ThewallinBelfasthascontributedtoaperiodoftranquilitybetween CatholicsandProtestants,andwallssurroundingJerusalemandKashmirhavecontributedtoamarkedreductioninterrorattacks.7“Walls”arebestjudgedbytheir intendedpurposeanduse,notbystereotypes.Whenfullyconsidered,somemaybe goodwhileothersmaynot.MostshouldnotbeconfusedwiththenotoriousBerlin Wall,whichwasbuilttokeepciviliansfromescapingaone-partystate. Alsoconsideredasbeingwalledinare“gatedcommunities,”wherespacesare separatedbyconcrete,gates,fencing,hedges,andbooms.Theseparationcanbe complete,aswhenwholecommunitiesaresetofffromthesurroundingenvironment,
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Figure6.1 PartofBelfast’sWall
ThephotoshowsoneofthemaingatesinBelfast’s“peaceline.”Thisgateisusedtoblock aroadbetweenCatholicFallsRoadandProtestantShankhill.(CourtesyofConflictand PoliticsinNorthernIreland(CAIN),Belfast,NorthernIreland.Formoreinformationsee cain.ulst.ac.uk/photographs.)
orpartial,asinthecaseof“alleygating,”wherethesidesorrearsofindividual housesareclosedoff.AlleygatingisparticularlyprevalentinLiverpool,andboth wealthyandpoorneighborhoodsuseittopreventloiterersandburglarsfromaccessingneighborhoodhousing.8 Gatedcommunitieshavebeenusedforavarietyofpurposesthatincludesocialsegregation,crimeprevention,andeffortstoattainprivacy.Asoflatethey havebeenemployedtowardoffterrorism—mostnotablyinNorthernIreland andIsrael.GatedcommunitiesarecommonintheUnitedStates(Jacksonville, Miami),theUnitedKingdom(London,Manchester),Brazil(SãoPaulo),South Africa(Johannesburg,CapeTown),andNigeria(Lagos).Scholarshavefewkind wordsforgatedcommunitiesandviewthemasbastionsofprivilegethatfeed socialtensions.9 Indeed,anykindofbarrierisviewedwithsuspicionandassignedthefuzzy,if notpejorative,connotationofbeinga“wall.”Notwithstandingtheirnegativeeffects, wallscomeinmanydifferentforms.Societyhascomealongwayfromthesimple wallguardedbysomeonestandingonitsramparts.Themostmodernareoutfitted withsophisticateddevicesforobservation,detection,andtracking. Today’swallsarenotjustsolidbarriers,butallowforanenormousrangeof
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surveillanceandprotection.Inamannerofspeaking,modernwallsareamalgams ofhumanpatrols,elaboratelighting,automatedobservation,complexdetectors, andscanningdevices.Peoplemayormaynotlikethem,buttheirusegrows.Iinterpretsurveillancebroadlytoincludealltypesof“walls”anddevicesthatpermit publicsupervision.Also,becausebarriersarecentraltoconductingsurveillance, Iconsidertheminalltheirmanifestations(fences,gates,booms,andthelike).As theavailabilityandtypesofregulatorydeviceshavegrown,sotoohastheirapplicationtosurveillance.AwidelyreceivedreportonsurveillanceintheUnited Kingdom includes all types of regulation—from low-tech Breathalyzer tests to monitoringoffinancialtransactionsandadvancedDNAsampling.10Theissues are how can we best understand surveillance and what does it portend for the regulationofcityspace? SurveillancetoDate Amongotherthings,surveillancecanbeseenasawaytoregulatepublicspace.11 Asappliedhere,surveillancedenotesintensescrutinyandvariousmeansofcontrol inordertodeter,mitigate,preempt,orhaltterroristattack.Ratherthananabsolute, black-and-white, descriptive noun, surveillance is better seen as activities that occurronacontinuumrangingfromtheleasttothemostphysicallyobstructive. Themeasureofobstructionistheextenttowhichhumanmovementisblockedor prevented.Beginningwiththeleastobstructive,thegenericcategoriesinclude(1) theanimatedpresenceofthecitizenryorstreetwatchers;(2)panopticdevicesthat facilitateobservation;(3)advancedtechnologicaldetectionthatidentifiesbiological,chemical,orothertraits;(4)moveablebarriers,guards,andpolicepatrolsthat regulatehumanbehavior,and,themostobstructive;(5)fortressconstructionthat permanentlyrestrictsmovementbyshieldingorblockingpeople.12Allofthese measuresdefineorshapetheurbanlandscape.Inmanywaystheyoftenreconfigure theurbanlandscape—narrowingpathways,closingoffothers,andultimatelychannelingpedestriansandvehiclesintopredictablepatternsofmovement.Theresult: ashrunkenurbansettingbesetbystultifiedandrigidifiedsocialrelations. Animated presence of the citizenry and street watchers use the presence of communityresidents,workers,andpedestrianstoensurepublicsafety.Theyare the“eyesonthestreet”—shopkeeperswhogreetcustomers,neighborswhopeer outofwindows,shopperswhostrollaroundstores,orbuildingguardsandtraffic controllerswhostandatcriticaljunctures.Thesearethemostnaturalwaysofdeterringattackbecausethebestawarenessemanatesfromindigenousforces:from peoplecarryingoneverydayfunctionswhobelongintheneighborhood.Theidea hereistotakeadvantageofthenaturalpropertiesofbuildingsandtheirinherent connectiontostreets.Somebuildingshaveanosmoticrelationshiptowhatoccurs aroundthem.13Theyconstantlyabsorbandreleaseenergyintotheirenvironments aspeopleenter,remain,andexit,makingsurveillancenormalandeasy. InherclassicTheDeathandLifeofGreatAmericanCities,JaneJacobsre-
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countshowurbanosmosisworkedtopreventachildfrombeingluredawaybya stranger: AsIwatchedfromoursecond-floorwindow,makingupmymindhowtointervene ifitseemedadvisable,Isawitwasnotgoingtobenecessary.Fromthebutcher beneaththetenementhademergedthewomanwho,withherhusbandrunsthe shop;shewasstandingwithinearshotoftheman,herarmsfolded,alookof determinationonherface.JoeCornaccchia,whowithhissons-in-lawkeepsthe delicatessen,emergedaboutthesamemomentandstoodsolidlytotheotherside. Severalheadspokedoutofthetenementwindowsabove,onewaswithdrawn quicklyanditsownerreappearedamomentlaterinthedoorway.Twomenfrom thebarnexttothebutchershopcametothedoorwayandwaited.Onmysideof thestreet,Isawthatthelocksmith,thefruitmanandthelaundryproprietorhad allcomeoutoftheirshopsandthatthescenewasalsobeingsurveyedfroma numberofwindowsbesidesours.14
Granted,JacobsiswritingaboutauniqueneighborhoodinManhattanandone thathadaveryspecialsenseofcommunity.Butmanycityneighborhoodslend themselvesto“eyesonthestreet.”London,Istanbul,Jerusalem,Mumbai(Bombay), andmostothertraditionalcitiesarefilledwithsuchcommunities.Thestrengthof animatedpresenceliesinharnessingtheattributesofacommunityandasenseof territorialitytobuildsafety.15 Moreover,animatedpresencemaynotjustpreventanimminentaction,butis meanttosupplylong-termintelligencesothatterroriststryingtouseaneighborhoodtoplananattackmightbespotted.ItwasnotbyaccidentthattheLeedsand Hamburgcellsplannedtheirattacksinlargelyrootlessneighborhoodswithhighly transientpopulations.Therewereveryfeweyesontheseneighborhoods,andthose eyesthatwerepresentwerelargelyavertedfromsuspiciousbehavior. Forallitsvalue,animatedpresencewillnotpreventsmall-scalespontaneous attacks.Terroristswhoaredeterminedtohitatargetareverydifficulttostop.In 1981, French fascists struck a tightly knit Jewish neighborhood in the heart of Paris.Theattackwascarriedoutfromaspeedingautomobilewhoseinhabitants firedautomaticweaponsatpatronsofawell-knownrestaurant.Thereisverylittle inthearsenalofprotections,andcertainlynotinanimatedpresence,thatcould havepreventedthisincident. Next,weconsiderpanopticdevicessuchascameras,closed-circuittelevision cameras(CCTV),andone-waymirrors.Thenotionofapanopticongoesbackto theearlywritingofJeremyBentham,whobelievedthatwatchingpeoplecouldbe usedforthepublicgood.Benthamofferedanarchitecturaldesignforprisonsthat featuredacircularbuildinghousinginmatesincellslocatedonaradiusaround theperimeter.Inspectorswouldbepostedinaguardhouseatthecentertoobserve theconductofprisoners,withouttheprisonersseeingthosewhowerewatching them.16Benthamsawthisinthestarkesttermsasenlightenedreform—orasheput it,“moralsreformed,healthpreserved,industryinvigorated,instructiondiffused, publicburdenslightened,andeconomyseated,asitwere,uponarockbyasimple
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ideainarchitecture.”17Soappealingdidpanopticarchitectureseematthetime, thatitwasproposedforschools,factories,andotherinstitutions. Thenineteenth-centurypanopticonhassincetakenonmodernusagethrough sophisticatedformsofvideosurveillance.Today,CCTVisemployedthroughout Europe,NorthAmerica,andotherpartsoftheworld.France,Spain,theNetherlands,Germany,theUnitedStates,andIsraelhaveuseditextensively,especiallyin monitoringgovernmentbuildings,publicspaces,andborders.InGermany,video surveillancecameintovogueduringthe1980stoprotectofficialsagainstkidnappingsbytheRedArmyFaction.CamerashavealsobeenusedinSpaintodetect possibleattacksinBasquecities,andFranceemployedvideosurveillancedecades agotoguardagainstAlgerianterroristsinParis.Shortlyafterthe9/11attacks,the federalgovernmentsetupdozensofcamerasinsensitivelocales.TheStatueof Libertywasoutfittedwithsurveillanceapparatus,andanyonewhowantedtotake theextraclimbintoitscrownpassedthroughadditionalscreening.Israelhasset upextensivevideosurveillanceinJerusalem’sOldCitytopreventknifingsand assaultsoncivilians. GreatBritainisfaraheadofothernationsinapplyingpanoptictechnology. One study estimates there may be as many as 4.2 million CCTV cameras, or nearlyoneforeveryfourteencitizens.18Over500towncentersrelyonCCTVto combatcrime,terror,orotherunwantedbehavior.19London’sfinancialdistrict alonecontainsover1,500camerasthatmonitorpedestrians.Asofthiswriting, London’stransportationsystemusesover6,000CCTVunitsacrossthenetwork, nearlyathirdofwhicharededicatedtotrains.Additionalcamerasareplanned overthenextthreeyears,bringingLondon’stotaltomorethan9,000cameras. ItiscommonlythoughtthattheaverageBritoncrossesthelineofsightofvideo surveillance300timeseachday.20 Soonafterthe7/7attack,videosoftheterroristspreparingfortheeventwere shownonhometelevisionscreens.Viewerscouldseeterroristswearingbackpacks, passingthroughturnstiles,racingthroughtheunderground,orsearchingseatsona bus.YetthefactthattheLondonbomberschosethemostheavilywatchedcityin theworldremindsusthatsuicideattackersriskverylittlewhenbeingtaped.Some studiesindicatethatvideosurveillanceisnotlikelytoreduceterrorism,andothers claimthatitonlydisplacescrimetoother,unobservedlocations.21Nevertheless, theBritishexperiencealsoshowsthatpanopticdevicesdoprovideauthoritieswith valuableinformationaboutterroristbehaviorandsuggestswaysinwhichsimilar attacksmightbedeterred.Videosurveillancealsofurnishescluesaboutlogistics andconnectionsbetweenterroristnetworks. A related category consists of advanced technological detection, which ties advancedpanopticstoelaboratedatabases.Technologicaldetectionalsoembraces motion or thermal sensors, biometric devices, and scanning for entry and exit. Whilethesearemostlyusedatairportsorborderfences,theyareapplicableto urbanenvironments.Publicmasstransitisafavoredtargetandallmannerofdevicescanbeusedtoidentifypeopleandpackagesastheyenterastationorboard
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Figure6.2 VideoCamerainJerusalem
ThecameraislocatedontheceilingofoneoftheOldCity’slabyrinthinestreets.Pedestrians andshopperswalkthroughthisareawithsomefrequency.(PhotobyH.V.Savitch)
atrain.TheserangefromCATscannersthatcaninspecttheinteriorofluggage, toelectronicdevicesthatcan“sniffout”explosives,toahostofbiometricsthat identifypeoplebytheirorganicproperties(irises,retinas,handgeometry,veinpatterns).Recently,securityagencieshavebeguntoemphasize“behaviordetection” byusingsequentialphotographytoidentifyfacialexpressionsthatrevealanger, fear,anddeceit.Anothertypeofbehaviordetectiontracksthepathwaystakenby anindividualandconstructsacompositeofaperson’smovementoveraperiodof time.Thisallowsauthoritiestospotsuspiciouspatternsanddetainasuspectfor investigation.Whilehighlyeffective,manyofthesetechnologiesarebulkyand slowbecausetheyscreenpeopleoneatatime. Sometypesofentry–exitdetection,however,canbeemployedinacollective mannerbyseparatingtrustedindividualsfromsuspiciousones.Thissometimes takesplaceontheentrysidebyrequiringadvancedclearancebeforeindividualscan
130 CHAPTER6
enterabuildingorbyexactingafeebeforesomeonecanuseahighway.London’s systemofAutomaticNumberPlateRecording(ANPR)isintendedtodiscourage singledriversfromenteringcrowdedportionsofthecitybyapplyingsteepuser charges.ANPRutilizesdigitalimagingtoreadvehiclelicenseplatesandautomaticallychargestheirownersanentryfee. Singaporehasimplementedasystemthatallowsmotoriststousea“smartcard” inordertotravelonahighway.WhileANPRand“smartcards”aredesignedto expeditetraffic,theycanbeputtomultipleusesandappliedtowardcivil,criminal, orterroristsurveillance.Oncecarsenterathoroughfare,electronicdevicestiethe identificationofthevehicletoadatabasethatcanflagothercharacteristics.The datacanrunallthewayfromlistingthepersonalcharacteristicsandhabitsofvehicleownerstoidentifyingvehiclesbysize,color,andshape,totrackingvehicular patterns.Vehiclesinthevicinityofaterrorattackcouldbeputonawatchlistand subsequentdrivingpatternschecked.LondonandSingaporecouldbetheforerunnersforconvertingordinarytrafficcontrolintolarge-scalesurveillance.22By2006, Londonhadreadover25millionvehiclesandbeguntrackingthemforcrime,terrorism,andtaxevasion.IfmuchofthissoundsalarminglyOrwellian,takenoteof thefollowingfivestepsdesignedforcollectiveentry–exitscreening. Firstyouprojectelectromagneticwavesacrossawiderangeoffrequencies, from radar, millimeter-waves, and infrared heat through visible light and x-rays.Thereareotheralternatives,too—magneticpulsesandacousticwaves, forexample.Second,youcarefullylookforwhatgetsthroughorbounces back.Third,youintenselyanalyzethesame,crunchingthenumberstoturnthe massivestreamofreturndataintoacoherentimage.Fourth,youmakesense ofit,generallybyanothermassiveroundofnumbercrunchingforpattern recognition,comparingtheimageathandwithahugedatabaseofimages, previouslystored.Fifth,youdon’tlikewhatyousee,thenyoukillit,disable itorattheveryleastshuntitasideforcloserandmoreleisurelyscrutiny.If youseeanthrax,say,killitwithaburstofgammaraysoranelectromagnetic pulseintenseenoughtoshatterDNA.23
Settingasidetheobjectionthatthesedevicesmightconstituteaninvisibleintrusionintopeople’slives,mostofthepublicisnotlikelytofeelorevenseetheir physicaleffects—atleastnotinitially.Puttoitsultimateuse,however,high-tech detectioncansignalthemostdangerousintrusion.Certainly,zappingapersonora commoditywithdeadlyraysisnotsomethingtobeeasilycountenanced.Ultimately, advanceddetectioncanbuildavirtualwallofdiscriminationaroundacity. Moreapparentlyobstructivearemoveablebarriers,guards,andpolicepatrols. Thesemeasuresarecommonlyusedinemergencieswhenpolicesetupstanchions orwoodenbarrierstorestricttheuseofspace.Asurbanterrorbecamemorebrazen, thesemeasureswerequicklyadopted.London’sexperiencewithterrorattackson TheCityisacaseinpoint.Soonaftertheattacksin1993,thepolicesetupa“ring ofsteel”toprotectfinancialinstitutions.AsCoaffeedescribesit,the“ringofsteel” washardlythatandmorelikea“ringofplastic.”Theregulationconsistedoftraffic
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conesthatguidedautomobiles,gatesplacedaroundvariouscheckpoints,andan extensivenetworkofcameras.24Barriersofthissortprovidedsomesecurityfor London’sglobalfinancialinstitutions.Soonafter9/11andinthewakeofthreats toNewYork’shighfinance,WallStreetadoptedadownscaledversionofLondon’s ringofsteel.WallStreet’sregulatorymeasuresweremorelikearingofbarriers andpoliceattheNewYorkStockExchange. JerusalemwentthroughasimilarexperienceinitscitycenterafteralAqsaterror brokeoutduring2002and2003.Assuicideattackstookadevastatingtollonlifeand property,troopswereplacedbehindtemporarybarriersalongKingGeorgeandJaffa streets.CriticalspaceslikeZionSquarewerecordonedoffandreinforcedbyarmy patrols.Guardsstoodatentrancestorestaurants,cafes,andpublicestablishments. Thoseestablishmentsnotguardedlockedtheirouterdoors,allowingcustomersto enteronlyaftertheyidentifiedthemselvesandwentthroughabriefpat-down.A fewblocksfromthecitycenterattheMehaneYehudamarket,barriersandarmy troopscordonedoffitsentrances.Thisallowedshopperstobeinspectedontheir wayintothemarketandguidedarounditsopenstallsafterentering.25 Someregulatorymeasuresplacegreateremphasisonsortingoutindividualsby directconfrontation.SoonafterattacksinMoscow,theonce-discardedpropiska systemwasrevived,wherebycitizenswererequiredtocarryidentitycardsand routinelystopped.Thecheckswentbeyondarandomexaminationofpapersand focused instead on interrogating dark-skinned residents, presumably from the Caucuses.Stop,identify,andsearchtechniquesarealsocommoninIstanbul.The city’steemingmarketplacesandsinuousstreetsaredifficulttosealoff,soauthorities haveturnedtomoreintensivestreetpatrolling.Thenormistoregulate,sometimes withtrafficstopscoupledtopersonalsearches. Last,wefindvariouskindsoffortressconstruction,whichincludespermanent partitions, fences, gates, and solid walls.Any settlement that is wholly or substantiallysurroundedbyapermanentbarriercanbeconsideredasprotectedby fortressconstruction.Seeninthislight,fortresscommunitieshavealwaysexisted andaretodaymorecommonthanwerealize.Notonlyareresidentialsubdivisions partitionedofffromtheirsurroundingenvironments,butsotooarefactories,office complexes,holidayresorts,andshoppingmalls. Thepartitioningcanbeunfinishedandunsightly,aswhenfactoriesputupcyclonefencesthatdemarcatetheirspace.Quitedifferently,thepartitioningcanbe polishedandsubtle,aswhenlavishhousesaresurroundedbyhighhedgesbacked upbyspaciouslawnsthatdivorcethemfromstreetlife.Manyluxuriouscommunitiesreinforcetheirfortressesbyprohibitingpublicparkingandhiringguardsto keepunwantedguestsaway.OwnersofthepalatialhousesalongthecoastsofNew England,NewYork,andtheFloridakeyshavesucceededinbuildingfortresses aroundpreciousseashoreswithoutmuchcomplaint. Stillanothervariationoffortressconstructioncanbefoundin“edgecity”office complexesthatarefrontedbylargelawnsandparkinglots.26Gates,booms,ora guardhouseareusedtoallowentry—eitherbypayingafeeorbyrightofownership,
132 CHAPTER6
Figure6.3 BarrieringtheNewYorkStockExchange
ThegatesaroundtheNewYorkStockExchangecanbemoved.Lessportablearetheconcrete plantersinfrontoftheentrance.Thetwobarriersarerespectivelydesignedtokeeppeople awayandpreventexplosiveladenvehiclesfromreachingthebuilding.Securitypersonnel alsopatroltheentryway.(PhotobyH.V.Savitch)
tenancy,worker,orgueststatus.Mallsusemilderformsoffortressconstruction becausetheyareformallyopentoallentrants.Butmallstooblockofftheirsurroundingenvironmentsandprivatizetheirownspaces.Manyarealsolocatedata distancefrompopulationcentersandcanbereachedonlybyprivateautomobile. Theeffectisanunsupervised,systemicselectionofclientele. Rarelyarewholecommunitiesbuilttowardoffterror.Intendedornot,someare builtwithfortress-likefeatures.Giloisonesuchcommunity,locatedonthesouthern perimeterofJerusalem,minutesfromtheWestBanktownsofBethlehemandBeit Jalla.Overtheyearsithasbeensubjecttostreamsofgunfireandinfiltrationfrom nearbyArabvillages.Itsdefensiblespacehasnowmitigatedthatvulnerability. Gilo’shousingconsistsofclustered,attachedunits,frontedbyopenspacesthat allowforeasysurveillance.Itsentrancesarefrontedbyelongatedgatesorlow walls.Itsconstructionisinconcreteorstone.Giloalsositsonahillthataffords considerableprotection.Additionalslabsofconcretehavebeenputupalongits mostvulnerablesidestoshieldagainstgunshots.Inrecentyears,theseprotections haveworkedtoreduceassaultstonearzero.27 The prevalence of this kind of scrutiny should not be overstated. Most city spacesarenotsubjecttoheavyorextensivesurveillance.Asofthiswriting,itcan
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Figure6.4 Gilo’sFortressConstruction
Gilo is on the southern perimeter of Jerusalem and overlooks theWest Bank towns of BethlehemandBeitJalla.Inordertoprotectagainstunwantedindividualsandassaults,it haserectedapermanentfencearounditsperipheryandinstalledconcreteslabs.(Photoby H.V.Savitch)
besaidofliberaldemocraciesthatsurveillanceishardlythedominantconditionof theurbanenvironment.Still,therearesignificantexceptions,andselectspacesare intenselyscrutinized.Intheseinstances,surveillancehaschangedtheimmediate environmentandthebehaviorofitsusers.Almostalways,surveillanceinvolves intrusionofonekindoranother.Invariablytherearecostsforthisprotectionand risksfornonprotection.Ultimately,surveillancehingesonwhethertheintrusion, thecosts,andtherisksarejustified. ShrinkingUrbanSpace Despite the fact that many ancient cities were begun on a sheltered landscape, safeguardedbymoatsandsurroundedbywalls,thereisanincompatibilitybetween surveillanceandurbanvitality.Asoftenmentioned,citiesdependuponthecultivationofanopen,diverse,andtolerantenvironment.Theimpositionofpanoptic, high-techdetection,barriers,patrols,andfortressconstructionsuffocatesacity’s countlessself-adjustinghumantransactions.Thisistrueevenwhensurveillanceis intendedtobeasunobtrusiveaspossible,saybyconvertingwhatwouldnormally beseenasobstaclesintoattractiveplantersandstreetfurnitureorbyattemptingto
134 CHAPTER6
Figure6.5 ShrinkingUrbanSpaceinLowerManhattan
ShriveledspaceinthevicinityofWallStreet.Notetheunusedspaceonthestreetandthe planters that block space on the opposite side of the road. These barriers shape human behavior.(PhotobyH.V.Savitch)
camouflageadeviceorblenditintoitssurroundingenvironment.Eventhemost benignsurveillancecanbeproblematic.Thus,whenbroughttoexcess,streetwatchingcancastapallofsuspicionoverneighborhoodsandupsetsocialrelations. Spaceistheoxygenofthecity,andsurveillancereducestheroominwhichitcan circulate.Themostseriousshrinkageoccurswiththemostobstructiveprotections suchasmoveablebarriers,patrols,andlonger-termfortressconstruction.Stanchions, gates,andsidewalkbarricadesfunnelmixedcrowdsintoseeminglyuniformqueues. Withtheseprotections,oncepulsatingthrongsofpeopleareconvertedintocompliantsubjects,gatheredalongnarrowpassagesforpersonalinspectionorcollective surveillance.Asaresult,partsofthestreetscaperemainemptyandunusedwhileother partsoverflowinawkwardprocessionsofharriedcitizens.Examine,forexample, thephotosofNewYork’slowerManhattaninFigures6.5and6.6. Notice,inFigure6.5,the“disappearance”oftheleftsidewalkandtheconstrictionofthecrowdontoanarrowpathontherightside.Before9/11,bothrightand leftsidewalksteemedwithpeoplewhooftenspilledontoastreetonceintendedfor horse-drawncarriages.After9/11,thatsamespacehasshrunkbyabouttwo-thirds. Concreteplantersintendedtopreventatruckbombingnowrestrictthepassageway ontheleftsidewalk.Portablegatesandsecuritypatrolsblockthestreetvista,centeredattheendofthepathwaybytheGreekRevivalistCustomsHouse.
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Figure6.6 SlowingMovementinLowerManhattan
ShriveledspaceneartheNewYorkStockExchange.Apost–9/11scenewhereobstacles dressedupasstreetartslowpedestrianmovementandmakeconversationawkward.(Photo byH.V.Savitch)
ThephotoinFigure6.6alsoprovidesaviewofhowmovementcaneitherbe haltedorradicallyreducedbystreetprotections.Here,anumberofpolyhedron sculptedformsareawkwardlysituatedatabuildingfront—apparentlytothwart anattackingtruckorautomobile.Whatthisdoestohumantrafficisquiteanother matter.Pedestrianshaveeitherstoppedinthemiddleofthesidewalkormeandered aroundtheobjects.Noticethemakeshiftguardstationfrontedbyaportablegate onthefarrightcorner,whichblocksoffaportionofthesidewalk. WeshouldrememberthatpedestriansusingthisspacearenotqueuingorgatheringforaBroadwayshow,butareworkerswhoaresupposedtobegoingabouttheir normalmiddayschedules.Tobesure,peopleadaptandnonchalantlybypassthe obstacles.Buttheobstacleshavenonethelessreducedavailablespaceandshaped thebehaviorofthosewhoseektouseit. Theseareshriveledspaces.28Asdefinedhere,shriveledspacesareareasthatonce amplyaccommodatedlargenumbersofpedestriansandnowhavebeenconverted toscarcerspaces.Thesespaceschannelpeopleinpredictabledirections.Predictabilityliesattheheartofsurveillanceandentailsinducingpeopleintoknowable patternsofmovement,sotheycanbecontrolledandinspected.Toaveryrealextent, thesebarriershaveaccomplishedthat,thoughquestionsremainaboutwhetherit isgoodforthecity.
136 CHAPTER6 Figure6.7 ARingofConcreteinWashington,DC
PricklyspacesattheU.S.TreasuryBuilding.Movableconcretebarriersandaguardhouse block entryways.These obstacles make it inconvenient forautomobilepassengerstobe droppedoffandforpedestrianstousethearea.(PhotobyH.V.Savitch)
Thereareotherwaysinwhichfortressconstructionandregulationshavethe effectofdiscouragingandshrinkingtheuseofurbanspace.After9/11,anational commission recommended thatWashington, DC, be fortified and aggressively regulated.Sixcontextualzoneswerechosenforspecialprotection.29Newbuildingsweresupposedtobebuiltwithsetbacksofatleast100feet,furtherdivorcing themfromstreetlifeandcompromisingtheirosmoticpotential.Allbuildingswere hardened with barriers of various kinds.While genuinely trying to make these obstaclesattractive,therewerelimitstohowbleak-lookingwallsandgatescould be disguised as “street furniture.” The changes amounted to the installation of “ringsofconcreteandsteel”aroundhigh-profileinstitutions.Placedatthelikely targetsweredeltabarriers,jerseybarriers,bollards,andconcretebenchesthatjut intothestreetlikedaggers.Asidefrommarringsomepreciousarchitecture,the protectionsproducesocialvacuums.Thishasbecomealltooapparentinpost–9/11 Washington.Examine,forinstance,thesiteoftheU.S.Treasurybuildingshown inFigures6.7and6.8. These barriers deaden the streets, ridding them of pedestrians and anybody seekingtobeletoutofanautomobile.Eventhemostvaliantattemptstotreatthese obstaclesasnaturalpartsofthelandscapefalterinthefaceoftheirposition,mass, andbleakness.Whilethebenchessituatedinfrontofthebuildingmaybeableto
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Figure6.8 “StreetFurniture”inWashington,DC
MorepricklyspacesattheU.S.TreasuryBuilding.Whileseemingtoprovideseatingfor pedestrians,thesearereallycamouflagedspacesintendedforprotection.Thebenchesare neithercomfortablenordotheyoffermuchtowatch.(PhotobyH.V.Savitch)
jutintoanoncomingtruckbombandstopitcold,theyhavelittlecivilianuseor aestheticvalue.Forthemostpart,peoplearelikelytoshyawayfromthehard, uninvitingsurfacesoftheconcretebenches.Thosewhodochoosetotakeaseat willhaveadifficulttimefindingsomethingthatisinterestingtoobserve. Thesearepricklyspaces.30Byvirtueofeitherplacementorconstruction,prickly spacesaredifficulttocomfortablyoccupy.Theycanincludebacklessbenches, seatsthataretoohigh,toohard,steeplysloped,orladenwithspikes.Wemight doubt whether these spaces were genuinely intended for occupation. Certainly theirprimaryfunctionappearstokeeppeopleaway,withoutindividualshavingto noticethatthespacesareunusuallyuncomfortable. Inotherspacestheneedforsurveillancehasledtoacoarseningoftheurban texture.Whatwasonceafine-grainedbuiltenvironmentthatfacilitatedstopping, watching,chatting,ortakingadetourviaanopengate,istodayaflat,monotonous expanse.Thesespacesarenotsomuchcreatedbyfillingthemwithbarriers,but bythepresenceofforbiddingconditionsthathaveatendencytoemptythestreets. Thebestillustrationofthiscanbefoundat1600PennsylvaniaAvenue.Takenote, forinstance,ofFigures6.9and6.10,whichshowthefrontentrancesoftheWhite HouseaswellclosuresattheendofPennsylvaniaAvenue. WeshouldrecognizethatplacinggatesaroundtheWhiteHouseisnotbrand-new.
138 CHAPTER6
Figure6.9 FieldofVisionattheWhiteHouse
HostilespaceatthecenterofPennsylvaniaAvenue.Noteoneofmanyguardsatthegates oftheWhiteHouse.Intensivesurveillancecansubstituteforbarriersandbringaboutthe nonusageofspace.(PhotobyH.V.Savitch)
Priorto9/11,gatesdemarcatedpedestrianareasfromtheWhiteHouseandadjoiningbuildings.Butratherthanservingasabarrier,thesegatesidentifiedaparticular place, and pedestrians passed through their entrances with minimal inspection. Before9/11,PennsylvaniaAvenuewasabusythoroughfare,notjustfortourists anxioustovisittheWhiteHouse,butforsurroundingbusinesses,strollers,andbusy officials.Itsgateswereusedtoleadandinvitepeopleintoitsinteriorspaces. Allthischangedafter9/11.PennsylvaniaAvenuewasclosedtotraffic,blocked offateachend,andreinforcedbypatrolsandguardhouses.Theavenuewasconvertedintoasuper-block,whichtodayservesasafieldofsurveillance.Policeguard itonfootandpatrolitonbicycle.Hiddenfromviewaresharpshooters,guardswith automaticweapons,armoredtrucks,CBRN(chemical,biological,radiation,and nuclear)units,andmore.Theavenueofpresidentshasbeenturnedintoaconcrete moat.Thisradicalchangeillustratesthatitisnotonlybarriersthatshrinkurban space,butintensifiedsurveillancethatrendersthemuselessbyeliminatinganything thatmakesthemremotelyinteresting. Thesearehostilespaces.Thistermismeanttoconveyanexpanseoflandorthe creationofasuper-block,watchedandguardedbyuniformedpatrols,lackingin detailforpassers-by,andoftenlaborioustotraverse.Therearefewopportunities hereforunintendedstops,chanceencounters,orimpromptudetours.Pedestrians
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Figure6.10 BlockingOffandPatrollingtheWhiteHouse
HostilespaceatthemiddleandendofPennsylvaniaAvenue.Vehiculartrafficisnowclosed offtoaformerlythrivingstreet.Notethebicyclepatrolaswellasthebarelyvisiblebarriersandguardhouseattheendoftheavenue.Whileonecanseesmallclustersofpeoplein frontofthegates,theenvironmentdoesnotinvitelingeringforanylengthoftime.(Photo byH.V.Savitch)
areencouragedtomovequicklyfrompointAtopointB.Whilenotexplicit,the effectonpassers-byistodiscourageactivitythatisunplannedorunofficial. Allinall,wecanunderstandtheeffectsofbarriers,patrols,fortification,and intensifiedsurveillance.Theseprotectionsaremeanttocontrol,investigate,and possiblyapprehendthosewhowouldharmthecityanditspeople.Theyarealso intendedtoreducethevisibilityandexposureofpotentialtargets.Nonetheless, they have created spaces that have either shriveled in size, become prickly for users,orlapsedintoahostileenvironment.Insum,theyhaveshrunkurbanspace andtheirparadoxicaleffectistodrainthecityoftheveryvibrancytheyaresupposedtosafeguard. SurveillanceandPreemption WhenaskedaboutthephysicalchangesmadeforprotectingJerusalem,thecity’s formerchiefengineer,UriShetreet,shruggedoffthequestion.“Terror,”hesaid, “cannotbedealtwithatthepointofcontactoratthemomentofdetonation.” Shetreet continued, explaining that “Any real protection has to stop terrorists
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in their tracks, when they’re preparing or well before, and that takes a lot of hardwork.It’snoteasytobeproactive...anybodyinthisbusinesshastobea desperateoptimist.”31 Shetreetwastalkingaboutpreemptingterrorismbykilling,capturing,orinterdictingattackersbeforetheyhadachancetostrike.Ifanything,hehadunderstated thechallengesthatmakeanykindofpreemptionfeasible.Effectivepreemption requiresextensivesurveillancewhoserangecanincludedirectinfiltrationofterrorist cellstolessdirectscrutinyofmoneytrailsusedtosupportterrorism.Preemption depends upon mounds of intelligence and grounded intimacy with an enemy’s habitsandmovement. Thisisatallandcomplicatedorderanditbeginswithinformationgathering.At baseisthecapacitytofindandblocksourcesoffinance.Terroristsgeneratetheir ownfunds,acquiredthroughvoluntarydonations,copyrighttheft,drugs,smuggling, kidnapping,andshakedownsofArabexpatriates.InSouthAmerica,alQaedaand Hezbollahhaveamassedfundsbysellingpiratedfilmsandrecordings.32InDetroit, terroristoperativeshavemadeuseofmillionsofdollarsinfraudulentcashier’s checks;inBostontheyhaveexploitedcreditcardandsocialsecuritynumbers;and inNorthCarolinaandMichigantheyhaveresortedtocigarettesmuggling.33 Theinstitutionalsourcesofterroristfinanceareextensiveandinvolvetransactionstosendandreceivemoney,“loans”fromconventionalbanks,anddonations tocharitablefronts.Conventionalbanksserveasfinancialintermediariesinlaunderingandfunnelingmoney.TheUnitedStatesandseveralothernationsidentified the Bank al-Taqwa as serving the needs of a conglomerate of radical Islamists includingtheMuslimBrotherhood(Egypt),Hamas(Palestinianterritories),and theArmedIslamicGroup(Algeria).34TheAlRashidTrustiscloselylinkedtoal Qaeda(worldwide)andJa’ishMuhammad(Indiansubcontinent).TheArabBank isknowntohavefunneledmoneytoalAqsaMartyrs’BrigadeandalQaeda(Spain, Pakistan,andYemen).35 EnlistedintheefforttodryupfundsaretheEuropeanUnion(EU),theG8,and ahostofothernations,ledinpartbytheUnitedStates.TheEUkeepsalistofterroristorganizationsandisactivelyengagedintrackingfundsandshuttingdown illicitbankingtransactions.TheG8hasalsocompiledalistofterroristgroupsand frozentheirassets.36 TheUnitedStateshastakenthemostvigorousactionthroughaBrussels-based consortiumofbanksformallycalledtheSocietyforWorldwideInterBankFinancial Telecommunication,dubbedSWIFT.Upuntilrecently,theSWIFTprogramwasa covertoperationconductedbytheFBI,theCIA,andtheU.S.TreasuryDepartment. Workinginconcert,theseagencieswereabletomonitormorethan6trilliondaily transactionsconductedamongnearly8,000financialinstitutions.SWIFTprovided thetechnologytosiphonoffthosethatlookedsuspicious.CountedamongitssuccesseswasthecaptureofaleadingJemaahIslamiyaterroristresponsibleforthe bombinginBaliandotherswhoplottedattacksinNewYorkandLosAngeles.37 CharitablegivingisamainstayofIslamicculture.Someterroristgroupsmaintain
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anetworkofsocialservices,andthismakesthelinebetweencharityandviolence verypermeable.ThefinancialtrailhasoftenledtoSaudiArabia,whichhasfunded charitiesandcharitablefrontsthroughouttheworld.Amongitsmajorbeneficiaries havebeenalQaeda,AbuSayyaf(Phillipines),andHamas.SomeofthemorenotoriouscharitiesincludealWafa(weaponssmugglingintoAfghanistan),theIslamic ReliefOrganization(embassybombingsinAfrica),andtheHolyLandFoundation (suicideattacksinIsrael).Atleastsomeofthesefrontshavebeenraidedandtheir officesshutdownintheUnitedStatesorCanada.38 Preemptionisnormallyassociatedwithmorefrontaloperationsthattrackdown terroristsandinterdictthem.Interpolservesasaclearinghouseforpoliceforces aroundtheworld,anditcoordinatestheactivitiesofmorethan100members.Its FusionTaskForcemaintainsarogue’sgalleryofover300terroristsuspectsand holdsmorethan7,000profiles.Muchofthisiscomplementedbynationalcounterterroristagenciesaroundtheworldwhosemajorprongsincludeacomplexof Americanagencies(FBI,CIA,DepartmentofDefense,HomelandSecurity)aswell asGreatBritain’sMI5anditsHomeOfficeandFrance’sDirectiondelaSurveillance duTerritoire,orDST,anditsspecialcourts.Othernations’counterterrorismagenciesarenolessformidableandincludeRussia’sFederalSecurityService(FSB), Israel’sShinBet,andIndia’sNationalSecurityGuards(NSG).Alloftheseagencies maintainmassivedatabasesthatdenoteareasofterroristconcentration,trajectories ofaction,andprobablelogisticalpaths.Anybodyabletovisittheseagencieswould seemountainsofdigitalinformation,photogalleries,videotapes,audiorecordings, organizationalcharts,networkmatrices,briefingbooks,intelligencereports,and old-fashionedpaperfiles.Onewouldalsospotsmallsurveillancegearlikemini camerasandhigh-endbuggingdevicesforlistening,dubbing,andtaping,aswell asbanksofsecuretelephonesandatelevisiontunedtoalJazeera. Anti-terroristsurveillanceislaborintensive.DuringOperationCrevice,MI5 consumed34,000hoursofintelligenceandpolicework.Listeningdevicesand cameraswereinstalledinthehomesandcarsoftheplotters,andundercoveragents trackedtheirmovementsbydayandnight.Thesheercostandconsumptionoftime required MI5 to limit its priorities, thus preventing it from extending the same surveillancetotheLeedscell. Atalocallevel,NewYork’sleadisunchallenged.NYPD,thecity’s37,000memberpoliceforce,hasmorethan1,000officersdevotedtocounter-terrorism, someofwhomspeakArabic,Pashto,Farsi,andUrdu.ItsCounterTerrorismBureau conductssurveillance,investigates,andispreparedforanypreemptiveaction.The bureau’sworkbeginsatthemicrolevel.Withinitsoffices,mapscanbefoundthat displayneighborhoods,withsometaggedascontainingconcentrationsofPakistanis, Palestinians,orothergroups.39 NYPDhasasignificantnetworkofintelligencegatherersthatworklocallyand internationally. The bureau’s contacts reach into the sinews of the commercial worldwithover25,000contactsthatcoverthecityandsomemajorstates.40Atan internationallevel,bureaupersonnelhavebeenstationedinLondon,Hamburg,Tel
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Aviv,Toronto,Lyon,Amman,andSingapore.41TheyhavevisitedIstanbul,Madrid, andMoscowafterthosecitieswereattacked.Andtheymadespecialeffortstobe onhandaftersuicideattacksinJerusalemandthemassacreofschoolchildrenin Beslan. ThereisalsoagooddealofbrawnconnectedtoNYPD’sbrains.Speciallytrained “Herculesteams”ofheavilyarmedpolice,ridinginarmor-platedautomobilesmight makesuddenappearancesincityhotspots.TheEmpireStateBuilding,Brooklyn Bridge,TimesSquare,andNewYorkStockExchangearelikelyplacesinwhich terroristsmightbeinterdicted.Thecity’ssubwaysystemisgiventhemostcareful scrutiny,andallsevenofitsunderwatertunnelsaresubjecttoconstantsurveillance. Muchofthisisashowofforce—anefforttodemonstratethatthecitycanstrike terroristswithdevastatingeffectandcandosopreemptively. Byatleastthebureau’sownaccounts,interdictionhaspaidoff.Itsundercover agentsspentmorethanayeartrackingaPakistaniimmigrantandhisaccomplice who,in2004,wereplanningtoblowupasubwaystationatHeraldSquare.Ayear before,thebureautracedanalQaedaoperativenamedLymanFarrisashesought outpossibilitiesfordestroyingtheBrooklynBridge.Aftermonthsofsearchingthe target,Farriscalledofftheattackbysignalingtohishandlersthat“theweatheris toohot.”42Anotherwell-knownplotwasallegedtohaveoccurredin2001when analQaedaoperativenamedIssaalHindiwasdiscoveredtohavesearchedout fordestructiontheNewYorkStockExchangeaswellaslargebuildingsinJersey CityandWashington,DC.NYPD’sbureauhasbeengivencreditforinterdicting otherplotsinoraroundthecity.43 Havinglivedthroughoneoftheworstterrorattacksinhistory,NewYorkCity maybeinastateofunusualreadiness.Bythesametoken,NewYorkismuchlike other megaglobal cities. London orTokyo, Mumbai or Cairo contain extensive publictransit,largebuildings,hugeagglomerationsofpeople,andcomplexinfrastructures.TheNewYorkexperiencecouldinformusaboutthecostsandbenefits ofthiskindofsurveillance. SurveillanceontheHornsofaDilemma Therearethosewhodespairofsurveillancepreventingordeterringanattack.Expertsadmitthatlittlecanbedonetotrulystopadeterminedterroristfromreaching somekindoftarget.Theyreasonthatoncetargetsare“hardened”andputoutof reach,terroristscansimplyturnto“softer”targets.Threatsarethendisplacedfrom lessvulnerabletomorevulnerablesites.Othersarguethatsurveillanceandterrorismareinaracewithoutend,whereonesideescalatesitsdefensesonlytofind theothersidehasdiscoveredwaystoevadethosedefenses.Andsoonitgoes,ina racetothebottomwhereeachsidefindsawaytooutwittheother.Inthecourseof runningthatrace,surveillanceexactssocialpenaltiesandmostimportantlycoststo fundamentalrights.DavidLyonisparticularlyskepticalaboutanypossiblegains stemmingfromsurveillanceandadmonishespolicymakersto“bewareofhigh-
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technologysurveillancesystemsthatcannotachievewhattheirproponentsclaim butwhichmayalltoowellcurtailcherishedandhardwoncivilliberties.”44 Thereissomethingtobesaidaboutthedangersofslidingintoasurveillance mentality,wherepeoplecometobelievethatprotectioncanonlybebenign.The day-to-dayinfringementsofsurveillanceareincremental,butthelong-termpoliticalcostsarecumulative.Ironically,theoveruseofsurveillancecanevokefear, generatingtheveryinsecurityitissupposedtoprevent.Whathascometobecalled “surveillancecreep”embodiessnowballingcosts,anditsrisksstemfromnew technologiesthataregraduallyincorporatedintosociety.45Asthetermsuggests, surveillancecreepsneaksuponasocietywithoutmuchnotice.Sometimesthe merediscoveryofdetectionequipmentisenoughtobringittopublicacceptance. Surveillancecreepcanalsobeencouragedbyrivalcitiesthatareseenbylocal elitesasbeingonthe“cuttingedge”ofcivicprotection.Theimmediateresponse istocopythem,lestacitybeaccusedoflaggingbehindthetimes. Continuing,graduallyescalatingsurveillanceisalsothoughttoevokedistrust amongthecitizenry.Scanningpeopleandexaminingtheireverydaymovements producesanatmospherewheresuspicionbecomesthenorm,andthisisboundto redoundonthoseconductingthesurveillance.Thus,itmaynotbebychancethat policeandpolicesupervisorshavebecomelesstrustedandaresometimesfaced withhostility.ThecuriousironyisthatwhilemanyBritishapplaudthepolicefor pursuingterrorists,publicconfidenceinlawenforcementofficershasfallenby 15percentsince2003.Thisisparticularlyacuteamongminorities,wheretrust inthepoliceismuchlower.InLondon’sWhitechapel,beardedyoungmenhand outpamphletswarningtheircompatriotsnottotalktoinvestigators,whileinNew York’sHarlemandParis’snorthernsuburbs,blackorMaghrebianteenagersopenly mockpolicesurveillance. Sometimessurveillancecreepwillbesupersededby“surveillancesurge.”This occurswhentraumaticassaultssuddenlygenerateademandtofindadeterrentor protective shield.46 Events present opportunities for technological innovation, a perceivedneedtouseit,anda“musthaveit”attitude.Theonsetofterrorismin Jerusalem,NewYork,andLondonbroughtanavalancheofnewbusinessesdedicatedtosecurity.Amongthehottestitemssoldtocitieswerecamerasthatfeatured algorithmicsurveillance,newmethodsoffacialdetection,andblackboxesthat testedforcontrabandmaterial. Bothsurveillancecreepandsurveillancesurgearemadepossiblebythehabitsof powerholders.Governmentisaslipperyslopealongwhichincreasedsurveillance cantravel.Oncesecurityagenciesintrudeintopeoples’lives,theyrarelyletgo. Whatwasonceapilotbecomesalong-termfixture.Powerhasavoraciousappetite, andsmallergroupsofofficialdomcanalltooeasilyexploitit. Besides this, it is much safer for politicians and bureaucrats to aggressively adoptsurveillancethanresistit.Afteralarmbellsring,officialsareinclinedto inoculatethemselvesagainstchargesthattheyarefailingtotakeadequateprecautions.Officialdomisalwaysonguardaboutallegationsthatitwasnegligentinnot
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puttingupbarriersagainstatruckbombordidnotadequatelypatrolthecorridors ofashoppingcenterordidnotpurchasesuitabledetectionequipment.Asenseof beingexposedtoriskpromptsauthoritiestodomoresurveillanceratherthanless. Norispublicoverreactionhelpedbythemedia,whichmayrailagainstsurveillancebeforeanattack,butafteranattackwillbethefirsttopointoutwhatwas notdonetothwartit. Ratherthantreatingsurveillanceasanabsoluteliabilitytoberesisted,wemight appreciatethedilemmaassociatedwithanychoice.47Ontheonehand,surveillance violatesprivacy,butitsabsencealsoputspeoples’livesatrisk.Eitherway,wepay aprice—eitherforsurveillanceorforthelackofit.Exactlyhowthisdilemmais resolvedorwhoresolvesitisnotclear.Certainlyifweconsultpublicopinion, surveillanceisfairlywellsupportedinboththeUnitedStatesandWesternEurope. AmericansaresomewhatlessenthusiasticaboutsurveillancethanEuropeans,but bothpublicsgenerallyendorseit.Whenaskediftheywereinfavorofvideocameras, 78percentofAmericansand71percentofEuropeansexpressedapositiveview. Similarly,equalpercentagesofAmericansandEuropeans(54percent)favoredthe monitoringofInternetcommunications.Monitoringofbanktransactionswasless popular,withonlyaminorityofAmericanssupportingit(39percent)andmore Europeansfavoringit(50percent).48 Onamorepracticalbutlessscientificlevel,securityexpertsclaimthepublic actually feels reassured with more surveillance. Public spaces that are visually monitoredorpatrolledorholdentrysearchesaremorelikelytoattractclientele thanthosewithfewornoprecautions.InJerusalem,realestateagentswerequick to point out that enclosed malls and guarded apartment complexes were more likelytopleasebuyersthanunprotectedsites.49HebrewUniversityofficialswere surprisedtolearnthatitsmultiplelayersofsurveillanceactuallyenticedstudents toenroll.50Andordinarycitizensweremoreapttoattendpublicspectaclesthat wereenclosedbytemporarypartitionsandregularlypatrolled.Itmaybethatover aperiodoftime,thepublicwillgrowwearyofsurveillanceandrejectit.Butfor theforeseeablefuture,citizenswillbequicktoexpresstheirsatisfactionwithaggressivesurveillance. SurveillanceonBalance Doesthismeanthateffortstocombatterrorismareboundtoseverelycompromise localdemocracyorpavethewayforarepressivestate?Bysomeaccounts,the UnitedStateshasalreadyreachedthatdismalcondition.WritingaboutAmerican reactionsto9/11,DavidHarveyclaimsthat“Dissidentviewswerecondemned outrightandfreedomsofspeechwerethreatened.Thereweremorethanafewsigns ofU.S.versionsoffanaticismandzealotry,initiallydirectedagainstMuslims.”51 Harveydoesnotindicatewhere,when,orhowoftenfreespeechwasthreatened. Norareweeverinformedabouttheidentityoftheallegedrepressors.Thisleaves theallegationindoubt,buteveniftrue,thesearecrudegeneralizations.Thereis
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a crucial difference between repressions that are sanctioned by government or repressivestatementsthatarepromulgatedbyamassmediaandrepressiveacts byafewhatemongers. TakingHarvey’saccusationastepfurther,anotherwriterasserts:“Systematic staterepressionandmassincarcerationhavethusbeenbroughttobearonArab AmericanneighbourhoodslikeDearbon[sic]inDetroit....ThousandsofU.S. citizenshavealsoeffectivelybeenstrippedofanynotionofvalue,tobethrown intoextraorintra-territorialcampsassuspectterrorists....”52Exactlyhowmany thousandshavebeenincarceratedorthrownintocampsisneverstated,neitheris thefigurecorroborated.Indeed,theestimatesofpost–9/11incarcerationsinthe United States are substantially different than anything suggested by these sentences.53Further,inanationof300millionpeoplestretchingacrossacontinent, oneisboundtofindabuses;tryingtocreatetheimpressionofgovernmentalor popularrampageagainstArabAmericansstrainscredibility.54 Thequestionofsurveillanceisbesttreatedbyavoidinghyperbole,andmany accountsdobringasoberanalysistotheissue.Theseexpressrealconcernsabout slippage inAmerican democracy, and phrase it as a danger to be watched by everyoneandevaluatedbythefactsathand.EditorsandcollaboratorsatUrban AffairsReview(UAR)writeaboutapost–9/11tendencywhere“publicsafetycan overwhelmvaluesemphasizingcivilliberties,civicdiscourseandhumandignity.”55 AnotherUARwriterlegitimatelypointsoutthat“themainthreattocitiescomes notfromterrorism,butfromthepolicyresponsestoterrorism....”56 Theseareseriouswarningsaboutoverreactingtothreatsandtheneedtoput themindemocraticperspective.Anyanswertotheseconcernscanonlybetentativeandextrapolatefromexperience.Todate,theevidencewouldsuggestcautious optimism. India, the world’s largest democracy, and Israel, one of the world’s smallestdemocracies,haveretainedtheessentialsoftheirdemocraticinstitutions. ThishasoccurredwhileSrinagarandMumbai,JerusalemandTelAviv,experienced witheringassaults.TheUnitedKingdom,Spain,andFrancealsohaveheldtotheir democraticinstitutionsinthewakeofattacks.WhenLondon,Madrid,andParis facedwavesofterrorism,allofthesenationsrespondedwithlarge-scalesurveillanceandextraordinarymeasuresforlawenforcement. SpainandFrancehaveimposedasystemofadministrativedeportationforradical Islamistsfoundtobeexhortingotherstocommitactsofterrorism.Citizenshipcan alsoberevokedinsomeinstances.Inbothcountries,legislators,thecourts,and civilrightsgroupshaveactedtocounterpossibleabuses.GreatBritainpassedthe TerrorismActof2006,whichamongothernewlydesignatedillegalities,makes itacrimetoglorifyterrorismorissuestatementsthatleadtoterroristacts.This legislationgoesquitefarinregulatingtheexerciseoffreespeech.Foralltheallegationsaboutbeingexcessive,thelegislationhasbeenscrutinizedintheHouseof Commons,criticizedintheHouseofLords,andheldincheckbyBritishcourts. SimilarresponsesoccurredintheUnitedStates.There,afreepressreportedon possibleexcessesfromOperationSWIFTandanauditingfirmverifiedthatdata
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searcheswereconnectedtoproperintelligenceleads;Congresscontinuedtooversee thePatriotActandthecourtshavefreedpersonsaccusedofviolatinganti-terrorlaws.57 Civillibertiesorganizationshavesprungtolifeinthejudicialarenabyworkingfor defendantrights;coalitionshaveemergedtolobbylegislatorsonbehalfofaliens;and citieshaverefusedtoenforcefederallawsrestrictingimmigration,choosinginstead tobecome“immigrantsanctuaries.”58During2006,theDemocraticoppositionmade impressivegainsatthepolls—itsmembers,rightlyorwrongly,havebeenfulsome criticsoftheJusticeDepartment,theFBI,andtheCIA.Political,legal,andsocial checksonauthorityhaveheld,despite9/11andchargesofterroristplots. Peoplemaycomplainthatgovernmenthasgonetoofarandthatmoreneeds tobedone,butthisisafarcryfromarepressivestate.Democraciesaredynamic, constantlyevolving,andsubjecttoabuse.Theyarefilledwithflaws,butwartsand all,theyareremarkablyresilient.Thisisbecausetheycontainself-correctiveinstitutionsandhabits.Theinstitutionsofdemocraticaccountabilityprovideaclueabout howwemightbalancethethreatofterrorismagainstthecostsofsurveillance. Withtheexceptionofensuringconstitutionalprotections,nohard-and-fastrules canbeputonhighlymutableandunpredictableconditions.Rather,democraticinstitutionsshouldbebroughttobear—incrementally,withpropersafeguards,andas thesituationwarrants.Thisbalancecanbeachievedbyusingstandardincremental techniques—frequentlymatchingmeanstoends,oftenmakingadjustments,and, mostofall,invokingconstantcomparisonsbetweenonesituationanother.59Dependinguponthecircumstances,thebalancewillfrequentlyshift,requireahigh degreeofjudgment,andshouldbeweighedbytypeofsurveillanceandeffectson cityspace.Analertcitizenry,avigilant,honest,andconsistentpress,avigorous legislature,andanindependentjudiciaryaretheonlywaystobalancecompeting ends.Theseinstitutionsshouldbematchedbyenergeticlocalgovernmentandstrong neighborhoodinvolvement.Anetofdemocraticinstitutions,coupledwithcitizen involvement,canthenbeusedtothickenpublicoversightofbureaucraticpolice powers.Thiscombinationofincrementaladjustmentandinstitutionalthicknesscan worktoputsurveillancewithinaframeworkofdemocraticaccountability.60This ismoreeasilysaidthandone,butitremainsthebestavailablechoice. Conclusions Surveillanceofonekindoranotherhasalwaysbeenapartofcitylife.Throughout theMiddleAges,wallsservedthisfunction,andupthroughmoderntimetheyhave becomemoreelaborate.Whilemodernwallsareunsightlyfromafunctionalpoint ofview,theyareneithernecessarilygoodnornecessarilybad.Rather,theyshould bejudgedbytheirpurpose,theiruse,andwhethertheyarenecessary.Somewalls havereducedterrorism,separatedwarringfactionsandestablishingboundaries, whileothershavecreatedcarceralcities. Wallsarejustonewayofmaintainingsurveillance,whichcanbestbeviewed asacontinuumthatrangesfromlesstogreaterobstruction.Theleastobstructive
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areanimatedpresence,panopticdevices,andadvanceddetection;moreobstructive aremoveablebarriersandpatrols;andthemostobstructiveisfortressconstruction.Almostallsurveillanceshrinksspace,thoughsometypesofsurveillanceare moredeleterioustocityspacethanothers.Excessivestreet-watchingandpanoptic devicescancreateunwarrantedsuspicionandstultifysocialrelations.Advanced detectioncanbecomealarminglyOrwellian.Barriershavebeenknowntonarrow city space, and fortress construction can completely block off space. Intensive surveillancecoupledwithforbiddenspacecandeadenstreetlife.Theparadoxical effectofsurveillanceisthatitdrainsthecityoftheveryvibrancyitissupposed tosafeguard. A final component of surveillance is preemption, and experts point out that terrorismcannotbestoppedatthepointofdetonationbutshouldbeinterdicted wellbefore.Thisrequiresextensive,on-the-groundintelligenceaswellasastrong capacitytoapplyforce.NewYorkhasshownitselftobewellaheadofmostcities andcouldbesettingapatternforotherglobalormegacities. For all its drawbacks, surveillance has become necessary. In fact, urban populations have demanded protection, and surveys show that most citizens favorsurveillanceofonekindoranother.Thechallengeistoresolveparticular tensions—between the need for a modicum of surveillance and a maximum oflocaldemocracyaswellastheneedtominimizetargetvulnerabilityandto maximizetheopenqualitiesofcityspace.
7 SustainingLocalResilience
Youknow,IreallymissSeptember10th. —Doonesbury 9/11Dystopia September11willbestberememberedbecauseitcametosymbolizeanewconsciousnessandbroughtaboutanewera.Foralltherightfulrecognitionthatday brought,italsodrewanextremelydismalpictureoftheurbanfuture—or,asitis calledhere,9/11dystopia.Theelementsof9/11dystopiaweremanifestedindifferentresponsestotheattack.Onewasanemotionalresponsereflectingadeep pessimismthatsawcitiesfallingintostiflingfearanddarkrepression.Another hadmoretodowithastrategicresponse,andsawthepathtonationalsurvivalin movementawayfromcitiesandtowarda“defensivedispersal”ofpeople,housing, andindustry.Thelastwasburrowedinabeliefthatcitieshadgoneastraybecause oftheirinfatuationwith“tallbuildings.”Accordingtothiscreed,skyscrapersnot onlycompromisedthevaluesofsoundplanningbutmadecitiesvulnerabletoattack.Eachoftheseresponsesistakenup. Themostemotionalresponsesweredrawninthedaysimmediatelyfollowing 9/11anddenotedanewworldofdarkness.Oftenheardwerepredictionsabout growing repression by armed police, bounty hunters, and authoritarian rulers. Imagemakersproducedafrightfulpicture.Broughtintovogueagainwerefilms like Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, an expressionist work made in 1920s Germany, and Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, anAmerican cult classic released during the 1980s.Whileseparatedbymorethanhalfacentury,bothfilmsshowthecityat itsworst—lordedoverbytechnologygonemad,riddenbysocialdivisions,and headedforself-destruction. At a scholarly level, Harold Lasswell’s 1941 classic, “The Garrison State,” wasbroughtbacktolifetoshowthepoliticaltemperof9/11dystopia.Thearticle presagedanequallybleakurbanfuture.1Lasswellwantedto“considerthepossibility”thatwewouldfaceaworldwhere“specialistsinviolence”wouldbecomethe mostpowerfulgroup.Hewentontowritethat“internalviolencewouldbedirected principallyagainstunskilledmanualworkersandcounter-eliteelements,whohave comeundersuspicion.”2Ashesawit,societywastheretoberuledbythosewho couldmanipulateappealingsymbolsanddominatemassopinionthroughpublic 148
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 149
relations.Lasswell’s“garrisonstate”wentfarbeyondMadisonAvenuemanipulation andtookthecoerciveformofmilitarycontrolcoupledwithmoderntechnology. Itscardinalrulewasobedience,service,andwork.Inmanyways,theideaofa “garrisonstate”wasinfluencedbytherisingfascismofthe1930s,buttosomeit seemedapplicabletothedaysfollowing9/11whentheFBIlaunchedlarge-scale searchesandpoliceswarmeddowntownstreets. Thiswasdystopia’semotionalmindset,anditwasfilledbythespeculationof newspapercolumnists,popularwriters,andacademics.Littlemorethanamonth after9/11,MikeDavisreferredto“militaryandsecurityfirmsrushingtoexploit thenation’snervousbreakdown.”Theywould“growrich,”hewrote,“amidstthe generalfamine.”Davispredictedthat“Americanswillbeexpectedtoexpressgratitudeastheyarescanned,frisked,imaged,tappedandinterrogated....Security willbecomeafull-fledgedurbanutilitylikewaterandpower.”3Daviswasnoless ominousabouttheeconomyashedeclaredthatthecomingdays maylikelybetheworstrecessionsince1938andwillproducemajormutations in theAmerican city.There is little doubt, for instance, that bin Laden et al. haveputasilverstakeintheheartofthe“downtownrevival”inNewYorkand elsewhere.Thetraditionalcitywherebuildingsandlandvaluessoartowardthe skyisnotyetdeadbutthepulseisweakening.4
WhileDaviswasatanextremeendofdystopia,othersintheplanningprofessionjoinedhim.Oneprofessionalvoicedconcernthat“thewaragainstterrorism threatenstobecomeawaragainstthelivabilityofAmericancities.”5Ataboutthe sametime,ColumbiaUniversityplannerPeterMarcuseflatlypredictedof9/11that “theresultsarelikelytobeafurtherdowngradingofthequalityoflifeincities, visiblechangesinurbanform,thelossofpublicuseofpublicspace,restrictions onfreemovementwithinandtocities,particularlyformembersofdarkerskinned groups,andthedeclineofopenpopularparticipationinthegovernmentalplanning anddecision-makingprocess.”6Thesewerenotisolatedcommentaries,andsimilar diagnoseswerepublishedalongwithMarcuse’sarticleintheInternationalJournal ofUrbanandRegionalResearch.7 Inthemidstofthis,anothergroupofwriterstookadifferenttack,arguinginstead forachangeinurbanstrategy.Theirwatchwordwas“defensivedispersal,”andthe ideawastofindapaththatwouldensuresafety.AsmentionedinChapter3,“defensivedispersal”datesbacktothe1950s,wheninterstatehighwayswerelauded becausetheyproducedlow-densitysuburbsthatwouldeludeasingledevastating bomb.TheHousingActof1954hadreinforceddefensivedispersalbypromoting low-densityperipheraldevelopment.Otheradvocatesofdispersallaidoutascheme tobuild“adispersedpatternofsmall,efficientcities”withradiatingexpressways inordertothwartanenemyattack.8Once9/11hit,theideaofdefensivedispersal wasrevisedandlinkedtothedigitalageandabroadermovementtowarddecentralization.Asthetheorywent,compactcitieshadoutlivedtheirusefulnessand werenotasefficientasplannersmighthavethought.Buildingdensitybyvertically
150 CHAPTER7
storingpeopleandindustrywasoutmoded,andmodernindustrywouldoperate farmoreefficientlyonanexpandedhorizontalscale.Evenairpollutionwouldbe better controlled by dispersing population across wide-open spaces rather than confiningpeopletocompactcities.Thedigitalagehadrenderedcompactcities unnecessarybypermittingpeopletocommunicateacrossvastdistances.9Besides, sincewewerealreadyasuburbannation,whynotpushthistrendfurtherandgain adefensiveedge? ThetheoryofdefensivedispersalwaspromotedbyeditorialistsfromtheWall StreetJournal,whosawanadvantageinsprawledcities,andbyjournalistsatthe DetroitNews,whonotedthat“inthewakeofSeptember11,theconstituencyfor densityhadprobablythinnedout.”10Otherwritersbegantothinkaloudaboutthe dangersofdensityandsawatrendinthemaking.Inanarticletitled,“TheDeClusteringofAmerica,”JoelKotkinwrote,“thedispersionoftalentandtechnology tovariouspartsofthecountryandtheworldhasalteredtheoncefixedgeographies oftalent.”11Bythisthinking,counteringterroralsocoincidedwithlow-density andunstructuredpatternsofsettlementwhereanythingcouldbedoneanywhere. AsKotkinsawit: ThisdispersiontrendhasbeenfurtheracceleratedbythefalloutfromSeptember 11.Already, many major securities companies have moved operations out of Manhattan....Manyofthemhavesignedlong-termleasesandaren’tcoming back.FinancialandotherbusinessservicefirmsaremigratingtotheHudson Valley,NewJersey,andConnecticut.12
Finally,9/11dystopiawasreinforcedbyabeliefaboutthedecliningqualityof urbanlife.Thiswasatestimonyaboutvaluesthatneededtoberestoredanditwas basedonanaversiontotallbuildings.Farfrombeinganefforttoabandonthecity, thesewriterswantedtoreinstateamoretraditionalEuropean-styledcity,whose humanscalewouldfacilitatecloseridentitywithinameaningfulcommunity.For thesevalue-orientedtheoreticians,tallbuildingshadnotonlyrobbedthecityofits humanity,butbroughtsuffocatingcongestiontoitsstreetsandoverloadeditsfragile infrastructure.Packingpeopleintoflooruponfloorofskyscraperwasintolerable, anditcreatedanabysmalcondition,whichtheylabeled“urbanhypertrophy.”13 Having discredited tall buildings because of their seeming threat to humanity, itwasnotafarsteptopointuptherisksofinhabitingthemandpredictingtheir demise.Twourbanwritersmountedthecampaignagainsttallbuildings,writing shortlyafter9/11that“Weareconvincedthattheageofskyscrapersisatanend. Itmustnowbeconsideredanexperimentalbuildingtypologythathasfailed.We predictthatnonewmegatowerswillbebuilt,andexistingonesaredestinedtobe dismantled.”14 Tosaytheleast,9/11dystopiawasstark.Iteithersawlittlefutureforcitiesor arguedfortheircompletereconception.Itwaspredicatedonsomenarrowpossibilities.Eithersocietyhadrottedfromtheinsideandtheattacksweretobeexpected,
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 151
orcitieshadleftthemselvesexposedtoSeptember11bymisplaceddevelopment andtheyshouldbeabandonedorrevamped.Takenasawhole,the9/11disillusion wasareactiontorecentdecadesofurbandevelopmentanditsremediesleftlittle roomforleeway. TheResilientCity UnderstandingResilience Atbest,9/11dystopiamissedthemarkandatworstitignoredacity’scapacityfor resilience.Beforeexploringthisproposition,wemightaskhowpeoplewhohad observedandstudiedthecityforsolongcouldhavebeensomistaken.Anynumber ofexplanationsisplausible.Amongthemoreapparentreasonsforthemiscalculation wasthatlowerManhattan’sdevastationwassoextensivethatitdistortedindividual perspectives.Asinglestrokeofsogreatamagnitudehadsostunnedthepublic, andcreatedsodarkacloud,thatitwastodifficulttospotasilverliningmuchless seesunlight.Amidthegloomonecouldonlyportendadditionalgloom.Another explanationforthedistortionsof9/11dystopiaislessgenerous.Thisrestsonthe ideologyofitsanalysts—fromboththepoliticalleftandthepoliticalright.As thisexplanationgoes,somecommentatorsweresoconvincedabouttherighteousnessoftheirbeliefthattheysawitsvindicationinanyactorcircumstance.Their predictionswerecouchedinapolemicthatsoughttojustifyitspremises.Afinal explanationwoulddenythat9/11dystopiawasentirelywrong.Itmightgoonto arguethatmostoftheanalysesandpredictionswerebasicallycorrect.Dystopia’s defendersmightcitethegrowthofsurveillanceandtheshrinkageofurbanspace toconvinceanaudiencethattheirprognosiswascorrect.Thosewhoheldadim viewofthecitymightalsopointtothecontinuingflighttothesuburbs.Whilethis hassomeplausibility,thefactsaboutwhathappenedtoNewYork(andothercities) afterbeingattackeddonotquitefit. Anyassessmentofresilienceworksbestwhenguidedbythehistoricorempirical record,mostparticularlybyothercitiesthatunderwentwarfare,terror,orendemic violence.15Whilethisisacomplicatedmatter,themajorityoffindingspointina similardirection.Thesalientconclusionisthatmostcitieshavearemarkablecapacityforresilience.Citiesmaywellexperienceshort-termnegativeeffectsfrom anattack,butundervaryingconditionsandovervaryingperiodsoftimetheydo recover.Moreover,recoveriesarenotaccompaniedbyaperiodthatgivestoarise a“garrisonstate”orrepressivepolitics.16Tothecontrary,citiesinfreesocieties retainthefundamentalsoflocaldemocracy,andwhilecitizensmayfeelpangsof anxiety,theirday-to-dayhabitsareunchanged.17 Togetabetterideaofhowresilienceworks,wecanthinkofcitiesaslargeagglomerationsofhumansettlement,socialrelations,andfactorsofproduction—held together and made dynamic by an extensive infrastructure.What makes cities dynamiciscircularcausation,wherefortuitouscircumstancestriggerpositiveef-
152 CHAPTER7
fects,whichinturnfeedthosecircumstancesagaintoproducestillmorepositive effects.Lyingattheheartofthisrepetitiveprocessisthemagnitudeofthecityand itsdynamicagglomeration.Generallyspeaking,thelargerandmoredynamicthe city,themoredifficulttosetitinreverse.Anyattackwouldhavetobemassivein ordertopermanentlyhalttheseself-generatingprocesses.Evenwhensubjectto enormousshocks,citiesseemtoregenerateandspringbacktolife. Themostcompletepictureontheeffectsofviolentshocktourbansocietycan befoundinstudiesofconventionalwarfare.Researchonselectcitiesexamines theirexperiencewithintenseperiodsofincessantbombing,firestorms,oreven atomicwarfare,andshowsthemtoberemarkablyresilient.IntheUnitedKingdom andFrance,LondonandParisexperiencedyearsofairbombing,closecombat, or military occupation. In Germany, cities like Cologne, Hamburg, Berlin, and Dresdenweresubjecttoheavyaerialbombardment.InJapan,thedevastationin TokyoandespeciallyHiroshimaandNagasakiwasmuchgreater.Largesections ofJapanesecitiesweredestroyedandhundredsofthousandsofpeoplekilled.Yet allofthesecitiesinEuropeandAsiarecovered,andmostwentontoaperiodof unprecedentedprosperity.18 Asomewhatmorecomplicatedpictureemergesfromcitiesunderterroristattack. Asweknow,urbanterrorisadifferenttypeofwarfarethatemphasizeslongerassaultsoncivilians,persistentattacksgearedtowardthedecontrolofterritory,and sustainedeffortstoparalyzenormallife.Ratherthanextensiveandabruptshock, mostterrorconsistsoflow-intensitywarfarethatissupposedtoweartheenemy downthroughprotractedfriction.19Itstandstoreasonthaturbanterrormightaffectcitiesindifferentwaysthanconventionalmilitaryaction.Inthesecases,the evidencepointstovaryingdegreesofrecoveryovervaryingperiodsoftime.While thefindingsarequalified,theystillarereasonablyoptimistic.StudiesofAmerican citiesindicatethattheyare“highlyunlikelytodeclineinthefaceofevenasustained terrorist campaign.”20 Other research on Italian cities demonstrates short-lived economiceffectslastingforaboutayearafterattack.21Anotherlineofworkon IsraeliandBasquecitiesshowslonger-termeffectsfromterrorism,thoughinthe absenceofcontinuedattackstheseeffectsdowearoff.22 Weshouldunderstandthatresilienceisnotanabsoluteoramatterofeitherbeing resilientornot.Citiesareresilienttodifferentextents,indifferentways,andhave differentperiodsofrecovery.Muchdependsonthesizeofthecity,thestrength ofitseconomy,anditssocialcoherence.Thesefactorscanthenbecoupledtothe frequency and severity of attack to obtain a more nuanced picture of recovery. Fromallindications,theresilienceofNewYorkandLondonaredifferentfrom thatofJerusalem. Howmightweknowwhetherresiliencehasbeenachieved?Whileitisnormally difficulttopreciselysortouttheeffectsofonevariableuponanother,assessing resilienceinvolvesthesimplertaskofdeterminingtheextenttowhichaprevious conditionhasbeenreinstated.23Simplyput,thethresholdforresiliencecanbesatisfiedbyestablishingwhetheracityhasbouncedbackaftersustaininganattackor
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 153
waveofterror.Forexample,afteracityexperiencedmegaterrorwewouldwant toknowwhetherthepopulationhasreturned,orafteracityincurredsmartterror whetheraninfrastructurehasbeenrebuilt.Measurableresultsshouldthentellus whetheranareahasrecovered,theextentofthatrecovery,orwhetheranyrecovery tookplace.Resiliencemightalsobeachievedifanattackhadnotchangedfundamentalconditionsorhadnosignificanteffectonnormallife.Thiswouldmeana cityhadseennoadversechangeandwithstoodanintendedshock.Acitymeeting thesecriteriacouldbeseenasresilient. DifferentCities/DifferentResilience Asweknow,NewYork’sterrorismhasbeensporadicandmarkedbyoneenormous blow.Withover3.5millionjobsandagrossproductof$400billion,NewYork possessesoneofthelargestlocaleconomiesintheworld.24Almost64percentof thecity’sagglomerationislocatedinManhattan,andmostofthatisconcentrated initsmidtownordowntownbusinessdistricts.25Highfinanceundergirdsthisgreat financialedifice,anditsgeographicconcentrationmakesitvulnerabletoattack. September11showedjusthowsmartterrorcouldpinpointcriticalassets. London’sterrorismhasbeenlessmurderous,thoughmorefrequent,andhas occurredincyclicalpatternssincethe1970s.ItseconomyissimilarinsizetoNew York’s,withanemploymentbaseofcloseto4millionjobsandagrossproduct ofover$250billion.26London’scentralbusinessdistrictisconcentratedinThe CityandinthecentralboroughsofWestminsterandKensington,lyingtothewest. MuchlikeNewYork’sbusinesscores,theseareasaredrivenbyhighfinance.27 Whilethecycleofattacksinthe1990stargetedTheCity,theattackof7/7was somewhatmoredispersed,occurringinWestminsterandTheCity,butalsojust astridetheseboroughs. Bycomparisonwithitstwogiantcounterparts,Jerusalem’ssocioeconomicprofileisquitemodestanditspatternofcontinuedterrordiffers.Jerusalem’s180,000 jobsanditsgrossproductof$14billionareafractionofitsgiantcounterparts.28 Also,unliketheothertwocities,Jerusalemisanotaneconomiccapitalbutapoliticalandreligiousone.Itscentralbusinessdistrictconsistsofmoderatelypriced retailshops,restaurants,andafewimportantbanks.Governmentbuildingsand culturalinstitutionsarescatteredthroughoutthecity. Oneassetthatallthreecitieshaveincommonisanimportanttouristindustry, thoughthistoogreatlyvariesinsize.Londonisoneoftheforemosttouristdestinationsoftheworld,anditstourismreachedazenithin2005with14.9million foreignvisitors.NewYork’stourismislessthanhalfthatmuch,havingreachedits heightin2005with6.8millioninternationaltourists.TourismisoneofJerusalem’s majorindustries,anditstourismreachedapinnaclein2000with953,000visitors. Unlikemorestableindustries,theelasticityoftourismrelativetoterrorisauseful abarometeroflocalresilience. Underthecircumstances,wewouldexpecttheresilienceofthesecitiestobe
154 CHAPTER7
markedlydifferentfromoneanother,anditis.Amongthefactorsusedtoassess recoveryinNewYork,London,andJerusalemareemployment,tourism,andoffice markets(seeAppendix,TablesA13andA14). ResilienceinNewYork,London,andJerusalem Intheimmediateperiodafter9/11,NewYorkemploymentfellsharplyandthe citylostmorethan100,000jobs.29Thedropwasprecipitous,linkeddirectlyto thecollapseinlowerManhattan,anditoccurredinthefewmonthsafterSeptember.ThebulkofthelostemploymentoccurredintheareaaroundtheWorld TradeCenter,thoughitalsospreadtootherpartsofManhattanandtherestof thecity.Foratime,thejobsituationwasbleak,butby2004thecity’semploymentbegantomoveupward;bytheendof2005thecity’sjobbasehadreached 3.6million.30 London’scyclicalviolenceburstoutagainbetween1990and1993,whenfinancialinstitutionsweretargetedbytheIRA.BycomparisontoNewYork,these attackswerepinpricks,thoughtheyengenderedahugepsychologicalresponse, whicheventuallyledtothe“ringofsteel.”Whileitisnotpossibletoattributethe subsequentdropinLondon’semploymenttotheseattacks,thefalloffwassignificant. Oncethecycleofterrorhadceased,Londonwasdownbyabout450,000jobsfrom thepreviousperiod.31AsinNewYork,thenumbercreptupinsubsequentyears, andbytheturnofthecenturyemploymentreachedahighthathoveredaroundthe 4millionmark. For Jerusalem, the key period of terror occurred in the fall of 2000 through 2002. Here, too, the City Center was targeted, though neighborhoods within a shortdistancewerealsostruck.UnlikeLondon,thetargetswerepeople,ratherthan financialinstitutions.Whilebusinesseswereseverelyaffectedandmanyclosed, otherswaitedoutthestorm.TheIsraeligovernmentalsosteppedintobolsterthe localeconomy.32Apparently,governmentprogramsmadeupforprivatebusiness failuresandthroughtheseyearsjobsremainedatabout180,000.By2003,terrorismsubsidedandemploymentroseto183,000;ithassincemodestlycontinued onthattrajectory.33 Table7.1summarizestheseobservations.Notetheperiodsinwhichterrorism begantorise,reachaplateau,andwinddown.Aswecansee,thereareinstances whenemploymentfallsafteranattackandgraduallyrisesasterrorismsubsides. Thereisalsovariabilityineachcityandinstanceswhereanattackhadnodiscernible effectonemployment.ThefirstattackonNewYork’sWorldTradeCenter(1993) leftnoimprint.Tothecontrary,employmentcontinuedtorisethroughthe1990s. Thesecond,muchbiggerattack(2001)leftadeepimprint,butby2004thecity showedsignsofrecovery.LondonfellintoatroughjustastheIRAstruckinthe early1990s,butitsemploymentdramaticallyacceleratedthroughtime.Jerusalem faredsomewhatworseandalsosomewhatbetter.Itsdrop-offwasnotassteep,but itsrecoverywasslowerandmoremodest.
3,810
NewYork
London
1990
1991
3,540
3,380
1992
3,410
3,260
1993
3,340
WTC first attack
3,220
148.7
155.0
161.4
IRAterrorcampaign
3,720
3,600
1994
166.0
3,360
3,250
1995
171.0
3,400
3,280
1996
177.0
3,460
3,270
1997
180.2
3,610
3,480
1998
181.6
3,750
3,550
1999
180.6
3,856
3,650
2000
2001
180.1
4,014
WTC second attack
3,630
2002
181.0
3,921
3,510
2003
183.0
3,928
3,500
alAqsaterrorcampaign
180.6
4,060
3,821
2004
183.5
3,953
3,580
Source:U.S.DepartmentofLabor,BureauofLaborStatistics,CurrentEmploymentSurvey,2006;“CityResearchFocus,”availableatwww. cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/business_city/research_statistics/Research+periodicals.htm#focus.JerusalemInstituteforIsraelStudies,2001, 2002,2003StatisticalYearbookofJerusalem;datawereestimatedforJerusalem2003and2004.
Jerusalem
1989
3,550
City
EmploymentandTerrorisminNewYork,London,andJerusalem(inthousands)
Table7.1
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 155
156 CHAPTER7
Mightallthisbecoincidenceandtiedtootherfactors?Nodoubtexogenous factorsplayedarole,thoughwecanseethesamefallandriseinothersectors ofthelocaleconomy,particularlytourism.Foreigntourismisausefulgaugeof resiliencebecauseofitssensitivitytolarge-scale,highlypublicizedviolence. Ifacitywereresilient,wewouldexpectforeignvisitorstoreturnwithinareasonableperiodoftime.Indeed,intheimmediateyearsafter9/11,NewYork’s touristtrafficplummeted.Ayearaftertheattack,tourismhaddroppedby25 percentcomparedtoitspre-attacklevel,andbythesecondyearithadfallen by more than 29 percent from its pre-attack level.34 For a while it appeared thetouristindustrywouldfade,butby2004itwasbackupandby2005the industry had fully recovered to its pre-disaster level of 6.8 million foreign visitorsannually. London’stourismwashardlytouchedbytheattacksof1990–93andtourism actuallyincreased.By1995,London’stourismhadgrowntomorethan13million foreignvisitorseachyear.Followingsomeerraticyears,LondontourismcontinuedtoriseuntiltheattacksofJuly7,2005.35Theattacksofthatsummerchanged everything,wreakingalsoashort-termeffectontourism.Duringthemonthafter 7/7,tourismfellby18percentfromthepreviousyearandthedeclinepersisted intoAugust.36NotuntilSeptemberdidtourismbegintorevive,andithasnow climbedtoanall-timehigh.Apossibleexplanationforthedifferencebetweenthe pre–andpost–7/7touristreactionwasthehumantollofthelatestattacks.London demonstratedagainthatmegaterroraimedatpeopleismoredamagingtothetourist industrythansmartterroraimedatthings. Jerusalem, where attacks have been especially aimed at people, bears out thisgeneralization.Figure7.1showsthetrajectoryofterrorismcountedbytotal casualtiesascomparedtothetrajectoryforhoteltrade,countedbynumbersof foreignhotelguests.Observetheclearinverserelationshipasthelinesriseand fallinoppositedirections.Duringthe1990s,lowterrorcorrespondedtohigh touristvisitsandthenumberofforeignvisitorssurpassed950,000attheturnof thecentury.Bytheendof2000,JerusalemwasinthethroesofalAqsaviolence. Terrorismshotupandwecanseetourismplummetingduringthisperiod.As casualtiesfromterrorcontinuedtorisethroughtheyears2001and2002,tourism continuedtofall.Bytheendof2003,terrorismhadtakenasharpdeclineand tourismroseonceagain.Thetrendtowardlowerterrorismandhighertourism continuesthrough2004asthelinesmoveagaininoppositedirections.Withthe declineofterrorism,Jerusalembegantobounceback,thoughitisstilladistance fromrecordlevels. Officemarketsalsoreflectacity’scapacityforresilience.Theyindicatewillingnesstoinvestinacity,useclusteredenvironments,andtakeachanceontall buildings.Jerusalemhasrelativelylittleofthiskindofinvestmentandalmostno tallbuildings,andweputthatcaseinabeyance.ButNewYorkandLondonare the world’s corporate office capitals and exemplify the dynamics of urban agglomeration.
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 157
Figure7.1 ElasticityandResilienceinJerusalemTourism,1998–2004 (foreignguestsshowninthousands) 1,000
800
600
400
200
0 1998
1999
2000 Casualties
2001
2002
2003
2004
Foreign Guests
Source: Data derived from Table XII/4—Foreign Guests, Overnight Stays,Average Overnight Stays per Guest, and Occupancy in Tourist Hotels in Jerusalem, 1985–2004. StatisticalYearbookofJerusalem,2004.JerusalemInstituteforIsraelStudies.
NewYork’sreboundisinstructive.Afterthelossandinjurytolives,themost devastatingeffectof9/11wasthelossofbuildingsandofficespace.Thecity’s estimatedpropertyandattendantlossesreachashighas$83billion.Thefigure includesthelossofsixbuildingsoftheWorldTradeCenterandthecomplete destructionof13.4millionsquarefeetofofficespace.Puttingthisinperspective, thedestroyedspaceequaledtheentireofficestockinthecityofDetroit.37 Undercloudsofdistrustfortallbuildings,onemighthaveexpectedthedisasterthatbefellNewYorktohaveeliminateditsmarketdemand.Indeed,fora whiletheofficemarketcontinuedtosoften,eveninthewakeofspaceshortages createdby9/11.Inthetwoyearsafter9/11,officevacanciesroseinManhattan andelsewherearoundthenation.By2005,however,officemarketshadturned around.Mid-Manhattanvacanciesshrunktobelow8percentwhilelowerManhattanfellbelow11percent.Manhattan’sofficemarketswerenotbacktothe halcyondaysofthelate1990s,buttheyhadconsiderablyimprovedfromthe devastationof9/11andby2005theyweretheenvyofmuchoftheworld(see Appendix,TableA14). Thenewswasgoodonotherfrontsaswell.Surveysshowedthatmorethan halfthedisplacedtenantshadreturnedtolowerManhattanandmanyotherfirms
158 CHAPTER7
hadchosenNewYorklocations.38Mostencouraging,thebulkofthosewhosought newlocationschosetallbuildingsoftwentystoriesorhigher.39Elsewhereinthe country,tallbuildingsweredoingquitewell.FromBostontoDallas,developers continuedtoputupskyscrapersandfillthem.Amongthefirsttoridethetidewas developerDonaldTrump,whotriedtobuildChicago’stallestskyscraper.Trump hasalsosethissightsforatallhotelandtowerinToronto. OfficemarketshavebeenevenstrongerinLondon.Vacancyratesinthecentral boroughshavehalvedinjusttworecentyears.By2006,emptyofficespacehad fallen to under 5 percent (seeAppendix, TableA14). The largest development firmspushhardtoobtainconstructionpermitsforskyscrapers,albeitwithgreat publiccontroversyabouttheiraestheticdesirability.Themostfervidrushandthe sharpestcontroversiestranspireoverwhohadalreadybuiltorwasabouttobuild thetallestbuilding.Asofthiswriting,permissionwasgrantedtobuildLondon BridgeTower,whichwillrise1,000feet(305meters)abovestreetlevelandwill becomeEurope’stallestbuilding.Londonalsobehavedinanuntraditionalmanner whenitsplanexplicitlyendorsedtallbuildings,cheeredonbytheeffusivesupport ofitssocialistmayor.40 AsIgalCharneypointsout,tallbuildingshavecontinuedtoappealtocities.41 Sometimescalled“trophy”or“designer”buildings,theyarenowasourceofprestige.MoscowandSeoulhavealreadyapprovedbuildingsthataretwicetheheight ofthoseplannedforChicago,Toronto,andLondon.Dubaihasalreadygranted permissiontoconstructtheworld’stallestbuilding.Thesenewbuildingsexceed theheightoftheformerTwinTowers.42 Finally,asiftodefytheadmonitionagainsttallbuildings(andpossibleattackers),skyscrapersareonceagainspringingupatgroundzero.TheFreedom Towerisnowunderconstructionandso,too,isa2millionsquarefootoffice towernotfaraway.Asofthiswritingbanksandfinancialhousesareplanning otherskyscrapersinthearea.WhilelowerManhattan’scentralbusinessdistrict had slipped after 9/11, it is now rising again as one of the nation’s foremost financialcenters. Tallbuildingshavepersistedagainstthewishesofdystopianvaluewritersaswell asthelawsofeconomics.Ascommercialventures,tallbuildingsareinefficient. Skyscrapersforeverfightagainsttheirownweightbecausesomuchcapacityis consumedsupportingtheirupperheight.Numerousairshafts,elevators,pillars,and othersupportstakeup30percentofpotentiallyrentablespace.Intheaftermathof 9/11,theideaofconstructingstillmorevulnerabletargetsseemedinconceivable. Oneeconomistexpressedhisfearthat“foratleastadecade,theprimaryrealestate issueregardingterroristattackswillnotbe60versus100storybuildings...but whetheranyunsubsidizedbuildingswillbebuiltbytheprivatesectoratall.”43On thisissue,moderneconomistshavebeenoutpredictedbyarchitecturalphilosophers ofanotherera.The“tallofficebuilding,”wroteLouisSullivanin1896,“isoneof themoststupendous,oneofthemostmagnificentopportunitiesthattheLordof NatureinHisbeneficencehaseverofferedtotheproudspiritofman.”44
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 159
ResilienceandOtherConsiderations Afairassessmentofthesecitieswouldconcludethattheyreboundedfromdisaster becauseofthestrengthoftheirsocialfabric,thedynamismoftheireconomies,and theoptimismoftheircitizenry.Inhisreviewofpost–9/11Americancities,Peter Eisingerremarks,“Ifthetextureandpaceofcitylifearecloudedsomewhatby publicanxietyaboutterror,theactualchangesurbandwellersencounterintheir dailylivesinmostplacesinthecountryandatmosttimesaresmallandrelatively unobtrusive.”45Withsomequalificationabouttimeofrecovery,muchthesame couldbesaidforothercitiesaroundtheworld.Formostothercitiesstruckbyterror, timeisakeyelementinjudgingrecoverybecausethosecitieslackthemagnitude ofNewYorkorLondon. Jerusalempresentsthealternativeviewofamajor,mid-sizedcity.Inthemidst ofwaveafterwaveofattack,thecitylookedasifitwouldneverrecover.This authorwasinJerusalemobservingthesituationduringonesuchwaveandwrote inalaterarticle: AtleastforthemomentpartsofdowntownJerusalemhavebeguntoresemble olderAmericanurbancoresthatwereshatteredbyde-industrialization.[Their] wornlookcreatesa“brokenwindows”atmospherethatcanonlydiscouragebusiness....Oncethrivingretailershavenowleftandrentalsignshangeverywhere. Somerentshavedroppedbyasmuchas90percent.Thosepropertiesthathave beenrentedsellcheap,fast-turnovermerchandise.Onceupscalejewelryshops now offer inexpensive souvenirs for sale. Former clothing shops have been convertedintostoragefacilities.Accessoriesandtrinketshanginstorewindows orlieonmakeshiftstands.Theupperfloorsofsomebuildingshavebeenturned intogamblingrooms,exoticdancingstudiosandsexclubs.Downtownappears tobestruckbytheeffectsofacrimewave(bleakanddowngraded)ratherthan war(completedevastationandrubble).46
Thepassagescontinueinthisarticle,emphasizingthatanypessimismabout thecity’sfutureshouldbetemperedbyanumberofcaveatsaboutdrawinghasty conclusions.Amongthesewasthat“Jerusalemitesareresilient,andevenaftera bloodyattacktheypersevere.”47Sincethen,thecityhascontinuedtorecover.Foreign touristshavereturnedtoitshotels,downtownstreetsarerefilled,andrestaurants havereopened.Tourismhasnotyetreturnedtoitspeakyearof2000,butithas comecloseandforasinglerecentyearhasnowexceeded850,000foreignvisitors. Thecityisalsoexperiencingarealestateboom.Housing,retail,andofficemarkets arerobustandinmanyplacespriceshavegoneabovepre-terrorismlevels.While notallsectorshavefullyrecovered,mosthavemadesubstantialprogress.Clearly, ifJerusalem’s700,000residentsshowthiscapacityforresilience,wecansayitis notthesolepreserveofmegaorglobalcities. Weshouldalsoacknowledgethatwhileresilienceentailsrecovery,itdoesnot eraseadisaster.Criticalevents,liketerrorism,doleaveamarkofonekindoranother.Sometimesthatmarkcangerminateintoamovementthathadbeenhardly
160 CHAPTER7
discerniblebeforeterrorstruck;atothertimesitcanacceleraterecognizedtrends. Jerusalem’sexperiencewithattackscatalyzedanexistingexodusofhouseholds fromthecenterintotheperipheries.TheattackonNewYorkcatalyzedanexisting movementofbusinessfromlowerManhattantomidManhattan.London’sbout withterrorismtookasocietythatwasheavilyriddenwithsurveillanceandmade itevenmoreso.Thefinalwordonurbanresiliencemayneverbewritten,butTom Wolfe’smaximthat“youcan’tgohomeagain”ringseversotrue.48Thechallenge istomakethatverydifferentfutureamoresecureone. SustainingaBetterFuture TheNationalApproachtoSustainingResilience Muchofacity’sresiliencestemsfromitsagglomerativenatureandwhatmight becalleditsnaturaldynamism.Butthisishardlytheendofthestory,becausea city’scapacityforresilienceisneitherautomaticnorisitunassisted.Rather,local resilienceishelpedandsustainedbygovernment.Governmentatalllevelsmakes recoverypossibleandplaysacriticalrole,whetherthattakesplacebybuilding infrastructure,educatingthecitizenry,stabilizingthesocialorder,protectingsociety, ortakingresponsibilityforahostoffunctions.Forsome,thelaissez-fairestate mighthaveappeal,butitdoesnotexist.Evenprivateinsuranceispubliclyregulated,publiclyassisted,andoftenpubliclysubsidized.Whengreatcalamitiesstrike, governmentistheforemostactorinrescueandreconstruction.Usuallygovernment atupperandmidlevelstakesthelead.Atmidlevels,statesorprovincescanplay aroleinstaunchingacrisis,buttheirgeographiclimitationsandtheirresource constraints are insufficient to the task. Operating from the top down, national governmentisbestabletocastthewidestnetsandmostcapableofcoordinating localefforts.Nationalgovernmentisalsobestabletoenlistprivateenterpriseor nonprofitorganizationstoworkwithauthoritiesatalllevels.Generally,thegreater thebreakdownthemoreitrequiresnationalattention. Thiswascertainlythecaseinthepost–9/11era,whenfreemarketsfailedand most insurance companies refused coverage to high-risk clients. In the United States,thebiggestandmostvulnerablecitiesfoundthemselvesinadiresituation. TerrorisminsurancewasespeciallydifficulttoobtaininNewYork,Chicago,Los Angeles,andSanFrancisco.Thisputpropertydevelopersinaquandarybecause lenders required insurance before a project could be financed. The absence of availableunderwriterswentbeyondnewbuildingconstructionandaffectedcity debtratingsaswellthoseofotherpublicagencies.Sincethen,insurancepremiums haverisendramatically,increasingthecostsforbothpublicandprivatesectors. Onthepublicside,premiumsforNewYork’stransitsystemroseby300percent, andintheprivatesector,theownersoftheEmpireStateBuildingpaid900percent moreforalesserpolicy.49 Someinsurancecompaniesbegantowrite“sunsetclauses”intotheirpolicies
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 161
thatweredesignedtorelievethemoffutureobligations.Otherinsurancecompanies haveeitherrefusedtounderwritelarge-scaleprojectsorchargedenormouspremiumstodoso.Shortlyafter9/11,morethan$15.5billioninrealestateprojects weresuspendedorcanceledbecausedeveloperscouldnotobtaininsurance.50In SanFrancisco,insurancefortheGoldenGateBridgedoubled.InBaltimore,insurancecompaniesrefusedtoissuecoverageforitsInternationalAirportandsporting eventsinCamdenYards.UnderpressurefromthestategovernmentofMaryland, thecompanieslaterrelented. America’sfederalgovernmentsoughtwaystofillthevoidandhastilystrung togetherabroadsafetynet.TheforemostmeansofdoingthiswastheTerrorism RiskInsuranceActof2002,orTRIA.Theactwasextendedin2005throughthe endof2007,presumablyallowingtheinsurancemarkettostabilizeandresume normal pricing. Only commercial establishments are eligible and only foreign attacksareinsured.Intheeventofanattack,TRIAcovers90percentoflosses, afterdeductiblepaymentsaremet.Lossesabove$100billionarenotcoveredby theact.TRIAalsolimitsliabilitybyprecludingpaymentsforpropertydamages duetoaCBRN(chemical,biological,radiological,ornuclear)attack.Overall,the restrictionsareintendedtospreadtheriskbetweenthefederalgovernment,private insurers,andtheinsured. Elsewhereintheworld,thepartplayedbynationalgovernmentinproviding terrorisminsurancevariesquiteabit.France,Spain,andAustraliamakecoverage mandatory,andnationalgovernmenthasadirectroleinmakingsurethatcoverageiscompleteandequitable.Francehasestablishedcommoninsurancepools withhigherpremiumsfordeveloperswhoundertakenewconstruction.TheUnited Kingdom allows insurance to be optional.This has posed problems for British theatergoersandothermassaudiences.Asprospectsofamegaattackincreased overrecentyears,sotoodidinsurancepremiums,andpubliceventshaveborne thebruntofthepain.Insuranceratesincreasedby200percentormoreforhighly publicizedevents.Intangibleterms,thismeantthatthecostforaconcertatthe NationalTheaterjumpedby250,000pounds;thecostofaneventattheroyalOpera Houseroseby500,000pounds.Giventhecircumstances,thepublicwouldhave toforegosomeeventsorpaymoreforaticket.Becausemanycitiesdependupon cultureandentertainmenttodrivetheireconomies,theincreasedpricesforatime dampenedtherevenuecapacityofthesesectors.Troubledbythisturnofevents, Londonersreferredtothechangeasthe“BinLadeneffect.”51 Muchoftheinsuranceissueinvolvesguessingaboutthecostsofanattack,anda numberofmodelshavebeenusedtoestimatepotentiallosses.Monetaryestimates greatlyvary,beginningatalowof$50billionandrisingtoasmuchas$250billion perattack.52Judgingfrompastattacks,analystsseemtobeanticipatingsignificant increasesinthecostofterrorism. Table7.2displaysalistofattacksandinsurancelossesfordifferentcountries between1970and2001.Alsoshownarefatalitiesperattack.Aswecansee,the amountofinsuredlosseshassteadilyclimbed.Theascensionstartedatalowof
162 CHAPTER7
Table7.2 LargestInsuredLossesDuetoTerrorism,1970–2001 (insuredlossesinmillions)
Event
Country
AttackontheWorldTradeCenter(2001) BombinginthecityofLondon(1993) BombinginManchester(1996) FirstWorldTradeCenterbombing(1993) BombexplodesinLondon’sfinancialdistrict(1992) SuicidebombinginColomboAirport(2001) BombingatLondon’sSouthKeyDocklands(1996) OklahomaCitybombing(1995) PanAmBoeing747explosionatLockerbie(1988) ThreehijackedairplanesdynamitedinZerga(1970)
U.S. UK UK U.S. UK SriLanka UK U.S. UK Jordan
Insured Fatalities loss($) 2,749 1 0 6 3 20 2 166 270 0
47,000 907 744 725 671 398 259 145 138 127
Source:Hartwig(2002a);PartnershipforNewYorkCity(2001);andSaxton(2002).
$127millionin1970forairplanehijackingsinJordan,rosetoover$700million becauseofattacksonLondon’sfinancialdistrict,andculminatedina$47billion paymentin2001becauseoftheattackonNewYork’sdowntown.53 Themostpositiveviewofterrorisminsurancewouldacknowledgethatitestablishesanetbelowwhichvictimsshouldnotfall.Moretenuously,thenetcanbe brokenbyexcessivedamages(above$100billion)orbyattacksthatarenotcovered. Terrorisminsuranceisaretroactivewayofensuringadegreeofeconomicsecurity. Whilepost-disasterreliefisimportant,proactivemeasuresarejustasimportant. These,however,arenotquiteasclearcut;theyinvolveanamorphousarrayofactionsandareconductedbygovernmentsandprivateactorsatmultiplelevels. Multi-GovernanceApproachestoSustainingResilience Grandpoliciescanbeproclaimedfromhighpoliticalpostsandambitiousgoals can be announced by presidents, prime ministers, and cabinet members.When allissaidanddone,however,theactionisaccomplishedatthelocallevel.City politicsisthepoliticsofthetrenches,wheremayorsandlocalofficialstakematters inhand,dotheactualimplementation,andfaceconstituents.Thisisparticularly trueoftheUnitedStates,wherelocalpoliceareresponsibleforpublicsafetyand exerciseconsiderableautonomyoverpolicychoices. ReferringtotheAmericansituation,SusanClarkepointsoutthatthegreaterthe nationalsecuritythreat,themoreimportantthelocalrole.54Clarkeiscorrect,and itcouldbeaddedthatthreatsdonotrestatasinglelevelbutinaskeinofmultiple governmentsatalllevels.Thereissomethingaboutimminentcrisesthatcreates aneedtopulltogetherdifferentlevelsofgovernment,evenwhentheimmediate
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 163
challengeistoclarifyresultsinanincomprehensibletangleofrelationships.Lyndon Johnson’sWaronPovertyinvigoratedintergovernmentalrelationsjustasGeorge W.Bush’sWaronTerrorhasgivenintergovernmentalrelationsanewtwist.Sloganeeringaside,theagendaofeach“war”hasbeenconsiderablydifferent.Johnson’s warconvertedcitiesintocentersofdevelopmentandincomeredistribution,while Bush’swarhasbroughttocitiesanagendaofsecurityandwatchfulness. Theattentionpaidtoterrorismatalocallevelisfarreaching.Arecentpollof Americansshowedthatterrorismwasattheverytopoftheagenda.Fully79percentoftheAmericanpublicbelievedterrorismwas“veryimportant”(comparedto 66percentforEuropeans).55Atthelocallevel,nearlythree-quartersofAmerican municipalitieshaveinvestedinsometypeofemergencypreparedness(technology,security,disasterpreparedness).Citieshaveconductedmockdrills,closed offbuildings,reroutedtraffic,andaddedpoliceandhavebeguntoreorienttheir emergencymedicalservices.56Whilehomelandsecuritynolongertopsthelistof localpriorities,itdoesappearwithinthetopthirty-eightissuesthatpublicofficials considermostimportanttoaddress.57 The jumble of intergovernmental cooperation is bound together by federal funding.ThemajordistributorofthislargesseistheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS).Since9/11,thatdepartmenthaddispensedover$18billion inassistancetostatesandlocalities.58BecausethePatriotActrequiresaminimum distributionofassistance,allfiftystatesplusWashington,DC,andU.S.territories receivedsomeamount.WithintheDHSmoneypot,thelargestprogrampertaining tocitiesistheUrbanAreasSecurityInitiative,orUASI,whosetotalfundingin 2006wasapproximately$711million.UASIfundingisbasedonaformulathat assessesthreebasicriskfactors—namely,threat,vulnerability,andconsequences. Intheory,thisshouldgearfundingtowardcitiesfacingthegreatestprobabilityof attackandpotentialdamages.Realitiesaredifferent,though,andUASIfunding hasnowbeendistributedtoover50localities;centralcitiesranginginsizefrom NewYork’s8milliontoSacramento’s445,000areincluded. Table 7.3 lists UASI funding for 2006. Shown in the table are thirty of the heaviestrecipients,theirfundinginabsoluteamounts,andtheirpercapitafunding. Allocationspercapitaarebasedonmetropolitanareapopulation. Wecanseethevariationinamountsfromahighof124millionforAmerica’s largest city to the lesser amount of 7 million for smaller cities.The per capita amountsarerevealing.Takingtwohigh-riskexamples,NewYorkCityandWashington, DC, were among the highest recipients in both absolute and per capita expenditures.Eachcityalsoreceivedahandsomeproportionofthetotalbudget. NewYorkCitygarnered18percentwhileWashington,DC,received7percent. Relativetothepreviousyear,however,bothofthesehigh-riskcitiesweredown by40percent.NewYork’smayor,MichaelBloomberg,andWashington’smayor, AnthonyWilliams,protestedthecuts.Astheirreasoningwent,eachcityhadalready incurredmuchhigherexpensesthanotherlocalitiesandeachwouldcontinuetobe anexceptionallysought-aftertarget.59HomelandSecuritywasnotpersuadedand
164 CHAPTER7
Table7.3 UrbanAreaSecurityInitiativeFundingfor2006(30cities)
Urbanarea
Allocation($)
Allocationper capita($)
NY—NewYorkCity CA—LosAngeles/LongBeacharea IL—Chicagoarea DC—Washington,nationalcapitalregion NJ—JerseyCity/Newarkarea CA—Bayarea PA—Philadelphiaarea GA—Atlantaarea MI—Detroit MA—Bostonarea TX—Houstonarea FL—Miamiarea TX—Dallas/FortWorth/Arlingtonarea CA—Anaheim/SantaAnaarea FL—Ft.Lauderdalearea MD—Baltimore FL—Orlandoarea OR—Portlandarea FL—Jacksonvillearea MO—KansasCityarea MO—St.Louisarea WA—Seattlearea NC—Charlottearea FL—Tampaarea WI—Milwaukeearea KY—Louisvillearea NE—Omahaarea CA—SanDiegoarea NV—LasVegasarea CA—Sacramentoarea
124,450,000 80,610,000 52,260,000 46,470,000 34,330,000 28,320,000 19,520,000 18,660,000 18,630,000 18,210,000 16,670,000 15,980,000 13,830,000 11,980,000 9,980,000 9,670,000 9,440,000 9,360,000 9,270,000 9,240,000 9,200,000 9,150,000 8,970,000 8,800,000 8,570,000 8,520,000 8,330,000 7,990,000 7,750,000 7,390,000
13.15 8.18 6.16 8.89 12.82 4.86 3.78 4.12 4.17 5.32 3.71 6.84 2.45 8.49 5.77 3.68 5.24 4.61 7.90 5.00 3.46 3.69 5.56 3.48 5.67 8.16 11.24 2.46 4.35 4.12
Source:U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,FY2006,UASIbyUrbanAreas(Washington,DC,2006);StateoftheCitiesDataSystems(SOCDS),availableathttp://socds. huduser.org.
insteadawardedincreasestosmallercities.Sacramento’sallocationincreasedby 17percentwhileJacksonville’sfundingroseby26percent.60 ForNewYorkandWashington,DC,aswellasothercitiespoliceprotection anditscostsarecritical.Inadditiontoheightenedprotectionindenselypacked, built-upareas,thenewWaronTerrormandatesthatairportsandotherformsof interstate transportation be covered with additional local police.Yet legislation pertainingtohomelandsecurityoftenpreventsfederalsupportforpoliceovertime orhiringnewpersonnel.61 Whilethecostsforprotectionflowtocities,notallthereimbursementsfollow.
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Moreoftenthannot,statesreceivefundingandpassitdowntocitieswithinstructions fortheapplicationofthatfunding.Therearetimeswhenstateprioritiesdifferfrom thoseoftheircities,wideningthegapbetweenresponseandneed.Judgmentsabout prioritiesareverysubjective,andinvariablypoliticalconsiderationwillenterthemix, therebyshiftingtheemphasisfromprotectingtargetstodistributingrewards. Theconversionfromapinpointedpolicymeasuretoamoreamorphousmonetary benefitishardlynewtoWashington.62Beneaththesurface,apoliticalpageanthas beenplayedout.Inthispageant,allocationsarespreadtocitiesthatcanofferthe rosiestpresentationandsummonthebestrationales.Whatwasonceaninitiative toconcentratefundinginsevenhigh-riskurbanareashasbeenturnedintoporkbarrellegislationthatdistributesfundingtoalargerlistoflow-riskrecipients.The allocationsmayverywellbeputtopublicuse,buttheyarenotwellconnectedtothe likelihoodofattack.Policyanalystsmightsaythatameasuretoensuresecurityhas beenturnedintoadistributivepolicytorewardfriendsandplacateopponents.63 Inefficientspendingmaybetheleastoftheobstaclesconfrontinghomeland security.Therealproblemliesinhowtosustainthecapacityforresilienceovera lengthyperiodoftime.Atbottom,theobjectivesofhomelandsecurityareriddledby questionsofhowcooperationcanbemusteredacrossdiversemetropolitanboundariesandhowanymomentumcanbekeptup.Individualmetropolitanareasdifferby size,numberofjurisdictions,socioeconomiccomposition,politicaldemands,and localculture.Ensuringsecuritywithinanysinglearearequiresworkingwithagreat manyparties—mayors,legislators,bureaucrats,andprivatecontractors—where motivationsdiffer,problemsvary,andrewardsareasymmetrical.64Itisdifficult enoughtoconcertcollectiveactionamonglike-mindedactors,buthowtosustain acommonobjectiveamidthispoliticalcacophonyisachallenge. Thechallengeismagnifiedbytheinherentinertiaofpublicprotection.Both timeandplacearecriticalbutunknownelements.Giventheperspectiveoftime, weknowthateventhemostfrequentlystruckcitiesexperiencelongperiodsof calm.Typically,assaultsoccurattheendofextendedintervalsandthoseperiods canstretchintomonthsoryears.Thisistrueevenforoneofthemostincessantly struckcities—Jerusalem.Thatcityexperiencedintermittentpeaceinthe1990sand hasenjoyedanotherperiodofcalmduringthelastthreeyears.TakingNewYorkas anotherexample,morethansevenyearselapsedbetweenthefirstandsecondattacks inlowerManhattan.Since9/11,morethanfiveyearshavegonebywithoutanattack,andthereisnotellingwhenorifanothersucheventwilloccurinNewYork. Fromtheperspectiveofplace,attackscouldoccuralmostanywhere.Big,global citieshaveseeminglylimitlesstargets.Isatransitsystemthatstretchesformiles mostlikelytobehit?Orisanyoneofthesixty-plusskyscrapersthatfillManhattan atgreaterrisk?Orisamass-attendedconcertmostsusceptibletoattack? Itisbynowcommonplaceinsecuritycirclestoremindpeoplethatterroristscan choosebothtimeandplace,whiledefendersmustalwaysbeonalert.Attackers requirejustonesuccess,whileprotectorsrequireasuccessrateof100percent. Itishardlysurprisingthatoveraperiodoftimeandatvaryingplaces,citiesfall
166 CHAPTER7
preytowhatcanbecalledasymmetricalreactionsthatswingbetweenlethargyand hyperactivity.Asusedhere,asymmetricalreactionsareeithernotcommensurate withtheproblemathandoroutofsynchronywiththetimetrajectoryofterrorism ornotfullycognizantofrealities. Thepatternisfamiliartoairlinepassengersduringheightenedperiodsofalert. Itwasparticularlyvividforthosewhofoundthemselvesinthemidstofanalert inAugust2006becauseofathreattoblowupaircraftflyingoutofLondon.The generalscenarioissomethinglikethis:Duringthefirstblushoftraining,security isreadyandalert.Intheabsenceofanemergency,alertnessgraduallyfades.As readinessreachesalowpoint,anattackorthreatcatchespersonneloffguard.Having realizedtheywereunprepared,securityofficialsenteraperiodofhyperactivityor overvigilance.Picayunerulesreplacecommonsense,ordinaryactionsareviewed with unwarranted suspicion, and authority becomes overbearing.This behavior continuesforawhile,onlytolapseagainuntilthenextrealemergency. Asymmetricreactionoccursinmostcitiesaroundtheworld.Soonafterterror struck Moscow, the militia closed roads, put public transport under intense surveillance, and began implementing strict rules concerning the possession of identificationpapers.Withinafewmonthsthealertsworeoffandsecurityforces fellintoastateofindifference. Therearenoeasyanswerstotheproblemofasymmetricalreaction.Anyremedy mustachieveasteadinessofresponsethatisbasedoncompetenceandpracticed teamwork.Themachineryofcounterterrorismcanbeoiledbyplans,drills,simulations,and“table-top”exercises.Thismightnotbeasubstitutefortherealthing,but itdoesenablefirstresponderstobereadyfortheunexpected.Anotherremedyisto developflexibleresponsesthatcanberaisedorloweredinmeasuredsteps.Thekey toachievingthisliesinsynchronizedintergovernmentalcoordination.Governments canbeginthatprocessbyclarifyingandrespectingmutualresponsibilities.Atthe locallevel,officialsshouldbeabletocomplywithhigher-levelregulations,while avoidingthetrapofgoaldisplacementorbecominglostinmoundsofrules.At nationalandstatelevels,authoritiesshouldexerciseoversightwhilealsodelegatingdiscretiontolocalactors,sotheycanexercisejudgmentandretainasenseof purpose.Thebalancebetweenaccountabilityandfreedomofactionisdifficultto achieve,muchlessmaintainovertime.Terroristsdependuponsurprise,andeven modestreductionsinuncertaintycanmitigatetheshockofattack. Conclusions Thefearsarisingfrom9/11dystopiaunderestimatedthecity’scapacityforresilienceinthefaceofwarorterrorism.Thatcapacitynotonlyvariesbyfrequency andseverityofattack,butalsobythesizeofacityandthedynamicsofitsagglomeration.Theabilityofcitiestobouncebackfromviolentshockcanbeseenin theexperiencesofNewYork,London,andJerusalem.Inthosecities,employment, investmentintallbuildings,andtourismoftensufferedvaryingdegreesofdecline.
SUSTAININGLOCALRESILIENCE 167
However,overtime,thesesectorsrecoveredandsomewentontodoexceedingly well.Tourismisparticularlysensitivetooutbreaksoflarge-scaleviolence,butthis industrytoosprangbacktolifeonceterrorismabated. Forallthenaturalresilienceattributedtocities,governmentplaysacriticalrole intheirrecovery.InEurope,nationalgovernmentshelpedestablishabetterequilibriumbetweeninsurancecarriersandconsumers.IntheUnitedStates,national policieswereinstrumentalinrestoringinsurancecoverageinhigh-riskcities.The U.S.federalgovernmentalsoprovidedasystemofaidtolocalitiesinordertodeal withthreatsfromurbanterror.Thisaidhasatendencytobespreadandwatered down because of political pressures. Terrorism is still an important concern in NorthAmericaandWesternEurope,andstilloccupiesanimportantplaceonthe localgovernmentagenda.Inmanyinstances,localgovernmentisresponsiblefor trainingandfurnishingacadreoffirstresponders.Whilethishasbeenapositive step,itisnotwithoutitsproblems.Thechallengesbesettinggovernmentatalllevelslieinbringingaboutcollectiveactionandsustaininglong-termcommitments. Governmentsalsofaceproblemsinmaintainingstablelevelsofperformance.High performance is compromised by common patterns of asymmetrical reaction to terrorism,definedasasituationwherebehaviorisnotcommensuratetoanevent. This is difficult to remedy, though a beginning can be made by synchronizing intergovernmentalcoordinationandsimulatingcriticalevents.
London: Surveillance camera used for congestion fees. (Photo by Hank V. Savitch)
London: Underground crowds vulnerable to attack. (Photo by Hank V. Savitch)
London: U.S. Embassy, guarded and blocked off. (Photo by Hank V. Savitch)
Jerusalem: A bus blown up by a suicide terrorist. (Photo ©2004 Yaakov Garb)
New York: Rescue workers at the World Trade Center. (Photo courtesey of FEMA)
Part4 Conclusions
8 RestoringaSelf-AffirmingCity
Premisesariseonlyasconclusionsbecomemanifest. —JohnDewey,“ArtasExperience” Self-NegationversusSelf-Affirmation Thepremisesofurbanterrorismarestraightforward,andso,too,aretheconclusionsstemmingfromthem.Terroristsattempttousethecity’sownstrengthagainst itself,forcingittoimplode.Asmallanddeterminedgroupcanturnacityupside downbyexploitingitsfreedoms,itsopenness,itsinterdependencies,anditsvery magnitude. Catalytic terrorism plays upon the city’s concentration of media to attractanaudiencebystunningitwithactsofviolence.Megaterrorismusesthe city’sdemographicmassanddensityasfodderforcasualtiesandtoinjectfear. Smartterrorismtakesadvantageofcriticalassetsandinfrastructurewithinatightly coupledurbanterritorytopromotechaos. September 11 exemplified this potential for self-implosion by combining catalytic, mega, and smart terrorism.A handful of men turned civilian aircraft intomilitaryweaponsandusedthemtoigniteskyscrapers.WhileNewYorkisan extremecase,itsexperiencesymbolizedamaladythathadplaguedcitiesforsome time.Overtheyears,“firstcities”oftheglobal,mega,andmajorvarietywereused insmallerthoughsimilarwaystoactagainstthemselves.InMunich,terroristsused an international celebration to create an international calamity, and in Mumbai (Bombay),theyturnedsystemsofmassmobilityintoastagnantgraveyard. Norhasurbanterrorismbeenconfinedtoafewwell-knowncornersoftheearth. Itsscopehasbeenquitebroadanditsoccurrencewidespread.Terrorism’sfrequency canalsobetracedasreoccurringwavesthatarelargelyerraticandskewedbythe temperoftime.Distinctlyratchetingupwardovertimeisurbanterrorism’sseverity, orabilitytoinflictcasualties.Thesheerattributesofcitylifeenableterroriststoact withgreaterefficiency,increasingthelethalityperattack.Largecitiesarelikely targetsformegaattackspreciselybecausetheyholdanabundanceofhumanity, containvaluableassets,andbroadcastaninternationalmessage.Anotherreason fortheincreasedcasualtiesliesinthewillingnessofyoungmenandwomento becomehumanbombs—bolsteredbyasuccessratethatturnsprimitiveexplosives intotheultimate“smartbomb.” The city’s penchant to telegraph events to its citizens has also been turned 171
172 CHAPTER8
againstitself.Messagesmovequicklyandbluntlythroughurbanenvironments, andthisallowsterroriststothreatenunrelentingattack.Bycreatingtheimpressionthatthereisworsetocome,terroristscancastcitiesintoapermanentstateof alarm.Proximitymagnifiesfear.Mediareportsofterroristsactingindistantplaces arefilledwitheuphemismsandsoftdescriptionsofterrorists.Oncethevenueis closertohome,thereportschangeandso,too,doesthedescriptivelanguage.A singlemegaattackleavesalastingmemorythatcaneasilybetransmutedintoother fears—particularlyastheusebyterroristsofchemical,biological,radiological,or nuclearweaponsnolongerseemsimpossible. Fearalsopromotesambientsuspicionandthisstrikesattheheartofurbanlife, preventingpeoplefromfrequentingpublicspacesorridingonmasstransit,makingsomeunwillingtoworkintallbuildings.NewYork,London,andJerusalem demonstratetheenduringeffectsofstressandanxietyonportionsofthepublic. Theconsummateeffectscanbeseenaspartofthe“frictionofterror,”wherethe menaceoflow-level,protractedviolencefrightenscitizensintonarrowingcivil liberties.Theveryattributesofa“justsociety”—trusting,diverse,andtolerant—are broughtintoquestiontothepointwherecitiesbegintorejectthevaluesonwhich theywerefounded. Oneofthegreatassetsofcitylifeistheanonymityaffordedtothosewhowant todisappearorreappearastheoccasionwarrants.Buthere,too,avirtuehasbeen inverted.Notonlycanterroristcellsincubatewithinparticularcommunities,but those neighborhoods can be used to access nearby sites for attack. Referred to hereasterroristhaunts,theseneighborhoodsareusuallylocatedjustoutsidethe centercity—ingrayareaslikeHarburgorSeine–St.Denis.Theinitialattackon theWorldTradeCenterin1993wasinspiredinnearbyJerseyCity;theattacksin Jerusalembetween2000and2003werelogisticallysupportedfromneighborhoods totheimmediatesouthandeastofthecitycenter;andthecoordinatedblaststhat ripped through Mumbai’s commuter trains in July 2006 (known as 7/11) were suppliedwithmenandmatérielhousedinrundownneighborhoodswithinashort distanceofthesites. Thepatternofstrikesonstrategicspacesacutelyshowshowcityassetscanbe turnedintoliabilities.Terroristshavebeenquicktolatchontothisvulnerabilityby gearingtheirattackstodecontrollingterritory.Theiraimistodisrupt,destabilize, andwherepossible,paralyzecivilianmovement.Despitethedifferencesinterrorist identity,terroristsdolearnfromoneanother.NewYork,London,Jerusalem,and Istanbulshowthatattackersshareasimilarmodusoperandi.Eachoftheircentral businessdistrictsaccountsforadisproportionatenumberofincidentsandcasualties.Thesamespaceshavebeenstruckrepeatedlyandinconcentratedblows.The objectiveistoeviscerateanysemblanceofpublicsecurityanddemonstratethat localauthoritiescannotshieldcitizensfromattack. Ofcourse,patternsofattackwilldiffer,dependinguponthestatusofthelocality.Hereagain,thecosmopolitancitycanbeturnedagainstitself.Muchdepends upontherelationshipofacitytotheoutsideworld,theabilityofcellstoestablish
RESTORINGASELF-AFFIRMINGCITY 173
logisticalsupport,andthenatureoftheconflictinwhichthecityisenmeshed. Thesecircumstancesshapethebehaviorofinternationalversuslocalvarietiesof urbanterrorism.Internationalterrorismislikelytobesporadicthoughlaunchedin largerdoses—asmegaattacks.Localizedterrorismismorefrequentandmanifested insmallerassaults,oftenforcatalyticeffects.Thelinesbetweeninternationaland localterror,however,areporous,andagreatmanyassaultsreceiveaidfromabroad. Evenmembersof“homegrown”cellsvisitforeignnationsfortrainingandhave importantconnectionswithinternationalsources. Theultimateironyisthatinanefforttodefenditself,thecityoftenfulfillsterroristobjectives.Atalocallevel,thecommondefenseistoprotectcitizensand strategicspacesthroughregulation,partition,andbarriers.Obstructivemeasures liketheseeffectivelyshrinkurbanspacebymakingitunavailableordifficultto occupy.Evenlessobstructivedeviceslikesurveillancecameras,metaldetectors, andheatsensorsdiscouragethefreeandopenuseofurbanspace.Takentogether withothertypesofsurveillance,theresultscanbeself-defeating.Alltoooften, securityagenciesfindthemselvesonslipperygroundbyoverreacting,actingarbitrarily,orissuingblanketprohibitions—thesumtotalofwhichcansuffocatethe veryenvironmenttheyseektoprotect. Viewingthisthroughadeconstructionistanddialecticallens,philosopherJacques DerridalikenstheWesternresponsetothebiologyofautoimmunity,“wherealiving being,inquasi-suicidalfashion,itselfworkstodestroyitsownprotection.”1By Derrida’saccount,thecity’sreactiontoterrorhasledtoaself-inflictedpathology by“immunizingitselfagainstitsownautoimmunity.”2Theconclusionisinescapable.Self-negationismuchlikeadisease,butratherthanbeingacquiredpassively itispurposelyandclumsilystumbledonto. Derridamaywellbepointingupacertainexcess,butweshouldkeepinmind thatreversinganexcessdoesnotmeanreversingtheintendedandbasicprocess. Citiesshouldbeprudentaboutheavy-handedsurveillance,butthatdoesnotmean theyneedrelinquishreasonableusesofitoranyotherprotection.Tocontinueand perhapsembellishDerrida’smetaphor,thepathologyof“autoimmunity”doesnot precludeahealthyretentionof“immunity.” Asweknow,citiesarefarfromterrorfree.Whilemostarenotlikelytosufferan attack,somewill.Itmayverywellbethatfeargeneratesitsownfear,butfearcan alsobeveryreal,andaninterpretationofsocialcontracttheorywouldsuggestthat statesowecitizensamodicumofprotection.Nordoestheissueinvolveasimple bifurcatedcostlesschoiceof“doing”or“notdoing”somethingtothwartterrorism. Onewayoranotherwepayaprice—eitherforsurveillanceorforthelackofit. At bottom, cities face two very different and contradictory conditions, each pittedagainsttheother.Oneconditionstressesurbanvulnerability—eitherfrom unrelentingattackorfromoverreactionstoitandtheconsequentpossibilityof self-negation.Asecondandencouragingconditionisthecity’scapacityforresilience—itscontinuedabilitytowardoffassaultsorbouncebackfromtrauma.As wehaveseen,citiesarenoteasilystopped.Theireconomicandsocialagglomera-
174 CHAPTER8
tionenablesthemtorecoverfromassaultsandinsomeinstancesbarelynoticea difference.Despitethehandwringinganddystopianpredictionsaboutthecity’s demise,NewYorkhasgoneontoprosper.Jerusalem,subjecttomorepersistent andsevereattacksthanalmostanyothercity,hasalsogoneontoabrightertime. London’ssocialandeconomicstrengthwashardlytouchedby7/7.Alongsidethese examples,Madrid,Istanbul,Moscow,andMumbaicontinuedtothriveintheface ofurbanterror. Cities,then,appeartoshakeofftheeffectsofterrorism.Someofthisisattributedtolocalitiesgrowingusedtoviolence.Therehasbeentalkaboutthe“banality ofterror,”andcitizensareallegedtohavebecomelesssensitivetothebrutality ofrepeatedattacks.Butthisreactionmighthavemoretodowithdetermination thanbanality.Thelocalresponsemaybeanadjustmenttoadifficultsituationand restonthestubbornbeliefthatpeopleshouldnotbemovedbyeffortstoscare andintimidatethem.This,too,isasampleoflocalresiliencethatisbuiltintothe socialfabric. Localresilienceisalong-termandinherentconditionofcities.Itisnonetheless helpedalongandsustainedbythepoliticalorder.Withoutthatsustenance,cities wouldbeinamuchmoretenuoussituation.Whenallissaidanddone,philosophers mayhavethelastwordaboutcitiesinatimeofterror.Aristotlewasamongthefirst torealizethatpoliticsmadethecitypossible.Forhim,thecitywastheonlyplace wherethegoodlifewasattainable.3Itisaltogetherfittingtoendthisvolumewithan affirmationofAristotle’screedthatgoodpoliticscanreaffirmtheurbanfuture.
Appendix
APPENDIX 177
TableA1 Twenty-FiveNations,Regions,andCitiesStruckbyTerror Nation
Majorcities
Algeria Canada Chechnya Colombia Egypt France Germany Greece India Indonesia Israel Italy Japan Kashmir Kenya Morocco N.Ireland Pakistan Peru Russia SaudiArabia Spain Turkey UnitedKingdom UnitedStates
Algiers Montreal,Ottawa Grozny Bogotá Cairo Paris Berlin,Hamburg,Munich Athens Mumbai(Bombay),NewDelhi,Calcutta Jakarta,Bali Jerusalem,TelAviv,Haifa Rome,Milan Tokyo Srinagar,Anantnag,Jammu Nairobi Casablanca,Rabat Belfast Islamabad,Karachi,Peshawar Lima Moscow Riyadh,Mecca Madrid,Barcelona Istanbul,Ankara London OklahomaCity,NewYork,Washington,DC
178 APPENDIX
TableA2 Global,Mega,andMajorCities:ShareofNationalPopulation
Firstcities(global, mega,major)
Shareofcity population aspercentageof thenationaltotal
Algiers Athens Berlin Bogotá Cairo Casablanca Islamabad Istanbul Jakarta Jerusalem Karachi Lima London Madrid Milan Moscow Mumbai(Bombay) Nairobi NewYork Paris Riyadh Rome Srinagar TelAviv Tokyo
5 7 4 15 11 10 >1 14 4 11 7 27 12 7 2 7 2 7 3 4 18 4 9 5 7
Secondcities
Shareofcity populationas percentageofthe nationaltotal
Oran Thessalonica Hamburg Munich Cali Alexandria Rabat Lahore Ankara Surabaya Haifa Lahore Arequipa Birmingham Barcelona Naples St.Petersburg Calcutta Mombassa LosAngeles Marseille Jeddah Naples Jammu Haifa Yokohama
2 3 2 2 5 5 6 4 5 1 4 4 3 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 1 12 2 4 4 3
Note:Globalcitiesareshowninbolditalics;megacitiesareshowninbold;majorcities areregulartype.
APPENDIX 179
TableA3 TerrorinSecondCities,1990–2005
NationsSecondcities
Incidents
Oran Cali Alexandria Marseille Hamburg Munich Greece Thessalonica India Calcutta Indonesia Surabaya Israel Haifa Italy Naples Yokohama Japan Kashmir Jammu Kenya Mombassa Morocco Rabat Lahore Pakistan Peru Arequipa St.Petersburg Russia SaudiArabia Jeddah Spain Barcelona Ankara Turkey UnitedKingdom Birmingham UnitedStates LosAngeles
5 10 0 5 11 15 9 1 1 9 1 2 22 4 1 7 0 3 5 8 17 0 1
Algeria Colombia Egypt France Germany
Casualties 13 3 0 0 3 2 0 24 0 191 0 0 340 93 1 127 0 0 27 53 9 0 6
Incidents: Casualties: National National Share(%) Share(%) 7 6 0 5 6 8 5 3 3 2 1 10 2 25 11 8 0 6 13 12 10 0 3
6 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 4 0 0 10 2 >1 13 0 0 3 3 1 0 1
Source:AdaptedfromRANDdatabase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2data.
180 APPENDIX
TableA4 TerroristIdentityandIncidentsinTwenty-SevenCities,1968–2005
Cities
Incidents
Algiers Athens Belfast Berlin Bogotá Cairo Casablanca Grozny Islamabad Istanbul Jakarta Jerusalem Karachi Lima London Madrid Milan Moscow Mumbai Nairobi NewYork Paris Riyadh Rome Srinagar TelAviv Tokyo
39 300 N/A 44 98 49 8 N/A 29 151 17 306 52 257 141 70 41 15 8 4 169 343 24 160 N/A 90 29
TOTAL Percentage
2,444 100
Anarchist 14
8
3
1
18 0.74
Secular
Religious
Other/ Unknown
0 143
24 1
7 49 15 0
1 26 4
0 46 3 94 15 175 58 38 13 1 5 2 72 137 0 57
3 6 4 38 8 82 6 5 1 2 3 1 47 21 6 2
26 99 10 174 29
30 9
14 1
46 19
962 39.1
210 8.66
15 142 37 48 4
77 27 24 12 1 50 184 18 101
1,254 51.5
Source: Data from Terrorism Knowledge Base, available at www.tkb.org. Type II database.
APPENDIX 181
TableA5 TerroristIdentityandCasualtiesinTwenty-SevenCities,1968–2005
Cities
Casualties
Secular
Algiers Athens Belfast Berlin Bogotá Cairo Casablanca Grozny Islamabad Istanbul Jakarta Jerusalem Karachi Lima London Madrid Milan Moscow Mumbai Nairobi NewYork Paris Riyadh Rome Srinagar TelAviv Tokyo
84 200 N/A 247 155 272 134 N/A 1,448 1,178 378 3,019 695 284 952 1,872 10 885 1,519 5,391 10,969 1,256 333 371 N/A 1,538 5,033
0 99 0 226 128 41 0 0 0 224 0 1,078 208 188 76 79 9 0 1 100 125 545 0 267 0 683 15
TOTAL Percentage Casualtiesperincident
38,223
4,092 10.7 4.3
15.6
Religious 40 1
Other/ Unknown
658 5012
44 100 0 21 27 66 4 0 1,369 142 1 506 445 96 121 2 0 66 0 0 25 482 84 102 0 197 6
30,225 79.1 144
3,906 10.2 3.1
165 130 79 812 377 1,435 44 753 1,791 1 819 1,518 5,291 10,819 229 249 2
Source: Data from Terrorism Knowledge Base, available at www.tkb.org. Type 2 database.
182 APPENDIX
TableA6 TerroristIdentityinTwenty-TwoNations:Comparing1968–1994and 1995–2005 Ideology Anarchist Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Secular Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Religious Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Other/unknown Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident TOTAL Incidents Casualties Casualtiesperincident
1968–1994
1995–2005
12 0.30 78 0.52 6.5
25 2.23 0 0 0
1,812 45.46 5,399 36.08 2.98
254 22.64 1,665 4.92 6.56
219 5.49 1,793 11.98 8.19
175 15.60 28,966 85.54 165.52
1,943 48.75 7,695 51.42 3.96
668 59.54 3,233 9.55 4.84
3,986 14,965 3.75
1,122 33,864 30.18
Source: Data from Terrorism Knowledge Base, available at www.tkb.org. Type 2 database.
APPENDIX 183
TableA7 TerroristIdentityinTwenty-TwoNations:Comparing1968–1994and 1995–2005(detailedbygroup) Ideology Anarchist Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Leftist Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Right-Wing Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Nationalist/Separatist Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Environmental Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Religious/Christian Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Religious/Cult Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident
1968–1994
1995–2005
12 0.30 78 0.52 6.5
25 2.23 0 0.07 0
828 20.77 1,780 11.90 2.15
139 12.39 169 0.50 1.22
3 0.08 1 0.01 0.33 978 24.54 3,596 24.03 3.70
0 0 0 0 0 115 10.25 1,496 4.42 13.01
3 0.08 0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0.03 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0
0 1 0.09 5012 14.80 5,012
(continued)
184 APPENDIX
TableA7(continued) Ideology
1968–1994
1995–2005
168 4.21 1,791 11.97 10.66
173 15.42 23,954 70.74 138.46
Religious/Islamic Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Religious/Jewish Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Religious/Sikh Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Other Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident Unknown Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesperincident
821 20.60 3,934 26.29 4.79
105 9.36 962 2.84 9.16
1122 28.15 3,761 25.14 3.35
563 50.18 2,271 6.71 4.03
TOTAL Incidents Casualties Casualtiesperincident
3,986 14,965 3.75
1,122 33,864 30.18
47 1.18 22 0.15 0.47 3 0.08 2 0.01 0.67
1 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Data from Terrorism Knowledge Base, available at www.tkb.org. Type 2 database.
Algiers Incidents Casualties Athens Incidents Casualties Belfast Berlin Incidents Casualties Bogotá Incidents Casualties Cairo Incidents Casualties Casablanca Incidents Casualties Grozny Istanbul Incidents Casualties
Cities
N/A
N/A
1968–1994
14
1995–2005
Anarchist
3 2
3 810
4 130 37 156
8 41
11 92
7 226
115 97
9 68
2 74
28 2
1995–2005
Secular 1968–1994
47 54 4 73
6 11
1995–2005
1 0
1 1
18 29
1968–1994
Religious
TerroristIdentityinTwenty-SevenCities:Comparing1968–1994and1995–2005
TableA8
68 120
3 0
22 55
39 25
34 21
106 100
11 6
(continued)
31 22
1 4
4 11
9 2
3 0
36 0
4 38
1995–2005
Other/Unknown 1968–1994
APPENDIX 185
Islamabad Incidents Casualties Karachi Incidents Casualties Jakarta Incidents Casualties Jerusalem Incidents Casualties Lima Incidents Casualties London Incidents Casualties Madrid Incidents Casualties Milan Incidents Casualties Moscow Incidents Casualties
Cities
TableA8(continued)
1968–1994
3
1995–2005
Anarchist
4 1,691
1 100
2 819
4 752
2 1
1 1
24 1,348
11 8
38 79
1
2 1
4 1
3 52
172 136 54 73
16 403
1 56
78 675
3
4 377 14 87
14 152
4 40
4 4
1995–2005
Secular 1968–1994
1 77
1995–2005
2 2
1968–1994
Religious
2 2
17 0
24 2
60 120
79 95
88 339
1 0
14 352
18 1304
1968–1994
10 64
7 0
3 0
17 3
3 1
86 167
9 1
15 91
8 67
1995–2005
Other/Unknown
186 APPENDIX
1 0.05 0
N/A
1
17 3.48 0
125 6.40 1,514 16.35
6 85
2 2
13 38
46 1,070
883 44.88 4,634 50.04
8 15
1 5,012 85 17.38 27,193 93.89
22 383
56 267
134 528
72 125
2 100
8 573
6 249
8 191
1 9,749
1 5,291
5 1,519
Source:DatafromTerrorismKnowledgeBase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2database.
Percentofcasualties
Casualties
Incidents
Percentofincidents
Mumbai Incidents Casualties Nairobi Incidents Casualties NewYork Incidents Casualties Paris Incidents Casualties Rome Incidents Casualties Riyadh Incidents Casualties Srinagar TelAviv Incidents Casualties Tokyo Incidents Casualties TOTAL 79 16.16 974 3.36
1 0
8 300
1
3 17
946 48.67 3,112 33.61
18 6
36 133
2 4
90 102
166 306
44 20
1 0
3 0
308 62.99 796 2.75
1 0
10 64
16 80
11 0
18 176
6 5
0 0
0 0
APPENDIX 187
Algiers Incidents Casualties Athens Incidents Casualties Belfast Berlin Incidents Casualties Bogotá Incidents Casualties Cairo Incidents Casualties Casablanca Incidents Casualties Grozny Istanbul Incidents Casualties
Cities
Leftist
Right-Wing
Nationalist/ Separatist
Religious Islamist
Religious Non-Islamist
Other/Unknown
N/A
14 0
2 0
15 151
22 5
6 27
2 31
6 10
3 0
2 74
42 54
20 52 3 26
27 2
4 200
95 45
3 41
1 0
3 2
11 92
1 1
18 29
3 810
68 120
3 0
4 130
39 25 22 55
1 0
34 21
106 100
11 6
4 73
6 11
31 22
1 4
4 11
9 2
3 0
36 0
4 38
1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005
Anarchist
TerroristIdentityinTwenty-SevenCities:Comparing1968–1994and1995–2005(detailedbygroup)
TableA9
188 APPENDIX
Islamabad Incidents Casualties Karachi Incidents Casualties Jakarta Incidents Casualties Jerusalem Incidents Casualties Lima Incidents Casualties London Incidents Casualties Madrid Incidents Casualties Milan Incidents Casualties Moscow Incidents Casualties Mumbai Incidents Casualties Nairobi Incidents Casualties
3
1 1
1 4 1,519 1 100
1
6 5
1 0
1 0
29 49
9 30
5 3
51 73
3 0
1 1
4 1
1 1
1 100
2 3
1 5,291
2 819
4 1,691
4 752
2 0
3 52
169 135
13 87
23 1,348
16 403
4 40
63 530
4 4
15 145
1 56 4 377
13 152
1 77
3 0
1 0
2 2
1
1
0 0
10 64
7 0
3 0
17 3
3 1
86 167
9 1
15 91
8 67
1 0 0 0 (continued)
3 0
2 2
17 0
24 2
60 120
79 95
88 339
1 0
14 352
18 1,304
APPENDIX 189
Leftist
Right-Wing
Nationalist/ Separatist
Religious Islamist
Religious Non-Islamist Other/Unknown
17 3.48 0
0.00
1 0.05 0
0.00
N/A
1 0
1
40 8.15 155 0.55 3.88
473 24.23 1,139 12.30
2.41
8 15 3 0.15 1 0.01
1 0.20 0 0.00
0.33
0.00
8.74
407 20.49 3,494 37.73
16 237
36 172
20 95
6 146
76 275
67 122
58 253
5 3
21.55
38 7.74 819 2.83
8 300
1
3 17
8 573
6 249
8 191
1 9,749
29.6
267.2
78 83 4 16.9 1,492 22,181 16.1 76.58
5 85
2 2
13 38
2 1,048
0.4
47 2.44 22 0.2
1
44 22
2,506
2 0.44 5,012 17.3
1 5,012
3.2
946 48.67 3,112 33.61
18 6
36 133
2 4
90 102
166 306
44 20
2.51
308 62.99 796 2.75
1 0
10 64
16 80
11 0
18 176
6 5
1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1968– 1995– 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005
Anarchist
Source:DatafromTerrorismKnowledgeBase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2database.
TOTAL Incidents Percentofincidents Casualties Percentofcasualties Casualtiesper incident
NewYork Incidents Casualties Paris Incidents Casualties Rome Incidents Casualties Riyadh Incidents Casualties Srinagar TelAviv Incidents Casualties Tokyo Incidents Casualties
Cities
TableA9(continued) 190 APPENDIX
APPENDIX 191
TableA10 ShareofTerrorAttacksinJerusalemNeighborhoods,1998–2005
Neighborhoods Talpiot WestJerusalem Gilo FrenchHill OldCity AlTur ArmonHanatzirpromenade BeitHanina Center/Downtown EastJerusalem/MountScopus/Hebrew University/Ra’sal-’Amud Germancolony KiryatHayovel Mamila MeaShearim Musrara NeveYaakov NeweShemu’el PisgatZeev QiryatMenahem RamatShlomo Ramot Shmu’elHanavi Unknown TOTAL
Incidents 1 1 43 9 14 1 3 1 20
Attempted incidents 1
Casualties
3
0 47 86 144 12 0 4 1 932
5 1 2 1 3 1 5 1 3 1 1 1 2 14
7
116 0 35 6 2 2 11 1 2 59 1 1 141 27
134
14
1,630
1 2
Source: Data from Terrorism Knowledge Base, available at www.tkb.org. Type 3 database.
192 APPENDIX
TableA11 ShareofTerrorAttacksinNewYorkCity’sNeighborhoods,1993–2005 Neighborhoods
Incidents
BritishConsulate(UpperManhattan) WorldTradeCenter(LowerManhattan) WorldTradeCenter(LowerManhattan) RockefellerCenter(Midtown) EmpireStateBuilding(Midtown) BrooklynBridge NewYorkStockExchange(LowerManhattan) HeraldSquareStation(Midtown) PATHTunnels(LowerManhattan/NJ) Unknown
1 1 1 1 1 1
TOTAL
6
Attempted
Casualties 0 1,048 9,749 0 5 4 0 0
1 1 1 5
4
8
10,810
Sources:TerrorismKnowledgeBase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type3databasewithpartialadditionsfromType1.U.S.DepartmentofJustice,PressRelease,August28,2004.
TableA12 ShareofTerrorAttacksinLondon’sNeighborhoods,1998–2005 Neighborhoods Lambeth TheCity Westminster KensingtonandChelsea Hammersmith Ealing Camden Hackney Unknown TOTAL
Incidents
Attempted
Casualties
3 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 3
1 179 170 0 1 7 1
491
1
2
16
360
493
0
0
Sources: Terrorism Knowledge Base, available at www.tkb.org. Type 3 database. U.S.DepartmentofJustice,PressRelease,August28,2004.
1991
N/A
N/A
10,300 9,200
1990
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
6,000 6,600 6,800 5,700 5,100 4,800 6,200 6,800
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
953
296
211
278
414
850
9,200 10,200 11,500 13,300 12,300 12,300 12,300 13,200 13,100 11,500 11,600 12,000 13,700 14,900
1992
Sources:NewYorkCityOfficialTourismWebsite,availableatwww.nycvisit.com/content/index.cfm?pagePkey=57(retrievedonNovember9, 2006);UKNationalStatistics—FocusonLondon2003report,availableatwww.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/FOL2003/00Prelims. pdf(retrievedonNovember9,2006);Israel’sCentralBureauofStatistics,availableatwww.cbs.gov.il/tourism_sp/t32.pdf(retrievedonNovember 9,2006).
Jerusalem
London
NewYork
Cities
UrbanResilience:TourisminNewYork,London,andJerusalem,1990–2005(foreignvisitors,inthousands)
TableA13
APPENDIX 193
194 APPENDIX
TableA14 UrbanResilience:OfficeVacanciesinNewYorkandLondon,2000–2006 (inpercent) City NewYork Downtown Midtown London CentralLondon TheCity
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
3.6 3.6
9.5 8.2
13.2 11.1
13.5 11.9
13.7 10.1
10.7 7.8
10.0
9.6 10.9
7.8
2006
4.9 8.4
Sources:JamesOrr,ResearchandStatisticsGroup,“OutlookfortheNewYorkMetropolitanArea Economy,” Federal Reserve Bank of NewYork, 2006.Available at www. njmeadowlands.gov/app_forms/NJMC_Econ_Test_30.cfm/James%200rr.ppt?&CFID=513 773&CFTOKEN=56831945&jsessionid=72307ed66e1d$B5$A6$5.UKNationalStatistics Online(2003)“FocusonLondon.”Availableatwww.statistics.gov.uk/focuson/london/.
1985
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Non-urban
1991
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Urban
1989
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Source:AdaptedfromRANDdatabase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2data.
0%
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1993
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FigureA1 ShareofUrbanandNonurbanIncidentsinTwenty-TwoNationsandRegions
APPENDIX 195
2005
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Non-urban
1990
Urban
1989
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Source:AdaptedfromRANDdatabase,availableatwww.tkb.org.Type2data.
0%
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1985
FigureA2 ShareofUrbanandNonurbanCasualties,1968–2005 196 APPENDIX
2005
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Notes
NotestoPreface 1.TheRand-MIPTdatabasebuildsoninformationfromnewspapers,information agencies, and radio and television broadcasts. In most cases urban areas are distinguishedfromnonurbanareas.Wenonethelesscross-checkthelocationsfortheir urbandesignationandinvestigateareaswherethedesignationisnotmade(about10 percentoftheincidents).Weacceptcountryorregionaldesignationsfordetermining urbanversusnonurbanlocations. 2. Incidents and casualties for each database are as follows: Type 1: 12,741 incidents,56,589casualties.Type2:5,137incidents,46,138casualties.Type3:8,335 incidents,47,752casualties. 3.Thereareanumberofreputablesourcesfordataonterrorism.Theseinclude the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (available at http://www.ict.org.il) andtheU.S.DepartmentofState(availableathttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/). The source used for data in this study is the Rand-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base(availableathttp://www.tkb.org).BecauseType2datahavebeenconsistently collectedovermorethanthreedecades,itisthetypemostfrequentlyused.Theuse ofType2datalimitstheanalysistoincidentsclassifiedsolelyasinternationalevents. Perforce,citieslikeBelfast,Algiers,orSrinagar,whoseterrorislargely“domestic,” areundercountedorexcluded.Becauseitiscomprehensive,Type3isusedtoconfirm propositionsthatarealsoestablishedfromType2data. 4.SeeRand-MIPTathttp://www.tkb.org. 5. U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.usip.org/class/guides/terrorism.pdf. U.S.StateDepartment,U.S.CODE,Title22,Section2656(f)(n.d.).U.S.Department ofState,PatternsofGlobalTerrorism(Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrinting Office,1990),availableathttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/;andtheEU,Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002), available at http://www.statewatch.org /news/2002/jul/frameterr622en00030007.pdf.
NotestoChapter1 1.Figureswillvarysomewhataccordingtothedatabaseused.Urbanincidents account for 76 percent of the total, and urban casualties account for 85 percent of allcasualties.Casualtiesbreakdownasalmost12,000fatalitiesand50,000injuries, accountingrespectivelyfor71.7and88.6percentofthetotal.Thefigurescoveronly thetwenty-fivenationsandregionsusedinthisstudy.AdaptedfromRANDdatabase atwww.tkb.orgType1data.SeealsoChapter2Table2.1forType2data. 2.Itmightbebesttobeginwiththeusageofkeytermsliketerrorism,terror,and terrorist.AsdefinedbyWebster’sInternationalDictionary,terrorismisbestdescribed 197
198 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
asanactbywhichextremefearisbroughtaboutforpoliticalpurposes.Terrorismis alsosomethingthatoccursasaresultofanaction,ormoretypicallyasaseriesof actions.Thereis,too,an“ism”interrorism,whichallowsittobeseenastheadoption oforbeliefinasetofactionsforbringingaboutacertainresult.Bycomparison,terror is best described as a state of mind characterized by extreme fear, which is sought by those committing acts of terror in order to change people’s political conduct.A terroristisapersonwhocommitstheseacts.Terroristsactivelyandpurposefullyuse violence against noncombatants. A succinct illustration of these three distinctions could be made by referring to those who have experienced the terror of terrorism broughtonbyterrorists. 3.Onereviewoftheconceptofterrorismcomesupwith109definitionsofterrorism, andanotedscholarinthefieldisskepticalaboutagreementonasingledefinition. Nevertheless,terrorismdoeshavecertaincommonelements,andevenskepticsagree that these include violence against noncombatants designed to threaten and induce fear.SeeAlexSchmidtandAlbertJongman,PoliticalTerrorism(NewBrunswick,NJ: TransactionBooks,1988).Thenotionofcommonelementsofterrorismhasyielded historicalandconceptualwork.SeeWalterLaquer,Terrorism(London:Weidenfeld &Nicolson,1977);Laquer,“ReflectionsonTerrorism,”ForeignAffairs65:1(1986); Laquer,TheAgeofTerrorism(Boston:Little,Brown,1987). 4. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Code,Title 22, Section 2656 (f) (n.d.). U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1990),availableathttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/. U.S.DepartmentofState,PatternsofGlobalTerrorism1993–2001.Releasedbythe OfficeoftheCoordinatorforCounterterrorism(2002),Washington,DC. 5. As with any definition, the challenge lies in the accuracy and consistency ofitsapplications.Notallactsofmaiming,killing,andsoforthofnoncombatants will easily fit within this definition, but many will be accommodated by it. Not all situationsarepure,andattimestheyaredistinguishedbyafineline.Thisiswhythe definitionisbestappliedasacontinuumwithvaryingdegreesofconformity.Much likeacourtofjusticedefinesanddecidesvariousdegreesofhomicide,sotoomight webeabletodistinguishamongtypesofterrorismandevaluateborderlinecases.See Laquer,“PostmodernTerrorism,”ForeignAffairs75(1996):24;LouiseRichardson, “GlobalRebels,”HarvardInternationalReview20(1998):52;andA.T.Turk,“Social Dynamics of Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science463(1982):119–128. 6.Forgeneraltreatmentofthesubject,seeJessicaStern,TheUltimateTerrorist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); and Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1998). 7.Therearegoodreasonsforthesedistinctions.Labelingconventionalwarfareas terroristwouldbemeaninglessbecauseitwouldbeboundless,itwouldlackprecision, anditwouldbedevoidofconceptualsignalsthroughwhichparticularkindsofacts couldbeidentified.Putanotherway,ifeveryviolentactcanbecalledterrorist,nothing canbeseenasanactofterrorism. 8. Robert Pape argues that for policy reasons it is impractical to include state terrorismwithinthegeneralcategoryofterrorism.Papealsoreasonsthattheincentives aswellasthepressuresthatshapethebehaviorfornonstateorgroupterroristsare quite different. Thus, he defines terrorism as involving “the use of violence by an organization other than a national government to intimidate or frighten a target audience.”SeeRobertPape,DyingtoWin(NewYork:RandomHouse,2005),pp.9,
NOTESTOCHAPTER1 199
200.AndrewKyddandBarbaraWalteralsodefineterrorismas“theuseofviolence againstciviliansbynonstateactorstoattainpoliticalgoals.”SeeAndrewKyddand BarbaraWalter, “The Strategies ofTerrorism,” International Security 31, 1 (2006): 49–80. 9. This is not to say there are no exceptions to these distinctions. These distinctions,however,arereasonablyconsistentandapplicableinageneralmanner. 10.Themoreacceptedaterroristorganizationbecomeswithinagivensociety,the greatertheprobabilityitwilldevelopmorecomplexandhierarchicalforms.Infact,as Hezbollahmakesgreateruseofguerrillawarfare,ithasbecomemoreformal. 11.Thisisnottosaythatnonstateterroristscannotacquirenuclearorchemicalor high-techweapons.Butevenhere,suchweaponsarelikelytoberelativelyprimitive, consistingof“dirtybombs,”homemadechemicals,orpilferednuclearweapons.See GrahamAllison,NuclearTerrorism(NewYork:HenryHolt,2004). 12.Inusingtermslikedecontrollingterritoryorterritorialdecontrol,Imeanto describemethodsofwarfare.Itisthenpossibletodistinguishbetweenimmediateor medium-rangeobjectivesaspartofterroristwarfareandwhatmightbetermedultimate political or ideological goals. The immediate objective of terrorists is to decontrol territory,thoughlikeallorganizationstheymayultimatelyhaveterritorialaspirations. TheBasqueETAhopedforsecessionfromSpainandestablishmentofaterritorial state. Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba also hold as their ultimate objective theincorporationofKashmirintoPakistan.HamasandthePalestinianIslamicJihad holdastheirultimategoalthedestructionofIsraelandtheestablishmentofanIslamic stateinPalestine.Similarly,alQaedaholdstheultimategoalofestablishingacaliphate throughouttheMiddleEastandevenextendingittopartsofSpain. 13.Foradiscussion,seeLeonardWeinbergandAmiPedhazur,“TheChallengesof ConceptualizingTerrorism”(paperpresentedattheAnnualMeetingoftheAmerican PoliticalScienceAssociation,2003,Philadelphia,Pennsylvania). 14.Comparingabroadanddiversespectrumofterroristgroupscanbechallenging. There are, however, conceptual features to terrorism that make comparison quite feasible. The first is that terrorism is a type of warfare, and like any other type of warfareitisconductedbyanarrayofverydifferentorganizations.Inthesameway that conventional warfare waged by Communist Russia, Fascist Germany, or the Anglo-AmericanAlliescanbeexamined,sotoocanterroristwarfarewagedbygroups asvariedasSriLanka’sTamilTigers,Peru’sShiningPath,ortheglobaljihadistal Qaedaalsobestudied.Second,thisstudyplacesanurbanfocusonthisvariationandI examineterrorismasitmanifestsitselffromtheuniqueperspectiveofthecityandits consequencesforurbanlife. 15.Toelaborate,internalcomplexityallowsforgreaterspecialization,moredetailed divisionsoflabor,andaneedfordifferentsectorsofsocietytocollaborate,hencethe growth of pluralistic tolerance and the release of creative energy. This conception isveryJacobs-like,butalsorootedintheliterature.SeeJaneJacobs,TheEconomy of Cities (NewYork: Random House, 1970); and Cities and theWealth of Nations (NewYork: Random House, 1984). Also consult Peter Hall, Cities in Civilization (NewYork:RandomHouse,1998);JayForrester,UrbanDynamics(Cambridge:MA: MIT Press, 1969); and Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class (NewYork: Routledge,2005). 16.Fordataonthis,consultPape,DyingtoWin.Anotherstudyfoundthatbetween 2000and2003whatcouldlooselybecalled“liberaldemocracies”incurred51.1percent ofattackswhilenondemocraciesincurred26.2percentandthoseinanintermediate
200 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
categoryincurred22.6percent.CategoriesforthisstudyweretakenfromtheFreedom House classification consisting of states that are “free” (democratic), “partly free” (intermediatedemocracy),and“notfree”(nondemocracy).SeeGregoryGause,“Can DemocracyStopTerrorism?”ForeignAffairs84,5(2005):62–77. 17. This is not to say that cities can be considered as “independent variables” governing the incidence of terrorism. Cities might, however, be “intervening” or “interacting”variableswhosepresenceenablesindividualstouseterrorasamethod ofwarfare.SeeMorrisRosenberg,TheLogicofSurveyAnalysis(NewYork:Basic Books,1968). 18.Thedefinitionofacitycontainsastrongterritorialcomponent.Whilecities are internally dynamic, they are identified by land area. Urban terror would not includevehicleslikeplanesandlargeshipsthatareattackedoutsideacity’sterritorial boundaries.Somewritersdoseethesemodesoftransportationasurbanenvironments because they are continuations of urban life and considered as being closed, selfcontained systems. See Richard Clutterbuck’s Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare (London:RoutledgePress,1990). 19. Robert Pape refers to terrorist efforts to gain publicity as “demonstrative terrorism.”AsdistinguishedfromPapes’snotion,catalyticterrorismgoeswellbeyond publicitybecauseitisalsointendedtoshock,frighten,anddrawimmediateattention. See Robert Pape, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review97,3(2003):343–361. 20.Fordetails,seeNadyaLabi,“Jihad2.0,”TheAtlanticMonthly,July–August 2006:102–106. 21. See B.L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & LittlefieldPublishers,2002). 22.QuotedinPaulMurphy’sTheWolvesofIslam(Dulles,VA:BrasseyPublishers, 2004),p.179.SeealsoMurphy’sdescriptionoftheMoscowapartmentbuildings, p.104. 23.Iusetheword“essence”torefertoMaxWeber’s“idealtype.”Anidealtype is a construct taken from a particular perspective that abstracts a set of specific features. The extrapolated features are not typical, but rather “essential” to the meaning of the phenomenon.As such, an “ideal type” will synthesize a plurality of data and accentuate vital information by incorporating them into an emphatic composite.Terrorismisextrapolatedinitspureform,orasthecasemaywarrant,its “extreme”form,asawaytounderstanditsramifications.SeeMaxWeber,Theory of Economic and Social Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford UniversityPress,1947). 24. Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, eds., The Middle East (Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversityPress,2002),p.252. 25. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction byA.D. Lindsay (NewYork: Dutton,1950);andDanielBell,TheComingofPost-IndustrialSociety(NewYork: BasicBooks,1995). 26.SeeToddSwanstrom,“AreFearandUrbanismatWar?”UrbanAffairsReview 38,1(2002):135–140. 27. See, for example, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of the Security Service, “The International Terrorist Threat,” Speech at Queen Mary’s College,London,November9,2006. 28. See John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” Foreign Affairs 85, 4 (2006):1–8.
NOTESTOCHAPTER1 201
29.Ibid.,p.8. 30.Justafewrepresentativesamplesinclude,Laquer,Terrorism;Pape,Dyingto Win;Stern,TheUltimateTerrorist;Hoffman,InsideTerrorism;JosephLelyveld,“All SuicideBombersAreNotAlike,”NewYorkTimesMagazine(October28,2001);and JeffreyGoldberg,“TheMartyrStrategy,”NewYorker(July9,2001):34–39.Anumber offilmsalsoappearedin2005depictingterrorists,mostnotablyStevenSpielberg’s MunichandHanyAbu-Assad’sParadiseNow. 31.BBCWorldService,Newshour12:00GMT,February14,2006,availableat http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/newshour/. 32.Ibid. 33. I have identified global cities by their world “connectivity” as expressed by P.J.Taylor,“GlobalNetworkServiceConnectivitiesfor315Citiesin2000,”DataSet 12oftheGaWCStudyGroupandNetworkpublicationofinter-citydata,available at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/datasets/da12.html. This data set holds over 300 citiesandwhilethetophalf-dozencitiesareclearlydominant,theamountofworld connectivitysharplyfallsoffafterthat. 34. To simplify and for greater precision I have taken a restricted view of the conceptsofglobal,mega,andmajorcities.Otherwritersemploybroaderdefinitions ofvariousurbantypologiesanduseideaslike“worldcities”toconveytheirregional primacy.See,forexample,JohnFriedman’s“WorldCityHypothesis,”Development andChange17(1986):69–83.ForusefultreatmentsofthissubjectseeSaskiaSassen, CitiesinaWorldEconomy(London:PineForgePress,2000);JohnR.Short,Global Metropolitan: Globalizing Cities in a CapitalistWorld (London: Routledge, 2004); andPeterTaylor,WorldCityNetwork:AGlobalUrbanAnalysis(London:Routledge, 2004). 35.Thedistinctionissomewhatarbitrary,butnotentirelyso.Thus,ametropolitan populationof10millionpeopleormoreconveysthenotionofasprawling,unwieldy populationthatcouldinthefuturethreatenitssecurity.MetropolitanParisisquitelarge, containingpopulationsof7or8million,butthissizecanbemanaged.Onceacity’s surrounding metropolis exceeds 10 million its manageability is more problematic, especiallyifitcontainslargebeltsofimpoverishedslumsandsquattersettlements. SeeUN-Habitat,TheChallengeofSlums:GlobalReportonHumanSettlement(2003), availableathttp://www.unhabitat.org. 36.Thus,somefirstcitieslikeIstanbulandLondonholdover10percentofthe population,accountforroughly20percentofthenationalGDP,andmonopolizethe nationalmedia.LondonhasnorivalintheUK,andwhileAnkaraisTurkey’scapital, IstanbulisTurkey’sgatewaytotheWest.InGermanythisdominanceisshared,so thatFrankfurtreignssupremeineconomicvitality,Berlinisthepoliticalcapital,and Hamburgmonopolizesthenationalmedia. 37.Scoreswereobtainedthroughauniverseof75cities,runningfrom100asthe highestscoredowntozero.Thetabledisplays30ofthesecities,andthelowestscore forthisselectionofcitiesis60.Themethodologyforcalculatingtheseverityscoreis borrowedfromRichardFlorida’sRiseoftheCreativeClass(NewYork:BasicBooks, 2002).ToconvertFlorida’screativityindextoaseverityindex,threeequallyweighted factorsweretaken,consistingof(1)numberofincidents,(2)numberoffatalities,and (3)numberofinjuries.Seventy-fivecitieswerethenrankedbythesefactors.Citieswere givenarankaccordingtoeachofthesefactors,andtheranknumberfromeachfactor wastotaled,givingeachcityarawscore.IamindebtedtoAnarValyevforbringing thismethodtomyattention.SeeAnarValyev,“UrbanTerrorism:DoTerroristsAttack
202 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 1 & 2
Cities and Why?” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Louisville, 2007). Raw scores werestandardizedfrom100to0accordingtotheformulalistedbelow.(SeeRichard NathanandCharlesAdams,“FourPerspectivesonUrbanHardship,”PoliticalScience Quarterly104,3[1989]:483–508.) X=(Y–Ymin)/(Ymax–Ymin)*100 WhereX=standardizedvaluestobecreated Y=valuesfordifferentvariables Ymax=maximumvalueofY Ymin=minimumvalueofY 38.ThesecalculationsarebasedonType3dataforbothdomesticandinternational assaultscommittedbetween1998and2005. 39.SeeValyev,“UrbanTerrorism.”
NotestoChapter2 1. For details, see the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) as well as the Federal EmergencyManagementAgency’sWorldTradeCenterBuildingPerformanceStudy (2002). 2.Forperspectiveonthis,seeBruceHoffman,“TheLogicofSuicideTerrorism,” andHoffman(2003b)“Comment/Discussion”inTerrorinJerusalem,editedbyAmi PedhazukandGadiParan(TheJerusalemInstituteforIsraeliStudies,June30);and JessicaStern,“TheProteanEnemy,”ForeignAffairs82,4(2003):27–40. 3.ForalargertreatmentofthesubjectseeH.V.Savitch,withGreggArdashev, “DoesTerrorHaveanUrbanFuture?”UrbanStudies38,13(2001a):2515–2533;and Savitch,“Does9–11PortendaNewParadigmforCities?”UrbanAffairsReview39, 1(2003):103–127. 4.The9/11CommissionReport,TerroristAttacksUpontheUnitedStates,pp. 71–72. 5. Unlike the Type 1 and Type 2 data used elsewhere in this study, these data take into account domestic terrorism for earlier decades going back to 1968. See BBCReport,2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/4661753.stm;andTonyBlair, “SpeechofthePrimeMinisterintheHouseofCommons,”July21,2005,availableat http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7969.asp. 6.Fordetails,seetheNationalMemorialInstituteforthePreventionofTerrorism (MIPT)TerrorismKnowledgeBaseatwww.tkb.org. 7.The account is intended to provide the reader with an idea about the extent ofterrorandusesIndia’smajorcitiestoillustratethis.Pakistantoohassubstantial damagetolifeandpropertyduetoterrorism.Since1968,Karachihassustained151 incidentsandover1,300casualties.Islamabadincurred39incidentsandover1,700 casualties.RANDdatabaseatwww.tkb.org.Type1data. 8.Theauthorwasthesingleexception.SeeSavitch,withArdashev,“DoesTerror HaveanUrbanFuture?”OtherpapersincludeBrennan(1999);Cardia(2000);Ducci (2000);Mehta(1999);Renner(1998);Rogers,Bouhia,andKalbermatten(2001);Rolnik (1999);Stren(1998);Voronin(1998);Wilheim(1999);andYacoobandKelly(1999). 9.RobertFishman,“TheAmericanMetropolisatCentury’sEnd:PastandFuture,” HousingPolicyDebate,11,1(2000):199–213. 10.UnitedNations,WorldUrbanizationProspect(2003):p.77.
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11. UN-Habitat, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlement (2003),availableathttp://www.unhabitat.org/p.2.SeealsotheInternationalSchool of Geneva, at http://www.geographyjim.org/ and http://www.geographyjim.org/ Documents/Urban%20Debate/Urbanisation%20Notes.doc. 12.Sassen,CitiesinaWorldEconomy,p.27. 13. Figures will differ depending on the particular year used. For New York City, see State of the Cities Data Systems, Output for NewYork, NY, available at http://socds.huduser.org/Census/incpov.odb.Also see Corporation of London et al., London–NewYorkStudy:TheEconomicsofTwoGreatCitiesattheNewMillennium (2000),Section1,pp.14,26. 14.JohnMollenkopfandManuelCastells,eds.,DualCity:RestructuringNewYork (NewYork:RussellSage,1991);andSusanFainstein,IanGordon,andMichalHarloe, DividedCities:NewYorkandLondonintheContemporaryWorld(Cambridge,MA: BlackwellPublishers,1992). 15.SeeLarryJohnson,“TheDecliningTerroristThreat,”NewYorkTimes,July10, 2001,p.A19. 16.Stern,“ProteanEnemy.” 17.Excludingthe9/11attack,casualtiesfor2001wouldhavecometojust8.5per attack.Whileworthyofnote,thisisapurelymootquestionbecause9/11didhappen. 18.WalterEndersandToddSandler,“IsTransnationalTerrorismBecomingMore Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, 3 (2000):307–332. 19.Hoffman,“Comment/Discussion,”PartII,8. 20.ForconfirmationofthisgrowingtrendseeRobertPape’sDyingtoWin(New York:RandomHouse,2005).Therearedifferingaccountsofwhofirsttookupthe ideaofsuicideasamethodofguerrillaorterroristattack.Someattributetheideato thesecularistPopularFrontfortheLiberationofPalestine,whichfirstuseditin1974 againstcivilians(terrorattack).OtherssaytheTamilTigersperfecteditagainstthe armyinSriLanka(guerrillaattack).Hezbollahseemstohaveemployedsuicidein guerrillaattacksatanearlydateandindramaticfashion.Hezbollahusedexplosiveladentruckstodriveintomilitaryinstallations. 21.DavidVenessmentionsanumberoffeaturesthatmakecitiesespeciallydesirable targets.SeeDavidVeness,“LowIntensityandHighImpactConflict,”Terrorismand PoliticalViolence11,4(1989):8–14. 22.AnthonyTu,ChemicalTerrorism:HorrorsinTokyoSubwayandMatsumoto City(FortCollins,CO:Alaken,2002). 23. John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff, “World City Formation: An Agenda for ResearchandAction,”InternationalJournalofUrbanandRegionalResearch,6,3 (1982):309–344. 24.JonCoaffee,Terrorism,RiskandtheCity(Burlington,VT:AshgatePublishing House,2003). 25.IsraeliNationalFederationofTrade,2004. 26.DameElizaManningham-Buller,DirectorGeneraloftheSecurityService,“The InternationalTerroristThreat,”QueenMary’sCollege,London,November9,2006. 27. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998),p.61. 28.SeeNoamChomsky,9–11,NewYork(NewYork:SevenStoriesPress,2001); andStephoneGraham,ed.,Cities,WarandTerrorism(Oxford,UK:BlackwellPress, 2004).
204 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 2 & 3
29.MichaelRadu,“London7/7andItsImpact,”ForeignPolicyResearchInstitute 6(2005):5. 30.ForanelaborationofthisideaseeSavitchandArdashev,“DoesTerrorHave anUrbanFuture?” 31. See Jonas Rabinovich, “PracticalApproaches to Urban Poverty Reduction,” statementattheInternationalForumonUrbanPoverty,Governance,andParticipation, November10–13,1997,Florence,Italy;andDavidSatterthwaite,“TheUnderestimation ofUrbanPovertyinLowandModerateIncomeNations”(workingpaperonPoverty ReductioninUrbanAreas14,2005). 32.SeeasplendidessayonthissubjectbyWalterLaquer,“PostmodernTerrorism,” ForeignAffairs75(1996):24.
NotestoChapter3 1. In the United States, National Public Ratio (NPR) most often uses the term “militant”torefertosuicideattackersinIsrael,Russia,andothercountries.However, there occurred a palpable shift in noun usage when NewYork and London were attacked.Intheselatterinstances,NPRdiscovered“terror”and“terrorist”todescribe thesituation.Similarly,theBBCinsistedonthenoun“militant”wheneverterrorists killedIsraeliandRussiancivilians,andatleastbrieflyfoundthenouns“terror”and “terrorist”whenpassengersonLondon’stransitsystemswerekilled.SeeAlexSafian, “TerrorRulesatNPR,”CAMERA(March10,2003),aswellasTomGross,“TheBBC Discovers‘Terrorism,’Briefly,”JerusalemPost,July11,2005. 2. Reuters Editorial Policy, available at http://about.Reuters.com. Accessed October2004. 3. British Broadcasting Corporation, “Editorial Guidelines,” available at www. bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/edguide/war/mandatoryreferr.shtmi. 4. Michael Getler, “The Language of Terrorism,” Washington Post, September 21,2003. 5.Ibid. 6.ItisapparentfromthecontentoftheinterviewthatSecretaryRicetookpains to emphasize the dismantling of terrorist organizations. While there was a single quote from Rice mentioning terrorism, the newspaper’s reporters or editors were equallydeterminedtoavoidtheterm.Strictlyspeaking,thismightnotbeadistortion, though the usage of particular wording did give the interview a particular tilt. See Steven Weisman and Joel Brinkley, “Rice Urges Israel and Palestinians to Sustain Momentum,”NewYorkTimes,August18,2005. 7.ChristineChinlund,“WhoShouldWeartheTerroristLabel?”BostonGlobe, September8,2003. 8.MichaleShuster,TalkoftheNation,NPR,May19,2003. 9.Years later, the Italian foreign minister, Massimo D’Alema voiced a similar opinion. D’Alema, however, was careful to note that it was simplistic to describe Hezbollahas“solelyaterroristorganization”(emphasisadded).D’Alemamayhave beensearchingforastrawmanbecausemostcommentatorswhoviewedHezbollah as terrorists also recognized it carried out other functions.As noted, recent history showsthatterroristorganizationscanbemultifunctionalbecausecarryingoutsocial services increases mass support. See Meron Rapoport, “Italian Foreign Minister: HarshApproachtoMideastHasFailed,”Haaretz,August8,2006,p.1.Eventuallythe EuropeanUniondiddesignateHamasasaterroristorganization,joiningtheUnited
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States and Canada. See Staff Report, “UK, France at Odds over Banning Hamas PoliticalWing,”JerusalemPost,January16,2003. 10. In an effort to portray individuals who strap explosives around their bodies intending to blow up themselves and others, media guidelines advise journalists to employ“bomber”or“suicidebomber.”Whilethetermisconfusing,itdoesnotfall outsidetheboundsofaccuracy. 11. For all its other biases, Le Monde does not shy from using the terrorist nomenclatureandfullyacceptsitasanaccuratedescriptive. 12.Considerherethreeexamplesofthewordmilitant.Onewell-knownfeminist whoaggressivelycampaignedagainstpornographyquiteeasilydescribesherselfasa “militant.”SeeAndrea’sDworkin’sHeartbreak:ThePoliticalMemoirofaFeminist Militant(NewYork:BasicBooks,2002).Also,unionworkerswithahighpropensity togoonstrikehavebeendescribedas“militant,”andthetermhasalsobeenusedto mean“extensivegoalsetting,resistanceandmembershipmobilizationunderpinnedby anideologyofconflictinginterests....”SeeGregorGall,TheMeaningofMilitancy: Postal Workers and Industrial Relations (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Press, 2003). Finally,foranaccountofalegitimatethoughradicalpoliticalpartycalledMilitant Tendency, see Peter Taffe’s and Tony Mulhearn’s Liverpool—A City that Dared to FightLondon(London:FortressPress,1988). 13.“TheEgyptianTawhidWalJihadIssuesaStatement,”SearchforInternational TerroristEntities(SITEInstitute),availableatwww.siteinstitute.com. 14. Maria Reese, “Jayash Islamiya Claims Jakarta Car Bombing,” available at http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clikability.com. 15.ArnonRegular,“Hamas:ForeignersShouldLeaveCountry,”Haaretz,June13,2003, and“ArafatCallsonPalestiniansto‘TerrorizeYourEnemy,’”Haaretz,May15,2004. 16.PublicBroadcastingSystem,OsamabinLaden,Interview,Frontline,available atwww.pbs.org. 17.ABCNews,ShamilBasayev,Interview,Nightline,availableathttp://abcnews. go.com. 18.Thepoliticalpricesometimesconsistsofthreatstoaparticularnewsoutletor disapprovalbysympathizers.Asdiscussedearlier,neitherconventionalnorguerrilla norinsurgentwarfarefitsthe“terrorist”description. 19.See,forexample,SergeSchemann,“DayofTerror,”NewYorkTimes,September 12,2001,p.1,andN.R.Klienfield,“ACreepingHorrorandPanickedFlight,”New York Times, September 12, 2001. For its part, the BBC labeled the 7/7 attacks as “terrorist,” but as time elapsed resorted to familiar euphemisms. For commentaries on this, see Economist, June 24, 2006, p. 65, and Independent Panel for the BBC Governors, “Impartiality of BBC Coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” London,April2006. 20. See Center for Strategic Studies, “Post Amman Attacks, Jordanian Public OpinionandTerrorism,”PublicOpinionPollingUnit,UniversityofJordan:January 2005. 21.Ibid. 22. For an outstanding treatment of this subject, see Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations (NewYork: Random House, 1972). For its application to cities, see Susan Clarke, “Local Governance and Homeland Security” (paper presented at the Thomas J. Anton/Frederick Lippitt Conference on “Homeland Security in Urban America,” panel on “National Perspectives on Urban Homeland Security,” Brown University,September23–24,2004).
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23.See,forexample,E.GlaeserandM.Shapiro,“CitiesandWarfare:TheImpactof TerrorismonUrbanForm,”JournalofUrbanEconomics51(March2002):205–224. SeealsoH.V.Savitch,“AnAnatomyofUrbanTerror:LessonsfromJerusalemand Elsewhere,”UrbanStudies42,3(2005):361–395;andSavitch,“Does9–11Portenda NewParadigmforCities?”UrbanAffairsReview39,1(2003):103–127. 24.As an empirical detail, terrorists are often not “weak,” and relative to their victims can be quite “strong.” For example, the Ku Klux Klan terrorized blacks in America’s South for nearly a century.The Klan was the dominant party, and for a time their strength through terror succeeded in disenfranchising blacks. Similarly, in this century in Sudan,Arab marauders constituting the “Janjaweed” are clearly thedominantgroupandterrorizeAfricanblacksbycarryingoutcampaignsofmass murder.Also,inAfghanistan,theTalibanwereabletointimidateunarmedcivilians byusingbruteforce.TheKuKluxKlan,theJanjaweed,andtheTalibanwereorare strongrelativetotheirvictimswhileatthesametimebeinglow-resourcegroupsthat relyorreliedonprimitiveweapons. 25.QuotedinRandCenterforRiskManagementPolicy,TrendinTerrorism(Santa Monica,CA:RAND,2005),p.31. 26. SeeAnthony T. Tu, Chemical Terrorism: Horrors in the Tokyo Subway and MatsumotoCity(FortCollins,CO:Alaken,2002). 27.SeeGrahamAllison,NuclearTerrorism(NewYork:TimesBooks,2004). 28.RichardLugar,“TheLugarSurveyonProliferation:ThreatsandResponse,” UnitedStatesSenate,Washington,DC,2005,availableathttp://lugar.senate.gov. 29. The extent of the disagreement is considerable. Some experts judge the likelihoodofasuccessfulbiologicalornuclearattacktobe“verylow”or“extremely low,”andthepossibilityofachemicalattacktobe“low.”SeeMichaelO’Hanlon,Ivo Daalder,DavidGunter,PeterOrszag,I.M.Destler,RobertLitan,andJamesSternberg, Protecting the Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 6. See also John J. Kiefer, “Implementing Strategies to Mitigate the Impact of Terrorist Attacks against the Built Environment” (Ph.D. dissertation,OldDominionUniversity,Norfolk,VA,n.d.). 30.SeeMichaelReinemerandChrisHoene,“CitiesTakingonNewSecurityRoles amidEconomicConcerns,”Nation’sCitiesWeekly25,36(September9,2002):1–2. 31. For a powerful essay on the subject, see Gene Weingarten, “Fear Itself,” WashingtonPostMagazine,August22,2004,p.W-18. 32.ForanotentirelyfaircomparisonofLondoners’attitudesafter7/7andduring WorldWarII,seeCharlesGlass,“TheLastofEngland:ChurchillGaveLondonCourage, BlairisServingFear,”HarpersMagazine,311,1866(November2005):43–49.Foran accountoftheeditorialcartoon,seeSarahLyall,“LondonersGrapplingwithPervasive NewFoes:FearandSuspicion,”NewYorkTimes,July26,2005,p.A6. 33.Economist,July30,2005,p.12. 34.PewResearchCenter,September5,2002,“OneYearLaterNewYorkersMore Troubled,WashingtoniansMoreonEdge,ThePersonalTollPersists,PolicyOpinions Change,”availableathttp://people-press.org/reports/print.php. 35.SeeDarrellWestandMarionOrr,“ManagingCitizenFears:PublicAttitudes towardTerrorism,”UrbanAffairsReview41,1(2005):93–105. 36.Soonafter9/11,only12percentofNewYorkersagreedthattheyfeltsafein thatcity,whilethenationalfigurewas17percent.OklahomaCityandWashington, DC,residents,however,cameclosertothenationallevel.“WorriesaboutTerrorism SubsideinMid-America,”ThePewResearchCenter,November8,2001,availableat http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3.
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37.Ibid. 38. The reader can compare the results in the NewYork Times/CBS News Poll, August17–21,2006,p.9,andAugust23–27,p.6. 39.DavidCohen,BrianGerber,andKendraStewart,“StateandLocalGovernment ActionsonHomelandSecurity:ExplainingVariationinPreparednessEfforts”(paper preparedforthe2004annualmeetingoftheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation, Chicago,April2004). 40.PewResearchCenter,September5,2002,“OneYearLaterNewYorkersMore Troubled,WashingtoniansMoreonEdge,ThePersonalTollPersists,PolicyOpinions Change.” 41.FollowingaretheresponsesandsourcesforTable3.1.
GeographicalProximity Response 1—Percentage of people feeling fear (stress, depression, worry) dependingonproximitytocrashsites.AreasincludeNewYork,Washington,DC, othermajormetropolitanareas,andintheremainderoftheUnitedStates. FromWilliamE.Schlengeretal.,“PsychologicalReactionstoTerroristAttacks,” JournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation288,5(2002):586. Response2—Percentageofpeoplefeelingfear(stress,depression,worry)depending onresidentialproximity.AreasincludeupperManhattanandlowerManhattan. FromSandroGaleaetal.,“PsychologicalSequelaeoftheSeptember11Terrorist Attacks in NewYork City,” New England Journal of Medicine 346, 13 (2002): 982–987.
SocialProximity Response3—Percentageofpeoplewhodirectlywitnessedevents. FromGaleaetal.,“PsychologicalSequelae.” Response4—Percentageofpeoplewhosefriendsorrelativeswerekilled. FromGaleaetal.,“PsychologicalSequelae.” Response5—Percentageofpeoplewhoseacquaintanceswerekilledorinjured. FromSchlengeretal.,“PsychologicalReactions.”
ChronologicalProximity Response 6—Percentage of people worried by greater chances of attack before andafterSeptember11,2001. From“TwoYearsLater,theFearLingers,”ThePewResearchCenter,September 17,2003,http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=192. Response 7—Percentage of people worried by greater chances of attack before andafterJuly7,2005,attacks. From CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, USA Today, July 12, 2005, http://www. usatoday.com/news/washington/2005–07–11-bush-poll.htm.
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42.NewYorkTimes/CBSNewsPoll,August23–27,2006,p.4. 43.GabrielBen-Dor,andDaphnaCanetti-Nisim,PsychologicallyCopingwiththe Intifada:HaifaUniversitySurveyFinds(NationalSecurityStudiesCenter,2004). 44. See, for example, Yaacov Garb and Hank V. Savitch, Urban Trauma in Jerusalem: Impacts and Possibilities for Recovery (The Floersheimer Institute for PolicyStudies,2005). 45.AmiPedahzurandDaphnaCanetti-Nisim,“TheImpactofTerrorismonPolitical Attitudes:ATwo-EdgedSword”(PresentationattheNationalSecurityStudiesCenter, UniversityofHaifa,2004). 46. Avraham B. Bleich, Marc Gelkopf, and Zahava Solomon, “Exposure to Terrorism, Stress-Related Mental Health Symptoms, and Coping Behaviors among a Nationally Representative Sample in Israel,” Journal of the American Medical Association290,5(2003):612–620. 47.TheideawasbornintheNationalInterstateandDefenseHighwayActof1956. PolicymakersactuallybelievedAmericanscouldescapeanuclearattackbydispersing into the hinterlands. President Dwight D. Eisenhower recounts the reasoning and inspirationbehindthenationalhighwaysystem:“Ourroadsoughttobeavenuesfor personslivinginbigcitiesthreatenedbyaerialattackornaturaldisaster;butIknew thatifsuchacrisiseveroccurred,ourobsolescenthighways,toosmallforthefloodof trafficofanentirecity’spopulationgoingoneway,wouldturnintotrapsofdeathand destruction.”SeeDwightD.Eisenhower,MandateforChange(NewYork:Doubleday, 1963),p.548. 48.See,forexample,ToddSwanstrom,“AreFearandUrbanismatWar?”Urban AffairsReview38,1(2002):135–140. 49.ForanaccountofhowthisworksinBelfast,seeWilliamNell,“Marketingthe UrbanExperience:ReflectionsonthePlaceofFearinthePromotionalStrategiesof Belfast,DetroitandBerlin,”UrbanStudies38,5–6(2001):815–828. 50.An excellent summary of these symptoms can be found in RaphelYehuda, “Current Concepts: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” New England Journal of Medicine346,2(2002):108–114. 51.FollowingaretheresponsesandsourcesforTable3.2.
SpatialResponse Response1—Percentageofpeopleuneasyaboutcrowdedareas. From“ChangessinceSeptember11,”NewYorkTimes/CBSNewsPoll,NewYork Times,June11,2002. Response2—Percentageofpeopleuneasyabouttravelingbysubway. From“ChangessinceSeptember11.” Response3—Percentageofpeopleuneasyaboutgoingintoskyscrapers. From“ChangessinceSeptember11.”
PoliticalResponse Response4—Percentageofpeoplewillingtorelinquishsomelibertiesbeforeand afterSeptember11,2001,attacks.
FromAmitaiEtzioni,“AmericanSocietyintheAgeofTerror,”inAmericanSociety
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intheWakeofTerrorism:CommunitarianPerspectives,2002. http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/news_american_society.html#n_1 Response5—Percentageofpeoplewillingtorequiremetaldetectorsearchesfor officebuildings. From “On Security, Public Draws Blurred Lines,” USA Today,August 3, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005–08–03-security-lines-publicopinion_x.htm?csp=N009. Response 6—Percentage of people willing to requireArabs to undergo special checksatairports(includingU.S.citizens). From“OnSecurity,PublicDrawsBlurredLines.” Response 7—Percentage of people willing to require Arabs to carry special identification(includingU.S.citizens). From“OnSecurity,PublicDrawsBlurredLines.” Response8—Percentageofpeoplewillingthatgovernmentsearchesforborrowed librarybooks. From“ChangessinceSeptember11.” 52. NewYork Times/CBS News Poll, September 2003, available at http://www. nytimes.com/packages/html. 53. After the September attack, 42 percent of New Yorkers reported feeling “nervousoredgy,”andbyAugust2006thatpercentagestoodat40percent.NewYork Times/CBSNewsPoll,August23–27,2006,p.7. 54.Economist,July30,2005,p.49. 55.TransatlanticTrends:KeyFindings(Washington,DC:TheGermanMarshall FundoftheUnitedStates,2006). 56. Ibid., p. 16. Nations with the highest percentages are Germany, 67 percent; Slovakia,63percent;Spain,62percent;andItaly,62percent. 57.UnlikeLong’sframework,theecologyofgamesforterroristsdoesnotentail “systematicfunctionalresults”whereactionsfelicitouslymeshwitheachother.See NortonLong,“TheLocalCommunityasanEcologyofGames,”AmericanJournalof Sociology64,3(November1958):251–261. 58.InrejectingtalkswiththeChechans,Putindeclared,“Youfinditpossibleto setsomelimitationinyourdealingswiththesebastards.Sowhyshouldwetalkto people who are child-killers?” Putin’s view changed when it came to Hamas, and hereadilydemonstratedhiswillingnesstomeetwiththatorganization,stating,“The RussianForeignMinistryhasneverregardedHamasasaterroristorganization.... Weshouldsitdowntogetherandlistenandhearwhatotherssay,andweshouldmake concerted decisions.” “Putin Rejects Child Killer Talks,” BBC News, February 10, 2006,and“WorldShouldNotCutOffAidtoPalestinians—Putin,”Mosnews,January 31,2006. 59. For Livingstone’s remarks, see BBC News, “Mayor Blames Middle East Policy,”October5,2005,availableathttp://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools /print/news.bbc.co.uk. See also Michael Radu, “London 7/7 and Its Impact,” ForeignPolicyResearchInstitute6,5(July2005):1–8.Asidefromnumerousother reasons,Livingstone’scauseandeffectisfaulty.Algeria,whichhasvirtuallynooil,
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experiencedthemostsevereterrorismintheArabworldandhundredsofthousands have been killed in that country. Afghanistan, which housed the most notorious terrorists within al Qaeda and theTaliban, has no oil. Neither does Livingstone’s attributionexplainrampantterrorisminIndonesia,Thailand,thePhillipines,andthe Indian subcontinent. Livingstone might pick and choose whatever idiosyncrasies might be blamed onWestern foreign policy, but this self-serving selection hardly establishesacase. 60. For Galloway, see his remarks in the House of Commons, available at http: //www.publication.parliament.uk.ThesamefaultsforLivingstoneequallypertainto Galloway.Gallowayisparticularlycrudeonthesubjectofglobalcapitalism.While capitalismissupposedtohaveaworldwideimpact,hedoesnotexplainwhyterrorism hasnotdevelopedindigenousrootsthroughoutEastEurope,muchofLatinAmerica, ormostofsub-SaharanAfrica. 61.ForacomplimentaryaccountofGiuliani’sperformanceseeFredSiegel,Prince oftheCity(SanFrancisco:EncounterBooks,2005). 62.NewYorkTimes/CBSNewsPoll. 63.JillLawless,“LondonTubeReopensMonthafterBombings,”SeacoastOnline, September9,2005,availableatwww.seacoastonline.com.
NotestoChapter4 1.DavidRapoport,“TheFourthWave:September11intheHistoryofTerrorism,” Current History (December 2001): 419–424. Jessica Stern developed the notion of terror as a “protean enemy” in “The Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs 82, 4 (July– August 2003): 27–40. See also Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home and Abroad(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003). 2.Itisdifficulttogeneralizeordetermineaboutwhetherreligionwasputtothe serviceofterrorismorterrorismenlistedforreligiousand/orpoliticalobjectives.See Sheffer’scogentargumentinDiasporaPoliticsthatterrorismhasbeenenlistedinthe serviceofpolitical-religiousideologies. 3. For an account of Aum Shinrikyo, see Anthony Tu’s Chemical Terrorism: HorrorsinTokyoSubwayandMatsumotoCity(FortCollins,CO:Alaken,2002). 4.Whilerecognizingthat“certainusersofterrorismformaclassapart,”Charles Tillycomestotheconclusionthatterrorismisastrategyandshouldnotbejudgedas anideology.OnthiscountIdisagreewithTilly,andwouldarguethatbecausemost terrorists are often motivated by ideological extremism, and leaving the particulars of ideology aside, they can be evaluated by the commonalities that make up that extremism.SeeCharlesTilly,“Violence,TerrorandPoliticsasUsual,”BostonReview 27,3–4(Summer),p.10.SeealsoJonathanAriel,“AWarwithoutanEnemy,”Maariv, August9,2004,p.1. 5. Thus Hamas takes pains to distinguish itself from al Qaeda, and in some waysthetwoorganizationsaredifferent.ThemostobviousdifferenceisthatHamas purportstofollowthepathoflocaljihadwhereasalQaedaembracesaworldjihad.At aminimum,bothorganizationsbelieveinIslamicrule,botharewillingtointentionally killciviliansinpursuitoftheirobjectives,andbothhaveusedindoctrinatedsuicide attackerstocarryoutwarfare. 6.SeeEricHoffer,TheTrueBeliever(NewYork:HarperandRow,1951). 7. The long-term data will hold the longitudinal advantage of being able to collectmoreincidentsovertimewithanarrowfieldofsubjects.Therecent,short-
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termdatawillholdabroaderfieldofsubjects,buttheseareconstrictedbyamore limitedtimeframe.Usedtogethertheycanconfirmbasicpatterns.Thesedatabases cannotbeusedincomparisonwitheachother,butrathertoverifyasetofindependent propositions.ThesedatabasesconformtotheType2andType3datadescribedin Chapter1. 8.Asdistinguishedfromcasualties,DavidTuckerdevelopsalethalityindex.See DavidTucker,“WhatIsNewabouttheNewTerrorismandHowDangerousIsIt?” TerrorismandPoliticalViolence13,3(Autumn2001):1–14. 9. NewYork Times, March 14, 2004, section 4, p. 1. C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ TargetSelection(London:MacmillanPress,1998). 10.SeeDrake,Terrorists’TargetSelection,104. 11.ThenationalistLTTE(TamilTigers)alsousedsuicideterror,andwhilethey haveinflictedhighcasualties,theirhumantollisstillmuchsmallerthanthatoftheir Islamistcounterparts.Thus,between1968and2005,theTamilTigerswereresponsible for134attacksresultingin3,060casualties,or22.83casualtiesperattack.Compare thiswithIslamistterrorforthesameperiodresultinginover200incidentsandmore than 30,000 casualties, or 143.9 casualties per attack (Rand Corporation, Terrorist KnowledgeBase,www.tkb.org).AnydoubtsabouttheusetowhichIslamhasbeen put to rationalize terror should be resolved by consulting the film “Ask for Death. TheIndoctrinationofPalestinianChildrentoSeekDeathforAllah–Shahada,”Itamar Marcus, Director of Palestinian Media Watch, available at http://www.pmw.org.il/. ThenotionofmartyrdomisverymuchanIslamicconceptandusedextensivelyto justifysuicideattacks. 12.WhilesomeattributetheonsetofsuicideterrorismtotheLTTE(TamilTigers) ofSriLanka,the“model”forsuchattackswasfurnishedbyHezbollahinLebanon.In October1983,Hezbollahcarriedoutsuicideattacksthatkilled241Americanmarines at the multinational force barracks in Beirut. Ehud Sprinzak argues that the Tamil Tigersmadeastrategicdecisiontoadoptthemethodofsuicideattackafterobserving itslethaleffectivenessinthe1983suicidebombingsoftheU.S.andFrenchbarracks inBeirut.TheTamilTigersfirstbeganemployingsuicideoperationsin1987intheir effortstoretardthemovementofSriLankantroopsintoJaffnaCity.Theseattacks involved driving explosives-laden trucks into Sri Lankan army positions. See Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy 120 (September–October 2000): pp. 66–73. 13.SeeRogerMasters,“Pre-EmptiveWar,IraqandSuicideBombers,”Forum1, 2(2002):pp.1–3. 14.Whilethedistinctionbetweensecularandreligiousterrorismisrelativelyclear, thelinebetweenreligiousandpoliticalterrorismoftenblurs.Religiousterroristslike Hamasoftenhavepoliticalgoals.WhileHamascanbeconsideredtobeapoliticaland areligiousorganization,itsobjectiveliesintheascendancetogovernmentbyclerics ortheocrats.SeeSheffer,DiasporaPolitics. 15.TheUnitedStatesstillhasaformidablearrayofneofascist/nationalistgroups. TheattackinOklahomaCitywascarriedoutbyTimothyMcVeighandTerryNichols, who represent the extremes of this identity. SouthAmerica’s leading terrorists are membersofleftistrevolutionaryorganizationssuchastheRevolutionaryArmedForce of Colombia (FARC) and Peru’s Shining Path. With the exception of Sri Lanka’s TamilTigers,theIndiansubcontinentandSoutheastAsiaaredominatedbyIslamist /nationalistterrorism. 16. For the cost of the 9/11 attack, see the 9/11 Commission Report, Terrorist
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AttacksupontheUnitedStates,p.169.Forthecostof7/7,seeHouseofCommons, ReportoftheOfficialAccountoftheBombingsinLondonon7July,2005(London, theStationeryOffice,May2006).Whereapplicable,theamountswereconvertedto dollarsusingexchangeratesthatwerecurrentatthetime.Theexchangerateforthe year2005wascalculatedat1.8dollarsperBritishpound.Otherwritershavecome up with lower cost estimates. See Michael Buchanan, “London Bombs Cost Just Hundreds,” British Broadcast Corporation, available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk (accessedJanuary3,2006). 17.Rapoport,HistoryofTerrorism. 18.MarcSageman’sexcellentwork,UnderstandingTerroristNetworks(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2004),makesadifferentpoint.Herevealsthat while Milan, Madrid, and Hamburg have harbored world jihadists, other cities like Barcelona,Berlin,Rome,andParishavenotdoneso(p.143).Ifindthisnottobethe casefortheParisianarea,especiallyifwearetalkingaboutMaghrebianterrorism. SeeJeanChichizola“Unefilièredebraqueursetd’islamistesdémantelée,”LeFigaro, December13,2005,pp.1,11. 19.LeMonde,December25,2004. 20.Reuters,October4,2004. 21.ThissectionisdrawnfromLorenzoVidino,“IsItalyNextinLineafterLondon?” TerrorismMonitor3:18(Washington,DC:TheJamestownFoundation,September21, 2005). 22.“AlQaeda’sNewFront,”PublicBroadcastingSystemVideo,www.pbs.org. 23.Ibid.,p.5. 24.ThissectionisdrawnfromPaulTumelty,“AnIn-DepthLookattheLondon Bombers,” Terrorism Monitor 3:15 (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, July28,2005). 25. Particulars on London’s boroughs can be found in London Key Statistical Tables,CrownCopyright,2001(London:2001),TableKS09AandTableKS11A. 26.PolicedidraidaNorthLondonapartmentbelongingtomembersofHamza’s mosqueanddiscoveredsmallquantitiesofricin. 27. Simon Freeman, “Abu Hamza Jailed for SevenYears for Inciting Murder,” February7,2006,TimesOnLine,availableathttp://www.timesonline.co.uk. 28.SeeJensDangschat,“EconomicImprovementDividestheCity:TheCaseof Hamburg”(manuscript,DepartmentofSociology,UniversityofHamburg,n.d.). 29.Intotal,thecellhadeightmembersconsistingofMohammedAtta,Marwan al-Shehhi,ZiadJarrah,RamziBinalshibh,SaidBahaji,ZakariyaEssabar,Mounirel Motassadeq, and Abdelghani Mzoudi. See the 9/11 Commission Report, Terrorist AttacksupontheUnitedStates,pp.160–173. 30.ElenaLappin,“Portrait:AttainHamburg,”Prospect,August29,2003,p.2. 31.Audioandvideotapesdiscoveredbythepolicerevealedanextensiverecordof sermonsurgingfollowerstoattackunbelieversand“slitthethroatsofChristiansand Jews.”SeeDouglasFrantzandDesmondButler,“ImamatGermanMosquePreached Hateto9/11Pilots,”NewYorkTimes,July16,2002,p.2. 32.PeterFinn,“Hamburg’sCauldronofTerror,”WashingtonPost,September11, 2002,p.6. 33.Lappin,“Portrait:AttainHamburg,”p.7. 34.Sageman,UnderstandingTerroristNetworks,p.151. 35.Ibid.,p.151. 36.Radu,“London7/7andItsImpact.”
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37.Manningham-Buller,“TheInternationalTerroristThreat.” 38.Sageman,UnderstandingTerroristNetworks,pp.139–158. 39. The 9/11 Commission Report, Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, pp.215–241. 40.PublicBroadcastingSystem,“AlQaeda’sNewFront.” 41.Sageman,UnderstandingTerroristNetworks,p.159.
NotestoChapter5 1.KevinHetherington,“InPlaceofGeometry:TheMaterialityofPlace,”inIdeas ofDifference(London:Blackwell,1977),p.184. 2.SeeH.V.Savitch,PostIndustrialCities:PoliticsandPlanninginNewYork, ParisandLondon(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988). 3. Lewis Mumford, The City in History (NewYork: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1960).LouisWirth,“UrbanismasaWayofLife,”AmericanJournalofSociology44 (1938):1–24.ConsultJakeJacobs,TheEconomyofCities(NewYork:RandomHouse, 1970)andCitiesandtheWealthofNations(NewYork:RandomHouse,1984). 4. A foremost proponent of this view was Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, SocialismandDemocracy(NewYork:HarperandRow,1950). 5. See, for example, the treatment of different cities in Michael Cohen, Blair Ruble, Joseph Tulchin, andAllison Garland, eds., Preparing for the Urban Future (Washington, DC:WoodrowWilson Center Press, 1996); and Roland Fuchs, Ellen Brennan,JosephChamie,FuChenLo,andJuhaUitto,eds.,MegaCityGrowthand theFuture(NewYork:UnitedNationsUniversityPress,1994).SeealsoFulongWu, “Globalization, Place Promotion and Urban Development in Shanghai,” Journal of UrbanAffairs25,1(2003):55–78. 6.Foranaccountofthediscretionaffordedtocities,seeH.V.SavitchandPaul Kantor,CitiesintheInternationalMarketplace(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversity Press,2002),especiallyChapter2.Foraninterestingdiscussionofhowplannersmake space,seeDavidPerry,“MakingSpace:PlanningasaModeofThought,”inSpatial Practices,ed.HelenLiggetandDavidPerry(ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublications, 1993). 7.Type1dataisportrayedinthetableanditsresultscomparedtoType2data.No significantdifferenceswerefound. 8. Not all terrorism works with this kind of consistent precision, and some terroristswillattackthenearesttargetofopportunity.Butthemostefficientterrorist organizations do exercise impressive levels of tactical and strategic awareness. For theindiscriminatenatureofterrorism,seeRaymondAron,PeaceandWar(London: WiedenfeldandNicolson,1966). 9.Anadolescentlaterexplained,“Iwantedtodieasaheroandmeet70virgins promisedinparadise.”StephanieLeBars,“UnJeunePalestinienvoulaitsefairesauter áunbarrageenCisjordanie,”LeMonde,March25,2004,p.1.SeealsoAmosHarel, “TanzimRecruitingMinorsforAttacks,”Haaretz,April15,2004,p.1;andJerusalem Post Staff, “Woman Found with Grenade While Holding Baby,” Jerusalem Post, October22,2005. 10.SeetheU.S.DepartmentofJustice,TheAlQaedaTrainingManual,available athttp://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm. 11.Forathoroughanalysis,seeD.Radlauer,“AnEngineeredTragedy:Statistical AnalysisofCasualtiesinthePalestinian-IsraeliConflict,September2000–September
214 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
2002.”InternationalPolicyInstituteforCounterTerrorism,June24,2002.http://www. ict.org.il/index.php?sid=119&lang=en&act=page&id=5305&str=Radlauer. 12. Tel Aviv’s metropolitan area contains 2 million inhabitants, while Haifa’s metropolitan district includes 980,000. As opposed to the metropolitan area, the municipalsizeofTelAvivandHaifaisconsiderablysmallerthanthatofJerusalem. TelAviv’s municipal population is 360,000 while Haifa stands at 270,000 (Israeli CentralBureauofStatistics,Jerusalem,Israel,2004). 13.Thebreakdownforterroristmeansofattackisfortheyear2002.SeeJerusalem Municipal Government Statistical Profiles, 2003, available at http://www.jerusalem. muni.il. 14.SeeAmiPedahzurandGadiParan,“LessonsfromtheNumerousActsofTerror andViolenceagainstCiviliansinJerusalem”;andHoffman,“TheLogicofSuicide Terrorism,”AtlanticMonthly,June2003. 15.Masters“Pre-EmptiveWar,Iraq,andSuicideBombers,”Forum1,2(2002): 1–3. 16.Hoffman,“Comment/Discussion.” 17.Ratesofincidenceandcasualtiesrateswillvaryaccordingtothetimeperiods selected.Thus, over a recent twenty-five-year period, this small area accounted for 65 percent of all casualties within the entire city. See International Policy Institute forCounter-Terrorism,2004,Database,Herzliya,Israel,availableathttp://www.ict. org.il.SeealsoSavitch,“AnAnatomyofUrbanTerror:LessonsfromJerusalemand Elsewhere,”UrbanStudies42,3:361–395. 18. S. Hazam and D. Felsenstein, “A SpatialAnalysis of Terror in Jerusalem,” (unpublishedpaper,InstituteofUrbanandRegionalStudies,HebrewUniversityof Jerusalem,2004). 19. For a succinct account, seeY. Sheleg, “A Short History ofTerror,” Haaretz, December3,2001. 20.See,forexample,AmiPedahzurandGadyParan,TerrorinJerusalem,aswell as Paran, Pedahzur, andArie Perliger, Coping withTerrorism in Jerusalem: 1967– 2002(TheJerusalemInstituteofIsraelStudies,2005). 21. Arabs and Jews are served by different school systems, utility and bus companies. 22.AviDichter,SecurityChiefNamesIranasWorldN1TerrorState;SaysSecurity FenceIsVital,IsraelMinistryofForeignAffairs,2003,availableatwww.israel-mfa. gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH002r0. 23. David Makovsky, “How to Build a Fence,” Foreign Affairs (March–April, 2004):50–64. 24.Foranaccountofthisepisode,seeBeverlyGage,“TheFirstWallStreetBomb,” inMichaelSorkinandSharonZukin,eds.,AftertheWorldTradeCenter:Rethinking NewYorkCity(NewYork:Routledge,2002). 25.Ibid.,p.48. 26. The practice of “preemptive arrests” by local or national agencies tends to exaggerate threats because suspects are intercepted as quickly as possible—often beforeanyrealactisexecuted.Therealityofthesethreatsisthenunclear,thoughitis fairtoassumethatsomeofthemwouldhavematerialized. 27.InformationonthiscanbefoundinFederalEmergencyManagementAgency, WorldTradeCenterBuildingPerformanceStudy,FEMA,RegionII(NewYork,May 2002). 28.The9/11Tapes,CityofNewYork,2006.
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29. The account is taken from Ron Susskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York:SimonandSchuster,2006). 30.Ibid.,p.xx. 31.Thegradualaccretionofeventsoveralongerperiodofthirtyyearshasresulted inabout300incidents,leaving119deadand1,550wounded.SeeTonyBlair,“Speech ofthePrimeMinisterintheHouseofCommons,”availableathttp://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page7969.asp. 32. The factions of the Irish RepublicanArmy (IRA) consist of the Provisional IrishRepublicanArmy(PIRA)aswellastheRealIrishRepublicanArmy(RIRA). ThePIRAsplinteredfromtheIRAduringthe1970s.TheRIRAisadissidentgroup responsiblefortheOmaghbombinginAugust1998.Itopposedcease-firesin1994 and1997. 33. See Jon Coaffee, Terrorism, Risk and the City (Burlington, VT: Ashgate PublishingHouse,2003),p.75. 34.Seaggate,AssociatedPress,July7,2005. 35.BBCreports,www.bbc.co.uk 36.Caoffee,Terrorism,RiskandtheCity,p.75. 37.TheCorporationofLondon,London–NewYorkStudy.SeealsoTubeprune,London UndergroundStatistics,availableatwww.trainweb.org/tubeprune/Statistics.htm. 38.Ibid. 39. During this period and afterward there were scattered attacks and attempts elsewhereinLondon.InNovemberof1992,abombwasfoundanddefusedatCanary Wharf,andin1996abombwasdetonatedintheDocklandsareaofLondon,killing two persons and wounding 100 others. In 2001, a car bomb exploded outside the BBC’smaintelevisionfacilities,causingslightpropertydamageandnoinjuries.See Coaffee,Terrorism,RiskandtheCity,p.76,andBBCReports,www.bbc.co.uk. 40.MI5issupposedtohaveconfirmedthisclaim.ConsultAndrewDorman,“The BritishExperiencewithTerroristNetworks,”(paperpresentedattheAmericanPolitical ScienceAssociation,102ndAnnualMeeting,Philadelphia,August31–September3, 2006). 41.See,forexample,PrimeMinisterTonyBlair’sstatementayearearlieronthe imminenceofaterrorattack,IntelligenceandSecurityCommittee, Reportintothe LondonTerroristAttackson7July2005,Whitehall,London,March30,2006. 42.Manningham-Buller,“InternationalTerroristThreat.” 43.GreaterLondonAuthority,Reportofthe7JulyReviewCommittee(London, June2006),p.73. 44.Ibid.,p.27. 45.Ibid.,p.12. 46.Ibid.,p.26. 47.Ibid.,p.34. 48. For a revealing account of London and the rise of Islamic radicalism, see MelaniePhillips,Londonistan(NewYork:EncounterBooks,2006). 49.BBCNews,“Profile,JawadAkbar”May1,2007,availableathttp://.bbc.co.uk. 50.Manningham-Buller,“InternationalTerroristThreat.” 51.Ascanbeseenfromthefigure,thenextmostfrequenttargetisinthenearby OldCity,locatedjustacrosstheGoldenHorn.TerroristshavealsoattackedtheOld City’s“OldBazaar”(amainmarketplace)aswellastherenownedBlueMosqueand HagaSofiaMosque. 52.BBCNews,November20,2003.
216 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
NotestoChapter6 1.Foradiscussion,seeHowardJ.Nelson,“WalledCitiesoftheUnitedStates,” AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers51,1(March1961):1–22. 2.SeeLewisMumford,TheCultureofCities(NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1938), p.15. 3.QuotedinNelson,“WalledCitiesoftheUnitedStates,”p.1. 4.HenriPirenne,MedievalCities(GardenCity,NY:Doubleday,1956),p.49. 5.Concreteslabsareinstalledincongestedurbanareaswherewiderbarriersare impracticalortopreventsnipingbygunfire. 6.SeeH.V.SavitchandYaakovGarb,“Terror,BarriersandtheRe-topographyof Jerusalem,”JournalofPlanningEducationandResearch(Winter2006). 7.ThereductioninterroristattacksisparticularlywelldocumentedforJerusalem. Since the partial construction of the barrier, terrorist attacks in Jerusalem between 2002and2004havebeenreducedby90percentandcasualtiesreducedbymorethan 84percent(InternationalPolicyInstituteforCounter-Terrorism,2004;Pedahzurand Canetti-Nisim,2004;RandCorporation,2004).Asubstantialnumberofattemptshave eitherbeenstoppedormitigated,andpotentialattackershavebeencaughtwhiletrying tocircumventthebarrier.(SeeIsraelMinistryofDefense,2003,2004,TheSecurity Fence,availableatwww.securityfence.mod.gov.il. 8.SeeKarinaLandman,“Alley-GatingandNeighborhoodGating:AreTheyTwo SidesoftheSameFace?”(paperpresentedattheconferenceon“GatedCommunities: BuildingSocialDivisionorSaferCommunities?”Glasgow,UK,September18–19, 2003). 9.Theliteratureonthissubjectisextensive.ForgatedcommunitiesintheUnited States,seeEdwardBlakelyandM.G.Snyder,FortressAmerica:GatedCommunities intheUnitedStates(Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitution,1997).SeealsoAdrivan deWetering,“EnclosedNeighborhoodsinPerspective”(researchpaper,Universityof Pretoria,2000).ForSouthAfrica,seeKarinaLandman,“GatedCommunitiesandUrban Sustainability:TakingaCloserLookattheFuture”(paperpresentedattheSouthern African Conference on Sustainable Development in a Built Environment, panel on “StrategiesforaSustainableBuiltEnvironment,”Pretoria,SouthAfrica,August23– 25,2000),and“GatedCommunitiesinSouthAfrica:BuildingBridgesorBarriers?” (paper presented at the International Conference on “Private Urban Governance,” Mainz, Germany, June 6–9, 2002). See also Derek Hook and Michele Vrdoljak, “GatedCommunities,Heterotopia,anda‘Rights’ofPrivilege:A‘Heterotopology’of theSouthAfricanSecurity-Park,”ITDPGeoforum33(2002):195–219. 10.SeeSurveillanceStudiesNetwork,AReportontheSurveillanceSociety,ed. DavidM.Wood(London,2006). 11. Surveillance can be seen as a form of protection and as an instrument of abuse.Thefactofthematteristhatsocietiesusuallyrequireadegreeofsurveillance inordertosafeguardcitizens,butsurveillanceisalsosubjecttooveruse.Forclassic examplesoftheabusesofsurveillanceseeGeorgeOrwell,1984(NewYork:Bantam Books, 1932); andAldous Huxley, Brave NewWorld (NewYork: Bantam Books, 1932). 12.TheseclassificationsaremodifiedandthegeneralideatakenfromTanerOcand StevenTiesdell,“UrbanDesignApproachestoSaferCityCenters:TheFortress,the Panoptic,theRegulatoryandtheAnimated,”inLandscapesofDefense,ed.J.R.Gold andG.Revill(UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:PrenticeHall,2000).
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13. For a discussion of urban osmosis, see Oc and Tiesdell, “Urban Design ApproachestoSaferCityCenters,”p.200. 14.JaneJacobs,TheDeathandLifeofGreatAmericanCities(NewYork:Random House,1961),p.48. 15.OscarNewman,DefensibleSpace(NewYork:Macmillan,1972). 16.SeeJeremyBentham,ThePanopticonWritings,ed.MiranBozovic(London: Verso,1995). 17.QuotedinNanEllin,“ShelterfromtheStormorFormFollowsFearandVice Versa,” in Architecture of Fear, ed. Nan Ellin (NewYork: Princeton Architectural Press,1997),p.16. 18.SurveillanceStudiesNetwork,AReportontheSurveillanceSociety,Section 9.52. 19. See Katherine S. Williams, Craig Johnstone, and Mark Goodwin, “CCTV Surveillance in Urban Britain: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crime Reduction,” in LandscapesofDefense;andEricTopfer,“TheRiseofCCTVandtheTransformation ofViolentConflict,”(paperpresentedattheconferenceon“CitiesasStrategicSite: Militarisation,Anti-Globalisation,Warfare,”Manchester,UK,November6–9,2002). 20.SeeJonCoaffee,“RingsofSteel,RingsofConcreteandRingsofConfidence: Designing Out Terrorism in Central London pre and post-September 11th,” InternationalJournalofUrbanandRegionalResearch,28,1(March2004):201–211. SeealsoJohnSchwartz,“CamerasinBritainRecordtheCriminalandtheBanal,”New YorkTimes,July23,2005,p.A8. 21. Williams, Johnstone, and Goodwin, “CCTV Surveillance in Urban Britain: BeyondtheRhetoricofCrimeReduction.” 22. See Peter W. Huber and Mark P. Mills, “How Technology Will Defeat Terrorism,”CityJournal(Winter2002). 23.Ibid.,p.2. 24. Eventually the plastic was converted into concrete stanchions and bollards, but this hardly made it a ring of steel. See Coaffee, Terrorism, Risk and the City (Burlington,VT:Ashgate,2003),pp.100,114. 25.SeeH.V.Savitch,“AnAnatomyofUrbanTerror:LessonsfromJerusalemand Elsewhere,”UrbanStudies42,3(2005):361–395. 26. For the concept of an “edge city,” see Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the UrbanFrontier(NewYork:Doubleday,1991). 27.Thereissomedebateaboutthe“defensiblespace”aspectsofnewneighborhoods. SomescholarswillpointoutthatthiskindofarchitectureisindigenoustoJerusalem, and new neighborhoods would have been built in this style anyway. While these points are well taken, there is a distinct difference between new neighborhoods on the periphery and those closer to the center of the city (whose defensible space is relativelyminimal). 28.Someofthespacesdesignatedherearemyown,inspiredbytheworkofothers. ForinsightsonurbanspaceIamindebtedtoStevenFlusty’s“BuildingParanoia”in ArchitectureofFear,ed.NanEllin,pp.47–59. 29. Contextual zones are communities with buildings, blocks, streets, and functionscapableofbeingtreatedinlikemanner.Thisissupposedtoensureacertain consistencyinapplyingdifferentprotectivemeasures.Thezoneswereidentifiedas President’sPark(WhiteHouseandenvirons),CapitolHill(House,Senate,Libraryof Congress),TheMall(Smithsonian,museums,andsoforth),FederalTriangle(Ronald ReaganBuildingandvicinity),theWestEnd(DepartmentofState,FoggyBottom),
218 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
and Downtown (commercial central business district). See U.S. National Capital PlanningCommission,DesigningforSecurityintheNation’sCapital(Washington, DC:October,2001). 30.ForpricklyspacesseeFlusty,“BuildingParanoia.” 31.UriShetreet,interviewbyauthor,May26,2004. 32.SeeMatthewLevitt,“ThePoliticalEconomyofMiddleEastTerrorism,”Middle EastReviewofInternationalAffairs6,4(December2002). 33.U.S.House.CommitteeonFinance,StevenEmerson,speakingontheFund Raising Methods and Procedures for International Terrorist Organizations to the SubcommitteeonOversightandInvestigations(February12,2002). 34.Ibid. 35.Ibid. 36.U.S.SenateCommittee,UndersecretaryAlanLarsonofEconomic,Business, andAgriculturalAffairs,speakingontheInternationalDimensionsofCombatingthe FinancingofTerrorismtotheCommitteeonFinance(October9,2002). 37. See “Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to BlockTerror,” NewYorkTimes, June23,2006,availableathttp://bert.lib.indiana.edu:2310/iw-serch/we/InfoWeb/?p_ action. 38.Levitt,“ThePoliticalEconomyofMiddleEastTerrorism.” 39.SeeWilliamFinnegan,“TheTerrorismBeat,”NewYorker,July25,2005,p.58. 40.RaymondA.Kelly,interviewbyCharlieRose,TheCharlieRoseShow,PBS, August8,2006. 41.See,forexample,CraigHorowitz,“TheNYPD’sWaronTerror,”2005,available atwww.NewYorkmetro.com. 42.Finnegan,“TheTerrorismBeat,”p.23. 43.Kelly,interviewbyCharlieRose. 44. David Lyon, Surveillance after September 11 (Cambridge, UK: Polity Publications,2003),p.8. 45.Theterm“surveillancecreep”isattributedtoGaryMarx.SeeGaryMarx,“The EngineeringofSocialControl,”inCrimeandEquality,ed.J.HaganandR.Peterson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). For a discussion, see also David Wood,EliKronwitz,andKirstieBall,“TheConstantStateofEmergency:Surveillance after9/11,”inTheIntensificationofSurveillance,ed.KirstieBallandFrankWebster (Sterling,VA:PlutoPress,2003),pp.137–150. 46.Ibid. 47. For very critical attitudes toward surveillance—some of which recommend resistancetoit,seeLyon,SurveillanceafterSeptember11,aswellasWood,Kronwitz, andBall,“TheConstantStateofEmergency?Surveillanceafter9/11.” 48. See the U.S. German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings (Washington,DC:2006). 49. M. Lovall, interview by author, May 18, 2003. Anglo Saxon Real Estate, Jerusalem,Israel. 50.ArielShachar,interviewbyauthor,May9,2003.TheHebrewUniversityof Jerusalem,Israel. 51.DavidHarvey,“CracksintheEdificeoftheEmpireState,”inAftertheWorld TradeCenter,ed.MichaelSorkinandSharonZukin(NewYork:Routledge,2002)pp. 57–68.ForHarvey’squote,seep.62. 52.Dearbornismisspelledinthearticleas“Dearbon”andismistakenlyidentified asaneighborhoodinDetroitratherthanaseparatecity.SeeStephenGraham,“Cities
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andtheWaronTerror,”InternationalJournalofUrbanandRegionalPlanning30,2 (2006):255–276,p.261. 53. Estimates vary by source, the time taken for judging incarcerations, and the population considered. None of the available sources suggests thousands of incarcerationsofeitherAmericancitizensorresidentaliens—atleastnotwithinany reasonableperiodoftimeafter9/11.Inthefirstelevenmonthsafter9/11,theU.S. DepartmentofJusticeidentified762alienswhoweredetainedforvariousoffenses, including visa overstays and illegal entry.According to this source, eighty-four of these aliens were held at a correctional facility during the eleven months after the attack. See U.S. Department of Justice, “Supplemental Report on September 11 Detainees’AllegationsofAbuseattheMetropolitanDetentionCenterinBrooklyn, New York,” (December 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0312/ chapter1.htm. Human Rights Watch (HRW) takes a different view and uses three categoriestoexaminedetentions—(1)noncitizensoralienswhowereintheUnited States,(2)Americancitizens,and(3)capturedenemycombatants.HRWidentifiesat least1,200noncitizenswhoweredetainedinconnectionwithterroristinvestigations. InthecategoryofU.S.citizensarejusttwoindividuals.Thesefiguresdonotinclude thethirdcategoryofcombatantswhowerecapturedinaforeignwarinAfghanistan andimprisonedatGuantanamoBay,Cuba,consistingofalmost600detainees(more recent figures put this number well above 700). Normally, HRW closely monitors incarcerationsandsinceitslastreportin2003appearsnottohavepursuedthesubject. See Human Rights World Report, Country Report USA (2003), available at http: //www.hrw.org/wr2k3/pdf/us.pdf. 54. Graham, in “Cities and the War on Terror,” relies on an article by Sally Howell andAndrew Shyrock to make the case for mass repression in the United States. These authors have used the 1,200 figure for alien detainees but cite no source for that figure. Also, contrary to U.S. Department of Justice statements, theseauthorsclaimthedetaineeswerenevernamedorchargedwithcrimes.See SallyHowellandAndrewShyrock,“CrackingDownonDiaspora:ArabDetroitand America’sWaronTerror,”AnthropologicalQuarterly,76(2003):443–462,p.449. MikeDaviscompoundsthedistortionbystatingthat“11,000-pluspeoplehavebeen arrested and detained in the course of the government’s terrorism investigation.” DaviscitesaNewYorkTimes,editorialforthe11,000figure.Whileanxioustouse theinflatednumber,DaviseitherneglectedorignoredaNewYorkTimescorrection totheeditorialstatingthatthefigurewas“about1,100not11,000.”Thecorrected figureisclosertothatcitedbyHowellandShyrock.SeeMikeDavis,“TheFlames ofNewYork,”NewLeftReview12(November–December2001),pp.34–50,atp. 49;andcompareittoNewYorkTimes,EditorialDesk,“DisappearinginAmerica,” November10,2001,p.22. 55. Susan Clarke, Michael Pagano, and Gary Gaile, “Urban Scholarship after September11,2001,”UrbanAffairsReview37,3(2002):460–467. 56.ToddSwanstrom,“AreFearandUrbanismatWar?”UrbanAffairsReview38, 1(2002):135–140. 57.ThecontroversyovertheSWIFTprogramwascarriedinnewspapersacrossthe country.ForanearlybreakingstoryseeEtichLichtblauandJamesRisen,“BankData isSiftedbyU.S.inSecrettoBlockTerror,”NewYorkTimes,June23,2006,p.1.A differentviewofOperationSWIFTistakenbytheSurveillanceStudiesNetworkinA ReportonSurveillance.Accordingtonewspaperreports,hundredsofcaseshavebeen dropped,thrownoutofcourt,orresultedinacquittals.See“JudgeThrowsOutTerror
220 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 6 & 7
Conviction,”WashingtonPost,September1,2004,p.1;andMaureenO’Hagan,“A TerrorismCaseThatWentAwry,”SeattleTimes,November22,2004,p.1. 58.A number ofAmerican cities do receive large numbers of immigrants, and some have designated themselves “sanctuaries,” indicating that their police would not enforce tightened immigration laws. The largest include NewYork, Houston, Portland,LosAngeles,SanDiego,andSanFrancisco(NewYorkhassincerepealed its“sanctuarystatus”).SeeJudithGarber,“CitiesasAgentsofAntiterroristPolicy” (paperpresentedattheAnnualMeetingoftheUrbanAffairsAssociation,Washington, DC,March31–April3,2003). 59. See Charles Lindblom, “The Science of “Muddling Through,” Public AdministrationReview19(1959):79–88;aswellas“StillMuddling,NotYetThrough,” PublicAdministrationReview39(1979):517–526. 60.Forthelocalapplicationsof“institutionalthickness,”seeH.V.Savitch,“Global ChallengeandInstitutionalCapacity:OrHowWeCanRefitLocalAdministrationfor theNextCentury,”AdministrationandSociety30,3(1998):248–273.
NotestoChapter7 1. See Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Urban Sociology46(January1941):455–468. 2.Ibid.,p.455. 3.SeeMikeDavis,“TheFlamesofNewYork,”NewLeftReview12(November– December2001):45. 4.Ibid.,p.44. 5. David Dixon, “Is Density Dangerous? TheArchitects’ Obligations after the TowersFell,”inPerspectiveonPreparedness,BelfareCenterforInternationalAffairs andTaubmanCenterforStateandLocalGovernment,HarvardUniversity(October 12,2002):1. 6.SeePeterMarcuse,“UrbanFormandGlobalizationafterSeptember11:The ViewfromNewYork,”InternationalJournalofUrbanandRegionalResearch23,3 (September2002):596–606.ForMarcuse’squote,seep.596.Marcuseheldmuchthe sameopinioninanearlierarticle.SeePeterMarcuse,“AlternateVisionsforNewYork City:ByWhom,forWhom,”MetroPlanner(January–February2002),p.3. 7.Thereappearedtobeauniformityofopinioninmostofthepublishedarticles. SeetheInternationalJournalofUrbanandRegionalResearch26(September2002): 589–590,and27,3(2003):649–698. 8.MichaelDudley,“SprawlasStrategy:CityPlannersFacetheBomb,”Journal ofPlanningEducationandResearch(Fall2001):52–63. 9.Theideaactuallybeganinthe1960sandwaselaboratedduringthe1990s.See MelvinWeber,“OrderinDiversity:CommunitywithoutPropinquity,”inCitiesand Space:TheFuture,ed.LowdonWingo,Jr.(Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press,1963).Forlaterandcruderversions,seeHarryRichardsonandPeterGordon, “MarketPlanning:OxymoronorCommonSense?”JournaloftheAmericanPlanning Association 59 (Summer 1993): 59–77; and Peter Gordon and Harry Richardson, “AreCompactCitiesaDesirablePlanningGoal?”JournaloftheAmericanPlanning Association63(Winter1997):95–107. 10. Quoted in Keith Schneider, “Sprawl Not anAntidote to Terror,” Elm Street WritersGroup(MichiganLandInstitute,December2001). 11.SeeJoelKotkin,“TheDeclusteringofAmerica,”WallStreetJournal,August
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12,2002,p.A12.Forextendeddiscussion,seeJoelKotkin,TheNewGeography:How the Digital Landscape Is Reshaping theAmerican Landscape (NewYork: Random House,2000). 12.Ibid. 13. James Kunstler and Nikos Slingaros attribute the term “urban hypertrophy” toLeonKrier.SeeLeonKrier,LeonKrier:Houses,Palaces,Cities(NewYork:St. Martin’s Press, 1984). See James Kunstler and Nikos Slingaros, “The End of Tall Buildings,”Planetizen(September17,2001),availableatwww.panetizen.com/oped/ item.php. 14.Ibid. 15. See Edward Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro, “Cities andWarfare:The Impact of TerrorismonUrbanForm,”JournalofUrbanEconomics51(March2002):205–224; andRonaldR.DavisandWeinsteinE.David,“Bones,BombsandBreakpoint:The GeographyofEconomicActivity,”AmericanEconomicReview92(December2002): 1269–1289.SeealsoStevenBrackman,HarryGarretsen,andMarkSchramm,“The Strategic Bombing of German Cities during World War II and Its Impact on City Growth,”JournalofEconomicGeography42,2(2004):201–208. 16.Forvaryinginterpretationsofthewaronterror,includingthegarrisonstate,see KatheCallahan,MelvinDubnick,andDorothyOlshfski,“WarNarratives:Framing OurUnderstandingoftheWaronTerror,”PublicAdministrationReview66,4(July– August2006):554–568. 17. See Peter Eisinger, “The American City in an Age of Terror: A Preliminary AssessmentoftheEffectsofSeptember11,”UrbanAffairsReview40,1(2004):115–130. 18.Ibid.Brackman,Garretsen,andSchramm,StrategyBombing,dopointoutthat citiesinWestGermany(FRG)incurredatemporaryimpactbutfullyrecovered,while thoseinEastGermany(GDR)didnotandtheAlliedbombinghadapermanentimpact. While the authors do not venture into why the FRG cities would show a different recoverythanGDRcities,aplausiblereasonmightbethatFRGcitieswerelocated inmoredynamic,aggressive,andproductivenationaleconomies.Thoseeconomies acteddifferentlyontheirrespectivecities. 19. In distinguishing between conventional warfare and terrorism, we can talk abouttheunboundedfrictionofurbanterror.Thisfrictionisakintotheexperience oftheMiddleAges,whereplunderandsiegelastedfor20,30,or100years.Inthese instances,constantinvasionsandcenturiesofpillagecausedmanycitiestowitheror disappear(seePirenne,MedievalCities).TheThirtyYears’Warresultedinaradical depopulationofGermancitiesinwhichMarburgandAugsburglostmorethanhalf their inhabitants, never to regain their predominant status (C.V. Wedgewood, The ThirtyYearsWar[GardenCity,NY:Doubleday,1961]).Anotherwayofunderstanding howthefrictionofterrormightaffectcitiesistoexaminetherelationshipbetween crimeandurbansettlement.Liketerrorism,crimecreateschronicapprehensionand paralyzes normal life. Much as guards, gates, and surveillance are used to thwart terror,sotooaretheyemployedtopreventcriminalaggression. 20.JamesHarriganandPhilippeMartin,“TerrorismandtheResilienceofCities,” EconomicPolicyReview(November2002):97–116. 21.RobertGreenbaumandAndyHultquist,“TheImpactofTerrorismonItalian EmploymentandBusinessActivity”(unpublishedmanuscript,2006). 22. For the Israelicase,seeZviEcksteinandDanielTsiddon,“Macroeconomic Consequences of Terror: Theory and the Case of Israel” (paper presented at the conference on “Public Policy,” Carnegie-Rochester, November 21–22, 2003); and
222 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
Daniel Felsenstein and Shlomie Hazam, “The Effect of Terror on Behavior in the JerusalemHousingMarket”(unpublishedmanuscript,InstituteofUrbanandRegional Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2005). For the Basque case, seeAlberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabai, “The Economic Costs of Conflict:A Case Control StudyfortheBasqueCountry,”NationalBureauofEconomicResearch(Cambridge, MA,September2001). 23. Resilience can also be complex, and Vale and Campanella adumbrate its processes beginning with the onset of disaster to rebuilding. The purpose here is simpler and involves narrowing down a condition to see whether the disruption endures,forhowlong,andwhethertherehasbeenarestoration.SeeLawrenceVale andThomasCampanella,eds.,TheResilientCity:HowModernCitiesRecoverfrom Disaster(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005). 24.ForanaccountofNewYork’seconomyafter9/11,seeEdwardHillandIryna Lendell,“Did9/11ChangeManhattanandtheNewYorkRegionasPlacestoConduct Business?” in Resilient City: The Economic Impact of 9/11, ed. Howard Chernick (NewYork:RussellSage,2005),pp.23–61. 25.Ibid.,p.35. 26.Grosscityproductiscalculateddifferentlyfromonecountrytoanother,andthis mayaccountfortheLondon’slowerfigure.SeeCorporationofLondon,London/New York:TheEconomiesofTwoCitiesattheMillennium,ExecutiveSummary(London: CorporationofLondon,June2000),p.16. 27. Ibid., sec. 2, “Driving Forces of Change in London and New York Economies.” 28. Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1999–2000, The JerusalemYearbook, availableatwww.jiis.org.il/shnaton. 29. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey,2006.SeealsoEisinger,“TheAmericanCityinanAgeofTerror,”UrbanAffairs Review40,1:115–130;andHillandLendell,“Did9/11ChangeManhattanandtheNew YorkRegionasPlacestoConductBusiness?”inChernick,ed.,ResilientCity. 30.SeeChernick,ed.,ResilientCity,fortheperiodupthrough2004,andJames Parrot,NewYorkCity’sLaborMarketOutlookwithaSpecialEmphasisonImmigrant Workers,NewYork:FiscalPolicyInstitute,December2005. 31. The year taken for the previous period is 1989 and the year taken for the cessationofterroris1994.Asofthiswriting,dataonLondonwerenotavailableto assesstheemploymenteffectsduetotheattacksofJuly2005.SeeCityofLondon Corporation, City Research Focus, available at http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk /Corporation/business_city/research_statistics/Research+periodicals.htm#focus, and AnnualBusinessInquiry. 32.SeeH.V.SavitchandGarbYaacov,“Terror,BarriersandtheRe-topographyof Jerusalem,”aswellasHankV.Savitch,“AnAnatomyofUrbanTerror.” 33.JerusalemInstituteforIsraelStudies,“StatisticalYearbookofJerusalem2001– 2004.” 34.Thecomparisonsmadearebetweenthepre-attackyearof2000andthepostattack years of 2002 and 2003. The tourist figures cited in this section deal with tourismfromothernations,or“foreigntourists.”NewYorkstatisticsareobtainable ontheNewYorkCityOfficialTourismWebsiteathttp://www.nycvisit.com/content/ index.cfm?pagePkey=57. 35. Visit London Corporate, London Monthly Trends, Monthly Visitor Index (London:VisitLondon,July–September2005).
NOTESTOCHAPTER7 223
36.Ibid. 37.FranzFuerst,“TheImpactof9/11ontheManhattanOfficeMarket,”inResilient City,ed.HowardChernick(NewYork:RussellSage,2005)pp.62–98. 38.Ibid.About20percentoffirmschosetomoveoutofthecity. 39.Ibid.,p.81. 40. See Igal Charney, “Reflections on the Post-WTC Skyline: Manhattan and Elsewhere,”InternationalJournalofUrbanandRegionalResearch29(March2005): 172–179. 41.Ibid. 42.Ibid.TheskyscraperinDubaiwillrisetoover2,300feet(705meters).The antenna/spire of the World Trade Center was 1,731.9 feet (527.9 meters) and its rooflinewas1,368feet(417meters). 43.QuotedinEdwinMills,“TerrorismandU.S.RealEstate,”JournalofUrban Economics51(2002):198–204. 44.Quotedin“SpecialReport:TheSkyscraperBoom,”Economist,June3,2006, pp.65–67. 45.Eisinger,“TheAmericanCityinanAgeofTerror,”p.126. 46.Savitch,“AnAnatomyofUrbanTerror,”p.388. 47.Ibid.,p.389. 48.ThomasWolfe,YouCan’tGoHomeAgain,2ded.(NewYork:HarperPerennial Classic,1998). 49.JonathanSchwabishandJoshuaChang,“NewYorkCityandTerrorismInsurance inaPost9/11World,”IssueBrief(PartnershipforNewYorkCity,September2004). 50. National Underwriter Company, Property and Casualty/Risks and Benefits (NationalUnderwriterCompany,November2002). 51.Editorial,LondonTimes,December14,2002.p.1. 52.SeeOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment,TerrorismRisk Insurance in OECD Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,2005). 53.Asdisastersgo,terrorismisgenerallylessexpensivethannaturalcalamities. Most hurricanes cost upward of $3 billion, and Hurricane Katrina, which racked America’sGulfCoast,costover$35billion.TheWorldTradeCenterwasunusualin thissense.Itshouldalsobenotedthatnaturaldisasterscoveramuchlargergeographic areathanhuman-madedisasters.RawleKing,“HurricaneKatrina:InsuranceLosses and National Capacities for Financing Disaster Risk,” a Congressional Research ServicereportpreparedfortheU.S.Congress,September2005,p.15. 54.SusanClarkeandEricaChenoweth,“ThePoliticsofVulnerability:Constructing LocalPerformanceRegimesforHomelandSecurity,”ReviewofPolicyResearch23, 1(January2006):95–114. 55.GermanMarshalFund,TransatlanticTrends:KeyFindings,p.7. 56. National League of Cities, “Cities Report Change in Financial Conditions,” StateofAmericanCitiesSurvey.(Washington,DC:NationalLeagueofCities,2001). 57.Ibid. 58. U.S. Senate, Undersecretary of Preparedness George Foresman, Department of Homeland Security, speaking “For the Record” to the Committee on Homeland Security(June21,2006),p.3.Thisdoesnottakeaccountofothersources,andsome havepeggedthetotalamountat$28.9billion.SeeClarkeandChenoweth,“Politics ofVulnerability.” 59. U.S. House Committee, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg of New York City
224 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 7 & 8
and Mayor Anthony Williams of Washington, DC, speaking on “DHS Terrorism PreparednessGrants:Risk-BasedorGuessWork?”totheCommitteeonHomeland Security(June21,2006). 60. Department of Homeland Security, FY 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)byUrbanAreassec.2(Washington,DC,2006). 61. For a discussion of this see Peter Eisinger, “Imperfect Federalism: The IntergovernmentalPartnershipforHomelandSecurity,”PublicAdministrationReview, (July/August2006):537–545. 62.Thisisapoliticallogicthatdecadesagomarkedeffortstocreatefullemployment andmodelcities.See,forexample,CharlesHaar,BetweentheIdeaandtheReality (Boston:Little,Brown,1975). 63.SeeTheodoreLowi,“AmericanBusiness,PublicPolicy,andCaseStudiesand PoliticalTheory,”WorldPolitics16:(1964):677–715;andPaulPeterson,CityLimits (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1981). 64.SeeClarkeandChenoweth,“PoliticsofVulnerability.”
NotestoChapter8 1. See Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Philosophy in aTime ofTerror, IntroductionandCommentsbyGiovannaBorradori(Chicago:UniversityofChicago Press,2003),p.94. 2.Ibid. 3. The Politics of Aristotle, ed. Earnest Barker (NewYork: Oxford University Press,1962),especiallyconsultBooksIandIII.
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INDEX 239
Index
ANPR.SeeAutomaticNumberPlate Recording abortionclinics,75,76 AbuHafsalMasriBrigade,87 AbuSayyaf,141 abuses,civilrights,145–46 accelerationoftrends,160 accessibility,103,119 accountability,146,166 advanceddetection,128,146–47 Afghanistan,xii,9,69,82,84,86,90,91, 96,112,141 Africa,30,42,67,141 agglomeration,152,153,156,160,166, 173–74 aggressivecapitalism,49 aggressivesurveillance,144 aggressiveness,45–46,61–62 airplanes,xiv,26,50,52,53,93,95–96, 108–9,110,114,116,162,171 AlAqsa,MartyrsBrigade,40,46–47,53, 57,105,117,124,131 AlFazazi,89 AlHinda,Issa,142 AlJazeera,141 AlQaeda,4,6,10,12,30,38,46,48,54, 68,76,77,82,86–87,91,96,98,99, 105,106,111,112–13,117,119,140, 141,142 AlRashidTrust,140 AlShehhi,Marwan,88 AlWafa,141 AlZarquawi,9 Albania,19,41 Albany,123 AldgateEast,114 Algeria,17–18,19,20,21,22,32,33,41, 68–69,70,73–75,80,82,85,88,92, 128,140 alleygating,125
Allison,Graham,52 AmericanExpress,109 Amman,48,98,141–142 AnarchistFaction,67 Anarchists,xv,10,67,69–74,78–79,93, 105,117 animatedpresenceofcitizenryandstreet watchers,126–27,146–47 Ankara,xiii,24 anonymity,41,83,90,93,94,98,172 anthrax,50,51,52,106 anti-terrorism,54,67,84,124,141,146 anxiety,151,159,172 apartheidwall,124 AqsaMartyrs’Brigade,140 ArabBank,140 Arabs,19,29,59,60,61,89,101,102, 103,104,105,110,119,132,140, 141,145 Arafat,Yasir,46–47,69 Aristotle,174 ArmoftheLord,68 ArmedIslamicGroup(GIA),84,92,140 Armenia,29 AsQudsMosque,89 Asia,30,67,82,87,90,152 assassinations,29,75 asymmetricalreaction,165–66,167 Athens,16,17,19–20,22,63,70,77 AtochaStation,27 Atta,Mohammed,88–89,108 attacks,40–41,75,160,165 actualityof,14,63 anthrax,50 anxietyfrom,50,56,151 awarenessof,126–27 biological,52 buildingsand,156,157,158 businessesand,40,154,156 CBRNand,51,52,96,161 239
240 INDEX
attacks(continued) calculated,98 casualtiesin,10,12,22,37,39,43,46, 47,50,52,56–57,75,79,96,98, 101–2,106–7,111,112,113,117, 153,156,157,160–62,171,172 catalyticterrorand,9,11,18,96,112 centralbusinessdistrictsand,107, 113–14,172 citiesand,19–20,22,40–41,49,51,54, 72–74,83,86,93,105–6,112,142, 150–51,152–56,163–64,165 cityhauntsand,83–93 civiliansand,79,82,98,128,152,154, 156 cluster,98,108–9 concentrationof,98,99,100–4,112–17, 118–19 continuous,56,96,99–100,117 coordinationof,93,105 costsof,161 cyclical,35–36,99,111,153,154 declinein,77–79,102,124,132,146, 154–56 democraciesand,7,11 depressionfrom,54–46 destructionfrom,52,53 deterrencefrom,52,126 developednationsand,24 disruptionfrom,28,115 domestic,72,79,82 durationof,152 economyand,111,112,152,153 effectivenessof,50,171 experiencewith,48–49 factional,69 familiarityand,56 fearof,36,42,44,63,172 financialcentersand,29,40,109,162 firststrike,98 foreignlinkageto,79,82,161,173 frequencyof,22–23,56,57,72,73,99, 100–2,105,117,152,153,166, 171,173,174 globalcitiesand,72,142 helplessnessfrom,62 highvaluetargetsand,11 historic,112 imminenceof,62,112–13 immunityfrom,104 impactof,96,97,100 incidentsof,72–74,107–8,113,117,172
attacks(continued) increaseof,38,63,78–79,102,104–5, 154–56 insurancefor,160–62,167 intelligenceand,112–13 intensityof,99,102 internationalalarmfor,41,42 internationalpresencein,72,82 lethalityof,37–38,79,171 logisticsof,106–7,116 low-impact,105 manipulationand,44 marketsand,29–30,154,156,157,158 massive,108–11 mediaand,50,144,148,172 mega,96,100,106,115,117,171,172, 173 megaterror,10,11,12,18,72,79,82, 87,93,114,156 neighborhoodsand,101,116,117,127, 154,172 noncombantsand,xiv,12,46,75, 99–100 organizationof,82,83,103 originationof,82–83 panicand,11,53,111,114 paralysisfrom,28,117,152 patternsof,72,99,153,172 penetrationfrom,98,99,105,108 percapita,99–100 persistenceof,105,152 planningof,63,86,96–97,106–8,128, 140,141,142 politicalattitudesand,58–60 populationsand,60,100,109 proximityof,48,104,112,172 publicpolicyand,48,54,57 recoveryfrom,152,154–56 repetitive,99,100–4,112–16,117, 118–19 resilienceafter,153–54 responseto,xii–xiii,79,148,154,166 secular,30,75,77–79 severityof,22,23–24,36,37,38,117, 152,166,171,174 shockvaluefrom,98,104,108,152,166 similaritiesof,47,118–19 smart,96,98,112,146 sporadic,99,153,173 stressfrom,36,54–56 successof,165–66 suicide,9,10,11,38,46,75,76–77
INDEX 241
attacks(continued) surveillanceand,142,144 synchronized,93,103,11,114 targetsof,98,103–4,112 terrorismand,xv,3,4,9,10,11,19–20, 25,27,41,47,50,51,54,58,63, 69–74,77,82,86,90,91,103–4, 105,107–8,111,112,113,114, 115,124,126,128,130–31,135, 140,142,144,145,146,149, 150–51,152,154,158–59,160, 161,166,171,174 transportationand,29,58–60,111,114, 115–16,128,171 vulnerabilityof,40,148,153 wavesof,35–36,159 attitudinalresponses,58–60 Auckland,50 Australia,46,47,82,161 authoritarianism,68,148 AutomaticNumberPlateRecording,130 Aznar,JoseMaria,61 BBC.SeeBritishBroadcasting Corporation BaaderMeinhof,68 Bali,12,40,79,82,93,140 Balkans,119 BalticExchange,40 Baltimore,161 Baltimore-WashingtonInternational Airport,161 banalityofterror,174 Bangladesh,116 Bankal-Taqwa,140 barriersandpatrols,124–26,130–31, 132–33,135,136,138,139,147,173 Basayev,Shamil,47,67 Basque,128,152 BasqueFatherlandandFreedom,18,22, 29,61,69,75,77 behavior,58–60,119,129 Beijing,7,42,123 Beirut,41 BeitJala,132,133 Belfast,xii–xiii,16,17,18,19,29,41,56, 69,70,98,99,116,124,125 Belgium,92,123 beliefsystems,68 Bell,Daniel,12 BenYehudaMall,98,100,102,103,114 Bengal,88
Bentham,Jeremy,127–28 Berlin,17,21,69,70,73,77,79,82,124, 152 BerlinWall,124 Beslan,13,79,142 Bethlehem,104–5,132,133 BigBen,88 BinLaden,Osama,47,51,90,149,161 Binalshibh,Ramzi,88 Bishopsgate,112 BlackPlague,52 blackwidows,47 BladeRunner,148 Blair,Tony,4,118 Bloomberg,Michael,163 BlueMosque,30 Bogota,17–18,19,20,21,22–23,39,41, 69,70 BojiinkaPlot,93 Bologna,75 Bombay.SeeMumbai BombayStockExchange,30 bombs,4,13,27,29,46,86,95–96,102, 111,112,115,128,134,137,141, 144,152,171 bookshops,83,86,89,92,93,113 borders,123–24 Bosnia,4,85 Bosporus,117 Boston,123,140,158 Botswana,124 boundaries,xii,94,123,146 Brazil,53,60,125 BritishBroadcastingCorporation,44,48 BrixtonMosque,116 broadscope,171 Brooklyn,28–29,83 BrooklynBridge,107,108,142 Brussels,83,140 Buddhism,9,68,75,76 BuenosAires,22–23,42 buildings,156,157,158 citiesand,148,149–50,158,172 surveillanceof,128 targetsas,131,136,137,138,142,153, 158–59,166–67 terrorismand,13,15,16,26–27,28, 29,38–39,49,51,58–60,82,88, 91,94,95,111,126–28,142,153, 166–67 trophy,158 bunchesofguys,89–90,91–92
242 INDEX
bureaucracy,61,62,63,143–44,146 Bush,GeorgeW.,118,163 businesses,16,28,40,85,100,106, 108–9,117,150,154,156,160 CBDs.Seecentralbusinessdistricts CBRN,12,51,52,63,88,95,96,110, 138,161,172 CCTV,75,127–28,144 CIA.SeeCentralIntelligenceAgency Cairo,xii–xiii,16,17,19,22,24,39,42, 69,70,73,77,142 Calcutta,16 Camden,114,115 CamdenYards,161 CampDavidtalks,30 Canada,33,91,141 CapeTown,125 capitalism,11,49,61–62,94,105,153 carceralcities,146 Caribbean,87,106 Casablanca,17,19,20,39,69,70,73–75, 77 Casualties, attacksand,10,12,27,28,30,37,39, 40,43,47,50,52,56–57,73–75, 96,98,99,101–2,111,113,112, 115,117,153,156,157,171,172 declinein,37,77–79 firstcitiesand,21,40 increasein,37,77–79 maximizationof,39 megaterrorand,77 nonurban,36,37 numberof,100–2 percapita,99–100 proportionof,20–21,79 religionand,73,76 terrorismand,xiii,xv,3,10,11,12, 14,19–20,22,25,26–27,33,36, 39,40,46,47,50,52,72–74,77, 106–7,110,111,117,118,131, 156,171 urbanterrorismand,32,36,37,43 catalyticterror,9,10,11,12,18,25,27, 38–39,43,47,50,51,72,96,108, 112,116,117,171,173 Caucuses,131 cells,terrorism,83,84,85,90,91,93,99, 108,111,127,140,141,172–7 centralbusinessdistricts,79,94,95,107, 108–9,113–14,117,153,158,172
CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),111, 140,141,146 charitableorganizations,45,140–41 Charlestown,123 Charney,Igal,158 Chechnya,10,19,24,33,47,67,79,82, 84,85,99,119,80 chemical,biological,radiological,and nuclearweapons.SeeCBRN Chicago,158,160 China,123 ChristianPatriots,68 Christians,46,68,75,76,87,116 chronologicalcycles,54–56,111 circularcausation,151–52 cities,149 adaptationof,84,94 againstthemselves,12,173–74 agglomeration,166 ancient,xvi,133 anonymityof,94,172 anxietyand,xv,159,172 assimilationof,85 asymmetricalreactionof,166 attacksin,19–20,22,24,40–41,49,51, 54,72–74,86,93,105–6,112–16, 150–51,152–53,154,163–64,165, 173 attributesof,7–8,9,12,15,16–17,18, 24,31,32,38–39,40,43,49 barriersin,133–34,136,138,139,173 boundariesof,94,123,146 buildingsin,148,149–50,160,158,172 capacityof,94 catalyticterrorismin,171 centralbusinessdistrictsin,153,158 challengesof,94 characteristicsof,83 civiliansin,159,171–72 clusteredspacesin,92,93,108–9 coherenceof,152 compact,150 concentrationof,117 conditionsin,153 congestionin,150 consequencesin,163 constructionin,160 core,93 cultureand,16,17,18,38–39,161,165 cyberspacein,95 damagesin,110,163 decontrolof,117
INDEX 243
cities(continued) defenseof,49,110,123 definitionof,94,123 democracyin,151 densityand,9,32,39,102 destructionof,11–12,52,105,152 developmentof,9,16,150–51 differencesin,153–54,165 dimensionsof,95 disruptionof,15,117 distinctcommunitiesin,83–84 diversityof,86,88,113 divided,32 dual,32 dynamicsof,151–52,160 dystopia,150–51 economyof,16,17,49,112,152,153, 154,159,165,173–74 efficient,149 emergencypreparednessof,163 employmentin,153,154 environmentin,95,134,137–38,139 ethnicityin,83,84 European-styled,150 faubourgs,123 financialcentersin,150,153,158 first,21–22,171 fortificationof,133,134,139 freesociety,151 functionof,95 fundingof,95,163,167 futureof,150–51 gated,136–38 geographyof,153 global,15–21,28–29,38–43,69,72,73, 106,110,112,142,147–59 governmentin,160,167 growthof,94 hazardsof,53 highdensity,27–28,38–39,43,109 highrisk,163–64,167 highvalue,38–39,43 historical,31,39,123 hostilespacein,137–39 hostilitytowards,49 housingin,42,83,84,132 immigrantsin,16,32,39,41,83,86,92 importanceof,15,22 industrial,83,84,85,86,88,149–50 infrastructureof,16,38–39,43,49, 149–50,151–52,153,160,171 insurancefor,167
cities(continued) interconnectivityof,49 interdependenceof,7,49,171 intergovernmentalcoordinationand,167 internationalprofileof,16,38–39,43 landand,95 liabilitiesof,172 liberal,94 major,15–21,38–43,69,83 mass,26–27,171 mediaand,16,39,171 megaattackson,15–21,24,38–43,93, 153,171,172 migrationto,42 mobilityin,94 modern,95,146 multiethnic,39,88 nationalmovementsin,19 neighborhoodsin,16,39,95 networkofnodesin,93 obstaclesin,136–37 open,83,171 optimismof,159 parallelsin,117 paralysisof,102,117,152,172 pedestriansin,133–35,136,138 penetrationof,108 planningin,92 policein,138,163,164 politicalpowerin,15,16,17,95,165, 174 pollutionin,150 populationcentersin,12,15,16,20,24, 32,42,49,57,109,153 povertyin,16,31,32,42 pricklyspacesin,136–38 prosperityof,152 protectionof,123,135,160,164–65,173 proximityof,54–56,172 publiceventsin,161 publicpolicyand,54 reconceptionof,150–51 recoveryof,151,152,159 regional,17–18 regulationof,129–31 reinventionof,94 religionand,15,16,18,19,84 repressionof,148 resilienceof,xv,24,63,152–54,156, 159,160,165,166–67,173–74 restrictionson,149 safeareasin,95–96,149
244 INDEX
cities(continued) satellite,93 second,21–22 securityand,12,16,40,95–96,103,111, 123,160,163,164,165–66 serialattacksin,117–18 shockwavesin,108 shriveledspacesin,134–35 singleattribute,16 sizeof,15,27,152,153,166 smartterrorismin,153,171 socialfabricof,32,147,159,160 societyin,173–74 spacein,94,95,132–33,132,136–39, 144,146 squattersettlementsin,42 stabilizationin,160 statesversus,165 strikingdistanceof,83 suburbsin,83,84 surveillanceof,129–31,132–33,134, 135,139,142,143,146,160,173 symbolismof,15,16 systematicterrorismin,105 targetsin,xii,7–8,12,21,32–33,38, 43,82,83,106–7,139,158–59, 163–64,167 technologyin,150 territoryand,18,95 terrorismand,xii,xv,xvi,3,9,11–12, 14,18–20,21–22,24,26–27, 28–29,30,32,42,43,49,50–51, 53,54,57,69–74,76–77,82, 83–93,95–96,102,104,105–6, 129–31,134,136–39,142,145, 147,148,149,150–51,152–53, 154–56,158–59,163–64,167,171, 172,173,174 threatsto,24,33,60,163–64 tightlycoupled,49 tolerancein,83,93 tourismin,12,38–39,40,138,153,159 transportationin,38–39,95,142,172 urbandistinctivenessof,7–8 urbanenvironmentof,49,83 urbanfabricof,83 urbanspacein,134 urbanterrorismand,3,7,9,15,83,93, 95,152 usefulnessof,149–50 valueof,94 variablesof,154–56
cities(continued) vibrancyof,139,147 violenceand,21–22,152,154,166–67, 171,174 visibilityof,22 vulnerabilityof,xv,xvi,12,40,49,103, 112,113,132,142–44,147,148, 153,160–61,163 wallsand,xvi,123,133,146 warfarein,24,49 CityCenter,100,101,102,154 cityhaunts,xv,83–93,172 citylife,60,146,171 cityspace,95–96,126,146,147 civilliberties,58–60,172 civilrights,45,145–46 civilwars,xii,19,85 civilians,31,46,47,54 attackson,128,152,154,156 citiesand,171–72 defensivedispersalof,148 emotionsof,60–61,62,63,79,98,102, 111,151,152,159 governmentand,149 optimismof,159 paralysisof,172 protectionof,146–47,173 repressionof,145 rightsof,145 safetyof,144,145,149,173 senseofcommunityfrom,127 spaceand,172 surveillanceand,143 targetsand,xiv,3,75,82,154,156 terrorismand,4,11,49–50,61,82, 98,105,126,128,144,146,154, 171–72 Civitas,94 Clarke,Susan,162-63 closed-circuittelevisioncameras.See CCTV closedsociety,13 clusteredspaces,92,108–9 clusters,91–92,98,132,150,156 Coaffee,Jon,130–31 ColemanStreet,112 Cologne,152 Colombia,14,19,21,33,34,67,68,80 colonialism,67,123 ColumbiaUniversity,149 commercialassets,38–39,43 CommunistParty,45
INDEX 245
compactcities,150 concentration,98,99,100–1,102–4, 112–19 Connecticut,150 conservatives,45 construction,136,160,161 contagiousdisruption,115 continuousviolence,116 conventionalwarfare,51,152 coordination,105,167 counterterrorism,13,79,141–42,144–46, 150,163,166 Crimea,52 Croats,19 culture,13,16,17,18,27,38–39,47,82, 90,109,140–41,153,161,165 CultureofCities,The,123 cumulatedattributecities,16 cybernodes,93 cyberspace,95 cycleofterror,154 cyclicalattacks,99,111,116,154 Cyprus,124 DHS.SeeU.S.DepartmentofHomeland Security DST.SeeDirectiondelaSurveillancedu Territoire damages,110,111,163 DaresSalaam,47 Davis,Mike,149 DeVillepin,Dominique,45 deadzones,15 Dearborn,145 DeathandLifeofGreatAmericanCities, The,126–27 decentralization,149–50 De-ClusteringofAmerica,150 decontrollingterritory,63,94–99,152,172 defense,110,123 defensivedispersal,57,148,149 democracy,xvi,4,7,12,15,45,60,85,95, 133,144–45,146,147,151 demoralization,9,95 density,92,102 Derrida,Jacques,173 destabilization,95 destruction,131,152,159–60 terrorismand,49,50–51,52,53,68,75, 77,93,95–96,105–6 urbanterrorismand,11,12–13,14, 50–51
detection,99,143 deterrence,52,124 Detroit,123,140,145,157 DetroitNews,150 development,9,16,31,123,163 citiesand,150–51 lowdensity,149 urban,151 Dhahran,79 DirectAction,xi,68 DirectiondelaSurveillanceduTerritoire (DST),141 dirtybombs,51,52 dispersal,149–50 disruption,115,117 diversity,49,86,88,113 dividedcities,32,124 Djerba,12,40 Doha,Abu,84,116 domesticattacks,xiii,13,21,72,79,82, 86 Drake,C.J.M.,75–76 Dresden,152 drugs,19,39,140 dualcities,32 Dubai,158 DubrovkaTheater,10–11 dynamiccities,151–52 dynamitards,10 dystopia,148–151,158,166 ETA.SeeBasqueFatherlandandFreedom EU.SeeEuropeanUnion EasternEurope,88 economy,149,156 attacksand,152,153 citiesand,152,153,154,159,165, 173–74 command,94 disruptionof,12,50,96,111,112 fearand,61–62 firstcitiesand,21–22 G8and,114 growthof,42,94 internationalbusiness,16 internationalmarketplace,16 lawsof,158 market,160 regional,17–18 ruptureof,40 secondcitiesand,21 securityand,162
246 INDEX
economy(continued) socialist,94 strengthof,159 switchingstationsand,15–16 terrorismand,11,12,15,24,25,32, 39–40,50,93,111,112,152,153, 154 world,15–16 Ecuador,34 efficiency,104,119,171 Egypt,xii–xiii,24,32,33,47,77,79,80, 82,88,140 EiffelTower,9,41,88 elites,60–61 EmpireStateBuilding,106,107,142,160 employment,153,154,166–67 Enders,Walter,37–38 entrepreneurs,83 entry–exitdetection,129–30 environment,91,95,108,113–14,124–27, 131–32,133–34,137–38,139,156, 171–72 ethnicity,41,58–60,83,84,88,98 Europe,18,22,24,30,60,67,69,77,84, 87,90,92,119,128,144,150,152, 163,167 EuropeanUnion,xiv,10,18,45,92,140 EustonStation,111 evolution,xv,96 explosives,29,51,53,91,92,98–9,102, 104,105,106,109–10,115,116,118, 129,132 FARC.SeeRevolutionaryArmedForce FBI.SeeFederalBureauofInvestigation FSB.SeeFederalSecurityService factionalattacks,69 factories,88,92,95,128,131 faith-basedcharities,45 FannieMaeFoundation,31,32 Farris,Lyman,142 fascists,68,72,149,127 faubourgs,123 fear,xiv–xv,3,9,10,11–12,13,36,42, 44,45–48,49,50,51,53,54,56,57, 58–60,61,62,63,143,148,166,171, 172 FederalBureauofInvestigation,13,29, 106,140,141,146,149 FederalSecurityService(FSB),141 fighters,45,46 finances,11,92,140,141,144
financialcenters,4,11,15,29,27,30,39, 40,51,98,100,103,109,111,112, 117,128,130–31,150,153,154,158, 162 FinsburyMosque,87–88,91,116 firstcities,15,21,171 Fishman,Robert,31 flexibleresponses,166 FloridaKeys,131 forbiddenspace,147 foreignbasedterrorism,29,34,61,79–80, 82,84,89,106,108,161,173 foreignpolicy,18,27,42,112 FortDix,106 fortressconstruction,permanentpartitions, fences,gatesandsolidwalls,131–32, 133,134,136,147 fortresszones,91 fourthwaveterrorism,67,79–83,93, 105–6,112 France,xi,6,9,18–19,32,33,40–41,45, 62,67,68,75,80,84,85,86,91,92, 127,128,141,145–52,161 Frankfurt,23,50 freemarkets,160 freesociety,13,151 freespeech,87,144–45 freedomfighters,xii,3–4 freedomofaction,166 FreedomTower,158 FrenchHill,103 frequencyofterrorism,xv,35–37,43,56, 99–102,105,117,152,153,166,171, 173,174 frictionofterror,51,172 functionofplace,91 funding,163,165,167 FurnivalStreet,112 FusionTaskForce,141 G8Group,114,150 GIA.SeeArmedIslamicGroup Galloway,George,61–62 GarrisonState,The,148–49,151 gatedcommunities,124–25 gates,136–38 Gaza,38,76–77 geography,32,54–56,86,153 GeorgeWashingtonBridge,106 geospatialfeatures,xv,63 Germany,21,33,45,60,67,68,69,79,80, 82,88–89,91,92,93,128,148,152
INDEX 247
Gilo,132,133 Giuliani,Rudolph,62 globalcities,13,15–21,24,28–29,38–39, 41,43,69,72,73,92,106,110,112, 142,147,159 globalnodes,91–93 globalprofile,40–41 globalization,39–40,42,61–62,93 GoldenGateBridge,161 government, attacksand,50,54 citiesand,39,40,160,162,167 civiliansand,149 federal,161 fundingby,163–64 intrusionby,58–60 levelsof,162–63 local,166,167 manipulationfrom,148–49 national,160 politicsof,162,165 publicsafetyand,162–63 recoveryand,167 repressive,144–45 rescueby,160 resilienceof,160 safetyand,162–63 surveillanceand,143 terrorismand,xiv,6,27,31,39,50,52, 54,59,62,63,69,79,92,100,111, 112,117,128,143,146,149,153, 154,163,167 GreatBritain,4,11,18–19,27,28, 29,32,39,41,42,61–62,86,86, 111–12,116,125,128,141,143, 145,161 GreatWallofChina,123 Greece,33,67,77,80,124 GreekRevivalistCustomsHouse,134 GroundZero,26,158 Grozny,69,70,79 Guardian,44 guerillawarfare,5,14,46 Guyana,106
HamburgCell,88–89,92,99,127 Hammersmith,115 Hamza,Abu,88 Hanif,AsifMohammed,116 Harburg,88–90,93,108,172 Harlem,143 HarrodsDepartmentStore,112 Harvey,David,144–45 HeathrowAirport,50 HebrewUniversity,103–4,144 HeraldSquare,106,107,142 Herculesteams,142 Hezbollah,5,6,29,30,45,68,69,96,99, 119,140 highvalue cities,38–39,43 targets,39–40 Hindus,19,22,41,70,71,75 Hiroshima,152 historictargets,112 HitlerYouth,45 Hobbes,Thomas,12 Hoffman,Bruce,38 Holland,92 HollandTunnel,29,106,107 HolyLandFoundation,141 homegrownterrorists,10,19,29,91,93, 106,112–13,116,173 HomeOffice,141 homelandsecurity,163,165 hostile environment,139 spaces,137–39 hotbuttonissues,44 hotspots,xii,142 HouseofCommons,145 HouseofLords,145 HousingActof1954,149 housing,83,84,86,93,99,125,132,148, 159,160 HudsonValley,150 Hussain,Hasib,86 HydePark,112,114 Hyderabad,41
HackneyRoad,115 HagahSophiaMosque,30 Haifa,46,100 Hamas,10,30,44,45,46,68,69,96,98, 117,140,141 Hamburg,13,21,83,87,88–90,91,92, 93,99,108,127,141,152
IRA.SeeIrishRepublicanArmy ideology,terrorism,12,19,44,67,68, 69–72,83,84,105,151 immigrants,16,18–19,29,32,39, 41,53,76,79,82,83,84,85, 86,92,104,113,116,142, 146
248 INDEX
incarceration,145 India,22,24,30,32,33,43,75,79,80,82, 99,124,140,141,145 Indonesia,33,34,40,47,79,80 industry,12,83,84,86,88,91,114,148, 149–50 informationgathering,140 infrastructure,11,16,25,27,49,62,63, 79,86,92,93,94,142,149,150, 151–52,153,160,171 insurance,160–61,167 insurgents,61 intelligence,12–13,15,38–39,90,98, 104–5,112,127,141–42,145–46, 147 interconnectivity,49 interdependence,49,171 interdiction,141–42 intergovernmentalcooperation,162–63, 167 international alarm,41 business,16 character,82 conflict,39 disputes,41 economy,93 environment,40–41 events,72 intelligence,141–42 interdependence,39–40 jihadists,91 linkage,93 marketplace,16 message,42 network,39–40 profile,15–16,18–19,40–41 terrorism,xiii–xv,4,7,10,12,13–14, 19,21,22,25,29,38–39,43,61, 90,93,99,113,171,173 InternationalJournalofUrbanand RegionalResearch,149 InternationalOlympicCommittee,114 Internet,60,144 Interpol,141 intimidation,47–48,63,96,174 Iran,68,76 Iraq,xii,27,38,41,79,84,96,112 Ireland,111,119 IrishRepublicanArmy,4,18,29,45–46, 67,72,73,75,77,82–83,84,99,111, 112,116,154
Islam,9,12,18,19,22,28–29,30,40, 46–47,60,67,72,73,75,77,82–83, 84,86,106,112,113,116,117, 140–41,145 Islamabad,21,22,69,70,73–75,79,82 Islamicextremists,30,34,40,68,69,70, 71,72,73–75,82,87,112,116,117, 145 Islamicjihadists,3–4,13,30,46,52,69, 72,78,84,89,90,93,117 IslamicReliefOrganization,141 Israel,xii–xiii,xvi,4,5,11,13,21,24,27, 30,33,47,48,53,56–57,68,75,79, 80,82,86,98,99–105,124,125,128, 141,145,152 Istanbul,xii,xiii,17,19,20,22,24,29–30, 32,40,43,56,57,69,70,73,93,117, 123,127,131,142,172,174 Italy,21,33,60,67,75,77,80,85,86,92, 93,152 Ja’ishMuhammad,140 Jacksonville,125,164 Jacobs,Jane,94,95,126–27 JaffaStreet,100,102,103,131 Jaish-e-Mohammed,30 Jakarta,16,17,42,46,70 Japan,33,39,51,68,79,80,152 Jarrah,Ziad,88 JemaaIslamiya,46,140 JerseyCity,28–29,83,142,172 Jerusalem,xi–xiii,xvi,13,14,16,17–18, 19,21,22,23,24,27,30,32,40,46, 51,53,56–57,61,69,70,73,77,79, 93,98,99–105,114,116,117,123, 127,131,132,133,139–40,142,144, 145,152,153,154,156,159,160, 165–67,172,174 Jihad,86,87,89,90,93 Johannesburg,42,125 JohnF.KennedyInternationalAirport,106 Johnson,Larry,34,35,36 Johnson,Lyndon,163 Jordan,48,49 Judaism,xvi,19,39,46,57,68,70,71,75, 82,87,88,101,103–4,105,116,127 July7event,28,48,53,54–56,60,61,86, 112–13,116,153 attacksof,xv,27–28 blamefor,42 casualtiesfrom,28,114,115 costof,82
INDEX 249
July7event(continued) descriptionof,27–28,43,114–16 mediaand,48 megaattackand,93,115 megaterrorismand,43,79,114 panicand,50 participantsin,86 post–,62–63,128,156,174 pre–,156 preparationof,87 reasonsfor,41 tourismand,156 justsociety,172 Kach,68 Karachi,17–18,21,22,69,70,73,77,79, 82,83,87,93 Kashmir,22,30,33,80,116,124 Kensington,153 Kenya,33,47,79 Khan,MohammedSiddique,86–87,92 kidnapping,xiv,4,10,12,47,51,68,75, 77,85,96,99,128,140 KingGeorgeStreet,100,102,103,131 King’sCross,111,114 KingsCrossStation,28 Kosovo,41 Kotkin,Joel,150 Kremlin,123 KurdishWorkersParty,29–30 Kurds,19,22,24,29–30,117 LaCourneuve,84,91 LaDirectiondelaSurveillancedu Territoire,84 LackawanaSix,91 Lagos,16,17,125 Lambert,115 Lang,Fritz,148 LasVegas,108 Lashkar-eTaiba,30,46 Lasswell,Harold,148 LatinAmerica,22 Lebanon,xii,29,68,69,76,118 Leeds,83,86,87,91,92,93,99,127, 141 Lefebvre,Henri,94,95 leftists,29,30,61,68,69,70,71,72,75, 77,85,151 Lenin,Vladimir,67,72 lethality,37–38,51,79,93,171 liberalism,94,95,133
Libya,82 Lima,17–18,19,20,22,69,70 LincolnTunnel,29,106 Lindsay,Jermaine,86 lineofcontrol,124 Liverpool,114,125 Livingstone,Ken,42,61,62 local culture,165 government,162–63,166,167 Locke,John,15 logistics,15,25,63,91,105,106–9,116, 128,141,172–73 London,xii,xv,xvi,7,13,15–16,17, 18–19,20,21,22,23,27,28,29,31, 32,40,42,43,45,48,50,51,53,54, 56,60,61,62,69,71,73–75,77,79, 82,83,86,87–88,91,92,93,99,105, 111–17,123,125,127,128,130–31, 141,142,145,152,153,154,156, 158,159,160,161,162,166,167, 172,174 LondonBridgeTower,158 LondonStockExchange,112 LondonUnderground,27–28,53,60, 62–63,114,115,128 Londonderry,29,41,98,116 Londonistanmentality,116 Long,Norton,61 LosAngeles,21,53,108,116,140, 160 lowdensitydevelopment,149 lowdensitysuburbs,149 lowimpactattacks,105 lowintensitywarfare,95,152 Luxor,12,40 Lyon,141–42 Lyon,David,142–143 MI5,13,112–13,141 MadisonAvenue,149 Madrid,xii,xv,13,17–18,20,21,22, 27–28,29,32,43,56,61,69,71, 73–75,77,79,82,83,85,92,93,142, 145,174 Mafia,85 Maghreb,143 Mainz,123 majorcities,15–21,38–43,50,69,83 majortargets,117 Major,John,112 Manchester,39,116,125,162
250 INDEX
Manhattan,54–56,83,107–9,127,134, 135,150,151,153,154,157–58,160, 162,165 Manila,93 manipulation,44,60–61,148–49 MaoZedong,15 March11event,61 attacks,27 casualtiesof,27 catalyticeventof,27 costof,82 descriptionof,xv,27,43 megaattackand,93 megaterrorismand,43,79 panicand,50 pre–,29 reasonsfor,41 urbanterrorismand,28 Marcuse,Peter,149 markets,15,29–30,46,100,102–3,156, 157 attackson,154,156,157,158,159 economyand,160 free,160 targetsand,131,156,157,158 terrorismand,154,156,157,158,159 Marseille,21 martyrdom,3–4,11–12,76–77.Seealso suicidebombers Maruseido,75 Marx,Karl,67,72 Marxist-Leninist,67,72,75 Maryland,161 mass attack,108–11 cities,171 disruption,95–96 fear.Seefear violence,14,38,48,82–83 Masters,Roger,76–77 masteryofspaces,95 measureofobstruction,126 media attacksand,144,148 citiesand,16,27,39,62,124,171 civilrightsand,145–46 descriptivewordsfrom,44–45 fearand,44 firstcitiesand,21 manipulationby,44 propagandaof,46 repressionof,145
media(continued) rhetoricof,48 statesand,6 surveillanceand,144,145 terrorismand,xi,xiv,xv,3–4,9,14, 15,18,27,30,34,39,41,42,44, 46–48,50,51,53,57,58,63,87, 104,105,106,140,141,144,145, 146,171,172 medieval,123 megaattacks,79,87,106,115,117,173 citiesand,24,30,171,172 componentsof,82 policyand,79 politicsand,79 responseto,79 terrorismand,82 megacities,15–21,24,38–43,72,147,159 megaevents,24,96,108 megaterror,153,156,171 attacksand,10,11,18,25,26–27,38, 43,47,50,76,77,79,93,96,108, 114,115,116,117,171 casualtiesby,10,11,12,24,96,108 damageby,10,11,25 definitionof,10 fearand,10 increaseof,38 kidnappingsand,10,12 persistenceof,10 responsesto,10 societiesand,10,18,25 tandemwithcatalyticandsmart,12,18 targetsand,9,10,11,18,25 MehaneYehudaMarket,102–3,131 MerrillLynch,109 Metropolis,148 Mexico,124 MexicoCity,17–18,42 Miami,108,125 Michigan,140 MiddleAges,123,146 MiddleEast,22,30,41,44,61–62,67,69, 82,89,90,108,119 migration,42,67 Milan,17–18,69,71,73,77,83,85,91, 92,93 MilitantTendency,45 militants,3–4,45,48,89–90 military,4,5,6–7,29,46,61,79,82,106, 123–24,131,149,152 moderncities,123–24,146
INDEX 251
modernterrorism,22 modernwalls,125–26,146 Mohammed,KhalidSheikh,90 MohammedtheEgyptian,85,92 Mombassa,12 Montreal,92 Morocco,29,32,33,82,124 Moscow,xvi,10–11,13,17–18,19–20, 24,41,43,47,69,71,73–75,77,79, 93,98,99,123,131,142,158,166, 174 mosques,30,77,82,83,84,85,86,87–88, 89,91,92,93,99,112,113,116 Moussaoui,Zacarius,88,116 movementacrossspace,95 Mubtakkar,110–11 Mueller,John,13 mujahadeen,77,82 Mumbai,7,16,17,18,19,20,22,24,30, 32,14,42,43,71,73–75,77,79,82, 93,127,142,145,171,172 Mumford,Lewis,94,95,123 Munich,171 MunichOlympicGames,10 MuslimBrotherhood,140 Muslims,18,19,22,38,41,46,51,60,61, 76,82,112,116,144–45 NATO,18 NPR.SeeNationalPublicRadio NSG.SeeNationalSecurityGuards NYPD.SeeNewYorkPoliceDepartment Nagasaki,152 Nairobi,17,40,47,69,71,73–75,77,79, 93 Natanya,46 NationalLeagueofCities,52 NationalPublicRadio,44 NationalSecurityGuards,141 NationalTheater,161 NationalUnity,68 nationalists,19,29–30,44,61,67,69–72, 75,77,82,86,90,98,117 nationals,foreign,79–80 nations, civilwarsin,xii developed,24 developing,16 foreign,173 industrial,114 lessdeveloped,39 undeveloped,24
nations,attacksin,xiii Nazis,45,69,89 neighborhoods,16,31,39,83,84,88,89, 90,94,95,98,99,104,109–10,113, 116,117,124,125,145,154 attacksin,127,154,172 securityand,127 surveillancein,134,146 terrorismand,127,131,141–42,172 neofascism,67,75 Netherlands,128 networkofnodes,93 networks,91–92,119,128 NewDelhi,22,24,30 NewEngland,131 NewJersey,150 NewOrleans,123 NewYorkCity,xv,xvi,13,15–16,17, 18–19,20,21,24,26–29,31,32,39, 40,42,43,48,50,51,53,54,56,58, 62,63,69,71,73–75,77,79,96,98, 99,105–11,114,116,117,123,131, 134,140,141,143,147,149,151,152, 153,154,156,157,158,159,160,162, 163–64,165,166,171,172,174 NewYorkCounterTerrorismBureau,13 NewYorkPoliceDepartment,141–42 NewYorkPoliceDepartmentCounter TerrorismBureau,141–42 NewYorkStockExchange,27,40,106, 109,131,132,135,142 NewYorkTimes,34,44,48 9/11.SeeSeptember11event Nigeria,34,125 noncombatants,xiv,4,12,25,44,46,47, 75,99–100 nondemocraticsocieties,7 nonprofitorganizations,160 nonurbanterrorism,xiii,3,33,35,36,37 nonviolence,terrorists,69 NorthAfrica,22,40–41,82,89,111,116 NorthAmerica,18,24,32,91,128,167 NorthCarolina,140 NorthKorea,124 NorthernIreland,xii–xiii,33,67,77,112, 116,124,125 nuclearweapons,51,52,57,88,152,172 O’Neil,Tip,61 obstacles,136–37 obstruction,126,130,146–47 OklahomaCity,39,79,93,162
252 INDEX
OldCity(Jerusalem),100,123,128,129 OlympicGames(2012),114 OlympicGames,63 Open cities,83,171 environment,133–34 society,12,13 space,124,147,150 OperationCrevice,86,116,141 OperationSWIFT,145–46 OperationVigilance,63 opinionpolls,48,53,54,60,63 OrthodoxJews,103 Orwell,George,147 OsloAccords,30 OvalStation,115 PIRA.SeeProvisionalIrishRepublican Army PKK.SeeKurdishWorkersParty PTSD.Seepost–traumaticstressdisorder PacificBasin,30 Pakistan,21,24,30,32,33,76,79,82, 84,86,87,88,91,92,116,124,140, 141,142 PalestinianLiberationOrganization,117 Palestinians,10,11,18,38,44,46,75,76, 82,103,106,124,140,141 panic,52,53,111,114 panopticdevices,126,127–28,133, 146–47 Paris,17,18–19,20,21,22–23,40–41,42, 43,50,51,53,63,69,71,73,75,77, 83,84,91,92,93,114,116,123,127, 128,143,145,152 patterns,117,153,172 peaceline,125 peacewall,124 pedestrians,133–35,136,138 penetration,99,105 Pennsylvania,106 Pentagon,11,53,96,108 perceptions,54,60–61,63 persistenceofattack,105 personalitychanges,57–58 Peru,33,68 Philippines,141 PiccadillyCircus,41 Pirenne,Henri,123 police,6–7,12–13,29,49,53,60,62,63, 67,85,92,104,106,110,115,130–31, 138,141–43,146,148,149,163,164
political base,68 movements,45 organizations,45–46 terrorism,89–90 politics,151 abusesfrom,146 capitaland,153 CBRNand,51 citiesand,16,17,95,165,174 conservativesand,45 fearand,44 government,165 hotbuttonissuesand,44 manipulationby,44,60–61 megaattacksand,79 militaryforceand,61 organizationsand,45 repressionand,151 securityand,165 socialdemocratsand,45 surveillanceand,143–44 targetsand,15 terrorismand,4,22,15,39,44,47, 49–50,51,57,58–63,68–69,77, 79,106,146,162 pollution,cities,150 population,163 citiesand,15,16,17,20,24,32,42,49, 57,60,109,153 densityof,31,92 dispersalof,149–50 diversityof,88 protectionof,146–47 resilienceof,50 terrorismand,28,29,32,38,50,57,60, 76,86,87–88,92,96,98,99,100, 103,104,116,127,132,146–47 urbanareasand,31 vulnerabilityof,41–42 porkbarrelfunding,165 PortaVenezia,85 ports,88 post–traumaticstressdisorder,xv,57–58 poverty,16,31,32,42,76–77,125 power,17,50,52,68–69 PradoMuseum,27 preemption,140,141,147 pricklyspaces,136–38 Pristina,17,18,19 privacy,125,130,143,144 propaganda9–10,46,90
INDEX 253
property,75,77,79,82,111,131 propiskasystem,131 protection,123,125–26,160,164,173 Protestants,19,124,125 ProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy,111, 112 proximity,48,54–56,98,99,104,112, 172 psychology,xv,12,53,154 public opinion,48,57,58,60,62,116,144, 147,148–49,163 policy,xvi,54 protection,165 safety,126–27,162–63 spaces,144,149 Putin,Vladimir,61 Quebec,123 Rabei,Ahmed,85,92,93 racism,88,89 radicalism,45,84,90,105,111,112,113, 116,117,140,145 Ramallah,103 Rand-MemorialInstituteforthePrevention ofTerrorism(Rand-MIPT),xiii,xiv rationalactors,38 rationalization,xii,48 reactions,165–66,167,173 realestate,161–62 reconnoiters,105 reconstitutedenvironments,91 reconstruction,160 recovery,152,159,167 recruitment,9,38,45,76,77,85,86,90, 91,92,93,105,116,173 RedArmyFaction,67,128 RedBrigades,45–46,67,77 RedCross,104 refrigeratorbombing,102 regeneration,152 Regent’sPark,112 Reid,Richard,88,116 reignofterror,6 religion,15,16,18,19,45,67,68,69–74, 75–76,77–79,82–83,84,85,87 terrorismand,xv,10,12,15,22,24,25, 41,51,73,75,77,84,89,90,93, 98,104,117,153 rememberedlandscapes,94
repetitiveattacks,98,99,100–4,112–16, 117,118–19 repression,144–45,148,151 repressivestate,144–45,146 RepublicanNationalConvention(2004), 106 resilience,152–53,156,159,165,173–74 citiesand,xv,xvi,24,63,151–67 definitionof,151 responses,166,174 Ressam,Ahmed,116 restorationofvalues,150 Reuters,44 revolutionaries,29,30,67–69,75 RevolutionaryArmedForce(FARC),67, 68 RevolutionaryOffensiveCells,67 RevolutionaryOrganizationof17 November,77 RevolutionaryPeople’sLiberationFront, 30 Rice,Condoleeza,44–45 ricin,51 rightists,67,72,151 ringofsteel,112,130–31,136,154 ringsofconcreteandsteel,136 RiodeJaneiro,16,17–18 RishonLeZion,46 riskfactors,163 Riyadh,xii,7,20,69,71,73–75,76–77 RomanCatholics,19,124,125 Rome,21,22,63,69,71,73,77 Rotterdam,83 RoubaixGang,84 RoyalOperaHouse,161 RussellSquare,114 Russia,13,19,24,33,38,47,48,61,68, 79,82,141 SWIFT.SeeSocietyforWorldwideInter BankFinancialTelecommunications Sacramento,163,164 safeareas,95–96 safehouses,15,41,84,92,93,99,104 safety,149,145,163–62 Sageman,Marc,90 SalafistIslam,84 SanFrancisco,62,160,161 SaoPaulo,42,125 Sarajevo,17–18,19,41 sarinnervegas,39,51,75,96 SaudiArabia,xiii,33,77,79,124,141
254 INDEX
Savannah,123 scale,urbanterror,77 scope, terrorism,171 urbanterrorism,xv,31–34,43 Scotland,114 Scott,Ridley,148 seamline,101,105 secondcities,21–22 sectarianism,22 secular,xv,22,19,30,67,69–74,75,76, 77,93,116,117 security,12,13,16,31,40,40,53,54,57, 58,59,60,62–63,67,84,95–96,98, 100,103,104,111,112–13,123–24, 149 attacks,165–66 barriers,guardsandpolicepatrols, 130–31,132 behaviordetection,129 cities,160,163,164,165–66 civilians,144,173 economy,162 environments,131–32 fortressconstruction,permanent partitions,fences,gatesandsolid walls,131,133 fundingfor,163,165 homeland,163–65 intelligence,127,145–46 obstruction,130 panopticdevices,127–28 police,141–42 politics,165 population,132,163 privacy,143 propskasystem,131 public,172 smartcards,130 space,132 surveillance,144 territory,127 terrorism,126–27,139–40,144,163, 165–66 threat,162–63 urbanareas,163–65 urbanenvironment,128–29 walls,133 segregation,125 Seine-St.Denis,172 senseofcommunity,127 Seoul,158
separation,124–25 separatists,70,71 September11event,xi,xii,25,43,56,62, 112,146 accomplicesand,88,116 attackers,12,89,92,93,99,108–9 attempttojustify,151 casualtiesfrom,26–27,37,43,106–7, 110 catalyticterrorism,27,43,171 costof,82 descriptionof,xv,26–27,43,108, 109–10,171 devastation,151,157 dystopia,xvi,148–51,166 economicruptureand,40 economyand,157 emotionalimpactfrom,53–54,148–49, 151 extremecase,171 fearsafter,54,166 fundingof,108 impactof,154–56 layoutofWTC,109–10 mediaand,48,148–49 megaeventas,24,26–27,43,79,93, 106–11 megaterrorism,171 newera,148 opinionpolls,54 panicand,11,50 planningfor,13,88–89 politics,151 post–,11–12,13,18,34,52,57,106, 128,131,134,136,145,149,154, 156,157,158–59,160,161,163, 165 pre–,32,39,87,105,134,138,156 proximityto,54–46 publicattitudesfrom,53–54 reactionsto,144–45 reasonsfor,41 resiliency,166 responsesto,58–60,148,149–51 smartterror,43,153,171 targets,110 uniquenessof,43 urbanterrorismas,27,28,108–9 victimsof,110–11 Serbs,19,41 serialattacks,117–18 settlements,42,123,150
INDEX 255
severity,attacks,xv,22,25,37,38,43, 117,152,166,171 Shaban,Anwar,85 ShamilBasayevGang,67 Shanghai,17–18,42 Sharif,OmarKhan,116 Sharm-al-Sheikh,40,46,79 Shepherd’sBush,15 Shetreet,Uri,139–40 ShinBet,141 ShiningPath,68 Shinrikyo,Aum,68,75,76,110 shock,7,9,36,49,98,104,108,152,166 shrinkageofspace,133–39,147,151,173 shriveledspaces,134–35 similarities,attacks,118–19 Singapore,7,13,17,18–19,130,141,142 singleattributecities,16 1600PennsylvaniaAvenue,137–38,139 sleepercells,19,90 Slovakia,60 smallpox,52 smartbomb,171 smartcards,130 smartterror,9,11,12,18,25,27,38,43, 47,50,51,76,96,98,108,112,116, 117,153,156,171 smuggling,140 socialbonds,89–91 socialclasses,32 socialcoherence,152 socialdemocrats,45 socialdistance,54–56 socialfabric,159,174 socialorder,160 socialrelations,134,147 socialservices,68,140–41 socialwelfare,45 socialism,158 societies,124,160 cities,173–74 closed,13 coherence,152 democracy,95 free,7,13,151 industryand,12 intimidationof,63 just,172 liberal,95 nondemocratic,7 open,12,13 post–industrial,12
societies(continued) powerof,12 segregation,125 surveillance,143 tension,125–26 terrorismand,7,12,24,42,49–50,90, 91 tightlycoupled,49 tolerance,42 urban,11,152 SocietyforWorldwideInterBank FinancialTelecommunications, 140 softspots,98 softtargets,5,38 SouthAfrica,68–69,125 SouthAmerica,42,69,106,140 SouthAsia,32,83 SouthKorea,124 SoutheastAsia,17,19,42 SovietUnion,45,57,82 space, attacks,79 cities,95,132–34,147 defensible,132 definitionof,15 forbidden,147 hostile,137–39 makingof,94 masteryover,94 movementacross,95 open,147,150,172 prickly,136–38 productionof,94 public,144,149,172 security,132 shrinkageof,133–39,147 strategic,172,173 surveillance,126,134,137–38,147 terrorismand,xii,xv,15,79,95,98, 137–38 urban,151 Spain,11,18,21,22,27,29,33,41,60, 61,62,79,82,85,92,128,140,145, 161 Spatero,Armando,85,92 sporadicattacks,153,173 squattersettlements,42 Srinegar,17,18,56,69,71,145 St.Louis,123 St.MaryAxe,112 stabilization,160
256 INDEX
states, citiesversus,165 priorities,165 repressive,144–45,146 urbanterrorism,5–6,7,32,39,82 StatueofLiberty,88,128 strategicsites,urbanterrorism,98 strategicspace,172,173 strategy,urbanterrorism,49,68 streetlife,147 stress,54–56,58–60,172 strikes,pattern,172 strikingdistances,83 suburbs,17,57,83,84,149,151 suicidebombers,4,9,10,11,30,38,39, 40,46,47,52,53,61,68,75,76–77, 86,87,93,96,98,100,102,105,128, 131,141,142,171 Sullivan,Louise,158 SunBelt,49 sunsetclauses,160–61 supervision,125–26 support,terrorism,99,172–73 surveillance,xv–xvi,63,125–33,139, 146–47,160 aggressive,144 attacks,142,144 buildings,128 bureaucracy,143–44 CCTV,144 cities,129–31,132–33,135,142,143, 146 civilians,143 creep,143 democracy,147 detection,143 environment,133,134 fear,143 gates,136–38 government,143 growthof,151 increasein,144 informationgathering,140 interdiction,141–42,145–46 largescale,130,145 media,144,145 mentalityof,143 neighborhoods,134,146 panoptic,133 police,143 politics,143–44 predictability,135
surveillance(continued) preemption,140,147 privacyissues,130,144 publicopinion,144 society,143 space,132–34,137–38,146 surge,143 technology,142–44 terrorism,132–33,136–38,139–46,147, 166,173 trafficcontrol,130 transportation,142 urbanenvironment,133 urbanvitalityand,133–34 vulnerability,142–44 walls,146 switchingstations,15–16 Sydney,42 symbols,terrorismand,9,12,15,16,88, 98,112,118,148–49 synagogues,30,82 synchronizedattacks,111,114 synchronizedresponses,166 Syria,68,82,108 systematicterrorism,105 TRIA.SeeTerrorismRiskInsuranceAct tactics assassinations,75 decontrollingspace,95–119 defense,119 destruction,93 explosions,84 kidnapping,10,12,68,75,77,99,128, 140 kidnappings,128,140 martyrdom,76–77 objectives,96 penetration,98 shootings,96 strategyand,49 success,117 suicidebombers,61,68,75,76–77,93, 141,142 technology,110,119 terrorism,10,12,14,49,50,68,77,96, 117,119 torture,9 transfer,119 urbanterrorism,7,36,49 Taliban,69 TamilTigers,10
INDEX 257
Tanweer,Shehzad,86,87 Tanzania,47 targetproneness,18–20 targets,103–104,112 abortionclinics,76 accessibility,119 asymmetricalreaction,166 buildings,13,15,26–27,29,38–39,51, 58–60,82,88,91,109–10,111, 112,126–27,131,136,137,138, 142,153,156,157,158–59,166–67 businesses,100,106,117,154 catalyticterrorism,9,11 centralbusinessdistrict,113–14,117, 153,172 cities,xii,xiv,7–8,12,21,32–33,38–39, 43,57,82,83,139,163–64,165 civilians,75,82,154,156 commercialcenters,117 concentrated,39–40 culture,38–39,82,109,153 deadzones,15 density,39 ethnic,98 factories,88,131 financialcenters,11,15,25,39,98, 100,103,109,111,112,117,128, 130–31,154 firstcities,21–22 foreigners,82 globalcities,15–21,72 government,39,79,100,111,112,117 highvalue,11,39–40 historic,39,112 industry,88 infrastructure,11,13,15,25,38–39,79, 86,142 internationalconflictand,39 internationalroleof,18–19 limitless,165 major,117 majorcities,15–21 markets,15,100,102–3,131,154,156, 157,158 mass,38 mediacenters,39 megacities,15–21,72 megaterror,9,10,11 military,106 multiethnic,39 nationalist,98 natureof,105
targets(continued) neighborhoods,39,113 noncombatants,47,99–100 patterns,117 penetration,105 politics,15 populations,50,100 ports,88 property,79,82 proximityto,99 psychologyof,12 rationalityof,21 reasonsfor,12 religion,15,98 safehousesand,15 seamline,101 secondcities,21–22 selectionof,21 smartterror,9,11,18 socialgroups,4 soft,5,38 strategicvalueof,15 symbolic,88,98 terrorismand,xiv,4,6,12,14–15,30, 32,42,39–40,75,82,86,88,101, 106–7,114,115,138,142 tourism,38–39,82,109,111,117,153 transportation,13,15,38–39,58–60,79, 82,98,100,109–10,111,112,114, 115–16,128–29,142,165,171 typesof,38–39,43 vulnerability,25,42,142–44,147, 158–59 Westerners,82 targetsofcalculation,96–97 targetsofopportunity,96,103 TavistockSquare,114 TawhidWalJihad,46 technology,xvi,93,95,110,119,126–30, 133 cities,150 surveillance,142–44,173 terrorism,128–29,140,141,143,148, 149,163 TelAviv,xii–xiii,7,13,17–18,21,24, 69,71,73–75,77,86,99,100,116, 141–42,145 10DowningStreet territories boundaries,94–95 cities,95,172 controlof,19,94,95
258 INDEX
territories(continued) decontrolling,7,19,63,95–119,152 definitionof,15 disputesover,18,24 securityand,127 terrorismand,xii,15,19,24,41,52,108, 116,127,171 urbanterrorism,105 terror-inducedpost–traumaticstress disorder,58 TerrorismActof2006,145 TerrorismRiskInsuranceAct(2002),161 terrorism,125 accessibility,103,119 adaptationof,13,34,84,96 advancedtechnologicaldetection,128 aggressivenessof,45–46 anarchistic,xv,10,69,69–72,78–79, 93,117 angerand,58–60 animatedpresenceofcitizensandstreet watchers,126–27 anonymityof,15,41,83,90,93,98,172 anti-,124,141,146 anxietyand,xv,4,56,58–60,61,63, 159,172 apocalyptic,68,90 applicationof,44–46 armedfactions,45,46 assimilation,85 asymmetrical,42,166,167 attacksand,xv,3,4,11,13,14,19–20, 25,27,28,37,40–41,42,45,48, 50,51,52,54–56,58,60,62,63, 69,72–74,75,77,79,82–83,86, 90,91,93,96,98,101,102,103–4, 105,107–11,112–13,114,117–18, 124,128,130–31,132,133,135, 140,141,142,144,145,146,148, 149,151,152,153,154,156,158–59, 160,161,166,171,173,174 attacks,concentrated,112–16 attacks,repetitive,112–16 attitudestowards,58–60 attractionsof,32 authoritarianismand,68 banalityof,174 barriersand,126,131,132 basefor,79–80 behaviorof,xii,69,119,128 beliefsystemof,68 blamefor,42,44
terrorism(continued) bombsand,111,112,137,141,144,152 boundariesof,94 broadscopeof,171 buildingsand,13,15,29,38–39,49,51, 109–10,126–27,129,137,138, 142,153,156,157–58,166–67 bunchofguysand,89 bureaucracyand,61,62,63,143,144, 146 businessesand,28,40,79,85,100,106, 108–9,117,154,156,160 capacityof,52 capitalismand,11,49,105 casualtiesand,xiii,xv,3,12,14,19–20, 22,25,26–27,29–30,33,36,39, 40,46,47,52,56–57,72–74,75, 77–79,96,98,101–2,106–7,110, 111,112,113,115,117,118,131, 153,156,157,171,172 catalytic,9,11,12,18,27,38–39,43,47, 50,51,72,96,108,112,116,117, 171,173 causesof,7–8,32 CBRNin,51–52,63,96,138,161 cells,83,84,85,90,91,93,99,108,111, 127,140,141,172–73 centralbusinessdistrictsand,107, 108–9,113–14,117,153,172 characteristicsof,58–60,68 charitiesand,140 Christiansand,46 cities,129–31,132–35,136–38,139, 142,148,149,152–53,154–56, 163–64,167,171,172,173,174 citiesand,xii,xv–xvi,3,7,9,11–12,14, 15,18–22,26–28,30,32,38–43, 49,50–51,52,53,54,57,60,63, 69,72–74,76,82,83–85,87–88, 91,92,93,95–96,98,99–110,112, 117 citizenshipand,145 cityhauntsof,xv,83–93,172 civillibertiesand,58–60,172 civilsocietyand,51 civilwarsand,85 civiliansand,4,47,49–50,61,63,79, 82,98,105,126,128,144,146, 148,154,171–72 classificationof,44–45 closedsocietiesand,13 clusteringand,91–92,93,98,108–9,132
INDEX 259
terrorism(continued) collaborationof,91–92 colonialismand,67 commercialassetsof,38–39,43,117 communicationand,93 communitiesof,83–93 complexitiesof,25 concentratedattacksof,118–19 concentratedtargetsof,39–40,117 continued,56,153 coordinationand,93,105 corefeaturesof,5 costof,161 counter,13,79,141–42,144–45,150 crossroadsof,87 cultural,27,38–39,47,82,90,109, 140–41,153 cybernodesand,93 cyclical,35–36,111,116,153,154 deadzonesof,15 declinein,34,35,36,77–79,102,124, 132,146,154–56 decontrollingterritoryand,7,63, 95–119,152,172 definitionof,xii,xiv–xv,xvi,25,45–47, 67,96 democraciesand,xvi,4,7,12,15,60, 85,133,144–45,146,147 demoralizationand,9,95 densityand,39 deportation,145 depressionand,54–56 descriptionsof,xv,3–4,47 descriptiveterms,44–45,63,172 destructionfrom,11–12,14,49,50–51, 52,68,77,93,95–96,105–6,131 detectionof,99 deterrencefrom,52,126 developednationsand,24 disruptionfrom,115 distinctionsof,3–5,83–84 domestic,xiii,21,72,82,86 drugsand,39,140 dynamitards,10 ecologiesof,41 economyand,11,12,15,24,25,32, 39–40,42,50,96,111,112,140, 152,153,154 effectsof,32,50,152 efficiencyof,43,104,119,171 emotionsand,54–56 employment,153,154,166–67
terrorism(continued) entrepreneur,83 environmentsof,34,49,76,91,108, 113–14,126,127,131,132,133, 134,137–38,139,171–72 ethnicityof,41,58–60,83,88,98 evolutionof,xv,96 experiencewith,48–49,58 explanationfor,76–77 factories,131 fearcreatedby,xiv–xv,4,9,11–12, 13,36,42,44,47–48,50,51,53, 58–63,171,172 financialcentersand,11,27,29,30,39, 40,51,98,100,103,109,111,112, 117,128,130–31,154 financingof,4,60,92,108,140,141, 144 firstcitiesand,21–22,171 forceand,147 foreignbased,27,34,61,82,84,106, 108,112,173 foreignnationalsand,79–80,82,89 formsof,34,67 fortressconstruction,permanent partitions,fences,gatesandsolid walls,131–32 fourthwave,79–83,105–6,112 freesocietiesand,7,13 freespeechand,87,145 freedomfightersand,xii,3–4,45,46 frequencyof,12,35–37,56,57,73,99, 100–2,105,117,152,153,171,173 frictionof,51,172 fundamentalconditions,153 future,148 gangs,41,84 geographyand,xv,63,51–52,86 globalcitiesand,13,15–21,38–43,72, 92,106,110,112,142,147 globalnodesand,92,93 globalizationand,39–40,42,93 glorificationof,145 goalsof,68 governmentand,xiv,6,27,39,40,50, 52,54,58–60,62,63,69,79,92, 100,111,112,117,128,143,146, 149,153,154,162,163,167 groupsof,6–7,8,14 handlers,105 helplessnessengenderedby,62 highdensity,109
260 INDEX
terrorism(continued) highfrequency,104 highimpact,96 highvaluecities,38–39,43 highvaluetargets,11,39–40 historicalsitesand,39,40 historicaltrendsof,28,29,52,56, 67–68,93,105–6,151 homegrown,10,19,29,91,93,106, 112–13,116,173 homelandsecurity,163 hostilityof,49 hotbuttonissuesand,44 hotspotsand,xii,142 housing,83,86,96,99,132,148,159, 160 identitiesof,xv,69,70–72,82 ideologyof,12,44,67,68,69–72,83, 84,105 immigrationand,18–19,29,39,53,76, 79,82,83,84,85,86,92,113,116, 142,146 impactof,96 incarcerationsand,145 incidents,xv,3,33,19–20,34,35–36, 96,100,107–8,113,117 increasein,32–33,38,78–79,102, 104–5,154–56 independencemovementsand,22 indiscriminate,47 industriesand,11,84,91,114,148 inevitabilityof,60 infrastructureand,11,13,15,25,27, 38–39,62,63,79,86,92,93,142, 143,171 insecurityfrom,51,143 inspirationfor,67,78 insurancefor,160–62,167 insurgentsand,61 intelligencegatheringand,90,98,104–5, 112,127,141–42,145–46,147 intensityof,102 interdictionand,141–42,147 intergovernmental,163 internationalalarmand,41 internationalcharacterof,82 internationalconflictand,39 internationaldisputesand,41 internationalenvironmentand,40–41 internationalinterdependenceand,39–40 internationallinkageof,93 internationalmessageof,42
terrorism(continued) internationalnetworkand,39–40 internationalprofileand,40–41 internationalroleand,xiii,12,13–14, 15–16,18–19,21,22,29,38–39, 43,61,72,82,90,91,93,99,113, 141–42,171,173 Internetand,60 intimidation,xiv,4,10,25,47–48,63, 96,171 isolationof,34 jihadists,3–4,13,86,87,90 justificationfor,61–62,76 kidnappingand,xiv,4,10,12,47,51,68, 75,77,85,96,99,128–40 lateral,41 leftist,29,61,77,85 legacyof,72 legitimacy,42,69 lethalityof,37–38,51,79,93,171 liberalismand,133 linkagesof,82 localgovernmentand,162–63 local,82,173 locationsfor,119 logisticsand,xii,9–11,15,63,91, 105,106–7,108–9,116,128,141, 172–73 low-impact,105 majorcitiesand,15–21,38–43,50,69 manipulationby,44,60–61 marketsand,15,29–30,46,100,102–3, 131,154,156,157,158,159 martyrs,3–4,11–12,76–77 Marxist-Leninist,67 massviolence,14,46,53,82–83,96–96, 108–11 mediaand,xi,xiv,3–4,9,14,15,18, 27,30,34,39,41,42,45–46,48, 50,51,53,57,58,63,87,104,105, 106,140,141,144,145,146,171, 172 mega,9,10,11,12,26–27,38,43,47, 50,76,77,79,93,96,108,114, 115,116,117,153,156 megaattacks,30,79,82,87,93,100, 106,114,115,116,117,171,172, 173 megacitiesand,15–16,38–43,72,147 methodsof,100 migrationof,67 militantsand,3–4,45,48,89–90
INDEX 261
terrorism(continued) militaryand,4,5,22,61,79,106,131,152 modern,22 monitoringof,60 multiethnic,88 nationalistsand,19,22,29,61,67,77, 86,90,98,117 neighborhoods,39,83,84,88,89,90, 98,99,101,104,113,116,117, 127,131,141,142,146,154,172 neofascistsand,67 networks,85,91–92,93,119,128 noncombatantsand,xiv,4,12,25,44, 46,47,75,99–100 nondemocraticsocietiesand,7 nonstatemovementand,6,7 nonurban,xiii,3,33,35 nonviolent,69 objectivesof,4,52,95–96,173 opencitiesand,83,171 opensocietiesand,12,13 operatives,105 organizationof,25,103,119 overreactionfrom,145 overstatementof,62 panicand,11,52,111,114 panopticdevicesand,127–28 parallelsto,117 paralysisfrom,102,117,172 partitioningand,131 patternsof,30,117,153,172 payoffof,36 penetrationof,98,105,108 perceptionsof,xv–xvi,48–49,54, 58–60,61 persistenceof,105 personalexperienceand,54–56 personalitychangesfrom,57–58 placeand,91 planningof,96–97,128,140,141,142 plots,106–7 policeand,29,49,53,60,62,63,85,92, 104,106,110,115,130–31,138, 141–42,143,146,163 politicalattitudesof,58–60,89–90 politicalbaseof,68 politicsand,xii–xiii,4,22,25,39,44, 47,49–50,51,57,58–63,68–69, 77,79,106,143–44,146 populationand,20,24,28,29,42,50, 60,86–88,92,96,99,100,103, 104,109,116,127,132
terrorism(continued) povertyand,42,76–77 powerof,11–12,50,68–69 preemptionof,140 prevalenceof,96 privacyand,130 propagandaand,9–10,90 propertyand,75,77,79,82,131 proteanforceof,67 proximityto,48,54–56,98,99,104, 112,172 psychologicalimpactand,xiv,53,54, 154 publicopinionpollsand,53,54,63,116 publicpoliciesand,14,54 publicspectacle,9 racist,68,88 radicalizationof,84,90,116,117 randomnatureof,96 rationalizationof,xii,38,48 reactionto,14,48,56–57,165–67,173 reconnoitersand,105 recoveryfrom,152,154–56 recruitmentand,38,45,76,77,85,86, 87,90,91,92,93,105,116,173 religionand,xv,9,10,12,22,24,25,41, 51,67,68,69–72,73,76,77–79, 82–83,84,87,89,90,93,98,104, 117,153 renunciationof,77–78 repeatedattacksand,98,100–1,117, 118–19 repressionof,144–45,146 resilienceto,xv–xvi,152–54 responseto,xii–xiii,xv–xvi,13,62,63, 79,145,148,154,166,174 revolutionariesand,29,67,68–69 rightistsand,67 rogue,53 safeareasof,63,95–96 safehousesof,15,41,84,92,93,99,104 secondcitiesand,21–22 secular,xv,22,67,69–72,75,76,77–78, 93,116,117 securityfrom,12,13,40,50,53,57, 58,59,60,62–63,67,98,100, 103,104,111,128–30,131,132, 139–40,144,163,165–66,172 security,barriers,guardsandpolice patrols,130–31 security,funding,163 serialattacksand,117–18
262 INDEX
terrorism(continued) severityofattackand,22,23–25,36,38, 117,152,171 shockachievedby,7,25,36,49,108,152 similaritiesof,47,68,118–19 sleepercellsand,19 smart,9,11,12,18,27,38,43,47,50, 51,76,96,98,108,112,116,117, 153,156,171 smuggling,140 socialbondsof,x,4,5,45,89–91,134 societiesand,7,12,24,42,49–50,63, 90,91,160 softtargets,5 sourcesof,112 spaceand,xii,xv,15,98,132,133–35, 137–39,144,173 spokesmen,105 sporadic,153,173 squattersettlementsand,42 strategyof,xv,15,49,68 stressfrom,54–56,58–60,63,172 strikingdistancesand,83 successof,13,47,98,117,165–66 suicidebombersand,4,9,10,11,38,39, 40,47,52,61,75,76–77,86,87, 93,96,98,100,102,103,105,128, 131,141,142,171 supportof,91,92,99,172–73 surveillanceof,xv–xvi,63,126,127–28, 129–30,132,133,134,135, 136–38,139–46,166,173 symbolsand,9,12,98,112,118,148–49 synchronizedattacksof,114 systematic,105 tacticsof,xv,9,14,25,49,50,68,77, 84,95,96,99,110,117,119,140 targetsof,xiv,3,4,5,6,11,12,13–15, 24–25,26–27,30,38–40,42,43, 51,52,53,54,60,62,63,75,82, 83,86,88,96,99,100,101,103–4, 105,106–7,112,114,115,117, 119,130–31,136,137,138,139, 142,154,156,157,158–59 targetsofcalculation,96 targetsofopportunity,96,103 technologyand,93,100,119,126, 127–30,133,140,141–44,148, 149,163,173 tensionsfrom,147 territoryand,xii,15,19,24,41,52,63, 75,94,108,116,152,171,172
terrorism(continued) threatsand,11,12,13,15,24,25,52,53, 54,60,62,63,107,131,142,167 tourists,12,26–27,29–30,38–39,40, 46,49,79,82,88,103,109,117, 131,138,153,156,166–67 training,90,91,92,173 transportationand,xiv,13,15,27,28, 29,30,38–39,41,46,47,49,50, 53,58–60,63,75,79,82,95–96, 98,100,106,109,111,112,114, 115–16,128–29,142,164,171 transporters,105 traumafrom,14,56,58–60,173–74 travelby,92–93,99,105,116 uncertaintycreatedby,12,52 underground,85 undevelopednationsand,24 unemploymentand,84,86,87–88 urbanand,xv,xvi,3,11,13,14–15,33, 35,49–51,53,58–60,62,63,83, 85,92,113–14 urbanenvironmentand,128–29 urbanlandscapeand,126 urbansettingand,126 urbanshrinkageand,126 urbanspaceand,134–36 variablesof,154–56 varietyof,67 victimsof,14,25,26–27,36–38,44, 57–58,63,73,100–2,104,110, 115,160–62 violencefrom,xi,xiv,5–7,14,22–23, 25,29,41,45,56,68,69,73,75, 82–83,84,85,111,112,124, 140–41,152,156,166,167,171 vulnerability,xv,4,9,12,40,41–42,112, 113,132,142–44,147,153,173 waging,88 walls,123–24,131 warfareand,4,5,7,18,24,25,34,41, 42,44,45,47,51,52,61,63,67, 68,84,95,149,163,164 wavesof,35–36,67,100,145,152–53, 159,171 weakforceand,12 weaponsof,xv,6,10,12,26,39,47,50, 51,52,53,63,82,84,86,87,88,91, 92,95–96,98–100,102,104,105, 106,108–9,110,114,115,116,118, 126,128,129,131,132,134,137, 138,141,144,152,161,172
INDEX 263
terrorism(continued) Westerninterventionand,61,76–77,82, 88,99 widespread,171 womenand,46,47,76,98,103 terroristorganizations,xv,4,6,69–72, 75–76,103,116,140 AbuHafsalMasriBrigade,87 AbuSayyaf,141 alAsqaMartyrsBrigade,40,46,53,57, 105,117,124,131 alQaeda,4,6,10,12,18,30,38,46, 48,54,68,76,82,86–87,88–90, 91,93,96,98,99,105,106,111, 112–13,117,119,140,141,142 AlRashidTrust,140 alWafa,141 anarchist,69–74,78–79,93,105 AnarchistFaction,67 AqsaMartyr’sBrigade,140 ArmoftheLord,68 ArmedIslamicGroup,84,140 AumShinrikyo,68,75,76 BaaderMeinhof,68 BasqueFatherlandandFreedom,18,22, 29,61,69,75,77,128 Buddhist,75 charitable,140–41 Chechens,10,19,38,47 ChristianPatriots,68 Christians,75,76 criminalcartels,19 cults,71 DirectAction,xi,68 drugcartels,19,39 fascist,68,72,127 Hamas,10,30,44,45,46,68,69,96,98, 117,140,141 Hezbollah,5,6,29,45,68,69,96,119,140 hierarchyof,4,5,6,68 Hindu,70,71,75 HolyLandFoundation,141 identitiesof,69–72 ideologyof,69–72,82–83,84 Iraq,38 IrishRepublicanArmy,29,38,45–46, 67,69,75,77,99,111,112,154 Islamicfundamentalists,18,19,28–29, 30,34,40,46,52,68,69,70,71, 72,73–75,77,78,82–83,84,87, 89,90,91,93,106,112,116,117, 140,145
terroristorganizations(continued) IslamicReliefOrganization,141 Israeli,75 Ja’ishMuhammad,30,140 JemaaIslamiya,46,140 Jewish,70,75 KurdishWorkersParty,29–30 Lashkar-eTaiba,30,46 leaderlessresistance,68 leftist,68,69,70,71,72,75,77,85 Maruseido,75 Marxist-Leninist,72,75 MuslimBrotherhood,140 NationalUnity,68 nationalist,44,69–72,75,77,82,117 neofascists,75 networks,91–93 PalestinianLiberationOrganization,117 Palestinians,18,38,44,46,47 ProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy,111, 112 radicals,105 RedArmyFaction,67,128 RedBrigade,45–46,67,77 religious,69–74,75,76,82–83,85,87, 92 revolutionaries,75 RevolutionaryArmedForce,67 RevolutionaryOffensiveCells,67 RevolutionaryOrganizationof17 November,77 RevolutionaryPeople’sLiberationFront, 30 rightists,72 RoubaixGang,84 SalafistIslam,84 secular,30,69–74,75,76,93 separatists,70,71 ShamilBasayevGang,67 ShiningPath,68 socialservices,68,140–41 structureof,67–68 TamilTigers,10 TawhidWalJihad,46 TurkishHezbollah,30,99,118 UlsterLoyalists,75 UnitedStates,75 TheCity,112,113–14,130–31,153 ThirdReich,69 threats,12,13,15,24,25,52,53,54,60, 61,63,107 attacks,172
264 INDEX
terroristorganizations(continued) cities,163–64 overreaction,145 securityand,162–63 terrorism,131,142,167,172 tightlycoupledsociety,49 timeandplace,165 timeofrecovery,159 TimesSquare,107,142 Tobago,106 Tokyo,17,21,39,41,51,69,71,75,79, 96,142,152 tolerance,42,60,93 Toronto,91,141–42,158 TorontoSeventeen,91 tourism, attackson,29–30,38–39,40,103,123, 156,159 casualtiesand,40 citiesand,12,40,138 mutationsof,96 resilienceand,156 targetsand,82,109,111,117,153 terrorismand,12,26–27,39,40,46,49, 79,88,103,109,117,131,138, 153,166–67 trainingcamps,90,91,92 transnationallinkages,82 transportation,111,160 attacks,114,115–16,128,171 cities,38–39,95,142,172 population,57 surveillance,142 targets,39,58–60,79,82,96,98,100, 111,112,114,115–16128–29,142, 165,171 terrorismand,xiv,13,15,27,28,29, 30,39,41,47,49,50,52,53, 58–60,63,79,82,75,95–96,100, 106,109,111,112,114,115–16, 128–29,142,164,171 transporters,105 trauma,14,56,58–60,173–74 travel,92–93,99,105,116 trends,32,160 Trinidad,106 trophybuildings,158 Trump,Donald,158 Tunisia,82 Turin,85 Turkey,xiii,19,24,33,79,82,117–18, 124
TurkishHezbollah,30,99,118 TwinTowers.SeeWorldTradeCenter UAB.SeeUrbanAffairsReview UASI.SeeUrbanAreasSecurityInitiative U.S.AgencyforInternational Development,31 U.S.CapitolBuilding,108 U.S.Congress,146 U.S.DepartmentofDefense,xiv,141 U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity, 62,141,163 U.S.DepartmentofJustice,146 U.S.DepartmentofState,xiv,44 U.S.DepartmentofUrbanPlanning,108 U.S.PatriotAct,146,163 U.S.TreasuryDepartment,136,137,140 UlsterLoyalists,75 unemployment,84,86,87–88 UnitedKingdom,33,44,54–56,21,62, 79,82,87,90–91,116,125,126,145, 152,161 UnitedNations,16,29,106,107 UnitedStates,xiv,4,9,10,11,12,13, 29,32,33,40,41,42,44,47,49, 50,52,53–56,57,58,61–62,68, 75,79,82,83,90,91,92,112, 123,124,125,128,140,141,144, 145–146,148,152,160,161,162, 163,167 UrbanAffairsReview,145 UrbanAreasSecurityInitiative,163 urban areas,31,163–65 development,151 distinctiveness,citiesand,7–8 environment,128–29,133,171–72 environment,terrorismand,14–15,33, 49,50–51,53,83,92,113–14 fabric,83 facilities,58–60 form,149 future,148–49 hypertrophy,150 landscape,126 life,xv,11,13,31,49,50,53,60,62, 117,150,172 locations,69–72 neighborhoods,85 populations,146–47 setting,126 shrinkage,126
INDEX 265
urban(continued) society,63,152 space,xv,xvi,58–60,133–39,151,173 strategy,149 targets,57 urbanterrorism,108–9,167,171.Seealso terrorism analysisof,xii,83 anonymity,83 attacksand,xii–xiii,32,36,97,98,99, 100–4 beginningsof,xi boundariesof,xii brazen,130–31 camouflage,98 casualtiesfrom,32,36,37,43,99–100 catalytic,25 citiesand,3,7,9,15,83,95,152 concentrationof,99,100–4 connections,91 continuous,99–100 cooperation,105 cybernodes,93 definitionof,xii–xiii,xiv–xv,3–4, 11–12,25 destabilization,95 destructionby,12–13 distinctions,3–4 environment,19 escalationof,43 evolutionof,3–4 factoriesof,92 fearand,11–12,36 firststrikes,98 frequencyof,xv,34–36,43,99–102 geographyand,xv,32 historyof,28–29,32,43,88 hotspots,xii ideology,19 incidents,33,35 increase,32–33 intelligence,12–13 intensecycles,99 international,19 logistics,25 majorcities,83 mega,25 nationsand,xii neighborhoods,109–10 organizationsand,63 patternsof,99 penetration,99
urban(continued) percapita,99–100 politics,61 populations,32 prevalenceof,32 reasonsfor,119 repeatedattacks,98 repetition,99,100–4 resiliency,174 responseto,xii–xiii,12 scopeof,xv,31–34,43 severityof,xv,23,43 shockand,36,104 smallerscale,77 smart,25 space,95 sporadic,99 spreadof,32 states,32 strategicsites,98 strategicvalue,15 strategy,49,52 successof,98 surveillance,133–34 tacticaldefense,119 tacticaltransfer,119 tacticsof,7,36,49 technologyand,93 territory,25,105 trendstoward,xii,32 violenceand,7,19 vulnerabilityof,xv,12,173 warfareand,xv,xii,3,19,152 values,restorationof,150 variables,152–53 vibrancy,cities,139,147 victims, angerand,58–60 apprehension,58–60 attacks,115 behaviorof,63 civilians,47 fearby,58–60 helplessness,62 military,82 noncombatants,46,75,99–100 panic,58,114 personalitychanges,57–58 psychologyof,53 religiousterrorism,76 security,58
266 INDEX
victims(continued) terrorismand,14,25,26–27,36–38,44, 57–58,100–2,104,110,115,160–62 traumaand,14,58–60 women,116 violence,53,112,148–49,152 citiesand,3,21–22,171,174 collective,105 continuous,116 cyclical,111,154 fearof,57 groupterroristsversusstateterrorists, 6–7,8 historyof,75,151 indiscriminate,5–6,14 largescale,167 levelsof,29 mass,82–83 noncombatants,25,44 proximityto,48 radical,116 secular,77–78,116 shock,166 sustained,56 synchronized,111 terrorism,14,25,41,45,68,69,73,84, 85,111,112,124,140–41,156, 166,171 terroristorganizations,7,68,75 threatof,xiv,11–12 uniqueformsof,45 unrelenting,22–23 urbanterrorismand,7,19 vulnerability,xvi,3,9,12,25,40,41–42, 49,103,112,113,132,142–44,147, 148,153,158–59,160–61,163,173 WMDs.Seeweaponsofmassdestruction WTC.SeeWorldTradeCenter WallStreet,41,51,105,123,131,134 WallStreetJournal,150 walls,123–24,125–26,131,133,146–47 WaronPoverty,163 WaronTerror,44,61,149,163,164 war,xiv,3,30 agenda,163 terrorism,149,163,164 warfare, asymmetric,34,42 attacks,63 cities,49 conventional,4–5,152
warfare(continued) historyof,151 lateral,41 lowintensity,51,152 massdisruption,95–96 methodof,45 normsof,68 nuclear,57 publicspectacle,9 rulesof,47 terrorismand,4,7,18,24,25,45,47,61, 63,67,68,84,95 urbanterrorismand,xii,xv,19,152 WarrenStreetStation,115 warringfactions,124,146 Washington,DC,xvi,51,54–56,62,96, 108,136,142,163–64,165 WashingtonPost,44 wavesofterror,67,100,145,152,153, 159,171 weakforce,12 wealth,citiesand,31,32,88,125 weapons, airplanes,26,50,52,53,93,95–96, 108–9,114,116,171 ammoniumnitrate,86 anthrax,50,51,52,106 biological,52,126 bombs,13,29,86,92,95–96,102,111, 112,115,128,134,137,141,144, 152,171 CBRN,12,51,52,63,96,126,138,161, 172 chemical,51–52,84,88,95,96,110 choiceof,96 conventional,51 dirtybombs,51 explosives,10,40,46,51,53,82,84,87, 91,92,98–99,102,104,105,106, 109–10,114,115,116,118,129, 132 high-combustion,98 high-impact,96 hydrogencyanide,51 lethalityof,51 martyrdomand,11–12 massdestruction,12,52 nuclear,51,52,88,152,161,172 radioactive,51 ricin,51 sarinnervegas,39,51,96 shoebombs,88,116
INDEX 267
weapons,(continued) specialists,105 suicidebombers,30,38,40,52,53,68, 86,87,96,98,100,102,103,105, 114 supplyof,91,128,131,141,171 terrorismand,6,10,12,39,47,50,96, 97,108–9,115,134,141,171,172 transportation,46,52 weaponsofmassdestruction,xv,52 Weingarten,Gene,53 WestBank,38,98,132,133 WesternEurope,77,83–84,105,144,167 WesternSahara,124 Westerners,18,40,61,76,79,82,85,88, 93,99,104,173 WestminsterHall,111 WhiteHouse,137–38,139 Whitechapel,143 Williams,Anthony,163 Wirth,Louis,94,95 Wolfe,Tom,160
women,46,47,76,99–100,103,116 Women’sLiberationMovement,45–46 WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenter, 31,32 WorldFinancialCenter,109 worldofdarkness,148 WorldTradeCenter(1993event),28–29, 105,110,154–56,172 WorldTradeCenter,11,25,26–27,28,48, 53,56,96,98,105,106,108–10,114, 154,157,158,162 WorldWarII,88,152 WormwoodStreet,112 YehudaMehaneMarket,103 Yemen,91,124,140 Yokohama,21 YoungPioneers,45 Yousef,Ramzi,29,110 Zimbabwe,124 ZionSquare,102–3,131
AbouttheAuthor
H.V.SavitchistheBrownandWilliamsonDistinguishedResearchProfessorat theUniversityofLouisville.Hehaspublishedtenbooksandmonographs.His co-authoredworkwithPaulKantor,CitiesintheInternationalMarketplace,was namedBestBookintheurbanfieldbytheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation.ProfessorSavitchhasauthoredmorethanseventyscholarlyarticlesandhas receivednumerousawardsforteachingandscholarship.HehasbeenaFulbright Scholar(France),aLadyDavisFellow(Israel),andisaformerpresidentofthe UrbanPoliticsSection,AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation.Healsoservedas aconsultanttoformermayorofNewYorkCityDavidDinkins,theU.S.DepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment,theMayors’UrbanSummit,andthe OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment.